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Strategic Nonlinear Income Tax Competition with Perfect Labor Mobility
(Vanderbilt University, 2008)
The Nash equilibria of a tax-setting game between two governments who can set nonlinear income tax schedules for a perfectly mobile workforce whose members differ in unobserved skill levels are examined. Each government ...
A Unified Approach to Strategy-Proofness for Single-Peaked Preferences
(Vanderbilt University, 2011)
This article establishes versions of Moulin's [On strategy-proofness and single peakedness, Public Choice 35 (1980), 31-38] characterizations of various classes of strategy-proof social choice functions when the domain ...
The Impact of Changing Skill Levels on Optimal Nonlinear Income Taxes
(Vanderbilt University, 2007)
The impact of changing an individual's skill level on the solution to a finite population version of the Mirrlees optimal nonlinear income tax problem with quasilinear-in-leisure preferences is investigated. It is shown ...
Optimal Nonlinear Taxation of Income and Savingsin a Two Class Economy
(Vanderbilt University, 2005)
Optimal nonlinear taxation of income and savings is considered in a two-period model with two individuals who have additively separable preferences and who only differ in their skill levels. When the government can commit ...
Optimal Nonlinear Taxation of Income and Savings without Commitment
(Vanderbilt University, 2008)
Optimal nonlinear taxation of income and savings is considered in a two-period model with two individuals who have additively separable preferences and who only differ in their skill levels. When the government can commit ...
Comparative Statics of Optimal Nonlinear Income Taxation in the Presence of a Publicly Provided Input
(Vanderbilt University, 2009)
Comparative static properties of the solution to an optimal nonlinear income tax problem are provided for a model in which the government both designs a redistributive income tax schedule and provides a public input into ...
Dominant Strategy Implementation with a Convex Product Space of Valuations
(Vanderbilt University, 2011)
A necessary and sufficient condition for dominant strategy implementability when preferences are quasilinear is that, for any individual i and any choice of the types of the other individuals, all k-cycles in i's allocation ...