Search
Now showing items 1-10 of 22
On Equilibrium in Pure Strategies in Games with Many Players
(Vanderbilt University, 2005)
Treating games of incomplete information with countable sets of actions and types and finite but large player sets we demonstrate that for every mixed strategy profile there is a pure strategy profile that is 'epsilon-equivalent'. ...
Anonymous Price Taking Equilibrium in Tiebout Economies with a Continuum of Agents: Existence and Characterization
(Vanderbilt University, 2008)
We introduce a model of a local public goods economy with a continuum of agents and jurisdictions with finite, but unbounded populations, where the set of possible projects for each jurisdiction/club is unrestricted in ...
Behavioral Properties of Correlated Equilibrium;Social Group Structures with Conformity and Stereotyping
(Vanderbilt University, 2008)
We explore the potential for correlated equilibrium to capture conformity to norms and the coordination of behavior within social groups. Given a partition of players into social groups we propose properties that one may ...
Developing Country Second-Mover Advantage in Competition over Environmental Standards and Taxes
(Vanderbilt University, 2010)
Abstract: We show that, in competition between a developed country and a developing country over environmental standards and taxes, the developing country may have a 'second- mover advantage.' In our model, firms do not ...
Strategic Network Interdiction
(Vanderbilt University, 2010)
Abstract: We develop a strategic model of network interdiction in a non-cooperative game of flow. A security agency operates a network with arc capacities. An adversary, endowed with a bounded quantity of bads, chooses a ...
Strategic Basins of Attraction, the Path Dominance Core, and Network Formation Games
(Vanderbilt University, 2006)
Given the preferences of players and the rules governing network formation, what networks are likely to emerge and persist? And how do individuals and coalitions evaluate possible consequences of their actions in forming ...
Protests and Reputation
(Vanderbilt University, 2006)
Protests take place for a variety of reasons. In this paper we focus on protests that have a well defined objective, that is in conflict with the objectives of the government. Hence the success or failure of a protest ...
Tax Competition Reconsidered
(Vanderbilt University, 2006)
In a classic model of tax competition, we show that the level of public good provision and taxation in a decentralized equilibrium can be efficient or inefficient with either too much, or too little public good provision. ...
Dynamic Club Formation with Coordination
(Vanderbilt University, 2005)
We present a dynamic model of club formation in a society of identical people. Coalitions consisting of members of the same club can form for one period and coalition members can jointly deviate. The dynamic process is ...
The Law of Demand in Tiebout Economies
(Vanderbilt University, 2005)
We consider a general equilibrium local public goods economy in which agents have two distinguishing characteristics. The first is 'crowding type,' which is publicly observable and provides direct costs or benefits to the ...