Kalai (2002) demonstrates that in semi anonymous Bayesian games with sufficiently many players any Bayesian equilibrium is approximately ex-post Nash. In this paper we demonstrate that the existence of an approximate expost ...

Consider a multilateral bargaining problem where negotiation is conducted by a sequence of bilateral bargaining sessions. We are interested in an environment where bargaining protocols are determined endogenously. During ...

This paper studies a bargaining model where n players play a sequence of (n-1) bilateral bargaining sessions. In each bilateral bargaining session, two players follow the same bargaining process as in Rubinstein's (1982). ...

Abstract: We develop a strategic model of network interdiction in a non-cooperative game of flow. A security agency operates a network with arc capacities. An adversary, endowed with a bounded quantity of bads, chooses a ...

This paper identifies a new terms-of-trade externality that is exercised through tariff setting. A North-South model of international trade is introduced in which the number of countries in each region can be varied. As ...

Abstract: This paper brings together two of the most important solution concepts of game theory –subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium of a non-cooperative game and the core of a cooperativegame. Our approach rests on two ...

This paper shows how distance may be used to coordinate on a unique equilibrium in which trade agreements are regional. Trade agreement formation is modeled as coalition formation. In a standard trade model with no distance ...

We show that, in a setting where tax competition promotes efficiency, variation in the extent to which firms can use public goods to reduce costs brings about a reduction in the intensity of tax competition. This in turn ...

The players behave quite differently in the negotiation model under different time preferences than under common time preferences. Conventional analysis in this literature relies on the key presumption that all continuation ...

We explore the potential for correlated equilibrium to capture conformity to norms and the coordination of behavior within social groups. Given a partition of players into social groups we propose properties that one may ...