genuine religious experience, Berry is a model for preachers moving into the 21st century. We may not have his poetic gifts, but we can learn from him a less explanatory homiletic, one that sets the nerve endings of the soul to dancing and singing with the joy of the holy that is here and now with us "although we knew it not." We may claim afresh in our hearts, and help our people claim again what Berry acknowledges as he decorates a Christmas tree:

Our tree
is a cedar cut here, one
of the fragrances of our place,
hung with painted cones
and paper stars folded
long ago to praise our tree,
Christ come into the world. (p. 204)

Thomas H. Troeger


This work is a transcription of the manuscript sermon series on Psalm 130 of American Puritan minister Jonathan Michel (1624-1668). The sermons were preached in 1650 and are now located at the Massachusetts Historical Society. The intent of the transcription is to make them more readily available to scholars and to enrich our understanding of Puritan sermon literature.

Michael W. Casey

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What form of reasoning do we, or should we, find in preaching? As homileticians and preachers weigh the relative virtues of using deductive or inductive forms of reason, plots, conversational logic, or testimonial speech, questions about preaching as "foolishness to the Greeks" continue to haunt homiletic theory. If preaching is "reasonable" at all, how are we to grasp the unique kind of reason that is at work in the pulpit? And what is the origin of this kind of reason?

The Hermeneutics of Original Argument: Demonstration, Dialectic, Rhetoric does not completely answer these questions. It does, however, take the reader on a phenomenological journey behind the Greek philosophical tradition of reasoning so that we might consider more
carefully the nature of "original argument," that is, argument as it emerges out of *logos* into speech. Smith's plan is to "work back" from "reasoning by demonstration," through the theoretical give-and-take of dialectic, to "practical taking counsel in rhetoric." (p. 11)

Smith takes his cue in the initial chapters of the book from Heidegger's re-thinking of Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, and Heidegger's phenomenology of "Care" (*Besorgen*). He argues that both science's *apodeixis* or demonstration and dialectic's *dialegesthai* or theoretical discussion are abstractions from "what we say to each other in our engaged, practical taking care of things," as we are involved in "getting things done in our everyday existence." (p. 16) When the *logos* "originally" enters speech, therefore, it takes the form of a "'worried being-there' (*besorgtes Dasein*)" with others, and is oriented toward practical decision-making and *praxis*. Instead of working from a *logos* *apophantikon* or "declarative statement of necessary fact," original argument works from *endoxon*, or received opinions, and then reasons its way "*to doxa* or new opinions." (p. 25) Its subject matter, therefore, is "contingent and indeterminate," it could always be "otherwise," and is, consequently, "subject to revision." (p. 25) Original argument is, quite simply, the very open-ended and time-bound language of "getting things done." (p. 35)

This means, of course, that in original argument, "there is no getting back to an intuitively certain and self-grounding first principle." (p. 53) Original argument is not syllogistic reasoning, but *enthymematic* reasoning. Participants start from some soft form of "tacit consensus" that is "conceded in advance" in order that reasoning not degenerate into "an interminable digging for grounds for the grounds for the grounds, *ad infinitum*, in which the bottom would drop out. . . ." (p. 53) Original argument, therefore, "cannot proceed unless we have some measure of community with each other to begin with and have always already tacitly agreed to agree about some things." (p. 53)

In a chapter on Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, Smith points out that for Aristotle, *phronesis*, or practical reasoning, carries with it certain ethical qualities that are to find their way into the ethos of argument, notably "understanding," "consideration," "forbearance," and "clemency." (p. 41) Smith argues that "clemency" (*epeikeia*), which literally means "letting up" or "easing off," comes close in meaning to "chesed-elos," the Jewish-Christian qualities of forgiveness and mercy. This presupposes a "voicing" within original argument of "kindness" or generosity in both the hearing and understanding of one another. (p. 48)

Also in this chapter, Smith provides an excellent overview of Aristotle's exposition of the various tropes of rhetorical speech. He argues that original argument shares with rhetoric a reasoning by *topics*. It proceeds from a communal "naming," through investigations of "similarity and difference," "opposites," "the part and the whole," "the more and the less," and the "prior and posterior" in all of their temporality and potential for change.

From there, Smith moves to an investigation of the emergence of demonstrative reasoning in Plato's ongoing battle with the Sophists.
The Sophists perverted the original argument of rhetoric by passing off the contraries of the names (onomata) upon which the topics were built as the real things themselves. Instead of taking on the Sophists at the level of ethos and pathos, on the slippery slopes of challenging their trustworthiness and life orientation, Plato instituted a theoretical dialectics and ultimately a mathematical form of argument from "secured starting points" (archai) as an attempt to ground human reasoning.

Smith's critique of Derrida's theory of Plato's "pharmakon" is a crucial and significant part of this chapter. Smith disagrees with Derrida's argument that Plato attempted to use a metaphysics of speech (presence) to drive out the "pharmakon" (toxin) of writing (difference, contraries). According to Smith, Plato was not "attacking writing as secondary to speaking," but was ultimately "attacking speaking and the oral tradition by turning to the paradigm of mathematics." (p. 146) In this turn to mathematics as a way to establish "secured starting points," Plato winds up being "a lot closer to Derrida's position than Derrida recognizes" (p. 144), for "in mathematics the voiced word name was in fact always secondary to the written sign, the sound 'two,' for instance, always entirely secondary to the visual mark '2' that we read silently." (p. 146) Smith argues, contrary to Derrida, that "much more than the written word, the being of a voiced word is otherness and alterity, for it is the voiced word, the word that we hear from another, that comes over us from outside us and beyond the horizons of our awareness, draws us listeners into its resonance, only then to withdraw and fade out of hearing." (p. 157) It is here that Smith appeals to the Judeo-Christian tradition of "the homiletical, pro-phetic word, the word 'spoken forth' and that we hear spoken, not by ourselves to ourselves, (Plato's interior 'presence') but spoken to us by someone decidedly other than ourselves." (p. 158, parenthetical note mine)

Smith ends by arguing that "original argument" is "embodied," by which he means that it is embedded within a fusion of pathos and logos. Original argument is ensconced within a profound "hearing" (Horen) in which we "belong to" an other and "undergo" together "what arguments do with us," and "what happens to us when we speak." (p. 227) In original argument there is "not yet a spectator" (p. 231) or one who is unaffected, dispassionate, or disinterested in what is happening. Pathos is not added on to logos as ornamentation, it is intrinsic to logos. Here, it is Nietzsche, not Derrida, who has the correct understanding about how the logos originates and emerges into speech. Analyzing Nietzsche's recovery of the original acoustical experience in Birth of Tragedy out of the Spirit of Music, Smith notes that it is not writing's differential and binary "other," but sound's acoustical "other" that holds the originary spot. "Voice is the an-archic, unfathomable, bottomless underground, not on which the logical rests, but in which it floats precariously." (p. 302) Ultimately, according to Nietzsche, it is "the primal reverberations of acoustical, musical experience in which (the) onomazein or naming is inextricably embedded and from which it originates." (p. 303)

Here we find ourselves, perhaps, on the threshold of the oracular
roots of preaching, the kerygmatic naming of grace that occurs when a community of faith gathers around its sacred texts to "hear." Smith does not make the shift into homiletical theory and theology, but there is much of this that is implicit in his arguments, waiting to be worked out. He has helped the homiletician sort out the demise of logos in the Western cultural and philosophical tradition, and suggests its rebirth and revitalization in a form of communal practical reasoning in which both ethos and pathos are recovered as vitally intrinsic to the logos of our speaking-together.

John McClure


In the preface to this text, editor Ronald Cole-Turner observes that the birth of Dolly the cloned sheep "triggered a sudden interest in theology." His observation is validated on one level by the vast quantity of articles, editorials and television shows generated by the moral and religious concerns of human cloning. On the level of public policy discourse, however, religious responses are deemed to be interesting but ancillary to the expert testimony of geneticists, reproductive technicians, legal analysts, and biomedical ethicists, to name a few. With this text Cole-Turner et al provide a much needed corrective to public policy discussions by raising a number of theological concerns and offering a variety of Christian responses. In the words of Cole-Turner, "we who write in these pages agree that Christians must not be silent in the public debates about cloning." (p. xii)

The authors represented in this volume rightly agree that Christians have a vested interest in the cloning debate. The questions raised by human cloning cut to the core of human identity, the sanctity of life, and the meaning of family. For these reasons, the issues of whether and how to pursue these new technologies are too significant to leave entirely in the hands of policy makers or to the whims of the free market.

On the one hand, the text does an adequate job in presenting a variety of responses. Still, a broader representation reflecting a greater diversity of Christian traditions might be desirable. On the other hand, it does an excellent job of illuminating the theological concerns about human cloning shared by Christians. Cole-Turner acknowledges that the authors in this volume "stand for the most part closer to Paul Ramsey than to Joseph Fletcher" in their "maybe" response to the question, "Shall we clone?" Yet, he indicates that "their maybe is not equivocation or indecisiveness." (p. xii) On the contrary, one should understand the qualified yes and no responses that predominate here as indicative of "an invitation to discussion," and a willingness to weigh carefully both "theological and prudential" reasons.

The myriad concerns about human cloning voiced in this volume can be arranged into at least four categories or areas of concernment. In an essay written with Ph.D. candidate Joel Shuman, Stanley