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SEC Enforcement Heuristics: An Empirical Inquiry
(Duke Law Journal, 2003)
This Article examines the overlap between SEC securities enforcement actions and private securities fraud class actions. We begin with an overview of data concerning all SEC enforcement actions from 1997 to 2002. We find ...
Whither the Race? A Comment on the Effects of the Delawarization of Corporate Reorganizations
(Vanderbilt Law Review, 2001)
Recent empirical work has demonstrated that large, publicly held firms tend to file for bankruptcy in Delaware. In our previous work, we have documented this trend, and argued that it may be efficient for prepackaged ...
Corporate Voting and the Takeover Debate
(Vanderbilt Law Review, 2005)
For many years academics have debated whether it is better to permit hostile acquirers to use tender offers to gain control over unwilling target companies, or to force them to use corporate elections of boards of directors ...
Letting Billions Slip Through Your Fingers: Empirical Evidence and Legal Implications of the Failure of Financial Institutions to Participate in Securities Class Action Settlements
(Stanford Law Review, 2005)
This article presents the results of an empirical investigation of the frequency with which financial institutions submit claims in settled securities class actions. We combine an empirical study of a large set of settlements ...
What is Corporate Law's Place in Promoting Societal Welfare?: An Essay in Honor of Professor William Klein
(Berkeley Business Law Journal, 2005)
This is a short essay on what should be the fundamental criterion used to evaluate corporate law. I argue that the overall goal of good corporate law should be to assist private parties to create wealth for themselves and ...
Corporate Voting and the Takeover Debate
(Vanderbilt Law Review, 2005)
For many years academics have debated whether it is better to permit hostile acquirers to use tender offers to gain control over unwilling target companies, or to force them to use corporate elections of boards of directors ...
Does Private Equity Create Wealth? The Effects of Private Equity and Derivatives on Corporate Governance
(University of Chicago Law Review, 2009)
Private equity has reaped large rewards in recent years. We claim that one major reason for this success is due to the corporate governance advantages of private equity over the public corporation. We argue that the ...
There are Plaintiffs and . . . There are Plaintiffs: An Empirical Analysis of Securities Class Action Settlements
(Vanderbilt Law Review, 2008)
In this paper, we examine the impact of the PSLRA and more particularly the impact the type of lead plaintiff on the size of settlements in securities fraud class actions. We thus provide insight into whether the type of ...
The Evolving Role of Institutional Investors in Corporate Governance and Corporate Litigation
(Vanderbilt Law Review, 2008)
Each of the articles in this Symposium sheds new light on the ever-changing role of institutional investors in U.S. corporate governance and corporate litigation. They cover a broad range of topics, including institutional ...
Does the Plaintiff Matter? An Empirical Analysis of Lead Plaintiffs in Securities Class Actions
(Columbia Law Review, 2006)
The PSLRA's lead plaintiff provision was adopted in order to encourage large shareholders with claims in a securities fraud class action to step forward to become the class' representative. Congress' expectation was that ...