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Now showing items 11-20 of 22
Correlated Equilibrium and Behavioral Conformity
(Vanderbilt University, 2005)
Is conformity amongst similar individuals consistent with self-interested behavior? We consider a model of incomplete information in which each player receives a signal, interpreted as an allocation to a role, and can make ...
Public Good Differentiation and the Intensity of Tax Competition
(Vanderbilt University, 2007)
We show that, in a setting where tax competition promotes efficiency, variation in the extent to which firms can use public goods to reduce costs brings about a reduction in the intensity of tax competition. This in turn ...
Conformity, Equity and Correlated Equilibrium
(Vanderbilt University, 2008)
We explore the potential for correlated equilibrium to capture conformity to norms and the coordination of behavior within social groups. Given a partition of players into social groups we propose three properties one may ...
Market Games and Clubs
(Vanderbilt University, 2009)
The equivalence of markets and games concerns the relationship between two sorts of structures that appear fundamentally different -- markets and games. Shapley and Shubik (1969) demonstrates that: (1) games derived from ...
Cores of Many-Player Games: Nonemptiness and Equal Treatment
(Vanderbilt University, 2009)
This paper provides sufficient conditions to ensure nonemptiness of approximate cores of many-player games and symmetry of approximate core payoffs (the equal treatment property). The conditions are: (a) essential ...
The Partnered Core of a Game with Side Payments
(Vanderbilt University, 2009)
An outcome of a game is partnered if there are no asymmetric dependencies between any two players. For a cooperative game, a payoff is in the partnered core of the game if it is partnered, feasible and cannot be improved ...
Memetics & Voting: How Nature May Make us Public Spirited
(Vanderbilt University, 2005)
We consider the classic puzzle of why people turn out for elections in substantial numbers even though formal analysis strongly suggests that rational agents would not vote. If one assumes that voters do not make systematic ...
Behavioral Conformity in Games with Many Players
(Vanderbilt University, 2005)
In the literature of psychology and economics it is frequently observed that individuals tend to conform in their behavior to the behavior of similar individuals. A fundamental question is whether the outcome of such ...
On Purification of Equilibrium in Bayesian Games and Ex-Post Nash Equilibrium
(Vanderbilt University, 2005)
Kalai (2002) demonstrates that in semi anonymous Bayesian games with sufficiently many players any Bayesian equilibrium is approximately ex-post Nash. In this paper we demonstrate that the existence of an approximate expost ...
Competition over Standards and Taxes
(Vanderbilt University, 2008)
We show that, in competition between a developed country and a developing country over standards and taxes, the developing country may have a 'second mover advantage.' A key feature of standards is that, unlike public goods ...