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Strategic Nonlinear Income Tax Competition with Perfect Labor Mobility
(Vanderbilt University, 2008)
The Nash equilibria of a tax-setting game between two governments who can set nonlinear income tax schedules for a perfectly mobile workforce whose members differ in unobserved skill levels are examined. Each government ...
The Impact of Changing Skill Levels on Optimal Nonlinear Income Taxes
(Vanderbilt University, 2007)
The impact of changing an individual's skill level on the solution to a finite population version of the Mirrlees optimal nonlinear income tax problem with quasilinear-in-leisure preferences is investigated. It is shown ...
The Friedman Rule in an Overlapping Generations Model:Social Security in Reverse
(Vanderbilt University, 2007)
The welfare gains from adopting a zero nominal interest policy depend on the implementation details. Here I focus on a government loan program that crowds out lending and borrowing and other money substitutes. Since money ...
Tax Competition Reconsidered
(Vanderbilt University, 2006)
In a classic model of tax competition, we show that the level of public good provision and taxation in a decentralized equilibrium can be efficient or inefficient with either too much, or too little public good provision. ...
The Role of Government in the Credit Market
(Vanderbilt University, 2009)
The paper assumes a government advantage in collecting income contingent payments and develop a proposal for a government loan program that is an integral part of the tax system. The focus is on administrative costs and ...
Public Good Differentiation and the Intensity of Tax Competition
(Vanderbilt University, 2007)
We show that, in a setting where tax competition promotes efficiency, variation in the extent to which firms can use public goods to reduce costs brings about a reduction in the intensity of tax competition. This in turn ...
Optimal Nonlinear Taxation of Income and Savings without Commitment
(Vanderbilt University, 2008)
Optimal nonlinear taxation of income and savings is considered in a two-period model with two individuals who have additively separable preferences and who only differ in their skill levels. When the government can commit ...
Relaxing Tax Competition through Public Good Differentiation
(Vanderbilt University, 2006)
This paper argues that, because governments are able to relax tax competition through public good differentiation, traditionally high-tax countries have continued to set taxes at a relatively high rate even as markets have ...
Implementing the Friedman Rule by a Government Loan Program: An Overlapping Generations Model
(Vanderbilt University, 2008)
The welfare gains from adopting a zero nominal interest policy depend on the implementation details. Here I argue that implementing the Friedman rule by a government loan program may be better than implementing it by ...
Comparative Statics of Optimal Nonlinear Income Taxation in the Presence of a Publicly Provided Input
(Vanderbilt University, 2009)
Comparative static properties of the solution to an optimal nonlinear income tax problem are provided for a model in which the government both designs a redistributive income tax schedule and provides a public input into ...