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On Equilibrium in Pure Strategies in Games with Many Players
(Vanderbilt University, 2005)
Treating games of incomplete information with countable sets of actions and types and finite but large player sets we demonstrate that for every mixed strategy profile there is a pure strategy profile that is 'epsilon-equivalent'. ...
Dynamic Club Formation with Coordination
(Vanderbilt University, 2005)
We present a dynamic model of club formation in a society of identical people. Coalitions consisting of members of the same club can form for one period and coalition members can jointly deviate. The dynamic process is ...
The Law of Demand in Tiebout Economies
(Vanderbilt University, 2005)
We consider a general equilibrium local public goods economy in which agents have two distinguishing characteristics. The first is 'crowding type,' which is publicly observable and provides direct costs or benefits to the ...
Correlated Equilibrium and Behavioral Conformity
(Vanderbilt University, 2005)
Is conformity amongst similar individuals consistent with self-interested behavior? We consider a model of incomplete information in which each player receives a signal, interpreted as an allocation to a role, and can make ...
Memetics & Voting: How Nature May Make us Public Spirited
(Vanderbilt University, 2005)
We consider the classic puzzle of why people turn out for elections in substantial numbers even though formal analysis strongly suggests that rational agents would not vote. If one assumes that voters do not make systematic ...
Behavioral Conformity in Games with Many Players
(Vanderbilt University, 2005)
In the literature of psychology and economics it is frequently observed that individuals tend to conform in their behavior to the behavior of similar individuals. A fundamental question is whether the outcome of such ...
On Purification of Equilibrium in Bayesian Games and Ex-Post Nash Equilibrium
(Vanderbilt University, 2005)
Kalai (2002) demonstrates that in semi anonymous Bayesian games with sufficiently many players any Bayesian equilibrium is approximately ex-post Nash. In this paper we demonstrate that the existence of an approximate expost ...