Search
Now showing items 1-5 of 5
Independence Before Conservatism: Transparency, Politics, and Central Bank Design
(Vanderbilt University, 2002)
The problem of monetary policy delegation is formulated as a two-stage game between the government and the central bank. In the first stage the government chooses the institutional design of the central bank. Monetary and ...
Policy Games and the Optimal Design of Central Banks
(Vanderbilt University, 2002)
This article studies the impact of alternative institutional configurations on economic performance when there is strategic interaction between the government and the central bank. The interaction between the fiscal and ...
Independent Monetary Policies and Social Equality
(Vanderbilt University, 2003)
The problem of monetary policy delegation is formulated as a two-stage game between the government and the central bank. In the first stage the government chooses the institutional design of the central bank. Monetary and ...
The Cost of Heterogeneity in a Monetary Union
(Vanderbilt University, 2001)
In this paper, we explore whether heterogeneity among union members could threaten the stability of the EMU. The types of heterogeneity we consider are (1) asymmetries in the transmission of monetary and fiscal policies, ...
Government Leadership and Central Bank Design
(Vanderbilt University, 2002)
This article investigates the impact on economic performance of the timing of moves in a policy game between the government and the central bank for a government with both distributional and stabilization objectives. It ...