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On Purification of Equilibrium in Bayesian Games and Ex-Post Nash Equilibrium
(Vanderbilt University, 2005)
Kalai (2002) demonstrates that in semi anonymous Bayesian games with sufficiently many players any Bayesian equilibrium is approximately ex-post Nash. In this paper we demonstrate that the existence of an approximate expost ...
Market Games and Clubs
(Vanderbilt University, 2009)
The equivalence of markets and games concerns the relationship between two sorts of structures that appear fundamentally different -- markets and games. Shapley and Shubik (1969) demonstrates that: (1) games derived from ...
Developing Country Second-Mover Advantage in Competition Over Standards and Taxes
(Vanderbilt University, 2009)
We show that, in competition between a developed country and a developing country over environmental standards and taxes, the developing country may have a 'second-mover advantage.' In our model, firms do not unanimously ...
Cores of Many-Player Games: Nonemptiness and Equal Treatment
(Vanderbilt University, 2009)
This paper provides sufficient conditions to ensure nonemptiness of approximate cores of many-player games and symmetry of approximate core payoffs (the equal treatment property). The conditions are: (a) essential ...
Developing Country Second-Mover Advantage in Competition over Environmental Standards and Taxes
(Vanderbilt University, 2010)
Abstract: We show that, in competition between a developed country and a developing country over environmental standards and taxes, the developing country may have a 'second- mover advantage.' In our model, firms do not ...
Strategic Network Interdiction
(Vanderbilt University, 2010)
Abstract: We develop a strategic model of network interdiction in a non-cooperative game of flow. A security agency operates a network with arc capacities. An adversary, endowed with a bounded quantity of bads, chooses a ...
Subgame Perfect Cooperation in an Extensive Game
(Vanderbilt University, 2010)
Abstract: This paper brings together two of the most important solution concepts of game theory –subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium of a non-cooperative game and the core of a cooperativegame. Our approach rests on two ...
Public Good Differentiation and the Intensity of Tax Competition
(Vanderbilt University, 2007)
We show that, in a setting where tax competition promotes efficiency, variation in the extent to which firms can use public goods to reduce costs brings about a reduction in the intensity of tax competition. This in turn ...
Anonymous Price Taking Equilibrium in Tiebout Economies with a Continuum of Agents: Existence and Characterization
(Vanderbilt University, 2008)
We introduce a model of a local public goods economy with a continuum of agents and jurisdictions with finite, but unbounded populations, where the set of possible projects for each jurisdiction/club is unrestricted in ...
Behavioral Properties of Correlated Equilibrium;Social Group Structures with Conformity and Stereotyping
(Vanderbilt University, 2008)
We explore the potential for correlated equilibrium to capture conformity to norms and the coordination of behavior within social groups. Given a partition of players into social groups we propose properties that one may ...