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Market Games and Clubs
(Vanderbilt University, 2009)
The equivalence of markets and games concerns the relationship between two sorts of structures that appear fundamentally different -- markets and games. Shapley and Shubik (1969) demonstrates that: (1) games derived from ...
Cores of Many-Player Games: Nonemptiness and Equal Treatment
(Vanderbilt University, 2009)
This paper provides sufficient conditions to ensure nonemptiness of approximate cores of many-player games and symmetry of approximate core payoffs (the equal treatment property). The conditions are: (a) essential ...
The Partnered Core of a Game with Side Payments
(Vanderbilt University, 2009)
An outcome of a game is partnered if there are no asymmetric dependencies between any two players. For a cooperative game, a payoff is in the partnered core of the game if it is partnered, feasible and cannot be improved ...