The Forgotten Crusaders:

Western Missionaries in the Chinese Anti-Opium Movement

By
Tianyuan Guan

Thesis
Submitted to the Faculty of the
Department of History of Vanderbilt University
In partial fulfillment of the requirements
For Honors in History

April 2019

On the basis of this thesis defended by the candidate on April 30, 2019, we, the undersigned, recommend that the candidate be awarded Highest Honors in History.

Director of Honors – Arleen Tuchman

Faculty Adviser – Ruth Rógaski

Third Reader – Paul A. Kramer
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To my parents and Jiayi Zang—
without whose support I would never finish this thesis

To those who hope or hoped to make this world better—
Thanks for your efforts and sacrifices.
Timeline

667 Opium first entered China
1644 The Qing government started ruling China
1839 Emperor Daoguang ordered to implement anti-opium policies
1840-1842 The First Opium War
1840s Western Missionaries entered China
1856-1860 The Second Opium War
1858 Signing of the Treaty of Tianjin, which legalized opium trade
1907 Signing of the Anglo-Chinese Agreement on Opium (The Ten-Year Agreement)
1911 Xinhai Revolution (Led by Temporary President Sun)
1912 End of the Qing dynasty, and the founding of the Republic of China (the Republican government)
1912 Yuan Shikai became the President of the Republican government (the Beiyang government)
1915 The New Cultural Movement began
1915 Yuan crowned himself as the emperor
1916 Yuan died. China entered the Warlord Era
1917 End of the Ten-Year Agreement
1918 Founding of the International Anti-Opium Association
1919 The May Fourth Movement (the heyday of the New Culture Movement)
1921 The begin of Chinese Anti-Christian Movement
1923 The Founding of the National Christian Council of China
1924 The Founding of National Anti-Opium Association
1926-1928 The Northern Expedition (led by Nationalist party, Chiang Kai-shek)

1929 The Nationalist government gained control over most of China.
Introduction

As the most notorious drug in China, opium is repeatedly taught in school, and nearly all Chinese people could list its harmful effects. Yet instead of being taught in biology class as an addictive drug, it is introduced in history classes as a weapon employed by imperial powers to open the Chinese market, and a trigger of the two Opium Wars. These wars, according to the orthodox textbooks, “forcefully ended the long-term isolationism policy in China,” and since then “China gradually became a semi-feudal, semi-colonized country.”¹ Therefore, instead of its toxicity, opium is famous for its significance to the history of China.

Because of the education they receive, contemporary Chinese people universally believe that the opium business was intrinsically linked with imperialism. From their perspective, opium, as taught by teachers, is a highly addictive drug, the intake of which would dramatically impair people’s physical functions, and exhaust their vigor. Nevertheless, in the nineteenth century, westerner merchants, for the sake of silver, kept exporting opium to China, and enticed Chinese civilians into drug consumption, which turned them into lifeless addicts. When the righteous Chinese government officials decided to eradicate opium, the Western empires waged wars against China to protect their evil trade, and loot fortune from the Far East. Thus, opium, as the poison used to corrupt Chinese people and initiate war, is conceptually related to the invasion of imperial powers, and the decline of China in the mind of contemporary Chinese people. Most Chinese people do not realize that their perception of opium and its connection with western imperialism did not become the dominant narrative in this nation until the late nineteenth century.

¹ People’s education press version textbook serial history for middle school students (8th Grade II) 人教版课本初二历史书八年级下册初中教材教科书 8 年级下册历史 (Beijing: People’s Education Press, 2002).
century, decades after the outbreak of the First Opium War.²

An international anti-opium movement in the nineteenth century, which combined the efforts of both Chinese elites and western missionaries, led to the formation of the impression mentioned above. This campaign against opium trade, smoking, and planting fundamentally shaped how later generations viewed this drug and activities related to it. The promoters of the campaign associated opium with foreign colonization, social problems, and the loss of sovereignty in the nineteenth and twentieth century. Their works evoked public hatred against opium and the consensus about it in the nineteenth century. Furthermore, because these impressions, from the perspective of the government officials, could support the formation of new Chinese nationalism, these descriptions of opium were compiled in the textbooks.

What the textbooks totally ignore, however, is the role of Western Christian missionaries in the anti-opium movement. Because Chinese governments wanted to describe this movement as motivated purely by nationalism, in which Chinese people collectively resisted the corruption of the poison from the West, any mention of western missionaries was not only irrelevant, but also problematic since Chinese nationalism emerged from the invasion of the West and Chinese people’s resistance to Western colonial powers.

This thesis reevaluates the activities and roles of western missionaries in the Chinese anti-opium movement. The missionaries used to be a significant force against the opium trade, when Chinese governments held ambivalent attitudes about opium. They founded various anti-opium organizations advocating the harm of opium to arouse public hatred against the drug. Lobbying among the British and Chinese governments, they aimed to terminate the opium trade.

² William Park, *Opinions of Over 100 Physicians on the Use of Opium in China* (American Presbyterian Mission Press, 1899). The book collected the opinions of physicians who lived in late the nineteenth century China about opium smoking, which shows that there was no consensus among the physicians about the harm of opium at that time.
Maintaining semi-friendly relationship with the Chinese governments, they assisted and supervised the Chinese governments’ opium-suppression works.

Nevertheless, similar to the authors of school textbooks, Chinese scholars largely ignore the western missionaries’ participation in the movement, although they paint a far more sophisticated picture of the Opium Wars. For Chinese scholars nowadays, the main topic for that historical period is the construction of new nationalism and patriotism, which rose from the conflicts between Chinese people and the incoming Westerners who attempted to colonize the nation. Consequently, historians focus more on the military conflicts triggered by opium, instead of opium itself. Even those who concentrate on the anti-opium movement pay more attention to how Chinese elites and governments promoted opium-suppression policies, and largely ignore the contributions of Western missionaries. Though some western historians noticed the activities of missionaries, their evaluations of their contribution to the anti-opium movement varied greatly.

Since researchers even today are not in agreement about the actual physical influence of opium on human beings, some scholars, represented by Frank Dikötter, argue that missionaries intentionally exaggerated the toxicity of opium smoking, and the anti-opium movement was no more than a political scam or political propaganda. From his perspective, the missionaries did not help solve the opium problem. Instead, they created it. As he claims, an overdose of opium would lead to the deadly consequences described by anti-opium activists, only a negligible percentage of opium consumer would intake that much. Therefore, opium-smoking, as he proposes, should be studied as a recreational and social activity comparable to drinking alcohol,
a stand which was held by many contemporary pro-opium merchants and officers. Furthermore, Dikötter holds that the anti-opium movement led by western missionaries caused greater harm to the Chinese society, since some opium consumers switched to morphine and drug injections, both of which which posed more health hazards.

Some scholars, such as R.K. Newman and Thomas Rein, study opium trade and the anti-opium movement from an economic perspective, and conclude that missionaries’ contributions were negligible in the overall anti-opium movement. As they perceive, the opium trade was no different from other international commerce, the rise and decline of which could be explained simply by evaluating the market and profitability of the good. In 1907, Great Britain agreed to negotiate a treaty with the Qing government to terminate the opium trade, which was considered to be a milestone in the anti-opium movement. However, in Newman article "India and the Anglo-Chinese Opium Agreement 1907-14," he attributes the signing of the treaty to the declining profitability of the opium trade. As he write, the British parliament, instead of being dragged to the conference table by the missionaries, voluntarily sought negotiation with the Chinese government and utilized the opium trade as a bargaining chip to get greater financial interest. By comparing the economic importance of the opium trade to Britain in the mid-nineteenth century and the early twentieth century, Newman attempts to prove that the increasing competition with the Malwa opium, from which the East India Company could deprive little profit, and the Chinese domestic opium, and the tightening government regulation on opium in

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6 The Treaty was finally signed by both parties in 1908, and renewed in 1911.
China eroded the profits that Britain could derive from the opium trade.\textsuperscript{7}

Therefore, from Newman’s perspective, the western missionaries’ anti-opium campaign only accidentally took place at the same time, but did not contribute to the signing of the treaty in 1908. Moreover, he even claimed that connecting the opium trade with morality debate, which was a major way through which anti-opium missionaries recruit supporters, was a “mistake” made by them.\textsuperscript{8} Newman explicitly claimed that these moral arguments made by missionaries led the movement to a dead-end. Newman claimed that missionaries’ “emphasis on the moral laxity and physical degeneration of opium users” was “one of the errors of the reformers.”\textsuperscript{9} In 1894, the British government ordered the Royal Commission on Opium to investigate the harm of opium trade. Nevertheless, the official report generated by the Commission in 1895 did not favor the anti-opium activists. Therefore, Newman asserted that the publication of the investigation which concluded that opium was harmless, signified the failure of missionaries’ work. For him, the conclusion of the Commission’s report on opium “blunted the main trust of reform” and since then the missionaries who advocated the termination of opium the trade lost their weapons in the parliament.\textsuperscript{10} For him, missionaries should have focused more on the economic discussions which could have been more effective.

Though there are other scholars who compliment the efforts of missionaries, they have to admit that their contributions were limited. Kathleen L. Lodwick honors western missionaries as the pioneers of the Chinese anti-opium movement. In her book, \textit{Crusaders against Opium: Protestant Missionaries in China, 1874-1917}, she deliberately analyzes the motivations of and strategies employed by the missionaries to promote the movement. Lodwick emphasizes the

\textsuperscript{7} Newman, 528.
\textsuperscript{8} Ibid, 529.
\textsuperscript{9} Ibid, 529.
\textsuperscript{10} Ibid, 530.
notable role played by “morality” in this anti-opium crusade. As she claims, “opium was a moral issue for Chinese (people)” and “an emotional one for some Westerners, particularly the Protestant missionaries.”¹¹ She cites the diaries of missionaries to show the readers how the opium consumption in China depleted the individuals’ fortune and tore families apart to accentuate the psychological impacts those missionaries gotten from witnessing these tragedies. Furthermore, she indicates that the immoral nature of the opium trade urged the western missionaries to engage in the war against opium, and also became their powerful propaganda weapons against the business.

These Protestant missionaries founded anti-opium societies, represented by the Society for the Suppression of the Opium Trade, and, as Lodwick states, became the very first westerners who championed against opium use in China. By claiming in the British media that the drug corrupted the morality of opium smokers in China and destroyed their lives, the missionaries attempted to persuade the western world of the evilness and unchristian nature of opium.¹² By attracting supporters to their anti-opium claims, missionaries aimed to add pressure on the British Parliament by directing public opinions. Furthermore, they allied with the Liberal Party which won a majority in the House of Commons in 1906; at this point, the anti-opium movement did achieve substantial progress. With the efforts of missionaries and their allies, the House of Commons convicted the Indo-Chinese opium trade of being “morally indefensible” and claimed it was necessary to “bring a speedy end” to the trade.¹³ These substantial advancements in the anti-opium movement are partially credited to the western missionaries in Lodwick’s work.

¹² Ibid, 25.
Nevertheless, as stated before, Lodwick admits the limitations of western missionaries’ contribution to the anti-opium movement. Notwithstanding her descriptions of how missionaries strove to terminate the opium trade, Lodwick qualifies her previous arguments by indicating that their factual influences were limited by several factors. First of all, before the 1906 election in Britain, the missionaries’ anti-opium arguments had “fallen on the deaf ears” of the British Parliament for many years, because “they lacked access to the decision-making centers of the British.”

Therefore, the missionaries’ propaganda in the nineteenth century could not be defined as successful. Furthermore, though the newly elected liberal Parliament denounced the opium trade, and decided to investigate it, the official reports generated did not favor the missionaries, and did not end the trade as missionaries expected.

Similar to Lodwick and Newman, most historians studying the anti-opium movement consider the contributions of the missionaries to the suppression of opium to have been futile. In contrast, this thesis argues that western missionaries indeed helped Chinese people quit opium-smoking, assisted the Chinese government in negotiating the Anglo-Chinese Opium Agreement, and pushed the Chinese governments to implement anti-opium policies. Thus, my thesis explores missionaries’ anti-opium activities from the mid-nineteenth century to the early twentieth century, evaluates missionaries’ contributions to the campaign, and analyze the importance of their works for modern Chinese history.

Chapter one introduces the anti-opium work of missionaries before the signing of the Anglo-Chinese Opium Agreement in 1907. Beginning with the origin of opium and the debate about opium, the chapter traces the origin of anti-opium theories, and how the western missionaries contributed to them. During this period, missionaries modified Chinese critiques to

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14 Lodwick, 25, 63.
opium and gradually established their own ethical foundation to critique the trade in the western world, which provided a theoretical basis for the later anti-opium movement. When these arguments encountered fierce resistance, they initiated an opium debate in nineteenth-century Britain, whose constituents urged the British Parliament to investigate the nature of opium and the business. Furthermore, this chapter analyzes the rise of the missionaries’ international campaign, which led to the founding of several international anti-opium societies and the convening of the International Opium Convention signed in Shanghai and Hague, all of which would substantially further the anti-opium movement in the following decade.

The second chapter unveils how western missionaries interacted with Chinese civilians and governments to eliminate opium in China by focusing on the activities of Edward Thwing, an American missionary who was the president of the International Reform Bureau in China. After the signing of the Ten-Year Agreement, missionaries paid more attention to how to help the Chinese government fulfill its promise to terminate opium planting and smoking in time. Thwing was one of the missionaries assigned to China by an international anti-opium organization to promote the campaign in China. From 1908 to 1918, he cooperated with Chinese nationals, the Qing government, the Republican Beiyang Government, and the Nationalist Government to promote the suppression of opium. As the leader of one of the most influential anti-opium organizations at that time, Thwing’s case reveals the effectiveness of Missionaries’ work as both assistants and supervisors to the Chinese governments.

The third chapter concentrates on western missionaries’ anti-opium activities in the 1920s, when their influences over Chinese civil and political society gradually declined. After the mid-1910s, China entered one of the most chaotic period during which the already subdued opium planting reemerged. Striving to suppress the opium business, western missionaries
engaged in various forms of cooperation with the Chinese governments. However, the anti-Christian Movement and the Independent Church Movement notably compromised missionaries’ capability to influence public attitudes, which had traditionally been the source of their supervisory power over the opium-suppression works of the Chinese governments. Nevertheless, the indigenous anti-opium activists inherited those works and theories of the missionaries, which had enormous impacts on how later Chinese generations viewed opium.

Studying missionaries’ engagement in the anti-opium campaign in China could fill in the lacuna left in the modern history of China, the civil interactions between Chinese communities and western missionaries. In the thesis, we will examine how various motivations urged people from diverse background to participate in the anti-opium movement, and how the clergies adopted various strategies to win their support when interaction with them. Opium not only signifies conflicts between China and the western world, but also unveils complex relationships among Chinese people, governments and western society.
Chapter I: The Opium Debate and the Rise of the Anti-Opium Movement

Introduction

Opium was not a new product in the nineteenth century. Chinese people had been planting it to obtain opium for hundreds of years. According to Jiu tang shu, a Chinese official historical record, opium was first introduced to China in 667 C.E. from the Arabic World. The Arabic envoys gave opium as a tribute to the emperor of Tang. Since then, opium has been planted in the Sichuan and other southwestern provinces of China. Nevertheless, until the Ming Dynasty, opium had been classified as a kind of herbal medicine. According to Compendium of Materia Medica, the most comprehensive herbology book in the history of traditional Chinese medicine, opium could cure diarrhea and male sexual dysfunction. Contemporary Chinese people used it as an aphrodisiac.

In the late Ming Dynasty, Chinese people invented a new way to consume opium. People mingled opium with tobacco, a New World product introduced to China, and smoked the mixture; opium was later referred to as “Da Yan”, the big tobacco. Nevertheless, opium smoking did not become a serious social problem until the late Qing period. In the seventeenth century, the opium-smoking became increasingly prevailing in the empire, and was considered to be a fashionable habit by upperclassmen and nobles. The dramatic expansion of opium market created a shortage of supply and pushed up the price of opium. Noticing the profitability of the Chinese opium market, British East Indian Company started planting opium in India, and exported opium to China. Even though other countries were participating in this trade, Great

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1 Xu Liu, Jiu tang shu (Old Book of Tang), 945.
3 Great Ming Empire was a dynasty existed in China for 276 years. It was founded in 1368 and collapsed in 1644. The late Ming period here refers to the time period between late sixteenth century and the collapse of Ming.
Britain quickly emerged as the largest opium exporter to China, because of its ownership of the British East India Company.4

After the signing of the Treaty of Tianjin in 1858, western clergies were allowed to do missionary works in China for the first time since mid-seventeenth century. When these missionaries arrived in China, they started being aware of the opium trade. Though communications with opium takers and also anti-opium elites, they realized the physical and mental harm caused by these cargoes carried from British India. Combining the efforts of Chinese activists, an international movement against opium was initiated in China, which lasted for more than a century. In the following century, this movement continued to shape Chinese society, culture, and modern history. The campaign increased interactions between China and the western world, and simultaneously fostered Chinese nationalism, which has been affecting China until today.

As a crucial liaison between China and the rest of the world, western Christian missionaries played a significant role in promoting the Chinese anti-opium movement. Furthermore, the technics employed by them to popularize their arguments in both China and Britain set examples for later Chinese activist movements. This chapter briefly elaborates on the emergence of opium as a drug and social phenomenon, introduces debates on opium in the nineteenth century, and evaluates missionaries’ contributions to the anti-opium movement before the signing of the Ten-Year Agreement.

**Early Government Anti-Opium Attempts**

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Nowadays, Chinese people generally consider opium to be an evil drug that could wreck a smoker’s health and mental state. When mentioning opium smokers, one might immediately think of an image in which a lifeless man lying on the bed with his pipe. Nevertheless, Chinese people once perceived opium smoking not as a sign of depravity, but a fashionable recreational activity.

As indicated before, opium had been introduced to China for more than a thousand years before it became a severe social problem. The Qing government once implemented stringent regulations over the domestic plantation of opium, before the mid-nineteenth century. In the mid-Qing period, the nobles started noticing opium’s sedative effects and using it as a recreational drug. However, the rigid regulation of opium planting and selling made pushed up the price of opium on the market, and caused the flourish of opium smuggling. As described by a missionary who arrived in China by the same boat that carried opium, the smugglers, hired by the western companies, carried opium to China with ships, and deliver all their cargos to fast boats which Qing navy could hardly catch. Opium merchants would purchase opium with silver on the ship, and sell them in mainland China. These smuggling ships, equipped with light western weapons, could either escape or militarily resist, when being discovered by the navy fleets of Qing.5

The smuggling activities accelerated the expansion of the underground opium market in China, and made opium more accessible to Chinese people. Influenced by the nobles, some intellectuals and people from lower hierarchies started taking opium. Farmers and coolies who engaged in heavily laborious work quickly found the recreational drug useful to ease their physical pain.6 Opium smoking quickly emerged into a national-wide habit. The growth of

demand for opium in China demonstrated considerable potential in this market, which lured more foreign merchants into the smuggling business.

The opium smuggling started becoming a concern of the Qing government in the early eighteenth century, not only because of the harm of opium, but also because of the tremendous silver outflow caused by these activities. From the perspective of the Qing government, the health problems of individuals brought by opium were relatively minor, comparing to the harm opium done to the whole nation. In Qing, silver is the principal currency circulating, and a decreasing amount of silver in China would lead to economic recession, and fiscal problems. The capital outflow might direct cause the decrease of supply to armies, which Qing considered to be the base of the empire. The increasingly acute opium problem in China initiated a debate between two groups of Qing ministers.

Though both recognized the severity of the problem and the urgency of the issue, these ministers offered different solutions. Ministers, represented by Xu Naiji, sub-director of the sacrificial court, presented that it would be optimal for the government to legalize opium. In his memorial to the throne, Xu elaborated an opium-trade system in which the foreign opium merchants were only allowed to trade with Hong merchants in exchange for commodities, such as silk and porcelain, instead of silver or gold. As he proposed, there were three major benefits of this plan: first of all, the foreign merchants would trade under supervise which could make the opium under the control of government; second, the government could tax upon the trade which would increase financial income; thirdly, only permitting foreigners to get commodities from such trade would halt the silver outflow.

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7Jonathan and Cheng, 115. Zun Zhu, Memorial on Banning Opium, October 1836. The Hong merchants are a small group of merchants in Canton, China. They were the only merchants who had the licenses to trade with the foreigners in the Qing Empire. All foreign merchants who wanted to trade with Qing need to land in Canton and made deals with these merchants.
Plans, such as the one presented by Xu, encountered fierce attacks from ministers who condemned opium as evil goods, whose plantation, preparation, and consumption should definitely be banned in China. One of these ministers was Zhu Zun, a member of the council and the Board of Rites. In 1836, he submitted a memorial to Emperor Daoguang in which he indicated that the only way to prevent opium trade from harming the Qing Empire was to remove immediately the evil. He argued that a system, like Xu proposed, will not solve the problem, since when the commodities were not sufficient to pay the merchants, silver would still be used to pay, and silvers would be oozing away from China. Also, he suggested that opium was different from other merchandise in the trade with foreigners. It is a drug that “destroys human constitution”. Zhu and his colleagues warned that “if the opium continues pervading in China, there would not be healthy soldiers to defend the country, and not enough silver to support the army.”

Therefore, Zhu attempted to persuade the Emperor to outlaw all activities relating the opium trade, not only the trade with foreigners, but also opium preparation and smoking in China. To ensure the implementation of the prohibition, these ministers also suggested the emperor give harsh punishments to those who violate it.

As the debate continued, the success of Lin Zexu, the governor of Huguang, in eliminating opium in his jurisdiction greatly inspired Emperor Daoguang and considered it possible to implement anti-opium policies national-widely. Besides, Daoguang probably never expected the coming of a military conflict with the West. As the Emperor of Great Qing, he,

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8 礼部 The Board of Rites. It was one of the central ministries in the Qing Empire, which is responsible for censoring religious rites and ministers’ daily performance.
10 Ibid
11 People’s education press version textbook serial history for middle school students (8th Grade II)人教版课本初二历史书八年级下册初中教材教科书 8 年级下册历史 (Beijing: People’s Education Press, 2002).
12 Jonathan and Cheng, 117.
similar to his ancestors, had great confidence in his unbeatable cavalry. Therefore, from his perceptive, the conditions could not be worse. In 1838, Emperor Daoguang adopted the suggestions from the hardliners. In December 31st 1838, the Emperor named Lin Zexu, a provincial governor who promoted the anti-opium policies, the imperial envoy to supervise the suppression of opium in Qing Empire. When Lin arrived in Guangzhou, he confiscated the unsold opium British merchants stored in their warehouses, a destroyed them publicly in Humen, which the British government considered to be an act that prevented British subjects from profiting from legal trades. Even Queen Victoria expressed concerns over the issue and called it “a matter so deeply affecting the interests of my subjects and the dignity of my Crown” in her Annual Address to the House of Lords on 16 January 1840. After rounds of debates, British Parliament decided to launch a “justified” and “necessary” “measures of hostility” against China in 1840.

Being militarily defeated in the two opium wars, the Chinese government sought truce by punishing the anti-opium officers represented by Lin and Xu, and signing the Treaty of Tianjin in 1858, which legalized the opium trade between China and the western countries. After the legalization of the opium trade, the Qing government reversed the previous anti-opium policies by allowing domestic farms to cultivate opium poppies to compete with imported opium, and to mitigate silver outflow. It is noteworthy that some Chinese civil organizations and educated elites still maintained their anti-opium positions and educated the public of the harm of it. Nevertheless, the debate about the actual toxicity of opium continued, as opium smoking became

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13 Hansard of the British Parliament 1840s, 16 January 1840
a legal entertainment. Also, the government’s increasing reliance on the opium revenue rendered their efforts futile. Under the combined influence of domestic policies and increasing foreign import, the opium market in China experienced unprecedented flourish.

Motivations of Anti-Opium Crusaders

Western Christian missionaries started entering mainland China after the first opium war, when Christianity was first legalized by the Qing government. Since then, they became one of the most important channels connecting Chinese society with the outside world. Coming to the Far East, missionaries witnessed the prevalence of opium plantation and smoking in countries, such as China and India, and reported to the western world mainly through missionary publications. In their writings, missionaries expressed their distaste to opium and opium smoking, and attempted to unite the forces of Christians throughout the world to terminate this “morally indefensible” trade. Therefore, Kathleen L. Lodwick claimed that these missionaries were among the first westerners who realized the harm of opium, and the forerunners in this international anti-opium movement. In this age when the Chinese government retreated from the war against opium, missionaries, employing “all their influence with pen, with press and with tongue,” became the backbone of the anti-opium movement in China. Missionaries who engaged in the campaign against opium referred to themselves as “crusaders”. Claiming that they needed to lead the crusade against opium, the evil trade, these missionaries spent decades striving to eliminate opium in China. Though scholars, such as

16 Dikötter.
Lodwick, asserted that they were mostly motivated by the immorality of the trade, it is important to notice that the religious goals embedded in missionaries’ commitments and the factual benefits of promoting anti-opium campaign for the clergies. Missionaries considered the anti-opium movement to be more than a mere expedition against the evilness residing in China, but also a chance to sow the seeds of Christianity in this Far East country.

The emotional shock missionaries experienced when they first came to China and India should be a motivation that urged missionaries to participate in the anti-opium movement. As one of the first westerners entering China, these missionaries witnessed how prevailing opium smoking was in China as a habitual activity. As C.F. Harford claimed that one could “scarcely find a hamlet in which the opium pipe does not reign.” What shamed missionaries more was the fact that the ships transporting opium to China also carried them to this nation. Benefiting from this evil trade that they condemned made it more urgent for western missionaries to eliminate the devastated effects of opium on Chinese people. Thus, contributing to the anti-opium campaign was also a form of self-salvation for the clergies.

In addition to the moral motive, the tangible benefits anti-opium campaign could possibly bring to missionaries also urged them to act. The ultimate goal, for these clergies crossed oceans to China, was no other but to deliver Christian doctrines and implant Christianity in the Eastern land. Though the opium trade, as proclaimed by themselves, impeded the spread of God’s teachings, it also provided an opportunity for missionaries to interact more with Chinese civilians and officials, which promoted the development of Christianity in China.

In China, missionaries advocated that Gospel was an effective cure for opium addiction. According to their articles, the enlightenment and faith which Christianity granted the smokers

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20 Ibid, 108.
21 Lodwick, 35.
enabled them to quit opium-smoking. Rev. Farthing, a priest working in Taiyuanfu, recorded a case in which Wang Chengsui, an opium smoker, shook off the habit, because of Farthing’s preaching. As Rev. Farthing wrote, “apprehension of the truth of Christ made him ashamed of his opium habit” and “he would never take opium again.”\textsuperscript{22} From today’s perspective, Farthing was exaggerating the impact of Christianity to attract more support for the missionaries, because if opium addiction could be cured so easily, it would not have cursed Chinese for decades. Nevertheless, given that contemporary British knew little about opium and its effects, and that Chinese people received little scientific education, similar propaganda did help missionaries spread Christianity in China.

Also, their participation in the anti-opium movement enabled them to have more interactions with locals, win their trust, and persuade them to convert to Christianity. During this period, missionaries set up opium refuges in which they provided nutritious foods and sometimes medicines, such as the tonic pill, to the patients. For instance, according to a record from local hospital, the refuges in Taiyuan had accepted 135 Chinese opium smokers within ten months and successfully cured a large proportion of them. When staying in the refuges, local Chinese spent more time with missionaries, and some of them “came to Jesus,” after their stay.\textsuperscript{23} Moreover, by staying with and curing these “opium patients,” clergies gained increasing support from locals not only spiritually, but also practically. In the letter written by Rev. Farthing, he detailedly described how a blacksmith, who was previously addicted to opium and helped by Rev. Farthing,

\begin{footnotes}
\item[23] Ibid, 328.
\end{footnotes}
expressed his gratitude by providing spaces for worships.\textsuperscript{24} For these missionaries came from their distant hometown, the opium problem here provided a shortcut to their ultimate goal.

**The Crusade in Britain**

To promote their crusade, these missionaries attributed the opium problems mostly to Great Britain, the major opium exporter to China and also the nation whose navy crushed the gate of China. John Dudgeon, a missionary dwell in Beijing and Tianjin, was one of those clergies. He once argued that Chinese people are traditionally famous for abstinence, so it should be the influence of European culture that led this race to indulge in the mire of opium.\textsuperscript{25} Because of the portion Britain occupied in the trade, missionaries perceived persuading the British government to terminate the opium trade as the first step of the crusade.

In the late nineteenth century, missionaries were aware of the fact that both the British and Chinese governments were enticed by the profits derived from the opium trade, and would not spontaneously abandon it. Therefore, they sought help from the western society, in the hope that the British government would yield before public sentiments. The major way through which missionaries recruited supporters was writing anti-opium articles, and delivering speeches in public to arose public distaste to opium and add pressure on the Parliament. In their writings and manuscripts, two primary arguments were employed: the immoral and unchristian nature of the opium trade, and how the trade impeded the Christian missionary works in China.

In their works, missionaries condemned both the opium trade and smoking to be sinful and corruptive. Opium was introduced to the western world was a highly addictive drug that consumed smokers’ health, depleted their fortune, and corrupted their morality. As Rev. W.N.

\textsuperscript{24} Ibid, 364.  
\textsuperscript{25} Gao, 457.
Crozier wrote in his article, “opium using destroys its victims, soul and body,” and those who started taking opium could hardly abstain from it. Consequently, opium addiction would turn them into “slaves” to the evil.

Despite the harmful impacts opium exerted on the health of Chinese people, the economic burden that opium smoking added to smokers and their families, as missionaries claimed, was another reason why opium should be condemned evil. When attempting to support this argument, missionaries focused more on smokers who belonged to the lowest level of Chinese society, namely the artisans and coolies. Nevertheless, as stated before, opium-smoking was a luxury habit for contemporary Chinese and were common among the upper-class men as well. Presumably, smokers came from the lowest hierarchy, because there were much more lower-class men in the society. Also, this could be considered a method to appeal for emotion when advocating their anti-opium doctrines, since their desperate situations could evoke sympathy in the public more easily and accentuate the evilness of opium. According to missionaries’ records, artisans, who were among the “most moderate consumers” of opium, spent 6.5-15.5d daily on purchasing opium, which was a quarter to half of their daily income. These people, with some assets and deposits, could hardly preserve their savings, and experienced degradation in the hierarchical social system. Coolies, the unskilled labor forces, and sharecroppers suffered even more than the artisans. The morphine contained in opium made it a preferable painkiller for these men who engaged in highly intense labor works. According to a missionary report By Rev. W.N. Crozier, residents of some Chinese towns spent more money

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26 Crafts, Leitch, and Leitch, 115.
27 Ibid.
on opium than on rice, and even beggars “[went] without food in order to buy opium.”

However, their slender income could not afford regular opium smoking. Forced by the craving, they had to sell their properties to support their costly habits. During one trip to a village, one missionary recorded that “there was hardly a front door left that had not been torn away and sold to buy opium.” Therefore, Alford Jones indicated that the opium trade “makes every British subject that has a conscience left, blush when the subject is broached by a Chinese.”

Moreover, as indicated before, missionaries maintained that opium smoking wrecked one’s health, and, for these unskilled labors, losing physical wellness meant the loss of income, which mired their families in more severe poverty. The financial burdens and opium addiction forced some opium consumers to raise money in immoral ways. After selling out their assets, the some of the desperate smokers attempted to sustain smoking by selling their wives and children, which, as missionaries proposed, demonstrated the corruptive effects opium had on people’s morality. Other, smokers, who realized that they could not afford to smoke, engaged in illegal affairs and became robbers to raise money for opium. From the perspective of the western missionaries, these phenomena unveiled the evilness of opium and provided enough reasons for the believers in God to initiate a crusade against the evil trade.

Despite the harm opium caused on Chinese people, the Indian coolies, the planters and producers of opium, were also victims of the opium trade. As missionaries described, Indian farmers did not plant opium poppies voluntarily, since these plants were fragile when facing floods. Nevertheless, the revenue of producing and exporting opium blinded the local governors

29 Crafts, Leitch, and Leitch, 114.
31 Ibid, 261.
32 Ibid, 260.
who forced farmers to cultivate poppies. As the poppy plantations and factories enlarging in India, locals started getting addicted to this drug that they produced. According to the missionaries, the drug poisoned their producers no less than they harmed Chinese smokers. In areas, doctors prescribed opium for patients who got malaria, a prevailing deadly disease in India, but opium could not actually bring down their fever, but aggravated their symptoms.33

To further help westerners empathize with the people living on the other hemisphere, missionaries used to compare the harm of opium trade with that of slave trade, and liquor trade. In an address Hudson Taylor, the superintendent China Inland Mission, delivered at the Centenary Conference of the Protestant Mission of the World, he made the following statement:

“Oh, the evils of opium! The slave trade was bad; the drink is bad; the licensing of vice is bad; but the opium traffic is the sum of all villainies. It debauches more families than drink; it makes more slaves directly than the slave trade; and it demoralizes more sad lives than all the licensing systems in the world.”34

By making such comparison, Taylor was warning the Christian world of the danger of opium and reemphasizing the necessity to terminate the trade. Furthermore, by mentioning these evils prevailing in the West, missionaries attempted to recruit the supporters of the abolition movement and the temperance movement, both of which achieved substantial success in the nineteenth century, against the opium trade.

Despite the immorality of opium trade, the fact that the trade impeded the spreading of Christianity in China was another major argument used by missionaries to attract supporters for the anti-opium crusade in the western Society. As missionaries depicted, the opium trade adversely influenced how Chinese people viewed the Christian world. “It is your country that

34 Crafts, Leitch, and Leitch, 108.
sent us the opium’ is still the greeting China gives the English-speaking missionary.”

From a Chinese perspective, missionaries belong to the same group of people who came from the distant West, and sold opium to their country for silver. An article indicated that because the Christian missionaries were among the first westerners Chinese public encountered, the Englishmen were called “Christians alike by the Chinese.” Therefore, Christianity, to some degree, was linked with opium and the subsequent wars, in the mind of many Chinese. Such images, as claimed by some priests, triggered Chinese people’s resistance to Christianity, and prevented “one-third of the world” from accepting “the knowledge of salvation,” “Sabbaths,” “sanctuaries,” “Bibles,” and “hope of everlasting life.” By publishing these anti-opium articles on the western journals, these clergies aimed to catch the public attention against “the ignorance or indifference of British Christian which alone enables the British Government of India to carry on, and which powerfully neutralizes their efforts to carry the Gospel of Christ to many hundreds of millions of heathens and Mohammedans in China, India, and Malaysia.” Thus, the missionaries urged all Christians to “use heart, voice, and pocket to rid the world of this horrible habit,” not only because it could save “hundreds of thousands every year,” but also one’s support to the anti-opium movement, actually contributed to the spreading of Gospel in the Far East.

The Opium Debate and the Royal Commission on Opium

Though western missionaries in the nineteenth century and most scholars today were deeply convinced about the harmful effects of opium smoking, one needs to notice that there is

35 Ibid. 111.
36 Jones, 261.
39 Crafts, Leitch, and Leitch, 111.
no official conclusion about the toxicity of opium until even today. As mentioned in the introduction, historians, such as Frank Dikötter, were still arguing that opium smoking had influences far less severe than anti-opium activist claimed. Therefore, when missionaries were provocatively introducing the harmful effects and immorality of opium trade, the proponent of the trade attempted to rebut charges put on opium, and triggered a fierce debate in the contemporary western society.

In 1874, missionaries, together with their supporters in Britain, founded the Society for the Suppression of the Opium Trade, to lobby in the political arena against the continuation of the opium trade. In 1883, the SSOT submitted a petition to the House of Commons in which they detailedly addressed the indefensibility of opium trade and pleaded with the Parliament to terminate the business.\(^40\) In response to SSOT’s petition, William H. Brereton, a prominent pro-opium activist, gave several speeches which, from his perspective, unveiled the truth of opium which were deliberately distorted or disguised by the missionaries.

In his book, Brereton defended the trade by firstly stating that opium was not forced by Great Britain to China, so British people did not need to take responsibility for the prevalence of opium smoking in China. He began with a geographical and demographical introduction of China. By indicating that China is a vast empire in which “three hundred and sixty millions of people” separately dwelled, Brereton suggested that it was practically impossible for Chinese from different areas to “simultaneously adopt the practice of opium smoking when introduced by the despised foreigner.”\(^41\) The prevalence of such practice could only be a consequence of Chinese people’s voluntarily and domestic plantation, given the long history of opium plantation.

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\(^{41}\) Ibid, 28.
in China. Therefore, what British opium merchants did was participating in a market which was not initially created by them but by Chinese, the action which could not be condemned as immoral, and the Parliament should not halt it.

Secondly, in response to missionaries’ argument that opium has severe adverse effects on smokers’ physical and moral conditions, Brereton proposed that opium smoking was a kind of habit similar to alcohol drinking, and consuming a restrained amount of opium would not cause consequences as disastrous as described by missionaries. Brereton was a lawyer who once stayed in Hong Kong, an important opium port and a city with a number of opium consumers. Therefore, as he put it, his experiences in Hong Kong and personal interactions with opium smokers showed that opium did not influence human’s health. As he addressed, people’s negative images of opium and opium consumers were “owing to the false and exaggerated stories which have been disseminated by the advocates of the Anti-Opium Society.”\(^{42}\) One could hardly see the “swarms of wretched creatures, wan and wasted, leaning upon crutches, the victims of opium smoking” in Hong Kong.\(^{43}\) Also, the pro-opium activists cited the words from medical authorities, such as Doctor Philip B.C., the Inspector of Hospitals of Hong Kong, to demonstrate that opium smoking was “a luxury of a very harmless description.”\(^{44}\) Even though these opium defenders admitted that smoking opium in large quantity might indeed compromise one’s health condition, they stressed that “the excessive use or abuse” of anything might cause similar result, “a serious hindrance to its happy progress.”\(^{45}\) Thus, opium should be considered as normal as other commodities, and a free opium market should be protected.

\(^{42}\) Ibid, 22.

\(^{43}\) Ibid, 22.

\(^{44}\) Ibid, 19.

\(^{45}\) Ibid, 45. It’s from a letter written by Reverend F. Galpin, a missionary in Ningbo.
Finally, these proponents of the opium trade in the western world suggested that the fact that few people voiced their pro-opium opinion was not an indication of their dissent to the opium trade. As they proposed, British merchants were not willing to express supportive opinions was due to the fact that the business was monopolized by a few companies, and they could not profit from it. Moreover, Chinese people did not actually aim to end the opium business, but to expel British opium from China, so that they could eliminate foreign competitors, and control the market.\textsuperscript{46} Therefore, even when Great Britain stopped exporting opium from India to China, Chinese people’s opium smoking habit would not be eradicated, so the British Parliament should not demand the East India Company to end the profitable business.

The debate of opium lasted for years with neither side was willing to make a concession. When missionaries submitted petitions to the Parliament, pro-opium activists gave speeches hoping that the House of Commons would return the petitions back. Both sides devoted financial resources, and personal connections to lobby among the politicians, which attracted the attention of the British government, which decided to give thorough research on the opium trade. In 1894, the Royal Commission on Opium was established, but the founding of the Commission did not bring an end to the debate.

\textbf{The Commission Reports and the Anglo-Chinese Agreement on Opium}

In the year after its founding, the Commission travelled to India, interviewed more than seven hundred local residents, and visited several opium factories. According to available record, the Commission published at least two reports about the opium issue, which covered topics...
including the production, consumption, export, and health impacts of opium.\textsuperscript{47} However, though the report was considered comprehensive, the Commission did not visit China. Though some Chinese people received interviews, the report focused mostly on the Indian opium smoking habit, and seldom mentioned the conditions in China. Missionaries held high expectations on the reports, hoping that it could bring an end to the long lasting production and trade of opium. Nevertheless, the publication of the reports turned out to be one of the most severe setbacks that anti-opium crusaders had encountered.

In 1895, the Commission submitted its final report to the British Parliament. In this five-hundred-page report, the Commission indicated that the evidences gathered in the investigation conflicted with the testimonies of the missionaries. According to the report, while most of the missionaries believed opium smoking to be detrimental to people’s health, most of the government officials and the medical witnesses suggested that the opium should “be viewed in the same light of alcohol.”\textsuperscript{48} As shown in the report, when the Commission examined these conflicts, they considered the words from missionaries to be suspicious. By indicating most of the missionary witnesses who supported a total prohibition of the opium trade were “total abstainers and ardent workers in the cause,” the report implied that their arguments might be biased and should be reevaluated by the Parliament.\textsuperscript{49} At the end of the report, the Commission concluded that “the gloomy descriptions presented to British audiences of extensive moral and


\textsuperscript{49} Ibid, 93.
physical degradation by opium, have not been accepted by the witnesses representing the people of India, nor by those most responsible for the government of the country.”

The conclusion of the Reports initiated another round of debate among the opponents and proponents of the opium trade. One side criticized the Commission for being biased. Missionaries insisted that the Commission members overly focused on the evidences presented by the local governors who involved in the trade, so the issue should be reexamined. Nonetheless, pro-opium activists insisted that the Commission Report showed that anti-opium missionaries were exaggerating and fabricating the harm of opium. Though the political lobbying and opium debate again reached a stalemate, the anti-opium movement gradually became an international topic, during this period. The thriving of colonialism enabled missionaries to spread Christianity in a broader world. Being the pioneers of the Christian world, they believed that they held the responsibility to educate native races with Gospel. Summoned by such sense of mission, in 1893, an international anti-opium Christian organization was founded in the United States. The International Reform Bureau perceived the native races as “child civilizations” and urged the western world to fulfil its “parental responsibility” by putting an end to harmful business, such as opium, liquor, and slave trades, helping natives quit unchristian habits, and reforming “uncivilized” colonial areas. The International Reform Bureau actively engaged in the “civilizing” missions, and played a significant role in the Chinese anti-opium movement, which would be discussed in the next Chapter.

In the first decade of the twentieth century, the global anti-opium movement achieved one of its milestones. In 1907, the British government started negotiation with the Qing

50 Ibid. 94.
51 “History of the International Reform Bureau,” Twentieth Century Quarterly, Magazine Series, 2, no. 3 (December 21, 1902).
government about ending the opium trade, and the two sides finally reached a consensus in 1908, and signed the Anglo-Chinese Agreement on Opium. One year later, representatives from thirteen nations met in Shanghai to discuss the opium problem, which built the foundation for the signing of the International Opium Convention signed in Hague in 1912. These successes led the anti-opium movement into the next phase, in which western missionaries shifted their attention from arousing international concern over the immorality of the opium trade to eradicating opium in China.
Chapter II: Edward Thwing’s Anti-Opium Crusade

On December 9, 1909, Da gong bao, one of the most popular Chinese newspapers, published a letter from the International Reform Bureau in Washington (IRB). In the letter, the author introduced the tenets of his organization and acquainted Chinese people with the representative of the Reform Bureau to China, Edward Thwing. First founded in 1893, the International Reform Bureau aimed at promoting “those Christian reforms on which the churches sociologically unite while theologically differing.” The organization quickly expanded its global influence by founding subdivisions in South and East Asia. They persuaded locals to convert to Christianity not only by preaching in public, but also Christianizing the whole society. Reforming unchristian habits and traditions of the locals, they hoped to transform colonies into modern societies in the western model. Among all the habits, opium smoking was perceived as the one with greatest harm. Therefore, as written in Organ of International Reform Bureau, prohibiting opium and intoxicants was “indeed the Bureau’s most frequent theme.”

In the first decade of the twentieth century, the International Reform Bureau decided to launch a crusade in the country with the greatest population in the world, China. Edward Thwing’s previous missionary work experience in China made him one of the most competitive candidates for leading the Bureau in China. Similar to many other missionaries, Thwing was first influenced by the Third Great Awakening, a historical period in America characterized by increasing missionary works abroad, and came to China in 1887. In the following thirteen years,

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1 “History of the International Reform Bureau,” Twentieth Century Quarterly, Magazine Series, 2, no. 3 (December 21, 1902).
2 Ibid.
he had preached in different cities and taught in one school.3 During his stay in China, Thwing dedicated to studying Chinese culture and classics, which enabled him to gain a comprehensive understanding of this foreign society, detect problems embedded in the contemporary system, and communicate directly with the public. After he was reassigned to China in 1908, Thwing’s appreciation of Chinese culture allowed him to be embraced by the public as both a Christian missionary, and a foreign friend.

Consulting the examples of other subdivisions of the International Reform Bureau in Asia, Thwing promoted his reforms by first establishing the International Reform Bureau in Tianjin. Through the organization, Thwing aimed to modernize Chinese society in a western way. The changes he hoped to bring to China covered nearly every perspective of the daily lives of Chinese people. The organization prohibited all its members from concubinage, gambling, early marriage, footbinding, drinking alcohol, purchasing slave labors, and participating in the prostitution business.4

Among all these reforms, the anti-opium campaign had always been Thwing’s primary concern. Staying in China for years, he witnessed the soaring of opium-smokers, and the deteriorating situation there. As he indicated, “several decades ago, only ten to twenty percent of Chinese people consumed opium, while now about forty to fifty percent of the population is smoking opium.”5 Aiming to eliminate this societal evil and facilitate his reforms in this nation,

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4 Edward Thwing, “中国改良会发轫伊始 (The Start of Chinese Reform Bureau),” Da gong bao, July 18, 1910, 中国近代报刊《大公报》.
5 Edward Thwing, “论中国人民之三大害 (Discuss Three Harmful Things to Chinese People),” Da gong bao, May 22, 1910, 中国近代报刊《大公报》. In the article, Thwing apparently exaggerated the severity of the opium problem in China. The actual percentage could not be so high. However, exaggerating statistics was a prevalent technic employed by some anti-opium activists to attract public attention.
Thwing adopted a serial of strategies, such as uniting local gentries and intellectuals, who had long been opposed to opium, communicating with the public via Chinese social media, and maintaining connections with Chinese governments. The adoption of all these methods collectively made Thwing an influential public figure, national reform leader, and successful Christian missionary in China.

**Beneficial Connections with Elite**

As mentioned above, Thwing, when founding the International Reform Bureau in Tianjin, consulted experiences of other divisions in Asia. However, the Bureau he founded in China was fundamentally different from other societies in that Thwing cooperated with local elites extensively. China differed from other Asian countries in that it, though militarily defeated by the western powers, was not colonized. Therefore, both the Qing government and local elites preserved their dominant influence over social issues. Understanding the situational difference, Thwing did not choose to assemble council consisted exclusively of western missionaries, like other Bureaus in Asia did. As *Da gong bao* described, on July 4, 1910, Thwing and twenty other Chinese representatives, among whom were local gentries, businessmen, scholars, and journalists, met in Tianjin to discuss the general principles, and elected seven board members. Within the following month, these members met for three times and decided the detailed articles and regulations of the Reform Bureau. In the committee, Chinese representatives not only outnumbered missionaries, but also participated in the making of regulation.

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6 Wilbur Crafts, Mary Leitch, and Margaret Leitch, *Intoxicating Drinks & Drugs in All Land And Times*, revised 11th edition (US: The International Reform Bureau, 1911). The International Reform Bureau set subdivisions in numerous countries and areas, such as Assam, Burma, Ceylon, India, and some African countries.

7 Edward Thwing, “中国改良会发轫伊始 (The Start of Chinese Reform Bureau),” *Da Gong Bao*, July 18, 1910, 中国近代报刊《大公报》.
Besides, Thwing, when expanding the Reform Bureau, deemphasized the religious aspect of the organization, which was ostensibly contradictory to the original intention of the International Reform Bureau. There was no indication in the official documents that the organization was connected with the Church or Christianity, and one did not need to convert to Christianity in order to become a member of the organization.\(^8\) Besides, Thwing himself also omit to mention his identity as a missionary or the connection between the Reform Bureau and the Christian Church, when giving speech in public. The lack of primary resources makes it hard for modern scholars to analyze if he indeed wanted to construct the International Reform Bureau as a non-religious organization in China, or he adopted the strategy to further spread Christianity in a long run. However, from a result-oriented perspective, deemphasizing the Christian connections refrained the organization from excluding Chinese people who had stereotype over western religions, and gave the society more growth potential.

Though Thwing did not attempt to model himself as a dedicated missionary in front of the public, he actively utilized advantage of being a foreigner and a Christian to connect with Chinese elites. During the late Qing period, the Chinese government sent some students to western countries and Japan to study science and technologies, who, when coming back, assumed important positions in both government and private businesses. These international students admired western social system attempted to reform China, which made them firm allies of Thwing. Additionally, Thwing utilized his identity as a foreign missionary to build friendship with Chinese Christian elites, one of whom was Ying Lianzhi, the founder of the prominent

newspaper, *Da gong bao*. Thwing’s personal connection with journalists, such as Ying, and media factually facilitated the expansion of the Reform Bureau in China, which will be elaborated later in this Chapter.

**The Assistant and Supervisor of Governments**

When Thwing was appointed by the International Reform Bureau and arrived at China, China and Britain had already been negotiating about the Anglo-Chinese Agreement. According to the draft of the Agreement, China needs to prove its determination to end the opium trade by prohibiting domestic opium consumption and plantation in ten years. Thus, Thwing concentrated his work on opium suppression, and helping the Chinese government to fulfill its duties. During this period, he constructed cooperative relationships between the International Reform Bureau and the Chinese governments, both the Qing and, later, the Republic government. These relationships ensured that their anti-opium campaign was backed, or at least not impeded, by the governments. When the Qing government was still in power, Thwing cooperated with individual members in the Advisory Council, who were mostly progressive reformists. When the Xinhai Revolution successfully overthrew the governance of Qing and established the new Republic in 1912, cooperation between the new government and Thwing became more extensive, due to their mutually beneficial relationship.

In December 1910, the Qing government, with the support of Thwing and a group of nationalist senators, founded the National Anti-Opium Society (NAOA) to assist local officials in implementing the opium suppression policies. The NAOA is the earliest united civil anti-

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9 Ibid
10 The Advisory Council (Zizhengyuan) was a preparatory body for the establishment of parliament setup by the Qing government in 1910.
opium organization in China. This society later became one of the bases of Chinese anti-opium society and stimulated the progress of Chinese anti-opium campaign. Nevertheless, when they started constructing the NAOA, a number of central cities had already established their own local anti-opium organizations. Believing that such anti-opium society could only effectively perform their duties when they were united, Thwing and his colleagues in the International Reform Bureau went on a trip to seven major cities and six southern provinces to “go through the procedure for the merger of local anti-opium societies.”

Contemporary media, Da gong bao’s editors referred his trip as “an expedition,” highly appreciated his efforts and indicated that the work of Thwing was honorable. Thwing’s works facilitated the consolidation of regional anti-opium organizations, which enabled the National Anti-Opium Association to expand its scale and influence in China. Simultaneously, the local anti-opium organizations were also able to get more resources to further their anti-opium activities, because of their connections with the National Anti-Opium Association.

The cooperative relationship between the Thwing and the Qing government did not last for long. On October 10th 1911, the Xinhai Revolution burst in Wuchang and the Qing government quickly lost control over the empire. In January 1st 1912, the Republic of China was founded in Nanjing, which was not only a critical point in the history of modern China but also a turning point in the anti-opium movement that Thwing and his local allies were promoting. After 1912, Thwing’s interaction with the government became more frequent and the government’s support to Thwing’s anti-opium campaign increased as Thwing had more involvement in Chinese politics and diplomacy.

11 “改良会远征继闻 (Further information about the International Reform Bureau’s Expedition),” Da gong bao, September 9, 1911, 中国近代报刊《大公报》.
12 “改良会之远征 (About International Reform Bureau’s Expedition),” Da Gong Bao, September 6, 1911, 中国近代报刊《大公报》.
As an American, Thwing probably had an innate preference for the Republic government rather than the imperial one. In 1911, not long after the Provisional Government of the Republic of China was founded in Nanjing, Thwing submitted a petition to the Qing government trying to persuade the emperor to abdicate, which laid the foundation for the later cooperations between the Reform Bureau and the Republic government in the anti-opium movement.  

Thwing’s cooperation with the revolutionists and the Republic government began when Sun Yat-sen was leading the revolution. Some documents even indicate that their cooperative relationship could be traced to a time when Sun was still preparing for the revolution, and Thwing joined the Tongmenghui, a secret society founded by Sun to resist the governance of Qing. Nevertheless, since the accountability of these materials can hardly be verified, this thesis will start studying their cooperation after 1912. When Sun just assumed office as the Provisional President of the Republic of China, Thwing wrote a letter to him to inquire the attitude of the newly founded republic to the anti-opium movement. In reply to Thwing, Sun wrote: “Because of the turmoil now in China, the government might not be able to implement the opium suppression policies as stringent. I feel sorry about that. Once the government became stable, we would definitely eradicate this toxin.” In March, Sun appointed Thwing as the anti-opium consultant for the Republic government, which was the first time when Thwing assumed an office in the Chinese government.

13 “广西 桂督电告禁烟事宜 (Governor of Guangxi Teleported to Inform Anti-Opium Movement),” Da gong bao, May 12, 1912, 中国近代报刊《大公报》.
14 “Edward Thwing,” accessed April 10, 2019, https://baike.baidu.com/item/%E4%B8%81%E4%B8%81%E4%B9%89%E5%8D%8E/4022966.
Even though Sun did not stay in power for long, because Yuan Shikai soon succeeded him as the President of the Republic of China, Thwing’s cooperation with the government did not terminate. For Thwing, it was an opportunity to further the anti-opium movement, since Yuan was one of the former officials of Qing who ardently emphasized the importance of eradicating opium. Thwing became a firm ally to Yuan, and received unprecedented support from the central government of China. When the International Reform Bureau was holding its three year anniversary, President Yuan sent a representative to express his appreciation to the efforts of Bureau and Thwing himself.\(^16\) Moreover, when replying to Thwing’s inquire about the anti-opium policies, Yuan gave high praise over Thwing’s contributions and promised to implement the opium suppression stringently.\(^17\) On the other hand, Thwing started actively promoting the progress of the American-Chinese diplomatic relationship. Several years after Yuan took control of the Republic government, Thwing wrote a letter to the International Reform Bureau and the government of the United States hoping that the U.S. could recognize the Republic of China as the legitimate government of China and establish diplomatic relation with it.\(^18\) It is reasonable to assume that the mutual benefit relationship contributed to the thrive of the International Reform Bureau in China, and explained how Thwing got support from the Republic government.

With the support of the central government, the International Reform Bureau was able to perform more substantial tasks. As indicated before, eradicating domestically planted opium was the major task during this period. However, it is noteworthy that furious confrontations existed

\(^{16}\) “陆外长有赴英消息 (Minister of Diplomacy Lu Sent Information about the Trip to Britain),” *Da gong bao*, March 22, 1912, 中国近代报刊《大公报》.

\(^{17}\) “短讯 (Short Message),” *Da gong bao*, March 23, 1912, 中国近代报刊《大公报》.

\(^{18}\) “美借款将签字之密耗 (Information about the Signing of Loaning Treaty with America),” *Da gong bao*, October 26, 1912, 中国近代报刊《大公报》.
beneath the cooperative relationship between the Reform Bureau and the local Chinese
governments. Different from their previous works, terminating domestic opium plantation
touched the core of this trade, and threatened the vested interests of the participants in the trade.
As indicated in the *History of China’s Opium Suppression Laws and Regulations*, the farmers
even tried to protect their opium seeds and poppies with violence.\(^\text{19}\) Also, because opium tax
became one of the major sources of local financial revenue, some local officials cooperated with
the opium planter and violated the orders issued by the central government.\(^\text{20}\)

At this time, the function of the Reform Bureau as “a supervisor to the public and
government officials” became increasingly significant.\(^\text{21}\) The subdivisions of the Reform Bureau
formed a national-wide information net, through which the main Bureau in Tianjin could follow
up on how the opium suppression policies were implemented. When the local governments
showed reluctance to fulfill their duties or the officials were working inefficiently, local branches
of the Reform Bureau would report the situation to the main Bureau which would subsequently
seek assistance from the central government. As shown in the case of Yuhua, the local governor
intentionally ignored the opium fields protected by the gentries and bandits. After their protests
were ignored, the local branch reported the conditions to the main Bureau. Facing the pressure
from central government, the governor finally sent an army to wipe out the poppies.\(^\text{22}\)

Nevertheless, the pressure from the Reform Bureau sometimes caused distaste from the
officials. Thwing once demanded an official who was found smoking opium to burn his
paraphernalia in public to show his willingness to abstain from opium. However, the official,

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\(^\text{19}\) Ende Yu, 中国禁烟法令变迁史 *History of China’s opium suppression laws and regulations* (Shanghai, 1934).
\(^\text{21}\) “美商致改良会书 (American Businessmen’s Letter to the Reform Bureau),” *Da gong bao*, May 08, 1911, 中国近
代报刊《大公报》.
\(^\text{22}\) “关于禁烟之电报 (Telegram about Eradicating Opium),” *Da gong bao*, July 16, 1913, 中国近代报刊《大公报》.
despite having promised to do so, did not keep his word. After being asked repeatedly, he warned Thwing that “being too serious about the issue might make the government uncomfortable which could impede the anti-opium movement in the future.”

Though resistance in various kind persisted as the anti-opium campaign progressed, the early years of the Republic of China was the heyday of Thwing’s work and the campaign. Most of the governors, at least officially, prohibited opium plantation and smoking, and annually reported the progress of eliminating opium plantation in their districts to the central government.

**Convincing Chinese with Chinese**

By the time Thwing arrived in China, opium smoking had already become a prevailing societal habit in China, which made him realize that all anti-opium attempts would be futile, without educating the public properly. To promote the crusade, he devoted time and energy to picturing the evil effects of opium smoking in a way that he believed Chinese could understand, and presenting the image to the public, through speeches and media. Thwing took advantage of his understanding of Chinese culture and friendship with local intellectuals both of which permitted him to adopt public relation schemes that might be available to other missionaries to communicate with the public.

One of the schemes that contributed to Thwing’s success in promoting the anti-opium movement was that he abandoned traditional channels through which missionaries advocated their beliefs, and had more cooperation with Chinese local newspapers. Traditionally, western

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23 “关于禁烟之电报（Teleport about the Anti-Opium Movement International Reform Bureau’s Letter to the Main Bureau),” Da gong bao, March 29, 1913, 中国近代报刊《大公报》.
24 “万国改良会禁烟答 (The Answers of the International Reform Bureau about Quiting Opium),” Da gong bao, August 19, 1912, 中国近代报刊《大公报》. “万国改良会禁烟答(续) (Following: The Answers of the International Reform Bureau About Quiting Opium),” Da gong bao, August 20, 1912, 中国近代报刊《大公报》.
missionaries wrote on foreign publications exclusively, and most of their works were presented in English. For these missionaries, the target readers were westerners or westernized Chinese elites who were more willing to convert to Christianity and support Christian missions. Nonetheless, such practice limited the social influences of missionaries, and, thereby, was not suitable for facilitating anti-opium movement. As indicated before, Thwing maintained friendships with Chinese media leaders, whom helped him break the boundaries that constrained westerners in China. During his days in China, Thwing gave speeches in various situations and wrote numerous articles to advocate the opium suppression movement. He published a large number of these writings and speech scripts on widely-circulating newspapers, such as Da gong bao and Shen bao, whose readers were mostly educated Chinese. These publications which were owned by progressive Chinese social reformists were inclined to cooperate with foreigners who could provide news sources and help expand their influences in foreign concessions. Consequently, the mutually beneficial relationship created long-term fruitful cooperation.

Secondly, Thwing’s comprehensive understanding of Chinese society enabled him to understand the perceptual differences between westerners and Chinese people. Even though western physicians in the early twentieth century had already gained a basic understanding of how opium made people addict to it and the mechanism of how it wreaked one’s health, the majority of Chinese people could hardly understand explanations given by westerners, because the medical system in China developed along a quite different track from the that of western science. Therefore, even though Thwing worked as a physician in a hospital in China, he did not attempt to describe how opium poisoned people’s organs in a way that made sense to Western science. Instead he chose to focus on his communications with his patients and also how opium influenced the lives of these people.
Additionally, in order to strengthen his arguments and make them more acceptable to Chinese people, Thwing, utilized his knowledge of Chinese culture and cited Chinese classics to demonstrate the immorality of opium smoking to the public. Thwing criticized consuming opium to be contradictory to Confucian doctrines and an unfilial action. As he indicated, Confucianism emphasized the criticality of Xiushen which means “maintaining oneself.” The notion includes both maintaining one’s physical, and mental wellbeing. Because consuming opium, as Thwing suggested, not only “harmed the organ and compromised the functions of people’s bodies” but also “slowed the mind and lowered the intelligence of smokers,” opium-smoking was opposite to what the Confucian sages would discourage people from engaging.\(^{25}\) Furthermore, Thwing introduced the notion of filiality into the discussion of opium. He argued that intaking opium violated the standards of being filial recorded in Xiao Jing, the Book of Filial Piety. According to Xiao Jing, one’s body was given by its parents, so one should never harm themselves. Therefore, Thwing contended that since intaking opium apparently harmed one’s health, it should be condemned as an unfilial action. Filiality is a critical notion to Chinese culture, and Confucians claimed it to be the “highest virtue among all” that one can have. Thus, Thwing’s critic of opium smokers was quite serious and powerful, since being unfilial is one of the most severe moral sins in Chinese culture.

As the president of the International Reform Bureau, gathering support from the public was significant and one of the core tasks of Thwing’s work, because increases in followers also brought growth in donation and prestige. Uniting the patriotic force of the whole nation, according to Thwing, was the only way through which opium could be eliminated in China.\(^{26}\)

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\(^{25}\) Edward Thwing, “修身 (Maintaining Oneself),” Da gong bao, April 17, 1910, 中国近代报刊《大公报》.

\(^{26}\) Edward Thwing, “中国改良会发韧伊始 (The Start of Chinese Reform Bureau),” Da gong bao, July 18, 1910, 中国近代报刊《大公报》.
Therefore, Thwing attempted to attract followers by claiming that participating in the anti-opium movement was actually a representation of patriotism. In a petition letter Thwing submitted to the Ministry of Diplomacy in 1913, he referred opium smoking as “a stain” on the international fame of China, and summoned nationalists to wash off it by showing the determinations to expunge opium from China permanently. Moreover, the anti-opium movement was advocated by Thwing as a chance to reform and modernize China. From his perspective, it could be viewed as a time when the patriotic forces could unite to defend the sovereignty of the country, and a moment when China could cast its old shell of being an ancient empire, and present itself as a vibrant young nation in front of the world.

The Reform Bureau also, to attract public attention and further provoke the nationalist sentiments, organized opium burnings in major cities as a demonstration of its determination to eliminate opium. This ritual originated from Lin Zexu’s burning of opium in Humen, which triggered the Opium War, and was, since then, considered to be a patriotic rite. When opium and smoking equipment were confiscated by or submitted to the government, the International Reform Bureau sometimes would encourage government destroyed them in public. The Bureau, simultaneously, would utilize its connections with media to invite citizens to witness the burning, which, as them perceived, could boost Chinese morale against opium smoking.

Furthermore, to facilitate the recruitment and summon more support, Edward Thwing tried to model himself as a Chinese nationalist. As the International Reform Bureau in Washington stated in the introduction letter, “Thwing’s love to China is as deep as his love for

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27 Edward Thwing, “民国禁烟尤放弃约权耶(Should the Republic Forgive the Right to Revise Agreement),” Da gong bao, April 17, 1913, 中国近代报刊《大公报》.
his homeland, America. Even though these words can be regarded as an advertising strategy of the Reform Bureau, Thwing was indeed considered by many Chinese to be a Chinese nationalist. Similar to many missionaries came to China in that era, Thwing gave himself a Chinese name 丁义华 Ding Yihua which means brotherhood with China. The name directly indicated how he presented himself in front of Chinese people. Furthermore, in his letters and speeches published on newspapers, Thwing kept referring himself as “兄弟” (XiongDi), a word whose directly translation in English is “brother”, and also frequently used by Chinese to address close friends with similar goals. By employing these vocabularies that showed intimacy, Thwing tried to prove to Chinese people his close tie to this foreign country, and his enthusiasm for anti-opium movements. By keeping reinforcing Thwing’s picture as an international friend and a Chinese nationalist, the International Reform Bureau was able to expand its influence rapidly and emerged as one of the most influential civil organizations in some major Chinese cities.

An Active Messenger between China and the West

In that age when the public media could not convey much information, missionaries burdened the responsibilities to introduce the two worlds to each other, and the works of Thwing in the anti-opium movement demonstrated the significance of missionaries’ roles. During the days in China, Thwing kept publishing articles on western newspapers which informed the western society of the social changes in China, and one of these important changes was the anti-

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28 International Reform Bureau in Washington, “万国改良会启 (From the International Reform Bureau),” Da gong bao, April 17, 1913, 中国近代报刊《大公报》.
29 Edward Thwing, “演说 禁烟的进步 (Speech: The Progress of Anti-opium Movement),” Da gong bao, April 17, 1913, 中国近代报刊《大公报》.
opium movement. Due to Thwing’s identity as a Christian clergy, some of his articles connected the anti-opium crusade with Christian concepts, such as fighting against evilness, which could evoke the empathy of westerners and enabled Thwing to raise funds for the International Reform Bureau. According to the amount of foreign donation the International Reform Bureau published in the newspaper, it was one of the major financial sources that supported the daily operations of the Bureau, which also demonstrated the effectiveness of Thwing’s propaganda in the western world.

These foreign patronages not only economically bolstered the progress of Chinese anti-opium movement, but also boosted the morale of the anti-opium fighters in China. By mentioning the kindness and contributions of these foreign patrons, Thwing and editors of Chinese newspapers aimed to stimulate the domestic anti-opium zeal in China. “My fellow Chinese need to consider this,” Thwing wrote in a public letter, “these foreigners are willing to protest against their own people and harm the interest of their countries, because Chinese people were hurt by opium and cigarettes. Shouldn’t we unite together and abstain from opium?” By describing westerners’ enthusiastic engagement in the anti-opium movement, he called Chinese people to abstain from opium smoking spontaneously.

Furthermore, Thwing and the International Reform Bureau acted as observers which assisted the Chinese government to prove its determination to suppress opium to the international community. Though the British government signed the Anglo-Chinese Agreement, the world was still questioning if the Chinese government intended to eliminate opium thoroughly or to profit by monopolizing the opium market. Consequently, the agreement included an item in

30 “美商致改良会书 (American Businessmen’s Letter to the Reform Bureau),” Da gong bao, May 08, 1911, 中国近代报刊《大公报》.
31 Edward Thwing “外国人彼此反对 (Foreigners Arguing against Each Other),” Da gong bao, August 23, 1910, 中国近代报刊《大公报》.
which specified that if and only if China could eradicate domestic opium, Britain would stop exporting opium through India to China. To supervise Chinese government’s work, dependable observers should be assigned to China, and the International Reform Bureau, as a third party, was one of the agencies that took the responsibility.

Contemporarily, the Reform Bureau had already grown into an influential national organization. With the national influence and connection with governments, they, comparing to other organizations, had more access to first-hand data relating to opium issues in China. The branches in different cities collected information from local governments or direct researches, and the main Bureau in Tianjin gathered all these data and compile them into reports. Taking its advantage as a long-established organization, the Reform Bureau could generate more comprehensive reports than other observers sent by the International Opium Conference, and provide more dependable data than what the Chinese government submitted. With these data, the Bureau provided help Chinese government present the progress of domestic anti-opium movement and show China’s determination to eliminate opium. As an international non-governmental organization, the Reform Bureau channeled China with the international society, when the western world prevailingly considered China to be an unenlightened nation.

Moreover, Thwing utilized his position as an international observer to strive for China’s rights to revise the Anglo-Chinese Opium Agreement and terminate the opium trade. In 1912, shortly after the signing of the International Opium Convention, Thwing suggested President Yuan to negotiate with British diplomats and revise the terms in the Agreement, and shorten the duration in which Britain could export opium. Believing that the time had come to “expel opium
from China and restore the sovereignty,” Thwing also connected with the Anti-Opium Society in Britain in the hope that they could persuade the British Parliament and facilitate the renegotiation.

A Foreign Missionary and Chinese Nationalist

Thwing expressed his disgust towards opium consumption undisguisedly in his works. “Opium has been poisoning China for more than a century,” he claimed, “it wreaked the nation and harmed its people.” Also, he compared opium smoking with other morally destructive habits, such as drinking alcoholic beverages, to demonstrate that consuming opium was “the head of all sins.” From 1908 when Thwing came to China to the early 1920s, Thwing spent more than ten years in China to further the anti-opium movement, and also to spread Christianity. Under his lead, the International Reform Bureau emerged as a national civil organization which had extensive cooperation with local elites, and central government.

Thwing’s cooperation with Chinese intellectuals and successful advertising strategies made him an important figure to study in the anti-opium movement. When studying his activities in China, we can tell how his connection with media facilitate his works. By publishing articles and delivering speech in public, Thwing modeled him as an international friend and a Chinese nationalist, who came to help reform the society. With such an image, he won the trust from both the public and the Chinese government. Especially after the fall of Qing, Thwing, utilizing his

32 “总统府集议禁烟进行案 (President Held Meeting about Contemporary Opium Suppression),” Da Gong Bao, January 18, 1913, 中国近代报刊《大公报》; Edward Thwing, “民国禁烟尤放弃约权耶(Should the Republic Forgive the Right to Revise Agreement),” Da gong bao, April 17, 1913, 中国近代报刊《大公报》.
33 “来稿 (Contribution),” Da Gong Bao, January 23, 1913, 中国近代报刊《大公报》.
34 Edward Thwing, “论中国人民之三大害 (Discuss Three Harmful Things to Chinese People),” Da gong bao, May 22, 1910, 中国近代报刊《大公报》.
special identity, maintained a friendly relationship with the Republic government which allowed the International Reform Bureau to expand its influence. Furthermore, by connecting the anti-opium campaign with notions such as nationalism and patriotism, Thwing united a group of Chinese reformists, attracted domestic patronages, and recruited members for his organization, all of which substantially accelerated the anti-opium campaign.
Chapter III: The Retreated Missionaries

Introduction:

In 1916, a team of British diplomats, surveyors, and translators marched into the inland provinces of China in the accompany of missionaries and Chinese officials. They came abroad to testify if the Chinese government had fulfilled its promise, and to witness a great milestone in the fight against addictive drugs. The survey team went into mountainous areas in remote provinces and examined farmlands which once used to cultivate opium. After thorough examination, on March 31st, 1917, major newspapers in China published the news that Great Britain agreed to keep its promises by putting an end to the decades-long opium trade.

From 1907 to 1917, the western missionaries and their allies in the anti-opium crusade had achieved undeniable successes. In one the decade, both the Qing government and the Beiyang government had rigidly implemented anti-opium policies to ensure that opium plantation in China could be eliminated on schedule. Eradicating opium plantations, destroying poppy seeds, and managing opium business, Chinese governments exhibited an unprecedented determination to uproot the drug, which the western societies had not anticipated. Even scholars today, such as Edward Slack, appear surprised by the accomplishment achieved by the morbid governments of this fractured country.¹ In 1917, after examining the implementation of Beiyang government’s opium planting prohibition policies, Great Britain, according to the Ten-Year Agreement, terminated the legal opium business between India and China which had lasted for sixty years.

From 1858, when the opium trade was legalized in China, to 1917, the anti-opium crusaders could finally foresee the doom of the evilness that had haunted China for a century. For them, Great Britain was a symbol nation for the opium trade, because it was not only the greatest profiteer in the business but also the starter of the two Opium Wars. Therefore, western missionaries, as stated before, had paid special effort to dissuade the British Parliament from continuing the trade, since the mid-nineteenth century, and assist Chinese governments to manage opium smoking, and eradicate domestic opium planting.

Facing the triumph, western missionaries were not, however, fully, satisfied with the great success. Instead, they strived to persuade the government to negotiate similar treaties with other exporters and bring an end to the Chinese opium business. For example, in 1920, Edward Thwing telegraphed the central government urging the government to seek negotiation with Japanese and Portuguese ambassadors about the opium trade.² They knew that the Chinese government’s performance of the Ten-Year Agreement earned it enough credibility in the international society that it would be able to reach similar agreements with other major opium exporting nations. Shortly after Britain agreed to cease exporting opium to China, the Beiyang government sought to put an end to all international opium business with China and achieved substantial progresses.³

However, the subsequent anti-opium movement did not unfold as western missionaries expected. In the 1920s, China entered one of its most chaotic periods in its modern history. Weakened central government, relatively independent local military forces, and endless civil wars brought not only sufferings to the civilians, but also challenges to the anti-opium

² “丁义华请禁烟 向日葡交涉 (Edward Thwing Plead the Government for Anti-Opium Negotiations with Japan and Portugal),” Da gong bao, May 17, 1920, 中国近代报刊《大公报》.
³ Ende Yu, 中国禁烟法令变迁史 History of China’s opium suppression laws and regulations (Shanghai, 1934). P123
movement. Facing the split of an anti-opium central government and the rising of warlords who relied on opium trades, missionaries struggled to maintain their influences and promote the campaign by lobbying among local warlords, and evoking public hatred against opium. Nevertheless, when the New Culture Movement and the anti-Christian Movement weakened the social influences of foreign Christian missionaries, their leading positions in the campaign could hardly persist. Without firm support from the public, the missionaries could no longer serve as supervisors over the governments’ anti-opium policies, when the Nationalist Party gained control of the central government.

**Origin of Turmoil**

The origin of the Chinese political chaos in the 1920s could be traced back to the late Qing period. After the two Opium Wars, the Qing government realized the drawbacks in its traditional military policies, and promoted a series of military reforms by encouraging local generals to assemble militias and employ westernized methods to train them. These generals became an important force in late Qing politics and their influence persisted in the Beiyang Era. After Puyi abdicated as Qing emperor, and the Republic of China was founded in 1912, Yuan Shikai, the most powerful of the generals, was elected by the Congress as the President of the new Republic. Because of Yuan’s military forces and his prestige, local generals nominally acknowledged their loyalty to the Republic, but did not relinquish their control over the armies. In 1915, President Yuan attempted to transform the Beijing Republican government into a constitutional monarchial government. In December 1915, Yuan Shikai crowned himself as the emperor, and declared the founding of the Empire of China. Such a decision encountered the resistances of local military leaders. From their perspective, Yuan’s move could be considered as
a betrayal of the Republic and the revolution, which gave them a reason to rise against him, and try to seize control of the central government. Consequently, they refused to admit the legitimacy of Yuan’s government, stopped taking orders from the central government, and some revolted against the empire.

Though Yuan subdued the rebellion, his empire only survived for 83 days. He died on June 6 1916. After his death, no single person could overpower and lead the local warlords, and thus, China entered the Warlord Era. During this period, major warlords waged wars against each other to expand their spheres of influences, which resulted in the alternative control of the nominal central government in Beijing. Maintaining a large number of standing armies placed huge financial burdens on local warlords, and the military expenses caused by civil wars further exacerbated their financial plight. Consequently, these warlords turned back to the business in which the local officials of Qing had once engaged, and began planting and selling opium again. Although the central government still held its prohibition against opium cultivating and smoking, it could no longer enforce the laws in areas occupied by military forces. Indeed, the central government itself fell into the hands of warlords who could not resist the attraction of the opium business.

**Residual Opium in China**

Shortly after the cessation of opium trade with Britain, warlords were still cautious about their engagement in the opium trade, probably because of the possible criticism from the western powers, so they focused on the residual opium market in China.\(^4\) Though the termination of

\(^4\)According to the yearbook of IAOA, British diplomats indeed protested to the central government, when Fujian, Hunan, Sichuan, Yunnan, Xinjiang, and the three Eastern provinces, Jilin, Fengtian, and Heilongjiang restarted planting opium, which could be considered as “a failure on the part of Chinese to observe treaty obligation”. The
import and elimination of domestic planting ensured that no new drugs could legally flow into the market, large amounts of unsold opium were still circulating in the market. Since it was hard for opium consumers, especially those who took large amounts, to quit in a short time, the demand for opium persisted. According to a scholar in the early twentieth century, Yu Ende, some speculators sensed the determination of the Chinese government to cease the trade, and foresaw the rise of opium prices caused by a supply shortage in the short future. These merchants started purchasing and hoarding opium, and the price of opium skyrocketed. Additionally, the official British official promise to stop exporting opium to China did not solve the smuggling problem. Smugglers tempered by the high profit transmitted opium produced in India and other South Asia countries, but the warlords, who focused on the civil war paid little attention to these activities. Consequently, the cessation of opium import, though it prevented opium from officially entering China, led to a thriving drug market.

Due to the pressure from large-scale land owners and merchants, who held large amount of opium in stock, the warlord governments could not halt the selling of existing opium on the market. Especially in the Southwestern provinces, such as Sichuan and Yunnan, which once were major production areas of opium, opium had been so crucial to the local economy that large-scale land owners purchased opium as a way to store fortune against inflation. The limited control the central government had over the provincial areas and the political turmoil in China guaranteed the continuance of opium trade, as did the different opinions among the warlord governments about how to proceed. Some suggested that the warlord governments should suppress the trade with high opium tax, which would not only deter people from purchasing it, 

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War against Opium :The International Anti-Opium Association, Peking. (Tientsin :, 1922),
http://hdl.handle.net/2027/coo1.ark:/13960/t3ws97q3s. 27
5 Yu. P113-176
6 Ibid 165
but also finance the government, while others believed it could be more profitable for the
warlords to monopolize the opium market, which would further elevate their income.

Western missionaries were aware of the intentions of warlords, before the government
officially announced their plans, and utilized their social influence to dissuade the government
from encouraging or participating in the opium business. For example, in September 1916,
several months before the termination of the trade with Britain, Edward Thwing heard that the
government of Shanghai, which was controlled by Feng Guozhang, “planned to derive
significant profit from it, by rising taxes on opium and delaying the deadline for selling British
opium in stock.”7 Hoping to add pressure on the Shanghai government, Thwing took advantage
of his connections to inform other warlords in other provinces about the plan. Simultaneously, he
held an anti-opium conference in Shanghai, and invited influential figures from diverse areas to
discuss solutions.8

Initially, the Shanghai government did not directly reply to Thwing’s petition.9 On the
contrary, the officials proposed that the government could monopolize the opium trade by
purchasing the unsold British opium with public funds and reselling it as medicine only.10
Nevertheless, the anti-opium crusaders argued that such decision could “burn down all the
achievements.”11 “It’s impossible for the government to track how the opium sold was
consumed” they indicated, “because Chinese people smoke opium in private spaces, where

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7 “禁烟条约届满在埔存土甚多，闻愿加税运动展限以销完攘此大利。 (Large Amount of Opium in Shanghai),”
_Da gong bao_, September 29, 1916, 中国近代报刊《大公报》.
8 “上海禁烟大会开会预志 (The Fourth Day Examining Opium in Stock),” _Da gong bao_, February 13, 1917, 中国
近代报刊《大公报》.
9 Guozhang Feng was the leader of the Zhili clique, one of the most powerful warlord groups. At this time, he was
the Vice President of the Republic of China.
10 “丁义华反对专卖烟土之通电 (Edward Thwing’s Telegraph against Governmental Monopoly of Opium
Business ),” _Da gong bao_, October 25, 1918, 中国近代报刊《大公报》.
11 Ibid
government could not probe.”

In response to the new proposal, on February 16th 1917, the International Reformist Bureau invited both foreign residents in Shanghai and Chinese intellectuals to discuss how to protest against the Chinese government’s new opium policy. Their conference and protests received attention from different presses, which published a series of articles on the government’s proposal to purchase opium. Finally, after a long-term struggle, the Shanghai government, under pressure from missionaries and the media, revoked its original policy. To demonstrate its determination to eliminate opium, the Shanghai government purchased the unsold opium from merchants and publicly burnt all of it, and invited anti-opium activists who attended the conference to the burning site as witnesses. To ensure the final victory of their crusade, western missionaries acted again as supervisors to the Chinese governments.

### Warlords’ Ambivalence

Though the missionaries succeeded in this case, it was only one confrontation in the persisting battle between missionaries and the warlord governments, and the warlords’ complicated attitude toward opium trade made this battle endless. On the one hand, no warlords could resist the lure of the financial income the opium business could bring them. Tax income derived from agriculture and normal industries was not enough to cover military expenses. The financial pressure was so great that all Chinese governments after the collapse of Qing tagged the

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12 “上海反对收买存土大会详情 (Details about the Conference protesting against purchasing opium: What is the difference between selling opium as medicines and selling opium directly?),” *Da gong bao*, February 16, 1917, 中国近代报刊《大公报》.

13 “上海禁烟大会开会预志 (The Fourth Day Examining Opium in Stock),” *Da gong bao*, February 13, 1917, 中国近代报刊《大公报》.

14 “检验存土之第四日 (The Fourth Day Examining Opium in Stock),” *Da gong bao*, January 24, 1919, 中国近代报刊《大公报》.
opium tax as a source of major income, and most of them attempted to get involved directly or indirectly in the trade. Some warlord governments expressed their interest in opium more explicitly. In Guangzhou, which was controlled by the Nationalist Party, most of the opium shops were owned by retired soldiers who had military connections, and the government sent armies to protect their cargos, during transportation. Moreover, the Yunnan clique and other small fractions based in Sichuan, which included previous opium production areas, forced farmers who had abandoned opium plantations to restart cultivating opium. In these ways, warlords could extract taxes and cover their costly military confrontations with each other.

On the other hand, warlords could not openly promote the opium trade. Because of the decade-long anti-opium propaganda campaign, an evil image of opium had rooted in the mind of Chinese people. Even Li Yuanhong, who had been elected as the President of the Republic of China twice, publicly condemned opium as wuqiong zhi hai (endless evil). Such images refrained warlords from publicly encouraging or engaging in the opium business, because it would make the government seem immoral, and morality was crucial for any Chinese regime to justify its governance. When warlords fought against each other trying to gain control of more territories and the central government in Beijing, they needed to demonstrate their moral rightness which justified their ruling, and, equally importantly, to declare the immorality of their competitors. Therefore, even though missionaries strived to cut off their income, the warlords avoided direct confrontations with them. In order to construct a righteous image, some of these warlords even encouraged the anti-opium activists in public. For an instance, Yan Xishan, the head of warlords in Shanxi, once wrote an letter to the central government saying that “Edward

Yu, 142
Ibid
17 The War against Opium: The International Anti-Opium Association, Peking. (Tientsin :, 1922), http://hdl.handle.net/2027/coo1.ark:/13960/t3ws97q3s, Preface
Thwing should be honored by the Republic government for patronizing the Chinese anti-opium movement for years.”18 By complimenting anti-opium works on public media, they established righteous images without sacrificing their own interests.

Because of the warlords’ ambivalent attitudes about opium, missionaries could express their opinions and influence warlords’ implementation of the opium policies, like they did in the case stated. Missionaries were confident that the government cared about their public images, and used their connections with the public media to add pressures on the warlords. To amplify their influence over the warlord administrations, western missionaries inaugurated the International Anti-Opium Association (IAOA) in 1918.19 The IAOA quickly emerged as one of the leading anti-opium societies in China, uniting western missionaries, and Chinese elites.

The IAOA had extensive connections with both the central government and the regional warlord governments, which allowed it to realize “the bringing to bear of public opinion upon the drug question.”20 As indicated in its yearbook, politicians, such as the newly elected President of the Republic Xu Shichang, and the Premier Chin Yun-peng, became patrons of IAOA.21 Warlords, such as Yan Xishan and Cao Kun, also openly supported the work of IAOA, even though they all relied on the opium trade to feed their armies.22 From its wide-ranging networks, it is reasonable to assume that the IAOA’s rapid development in China could be attributed to both its internationality and the connections between its organizers and major political figures. In addition to the expansion in China, these connections also enabled IAOA to

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18 “晋督请给奖丁义华 (The Governor of Shanxi Asked Honor for Edward Thwing),” Da gong bao, September 07, 1919, 中国近代报刊《大公报》.
19 Mrs. Hamilton was an Australian, and was a prestigious anti-opium activist in China.
20 The War against Opium : The International Anti-Opium Association, Peking. (Tientsin :, 1922), http://hdl.handle.net/2027/coo1.ark:/13960/t3ws97q3s, 19.
21 Ibid. Preface II
22 Ibid.
achieve goals that local anti-opium societies could not. In 1919, the IAOA worked as a mediator between the Chinese government and the Japanese government, the later of whom agreed to strengthen its regulation of opium transportation to China. Furthermore, the Association successfully persuaded the Japanese government to “abolish the opium monopoly system” in Qing Dao and Kwantung Leased Territory.\(^23\)

During the early warlord period, western missionaries pushed warlords to strengthen their opium-related policies, and strived to prevent them from engaging in the trade, by utilizing their connections with Chinese politicians, local media, and international organizations. Even though the opium business ultimately reemerged in the beginning of the 1920s, due to the encouragement of warlords, missionaries’ works had some effect on hindering the full-fledged revival of the opium trade.

**The Declining Influence**

In the 1910s, western missionaries actively took advantage of their positions and influences in the political arena to push the anti-opium movement. However, they faced critical challenges in the 1920s. The anti-Christian movement and the Independent Church movement drastically altered western missionaries’ status in Chinese society, and compromised their abilities to further contribute to the anti-opium movement.

The origin of these anti-Christian movements can be traced back to the New Culture Movement, started in 1915. At that time, the newly founded Republican government’s diplomatic failures disappointed Chinese educated elites, who then called for a critical reflection

\(^{23}\) Ibid. Preface IV
on the Chinese traditional culture. They believed that, facing the foreign imperial powers and domestic unrest, Chinese people should no longer adhere to traditions, and only “Mr. Democracy” and “Mr. Science” could save China from the mire of endless warfare. During this period, a large variety of western political thoughts flooded into China, including liberalism, realism, socialism, and communism. The influx of all these thoughts dramatically altered the political environment in China in the following decades. However, at this time, the New Culture Movement did not hinder the regular missionary works in China.

According to the research of Chinese Protestant Church, missionary activities experienced expansion from 1915 to 1920, which means, even during its heyday, the New Culture Movement did not have much impact on the spread of Christianity in China. Nevertheless, some contemporary scholars, partially influenced by the newly introduced communist ideas, shifted their focus and targeted Christianity. In 1921, the Russian Communist party was convinced that Christian education would strengthen the western countries’ influence over Chinese teenagers and eventually become an obstacle to the spread of communism in China. Therefore, the Young Communist International utilized its connections with Chinese scholars and college students to prepare for a battle against Christianity. The opening of the annual conference of the World Student Christian Federation in Shanghai was the trigger that initiated the anti-Christian movement.

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24 The signing of the Twenty-One Demands in 1915, as considered by many historians, signaled the beginning of the New Culture Movement.
Students founded the Anti-Christian Student League and the Anti-Religion League to protest against the convening of the Conference and the Christian Church’s influence over the Chinese education system.\textsuperscript{27} The promoters of the movement included prestigious scholars, such as Cai Yuanpei, the president of Peking University, and Chen Duxiu, the First Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party. They claimed that Christianity, similar to other religions, advocated superstitious beliefs which contradicted to scientific thinking, making so Christian education was improper for Chinese teenagers.

Though the movement began with student protests against Christian education, but the involvement of the Chinese Communist Party and the Nationalist Party enlarged its scale, and turned it into a total war against Christianity. In 1922, the China Continuation Committee, a major Church administrative committee in China, published a report, *The Christian Occupation of China* 中华归主, about the status of the Chinese Christian Church in order to introduce general information about China to foreign missionaries. Shortly after its release, the provocative title of the report drew the attention of the public, and triggered the anti-Christian movement. This time, advocates of the movement used political journals which were funded by the Chinese Communist Party, such as *China Youth* and *Consciousness*, as battlefields, and associated the Anti-Christian movement with the uprising of nationalism. They attributed the invasion of the imperialist forces and the signing of the unequal treaties to the works of missionaries. In an article published in 1924 in *Consciousness*, a Chinese Communist magazine, the author, Li Chunfan, referred to missionaries as “the herald of imperialism.”\textsuperscript{28} Li wrote that missionary works should never be viewed separately from imperialism, and Christianity was a tool that...

\textsuperscript{27} Wong John Kam Fai, “Nationalism and the anti-Christian movement in the 1920s 民族主义与二十年代的非基督教运动,” *University of Hong Kong Faculty of Arts*, 1991. 15

which western imperialism used to conquer China. “Once Chinese people was paralyzed by the Christianity,” as another scholar, claimed, “people may lose their will to resist imperialism, and imperialists could interfere with our politics and colonize our country in the name of God.”\(^{29}\) By connecting missionary works with imperialism, the promoters attempted to provoke Chinese nationalists against the Christian Church, deter it from further expansion in China, and urge the Nationalist government to assume more influence over the Christian schools which were major channels through which the Church spread its doctrines.

Certainly, the large-scale anti-Christian movement could not be solely attributed to the uprising Communism. The tacit consent of the Nationalist government also accelerated the movement. As indicated by Wong John Kam Fai, though the Nationalist government sought cooperation with the western powers, it also hoped to reclaim its control over education from the western missionaries. Therefore, though the central government did not openly express its support for the anti-Christian movement, it did not impede its development.

As the scale of the anti-Christian movement grew, restrained protests became violent attacks against foreigners and Christians. Activists interrupted the daily operations of Christian schools, and a large number of schools had to suspend classes. Some mobs attacked foreigners outside the concessions, and even looted Churches and schools.\(^{30}\) However, the Chinese government did not react promptly to these riots, which, to some degree, proved that Chinese officials wanted to suppress the power of foreigners and the Christian Church in China with the hands of activist mobs. The negligence of the Chinese government intensified the violence.

\(^{29}\) Qinshi Zhang 张钦士, Domestic religious thoughts in the last Decade 中国近十年之宗教思潮 (Beijing: 燕京华文学校研究科参考材料, 1927). 200
Local officials had to warn the foreigners to move out of the cities to evade turmoil.\textsuperscript{31} More than two thousand Christians evacuated from China.\textsuperscript{32} The movement shook the foundation of Christian Churches in China. The destructiveness of the anti-Christian movement to western missionaries’ contribution to the anti-opium movement was two folds. First of all, the anti-Christian propaganda negated the efforts western missionaries had made to building trust between them and Chinese intellectuals, without which missionaries would no longer be able to stoke public sentiments to protest Nationalist government’s engagement in the opium business. Furthermore, since the Communist Party was one of the major forces that fueled the anti-Christian movement, the works that western missionaries did could not gain recognition after the Communist Party unified China.

In addition to outside pressure on western missionaries, they were also facing challenges from native clergy in the Chinese Christian Church. For decades, foreign missionaries kept firm control over the Church in China. They gave guidance to Chinese followers and trained native ordained workers. In the 1910s, as the number of native clergies increased, they started seeking more managerial positions in the Church. Among a thousand missionaries who attended the National Christian Conference held in 1907, there was no Chinese missionary. However, six years later, about a third of the representatives were Chinese.\textsuperscript{33} Western missionaries were well aware of this trend and acknowledged that, “as far as numbers were concerned,” the leadership would eventually be “passed from missionaries to Chinese.”\textsuperscript{34} In the early 1920s, however, foreign Church leaders did not perceive the growth of indigenous leadership to be an adverse

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{31} Wong John Kam Fai, “Nationalism and the anti-Christian movement in the 1920s 民族主义与二十年代的非基督教运动,” \textit{University of Hong Kong Faculty of Arts}, 1991. 45-50
\item \textsuperscript{32} Ibid
\item \textsuperscript{34} Ibid. 35
\end{itemize}
tendency. They believed that the Independent Church Movement was not so strong to split the Church, and that general cooperation between China and the West was “possible and advisable”³⁵.

The Church was wrong. In the same year that the Church published *The Christian Occupation of China*, The National Christian Council of China was established. For the first time, Chinese Christians started assuming managing positions in the Church, which, as described by Edward Slack, was “the first step away from the darkness of conservative missionary domination toward the light of Chinese nationalism.”³⁶ Despite his subjective favor to the Church reform expressed in the sentence, his words indicate that the Chinese Christians, as a force separated from traditional westerner controlled Church, became increasingly active in the Chinese society. Simultaneously, the western missionaries were squeezed out of the central circle in the Church.

The joint efforts of the New Culture Movement and the Independent Church Movement in the 1920s pushed western missionaries out of the sight of the public’s sight. This became quite apparent in the anti-opium societies. Before 1922, most of the national anti-opium organizations in China were headed by western missionaries, who had connections with international anti-opium societies and were able to utilize their identities as foreigners to negotiate with the government. After the anti-Christian Movement began, during which a large number of missionaries fled back to their home-countries, Chinese intellectuals who had personal connections with government or held positions in the warlord governments assumed the positions once monopolized by the foreigners. The founding of the National Anti-Opium

³⁵ Ibid. 36
³⁶ Timothy Brook and Bob Tadashi Wakabayashi, *Opium Regimes: China, Britain and Japan, 1839-1952* (Berkeley, UNITED STATES: University of California Press, 2000),
Association (NAOA) which was the largest anti-opium organization in China, mirrored the impact of the anti-Christian movement to western missionaries who engaged in the anti-opium movement.\(^{37}\) This anti-opium association, which incorporated thirty-eight social organizations, was first proposed by five hundred Chinese “non-Christian urban elites,” and its board was composed entirely of Chinese, both of which were rare before the 1920s.\(^ {38}\) Furthermore, reports and passages about western missionaries engaging in the anti-opium movement gradually vanished from the newspapers which once showed unreserved support for western missionary’s works, such as Da gong bao and Shen bao. The frequency of positive articles about missionaries were decreasing as the one of negative reports increased. With the loss of allies in the publication industry, the crusaders from the West could maintain their influence over neither the government nor the civilians.

Under the Nationalist Government

During the Warlord Era, missionaries, though they encountered criticisms and attacks from the urban elites, were still able to maintain a friendly relationship with the Chinese government. Because of the warlords’ unwillingness to get involved in diplomatic affairs, they usually refrained from from interfering missionaries’ works. This policy ensured that missionaries and the anti-opium societies had flexibility and enough independence from the government, both of which were necessary for performing the duty as a supervisor to the Chinese governments’ opium policies. Nevertheless, when the Nationalist government headed by Chiang

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\(^{37}\) The NAOA was funded on 5th August 1924, preparing for the upcoming Geneva Opium Conferences. Some scholars who participated in anti-Christian movement, such as Cai Yuanpei, and Gu Ziren, were elected as “people’s delegates” to attend the conference.

Kai-shek initiated the North Expedition in 1926, which defeated and incorporated Beiyang warlords, missionaries and their anti-opium societies lost their ability to oversee the government activities relating to opium.

When multiple administrations coexisted, warlords, though considered anti-opium propositions disturbing, had to respond to the anti-opium media since they could affect warlords’ popularity relative to their counterparts. Their ignorance of missionaries’ criticism might push the ones who originally defended their administration to other warlords. Therefore, they pretended to be supportive of the missionaries’ works and strived to directed missionaries’ attention to the opium problems residing in other warlords’ territories. However, when the Nationalist government came to power, there was no other warlord to whom the anti-opium crusaders could switch their support, and the activists lost their chips in the bargain with the central government. Though some warlords still maintained de facto power in some parts of China, they hardly publicly denounced the decisions of the central government.

The absence of alternatives confiscated missionaries’ supervising power. They had no choice but to cooperate with the Nationalist party, since the central government now could simply ignore their suggestions at negligible cost. According to some scholars even claimed that the anti-opium organizations even faced punishments, if they did not endorse the decisions of Nationalist government. In most cases, the Nationalist government evaded direct confrontations with them, because the Nationalist government headed by Chiang Kai-shek sought assistance from the United States. However, loss of public support deprived missionaries’

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39 In 1927, Chinese Nationalist Party’s four-year-long alliance with the Communist Party was broken, the Nationalist Party seized control of the central government, and declared the Communist Party illegal. Therefore, there was no other legal political party in the government that could compete with the Nationalist Party.
40 Yu, 113-176.
bargaining power with the government. To maintain their limited influence over government opium policies, anti-opium missionaries had to publicly compliment the Nationalist government, though they were not satisfied with these policies. Therefore, after 1926, the role played by western missionaries’ status was gradually reduced from a supervisor with coercive power to an advisor on opium issues who could hardly direct governmental policies.

**Conclusion:**

In the decade after 1917, the anti-opium movement encountered major defeats in China. Though Britain and other major opium exporters agreed to terminate the opium trade with China, an opium problem persisted in China and became increasingly severe in the late 1920s. Without a powerful central government, the anti-opium policies could not be effectively enforced, and warlords’ desperation to raise fund for their armies further challenged the accomplishments in the last decades. Even in such a harsh situation, the western missionaries were able to fulfill their duties as anti-opium supervisors by provoking public dissent to warlord’s involvement in the opium business. However, when the Nationalist Party subdued the warlords and unified China, its leaders, though officially declaring opium trade immoral, attempted to monopolize opium trade and profit from it. It turned out to be more difficult for the missionaries to promote the anti-opium movement when the powerful central government was not willing to cooperate than when the central government was too weak to implement its policies. Western missionaries’ position declined from supervisors to advisors. Moreover, the anti-Christianity movement and the Independent Church movement forced foreign missionaries in China to retire from the leading positions in Church and civil organizations, which included anti-opium societies. After this series of changes, western missionaries who engaged in the Chinese anti-opium movement had
generally been squeezed out of the arena, and replaced by a group of Chinese intellectuals who succeeded missionaries’ positions in the anti-opium movement.

In the 1920s, a series of diplomatic defeats of the Chinese government kept reminding Chinese urban elites of the urgency of resisting the increasingly apparent imperial encroachment to Chinese sovereignty. They eagerly sought for the origin of China’s decline and a path to salvation for Chinese society, which gave rise to Chinese nationalism and aversion to foreigners. The change in public sentiment toward western missionaries hit thee influence of the anti-opium crusaders in China. Though the organizations they founded still persisted, Chinese Christians and other social elites started casting more influence over these civil societies, and assuming more managerial positions in them. Simultaneously, native national anti-opium organizations, such as the NAOA, started playing increasingly significant roles in the Chinese anti-opium movement.
Conclusion

Recreational opium smoking was not eliminated until the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949. Until then, nearly all Chinese governments after Qing, both local and national ones, relied on opium as one of its crucial financial incomes. After the Chinese Communist Party unified the mainland, all businesses related to recreational opium were outlawed, and the government also put medical use of the drug under rigid regulations. The hundred-year-long war between Chinese people and opium finally came to an end. Nevertheless, the impact of opium did not vanish with the smoking habits in China. Until today, opium is an inevitable topic for everyone who are interested in Chinese modern history. Though scholars hold contradictory opinions about the toxicity of opium, the historical significance of opium trade and the anti-opium movement to the Chinese modern history is undebatable.

In the nineteenth century, when the missionaries started noticing the opium problem, they targeted on the Anglo-Chinese opium trade. Through public media and social connections, they denounced the opium trade publicly, aiming to arouse public dissent and adding pressure on the British Parliament. Nevertheless, some scholars, represented by R.K Newman and Thomas Rein propose that the declining of profitability of the opium trade was the primary motivation that urged British parliament to negotiate with the Qing government and signed the Ten-Year Agreement. After analyzing their evidences employ to support their claim, I find another way to interpret the data, and reach an opposite conclusion.

In Rein’s article, he indicates that the decrease in the volume of opium exported to China
demonstrates that the opium trade was no longer as profitable as it used to be for Britain. In order to prove the declining of the trade, Rein cites chart one which documented the amount of licit foreign opium imported to China. By comparing the fluctuation of the amount of opium imported to China in this form below, he reaches a conclusion that is similar to Newman: the opium trade reached its heyday in the 1880s and started declining since then.

<table>
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<th>Year</th>
<th>Amount</th>
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</table>

Source: RIOCS, 2146-7.

Chart One

Chart Two

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2 Ibid, 115.
Intuitively, the amount of opium that China imported decreased in the last decade of the nineteenth century, but this trend could not directly prove the decline of the trade’s profitability, because one needs to consider the variation in price of opium. According to the statistics cited by Ende Yu (chart 2) which came from Statistic Journal, we can see that, the total value of opium imported to China did not decrease in the nineteenth century. Combining the two charts, we can reach a result that, although the amount of opium that China imported decreased, the price of opium actually increased in a high percentage. Taking the data of 1888 and 1904 as examples, we can see that the price for 1 picul of opium was $391.4 in 1888 and $677.5 in 1904, which means the price of opium increased 73.10%. At the same time, the amount of opium exported to China only declined 33.72%, which means that the decrease in the volume of opium trade could be compensated by the increase of price. Therefore, the decrease of opium exported to China in this period doesn’t necessarily mean Britain were getting diminishing profit from the Sino-British opium trade.

Besides, both Newman and Rein emphasize that the anti-opium efforts of the Chinese government contributed to the declining profitability of the trade. Apparently, the anti-policies in China was an important or even dominant factor that brought the trade to an end. Nonetheless, as shown in the thesis, western missionaries not only played an important role in strengthening Chinese governments’ determination to end the trade, but also pushed different Chinese governments to fulfil their anti-opium promises. Therefore, though scholars, such as Lodwick, claim that Chinese government’s opium-suppression policies, rather than missionaries’ activities suppressed international and domestic opium trade in early-twentieth-century China, some of

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3 Ende Yu, 中国禁烟法令变迁史 History of China’s opium suppression laws and regulations (Shanghai, 1934). 331.
those policies might not be implemented so effectively without the efforts of western missionaries.

Admittedly, this thesis could not unveil the full picture of Chinese anti-opium campaign, or even that of western missionaries’ anti-opium activities in the nineteenth and twentieth century. Potential connections between missionary activities and some anti-opium events, such as the International Opium Convention, are not examined here. However, I hope the thesis might serve as a reminder for scholars who are willing to uncover relevant history, and place western missionaries who were usually unmentioned in this period back to the place they deserve.
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