American Education for the Chamorros:
Reconciling Benevolence and Military and Civilian Educational Objectives in the U.S.
Administration of Guam in the Early Twentieth Century

By Christian Simoy

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On the basis of this thesis defended by the candidate on April 23, 2012, we, the undersigned, recommend that the candidate be awarded highest honors in History.

[Signatures]
Director of Honors
Faculty Adviser
Third Reader
To my grandparents, Sergio and Jesua Somodio,

and my mother, Charisse Somodio, who taught me to speak up and ask questions.
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INTRODUCTION

This story of civilian education strikingly begins and ends with war. Spain ceded the Pacific island of Guam to the United States in resolution of the Spanish-American War of 1898. In December 1941, Japan seized Guam after four decades of American colonialism in a deadly round of attacks that brought the U.S. into World War II. Between these two pivotal moments, the U.S. navy subjected the Chamorro people of Guam to social and economic reforms aimed at bringing fundamental changes to the island and people. As part of a “benevolent” civilizing mission, naval governors with plenary power over Guam mandated American education for the Chamorros.\(^1\) In my thesis, I focus on the development of this education over four decades of American military rule in early twentieth century Guam.

On April 11, 1898, President William McKinley asked Congress to declare war against Spain. Two months earlier, 266 Americans died as a result of the explosion of the U.S. battleship Maine in Spanish-controlled Cuba—it became the catalyst for war. A little more than two months after Congress overwhelmingly approved McKinley’s request, the U.S. Navy destroyed the Spanish naval fleet in Manila. Soon after, an American squadron set its sights on an unsuspecting Spanish colonial outpost in the island of Guam.

At the time, the residents of Guam, a small island in the western Pacific Ocean, were oblivious to the major political events occurring between Spain and the U.S.\(^2\) These distant events ultimately led to an abrupt change of colonial control of the island. Without any prior

\(^1\) William McKinley, “Instructions for the Military Commander of the Island of Guam,” 1898, as cited in: http://guampedia.com/american-style-colonialism/

\(^2\) Oscar Davis, Our Conquest in the Pacific. New York: Frederick A. Stokes Co, 1898, 52-53. According to Oscar Davis, a journalist travelling on board the Charleston, the Spanish were completely unaware that Spain and the United States were at war when the Americans arrived on Guam to order their surrender of the island.
warning of war with the U.S., the isolated Spaniards had no time for a defense. Within three days of American arrival in Guam, the Spaniards peacefully surrendered the island their mother country had called its possession for over two hundred years.

The official ceding of Guam and other Spanish territories to the United States through the signing of the Treaty of Paris came six months after the American squadron first arrived in Guam to overthrow the Spanish government. This treaty objectified Guam’s people as if they were spoils of war and subjected them to American power. It was not until the arrival of the gunboat Bennington, which delivered U.S. Commander Edward D. Taussig to the island, however, that the Americans officially occupied the island and made their intentions known:

The island of Guam in the Ladrones is hereby placed under the control of the Department of the Navy. The Secretary of the Navy will take such steps as may be necessary to establish the authority of the United States and to give it necessary protection and government. ³

Signed by President McKinley thousands of miles away in Washington, D.C., Executive Order Number 108-A authorized the Department of the Navy to develop a system of government to rule with plenary power, yet “benevolent” objectives.⁴

Over the next four decades, appointed naval governors arrived on the island and imposed their will on the people using this rhetoric of “benevolent assimilation.”⁵ Echoing main points set forth in the U.S. proclamation for the occupation of the Philippines two days earlier, these governors sought to substitute “the mild sway of [Spanish] justice and arbitrary rule” with an American alternative.⁶ Education became their primary means of civilizing the Chamorro people into this American way of life. In fact, naval officials asserted that American education would

provide Chamorros opportunities to “improve[e] [their] mental condition” that they claimed the Spanish deprived Chamorros of during Spanish rule.\textsuperscript{7}

Under the Spanish crown, Catholic priests and missionaries were the main education providers. Consequently, Chamorros received education in Spanish and Chamorro languages, elementary arithmetic, reading, and writing through lessons that revolved around Christian doctrine.\textsuperscript{8} With over two hundred years of Spanish education, the Chamorro people eventually adopted many Catholic rituals into their way of life and Spanish words into their Chamorro vocabulary.\textsuperscript{9} Only Chamorros of advantaged socioeconomic backgrounds, however, received education beyond this primary level. For most Chamorros, formal education was limited to “handicraft work, manufacturing of linen, and other useful arts” and agricultural work.\textsuperscript{10} While the Spanish limited access to more advanced education, the Roman Catholic Church operated schools in “every major town and village” at the time the U.S. arrived in 1898.\textsuperscript{11}

As soon as U.S. naval officials occupied the island, they sought to do away with Spanish influences and reorient Chamorros under a new brand of benevolent American colonialism. As documented in the Annual Reports of the Governors of Guam, naval officials intended for education to play a crucial role in the distinction of their governance from their Spanish predecessors. On January 22, 1900, the first naval governor Commander Richard P. Leary signed General Order No. 12 into law. In it, he outlined four major provisions: 1) the Navy Government would pay the costs of public school instruction; 2) religious instruction would be prohibited; 3) public school education would be mandatory for children ages eight to fourteen; and 4) English

\textsuperscript{8} Paul Carano & Pedro Sanchez, A Complete History of Guam, Charles E. Tuttle Company, Rutland, Vermont and Tokyo, Japan, 1964, 405.
\textsuperscript{11} Carano & Sanchez, A Complete History of Guam, 1964, 405.
would be the only language of instruction in public schools. With one signature, Leary forbade by law over two hundred years of Spanish religious-based instruction and mandated that every eligible child attend English-only, American public schools.

The implementations of the general order, however, would not appear over night. Instead, Governor Leary’s first order on education formed the foundation for the development of larger scale colonial educational initiatives throughout the first half of the twentieth century. But even in 1900, Leary’s first order exhibited motives behind educational progress that were not, if ever, purely charitable in nature. In fact, such policies, as I will show, served more economic purposes and naval interests in preserving their authority in the island.

While American officials often used discourses of benevolence in describing their educational goals for the island, a closer inspection of their claims reveals a more complex story filled with conflicting opinions on how to best govern. Issues of military and political strategy, economics, and self-sufficiency also played major roles in the development of education policies. Additionally, cross-cultural considerations, or lack thereof, heavily influenced the kinds of policies implemented and the degree to which Chamorros embraced them. For this thesis, I will explore these various issues over three distinct periods in Guam’s American educational history to unravel the different motivations and goals behind the implementation, reception, and effectiveness of various education policies.

Chapter One encompasses the first two decades of American colonial occupation in Guam. Operating under the pretense of benevolent intentions, naval governors sought to establish an education system that instilled American values. In particular, naval governors emphasized English language learning and American agricultural methods to spur Chamorro assimilation and economic growth. However, the U.S. federal government's laissez faire role in

the civilian affairs of the peripheral naval government of Guam set the tone for the development of inconsistent and ineffective education policies.

Chapter Two follows the development of a more standardized education system in the twenties. Increased federal financial support and commercial opportunities stimulated Guam’s economic growth and subsequently fueled investment in a more systematically organized public school system and other vocational programs. Throughout this period, naval governors improved the school system’s infrastructure by increasing the number of schools in the island, student enrollment, and qualified teachers in the classrooms. Nevertheless, top-down politics became an increasingly focal point in Chamorro dissatisfaction with American education. While naval officials continued to assert that education was a means to attain equal rights and meaningful political representation, the federal government had strategic military reasons for maintaining the political status quo.

Chapter Three delves into the impacts of the Great Depression on naval governance and educational policies. Guam’s participation in the global economy in the twenties proved highly beneficial for the island’s development; however, the naval government could not sustain growth. The global economic downturn depressed export prices that previously fueled the government’s various reforms. Further, the naval government could not rely on federal support in sluggish economic times within the mainland. Consequently, naval officials in their education policies emphasized the necessity for students to pursue educational pursuits in industry and agriculture for self-sufficient life in the island.

Admittedly, this study is primarily focused on the American officials who developed the education policies. Chamorro agency in the development of and reaction to the American education system certainly impacted the choices naval governors and other American officials
made; however, due to limited Chamorro primary sources, the Chamorro perspectives discussed in this piece are by no means completely representative of their more complex reactions. Despite this limitation, I contend that the American military government in place was ultimately a top-down policy-making body with the plenary power to dictate wide-ranging civilian policies.

By shedding light on how American education policy was developed, I hope to contribute to a better understanding of the adversities Chamorros faced as second-class noncitizens in their own land. Spanish conquistadors, American naval rulers, and the Imperial Japanese Army all laid claim to Chamorro land and objectified the Chamorro people as spoils of war during the period of my study. Yet, the Chamorro people endured even as American colonizers tried to push Chamorros to the periphery on issues of self-government. It is my hope that this study helps to stimulate further research and bring the Chamorros’ experiences with colonialism to the forefront of academic discourse.
ESTABLISHING AMERICA IN THE PACIFIC, 1898-1916: MILITARY GOVERNANCE AND CIVILIAN EDUCATION AFFAIRS

The navy’s mission was clear: “Stop at the Spanish Island of Guam… [and] use such force as may be necessary to capture the port… making prisoners of the governor and other officials and any armed force that may be there.”

On June 20, 1898, Captain Henry Glass and his crew on the U. S. S. Charleston docked in the small Pacific island and sought to quickly achieve their military objectives. In just two days, the Americans completed their mission with a peaceful Spanish surrender. They raised the American flag over Guam, sang the Star Spangled Banner in victory over the Spaniards, and refueled their ship before heading promptly to support the U. S. fleet in Manila Bay. Guam was not their ultimate goal or destination—it was merely a stop on the way.

The Americans raised their flag over the island as a symbol of victory over the Spanish. But the flag’s quick removal after the ceremony was emblematic of the country’s priorities at this early junction of American expansionism in the Pacific at the turn of the century. According to Oscar Davis, a journalist travelling on board the Charleston, “[Captain Glass] hoisted it [the flag] merely for the purpose of saluting it, and has no intention of leaving one here.”

The Americans had no immediate plans for occupying the island, but they would ensure that the Spanish no longer called this land their own. For the Navy, Guam was simply a strategically valuable stepping stone that would link America to its interests in the Pacific.

Naval officials understood the strategic value of the land but initially overlooked the Chamorro people who lived within it in their military plans. For centuries prior to Spanish

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14 Oscar Davis, Our Conquest in the Pacific. New York: Frederick A. Stokes Co, 1898, 76.
15 Davis, Our Conquest in the Pacific, 1898, 76.
colonization in the seventeenth century, the Chamorro people saw this island not as a coaling station but as their home. They lived in family clans that shared the land and its rich resources to provide for the needs of their communities. Land was not property to be owned or exploited.\textsuperscript{16} Contrary to American views of ownership, the Chamorros believed that they belonged as much to the land as the land belonged to them.

In fact, Chamorro legends tell the story of how man was made from the red earth of Guam’s land. An escaped soul of Chaifí, the god of wind, waves, and fire, fell on Guam and turned into stone. But the rays of the sun and the waves of the ocean gave the stone life. Upon seeing the beauty of the island, the man mixed red earth and water together to form men, harnessing the heat of the sun to give them all souls.\textsuperscript{17} Hence, the Chamorros were born “taotao tano,” which literally means “people of the land.”

The Americans’ capture of Guam from the Spanish was about obtaining control of the land ancient Chamorros thought was integral to their being. Even as the Charleston left for Manila Bay to fight in the ongoing Spanish-American War, the men aboard saw its strategic military potential. As they departed for the Philippines, Davis wrote, “Undoubtedly, Guam would be a valuable possession for the United States. Its resources have never been touched; development of them has never been dreamed of.”\textsuperscript{18} He continued:

The islands can be made immensely valuable. The harbour of San Luis d’Apra can be made a magnificent coaling station at very slight expense. It is almost in the direct line between Honolulu and Manila, and the whole island is capable of the easiest and best defence.\textsuperscript{19}

\textsuperscript{17} Gertrude Hornbostel, “Legends of Guam: Guam’s Adam,” The Guam Recorder (1940): 235.
\textsuperscript{18} Davis, Our Conquest in the Pacific, 1898, 88.
\textsuperscript{19} Davis, Our Conquest in the Pacific, 1898, 90.
Davis was clearly impressed with the island’s potential. While he and the crew left Guam in just two short days after their arrival, his words foreshadowed the fact that American officials would soon make bigger plans for the island.

In the interim, however, Guam and its people were in an unusual situation. The Americans removed the Spanish leadership, but did not replace it. As Davis noted, “Theoretically Guam is a United States possession; [but] practically it is an independent island.” For months, American leaders left the question of Guam’s political status unanswered. However, as American naval ships continued to arrive at and depart from the island, it was increasingly clear that the Department of the Navy came to a similar conclusion as Davis about Guam’s potential as a military coaling station—but utilizing Guam militarily also required establishing a government to control and regulate the local Chamorro people.

On December 23, 1898, President William McKinley gave the Department of the Navy plenary power to govern the island. In his executive order, McKinley wrote, “[T]he Navy shall take such steps as may be necessary to establish the authority of the United States, and to give it necessary protection and government.” Effectively, McKinley gave the Navy the permission to do whatever it pleased in its governance of the island. While his order placed clear control of the land under the Navy, the order left ambiguous the status of the Chamorros. They would not become American citizens for another half-century; instead, they were simply designated as non-citizen American nationals—people born in outlying U.S. territories with no political power or rights of citizenship under American rule. With this order, the U.S. federal government entrusted the Navy and an appointed naval official with absolute authority to make military and civilian decisions that drastically impacted the lives of the Chamorro people over the next forty years.

20 Davis, Our Conquest in the Pacific, 1898, 90.
The structure of this established government illustrates the distinctly military lens that governors would view the island through for years to come. The Governor, a naval official appointed by the Secretary of the Navy, would wear two hats: one as Commandant of the United States Naval Station, Guam, and the other as Governor of the Naval Government of Guam. The former title involved governance of the military on the island, while the other involved governance of Chamorros and their civilian issues. In his instructions for the first governor of the island, the Secretary of the Navy wrote of this guiding governing policy:

It will be the duty of the Military Commander to announce and proclaim in the most public manner that we come, not as invaders or conquerors, but as friends, to protect the natives in their home, in their employments and in their personal and religious rights. All persons who, either by active aid or by honest submission, cooperate with the Government of the United States to give effect to those beneficent purposes, will receive the reward of its support and protection.22

While dual titles and annual reports suggest that naval governors attempted to differentiate and separate military and “beneficent” civilian responsibilities, their military status greatly affected their decision-making on civilian policies. Thus, strategic military objectives often outweighed the needs of Chamorro civilians.

Governors throughout the first two decades of American occupation established various civilian education policies that showed this partiality towards their military goals. Operating under the guise of benevolence and paternal responsibility, naval governors built public schools to teach Chamorro students the American way of life. Specifically, they sought to teach Chamorro students the English language and American methods of agricultural production. Naval governors tried to establish English as the de facto language in hopes that Chamorros could then quickly assimilate with the Americans colonizing the island. Further, they introduced

new agricultural methods and crops to spur local economic growth based on export-oriented produce. While naval governors experienced some success with these civilian policies, ultimately, their preference for the completion of military objectives limited the impact and efficacy of educational endeavors.

"Fulfilling our moral obligation": Unveiling the Strategic Value of Providing Education

Early on in their administration of Guam, naval officials observed the necessity of American education for the Chamorros. “There is no adequate provision for the education of the natives,” wrote Lieutenant Governor William Safford in his personal notebook on October 1899.23 Pointing to high illiteracy rates, he asserted the need for more resources for large-scale education initiatives from the naval administration. Succeeding governors continued using similar rhetoric in their advocacy of education. In fact, they insisted that their educational efforts were part of a broader goal of “fulfilling [their] moral obligation” to less fortunate people.24 According to these naval governors, the Chamorros were poor, ignorant, and unsanitary, and would thus benefit from American occupation and education.25

This discourse of benevolence was integral to America’s colonial propaganda campaign both at home and in the Pacific. Proclaiming the charitable nature of their efforts served multiple purposes. In their annual reports to the Department of the Navy and to mainland American audiences, naval governors emphasized Chamorro destitution to lobby for public, financial, and political support for the maintenance of the naval government of Guam. Using similar rhetoric with the Chamorro people, naval leaders sought to “win the confidence, respect and affection of

the inhabitants of the Island.” Presuming that Chamorros would embrace American education as a social and economic positive, both naval and federal leaders promoted the idea that education served as a means for Chamorros to better themselves within this new American colony. For the navy, however, civilian education was a means of reaching military objectives.

In its initial phase, naval governors envisioned that American schools would sponsor widespread learning and use of the English language among the Chamorro population. On January 22, 1900, the first official governor, Commander Richard P. Leary, signed General Order No. 12 into law at the Government House in Agaña. In this order, Leary established that public school education would be mandatory for children between the ages of eight and fourteen and that the Chamorro students would receive instruction only in the English language. He further ordered that English would be the only language spoken at the government workplace.

His next directive, General Order No. 13, would be signed into law just a day later, widening the scope of American influence and education to the rest of the population. In addition to stipulating that every able-bodied resident must learn to write his or her name for the purposes of legal documentation or other commercial transactions, it emphasized that learning how to read, write, and speak the English language “would improv[e] their own mental condition.” By recommending that every Chamorro person learn the language by every available means, Governor Leary sought to establish English as the de facto and official language of the island.

With the implementation of these English-only policies, the Americans began to alter long withstanding Chamorro class dynamics. Prior to American rule, Chamorros observed a

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strict hierarchy of class divisions. There were two distinct classes during the late Spanish period: the “manak hilo” and “manak papa.” The “manak hilo” were the property-owning elite who mingled and intermarried with the Spanish and chose not to associate with the “manak papa,” who were the lowly class.  

29 Under Spanish rule, those within the elite group sought out private tutoring for their children and maintained close relations with Spanish administration. Under American rule, however, Chamorro class distinctions did not matter. All Chamorro students had to attend public schools. Consequently, parents encouraged their children to excel in American schools in hopes of raising their economic and social status.  

30 Naval governors believed that strictly enforcing these English-only policies would compel more Chamorros to assimilate into their new American government. Because Chamorros working in government positions were only allowed to speak English at the work place, learning the language became increasingly important for Chamorros considering such positions. According to Pilar Lujan, the daughter of a Chamorro raised during the naval occupation, English proficiency became a prominent determining factor for economic gain and status. In effect, this requirement implicitly created a new elite Chamorro class that could work within positions of government by virtue of their English speaking, reading, and writing abilities. Further describing the benefits of learning the language, Lujan wrote that her father “became a teacher and then served on the naval governor’s staff” because of his English language abilities.  

31 Naval officials would also tap other Chamorro students who “show[ed] special aptitude” amongst their peers to receive further education and jobs primarily as teachers, but also

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30 Thompson, *Guam and Its People*, 1947, 228.

in other clerical positions. In other words, more and more Chamorros perceived English education as a motor for upward mobility within the U.S. system.

The naval governors recognized that they needed to provide education to create a skilled Chamorro workforce to operate long-term. Technically, only the Naval Station of Guam was under the control of the Department of the Navy, and thus, naval appropriations were not directly provided for the administration of the civilian government. Moreover, the U.S. Congress, for decades, refused to act on Chamorro requests for United States citizenship. Thus, federal allocations specifically for civilian purposes were limited and unreliable. Consequently, naval officials faced major financial difficulties in securing professionals for long-term work on an island even some well-travelled navy men deemed too far and so different from home.

Commander Seaton Schroeder, the second governor of Guam, experienced firsthand the difficulties of finding and keeping American professionals on the island. In 1901, he hired H. Hiatt, an education graduate of Iowa State University, as superintendent in charge of the first official American public schools. By October 1901, three public schools opened in the capital city of Agaña offering English instruction under the supervision of Hiatt, his family members, two naval officers, and one Chamorro teacher. But due to inconsistent funding sources, these schools were often temporarily closed. Only with the support of the Jagatna Civil Club of Agaña, an organization of civil employees of the naval station, did education continue. Passing organization resolutions “deploring the necessity of interrupting the course of American education in Guam,” the club pledged six months worth of maintenance costs for the public schools including Superintendent Hiatt’s wages. The naval government, however, was unable

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34 Schroeder, “Letter to the Assistant Secretary of the Navy,” 1902.
to furnish further resources to accommodate his continued stay. Ultimately, Hiatt, like many other foreign American workers, would depart after a short period of work on island.

Guam’s distance from the mainland United States was certainly a major deterrent in the development of consistent school system administration. As Hiatt’s departure illustrates, the naval government had difficulties both persuading and properly compensating qualified individuals to take on leadership roles far removed from the mainland. One governor bluntly asserted, “Generally speaking no American will be willing to live here permanently.”\textsuperscript{35} Those obligated by naval assignment to work in Guam often would not stay for longer than the appointed duty required. More important, many of those assigned to leadership roles were naval officers, chaplains, and military wives without training in pedagogy. Because of problems with keeping qualified personnel on island, naval governors developed apprenticeship programs for Chamorros to learn how to perform jobs in the naval station and government.

While the government needed carpenters, mechanics, and other skilled workers, the main focus of the initial public schools was to provide Chamorros with practical English language knowledge. Ultimately, naval officials hoped that the Chamorros would become competent enough with the language to communicate effectively in the various other positions Americans currently filled. Because of the difficulty of obtaining American labor, the third governor of Guam Commander G. L. Dyer wrote, “The main dependence for continuing employees, clerical, mechanical, and laboring, will have to be the natives.”\textsuperscript{36} Accordingly, many of the early governors implemented educational policies with the purpose of training Chamorro people to become English language teachers given the dearth of American teachers.

\textsuperscript{35} Dyer, “ARGG of 1904,” 1904. (The Annual Reports of the Governor of Guam from 1901-1915 were not paginated. These documents can be found in Reel 1 of 3 in the Reports from the National Archives microfilm copy, 1950.)
\textsuperscript{36} Dyer, “ARGG of 1904,” 1904.
Governor Dyer developed one of the first informal Chamorro teacher training programs on the island in 1905. He wrote, "A few of the brighter children... are formed into a class by themselves and given a more advanced course. From this class it will be possible, in the course of a year or two at most, to obtain a sufficient number of native teachers for the island schools." Governor Dyer's comments highlight the navy's desire for insular self-sufficiency as well as the teacher-training program's intrinsic selectivity. Not every Chamorro was bound for a career in teaching. In fact, most students received a basic curriculum consisting of simple reading, writing, and arithmetic before being placed on industrial and agricultural tracks. Only a select few received the higher academic instruction to become teachers in an education system the navy developed to ultimately teach and produce a cheaper, island-grown alternative to a foreign American work force.

**The Initial Push for Agricultural Education and Arising Problems of Military Governance Over Civil Affairs**

"This is purely an agricultural people," wrote Dyer in his annual reports in 1904. Consequently, he asserted that the most practical education would be in agriculture and cultivation of the land. The Chamorros, however, had cultivated the land to the benefit of their communities long before any colonial interference. But in advocating for his form of agricultural education, Dyer argued that the Chamorros' methods were wrong. To the naval governor, their methods were outdated and the variety of their produce was not enough to sustain economic growth necessary for the naval government to survive on its own. In response to this seeming deficiency, the naval government made efforts to provide Chamorro students with educational opportunities to learn modern agricultural techniques.

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37 Ross Fink, "United States Naval Policies on Education in Dependent Areas" (PhD diss., University of North Carolina, 1948): 73.
In 1905, Governor Dyer opened the first agricultural school in coordination with the new Agricultural Experiment Station. Twenty-nine boys composed this inaugural class designed to introduce Chamorro students to the American ways of cultivation. Instructors disagreed with "old methods of planting the crops and allowing nature to do the rest."\(^{38}\) Instead, they taught "modern rational methods of cultivation" like how to respond to insect infestations and to irrigate large tracts of land.\(^{39}\) Further, various naval governors were critical of the fact that Chamorro farmers sold only one major export-oriented crop in the global market: copra. Copra, the dried meat of coconut, was valuable primarily to the Japanese for the oils that could be extracted from it for cooking and as fuel. However, naval governors wanted to diversify their exports. Thus, students were also given small plots of land to practice planting and growing a wider variety of export-oriented crops using American cultivation methods.\(^{40}\) After a year, the next governor noted that despite their systematic efforts, the school was not popular with the locals.\(^{41}\)

Chamorros' disinclination for the American agricultural school could be attributed to their divergent opinions on effective agricultural methods. Naval aims for agricultural education clearly contrasted with the way many Chamorros believe the land should be used. Naval governors wanted to increase the productivity of lands they believed were wasted or planted with crops that were not economically valuable to foreign markets. The Agricultural School and Experiment Station favored export-oriented agriculture and the production of staple crops like coffee and rice that "thrive well in the island if properly cultivated and will become a source of increased income to the ranch owners."\(^{42}\) However, many Chamorros continued to cultivate their

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\(^{38}\) Templin Potts, "ARGG of 1907," Washington: U.S. Navy Department, 1907.

\(^{39}\) Potts, "ARGG of 1907," 1907.


\(^{41}\) Potts, "ARGG of 1907," 1907.

\(^{42}\) Potts, "ARGG of 1907," 1907.
ranches—large plots of farm land—just as their ancestors had: for the purpose of growing subsistence crops like taro and yams to feed and support their immediate and extended family.

Despite these circumstances, naval governors continued to push agricultural pursuits as a default path for many of Guam’s students in the long-term; however, the naval government also quickly and urgently needed to fill operational positions. In 1907, Governor Potts wrote of the naval governor’s increasingly difficult job of maintaining both naval station business and the civil affairs of 11,000 Chamorros with money only given for the support of the Naval Station from the Department of the Navy. Because he could only use navy bureau funds to pay naval officers, he complained, “[I]t would seem that the allotted complement of officers is too small to properly perform the work.” Consequentially, he argued, “If the Department wishes to see this Island developed, under purely Naval administration and the people educated so that they may eventually be fitted to hold positions under the Island Government,” Potts would need more trained professionals on his Naval Station staff.

Potts’ forceful requests from the Navy Department evidenced the problems arising from having a military government in charge of both naval and civil affairs. In fact, the issues had been festering. In 1901, thirty-two Chamorros drafted a petition to the U.S. Congress criticizing autocratic naval rule over the island and people of Guam. In their petition, they wrote, “The change of sovereignty was welcomed by the inhabitants of Guam, [but a] government at best is distasteful and highly repugnant to the fundamental principles of civilized government.” The Chamorros who drafted this petition were members of the wealthy, educated, and politically connected elite under Spanish rule, but their clout did not help to persuade naval and federal

43 Potts, “ARGG of 1907,” 1907.
44 Potts, “ARGG of 1907,” 1907.
officials. Their pleas for a change to what they perceived as a flawed system would go unanswered by Congress. But in 1904, Governor Dyer shared similar observations.

Naval governors faced many issues trying to simultaneously handle the responsibilities of both the naval station and the naval government. Financial problems plagued early naval governors because of the Department of the Navy’s insistence on only financially supporting the naval station. While the Secretary of the Navy made clear that military objectives should be the governor’s main priority, Governor Dyer, too, articulated the difficulties of maintaining military interests without also properly considering and resolving civilian issues. In his annual report of 1904, he wrote these words:

[T]he interests of the Naval Station and natives are intimately interwoven. The one, as an organization, cannot escape, or live far apart, from the other, and the efficiency of the first depends entirely on the welfare of the second. It is therefore incumbent on us for our self protection and efficiency to give the natives such care as they are unable to care for themselves, to see that they are kept healthy and free from contagion, are afforded practical instruction in their sole pursuit, agriculture, and to educate some of them to occupy such positions as clerks, mechanics and intelligent laborers in the Naval Station that will eventually be established here.47

Governor Dyer infantilized the Chamorro people to assert the mutually beneficial outcomes from naval investment in civilian affairs. Using this paternalistic tone, Governor Dyer argued for more civilian financial funding while also highlighting the moral good in their military objectives.

By 1907, Governor Potts asserted that the financial problems facing civilian affairs greatly impeded educational development. He wrote, “Work in this Department [of Public Instruction] has been greatly retarded having no permanent, competent head, and the limited number of teachers available.”48 Even with the use of Chamorro teachers, they were far too few and still largely unqualified compared to the mainland professionals the naval government

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48 Potts, “ARGG of 1907,” 1907.
desired but could not afford to hire. With only 33 teachers to instruct nearly 1,500 Chamorro students attending twelve different public schools across the island, the Island Government needed funds the Navy Department was reluctant to give.  

But the Navy Department budged on its stance against financially supporting civil education the following year. While the Department still did not directly fund the public schools, they permitted twelve special laborers—primarily enlisted and ex-marines—paid through Naval Station funds to work as the Superintendent of Public Instruction, principals, and teachers in the schools. Although they were still not as qualified as trained professionals in the field of education in the mainland, Potts deemed their English language skills sufficient to teach Chamorros at the primary levels of schooling.

More important, the Navy Department’s acquiescence to Potts’ request symbolized its implicit acknowledgement of the strategic military benefit of supporting civilian education. In order to fill the positions necessary for both the Naval Station and the Island Government to operate successfully, the Department of the Navy would need to more seriously consider the mechanism through which it trained future Chamorro employees. The Department’s allocations for the Special Laborer fund allowed future naval governors over the next decade some leeway to develop education and other civil affairs as funds would allow.

Over the next decade, however, the importance and emphasis of educational projects varied with each succeeding governor. Given the short one- to three-year appointments of naval governors, their miscellaneous actions highlighted the benevolent despotism that had come to characterize the first American naval governors who seemed to do as they pleased. For instance, in 1911, Governor Salisbury actually implemented a policy that undermined the compulsory

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49 Potts, “ARGG of 1907,” 1907.
nature of naval education. His distance policy allowed families to exempt their children from attending if they lived more than two miles from the schools, but it was not implemented out of convenience to Chamorros. Instead, it was a governor’s attempt to coerce people to live on their farms as opposed to “wast[ing]” their time commuting from their ranches to their homes in the city.  

51 In another example, Robert Coontz, the governor from 1912-1913, decided to build playgrounds at the schools as part of his legacy as governor, insisting that play facilitated Chamorros students’ acquisition of the English language.  

52 It was only when Governor William Maxwell arrived in the island that the naval government attempted to overhaul and systematize an inconsistent education system. In his first annual report as governor, he criticized that teachers subject to general curriculum examinations could not pass them. Further, he observed that despite the increase in popularity of American education amongst the Chamorros, “the educational standards [were] low and practically the same as when the schools were started.”  

53 In response, he inaugurated the first Normal School in 1914, which was a course of study and examination designed to “advance island teachers to a higher standard” and dismiss those teachers who continued to fail.  

54 The creation of the Normal School registered a profound change because for the first time, it sought to hold students and teachers within the public school system accountable to a set standard based on merit through examination.

Maxwell sowed the seeds for a more systematized education system that began to thrive at the start of the 1920’s. His successors built upon his framework at the turn of the decade riding the waves of American economic prosperity in the aftermath of World War I in 1918. In contrast

to the constant struggle for financial funding for civilian affairs in the previous two decades of American naval rule, Guam experienced unprecedented economic growth in the 1920’s that helped facilitate drastic changes to the public school education system and paved the paths Chamorro students would take towards their professional careers.
II
CHAMORRO/NAVAL EDUCATIONAL EXPECTATIONS, 1917-1929: DISSATISFACTION AMIDST WIDESPREAD REFORM

Chamorros: “Members of the American People or their Servitors”?

On February 3, 1917, Governor Maxwell’s successor, Captain Roy C. Smith, called into order the first session of the Guam Congress. As the first legislative body composed of a majority of prominent Chamorros appointed by the governor, Smith’s move was unprecedented for its ostensible acknowledgment of the Chamorros’ voices in the development of government regulation. In theory, the appointed Congress, which also included American naval officers, was to “consider and recommend measures for the improvement of the Island and the welfare of its inhabitants.” In practice, however, the Guam Congress was often merely a façade of representative governance masking both the governor’s ultimately plenary power over civil affairs and the federal government’s political motivations for possessing the island.

At the first session, Chamorro members sought to debate the issue of Guam’s political status, testing the extent of efficacy of their roles. The Guam News Letter, the island’s only local news publication at the time, printed an excerpt of Chamorro Tomas Calvo Anderson’s speech:

It is high time that there be granted to the people, respectful, loyal, and devoted to the great American nation, the same rights that have been granted to the different States, territories and possessions… that we may know whether we are to be members of the American people or their servitors.56

At the following session in March, Major Edward D. Manwaring, an American official in the Guam Congress, denied Anderson’s motions, emphasizing the limited “advisory” nature of the body. Simply put, appointed congressional positions were largely symbolic in nature.

In reality, in the first two decades of naval rule, naval governors tried to force the Chamorros to adopt American policies and practices wholesale largely without Chamorro consultation. Throughout the next decade, naval officials continued to assert that American education would provide Chamorros with the mental capacity and skills to reap various social and economic benefits. For instance, naval officials believed that adopting American ways of cultivating the land would allow Chamorros to produce more crops that they could export for profit. More important, naval officials also promoted the idea that Chamorros would eventually receive rights and political representation through education. Nevertheless, U.S. officials continued to disregard the requests of Chamorros who lobbied for citizenship and political representation, while still promoting education as the means of attaining these benefits. While the infrastructure of the public schools drastically improved with the help of federal funding and rising copra exports, the naval government faced Chamorro resistance to English language-only policies and American agricultural methods and growing skepticism among the educated elite of the ultimate aims and means of education.

Towards a Standardized Education System in Guam

As discussed in Chapter One, Governor Maxwell was critical of the unsatisfactory state of American education in Guam after fifteen years of occupation. Maxwell and his predecessors faced various infrastructural, financial, social, and other issues in providing education for the Chamorros. Tropical typhoons and earthquakes often rendered schools unusable for weeks and

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months at a time. Financial support from the Department of the Navy budget and additional federal allocations were never guaranteed. Qualified teachers were always in short supply. Most important, in spite of often-overcrowded classrooms, the government’s primary educational objective of sponsoring widespread use of English was a failure—most students still used and preferred the Chamorro language. After fifteen years, Maxwell believed that the Island Government should have had more to show for its educational endeavors.

For Maxwell, inconsistent measures of academic achievement were to blame for poorly performing students; thus, he focused on standardizing the mechanism for their academic promotion. During his three-year tenure, he developed the Normal School for teachers in an attempt to increase the quality of Chamorro teachers. Through assessment via the implementation of semi-annual examinations, Maxwell developed a means for rewarding high-performing students with teacher certificates and removing low-scorers from the teaching service. Implicit in this policy was Maxwell’s belief that better-trained teachers were the remedy to resistance—as indicated by Chamorros’ limited use of English—to American education.

Succeeding governors followed Maxwell’s program and continued developing the Normal School’s teacher training and assessment programs as the main means of improving the public school education system. Maxwell hoped that these few highly trained teachers could then teach effectively to the masses in a trickle-down effect. In 1918, four years after the Normal School first opened, however, Governor Roy Smith’s annual reports suggest that positive results were still unseen. He wrote, “Most attention is given to teaching English, in which the progress is far from satisfactory. The children all speak Chamorro at home and it will be a long time before English is spoken generally throughout the Island.” Even so, Smith was still adamant

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about his observations and hopes of the Normal School. Just two bullet points after noting poor student performance in the main course of English, he gushed, "The effort of this school is excellent. It keeps the teachers up to their work and furnishes as an incentive to improvement." In other words, the Normal School was, at the least, effective in providing a more standardized path for elite students to become teachers.

But for the majority of students who did not become teachers, the government’s system for academic instruction was largely ineffective and inconsequential. Prior to 1920, governors focused on developing a small group of students who they envisioned could become leaders among Chamorros. Despite the pretense of compulsory academic education for all school-age students, the government did not have the resources to provide adequate educations for every student they mandated to attend. In 1920, 1,894 students—14% of the island’s total population—crowded fourteen public schools throughout the island. While naval reports of these overcrowded classrooms suggest the popularity of American education among the Chamorros, the government’s financial constraints raise serious questions about the quality of educational instruction the majority of students received. All students were subject to half-day school sessions and crowded into classrooms as only 67 teachers and substitutes, some of which were American officials and navy spouses, demonstrated English proficiency standards to teach across those fourteen schools. Moreover, Chamorro teachers were only allowed to instruct their students in English despite the fact that most students spoke only Chamorro at home. In practice, most students simply went to school for academic instruction until they reached the

60 Smith, “ARGG of 1918,” 1918, 18.
63 Smith, “ARGG of 1918,” 1918, 17.
non-compulsory age of twelve and were not charged monetary penalties for their absence from school.  

As an alternative to the elite academic realm of teaching, Governor Smith introduced rudimentary but financially feasible and economically beneficial vocational courses to the Chamorros in 1917 that would serve to prepare the majority of students for other types of work. That year, he established makeshift courses in carpentry, weaving, basketry, mat making, lace making, embroidery, and domestic science, noting that the “children [took] to these courses with avidity.” More important, he wrote, “A wealth of material for these purposes grows on the island, hitherto largely going to waste, which can now be utilized” for production of goods for sale. In contrast with the expense of academic instruction with no quickly visible returns, Smith asserted that Guam’s students could be vocationally trained to contribute to the economy using the island’s homegrown resources.

Smith’s comments are suggestive of the degree to which naval governors saw an opportunity to use Guam’s land and people for economic productivity. Presuming that unused land was a “waste,” Smith and other governors developed industrial training in addition to agricultural education to turn a profit from exploitation of the land. By 1920, Smith’s successor, Captain William Gilmer, noted that students were already achieving small-scale commercial success by selling their work at Guam’s annual industrial fair. Wanting to capitalize on this industrial opportunity, he wrote, “The demand always exceeds the supply. With a proper building and equipment of machinery a large part of the cost of the school system could be paid from the profits” of goods produced, while also providing students with a portion of the proceeds.

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65 Smith, “ARGG of 1918,” 1918, 17.
from their work. Desirous of capital to fund the government’s operations, Gilmer wanted to establish these industrial schools more uniformly to prepare more students for “useful work.”

With an influx of funds and opportunity at the turn of the decade, his successor, Governor Althouse not only formalized the industrial schools, but also substantially standardized academic curriculum and grading for schools and students throughout the island.

**Japan, Copra, and Federal Appropriations: Funding Education for the Majority**

The twenties were a time of significant growth and investment in Guam’s public school system. World War I provided Guam with both federal financial support and commercial opportunities that spurred Guam’s economy. While Guam saw little actual wartime violence during the four years of conflict, the island reaped substantial financial benefits due to its strategically valuable location as a stopover for visiting ships travelling through the Pacific. Increased demand and the cost of copra also increased the island’s export revenue in the Asia Pacific. Further, the federal government began making consistent appropriations for civilian affairs as various members of Congress directed their attention to Guam to determine the island’s strategic value to the country. Such funds played a major role in establishing the feasibility of various educational improvements, while also influencing Chamorro acceptance of American education.

Interestingly, Japan contributed to Guam’s economic development and subsequent educational efforts in important direct and indirect ways. During World War I, Japan dramatically increased its importation of coconut oil; Guam’s copra trade flourished because of the demand. Starting in 1915, the island began exporting nearly two million pounds of copra.

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69 The German auxiliary cruiser *Cormoran* was interned in Guam on December 15, 1915. On April 7, 1917, the U.S. declared war with Germany and nullified Guam’s status as a neutral territory. Instead of surrendering the *Cormoran* to the naval government, German personnel abandoned and blew up the cruiser causing seven casualties.
annually to its largest customers, Japan and the United States.\(^7\) The volume of copra exportation increased throughout the twenties and the island also benefitted from the increased value of copra per pound in the aftermath of war. Additionally, under the Treaty of Versailles of June 1919, Japan would have to develop and open up its mandates in Micronesia—territories formerly occupied by Germany—to free trade, which allowed Guam even more opportunities to export its copra.\(^7\) In this sense, their demand for copra directly benefited Guam’s economic development in the form of increased export revenue.

In a more indirect way, Japan’s presence in Micronesia forced the U.S. federal government to pay closer attention to Guam’s needs. Japan’s possessions in Micronesia were a perceived threat to American interests in the Asia Pacific. In the event of conflict with Japan, Guam could be isolated from the Philippines and Hawaii due to Japanese military capabilities within the region. In this light, President Wilson’s demand that Japan open up its islands in Micronesia to trade could be viewed as an issue of military security. By trading with the Japanese, naval officials in Guam could keep an eye on Japanese activity in their possessions for any threat to American interests.\(^7\) Negotiating open trade for primarily military purposes also stimulated Guam’s local economy. In order to protect these interests, the federal government invested in the naval government of Guam, while also showing perfunctory support and interests in the calls of the Chamorro people.

In 1922, Governor Adelbert Althouse secured federal appropriations that dramatically changed an inconsistent education system set up by governors since the beginning of US occupation. In prior years, governor and Chamorro appeals for civilian support often went

\(^7\) Robert Rogers, *Destiny’s Landfall: A History of Guam*, (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1995), 146; Despite the United States’ exclusion from the League of Nations, President Wilson demanded that the mandates Japan received be developed and open to trade. Japan agreed.
unheard by Congress, and the Island Government had to make do with its naval appropriations and local revenue. In contrast with previous attempts, Governor Althouse, with support from Guam Congress, successfully advocated for funds to lift the state of education in the island from its “crudest infancy.”73 With more financial support now available, Althouse built on Maxwell’s groundwork for standardizing the testing of those limited number of students on a teacher-training track and redefine the entire education system to comprehensively assess student academic achievement on a wider scale.

As opposed to previous educational endeavors, Governor Althouse implemented changes to the island’s education system with professional pedagogical guidance. In previous years, naval governors implemented policies simply as they saw fit or as funds allowed, placing teachers and public education leadership in the hands of unqualified chaplains, naval officials, or officer spouses. In his annual reports, he observed that after nearly twenty-five years of occupation, public schools still suffered from a multitude of problems including a lack of efficient teachers, a positive graded system of instruction, and a lack of efficient administration.74 Consequently, Althouse fired the island’s ineffective twelve-year education superintendent and hired Dr. Thomas Collins, a doctor of pedagogy, to revamp all the island’s public schools and the kinds of instruction they received.

Dr. Collins’ primary initiatives focused on standardizing education in order to measure the progress of both students and schools more comprehensively and consistently. In a letter to Governor Althouse critical of the current system, he wrote, “It can hardly be understood how pupils knew whether they were promoted,” highlighting the lack of standard grading in the

curriculum for students and schools.\textsuperscript{75} In response, he instituted a grading system equivalent to the one used in U.S. schools and systems in other American territories. Dr. Collins was directly responsible for creating a course of study based on the California elementary school curriculum, which, according to Althouse, was the "equivalent to that in practically any part of the United States or the Philippine Islands."\textsuperscript{76} In addition, Althouse furnished new textbooks for all the grades while Collins modernized the record system to show the "detailed progress of each child from date of entry to date of leaving."\textsuperscript{77} Prior to these changes, definite graded courses of study were limited to the Agana schools and Normal School students. By establishing these standards across the island, Governor Althouse and Dr. Collins asserted that "the opportunity for a pupil in Guam to gain education will be equal to that of the average American boy in the United States and limited only by the capacity of the teachers to assist in their instruction."\textsuperscript{78}

Governor Althouse formalized industrial school training as well. In previous years, the Department of Industries offered the Industrial School as part of a "largely voluntary and loosely run organization."\textsuperscript{79} Instead, Althouse sought to mandate industrial education as part of the school curriculum, ordering industrial schoolwork to be compulsory for students after the first grade. Additionally, he expanded industrial courses throughout the island’s schools. While a wider array of classes ranging from dressmaking and carpentry to cooking was initially only available at the Agana schools, schools across the island began offering specialty courses in basketry and weaving, and every school offered gardening. In the following years, Althouse and other governors expanded industrial work to all the other outlying schools. Moreover, even high


\textsuperscript{77} Althouse, "ARGG of 1923," 1923, 18.

\textsuperscript{78} Althouse, "ARGG of 1923," 1923, 18.

\textsuperscript{79} Adelbert Althouse, "ARGG of 1922," (Washington: U.S. Navy Department, 1922, 12.
performing academic students in the Normal School were now required to take Industrial courses as part of their curriculum.\textsuperscript{80} In expanding and mandating industrial education, Governor Althouse laid the foundations for the paths the majority of Chamorro students would take towards careers within and for the naval government and for the island’s economic productivity.

With standardized education throughout the island schools and mandatory industrial training, Governor Althouse widened the scope of the education system’s influence on Chamorro youth. While public schooling was compulsory since the beginning of the naval occupation, for the first time, the Department of Education offered practicable options for the large majority of students who were not poised for teaching or other clerical government positions to receive a more substantial elementary and industrial education. Further, with the stricter enforcement of fine collection for absenteeism, the percentage of Guam’s total school absenteeism was cut in half by the second year of Althouse’s tenure to 2\%\textsuperscript{81} Given that Governor Smith previously implemented English requirements for appointments and promotions within island and federal government positions, these other schooling options provided the majority with career paths that did not require as exceptional English-speaking skills.\textsuperscript{82} In other words, education under Althouse became less ornamental and more practical in seeking to prepare the majority of students for jobs as farmers, manufacturers, and other laboring positions.

From an infrastructural standpoint, the educational legacy of Althouse’s tenure could be deemed a success. Over the next five years after his departure in 1923, another agricultural school was built in rural Piti offering “intensive courses in practical tropical agriculture”\textsuperscript{83} adding to the industrial courses developing throughout the schools, school buildings increased

\textsuperscript{80} Althouse, “ARGG of 1923,” 1923, 18.
\textsuperscript{81} Althouse, “ARGG of 1923,” 1923, 23.
\textsuperscript{82} Smith, “ARGG of 1918,” 1918, 15.
from sixteen to twenty-six, and enrollment rose by approximately one thousand students to 3,517 by 1928. Further, education remained the government’s largest expenditure from island revenue and the federal government continued to provide appropriations for education ranging from $12,000 to $16,000 annually under the Leper and Special Allotment Fund. However, these infrastructural successes belied Chamorros’ growing skepticism of the aims of their education.

**Mutual Dissatisfaction with the Aims of Education**

The twenties were replete with Chamorro calls for American citizenship. Educated Chamorros throughout the decade frequently made their cases to the naval and federal government insisting on the revision of Chamorros’ political status. For years, naval officials emphasized the role that education would play in bringing about Chamorro political advancement. In the figure below, for instance, printed in *The Guam News Letter* in July 1912, Guam is depicted as a dark-skinned and feminized child with much to learn from the patriarchal and stately figure of America. With improvements such as hospitals, public works systems, and education, Chamorros could theoretically attain the stature of Americans. Yet, as the image depicts, even as the Chamorro reaches the height of Uncle Sam, the Chamorro is only just a child still in need of American paternalism. Throughout the decade, Chamorros leaders continued to express their beliefs that American citizenship for their people was long overdue, yet they were continuously denied.

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The Guam News Letter caricature supported among other things the idea that the United States perceived itself as a benevolent actor providing “ignorant” Chamorros with modern tools for advancement. Naval governors believed that they could rule from the top-down, not just because they had the plenary authority to do so, but also because they believed they knew what was best for the people. Hence, into 1920, naval governors continued to invest in education.

improvements under the impression that more professionalized adaptations of mainland
education systems were the answer to students’ poor performance, particularly in English. With
the additional funding sources for education throughout the twenties, the naval government
certainly improved the public school system’s physical infrastructure and offerings. However,
students’ reluctance to fully embrace the education system even with more imported teachers and
higher standards for teacher training was emblematic of Chamorros’ passive disapproval of top-
down education and other civilian policies.

By 1929, Guam’s public school education system was as formalized and orderly as ever,
but their results still evidenced Chamorro reluctance to embrace the system and its developers’
mission. Even with more funding, schools, classes, teachers, and organizations, naval governors
still complained about widespread use of Chamorro among students and minimal use of English
outside the classroom. Moreover, one fourth of students above compulsory age chose not to
continue with their education, which suggests that a large number of students were only in school
because it was required.87 Further, despite the naval government’s various attempts to promote
American agricultural methods, the agricultural school sponsored by the Agriculture Department
remained largely irrelevant to Chamorro students within the public school education system.

Time and again, the insular and federal government gave Chamorros reason to be
skeptical of the promised benefits of American education and occupation. In a May 1924 article
in The Guam Recorder, a privately run news publication, pro-navy editors echoed naval
governors arguing that American education and English-language learning were the basis for
Chamorros’ progress in American society and in the world.88 Further, while they noted that
Chamorros had been denied their requests for American citizenship on multiple occasions since

1901, they asserted that education would make “Chamorros... fit to receive it [citizenship].” In essence, they asked Chamorros to have faith that embracing American education would prepare them for the equal rights and representation under the American flag they would receive at some unspecified time.

Many of Guam’s most educated Chamorros believed that the time for equal rights was already upon them, but they continued to fail in their attempts to achieve citizenship. Throughout the twenties, dozens of high-ranking federal officials visited Guam on their way to and from countries in Asia for various military and other official business. On their short tours around the island, U.S. congressmen entertained Guam Congress members and other prominent Chamorros who lobbied on behalf of their Chamorro people for American citizenship. While several visitors promised serious consideration of the issue, ultimately, Chamorro requests for citizenship would not gain the President’s signature of approval until after World War II.

In fact, the Department of the Navy had strategic reasons for hindering Chamorros’ citizenship efforts. In 1922, the United States and other naval powers signed the Washington Naval Armament Treaty, which limited naval fortification in the Pacific. In a move to relieve military tensions among the world’s largest naval powers including closely watched Japan, the United States agreed not to build a fully operating military base in Guam and other territories west of Hawaii for at least ten years. While pleasing to the federal government, the treaty had negative implications for the naval government in Guam. The naval government would still occupy the island, but it would not receive federal financial support on the scale that it would have received had Guam been fortified as a naval base. Even so, Guam was still strategically valuable as a coaling stop in between Asia and Hawaii. Not wanting to relinquish plenary power.

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89 “Is Education in Guam a Mistake,” *The Guam Recorder*, May 1924, p. 3.
over a territory they still saw as potentially fortifiable in the future, naval officials chose not to endorse citizenship for the Chamorros. Moreover, naval officials knew that without fortification in a hypothetical war in the Pacific, they could not adequately defend U.S. citizens in Guam.

Thus, most naval governors in the decade either ignored or were lukewarm in their support for Chamorro citizenship, expending most of their civilian reform efforts and financial funding on educational improvements instead. In fact, it was only at the turn of the decade that a governor would proactively appeal to the Department of the Navy and U.S. Congress for American citizenship for Chamorros. In his first recommendation as Governor in 1929, Commander Willis Bradley lobbied for the Navy to urge Congress with the full support of the Guam Congress to draft and support legislation for Chamorros’ citizenship. In his annual reports, he wrote:

The greatest aspiration of the people of Guam is to become full-fledged citizens of the United States. Their present status is quite unsatisfactory, even the term “citizens of Guam” being almost meaningless... since there is no established system of acquiring citizenship in Guam and no law stating exact requirements for such citizenship.91

A year later, Bradley made a proclamation to establish rules for attaining Guam citizenship and further argued, “It is difficult to see how extension of United States citizenship... could be detrimental to America.”92 The Naval Department, however, did not take kindly to Bradley’s forceful advocacy of citizenship reform. In one particularly terse exchange with his superiors, Bradley wrote, “When I see and understand the crying needs of Guam, I shall fight for them as long as I am governor, even if it wrecks my future naval life.”93 Despite expressing his desire to

91 Bradley, “ARGG of 1929,” 1929, 64.
stay and work to improve the conditions in Guam, the navy eventually replaced him with a
governor unlikely to show as rigorous support for Chamorro citizenship requests.\textsuperscript{94}

Unfortunately for the Chamorros, the impending economic depression and war would
shift citizenship reform efforts even further down the list of naval priorities at the turn of the
decade. Contrary to their rhetoric, American education did not provide Chamorros with the rights
and political representation they vocally advocated for throughout the decade. Naval governors
would suspend the issue and instead focus on endeavors of self-sufficiency. In the absence of
federal support for civilian affairs due to international economic catastrophe and the subsequent
decrease in island revenues from depressed copra prices, naval officials turned to agricultural and
industrial education to buoy their continued operations.

III
CULTIVATING SELF-SUFFICIENCY, 1929-1941:
A PUSH FOR INDUSTRIAL & AGRICULTURAL EDUCATION

The repercussions of the Wall Street stock market crash of 1929 rippled throughout the
globe even making waves thousands of miles away on the island’s shores. America’s roaring
twenties were a time of substantial growth and investment, and Guam’s students benefited in the
country’s economic prosperity. From 1920 to 1928, the island government more than doubled its
investment in education from eighteen percent to nearly forty percent of total government
expenditures.\textsuperscript{95} Over the next decade, however, the government’s educational allocations
decreased substantially and while it would recover, funding would not again come close to the
peak levels of the 1920s.\textsuperscript{96} Education was still the largest expenditure of the island government.
But in the context of a fragile local economy largely dependent on the exportation of copra and
financial appropriations by Congress, naval officials decided to focus efforts on vocational
training. Uncertain of the sustainability and future of the remote island government and its
people at the turn of the decade, the naval government sought economic self-sufficiency through
more intensified investment in the development of industrial and agricultural schools.

The Ten Commandments of Copra and the Detriments of Trade and Federal Reliance

Copra was invaluable to the island economy. The abundant and easily amassed supplies
of coconuts provided the Chamorro people with a viable product in the form of dried coconut
meats and oils to trade with the world. During the pinnacle of copra exportation in 1929, Guam
sold almost six million pounds of copra to countries like Japan and the United States, the sales of
which helped to sustain the insular government and put money in the coffers of the local

\textsuperscript{95} Robert Underwood, “American Education and the Acculturation of the Chamorro of Guam” (PhD diss.,
University of Southern California, 1987).
\textsuperscript{96} See Robert Underwood’s table compilation of “Expenditures of Naval Government on Education in Prewar
Guam” from 1909 – 1941 in Appendix.
people. The coconut was considered so integral to the island’s future that the Guam Chamber of Commerce even submitted a full-page advertisement to *The Guam Recorder* in September 1928 stressing its value in the Ten Commandments of Copra. “I believe in the Coconut,” marketed the Chamber of Commerce, also emphasizing how the trade of coconut products would “make Guam more prosperous… [and] eliminate…poverty.” Seeing the economic benefits of copra exportation, the island government sought to continue the cultivation of coconuts as the main economic vehicle towards continued growth in the thirties.

The island government, however, could not foresee the Great Crash of Wall Street in 1929 that would eventually cripple the international copra market and devastate the world economy. By fiscal year 1930, Guam’s copra producers and exporters already felt the pinch from worsening prices in the world market. The depressed prices adversely affected funding for the island government’s various intended improvement plans as local producers increasingly could not afford to pay government taxes on land use and agricultural production. In fact, the sharp decline of copra prices would force struggling Chamorros to give up their land to the Navy because they could not afford continued taxation. A year later in June 1931, *The Guam Recorder* detailed the unsurprising collapse of the copra market and the unenviable position of local producers who had to compete with larger copra-producing countries with lower labor costs than Guam. Addressing the possibility of an improved outlook in the copra market, *The Guam Recorder* cautioned, “Farmers will be unwise to live in anticipation of higher prices for their copra.” Beginning in the thirties, the Great Depression decreased Guam’s principal export by a

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third and consequently warranted the development of a viable alternative for economic productivity for the island.

Limited ocean transportation for both passengers and cargo also posed a major obstacle for economic growth through trade. In 1930 and 1931, Naval Governors William Bradley and Edmund S. Root advocated in their respective annual reports for the reduction of national security restrictions that limited both foreign and American commercial and military ships from docking in the island—calls largely left unanswered. In fact, the federal government’s continued closed port policy restricting foreign ships from Guam except by permit only exacerbated the exportation problems borne from already depressed copra prices. Additionally, international treaties curbing the naval build-up reduced the number of Navy transports calling on the island, which served in a limited capacity as cold storage freight carriers for goods. Naval governors at the beginning of the decade called for more “frequent, regular, and satisfactory service by vessels carrying both [American and foreign] passengers and freight”. But protracted and reluctant federal action pushed the island government to more actively seek a self-sustainable economy.

In July 1931, The Guam Recorder published an editorial that delineated one of the most concerning issues of the decade: self-sustainability not only in the face of a collapsing copra industry but also the possibility of a change in government. The London Naval Conference in 1930 updated the Washington Naval Armament Treaty of 1921 and the U.S. federal government subsequently abandoned Guam as a military base, although the naval government still

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103 Bradley, Jr., “ARGG of 1930,” 1930, 3; Due to policies limiting both foreign and American commercial ships from docking on the island, the navy allowed some of its carriers to carry imported and exported goods to and from the island.
104 Root, “ARGG of 1931,” 1931, 86.
maintained governance of the island. In the article entitled, “Keeping Guam Money in Guam,” the pro-navy editors argued that in the absence of copra and government support, “Guam should make use of its agriculture possibilities and should not be dependent upon the government for employment nor upon their one and only item of product for export.” Instead, they insisted that Guam must produce a wider variety of products “sufficient for local needs” and to “patronize home industry first for the things that can be grown locally.” The article concluded by alluding to the idea that the education in schools should be equipping students to become producers. This article was just one of many that appeared in The Guam Recorder pressing for agricultural development and these criticisms did not go unheard among naval administration of the decade.

**A New Decade and New Governors “develop[ing] the agricultural spirit in the students”**

Despite more progressive efforts than his predecessors to garner citizenship and other social reforms for Chamorros, Governor Bradley’s short two-year would end. From his arrival in 1929 to his departure in May 1931, Bradley set forth an ambitious agenda to improve the island infrastructure and strengthen the quality of schools, advocate for American citizenship for the people of Guam, and propose a bill of rights for Guam citizens. Bradley took the mantle and led Guam to its most productive two-year period of social reform under naval governorship in spite of worsening economic conditions brought on by the Depression. Despite his personal requests and Chamorro requests on his behalf to extend his stay, Commander Edmund S. Root, a man not inclined to pursue progressive citizenship advocacy efforts, replaced Governor Bradley.

By his arrival in the summer of 1931, Governor Root focused more intently on economic issues and sidelined bureaucratically entrenched questions of Chamorro political status. Root

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stepped into the role of governor in the midst of an economic depression and tried to find new ways to increase income to counteract the impacts of a depressed copra market. While the governor urged coconut producers to increase their output of copra to compensate for the loss from low prices, the governor also took steps to reestablish market-based agricultural development and institutional learning. Taking a multi-pronged approach to improve the economy, Governor Root first built upon Commander Bradley’s plans for establishing a public market for locals to buy and sell produce and fresh meats to spur monetary exchange in the short term. Second, the governor increased efforts to develop agricultural and industrial programs and schools to attempt to instill Chamorro youth with the “agricultural spirit”—a desire to pursue agricultural endeavors that would benefit the economy—as opposed to white-collar focused aspirations for long-term growth. While certainly open to opportunities to export goods and trade with the outside world, the poor economic circumstances of Root’s tenure forced him to move beyond the rhetoric of his predecessors to substantive action to spur industrial and agricultural growth through the support of government institutions.

In spite of Governor Root’s claims that Guam “enjoyed a highly prosperous year,” his education reports of fiscal year 1932 suggest that Chamorro students and teachers struggled with budget constraints. That year, the government felt it economically unfeasible to operate on the normal ten-month school schedule and planned to reduce the school year by a month.107 According to his Head of the Department of Education Lieutenant Commander Francis Lee Albert, this school year 1931-1932 saw “the smallest allotment that the Department of Education has had for four years, and with the largest number of schools and the greatest pupil enrollment.”108 Grade school students were not the only ones to suffer academically from the

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poor economy. Teachers lost a month’s worth of salary due to the shortened school schedule and the cancellation of the summer Normal School hindered teacher training. In explaining the cancellation, Root rationalized that funding for an additional month of teachers’ salaries was simply unavailable and that “many of the teachers [needed to] support themselves and their families by farm labor during the vacation period.”\textsuperscript{109} In this weak economy, the urgency then arose to provide Chamorro students with an education on top of their more academic instruction that could be more economically beneficial for agricultural development in Guam.

While various governors certainly made efforts prior to the thirties, industrial and agricultural programs accelerated during the Root administration. Using the groundwork laid out by Commander Bradley, Governor Root saw through the tail end of the first year of operation of an industrial group of schools. Towards the end of Bradley’s term, he put into motion the development of a set of industrial schools. This group of schools offered specialized studies in carpentry, weaving, sewing, and cooking and its purpose was to provide Chamorros children with industrial training for more self-sufficient and export-oriented production.\textsuperscript{110}

The U.S. Department of Agriculture also provided the island government various livestock to supplement the Agricultural Experiment Station through the creation of the Agricultural School Farm in Barrigada, a fertile, rural area east of Agana in February 1931. This school furnished agricultural instruction and animal husbandry to both boys and adults for the purpose of teaching the people how to produce more of their own food and to provide a basis for further improving the quality of island livestock. In its first year, the school enrolled thirty students representing every district on the island who were taught courses on “major enterprises applicable to local conditions, such as poultry, cattle and hog husbandry, elementary botany and

\textsuperscript{109} Root, “ARGG of 1932,” 1932, 29.
\textsuperscript{110} Root, “ARGG of 1931,” 1931, 38.
agronomy, fruit and vegetable gardening.” The school marked the renewed and robust push for agricultural development through the Department of Education and would soon after be named the E. S. Root Agricultural School Farm in the governor’s honor.

Many more agricultural endeavors would spring from the Root Agricultural School Farm in the years to come, expanding and reforming education beyond the city limits of Agana. In 1932, a special naval field extension agent began disseminating farming and animal husbandry techniques to children and adults through public lectures and demonstrations, distributing plant material and animals to farmers, and supervising the development of the Boys’ and Girls’ Agricultural Clubs in the various villages throughout the island. During this fiscal year, the Department of Agriculture, in conjunction with the Department of Education, also systematically distributed seeds to farmers, schools throughout the island, and to the Boys’ and Girls’ Clubs to teach about farming techniques and to begin producing a wider variety of plant products such as corn, rice, yams, taro, bananas, and Hawaiian pineapples. Further, every school in the outlying districts was furnished with a school garden with seeds provided by the Department of Agriculture in conjunction with the Agricultural School Farm. Additionally, the island government constructed another school in Tumon to “develop... the agricultural spirit in the students” in the more rural areas northwest of Agana. By investing in infrastructural improvements in the rural areas away from Agana, the island government took active steps to persuade Chamorros to move out of the city and work in their ranches.

“White Collared Easy Position Hunters:” Educated Chamorros and their Work

During his final year as governor between 1932 and 1933, Captain Root made more concerted efforts to give Chamorros more positions in leadership within the schools. A year prior

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in 1931, senior Chamorro teachers already filled all the principal positions within Guam’s twenty-six public schools. With the hiring of a Chamorro to the position of supervisor of the agricultural school in 1932, Root inaugurated an even bolder policy of replacing all American teachers with Chamorro teachers at all the public schools. He wrote of the decision, “This was done both for the reasons of economy and in the belief that a properly trained native teacher could produce better results among the natives than an American.” Given the costs of importing and/or hiring Americans at mainland teaching wages, hiring an all-Chamorro teaching force was both cheaper and more self-sustainable. Moreover, more and more students were graduating from the public school system and needed jobs. While Governor Root asserted that such a move was also beneficial for Chamorro students, the policy was not necessarily made to give Chamorros more autonomy in the teaching process. In fact, English would still be the only accepted medium of instruction and an American naval chaplain who served as the Head of the Department of Education still closely supervised all the Chamorro teachers at these schools.

While the Governor and the Head of the Department of Education still held complete oversight of the Chamorro principals and teachers, this new policy of having all-Chamorro teachers evidenced the progress of American public school education in Guam. In January 1933, all the grade and industrial schools were “for the first time since their inauguration, carried on entirely by native personnel” for an approximate total of at least 165 employees. Enrollment reached 3,764 students across twenty-six public schools and the course of instruction was now uniformly based on the standards of the Office of Education of the Department of the Interior of the United States. Further, the Evening High School for advanced students—49 in 1933—was

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113 Root, “ARGG of 1931,” 1931, 32.
115 Alexander, “ARGG of 1933,” 1933, 34.
increasingly fulfilling its purpose as a mechanism for better qualifying and placing Chamorro students in positions as teachers and office employees. This school offered students courses ranging from pedagogy to business law and economics. On a variety of measures, then, Guam’s public schools were doing well. According to Governor Alexander, “the educational system of Guam ha[d] developed to such an extent that it [could] supply all local demands for qualified teachers, clerks, etc.” However, the public schools’ success in producing Chamorros well-versed in reading, writing, and arithmetic and ready for these white collar jobs became an increasingly critical focal point in pushing industrial and agricultural educational reform.

For years, naval officials had pointed to the need for an industrial focus in education and to reach economic self-sufficiency, and the government took more substantive action in the 1930s to promote that goal. In his annual report for fiscal year 1933, Governor Alexander wrote that the public schools were preparing more qualified students than there were positions available. Given a supposed lack of white-collar jobs, Alexander built on his predecessors’ work and saw through the beginnings of the Agricultural School Farm, where 18 of 30 boys continue to the second year of the inaugural program. Of those who dropped out during the first year, he wrote that they “lacked... proper foundation or because of their parents’ unfavorable attitude toward the course.” Many parents encouraged American education for their children so they could get jobs within government offices that paid more money. Alexander, however, believed that parents’ unfavorable attitude stemmed from the idea that many Chamorros thought their education qualified them for less physically arduous work as farmers. The naval government

117 Alexander, “ARGG of 1933,” 1933, 35.
118 Alexander, “ARGG of 1933,” 1933, 35.
119 Alexander, “ARGG of 1933,” 1933, 35.
continued to utilize this belief to both criticize Chamorros and justify the marked shift to industrial educational pursuits.

Many naval officials shared Alexander’s belief that Chamorros—because of their American grade school education—were more frequently opting for office jobs and unwilling to work as farmers. In a scathing article about Chamorro youth printed in *The Guam Recorder* in December 1932, for instance, T. E. Mayhew, Jr., an American naval officer stationed in Guam, wrote that education “has made them proud and arrogant, it has given them a superiority complex that will be hard to lose.” Mayhew argued that education was supposed to instill in students the ability to properly exercise their minds. According to Mayhew, while more educated than ever before, Chamorro youth had no results to show for their education. He wrote, “Respect for the law, and the exceptional courteousness of the past to their elders, is fast becoming a lost art among the present generation of the Chamorro people,” blaming Chamorro students for their inability to use their educations in ways considered appropriate. For Mayhew, “appropriate” use of education by Chamorros consisted of humbly going to work wherever the naval government needed them. Instead, however, he, like many other naval officials, contended that graduates sought “white-collar” jobs in the city, while hundreds of acres of pristine, resource-filled land went unplowed.

Such criticisms evidence the difference in perceptions between Chamorros and the naval government about how to use the land. Considering that many Chamorro families still continued to maintain their livelihood through the cultivation of their ranches, such criticisms must be viewed with skepticism. Whereas most Chamorros used their land to primarily fulfill the

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122 Mayhew, Jr., “What Has Education Done for the Young Man in Guam, 1932, 82-83.
necessities of their household, the naval government viewed the land as a resource to be exploited to its fullest extent for the most economic benefits. Thus, many of the naval government’s educational endeavors focused on teaching Chamorros to seek local and foreign markets to sell their surplus agricultural goods for economic growth and taxation to fuel the naval government’s operations—and not just to fulfill the immediate needs of the family.\textsuperscript{123}

Consequently, in 1934, the naval government sought to build up agricultural education as the primary pursuit for the majority of Guam’s students. In his annual report, Governor Alexander wrote of his efforts to create educated farmers—those who directed their agricultural practices towards the market—saying, “Definite steps are taken to prevent building up an excess of white collared easy position hunters, and all practicable is done to teach the idea that manual labor is perfectly consistent with a mind trained to think for itself.”\textsuperscript{124} That year, the Root Agricultural School Farm graduated 16 men who completed the first two-year program consisting of modern farming methods such as agronomy and animal husbandry, which emphasized maximizing soil production and the breeding of livestock for profit. The naval government also sought to make it easier for students across the island to go to the agricultural school by establishing temporary dormitory facilities and providing transportation to remove the question of distance from the decision to attend. They also took further steps to both literally and figuratively lay down the seeds of agricultural development among youth. Chamorro principals and teachers were now primarily responsible for the maintenance of the Boys and Girls Agricultural Clubs at all the public grade schools, which were all furnished with gardens for hands-on lessons in planting and other farming activities to “develop ranch spirit and

\textsuperscript{123} Alexander, “ARGG of 1933,” 1933, 35.
practice.”\textsuperscript{125} The naval government also limited access to the Junior High School to only 70 students with the best examination scores annually for the purposes of preventing “the growth of an unemployed scholarly group.”\textsuperscript{126} In taking these actions to maintain this agricultural spirit, the government exhibited its belief that academic instruction past the sixth grade was not a necessary or economically beneficial pursuit for a majority of Guam’s students. Instead, the government envisioned a Chamorro society that both valued industry and cultivation of the land and was educated just enough to understand how to use agricultural production for export-oriented economic growth.

\textbf{An Adapted Agricultural Education is Not Enough}

Throughout his tenure, which lasted until 1936, Governor Alexander continued to reinforce an education policy largely focused on industrial vocational training. By 1935, Governor Alexander began requiring students above the third grade to attend at least one vocational class in carpentry, cooking, sewing, weaving, or net-making and a year later made attendance in these industrial courses compulsory for boys and girls grades five through nine. Thus, a student in the majority not selected to continue to the Junior High School for further academic instruction was now mandated to receive training in what the naval government perceived to be more practical educational pursuits for Chamorro youth. As far as the E. S. Root Agricultural School and Farm was concerned, its quickly increasing activities warranted the creation of a separate Department of Agriculture to continue growth and expansion. While the Department of Education no longer had oversight of the school and farm, the development of a separate department evidenced the government’s increasing stress on the importance of industrial work in the island.

\textsuperscript{125} Alexander, “ARGG of 1934,” 1934, 7.
\textsuperscript{126} Alexander, “**ARGG of 1934,” 1934, 8.
Under Governor Benjamin McCandlish’s administration, the Department of Agriculture undertook yet another major agricultural operation previously maintained by the Department of Education. The Boys and Girls Agricultural Clubs were considered successful agricultural endeavors by the naval government as extra-curricular activities within the public school. With the objectives of “mak[ing] farm work more attractive by inculcating progressive ideas in the minds of youth; …demonstrat[ing] better farm practices; …train[ing] boys and girls for rural leadership; and… induc[ing] the boys and girls to remain on the farm, the organization was intended to reach out to students and stimulate their interest in agriculture early in their academic careers.\(^{127}\) By 1936, the organizations expanded to the outlying districts and boasted fourteen clubs with a total enrollment of over 1,000 boys and girls. However, in a move to build a stronger relationship with the more formalized education program offered at the agricultural school farm, the extra-curricular clubs were placed under the jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture by January 1938. In hopes of feeding more students already involved in the clubs to the agricultural school, the naval government increasingly sought to adapt their instituted American education to the economic insecurities of life in Guam under naval rule.

Naval government attempts at improving agricultural output for export and commerce and spurring industrial agricultural development throughout the decade would continue to fall short of the naval government’s expectations and financial goals. Throughout the latter half of the decade, naval governors continued to complain that the island’s revenues were not sufficient and thus created a problematic imbalance of trade. In explaining the deficit, many governors perpetuated the idea that Chamorros were just not productive and efficient enough to use the land and their education to make a profit. In fact, Governor McCandlish echoed previous governors in asserting that Chamorro lack of productivity and seeming inability to be self-supporting without

federal financial subsidies was grounds for the continuation of “benevolent” naval rule. In a
backhanded compliment, he had this to say of the Chamorros:

“The natives are not self-supporting and probably will not be for many years. They are
not industrious as the term is understood in America. Their needs are few and if these are
satisfied they are content. They are amiable, kindly and most generous. There is little
‘laying by for a rainy day.’ If disaster overtakes a family it moves in with more
prosperous relatives.” 128

His successor, Governor James Alexander continued to point fingers of blame for the imbalance
of trade on the Chamorro people who “[were] developing an increasing taste for manufactured
goods” but were not producing enough from the land to export for revenue. 129 But in the midst of
other economic and political issues in the latter half of the decade, it seems the Chamorros were
inappropriately subject to the naval government’s misplaced blame.

Despite positive reports on the state of Guam’s economy in 1939, Governor Alexander’s
tenure was replete with economic obstacles and ominous political maneuvering. The three pillars
of Guam’s economy—copra, federal appropriations and support, and agriculture—were shaking
at their bases. Despite a consistent, if not increasing, output of copra, depressed copra prices
continued to limit the economic gains that had fueled economic growth in previous years.

Further, political turmoil on the international stage had major implications that eventually led to
Japan’s relatively easy capture of Guam from the US in December 1941. Despite various naval
calls to fortify the island in 1938 in light of increasing Japanese military activity within the
Pacific region, Congress did not authorize more military and infrastructural development in the
island. 130 In fact, the federal government actually further hindered opportunities for Chamorro
self-sufficiency by denying entry to all foreign vessels in 1938 to prevent intrusion by countries
like Japan with the island already struggling to export products with very limited carriers.

130 Rogers, Destiny’s Landfall: A History of Guam, 1995, 156.
Congress also separately refused to grant Guam an exempt status from excise taxes on its most valuable yet quickly depreciating copra product.\textsuperscript{131} Even if the Chamorros could somehow overcome many of these federally sanctioned obstacles to economic productivity, the naval government continued to take over land that Chamorros could no longer afford to keep because of naval taxes in an already downtrodden economy. By 1941, the federal and naval government owned more than one-third of the land and would soon see it all fall to the Japanese Empire.

In the last annual report before Japan’s assault and capture of the island, Governor McMillin continued to deny the impacts of external forces on the naval government and the local economy. He wrote, “The affairs of the Island and its people have continued to be little affected by political, economic, and industrial problems of the world at large. The standard of living, education and health of the natives continues to improve.”\textsuperscript{132} In reality, Guam was not immune to the impacts of these forces. After forty years of naval rule in Guam, Chamorro teachers were paid lower than naval day laborers and education spending per child was significantly lower than even the poorest states; major trade imbalances continued to accrue as agricultural efforts stalled; and Chamorro families were quickly losing ancestral land.\textsuperscript{133} After years of pushing the idea of self-sufficiency in Guam, external economic and political circumstances forced more Chamorros to be dependent on an American government that was prepared to give the island up in the event of war with Japan.\textsuperscript{134}

\textsuperscript{131} George McMillin, “ARGG of 1940,” Washington: U.S. Navy Department, 1940, 6.
\textsuperscript{132} McMillin, “ARGG of 1940,” 1940, 2.
\textsuperscript{134} According to the Rainbow War Plans, the US Navy categorized Guam as a “territory that could not be defended” in the event that America entered into WWII.
CONCLUSION

On December 8, 1941, Japanese warplanes began their assault on Guam. With minimal arms and defensive forces, the U.S. navy did not have the capacity to put forth any serious resistance. In just two days of air strikes and short-lived land combat, Governor McMillin and the American garrison surrendered control of the island to the Empire of Japan. After forty-three years of American naval governance, they, like their Spanish predecessors, relinquished control of the island in a lost battle in war.

As the Americans’ surrender to the Japanese in 1941 shows, after four decades, the naval government was unsuccessful in its primary military objectives for the island. Guam was supposed to be a strategically valuable military base that connected Honolulu to Manila. Moreover, a well-established military presence in Guam was supposed to deter perceived threats from other countries—Japan specifically—to American interests in the Asia Pacific. Despite concerted efforts throughout their occupation, however, the U.S. Congress on multiple occasions chose not to acquiesce to naval lobbying for major fortifications in Guam.

With talks of war on the horizon in mid-1941, the navy took steps that all but acknowledged the military failure of their occupation. In the few months before the Japanese assault, the naval department began evacuating all its military dependents from the island.\textsuperscript{135} On December 6, officials in Washington ordered Governor McMillin to destroy all of the navy’s classified material.\textsuperscript{136} By December 8, the naval government was essentially prepared for Japanese arrival—not to defend, however, but to surrender.

Over the course of four decades, the federal government allowed military officials the plenary power to govern over the military and civilian affairs of the island and people of Guam.

While naval officials were charged with fulfilling both responsibilities, the Department of the Navy often emphasized the priority of military objectives over civilian issues. This dynamic of military governance over civilian affairs played a major role in the implementation, reception, and effectiveness of the navy’s various education policies.

From the beginning of their occupation, American officials asserted the benevolent nature of civilian education. In apparent attempts to differentiate themselves from their Spanish predecessors, early naval leaders articulated the many socioeconomic and political benefits of American rule and education. Most significant of these benefits, naval officials propagated the idea that education would stimulate economic growth and self-sufficiency and provide Chamorros with the mental capacity and skills to assume the responsibilities of American citizenship and self-governance. However, a thriving economy and substantive political rights were not realized during their initial colonial administration.

From a cursory glance, naval actions suggest that naval officials were negligent in fulfilling their civilian responsibilities and prioritized instead their military objectives. In truth, many naval officials believed in the benevolence of their intentions for education. As funds allowed, naval officials devoted large sums of revenue to the development of civilian education policies aimed at fundamentally changing—and in their eyes, improving—Guam and its people. I also found that naval governors developed policies in response to Chamorro reactions, despite limiting Chamorros’ opportunities to provide meaningful input in education policies. To be sure, naval governors could have certainly done more to work in coordination with Chamorros to develop and advocate for civilian development. However, their civilian efforts were only marginally successful because they were ultimately secondary to military goals.
In the context of military governance and war, this study of American education shows that competing interests clashed in the navy’s failure to reach both its military and civilian objectives. As a primarily military organization, naval governors considered larger military objectives in their development of civilian policies. As government funds were often mostly if not only allotted for military operations, such operations were prioritized first in spite of efforts to also invest in civilian development. For instance, naval officials mandated public school instruction, yet did not have the financial funding to provide the majority of students more than the basic reading, writing, and arithmetic classes that Chamorros also received during Spanish occupation. Aside from government revenue, funding for civilian initiatives were also largely contingent on congressional appropriations, which often gave preference to military spending. While many naval governors made repeated requests for funding, the U.S. Congress continually denied them. Agricultural and industrial efforts were also stymied by Congressional acts that restricted access to Guam’s ports on the basis of military security, which denied Chamorros crucial foreign trade opportunities. Consequently, external economic pressures like the Great Depression exacerbated already limited civilian budgets. In other words, civilian development policies did not have wholehearted financial or political support to maintain any consistency.

More important, naval education policies did not reflect the input of the Chamorros they were supposedly helping. In 1938, Laura Thompson, an education anthropologist commissioned by the naval government to study the changing culture and behavior of Chamorros, found that Chamorro participation in government and policymaking was largely symbolic. She observed, “Gestures have been made in the direction of local self-government by various governors… but no real self-government has yet been attained by the Guamanians under American
sovereignty.”137 In her memoirs, she wrote that the Governor consulted with her about Chamorros’ perspectives as a basis for future policymaking considerations. However, these consultations would soon be irrelevant to the prewar administration as the Japanese began mobilizing for war.

Ultimately, Chamorros suffered from both the Navy and federal government’s inability to reconcile military and civilian goals for the island. As my research shows, military objectives hindered the progress of civilian development. After four decades of American occupation, the imbalance of trade on Guam was at the largest it had even been. Chamorro exports faltered even as naval governors increasingly emphasized agricultural and industrial education as the means for self-sufficiency. And they did little to include Chamorros in their discussions of education policies. Even with their heavier emphasis on military objectives, however, they still failed to fortify Guam. Consequently, the Americans’ surrender of Guam to the Japanese is representative of the naval government’s inability to effectively reach either of its military and civilian objectives.

## APPENDIX

### EXPENDITURES OF NAVAL GOVERNMENT ON EDUCATION IN PREWAR GUAM

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<th>YEAR*</th>
<th>TOTAL EXPENDITURES, EDUCATION</th>
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* Fiscal year; No data available prior to 1909

x Indicates no data available

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