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Now showing items 11-20 of 20
Tax Competition Reconsidered
(Vanderbilt University, 2006)
In a classic model of tax competition, we show that the level of public good provision and taxation in a decentralized equilibrium can be efficient or inefficient with either too much, or too little public good provision. ...
Optimim Tariffs and Retaliation: How Country Numbers Matter
(Vanderbilt University, 2009)
This paper identifies a new terms-of-trade externality that is exercised through tariff setting. A North-South model of international trade is introduced in which the number of countries in each region can be varied. As ...
Dynamic Club Formation with Coordination
(Vanderbilt University, 2005)
We present a dynamic model of club formation in a society of identical people. Coalitions consisting of members of the same club can form for one period and coalition members can jointly deviate. The dynamic process is ...
Public Good Differentiation and the Intensity of Tax Competition
(Vanderbilt University, 2007)
We show that, in a setting where tax competition promotes efficiency, variation in the extent to which firms can use public goods to reduce costs brings about a reduction in the intensity of tax competition. This in turn ...
Conformity, Equity and Correlated Equilibrium
(Vanderbilt University, 2008)
We explore the potential for correlated equilibrium to capture conformity to norms and the coordination of behavior within social groups. Given a partition of players into social groups we propose three properties one may ...
Relaxing Tax Competition through Public Good Differentiation
(Vanderbilt University, 2006)
This paper argues that, because governments are able to relax tax competition through public good differentiation, traditionally high-tax countries have continued to set taxes at a relatively high rate even as markets have ...
Behavioral Conformity in Games with Many Players
(Vanderbilt University, 2005)
In the literature of psychology and economics it is frequently observed that individuals tend to conform in their behavior to the behavior of similar individuals. A fundamental question is whether the outcome of such ...
On Purification of Equilibrium in Bayesian Games and Ex-Post Nash Equilibrium
(Vanderbilt University, 2005)
Kalai (2002) demonstrates that in semi anonymous Bayesian games with sufficiently many players any Bayesian equilibrium is approximately ex-post Nash. In this paper we demonstrate that the existence of an approximate expost ...
A Revelation Principle for Dominant Strategy Implementation
(Vanderbilt University, 2008)
We introduce a perfect price discriminating (PPD) mechanism for allocation problems with private information. A PPD mechanism treats a seller, for example, as a perfect price discriminating monopolist who faces a price ...
Subgame Perfect Cooperation in an Extensive Game
(Vanderbilt University, 2010)
Abstract: This paper brings together two of the most important solution concepts of game theory –subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium of a non-cooperative game and the core of a cooperativegame. Our approach rests on two ...