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\chapter{Vacancies and Presidential Influence Over the Administrative State in the United States}\label{CH4_Influence}
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\section[Introduction]{Introduction\footnote{A previous version of this paper was presented at the 2021 and 2022 annual meeting of the American Political Science Association. I would like to thank John Dearborn, George Krause, David Lewis, Sharece Thrower, Alan Wiseman, and the participants of the two APSA panels for helpful comments. Participants of the Vanderbilt American Politics Workshop also provided helpful comments. I particularly thank Bill Resh for thoughtful feedback and kindly sharing vacancy data with me.}}

President Joseph Biden entered office having promised to “restore sensible [immigration] enforcement priorities” and to place “responsible, Senate-confirmed professionals” to lead Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) \citep{biden_biden_2020}. However, President Biden’s nominee to head the agency, Texas Sheriff Ed Gonzalez, withdrew from consideration after waiting over a year and a half for Senate confirmation \citep{post_tracking_2021}. Without confirmed leadership, Biden’s efforts to reform the agency from its status as the “public face of the Trump administration’s hard-line immigration policies” have stalled and many in the agency’s work force are resistant to the administration’s changes in policy \citep{rose_bidens_2021}. 

This case is representative of the larger pattern of appointments under the current state of the nomination and confirmation process. The United States government has faced longer and more frequent periods of vacancies in appointed positions over time, exacerbated by increasing periods of delay and confirmation failure rates \citep{oconnell_vacant_2009,oconnell_staffing_2017,dull_continuity_2009,resh_appointee_2021}. Exemplifying this pattern, delays of confirmation and confirmation failure rates have more than doubled since the Reagan administration \citep{oconnell_staffing_2017,service_joe_2022}. Over a year and a half into the Biden administration, roughly half of the 800 Senate-confirmed positions noted as “key” roles by the \textit{Washington Post} and Partnership for Public Service remain vacant or filled by Trump holdovers.

The increased prevalence of vacancies in appointed positions raises the more general question of how vacancies influence the president’s ability to direct the activities of the executive branch. Scholars generally agree that vacancies are detrimental to the president’s ability to influence administrative policy \citep[e.g.,][]{oconnell_vacant_2009,bolton_organizational_2015,lewis_president_2018,piper_going_2022}. \citeauthor{lewis_president_2018} state that vacancies do “not allow the president to control the levers of administrative policy making” (2018, p.491) and \citeauthor{oconnell_vacant_2009} argues that “frequent and lengthy vacancies may make agencies less responsive to the elected branches of government” (2009, p.921).

However, the relationship between vacancies and presidential influence is not always as clear cut as the Biden Administration example suggests. For instance, President Trump waited over nine months for John Ratcliff to be confirmed as the Director of National Intelligence (DNI). In the period of delay, the president was able to choose who would serve in the position in an acting capacity. Trump passed over the individual next in line for the position, Principal Deputy DNI Susan Gordon, a career intelligence official with over four decades of experience. Instead, Trump chose Joseph Maguire to serve as the acting DNI \citep{welna_exclusive_2020}. Maguire, although initially thought to be more aligned with Trump than Gordon, was removed for being disloyal to the president by cooperating with Congress’ investigations into Russian interference in the 2020 election \citep{cohen_ousted_2020}. Ambassador Richard Grenell, the next acting DNI, despite having no intelligence experience, was known for his fierce loyalty to the president \citep{marquardt_richard_2020}. During his short tenure, Grenell made several consequential decisions, including firing top officials in the agency and declassifying documents to fuel the president’s conspiracy theories \citep{marquardt_richard_2020}. Overall, despite the prolonged vacancy, Trump was able to use acting officials to strategically advance his agenda in a way he likely could not achieve through the confirmation process, as someone with Grenell’s lack of experience and extreme loyalty to the president may not have survived the Senate confirmation process.  

Matching with the preceding case, some scholars have suggested that presidents may have an incentive to leave positions vacant because they provide the president the opportunity to unilaterally select an acting official to serve on an interim basis \citep{kinane_control_2021,piper_presidential_2022}. The empirical trends back this up, showing that presidents use acting officials strategically and that their use has greatly increased even from the Obama to Biden administration \citep{piper_presidential_2022}. Representing this pattern, President Trump claimed to “like acting[s] because [he could] move so quickly” and they gave “[him] more flexibility” \citep{samuels_trump_2019}. 

It has been difficult to arbitrate between competing views about the effect of vacancies because the moderating influence of contextual factors like acting officials or the presence of other appointees has been underappreciated and good measures of presidential influence over the administrative state are hard to find \citep{lewis_invisible_2013,kinane_control_2021,piper_presidential_2022}. More specifically, the broader management environment of the agency and the president’s use of acting officials might moderate the effect of vacancies on presidential influence. This conditional relationship is important because presidents have unilateral tools, both the placement of non-Senate confirmed appointees\footnote{Both non-career members of the Senior Executive Service (SES) and Schedule C appointees are classes of appointees that do not require Senate confirmation. The SES is comprised of approximately 7,000 senior management officials that serve between presidentially appointed and Senate confirmed (PAS) officials and the civil service \citep{lewis_politics_2008}. By law, political appointees cannot exceed 10 percent of the entire SES. Schedule C appointees are reserved for policy-supporting positions. Schedule C posts include advisors and assistants to PAS appointees, communications officials, and legislative liaisons \citep{lewis_politics_2008}. In some agencies, the PAS official leading the agency is the only appointee in the agency, while in other agencies, there are large appointee teams of Senate confirmed, non-career members of the SES, and Schedule C appointees.}  and the selection of acting officials,\footnote{According to the Federal Vacancies Reform Act of 1998 (5 U.S.C. § 3345), presidents can either allow the individual serving in the “first deputy” position below the PAS position to become the acting official or the president can select a previously confirmed PAS official or a senior “officer or employee” within the agency to serve in an acting capacity \citep{brannon_vacancies_2020}.}  at their disposal that may allow them to exert greater influence without needing Senate advice and consent. When presidents are able to use these tools, vacancies may matter very little for the president’s ability to direct agency policymaking. Therefore, interpreting the average effect of vacancies may lead to false conclusions about whether vacancies are harmful to the president. This is particularly the case since scholars have had to rely largely upon detailed case evidence to support assertions. 

In this paper, I reconcile the competing views about the impact of vacancies on presidential control of the administrative state by explaining why vacancies sometimes constrain presidential influence and at other times expand it, depending upon three factors. Vacancies in agencies with more non-Senate confirmed appointees in leadership positions within the agency and in agencies where the president uses politically appointed acting officials will have less of a detrimental effect on the president’s ability to exert influence over administrative policy. These appointees, because they are selected unilaterally by the president without Senate consent, are typically more loyal to and more ideologically aligned with the president than their confirmed counterparts and are, therefore, more willing to ardently pursue the president’s program \citep{lewis_invisible_2013,bonica_senate_2015,waterman_rethinking_2020,kinane_control_2021,piper_presidential_2022}. Further, when there are other Senate confirmed appointees overseeing the agency,\footnote{Some agencies, such as the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) or the U.S. Census Bureau, are situated within larger cabinet departments and are, therefore, subject to oversight from multiple layers of political appointees within the department. However, other agencies, such as the Small Business Administration (SBA) and Social Security Administration (SSA), are located outside of cabinet department structures and have no overseeing appointee above the head of their agency.}  vacancies in the position most proximate to the agency will have a weaker effect on presidential influence. Appointees higher in the agency’s hierarchy can provide oversight during vacant periods that lessens the need for appointee placement closer to the agency. 

To evaluate the relationship between vacancies and presidential influence, I use new data on presidential influence in the bureaucracy from a three-wave survey of federal executives and new data on appointee vacancies during the Bush, Obama, and Trump administrations. A careful analysis of this data reveals that the effect of vacancies on presidential influence is conditional. Vacancies in agencies outside of cabinet department bureaus have a particularly detrimental effect on presidential influence. However, presidents gain influence over agency policymaking from lengthier vacancies when agencies are more highly politicized. These results suggest 
 that vacancies in Senate-confirmed positions do not necessarily spell trouble for democratic accountability within the administrative state. Rather, through the unilateral placement of non-Senate confirmed appointees, presidents can assert control over agency policymaking despite constraint from the Senate in the appointments process.

\section{Presidential Control and the Vacancy ``Problem"}
Presidents use the appointments process to assert control over the federal bureaucracy \citep{moe_politicized_1985,lewis_politics_2008}. Yet, their ability to freely politicize the bureaucracy through Senate confirmed appointments has been complicated by increasingly delayed and failed confirmations by the Senate \citep{oconnell_vacant_2009,oconnell_staffing_2017,dull_continuity_2009,resh_appointee_2021}. Such obstacles have necessitated presidents to divert their attention to seeking confirmation immediately for the most important positions \citep{oconnell_vacant_2009,lewis_very_2021,piper_presidential_2022}. Presidents have increasingly left the remaining broad swath of PAS positions vacant for extended periods of time \citep{oconnell_vacant_2009,resh_appointee_2021,piper_presidential_2022}.

Consequently, scholars generally conclude that vacancies inhibit the president’s ability to control the bureaucracy for four reasons \citep[e.g.,][]{oconnell_vacant_2009,bolton_organizational_2015,lewis_president_2018,piper_going_2022}. First, vacancies are believed to slow down agency activity, making it more difficult for the president’s policy initiatives to be accomplished \citep{oconnell_vacant_2009,mendelson_uncertain_2014,bolton_organizational_2015,kinane_control_2021,piper_vacancies_2022}. Second, vacancies may lead to a heightened role of career civil servants that might not share the president’s policy views \citep{heclo_government_1977,oconnell_vacant_2009,mendelson_uncertain_2014,bolton_organizational_2015}. Without appointees in place to channel the priorities of the president and shape policy formation, agency policymaking led by civil servants may be out of alignment with the president’s agenda \citep{lewis_politics_2008,piper_going_2022}. Third, appointees are brokers that help resolve conflict between the White House and the agency \citep{heclo_government_1977,wilson_bureaucracy_1989,mendelson_uncertain_2014}. Without confirmed leadership, an adversarial relationship between the White House and agency may form, preventing agency cooperation with the president’s desired policy change. Finally, vacancies create a leadership vacuum that may allow civil servants to resist the directives of other appointees or the president \citep{chang_tenure_2001}. 

Despite the commonly held view that vacancies are detrimental to presidents, the prevalence of vacancies continues to grow, aided by a declining pace of presidential nominations and an increasing selectiveness in which positions receive nominations \citep{oconnell_vacant_2009,lewis_very_2021,piper_presidential_2022}. Why would presidents allow vacancies to persist if they were detrimental to their ability to control agency policymaking? Recent scholarship by \citet{kinane_control_2021} and \citet{piper_presidential_2022} suggests that the neglect of nominations by presidents is strategic and that presidents may benefit from vacancies, or at least have developed new strategies to navigate around vacancies and to diminish their negative effects. Presidents may desire a contraction in agency policymaking that can be best achieved by leaving the agency leaderless \citep{kinane_control_2021}. Presidents may also seek to unilaterally select an individual to take over the position in an acting capacity \citep{kinane_control_2021,piper_presidential_2022}. 

Existing scholarship, however, tends to focus on whether or not vacancies are detrimental to presidential influence rather than when they are detrimental. It is likely that the effects of vacancies on presidential influence will depend on the context in which the vacancy occurs and the strategy that presidents pursue in the face of the vacancy. In some cases, vacancies may be detrimental to presidents, while in other instances vacancies will have minimal consequences for presidential influence. More specifically, existing scholarship often does not account for the management environment of the office in which the vacancy occurs or who in the agency’s leadership takes on a larger role during vacant periods. These shortcomings are representative of a larger trend in the literature to neglect lower-level appointees and acting officials that step into vacant PAS positions \citep{lewis_invisible_2013,moore_polarization_2018,waterman_rethinking_2020,kinane_control_2021,piper_presidential_2022}. These appointees vastly outnumber Senate confirmed appointees and can be placed quickly and unilaterally by the president. As \citeauthor{lewis_invisible_2013} argue, the literature’s “primary focus on PAS appointments … may provide a distorted picture of presidential appointment politics…” (2013, p.37). Therefore, if we are to understand the effects of vacancies more fully, we must take these broader contexts into account. Examining the context-dependent effects of vacancies may help to explain the rising prevalence of vacancies and the dearth of presidential nominations.  

Further, these accounts have not systematically assessed their claims regarding the effects of vacancies, instead relying on evidence from individual agencies. For example, existing work has shown that appointees, when in place, have influence over agency outputs and that when appointees are absent, agency performance of individual tasks is slowed and agency responsiveness to the president declines \citep[e.g.,][]{wood_dynamics_1991,bolton_organizational_2015}. However, finding comparable tasks across administrative agencies that are central to the agency’s mission or policymaking activities poses a significant challenge. This has prohibited existing work from taking a broad view of the effects of vacancies on a whole range of outcomes connected to the core of agency policymaking. 

\section{When Do Vacancies Matter?}
With administrative agencies at the core of policymaking in the United States, presidents naturally seek to make agencies responsive to them \citep{moe_politicized_1985}. Presidents may seek to curtail or augment the activity of agencies in order to achieve their policy goals. For example, a Republican president may seek to constrain the regulatory activities of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), while bolstering the enforcement activities of ICE. Both desired outcomes require changes in agency agendas, priorities, and productivity. For these changes to occur, presidents need control. Without control, agencies are likely to stick to their status quo policy activities \citep{piper_going_2022,piper_vacancies_2022}.

One of the key mechanisms by which all presidents assert control over the administrative state, comprised of hundreds of agencies, is by getting people aligned with their policy agenda and ideology into leadership positions of executive agencies \citep{moe_politicized_1985,lewis_politics_2008}. Presidents target appointments to agencies where they most need control over agency activities, particularly in agencies connected to their policy priorities and agencies that are predisposed to favor policy contrary to the president’s preferences \citep{lewis_politics_2008,hollibaugh_jr_presidents_2014,hollibaugh_jr_when_2017,piper_presidential_2022}. Appointees in these agencies can serve multiple purposes, from agency “advocates,” working to protect and bolster the agency, or “budget-cutters,” working to constrain the agency and cause a retrenchment in activities \citep{wilson_bureaucracy_1989}. 
 
 While vacancies, on average, may or may not lead to the president having less influence, not all vacancies will have equally detrimental effects. Instead, vacancies will matter more for presidential influence in some contexts than others. While there are several, I focus on three key factors related to the president’s use and placement of other political appointees: the presence of Senate confirmed appointees above the agency, the prominence of other appointees within the agency, and the occupant of the office during the vacancy. Rather than operating in isolation, appointees are often part of a team, with other Senate confirmed and non-Senate confirmed appointees working in tandem with them. The presence or absence of these other appointees will augment or constrain the effect of vacancies on presidential influence. Additionally, presidents have other, unilateral tools at their disposal that may alter their ability to influence agency policy during vacant periods. By neglecting these differences, scholars have made broad assertions that often do not apply across contexts.

First, the effect of vacancies will vary depending on the structure of the agency. Bureaus within cabinet departments are situated within hierarchies with many levels of political appointees. During vacant periods in the positions leading the bureau, the next appointee up in the departments’ hierarchy will be able to fill in the gap left by the vacant position, providing direct oversight from their office and indirect oversight by using the other appointees at their discretion. For example, if the Assistant Secretary overseeing the Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy was vacant, the Under Secretary of Energy could take on a larger role in overseeing the agency. Indeed, as shown in Figure 4.1, the Under Secretary of Energy has four non-PAS appointees in their office and five other PAS assistant secretaries and office directors that they manage. However, non-cabinet department bureaus, such as independent executive agencies, have no level of political appointee oversight above the head of the agency. For example, the EPA (Figure 4.2), because it is outside of a cabinet department, has no appointee overseeing the agency above the administrator position. Therefore, vacancies within non-bureaus will be more harmful, as there are no appointees higher in the hierarchy to fill the gap left by the vacant leader. 

\begin{figure}[htp]
    \centering
    \caption{Management Hierarchy of the Office of the Under Secretary of Energy \citep{department_of_energy_organization_2022}}
    \includegraphics[width=15cm]{Figures/chapter4_figure1.jpg}
    \fnote{\textbf{Note:} White box indicates the position directly overseeing the Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy in the Department of Energy. Each position is listed with its classification in parentheses: PAS denotes presidentially appointed and Senate confirmed and SC denotes Schedule C \citep{book_united_2020}.}
    \label{fig:energyhierarchy}
\end{figure}

\begin{figure}[htp]
    \centering
    \caption{Management Hierarchy of the Environmental Protection Agency \citep{epa_environmental_2020}}
    \includegraphics[width=15cm]{Figures/chapter4_figure2.jpg}
    \fnote{\textbf{Note:} White box indicates the position directly overseeing the EPA. Each position is listed with its classification in parentheses: PAS denotes presidentially appointed and Senate confirmed and NA denotes non-Career SES \citep{book_united_2020}.}
    \label{fig:epahierarchy}
\end{figure}

\noindent \textbf{Bureaus Hypothesis}: Vacancies will diminish presidential influence less in cabinet department bureaus. 

Of course, the impact of vacancies within Cabinet department bureaus will depend upon whether the Under Secretary position itself is filled with a Senate-confirmed appointee. If multiple levels of the hierarchy are vacant, then the agency will be left without any proximate political appointee above the agency to provide oversight of and direction to the agency. The closest remaining Senate-confirmed appointee would likely be the Department Secretary, individuals that are often far removed from the day-to-day activities of the agency and that have an already full plate of responsibilities. Therefore, when vacancies occur at multiple levels of the agency’s leadership hierarchy, the effect of a vacancy in the position closest to the agency will be more detrimental to the president’s ability to control the agency’s policymaking. 

\noindent \textbf{Accumulation Hypothesis}: Within cabinet department bureaus, vacancies will diminish presidential influence more when there are multiple vacancies in the agency’s leadership hierarchy.

Additionally, the effect of vacancies will vary depending on the management environment within the agency, starting with the prevalence of other political appointees, or the level of politicization, in the agency. PAS agency heads do not operate in isolation, instead they are members of a team of appointees within an agency \citep{lewis_contemporary_2012}. Members of these teams include other PAS officials, non-Career members of the SES, and Schedule C appointees. As shown in Figure 4.3, an agency such as the Economic Development Administration (EDA) has several “layers” of political appointees that operate in tandem. These additional appointees provide the president with a greater ability to influence agency policymaking \citep{light_thickening_1995}. \citeauthor{lewis_invisible_2013} describe the increased use of these “invisible” appointees as “arguably the most important trend in the administrative presidency” (2013, p.37).

\begin{figure}[htp]
    \centering
    \caption{Management Hierarchy of the Economic Development Administration \citep{book_united_2012}}
    \includegraphics[width=10cm]{Figures/chapter4_figure3.jpg}
    \\ \fnote{\textbf{Note:} Gray boxes indicate appointed positions, while white boxes indicate careerist positions. Each position is listed with its classification in parentheses: PAS denotes presidentially appointed and Senate confirmed, NA denotes non-Career SES, SC denotes Schedule C, and CA denotes career civil servant \citep{book_united_2012}.}
    \label{fig:edahierarchy}
\end{figure}

Non-Career SES and Schedule C appointees will take on a greater role in the absence of confirmed leadership \citep{moore_polarization_2018}. For example, in the EDA, the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Economic Development and the Chief of Staff to the Assistant Secretary could take on a larger role when the Assistant Secretary position is vacant. The individuals filling these lower-level appointed positions do not have to appease a Senate majority to enter their positions and are more likely to be loyal to the president \citep{lewis_presidential_2011,lewis_invisible_2013,waterman_rethinking_2020} and more ideologically extreme \citep{bonica_senate_2015}, compared to their confirmed counterparts. Therefore, because these appointees are more ardent supporters of the president and because they are less accountable to members of Congress, their increased role during periods of vacant PAS leadership will allow the president to have greater influence over the agency. However, an agency like the Indian Health Service (Figure 4.4), does not have a similar appointee team in place that could step in when the Director position is vacant. Instead, the three careerist deputy directors, with no ties to the president, would likely take on a greater role during vacant periods. 

\begin{figure}[htp]
    \centering
    \caption{Management Hierarchy of the Indian Health Service \citep{book_united_2012}}
    \includegraphics[width=15cm]{Figures/chapter4_figure4.jpg}
    \fnote{\textbf{Note:} Gray boxes indicate appointed positions, while white boxes indicate careerist positions. Each position is listed with its classification in parentheses: PAS denotes presidentially appointed and Senate confirmed, NA denotes non-Career SES, and CA denotes career civil servant \citep{book_united_2012}.}
    \label{fig:ihshierarchy}
\end{figure}

\noindent \textbf{Politicization Hypothesis}: Vacancies will diminish presidential influence less in more politicized agencies. 

Finally, presidents have opportunities to unilaterally fill positions on an interim basis during vacant periods \citep{oconnell_vacant_2009,kinane_control_2021,piper_presidential_2022}. According to the Federal Vacancies Reform Act of 1998 (5 U.S.C. § 3345), commonly referred to as the Vacancies Act or the FVRA, there are two “types” of acting officials that can serve on an interim basis when a vacancy occurs. If there is an individual serving in the “first deputy” or “first assistant” position below the PAS position, that individual will become the acting official by default \citep{brannon_vacancies_2020}. The president may also select a previously confirmed PAS official or a senior “officer or employee” within the agency\footnote{Senior “officer[s] or employee[s]” must be in the agency for a period of at least 90 days and be paid at the equivalent of the GS-15 pay level or above \citep{brannon_vacancies_2020}.} to serve in an acting capacity \citep{brannon_vacancies_2020}. 

Senior career civil servants who are in line for the position will work to keep the agency functioning as usual, but their experience and stability will come at a cost to a president who expects loyalty and who desires a drastic change in the course of agency policymaking \citep{mccarty_advice_1999,oconnell_vacant_2009,oconnell_actings_2020,mendelson_uncertain_2014,piper_presidential_2022}. These default acting officials have assurance that they cannot be fired and that they will return to their original position once their acting service ends. 

Non-default acting officials and politically appointed deputies, in contrast, are under the complete, unilateral control of the president. The principal default acting official is in some cases a political appointee, either a Senate confirmed (e.g., Deputy Secretaries) or non-PAS appointee (e.g., most Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney Generals). These individuals, like other politically appointees, are agents of the president without civil service protection. The president can also select anyone within the limits outlined above, allowing them to choose someone potentially less qualified or more ideologically consistent with their views. Additionally, because these officials are only moved into their position at the direction of the president and because they are often themselves non-PAS appointees without civil service protections, they are more likely to be beholden to the president’s wishes. Therefore, when vacant PAS positions are filled by politically appointed acting officials, we should expect that the president will exert more influence over the agency than if a careerist acting official was allowed to serve.\footnote{To validate proposed differences between types of acting officials, careerist and appointed, I gathered information on the background characteristics of acting officials. I find that appointed acting officials are more likely to have background characteristics that are associated with loyalty to and ideological alignment with the president \citep[see e.g.,][]{waterman_rethinking_2020}. Summaries of the acting official background characteristics by acting official type are reported in Appendix 5.3.6.}

\noindent \textbf{Political Actings Hypothesis}: Vacancies will diminish presidential influence less when the president uses political acting officials during the vacant period. 

In total, we should expect that the effect of vacancies on the president’s ability to influence administrative policymaking will be conditional on presence of overseeing political appointees, the management environment within the agency, and the president’s use of acting officials. When presidents have larger appointee teams to rely on and when they use politically appointed acting officials, vacancies will have less of an effect on the president’s ability to influence the agency. However, when there is no confirmed overseeing appointee above the agency, vacancies will have a larger, more detrimental effect on presidential influence.

\section{Data, Variables, and Methods}
To evaluate the impact of vacancies on presidential control of the executive branch, we need a measure of presidential influence in administrative agencies. Measuring influence over agency policymaking is difficult for two reasons. First, agencies conduct a breadth of activities that are typically not comparable across agencies \citep{wilson_bureaucracy_1989}. Therefore, scholars have typically been limited to examining influence over activities unique to a particular agency \citep[e.g.,][]{wood_dynamics_1991,bolton_organizational_2015}. Second, parsing out influence over agency decision making observationally is extremely difficult. While we may observe changes in agency policymaking, it can be difficult to determine how much credit any individual actor deserves for the occurrence of those changes. 

To overcome these challenges, I use the 2007, 2014, and 2020 Survey on the Future of Government Service (SFGS), an online and paper survey of US-based federal executives.\footnote{Full details of the survey, including information on response rates and survey weights are included in Appendix 5.3.1.}  The respondents include all political appointees, career members of the SES, and senior Foreign Service officers serving domestically. The survey sample also includes other high-level managers who administered key programs or offices. Other scholars have similarly used these surveys to assess the influence of political actors on administrative policymaking \citep{bertelli_policy_2012,clinton_influencing_2014,selin_what_2015}. 

To measure the influence of the president, I use a question from the SFGS that asked: “In general, how much influence do you think the following groups [White House]\footnote{Respondents were also asked to evaluate the policy influence of agents of the president, including political appointees and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). I also estimated models using agency average responses to questions regarding the policy influence of political appointees and OMB as the dependent variable. Results, reported in Appendix Tables 5.19 and 5.20, are substantively similar to the main specifications with White House influence as the dependent variable.}  have over policy decisions in [your agency]?” Respondents were given a scale from 0-None to 4-A great deal, or could select “Don’t know.”\footnote{Respondents that responded “Don’t know” were not included in the agency average and did not count towards the five-respondent threshold for inclusion into the sample.}  The question asks federal executives to evaluate how much influence each actor has over policy decisions in their agencies by name.\footnote{Respondents in the Office of the Secretary, however, were asked about the departments as a whole. In departments where I have at least 5 respondents from the Office of the Secretary, I include agency average White House influence for the entire department.}  Given that the hypothesized variation is at the agency level, I aggregate\footnote{Agency averages account for survey weights to ensure that survey responses are representative of the target population. For further information on weighting, see Appendix 5.3.1.}  weighted responses\footnote{I also estimate models on weighted agency averages calculated using only the responses of careerists since political appointees’ evaluations of presidential influence may be biased. Results reported in Appendix Table 5.22 are substantively similar to the main model specification.}  by agency for all agencies with at least 5 respondents. In total, the sample includes 274 agency average observations from 144 executive agencies.\footnote{A full list of included agencies and the surveyed years in which they were included is reported in Appendix 5.3.2.} This includes 231 observations from 124 agencies within cabinet departments, 5 observations from three agencies within the Executive Office of the President, and 38 observations from seventeen independent executive agencies. There is significant variation in the influence measure across agency averages. White House influence averages vary from 0.96 to 4, with a mean value of 2.96 (SD 0.62).  

Using these surveys to measure presidential influence has two key advantages. First, the observations are consistent across agencies and time, allowing us to draw generalizable conclusions about the effects of vacancies on administrative outcomes. In contrast, existing work has been restricted by the limited number of agency outputs that are observable, such as rulemaking review time \citep[e.g.,][]{bolton_organizational_2015}. Few agency outputs are comparable across agencies, and those that are (e.g., response time to FOIA requests, payment to contractors, etc.) may not be central to policy mission of the agency. Second, the survey-based measures employed here rely on senior executives’ perceptions of influence over agency policymaking, ameliorating the inherent difficulties in observing the effects of political actors on outcomes. These respondents are appropriately positioned to judge policy influence within their agency. 

At first glance, the agency average responses to questions about presidential influence look reasonable. For example, respondents in the Bureau of Consular Affairs within the State Department in 2020 reported one of the highest average levels of White House influence. This fits with reporting that highlighted the administration’s slashing of the bureau’s budget and restrictions on its ability to issue visas \citep{richardson_state_2021}. Additionally, three of the highest averages for White House policy influence come from agencies within the Executive Office of the President (EOP). 

In Figure 4.5, I graph the influence measures with another question from the 2020 survey dealing with perceptions of agenda change. Here, respondents were asked “Some agencies’ policy agendas changed after the inauguration of President Trump. Other agencies’ policy agendas stayed the same. In your experience, how much did the policy agenda of [your agency] change after the inauguration?” Respondents were given a sliding scale from 0-Did not change to 3-Changed significantly. They could also indicate a “I did not experience the change in administration” or “Don’t know” response. As Figure 4.5 suggests, White House policy influence is strongly, positively correlated with agency policy agenda change. This provides further evidence that the influence measure is representative of tangible policy change.\footnote{I also estimated models using agency average responses to the agenda change question as the dependent variable. Results, reported in Appendix Table 5.21, are substantively similar to the main specifications with White House influence as the dependent variable.}

\begin{figure}[htp]
    \centering
    \caption{Comparison of 2020 White House Policy Influence with 2020 Agency Policy Agenda Change}
    \includegraphics[width=15cm]{Figures/chapter4_figure5.jpg}
    \fnote{\textbf{Note:} Fitted lines estimated based upon all agencies with at least 5 respondents in the 2020 survey. Some agency acronyms are excluded from the figure to limit overlap among acronyms. Agency acronyms E (Economic Growth, Energy, and the Environment), M (Management), and R (Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs) indicate bureaus within the Department of State.}
    \label{fig:ihshierarchy}
\end{figure}

\subsection{Key Independent Variables}
To measure vacancies, I used the length of time the PAS position most closely overseeing the respondent’s office\footnote{I used the Plum Book to find the PAS position most proximate to the subunit. When the Plum Book was not clear, I used agency organizational charts to determine those positions.} was vacant between the president’s inauguration date and the date the SFGS survey was fielded.\footnote{Vacancies were scaled to account for differences in the time from inauguration to when each survey was fielded. Specifically, vacancies in the Bush and Trump administration were scaled to be equivalent to those in the Obama administration.}  For ease of interpretation, I report vacancies in terms of months.\footnote{For the 2007 and 2014 survey, I used vacancy data collected by \citet{resh_appointee_2021}. I then supplemented their data with information on confirmation dates from Senate.gov and exit dates from agency websites and other external sources (e.g., news sources, Leadership Connect). For the 2020 survey, I used the PPS and \textit{Washington Post}’s “Political Appointee Tracker” to gather confirmation and exit dates. Data for the positions not listed on their tracker was similarly gathered from Senate.gov for confirmation dates and from agency websites and other external sources for exit dates.}  The average most proximate PAS position was vacant for about 29\% of the time between each president’s inauguration and the time the survey was fielded. 

To assess whether vacancies in cabinet department bureaus are less detrimental to presidential influence, I include an indicator for whether the agency is a bureau within a larger department. I code the “Bureau” variable with a 1 if the agency is a cabinet department bureau and 0 otherwise. About three quarters of agency observations are from cabinet department bureaus. I expect that vacancies within cabinet bureaus will have smaller effects on the president’s ability to influence agency policymaking. 

To assess whether vacancies in both positions overseeing the cabinet department hierarchy and positions most proximate to the cabinet department bureau are more detrimental to presidential influence, I measure the length of time the PAS position overseeing the PAS official most proximate to the respondent’s office\footnote{I used the Plum Book to find the PAS position that was directly above the PAS official closest to the respondent’s office. When the Plum Book was not clear, I used agency organizational charts to determine those positions.}  was vacant between the president’s inauguration date and the date the SFGS survey was fielded.\footnote{Cabinet departments as a whole, independent executive agencies, and agencies within the Executive Office of the President are excluded from any models with this measure, as there is no PAS official overseeing these agencies.}  The same process for calculating vacancy length for the most proximate PAS position was used to measure the vacancy length of appointees higher in the agency hierarchy.\footnote{These vacancies were similarly scaled to account for timing differences between surveys.}  The average next-up PAS position was vacant for about 23\% of the time between each president’s inauguration and the time the survey was fielded. I expect that joint vacancies at both levels in the agency’s hierarchy will be more detrimental to the president’s influence over the cabinet bureau, compared to vacancies in only one level of the hierarchy. 

To measure politicization, I calculated the percent of supervisors in an agency that were comprised of political appointees \citep{lewis_politics_2008}. I gathered agency supervisor employment data for June of the surveyed year from the Office of Personnel Management’s \textit{FedScope}.\footnote{June was selected because it was the closest observation of agency employment prior to the administration of each survey.}  I counted the number of PAS, non-Career SES, Schedule C employees in the agency from the 2004, 2012, and 2020 editions of the Plum Book. The average agency had 3.62\% of their supervisors comprised of political appointees. I expect that vacancies will be less harmful to presidential influence as the agency becomes more politicized. 

To measure the president’s use of acting officials, I track the occupant of each PAS position of interest using the four quarters of the \textit{Federal Yellow Book} from the year prior to each survey’s administration. The \textit{Federal Yellow Book} is a quarterly directory of executive officials, akin to a telephone book.  To categorize acting officials, I gathered the employment history of each individual on Leadership Connect, the online edition of the \textit{Yellow Book}, LinkedIn, and an additional online source, typically their biography page from the agency they served in or a news article. Individuals who were in a politically appointed positions immediately prior to their service as acting were categorized as “political actings.” I then created a dichotomous measure for whether a political acting served in the year prior to the survey’s administration. This serves as a proxy for the president’s use of political actings during the entire vacant period leading up to the survey. Twenty percent of agencies had a political acting serve in at least one of the 4 quarters prior to the survey’s administration. I expect that vacancies will be less harmful to presidential influence when the president uses political acting officials during a vacant period.  

\subsection{Control Variables}
To account for potential confounders, I include agency and survey-level controls. To begin, I control for whether the agency is a priority to the president.\footnote{I also estimate models on the subset of priority agencies. Results, reported in Appendix Table 5.23, are substantively similar across specifications. Additionally, I conducted mediation analysis to observe how much of the effect of presidential priority is direct and how much of the effect is mediated through vacancies. Results, reported in Appendix 5.3.7, show that almost none of the effect of priority is mediated through vacant months.}  For the 2007 and 2014 survey, I coded agencies with a 1 if the agency was mentioned as responsible for a policy or an issue raised in the president’s first address before a joint session of Congress. For the 2020 survey, I coded agencies with a 1 if the agency is responsible for carrying out an item on President Trump’s \textit{Contract with the American Voter} and 0 otherwise. Agencies important to the president’s policy agenda are less likely to experience lengthy vacancies and are more likely to be subject to other tools of presidential control \citep{hollibaugh_jr_presidents_2014}.\footnote{Of course, presidential priorities may change over the course of an administration. This measure is recorded prior to treatment as one reason for changing presidential priorities is the level of control presidents have over agencies connected with a policy area.} 

Second, I control for the agency’s location in either a cabinet department or the Executive Office of the President (EOP). I code the “EOP” variable with a 1 if the agency is within the EOP and 0 otherwise. I code the “Department” variable with a 1 if the agency is within a cabinet department and 0 otherwise. Therefore, the comparison group is independent executive agencies (e.g., EPA, Social Security Administration, etc.). Agencies in the cabinet and EOP are more likely to report presidential influence and are more highly politicized.\footnote{I also estimated models that control for agency independence \citep{selin_what_2015}. Results, reported in Appendix Table 5.24, are substantively similar across specifications.} 

Third, I control for whether the agency has an ideological reputation that is in opposition to the president. To measure ideological position in relation to the president, I use a measure of agency ideological reputation from the 2014 SFGS \citep{richardson_elite_2018}. I code the “Ideological Opponent” variable with a 1 if the agency has an ideological reputation that is in opposition to the president (e.g., liberal agency-Republican president). Respondents from ideologically opposed agencies may be more or less likely to report policy influence by the president. Agency ideology may also influence the president’s appointment strategy \citep{lewis_politics_2008,hollibaugh_jr_presidents_2014,hollibaugh_jr_when_2017,piper_presidential_2022}.  

Fourth, I control for the percentage of agency respondents that were political appointees. Ten percent of agency respondents were political appointees on average. Political appointees likely are biased in their evaluations of presidential influence and may inflate the degree to which the president influences administrative policymaking. 

Finally, I include presidential fixed effects. I code the “Obama” variable with a 1 if the average was derived from the 2014 SFGS and 0 otherwise. I code the “Trump” variable with a 1 if the average was derived from the 2020 SFGS and 0 otherwise. It is possible that observations from one presidential administration are systematically different than in another administration.\footnote{I also estimated models on the subset of observations from the Bush and Obama administration and the subset of observations from the Trump administration, as it might be possible that there were differences across presidents. Results, reported in Appendix Tables 5.25 and 5.26, are mostly substantively similar across subsets with one notable difference. Specifically, I find that, for the Trump administration, vacancies in bureaus were not less detrimental to presidential influence.} 

\subsection{Models}
I estimate models via Ordinary Least Squares to estimate the effect of vacancies in PAS positions on presidential influence over agency policymaking.\footnote{To address how fragile my estimates are to potential omitted confounding variables, I also conducted sensitivity analysis. Results of the sensitivity analysis, reported in Appendix 5.3.8, show that the main results of the paper are robust to the effects of potential omitted confounders.}  I begin by estimating models with only the measure of vacancy length to assess the average effect of vacancies on presidential influence. I then estimate models with each of the interaction variables. Because some unobserved agency characteristics may be correlated with their parent agency, I clustered standard errors at the cabinet level, with agencies within the EOP and independent agencies in separate clusters.\footnote{We may be concerned that vacancies have different intended effects across agencies. For example, whether a president wants to augment or constrain the activities of an agency may influence their propensity to leave positions vacant \citep{kinane_control_2021}. If this neglect, or outright hostility towards an agency, is not perceived as influence, model estimates may be biased towards my hypothesized relationships. While the included model controls should at least partially address these concerns, I have also estimated models on a series of agency subsets that are presumably connected to the president’s goals for the agency. Subsets include agencies connected with the president’s policy priorities, agencies ideologically aligned with the president, and agencies ideologically opposed to the president. Agencies that are connected with the president’s priorities and that are ideologically aligned with them are likely to be targeted for expansion. However, agencies that are ideologically opposed to the president are more likely to be subject to reduction efforts. If estimates are substantively similar across agency subsets, representing cases of differing presidential goals, our concerns should be attenuated. Indeed, I find that, across all subsets, vacancies are more harmful for presidential influence when there is no Senate confirmed appointee overseeing the agency and less harmful to presidential influence when the agency is more heavily politicized. Model estimates are reported in Appendix Tables 5.23, 5.27, and 5.28.}  

\section{Results}
One central pattern is illuminated within the results of the models, namely that the effect of vacancies on presidential influence is conditional. The effect is conditioned on two key factors: the presence of an overseeing appointee above the agency and the level of politicization in the agency. Vacancies where there is no confirmed appointee overseeing the agency have more deleterious consequences for the influence of the president. In contrast, presidents do not suffer as severe of loses of influence when agencies are more politicized. Instead, they may even gain influence at high enough levels of politicization. 

These results suggest that, under certain circumstances, presidents benefit from the use of strategic vacancies. Once a vacancy occurs, rather than attempting to fill the vacancy with a nominee capable of appeasing a Senate majority, presidents can rely more heavily on the remaining PAS appointees overseeing the agency and lower-level appointees within the agency, agents that are more loyal to and more ideologically aligned with the president. This helps to explain the rising prevalence of vacancies and puts presidents at a greater advantage in our separation of powers system, allowing presidents to act unilaterally without Senate input. Further, the Senate’s own delays and amenability to presidential nominees may only further incentive presidents to use non-Senate confirmed appointees.  

I proceed first by examining the average effect of vacancies on presidential influence (Model 1). There is limited suggestive evidence supporting the common expectation that lengthier vacancies in the most proximate PAS position are associated with diminished presidential influence. The coefficient is negative but it is small and imprecise. Substantively, moving from the first to third quartile in direct vacant months (+19.43) is associated with a 0.05-point decrease in White House influence, or slightly less than one tenth of a standard deviation decrease in While House influence. The mixed evidence of an average effect is to be expected, given our expectation that the effect of vacancies is contextual. 

%%% TABLE 1 Here

\begin{table}
\caption{Base, Hierarchy Interaction, Politicization Interaction, and Acting Interaction Models} 
  \footnotesize
\begin{center}
\begin{tabular}{l c c c c c}
\\[-1.8ex]\hline 
\hline \\[-1.8ex] 
\\[-1.8ex] & Average Effect & \multicolumn{2}{c}{Hierarchy} & Teams & Actings \\
 & Model 1 & Model 2 & Model 3 & Model 4 & Model 5 \\
\hline \\[-1.8ex]
Most Proximate PAS Vacant Months                           & $-0.0025$       & $-0.0102^{***}$ & $0.0028$       & $-0.0042$               & $-0.0010$       \\
                                                           & $(0.0031)$      & $(0.0017)$      & $(0.0039)$     & $(0.0034)$              & $(0.0038)$      \\
Most Prox. PAS Vacant Months:Bureau                        &                 & $0.0093^{***}$  &                &                         &                 \\
                                                           &                 & $(0.0027)$      &                &                         &                 \\
Higher Up PAS Vacant Months                                &                 &                 & $-0.0036$      &                         &                 \\
                                                           &                 &                 & $(0.0053)$     &                         &                 \\
Most Prox. PAS Vacant Months:Higher Up PAS Vacant Months   &                 &                 & $-0.0001$      &                         &                 \\
                                                           &                 &                 & $(0.0002)$     &                         &                 \\
Politicization \%                                          &                 &                 &                & $0.0033$                &                 \\
                                                           &                 &                 &                & $(0.0104)$              &                 \\
Most Prox. PAS Vacant Months:Politicization \%             &                 &                 &                & $0.0009^{*}$            &                 \\
                                                           &                 &                 &                & $(0.0004)$              &                 \\
Political Acting (Yr. Prior)                               &                 &                 &                &                         & $0.2636^{**}$   \\
                                                           &                 &                 &                &                         & $(0.1150)$      \\
Most  Prox. PAS Vacant Months:Political Acting (Yr. Prior) &                 &                 &                &                         & $-0.0066$       \\
                                                           &                 &                 &                &                         & $(0.0052)$      \\
Priority                                                   & $0.1131$        & $0.0950$        & $0.0999$       & $0.1000$                & $0.0952$        \\
                                                           & $(0.1006)$      & $(0.1005)$      & $(0.1215)$     & $(0.0926)$              & $(0.0939)$      \\
EOP                                                        & $0.8044^{***}$  & $0.6981^{***}$  &                & $0.2456$                & $0.8204^{***}$  \\
                                                           & $(0.0901)$      & $(0.0865)$      &                & $(0.3740)$              & $(0.0760)$      \\
Department                                                 & $0.3927^{***}$  & $0.2617^{**}$   &                & $0.4697^{***}$          & $0.4128^{***}$  \\
                                                           & $(0.1318)$      & $(0.1201)$      &                & $(0.1209)$              & $(0.1391)$      \\
Bureau                                                     & $-0.4700^{***}$ & $-0.5364^{***}$ &                & $-0.6132^{***}$         & $-0.4891^{***}$ \\
                                                           & $(0.1435)$      & $(0.1457)$      &                & $(0.1187)$              & $(0.1493)$      \\
Ideological Opponent                                       & $0.1113$        & $0.1218$        & $0.1146$       & $0.0898$                & $0.1091$        \\
                                                           & $(0.0715)$      & $(0.0718)$      & $(0.1016)$     & $(0.0677)$              & $(0.0695)$      \\
Percent Appointee                                          & $0.4624^{*}$    & $0.4201^{*}$    & $0.4915^{*}$   & $0.1074$                & $0.4588^{*}$    \\
                                                           & $(0.2311)$      & $(0.2170)$      & $(0.2468)$     & $(0.1859)$              & $(0.2419)$      \\
Obama                                                      & $0.0438$        & $0.0521$        & $0.0270$       & $0.0354$                & $0.0238$        \\
                                                           & $(0.0795)$      & $(0.0840)$      & $(0.0903)$     & $(0.0906)$              & $(0.0790)$      \\
Trump                                                      & $0.1855^{*}$    & $0.1873^{*}$    & $0.2123$       & $0.1778^{*}$            & $0.1789^{*}$    \\
                                                           & $(0.1007)$      & $(0.0995)$      & $(0.1454)$     & $(0.0982)$              & $(0.0958)$      \\
Constant                                                   & $2.8693^{***}$  & $3.0325^{***}$  & $2.7865^{***}$ & $2.8981^{***}$          & $2.8342^{***}$  \\
                                                           & $(0.0716)$      & $(0.0611)$      & $(0.1195)$     & $(0.0921)$              & $(0.0756)$      \\
\hline
R$^2$                                                      & $0.1678$        & $0.1767$        & $0.0458$       & $0.2209$                & $0.1794$        \\
N                                                       & $225$           & $225$           & $162$          & $195$                   & $225$           \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\begin{tablenotes}
\item[] \textbf{Note:} *** p$<$0.01; ** p$<$0.05; *p$<$0.1. Data: Survey on the Future of Government Service, 2007, 2014, and 2020. Dependent variable is weighted average agency response to question: “In general how much influence do you think the following groups [White House] have over policy decisions in [your agency]?” (0-4). Model estimated with Ordinary Least Squares and standard errors are clustered by department with independent agencies and agencies within the Executive Office of the President in separate clusters. Model 3 is estimated on the subset of cases from cabinet department bureaus.
\end{tablenotes}
\end{center}
\end{table}

\subsection{Bureaus}
Next, we can examine how the effect of vacancies is conditioned on the presence of other appointees overseeing the agency. Consistent with my expectation in the Bureaus Hypothesis, vacancies within cabinet department bureaus are less detrimental to presidential influence. As shown in Model 2 of Table 4.1, the interaction term is large and estimated precisely. Indeed, the coefficient on the interaction term is almost the same size as the main effect of “Most Proximate PAS Vacant Months.” Its substantive effect is best seen in Figure 4.6 which shows the predicted level of White House influence. Here, we see that vacancies have basically no effect on presidential influence in cabinet department bureaus. For all other agencies, however, including Cabinet departments, agencies within the EOP, and independent executive agencies, vacancies are estimated to limit presidential influence and limit it more the longer the vacancy. For example, moving from the first to third quartile in vacant months, an increase of about the length of time the Social Security Administrator position was vacant in the lead up to the 2014 SFGS, is associated with a 0.20-point decrease in White House influence, or about one-third of a standard deviation decrease in White House influence. This effect size is more than twice the effect of an agency being connected to a priority on the president’s policy agenda. 

\begin{figure}[htp]
    \centering
    \caption{Predicted Level of White House Influence Given Most Proximate PAS Vacancy Length and Agency Structure (Model 2 of Table 1)}
    \includegraphics[width=15cm]{Figures/chapter4_figure6.jpg}
    \fnote{\textbf{Note:} Y-Axis truncated to the range of agency averages of White House Influence between the 10th and 90th percentiles. }
    \label{fig:predictedwhinflagencystruc}
\end{figure}

These results suggest the importance of agency structure and the broader appointee team in determining presidential influence. Rather than individual appointees operating in isolation, appointees overseeing the cabinet department bureaus can step in when the position most proximate to the agency is vacant. However, when there is no higher up appointee to step in, vacancies have a more detrimental effect on presidential influence.

\subsection{Accumulation}
Given the differences between cabinet department bureaus and non-bureaus, it is important to consider whether vacancies in the most proximate position to bureaus have more harmful effects on presidential influence when the position overseeing the agency is also vacant. As shown on the interaction term on both measures of vacancies in Model 3 in Table 4.1, each additional month that one PAS position is vacant, increases the negative effect of a vacancy in the other PAS position. This provides suggestive evidence that, like non-bureaus, the absence of an overseeing appointee causes vacancies in the most proximate position to be more detrimental to the president’s ability to control agency policymaking. However, the effect is small and imprecise. Only a two and a half standard deviation increase in higher up vacant months (about 30 months) reduces the coefficient on most proximate vacant months to zero. 

\subsection{Politicization}
We can now examine how the effect of vacancies is conditioned on the level of politicization within the agency. Consistent with the Politicization Hypothesis, the level of politicization had a moderating influence on the effect of vacancies. As shown in Model 4 in Table 4.1, the coefficient on the main effect of politicization is positive (i.e., more politicization leads to more presidential influence) and the interaction is positive, suggesting vacancies are less consequential in more politicized agencies. The effect is statistically significant at the 0.1 p-value threshold. This effect is easiest to see in Figure 4.7, which shows the predicted level of White House influence based on the length of vacancy for two different kinds of agencies (high politicization—black, low politicization—gray). In more politicized agencies, vacancies are correlated with greater presidential influence. In less politicized agencies, vacancies are correlated with less influence. 

\begin{figure}[htp]
    \centering
    \caption{Predicted Level of White House Influence Given Most Proximate PAS Vacancy Length and Fixed Level of Politicization (One-Standard Deviation Below and Above the Mean) (Model 4 of Table 1)}
    \includegraphics[width=15cm]{Figures/chapter4_figure7.jpg}
    \fnote{\textbf{Note:} The Y-Axis lower bound is truncated to the 10th percentile of agency average reported White House Influence. The Y-Axis upper bound is set to the maximum value of agency average reported White House Influence to account for the confidence intervals.}
    \label{fig:predictedwhinflpolit}
\end{figure}

These results suggest that lower-level appointees play an important role in agency operations when Senate confirmed leadership is absent that is advantageous to presidents. The characteristics commonly associated with non-Career SES and Schedule C appointees, in particular loyalty and ideological alignment, make these appointees more responsive to the president and less concerned with appeasing Congress. Therefore, presidents may intentionally delay nominations to vacant positions in more politicized agencies. 

\subsection{Political Actings}
Finally, we can examine how the effect of vacancies on influence is conditional on the president’s use of political acting officials. The main effect of presidents appointing a political acting is positive and significant, suggesting that presidents gain influence through the choice of a political acting rather than allowing the default acting official serve. Interestingly, the use of political actings by the president during periods of vacant leadership did not significantly moderate the effect of vacancies on presidential influence. These effects are graphed in Figure 4.8. Agencies staffed with political acting officials initially report greater White House influence but this effect diminishes the longer a position is vacant. By contrast, vacancies have almost no effect on presidential influence in agencies staffed by temporary careerist officials. One reason why vacancies may appear to on average have little effect when careerists serve in temporary roles is because careerists themselves may have been selected by the president as acting officials and serve with the threat of removal from their interim role \citep{piper_presidential_2022}. In these cases, presidents may gain influence like they would with a political acting. However, this is counterbalanced by cases in which the president simply allows the careerist next in line for the position to serve as the acting official and, therefore, has little leverage over the acting \citep{piper_presidential_2022}. 

This is not to say that presidents do not gain influence from the use of political actings. In fact, whether the president used a political acting in the year prior to the survey’s administration had a strong, positive, and statistically significant effect on presidential influence. As shown in Figure 4.8, it is only after the most proximate position is vacant for a lengthy period, about 40 months, that the positive effect of political actings is nullified. Given the limitations on acting service,\footnote{Individuals placed in an acting position may serve for a temporary period of 210 days. This period will be extended if a presidential nomination to fill the position is made.}  it is highly unlikely that a political acting could serve for this length of time. Therefore, these results suggest that presidents, in the short term, can gain in influence over agency policymaking by selecting political acting officials during vacant periods. This provides confirmation of the efficacy of presidential acting strategy suggested by other scholars \citep{kinane_control_2021,piper_presidential_2022}. 

\begin{figure}[htp]
    \centering
    \caption{Predicted Level of White House Influence Given Most Proximate PAS Vacancy Length and President’s Use of Political Acting (Yr. Prior) (Model 5 of Table 1)}
    \includegraphics[width=15cm]{Figures/chapter4_figure8.jpg}
    \fnote{\textbf{Note:} Y-Axis truncated to the range of agency averages of White House Influence between the 10th and 90th percentiles. }
    \label{fig:predictedwhinflacting}
\end{figure}

A few other results stand out across model specifications. First, President Trump’s White House was significantly more influential than President Bush’s. This stands in conflict with existing accounts of an ineffectual Trump administration. Second, agencies connected to the president’s policy agenda and those ideologically opposed to the president consistently reported higher levels of White House policy influence. This provides further evidence that presidents are more focused on controlling agencies with an ideological bent against their own and may be more likely to neglect agencies that tend to perform non-ideological tasks and tasks that are off their agenda. The neglect of certain types of agencies by presidents should raise concerns for agency performance and the health of the administrative state \citep{piper_vacancies_2022}.

\section{Conclusion}
President Biden entered office knowing that his nominees to Senate confirmed positions would face significant confirmation delays \citep{pfiffner_organizing_2021,kumar_joseph_2021}. Therefore, rather than focusing solely on the selection of nominees to Senate-confirmed positions, the president’s transition team prioritized the placement of non-Senate confirmed appointees, individuals that are selected unilaterally and that could take their positions on day one of the Biden administration \citep{pfiffner_organizing_2021,kumar_joseph_2021}. Biden, then, selected many of these non-Senate confirmed appointees to serve as acting officials in vacant Senate-confirmed positions \citep{piper_presidential_2022}. Combined, these strategies allowed the incoming president to gain a foothold over the sprawling administrative state in the early days of his administration.

There is growing concern among scholars and the media about the increased prevalence of vacancies in PAS positions. These trends have led some experts to claim that the traditional route of appointments through presidential nomination and Senate confirmation is broken and that reform is needed to reduce the number and length of vacancies \citep{stier_senate_2021}. Others worry that vacancies may diminish democratic accountability within the administrative state \citep{oconnell_vacant_2009,lewis_president_2018}. 

The results in this paper indicate that the effect of vacancies for presidents is conditioned on the presence of other appointees overseeing the agency and the degree of politicization in the agency. When there is no Senate confirmed appointee overseeing an agency, vacancies in the position closest to the agency are more harmful to presidential influence. In contrast, when an agency is highly politicized, vacancies are associated with increased presidential control. This suggests that Biden’s politicization strategy should attenuate the effects of the large number of lengthy vacancies his administration continues to face.

Several implications emerge from this analysis. First and foremost, vacancies in Senate-confirmed positions are not necessarily problematic for democratic accountability within the administrative state. Instead, presidents have developed new strategies in the face of vacancies that allow them to assert as much or more control over administrative policymaking during vacant periods. Second, because presidents can garner greater influence over agency policymaking through the use of non-Senate confirmed appointees, presidents may have an incentive to delay nominations and to leave Senate-confirmed positions vacant for lengthy periods of time. This will especially be the case as the costs in time and resources of confirmation increase over time and helps to explain the declining pace at which presidents make nominations \citep{lewis_very_2021}. Finally, presidents are resilient in their ability to assert control over administrative agencies in the face of constraint from the Senate. Rather than increased confirmation delays and decreased Senatorial deference in the appointments process shifting power away from presidents, presidents have found alternative means to exert influence. This provides presidents with enormous unilateral authority that is at odds with our separation of powers system of government.
