A MOST DIVISIVE YEAR
THE YEAR OF EUROPE AND THE SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP IN 1973

By
Samuel R. Jeffrey

Thesis
Submitted to the Faculty of the
Department of History of Vanderbilt University
In partial fulfillment of the requirements
For Honors in History

April 2016

On the basis of this thesis defended by the candidate on April 26, 2016, we, the undersigned, recommend that the candidate be awarded HIGHEST HONORS in History.

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Director of Honors – Samira Sheikh
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April 15, 2016
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INTRODUCTION

Separating Sentiment from Substance in the Anglo-American Special Relationship

“There is a union of mind and purpose between our peoples which is remarkable and which makes our relationship a truly remarkable one. It is special. It just is, and that’s that.”

- Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, February 20 1985, Toast Celebrating 200 Years of Anglo-American Relations

OF THE MANY American foreign policy relationships that suffered during President Richard Nixon’s second term in office, including those with France, the Soviet Union, Israel, and Egypt, none was perhaps as surprising as the deteriorating relationship with the United Kingdom under Prime Minister Edward Heath. Prior to this turbulent year, the post-World War II Anglo-American “special relationship” was characterized by a degree of cooperation and mutual consultation that few other nominally special relationships have matched. Leaders on both sides of the Atlantic extolled a relationship that was based on not merely a common strategy but on a shared heritage and a shared culture. In hopes of reaffirming this powerful connection between nations, Henry Kissinger, the President’s National Security Advisor, heralded 1973 as the “Year of Europe,” and embarked on a series of policy initiatives to revitalize the connection between the United States and its allies across the Atlantic. Although the American relationship with the United Kingdom was uniquely close compared to those with the other nations of Europe,

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Kissinger intended to include repairing relations with the British in his policy initiatives. On the surface, the year seemed to be an ideal time for healthy relations between the two allies.

However, in reality, the Heath and Nixon years of the Anglo-American relationship were uniquely prone to tension. Despite Kissinger’s goal for the Year of Europe to usher in a new era of constructive relations between the United States and its Western European allies, relations between the United States and the United Kingdom quickly soured over a series of disagreements that had uneasy implications for nuclear weaponry and intelligence cooperation. The Nixon Administration, embattled as it was by the ongoing Watergate scandal, discomfited their allies across the Atlantic with their perceived pivot towards improved relations with China and détente with the Soviet Union. Meanwhile, the United Kingdom was crippled by economic weakness, leading Prime Minister Edward Heath to pursue British admission to the European Economic Community (EEC) at the cost of distancing the British from their American allies. In 1973, this disconnect between the goals and expectations of the two friendly nations would erupt into a trenchant conflict as each side became aware of the extent of their rift, and relations deteriorated so severely that on August 9, 1973, President Nixon announced angrily that there would be “no more special relations.”

The Anglo-American relationship is one of the most frequently analyzed alliances in the study of international relations and accordingly there is a rich body of literature focusing on the special relationship in general. However, until recently very few scholars had examined the impact of the Year of Europe on the special relationship in detail, preferring instead to gloss over

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it in favor of examining differing policy on the Arab-Israeli War of October 1973 and the energy crisis that followed. Although perhaps flashier and more easily analyzed than the complicated diplomatic thicket of the Year of Europe deliberations, this period is ultimately of less use in understanding the true dynamics of the special relationship than the events of earlier in 1973 which this thesis will investigate. This historical oversight has downgraded the Year of Europe conflict to a minor anomaly in Anglo-American relations, a brief disagreement, explainable by a short reference to the clashing personalities of Nixon and Heath. However, in reality, the Year of Europe and the confrontation that it sparked are of critical importance in understanding the dynamics of the special relationship. Using the models of decision-making proposed by scholars such as Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow, as well as Richard Neustadt’s analysis of alliance politics, I will demonstrate that the few historians who have analyzed the period, such as R. Gerald Hughes and Thomas Robb, have relied too heavily on the intentions of Kissinger and Heath in investigating the Year of Europe and failed to follow these intentions through to their eventual policy results. This oversight has led to systemic errors and misunderstandings of the period, which in turn have broad implications for the general historical consensus on the nature of the special relationship itself as one between leaders rather than between the bureaucracies of these states. A granular, in-depth analysis of transatlantic events and communications in 1973 is entirely necessary to rectify these mistakes and explain how the gap between top-level decisions and eventual policy outputs led to repeated misunderstandings, artificially-raised expectations, and finally a bitter confrontation between such close allies.
The Functional “Special Relationship”

Since World War II, the alliance between the United States and the United Kingdom, the two geopolitical giants of the Anglosphere, has stood as one of the enduring facets of international affairs. However, historians and statesmen alike have tended to celebrate the relationship in rhetorical terms about shared culture and history, when in reality the Anglo-American relationship is special as much for its unique tradition of functional cooperation as it is for its cultural basis. Such a reliance on platitudes rather than substance by historians should not be surprising, since so many of the post-war American and British leaders, seeking to reaffirm the role of the special relationship in their respective administrations and premierships, have employed the same bromides. Prime Minster Winston Churchill regularly referred to the “fraternal association” and “kindred systems of society” that existed between the two nations. 3 Fifty years later President Bill Clinton similarly affirmed the importance of the relationship with the United Kingdom “because of the history we have lived, because of the power and prosperity we enjoy, because of the accepted truth that you and we have no dark motives in our dealings with other nations.” 4 This effusive narrative of the relationship between the United States and the United Kingdom tends to obfuscate what truly makes the special relationship special – its mutually beneficial, functional nature.

First described as “special” 5 in the modern sense by Winston Churchill during an address to the House of Commons in 1945, Anglo-American relations solidified during World War II, as

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American and British “policy-makers became ‘mixed up together’, to borrow his famous phrase,” in the unprecedented cooperation of the joint command wartime arrangement. At root, the connection was not primarily a sentimental one, but a pragmatic mutual defense strategy. This arrangement entailed close communication between military, intelligence, and political leaders at nearly all levels of operation, converting the two disparate nations into a uniquely integrated unit. The partnership was a wartime necessity to confront the military menace of the Axis powers, but as World War II drew to a close, the allies were left the difficult task of disentangling their unified military and intelligence operations while maintaining a close working relationship to preserve order in the instability of the post-War world. Although the joint allied command arrangement was dissolved with the ending of the war, the networks of personal cooperation endured between their lower-down counterparts in both government bureaucracies.

These personal relationships were established initially on the basis of shared goals and mutual reliance but were strengthened by the power of a common language, which “permitted more extensive and more intensive communication than would otherwise have been possible, since, in principle, any Briton or American could participate at a depth usually permitted only to skilled linguists.” As American diplomat George Ball explained, “To an exceptional degree we look out on the world through similarly refracted mental spectacles. […] Starting from similar premises in the same intellectual tradition, we recognize common allusions, share many common

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7 Ibid., 4–5.
prejudices, and can commune on the basis of confidence.” Historian David Reynolds argues that the importance of this shared language, though it may seem obvious, should not be underestimated in analyzing why the special relationship became so qualitatively distinct from other post-war peacetime alliances. While any set of allies could find the means to communicate on official business, American and British policy-makers could develop real friendships, as seen most obviously between President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill, as well as President Kennedy and Prime Minister Macmillan, who discovered to their delight that they were actually distantly related, but also between crucial but less public bureaucrats on both sides of the Atlantic. Beneath the rhetoric of politicians and the state friendships of leaders, the close relationships forged in the crucible of World War II and institutionalized by the global instability of the Cold War allowed each partner on either side of the Atlantic to rely upon the other for information, security, and advice.

While both British and American leaders tended to wax poetic about the sentimental importance of the relationship, at its heart were the functional advantages that each nation could draw from the other. To an enormous degree, this relationship was shaped by the British idea of the United States as a close national relative, derived from its colonies and its culture. In 1923, less than 50 years after independence, British Foreign Secretary George Canning proposed a formal alliance with the United States, demonstrating that British leaders already recognized the great potential of a close alliance with the new nation across the Atlantic. Although this was declined as part of the early American diplomatic habit of eschewing peacetime alliances, the

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British believed that preventing other European nations from unduly influencing the young nation was extremely important, and the British Navy helped to enforce the Monroe Doctrine by blocking its rivals forays into the New World throughout the nineteenth century.¹¹ This interest in the United States remained a relative constant in British foreign policy, and Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Robert Cecil argued in a September 1917 Cabinet memo that “though the American people are very largely foreign, [they] share our political ideals,” which he believed was a cultural connection that could and should be used to Britain’s advantage.¹² Moreover, as the United States roused itself from its self-imposed isolationism and began to take a more active role in the world of international relations, Cecil argued presciently that “if America accepts our point of view […], it will mean the dominance of that point of view in all international affairs.”¹³ The United Kingdom was still very much a major world power in this period, but his keen assessment of the potential for Anglo-American cooperation became even more crucial when the British empire began to crumble only a few decades later.

Although that ambition for joint Anglo-American hegemony was not realized immediately, as the United States lapsed back into isolationism in the wake of World War I, the concept of British prominence buoyed by American support would remain an ardent desire of British policymakers throughout the early twentieth century. Indeed, members of the British Foreign Office argued in a March 1944 review of international diplomatic strategy that the primary transatlantic British goal should no longer be to balance American power but, in recognition of the fading British empire, to “help steer this great unwieldy barge, the United

¹² Cab 24/26, GT 2074, Cecil, memo, 18 September 1917, quoted in Reynolds, “A ‘Special Relationship’?”
¹³ Ibid.
States of America, into the right harbour. If we don’t, it is likely to continue to wallow in the ocean, an isolated menace to navigation.”¹⁴ During World War II, future Prime Minister Harold Macmillan described the new developing role of the British, capturing both his optimism for the continued importance of the United Kingdom and that uniquely British attitude toward Americans, common among many policymakers in the United Kingdom, that was at once patronizing and admiring.

We, my dear Crossman, are Greeks in this American empire. You will find Americans much as the Greeks found the Romans – great big, vulgar, bustling people, more vigorous than we are and also more idle, with more unspoiled virtues but also more corrupt. We must run [Allied Force Headquarters] as the Greek slaves ran the operations of the Emperor Claudius.¹⁵

He would continue to develop the political paradigm underlying this colorful metaphor during his political career after the end of the war, and later confided in his diary that the United Kingdom would have to guide the “childish and amateurish” American newcomers to the international scene, “both for their advantage and ours for the future peace of the world.”¹⁶

At the end of World War II, the inequality between the two partners was becoming more and more pronounced, as the fortunes of the United Kingdom and the United States were rapidly diverging as world powers. The United States emerged from the war bustling with newfound industrial self-sufficiency, an unparalleled economic position, and the as-yet unmatched power of the atomic bomb. Although still a prominent global player and enjoying the political spoils of a military victor, the British needed to confront “British postwar economic weakness, Britain’s

¹⁶ Ibid.
accelerated relative decline vis-à-vis the US and the emergence of the USSR as a pressing threat to national security." Nonetheless, the British hoped to maintain their position as a leading global power even though they increasingly lacked the economic, military, and geopolitical standing to guarantee such importance. Accordingly, the need for American support was obvious to British policymakers, who desperately looked for ways to extend the joint arrangement of World War II into the post-war era.

The United States, though clearly the superior power in this relationship, also stood to gain from a strong Anglo-American relationship in which it could rely on the experience and assets of the United Kingdom. While American statesmen did not intend to be harnessed wholesale, as the British might have hoped, they recognized that their unique relationship afforded them a loyal ally in the complex diplomatic milieu of postwar Western Europe and an old, experienced hand in parts of the world that the until-recently isolationist United States did not know. Similarly, they understood that, in light of their fading strength, the British would be eager to form such a relationship. In the words of Undersecretary of State Dean Rusk in 1950, “Since it is clear that the British cannot recapture a sound [...] position without the support of the U.S., or even maintain their present position, they must accept wholeheartedly the necessity for collaborative action.”

From a Cold War standpoint, Great Britain was of vital importance in the struggle against the Soviet Union for dominance. A 1946 State Department confidential assessment concluded that “If Soviet Russia is to be denied hegemony of Europe, the United Kingdom must continue its existence as the principal power in Western Europe [...] The US should, therefore, [...] give all feasible political, economic, and if necessary, military support

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18 Ibid., 177.
within the framework of the United Nations, to the United Kingdom.” Briefly, then, in its unsentimental, functional form, the relationship comprised of British hopes to use “its network of global bases, its well-practiced diplomacy, coupled with its military and intelligence capabilities, to exercise a decisive influence over U.S. foreign policy” and American plans to use the United Kingdom as a diplomatic anchor across the Atlantic, as a bastion against European communism, and as an “unsinkable aircraft carrier” for American weapons and spy bases.

By the 1960s, the unequal nature of the special relationship had become even more pronounced. As Dean Acheson presciently observed in 1962, “Great Britain has lost an empire and not yet found a role,” and British leaders increasingly sought to connect themselves ever more closely to their parvenu counterparts in the United States. As the last of the United Kingdom’s imperial holdings gained independence, Heath’s predecessors found themselves unable to afford British defense commitments around the world, and accordingly their use to the United States in providing global expertise declined. Nixon’s predecessors, conversely, struggled to accommodate the British slump. Some American presidents like Kennedy largely supported the United Kingdom, while others, like Lyndon Johnson, were distinctly uncomfortable with the disproportionate influence that the British still wielded in the United States. By the time Nixon and Heath took office, the Pax Brittanica was a distant memory and the Pax Americana was facing challenges of its own, considering the pressures of the now entrenched Cold War and the

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agonies of war in Southeast Asia. A transatlantic confrontation was far from inevitable, but the time was indeed unusually ripe for a reevaluation of the special relationship.

**Diplomatic, Intelligence, and Nuclear Cooperation – “The Three Specialités” of the Special Relationship**

Post-war Anglo-American relations coalesced over diplomatic, intelligence, and nuclear cooperation. Known as the three *specialités* of the alliance, they formed the bedrock of the functional aspect of the special relationship.²³ Importantly, these *specialités* were protected by their isolated nature, by which these “narrow, compartmentalized relationships, for example between those working on economic intelligence or guided missile intelligence, could remain unshaken by high-level disagreements over Cold War policy.”²⁴ The flexibility and separation of *specialités* is frequently cited as what truly made the relationship a special one. Their partial collapse in the 1970s would contribute to the severity of the confrontation surrounding the Year of Europe.

Diplomatic cooperation between the United States and the United Kingdom flowed smoothly from established wartime connections. Most foreign service officers on both sides had nearly direct opposites across the Atlantic, and a shared language and similar strategic goals made diplomatic consultation easy and cooperation natural. The majority of consultation took place between members of the American State Department and their counterparts in the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO). Importantly, such consultation did not guarantee agreement; as a member of the FCO noted in 1944, “if consultation fails to produce an agreed

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²³ Reynolds, “A ‘Special Relationship’?”
policy, each partner should be free to follow that policy which it thinks best, taking due account of the other’s special interests and susceptibilities.”25 In the diplomatic relationship, the British had little to offer beyond expertise and sage advice. However, they recognized that the American connection was one of their primary methods of influencing international affairs and therefore they cultivated it assiduously. Indeed, in one oft-bandied story about an applicant for a position in the FCO, the hopeful candidate responded to an interview question about the three most important things in life with “God, love, and Anglo-American relations.” According to the story, the man got the job.26 The British were so adept in offering diplomatic advice that Kissinger later reflected “that they managed to convey the notion that it was they who were conferring a boon on us by sharing the experience of centuries,” and he added charitably “Nor were they quite wrong in this estimate.”27

Close diplomatic cooperation is not solely the province of the special relationship, as both the United States and the United Kingdom enjoyed warm and productive relations with numerous other friendly nations. However, the habit of consultation and advice-seeking even on matters in which the other nation had no realistic involvement, between government members “not exclusively of the highest rank, […] engaging in a constant interchange of information and views on all issues of common interest, with the normal barriers of secrecy, both about security and technology, being, on the whole, fairly drastically reduced,” marked it as profoundly different from diplomatic relations between other allies. Indeed, in an example which I will analyze in my first chapter, in 1972 and 1973 the American National Security Council (NSC)

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27 Henry Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, (Boston: Little, Brown, 1982), 140.
cooperated with members of the British FCO in drafting a top-secret treaty between the Soviet Union and the United States, a treaty to which the British would not be party. This example of close diplomatic consultation was so unusual that one member of the FCO remarked that he was “Struck by the astonishing anomaly of the most powerful nation in the world invoking the aid of a foreign government to do its drafting for it.”

Although diplomatic cooperation comprised the day-to-day material of Anglo-American relations, the intelligence and nuclear specialités were the real lifeblood of the special relationship. Born out of the close cooperation of World War II and made permanent by the mutual need for security and support, Anglo-American intelligence cooperation benefited both nations perhaps more substantively than did diplomatic consultation. The 1947 UKUSA Agreement on the sharing of signal intelligence between the United Kingdom and the United States stemmed from a postwar coincidence of needs in which the British could no longer afford to maintain the enormous intelligence network of the Special Intelligence Service without American financial assistance, and the United States needed experience in establishing its permanent replacement for the wartime Office of Strategic Services, the Central Intelligence Agency. Under this agreement, the United States and the United Kingdom, along with Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, the other nations of the so-called Anglosphere that came to dominate global politics, shared most of the raw intelligence data that they gathered worldwide, allowing each nation to operate with a far greater wealth of information than had they each been

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29 Reynolds, “A ‘Special Relationship’?,” 11.
forced to acquire it on their own. In theory, the agreement constituted a fair and equal exchange of information. However, in practice, the United States, with its booming economy and burgeoning commitment to global security in the developing Cold War, gathered the vast majority of the data that would be shared, as well as indirectly bankrolled many of the intelligence operations of the other four nations.\textsuperscript{30} The United States intelligence community benefited mostly from access to networks and expertise in parts of the world to which it traditionally had little access, especially in East Asia, the Middle East, and Northern Africa. This pooling of information, which continued even through outright policy disagreements and conflicts between the United Kingdom and the United States such as in Suez in 1956, became known as the Anglo-American intelligence tap, a reference to the unceasing torrent of information that flowed through it.\textsuperscript{31}

The final and most unique aspect of the special relationship was cooperation in the field of nuclear weaponry. This \textit{specialité} too began in World War II, with the joint Manhattan Project to develop the atomic bomb. Initiated early in the war by British scientists before being moved to safer facilities in North America and financed mostly by the United States, the allied Anglo-American development of the nuclear bomb was one of the many remarkable examples of the close cooperation and completely free exchange of information of the joint wartime command structure.\textsuperscript{32} This cooperation was made permanent by the top secret September 1944 Hyde Park Agreement between Churchill and Roosevelt, which extended full collaboration on nuclear weaponry indefinitely after the defeat of Japan unless terminated by joint agreement. This


\textsuperscript{32} Ibid., 868–869.
agreement represented a major strategic victory for a United Kingdom that was afraid of losing its access to nuclear weaponry as soon as the war ended.\textsuperscript{33} However, the agreement was so secretive that, after Roosevelt’s sudden death a few months later, apparently no one in the American government, including President Truman, knew of it. The British were accordingly alarmed and surprised when the increasingly suspicious and secrecy-obsessed post-war United States Congress passed the McMahon Act of 1946, which explicitly prohibited the transfer or sharing of nuclear information to any foreign government, without an exception for the United Kingdom.\textsuperscript{34} The post-war British governments of Attlee, Churchill, and Eden, conscious of the great power status that could only be gained through access to nuclear weaponry, all sought to rectify this apparent miscommunication and restore nuclear cooperation.

Cold War pressures eventually repaired this rift in the special relationship. In recognition of the vital role that an independent nuclear deterrent in the United Kingdom could play in counterbalancing the now-nuclear Soviet Union, and aided by the rediscovery of the Hyde Park Agreement, President Eisenhower personally sought and achieved amendments to the McMahon Act in the late 1950s which made an exception for the United Kingdom, finally making official the \textit{de facto} wartime cooperation arrangement.\textsuperscript{35} The origins of the nuclear \textit{specialité} therefore demonstrate the uniquely close Anglo-American relationship but also its grossly unequal nature; from its very inception, the United States was the nuclear provider while the United Kingdom was occasionally forced to play the supplicant. The major British contribution to the nuclear relationship, beyond technical and scientific assistance whenever possible, was nuclear bases and

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{33} Kenneth D. Nichols, \textit{The Road to Trinity} (New York: Morrow, 1987), 177.
\item \textsuperscript{34} Reynolds, “A ‘Special Relationship’?,” 11.
\end{itemize}
test facilities in parts of the world to which the United States would not otherwise have access, and in the early days of limited range nuclear delivery systems, this contribution was still a very significant one. However, as more advanced and longer-range missile systems replaced aircraft systems, the relationship once again became characterized by increasing inequality, and by the 1960s, the United States appeared less committed to their transatlantic nuclear ally. Indeed, the United Kingdom, under Prime Minister Harold Macmillan, was massively discomfited when the Kennedy Administration scrapped the AGM-48 Skybolt, a planned air-launched nuclear missile system, for being likely ineffective and far too expensive to justify. The British, with their relatively large air force, had planned to base their entire independent nuclear deterrent on the Skybolt and accordingly abandoned the development of their own delivery system, the Blue Streak missile, as its costs mounted in anticipation of adopting the American system. However, their nuclear legitimacy was left in jeopardy when the American project was indefinitely postponed, and Macmillan was forced to make an impassioned plea to Kennedy, on the basis of the strength of the special relationship and their personal friendship, to find an alternative that would allow them to maintain a credible deterrent. In a move that his own Secretary of State derided as likely contrary to American national interests, Kennedy yielded and allowed the United Kingdom to purchase the Polaris submarine launched missile system under the 1962 Nassau Agreement. This system was due to be replaced and the agreement renegotiated in ten years’ time, adding additional stress to the Nixon-Heath iteration of the special relationship.

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37 Ibid., 98–106.
Conceptualizing Decision-Making in the Special Relationship

Before an accurate analysis of the complicated conflict of 1973 is possible, a complete model is needed to understand exactly how policy on both sides of the Atlantic was developed. In his book, *The Essence of Decision*, historian and political scientist Graham T. Allison developed a series of three models of governmental decision-making in order to analyze the Cuban Missile Crisis. These models provide alternative lenses through which to review and understand the actions and decisions of nations and their leaders in international affairs. The first model, which Allison refers to as the Rational Actor Model, is both the most popular and the least incisive method of conceptualizing the foreign policy decision-making process. In this model, the historian “puts himself in the place of the nation, or national government, confronting a problem of foreign affairs, and tries to figure out why he might have chosen the action in question,” imagining that governments are monolithic bodies, or “black boxes” in Allison’s parlance, that seek rationally to achieve their nations’ goals. This model therefore ascribes great importance to the role of individual leaders.\(^\text{38}\) Importantly, however, the Rational Actor Model, in its strict form, does not seek to identify a single, existing rational actor within a government in order to follow his own personal decision-making process. Instead, the true Rational Actor is the state condensed, a purely hypothetical construction used by historians to try to understand why a nation pursued a certain course of action by personifying it as an individual making rational decisions. For convenience, adherents of this model tend to refer to the Rational Actor by the name of the chief decision-maker in each country, such as by saying “Heath chose to…” or “Kissinger then decided to…” Despite this misleading nomenclature, Allison’s Rational Actor is

unaffected by the idiosyncrasies of the actual leaders, and is rather a way to simplify and understand the decisions of the state as a whole. While such an approach is certainly “a useful shorthand for understanding the problems of policy,” it ignores the true nature of foreign policy development and neglects the role of the bureaucracy.

Allison developed two further models, the Organizational Process Model and the Bureaucratic Politics Model, which more accurately account for the facts that “large acts result from innumerable and often conflicting smaller actions by individuals at various levels of bureaucratic organizations in the service of a variety of only partially compatible conceptions of national goals, organizational goals, and political objectives.”39 Specifically, Allison argues in the Organizational Process Model, or Model II, that governments are far too large and complicated to make decisions “on a clean slate” and instead rely on a series of standard operating procedures to develop plans of action. Therefore, policy in its final form is more of an output than a decision.40 While individual, maverick-style leaders such as Heath and Kissinger, can have an impact on policy, such instances are rare and the changes they effect tend to be gradual. In the Bureaucratic Politics Model, or Model III, Allison further dispelled the notion of monolithic state actors by conceptualizing governments as “constellations of loosely allied organizations” whose leaders are players in a complicated intra-governmental game of politics, “players who make government decisions not by a single, rational choice but by the pulling and hauling that is politics.”41 More simply, Allison summarized the model as “Men share power. Men differ about what must be done. The differences matter.”42 Model III, although relevant to

39 Ibid., 3–6.
40 Ibid., 67–88.
41 Allison, Essence of Decision; Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, 144.
42 Ibid., 145.
the Year of Europe conflict, is less useful than Model II, which ultimately clears away many of
the misunderstandings surrounding the controversy.

Relying on a similar but less well-defined framework for understanding disagreements
between allied nations, historian and international affairs scholar Richard E. Neustadt explained
how such conflicts spiral far out of proportion to their original disagreement in his analysis of the
miscommunication surrounding the Suez and Skybolt transatlantic crises of decades earlier.
Written in 1970, his conclusions are nonetheless extremely useful in understanding the
mismanaged expectations of the Year of Europe:

Acquaintance ran so deep that each American conceived himself an expert on the British, and vice versa. Such are the consequences of a common language, a shared history, wartime collaboration, intermarriage, all abetted by air travel and the telephone. But confidence in one’s own expertise diminishes one’s sense of need to probe, reduces one’s incentive to ask questions, removes from sight the specialists of whom these might be asked, and also pushes out of sight the usefulness of feedback.43

Combining Neustadt’s analysis and Allison’s models yields a far more complete and far more
useful schema for understanding how the Year of Europe led to such an unexpectedly bitter
confrontation between longtime allies than those used by other historians who have struggled to
explain it. By assuming that Kissinger, Nixon, and Heath were acting as Rational Actors who
made optimal decisions on behalf of the state, historians have underplayed the importance of the
bureaucracies, whose moderating role expanded the gap between policy decisions and output and
actually explains much of the historical confusion over the Year of Europe.

The Overemphasis of Personal Relations in the Historiography of the Special Relationship

Historiography on the special relationship is particularly susceptible to Rational Actor, or Model I, oversimplification. Indeed, the majority of historians who have investigated the period in depth, including Hughes, Robb, and Hynes, have employed the Rational Actor almost exclusively. While it is convenient and practical to refer to periods of the relationship by the names of their president and prime minister, like the Roosevelt-Churchill or Kennedy-Macmillan years, historians have too often yielded to the temptation to analyze U.S.-U.K. relations as if they were primarily the result of interaction between their titular leaders. This style of historiography is best captured by the likely apocryphal anecdote, related by David Reynolds and many others, in which President Roosevelt stumbled upon Prime Minster Churchill in the bath, to which Churchill responded unselfconsciously “The Prime Minister of Great Britain has nothing to conceal from the President of the United State.” More topically, nearly every historical work on the Heath - Nixon years begins with a description of the conflicting personalities of the two men – Nixon mercurial and diffident, Heath stubborn and thorny – demonstrating the great importance that historians place on the compatibility of president and prime minister as an indicator of the health of the special relationship.

Perhaps a large part of the reason why the special relationship in this period is so commonly analyzed through the lens of the Rational Actor Model is that Kissinger himself is so obviously drawn to it, both as a historian and as a statesman. In his memoirs, he described Nixon and Heath as remarkably similar, both cold and solitary, and explained that this “similarity in psychological makeup was just great enough to make the ultimate difference unbridgeable,”

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44 Reynolds, “A ‘Special Relationship’?,” 1.  
memorably comparing Nixon’s relationship with Heath to “that of a jilted lover who had been told that friendship was still possible, but who remembers the rejections rather than being inspired by the prospect.”\textsuperscript{46} As a statesman, particularly when he was empowered by the crisis of Watergate that consumed Nixon and many of his other top advisors, Kissinger tended to act as though he were the Rational Actor that Allison described, imagining himself to be creating policy as the sole czar of American foreign policy with the entire American bureaucracy in place only to translate his decisions into action.\textsuperscript{47} For him, foreign policy development was a personal process that took place between the highest ranking members of government, and many of the stumbles of 1973 can be explained only through an analysis of his underestimation of the independent and sometimes wayward nature of the bureaucracy.

This thesis does not seek to buck the trend of Rational Actor interpretation entirely; understanding the personal relations between Nixon, Heath, Kissinger, and other members of the two governments is necessary for a complete picture of the complex policy arrangement of the 1970s. After all, years later when asked which American president and British prime minister had the best relationship since the war, Heath “didn’t hesitate more than a nanosecond” before replying “Heath and Nixon.”\textsuperscript{48} Despite this optimistic assessment, the special relationship clearly suffered in 1973. Therefore, the personal relationship between Nixon and Heath is obviously far from an appropriate indicator of the health of the relationship during their joint tenures. Furthermore, Nixon was not even the primary decision-maker in American foreign policy for much of 1973 due to his distraction with the Watergate scandal, and focusing on his relationship

\textsuperscript{46} Kissinger, \textit{Years of Upheaval}, 1982, 141.
with Heath ignores the importance of Henry Kissinger as a policymaker. Kissinger operated as a unique go-between throughout the layers of American policy development, and tracing his decisions through to their eventual output in the form of policy is vital both for understanding the nature of the unexpected tensions that would flare between the United States and the United Kingdom and for revealing the misinterpretations of other historians. To a remarkable degree, Kissinger is anomalous in the study of international relations. Acting both as a primary decision-maker and a powerful bureaucrat, Kissinger wielded enormous influence in the American foreign policy machine in the 1970s and was able to personally create and effect dramatic policy shifts. However, this role has been exaggerated by Kissinger and his scholars, and the story of the Year of Europe conflict is as much a story of Kissinger’s failures to act as the quintessential Rational Actor as it is of his successes. Though relations between these leaders are important for understanding the special relationship, overemphasizing personal relationships between leaders marginalizes the role of the huge network of links between and among the American and British bureaucracies and loses sight of the complicating factors of bureaucratic operations in both governments. Instead, by employing Allison’s second two models of decision-making, this thesis will examine the masking effect of standard consultation procedures in the British FCO on the burgeoning conflict in order to explain the artificially elevated American expectations for the Year of Europe and their ultimate disappointment.

A Note on Sources and Structure

In 2008, the last remaining American documents from this period were declassified, leading to a new wave of scholarly interest in the Year of Europe by historians including R. Gerald Hughes, Thomas Robb, and Catherine Hynes. However, these historians have made a number of errors
and omissions in analyzing these newly available documents, errors that I plan to rectify through a careful investigation of the congruencies and discrepancies between the American and British documentary records of the period.

Memoirs and autobiographies from the major personas from the period, including Kissinger’s *Years of Upheaval*, Heath’s *The Course of My Life*, and Nixon’s *In the Arena* constitute an interesting but historically problematic form of primary material. Although the memories of such men can be a potentially invaluable source of evidence, especially when transcripts and other documentary recordings do not exist or are not available, they exhibit a clear bias. In the words of Dean Acheson, “no man comes out of his own memorandum of conversation looking second best,” and Kissinger’s memoirs in particular exhibit a self-conscious awareness of their own historicity.49 Through careful examination and comparison of multiple personal accounts of the same event, however, important inferences can be drawn. Fortunately, there is a wide variety of documentary primary source material on this era with which to corroborate such primary accounts, even though those referring to nuclear and intelligence relations are among the most heavily classified historical documents.

Over the course of my research, I visited the Nixon Library in Yorba Linda, California, and focused primarily on Kissinger’s National Security Council (NSC) Europe Country Files, especially those boxes that contained his telephone conversations and documents relating to Anglo-American nuclear cooperation, U.S. - French relations, and the Year of Europe debate. The Nixon Library has a vast array of useful and interesting documents on the period. Although Nixon, learning from the mistakes of Watergate, stopped recording his meetings in this period and therefore deprived scholars of potentially invaluable evidence, Kissinger’s office continued

recording his conversations, amassing 20,000 pages of transcribed telephone calls. After leaving office, Kissinger took with him this enormous collection of telephone conversations, or telcons, from his years in the National Security Council and the State Department, claiming that the approximately 20,000 pages of conversations were personal property. However, in 1999 the National Security Archive successfully undertook legal action to compel Kissinger to release his collection to the NARA, which processed them and released the telcons in 2004. Since most American government documents are declassified 25 years after their creation, the Kissinger telcons proved an unexpected boon for historians hoping to continue to analyze the Nixon and Kissinger years. Several documents in this collection in particular have been enormously influential in the recent historiography of the special relationship, and I obtained these documents from the Nixon Library and analyzed them thoroughly.

Additionally, while studying abroad in Great Britain, I was able to make use of the National Archives in Kew Gardens, and I amassed a large collection of documents from the Foreign Office and the Prime Minister’s Office. The candor of British diplomats in private conversations has been extremely useful for historical analysis. For example, I discovered a series of letters between members of the British Foreign Service hoping to draft a paper on the personal ideas and idiosyncrasies of Henry Kissinger in late 1972. These documents both revealed the great lengths to which British diplomats went in order to carefully court the American National Security Adviser and preserve the special relationship, as well as yielded some tongue-in-cheek British observations about Kissinger’s love life.50 During my research, I

50 In a letter about Kissinger’s brief romantic affair with French writer Danielle Hunebelle, one British diplomat observed “Danielle Hunebelle seems to have made a complete ass of herself. She decided to love Kissinger, without any assurance of reciprocity, and hoped to civilise him!” The National Archives of the UK: FCO 49/395: Paper on the Ideas of Dr Kissinger, Assistant for National Security Affairs. 1972.
focused on Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) files pertaining to Henry Kissinger, the Special Relationship, and the Watergate Crisis. Additionally, I secured documents from the Prime Minister’s Office (PREM) files, focusing mostly on briefings to the Prime Minister on the personality and career of Kissinger, the 1972 election in the United States, and the Year of Europe proceedings. Although I made extensive use of these British documents, it is important to note that this thesis largely follows the American perspective of the crisis because the decisions of Kissinger and the process of American foreign policy development most directly led to the conflict of 1973. British sources are therefore used largely to corroborate American claims and investigate British responses to American actions.

In addition to archival research, I have made use of the Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) series, which is hosted online on the website of the U.S. Department of State Office of the Historian. The FRUS series contains interesting and useful memoranda, notes of conversations, and records of correspondence between the United States and the United Kingdom, which can be extremely revealing even if they have been carefully sanitized. Similarly, on the British side, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office has published a series of document collections entitled Documents on British Policy Overseas. Volume IV of Series III of this collection, “The Year of Europe: America, Europe and the Energy Crisis, 1972-1974,” contains several hundred curated documents of key interest on the period. Through comparing and synthesizing British and American sources, this thesis will avoid the mistakes of overreliance on the records of one side and present a comprehensive chronicle of the conflicts of 1973.

This thesis seeks to explain that the unexpected transatlantic conflicts of 1973 were made possible by an unusual confluence of crises of confidence in both the United States and the
United Kingdom, succeeding where other historians have failed to understand and properly analyze existing documentary evidence. In the first chapter, I will demonstrate how in the years and months preceding the conflict, Heath’s unprecedented Europeanist mentality was masked by the committed Atlanticism and habits of close cooperation of the British bureaucrats in the FCO, who effectively disguised Heath’s pivot toward Europe and raised American hopes for a reestablishment of close relations in the wake of British accession to the EEC. This unstable arrangement led to a conflict, chronicled in chapter two, when the artificially-high American expectations for the seemingly anodyne Year of Europe initiative were dashed by Heath’s Europe-first response, leading to a bitter confrontation that appeared to Kissinger as well as to many traditional historians to be far out of proportion to the announcement that provoked it. In the third chapter, I will show how miscommunications and complicated diplomatic maneuvering surrounding the circulation of two top-secret American documents, rather than rational decision-making, forced Heath to reveal the full extent of his Europeanism. In the final chapter, I will examine the American response to the perceived betrayal of their British allies and demonstrate how the clash escalated over blustery threats regarding intelligence and nuclear weapons collaboration, as Heath attempted to reassert control over his bureaucracy and Kissinger more completely dominated the American policy machine. Only with the changing of the guard triggered by the collapse of the Nixon government and by the electoral failure of Heath in 1974 was the special relationship able to limp toward reconciliation.
CHAPTER 1

A Sea Change in Transatlantic Relations

November 1972 – April 1973

“It is hard to understand when allies turn on you.”

- President Richard Nixon, in reference to European criticism of the Christmas Bombing Campaign, February 1973

1973 – A YEAR OF crises, domestic and international, that would rattle the special relationship between the United States and the United Kingdom and destroy the authority of leaders on both sides of the Atlantic - began auspiciously enough. Richard Nixon, fresh from a landslide reelection victory over George McGovern in November 1972, felt that he had finally regained his momentum and, as he explained to Edward Heath in February 1973, had far more latitude to operate in foreign policy and hopefully to pull off more spectacles in his second term.¹ Heath was pleased with the victory, and wrote to Nixon in November that “It is immensely reassuring to America’s friends to know that the leadership of the world’s most powerful nation will be in your experienced hands,” although he added gloomily that there were still “many common problems” to be faced, requiring “the fullest consultation between us and with our allies.”²

² The National Archives: PRO PREM 15/1980, undated, Heath to Nixon, quoted in Catherine Hynes, The Year That Never Was: Heath, the Nixon Administration, and the Year of Europe (Dublin, Ireland: University College Dublin Press, 2009), 74. The National Archives will henceforth be abbreviated as TNA.
States, was more enthusiastic in his analysis of the victory, writing to the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) that “I do not think that there can be any doubt that the outcome is satisfactory to us” as “President Nixon is, I think, a good friend of ours.”

It was Henry Kissinger, however, who was most sanguine about the future at the end of 1972. He reminisced in the second volume of his memoirs, *Years of Upheaval*, that the administration “had begun Nixon’s second term imagining that we were on the threshold of a creative new era in international affairs; seldom, if ever, had so many elements of foreign policy appeared malleable simultaneously.” Kissinger, Nixon, Cromer, Heath, and many other policy makers on both sides of the Atlantic would be shocked, however, by the failures of the year to come, which was marked by crisis rather than creation, paralysis in the place of malleability, and misunderstanding instead of cooperation. To the leaders of the United States and Britain, 1973, then, would be a year of disappointment.

In examining 1973 as a rare example of post-war transatlantic tension, many historians forget that the special relationship was never without minor conflicts. In day to day operations, a certain amount of diplomatic head-butting was unavoidable between two nations that, regardless of their shared history and generally compatible overall policy goals, differed tremendously in size and scope of interest. However, what had made the Anglo-American relationship truly special in the past was that productive cooperation between bureaucracies could continue even during high-level disagreements, as demonstrated by the uninterrupted Skybolt discussions during the Suez crisis of 1956. In fact, in 1972, only a year before the purportedly

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3 TNA: PRO FCO 73/138, 8 November 1972, Cromer to Douglas-Home, quoted in ibid.
5 Aldrich, “British Intelligence and the Anglo-American ‘Special Relationship’ during the Cold War,” 337.
unprecedented Year of Europe conflict, historian David Nunnerly referred to the days of Skybolt as:

A crisis compounded of drama and deceit, of uncertainty and distrust, of muddled perceptions and disappointed expectations, of high political stakes both won and lost, of miscalculation and misjudgement, at times carefully concealed from the public eye, at times skilfully exposed for the public’s benefit.\(^6\)

This description could aptly be applied to the Year of Europe crisis that would soon follow, a congruence which demonstrates that the special relationship was not special because it was completely bereft of conflict. Instead, what made it special was that cooperation in other specialités continued even during times of public confrontation. The Year of Europe crisis is notable because, for the first time, all three specialités were challenged simultaneously.

The special relationship tended to guarantee consultation rather than agreement, and as British historian Joseph Frankel noted in 1975, this “agreement to disagree” policy was safest “as long as relations were normal, i.e. as long as the Foreign [and Commonwealth] Office and the State Department were in full control.”\(^7\) Indeed, in such a stable situation, external conflicts which would clearly shake cooperation between monolithic state actors tended not to greatly affect the standard operating procedures of consultation between the United States and the United Kingdom, a clear example of Allison’s Model II at work. However, as a result of transatlantic crises of confidence in both the United Kingdom and the United States, as well as of the idiosyncrasies of the Heath and Nixon governments, relations were far from normal and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) and State Department both faced difficulties in maintaining control of Anglo-American diplomatic relations. Optimistic though the Nixon

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\(^7\) Frankel, *British Foreign Policy 1945-1973*, 205.
Administration may have been about the future of international relations, both the United States and the United Kingdom were entering into uncharted and dangerous waters, domestically and internationally, that could not help but alter their foreign policies and the tenor of their bilateral relations. The “agreement to disagree” policy would be tested in 1973. In this chapter, I will demonstrate that 1973 was already prone to transatlantic tensions, as both the United States and the United Kingdom faced crises of confidence and alterations to their post-war foreign policy strategies. The primary cause of the conflict of later in the year, however, was the masking effect that the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office, acting as stewards of the diplomatic specialité of the special relationship, had on Heath’s desire to alter the primary objectives of British foreign policy in order to bring the United Kingdom politically into Europe.

Finding a Role – Systemic Decline in the United Kingdom

In reality, transatlantic tensions had begun years before the events of 1973. Heath, after his surprise Conservative victory in 1970, inherited a nation trying desperately to come to grips with its new position as a fading, former global superpower. His Labour party predecessor, Harold Wilson, had concluded in 1967, after being dogged by repeated economic and monetary crises, that the United Kingdom could no longer afford to maintain its costly military commitments in Southeast Asia, including large presences in Malaysia and Singapore. In 1968, he therefore announced that he would be rapidly withdrawing British forces from commitments “East of Suez,” a geographical designation that became shorthand for the decision to scale back British overseas commitments.  

controversial East of Suez policy and consistent support for the American war effort in Vietnam initially sparked hopes in Washington that his electoral victory meant a renewed determination in London to share the heavy cost of global order.

To this end, upon taking office Heath ordered a careful review of British defense commitments. However, the grim results forced even the hawkish Heath to conclude that the nation simply could not finance its old commitments, and even worse, could ill afford to support its remaining forces in Europe and the Middle East. As he later recalled in his memoirs, “there was no way in which that [East of Suez] decision could be reversed,” although in 1971 he did conclude the Five Power Defense Arrangements (FPDA), a loose collective defense arrangement designed to protect the former British domains in Southeast Asia and defend against claims of Britain abandoning its posts.9 As a mark of American recognition of the reality of British geopolitical decline, even the disappointed Kissinger and Nixon decided not to push the new Prime Minister on “burden sharing,” a favorite 1970s congressional buzzword which demanded that Europeans take more responsibility for their own defense and allow the United States to reduce some of its costly global troop commitments. As Kissinger opined in a memo to the President, “the British have probably done about as much as they can,” and the President agreed.10 Additionally, the Federal Republic of Germany’s strong contributions to NATO, which exceeded the British contribution for the first time in 1964 and continued to increase

through the late 1960s, may have taken some of the American pressure off of the United Kingdom, as Germany increasingly took over the role of the European defense pillar of NATO.\footnote{Reynolds, “A ‘Special Relationship’?,” 13.}

Heath’s woes were not limited to defense capabilities. Unlike the post-war boom in America, the British economy emerged from World War II exhausted and increasingly dependent on overseas trade and investment for survival.\footnote{Marsh and Baylis, “The Anglo-American ‘Special Relationship,’” 176.} Although it enjoyed a largely recession-less period of growth in the decades after the war, the British economy faltered through the 1950s and 1960s because its real growth rate lagged far behind those of its European competitors.\footnote{Christopher Dow, \textit{Major Recessions: Britain and the World 1920-1995} (Oxford University Press, 2000), 303.} This was in large part caused by the inherent difficulty of adjusting to the new limits of a post-colonial global trade arrangement. Deprived of the economy-boosting power of exploitive policies in natural resource-rich colonies in Southeast Asia and Africa, the new United Kingdom was much weaker economically. This challenging economic readjustment was further hindered by the British refusal to take advantage of the opportunities of an increasingly economically integrated Europe, as in the case of their decision not to take part in the creation of the 1951 European Coal and Steel Community which greatly restored the economies of West Germany and France. Furthermore, they were occasionally barred from doing so, as in their failed 1963 and 1967 attempts to join the European Economic Community.\footnote{Steven Broadberry, “The Impact of the World Wars on the Long Run Performance of the British Economy,” \textit{Oxford Review of Economic Policy} 4, no. 1 (April 1, 1988): 36. Nicholas Crafts and Gianni Toniolo, \textit{Economic Growth in Europe Since 1945} (Cambridge University Press, 1996), 41–42.} The West German economic ‘miracle’, French modernization, and the unexpected specter of a rapidly rebuilding
Japan caused Britain to lag far behind economically, relegating it from the world’s third largest economy in 1951 to a distant sixth by 1961, with a GNP of roughly half of that of Japan.\(^{15}\)

The health of the British economy was, however, greatly buoyed by its strong international finance and capital markets, which enjoyed preeminence as a relic of empire but which were largely codependent on their American equivalents. Even as the economy flagged, the world’s great financial markets remained in London and New York and large international transactions were either denominated in Pounds or in Dollars. However, this pillar of the British economy was dealt an unexpected blow in August 1971, when Nixon’s bullish Secretary of the Treasury, John Connally, announced the unilateral termination of the dollar’s convertibility with gold. Despite America’s generally booming post-war economy, it too was hurting in the late 1960s and early 1970s, and Nixon and Connally hoped to shore up their own weaknesses, which included a negative balance of payments, rising public debt, and persistent inflation, with a bold experiment in fiat money that became known as the Nixon Shock.\(^{16}\) However, this sudden announcement effectively ended the Bretton Woods system upon which the British, and much of the global money market, had depended since the Second World War. Even more shockingly, the decision was made almost entirely without consulting the British.\(^{17}\) Heath’s Principal Private Secretary and close advisor, Robert Armstrong, excoriated the Americans in a letter draft for “in fact [removing] without warning the keystone of the international system as it has been built up on the basis of Bretton Woods.” Heath tactfully declined to mail the draft, but the Prime Minister was no less incensed by what he saw as the self-serving economic tactics of the Nixon

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\(^{15}\) Reynolds, “A ‘Special Relationship’?,” 13–14.
\(^{16}\) Edward Heath, “Realism in British Foreign Policy,” *Foreign Affairs* 48, no. 1 (October 1, 1969): 44–45.
Administration. He even remarked acidly to Armstrong, “I knew they killed the wrong man in Dallas,” referring to Connally’s injuries sustained during the Kennedy assassination.\textsuperscript{18} Gallows humor aside, the Nixon Shock of 1971 compounded British economic issues and increased Heath’s determination to restore Britain’s waning role in world affairs to help secure a much needed measure of economic security. In addition, while this was one of multiple crises that Heath would face during his premiership, it was likely the first that would make him question the wisdom of maintaining relations with America over all others.

Heath, conscious of Acheson’s analysis about Britain’s lost role internationally, was personally determined to find and restore that role in the changing world of the 1970s. Unlike many of his predecessors, however, he believed that that role would be across the Channel, not across the Atlantic. His planned pivot to Europe was actually consistently supported in the United States throughout the 1960s, as American policymakers hoped that greater British integration with Europe might help to stabilize the ailing British partner in the special relationship. Additionally, Americans including Nixon and Kissinger believed that such an arrangement could allow greater American influence into the affairs of the continental European states, who, under the leadership of the formidable French President Charles de Gaulle, had stubbornly rebuffed American ingress beyond the operations of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).\textsuperscript{19} Nixon and Kissinger, despite Kissinger’s personal misgivings that “a

\textsuperscript{18}“TNA: PRO PREM 15/309, 20 August 1971, Armstrong to Heath, quoted in ibid., 35. Andrew Roth, \textit{Heath and the Heathmen} (London, Routledge and KPaul, 1972), 224. While serving as Governor of Texas, Connally was seated in the front seat of the car in which President John F. Kennedy would be assassinated. Connally was also struck, and sustained serious injuries to the chest, wrist, and thigh. Heath’s reference further demonstrates the familiarity of British policymakers with the details of the American political scene.

Europe largely constructed on theoretical models might be forced into an anti-American mold because its only sense of identity will be what distinguishes it from America,”

therefore initially supported Heath’s quest for British integration into Europe, “holding to a long-established goal of American foreign policy.”

In 1972, Heath achieved his great ambition of bringing the United Kingdom into the EEC. He succeeded where the past two British overtures had failed (one of which he had personally headed), in convincing the French that allowing the British to join the EEC would not be tantamount to allowing an American shill into the thoroughly European community. Heath’s bid benefited from the death of de Gaulle, whose vehemently France-first political legacy, known as Gaullism, was at least somewhat lessened in his more moderate successor, Georges Pompidou. However, Heath did not intend to leave this third and final attempt up to the whims of relative newcomer to the European international relations scene. As he explained in a 1969 treatise on “Realism in British Foreign Policy,” “if this effort is to succeed it must be most carefully prepared, for public opinion could not tolerate a third failure.”

In a March 1971 meeting with Pompidou, therefore, Heath set about convincing the French President that not only would the British not allow the Americans to abuse the special relationship to gain influence in the EEC, but that “There could be no special relationship

22 De Gaulle memorably charged the UK of being a “cheval de Troi,” or Trojan horse, for America during the 1962 EEC discussions. United Kingdom Ministry of Defense. United Kingdom Official Meets with Henry Kissinger; Includes Attachment Entitled "Notes from Conversation with Dr. Kissinger", 23 December 1968, DNSA Collection.
23 Heath, “Realism in British Foreign Policy,” 42–43.
between Britain and the United States, even if Britain wanted it,” because of their inherently asymmetrical power. Heath, worried that any hint of Anglo-American collusion might scuttle his last shot at entry to the Community, wanted to show no sign of a special relationship with the United States and accordingly endeavored both in his meeting with Pompidou and in his general comportment in office to avoid the symbols of a close connection with the United States that the special relationship produced. The FCO, under former Prime Minister and committed Atlanticist Alec Douglas-Home, was the equivalent of the American State Department, and as a bureaucratic office it was largely unchanged by Heath’s surprise electoral victory. Accordingly, it was much more committed to the trends of transatlantic cooperation than was the Prime Minister’s Office, a distinction that would become more pronounced as Heath completed his pivot toward Europe. This intra-governmental conflict demonstrates the importance of Models II and III in understanding this period of history. While other historians have assumed that Heath’s decision to pivot towards Europe was carried out smoothly by the functionaries in his government, in reality, most bureaucrats in the FCO kept to standard operating procedures of cooperation and communication with their counterparts in the Nixon Administration. While this did not stop Heath from courting the leaders of Europe, it did prevent the Americans from understanding the extent of his Europeanism and contributed to their later conflict.

Throughout his early tenure in office, Heath repeatedly rebuffed Nixon Administration attempts to demonstrate the special relationship, even making a point of referring to it as a “natural relationship,” which he described unsentimentally as “the result of our common history

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and institutions."\textsuperscript{27} Citing domestic difficulties surrounding a dock workers strike and violence in Northern Ireland, Heath declined his first invitation to visit the White House in 1970, making him “the first post-war British premier not to seek an early meeting with the President,” a distinction which worried the President.\textsuperscript{28} Nixon even told his staff that his strict “proscription against ‘unscreened calls’ did not apply to the British Prime Minister” but even so, such calls were reportedly rare.\textsuperscript{29} These rejections did not go unnoticed in Washington, and Kissinger warned British Ambassador John Freeman that, should this trend continue, “something could be lost in personal understanding,” a subtle threat that Freeman found ominous enough to repeat it verbatim to the Prime Minister.\textsuperscript{30} Heath was undeterred, however, and throughout his time in office insisted on treating the relationship with America little different from any other peacetime alliance. In essence, and much to the shock of the Nixon Administration and his own FCO, he insisted on turning down what his predecessors had bought dearly when it was essentially offered to him for free.\textsuperscript{31} Probably conscious of what this policy of abnegation had cost Heath, Pompidou was convinced of his good faith and acquiesced to British entrance to the EEC. After French acceptance, the rest of the EEC quickly followed, and the United Kingdom, along with Denmark and Ireland, officially joined the EEC in a small ceremony in Brussels on January 22\textsuperscript{nd}, 1973, rounding out the fateful Nine of Europe.\textsuperscript{32}

Out of Britain’s crisis of empire, Heath had achieved a milestone accomplishment in finally integrating the British with their neighbors across the Channel. Even his detractors

\textsuperscript{27} Heath, \textit{The Course of My Life}, 472.
\textsuperscript{28} Hynes, \textit{The Year That Never Was}, 2009, 18.
\textsuperscript{29} Ibid., 18–19.
\textsuperscript{30} TNA: PRO PREM 15/161, 10 August 1970, Freeman to Heath, quoted in ibid., 18.
\textsuperscript{31} Renwick, \textit{Fighting with Allies}, 206–207.
\textsuperscript{32} Hynes, \textit{The Year That Never Was}, 2009, 59.
grudgingly cited British accession to the EEC as one of the few bright spots in a premiership that was generally perceived as dismal and unspectacular. However, what effect this achievement would have on British policy in 1973 remained unclear. Although the EEC was primarily an economic organization, its biannual meetings and network of communication were often used by member nations as a forum for general discussion and consultation on foreign and defense policy, especially by the French who had withdrawn from NATO’s integrated command structure in 1966 under de Gaulle. Whether the British would follow this trend or insist on using the Community purely for economic cooperation, as well as to what extent they would consult with Washington on their new European-based policy, were still largely unanswered questions in London in 1973. The role of the EEC in British policy-making and its potential effect on the special relationship was therefore another unknown in a period marked by uncertainty.

Triangulation and the Changing Face of American Foreign Policy

The United Kingdom was not alone in dramatically revamping its foreign policy in the early 1970s. The Nixon Administration’s post-election exuberance, especially in reference to major successes in foreign policy, belied a nascent and not universally popular conception of American foreign relations, and masked a growing scandal that would destroy the presidency and restrict the ability of the famed Kissinger foreign policy machine to operate. Although the United States

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was clearly the stronger partner in the special relationship in the 1970s, it was facing crises of its own.

While the United Kingdom’s foreign policy future was complicated by its integration into a community of European allies, in the early 1970s the United States had entered into an even more complex arrangement with former and current Cold War foes. In late 1972, Kissinger and Nixon were confident that “Peace is at hand” in Vietnam. Accordingly, they hoped that an end to hostilities would allow the Administration to pursue ambitious goals elsewhere around the globe, once free from the albatross of the brutal war of attrition in Southeast Asia. Although “peace with honor” proved more elusive than the President suggested in his triumphant speech in January 1973, the national relief felt at the end of the war was very real. However, the lingering Vietnam syndrome – a term for the general domestic malaise and unwillingness to enter into further international commitments that persisted in the United States even after the ending of the war – threatened to drive the United States into a period of neo-isolationism. This was an outcome that the British were particularly eager to avoid, as they were keenly aware that the massive American contribution to NATO and to global nuclear defense, the great bastion of European security, represented just such a commitment.

Nixon and Kissinger’s greatest international successes stemmed from bold reevaluations of relationships with former enemies. Accordingly, Nixon and Kissinger won great acclaim in the early 1970s when they succeeded in dramatically altering the once belligerent tone of discussions with the Soviet Union. They capped this accomplishment in May 1972 with the signing of a landmark nuclear weapons agreement known as the Strategic Arms Limitation

35 Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, 1982, 1–2.
Treaty (SALT). The agreement was rapidly rendered obsolete by the development of Multiple Independently Targetable Reentry Vehicle (MIRV) technology on both sides of the Iron Curtain, which allowed a smaller quantity of nuclear missiles, as prescribed by the treaty, to threaten even more devastation. Nonetheless, the real success of this policy of détente was the lasting and constructive dialogue between the Americans and Soviets which it facilitated. These productive discussions yielded a number of other potential agreements, including the Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War (PNW), Mutual and Balanced Forces Reduction (MBFR) talks, and SALT II.

Détente with the Soviet Union, although celebrated by the Nixon Administration as a major achievement and regarded as an enormous step in the creation of a lasting global peace, represented a major source of anxiety for the United Kingdom and the other nations of NATO that depended upon the American nuclear deterrent for their own security. A United States that was friendly with the Soviet Union seemed far less likely, in the eyes of European leaders, to risk a retaliatory strike on Washington D.C. in order to defend Paris or Bonn from potential Soviet conventional aggression.³⁷ Additionally, bilateral U.S.-U.S.S.R. negotiations on nuclear weapons reductions worried the French and British, who feared, despite multiple assurances from Kissinger and Nixon to the contrary, that the United States might agree to bargain away British and French nuclear weapons without consulting them in exchange for further Soviet concessions.³⁸ Europeans, especially the French, also feared that “a dreaded condominium” might develop between the United States and the Soviet Union, in which the Americans and

Soviets would settle international issues through joint superpower fiat and simply compel the smaller nations to fall into line without consultation.\(^\text{39}\) Regardless of whether any of these fears actually came to pass, Zbigniew Brzezinski, a respected détente critic, bitter Kissinger rival, and later National Security Advisor, observed in 1970 that, in light of the American policy of détente, “for Europeans, contemporary America is doubtless a less certain protector, a less committed partner.”\(^\text{40}\)

Perhaps even more surprising to the international community was Nixon and Kissinger’s famed rapprochement with the People’s Republic of China in the early 1970s. As the United States gradually disentangled itself from the morass of Vietnam and the Chinese grew more determined to throw off the yoke of Soviet dominance in the communist world, especially during the Sino-Soviet border crisis of 1969, mainland China increasingly appeared to Nixon and Kissinger as a potentially useful counterweight against the might of the Soviets.\(^\text{41}\) Kissinger explained that “in a subtle triangle of relations between Washington, Beijing and Moscow, we improve the possibilities of accommodations with each as we increase our options toward both,” an inventive maneuver which became known as triangular diplomacy.\(^\text{42}\) The complex arrangement required careful monitoring and a deft hand for playing the two prickly communist

\(^{39}\) Henry Kissinger, *White House Years*, (Boston: Little, Brown, 1979), 94.


\(^{42}\) Kissinger, *White House Years*, 165.
powers against each other without sparking outright conflict, which only increased Kissinger’s value to Nixon, because, as his biographer Walter Isaacson opined colorfully, “That type of thinking came naturally to someone who was both a brilliant conceptualizer and slightly conspiratorial in outlook, who could feel the connections the way a spider senses twitches in its web.”

The opening with China caused problems of its own with the British. Although Chinese rapprochement did not spark the same fears for European security as did détente with the Soviet Union, the almost complete lack of consultation between Kissinger and the FCO increased British misgivings surrounding their own fading importance in the special relationship. In part of a growing pattern of non-consultation, Kissinger neglected to notify his British counterparts that he had travelled to Beijing secretly in July 1971 to negotiate a possible Nixon visit in 1972. This dissembling was not necessarily surprising, as the visit was high-risk and completely confidential, and there was no guarantee of successful negotiations. What the British found harder to accept, however, was the paltry warning that the FCO received on July 15, 1971, a mere hour before Nixon triumphantly announced his upcoming trip to Beijing. Douglas-Home resented the “somewhat cavalier” attitude that the Americans affected while John Morgan, the head of the British Far Eastern Department, remarked that it was difficult to ignore “the contrast between our total openness with the Americans on our own initiatives towards China and the 75 minutes notice we received in London of President Nixon’s intention.” Clearly, the changing face of American foreign policy had direct effects on the substance of the special relationship.

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44 TNA: PRO FCO 21/826, 27 July 1971, Morgan to Tomlinson, quoted in Hynes, The Year That Never Was, 2009, 32–33. Other sources suggest that the Prime Minister’s Office may have had as much as four days warning before the announcement, although it is clear that the FCO was
The Ramifications of Watergate on the Nixon Administration

The Nixon Administration’s future was rendered even murkier by domestic scandals as well as diplomatic “coup” abroad. Far from the much-lauded foreign policy achievements in Moscow and Southeast Asia, the implications of a botched break-in at the Watergate Hotel threatened to destroy Nixon’s second term before it really began. As details of the involvement of highly ranked officials began to emerge and started to fuel an American media storm in March and April of 1973, Nixon was forced to devote more and more of his time to quelling rumors and addressing the formal Senate inquiry, which “not only took away most of the president’s time but also quickly undermined his political standing.” This unexpected Watergate crisis, although it greatly hampered the authority of the Nixon Administration abroad as cautious foreign leaders hedged their bets and tried to avoid making lasting commitments to a president with an increasingly uncertain future, proved to be singularly empowering for Henry Kissinger.

Before the scandal, Nixon maintained an unusual and uneasy foreign policy operation that split responsibilities between the more public State Department and the more secretive but ultimately more utilized National Security Council (NSC). Kissinger served as Nixon’s National Security Advisor, and represented a powerful tool in the President’s foreign policy arsenal,

\[\text{not notified until the day of. In either case, the notice was too late for meaningful consultation and angered the British. Robb, A Strained Partnership?, 40–41.}\]
capable as he was of conceptualizing a broad and complicated system of international linkage and using it to tirelessly negotiate complex agreements with old enemies. William Rogers, Conversely, served as Secretary of State in a more official but less useful capacity. Rogers was employed mostly for ceremonial occasions and less delicate negotiations where high rank was the most important qualification. This bicameral arrangement was a product of Nixon’s personal proclivity for secrecy and his mistrust of the bureaucratic State Department. However, it was also unwieldy and confusing, especially for American allies who did not fully understand how best to cooperate with two arms of American foreign policy that pursued different and sometimes conflicting courses of action.47

Kissinger explained that he and the President “came to deal increasingly with key foreign leaders through channels that directly linked the White House Situation Room to the field without going through the State Department – the so-called backchannels,” in a process that “started on the day after Inauguration.”48 In a 1980 defense of his stewardship of the special relationship, Kissinger even recalled sheepishly that he “kept the British Foreign Office better informed and more closely engaged than I did the American State Department – a practice which, with all affection for the British, I would not recommend be made permanent.”49 This policy may have been instrumental in negotiating delicate openings with former enemy nations as it preserved a level of secrecy that would have been impossible in the more public State Department. However, it was less useful in dealing with allies, who were frequently hard pressed to find a suitably empowered counterpart with whom Kissinger could negotiate.

48 Kissinger, White House Years, 29.
Although Kissinger seems to remember this arrangement fondly, for the British, the situation was utterly bewildering. For example, in response to the British complaint that they had not been consulted sufficiently before announcing Nixon’s visit to China in late 1971, Kissinger explained to Ambassador Cromer that he had not been able to confer with the British because he had not even notified the American State Department, who had been working under Rogers on an “entirely opposite policy.” An astonished Cromer reported back to his superiors in the FCO that he had been unable to manage a reply to this “really rather remarkable statement.”

Although Kissinger seemed to hope that demonstrating this preferential treatment over the State Department would reassure the British of the special nature of their relationship, Cromer and the FCO were more bemused than flattered. “We have no option but to react to the Kissinger manner of operation as best we can.” Cromer remarked to Denis Greenhill, the Permanent Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and Head of the Diplomatic Service, in 1972. “One only hopes that after the present American Presidential election the Americans may revert to more conventional diplomatic practices.”

The arrangement complicated the diplomatic specialité of the special relationship and made the habit of communication between both foreign policy nexuses more challenging.

In this hope, Cromer would be sorely disappointed. After the 1972 election, with Watergate beginning consume the time and threaten the authority of the presidency, Nixon increasingly came to rely on Kissinger to run his foreign policy largely unmonitored. Kissinger, although peripherally involved in some wiretapping of members of his office, escaped almost

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unscathed from the scandal and, as the Kalb brothers waxed poetically in their biography of Kissinger, “compared to the Nixon aides facing indictment, [Kissinger] stood out like a knight in shining armor – Lancelot among a band of brigands.”\textsuperscript{52} Although Nixon privately distrusted Kissinger’s melodramatic personality and self-aggrandizing style, and particularly disliked his tendency to court the press and steal acclaim from the President, he recognized that he needed Kissinger more than ever in such a crisis. Accordingly, Nixon eventually granted Kissinger his long-time desire, eventually requesting Rogers’ resignation and replacing him with Kissinger as Secretary of State in September 1973.\textsuperscript{53} Kissinger did not abdicate his old position, and therefore for the remainder of the Nixon Administration, he ran both the National Security Council and the State Department, an arrangement that Kissinger recalled “did not work,” but one that made him one of the most uniquely empowered unelected statesmen in the world.\textsuperscript{54} If Joseph Frankel’s argument is accepted that the special relationship was safest when business proceeded as usual in the normal channels for transatlantic cooperation, through the State Department and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, then 1973 was clearly a time of unusual peril for the special relationship.

**Early 1973 – The Last Good Days of the Nixon-Heath Special Relationship**

Though each nation was clearly facing crises that would alter their policy schedules and eventually threaten to affect the tenor of the special relationship, in early 1973, the Americans at

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{52} Marvin L. Kalb, *Kissinger*, (Boston, Little, Brown, 1974), 444.  
\textsuperscript{53} In a 1988 televised interview, Nixon said of Kissinger “Now Henry is difficult, Henry is devious – some people think he’s obnoxious – but he’s a terrific negotiator.” Connie Chung, “Nixon/Interview,” *Meet the Press* (NBC Evening News, April 9, 1988), Vanderbilt TV News Archive.  
\textsuperscript{54} Horne, *Kissinger*, 186.}
least appeared optimistic about the state of Anglo-American relations. Nixon was extremely grateful for Heath’s support for his controversial decisions surrounding the ending of the Vietnam War, and Kissinger was hopeful that his close cooperation with British policymakers on a draft for an agreement with the Soviet Union indicated a healthy relationship. However, such early coordination was misleading, as differences in strategy within the British government artificially inflated American hopes for the Year of Europe.

Although the gesture may appear insignificant in the tremendous upheaval surrounding the ending of the Vietnam War, Nixon was profoundly affected by Heath’s support during the outcry over the Christmas Bombing campaign. The hostilities were greeted with renewed protests in the streets of cities across the country, and vehement editorials appeared in major newspapers. The Boston Globe pronounced somberly “It is our own bombs which are reducing America itself to the Stone Age level of morality, humanity and savagery.” The invective was not merely domestic, however, and many European leaders condemned the campaign, including King Gustaf VI Adolf of Sweden who publically described the air raids as “merciless.” Indeed, Kissinger recalled that all of America’s European allies, with the exception of Heath, disapproved of this “last painful tremor of the Vietnam War,” a betrayal which enraged Nixon.

Months later, Deputy Under-Secretary of State at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Thomas Brimelow, revealed to Kissinger that the United Kingdom had been approached to support a formal complaint about the bombings, which they refused to do. He declined to identify who specifically had approached them, but Kissinger suspected, probably rightly, that

57 Kissinger, *Years of Upheaval*, 1982, 137.
the French had been behind the abortive joint condemnation.\(^{58}\) Although the British stopped short of publicly supporting the campaign, Heath privately conveyed his support to the President and Cromer notified Kissinger that Heath Administration would continue to avoid making any negative comment on the bombing, at least through early January 1973, despite receiving bitter criticism from the British press for their prolonged silence.\(^{59}\)

Although the British were reportedly irritated by the lack of prior consultation they received on Vietnam policy, this continued support against the tide of global disapproval was seen by Nixon and Kissinger as a good omen for Anglo-American relations. Kissinger even personally apologized to Cromer, claiming that he had been “very remiss” in failing to notify them that they planned to briefly resume bombing, and promised a full consultation over breakfast when he returned to Washington.\(^{60}\) Always sensitive to criticism and happy to be praised, Nixon was even more effusive. Employing some roundabout logic, the President explained to Kissinger that he had not even done the bombing for the United States or “for a miserable Vietnam, but [for] Europe, [and] the Mid-East,” in the hopes of establishing a more secure position in the wider conflict of the Cold War.\(^{61}\) Accordingly, criticizing the decision was a cheap way for European leaders to score points with their left-leaning demographics over an action from which they ultimately benefitted through increased global security. Therefore, the


\(^{60}\) Hynes, *The Year That Never Was*, 2009, 82. TNA: PRO PREM 15/1281, undated, Cromer to Greenhill, quoted in ibid., 84.

European opprobrium was not just disrespectful of an ally, it was a keenly felt betrayal. The President therefore personally thanked the Prime Minister, telling him “What you did did not go unnoticed, and what others did, did not go unnoticed either.” Considering the bitter conflict that would soon arise in Anglo-American relations, Nixon’s conclusion that “It is hard to understand when allies turn on you,” would soon take on unexpected significance.  

Buoyed in part by the good feeling that this British support generated, Heath’s February 1973 visit to Washington was one of the last cordial meetings between the two leaders before the advent of the Year of Europe speech and the subsequent deterioration of Anglo-American relations. Originally planned for December 1972, the meeting was postponed due to the turmoil of Vietnam, but both sides placed a high degree of value on the meeting and it was quickly rescheduled for February 1st. Observers in Britain and the United States were hopeful that the meeting, the first since British accession to the EEC, would help to clarify the nature of relations between the United States, the United Kingdom, and the unified nations of Europe. A writer for The New York Times recognized that the talks would be “crucial” and opined optimistically that “Mr. Heath is perhaps uniquely qualified to get the imperative Transatlantic dialogue under way at the highest level.”

The visit was Heath and Nixon’s third formal meeting and Heath’s second time in Washington, and considering misgivings over the EEC enlargement and Heath’s increasing pivot towards Europe, the occasion was surprisingly replete with symbols of the closeness of the U.S.-U.K. relationship. Heath attended a meeting of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in the Capitol and, in an unusual but not unheard of move for a visiting foreign leader, gave a lengthy

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62 Meeting with British Prime Minister Heath and Sir Burke Trend, Thursday, February 1, 1973, 10:43 A.m.-12:25 P.m., the Oval Office, the White House, 1 February 1973, DNSA Collection.
speech to the prominent committee. His message was mostly positive, but Heath could not resist using the opportunity to remind the assembled senators that the British spent a far higher portion of its GDP on defense in Europe than did the United States and that “there are ten Europeans under arms for the defence of Europe for every one American,” as well as to chide the Americans for the lingering economic effects of the Nixon shocks of 1971. In an even more remarkable gesture, President Nixon unexpectedly accepted an invitation to dine with Heath and his visiting entourage at the British Embassy in Washington, an honor for which Kissinger had encouraged his British counterparts not to hope, because Nixon had only ever attended such a dinner one other time, with French President Pompidou. Kissinger later pointed out to a gratified Ambassador Cromer that the British had “won all along the line,” because even Mrs. Nixon would be attending the dinner, an honor that had not been bestowed upon the French. The visit culminated with a weekend at Camp David, a similarly unusual boon for which the British had been particularly eager.

65 TNA: PRO PREM 15/1978, 1 February 1973, Record of a meeting between the Prime Minister and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee at the Capitol, Washington DC, quoted in ibid., 91.
67 United States Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. Missiles Discussion with United Kingdom, 30 January 1973, DNSA Collection.
68 In his memoirs, Kissinger related a humorous anecdote from the visit that perhaps illustrates the unusual and uneasy personal relationship between Nixon and Heath. He recalled that heavy fog forced the Presidential helicopter to land about halfway to Camp David, and the party was obliged to continue by car. Nixon and Heath travelled together in the lead car while Kissinger and Trend followed behind, speculating nervously about “how these two withdrawn men would conduct a social conversation in the back seat of a car when there was neither agenda nor any of the normal supports of governmental ambience.” Amusingly, Nixon refused to discuss the awkward conversation and only ever reported that it was “tough going.” Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, 1982, 142.
Discussions between the American and British leaders were reportedly good natured and wide ranging, but largely inconclusive. Nixon repeatedly reaffirmed his commitment to Europe and to the British, but Heath, while appreciative, avoided making any firm commitments of his own. The President explained that America was in a “dangerously isolationist mood and an inward-looking, protectionist European Community risked finding themselves in serious conflict,” and Heath agreed that such tensions were possible and undesirable. However, when Nixon proposed working groups and the development of a system of shared American and European goals – what would become the beginnings of the nascent Year of Europe plan – Heath stopped short of endorsing any of Nixon’s strategies and did not propose any of his own. Kissinger recalled succinctly that Heath “could not have been more helpful on diagnosis or more evasive on prescription.”

Although the British left Camp David satisfied with the meetings, Kissinger and Nixon were very worried. Kissinger reflected that there was “a nearly impenetrable opacity about Heath’s formulations which, given his intelligence, had to be deliberate,” and voiced a growing suspicion that Heath wanted American and British consultations for strategic intelligence reasons without actually planning any related cooperation. The difference in British and American evaluations of the meeting led to markedly different plans of action. Heath, believing that he had maintained the status quo despite the complications of the EEC, was pleased with the general attitude of the meetings and satisfied that he had not been manipulated into any major joint

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70 Ibid.

71 Kissinger, *Years of Upheaval*, 1982, 143.

actions with the United States that might jeopardize his still delicate position in Europe. The British premier and his staff recognized that care would have to be taken to continually reassure the Americans of the good health of the Anglo-American relations, but were optimistic in general. Nixon and Kissinger, conversely, were alarmed by the lack of conclusive results and therefore endeavored to renew productive relations with Great Britain and Europe at large, a motivation that developed over the next month and a half into the Year of Europe announcement.

In her comprehensive analysis of the failed Year of Europe initiative, *The Year that Never Was*, historian Catherine Hynes has largely concluded that the Washington visit of 1973 represented the first occasion in which President Nixon and especially Kissinger recognized the growing gulf that already existed between the two administrations. Leaning more heavily on British than American sources, she argued that the British were already aware of the widening divide between the two nations and that Heath’s satisfaction with the February discussions should not be seen as an indication of the good health of the relationship but instead as an example of its increasingly adversarial nature. Thorough though her work is, Hynes does not recognize that the uneasy disconnect between British and American perceptions of the meeting may have stemmed from the complexities of bureaucratic operations on both sides. Kissinger later suggested that some of the confusion resulted from conflict within the British government, and Heath’s intentional recalcitrance may have been masked by high-ranking members of the FCO, like Douglas-Home and Thomas Brimelow, who “did their efficient best to hide their Prime Minister’s foot-dragging” by “following more established habits of collaboration.”

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75 Kissinger, *Years of Upheaval*, 1982, 143.
Clearly, this is an example of Models II and III, the Organizational Process Model and the Bureaucratic Politics Model respectively, at work as reliance on standard operating procedures in the FCO and disagreement between the FCO and the Premier’s Office led to confusion between allies. Kissinger and Nixon, unaware of the full extent of the gap between British and American conceptions of the future of the special relationship, “took silence as consent, […] and counted on the British as supporters in what we took to be the common task of strengthening Atlantic unity.” This inability to see eye to eye would later contribute directly to the bewilderment on both sides of the Atlantic over the announcement and failure of the Year of Europe initiative.

“The Astonishing Anomaly” – Operation Hullabaloo and the Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War

Kissinger’s close cooperation with the FCO on the drafting of the Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War (PNW) with the Soviet Union was both an example of the diplomatic and nuclear specialités of the special relationship at work and a source of transatlantic confusion stemming from competing American policy within the British government. The PNW was a nuclear non-aggression treaty idea first raised by the Soviets in mid-1972, only a few months after Nixon’s well-publicized opening with China. Kissinger, while hopeful that such an agreement would be regarded as a rhetorical accomplishment of détente, was also suspicious that the agreement was a Soviet attempt to dilute the American nuclear deterrent in order to allow the Soviet Union to attack or threaten to attack the increasingly recalcitrant China with impunity.76 Their motives, in Kissinger’s words, “were obvious: to create the impression of détente, to create

the impression of great-power bilateralism, and to give them a relatively free hand for blackmail [against the Chinese].” After all, if the Americans agreed not to use nuclear weapons against the Soviet Union, who would be able to stop the Soviet Union from “castrating” the nuclear capabilities of their former ally and reemerging as the dominant global communist power? Accordingly, Kissinger agreed to begin drafting such an impressive sounding agreement, but he wanted it to be entirely without teeth to actually confine American policy. He planned to “give [the Soviets] enough of the form without any of the substance.”

In order to produce a document that would achieve this delicate goal, its wording would have to be precise and its drafting would have to be masterful. Kissinger and the National Security Council took the lead in its conceptual development, but Kissinger wanted a second, reliable party that understood American objectives precisely to undertake the actual writing of the document. Oddly, however, Kissinger did not turn to the American State Department for assistance, brimming though it surely was with foreign policy experts who were presumably aware of Soviet intentions and should certainly have understood American priorities. Kissinger distrusted the large American bureaucracy and preferred to operate personally and through secret back-channels. Additionally he was fiercely competitive with then-Secretary of State Rogers, whom he considered incompetent. Accordingly, he asked British diplomat Thomas Brimelow, “who had good cause to be regarded as one of the foremost Soviet experts in the Foreign Office,”

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80 Boaz and Shalom, “The White House Middle East Policy in 1973 as a Catalyst for the Outbreak of the Yom Kippur War,” 77.
to help draft the top secret agreement, an agreement to which the British would not be party.81 With Heath’s uneasy blessing, provided on the condition that the arrangement remain secret and no word of British involvement be divulged to the nations of Europe, the British agreed to the bizarre undertaking. The cooperation became known in FCO parlance as “Operation Hullabaloo,” in reference to its unlikely nature.

This arrangement is so unusual that it is worth restating. Kissinger was so concerned about secrecy that no American outside of the White House was even aware of the possibility of the PNW. He consulted directly with Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin and all negotiations and draft exchanges took place through top secret American-Soviet backchannels. However, his cooperation with the British was comprehensive, a far cry from the tardy and perfunctory notification he typically offered his counterparts across the Atlantic on other aspects of American foreign policy. Indeed, Kissinger discussed the PNW in its minutia in nearly every major conversation that he had with Brimelow and other members of the FCO through late 1972 and early 1973. Cooperation was so in depth, in fact, that in a top secret meeting between Trend, Cromer, Kissinger, and their aides, Kissinger felt obliged to personally notify his British counterparts that, in an American rewrite of a British draft, they “changed ‘their policy’ to ‘their policies.’”82 On another occasion, Kissinger called Brimelow directly to ask whether he had a strong preference between the apparently interchangeable phrases “do their utmost” and “act in such a way as to” for use in a minor clause of the document.83

81 Jones, “‘A Man in a Hurry,’” 88.
The bizarre nature of this arrangement was not lost on the British. Cromer, in an extremely forthright letter to Brimelow, commented that he was “Struck by the astonishing anomaly of the most powerful nation in the world invoking the aid of a foreign government to do its drafting for it, while totally excluding its own Ministry of Foreign Affairs.”\(^{84}\) Flattered though he may have been, he was not entirely enthused about the operation. “It is a dangerous and complicated path that we tread and I am always aware of the pitfalls that lurk on either side,” he warned, and recommended that while they continue to work closely with Kissinger on the agreement, they should never forget “the highly devious nature of Kissinger’s intellectual makeup” and that his primary rationale for the cooperation was his “own self interest and not necessarily […] ours.”\(^{85}\) Brimelow, too, was conscious of the precarious position in which the agreement placed the British, and explained in a letter to Greenhill that “If our own part in the exercise becomes known, we may be criticised for keeping the other members of NATO, and the Nine in particular, in the dark. If our own part does not become known, and the rest of the Nine become critical, we may be expected to join in public criticism of a text to which we have contributed.”\(^{86}\)

In a rare 1973 example of the unflappable intelligence cooperation of earlier periods of the special relationship, Operation Hullabaloo continued largely uninterrupted during the Year of Europe conflicts later in the year. The Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War was finalized by early summer and signed by Soviet Leader Leonid Brezhnev and President Nixon in


\(^{85}\) Ibid.

Washington on June 22, 1973. In order to disguise their role in the drafting, the British requested that Nixon write personally to the French, German, Chinese, and British leadership to notify them of the treaty twenty-four hours before it was officially announced to NATO. In return, the British promised to support it, albeit with some reservations to disguise their involvement. Douglas-Home instructed Sir Edward Peck, the head of the British delegation to NATO, “to welcome the agreement without indicating that we had prior knowledge of it.” The response from the notified parties was uniformly negative, with many in Europe claiming that the Americans had finally vindicated de Gaulle in demonstrating that “the US would not risk nuclear destruction to defend Europe or risk New York to save Hamburg.” Even Peck apparently voiced some dissatisfaction about the Agreement in a closed NATO meeting, prompting Kissinger to complain to Cromer about the “absurdity that Britain’s permanent representative strongly criticized what was to a large extent a British draft.” Cromer argued in return that Peck had been appropriately circumspect, considering the general response from Europe. He later reflected to Burke Trend that Kissinger had “chosen to play the prima donna, only to find that he is singing from the wrong score.”

Hynes argued that the continued cooperation, “despite the high level hostility in Anglo-American relations” at the time, demonstrated that “at an important, practical level, the special relationship continued to flourish.” Although Hynes is correct in supposing that Kissinger continued to rely on the assistance of Operation Hullabaloo for practical reasons, this was more

87 Tel 245 to UKDEL NATO, Brimelow Papers, 18 June 1973, Document 131, ibid.
89 Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, 1982, 286.
91 Hynes, The Year That Never Was, 2009, 121.
an example of Allison’s Model III in action than it was a good litmus test for the health of the relationship. Judging by the level of specificity with which Kissinger consulted with Brimelow, he actually valued his opinion and recognized his usefulness. He told Cromer in March that, compared to anything the Americans might have produced on their own, Brimelow’s draft “was longer, more comprehensive, more vague, gave the impression of conveying more but in fact meant a great deal less.”\(^{92}\) In short, exactly what he had hoped for. Furthermore, remarkable though this arrangement was, it was still in keeping with the uniquely close diplomatic and intelligence cooperation upon which the true functional special relationship was built. In this respect, Hullabaloo was an example of the Organizational Processes Model as well, as this close cooperation continued even as top-level disagreements raged later in the year.

For its part, the FCO was demonstrably more committed to maintaining transatlantic relations with the United States than the Premier’s office and, as an unelected bureaucracy, was more reliant on standard operating procedures and less responsive to rapid changes in policy outlook.\(^{93}\) Accordingly, it continued to cooperate with the United States in much the same way that it had for the last 25 years, regardless of the growing gulf between the two executive offices. Hynes’ mistake is in imagining the British government to be a monolithic body, in which actions undertaken by one facet of the government naturally represent the disposition of the entire government. Instead, this form of continued cooperation only served to mislead Kissinger about the real state of relations and artificially inflate his expectations for British reception of the Year of Europe initiative.


\(^{93}\) Renwick, Fighting with Allies, 209.
Conclusion

Historians disagree on to what extent the period immediately before Kissinger’s announcement of the Year of Europe was a metaphorical calm before the storm, when events were already in motion that would lead directly to the conflicts of later in the year. While both American and British statesmen were optimistic about the future of international relations and the transatlantic alliance at the start of Nixon’s second term, the contemporary and historical conceptualization of international actors as monolithic, purposive decision makers contributed to a complicating discrepancy in analyses of the special relationship. Kissinger, empowered by the growing Watergate scandal to indulge his propensity for secrecy and personal control, bewildered members of the British FCO and Prime Minister’s Office who had become used to a standard operating procedure that involved close cooperation between the State Department and the FCO. That same tendency towards habitual action in the FCO similarly confused Kissinger and Nixon, who realized too late the extent to which Douglas-Home, Brimelow, Trend, Cromer, and their associates had masked Heath’s revolutionary pivot towards Europe. That Kissinger should rely on British support for his upcoming declaration seemed entirely natural to him, while to the increasingly Euro-centric Heath, it was anything but. Kissinger’s confident assumption of British support for his Year of Europe plan would eventually be replaced by confusion, disappointment, and outrage at what he saw as British betrayal.
CHAPTER 2

Kissinger’s Year of Europe and the Beginning of Destabilization in Transatlantic Relations

April – May 1973

“If we permit the Atlantic partnership to atrophy, or to erode through neglect, carelessness, or mistrust, we risk what has been achieved and we shall miss our historic opportunity for even greater achievement.”
- Henry Kissinger, The Year of Europe Speech, April 23 1973

“For Henry Kissinger to announce a Year of Europe without consulting any of us was rather like my standing between the lions in Trafalgar Square and announcing that we were embarking on a year to save America!”
- Edward Heath, The Course of My Life

ON THE EVENING of April 20th, 1973, days before he would deliver the divisive “Year of Europe” announcement, Henry Kissinger did not seem to believe he was preparing to give a particularly revolutionary speech. In a phone call with Marilyn Berger of the Washington Post, Kissinger swapped some customary banter with the reporter before hinting casually that his speech would cover “Probably European policy.” She eventually cajoled him into expanding that “it would be basically, you know, [a] more philosophical statement of what we’re trying to do and what we mean by the “Year of Europe.” However, he cautioned her not to expect too much from the speech, as “It’s hard to say anything in ten minutes.”¹ Three days later, Kissinger would prove himself wrong. On April 23rd, though he spoke for closer to twenty minutes to the annual

Associated Press Luncheon in New York, he managed to say more than a few things that enraged policymakers and pundits throughout Britain and the EEC.

The twin shocks felt by the Heath and Nixon Administrations – that the Americans would be so bold and tactless on the part of the former and that the British would be so misleading and traitorous on the part of the latter – are difficult to explain using the Rational Actor Model alone. Two rational states as closely allied as the United States and Great Britain should not logically have come to such a trenchant confrontation over such an objectively mild initiative. However, Kissinger and Heath alike fell victim to an old fallacy of alliance politics: assumed expertise in the affairs of an allied government. Kissinger assumed that the continued habit of cooperation between his NSC and the British FCO was indicative of healthy Anglo-American relations, while Heath assumed that the Nixon government would recognize the delicate nature of his position in the EEC and would refrain from drawing any obvious connections between the United States and United Kingdom that might invite European scorn. Instead, bureaucratic infighting between the Prime Minister’s Office and the Foreign Office in the United Kingdom and a reliance on standard operating procedures, as well as Kissinger’s confidence in his own understanding of British priorities, artificially inflated expectations for the Year of Europe, leading to an unexpectedly acrimonious conflict that appeared to many contemporary observers and historians as inexplicable, considering the relatively innocuous nature of the Year of Europe.

“A Man in a Hurry” – Kissinger’s Rush to the Year of Europe Announcement

President Nixon began 1973 with an injunction to revitalize American-European relations, and announced proudly in January “We have been to the People’s Republic of China. We have been to the Soviet Union,” before concluding, “We have been paying attention to the problems of
Europe, but now those problems will be put on the front burner.”² However, as the Watergate scandal continued to pick up steam and details began to emerge that appeared to personally implicate the President, Nixon recognized that his close involvement with new policy initiatives might hurt their credibility far more than it helped. Additionally, his schedule was increasingly tied up in the now all-encompassing task of fending off Watergate allegations, and he no longer had the time nor the energy to devote to personally managing the intricacies of foreign policy to the extent that he did during his first term.³ Accordingly, he tapped Kissinger to make an official announcement of the new transatlantic foreign policy initiative, instructing him airily to “explain to Europe what we are all about.”⁴

The Year of Europe itself had actually been announced on February 15th during a photo session with General Andrew Goodpaster, the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, but no details of substance were disclosed and the announcement attracted little public attention. Privately, however, members of the FCO were already keenly interested in the potential effects of a new plan that might redefine transatlantic relations, but were having difficulty tracking down concrete details on the nature of the initiative or even the origin of the term.⁵ Kissinger’s announcement would for the first time flesh out the details, explain the motivations of the plan,

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and hopefully put British concerns to rest. The speech, therefore, was consequential on a policy level, but it also held great personal significance to Kissinger. It would be his first major foreign policy speech and, perhaps just as important to the bitterly competitive Kissinger, the President had selected him to deliver it instead of Secretary of State Rogers, which would have been far more traditional. This was a mark of Nixon’s increasing reliance on Kissinger’s foreign expertise and recognition of his rising international stardom in the wake of successful negotiations with China and Moscow, both of which Kissinger had engineered without the assistance or occasionally even the knowledge of the State Department.

Kissinger was therefore very nervous about the speech, but for personal reasons that would later appear trivial in light of its negative international reception. Beginning only a few days before the announcement was planned, Kissinger drafted the speech almost entirely himself with the help of only a small group of NSC staff, before turning to Nixon speechwriter John Andrews and a few other friends in the wider White House organization anxiously for advice on how the “thing holds together.” In a prime example of Kissinger’s conspiratorial style, he cautioned his unofficial editors that he did not “want it bouncing around the [State] Department,” and refused to give out typed copies, preferring instead that Andrews and others come to his office to read it in person, and directed White House Press Secretary Ziegler not to hand out

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advance copies of the speech. Indeed, Kissinger developed the speech and the initiative to the almost complete exclusion of William Rogers, who was also slated to give a speech in New York on the same day, a fact that he discovered to his general consternation that morning.

Significantly, this proscription against advance notice did not extend to the British. As early as March 5th, Kissinger broached the subject with Brimelow during a conversation on Hullabaloo, more than a month before many in his own government would hear of the expanded initiative. He gave Brimelow a top secret NSC memorandum on American plans for U.S.-European and U.S.-UK relations and requested an analysis of British ideas on the future prospects of the transatlantic relationship. Additionally, Kissinger proposed a visit by top members of the FCO to Washington in order to discuss the two papers further in April, before he announced anything publicly. Heath was aware of the paper and authorized Brimelow to respond, but was removed from the actual discussions and personally read neither the NSC draft nor the FCO response. This was not unusual, as both papers were intended to be affirmations and explanations of general strategic trends. However, this lack of personal involvement may have contributed to the confusion regarding the later British response to the Year of Europe.

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9 United States Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. *European Security Conference and Speech on Relations with Europe*, 1973, DNSA Collection. However, this delay in giving copies of the speech to the press may have been as much a result of Kissinger’s own inexperience in making major speeches for the President. In his conversation with Ziegler, he appeared honestly confused about “the way to do it.” United States Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. *Meeting with Chinese Officials; Speech on Relations with Europe*, 19 April 1973, DNSA Collection.


12 Note by Trend, Hunt and H F T Smith, CAB 130/671, Document 65, ibid.
Kissinger received Brimelow’s response, a lengthy and thoroughly researched memo entitled “The Next Ten Years in East/West and Trans-Atlantic Relations,” on April 10th, more than a week before the British delegation planned to travel to Washington to discuss it.\textsuperscript{13} In the paper, Brimelow offered a forthright analysis of the potentially negative effects of U.S. détente policy on transatlantic relations. He explained that many European leaders would likely see the American pursuit of arms reductions agreements like MBFR and SALT as evidence of an overwhelming desire to relax tensions with the Soviet Union, no matter the cost to European security.\textsuperscript{14} In such a context, American requests for Europe to take on more of the burden of its own conventional defense forces in Western Europe would likely only reinforce fears of a United States that was willing to abandon its traditional allies to bolster its new friendly relationship with the Soviet Union. Therefore, “European defence levels are not likely to increase.”\textsuperscript{15} Accordingly, he recommended that the Americans expect more transatlantic misunderstandings and disputes in the decade to come.\textsuperscript{16}

In response to Kissinger’s overtures about a transatlantic forum for discussing such conflicts, Brimelow was cautiously optimistic, if circumspect. He argued that such a venue did not exist now and should certainly be pursued, but pointedly avoided committing the British to any course of action. Additionally, on orders from the Premier’s office, Brimelow did not broach the subject of how the EEC would formulate policy that would affect the United States, nor did he offer any promises regarding to what extent the British would consult with the United States

\textsuperscript{13} Document 62, ibid.
\textsuperscript{14} Jones, “‘A Man in a Hurry,’” 88.
\textsuperscript{16} Document 62, ibid.
on EEC decision-making, as this was the subject of ongoing debate in London.\textsuperscript{17} Overall, “This depressing gaze into the crystal ball,” as Trend described it, was remarkably prescient, predicting accurately many of the trends and conflicts of the 1970s, including the rise of the international decision-making clout of the Nine, shorthand for the nine nations of the EEC, increasing tensions between the United States and the EEC, and even the likelihood of a destabilizing energy crisis, likely corresponding to unrest in the Middle East.\textsuperscript{18}

Unfortunately, Kissinger did not actually read the document, or at least not closely.\textsuperscript{19} Instead of parsing the discouraging report, Kissinger had his aide, Hal Sonnenfelt, summarize the findings and present them to him. Sonnenfeldt did attempt to draw Kissinger’s attention to some of the more “worrisome aspects” and “‘gloomy’ conclusions” of the document, but in general he was dismissive of the report as “mild fatalism,” and did not recommend that Kissinger look much further into the notion that productive transatlantic exchange, as envisioned by Kissinger, was “doomed from the start.”\textsuperscript{20} Thus, the most obvious and prophetic hint of the Anglo-American conflict to come was disregarded as mere cynicism.

Perhaps Kissinger had only asked Brimelow for his analysis as a courtesy, to convey the impression that British input was valued on every American initiative, no matter how commonplace it might be, or perhaps like Heath he assumed that Brimelow’s report would be a general affirmation of existing transatlantic strategies. Kissinger was exceedingly busy, especially as the Watergate scandal consumed the time of many of Nixon’s other top aides, and

\textsuperscript{17} Document 62, ibid.
\textsuperscript{18} Document 65, ibid.
\textsuperscript{19} Jones, “‘A Man in a Hurry,’” 92.
additionally he seemed to be increasingly aware that he had only three years remaining in which to complete his foreign policy, perhaps fewer if Watergate continued to expand. In Trend’s personal estimation, Kissinger was now “a man in a hurry,” possessed by “a new urgency and an additional impatience […] which results, I suspect, from his increasing realisation that time is beginning to run against him.”

However, unlike in Heath’s case, this initiative was Kissinger’s domain, and he had personally requested Brimelow’s report. Accordingly, his failure to read the paper was both more unusual and more problematic for the special relationship than was Heath’s. As in Neustadt’s analysis, Kissinger had assumed an overfamiliarity with the workings of the British government which, combined with his close workings with Brimelow on Hullabaloo, led him to assume that support for his initiative would be a nonissue.

The United Kingdom delegation that met with Kissinger on April 19th in the British Embassy in Washington, comprised of Trend, Brimelow, and Cromer, all of whom were primarily connected to the FCO, later expressed their surprise at Kissinger’s lack of familiarity with the report. The meeting lasted nearly four hours and the conversation was wide-ranging, covering MBFR, Hullabaloo, China, the Middle East, détente policy, and Kissinger’s casual notification that he would be making “a speech on Monday to a group of newspaper publishers in New York” in order to “give symbolism to our relations with Europe.” He explained that the group of leaders who had personally experienced World War II and therefore felt strongly invested in Europe were leaving, and soon there would be “nothing Americans feel they can be

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22 Jones, “‘A Man in a Hurry,’” 92.
proud of in European relations.” This sentiment, Kissinger argued, was all but “an emotional necessity” to justify the continued stationing of American forces in Western Europe, a carrot that the British could not bear to do without. As Kissinger concluded colorfully, “the only way we can keep troops in Europe is to throw a few babies to the wolves.”

The speech he had in mind would be just such a symbolic baby. Clearly, Kissinger was trying to demonstrate that little of substance would be altered. The speech, and the initiative which it would herald, were designed to vivify transatlantic relations which had grown stale in the absence of the type of dramatic cooperation and visceral symbols of friendship that were so commonplace in World War II. Perhaps hoping to cut through Kissinger’s abstract rhetoric, Trend challenged Kissinger directly “In not more than five lines, what is the importance of Europe to America? What do you care?” Kissinger, apparently just as ready to play hardball as his British counterparts, responded forthrightly that if the United States lost their allies in Western Europe to Soviet influence, all at once or piecemeal, then the rest of the world would soon follow. Without Europe, “Our ability to influence events in the world would gradually vanish. Never can we survive in a totally hostile environment.” Trend changed the subject, seemingly satisfied, but he later speculated that the initiative was merely a ploy to distract the American public from the Watergate scandal. “It underlies the anxiety with which he spoke about the fragility of the United States society,” mused Trend in a memo, “and the importance, to the United States itself, of re-establishing the old links with Europe.”

24 Ibid.
25 Ibid.
26 Ibid.
27 Ibid.
28 TNA: PRO CAB 164/1233, undated, By Burke Trend, Discussion with Dr Kissinger. Quoted in Hynes, The Year That Never Was, 2009, 98.
that he may not have completely convinced his guests of his good faith, and promised the British a draft of his speech by that evening. Although the British significantly did not make any promises surrounding the impending Year of Europe, Kissinger took their silence as all the encouragement he needed. In his mind, after all, he was not making a revolutionary speech, and his constant consultation and cooperation with the FCO over the past several months must have heartened him.

Satisfied, therefore, that he had consulted adequately with his British partners and pleased that his speech would be the main act to which Secretary of State Rogers announcement on 1973 as “A Year of Building” would play the unwitting opener, Kissinger completed preparations for his speech. On the afternoon of April 23rd, he delivered his fateful “Year of Europe” declaration to the Associated Press Luncheon and was greeted with extremely mixed reactions.

No “General Marshall at Harvard” – The New York Speech and Initial Reactions to the Year of Europe Proposal

Kissinger began his short address to the Associated Press by echoing Nixon’s “front burner” remark of earlier in the year, claiming that 1973 “has been called the year of Europe, but not because Europe was less important in 1972 or in 1969,” and maintaining that “The alliance between the United States and Europe has been the cornerstone of all postwar foreign policy.” However, he then continued by leveling a series of accusations against the nations of Europe for derelecting the stewardship of this critical relationship. He related old American complaints that

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29 See Appendix A for the transcript of the full speech.
“Europe ignores its wider responsibilities in pursuing economic self-interest too one-sidedly and that Europe is not carrying its fair share of the burden of the common defense.” More to the point, he accused the nations of Europe of unfairly asking the United States “to accept [Europe’s] independence and their occasionally severe criticism of us in the name of Atlantic unity, while at the same time they ask for a veto on our independent policies — also in the name of Atlantic unity.” Furthermore, he blamed the EEC directly for prioritizing its own regional needs and forcing the United States to independently support the international monetary and trade system. Kissinger concluded his section on problems in transatlantic relations with a patronizing summary that he had often shared privately but had mostly avoided addressing publicly; “The United States has global interests and responsibilities. Our European allies have regional interests.”

Kissinger, engaged as he was in the pivot toward China, truly believed that Europe’s role as a global power was waning. He had said as much to Chairman Mao in a visit to Beijing only a few weeks before when asked what Europe might do if the Soviet Union attacked China; “What Europe thinks I am not able to judge. They cannot do anything anyway. They are basically irrelevant.” However, even considering that Kissinger expected a warm reception from the British and other EEC nations, this tactless comment seemed almost designed to incense the European nations to which Kissinger was ostensibly attempting to appeal. Although Kissinger’s speech was in essence as he had described it to the British — a reaffirmation of the importance of

31 Ibid.
32 Ibid.
the United State’s transatlantic alliances – its rhetoric placed far more of the blame for the
deterioration of relations on European nations than Kissinger had suggested in their meeting.

Criticisms complete, Kissinger announced that the time was now ripe for a “fresh act of
creation equal to that undertaken by the postwar generation of leaders of Europe and America,”
or else “we shall miss our historic opportunity for even greater achievement.”34 With that
declaration, he finally explained the substance of the Year of Europe. According to Kissinger,
the President planned to travel throughout the nations of Europe in 1973, in order to embark “on
a personal and direct approach to the leaders of western Europe” to “build on the past without
becoming its prisoner” and to “deal with the problems our success has created.”35 To that end,
Kissinger proposed the drafting of a new Atlantic Charter, building on the original 1941
agreement of the same name between Roosevelt and Churchill that was emblematic of the
American-European cooperation of World War II. He was intentionally vague on the details of
the Charter, since he meant for it to be mostly symbolic rather than substantive. British analysis
of the implications of the original Charter recognized that “it is an extremely general document,
marked by the circumstances of 1941 and capable of the widest application.”36 Kissinger’s
invocation of such an ostentatious original seemed to support that he intended the revised charter
to be primarily rhetorical. He finished the speech by pledging to continue to support European
unity, maintain global defense contributions, and pursue the relaxation of tensions with rivals
around the world.37

34 Henry Kissinger, “Address given by Henry A. Kissinger.”
35 Ibid.
36 Minute: Tickell to Wiggin, MWE 3/304/1, 4 May 1973, Document 85, Keith Hamilton and
Patrick Salmon, Documents on British Policy Overseas, The Year of Europe: America, Europe
and the Energy Crisis, 1972-74.
37 Henry Kissinger, “Address given by Henry A. Kissinger.”
As Kissinger had intended, the proposals were very modest and he had avoided committing the United States to any particular course of action that it was not pursuing already, with the exception of the drafting of a likely rhetorical Atlantic Charter. Indeed, he was initially disappointed with the response from the reporters in the room, who were so disinterested in the apparently banal content of his speech that they proceeded to use the entirety of the Q&A time to pepper an annoyed Kissinger with eight separate questions on Watergate. When Kissinger complained to *Washington Post* columnist Phil Geyelin about the paper’s minimal coverage of the speech, the unimpressed reporter responded flatly, “with all due respect to you, I don’t think it’s General Marshall at Harvard,” comparing the speech unfavorably to the groundbreaking 1947 announcement of the eponymous Marshall Plan for European reconstruction.

Historians have struggled to explain why Kissinger was so apparently insensitive to European concerns in writing his Year of Europe speech. Kissinger himself argued that the speech was a victim of “disastrous” timing, blaming Watergate for “muffling the thrust of our initiative” at home and the irresponsible behavior of leaders abroad, all of whom “found excuses to postpone a response to a major American initiative involving them,” probably because they were afraid to associate themselves with the burgeoning Watergate disaster. He characteristically avoided taking responsibility for the offense that many European leaders took from the speech, although he later conceded that “It may not have been wise to make reality

38 Kissinger, hoping to turn the topic of conversation away from Watergate, responded that he hoped to avoid an “orgy of recrimination” that the nation could ill-afford, and urged “compassion” for those involved. This comment in particular was poorly received, and Geyelin chose to report this premature Watergate apology as the main content of the speech in his column in the *Washington Post*. Kissinger, *Years of Upheaval*, 1982, 101.
explicit” to them. Hynes argued that the speech and the Year of Europe itself, at least at their inception, were “intended as nothing more than a cynical public relations ploy,” a sideshow to distract from the spectacle of Watergate and remind the American public and allies abroad of the great foreign policy successes of which the Nixon Administration was capable. She argued that the initiative only grew into a much larger project as Kissinger’s personal ire was raised in response to the negative reaction, but suggested that in the beginning he placed no great concern on the details of the speech because the speech itself was of little real importance. While it was certainly true that Kissinger did not believe the speech to be revolutionary, Hynes’ argument still fails to explain why Kissinger or one of his editors did not soften the charges of European parochialism and economic self-interest, as a speech intended to be symbolic surely needed not be so heavy-handed.

Hynes’ explanation leans too heavily on the Rational Actor Model of policy development. She assumed the Nixon Administration to be a monolith working smoothly to protect the President from Watergate and restore its own foreign affairs authority, and therefore ignored the complicating factors of bureaucratic politics and standard operating procedure reliance. A more nuanced use of Allison’s three models yields a more complete explanation of the ill-considered speech and its unexpectedly poor reception. Kissinger’s own secretive and self-aggrandizing nature was counterproductive to the goals of Nixon himself, preventing the speech from acting as it may have been rationally intended, as little more than a Watergate distraction. Such bureaucratic infighting produced a speech whose offensive nature is explicable only through consideration of its origin and context, as it was surely not the product of a rational

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41 Ibid., 162.
actor. Furthermore, the Foreign Office’s habitual cooperation with Kissinger encouraged him to proceed confident of British support, while the Prime Minister’s Office was clearly less inclined to approve of unilateral American action affecting its nascent European policy. Since he kept the speech so insulated from other members of the Nixon government who might have advised him to soften it and considered himself to be such an expert in the opinions of the British government, Kissinger shielded the speech from a normal editing process and its more hostile elements managed to escape a rational pruning.

“The Unfaithful Husband” – Negative European Responses to the Year of Europe

If Kissinger was upset with the media’s indifference, he would be even less pleased with the reception of the speech in Europe, which was both far more passionate and far more negative. Any positive response to the moderate proposals of the Year of Europe was outweighed by outrage at the charges of parochialism and selfishness that Kissinger leveled against the nations of Western Europe. Furthermore, critics across the globe seemed affronted by the simple audacity of Kissinger’s declaration. One unnamed European diplomat remarked that it was not dissimilar to “an unfaithful husband’s decision to declare a ‘year of the wife.’”

French President Pompidou, predisposed as he was to distrust sweeping American initiatives on transatlantic relations as a ploy to restore influence in European affairs, later pointed out acidly to Kissinger that “For Europeans, every year is the year of Europe.”

Heath himself was furious at what he saw as the accusatory and patronizing tone of the speech. He was particularly insulted “by the impression conveyed, that only the United States had world interests and that other

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44 Quoted in Hynes, *The Year That Never Was*, 2009, 234.
people’s interests were merely regional,” and argued grandiosely that, in light of the United Kingdom’s loose realignment with Europe, Kissinger “had not fully adjusted to the facts of the situation, since he still claimed for America the [sole] right to make the big decisions.”

Although Heath certainly feared that Congress might force the Nixon Administration to withdraw troops from Europe and grudgingly recognized that the underlying concept of the speech was “probably genuine,” on the whole he found the declaration insulting and poorly-timed, imagining that it would soon be overcome by the weight of Watergate.

Heath’s anger notwithstanding, there was disagreement inside the British government on how to respond to Kissinger’s declaration, and the reaction was not entirely negative. The FCO was much more welcoming of the Year of Europe than was the Prime Minister’s Office, and repeatedly attempted to minimize the offensive aspects of the speech and emphasize the constructive elements in messages to Heath. Trend conceded to Heath that the speech was “a good deal more forthright, more in the nature of a challenge to Europe, than he led us to expect,” but he agreed with Cromer that “the speech could have been substantially tougher,” had Kissinger intended to offend.

Cromer reminded the FCO that Kissinger expected a statement welcoming the announcement from the British, as they were the only ones that had been granted advance notice of the speech, and therefore the Americans “will be looking for us to take a

45 TNA: PRO PREM 15/1541, 2 May 1973, Summary record of a conversation between the Prime Minister and the Canadian Minister for Industry, Trade and Commerce at 10 Downing Street, quoted in ibid., 112.
lead.”

Demonstrating the keen understanding of American domestic politics that had for so many years rendered Anglo-American relations qualitatively distinct from other peacetime alliances, Cromer warned that if the European reaction was “crabbed,” there was “a real danger that the initiative will fall flat, and the President come in for a good deal of domestic criticism.”

Douglas-Home concurred, and released a statement the next morning, welcoming the Year of Europe as a major initiative and promising vaguely to give the speech “active thought.”

The Year of Europe was a topic of major discussion in meetings around Whitehall over the course of the next week, and Trend repeatedly pushed for the United Kingdom to act “in some sense as an intermediary” between the United States and the other nations of the EEC in drafting whatever joint declaration might arise from Kissinger’s exhortation to create a new Atlantic Charter. This was exactly the role Kissinger imagined the United Kingdom taking, and Trend’s espousal of it demonstrates that Kissinger’s optimism, though doomed, was based on the very real support that the FCO tried habitually, albeit unsuccessfully, to offer. However, “Cold water was poured on this idea from different directions,” particularly from the Prime Minster’s Office, and Trend contented himself with recommending that the British offer their full support for the declaration and attempt to act as a scout for Kissinger, surreptitiously gauging and

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48 Washington tel 1362 AMU 3/507/1, 23 April 1973, Document 71, ibid. Unknown to the British, Kissinger apparently also directed his aides to deliver a copy of the speech to the French Foreign Office. Whether he actually did so is unclear, as the French Foreign Office claimed not to have received it before Kissinger actually delivered the speech. United States National Security Council. Discussion with Ambassador Kosciusko-Morizet on U.S. Relations with France and Western Europe, 26 April 1973, DNSA Collection.

49 Document 71, ibid.


reporting on German and French reactions, even if Kissinger would have to “be responsible for following it up and making the running for at least the next round or two.”

The FCO found itself trapped in an untenable position on the Year of Europe. Heath’s personal affront at the declaration precluded the sort of encouraging response and expeditious policy-making that Kissinger expected. Instead the speech presented the Prime Minister with an ideal opportunity to demonstrate his commitment to forging European policy with the other members of the EEC before the United States, and he directed the FCO to proceed accordingly. Unfortunately for Douglas-Home and the rest of the FCO, the French, under the Gaullist Pompidou and his Minister of Foreign Affairs, Michel Jobert, were even more opposed to the speech than was Heath, and they avoided committing to a time to discuss the initiative inside the EEC, deliberately stalling the issue until after Nixon met with Pompidou in late May.

This Franco-American meeting was predictably unproductive, as Pompidou, feigning interest in round-table meetings on the Year of Europe, explained to an insulted Kissinger that he could think of no appropriate counterpart for Kissinger to meet with in the French bureaucracy, since Kissinger was not the Secretary of State.

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53 Kissinger saw the intractable Jobert as a personal rival, and described him in his memoirs as “a great talent, who might have thrived had his President not been stricken [with bone cancer] just when he reached prominence. […] Jobert, left without the guidance of his President, suddenly seized with visions of eminence unimaginable in his previous anonymity, turned into a meteor that briefly and brilliantly illuminated the firmament of diplomacy only to recede as quickly into obscurity. It was a great pity.” If Kissinger recognized how closely Jobert’s situation mirrored his own, he did not mention it. Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, 1982, 166. Minute: Robinson to J O Wright, MWE 3/304/1, 7 May 1973, Document 86, Keith Hamilton and Patrick Salmon, Documents on British Policy Overseas, The Year of Europe: America, Europe and the Energy Crisis, 1972-74.
Internally at least, it was clear that the British bureaucracy was struggling to devise a solution to their Sisyphean problem that would satisfy the Prime Minister, the French, and the Americans. Michael Butler, a member of the FCO, lamented that if the British were slow to respond to Kissinger’s declaration, it would not help their proprietary “effort to be regarded by the U.S. as an ‘interlocuteur valable,’ [sic] […] But the French are unlikely to make it easy.”\(^{54}\) In order to bring the French on board for Kissinger’s new declaration, Cromer suggested that they attempt to “appeal to their vanity” and asked if the French “might not, perhaps, be flattered by an invitation to produce the first draft, particularly if it was accompanied by a reference (whatever the truth of the statement) to the suitability of the French language for such purposes?”\(^{55}\) After a meeting between representatives of the nine members of the EEC finally occurred on May 25\(^{th}\), British representative Michael Palliser wrote back to the FCO to complain about the absurdly obstructive behavior of the French delegate, Francois Puaux, on all matters relating to the United States. According to Palliser, Puaux arrived with “the most restrictive brief imagineable [sic]” and “refused to allow any work to be done” until higher level representatives could meet the next month, knowing full well that a meeting between higher-ups would be unlikely to make any real decisions if no groundwork could be laid that night.\(^{56}\) Palliser reported indignantly that Puaux even rejected his suggestion that they release a joint statement affirming simply that “the nine wanted constructive relationship [sic] with the United States.”\(^{57}\) Such clear French stall tactics frustrated the FCO, who believed that the wisest course of British action was continuing to support the Nixon Administration and striving to act as an informal intermediary between the

\(^{54}\) Document 86, ibid.


\(^{57}\) Document 102, ibid.
Americans the other nations of the EEC, thus preserving their status as a favored European nation.

This disagreement inside the British government further demonstrates how ill-equipped the Rational Actor Model alone is for explaining conflicts in peacetime alliances. The decision that the British eventually made, to cautiously support the declaration but refuse to act as an American representative in Europe, both disappointed Kissinger and angered the French. Clearly it was not the rational result of a decision made by Heath, who was almost as opposed to being “assigned a ‘year’ by the Americans” as was Pompidou. Instead, the awkward compromise was the product of bureaucratic infighting between the neo-Europeanist Office of the Prime Minister and the FCO’s Atlanticist tendency of supporting American decisions to preserve their role as the most trusted ally in across the ocean.\(^5\)

\textbf{Conclusion}

Trapped as they were by the conflicting desires of France and the United States and stymied by disagreement inside of their own bureaucracy, the British charted a moderately Europeanist course on developing Kissinger’s new initiative. They bowed to French and German refusal to consider a new “Atlantic Charter” as such, and agreed only to consider an even vaguer and more anodyne “Declaration of Principles.” Furthermore, and much to Kissinger’s chagrin, Heath would soon disallow the FCO from cooperating directly with the Americans in drafting the new document, and forced them instead to notify Kissinger that on this initiative and all others directly affecting Europe, the United Kingdom would henceforth formulate policy privately with

the other eight members of the EEC and then discuss with the United States when a joint
decision had been made. This had been Heath’s intention at least since he made his final bid to
join the EEC, and to him the plan seemed to be entirely a natural one. However, FCO reliance on
standard operating procedures in cooperating with their counterparts in the Nixon Administration
had masked this top-level pivot on European policy from Kissinger. The Year of Europe,
although not intrinsically revolutionary, became divisive because it revealed the extent of
Heath’s existing Europeanism and rapidly destroyed the faith of an already strained Nixon
Administration in its “oldest ally.”

59 Renwick, Fighting with Allies, 204.
CHAPTER 3

Transatlantic Disillusionment and the Beginning of Adversarial Anglo-American Diplomacy

June – August 1973

“Now you’ve done this, we must have a year of the United States. Who are you to propose that there should be a Year of Europe? You’re not part of Europe. All right, well we’ll come along, have a Year of the United States … show you how to do these things.”

- Edward Heath, On what he would have liked to say to Henry Kissinger

“No grand design has produced more frenetic choreography than did our Year of Europe. The trouble was that most of the footwork it elicited was evasive.”

- Henry Kissinger, Years of Upheaval

BY THE SUMMER of 1973, Henry Kissinger’s initial confusion towards the unexpectedly tepid British response to the Year of Europe initiative and Atlantic Charter revision was rapidly turning to anger. As the British ambivalence increasingly served to pull the wool from Kissinger’s eyes about Heath’s Europeanism and the level of priority that the British Prime Minister had elected to give to EEC cooperation over transatlantic bilateralism, Kissinger began to suspect that he had been misled. Before a press conference on May 29th, he complained to Ron Ziegler that he had “made nothing but mistakes the last two weeks on this whole business.” Two months later, he was even more explicit; “This has been the worst judgment on my part in five

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1 Peter Hennessy and Caroline Anstey, Moneybags and Brains: The Anglo-American “Special Relationship” Since 1945 (Department of Government, University of Strathclyde, 1990), 16–18.
2 United States Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. Press Briefing on "Year of Europe" and Watergate Scandal, 29 May 1973, DNSA Collection.
years.” Such an admission was particularly significant from a man who had built his entire diplomatic career on a reputation for extraordinary technocratic competence. On an unrelated but similarly discouraging note, only three days before President Nixon revealed with an apologetic “I’ll be damned!” that he had forgotten Kissinger’s 50th birthday.

Kissinger’s disappointment would soon be replaced by a sense of betrayal that would have dramatic consequences for the special relationship. When he learned the full extent of Heath’s plans to protect European solidarity at the expense of unparalleled access and influence in Washington, both Kissinger and Nixon felt that the British Prime Minister had chosen to abuse the special relationship to gain stature in Europe. In response, Kissinger and the President engaged in increasingly heavy-handed negotiation tactics to jumpstart British cooperation on the Atlantic Charter revision, stalling the British nuclear submarine system upgrade discussions and threatening to unilaterally cut off the intelligence tap to Whitehall that had been the lifeblood of the special relationship since World War II. Historians, most notably R. Gerald Hughes and Thomas Robb, have in recent years misinterpreted these blustery negotiation strategies as examples of “coercive linkage,” in which Kissinger employed cruel and unusually adversarial tactics to manipulate the United Kingdom into behavior more amenable to the United States. Accordingly, they depicted 1973 as a year of outright conflict between the United States and the

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4 Jones, “‘A Man in a Hurry,’” 80.
United Kingdom, and questioned how, if indeed it did, the special relationship managed to survive such a turbulent period.7

In reality, Kissinger and Nixon, as well as the historians that have struggled to explain their actions, have made the persistent mistake of overreliance on the Rational Actor Model. The President and his National Security Advisor assumed that Heath’s sudden move to freeze them out of EEC discussions on a project that they initiated was a calculated decision to gain unilaterally from the present weakness of the United States. They did not imagine that it was instead the awkward and inefficient result of bureaucratic infighting and the masking effect of the Atlanticist Foreign and Commonwealth Office, or indeed that Heath’s hand was forced by Kissinger’s own complicated diplomatic machinations. A more careful examination of American and British source documents and a more nuanced understanding of alliance politics incorporating Models II and III as well as Model I yields a different and more accurate picture of misunderstandings and miscommunications between allies in a time of relative peace.

American Frustration with European Foot-Dragging on the Year of Europe

Kissinger demonstrated his increasing displeasure through the changing tenor of his conversations with his European counterparts. In response to his suspicion that French Foreign Minister Michel Jobert had written the Year of Europe off as a sideshow to distract from the specter of Watergate, he explained his constructive intentions to Jobert and then vented his frustration:

What we want is to use the 3-1/2 years remaining of President Nixon to [restore an emotional basis for the alliance.] Whether we call it a Charter or a set of principles makes no difference. [...] That can’t be an American objective.

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7 Ibid., 872–887. Robb, A Strained Partnership?
But we are subjected to […] criticisms about secret deals. Every time we make an overture to Europe, we are accused of dominating Europe. When we don’t make an overture we are accused of neglecting Europe. When we negotiate with Europe we are accused of trying to break Europe.  

Nixon, too, was enraged by the unenthusiastic European response to the initiative and fired at French President Georges Pompidou that “There is talk in the US of a confrontation between Europe and the US. There will be competition, yes, but if there is confrontation […] it will destroy the alliance.”  

This forthright talk of competition and conflict was a far cry from the conciliatory rhetoric of cooperation and symbolic ties that Kissinger and the President had been employing only a few weeks earlier, and it demonstrated the extent to which the two had become disillusioned by their European allies.  

Such ire was not limited to discussions with the French, with whom the United States had for years had a relatively uneasy relationship on transatlantic issues. In a June 4th meeting at the Embassy of the United Kingdom between Trend, Cromer, Kissinger, Sonnenfeldt and their assorted aides, Kissinger again tried in frustration to dispel the persistent rumor of Watergate’s pervasive influence on the Year of Europe by explaining that “if we want a Watergate success, we will follow the [Secretary of the Treasury John] Connally line. We will wrap ourselves in the American flag.”  

Kissinger was referring to Connally’s unabashedly America-first economic policies, such as the Nixon-shocks of 1971. This initiative, he argued, was instead an appeal to the sentiment of citizens and policy-makers in Europe and America alike to restore interest in the

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transatlantic relationship for the benefit of Europe. For the first time, Kissinger allowed his enthusiasm for the project to waver and threatened “Frankly, we will drop it if it doesn’t work. [...] Europe has the most to lose if this fails.”\textsuperscript{11} Although this ominous hint was likely just a negotiation technique to encourage active British participation in the initiative, Kissinger would soon begin to make good on his threats as Heath was forced to reveal the full extent of his pivot toward Europe.

The FCO apparently recognized that, even if Kissinger was being somewhat disingenuous on the total selflessness of the Year of Europe initiative, there was still something to be gained on both sides of the Atlantic by supporting his project and maintaining the British position as an interlocutor between the United States and the rest of Western Europe.\textsuperscript{12} This line of thinking was, however, not shared by the Office of the Prime Minister. One of Heath’s senior advisors explained colorfully that the Prime Minister not only believed that Kissinger’s plan was not “an honest attempt to put more sex appeal into the transatlantic relationship,” but that it was instead “a bit of private enterprise on his part to add the European scalp to his Russian and Chinese trophies and so improve his own position in Washington.”\textsuperscript{13} This accusation, lambasting the Year of Europe as little more than Kissinger trying to polish his own credentials, went even further than the suggestion of Watergate influence. Such an allegation revealed the dominance of the Rational Actor Model even in the minds of contemporary actors like Heath and Kissinger, who preferred to think of the complex and ungainly policy products of bureaucratic competition as the sole brainchildren of their leaders. Pinning policy to personalities rather than to imperfect

\textsuperscript{11} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{13} Minute: J O Wright to Greenhill, MWE 3/304/1, 7 June 1973, Document 113, ibid.
processes of development caused the conflict to escalate far out of proportion to its relatively inoffensive beginnings in the mostly rhetorical Year of Europe Declaration and the mild recommendation of an Atlantic Charter revision.

“Britain’s Rulers Cannot Ride Two Horses at Once” – The Question of the American Draft Declarations

The Atlantic Charter revision, or as the Europeans elected to refer to it, the Declaration of Principles, proved to be the test that forced Heath to reveal his hand and demonstrate his European credentials completely. Heath’s own opinion on how best to proceed was unequivocal. As he explained passionately to a visiting friend on June 19th, America had allowed her strength to be eroded in favor of détente with the Soviet Union and People’s Republic of China and accordingly, she was “no longer ‘No. 1’, […] though this fact was not yet widely recognized in the United States.”

Europe, and he included the United Kingdom in Europe as it “now existed,” was for the first time apprehensive of America’s fading power to protect them from the threat of the Soviet Union. Therefore, the leaders of the United States should hardly be surprised that the nations of Europe would act more in defense of their own interests than they had in years past.

The Year of Europe initiative, besides being extremely insensitive in tone, also completely missed the reality of the situation as Heath saw it. Europe, now a “twin pillar” in the Cold War, could not expected to act in whatever way was convenient for Kissinger or Nixon.

These changing circumstances brought the British to an inevitable watershed in the transatlantic relationship. As Heath explained in his memoir, “Britain’s rulers cannot ride two

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15 Ibid.
16 Ibid.
horses at once. [...] We cannot behave like an adjunct of the United States and simultaneously carry out our responsibilities [to Europe].”

To Heath, this situation had been clear for several years, and he had repeatedly attempted to demonstrate his commitment to Europe through his subtle but significant eschewal of the trappings of the special relationship. “Until we accept these facts and behave accordingly,” he concluded, “we shall always be regarded with suspicion by our European partners.”

Their position as a go-between for the United States and Europe on the Declaration of Principles was not only increasingly difficult but it was also contrary to British interests in the changing geopolitical environment of 1973.

Despite his cogent arguments on the matter, Heath’s decision to split with the United States on the Declaration of Principles was less a product of his own rational decision and more the result of series of misunderstandings and conflicting plots initiated by Kissinger himself. The historical record on any dense series of top secret negotiations can be plagued by inconsistencies and inaccuracies, as the participants share contrasting perspectives on the same discussion. Even so, the discussions on the Year of Europe are particularly rife with error and omission, and pulling together an accurate thread of the discussions is as difficult as it is crucial for understanding the root of the conflict. The crux of the issue was two drafts of recommendations and suggestions that the Americans developed for the initial discussions on the Declaration of Principles.

In a striking example of bureaucratic infighting affecting efficient policymaking, one draft was developed by the State Department, and a second, “more succinct and probably more contentious draft,” in Kissinger’s words, was developed by his own staff in the National Security

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18 Ibid.
Council. This was not the first time that the unusually conflict-fraught nature of Nixon’s own government had caused headaches for America’s allies abroad, but this example demonstrated in a microcosm just how far reaching the effects of such an unusual arrangement could be. Hughes and Robb ignore the role of the conflicting draft declarations in their studies of the Year of Europe conflict, and Hynes, although she did briefly describe the difference between the two sets of draft declarations, declined to investigate their root. Their omission by other historians belies the importance of this misunderstanding. Although the origins of the transatlantic conflict of 1973 began years before and were based in the larger geopolitical discrepancies investigated in chapter one, this interpersonal clash acted as the spark that caused latent discord to explode into outright conflict.

Interestingly, the origin of the two draft declarations that led to such a bitter confrontation had little to do with the transatlantic relationship, or even foreign affairs at all. By the summer of 1973, Watergate had consumed the Nixon Presidency. In late April, Nixon asked for the resignation of two of his top aides, Bob Haldeman and John Ehrlichman, in what he called “one of the most difficult decisions of [his] Presidency,” and by mid July, the Senate hearings that would eventually lead to Nixon’s resignation were in full swing. Aware that the Administration was hemorrhaging senior officials and that his sterling reputation was one of the few that remained largely untarnished by the growing scandal, Kissinger began angling even more aggressively for the position that he had desired for years — Secretary of State. Although Kissinger later denied that “the complex interdepartmental machinery of the National Security

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Council was designed to generate busywork for the bureaucracy while the real business of our foreign relations was conducted through [his] office,” he nonetheless recognized that he was Nixon’s “principal instrument” for achieving his goal that the White House would be “perceived as the fount of foreign policy.”\footnote{Ibid., 414.} He took advantage of this strength and Nixon’s relative weakness, implying heavily that he would soon resign his own position as National Security Advisor and attempting to frustrate Secretary of State Rogers’ plans in order to discredit him in the President’s eyes.\footnote{Kissinger denied that the NSC engaged in anything as “farsighted” and “devious” as a long-term plan to discredit the State Department, but he granted that “the relationship between Rogers and [himself] had soured beyond recovery” by late 1972 and that Watergate made the situation untenable. Ibid., 420–423. Sykes, of the British Embassy in Washington, doubted this explanation and asked, after all, “What refugee could resist being given the highest office that the Constitution of the most powerful nation has to offer?” Letter: Sykes to Overton, AMU 1/2, 31 August 1973, Document 214, Keith Hamilton and Patrick Salmon, \textit{Documents on British Policy Overseas, The Year of Europe: America, Europe and the Energy Crisis, 1972-74}.} The dual draft declarations were an example of just such a ploy.

Eager to engage the historically intransigent French as an ally in the negotiation process, Kissinger gave both sets of recommendations in secrecy to Jobert during their meeting at the Western White House in San Clemente in late June, and asked his opinion on whether the nations of Europe would likely be amenable to such a draft.\footnote{Sykes, \textit{Documents on British Policy Overseas, The Year of Europe: America, Europe and the Energy Crisis, 1972-74}.} Much to Kissinger’s chagrin, Jobert, however, refused to read the drafts in California and did not offer Kissinger a response on the content until more than two weeks later – far too late for it to be useful. However, Kissinger believed that Jobert had hinted that the French might be amenable to a Declaration of Principles along the lines that the Americans suggested, which he saw as welcome progress in the unexpectedly challenging negotiations on the Year of Europe. Anxious as he was for a European opinion in advance of the July 23rd meeting of the foreign ministers of the EEC in Copenhagen.

\footnote{Hynes, \textit{The Year That Never Was}, 2009, 148.}
and encouraged as he was by his optimistic perception of Jobert’s attitude toward the initiative, he then gave a copy of the drafts, also in secret, to Walter Scheel, the West German Foreign Minister, before his own visit to Washington in early July.\textsuperscript{25} Scheel proved more forthcoming and made various suggestions on how best to accomplish Kissinger’s aims of a reunited transatlantic community. Only after giving drafts to the West Germans and to the French, according to Kissinger’s memoirs, did he decide on July 8\textsuperscript{th} to also give them to the British, since he had “already gone that far.”\textsuperscript{26} At that point, in the words of Kissinger, “Draft documents were like pollen in the spring air,” and it was “impossible to tell who had actually seen or approved what.”\textsuperscript{27}

Handing out both drafts and allowing the Europeans to find and exploit the discrepancies between the two may seem an uncharacteristic blunder for such a seasoned backchannel diplomat as Kissinger to make. Indeed, in his memoirs, Kissinger later mused that giving both conflicting drafts may have been a mistake, because although he intended it as a sign of American transparency and goodwill, it instead allowed Jobert “to choose what is most advantageous to him and to learn of [our] internal disagreements,” all without necessarily yielding anything of value in response.\textsuperscript{28} As it eventually turned out, Jobert was not at all receptive to Kissinger’s drafts, and turned them both down as unacceptable only a few days before the Copenhagen summit. Outmaneuvered though he may have been, in truth Kissinger’s motivations were likely far more domestically motivated, and far more devious, than his memoirs suggest. Kissinger implied to all who read the draft declarations that the NSC draft was

\textsuperscript{25} Kissinger, \textit{Years of Upheaval}, 1982, 187.
\textsuperscript{26} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{27} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{28} Ibid., 183.
to be “taken more seriously” than the State Department draft, which suggests that this was part of his elaborate plan to discredit Secretary of State Rogers.\textsuperscript{29} By giving both drafts to the Europeans, Kissinger could appear impartial, and therefore when the French, Germans, and British responded more positively to the NSC draft, as he hinted they should, he could present another example to the foundering President of his great worth to the Administration. Clever though this maneuver may have been, it had dramatic and unforeseen consequences beyond the realm of domestic office politics.

Beyond Kissinger’s subterfuge, his timeline and his account of his casual conduct on the matter directly contradicts British records of the exchange of draft declarations. According to a telegram from Cromer to Brimelow, as early as June 14\textsuperscript{th} Kissinger had given Cromer an early draft of his headings and suggestions for the Declaration of Principles “in the strictest confidence.”\textsuperscript{30} Furthermore, Cromer received and transmitted the two full draft declarations on July 1\textsuperscript{st} 1973, a full week before Kissinger claimed to have given them to the British and at most three days after he gave them to Jobert.\textsuperscript{31} Why Kissinger would relate such a doctored version of the draft negotiation timeline in his memoirs is not entirely clear. However, the entire section was written with an air of casualness, as evidenced by his suggestion that he passed along the drafts to the British “like pollen in spring air,” that it seems likely that Kissinger was trying to obfuscate any hints of a cogent policy to discredit Rogers. This is consistent with his description

of Rogers’ resignation and his own promotion to Secretary of State, in which he denies any active hand in the proceedings beyond a demonstrated interest in the position. Even Brimelow recognized that many of the issues and complications surrounding the Year of Europe may well have stemmed from the fact that the NSC “machine was small and designed chiefly for the exercise of influence [and] unlike the Department of State, it could not count […] on becoming aware of potential misunderstandings as they arose.”

The contradiction between Kissinger’s memoirs and the British document trail may appear unimportant, but in the intervening week, unbeknownst to Kissinger, Jobert visited London and, in a personal test of the enduring closeness of the special relationship, attempted to gauge whether or not the British also had the seen the drafts. In Kissinger’s version of the negotiations, the British could not reveal any knowledge of the drafts because they honestly had never seen them. However, the British documents reveal that they did indeed have the drafts, and Kissinger’s earlier demands of complete secrecy on his June 14th sharing of headings suggest that they feigned ignorance to protect the sacrosanct nature of intelligence cooperation in the Anglo-American special relationship. Indeed, Kissinger specifically notified Cromer that Jobert did not know that he would also be giving the drafts to the British and requested that they not disclose their inclusion in this secret. He suggested that his meeting with Jobert had gone well and that, although they had agreed to no specifics, the French were open to the idea of a new

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Declaration of Principles.\textsuperscript{36} Heath, in stark contrast to the unabashed Europeanist that he has been depicted as by Rational Actor historians and by his own memoirs, honored Kissinger’s request and declined to notify Jobert, even when asked directly, that they too had the documents in their possession.\textsuperscript{37}

This dissembling is inexplicable to historians like Hughes and Robb, and even Hynes, who look for other explanations for the eventual split over the Declaration of Principles. In reality, though Heath may have been more committed to Europe than to the United States in his mind, he likely recognized the value of preserving the relationship as long as possible and accepted advice from the FCO to avoid disclosing their possession of the documents. It is also important to recognize that Cromer forwarded the drafts to the FCO on July 1\textsuperscript{st} and Heath met with Jobert the very next day, so a carefully considered decision on whether or not to reveal their knowledge to the French Foreign Minister may not have been possible for Heath at that stage. Regardless, the root of the intra-European argument that would devolve into a split between the United States and the United Kingdom began with the complexities of the Kissinger policy-making process and not with a rational decision by Heath to diverge. Thomas Robb, in his book on the period, completely misread the documentary evidence and argued that, while Heath was aware of the draft declarations and had even sought them out, he did not realize that Jobert had also received them. According to Robb, this led Heath into “a rather embarrassing situation” on July 2\textsuperscript{nd}, completely by accident, when he did not respond to Jobert’s intimations that he also knew of the declarations.\textsuperscript{38}

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\textsuperscript{37} Record of conversation: Jobert, Heath and Douglas-Home at 10 Downing Street, MWE 3/304/1, 2 July 1973, Document 146, ibid.
\textsuperscript{38} Robb, \textit{A Strained Partnership?}, 84–85.
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the split on simple miscommunication than on the latent British desire to ride both horses, whatever Heath’s argument to the contrary, and because it casts aspersions on some of Robb’s other, more revolutionary conclusions about the effects of the conflict, considering the obviousness of the error.

Unaware of the full extent of the subterfuge involved in the drafting process, Heath’s advisors complained that their dual role as both an unofficial American representative and a steadfast proponent of EEC solidarity was becoming untenable. Kissinger, through his contacts with Cromer and the FCO, intended to steer the early drafting process along lines that would resolve the issues of sentiment with the transatlantic alliance that he saw in America. However, his subtle influence faced opposition in the European committee itself, because while France and the rest of the Nine could not realistically oppose such an inoffensive suggested declaration without needlessly damaging relations with the United States, they would certainly not be willing to act as a smokescreen for a failing presidency. One representative, Charles Wiggin of the FCO, wrote back to his superiors that their strategy of staying “benevolently neutral” on the Declaration in public and in the eyes of their allies in Europe while privately giving Kissinger “some reason to expect our co-operation” was impossible to maintain. Wiggin did not believe he could convince the other Europeans to agree to Kissinger’s suggestions without revealing American involvement, which would be anathema to the rest of the Nine. He recommended that they “avoid committing ourselves, even privately, to further encouragement of Dr Kissinger’s ideas” and “continue to keep our heads down and avoid two dangers: being used by the

Americans to sell their ideas or actively opposing them.\textsuperscript{41} The Declaration of Principles and the larger Year of Europe, humble as it was intended to be, became problematic for the British because it acted as a wedge at a delicate time, forcing them to choose between preserving their influence with America, as the FCO had been doing for years, and demonstrating their true commitment to Europe, as Heath had promised Pompidou when negotiating entrance to the EEC the previous year. “Whatever the outcome,” Wiggin warned presciently, “we shall be running the risk of misunderstanding and damaging disappointment if we encourage Dr Kissinger to entertain too ambitious expectations.”\textsuperscript{42}

As Wiggin predicted, the American drafts of the Declaration led to a dramatic conflict both between the United Kingdom and France and subsequently between the United Kingdom and the United States, though perhaps not in the manner that he expected. At the Copenhagen meeting, Jobert listened incredulously as the British delicately tried to recommend substantive points and wording that he personally recognized as having been drafted by the Kissinger or the American State Department, and realized at once that he had been deceived. He approached Michael Palliser, the British Permanent Representative to the EEC, during a break in the meetings and remarked acidly “I suppose there seemed to be no need [to disclose knowledge of the American drafts] since the British and the Americans talk to each other.”\textsuperscript{43} He continued that he was completely aware of “Kissinger’s secretive methods,” but that he had been forthright with the British and given them two separate opportunities to disclose their knowledge of the drafts, no doubt referring to his conversation with Heath on June 2\textsuperscript{nd} and presumably one other occasion preceding the Copenhagen meeting. According to Jobert, he had meant these hints as “a test of

\textsuperscript{41} Document 129, ibid.
\textsuperscript{42} Document 129, ibid.
the Anglo-French relationship” and of the British first commitment to the nations of Europe about which the Prime Minister had spoken so passionately during the EEC accession negotiations. In response, he had received only silence and a “visage de glace” from the British, and he remarked coldly that he would adopt a similar strategy in the future.

Angered by this apparent confirmation that the British had chosen to play the role of the Trojan horse for the Americans, Jobert resumed deliberately stalling the discussions, rejecting all drafts that had a whiff of American collusion and demanding that the assembled parties agree to discuss these matters only amongst themselves before allowing a representative to present their decisions to the United States. If it was to be a true transatlantic relationship, Jobert argued, then it would be negotiated in the form of a bilateral treaty between both sides of that ocean.

Blindsided by Jobert’s sudden “filibustering” tactics, both the Premier’s Office and the FCO began to recognize that their position as an intermediary between the United States and the rest of Europe was impossible to maintain, and even Burke Trend, one of the committed Atlanticists in the British bureaucracy, recommended to Heath that their only option was to “try to agree with our French and German partners the form and content of [the Declaration and] only thereafter tackle the White House.” Trend concluded his message gloomily:

Otherwise, I am at a loss to see how we avoid another round of misunderstanding or succeed in ever breaking out of the vicious cycle in which we have been going round and round for the last few months.

44 Document 171, ibid.
45 Document 171, ibid. “A cold stare.”
46 Document 171, ibid.
Heath’s hand, then, was forced into a decision to which he had always been partial. On the evening of July 25th, two days after the Copenhagen meeting, Heath sent a message directly to Nixon, explaining in somewhat disingenuous terms that the meeting had been a definite, if minor, success for the Year of Europe and avowing the continued support of the British for the initiative. However, he concluded the message with “one other point I should mention.” He promised that they had, “of course, said absolutely nothing to our partners in the Nine about Kissinger’s meetings with Trend and Brimelow” but that there was “a strong ground-swell of opposition by the smaller countries to bilateralism between the larger European countries and the United States,” a current encouraged and exploited by the French. The outcome of this souring of opinions towards the United States was a decision between the Foreign Ministers of the Nine to “exchange the information which they obtain in the framework of bilateral conversations with the U.S. and try to harmonise their reactions with regard to possible suggestions of the U.S.” That the smaller nations were opposed to such great nation secret diplomacy likely came as no surprise to Kissinger and Nixon. However, the real stab in the back came from Heath’s delicate suggestion “that we shall stand the best chance of achieving the success which you and I both want if we ourselves are now seen to adhere to this decision.”

Despite Heath’s attempt to broach the subject of changing the nature of United States-United Kingdom bilateralism in as diplomatic a manner as possible, his polite overtures were doomed to be met with opprobrium from the Americans. In part of an emerging pattern of

49 Tel 1548 to Washington, AMU 18/1, 26 July 1973, Document 174, ibid.
50 Document 174, ibid.
51 Document 174, ibid.
52 Document 174, ibid.
implying that the British were privileged with more exclusive bilateral access than they were in reality, Kissinger had already consulted with Ambassador Egidio Ortona of Italy on the evening of July 24th, only a day after the meeting concluded and a full day before the President received Heath’s telegram.53 Kissinger valued Ortona’s report and opinion because he was a close friend and, more importantly, he represented a nation that was connected to the EEC discussions while being somewhat removed from the unspoken triangular power struggle between the United Kingdom, France, and the United States. This was Kissinger’s first official report of the meeting, as he had not even received any American cable on the matter, and it clearly colored his opinion of Heath’s missive that followed. Ortona reported that the French were stubborn toward the initiative, which evidently did not surprise or interest Kissinger, as he immediately asked about the other parties present. Their conversation, recorded verbatim by the NSC note-taker present, began to reveal the extent of the British machinations to Kissinger:

KISSINGER: Who else besides the French were stubborn?
ORTONA: Gaya54 said the British and the Germans were not hot about the idea of a summit this year. The British were somewhat cold. Brimelow was not there.
KISSINGER: That is not what they tell me.
ORTONA: That is my report.
KISSINGER: I trust Gaya.
ORTONA: [Douglas-] Home was orthodox. He was not warm to anything.
[…]
KISSINGER: But this is unmistakable. Gaya is a bright man. The problem is the way to talk to the British. What real approach can we now make.55

54 Gaya was an undersecretary to Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs Aldo Moro and represented part of the Italian delegation to the meeting.
Clearly, though Heath attempted to frame the pivot in optimistic, inoffensive terms, it was doomed to fail because Kissinger had already received an outside report of the lack of British enthusiasm for the initiative. Furthermore, this is additional evidence of the importance of bureaucratic infighting in policy development. If the Rational Actor Model were as dominant as many Anglo-American scholars believe, then perhaps Heath would have been able to frame the pivot in acceptable terms in his missive to Nixon, from one leader to another. Instead, word had preceded the Prime Minister through a considerably lower level of bureaucracy, coloring his decision and turning what could have been a smooth decision making process into an awkward series of conflicting discussions and perceptions. Therefore, as Kissinger explained in his memoirs, Heath’s telegram proved that, as long as “every communication to London would automatically be distributed to the Nine, the relationship was hardly ‘special’ any longer.”

Kissinger recognized that they had been outmaneuvered by Jobert, but to him this was unfortunate but not unexpected. It was only the perceived British betrayal that rankled Kissinger and the President, whose nerves were already frayed by the stress of Watergate. Therefore, Heath’s telegram was promptly met with a Presidential response, no doubt at Kissinger’s urging, “of unusual coolness.”

Nixon began by stating “frankly that I am quite concerned about the situation in which we seem to find ourselves.” He explained his high and noble hopes for the Year of Europe initiative to reverse the trend of neo-isolationism which, if not combatted, would leave “Europe, even more than the United States, […] the loser,” and argued that the United States had no

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57 Ibid., 190.
qualms with the development of an independent European identity, and in fact they encouraged it. It was for these reasons, Nixon argued, that he found the present state of negotiations over the Declaration of Principles to be “so disturbing.”59 He accused the British government of requesting bilateral negotiations with the United States when no forum for multilateral talks appeared forthcoming and then disavowing them in front of the rest of the Nine. Accordingly, he found “it puzzling what you say about the exploitation of our private bilateral contacts by the country that had originally insisted on them.”60 He summarily cancelled his plans to visit Europe because he believed it “highly questionable” that “such a course would produce significant and positive results.”61 He concluded that “If the [Declaration] documents are to be the product of what appears almost like adversary bargaining, […] then I question whether the effort, or my personal involvement in it will be worth it.”62

With the President’s disapproval made clear to the British, Kissinger embarked on a new strategy of transatlantic diplomacy. At a second meeting with Ortega later on July 27th, Kissinger began to outline how relations between the United States and Europe would proceed in the hopes that the Italian Ambassador would begin to spread news of the displeasure of the Nixon Administration around Europe. He announced categorically that the President would not travelling to Europe “to repeat an itinerary he has taken two times before, or meet with NATO Council [or Foreign Ministers] at a level below his.”63 Kissinger also explained that he was considering cancelling his own upcoming visit unless there was “a change in attitude,” as he had

59 Document 178, ibid.
60 Document 178, ibid.
61 Document 178, ibid.
62 Document 178, ibid.
no intention to come to Europe “as a supplicant.”

He dictated that the Europeans would have a draft of a Declaration ready within five months for the United States to review and complained that the new arrangement, wherein the Europeans shared all American information between themselves but presented their conclusions as a *fait accompli* through an intermediary with no independent power, was unacceptable.

He hinted that, unless the situation changed markedly, he would be more inclined to cave to domestic pressures to reduce American troop presence in Europe and give the Department of the Treasury free rein to enact America-first economic and monetary policy that could have ruinous effects in the client markets of Europe. Kissinger’s manipulative tactics were clearly designed to frighten the recalcitrant nations of Europe into submission, and reflected his penchant for aggressive negotiations. However, to give them the Presidential stamp of authenticity, he warned Ortega:

> I must tell you the President’s reaction. He is not involved in all these details as strongly as I am. I reflect a mild version of the President’s thinking. [...] I want to make it clear to you that this President is at an end. And the Europeans have exhausted our patience and good will. We no more feel the crux is on us.

Communications between Nixon and Kissinger reveal that, even if the President was removed from the negotiations, Kissinger’s descriptions of his anger were not merely scare tactics. The

64 Ibid.

65 The member nations of the EEC agreed that their foreign ministers would rotate acting as the lead negotiator for discussions with non-member nations like the United States. While the arrangement appeared reasonable in theory, it was perhaps unfortunate that the first acting minister with whom Kissinger would be meeting was, by chance, the unrenowned Knud Børge Anderson, Foreign Minister of Denmark. Kissinger later remarked acidly that “nobody regarded the Danish Foreign Minister, whose name [I do] not know, as an independent agent” with whom actual negotiation would be possible, and he found the implication insulting. Kissinger dismissed him as nothing “more than a messenger boy.” Record of meeting: Kissinger/Trend RS 2/3, 30 July 1973, Document 179, Keith Hamilton and Patrick Salmon, *Documents on British Policy Overseas, The Year of Europe: America, Europe and the Energy Crisis, 1972-74*.

President, embattled as he was by Watergate, seemed to categorize the European solidarity
decision as part of a growing list of betrayals by former friends and allies, which suggests that
his strong reaction may have been more emotional than it was rational.

Renowned for his success in negotiating with American enemies in the Soviet Union and
China, Kissinger was perhaps more comfortable with this colder line of negotiation, drawing on
America’s geopolitical strength and pressuring his weaker interlocutors, than he was with the
traditionally sentimental and affectionate style of the special relationship. When a British
delegation under Trend and Brimelow arrived in Washington three days later to discuss the
results of Copenhagen, Kissinger was even more explicit. Considering how closely Kissinger had
worked with both of the British diplomats on Operation Hullabaloo until only weeks before, the
difference in tone was obvious. He told his former close confidants that the United States refused
to be presented with “a fait accompli” on the Declaration of Principles and demanded a real seat
at the bargaining table, as the current “procedure was incompatible with the sort of relationship
the US had had with Britain in the past, as well as insulting.”67 Kissinger described the American
experience relating to the Year of Europe as a series of incomprehensible betrayals and
disappointments and, not for the first time, admitted that he wished he had never even announced
it. The British were apologetic and continually tried to mollify Kissinger, but he was obdurate.
He repeated his intimations that the Nixon Administration, which he went to great lengths to
depict as a friend to Europe, would be hard pressed to deter the neo-isolationists in Congress
from reducing American troop commitments and economic protections in Europe.

67 Document 179, Keith Hamilton and Patrick Salmon, Documents on British Policy Overseas,
The Year of Europe: America, Europe and the Energy Crisis, 1972-74.
The FCO, despite their best efforts, had proven unable to continue to mask the Europe-first attitude of the Prime Minister after the draft declarations crisis had disillusioned both parties, and Trend and Brimelow were forced to toe the line drawn by Heath. Richard Sykes, a minister in the British Embassy in Washington, even recognized the role the FCO may have played in exacerbating the crisis in a letter to Brimelow in which he argued that “in the eyes of the Americans [their relationship] was qualitatively of a very different kind from that which they enjoyed with any other country” and that “they had got in the habit of relying on us, and of expecting us to discuss things with us before either party took any major action.”

Therefore, the discovery of their close cooperation with the other members of the EEC, implicit though it may have always been in British accession to the community, came as quite a shock to the Americans. As Sykes described it, “Subconsciously, I fancy that they had always regarded us as a close relative whereas other Europeans were only friends or at best cousins.” A betrayal from family was all the more painful.

Conclusion

The days of unique privileges and close cooperation, of Hullabaloo and networks of close friendships across the Atlantic, were coming to an unexpected end. However, internal FCO communications demonstrate that, despite Heath’s stance on European solidarity being made public and Kissinger’s increasingly vitriolic criticism, they continued to quietly push for a productive and constructive Declaration in the EEC discussions. Again, the Rational Actor Model cannot adequately describe how such an arrangement is possible. Instead of following the

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69 Document 199, ibid.
policy of their Prime Minister, the British bureaucracy continued on an opposite policy of Atlanticism, demonstrating the power of bureaucratic reliance on standard operating procedure and the presence of infighting between branches of the British government.

Regardless of this behind-the-scenes support, the “special relationship” had reached a public and historic low. Kissinger believed and convinced the distracted and increasingly paranoid President that the British, their oldest ally, had abandoned them, sacrificing decades of close relations for a modicum of solidarity between the squabbling nations of Europe. Heath, on the other hand, found himself forced at a spectacularly inopportune moment into disclosing the pivot towards Europe which he had long been considering. The special relationship was deteriorating, but it was not the result of Rational Actors. Instead, the interplay between Kissinger’s complicated method of diplomacy and his domestic angling for power misled the British and indeed eventually outsmarted himself. By handing all of the cards to an obviously intransigent Jobert, Kissinger inadvertently forced the Declaration of Principles to become the wedge that revealed the extent to which the United States and the United Kingdom had drifted apart. The FCO could no longer mask Heath’s Europe-first philosophy, and Kissinger, feeling himself betrayed, embarked on a new and bitter strategy of negotiations, replete with bluffs, threats, and diplomatic strong-arming that transformed the tenor of transatlantic negotiations. Nixon’s decision to cancel his planned trip to Europe was only the first blow in a new and adversarial era of the special relationship.
CHAPTER 4

A Threat to End the Special Relationship

August – October 1973

“Sure. No special relations. Correct. They’ll have the relation with the French.”

- President Richard Nixon, Phone call with Henry Kissinger, August 7th 1973

“There is in my mind no incompatibility between that bilateral relationship and the multilateral relations between Europe and the United States. The two are complementary; and both should serve to reinforce the trans-Atlantic link on which, as you and I believe, the peace and security of the world are ultimately based.”

- Prime Minister Edward Heath to President Richard Nixon, Telegram, September 4th 1973

BY EARLY AUGUST 1973, Kissinger and the President had worked themselves into a fury concerning the wayward behavior of the EEC in response to their Year of Europe initiative. On August 7th, several days after the British delegation had left and Kissinger had had time to devise what he saw as an appropriately biting response to their betrayal, he called the President to outline his new policy. The transcript of this extraordinary conversation was first declassified by the United States National Archives and Record Administration in 2004 and, since its discovery by historians in 2008, it has become a lynchpin of misunderstanding in the historiography of the Year of Europe.1

The difference between what Kissinger and Nixon said and what action the foreign policy arm of the American government actually undertook has led to enormous confusion in the study of the period, most notably by Thomas Robb and R. Gerald Hughes. By viewing the

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1 For a full transcript of the conversation, see Appendix B.
conversation through the lens of the Rational Actor Model, Hughes and Robb assumed that any policy agreed upon by the angry Kissinger and Nixon was then translated smoothly into a dramatic policy reevaluation that then galvanized the British into action on the Declaration of Principles. Accordingly, they conclude that the bellicose stewardship of Kissinger and Nixon sacrificed the specialness of Anglo-American relations in order to twist the arm of the British into supporting an unimportant document, destroying nearly three decades of uninterrupted special relationship cooperation in the process. In reality, Kissinger and Nixon’s phone call was less substantive than rhetorical, and it resulted in little more than threats and bluffs that their well-informed British counterparts recognized as such. British cooperation was thus not coerced, and instead the FCO had been quietly working to support the American initiative throughout the period of supposed hostility. However, their cooperation was masked by Heath’s Europeanism after the pivot to EEC information solidarity, resulting in a neat reversal of the situation at the beginning of the year. Clearly, investigating and accurately analyzing this phone call and the policy alterations that it led to is thus of vital importance in understanding the new face of transatlantic relations in mid-1973.

“No More Special Relations”? – Kissinger and Nixon’s Overstated Ultimatum

At 3:12 PM, Kissinger called the President for one of their semi-regular, discursive talks on Watergate, Nixon’s enemies, and foreign policy. After listening briefly to Nixon’s maulderings on the behavior of Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin, Kissinger changed the subject to notify him of the extent of the British betrayal on the Year of Europe and the Declaration of Principles discussion. He explained to the President that the British had briefed all the other nations of the EEC on the top secret draft declarations they had obtained from the United States
through Kissinger, and yet when Kissinger asked for an inside description of the closed EEC discussions, the British had told him that “they would do it on a one time basis but they didn’t feel obliged to tell us what they discussed with the Europeans.”\(^2\) To Kissinger, this was the height of betrayal. He might have understood if the British had merely shared the draft declarations around, especially considering that Kissinger had also given copies in secret to at least two other European nations at that point, although he did not tell Nixon that. However, to then deny him the basic courtesy of a fair report on the EEC discussions appeared to Kissinger a clear disavowal of one of the most basic tenets of the special relationship, that the United States would exchange its information and resources for advice and expertise from the British in regions to which the Americans did not have access. If the British could not be expected to keep up their arguably much lighter end of the burden of the special relationship, Kissinger believed, then there was no reason for the United States to continue to support them. Firmly and rather brazenly, he told the President that he was “cutting them off from intelligence special information they are getting here. […] If they are going to share everything with the Europeans we can’t trust them for special relationship.”\(^3\) Nixon, revealing that he was interested and irritated but certainly not as close to the situation as Kissinger had implied in his meetings with representatives from Europe, did not contradict Kissinger but only asked “Who do you think is up to this? Who is playing this game?”\(^4\) His National Security Advisor answered that Heath, with his “tacky tendencies” towards British Europeanization, was clearly behind the plot, and he lamented that it was “a terrible mistake” that the United States had “pushed them into Europe.”\(^5\)

\(^3\) Ibid.
\(^4\) Ibid.
\(^5\) Ibid.
Here, Kissinger and Nixon both began to reveal the conversation for what it was, not a discussion on the development of a realistic policy but instead a blustery and at times immature talk between two men who felt themselves slighted and abused from all sides and who wanted nothing more than to vent their frustration. Both Kissinger – “We didn’t do it,” – and Nixon – “It was never my idea,” – explicitly denied encouraging the United Kingdom to enter the EEC, despite the fact that they had loudly and publicly, on multiple occasions, espoused that very decision. The casual counter-factual nature of these statements should have tipped off Thomas Robb and R. Gerald Hughes, who employ this conversation as the bedrock of their thesis on the unprecedented intelligence cutoff of the period, that the phone call should not be taken at face value. The President, satisfied of his blamelessness in the debacle, agreed with Kissinger in a statement that, were it only true, would revolutionize the history of the special relationship.

“Sure,” he responded, “No special relations. Correct. They’ll have the relation with the French.” Kissinger laughed, another obvious clue that the conversation was not entirely serious, and said that this was simply “a phase where we just have to show our teeth. Absolutely confident.”

The conversation drifted to Cambodia and the headache of the remaining American presence in Southeast Asia, and Kissinger referred to the American Ambassador to South Vietnam as “that son of a bitch.” This earthy language is yet another indication that the conversation was a release of pressure for the two obviously stressed men. Eventually, Nixon returned to the topic of the new European policy, and told Kissinger that “we don’t have to stay

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6 Ibid.
7 Ibid.
8 Ibid.
9 Ibid. Martin would later notoriously overestimate the strength of the South Vietnamese position and disregard the threat of the North Vietnamese army, and Kissinger may have been referring to his apparent lack of good sense. Later in the conversation, he blamed himself for not placing “a decent Ambassador there.”
[in Europe] Henry. We just don’t necessarily. You understand that?” and Kissinger agreed, saying that the British “cannot exclude us from their deliberations and expect us to give them an undiluted nuclear guarantee. That just cannot be.” The phone call concluded with Kissinger encouraging the President to stay strong in the face of the adversity of Watergate and unashamedly flattering Nixon in saying that he had “astonished [his critics] with many periods in your Presidency” and opining that his opponents would “have had nervous breakdowns already” were they in his place. In a single conversation, the President and Kissinger had, implicitly and at times explicitly, argued for the abandonment of the two great pillars of the special relationship: nuclear and intelligence cooperation between the United States and the United Kingdom.

This conversation reveals one of the many unusual facets of the relationship between Nixon and his closest advisors. In conversations with the notoriously insecure President, there was an obvious and unflattering tendency toward locker room braggadocio, abject groveling, and expansive hypothetical threats and plans of revenge against the President’s many perceived enemies. Knowing when to take the President seriously was considered by his advisors to be one of the most important skills in successfully dealing with Nixon’s unusually paranoid mind. Unfortunately, both Hughes and Robb completely overlook this habit in the Nixon Administration, and take this conversation as essentially their sole evidence for a bold and aggressive reevaluation of the American position in the special relationship. Hughes argued that the President used diplomacy as a “sword” in this instance to manipulate British policy, completely cutting off intelligence information to the British.

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10 Ibid.
11 Ibid.
12 Robb, A Strained Partnership?, 89.
Furthermore, this misunderstanding continued to propagate through Hughes and Robb’s explanation of the events to follow. According to Hughes, the British responded immediately to the revolutionary cutoff, and convened a series of emergency meetings in which they rapidly reevaluated their own policy toward the United States.\textsuperscript{13} Robb and Hughes argued that this conversation represented the beginning of a period of “coercive linkage” in which no element of the special relationship was off limits as a bargaining chip to bring the British back into the fold through diplomatic force.\textsuperscript{14} The British, then, were terrified of the possible consequences of their pivot to Europe and any cooperation that followed was not a result of the special relationship closeness but instead a product of the effective American diplomatic blackmail that Kissinger employed. Hughes’ and Robb’s thesis, in essence, was that Kissinger was an entirely different type of steward of the special relationship than the American leaders who had come before him, indifferent as he was to the sentimental nature of the alliance, and when he became empowered by Watergate and upset by the British refusal to support the Year of Europe initiative, he personally began dismantling the three specialités of the relationship in order to manipulate the weaker British. The argument has some merit, as Kissinger was an unlikely and unusual leader for the special relationship, but it rests on a flawed understanding of Kissinger as a Model I Rational Actor, developing and enacting policy smoothly and without delay.

Instead, just like Heath on the other side of the Atlantic, Kissinger’s ideas were subject to the same stultifying role of a bureaucracy that was very used to cooperating with their British counterparts. Even assuming that Kissinger had meant his conversation with Nixon to be anything more than a threat, the department heads that Kissinger spoke to about “cutting off” the

\textsuperscript{13} Ibid.
British simply did not do it. For example, in a conversation with George Shultz, Connally’s successor as Secretary of the Treasury, that Hughes cited as an example of Kissinger making good on his threat to cut off the British entirely, Kissinger did indeed tell the Shultz that he wanted to “get your area synchronized with ours so that they can’t claim a special relationship in one field and really put it to us in other fields.”\(^{15}\) He asked Shultz if the Treasury was doing anything for the British “that you are not doing for others in terms of information,” but when the Secretary responded that he did actually have a useful triangular relationship between economic ministers in the British, French, and West German governments, Kissinger conceded that he was “for that.”\(^{16}\) He eventually contented himself with asking the confused Schultz to think of some way to develop some leverage that he might use to persuade the British, although there is no evidence that anything ever came of this. That Robb should cite this as an example of an unprecedented cutoff seems to be a stretch. Instead, Kissinger clearly supposed himself to be a Rational Actor, but found himself frustrated at every turn by the slow and unresponsive nature of the American bureaucracy.

Kissinger did, however, mention to Shultz that he was in talks with the CIA to “cool” the intelligence relationship.\(^{17}\) If these talks occurred and if the CIA did cool or cut off their intelligence flow to the British, it would be a significant milestone in the special relationship and would support Hughes and Robb’s thesis, even if the cutoff was not as dramatic or complete as they implied. However, there exists no record of these talks beyond this passing remark to Schultz. This does not mean that they did not occur, as such talks would undoubtedly be highly

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\(^{16}\) Ibid.

\(^{17}\) Ibid.
classified and therefore might remain hidden from historians, but their notable absence does cast additional doubt on Hughes and Robb’s argument. If the CIA, at Kissinger’s urging, altered their behavior towards intelligence officials in the United Kingdom, it would surely be a major talking point amongst high level British foreign policymakers, and Robb does indeed cite a letter between Sykes and Brimelow as evidence of just such a reaction. However, the letter in question contained little more than a passing reference to actions the Americans may take “which may even be in their own best interests (I am thinking of the intelligence field here).”\(^{18}\) Furthermore, Sykes advised that they simply be “patient” and wait for the “pendulum to swing back again.”\(^{19}\) Additionally, in a letter on August 22\(^{nd}\), Sykes again referred to Kissinger’s “implied threat (together with any follow-up in the intelligence field).”\(^{20}\) Far from being shocked by the extent of Nixon and Kissinger’s umbrage, Sykes even recognized that the “impact of Watergate inevitably has had its effect on a man apparently so psychologically lonely as is the President” and that his reaction, therefore, “may well have been a good deal more emotional than it would have been in other circumstances.”\(^{21}\)

These do not seem like the words of a man blindsided by the complete upheaval of thirty years of international relations. Instead, Sykes’ letters and the lack of any frantic British response show that, for all of Kissinger’s bluster on the phone with the President, the intelligence cutoff never really materialized. Likely, the cutoff was largely a threat, not a course of action, and the British recognized this. As Sykes concluded, while they could not disregard Kissinger’s message, “I think we should recognise that there probably is an element of pressure and bluff in


\(^{19}\) Document 199, ibid.


\(^{21}\) Document 203, ibid.
they discussed it seriously and used it as evidence that the Declaration of Principles
remained an important American priority, but it did not constitute nearly as revolutionary a
departure from the traditional special relationship as Robb and Hughes have so fervently
claimed. Even when Kissinger did attempt to initiate some “cooling” of the intelligence tap,
probably to demonstrate that his threat was credible, he seemed to have as much difficulty in
convincing the American bureaucracy to pivot to his new course of action as Heath did in trying
to turn the British bureaucracy toward Europe and away from America.

“Antelope, Super Antelope, or Poseidon” – Stalling the British SLBM Upgrade Discussions
Kissinger did, however, have unexpected success in altering the tenor of the special relationship
in the nuclear field. Robb, in particular, argues that the failure of the pending sale of the
American Poseidon missile system to the British represents further evidence of the collapsing
special relationship and the seriousness of Kissinger’s policy of coercive linkage. Instead,
Kissinger intended to do nothing more than stall the deal, and its eventual failure was a result of
Heath’s unexpected maneuver to “buy British” and evade the diplomatic pressure and logistical
complications of devising a new or updated nuclear agreement. This came as a surprise to
Kissinger, which demonstrates that the collapse of the deal was not the result of his rational plan
but instead the product of complicated decision-making processes between allies.

Throughout 1973, the British had been in talks with the United States about purchasing
an upgrade for their submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) system that comprised the
majority of the independent British nuclear deterrent. The British leadership worried that the
aging Polaris missile system, acquired by Prime Minister Macmillan from President Kennedy in

22 Document 203, ibid.
the eponymous 1962 Polaris Agreement, would be unable to penetrate the new Soviet anti-ballistic missile systems, rendering the entire British deterrent obsolete.\textsuperscript{23} The most important consideration in upgrading the system was therefore “the Moscow Criterion,” a shorthand which referred to a missile delivery system’s ability to credibly threaten the city of Moscow with its current level of missile defense.\textsuperscript{24} If a system was thought capable by British defense experts of penetrating or evading the defense system by whatever means, then it passed the Moscow Criterion.

By 1973, the British were considering two main options for upgrading their missile system, codenamed Super Antelope and Poseidon. Super Antelope was a wholly British-made upgrade to the front end of the existing Polaris system, and included hardening the reentry vehicle and outfitting it with various decoys to allow it to evade Soviet anti-ballistic missile (ABM) technology.\textsuperscript{25} Tempting though it was to buy domestic, British defense experts recognized that this option was potentially risky, as it relied on inundating and overwhelming Moscow’s ABM system through a massive attack to allow sufficient missiles to slip through and destroy the city. The current U.S.-Soviet agreement, which the British had been watching closely, allowed for the deployment of 100 ABM sites around Moscow. This number was significant, because British intelligence estimated that 128 ABM interceptors around Moscow would be enough to render the Polaris system, even outfitted with Super Antelope improvements, useless.\textsuperscript{26} Super Antelope was cheaper than the other upgrade options, but if

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{23} Reynolds, “A ‘Special Relationship’?,” 13.
\item \textsuperscript{24} TNA, CAB 164/936 GEN (70), ‘International Aspects of Nuclear Defence Policy: Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, Report to Ministers’, 29 June 1970. In Robb, “Antelope, Poseidon or a Hybrid,” 801.
\item \textsuperscript{26} Robb, “Antelope, Poseidon or a Hybrid,” 802.
\end{itemize}
Heath chose to use it, the British defense system would be treading a thin line between credible and toothless on the Moscow Criterion.

The second option was purchasing the next-generation Poseidon missile system from the United States. The Poseidon missile had the massive advantage of being outfitted with Multiple Independently Targeted Reentry Vehicle (MIRV) technology. MIRV systems attached multiple warheads to a single missile, which were designed to detach and independently strike targets from the missile’s orbit. A single MIRVed Poseidon missile could therefore carry as many as fourteen independent thermonuclear warheads, giving it a much higher chance of overwhelming Soviet ABM systems and satisfying the Moscow Criterion, and was therefore the favorite choice of the British Royal Navy. However, it was also considerably more expensive than the Super Antelope program, and, more importantly, required approval from the Americans. The British also considered a third, hybrid option, in which they would purchase the Poseidon missile base system on a de-MIRVed capacity, as the United States Congress was uneasy about sharing their most advanced missile system to date. After purchasing the de-MIRVed Poseidon base, they would then outfit them with Super Antelope-improved Polaris warheads under American guidance. This was Heath’s favored option; it was affordable, probably purchasable, and was projected to satisfy the Moscow Criterion.

The Moscow Criterion, although significant, was not the only consideration facing Heath in his decision on how to upgrade the British deterrent. Relations with the Americans were quickly becoming more strained, and even had they not been, buying an American-made missile system at the precise moment that Heath was trying to prove his European credentials to the EEC

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was a worrying prospect. Nonetheless, in February 1973 he informally broached the subject of a potential buy during his meeting with Nixon in Washington, and the President responded positively, if guardedly, and welcomed further talks on the idea.\textsuperscript{28} The British were unsure whether the purchase of a new missile system would be allowed under the Nassau Agreement of 1962 or whether the deal would require the slow and costly negotiation of an updated nuclear agreement.\textsuperscript{29} Throughout early 1973, Kissinger encouraged the hopes of British delegations, telling them that “in the past,” American approval for such deals had been “fairly automatic,” and told the President that he believed it was “important for both military and political reasons to support our British ally in efforts to improve their missile capability against our major potential enemy.”\textsuperscript{30} As late as May 10\textsuperscript{th}, Kissinger was recommending that the United Kingdom purchase the Poseidon system and told them that he would have no difficulty securing congressional approval, and even implied that the did not think approval was needed for such a deal.\textsuperscript{31}

However, Hughes and Robb were correct in arguing that Kissinger did not conduct negotiations, even with America’s special ally, in a vacuum, and when Anglo-American relations began to fray over the Year of Europe, he became much less encouraging. On June 30\textsuperscript{th} he told Cromer that the Poseidon missile deal was a “major problem” and that he would indeed have to go through a likely disapproving congress if they hoped to make the purchase possible. He told the disappointed British Ambassador loftily that “Of course if the Prime Minister really wants to take this up with the President we will try our best,” but implied that there would be many


difficulties, including a possible renegotiation of the Nassau Agreement.\textsuperscript{32} On the evening of August 9\textsuperscript{th}, surely still acting on the momentum of his angry talk with the President, Kissinger began to make good on some of the threats he had made. He called the newly-appointed Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger, who was in charge of the nuclear discussions, to tell him that “The British are behaving shitty,” and instructed him to stall the negotiations.\textsuperscript{33} He told the Secretary of Defense to “Lead them on without giving up anything” because he wanted to show the British exactly what it meant to be on the same footing with France.\textsuperscript{34} Upon hearing that a British team was on their way to Schlesinger’s office to discuss the potential for a Poseidon purchase at that very moment, Kissinger instructed Schlesinger to “stop talking” about the deal but, significantly, “don’t move them out.”\textsuperscript{35} Schlesinger then obediently informed the waiting British delegation that, as he had just recently taken office, he had not had time to familiarize himself with all of the options and would therefore have to delay a final decision. The frantic British negotiators, who desperately needed a decision for their own strict domestic timetable, called back to London complaining of the new obstructive policy of the White House, but Kissinger told Schlesinger to press on, saying “Don’t let them up for air yet, Jim.”\textsuperscript{36} Despite his stall tactics, Kissinger never once told Schlesinger to actually cancel the deal. It was a threat, something to remind the British of just what they stood to gain from staying close to the United

\textsuperscript{32} United States National Security Council. \textit{Atlantic Summit; Poseidon Missiles; Middle East Peace Negotiations}, 30 June 1973, DNSA Collection.
\textsuperscript{33} United States Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. \textit{French Nuclear Discussion Discussion of Nuclear Cooperation with James Schlesinger}, 9 August 1973, DNSA Collection.
\textsuperscript{34} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{35} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{36} United States Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. \textit{United Kingdom Ballistic Missiles Issue; Interagency Cooperation}, 28 August 1973, DNSA Collection.
States, but not a cancellation of the nuclear *specialité* of the special relationship, as Robb has argued.

Heath, running out of time and sorely tired of Kissinger’s manipulations, then made a surprising decision. Unsure as he was of whether the Poseidon deal would require a drawn-out negotiation process, Heath did not feel comfortable embarking on a new series of discussions with a President crippled by Watergate. He no longer believed that the President had the authority to drive a deal of this magnitude through a Congress that had already begun formally investigating him, and additionally, Heath was feeling increasingly unsteady in his own office as he faced withering attacks from the British Left and his popularity waned. He even commented to Burke Trend in August that he felt there were “present attempts to create a Watergate atmosphere in this country.” For these reasons, the Prime Minister wanted to begin upgrading the British nuclear missile system immediately, eschewing any drawn-out negotiation process whose chances of success before he faced reelection were dubious. Accordingly, and much to the surprise and chagrin of Kissinger, he withdrew the British delegation and announced to his Defense ministers that he had chosen the Super Antelope option, strategically weak though it was. It was a “lowest common denominator” decision; it was cheap, it might earn him a small but much needed domestic victory, and it required no assistance from the uncertain friendship of the Americans.

Clearly, Kissinger had intended to use the nuclear deal as leverage to force the British to support the American line on the Declaration of Principles. However, as his shocked reaction to the Super Antelope decision shows, he had never intended to actually remove the Poseidon

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38 Heath to Trend, 21 August 1973, PREM15/2130, quoted in ibid., 268.
39 Ibid., 270.
system from the table. Instead, he had hoped to use it as a bluff, just like the abortive intelligence cutoffs that Hughes and Robb made so much of. Unlike in the field of intelligence cooperation, the British had another option that allowed Heath to escape from under the thumb of Kissinger and gave him an opportunity to prove his loyalty to Europe. That Heath should make this decision actually further weakens Hughes and Robb’s argument that Kissinger’s policy of coercive negotiations had a serious impact on British policy and forced them back into the American fold. Instead, in one of the few examples of actual policy change resulting from Kissinger’s pique, Heath maintained his Europeanist line, even as his negotiators in the EEC continued to push for a Declaration of Principles that would be amenable to the Americans.

**Doing “Their Efficient Best” – The Hidden Support of the FCO**

In the absence of strong documentary evidence for their argument about Kissinger’s transition to adversarial relations with the United Kingdom, Hughes and Robb argue that British support for the American initiative demonstrates that such a policy must have taken place and had a strong effect on British thinking. However, in seeking a clear explanation for British policy, the two have conflated several other factors in the complicated process of foreign policy creation into a neat, causal relationship between American pressure and British results. In reality, the explanation for British support for the Declaration of Principles is considerably more complicated and demonstrates not the effective action of rational actors but the awkward process of policy creation between bureaucracies in multiple nations.

The opinion of the FCO on supporting American policies had not changed with Heath’s pivot, and Trend, Brimelow, and Douglas-Home continued to push for a Declaration of Principles that would be amenable to Kissinger and Nixon. Their position was challenging, as the
French had initiated and championed a “groundswell” of anti-American opinion amongst the other members of the Nine, so representatives of the FCO were not able to present American drafts and ideas as such. Kissinger had consistently underestimated the obstructionary effect that the French had on the Year of Europe discussions, which led to serious misunderstandings of British policy. For example, during the European solidarity decision, when Heath’s hand was essentially forced by Jobert’s intransigence, Kissinger assumed that the British were trying to “take a free ride” on the Americans into Europe and did not suppose that they were merely attempting to navigate a complicated diplomatic environment and trying to prove their credentials as an unsteady new member of the Nine.40 This difficulty pervaded the British efforts to support their American ally, and an FCO member stationed in the British Embassy in France quipped that, despite their best efforts, “The argument about the need to reaffirm the Atlantic partnership in the American public consciousness or to impress Congress cuts little ice here (it leaves Jobert glacial).”41 More seriously, he reported in no uncertain terms that the French were “not sorry to see the American Year of Europe bogged down.”42

Despite these heavy pressures from both the Prime Minister and the French, the FCO still considered supporting the American line on the Year of Europe to be good policy. Hugh Overton, Head of the North American Department of the FCO, recognized in his analysis of the policy that, while it clearly had self-serving aspects, including the restoration of some measure of prominence to an ailing presidency, the Year of Europe would also benefit the United Kingdom

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42 Document 190, ibid.
and Europe as a whole. As he concluded glibly, the United Kingdom should support the Year of Europe in whatever manner possible, “the more so if […] it largely consists of hot air. From the US point of view, hot air is an important aid to locomotion.” After Kissinger’s furious conversations with Trend and the other representatives in the FCO and the transmission of his threats, a moment that Hughes and Robb regard as the turning point in Anglo-American relations in 1973, there was no obvious change in FCO policy. On August 8th, an FCO paper argued that the EEC had nothing to gain from not supporting the American initiative and indeed rather a lot to lose by dismissing it, as “the security of Western Europe might be jeopardised by the increasing alienation of American public opinion, [which] would be disadvantageous to both sides.”

Brimelow, in discussing Kissinger’s anger and the handling of the draft Declarations, explained candidly that “We do not like the American draft, but this does not mean we are opposed to the idea of declarations.” The NSC draft was too rigid, and Brimelow knew it would never make it through the stubborn EEC committees. However, he believed that the British, under his experienced guidance, could draft a more delicate document that might pass muster, and as such, “it will naturally be important not to give too negative an impression of our attitude.”

The FCO did not think that good relations with the United States and the rest of the EEC were as mutually exclusive as Heath and the French believed. Sykes argued that their best policy was to simply “try to avoid giving an answer, particularly in the present climate” to the question of whether relations with the Nine or with the United States represented a higher priority.

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43 Minute: Overton to Cable, AMU 3/507/1, 5 July 1973, Document 151, ibid.
44 FCO paper, MWE 3/304/1, undated, Document 193, ibid.
46 Document 198, ibid.
47 Document 203, ibid.
Accordingly, he recommended maintaining a steady flow of information to the United States on EEC negotiations and subtly pushing for American points, all without alienating the nations of Europe. In the face of Jobert’s stubbornness and Heath’s bold reevaluation of British foreign policy priorities, as well as Kissinger’s outrage, this was a difficult proposal. However, almost a month after Nixon and Kissinger’s furious phone call, when the dust settled somewhat from their threats, the FCO policy clearly won out. Now that the FCO could advance arguments amenable to the United States in EEC discussions without arousing suspicion, the French began to come around to the British line of thinking and on August 26th, Jobert told Heath that he was “very impressed by the amount of work which [the] Foreign Office have done and he thought the British draft was a good one.” Even the obstinate Puaux conceded that the French were prepared to accept an admittedly “fairly anodyne text” based on the British draft, which was essentially all that Kissinger had hoped for from the outset. As Douglas-Home would later explain to Kissinger, they had only managed to achieve this success through a Europeanist manner of which he did not initially approve. They had been forced by pressures within and without to seek a “consensus likely to produce the highest common factor of transatlantic agreement,” which required them to “justify transatlantic purposes by specifically European arguments and to seek the over-riding unity of the West through emphasis on the identity, within the West, of Europe.” This did not mean they had abandoned their ally across the Atlantic, as Nixon and Kissinger evidently supposed, but instead that they had been forced to hide it behind Europeanist credentials if they hoped to achieve anything. Finally, the FCO also succeeded in convincing Heath to mollify his position on EEC solidarity. On September 4th, at the urging of

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50 Tel 1815 to Washington, AMU 3/507/1, 6 September 1973, Document 221, ibid.
Trend and Brimelow, the Prime Minister sent a telegram to the President to reassure him of the strength of the special relationship:

There is in my mind no incompatibility between [our] bilateral relationship and the multilateral relations between Europe and the United States. The two are complementary; and both should serve to reinforce the trans-Atlantic link on which, as you and I believe, the peace and security of the world are ultimately based. I greatly hope that in that spirit we shall continue on our present paths together, even if the road is rather longer and more difficult than either of us would wish.\(^{51}\)

Accordingly, he reassured the President that their relationship, and the intelligence cooperation that it entailed, would continue as it had since World War II. Kissinger, though he continued to complain about the behavior of the French and the Germans, accepted the British explanation and reassured Douglas-Home, somewhat disingenuously, that he had never been “unduly worried about the British, with whom there had traditionally been close relations.”\(^{52}\) Beset by challenges on all sides, the FCO had continued to uphold, by whatever means necessary, their policy of quietly supporting American initiatives and achieving diplomatic accomplishments of mutual advantage.

Months earlier, Kissinger announced the Year of Europe initiative with hopes raised by the unwavering friendship of the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office, which had effectively hidden Heath’s Europeanist sentiments from view. The unmasking of this Europeanism sparked the transatlantic conflicts of summer 1973, but it also led to a reversal of the British masking effect. When Heath sent the telegram on July 25\(^{\text{th}}\), both he and Kissinger, as well as Hughes and Robb, believed that he was unveiling the new face of British foreign policy vis-à-vis transatlantic bilateralism with the United States. In reality, Heath had just as difficult a

\(^{51}\) Letter: Bridges to Alexander, AMU 18/1, 4 September 1973, Document 217, ibid.

time completely altering the operations of his foreign policy bureaucracy in the FCO as Kissinger did in trying to enter a period of manipulative negotiations. Hughes and Robb assumed that the eventual successes of the Year of Europe, such as they were, were a result of effective diplomatic blackmailing in the nuclear and intelligence relationships, but as the documentary evidence reveals, the intelligence cutoffs did not even occur, and Heath neatly evaded the pressure of the pending Poseidon deal. In reality, FCO support for the Declaration of Principles and the American line had been essentially unwavering throughout the Year of Europe conflict; it was merely forced out of the open and into the backrooms of the EEC by Heath’s proscription against unofficial transatlantic communications between the FCO and Kissinger. This continued reliance on standard operating procedure in the FCO, even in the face of outright confrontation between the rational actors at 10 Downing Street and the White House, demonstrates the weakness of Model I in completely explaining conflicts between allies. Although it has been characterized as a period of dramatic reevaluations in the special relationship, in truth, Anglo-American cooperation continued mostly undeterred by “Heath’s single-handed efforts to reorient British foreign policy” which ultimately “amounted to nothing more than a curious anomaly in post-war history.”

**Conclusion**

Hughes and Robb failed to recognize the roles of bureaucratic infighting between Kissinger and the other department heads, as well as their reliance on a standard operation procedure in cooperation with the British. While this overreliance on the Rational Actor Model is not an uncommon mistake in diplomatic history, in the case of Hughes and Robb the implications of

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53 Document 232, ibid.
their oversight are enormous. They completely misread clear documentary evidence and inflated a largely rhetorical threat of coercive action into an unprecedented and aggressive new face of American transatlantic policy that simply did not exist. The British FCO, who continued to champion the Declaration of Principles in EEC meetings, did not do so because they were coerced and manipulated by Kissinger’s intelligence and nuclear blackmail, as Robb and Hughes have argued. The intelligence blackmail hardly materialized and Heath actually evaded the American pressure of the coercive tactics on the Poseidon deal by simply choosing to buy British. Instead, the FCO continued doing “their efficient best” because they had never stopped believing that supporting American initiatives in Europe was the best way for the British to maintain their leading role in world geopolitics, regardless of the Europeanism of Heath’s fading premiership.
CONCLUSION

The Changing of the Guard and the Restoration of the Special Relationship

TREND: I think looking back Henry, one could see now that perhaps the whole thing could be done differently. But things could always have been done differently. […]
TREND: I thought in walking out of that house today – this is the end.
KISSINGER: Not for you and me. […]
TREND: We will go on doing our best – you know what history is.
KISSINGER: You know our two people really belong on the same side.
TREND: Of course.
KISSINGER: In a cooperative relationship.
TREND: Good.
KISSINGER: Bye Burke.

- Conversation, Henry Kissinger and Burke Trend, July 30th 1973, 8:55 PM

AFTER THEIR FINAL contentious meeting on July 30th 1973 concluded, Henry Kissinger called Burke Trend later that night to express his great disappointment to his friend and frequent collaborator across the Atlantic. This conversation was marked by the personal connections that had made the special relationship so unique in both American and British diplomatic history. Kissinger began by telling Trend “personally how much I have enjoyed working with you” and by letting him know that he had Kissinger’s “personal friendship and admiration.”¹ Trend responded in kind, telling Kissinger that he had “enjoyed [Kissinger] immensely” and that he

¹ United States Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. United Kingdom-U.S. relations, 30 July 1973, DNSA Collection.
thought the visit had been “terribly sad.” Kissinger agreed, pronouncing gravely that it was “a sad day in the history of our two countries.” In a remarkably unguarded fashion, the men briefly discussed the state of their two nations, and Kissinger conceded that mistakes had certainly been made. He even admitted that the accusation in Europe that Nixon was analogous to “a pyromaniac who sets fires and then asks the victims to help” was frankly a “brilliant” assessment, “even partially true,” although of course he had to fight it publicly. The conversation then turned to the Year of Europe, and both explained that they were still optimistic that something, however small, could still come of the initiative, although Kissinger hedged that it would come “probably at a price that didn’t make it worth it.” The predictions of both senior diplomats proved accurate.

The Year of Europe and the Declaration of Principles was soon swept from the fore of transatlantic policymaking by the sudden outbreak of an unanticipated and brutal October War in the Middle East, known as the Yom Kippur War in Israel and the Ramadan War amongst pro-Arab nations. The United States and the EEC differed markedly in how they responded to the war between Israel and the coalition of Arab states led by Egypt and Syria. The Americans supported the Israelis, while the Europeans, including the British, maintained a strict non-interference stance that further angered Kissinger. As the war subsided into an uneasy stalemate by the end of the month, the attention of the governments of Europe and the United States became occupied by the 1973 oil embargo and resultant 1974 energy crisis, which sent prices skyrocketing and policymakers in the West scrambling to form a united position to combat the

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2 Ibid.
3 Ibid.
4 Ibid.
5 Ibid.
impending economic disaster. While Nixon and Heath focused on the turmoil in the Middle East, work continued quietly on the Declaration of Principles, with the representatives of the United Kingdom continuing to push unobtrusively for an outcome that the Americans would be able to accept.

Despite the global tumult and transatlantic instability of 1973, the special relationship did recover from its time of conflict. Faced with bigger problems than the wording of a rhetorical Declaration, the United Kingdom successfully championed the American line of consumer solidarity in the face of the oil embargo to the other nations of the EEC during the energy crisis, isolating the French and demonstrating that transatlantic cooperation was still entirely possible. The recovery was further buoyed by a veritable changing of the guard that occurred in 1974. Heath, never a tremendously popular Prime Minister, suffered a further dwindling of support through the prolonged energy crisis. The winter of 1973 was particularly hard in Britain, and the Heath Government even had to shorten the work week to three days to conserve as much energy as possible. Heath called a general election in February of 1974 in hopes of bolstering support for his premiership with the slogan “Who governs Britain?” The result was apparently not Heath, as neither party was able to achieve a majority in the House of Commons and, under pressure from the Conservative Party, Heath resigned his office on March 4, 1974. Pompidou died in office on April 2nd 1974 as a result of an aggressive form of bone cancer, and the redoubtable Michel Jobert lost his political standing with the death of his president. Willy Brandt, Chancellor of West Germany during the period and occupier of an uneasy middle ground between the French and British positions on American influence in the affairs of Europe, resigned in May 1974 after information surfaced that one of his closest aides was actually an East German spy. Nixon, too, was not long for office. Although he denied personal wrongdoing for months in the
Watergate investigation, the discovery of the “Smoking Gun Tape” on August 5, 1974, essentially doomed Nixon to impeachment. On August 9, 1974, Nixon resigned the presidency, citing his foreign policy work as one of the great successes of his presidency. Their respective successors, Harold Wilson in the United Kingdom, Valéry Giscard d'Estaing in France, Helmut Schmidt in West Germany, and Gerald Ford in the United States, would prove less prickly stewards of transatlantic relations.

As the tangled historiography surrounding the Year of Europe demonstrates, peacetime alliances are difficult to explain through the lens of the Rational Actor alone. This method of evaluating relations in terms of the personal relationships between leaders may indeed be useful in analyzing adversarial negotiations. Summits and personal connections between leaders of enemy nations, such as those between Nixon and Brezhnev, are truly valuable indicators of the relationship between such nations. In these cases, contact between leaders is the only exchange of any importance between rival nations, and personal affection can indeed translate into productive policymaking. While it is tempting to apply this same filter to American-style peacetime alliances, which are often associated with multiple levels of linkage between member governments, this shorthand obfuscates the true nature of alliance politics and can lead to dramatic misinterpretations of the historical record, as in the case of Hughes’ and Robb’s study of the Year of Europe. In reality, alliances like the special relationship are better investigated at the bureaucratic level, because decades of cooperation have forged strong links in the more institutional sectors of foreign policy development. The Rational Actor Model can help explain how policy shifts begin, but the actual policy that results from these shifts often bear little resemblance to the plans that their leaders envisioned. Instead, bureaucratic infighting and

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reliance on standard operating procedure, as Allison argued, have a tremendous impact on decision making. The final policy product is more often the ungainly product of a long and complicated chain of decisions made by actors from the highest office down into the rank and file of the bureaucracy than the rational result of a top-level decision. As such, these models are most incisive in explaining the dense, entrenched bureaucratic ties that comprise the basis of the special relationship and may not be equally applicable to all peacetime bilateral alliances. However, they might be applied with similar effectiveness to the modern American-Israeli relationship, which has a similarly dense network of ties throughout all layers of government and a closeness and resilience that has confused scholars and policymakers alike.

In the case of the special relationship, something positive did eventually come of the conflicts of 1973, just as Kissinger and Trend predicted. The long-delayed Declaration on Atlantic Relations, the result of more than a year of negotiations between the nations of the Europe and the United States and perhaps the best symbol of the transatlantic rapprochement, was approved and signed in Brussels by all the member nations of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization on June 19th, 1974. Kissinger, who remained as Secretary of State and National Security Advisor for Nixon’s replacement, President Gerald Ford, was one of the few high-ranking American decision-makers who saw the Declaration of Principles from beginning to end. The product was, as Kissinger had expected, mild. It made no major changes, called for no grand reevaluations of strategy, and recognized both the United States and the nations of Europe for their commitment and contribution to collective transatlantic security. In stark contrast with the acrimonious diplomatic circumstances of its drafting, the Declaration concluded hopefully. “The
member nations look to the future, confident that the vitality and creativity of their peoples are commensurate with the challenges which confront them.”

However, as the two diplomats had also predicted, the Declaration came at a heavy price. Although Kissinger did eventually secure the document that he had proposed in April, the Year of Europe was nothing like how he imagined it, and he remembered the victory that he achieved on the Atlantic Declaration to be a pyrrhic one. Throughout the ordeal, he frequently lamented it as nothing but a series of mistakes, miscommunications, and betrayals, and he summarized the initiative in his memoir as “The Year that Never Was.” Although the special relationship was not completely sundered in 1973, as Robb and Hughes have argued, it undoubtedly struggled, and the vast and unique network of transatlantic friendships between policymakers in all levels of British and American government was weakened.

Nonetheless, historians and participants in the Year of Europe alike tend to recall the initiative as far more of a failure than it truly was. Tempers were raised, feelings surely were hurt, and friendships suffered. However, the special relationship survived and indeed cooperation at a sub-premier bureaucratic level continued largely unabated. The FCO, committed as it was to the Atlanticism that more obviously characterized an earlier age in Anglo-American relations, trudged forward through the complications caused by a maverick Prime Minister, a wounded President and his conspiratorial foreign policy czar, and the entrance of Great Britain into a loose constellation of Nine fractious European nations. That success was achieved at all is

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a testament to the power of the entrenched transatlantic relationships in the foreign policy wings of both the United States and the United Kingdom.

The Year of Europe and the events surrounding it should hold prominence as a period of interest to historians and international affairs experts alike, not only because of its relative uniqueness as an example of a rare and bitter confrontation in the special relationship, but also because of what it reveals about the processes of assumed familiarity and dashed expectations, of miscommunication and overreaction, in conflicts between peacetime allies. As Neustadt explained in his 1970 study of earlier crises between the United States and the United Kingdom:

These are cases of conflict, of cross-purposes, of breakdown followed by emergency repairs, costly for all concerned. I choose these not because I think them typical, far from it. I choose them rather because crises tend at once to be illuminating and remembered. Failure is a lightning flash, exposing salient features: participants recall it, journalists review it, historians record it, and contemporaries carry it in context.9

The Year of Europe was just such a lightning flash. It was an unexpected period of turbulence in the smooth post-war history of Anglo-American relations, shocking to those who experienced it and inexplicable to those who have studied it. In analyzing and explaining it more completely, this thesis has attempted to rectify many of the mistakes in the historiography of the special relationship, and brought to light a relationship that remains in the fore of western international affairs. As the people of the United Kingdom weigh exiting from the European Union, this story of its awkward entrance and the dramatic ramifications that followed have a special relevance today. Allowing the events of 1973 to remain a dark spot in the historiography of Anglo-American and transatlantic relations would be a grave error.

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This year has been called the year of Europe, but not because Europe was less important in 1972 or in 1969. The alliance between the United States and Europe has been the cornerstone of all postwar foreign policy. It provided the political framework for American engagements in Europe and marked the definitive end of U.S. isolationism. It insured the sense of security that allowed Europe to recover from the devastation of the war. It reconciled former enemies. It was the stimulus for an unprecedented endeavor in European unity and the principal means to forge the common policies that safeguarded Western security in an era of prolonged tension and confrontation. Our values, our goals, and our basic interests are most closely identified with those of Europe.

Nineteen seventy-three is the year of Europe because the era that was shaped by decisions of a generation ago is ending. The success of those policies has produced new realities that require new approaches:

— The revival of western Europe is an established fact, as is the historic success of its movement toward economic unification.

— The East-West strategic military balance has shifted from American preponderance to near-equality, bringing with it the necessity for a new understanding of the requirements of our common security.

— Other areas of the world have grown in importance. Japan has emerged as a major power center. In many fields, "Atlantic" solutions to be viable must include Japan.

— We are in a period of relaxation of tensions. But as the rigid divisions of the past two decades diminish, new assertions of national identity and national rivalry emerge.

— Problems have arisen, unforeseen a generation ago, which require new types of cooperative action. Insuring the supply of energy for industrialized nations is an example. These factors have produced a dramatic transformation of the psychological climate in the West — a change which is the most profound current challenge to Western statesmanship. In Europe, a new generation to whom war and its dislocations are not personal experiences takes stability for granted. But it is less committed to the unity that made peace possible and to the effort required to maintain it. In the United States, decades of global burdens have fostered, and the frustrations
of the war in Southeast Asia have accentuated, a reluctance to sustain global involvements on the basis of preponderant American responsibility.

Inevitably this period of transition will have its strains. There have been complaints in America that Europe ignores its wider responsibilities in pursuing economic self-interest too one-sidedly and that Europe is not carrying its fair share of the burden of the common defense. There have been complaints in Europe that America is out to divide Europe economically, or to desert Europe militarily, or to bypass Europe diplomatically. Europeans appeal to the United States to accept their independence and their occasionally severe criticism of us in the name of Atlantic unity, while at the same time they ask for a veto on our independent policies — also in the name of Atlantic unity.

Our challenge is whether a unity forged by a common perception of danger can draw new purpose from shared positive aspirations.

If we permit the Atlantic partnership to atrophy, or to erode through neglect, carelessness, or mistrust, we risk what has been achieved and we shall miss our historic opportunity for even greater achievement.

In the forties and fifties the task was economic reconstruction and security against the danger of attack; the West responded with courage and imagination. Today the need is to make the Atlantic relationship as dynamic a force in building a new structure of peace, less geared to crisis and more conscious of opportunities, drawing its inspirations from its goals rather than its fears. The Atlantic nations must join in a fresh act of creation equal to that undertaken by the postwar generation of leaders of Europe and America.

This is why the President is embarking on a personal and direct approach to the leaders of western Europe. In his discussions with the heads of government of Britain, Italy, the Federal Republic of Germany, and France, the Secretary General of NATO, and other European leaders, it is the President's purpose to lay the basis for a new era of creativity in the West.

His approach will be to deal with Atlantic problems comprehensively. The political, military, and economic issues in Atlantic relations are linked by reality, not by our choice nor for the tactical purpose of trading one off against the other. The solutions will not be worthy of the opportunity if left to technicians. They must be addressed at the highest level.

In 1972 the President transformed relations with our adversaries to lighten the burdens of fear and suspicion.
In 1973 we can gain the same sense of historical achievement by reinvigorating shared ideals and common purposes with our friends.

The United States proposes to its Atlantic partners that by the time the President travels to Europe toward the end of the year we will have worked out a new Atlantic charter setting the goals for the future, a blueprint that:

—Builds on the past without becoming its prisoner.
—Deals with the problems our success has created.
—Creates for the Atlantic nations a new relationship in whose progress Japan can share.

We ask our friends in Europe, Canada, and ultimately Japan to join us in this effort. This is what we mean by the year of Europe.

Problems in Atlantic Relationships

The problems in Atlantic relationships are real. They have arisen in part because during the fifties and sixties the Atlantic community organized itself in different ways in the many different dimensions of its common enterprise.

—In economic relations the European Community has increasingly stressed its regional personality; the United States at the same time must act as part of, and be responsible for, a wider international trade and monetary system. We must reconcile these two perspectives.
—In our collective defense we are still organized on the principle of unity and integration, but in radically different strategic conditions. The full implications of this change have yet to be faced.
—Diplomacy is the subject of frequent consultations but is essentially being conducted by traditional nation states. The United States has global interests and responsibilities. Our European allies have regional interests. These are not necessarily in conflict, but in the new era neither are they automatically identical. In short, we deal with each other regionally and even competitively on an integrated basis in defense, and as nation-states in diplomacy. When the various collective institutions were rudimentary, the potential inconsistency in their modes of operation was not a problem. But after a generation of evolution and with the new weight and strength of our allies, the various parts of the construction are not always in harmony and sometimes obstruct each other.
If we want to foster unity we can no longer ignore these problems. The Atlantic nations must find a solution for the management of their diversity to serve the common objectives which underlie their unity. We can no longer afford to pursue national or regional self-interest without a unifying framework. We cannot hold together if each country or region asserts its autonomy whenever it is to its benefit and invokes unity to curtail the independence of others.

We must strike a new balance between self-interest and the common interest. We must identify interests and positive values beyond security in order to engage once again the commitment of peoples and parliaments. We need a shared view of the world we seek to build.

**Agenda for the Future**

**Economic**

No element of American postwar policy has been more consistent than our support of European unity. We encouraged it at every turn. We knew that a united Europe would be a more independent partner. But we assumed, perhaps too uncritically, that our common interests would be assured by our long history of cooperation. We expected that political unity would follow economic integration and that a unified Europe working cooperatively with us in an Atlantic partnership would ease many of our international burdens.

It is clear that many of these expectations are not being fulfilled.

We and Europe have benefited from European economic integration. Increased trade within Europe has stimulated the growth of European economies and the expansion of trade in both directions across the Atlantic.

But we cannot ignore the fact that Europe's economic success and its transformation from a recipient of our aid to a strong competitor has produced a certain amount of friction. There have been turbulence and a sense of rivalry in international monetary relations.

In trade, the natural economic weight of a market of 250 million people has pressed other states to seek special arrangements to protect their access to it. The prospect of a closed trading system embracing the European Community and a growing number of other nations in Europe, the Mediterranean, and Africa appears to be at the expense of the United States and other nations which are excluded. In agriculture, where the United States has a comparative advantage, we are particularly concerned that Community protective policies may restrict access for our products.
This divergence comes at a time when we are experiencing a chronic and growing deficit in our balance of payments and protectionist pressures of our own. Europeans in turn question our investment policies and doubt our continued commitment to their economic unity.

The gradual accumulation of sometimes petty, sometimes major, economic disputes must be ended and be replaced by a determined commitment on both sides of the Atlantic to find cooperative solutions.

The United States will continue to support the unification of Europe. We have no intention of destroying what we worked so hard to help build. For us, European unity is what it has always been: not an end in itself but a means to the strengthening of the West. We shall continue to support European unity as a component of a larger Atlantic partnership.

This year we begin comprehensive trade negotiations with Europe as well as with Japan. We shall also continue to press the effort to reform the monetary system so that it promotes stability rather than constant disruptions. A new equilibrium must be achieved in trade and monetary relations.

We see these negotiations as a historic opportunity for positive achievement. They must engage the top political leaders, for they require above all a commitment of political will. If they are left solely to the experts the inevitable competitiveness of economic interests will dominate the debate. The influence of pressure groups and special interests will become pervasive. There will be no overriding sense of direction. There will be no framework for the generous solutions or mutual concessions essential to preserve a vital Atlantic partnership.

It is the responsibility of national leaders to insure that economic negotiations serve larger political purposes. They must recognize that economic rivalry, if carried on without restraint, will in the end damage other relationships.

The United States intends to adopt a broad political approach that does justice to our overriding political interest in an open and balanced trading order with both Europe and Japan. This is the spirit of the President's trade bill and of his speech to the International Monetary Fund last year. It will guide our strategy in the trade and monetary talks. We see these negotiations not as a test of strength, but as a test of joint statesmanship.

Defense

Atlantic unity has always come most naturally in the field of defense. For many years the military threats to Europe were unambiguous, the requirements to meet them were generally
agreed on both sides of the Atlantic, and America's responsibility was preeminent and obvious. Today we remain united on the objective of collective defense, but we face the new challenge of maintaining it under radically changed strategic conditions and with the new opportunity of enhancing our security through negotiated reductions of forces.

The West no longer holds the nuclear predominance that permitted it in the fifties and sixties to rely almost solely on a strategy of massive nuclear retaliation. Because under conditions of nuclear parity such a strategy invites mutual suicide, the alliance must have other choices. The collective ability to resist attack in western Europe by means of flexible responses has become central to a rational strategy and crucial to the maintenance of peace. For this reason, the United States has maintained substantial conventional forces in Europe and our NATO allies have embarked on a significant effort to modernize and improve their own military establishments.

While the Atlantic alliance is committed to a strategy of flexible response in principle, the requirements of flexibility are complex and expensive. Flexibility by its nature requires sensitivity to new conditions and continual consultation among the allies to respond to changing circumstances. And we must give substance to the defense posture that our strategy defines. Flexible response cannot be simply a slogan wrapped around the defense structure that emerges from lowest-common-denominator compromises driven by domestic considerations. It must be seen by ourselves and by potential adversaries as a credible, substantial, and rational posture of defense.

A great deal remains to be accomplished to give reality to the goal of flexible response:
— There are deficiencies in important areas of our conventional defense.
— There are still unresolved issues in our doctrine; for example, on the crucial question of the role of tactical nuclear weapons.
— There are anomalies in NATO deployments as well as in its logistics structure.

To maintain the military balance that has insured stability in Europe for 25 years, the alliance has no choice but to address these needs and to reach an agreement on our defense requirements. This task is all the more difficult because the lessening of tensions has given new impetus to arguments that it is safe to begin reducing forces unilaterally. And unbridled economic competition can sap the impulse for common defense. All governments of the Western alliance face a major challenge in educating their peoples to the realities of security in the 1970's.
The President has asked me to state that America remains committed to doing its fair share in Atlantic defense. He is adamantly opposed to unilateral withdrawals of U.S. forces from Europe. But we owe to our peoples a rational defense posture, at the safest minimum size and cost, with burdens equitably shared. This is what the President believes must result from the dialogue with our allies in 1973.

When this is achieved, the necessary American forces will be maintained in Europe, not simply as a hostage to trigger our nuclear weapons but as an essential contribution to an agreed and intelligible structure of Western defense. This, too, will enable us to engage our adversaries intelligently in negotiations for mutual balanced reductions.

In the next few weeks the United States will present to NATO the product of our own preparations for the negotiations on mutual balanced force reductions which will begin this year. We hope that it will be a contribution to a broader dialogue on security. Our approach is designed not from the point of view of special American interests, but of general alliance interests. Our position will reflect the President's view that these negotiations are not a subterfuge to withdraw U.S. forces regardless of consequences. No formula or reductions is defensible, whatever its domestic appeal or political rationale, if it undermines security.

Our objective in the dialogue on defense is a new consensus on security, addressed to new conditions and to the hopeful new possibilities of effective arms limitations.

_Diplomacy_

We have entered a truly remarkable period of East-West diplomacy. The last two years have produced an agreement on Berlin, a treaty between West Germany and the U.S.S.R., a strategic arms limitation agreement, the beginning of negotiations on a European Security Conference and on mutual balanced force reductions, and a series of significant practical bilateral agreements between Western and Eastern countries, including a dramatic change in bilateral relations between the United States and the U.S.S.R. These were not isolated actions, but steps on a course charted in 1969 and carried forward as a collective effort. Our approach to détente stressed that negotiations had to be concrete, not atmospheric, and that concessions should be reciprocal. We expect to carry forward the policy of relaxation of tensions on this basis.

Yet this very success has created its own problems. There is an increasing uneasiness — all the more insidious for rarely being made explicit — that superpower diplomacy might
sacrifice the interests of traditional allies and other friends. Where our allies' interests have been affected by our bilateral negotiations, as in the talks on the limitation of strategic arms, we have been scrupulous in consulting them; where our allies are directly involved, as in the negotiations on mutual balanced force reductions, our approach is to proceed jointly on the basis of agreed positions. Yet some of our friends in Europe have seemed unwilling to accord America the same trust in our motives as they received from us or to grant us the same tactical flexibility that they employed in pursuit of their own policies. The United States is now often taken to task for flexibility where we used to be criticized for rigidity.

All of this underlines the necessity to articulate a clear set of common objectives together with our allies. Once that is accomplished, it will be quite feasible, indeed desirable, for the several allies to pursue these goals with considerable tactical flexibility. If we agree on common objectives it will become a technical question whether a particular measure is pursued in a particular forum or whether to proceed bilaterally or multilaterally. Then those allies who seek reassurances of America's commitment will find it not in verbal reaffirmations of loyalty, but in an agreed framework of purpose.

We do not need to agree on all policies. In many areas of the world our approaches will differ, especially outside of Europe. But we do require an understanding of what should be done jointly and of the limits we should impose on the scope of our autonomy.

We have no intention of buying an illusory tranquillity at the expense of our friends. The United States will never knowingly sacrifice the interests of others. But the perception of common interests is not automatic; it requires constant redefinition. The relaxation of tensions to which we are committed makes allied cohesion indispensable yet more difficult. We must insure that the momentum of détente is maintained by common objectives rather than by drift, escapism, or complacency.

**America's Contribution**

The agenda I have outlined here is not an American prescription, but an appeal for a joint effort of creativity. The historic opportunity for this generation is to build a new structure of international relations for the decades ahead. A revitalized Atlantic partnership is indispensable for it. The United States is prepared to make its contribution:

— We will continue to support European unity. Based on the principles of partnership, we will make concessions to its further growth. We will expect to be met in a spirit of reciprocity.
—We will not disengage from our solemn commitments to our allies. We will maintain our forces and not withdraw from Europe unilaterally. In turn, we expect from each ally a fair share of the common effort for the common defense.

—We shall continue to pursue the relaxation of tensions with our adversaries on the basis of concrete negotiations in the common interest. We welcome the participation of our friends in a constructive East West dialogue.

—We will never consciously injure the interests of our friends in Europe or in Asia. We expect in return that their policies will take seriously our interests and our responsibilities.

—We are prepared to work cooperatively on new common problems we face. Energy, for example, raises the challenging issues of assurance of supply, impact of oil revenues on international currency stability, the nature of common political and strategic interests, and long-range relations of oil-consuming to oil producing countries. This could be an area of competition; it should be an area of collaboration.

—Just as Europe's autonomy is not an end in itself, so the Atlantic community cannot be an exclusive club. Japan must be a principal partner in our common enterprise.

We hope that our friends in Europe will meet us in this spirit. We have before us the example of the great accomplishments of the past decades and the opportunity to match and dwarf them. This is the task ahead. This is how, in the 1970's, the Atlantic nations can truly serve our peoples and the cause of peace.
TELCON
The President/HAK
August 9, 1973/3:12 p.m.

P: Hello

K: Mr. President.

P: Hi Henry how are you?

K: OK. I know you called me earlier but

P: No, I just called but I didn't--it was just something that I'd worked out with Al. It was nothing. It was on nothing of importance.

K: Right. Well, I've had lunch with Dobrynin and at least that part of our foreign policy is....

P: Still alive, huh? (Laughter)

K: Because we've got--we are working on next year's summit.

P: Right. I noted in the summary of course, the fact that they did test their first successful MERVE. It shows why they are against the MERVE ban.

K: Well we are making some progress from the result that they have tested the MERVE. They shall have to take a different ______. I think its already foreseeable.

P: Well with Dobrynin at least it was still cordial.

K: we're already plotting out the elements of an agreement. Of the series of agreements we've now begun to make a breakthrough on SALT. At least a breakthrough to indicate how it might go and we're talking about MBFR. Of course, I am convinced Mr. President we will have that European declaration no later than early next year and in many ways it will be better for us next year than this year.

P: Yes. You haven't heard from the British yet?

K: NO, but we can't until Heath comes back from Ottawa
P: Yes.

K: We had another bit of a discussion yesterday with their charge. Because they briefed all the other Europeans when Bert Trent was in here and didn't tell us ahead of time and wouldn't even tell us afterwards what they had said so I demanded the briefing and then they said they would do it on a one time basis but they didn't feel obliged to tell us what they discussed with the Europeans. So now I'm cutting them off from intelligence special information they are getting here. I mean if they are going to share everything with the Europeans we can't trust them for special relationship. I am putting it on the basis that we are reassessing all liaison relations. I am not doing it from the White House, I'm having the Agency heads do it.

P: Yes. Well, who do you think is up to this? Who is playing this game?

K: Well, you know he has these tacky tendencies Mr. President and he -- I think he is trying to take a free ride on us in getting into Europe.

P: Yes.

K: I think they'll come around but they are going to be tough because they will want to steal deGaulle's line from the French. It was a horrible mistake that we pushed them into Europe. We didn't do it.

P: Yes. It was never my idea. But never the less.

K: And they are doing that now with the same single-mindedness that they pursued the special relationship with us before.

P: I think they're determined if they are going to be in Europe, they want to wheel Europe and that is it and they don't want us to wheel in.

K: Yes, but if that is what they are going to do there is no sense in arguing them the information which they then can market in Europe. We are better off doing it directly.

P: Sure. No special relations. Correct. They'll have the relation with the French.

K: That's right.
P: With them and a few others.

K: (laughter)

P: That's alright. It is just part of the international game.

K: Oh no. This is...

P: It is a passing thing.

K: That is a phase where we just have to show our teeth. Absolutely confident.

P: Right.

K: You already see articles in the European press saying now they think the Declaration of Principles is a good idea. Where three weeks ago they were picking on it all the time.

P: Yes. Look. The main thing is as far as we're concerned though let's not be too eager. We are not eager with them, we are not eager with our Chinese friends. Understand?

K: That's right. Well the Chinese... Dobrynin gave me another interesting piece of information. They have a speech--they have now a meeting of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party which we did not know. But they obviously have sources in the Chinese Communist Party and at that meeting Chou En-lai made a very long speech on the international situation.

P: Yes.

K: And that mostly the domestic situation but in the international section he violently attacked the Soviet Union.

P: Yes, and the Soviet Union has violently attacked him.

K: Yesterday, in reply.

P: Oh, that's why it came.

K: That's right, and so as long as that is the case the Chinese just can't afford to take us on.
K: Well, we've got another cable from Graham Martin today whom we were called that son of a bitch and he is very optimistic about South Vietnam. He thinks even Cambodia might be held off.

P: Hmm, wonder why? You never know. You never know. These things are not going to go that quickly unless there is a hell of a psychological crack but basically lets fact it, the Khmers don't have any Air Force.

K: No thats right. Its a question of... Well we could still continue bombing. We'd probably even win because right now...

P: I know. I know that because I could tell from even reading the thing this morning they were doing rather well, the little guys. You know they, in their molasses-like way they took this back or they rolled this back. You know what I mean.

K: That's right.

P: And we all know it because frankly I was glad to see you got those up to 48.

K: That's right.

P: That's alright. Let them hit a few things. As long as we're there lets don't go out with a whimper. So, on Cambodia he feels that maybe even that they will hang on awhile does he?

K: That's what he thinks. Yes.

P: He didn't give any basis for it did he?

KK: Well, he went over there.

P: I know he went over but he didn't get his reasoning.

K: That's right.

P: He didn't get any reasons for...

K: No, no he didn't give any basis for his reasoning, that's what I meant.
P: He didn't tell anybody probably. We don't know. And incidentally, what frankly he guesses is as good as our guess, I don't know. Let's just pray for the best.

K: It's entirely a question of psychology. They have the resources to hang on.

P: Why sure. They have the resources without the bombing Henry. You know that.

K: Well, if we had had a decent Ambassador there--that's one of my mistakes there. I should have insisted on getting that son of a bitch...

P: I know, I know.

K: I don't mean this year. This year wouldn't have made any difference.

P: Let me see. But right now--

K: But two years ago.

P: But right now though they have, in terms of military resources, ground forces and so forth, they are not inferior to the Khmers are they?

K: Oh no, they are superior to the Khmers.

P: That's my point.

K: But they don't have the discipline and the dedication.

P: That's the point. I understand. So therefore, the chances of the Khmers going in and cutting them up and so forth and then their collapsing are considerable. But let me say this. That isn't going to mean the fall of South Vietnam and it'll frighten al lot of people. It'll frighten the Thais and it'll frighten alot of others but I don't intend to get--we can't get discouraged about any of those things.

K: Well, in this one you were right. The longer we could have held on in Cambodia the surer the situation in South Vietnam would have been. But even with that he thinks South Vietnam can hold six years which he says there is realistically but would get into the next Presidential period. His major concern is that the new President in 1976 have your conviction. After that he thinks it doesn't make any difference what happens.
P: Yes.

K: I mean he put it as coldly as that.

P: You mean he thinks it could hang for six years.

K: That is what he thought.

P: I think he's right. We've started a legacy there. Let's not...

K: Mr. President, if you had had the support that Ike had after the Korean war, that thing would be in -- 76 would be seen as a triumph and I must tell you honestly I didn't think it could hold beyond 1974, much beyond 74.

P: Yes. Well we'll see. You want to remember too that the North has its problems. They are trained and it maybe the Russians aren't helping them quite that much and the Chinese haven't got that much to put in there. You know what I mean. Let's fact it.

K: I don't think either of them are putting in a hell of a lot.

P: Yes. That's my point. I mean the situation has changed a great deal, Henry. I mean we've got our problems, psychological and others on our side, but they've got -- we'll see what they come up...Well, anyway on the Chinese side they owe you an answer and you all don't expect to get one do you for awhile?

KK: They may not give us an answer not until their Central Committee is over or they may not give us an answer until after August 15th.

P: Yes.

K: It doesn't make any difference because we didn't propose a date until September.

P: Well, my point is... Is their Ambassador back yet?

K: No, he is a member of the Central Committee so he would be staying over for the...

P: Yes. Well, that's all right. I just feel that sometimes we tend to...It's hard to you know, to sort of pull ourselves up by the bootstraps all the time with some things we are going through here but dog gone it we--with the Europeans... My attitude is so what--if they want to play this kind of a game. Fine. You know. Henry, you could find--I mean I wouldn't like it to happen to Europe but there are worse things than the American/Russian condominium now. Let's face i
K: Mr. President, the Europeans will be on their knees by the end of this year. They cannot do without us. All they have to understand is that they can lose us.

P: That's right because you see... You talk about these forces for Europe and that sort of thing but Good God, I mean what the hell are the Europeans going to do when you say -- each of them on their ways to Moscow. Now what in the hell do you think Brezhnev wants with Pompidou?

K: They've been taking us too much for granted.

P: That's right. We're going to have... That we have to stay, that we need them and that we're going to maintain the rein and so forth. Alright, we don't have to stay Henry. We just don't have to necessarily. You understand that?

K: I couldn't agree more.

P: Let me say, we do have to stay in Japan and Korea but that's a different thing.

K: Well, I think we have to stay to some extent in Europe but...

P: No, nobody even in Europe--I would play a different line and say alright and that means... It's up to you, you can't have a free rein they are not going to confront us and have us stay now. That's all there is to it.

K: They cannot exclude us from their deliberations and expect us to give them an undiluted nuclear guarantee. That just cannot be.

P: That is right.

K: But it is certainly not going to come to that point.

P: Right. Right. Well, I'm up here at Camp David. It's not as hot as in Washington but having to work on this dog gone speech and statement, boy oh boy. I'll be glad when this week is over.

K: It is a difficult period Mr. President but you have come through so many agonies.

P: Yes sure.

K: I know it isn't...
P: It's more difficult for reasons that we're -- I can't talk about you know but nevertheless we'll come through it Henry.

K: I have every certainty of that.

P: The thing that your liberal friends have always underestimated. They've always felt that I was like--strangely enough--would react the way they would. I mean there isn't a one of your liberal friends not a none, that wouldn't have crumbled 2 months ago. They'd have thrown in the towel. Right Henry?

K: Oh, no question. They would have had nervous breakdowns.

P: Really, I mean they would have.

K: I know it.

P: And the thing that astonished them, they wonder why the hell I didn't.

K: You've astonished them with many periods in your Presidency.

P: And don't you run MK into that in your private chats with some of them. What's the matter with--they constantly try to say well, how does he look or...

K: They keep asking me whether you saw any sign of strain and I always tell them in crisis you never do.

P: (laughter) That's the best way to talk. Well anyway, take care old boy. I'll get back to work.