This paper studies a bargaining model where n players play a sequence of (n-1) bilateral bargaining sessions. In each bilateral bargaining session, two players follow the same bargaining process as in Rubinstein's (1982). ...

Consider a multilateral bargaining problem where negotiation is conducted by a sequence of bilateral bargaining sessions. We are interested in an environment where bargaining protocols are determined endogenously. During ...

Treating games of incomplete information with countable sets of actions and types and finite but large player sets we demonstrate that for every mixed strategy profile there is a pure strategy profile that is 'epsilon-equivalent'. ...

We explore the potential for correlated equilibrium to capture conformity to norms and the coordination of behavior within social groups. Given a partition of players into social groups we propose properties that one may ...

Abstract: We develop a strategic model of network interdiction in a non-cooperative game of flow. A security agency operates a network with arc capacities. An adversary, endowed with a bounded quantity of bads, chooses a ...

This paper shows how distance may be used to coordinate on a unique equilibrium in which trade agreements are regional. Trade agreement formation is modeled as coalition formation. In a standard trade model with no distance ...

We make four main contributions to the theory of network formation. (1) The problem of network formation with farsighted agents can be formulated as an abstract network formation game. (2) In any farsighted network formation ...

Modeling club structures as bipartite networks, we formulate the problem of club formation as a game of network formation and identify those club networks that are stable if agents behave farsightedly in choosing their ...

We introduce a subsidized Vickrey auction for cost sharing problems. Although the average, marginal, and serial cost sharing mechanisms are budget-balanced, they are not allocatively efficient and they do not induce players ...

The players behave quite differently in the negotiation model under different time preferences than under common time preferences. Conventional analysis in this literature relies on the key presumption that all continuation ...