The Electoral and Public Opinion Consequences of Political Misconduct

By

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For my father

Acknowledgements

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Table of Contents

List of Tables

List of Figures

Chapter 1: Introduction

Political candidates campaign on and officeholders highlight policies that benefit the lives of their (future) constituents. Yet, political figures routinely engage in rent-seeking behavior, shirk numerous laws and norms, and hold outwardly moral positions that they privately ignore when it is convenient. Oftentimes these behaviors are concealed until well after a politician leaves office (or they are never made public), but sometimes the news media reveals the misdeeds of active politicians. Research on revelations of wrongdoing or scandals involving active officeholders has primarily centered on evaluations of politicians who are directly implicated and how they perform in elections after damaging revelations come out. This dissertation, contributes to a growing literature that examines the downstream consequences of malfeasance and scandal. In the following three chapters, I (1) assess how the role of hypocrisy in moral scandals involving members of the United States Congress (MoC) shapes opinions towards the party with which individuals identify; (2) how cases of presidential misconduct that have been investigated by an oversight body not only impact the incumbent party's performance, but may reshape the political party system as a whole; and (3) how those in voluntary and compulsory voting systems may abstain or invalidate their ballot at different rates when the incumbent president is implicated in malfeasance compared to clean incumbents.

These three chapters present evidence that wrongdoing involving politicians is not some mere frivolous political event, but rather one that shapes public opinion and political behavior of the mass public. Chapter 2 provides evidence that a single political scandal involving an individual politician can boost or reduce evaluations of one's own political party in a highly polarized party system. Furthermore, shifts in party evaluations are contingent upon who is

involved in the scandal (a co-partisan versus out-partisan) and the character of the scandal (hypocritical or not ostensibly hypocritical). In this study of public opinion dynamics in the United States, I find that hypocrisy is particularly distasteful for Republicans when the hypocrite is in the in-party, but Republicans feel better about their own party when a Democratic politician behaves hypocritically.

I shift to the Latin American context in Chapters 3 and 4, in which democracy is far less developed and the party system is far less robust (although polarized on different dimensions in many countries). In Chapter 2, I find that the public rejects parties whose presidents have been involved in malfeasance. Mass publics appear to be drawn towards new options (perhaps headed by familiar figures) and the playing field becomes more crowded. This suggests that party systems fragment and become more unstable as presidents are revealed to be involved in wrongdoing. Finally, Chapter 3 provides evidence that compulsory voting systems may result in an overall higher level of valid voting turnout, but when incumbents are malfeasant, on average, a larger percentage of the electorate opts to cast an invalid vote than when incumbents are clean. In voluntary voting systems, rates of invalid voting and overall turnout do not appear to be affected by incumbent malfeasance either way. These results may be unsatisfying—at least in voluntary systems it does not appear that incumbent malfeasance pushes voters to disengage, but it does not seem to inspire them either. In compulsory systems, on the other hand, if one ignores invalid voting and focuses exclusively on turnout it would appear that we would have the same story as those in voluntary systems—no difference in turnout regardless of incumbent malfeasance. However, focusing on invalid balloting, and overall valid participation, uncovers a depressing relationship with malfeasance in compulsory systems. When incumbents are malfeasant, the gap in valid participation is statistically indistinguishable between compulsory

voting systems and voluntary ones. The rest of this introduction chapter provides a summary of the core chapters (Chapters 2-4) and Chapter 5 provides detailed methodology for how I built the Latin America (EWLA) database used in Chapters 3 and 4.

Summary of Chapters

Chapter 2: Scandal, Hypocrisy, and Resignation: How Partisanship Shapes Evaluations of Politicians' Transgressions

Hypocrisy is a common feature of political scandal. Yet, it is unclear how individuals evaluate hypocritical misconduct differently based on a transgressing politician's partisan identity. Using survey experiments and with a focus on U.S. public opinion, this chapter assesses how exposure to different frames of wrongdoing involving actual members of congress spill over on to the evaluation of parties distinctly among co-partisans and out-partisans. I find that Republicans feel more positive towards their party after reading about the resignation of a hypocritical co-partisan politician compared to merely reading about the politician's hypocrisy. In addition, Republicans feel warmer about their party when reading about a hypocritical versus non-hypocritical out-party transgression. However, Democrats do not change their party evaluations after being exposed to different scandal frames involving co-partisan and out-partisan politicians. This suggests that Republicans and Democrats have different attitudes towards hypocrisy and/or differently apply information about individuals when evaluating parties.

Chapter 3: Publicized Presidential Wrongdoing and Party System Instability

Wrongdoing committed by individual politicians may reflect not only onto evaluations of their party, but their party's performance in elections. Presidential misconduct is particularly subject to close scrutiny by the press and blame attribution tends to be heightened. Yet, presidential elections are also distinct from other electoral contests because presidents are term limited and often are unable to run for reelection. This means that accountability for an incumbent's malfeasance often can only occur for the party rather than the president herself. Voters may punish the incumbent party if it is unable to disentangle itself from a malfeasant incumbent president, but a new candidate may be able to distance herself from an incumbent implicated in misconduct. If the incumbent party loses support, there may be additional downstream consequences for the party system as new parties and candidates can capitalize on weak incumbents. I test my theory using a novel dataset of executive wrongdoing in 18 Latin American countries occurring under 70 presidential terms between 1998-2020 (the Executive Wrongdoing in Latin America—EWLA dataset). I find that the incumbent party of malfeasant presidents is indeed more likely to lose support compared their clean incumbent counterparts. Furthermore, following wrongdoing by an incumbent president, presidential elections become more volatile and fragmented compared to when the president is clean. This suggests that presidential malfeasance not only damages the incumbent party's electoral prospects, but also has the potential to reshape party systems.

Chapter 4: Exit Through the Back Door: How Compulsory Voting Shapes Electoral Participation After Malfeasance

When incumbent politicians are implicated in misconduct the public may not only alter their evaluations of and votes for parties, but they may also alter their behavior in elections. Consequently, the revelation of malfeasant behavior may depress voter turnout as the public is not only disillusioned with the incumbent but rather the electoral process. Further complicating the participation calculus is the institutional framework of compulsory voting, which may constrain those who would prefer to abstain rather than turnout. Those in compulsory systems who would prefer to abstain, but do not want to incur the costly sanctions have another exit option—invalid voting. I hypothesize that those in voluntary systems should be more likely to exit through abstention while those in compulsory systems should be more likely to exit through invalid voting when incumbents are implicated in wrongdoing compared to clean incumbents. I test these ideas using the EWLA dataset introduced in Chapter 3. I find no significant difference in voter turnout when incumbents are clean versus malfeasant either in voluntary or compulsory systems. However, those in compulsory systems are more likely to cast an invalid ballot when the incumbent president is malfeasant compared to clean incumbents. The same is not true for those in voluntary systems. This suggests that although incumbent malfeasance does not seem to inspire or demobilize in voluntary systems, it may push many to disengage in compulsory systems not through the "front door" by abstaining but through the "back door"—by invalidating their ballot.

Chapter 2: Scandal, Hypocrisy, and Resignation: How Partisanship Shapes Evaluations of Politicians' Transgressions

In a 2009 interview with CNBC, then-congressmen Tom Price admonished his Democratic colleagues for the use of expensive private jets, stating "this is just another example of fiscal irresponsibility run amok in Congress" (Pramuk 2017).[1] Eight years later, the media revealed that Price, acting as Donald Trump's first Secretary of Health and Human Services, had taken at least two dozen trips with private and military jets to Europe and Asia at the cost of around $1 million dollars in taxpayer money. Left-leaning journalist Rachel Maddow gleefully reported the story, including details about Tom Price using the private jets to have lunch with his son (Maddow 2017). Meanwhile, a slew of Republican politicians criticized Price's actions (Fox 2017), and within two weeks of the first story, Price resigned from his position (Gambino 2017).

The journalists who uncovered Tom Price's use of taxpayer-funded private jets created a mediated political scandal, which can be defined as an action or event that transgresses values, norms or moral codes that is made public by the news media and provokes reactions from disapproval to outrage (Esser and Hartung 2004; Lee 2018; Thompson 2000). As the scandal unfolded, journalists who referenced Price's prior statements on private jets highlighted his hypocrisy, or "inconsistency between claimed behavior and actual behavior" (C. A. J. Powell and Smith 2013, 414). Hypocrisy is a common feature of political scandal. It can characterize misconduct from politicians of all ideological and partisan stripes from "family values"

Republican and former Louisiana Senator David Vitter, who faced revelations that he had solicited prostitutes, to former Florida Democratic congresswoman and public servant Corrine Brown, who took $1 million from a fake charity meant to provide scholarships for poor children.

Drawing from two actual political scandals involving US members of congress from both major political parties, this chapter tests how partisans evaluate parties after being exposed to the different stages of a hypocritical scandal—an initial scandal, revelations of hypocrisy, and when a hypocritical scandal is followed by a censuring response by same-party leaders. This chapter makes two primary contributions to the literature on the spillover effects of political scandals. First, I test how different features of scandal spill over on to party evaluations distinctly among co-partisans and out-partisans. Second, I assess how party evaluations change after a scandal ends in party-sanctioned resignation. I find that Republicans feel more positive towards their party after reading about the resignation of a hypocritical co-partisan politician compared to merely reading about the politician's hypocrisy. Furthermore, I find that Republicans feel warmer about their party when reading about a hypocritical versus non-hypocritical out-party transgression. However, Democrats do not change their party evaluations after being exposed to different scandal frames involving co-partisan and out-partisan politicians. This suggests that Republicans and Democrats have different attitudes towards hypocrisy and/or they differently apply information about individuals when evaluating parties.

Political Scandal, Spillover Effects and Hypocrisy

There is widespread evidence that political scandals may damage the evaluations of politicians involved in those scandals (Carlson, Ganiel, and Hyde 2000; Doherty, Dowling, and Miller 2011, 2014; Funk 1996; McDermott, Schwartz, and Vallejo 2015; Żemojtel-Piotrowska et al. 2017). The negative effects of scandals involving individual politicians can also have

7

consequences for evaluations of political parties associated with scandal-ridden politicians (Lee 2018; Maier 2011; Schwarz and Bless 1992; von Sikorski, Heiss, and Matthes 2020). These "spillover effects" of political scandals occur when an individual's interconnected cognitions are activated and people associate one target with another (Lee 2018). For example, when a politician is hypocritical, people not only evaluate the individual poorly, but they also negatively appraise the politician's party (von Sikorski and Herbst 2020).

Spillover effects of scandals may not be uniformly distributed in the United States as political evaluations are increasingly viewed through a partisan lens (Iyengar, Sood, and Lelkes 2012; Iyengar and Westwood 2015; Jacobson 2013; Mason 2015). Scandals represent actions or behavior that may be incongruent to co-partisans, who routinely engage in motivated reasoning, rejecting incongruous information and only accepting information which conforms to their beliefs (Erisen, Redlawsk, and Erisen 2018; Fischle 2000; Redlawsk 2002; Taber and Lodge 2006). Previous literature on hypocrisy and political scandal has found that hypocritical scandals are judged more harshly than non-hypocritical scandals (McDermott, Schwartz, and Vallejo 2015), but it is unclear whether *partisans* would evaluate hypocritical and non-hypocritical scandals differently. Some suggest that scandals may erode support among the politician's supporters (von Sikorski, Heiss, and Matthes 2020), but others find supporters of scandalous politicians retain their support (Fischle 2000). The additional information of hypocrisy in a scandal may cause co-partisans to reach an affective tipping point (Redlawsk, Civettini, and Emmerson 2010), or co-partisans may discount hypocrisy (Redlawsk 2002). This leads to two competing expectations: compared to a scandal without hypocritical information, exposure to a scandal with hypocritical information will result in lower party evaluations among co-partisans (H1a), or hypocritical

information will be disregarded and will not significantly lower party evaluations among co-partisans (H1b).

As a scandal involving an individual politician develops, party leaders sometimes encourage her to resign. In theory, co-partisans will assimilate the congruent information about the removal of a hypocritical politician, and dismiss the incongruent information about the hypocritical scandal itself (Taber and Lodge 2006). Therefore, I expect that co-partisans will evaluate their party more positively when they are exposed to the successful purge of a hypocritical politician from office compared to when they are merely exposed to a politician involved in a hypocritical political scandal (H2).

Exposure to information about out-party scandals, especially those that feature hypocrisy, ought to be perceived as a boon for out-partisans in the context of an affectively polarized society. Out-partisans can even experience schadenfreude—pleasure at another's misfortune—when exposed to embarrassing mishaps involving out-party politicians (Schurtz et al. 2014), which can boost group esteem (Ouwerkerk and van Dijk 2014). This suggests that, while a scandal committed by a politician from one party may increase party evaluations of a different party (Lee 2018), a hypocritical scandal could bolster party evaluations even more. Thus, I hypothesize that exposure to information about a hypocritical scandal committed by an out-partisan politician will enhance positive feelings towards one's party more than exposure to a scandal without hypocrisy (H3).

Research Design

To test my hypotheses about scandals, hypocrisy and resignation, I fielded two studies on Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) that exposed participants to information about actual members

of congress who had each been involved in a sex scandal.[2] After participants consented to taking

a Qualtrics survey, they were asked their party identification and level of news consumption.[3] Then

participants were randomly exposed to one of three experimental treatments. Study 1's (N = 507)

experimental stimulus focused on a scandal involving Tim Murphy, a conservative Republican

congressman from Pennsylvania, and Study 2 (N = 504) exposed participants to information about

a scandal involving John Conyers, a liberal Democratic congressman from Michigan.[4]

Participants in each study were randomly assigned to parts or all of the following text:

Study 1:

<u>Tim Murphy, a Republican congressman from Pennsylvania, admitted to having an extramarital affair with a personal friend in September 2017.</u> **Murphy is a member of the House Pro-Life Caucus in Congress and has voted to impose more restrictions on abortion access. News emerged that he pressured his mistress to get an abortion during a pregnancy scare.** *After House GOP leaders and senior Republicans put pressure on Murphy to step down, he resigned in early October.*

Study 2:

<u>John Conyers, a Democratic congressman from Michigan, was accused of sexual harassment by several women in November and December 2017.</u> **Conyers had previously cosponsored legislation which helped assist victims of sexual assault and domestic violence. The women, some of whom had worked for Conyers, say that among other things, Conyers groped and propositioned them for sex.** *After House Democratic leaders and other senior Democrats put pressure on Conyers to step down, he resigned in early December.*

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[2] I consulted both local and national news sources to obtain information for both studies. I read articles from *CNN*, *NPR*, *NBC News*, the *New York Times*, *Washington Post*, *Time*, *Politico*, and *Pittsburgh-Post Gazette* on Tim Murphy's scandal. For information on John Conyers' scandal, I read articles from *The New Yorker*, *Atlantic*, *Washington Post*, *New York Times*, *Politico*, *Huffington Post*, *NBC News*, *LA Times*, *Milwaukee Journal Sentinel*, and *Click on Detroit*. Both studies condensed the news down to 1-3 sentences depending on the treatment (more details below).

[3] In order to qualify for the study, participants had to be both U.S. citizens and at least 18 years of age. I used the standard question on partisanship from the American National Election Study (ANES). If participants reported that they were a Democrat or Republican, a follow up question asked about strength of partisanship. If participants indicated that they were an Independent or from another party, they were subsequently asked if they thought of themselves as closer to the Democratic or Republican Party.

[4] Full details of the recruitment and screening procedures for both studies can be found in the Appendix. Following Kennedy et al. (2020), I eliminated all respondents whose IP addresses denoted they were outside of the United States, and whose IP addresses indicated that they were using a VPS (Virtual Private Server).

The first group was randomly assigned to only receive the underlined text (scandal condition), the second group was given the underlined text and the bold text (hypocrisy condition), and the third group was given the entire text (resignation condition).[5] Thus, in Study 1, all participants were aware of Murphy's party affiliation and extramarital affair, but only some participants saw Murphy's incongruity of past actions and current behavior. Further, only those in the third group saw that members of his party effectively pushed him to resign.[6] These two studies were meant to complement each other, and I did not have any expectations as to differences between how co-partisans of different parties would react given the disdain hypocrites face in general (Jordan et al. 2017; Laurent et al. 2014; C. A. J. Powell and Smith 2013).[7]

After reading the text, all participants were asked to evaluate the political parties on a "feeling thermometer"—a 101-point scale where 0 indicates very cold feelings towards the party, 50 indicates indifference and 100 indicates feeling very warm towards the party. Participants were first asked about the party of the target politician, so those in Study 1 were first asked about the

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[5] Randomization appeared successful as likelihood ratio tests from multinomial logit regressions of the treatment assignment on participants' observable characteristics were not statistically significant (Study 1: Wald $\chi^2_{(16)} = 11.3$, p = .88; Study 2: Wald $\chi^2_{(16)} = 15.5$, p = .63) see Table A2.4 in the Appendix.

[6] The news of Murphy's affair first broke on September 6, 2017, subsequent developments about pressures for abortion were reported in October, and Murphy resigned on October 21, 2017. Study 1 was conducted on November 17-18, 2017, thus taking place 27 days after Murphy's resignation. Initial reports that Conyers settled a sexual harassment case with a staffer in 2015 emerged on November 21, 2017, more women came forward in late November, and Conyers resigned on December 5, 2017. Study 2 was conducted 88 days after Conyers' resignation on March 2, 2018.

[7] I chose cases in which politicians violated norms of the party, abortion in Study 1 and sexual harassment/assault in Study 2, which should be more relevant to co-partisans of the politician. In the 2016 ANES Election Study, a majority of Republicans and leaners (57%) said that abortion should never be permitted or only permitted in the case or rape or incest and nearly 60% of Democrats and leaners say a woman should always be able to obtain an abortion as a matter of personal choice. Conversely, Democrats had an average of 71 on a feeling thermometer asking about the #metoo movement, far warmer than Republicans who averaged 26 according to the 2018 ANES Pilot Survey. If I had swapped the parties, for example having a non-prototypical pro-life Democrat pressure a mistress to get an abortion, I would not expect Democrats to feel worse about their party, and I would expect that Democrats would feel far better about their party after this hypothetical Democrat resigned. Furthermore, I might anticipate that Republicans would feel better about their own party after witnessing out-party hypocrisy, but experiencing out-party hypocrisy of a *pro-life* Democrat might not generate warmer feelings of the Republican Party among Republicans.

Republican Party and those in Study 2 were first asked about the Democratic Party. Participants were then asked the same feeling thermometer question about the out-party of the target politician. These questions serve as my main dependent variables.

This study builds on previous experimental work manipulating frames from real political scandals (Cortina and Rottinghaus 2017; Maier 2011), but I employ a vignette approach similar to scholars who have investigated the effects of political scandals committed by hypothetical politicians (Bhatti, Hansen, and Olsen 2013; Botero et al. 2015, 2019a, 2019b; Doherty, Dowling, and Miller 2011, 2014; McDermott, Schwartz, and Vallejo 2015; Winters and Weitz-Shapiro 2013, 2015; Żemojtel-Piotrowska et al. 2017). The vignette format exposes experimental participants to the most pertinent information, akin to headlines or sub-headlines, at different stages of scandal— the initial scandal, second-order transgressions, and resolution. Furthermore, this format may reduce recall of other details of the scandal because of the brevity of the treatment compared to a newspaper article.[8] Nevertheless, using actual political events may run the risk of pretreatment, which may bias against finding significant effects (Druckman and Leeper 2012).

Results

I first test if individuals feel less warm towards their own political party after being exposed to a co-partisan politician engaging in hypocritical transgression compared to a co-partisan

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[8] Maier (2011) exposed experimental participants to a bogus news article about an actual scandal that broke a few months before his study was carried out. He found that few participants mentioned the scandal in an open-ended question about scandal recall, and removing participants who indicated they knew about the scandal prior to the treatment did not affect the results of his study. Unfortunately, I did not ask about knowledge of the scandals in either study, but following the treatment and questions about the dependent variables for Study 2, I asked if participants could identify Conyers' race. I assume that those who knew his race were more likely to be familiar with the scandal. To test if knowledge about Conyers' race affected the results, I created interacted a dummy variable where 1 was equal to correctly identifying Conyers' race and 0 was equal to incorrectly identifying Conyers' race, saying they do not know or having an invalid response. Removing respondents who knew about Conyers' race did not affect the results of Study 2 (see Appendix Tables A2.20-A2.22).

politician who merely transgressed without apparent hypocrisy. To assess this proposition (H1), I conducted difference-in-means tests of feeling thermometer evaluations of the target's co-partisans in the first scandal condition to co-partisans in the hypocrisy condition.[9] In Study 1, I find that, on average, Republican identifiers and leaners feel cooler towards their own party in the hypocrisy condition (56.9 degrees) compared to the baseline scandal condition (62.3 degrees), but this difference is shy of statistical significance (t = 1.19 & p = .10 in a one-tailed test). Similarly, I find that Democrats and leaners are slightly cooler upon being exposed to the hypocrisy condition (59.3 degrees) compared to in the baseline scandal condition (62.6 degrees) in Study 2, but again this difference is not statistically significant (t = 1 & p = .16 in a one-tailed test). These results suggest that hypocrisy did not create an affective tipping among partisans of the target, suggesting that partisans discounted the additional negative information of hypocrisy.[10]

To test if co-partisans feel better about their party after they are exposed to party leaders' successful purging of the hypocritical politician (H2), I again compared the means of feeling thermometer ratings of the target's co-partisans, but this time in the hypocrisy condition to the resignation condition. In Study 1, I find that Republicans feel 8.9 degrees more warmly towards their own party (t = -2.28; p <.05 in a one-tailed t-test) between evaluations of the Republican Party in the hypocrisy versus the resignation treatment (see Figure 1). In Study 2, however, the resignation treatment and the hypocrisy treatment produce nearly identical feeling thermometer

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[9] In all subsequent analyses, I pooled together participants who report that they were partisans and partisan leaners, excluding pure independents and those who support other parties from the analysis. In Study 1, 85.2% of eligible participants (N = 432/507) and in Study 2, 85.9% of eligible participants (N = 433/504) were partisans or partisan leaners. Summary statistics are included in the Appendix (Table A2.1-A2.2).

[10] While one might expect the initial scandal condition to be lower for co-partisans of the target because they are exposed to negative information about him, I find that there are no significant differences in feeling thermometer means for partisans in the scandal condition of the two studies. That is, Republicans and leaners average feeling thermometer ratings are 62.2 in Study 1 and 59.3 in Study 2 (t = .66 & p = .75 in a one-tailed t-test). Similarly, Democrats and leaners average feeling thermometer ratings are 62.5 in Study 2 and 64.1 in Study 1 (t =.48 p = .32 in a one-tailed t-test). Thus, the baseline scandal treatment does not appear to boost feeling thermometer evaluations of the out-party of the scandalous politician nor dampen feeling thermometer evaluations of the in-party.

ratings for Democrats (t = -0.03 & p = .49 in a one-tailed t-test), suggesting that Democratic leaders' pressure and Conyers' resignation was not enough to make them feel more warmly towards their party.

Figure 2.1: Predicted Values of Ratings of the Republican Party Among Republicans (Study 1)

Note: Confidence intervals for means are at the 90% level.

Figure 2.2: Predicted Values of Ratings of the Democratic Party Among Democrats (Study 2)

Note: Confidence intervals for means are at the 90% level.

Why were Republicans more sensitive to the treatments than Democrats? Various studies have found that conservatives and Republicans value loyalty and authority more than liberals and Democrats (Graham, Haidt, and Nosek 2009; Rempala, Okdie, and Garvey 2016; Severson 2018). Thus, Republicans may have felt strong sense betrayal after exposure to group norm violations when reading about hypocrisy, but a sense of justice after observing co-partisan leaders "correcting" the violation. Differences in the stimulus may have also contributed to diverging results in the two studies. The hypocrisy treatment in Study 1 included information about an affair and novel information about the congressmen pressuring his mistress to have an abortion. However, in Study 2, the hypocrisy treatment included information about harassment, but the additional information was about the severity of the transgression. Furthermore, going against the congressional caucus of which one is a member (Study 1) may be seen as a greater betrayal than behaving inconsistently with a single piece of legislation (Study 2).

My final hypothesis (H3) anticipates that out-party partisans evaluate their own party more positively when observing a hypocritical scandal versus a non-hypocritical scandal by an out-partisan politician. I compared feeling thermometers of the out-party for out-partisans of the target in the scandal and hypocrisy conditions using difference-in-means tests. Figures 3 and 4 present the results for Study 1 and Study 2, respectively. While in both studies out-partisans move in a positive direction, only in Study 2 do Republicans experience a statistically significant boost in feelings of their party, moving from 59.3 to 68 degrees on the feeling thermometer (t = -1.87 & p <.05 in a one-tailed t-test). Again, I find that Republicans appear more sensitive to the treatment than Democrats. Despite the evidence that both Democrats and Republicans "loathe" their opponents (Iyengar, Sood, and Lelkes 2012), some work has found that Republicans have stronger

bias against Democrats, and feel more positive when seeing the Democratic Party fail than vice

versa (Iyengar and Westwood 2015; Zillmann and Knobloch 2001).[11]

Figure 2.3: Predicted Values of Ratings of the Democratic Party Among Democrats
(Study 1)

Note: Confidence intervals for means are at the 90% level.

Figure 2.4: Predicted Values of Ratings of the Republican Party Among Republicans (Study 2)

Note: Confidence intervals for means are at the 90% level.

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[11] The Appendix contains additional tests for robustness. In general, results remain robust to regressing the interaction between a dummy variable for Democrats and Republicans (excluding pure independents, but including leaners) and the treatments for each hypothesis (a) including demographic controls, (b) excluding respondents from the media market of the member of congress, (c) interacting for knowledge of the race of Conyers in Study 2, and (d) removing respondents who knew of Conyers race in Study 2 (Tables A2.17-A2.22).

Finally, I explore two additional tests of my theory. First, I test how strength of partisanship conditions reactions to scandal, hypocrisy, and resignation of scandalous politicians. Those with strong priors (i.e. strong partisans) have been shown to be stronger motivated reasoners than those with weaker priors (i.e. weak partisans and partisan leaners), and more resilient to change in attitudes towards their party after experiencing incongruent information (Taber and Lodge 2006). I anticipate that strong partisans will discount a hypocritical political scandal compared to a non-hypocritical political scandal, leading to no difference in party evaluations between the two conditions (extending H1b). However, weak partisans and leaners will be more likely to change and reach an affective tipping point (Bisgaard 2015; Gaines et al. 2007; Redlawsk, Civettini, and Emmerson 2010) (extending H1a). I expect that strong partisans will boost their party evaluations more than weak partisans and leaners in the resignation condition compared to the hypocrisy condition (extending H2), and as out-partisans in the hypocrisy condition compared to the scandal condition (extending H3) because strong partisans prioritize directional goals more than weak partisans and leaners (Schaffner and Roche 2017).

I test these extensions of my hypotheses by regressing the feeling thermometers on the interaction between the treatment and strength of partisanship.[12] The results are underpowered, but reveal some interesting differences between strong and weak partisans and leaners. First, the results of H2 in Study 1 appear to be driven by weak partisans (increasing from 53.8 to 60.9 degrees, $t = -1.36$, $p < .1$ in a one-tailed test). Next, although I found no evidence for H3 in Study 1 among all Democrats, leaners experience a statistically significant increase in party evaluations from 45.7 to 56.4 degrees ($t = 1.62$, $p < .1$ in a one-tailed test). In Study 2, I found no evidence for

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[12] For ease of interpretation, I present the results from t-tests comparing the treatment conditions to each other among strong, weak and leaning partisans. See Tables A2.5-A2.10 in the for full results of the regressions, and Figures A2.1-A2.6 for predicted values from regressions in the Appendix.

H1a for all Democrats, but breaking the results down by strength of partisanship, I find that those leaning Democratic experience a huge drop in party evaluations from the scandal condition to the hypocrisy condition (moving from 55.5 to 36.3, $t = 3.4$, $p < .01$ in a one-tailed test). Finally, I find that the boost out-group members feel towards their party after exposure to a hypocritical scandal compared to a non-hypocritical scandal of an out-party politician is driven by weak Republicans (increasing from 51.3 to 64.5 degrees, $t = 1.5$, $p < .05$ in a one-tailed test) in Study 2. Altogether this suggests that those with weaker attachments are more sensitive to congruent and incongruent information than strong partisans.

Secondly, I probe how news exposure affects how partisans interpret the different treatments. The most politically interested and knowledgeable tend to double down on their attitudes and are more likely to engage in motivated reasoning (Erisen, Redlawsk, and Erisen 2018; Taber and Lodge 2006).[13] Thus, I expect that co-partisans who pay closer attention to the news are more likely to discount information on hypocrisy than those who pay less attention (H1b), are more likely to embrace information about a co-partisan hypocrite's resignation (compared to hypocritical scandal) (H2), and are more likely to boost party evaluations when exposed to a hypocritical (versus non-hypocritical) out-party politician (H3). To test this, first I created a dummy variable of news exposure where those who say they follow the news very closely are coded as 1, and those who follow the news somewhat, not very or not at all closely are coded as 0. Then I regressed the feeling thermometer evaluations for each hypothesis on the interaction of news exposure and the treatments. Only one of the interactions is statistically significant in a one-tailed test ($p < .05$). For H1 in Study 1, Republicans who follow the news very closely had a higher

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[13] Ideally, I would include a measure of political awareness or political knowledge through a battery of factual knowledge questions. However, unfortunately, my studies did not include these kinds of questions. While self-reports news consumption may be a unsatisfying proxy for political awareness (Price and Czilli 1996; Zaller 1992), I expect that those who pay closer attention to the news are more likely to be political interested and politically aware.

feeling thermometer of the Republican Party in the non-hypocritical scandal condition (70.8) compared to the hypocrisy condition (56.1), but those who did not follow the news very closely had nearly identical feeling thermometer ratings for the two treatments (57.3 and 57.5). This suggests that politically aware individuals were *more* sensitive to treatments, but this pattern does not hold for the other hypotheses (see Appendix Figures A2.7A-A2.12 and Tables A2.11-A2.16).

Discussion and Conclusions

Political scandals involving individual politicians have the potential to damage evaluations of a politicians' party (Lee 2018; von Sikorski, Heiss, and Matthes 2020). This study employs vignette experiments that draw on actual political scandals. Although this may enhance external validity, it also has its limitations. First, respondents may be pretreated with information about the political scandal, thus attenuating treatment effects (Druckman and Leeper 2012). Second, vignette experiments may not replicate how respondents would gain information about scandals in the real world despite the use of a real-world scandal. Future work could overcome these limitations by employing an article format (cf. Carlson, Ganiel, and Hyde 2000; Cortina and Rottinghaus 2017; Maier 2011; von Sikorski and Herbst 2020). Moreover, these two studies recruited via Amazon MTurk, whose pool is more diverse than other convenience samples, but tends to be younger, more male, less religious, more educated, and more liberal than the US population (Boas, Christenson, and Glick 2020; Levay, Freese, and Druckman 2016).[14] While an MTurk sample produces a valid Sample Average Treatment Effect (SATE) (Coppock and McClellan 2019), future work should test the hypotheses on a more representative sample.

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[14] See Table A2.3 in the appendix that compares the pooled MTurk sample to the 2018 ANES Pilot Study.

In the polarized two-party system of the United States, spillover effects of scandals differ significantly depending not only on the politician involved, but also on who is evaluating the politician. There was a large gap in party evaluations between Republicans who were exposed to the hypocritical transgression and those who read about the resignation of the hypocritical co-partisan politician. Furthermore, Republicans felt significantly warmer towards their own party when reading about a hypocritical transgression than non-hypocritical scandal committed by a Democratic politician. Yet, Democrats did not feel significantly differently about their party after exposure to both in-party and out-party hypocritical scandals. Future work should investigate if attitudes towards hypocrisy differ by partisans from the two parties, how strength of partisanship shapes evaluations of hypocritical behavior from individual politicians, and how partisans from different parties may assimilate attitudes towards individuals into groups.

Chapter 3: Publicized Presidential Wrongdoing and Party System Instability

What are the downstream consequences of presidential wrongdoing for the party system and national elections? Presidents, like other politicians, sometimes engage in rent-seeking behavior or abuse of office by taking undeclared campaign donations, embezzling state funds, and surveillance of political opponents, among other acts. Much of the research on presidential misconduct focuses on intra-electoral consequences related to the president herself. This work assesses how wrongdoing may hurt approval ratings and increase the likelihood of challenges by civilian or legislative actors, sometimes resulting in impeachment or other types of interruptions to a presidency (e.g. Carlin, Love, and Martínez-Gallardo 2015; Hochstetler 2006; Hochstetler and Edwards 2009; Kim and Bahry 2008; Pérez-Liñán 2007; Reyes-Housholder 2019). Meanwhile, some scholars theorize that presidential wrongdoing has consequences that reverberate beyond the president to the nature of the party system itself (Seawright 2012). This paper builds on those intuitions by considering the connection between publicized presidential wrongdoing and party system instability and fragmentation. In doing so, I extend scholarship that challenges the perils of presidentialism (Linz 1990), by recognizing that instability in Latin American democracies may stem not from regime change nor from presidential breakdown (Hochstetler and Edwards 2009; Kim and Bahry 2008; Pérez-Liñán 2007), but rather from within the domain of the party system and elections**.**

Most work on the relationship between publicized wrongdoing and electoral consequences has centered on national legislative and subnational mayoral actors. Many scholars have found that these incumbents incur an electoral penalty when their wrongdoing is widely publicized in the news (Chang, Golden, and Hill 2010; Costas-Pérez, Solé-Ollé, and Sorribas-Navarro 2012; Ferraz and Finan 2008). Others, however, have demonstrated that legislators and

mayors are punished quite weakly for publicized wrongdoing and many continue to win reelection (Bågenholm 2013; Fernández-Vázquez, Barberá, and Rivero 2016; Peters and Welch 1980; Welch and Hibbing 1997). These mixed results may be due to lower clarity of information and visibility associated with these offices. In contrast, widely publicized misconduct that directly involves presidents facilitates blame attribution and information acquisition, two of the biggest obstacles to electoral accountability (Jiménez and Caínzos 2006; De Vries and Solaz 2017). Yet, more often than not, presidents are ineligible for reelection, which means that voters most often can only hold the incumbent *party* accountable for malfeasance rather than the incumbent president herself.

To the degree that voters enact retribution on an incumbent party for a president's malfeasant behavior, there are potential repercussions for the stability of the party system as a whole. This is because presidents play outsized roles in shaping party systems (Mainwaring and Bizzarro 2018; Samuels and Shugart 2010). Party systems become more volatile and crowded as presidents dilute their brand by abandoning their party's traditional policy platform (Lupu 2016; Roberts 2013). A party's reputation may also be tainted by presidential misconduct (Baker et al. 2016). In these contexts, party systems may fragment and destabilize because voters are drawn to new politicians and political parties who capitalize on disenchantment with malfeasant incumbents (Engler 2016; Seawright 2012).

To test these propositions, I focus on presidential wrongdoing in the Latin American region. I employ a new database of wrongdoing in the executive branch in 18 Latin American countries in from 70 presidential terms between 1998-2020. I find that incumbent parties experience a loss in vote share when an incumbent president's investigated wrongdoing is exposed by the news media. Moreover, the presidential party system becomes more volatile and

22

fragmented in elections that follow a presidential term marked by wrongdoing compared to a term characterized by a clean incumbent president. Further, this increase in volatility comes from new parties entering and old parties exiting the system, rather than competition between existing parties. In sum, I find that investigated wrongdoing of an individual president tends not only to damage the electoral prospects of her party, but it also increases the instability of the party system as whole by opening up space for new parties and additional viable candidates in presidential elections.

Defining Publicized Wrongdoing

Publicized wrongdoing by a politician encompasses behavior that (1) is unlawful, involves an abuse of power, and/or breaks with norms or morals of a society, and (2) is revealed to the public by the media.[15] This includes a myriad of behaviors that may fall within the categories of corruption (i.e. embezzlement, bribery and nepotism), financial misconduct (i.e. tax evasion and campaign finance violations), abuse of power (i.e. illicit surveillance of political opponents), but may also include things such as sexual misconduct (i.e. sexual assault and infidelity). This definition of wrongdoing is quite similar to scandal, which encapsulates many of the same behaviors, but as a concept publicized wrongdoing does not require public outrage and condemnation as in many definitions of scandal (Thompson 2000).[16] All acts of corruption, often defined as the abuse of public office for private gain (Fisman and Golden 2019), fit under the umbrella of publicized wrongdoing when they are made public through the media. However, not

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[15] Throughout this paper, I use wrongdoing, misconduct, malfeasance, and their derivatives interchangeably.
[16] Nyhan's (2015, 2017) concept of media scandal is similar to the concept of publicized wrongdoing used in this paper. However, it requires that newspapers specifically refer to a controversy or episode of misconduct as a scandal. Publicized wrongdoing, as operationalized in this paper, does include cases of wrongdoing referred to as "*escándalo*" in Spanish media, but these events are not exclusively called "*escándalo*." Publicized wrongdoing is often coded by a specific act of "*nepotismo*" (nepotismo), "*malversación*" (embezzlement or misappropriation), etc.

all wrongdoing is necessarily corrupt (i.e. tax evasion as a private citizen or certain types of sexual misconduct), but must be made public by the media in order to be "publicized."

Politicians who engage in wrongdoing attempt to keep the behavior hidden from the public's view, yet journalists uncover wrongdoing in numerous ways. They follow prosecutors and regulators who look into irregularities in contracts, investigate judicial inquiries into politicians, and analyze information from auditing agencies that uncover discrepancies in government spending. In addition, informants, whistleblowers, rival politicians, and even administration officials may contact journalists directly (Casas-Zamora and Carter 2017). Reporters then publish news about misconduct in physical and online newspapers and discuss them on television and radio programs. Sometimes stories of politicians' wrongdoing linger in the press for weeks and months, while other times the press moves on much more quickly (Mitchell 2014).

News reports on wrongdoing may appear to be a valiant act of horizontal accountability as the public is made aware of bad behavior of politicians and can use this information when choosing candidates at the ballot box (Balán 2011). However, whether or not wrongdoing is exposed by the news media depends on a few things. First, although most politicians attempt to portray themselves as honest, some may be more likely to engage in misconduct both while in office or prior to holding office. Politicians may be represented by parties implicated in corruption networks or have a reputation for abuse of office. Individual politicians may be connected to illicit activities or have engaged in corruption in the private sector prior to their political career. Second, beyond their penchant for bad behavior, some politicians may be more vulnerable to having their wrongdoing exposed. Where intraparty competition is intense,

government insiders may denounce members of their own coalition to compete for political power (Balán 2011).

Journalists and other contextual factors influence how the news media reports on misconduct. Some have highlighted the collusion between the news media with the political opposition in publicizing wrongdoing (Nyhan 2015). This suggests that a strong opposition can increase the chances of the broadcasting of an act of wrongdoing by the news media. Moreover, journalists have their own agenda of ambition themselves, and often seek out damaging information involving presidents when they are particularly unpopular such as when they enact unpopular policies or during economic downturns. As some damaging information emerges about a president, journalists may deepen investigations as part of a "feeding frenzy," leading to investigations and even impeachments (Pérez-Liñán 2007). Conversely, exogenous events such as natural disasters and celebrity events may cause news congestion, leading to less coverage of wrongdoing (Nyhan 2015). Subsequent election outcomes may not cause wrongdoing, but the strength of the opposition and economic performance may influence whether wrongdoing is reported. I address these issues of endogeneity in my analyses.

Politicians' Wrongdoing and Accountability

Why should a politician's wrongdoing matter to voters? Voters seek out politicians who will implement policies that improve voters' welfare, and hold politicians responsible for past actions (Manin, Przeworski, and Stokes 1999). The public may react negatively towards malfeasance because politicians who enrich themselves signal that they are looking out for themselves and are not putting their resources into policymaking to benefit their constituents (Bågenholm and Charron 2014; Johnston 1986). Furthermore, malfeasance may (in)directly affect voters' welfare when politicians avoid paying their fair share of taxes or directly raid

25

public coffers (cf Fernández-Vázquez, Barberá, and Rivero 2016). When the public deems politicians' misconduct as strongly violating norms, they also receive more psychological benefits from increasingly costly punishment (Martin 2019).

Presidents should be particularly susceptible to costly punishment for malfeasance by the electorate. Presidential wrongdoing almost exclusively benefits the president and her inner circle so it is rarely welfare enhancing for the majority of the population. In hyper-presidential systems, such as in Latin America, presidents have a more consequential impact on everyday citizens' lives than legislators (Golden 2006). This may create optimal conditions for blame attribution attached to both the president and the party. Furthermore, not only is motivation for accountability heightened, but blame attribution is clearer by the importance and visibility of the office. The national news media closely covers misconduct involving the president, especially when she is being investigated by an oversight body. Contrast this to a widely publicized case of wrongdoing that implicated multiple members of the British Parliament—the 2009 House of Commons expenses scandal, in which over 90% of voters heard of the scandal, but more than half of voters were unaware whether their MP was implicated (Pattie and Johnston 2012; Vivyan, Wagner, and Tarlov 2012). Wrongdoing involving the president does not require voters to take the extra step to figure out who should be held responsible as with legislative misconduct. The high stakes of presidential elections and the presidency may motivate individuals to blame not only the president, but also the party responsible for the outcome. A malfeasant act by a highly visible politician like the president may damage party prospects because of the politician's close tie to the party brand (Baker et al. 2016). This leads me to the following hypothesis:

If an incumbent is implicated in wrongdoing, her party should be more likely to lose support in a subsequent presidential election compared to a clean incumbent president's party **(H1)**.

Even if informational constraints and blame acquisition should be less of an obstacle to accountability for presidential malfeasance by voters compared to misconduct committed by subnational and legislative actors, presidential electoral contests may complicate accountability in other ways. Mayors and legislators are often able to run in multiple consecutive elections, presidents tend to face more significant term limits. This means that presidential elections most often involve new candidates competing under the incumbent party's label and the party rather than the individual president will face accountability by voters. When an incumbent president is implicated in misconduct, the party's new presidential candidate could purposively distance herself from the incumbent president. Indeed, Basinger (2013) finds that although incumbent US congressmembers embroiled in misconduct experience a reduced vote share and have a lower probability of winning reelection, the incumbent party does not lose support when a new candidate competes in place of the malfeasant incumbent. In addition, there is some evidence that suggests parties may be resilient to malfeasance attributed to incumbent presidents: parties are more likely to break down when presidents engage in policy switches and have poor economic performance, but are less to likely to break down following misconduct by an incumbent president (Lupu 2016). This suggests that incumbent parties may be able to weather the storm of publicized wrongdoing.

Party System Change and Publicized Wrongdoing

Because presidents are the most powerful and visible political leaders in a country, their actions in office can have serious consequences for the entire party system beyond their individual party. Presidentialism nationalizes parties, which may impede the development of

party organizations and potentially reduces mass partisanship (Samuels and Shugart 2010). Party

identification with the president's party has also been found to decline when presidents dilute

their party brand by taking policy positions that go against their party's traditional platforms,

resulting in a more fragmented party system (Lupu 2014, 2016). Moreover, when presidents

from traditional left-leaning parties in Latin America adopted "bait-and-switch" policies in the

1990s and 2000s, party systems became unstable as electoral volatility spiked (Roberts 2013).

As the national news media closely covers misconduct involving the president and voters

become aware of this behavior, cases of serious presidential wrongdoing can potentially

influence the stability of the party system. A party may experience a drop in partisan

identification and a weakening of their linkages to society when an incumbent president—

arguably a party's most visible leader—is implicated in wrongdoing (Baker et al. 2016; Balán

2014).[17] This can open up space for new political movements or existing establishment parties to

capitalize on a wounded incumbent party. The public may perceive that mainstream opposition

parties are part of the same ecosystem that produced a malfeasant incumbent president. When an

incumbent is implicated in misconduct, people are more likely to believe that all politicians care

only about themselves (Bowler and Karp 2004). Furthermore, the public may begin to think of

all parties as equally malfeasant when both the incumbent party and previous ruling party are

associated with malfeasance (Snegovaya 2020). When establishment parties are tainted by high

levels of corruption, the political space can open up for outsiders and newcomers (Carreras 2012,

2017). Indeed, following publicized wrongdoing involving incumbent presidents in Peru and

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[17] Despite a strong economy and general commitment to their left-leaning policies Brazil's Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT) brand became associated with dishonesty during the presidencies of Lula and Dilma Rousseff compared to their reputation as corruption fighters in the 1990s. The PT had many cases of wrongdoing during Lula's term, but the president himself was never investigated for his role in Mensalão. During Rousseff's term, conversely, Lula's legal troubles ballooned, and Dilma Rousseff was impeached for her association with the Odebrecht corruption scheme.

Venezuela in the 1980s and 1990s, respectively, presidential candidates won large swathes of the vote competing under new party labels (Seawright 2012). However, establishment parties are also more likely to have developed party organizations with roots in society. Even when an incumbent party is perceived as malfeasant, voters may be risk averse and prefer establishment options over untested ones (Morgenstern and Zechmeister 2001). That is, sometimes voters may opt for the devil the know, but other times they go with the saint they do not.

If voters respond to incumbent misconduct by punishing the incumbent (**H1)**, they will seek out alternative options from either new movements or establishment parties, and votes should shift substantially. A key indicator that assesses party system and stability and change is electoral volatility, which measures the change in vote shares of parties between elections. Thus, I posit the following hypothesis:

> Electoral volatility will increase in the subsequent presidential election following a presidential term marked by publicized wrongdoing compared to terms in which presidents are not implicated in wrongdoing **(H2).**

Electoral volatility has been recently theorized and conceptualized as having two distinctive parts—party replacement volatility and stable party volatility (Cohen, Salles Kobilanski, and Zechmeister 2018; Mainwaring, Gervasoni, and España-Najera 2017; E. N. Powell and Tucker 2014; Weghorst and Bernhard 2014). Party replacement volatility calculates the shift in vote shares of new parties entering and old parties exiting the party system between elections. Stable party volatility measures the shift in the vote share among existing parties. An increase in party replacement volatility in response to malfeasance would provide evidence that voters are abandoning establishment parties and voting for brand new options. An increase in stable party volatility would suggest that voters are moving their support from some establishment parties to others. New parties

should benefit more if voters associate establishment parties with a corrupt political class. Establishment parties should benefit if voters see them as a more honest alternative to the incumbent, and voters value their electoral and political experience to untested options. This leads me to the following hypotheses:

> Party replacement volatility will increase in the subsequent presidential election following a presidential term marked by publicized wrongdoing compared to terms in which presidents are not implicated in wrongdoing **(H3a).**

> Stable party volatility will increase in the subsequent presidential election following a presidential term marked by publicized wrongdoing compared to terms in which presidents are not implicated in wrongdoing **(H3b).**

Presidential misconduct may also be related to the fragmentation of the party system. As presidential wrongdoing potentially damages party brands and reduces partisan identification with the incumbent party, voters will be eager to seek out cleaner alternatives. On one hand, multiple shrewd political entrepreneurs may decide to run for president, capitalizing on a scenario in which an incumbent is weakened by publicized wrongdoing. If so, the public may split their vote among several viable candidates and the election will result in a more fragmented party system. On the other hand, even as numerous options emerge, voters and political elites may coordinate on one or two viable candidates to ward off splitting the vote to defeat a malfeasant incumbent. This leads me to the following competing expectations:

> More viable presidential candidates in the subsequent presidential election will emerge in response to presidential wrongdoing compared to presidents not implicated in misconduct **(H4a).**

> Fewer viable presidential candidates in the subsequent presidential election will emerge in response to presidential wrongdoing compared to presidents not implicated in misconduct **(H4b).**

To summarize, I expect that voters will be repelled by wrongdoing involving the incumbent party, which should influence their voting decision making. Voters should be more likely to punish the incumbent party as even a new incumbent candidate will be tainted by misconduct from the outgoing president. This should cause voters to seek out different options, leading to higher levels of electoral volatility and previously inexistent parties may become particularly enticing. Multiple candidates will be attractive to voters, leading them to split their vote among several options. Alternatively, voters may not punish the incumbent party if they do not associate wrongdoing from an outgoing president with a new candidate. Even assuming voters punish wrongdoing, the alternative framework I put forward suggests voters may be more inclined to support established political parties because they are better equipped to capitalize on voters' discontent, and voters should be more likely to coordinate on few options in order to defeat the tarnished incumbent party.

Data

Operationalizing Publicized Wrongdoing under Investigation

Cross-national data collection of publicized wrongdoing is a challenging endeavor because it requires gathering news coverage that is consumed by eligible voters in the various Latin American countries. One approach could be to use national newspapers, which would undoubtedly cover investigations into presidential wrongdoing. However, newspapers have a particular editorial line, and may cover more (less) wrongdoing of president with which they have an adversarial (cordial) relationship. To get a balanced ideological profile of newspapers would require consulting multiple newspapers per country, which is challenged by the lack of digitization of newspapers in the region, especially over multiple decades. Several scholars have used the Latin American Weekly Report (LAWR)—a weekly publication that collates some of

31

the biggest news stories in the Latin American region and has been covering the region since the late 1960s—to collect data on scandals in the region (Carlin, Love, and Martínez-Gallardo 2015; Pérez-Liñán 2007; Reyes-Housholder 2019). The LAWR is an excellent resource, but is a weekly versus daily resource and does not cover all countries every week (see the discussion in Chapter 5). To overcome the limitations of national newspapers and LAWR, I collected data on presidential wrongdoing using two of the biggest newswire services in the world—EFE (Spanish Newswire Services), and the Spanish edition of the Agence France Presse (AFP—French Newswire Services) using the News archive site Nexis Uni (formerly LexisNexis).[18]

I employed Nexis Uni to do a guided search of both EFE and AFP to code investigated wrongdoing. Since these sources were both in Spanish, I used Spanish language keywords (and their derivatives) to uncover wrongdoing and restricted my search to a presidents time in office at any point prior to the subsequent presidential election (See Chapter 5 for details).[19] I then manually went through search results, recorded cases of wrongdoing directly involving the president, and determined which wrongful behavior was investigated by at least one oversight body.[20] I define oversight broadly as investigative bodies ostensibly independent from the president. These include the attorney or prosecutor general, judiciary (including the Supreme Court and Electoral Courts), comptroller general, congress, and anti-corruption bodies.[21] Like

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[18] See the Building the Executive Wrongdoing in Latin American Database chapter for details on why I opted for these data and wh.

[19] I did this in order to avoid coding any cases of wrongdoing that voters would be unaware of prior to the next election as many presidents in my dataset had serious cases of wrongdoing *after* their presidencies. This sometimes led to their conviction and arrest including Tony Saca in El Salvador (2004-2009), Alan Garcia in Peru (1985-1990; 2006-2011), and Lula da Silva from Brazil (2003-2010), among several others.

[20] The Executive Wrongdoing in Latin America (EWLA) dataset also includes cases of wrongdoing involving other members of the executive (the vice president, cabinet members, political appointees of state companies), and close family members (first ladies/gentlemen, children or siblings). The data also includes allegations or accusations that turned up in the search which are not investigated by an oversight body (the majority of cases).

[21] Cases of wrongdoing that were investigated by an oversight body tend to be more credible than mere allegations and typically last longer in the press than non-investigated wrongdoing. They may be less political than unsubstantiated claims in the press, but may still be partisan/political and are likely to have a bigger political impact

other work, I include cases that are investigated regardless of whether they are formerly accused, indicted, or convicted (Klašnja 2017).

I opt to use a dummy variable for publicized wrongdoing committed at any point in the presidency, rather than focusing on the timing of the allegation. Some scholars of accountability have found that voters are myopic, punishing or rewarding incumbents for good performance shortly before an election (Achen and Bartels 2016). Although a few studies have found that voters may be more punitive of malfeasance or when it is revealed later in a politician's term (Costas-Pérez, Solé-Ollé, and Sorribas-Navarro 2012; C. Pereira, Melo, and Figueiredo 2015; M. M. Pereira and Waterbury 2019), others have found timing less important for punishment of incumbent misconduct (Bågenholm and Charron 2020).

I include wrongdoing at any point in the term for three reasons. First, cases of wrongdoing are not a one-shot affair (Casas-Zamora and Carter 2017). An exemplar of publicized wrongdoing unfolding over time is the illegal campaign finance scheme involving Costa Rican president Abel Pacheco. The media revealed that his campaign had taken illegal contributions from a foreign businessman under investigation in the United States early in his presidency in 2002. In 2003, it was revealed that the campaign had received money from Taiwan and Switzerland, and in 2004, from the French telecom company Alcatel. Second, I only code cases of publicized wrongdoing that were investigated by some oversight body. Typically, an oversight body only opens up an investigation after an initial report is disseminated by the news media. For example, Guatemalan President Otto Pérez Molina (2012-2016) was investigated by the Congress in the last full year of his term (2015) months after his vice president's advisor was previously thought to be the ringleader of a customs bribery scheme. Lastly, as others who have

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(i.e. impeachments or derailing legislation). They may represent a "most likely" case for finding a relationship between wrongdoing and the dependent variables I analyze in this chapter.

used a similar coding scheme point out, older cases of wrongdoing may reemerge during elections (Kumlin and Esaiasson 2012). The opposition have incentives to dredge up dirt to benefit themselves electorally, as cases of misconduct can ostensibly damage the electoral prospects of an incumbent.

Dependent Variables

I test the relationship between publicized wrongdoing and five dependent variables—the change in the vote share of the incumbent party, total electoral volatility, party replacement volatility, stable party volatility, and the change in the effective number of presidential candidates (ENPC). I use and update the Latin American Presidential and Legislative Elections (LAPALE) dataset for all four of these variables (Cohen, Salles Kobilanski, and Zechmeister 2018). To calculate the change in vote share of the incumbent, I identified the incumbent party in election *t,* and calculated difference between the incumbent vote share in the first or only round of presidential election *t* and the incumbent's vote share in the previous presidential election *t –* *1*. Identifying the incumbent party involves implementing some decision rules. In Venezuela, Mexico, and the Dominican Republic voters may select from multiple parties for the same presidential candidate. In these countries, I code the entire vote share for the incumbent candidate representing the main party of the coalition in election *t* and *t – 1*.[22] If an incumbent's party changed names, split or merged from a coalition between *t – 1* and *t*, I followed Mainwaring (2018) in treating clear successor parties as the incumbent party in election *t*.

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[22] For example, to calculate the incumbent vote share for Mexico in 2018, I took the difference between incumbent PRI candidate José Antonio Meade's entire vote share 2018 (including votes that went to coalition partners from Partido Verde and Alianza) and Enrique Peña Nieto's entire vote share in 2012 (including votes from coalition partner Partido Verde).

Next, in order to measure party system change, I use electoral volatility and its component parts (party replacement and stable party volatility). Electoral volatility measures the change in vote shares obtained by individual parties between elections $t – 1$ and t, aggregated across all parties (Pedersen 1979). Party replacement volatility "measures shifts in vote shares among parties that newly entered competition at time t, as well as parties that exited competition between time $t – 1$ and t" and Stable party volatility "calculates volatility in vote shares among established parties" (Cohen, Salles Kobilanski, and Zechmeister 2018, 1018–19).[23] The main analyses use the original Pedersen (1979) measure (total electoral volatility) as well as the party replacement and stable party measures.

Finally, to measure fragmentation I again used the LAPALE data, which calculates the effective number of parties in presidential elections, adapting the classic formula from Laakso and Taagepera (1979), which as Jones (1999) describes is "N = 1/(sum of the squared vote share for every candidate in the first or only round of the presidential election)" (175). As with calculations of the incumbent vote share, I consider the sum of the vote share for each candidate, rather than each party that received votes separately in countries where candidates can receive votes from multiple parties. This ensures that I am not overstating the number of candidates in countries like the Dominican Republic, where while only five candidates competed in the 2020 presidential election, 27 parties received votes. As above, rather than using the effective number of presidential candidates in election t as my dependent variable, I take the difference between the effective number of presidential candidates in election t and $t – 1$. With this first difference

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[23] Again, rather than employing the exact coding of scheme of Cohen et al. (2018) who consider any party as new after a name change, merger, or split, I adopt Mainwaring's (2018) more candidate-based coding scheme. Using Mexico as an example, PAN is coded as part of Type B volatility from 2012-2018 using the total vote share for the PAN in 2012 and PAN-PRD-MC coalition in 2018. Bolivia's MAS is also considered part of the Type B volatility calculation even though it ran as a coalition with IPSP in 2009, but not in 2005.

measure, I can assess the relationship between fluctuations in fragmentation between elections with my publicized wrongdoing.

Additional Control Variables

My main dependent variables are all dynamic so I limit additional control variables to those that vary between elections.[24] My first two controls address concerns of endogeneity—wrongdoing has been found to be reported more when the economy is doing poorly and it is more likely to be investigated when horizontal accountability institutions are strong. In addition, a rich body of literature has demonstrated a direct connection between poor economic outcomes, a reduction of support for the incumbent and higher electoral volatility (Lewis-Beck and Ratto 2013; Murillo and Visconti 2017; Powell, Jr. and Whitten 1993; Remmer 1991; Roberts and Wibbels 1999; Singer 2013 but see Cohen, Salles Kobilanski and Zechmeister 2018; Mainwaring and Bizzarro 2018). In the main analysis I include a control for GDP growth from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) averaged over the year prior to the election and the year of the election following previous work (Singer 2013).[25] To address concerns that wrongdoing is more likely to be investigated when the judicial and legislative branches are stronger, I control for a horizontal accountability obtained from the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) project averaged over the presidential term. Strong legislatures and judiciaries are more likely to

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[24] This effectively omits the inclusion of institutional variables given the stability of institutions between elections. The relationship between institutions and electoral volatility (and its subcomponents) in legislative and presidential elections has had limited evidence (Mainwaring and Bizzarro 2018; Mainwaring, Gervasoni, and España-Najera 2017; E. N. Powell and Tucker 2014). A number of studies have looked at the relationship between institutions and the effective number of electoral parties (Golder 2006; Hicken and Stoll 2008; Jones 1999), but I am interested in what is associated with the *change* in the effective number of presidential candidates. Nevertheless, results remain robust to institutional controls and non-dynamic dependent variables in Table A3.10 in the Appendix.

[25] In the appendix, I present models that control for logged inflation (data from IMF) or unemployment (data from the World Bank/International Labor Organization) instead of GDP growth. In addition, I include a fully saturated model with all three economic measures. My substantive conclusions do not change with the use of these different economic measures (Table A3.5-A3.7).

investigate wrongdoing uncovered by the media and hold the president accountable for her actions (Helmke 2010; Kim 2014; Pérez-Liñán 2014).[26]

I also include controls for idiosyncrasies in presidential elections and among presidential terms. First, I control for whether the incumbent candidate was running for reelection. Many Latin American countries specifically prohibit consecutive reelection of particular candidates.[27] However, the rules of reelection have been changed in many cases, and popular presidents in Latin America have often successfully expanded term limits throughout their term (Corrales 2016; Corrales and Penfold 2014). In free and fair elections from 1997-2020, when incumbent candidates have been able to (either through rule changes or existing rules) they *always* run for reelection, with the exception of one case.[28] This suggests that running for reelection may be endogenous to one's popularity, and the likelihood of victory in a subsequent election. An incumbent president running for reelection has also been shown to reduce the effective number of candidates in elections (Jones 1999, 2004). I include a dummy variable for the incumbent candidate running (1 if they run for reelection 0 if they do not), regardless of whether their eligibility for running changed based on a rule change or was due to existing rules.[29]

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[26] In El Salvador, when Francisco Flores (1999-2004) and Tony Saca (2004-2009) were in power, the horizontal accountability score was only around .55 out of 1. Both presidents were later accused of wrongdoing after their presidencies ended. Compare this to Brazil, which scored between .81-.91, where in two of the five terms included, wrongdoing was investigated by an oversight body.

[27] For example, Mexico, Paraguay, and Guatemala offer no reelection of former presidents. In Uruguay and Chile presidents can run for reelection after sitting out of an election that follows their term.

[28] Although constitutionally eligible to run for reelection, Néstor Kirchner decided not to run. Instead the first lady Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner, ran for election in 2007 and was largely seen as continuation of Kirchner's political vision for Argentina. This means that 94% of the time when a president was eligible to run for reelection, they did (16 out of the 17 opportunities).

[29] Between 1997-2020, rule changes permitted the reelection (and victory) for Fernando Henrique Cardoso in 1998, Álvaro Uribe in 2006, Rafael Correa in 2009, Evo Morales in 2009, Daniel Ortega in 2011, and Danilo Medina in 2016. Omitting these presidencies from my analysis does not change the substantive conclusions of my analysis. Juan Orlando Hernández successfully expanded term limits in Honduras in 2015 from no re-election to unlimited reelection, but Honduran elections have not been considered at least moderately free and fair since 2009.

The analyses for volatility and fragmentation include elections in which the incumbent party does not field a presidential candidate. When an incumbent does not participate in an election, this may bias towards more party replacement volatility as a party that won enough votes to either win in the first or second round of presidential election is no longer participating. Indeed the mean of party replacement volatility is over 30 points higher for elections in which the incumbent party does not participate compared to when they do. Thus for these analyses, I include a dummy variable for whether the incumbent party is running.[30] On the other end of the spectrum, in the 70 elections that I analyze, eight presidents did not finish their terms because of impeachment or some other form of removal.[31] Because a presidential removal could substantially weaken the party and prospects for future elections, I control for whether an interim (or more than one interim) president finished out a presidential term in all analyses.[32]

Finally, I include the incumbent vote share and fragmentation in previous elections as controls. Wrongdoing may have a different effect on the change in incumbent vote share or level of fragmentation, respectively, when incumbents won (more) less votes and parties were (more)

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[30] I also run analyses without these observations in Table A3.3. Substantively there are few differences between the results including all elections compared to excluding cases in which the incumbent party does not run.

[31] The eight presidents include Argentina's Fernando De la Rúa (1999-2001), Bolivia's Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada (2002-2003), Brazil's Dilma Rousseff (2010-2016), Ecuador's Jamil Mahuad (1998-2000) and Lucio Gutierrez (2003-2005), Guatemala's Otto Pérez Molina (2012-2015), Paraguay's Raúl Cubas (1998-1999) and Fernando Lugo (2008-2012). Investigated publicized wrongdoing was reported the administrations De al Rúa, Rousseff, Mahuad, Gutierrez, Pérez Molina and arguably Cubas. However, it was only directly related to the removal of Rousseff and Pérez Molina. There is a marginally significant positive correlation of presidential removal and wrongdoing ($r = .21$ and $p < .1$), but 26 of the 32 presidents implicated in wrongdoing finished out their terms. Omitting all elections in which an incumbent party did not field a candidate and elections following an interim presidency did not change the substantive conclusions of my analyses (see Table A3.4 in the appendix).

[32] All presidents who were removed were replaced by same-party members or political independents with three exceptions. Fernando de la Rúa from the Radical Party was replaced by Peronist Adolfo Rodríguez Saá (who himself was quickly replaced by Eduardo Duhalde), Dilma Rousseff from the PT was replaced by PMDB member Michel Temer, and Fernando Lugo who was elected representing the Christian Democrats (PDC) under the Alianza Patriótica por el Cambio (APC—Patriotic Alliance for Change) was replaced by Liberal Federico Franco of the Partido Liberal Radical Auténtico (PLRA—Authentic Radical Liberal Party), formerly part of the APC. Two elected presidents Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada and Fernando de la Rúa were replaced by interim presidents, who were both later replaced by another interim president.

less fragmented in previous elections (Krause and Méndez 2009; Powell, Jr. and Whitten 1993).

I also control for the lagged effective number of candidates when I analyze electoral volatility, as

party systems that are more fragmented may also be more volatile (Mainwaring and Bizzarro

2018; Mainwaring, Gervasoni, and España-Najera 2017; E. N. Powell and Tucker 2014).

Publicized Wrongdoing Under Investigation Across Time and Between Countries

       There was at least one case of presidential wrongdoing under investigation in 32 terms, or

about 46% of all terms.[33] Figure 1 shows the average rate of wrongdoing preceding elections

between 2000-2020, divided up into five periods with between 13 and 15 elections in each

period.[34] The figure shows that at least 60% of the elections between 2000-2008 were marked by

serious wrongdoing by the incumbent. This was followed by a drop in incumbent wrongdoing

preceding elections between 2009-2015 to less than 22%, and increase to over 60% in the most

recent elections (2016-2020). It is difficult to draw major conclusions about wrongdoing over

time considering that each country has around four elections in the dataset. After the drop

between 2009-2015, elections in the past five years (2016-2020) have had several incumbents

that have been tied to the Odebrecht scandal, perhaps accounting for the high incidence of

wrongdoing (see Table 1A in the Appendix).[35] There is a high of variation both between and

within countries. Some countries have multiple presidential terms with wrongdoing (notably

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[33] Among presidential terms where there was wrongdoing, there were few cases in which I uncovered more than one case of wrongdoing. Occasionally, when a president was removed or resigned related to wrongdoing, the interim president also was implicated in wrongdoing by the media. This happened most notably during the term of Raúl Cubas and Luis González Macchi (1998-2003) in Paraguay and Dilma Rousseff and Michel Temer (2014-2018) in Brazil. Details of each case of wrongdoing per presidency can be found in Table 1A in the appendix.
[34] The time periods are 2000-2004, 2005-2008, 2009-2011, 2012-2015, 2016-2020.
[35] The Odebrecht scandal is named after Latin America's largest construction conglomerate, the Brazilian-based company Odebrecht. Odebrecht was found by investigators to have engaged in large-scale bribery in multiple Latin American countries in exchange for contracts (Gallas 2019). Multiple Latin American presidents have been tied to the scandal including Ollanta Humala and Alejandro Toledo from Peru, Juan Manuel Santos from Colombia, Juan Carlos Varela from Panama, among others.

Argentina with every term in the data and Panama in three of four terms), but others did not have

any cases of wrongdoing (Uruguay and El Salvador).[36]

Figure 3.1: Percent of Presidential Terms Marked by Publicized Wrongdoing

Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics

VARIABLES	Mean	SD	Min	Max	N
Δ Incumbent Party Vote Share	-0.102	0.156	-0.461	0.292	63
Total Electoral Volatility	0.401	0.197	0.0415	0.961	70
Party Replacement Volatility	0.237	0.188	0	0.725	70
Stable Party Volatility	0.164	0.100	0.0055	0.454	70
Δ Effective Number of Candidates	0.120	1.053	-3.165	3.102	70
Publicized Wrongdoing	0.457	0.502	0	1	70
Incumbent Candidate Running	0.229	0.423	0	1	70
GDP Growth (IMF)	3.712	2.336	-2.322	10.10	70
Horizontal Accountability (V-Dem)	0.711	0.220	0.248	0.971	70
Incumbent Vote Share (t)	0.371	0.171	0.023	0.639	70
Incumbent Vote Share ($t-1$)	0.447	0.108	0.206	0.639	70
Effective Number of Candidates ($t-1$)	3.145	1.104	1.986	6.810	70
Interim President(s)	0.114	0.320	0	1	70
Incumbent Party Running	0.886	0.320	0	1	70

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[36] It bears repeating that this does not necessarily signify that these presidents committed no wrongdoing during these terms, but rather it was not uncovered nor investigated by external oversight bodies. This is especially pertinent to El Salvador in which three of the four presidents (Franisco Flores, Antonio Saca and Mauricio Funes) in the dataset have had serious legal troubles stemming from wrongdoing committed within their presidencies but prosecuted after they finished their term. Nevertheless, while they were president they did not face any serious accusations of wrongdoing.

Table 3.1 shows descriptive statistics of all variables in the analyses. There appears to be an incumbency disadvantage for the incumbent party in presidential elections in Latin America as the average change incumbent vote share is over -10%.[37] This is consistent with what scholars have found in Latin America and other developing democracies for lower level executive elections (Klašnja 2015; Klašnja and Titiunik 2017). However, there is substantial variation: the worst performing incumbent lost over 46% of the vote share between elections, while the best gained nearly 29%. Electoral volatility is rather high overall, and party replacement volatility varies substantially between presidential terms. Finally, change in the effective number of candidates has a mean near zero, yet the standard deviation is quite high and range is quite big. As a first test to see if there is a relationship between presidential wrongdoing under investigation, I present box plots in Figure 3.2. The boxes marked clean represent presidential terms without any publicized wrongdoing under investigation, and the boxes marked wrongdoing have at least one instance of investigated misconduct. Figure 3.2 shows suggestive evidence that compared to clean presidencies, parties of malfeasant incumbents fare worse in subsequent elections, and these elections have higher electoral volatility and effective parties.

Table 3.2: Correlation Matrix of Dependent Variables

Variables	Inc Vote	Total Vol	Party Replace	Stable	ENPC
Inc Vote					
Total Vol	-0.29*				
Party Replace	-0.11	0.87*			
Stable	-0.36*	0.34*	-0.18		
ENPC	-0.57*	0.03	0.06	-0.04	

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[37] This variable only contains elections in which the incumbent party fields a candidate. Including elections with no incumbent party candidate overstates the level of punishment that parties incur, because at election *t* their vote share is effectively 0. Among the eight elections where the incumbent party did not field a candidate, five elections were marked by publicized wrongdoing by the incumbent president. However, the overall correlation between an incumbent party running for re-election and publicized wrongdoing by the incumbent president is relatively low and not statistically significant (r = -.12, p = .318). This suggests that incumbent parties tainted by malfeasance were not necessarily deterred from running in a subsequent election. Incumbent *candidates* in most Latin American countries are restricted by term limits, but there are no restrictions on parties running in consecutive elections.

Figure 3.2: Box Plots of the Dependent Variables and Presidential Wrongdoing

Methods and Analysis

To further test the relationship between publicized wrongdoing of the incumbent candidate and my dependent variables, there are a few important issues to consider with the structure of the data. The data are time series cross-sectional (TSCS), where the unit of analysis—presidential elections—is nested within the 18 countries.[38] Each country has at least two elections in the data, with some countries having up to five elections represented in the data.[39] I carry out a series of OLS regression analyses with the dependent variable as the first

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[38] Only 17 countries are included in the analyses of incumbent party vote change. Peru is excluded because incumbent parties did not compete in the three elections (held since the authoritarian period of Alberto Fujimori (2006, 2011, 2016). However, the volatility and fragmentation analyses include the Peruvian cases omitted from the incumbent party vote share change, along with four other elections in which incumbent parties did not compete (Colombia 2002, Ecuador 2002, Guatemala 2011, and Colombia 2018).

[39] The data cover presidencies between 1998-2020, so some of the variation in number of elections between countries is due to the length of the president's term. For example, Mexico has six year presidential terms, Chile shifted from a six year term to a four year term after Lagos' presidency (2000-2006), Guatemala has four year terms, and Paraguay has five year terms. In addition, Venezuela, Honduras, and Nicaragua all only have two elections

differences between the incumbent vote share and ENPC, and the measures of electoral volatility (total volatility, stable party volatility and party replacement volatility). Rather than using Panel Corrected Standard Errors (PCSE), I employ cluster-robust standard errors. This is because I have more countries than elections in any particular countries, which suggests that temporal dependence between observation should not be a major concern (Engler 2016). I follow Cohen, Salles Kobilanski and Zechmeister (2018) and do not include country fixed effects because of the small number of overall cases, and only two cases from some individual countries.[40]

I first test the relationship between publicized wrongdoing and change in vote share for the incumbent party. Table 3.3 Models 1 and 2 present the results of OLS regressions where the change in incumbent vote share is regressed on the dummy variable for wrongdoing committed in the previous presidential term. These results provide support for **H1**: incumbent parties experience a drop in vote share of about 5.5 percentage points ($p < .1$) when the incumbent candidate is embroiled in misconduct that has been investigated compared to a clean incumbent. When an interim president finished out a presidential term, incumbent parties tend to suffer. However, incumbent parties benefit substantially when the incumbent *candidate* is running for re-election. Incumbent candidates Hugo Chávez, who was implicated in embezzlement during his 2000-2006, and Cristina Fernández, who was being investigated for her ties to an illicit campaign finance scheme during her 2007-2011 term, actually earned a higher percentage of the vote in subsequent elections (by 3% and 8.8%, respectively). Independently of reported and investigated cases of wrongdoing, incumbents who face stronger accountability by the judiciary

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included in the data, because the most recent elections held were not considered at least somewhat free and fair by V-Dem (see more on this in footnote 56).

[40] Although temporal dependence or autocorrelation should not be a major concern, I carry out another modeling technique to address any potential autocorrelation. Using Stata 14, I used xtset with the panel variable as country and time variable as election number. I then ran the main analyses using generalized least squares with panel specific autocorrelation corrections, assuming each panel is homoskedastic. Results remain robust to this specification (Appendix Table A3.2).

and legislature tend to experience a steeper drop in vote share compared to those who are less

constrained by these other branches of government.

Table 3.3: Change in Incumbent Party Vote Share, Total Volatility and Wrongdoing

VARIABLES	(1) Inc Vote	(2) Inc Vote	(3) Tot Vol	(4) Tot Vol
Wrongdoing	-0.101**	-0.0554*	0.155***	0.114***
	(0.0363)	(0.0310)	(0.0431)	(0.0332)
Incumbent Candidate Running		0.137***		0.0976*
		(0.0307)		(0.0484)
GDP Growth		0.00846		-0.00202
		(0.00546)		(0.00570)
Horizontal Accountability		-0.113**		0.0195
		(0.0466)		(0.101)
Interim Finished Term		-0.120**		0.188**
		(0.0524)		(0.0772)
Incumbent Party Runs				-0.186***
				(0.0246)
Lagged ENPC				0.0511**
				(0.0200)
Lagged Incumbent Vote Share		-0.471*		
		(0.223)		
Constant	-0.0583***	0.0233	0.330***	0.315***
	(0.0196)	(0.0928)	(0.0385)	(0.0972)
Observations	63	63	70	70
R-squared	0.105	0.453	0.156	0.490

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Next, I turn to the analysis of electoral volatility. I anticipated that electoral volatility will

be positively associated with incumbent wrongdoing (H2). Table 3.3 Models 3 and 4 show the

results of a bivariate and multivariate OLS regression in which I regress total electoral volatility

on wrongdoing. The wrongdoing variable is associated with a big jump in electoral volatility

(.114) even after including controls. Electoral volatility is higher when an interim president

finishes out a term, but much lower when the incumbent party fields a candidate for the

presidency. Interestingly, there is higher overall volatility when an incumbent *candidate* is

running (p = .06), but lower volatility when the incumbent party runs.[41] Finally, when more

parties compete in previous elections volatility spikes in future elections, a result consistent with

prior scholarship (Mainwaring and Bizzarro 2018; Mainwaring, Gervasoni, and España-Najera

2017; Roberts and Wibbels 1999).

In countries like Costa Rica, total volatility averaged around .32, but increased by over .2

from between the elections following the relatively clean presidency of Laura Chinchilla (.28) in

2014 and the misconduct tainted presidency of Luis Guillermo Solís (.49) in 2018. Solís was

questioned by Congress for influence trafficking as he facilitated the provision of loans totaling

over $30 million dollars to a real estate developer to import cement from China, in a case

referred to as *Cementazo*. Solís' party obtained 9% fewer votes in the first round of the

subsequent election. Right-wing Evangelical Pastor Fabricio Alvarado from the Partido

Restauración Nacional (National Restoration Party), which had won fewer than 2% of the vote in

2014, won the most amount of votes in the first round with about 25%. Another far-right

candidate Juan Diego Castro, who has been compared to Donald Trump, nearly won 10% of the

vote in the first round of 2018 (compared to .5% of the vote in the 2014), with the *Partido

Integración Nacional* (National Integration Party).[42] Meanwhile, Otto Guevara, longtime

candidate from the right-leaning Libertarian Party, barely got over 1% of the vote in 2018 (after

previously obtaining between 10-20% of the vote in the 2010 and 2014 elections). The election

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[41] Incumbent candidates are associated with higher volatility as voters shift towards new parties enter and abandon old parties rather than shifting votes towards other establishment parties. Yet, when the incumbent party runs, all else equal, there is a lower likelihood that vote shares will shift towards new parties and higher likelihood that established parties will exchange votes (see Table 3).

[42] On December 20, 2017, only about a month and a half away from the February 4, 2018 election, Juan Diego Castro was actually leading in the polls (18%), first round winner Fabricio Álvarado was at a paltry 3%, and incumbent party candidate and eventual winner Carlos Álvarado obtained support from only 5% of the population. Castro's comparison to Trump came from his populist rhetoric, social media use, and his numerous television appearances as a high-profile lawyer (Grosser 2018).

represented a further decay of the Costa Rican party system as two parties that had been created

after 2000 advanced to the second round, and the two traditional parties received even fewer

votes than in the 2014 election.

Table 3.4: Party Replacement and Stable Party Volatility and Wrongdoing

VARIABLES	(1) Party Replacement	(2) Party Replacement	(3) Stable Party	(4) Stable Party
Wrongdoing	0.134***	0.100***	0.0215	0.0136
	(0.0399)	(0.0339)	(0.0227)	(0.0242)
Incumbent Candidate Running		0.0979**		-0.000358
		(0.0359)		(0.0300)
GDP Growth		0.00249		-0.00451
		(0.00688)		(0.00583)
Horizontal Accountability		-0.0338		0.0533
		(0.0941)		(0.0579)
Interim Finished Term		0.140*		0.0480
		(0.0743)		(0.0455)
Incumbent Party Runs		-0.320***		0.133***
		(0.0345)		(0.0274)
Lagged ENPC		0.0256		0.0255**
		(0.0187)		(0.0119)
Constant	0.175***	0.374***	0.154***	-0.0686
	(0.0322)	(0.116)	(0.0148)	(0.0714)
Observations	70	70	70	70
R-squared	0.127	0.490	0.012	0.188

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

I now assess if party replacement volatility, stable party volatility, or both types increase

in response to electoral volatility wrongdoing. Both party replacement volatility and stable party

volatility are correlated with total volatility, but the former's correlation is much stronger (r =

.87, p = < .001) than the latter's (r = .34, p < .01). This suggests that both may increase in

response to wrongdoing. However, since party replacement volatility and stable party volatility

are negatively and non-significantly correlated (r = -.18, p = .14), it is likely that only one may

increase in response to wrongdoing. Table 3.4 Models 1-4 present the results of OLS regressions with clustered standard errors.[43] Models 1 and 2 show consistent support that wrongdoing is associated with an increase in party replacement volatility of .10. The mean level of party replacement volatility in the data is .237, so the coefficient of wrongdoing is nearly half of the mean. For stable party volatility, the coefficient for wrongdoing is positive in both the bivariate model and with controls (Models 3 and 4), but never reaches statistical significance. Overall these results suggest that new parties entering and old parties exiting is what is driving the high rate of electoral volatility rather than competition between stable parties.

The Mexican and Brazilian elections in 2018 highlight how wrongdoing among incumbent presidents can reshape the party system. Prior to the 2018 Presidential Election, the Mexican party system had revolved around the PRI, PAN and PRD dating back to the several years prior to democratization in 2000. However, the PRI's comeback in 2012 with Enrique Peña Nieto was tainted by several cases of wrongdoing, most notably involving the use of government contractors to build a luxury mansion. The winner of the 2018 presidential election, Andrés Manuel López Obrador (AMLO)—who had previously been a stalwart of the left-leaning Partido de la Revolución Democrática (PRD)—won under the recently formed (2014) party Movimiento Regeneración Nacional (National Regeneration Movement—MORENA). In 2018, AMLO's previous party, the PRD, shockingly went into a coalition with center-right PAN, and an Independent, Jaime "El Bronco" Rodríguez, became an important contender in his own right. Party replacement volatility shot up from .04 in 2012 to .491 2018, breaking the pattern of stability of the Mexican party system since democratization in 2000.

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[43] The models where the three volatility variables are the dependent variable include the same control variables in the main analyses, but I control for the lagged volatility variables in the appendix (Table A3.9 in the Appendix).

In Brazil, the 2018 presidential election shook the stability of the Brazilian presidential party system after four consecutive victories of the PT. During her second administration, Dilma Rousseff was impeached for her association with the Odebrecht corruption bribery scheme, and Lula even went to jail in the heat of the 2018 campaign under Michel Temer's interim government. Party replacement volatility in presidential elections increased from .11 in 2014 to .44 in 2018. This was in part due to the rise of far-right congressmen Jair Bolsonaro who had recently affiliated with Partido Social Liberal (PSL—Social Liberal Party) after previous associations with a plethora of other parties. The PSL was a relatively minor party that had competed in legislative elections, but not in the 2014 presidential election. In 2018, it won 45% of the vote in the first round with Bolsonaro as its candidate. Ciro Gomes, also previously associated with several other parties, picked up over 12% of the votes with the left-leaning Partido Democrático Trabalhista (Democratic Labour Party—PDT) that had not run a candidate in 2014. Although the Brazilian legislative party system is notoriously fragmented, the top two presidential contenders from 1994-2014 had been from the PSDB or PT. In the first round of the 2018 presidential election, PT candidate Haddad did come in second place, but he obtained the lowest percentage of votes since Lula ran in 1994. Moreover, PSDB candidate Geraldo Alckmin did not even win 5% of the vote in the 2018 election.

The examples of Mexico and Brazil both highlight elections in which two seasoned politicians joined with new parties, with ultimate success. This poses an interesting question: who are the leaders in new political parties that are capitalizing on discontent with wrongdoing? Some successful parties are led by former members of the incumbent party such as Nayib Bukele in El Salvador. Others were formerly associated with non-incumbent established parties, but went on to form their own parties like Luis Abinader in the Dominican Republic (2020), Álvaro

Uribe in Colombia (2002), and AMLO (2018). Still others had little to no political experience, running with unknown or recently formed parties like Lucio Gutierrez (2003) and Rafael Correa (2007) in Ecuador, Jimmy Morales (2015) in Guatemala, and Fernando Lugo (2008) in Paraguay. Higher party replacement volatility is also heavily influenced by the high vote shares of those who did not ultimately win the presidency. These include other seasoned politicians from previously established parties like Ciro Gomes in Brazil (2018), those who jumped ship from the incumbent party like former president Leonel Fernandez in the Dominican Republic (2020), and new populists like Juan Diego Castro in Costa Rica (2018). This suggests that new parties may be a vehicle for both established politicians and relatively new political figures.

My final analysis tests the relationship between publicized wrongdoing and the change in the effective number of presidential candidates, a related measure to total volatility and another key indicator of party system change. As with previous analyses, I present the results of a bivariate OLS regression (Model 1) and a model with controls (Model 2) in Table 3.5 with standard errors clustered by country. I find support for H4a: more viable candidates emerge in response to incumbent wrongdoing. That is, elites and voters do not appear to strategically coordinate on fewer options in order to take out a malfeasant incumbent (H4b). Unlike previous work, the incumbent candidate running was not significantly related to the change in effective number of presidential candidates. Interestingly, horizontal accountability by other branches of government is associated with higher levels of fragmentation ($p < .1$) although no other control is significant. Wrongdoing is associated with an increase of around .53 of an ENPC between presidential elections. This suggests that presidential elections following incumbent misconduct

become more fragmented compared to clean incumbents. ENPC only increased by over 1 in 3 of

the 35 clean elections, compared to in 10 of the 32 elections marked by serious wrongdoing.[44]

Table 3.5: Change in Effective Number of Presidential Candidates and Wrongdoing

VARIABLES	(1) Δ ENPC	(2) Δ ENPC
Wrongdoing	0.622***	0.529**
	(0.204)	(0.227)
Incumbent Candidate Running		-0.348
		(0.243)
GDP Growth		-0.0290
		(0.0336)
Horizontal Accountability		0.699*
		(0.394)
Interim Finished Term		0.624
		(0.569)
Incumbent Party Runs		-0.181
		(0.771)
Lagged ENPC		-0.466
		(0.273)
Constant	-0.165	1.126
	(0.117)	(1.479)
Observations	70	70
R-squared	0.088	0.341

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

The Paraguayan presidential party system has had a relatively low number of effective

parties, as the dominant Colorado Party and Liberal Party tend to be the primary vote getters.

However, the ENPC increased by 1.6 from 1998 to 2003 following an interim presidency of Luis

Gónzalez Macchi (1999-2003) who replaced Raúl Cubas (1998-1999), himself a victim of

impeachment after only a few months in power. Gónzalez Macchi was nearly removed from

office after being investigated for the acquisition of a luxury bulletproof BMW that entered the

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[44] The correlation between wrongdoing and ENPC (rather than change in ENPC) is also quite high (r = .4). In 6 of the 32 elections marked by incumbent wrongdoing had over 5 ENPC, but only 1 of the 38 elections without incumbent wrongdoing had over 5 ENPC. This suggests highly fragmented electoral contests following wrongdoing.

country illegally and embezzlement of millions of dollars perpetrated by the president and his family. Although the incumbent dominant Colorado Party was still victorious, candidate Nicanor Duarte won less than 40% of the vote. The opposition was split, the Liberal party won around 25% of the vote, compared to over 40% in 1998. Center-Right *Partido Patria Querida* (Beloved Fatherland Party) won over 20% of the vote with Pedro Fadul, and nationalist party *Unión Nacional de Ciudadanos Éticos* (National Union of Ethical Citizens) won nearly 15% of the vote. The Colorado Party also lost its majority in both the Chamber of Deputies and Senate. Compare this to the election in 1998, in which the traditional Liberal and Colorado parties amassed over 98% of the vote between the two parties, and the Colorado Party had a majority in the legislature.

Robustness Checks

The Appendix includes a number of robustness checks. First, as party replacement volatility may be strongly impacted by the absence of competition from an incumbent party because a major competitor has exited the party system, instead of controlling for the incumbent party running, I exclude all elections in which the incumbent party does not run in Table A3.3. The relationship between wrongdoing and total and party replacement volatility remains robust to the exclusion of these elections. Next, Table A3.4 excludes all elections in which an incumbent party is not running for reelection *and* if an interim president finishes out a term. I do this because interim presidents are not necessarily representatives of the incumbent party (i.e. Michel Temer in Brazil and Federico Franco in Paraguay replaced presidents from other parties), and thus may skew towards finding a relationship between wrongdoing and my dependent

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variables. The results remain robust for all five dependent variables at p < .05 with the exception of the change in effective number of presidential candidates.

In the main models, I control for GDP growth, but other work has also assessed the relationship between other economic measures such as inflation and unemployment and my dependent variables (Mainwaring and Bizzarro 2018; Murillo and Visconti 2017; Singer 2011, 2013). Although GDP growth may have indirect consequences for the average voter, inflation and unemployment may be more likely to directly affect them, as high prices and a lack of income can significantly diminish one's quality of life. In Tables A3.5, A3.6, and A3.7, I present the results of three models for each dependent variable (with the full sample of cases): the first includes only inflation instead of GDP growth, the second includes only unemployment, and the last includes all three economic variables. The results remain robust—there is still a statistically significant and substantively similar relationship between wrongdoing and change in incumbent vote share, total volatility, party replacement volatility, and the change in the effective number of presidential candidates.

I test two additional specifications. In Table A3.8, I include an interaction with female incumbency because scholars have found that female presidents pay a higher political price for wrongdoing and poor economic outcomes compared to men (Carlin, Carreras, and Love 2020; Reyes-Housholder 2019). The parties of female incumbents may lose more of the vote share, and elections could be followed by higher volatility and fragmentation.[45] Table A3.8 shows that the interaction of wrongdoing and female incumbents does achieve statistical significance (p < .1) for party replacement volatility and the change in effective number of presidential candidates.

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[45] There are 8 of 70 presidential terms (more than 10%) in which a female is incumbent in my data (Mireya Moscoso from Panama, Laura Chinchilla from Costa Rica, Michelle Bachelet from Chile, Dilma Rousseff from Brazil and Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner from Argentina). Five of the eight terms where females were the incumbent were marked by wrongdoing (compared to 27 of 62 terms in which males were president).

Party replacement volatility is statistically indistinguishable when both male and female incumbents are not implicated in wrongdoing, but it is significantly higher when female incumbents are malfeasant (.39) compared to male incumbents (.27) (see Figure A3.1).[46] In Table A3.9, I include a control for lagged electoral volatility as previous levels of party institutionalization may be associated with publicized wrongdoing in future terms.[47] The wrongdoing coefficient remains significant at $p < .1$ for change in the incumbent vote share, and $p < .05$ for total and party replacement volatility, and change in ENPC.

I also tested to see if wrongdoing's effects were robust to the inclusion of time-invariant institutional controls. I used the incumbent vote share at time t (instead of change in incumbent vote share), effective number of parties at time t (instead of change in effective number of candidates), and the same volatility measures as dependent variables. I include two institutional variables that may be related to my dependent variables—whether the presidential elections follow a plurality or a majority plus runoff rule and if legislative elections are concurrent with presidential elections. The presidential formula has been found to predict the effective number of parties with majority/runoff rules increasing the number of effective number of candidates (Jones 1999, 2004), however this may be contingent on ethnic fractionalization (Golder 2006; Hicken and Stoll 2008). Majority/runoff rules also have implications for electoral volatility and the incumbent vote share in presidential elections as well (Murillo and Visconti 2017). Furthermore, concurrent elections may reduce electoral fragmentation (Murillo and Visconti 2017 citing Payne et al. 2001), and electoral volatility (Mainwaring and Bizzarro 2018).[48] Table A3.10 presents the

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[46] Despite the significant interactive term of female incumbent and wrongdoing on change in ENPC, confidence intervals overlap and it is difficult to draw conclusions from the results (see Figure 2A).

[47] Indeed, there is a moderately high and substantively large correlation between lagged total electoral volatility and wrongdoing in the subsequent president term ($r = .24$, $p < .05$).

[48] No work of which I am aware establishes a relationship between institutional rules such as concurrent elections and the plurality rule. There is a .17 correlation between concurrent legislative and executive elections and

results. Wrongdoing remains significantly and positively related to total volatility, party replacement volatility and the ENPC. It is not, however, significantly related to the incumbent vote share at time t (p = .11). As anticipated the plurality rule is associated with fewer effective candidates, but concurrence has no significant relationship to any variable.

I include two more tests to see if the results remain robust—a fully saturated model with all variables included, and seemingly unrelated regression (SUR). Table A3.11 includes a fully saturated model with all economic variables, institutional variables, and the two additional controls (using the incumbent vote share and effective number of candidates dependent variables in addition to the standard volatility variables). Again, the results remain robust and substantively similar. The last model uses SUR, which allows the error terms from different regression models employing different but related dependent variables to correlate. Since the incumbent vote share, volatility and effective parties are all related, we should expect errors from the regression models to be correlated. Table A3.12 presents the results of a SUR with change in incumbent vote share, total volatility, and change in ENPC. The coefficient on wrongdoing remains statistically significant and substantively similar for all three dependent variables.[49]

Discussion and Conclusions

Latin American presidential elections marked by incumbent misconduct witness lower vote shares for the incumbent party and higher levels of fragmentation as well as more new parties entering and old parties exiting the system compared to elections in which incumbents are not implicated in wrongdoing. Many robust party systems around the world have even

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wrongdoing, but it is non-significant (p = .15). The correlation between plurality rules and wrongdoing is effectively zero (r = -.004, p = .98).

[49] Because I am analyzing incumbent vote share in which I omit all cases where incumbent parties did not run for reelection, the N for the three regressions is 63 rather than 70.

moderately high levels of stable party volatility, but highly volatile party systems, especially those driven by party replacement volatility, often have shorter term policy horizons and lower quality democratic representation (Carreras and Acácio 2019). Having a multiparty system can enhance political representation, but in highly fragmented party systems parties often suffer crises of legitimacy (Scherlis 2014). Fragmentation is particularly pernicious in presidential elections as many first round or plurality elections result in a victory for candidates who obtain less than 30% of the vote, giving the winner a weaker mandate. Highly volatile and fragmented systems have significant governance challenges including high levels of party switching in the legislature (Sánchez 2008, 2009).

Latin American party systems have been facing existential crises for a number of years, and more systems have been decaying or have collapsed than have further consolidated and institutionalized (Mainwaring, Bizzarro, and Petrova 2018). This paper suggests that high profile cases of publicized wrongdoing involving the president may be one element weakening party systems. Mainwaring and Bizzarro (2018) highlight the role that strong presidents have played in reshaping the party systems among the Latin American left leaders like Hugo Chávez and Evo Morales. Here I find that presidential misbehavior also contributes to party system change as voters abandon incumbent parties for multiple other competitors who often come from new political movements (including political neophytes or seasoned politicians running on a new party label), resulting in a more fragmented and volatile party system. Although it is beyond the scope of this paper, there is suggestive evidence that presidential wrongdoing has long term implications for the party system, even contributing to the obsolescence of a malfeasant incumbent's party over time. Among the first thirteen presidencies in my database (from 1998-2004), when the incumbent was implicated in wrongdoing, only one of the parties (Colorado

Party from Paraguay) received more than 20% of the vote in the most recent presidential election. The parties of two of these presidents implicated in wrongdoing—Guatemala's Alfonso Portillo (1999-2003) and Ecuador's Jamil Mahuad (1998-2000)—no longer exist. Meanwhile all of the parties of the presidents not implicated in wrongdoing exist and won at least 10% of the vote in the most recent democratic presidential election except one.[50]

Future work should investigate the specific mechanisms by which why party systems shift significantly between elections following cases of publicized wrongdoing. As party reputations are damaged through cases of wrongdoing, do they only lose voters, or do partisan stalwarts jump ship as well? Can parties recover in the long-term from reputational damage or will politicians affiliated with malfeasance-tainted parties only make a comeback under new party labels? Future research should also analyze the consequences of party system volatility and fragmentation due to incumbent malfeasance. Following cases of incumbent wrongdoing, several presidential candidates have been successful running on an anti-corruption message such as Mexican president AMLO, Brazil's Bolsonaro and Guatemala's Jimmy Morales. Yet, Bolsonaro and Morales have both been directly implicated in major cases of wrongdoing themselves, and have attacked or dismantled anti-corruption institutions. Latin Americans may thus find themselves in a political corruption trap (Klašnja, Little, and Tucker 2018). Voters do not appear to be tolerant or supportive of corrupt incumbents. Yet, as parties become weaker and more fragmented, and party systems more volatile, malfeasant politicians may be increasingly the only option (Pavão 2018), even as they masquerade as anti-corruption crusaders.

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[50] Hipólito Mejía's Partido Revolucionario Dominicano (PRD—Dominican Revolutionary Party) did not compete in the presidential election, but did win a small percentage of the seats in congress for the 2020 general elections. President Luis Abinader was elected in 2020, under the Partido Revolucionario Moderno (Modern Revolutionary Party), arguably a successor party to the PRD.

Chapter 4: Exit Through the Back Door: How Compulsory Voting Shapes Electoral Participation When Incumbents are Malfeasant

Does news media coverage of presidential misconduct increase participation or generate withdrawal in subsequent presidential elections? The public may become more inspired to turn out to kick out power-abusing and/or rent-seeking politicians to replace them with clean(er) politicians (Inman and Andrews 2009; Kostadinova 2009; Pattie and Johnston 2012). Yet, the reverse is also be true. When incumbent politicians are implicated in misconduct, potential voters may prefer to sit out the election (Chong et al. 2015; Costas-Perez 2014), as the electorate may be suspicious not only of the incumbent but rather of all candidates, and would rather abstain than support a malfeasant political class (Carreras and Vera 2018). Drawing from Hirschman's (1970) framework of exit, voice, and loyalty, voters may express displeasure with the incumbent through voice or they may exit by abstaining from the election altogether.[51] In this last chapter I focused primarily on whether voters were opting for voice or loyalty. This chapter centers on the entire eligible voting public and asks whether malfeasance may generate exit (through abstention or invalid balloting) or not (through a valid ballot for the opposition or incumbent).

Missing in this debate is the role of institutions which are key drivers of turnout cross-nationally. The institutional framework of compulsory voting with enforced sanctions results in very high rates of participation among eligible voters who vote to avoid costly penalties (Panagopoulos 2008). The threat of sanctions may motivate participation even among those who would prefer to abstain in response to malfeasance. Yet, these voters do have another exit option: purposefully casting a null or blank ballot (Hooghe, Marien, and Pauwels 2011; Martinez i Coma

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[51] Of course, voters who are willing to overlook malfeasant behavior for other characteristics they value, do not care about malfeasance or even have an affinity for it may opt for loyalty as well.

and Werner 2019). In voluntary systems (or compulsory systems with no/little enforcement), in contrast, the cost of abstention is much lower. If eligible voters in these systems are turned off by a malfeasant political class due to incumbent wrongdoing, they may prefer to go with the relatively cheaper option of abstaining rather than adopt an invalid vote strategy. Of course, alternatively, if presidential malfeasance inspires potential voters to kick out the incumbent party, eligible voters will opt to cast a valid ballot rather than exiting through either the back door (invalidating their ballot) or the front door (standard abstention).

This chapter helps us understand the link between malfeasance and electoral participation by assessing how institutional variation in voting rules moderates exit strategies (invalid voting and abstention) in response to incumbent wrongdoing. I theorize that those who are in voluntary voting systems should be more likely to abstain when the incumbent is malfeasant compared to a clean incumbent. Yet, those in compulsory systems should be constrained by the high cost of abstention and be no more likely to abstain when the incumbent is malfeasant or clean. Conversely, I anticipate those in compulsory systems should be more likely to cast an invalid ballot when the incumbent is malfeasant compared to a clean incumbent as a replacement for abstention. Those in voluntary systems should be equally likely to cast an invalid ballot when incumbents are clean or malfeasant because of the lower cost of abstention and higher cost of voting nullifying their ballot.

I find that although voter turnout remains relatively stable between elections, regardless of incumbent malfeasance, invalid voting rates are far higher when incumbents are implicated in wrongdoing in compulsory systems compared to voluntary ones. For both voluntary and compulsory systems, incumbent malfeasance does not boost abstention nor does it encourage turnout. Contrary to expectations, eligible voters are no more or less likely to turnout in

voluntary systems when incumbents engage in misconduct compared to clean incumbents, despite the lower costs of abstention compared to compulsory systems. Yet, there is clear evidence that voters in compulsory systems exit through the back door when presidents are implicated in wrongdoing: invalid voting is significantly higher in compulsory voting systems when the incumbent is involved in misconduct compared to a clean incumbent. The same is not true in voluntary systems. Altogether this suggests that voter turnout in presidential elections is largely determined by institutional factors – in this case, compulsory voting – and factors such as habit and civic duty rather than the integrity of the candidates. This runs counter to an optimistic theory of democratic accountability in which voters turn out at high rates to kick out the rascals, but also should allay concerns from a more pessimistic account in which demobilized voters do not even bother to participate elections when incumbents are tainted by misconduct. To the extent incumbent malfeasance has an effect on the nature of voters' engagement, it is in compulsory systems, where many who might otherwise abstain cast an invalid ballot.

Voter Behavior and Preferences

Why do people participate in elections? The literature on voter turnout is one of the most rich and developed in political science (Blais 2006; Cancela and Geys 2016; Geys 2006; Stockemer 2017). Yet, few variables consistently predict voter turnout across multiple contexts (Stockemer 2017). Rational choice theorists assume that potential voters weigh the perceived costs and benefits of voting and make a decision on whether to turn out based on this calculus (Riker and Ordeshook 1968). Since the probability of casting a decisive vote is effectively zero, voting is almost always considered non-rational. Yet, large numbers of the voting eligible public consistently turn out in elections. To account for this paradox, many have included a *D* term

referring to civic duty, that appears to drive much of turnout. Indeed, participation in elections is heavily anchored by a strong sense of civic duty fostered in democracies (Blais and Achen 2019). Moreover, voting has been shown to be habit forming as participation in one election is often linked to participation in others (Aldrich, Montgomery, and Wood 2011; Gerber, Green, and Shachar 2003).

More recently, scholars have reconsidered where the costs lie in voting (or abstaining) and what motivates voters to participate in elections. Contrary to traditional rational choice theorists who assume that voting takes effort in making a decision, finding one's polling place, and other considerations (Downs 1957; see also Aytaç and Stokes 2019 discussion in Chapter 2), Aldrich (1993) argues that voting is a low cost activity even if it is also low benefit. Aytaç and Stokes (2019) further argue that rather than focusing on the cost of voting, scholars have often overlooked the costs of abstention. They present a theory of costly abstention centered on the perceived importance of the election and the strength of preferences between candidates/parties (see also Pacek, Pop-Eleches, and Tucker 2009; Stockemer 2017), and the strong emotions that may emerge in response. Moreover, eligible voters may feel a strong sense of civic duty when they are pressured to participate in a highly significant election, even if their own direct benefits are relatively low. Thus, key to understanding turnout fluctuations between elections is determining the strength of preferences in the electorate towards different candidates (Aldrich 1993; Blais and Achen 2019).

Assuming that the public cares about integrity of politicians, incumbent malfeasance may sharpen preferences between candidates if people perceive that only the incumbent is involved in wrongdoing while other candidates are seen as clean (or cleaner). The public may become angry, which in turn ought to inspire eligible voters to voice their discontent by voting for an opposition

party or candidate rather than staying at home on election day (Bauhr and Grimes 2014; Inman and Andrews 2009; Kostadinova 2009). As members of the voting public are inspired to kick out the malfeasant incumbent, more people will turn out to vote and cast a valid ballot.[52] Conversely, incumbent malfeasance may muddle preferences if it leads to a reduction of trust in politicians in general and the public seeing all candidates and parties as untrustworthy and potentially rent-seeking or power-abusing (cf Pavão 2018). Indeed, scholars have found that exposure to malfeasance may increase skepticism towards the benefits of voting, and lower trust in the government and politicians in general (Ares and Hernández 2017; Bowler and Karp 2004). Voters may associate all candidates or parties with malfeasance, not just the politicians who have had publicized cases of misconduct in the news media (Chong et al. 2015; Stockemer, LaMontagne, and Scruggs 2013). To the extent that this dynamic leaves many potential voters feeling disaffected, turnout levels will decline.

Malfeasance and the (Valid) Voting Calculus in Compulsory and Voluntary Systems

The public may turnout at different rates in elections marked by incumbent malfeasance compared to clean incumbents as misconduct shapes preferences, but institutional variation in voting rules also has a significant impact on turnout rates. Yet, traditional and more recent models of the calculus of voting are typically based on individuals and have thus tended to overlook how institutions may shape the cost of voting or abstention. For example the seminal model offered by Riker and Ordeshook (1968) is presented as follows: R = PB − C + D. *R* (the reward/utility) depends on *P* (the probability of casting a decisive vote) times *B* (the benefit incurred from the preferred candidate winning) minus *C* (the individual cost of voting) plus *D*

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[52] This theoretical framework assumes that the electorate has credibly clean alternatives to the malfeasant incumbent.

(civic duty). In this model, civic duty provides an explanation as to why voter participation is still relatively high even when the costs of voting usually outweigh the benefits (Aytaç and Stokes 2019).[53] However, the model overlooks the cost of abstention, which may be higher or lower among some individuals and some institutional contexts, independent of civic duty. Aytaç and Stokes' (2019) voting calculus brings the cost of abstention to the forefront. Their equation is as follows: $P = A - C + D_E$. *P* (participation) depends on the difference between *A* (the costs of abstention) and *C* (the costs of participation) plus D_E (extrinsic social pressures or civic duty).[54] Aytaç and Stokes further unpack the costs of abstention (*A*) as a function of the value of their preferred candidate/party winning (*B*) and the strategic context of the election (γ). They claim that "the costs of abstention are subjective and psychological," akin to cognitive dissonance (Aytaç and Stokes 2019, 28). However, cross-national differences in the costs of abstention are not exclusively psychological but may also be based on institutional variation.[55]

The costs of abstention differ between countries whose governments impose compulsory voting compared to countries whose compulsory voting rules are merely symbolic or those in which voting is completely voluntary. When eligible voters are subjected to compulsory voting rules with formal sanctions, they are disincentivized from abstaining (Singh 2015), and the cost of abstention outweighs the cost of voting (Panagopoulos 2008). However, there is significant

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[53] Habit may also help explain why participation *remains* consistently high from election to election even if there are some fluctuations (Aldrich, Montgomery, and Wood 2011; Gerber, Green, and Shachar 2003).

[54] Aytaç and Stokes divide up the duty term (D) into extrinsic or social pressures (D_E) and intrinsic or internal satisfaction of turning out to vote (D_I). They argue that internal duty will fall within the costs of abstention, while D_E takes into account social considerations independent of outcomes, closeness of the election, and benefits (see Aytaç and Stokes 2019, 33).

[55] Even within one polity, some individuals may have a greater cost of abstention depending on their social class if compulsory voting penalties result in sanctions that are more likely to be felt by the wealthy over working class citizens (Cepaluni and Hidalgo 2016). Moreover, compulsory systems typically have an upper and/or lower age limit in which voting becomes voluntary. For example in Brazil, those who are 16 or 17 and those who are 70 or older have the right vote, but it is not mandatory and those who are in these age groups are not sanctioned for abstaining. For those between 18-69, voting is compulsory and people in this age range will incur sanctions if they abstain without an excuse.

variation in the severity of sanctions and level of enforcement in compulsory systems. The cost

of abstention in countries that have compulsory voting but no/low penalties and weak

enforcement becomes functionally equivalent to voluntary systems (Panagopoulos 2008).

Because those who live in weakly enforced systems can abstain with the same (low) costs as in

voluntary systems, for the rest of this chapter I include these countries when I refer to voluntary

voting systems (e.g., Mexico and Paraguay). Likewise, I will refer to compulsory voting systems

as only those which have meaningful penalties and enforcement (e.g., Peru and Uruguay).[56]

When voting is voluntary, the cost of abstention is more closely related to perceptions of

importance of the election, the preferences of the public, and the level of civic duty in the

electorate. If there are high levels of indifference between the choice of candidates or parties in

the electorate, many people should consider abstaining in voluntary systems; yet, duty (or habit)

may buoy turnout even in these situations. However, in compulsory systems, even if many in the

electorate feel indifferent towards the leading candidates, the cost of abstention ought to compel

the vast majority of people to continue to turn out to avoid a costly sanction.

There are thus different factors to consider in generating expectations for how incumbent

malfeasance (vs. a clean incumbent) shapes turnout in compulsory and voluntary systems. In

compulsory voting systems, voters are constrained by sanctions. Regardless of whether

incumbent malfeasance muddles or sharpens preferences, there is strong theoretical reason to

expect that most eligible voters will still turn out to vote to avoid sanctions. That is, the cost of

abstention is consistently high even if eligible voters feel apathetic between the choices.

Therefore, in compulsory systems, there should be no difference between levels of turnout in

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[56] The following countries are coded as enforced compulsory: Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador, Peru, and Uruguay. The following countries are coded as voluntary (or unenforced compulsory): Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, and Venezuela.

elections when incumbents are directly implicated in wrongdoing compared to when incumbent are perceived as clean. As the cost of abstention is more malleable in voluntary systems, potential voters may be more likely to change their voting behavior in response to malfeasance. Yet, theory points to a set of competing hypotheses for the turnout calculus in voluntary voting systems. If the public feels indifferent towards the options in an election due to incumbent malfeasance because the public loses confidence in all politicians, the cost of abstention should drop, leading people to vote less in elections with malfeasant incumbents compared to clean incumbents (H1a). Alternatively, the public may lose confidence only in the incumbent politician or party, but people are not disillusioned by all politicians and parties. In this scenario, the cost of abstention increases because preferences are sharpened and fewer should abstain in the elections when incumbents are malfeasant compared to clean incumbents (H1b). Finally, civic duty or habit may overcome any demobilizing or mobilizing effects of publicized malfeasance, which would result in no change in turnout in elections with clean or malfeasant incumbents.

When eligible voters are unable to exit through the front door by abstaining because the cost of abstention is too high, they may decide to exit through the back door by casting an invalid ballot. The decision-making calculus between participation or abstention differs from the decision to cast an invalid or valid ballot. Yet, many voters purposefully invalidate their ballots for similar reasons to many who abstain—they distrust in the political system (Singh 2019), are alienated by political parties and institutions (Cohen 2018b; Uggla 2008), and are discontented with the slate of candidates (Arbache, Freire, and Rodrigues 2015). Some have even suggested that invalid balloting can act as a replacement for abstention for eligible voters in compulsory systems for those who would prefer to abstain, but do not want to incur the sanction levied to abstainers (Arbache, Freire, and Rodrigues 2015; Hirczy 1994; Hooghe, Marien, and Pauwels

2011; Power and Roberts 1995). Again, assuming that the public cares about the integrity of politicians, malfeasance can potentially sharpen preferences if eligible voters are exposed to incumbent malfeasance and believe there are credible clean alternatives. In this scenario, voters ostensibly cast a valid ballot for a credibly clean opposition figure. If voters' exposure to malfeasance muddles preferences by deepening cynicism and mistrust of the political system, they may be more likely to vote for no one by casting an invalid ballot.

Although the costs of abstention in compulsory systems are higher than voluntary ones, those who do turn out in either system may decide to cast an invalid ballot. When a voter is dissatisfied with all options, invalid voting represents a cheaper alternative to abstaining in compulsory voting systems. Yet, an alternative framework suggests that eligible voters may punish only the incumbent and be motivated to cast a valid ballot for a credibly clean alternative. I thus present rival hypotheses for invalid voting in compulsory systems. If malfeasance inspires skepticism towards all politicians, rates of invalid balloting should be higher when incumbents are implicated in misconduct compared to when they are clean in compulsory systems (H2a). Yet, if the public makes distinctions between the malfeasant incumbent and other candidates, fewer people will cast an invalid vote when there is a malfeasant incumbent compared to a clean one in compulsory systems (H2b). In voluntary voting systems abstention is less costly and more based on the strength of preferences of the electorate and competitiveness of the election. On one hand, if eligible voters in voluntary systems feel demobilized by a malfeasant political class, they should be more likely to abstain than cast an invalid vote. On the other hand, if they are inspired to vote out an incumbent implicated in wrongdoing and they do not perceive all politicians as necessarily corrupt, they should cast a valid vote. I thus expect that there should be no difference in invalid voting rates when incumbents are implicated in malfeasance compared to clean

incumbents in voluntary voting systems. Alternatively, if duty or habit anchor a sufficiently large percentage of the electorate to turn out, a higher percentage of voters in voluntary systems who feel disgruntled by a malfeasant incumbent may cast an invalid ballot compared to clean incumbents (H3).

Data

To analyze the conditional relationship between malfeasance and compulsory voting on abstention and invalid voting, I turn to the same data source as Chapter 3—the Executive Wrongdoing in Latin America (EWLA) database. The EWLA database codes news stories about cases of wrongdoing involving Latin American executives between 1998-2020 from two newswire sources—EFE and Agence France Presse in Spanish. I also conceptualize and operationalize publicized wrongdoing involving the president in the same way as I did in Chapter 3 of this dissertation.[57] That is, publicized wrongdoing involving the president must a) directly involve the president b) be investigated by some sort of oversight body. Publicized wrongdoing is coded as a dummy variable with a presidency coded as 1 if there was at least one case of investigated publicized wrongdoing, and 0 if there were no instances of investigated misconduct involving the president. I recoded V-Dem's variable on compulsory voting from a categorical variable with four values into a dummy variable. Compulsory systems with no sanctions or non-enforced sanctions and voluntary systems are coded as 0. Compulsory systems in which sanctions exist and are enforced, and impose either minimal or considerable costs upon the

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[57] I include all elections considered at least somewhat free and fair by V-Dem (version 10), following presidential terms starting between 1998-2016. I omit 7 total elections which are less than "somewhat" free. V-Dem codes three elections in Honduras (2009, 2013, and 2017), three in Venezuela (2012 and 2013), and one in Nicaragua (2016) as "ambiguous". The 2018 presidential election in Venezuela is coded as "not free"

offending voters are coded as 1. The dummy variables for wrongdoing and compulsory voting

rules serve as my main independent variables in the first set of analyses.

My dependent variables, voter turnout and invalid voting, include first round or single-

round presidential elections between 2000-2020. Turnout data are gathered from IDEA

International where first or only round electoral data was available. When IDEA only had the

results of second round contests, I consulted countries' Electoral Management Bodies (EMB) or

Nohlen (2005) for first round turnout.[58] Turnout is operationalized as the percentage of voters

who were registered to vote who participated in the first round of an election. I also use VAP

(Voting-Age Population) turnout rates and made my own VAP calculations using IDEA's

population data. This measures turnout as a percentage of the voting age population as an

alternative to turnout at as percentage of registered voters.[59] I obtained rates of invalid voting

from Mollie Cohen[60], and supplemented Cohen's data with EMB data for two elections (Chile

2017 and Dominican Republic 2020). The invalid voting data is the percentage of votes that were

considered null or blank by the EMBs over the total number of votes cast (see summary statistics

on Table 1A in the Appendix).[61]

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[58] I used EMB data for the following elections: Argentina (2015); Brazil (2002, 2010, 2014, 2018); Chile (2005, 2009, 2013, 2017); Colombia (2010, 2014); Costa Rica (2002, 2014); Ecuador (2006); El Salvador (2014); Guatemala (2007, 2011, 2015); Peru (2006, 2011, 2016); Uruguay (2009, 2014) . I used Nohlen for the following elections: Ecuador (1998, 2002); El Salvador (1994); Guatemala (2003); Uruguay (1999).

[59] This distinction is especially important in Chile, where prior to the 2013 general elections, the country had a peculiar system of voluntary voter registration, but compulsory voting for registered voters. The country experienced a steep decline in VAP turnout from a high in 1990 to 2009 under this system, but high rates as a percentage of registered voters. The rule was changed to voluntary voting and automatic registration, which meant that all Chileans over 18 were automatically registered to vote, but faced no sanctions for abstaining. Turnout as a percentage of registered voters plummeted from 84.2% to 49.4%, but the VAP turnout only dropped from 57.3% to 53.8% from the 2009 to 2013 presidential elections. Others have also explored turnout as percentage of eligible voters in a society. For example, in the United States incarcerated people and non-naturalized citizens who are residents in the country are ineligible to vote. Unfortunately these data are unavailable for Latin America.

[60] Assistant Professor, University of Georgia.

[61] Turnout rates include all invalid and valid votes cast. However, when EMBs calculate the percentage a candidate received in an election, they typically divide the number of votes that candidate received over the total number of valid votes.

In my regression analyses, I include a number of theoretically relevant control variables. I draw from Stockemer's (2017) review and meta-analysis of turnout, which only finds three variables that are broadly consistently related to turnout across many studies: compulsory voting, population size, and important elections. I control for population using World Bank data and perform a log transformation of the variable to account for its skewed nature. Important elections refer to elections where the stakes are higher (i.e. first-order versus second-order elections) (Ibid). I hold the type of election—first or single round presidential elections—constant in this analysis. However, other measures of stakes or consequentiality of the elections do vary between countries. First, concurrence of presidential and legislative elections should drive up turnout because they "clarify the policy consequences of one's vote, thereby increasing the perceived benefits of voting" (Dettrey and Schwindt-Bayer 2009, 1322). I include a dummy variable for whether a country holds concurrent elections in which voters elect both legislators and the president (1), or hold presidential elections separately (0).[62] Next, turnout may be higher under majority-runoff rules compared to plurality rules because voters in runoff systems more likely to cast a sincere vote in the first round compared to plurality systems where the party with the highest vote share automatically wins so strategic voting is employed more often (Carreras 2018; Johnson and Schwindt-Bayer 2009). I include a dummy variable for whether the election is in a plurality or first-round only system (1) or majority based system (0). Finally, I include a variable

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[62] Some countries hold more than just presidential and legislative elections simultaneously, such as mayoral elections and other local offices. Because of the limited number of cases I have, I use a simple dummy variable to refer to concurrence. Other countries like Mexico and Argentina have mid-term elections, which means that during the presidential elections not all legislative seats are being contested. In addition, legislative elections take place only two months prior to the presidential election in Colombia—which is coded as non-concurrent. Compare this to El Salvador, which has legislative elections every three years and presidential elections every five.

for whether the incumbent candidate is running for reelection as incumbency can drive voters to the polls whether people support or dislike incumbents (Dettrey and Schwindt-Bayer 2009).[63]

When I turn to analyses of invalid voting, I also control for the elections "stakes"— plurality versus majority-runoff, concurrent/nonconcurrent elections and the presence of an incumbent running for reelection. Studies on the correlates of invalid voting have considered that concurrent elections may increase efficacy and therefore reduce invalid voting, but they could also potentially be associated with voter error (Kouba and Lysek 2016; Martinez i Coma and Werner 2019). Plurality rules are expected to decrease invalid voting in the first round because the stakes are higher (Kouba and Lysek 2016). Outside of electoral stakes, incumbent candidates may reshape the invalid balloting calculus. If voters are dissatisfied with incumbent candidates, they may be more likely to cast an invalid ballot if the incumbent runs again. I include one additional control for unemployment, as a meta-analysis found that rates of invalid voting increase with the level of unemployment as more potential voters may become alienated and cast an invalid ballot as a protest against a political system that cannot provide jobs for its citizens (Kouba and Lysek 2019). I use a measure of unemployment gathered from International Labor Organization (ILO)/World Bank Data. I average the variable over two years including the year of and the year prior to the election.

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[63] This variable also captures an institutional idiosyncrasy. In all systems, voting can provide accountability for incumbent *parties*, but incumbent presidents may be term limited or barred from running from reelection altogether. Although rules on re-election of incumbent candidates are part of the constitution in some countries, popular incumbent candidates have changed the rules to run for multiple consecutive terms (see Corrales 2016; Corrales and Penfold 2014 and Chapter 3 for a discussion on this).

Descriptive Statistics

Before turning to multivariate regression analysis to assess my hypotheses, I present

some descriptive analysis in this section. Figure 4.1 shows turnout rates in the 70 elections in the

18 Latin American countries that are analyzed in this chapter. Countries with compulsory voting

are in light grey and countries with voluntary rules are in dark grey. Consistent with the voter

turnout scholarship (Blais 2006; Cancela and Geys 2016; Geys 2006; Stockemer 2017), nations

that implement compulsory voting rules with enforced sanctions have the highest rates of voter

turnout. Bolivia and Uruguay average around 90% for the elections included in the dataset.

Bolivia's sanction for abstention without justification in the 2014 presidential election was about

400 bolivianos or around $58 USD according to the exchange rate in October 2014.[64] In

addition, those who abstain without justification are not allowed to make transactions with

government organizations for three months. These sanctions are serious for a country that had a

GDP per capita of less than $3,100 in 2014 (the fine is equal to about 22% of one's monthly

salary), and where the state plays a vital role in one's life. The fine in Uruguay in 2019 was

1,200 Uruguayan pesos (around $32.40) for an average citizen for the first offense,[65] and citizens

are unable to access some government services even after paying the fine.[66]

Out of the countries that do not have strong enforcement of compulsory voting rules,

Argentina has turnout rates comparable with compulsory systems that do enforce sanctions. If an

Argentine abstains without justification they have to pay a 50 peso fine (equivalent of about $.85

in the 2019 election), and are not allowed to make transactions with public bodies for a year.[67]

Compared to Uruguay, Peru, and Bolivia, Argentina's sanctions are both much less costly for the

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[64] https://www.la-razon.com/lr-article/inhabilitados-para-las-elecciones-pagaran-bs-400-de-multa/
[65] https://www.corteelectoral.gub.uy/estadisticas/balotaje/costos-multas-eleccion-nacional-y-segunda-eleccion-2019
[66] https://www.elpais.com.uy/informacion/politica/vote-pasa-cuanto-pagar-casos-eximido.html
[67] https://argentina.as.com/argentina/2019/10/26/tikitakas/1572083703_938174.html

average Argentine and are not uniformly enforced. Colombia stands out among all countries as the only country with an average of less than 50% turnout in presidential elections (only reaching 53% in 2018). Honduras, Paraguay, Mexico, and El Salvador all have similar rates of turnout despite the fact that the latter country is the only of the four with completely voluntary voting, while the first three have compulsory systems with no sanctions.

Figure 4.1: Average Rates of Turnout (Of Registered Voters) by
Voting System (2000-2020)

Invalid voting rates are also somewhat higher in compulsory voting systems as shown in Figure 4.2, although it these rates are not quite as consistent as voter turnout. Invalid voting is quite high in Peru, with an average of about 15% in the three elections included, and in Ecuador with an average of over 10% in the five elections included in the dataset. Two other enforced compulsory systems, Brazil and Bolivia, also have invalid voting rates that are higher than most other countries. However, Guatemala, a completely voluntary system, is the only country besides Peru and Ecuador where over 10% of all votes cast are spoiled. On the other end of the spectrum, the Dominican Republic and El Salvador average around only 1.2% invalid votes of all votes cast. Uruguay is an outlier among compulsory systems, averaging less than 2.8% invalid votes. It

71

is clear that turnout rates are higher overall in compulsory systems that are enforced and invalid

voting appears to be higher in these systems as well (notwithstanding the outlier of Uruguay).

Figure 4.2: Average Rates of Invalid Voting by Voting System (2000-2020)

The central research question of this chapter, however, is how does wrongdoing by an

incumbent president interact with the type of voting system differently for voter turnout and

invalid voting? As an initial test of this question, Figure 4.3 shows the box plot distributions of

turnout and invalid voting rates by voluntary and compulsory systems, when incumbents are

implicated in wrongdoing compared to clean incumbents. The left panel of Figure 4.3 shows that

there is not much of a difference between turnout in elections following incumbent wrongdoing

or clean incumbents neither in voluntary nor compulsory systems. If anything, compulsory

systems appear to have marginally lower levels of voting when the incumbent is implicated in

wrongdoing compared to clean incumbents. However, the right panel shows that compulsory

systems not only have higher levels of invalid voting than voluntary systems, but invalid voting

appears to increase substantially when the incumbent is malfeasant compared to clean

incumbents. Overall this suggests that turnout may be relatively immovable by incumbent

wrongdoing, but invalid voting is more variable in compulsory systems based on incumbent

malfeasance.

Figure 4.3: Turnout and Invalid Voting by Voting System and Incumbent Wrongdoing

Methods and Analysis

In this section, I conduct more rigorous tests of my rival hypotheses using multivariate

regression analyses that assess the conditional relationship between voting rules and malfeasance

on invalid voting and turnout. Because my data are time series cross-sectional with very uneven

panels with presidential elections nested within 18 countries, I adopt the same analytical strategy

as in Chapter 3. I carry out a series of OLS regressions to test my propositions with cluster-

robust standard errors to account for the clustered nature of the data. I do not include panel

corrected standard errors (PCSE) because there are more units (countries) than observations

(elections) nested within units (countries) (Engler 2016). Nevertheless, the results remain robust

to PCSE (see the Appendix Table A4.3). Furthermore, I also do not use fixed effects for two

reasons: (a) there are limited number of cases from individual countries (Cohen, Salles

Kobilanski, and Zechmeister 2018), and (b) more importantly, fixed effects remove the ability to

include time invariant controls like compulsory voting.[68] Results remain robust to random effects

models, which allow for the inclusion of time invariant covariates (Wooldridge 2011).

Prior to presenting results of the regression analyses of the interaction of incumbent

wrongdoing and compulsory voting on voter turnout, I briefly discuss direct relationships

between my main independent variables and turnout. Wrongdoing does not significantly

correlate with voter turnout either by registered voters ($r = -.1$, $p = .4$) or by voting age

population (VAP) ($r = -.13$, $p = .28$). This suggests that incumbent wrongdoing has no direct

relationship to voter turnout. This runs contrary to some previous work that finds malfeasance

demobilizes (Carreras and Vera 2018; Chong et al. 2015), but is consistent with Costas-Perez

(2014), who finds no relationship between incumbent wrongdoing and voter turnout in mayoral

elections in Spain.[69] Yet, this null association is particularly striking because these cases of

malfeasance are widely disseminated in the news media involving the most important political

figure in a country. Compulsory voting does have a strong direct relationship with voter turnout

both for registered voters ($r = .66$, $p < .001$) and VAP ($r = .7$, $p < .001$), which is consistent with

voter turnout literature (Stockemer 2017).

Table 4.1 presents a series of regression analyses assessing the link between malfeasance

and voter turnout, conditional on type of voting system. Model 1 tests the interaction between

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[68] In no country in my dataset were there any changes in coding within countries. Only Chile moved from a compulsory system with no enforcement to a voluntary system. However, Chile remains coded as 0 for the entire period because, prior to the reform in 2013, V-Dem considered Chile to have weak enforcement for its compulsory voting rules.

[69] Costas-Perez (2014) does find that repeated corruption cases lead to lower voter turnout, but when she considers cases that occur only in the term prior to the election there is no relationship. This is consistent with my operationalization of incumbent wrongdoing.

compulsory voting and wrongdoing on voter turnout by registered voters. Without any additional

controls, it shows a conditional relationship between compulsory voting and wrongdoing ($p < .1$).

However, the coefficient is in an unexpected direction—compulsory voting systems are

associated with lower turnout when the incumbent is malfeasant. When controlling for other

theoretically relevant variables in Table 4.1 Model 2, the coefficient of the interaction of

wrongdoing and compulsory voting becomes statistically insignificant. The relationship is almost

identical using the VAP measure. With or without controls, the relationship between wrongdoing

and VAP is not statistically significant conditional on voting system (Table 4.1 Models 3 and 4).

Table 4.1: Wrongdoing and Compulsory Voting on Turnout in Presidential Elections

VARIABLES	(1) Registered	(2) Registered	(3) VAP	(4) VAP
Wrongdoing	2.823	2.303	1.915	3.194
	(3.451)	(2.700)	(4.099)	(3.648)
Compulsory	21.65***	18.28***	24.65***	25.10***
	(3.505)	(3.647)	(4.569)	(5.390)
Wrongdoing * Compulsory	-8.139*	-3.345	-6.474	-3.666
	(4.528)	(3.866)	(5.479)	(4.993)
Plurality		0.631		1.890
		(3.313)		(5.379)
Concurrent		9.274*		2.781
		(4.851)		(5.953)
Logged Population		-2.092**		-2.670*
		(0.937)		(1.357)
Incumbent Running		5.342*		3.627
		(2.975)		(3.468)
Constant	63.64***	90.18***	62.67***	102.2***
	(2.536)	(14.50)	(2.694)	(22.83)
Observations	70	70	70	70
R-squared	0.451	0.559	0.496	0.549

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** $p<0.01$, ** $p<0.05$, * $p<0.1$

Thus, I do not find conclusive evidence that wrongdoing demobilizes or mobilizes

eligible voters in voluntary voting systems (H1a or H1b). There may be two explanations for this null result. Firstly, voters may be dissatisfied with some or all of the candidates and parties, but still turn out because of civic duty, habit or the high cost of abstention (Aldrich, Montgomery, and Wood 2011; Aytaç and Stokes 2019; Blais et al. 2019; Blais and Achen 2019). Secondly, a malfeasant incumbent may sometimes inspire more people to turn out, but just as often may demobilize other potential voters who believe that the election will not make a difference in their lives. In compulsory voting systems, where the cost of abstention is higher, there are also no differences in rates turnout following clean or malfeasant presidents. Although previous literature has largely found that incumbent wrongdoing reduces efficacy and political trust (Bowler and Karp 2004), ultimately reducing voter turnout (Chong et al. 2015; Costas-Perez 2014) there may be a floor, especially in presidential elections.

Next, I assess the conditional relationship of wrongdoing and compulsory voting rules on invalid voting. Before discussing the results of the interactive regression models, I find that the correlation between wrongdoing and invalid voting is not significant ($r = .05$, $p = .68$). This suggests that just because an incumbent president is engaged in wrongdoing does not mean that voters in general (not considering compulsory vs. voluntary system type) are more likely to cast an invalid ballot. The correlation between compulsory voting and invalid voting, however, is positive and significant ($r = .52$; $p < .001$) as has been found in previous work (Cohen 2018a; Kouba and Lysek 2016, 2019). When the public is mandated to cast a ballot, it is more likely they will cast an invalid one compared to when voting is optional.

Table 4.2 presents the results of OLS regression analyses of the relationship between incumbent misconduct and invalid voting conditional on type of voting system. Model 1 shows a significant interactive effect between compulsory voting and incumbent wrongdoing ($p < .1$),

76

providing evidence for H2a. This finding is robust to controls for the electoral formula,

concurrent elections, unemployment, and incumbent candidates running for reelection (Table 4.2

Model 2).

Table 4.2: The Relationship between Wrongdoing and Compulsory Voting on Invalid Voting in
Presidential Elections

VARIABLES	(1) Invalid Vote	(2) Invalid Vote
Wrongdoing	-0.0369	-0.261
	(0.790)	(0.688)
Compulsory	3.065	1.043
	(1.847)	(1.954)
Wrongdoing * Compulsory	5.232*	6.070**
	(2.894)	(2.343)
Plurality		-2.353
		(1.625)
Concurrent Elections		1.328
		(1.701)
Unemployment		-0.351*
		(0.193)
Incumbent Running		1.178
		(1.128)
Constant	3.837***	6.147**
	(1.026)	(2.782)
Observations	68	68
R-squared	0.377	0.507

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** $p<0.01$, ** $p<0.05$, * $p<0.1$

Figure 4.4 presents the results of predicted rates of invalid votes by voting rules

following malfeasant and clean presidencies holding all other variables at their means. The left

panel shows that in voluntary and nonenforced systems, invalid voting is almost identical for

malfeasant and clean incumbents (allowing us to reject H3). However, the right panel provides

clear evidence that in compulsory voting systems that enforce sanctions, invalid voting increases

by nearly six percentage points from clean presidencies to malfeasant ones (5.5% to 11.3%).

This suggests a demobilizing effect of incumbent wrongdoing (H2a) rather than a mobilizing

effect (H2b). In compulsory systems, abstention is costly so turnout rates are high. Many voters

who may feel disillusioned due to incumbent misconduct in compulsory systems exit through the

back door by invalidating their ballot. This result is consistent with other work that has found

that invalid voting is higher when generalized levels of political corruption are high for

compulsory systems that enforce sanctions (Martinez i Coma and Werner 2019).

Figure 4.4: Predicted Rates of Invalid Voting by Voting Rules and Incumbent Malfeasance

Note: 90% confidence intervals

Is incumbent malfeasance related to an overall increase in exiting in presidential

elections? That is, do members of the public participate less in elections, and voters cast more

invalid ballots in response to malfeasance? Furthermore, does this differ in voluntary systems

and compulsory systems? In voluntary systems I found no evidence that malfeasance moves

voters to abstain more or cast more invalid ballots. However, more voters do cast invalid ballots

when the president is malfeasant in compulsory systems.

As an exploratory analysis, I test to see if the percentage of the voting eligible public who

cast a *valid* ballot decreases with wrongdoing for all elections, and conditional on compulsory

voting rules. That is, I assess the relationship between misconduct and the percentage of eligible

voters who did not abstain or cast an invalid ballot.[70] This analysis will demonstrate under what

conditions does presidential malfeasance result in higher levels of overall withdrawal from the

most important part of the democratic process, through both the front and back door. To conduct

these tests, I calculate the percentage of valid votes both by the number of registered voters and

the voting age population by multiplying turnout by the percentage of valid votes cast. Turnout

ranges between 40.1-94.6%, but valid voting figures as a percentage of registered voters range

between only 36.6% to 89.1%.[71]

To test the relationship between wrongdoing and the percentage of valid votes cast over

registered voters or the VAP, I again conduct OLS regressions with robust standard errors. I

include the same set of controls as in Table 4.1 and Table 4.2 (including both unemployment and

population as total valid ballots could be associated with these two variables). To answer the first

question of this exploratory analysis, wrongdoing does not significantly correlate with valid

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[70] Valid voting essentially calculates the percentage of valid votes cast as a percent of the voting eligible public
(either registered voters or voting age public).The invalid voting analyses use invalid voting as a percentage votes
cast not as a percentage of invalid votes compared to valid votes and abstention. Invalid voting as a percentage of
the voting eligible public has a slightly lower range: between .46-14.8 as registered voters and .46-16.2 as VAP
compared to .66-18.1 as percent of votes cast. Nevertheless, results remain robust to using invalid votes as percent
of the eligible voting public (see Table A4.5 in the Appendix).
[71] Valid voting figures as a percentage of the voting age population have a slightly different range, but it is striking
that in 11 of the 68 elections (16% of all elections) fewer than 50% of the voting age population cast a valid ballot.
Table A4.2 in the Appendix presents the correlation matrix of the dependent variables. Although invalid voting
approaches a positive correlation with voter turnout (r = .2, p = .11), there is no significant relationship between
invalid voting (as a percent of valid votes) and valid voting (as a percent of total eligible voters). Turnout and valid
voting are highly correlated.

balloting either as a percentage of registered voters (r = -.1, p = .41) or VAP (r = -.15, p = .22).

There is no direct relationship, consistent with what I have found for turnout and invalid voting.

Table 4.3: The Relationship between Wrongdoing and Compulsory Voting on Valid Voting in Presidential Elections

VARIABLES	(1) Valid Reg	(2) Valid Reg	(3) Valid VAP	(4) Valid VAP
Wrongdoing	3.543	2.930	1.872	3.485
	(3.561)	(2.824)	(4.450)	(3.699)
Compulsory	18.91***	17.34***	21.39***	22.96***
	(4.397)	(3.536)	(5.253)	(5.749)
Wrongdoing * Compulsory	-12.78**	-7.819**	-10.56	-8.241
	(5.207)	(3.508)	(6.225)	(5.260)
Plurality		3.015		2.688
		(3.491)		(5.858)
Concurrent Elections		8.609		1.142
		(5.738)		(7.009)
Incumbent Running		4.222		2.810
		(3.375)		(4.039)
Unemployment		0.697*		0.140
		(0.391)		(0.604)
Logged Population		-2.899***		-2.924*
		(0.874)		(1.483)
Constant	60.62***	95.71***	59.99***	103.8***
	(2.759)	(15.16)	(3.117)	(25.12)
Observations	68	68	68	68
R-squared	0.347	0.480	0.387	0.447

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 4.3 presents the full regression results, assessing the conditional relationship between valid voting, voting rules and malfeasance. The conditional relationship between wrongdoing and compulsory voting is significant for valid ballots as a percent of registered voters both without and with controls (Models 1 and 2). Models 3 and 4 of Table 4.3 show the results for registered voters as VAP. The interaction term does not reach conventional levels of statistical significance, but is close and suggestive for the small sample size (p = .14). Figure 4.5

presents the predicted probabilities for valid votes as a percentage of registered voters (Model 2), holding control variables at their means. In voluntary systems, the number of valid votes slightly increases, while in compulsory systems, valid voting declines when an incumbent is malfeasant compared to a clean incumbent. More importantly, rates of valid voting converge when the incumbent is implicated in wrongdoing—there is no statistically significant difference in valid voting between voluntary and compulsory systems. Compulsory voting systems may maintain high levels of voter turnout, but presidential misconduct appears to be associated with disaffection (i.e. fewer valid votes) among the electorate. By merely comparing turnout rates and not looking more deeply at valid voting, we may overlook the alienation among the voting publics in compulsory systems where incumbents are engaging in wrongdoing.

Figure 4.5: Predicted Rates of Valid Voting by Voting Rules and Incumbent Malfeasance

Note: Confidence intervals at 90%

Robustness Checks

     I conducted a series of robustness checks to see if the results hold for additional covariates and different modeling techniques with tables in the Appendix. First, some have

theorized that party system fragmentation should drive up invalid voting rates as voters are overwhelmed by too many choices (Cohen 2018a; Kouba and Lysek 2019). Since I found that wrongdoing is associated with an increase in party system fragmentation in Chapter 3, I do not control for the effective number of parties in the main analysis as I consider wrongdoing to be a potential cause for party system fragmentation. Table A4.3 shows that the results remain robust to the inclusion of this variable—the interaction of compulsory voting and wrongdoing is significant at $p < .1$ for invalid voting and valid voting. In Table A4.4, I include a control for whether or not the incumbent party is running. If voters are using the ballot box for accountability, then when an incumbent party is not running for election there may be a different set of considerations as whether to exit through abstention or casting a null vote. The interaction remains significant at for the models on invalid ($p < .05$) and valid balloting ($p < .01$). Next, if we conceive the decision to vote as a trichotomous one—casting a valid ballot, casting an invalid ballot or abstaining raises the concern that it is important to control for turnout or valid voting when analyzing invalid balloting as a dependent variable. Table A4.5 shows that the significant results for the interaction for invalid voting remain robust to controlling for registered voter turnout or VAP turnout and valid voting (as registered voters and VAP). I also recalculated invalid voting as a percentage of turnout rather than just a percentage of all votes cast. Table A4.6 shows that invalid votes as a percentage of registered voter turnout and turnout as VAP is higher in compulsory systems when the incumbent is implicated in wrongdoing compared to clean incumbents.

My last set of robustness checks assess if the results remain robust to modeling techniques that account for autocorrelation and potential unobserved heterogeneity beyond the clustered standard errors with OLS. Because rates of voter turnout, invalid voting and valid

voting are likely to be correlated within countries, OLS may be insufficient to deal with autocorrelation and/or unobserved heterogeneity. To address these concerns, I estimated the same models with random effects with standard errors clustered by country (Table A4.7) Prais-Winsten regression (panel corrected standard errors) where I account for panel-specific autocorrelation (Table A4.8), and generalized least squares with panel-specific autocorrelation (Table A4.9). In all three modeling techniques, the coefficient of the interaction of compulsory voting and wrongdoing remains positive and significant at $p < .05$ for invalid voting, and insignificant for the measures of turnout. For valid voting (as percentage of registered voters), results are less consistent with the negative coefficient on the interaction achieving statistical significance at $p < .1$ in Table A4.7 and Table A4.8, but not in Table A4.9 ($p = .148$).

Conclusion

This study finds that the exposure of an incumbent president's malfeasant behavior does not – on average – fundamentally alter the amount of voters who turn out on election day. Further, that null finding appears across both voluntary and compulsory systems. In the Latin American region, compulsory voting with enforcement tends to bring out at least 80% of eligible voters, while voluntary voting systems average around 65% turnout. Nevertheless, both in compulsory and voluntary systems, I find that although voters may not necessarily be more inspired to vote out the rascal, they are not dissuaded from going to the ballot box because of presidential misconduct. Future research should further unpack these findings at the individual level. Are some previous abstainers inspired to participate in elections where the incumbent is malfeasant while previous voters abstain in reaction to incumbent malfeasance? Do habitual voters continue to vote in every election regardless of the integrity of the candidates and parties?

Do habitual abstainers continue to stay home? Stable rates of turnout in the aggregate may be masking movement among individual voters in reaction to presidential misconduct.

Focusing only on voter turnout overlooks the voters who do turn out but exit through the back door by invalidating their ballots. In voluntary systems, voters do not invalidate their ballots more often following malfeasant presidencies compared to clean ones. Voters in voluntary systems exit both by abstention and invalid balloting at the same rate when presidents are malfeasant or clean. Although voting is relatively low cost in voluntary systems, so is abstention. Voters who are disinterested in participation may just stay home rather than take the extra step of turning out but nullifying their ballot. Conversely, in compulsory systems, voters are significantly more likely to cast an invalid ballot following an incumbent president implicated in wrongdoing compared to a non-malfeasant president. In these systems, beyond the intrinsic and social reasons that make abstention costly, abstaining may result in not only a monetary loss, but also sometimes a loss of government services. Future work should investigate why those in compulsory systems cast invalid votes at higher rates when the incumbent is malfeasant compared to clean, and why those in voluntary systems do not. Do individual voters who are would-be abstainers in compulsory systems cast an invalid ballot instead? Are those who are fed up with incumbent misconduct more likely to cast an invalid ballot? Is there a culture of invalid balloting in compulsory systems not found in voluntary ones?

This chapter also contributes to the growing literature that has uncovered some of the unintended consequences of compulsory voting. The literature on compulsory voting has highlighted many positives including the consistently positive effect on turnout (Birch 2018; Singh and Roy 2018; Stockemer 2017). Furthermore, compulsory voting can reduce the gap between voters and non-voters among those who are younger, less politically knowledgeable and

are less wealthy (Singh 2015). Yet, compulsory voting has been shown to increase political inequality when incentives to vote are skewed towards the wealthy (Cepaluni and Hidalgo 2016). Others have found that there are more lower "quality" votes from would-be abstainers who are uninterested in seeking out information on elections (Singh and Roy 2018). This chapter shows that while compulsory voting consistently produces high rates of turnout, when presidents are implicated in wrongdoing combined rates of abstention and null or blank votes increase and lead to levels of valid voting that are statistically indistinguishable from voluntary voting systems.

The implications for democratic accountability of this chapter's findings are mixed. On one hand, in Chapter 3, I found that those who cast valid ballots tend to vote against malfeasant incumbents. This suggests that politicians are held accountable to some extent—incumbent parties lose support (or sometimes do not even run candidates) and new options do well when incumbents are implicated in wrongdoing. On the other hand, as the final analysis of valid voting percentages demonstrated, between 27%-36% of the population exits by either abstaining or invalidating their ballot in response to incumbent malfeasance. This suggests that a large proportion of the electorate may feel alienated and discontented (Cohen 2018b; Singh 2019; Uggla 2008) or even withdraw altogether (Hooghe, Marien, and Pauwels 2011) from the most important part of the democratic process in response to malfeasance.

Chapter 5: Building the Executive Wrongdoing in Latin America Database

The Executive Wrongdoing in Latin America Database (EWLA) was conceived as a project specifically intended to code publicized wrongdoing in Latin American presidential administrations. As discussed in the main chapters in the dissertation, publicized wrongdoing of politicians is when a politician's unlawful, abusive or norm-breaking act is made public by the news media. Research on wrongdoing or political scandals involving Latin American executives has almost exclusively relied on the *Latin American Political Processes: Scandals, Protest, and Institutional Conflicts, 1980-2007* dataset (Lodola et al. 2009) and its extensions (Carlin, Love, and Martínez-Gallardo 2015; Carreras 2014; Martínez 2020; Pérez-Liñán 2007; Reyes-Housholder 2019). The dataset was first put together by a set of researchers at the University of Pittsburgh—German Lodola, Andrea Castagnola, Yen-Pin Su, John Polga-Hecimovich, Juan Negri, and Aníbal Pérez-Liñán. The researchers manually coded major political events including scandals using the Latin American Weekly Report (LAWR), beginning in 1980. Ryan Carlin, Gregory Love, and Cecilia Martínez-Gallardo updated the dataset to include 2013, with a focus on scandals. The scandal dataset was subsequently updated by Catherine Reyes-Housholder, and most recently by Christopher Martínez who coded scandals up until 2019. Martínez's data is also the most detailed with monthly level coding for corruption, moral and abuse of office scandals (and overall scandals) directly involving the president and involving the closer inner circle of the president.

The LAWR is published by LatinNews, which was initially established in 1967 to provide information on the political, economic and security situation in the Latin American and Caribbean region. The report is divided into a few sections. First, it contains the **Leader**, which is ostensibly the most important story of the week involving a Latin American country/countries.

Then the report contains stories involving **Andean Countries** (Colombia, Ecuador, Bolivia, Peru, Venezuela), **Brazil and the Southern Cone** (Brazil, Chile, Argentina, Paraguay and Uruguay), **Mexico**, **Central America and the Caribbean** (Haiti, Cuba, Jamaica, Guyana, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Costa Rica, Panama). There is also a **Postscript** which is a news story about another country. This means the report often covers around half of the Latin American countries.[72] Finally, the report is published 50 weeks a year.

Although the LAWR is an excellent resource for its long historical record of the Latin American region, it does have a number of drawbacks. Because it is a weekly report with limited real estate, it tends to publish more articles on the bigger countries, and allocate far less space for the smaller ones. In 2019, Mexico and Brazil were featured in all 50 weeks, often with more than one story, while there were 20 weeks in which Bolivia was featured in a story. For the Central America and Caribbean group, the problem may be even more severe; for example, in 2019 Panama had 13 stories and Costa Rica had only *four*. The coverage of Costa Rica versus Panama in 2018 flipped, with Costa Rica featured in 16 weeks, and Panama only in 8 weeks. Presidential elections may be influencing coverage as Panama's election was held in 2019 and Costa Rica's was in 2018. Nevertheless, the two biggest population centers with their own sections—Mexico and Brazil—had around the same amount of coverage in 2018 (when both countries held presidential elections) as in 2019. The additional coverage provides additional opportunities to report on impropriety in the executive branch, perhaps weighting these countries more heavily in a scandal database. Wrongdoing or malfeasance in smaller countries is more likely to be overlooked, especially if it is of less consequence to the entire region than a particular country.

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[72] For example, the June 20, 2019 edition (WR-19-24) contains articles of 10 countries of the 18 Latin American countries in my dataset.

To provide an additional resource to the *Latin American Political Processes* dataset, I began a new data collection endeavor. First, I turned to Nexis Uni (formerly LexisNexis) to assess the feasibility of doing targeted searches of national newspapers to find stories that were actually printed (or published online) in each country. Unfortunately the lack of digitization of Latin American newspapers meant that many countries have limited archives of their papers online. Mexico has a number of different newspapers or news sources that went back to the early 20th century or even 1990s. However, smaller countries like Paraguay and Panama have much less coverage. Most of the 18 Latin American countries in the dataset have at least one national newspaper beginning coverage in 2005 extending to the present day (but sometimes stopping in 2018 or earlier). Compared to LAWR, this coverage is not nearly as consistent and I could only include a subset of the countries if I wanted to use national newspapers from 2005 to present day. Another potentially major issue is the political nature of newspapers in Latin America (as other regions of the world), in which some publications are far more critical of presidents than others. If I relied on Clarín during the Kirchner years in Argentina, which had a very critical line, versus PRI-backed publications in Mexico owned by Televisa during Peña Nieto's term in Mexico, which may have been less critical, I may get a skewed set of wrongdoing coverage.

As an alternative to using newspapers and LAWR, I turned to newswire services or news agencies. Newswire services distribute stories in newspapers throughout the world as opposed to newspaper syndicates. By the beginning of the 1990s, four news agencies —the Associated Press (AP), United Press International (UPI), Agence France Presse (AFP), Reuters and TASS (Soviet Union) were the five major news agencies in the world. Different from national newspapers, the AFP had bureaus in 150 counties, 550 full time correspondents in foreign countries and had stories in printed in hundreds of papers (Alleyne and Wagner 1993). I selected AFP as a source

because it has widespread coverage of the Latin American region with its Spanish language coverage headquartered in Montevideo, Uruguay. Next, I turned to Agencia EFE, the Spanish Newswire Services, headquartered in Madrid and currently the fourth largest international news service and is the biggest news agency in Spanish around the world and also has an editing desk in Bogotá (Reuters 2019). Moreover, Nexis Uni (2021) indicates that EFE "is owned and operated by Spanish speakers, and proposes as part of its mission statement, to meet the information needs of Hispanics the world over." In addition, "approximately 70% of the content is Latin American news, and currently 25% of the content in the EFE Newswire appears in the newspapers of Latin America."

There are a number of reasons I opt to use these newswire services instead of LAWR and/or newspapers. First, both EFE and AFP provide daily coverage of Latin America, and publish their news content in Latin American newspapers. Second, coming from Europe, these two newswire services should more neutral in terms of local Latin American politics and thus less likely to selectively report on wrongdoing for presidents of a particular ideological background. Third, Nexis Uni has a long running archive of EFE and AFP articles beginning in December 1998 and June 2000, respectively, up until present day, allowing me to include 70 presidential terms and elections in my dataset. Finally, using two sources ensures a better representation of the universe of publicized wrongdoing throughout the time period because sometimes there was lighter reporting of particular presidencies in either EFE or AFP despite substantial overlap. At the same time, I encourage scholars to compare and contrast this dataset with the existing *Latin American Political Processes* data. Both the LAWR and the newswire sources may have certain biases in which cases of wrongdoing may be overlooked.

After selecting the AFP and EFE, I employed a strategy of targeted searching in Nexis Uni (formerly LexisNexis) to gather information on wrongdoing in the executive branch in Latin America. Initially, I worked only with EFE, and hired two undergraduate research assistants to help by searching for the name of a president and part of a word that would be associated with executive malfeasance. With Abel Pacheco from Costa Rica, we limited our search to only EFE as a news source, and then they would search the presidents name Abel Pacheco AND corrup*. Using the asterisk as a "wildcard" allows Nexis Uni to search for any iteration of the corrup (for example corrupción, corrupto, corrupta, corruptela, etc.).[73] The search term connector AND (capitalized) indicates that the two words or phrases must be in an article. The search term was limited to only when the president served in office to avoid coding incidents that occurred before or after a president took office.[74] I then organized search results chronologically, and manually went through the search results. As a first approach, I reviewed the pages and pages of results, and clicked on headlines or articles in which the president, a close family member/associate, or members of the executive branch was implicated in corruption, wrongdoing or malfeasance. I added each case that I found to a spreadsheet noting the date, country, president, who was actually involved (president versus family/cabinet member), if the event took place when the president was in office and some notes on the event.

This preliminary approach proved to be somewhat inefficient and so I adapted my technique to reduce noise in the search and target more articles that were really referring to executive wrongdoing. The approach I initially took ended up generating a few hundred search

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[73] I repeated with the words escandalo* and irregular*, which referred to scandal or irregularity(ies) in English.
[74] For example, Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner's search would extend from December 2007 – December 2015, Pacheco's would be from May 2002 to May 2006, and Michelle Bachelet's would be from 2006-2010 and 2014-2018. This also meant that prior to holding office, any allegations of wrongdoing that may have emerged during a campaign would not be captured by the search.

results per president. For example, any president that championed themselves as anti-corruption would produce a lot of results (such as Nestor Kirchner from Argentina) as would presidents who were implicated in corruption cases (like Alejandro Toledo from Peru). This was likely related to how the search function works in Nexis Uni in which an article can have the key words *anywhere* in the article. Fortunately, Nexis Uni can restrict a search to only the headline or the headline and lead paragraph by typing the word headline or hlead, respectively, and putting all words within parentheses.[75] In an updated approach, in addition to restricting articles to the headline and first paragraph, I also searched only using the president's paternal last name (in Spanish speaking countries people tend to have their father's last name as their first last name and mother's last name as their second).[76] Finally, I included 33 terms in the search rather than searching only one term and going back to repeat for different words that might be referring to a case of misconduct or wrongdoing. Any of the 33 terms could appear alongside the presidents last name for an article to appear (see the detail in the footnote).[77] This resulted in a more precise search and covered more cases of wrongdoing that may not have specifically been referred to as corrupt, scandalous or "irregular."

In total, I went through all full presidential terms from presidents who began their terms in the second half of 1998 to those who ended their terms in 2020. I used the search approach

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[75] For example, the same Pacheco search would be hlead(Abel Pacheco AND corrupt*). Unfortunately, I only discovered how to use Nexis Uni in a more streamlined way after I no longer had undergraduate research assistants.
[76] This may have been somewhat inefficient for presidents with common last names like Morales (two presidents in the dataset had this last name—Evo and Jimmy) and Fernandez (two presidents in the dataset had this last name—Cristina and Leonel). If I were to do this again I would use the presidents first name and last name (but only their paternal last name). In addition, I could include the country as well to ensure that the article was referring to the case at hand. There were two exceptions in which I used both the paternal and maternal last names— Luis González Macchi from Paraguay (1999-2003) and Enrique Peña Nieto from Mexico (2012-2018). Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner was referred to Cristina Fernandez by EFE, but Cristina Kirchner by AFP.
[77] hlead("Macri" AND (corrup* OR escandalo* OR denuncia* OR irregular* OR soborno* OR coima* OR mordid* OR OR malversa* OR peculado* OR desfalco*OR desvio* OR desvia* OR nepotismo* OR favoritismo* OR espia* OR espio* OR escuchas ilegales OR extorsion* OR evasion OR asociación ilícita OR compra de votos OR clientelismo OR pagos ilegales OR "abuso de" OR contraband* OR blanque* OR lavado OR trafica* OR trafico* OR sobreprecio* OR sobreprecia* OR plagi* OR conflicto de interes*))

outlined in the above paragraph for both AFP, which had coverage from 2000 to the present day in Nexis Uni and EFE, which had coverage from 1998 to present day.[78] I also shifted my data collection involving the instances of wrongdoing to include from whom the accusation/allegation emerged, whether or not it investigated by some oversight body and what the body was, in addition to the information on who was involved and details of the case. The dataset attempts to consolidate individual cases of wrongdoing into one row for each case of wrongdoing. This proved to be difficult as for many large stories of wrongdoing, there may be several people involved and stories evolve over time. Casas-Zamora and Carter (2017) point out that scandals are not a "one-shot affair," but it can be challenging to determine if different stories of impropriety are linked together. In total, I found over 350 discrete cases in AFP and over 380 cases in EFE wrongdoing in the executive branch involving the president directly, the president's family and other members of the executive branch.

Conclusion

The EWLA dataset thus covers numerous cases of wrongdoing across over 20 years of Latin American presidencies. Chapters 3 and 4 use the database by identifying cases of wrongdoing that directly involve the president and have been investigated by a wrongdoing body. I transformed all potential cases during a presidential term (involving either a president or interim president) into a dummy variable. However, the database could potentially be used to create a count variable of wrongdoing within a presidential term. In addition, the data could be

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[78] There were five presidents whose terms began in 1998 who had a few months of gap in coverage of their initial few months. According to LAWR, none of these presidents had cases of wrongdoing that were uncovered in these initial months of their presidencies. This is perhaps not very surprising as presidents typically have a "honeymoon" early on in their presidency before the media and public become more critical (Powell, Jr. and Whitten 1993; although see Kim and Bahry 2008).

used to test if wrongdoing committed by those close to the president has impacts on presidential approval and the legislative process in similar ways to presidents. Focusing on presidential elections is one of many outcomes that publicized cases of wrongdoing can potentially impact.

I also encourage researchers to employ new data techniques by taking search results from Nexis Uni using AFP and EFE and doing natural language processing or text analysis. This may be a more automated way that can serve as a complement to the manual searches that I did for this data collection endeavor. Furthermore, I tried to categorize cases of wrongdoing, but this also proved to be challenging. Corruption cases often involve not just embezzlement, but a combination of money laundering, bribery, abuse of office, illicit enrichment and other types of misconduct. Future data collection endeavors should come up with a systematic way to categorize cases of wrongdoing. Rather than focusing on type of wrongdoing, another approach could be to go back to Pérez-Liñán's (2007) idea of a "scandal index", in which more coverage of news of malfeasance in the executive branch builds or decays over time.

This dataset has not covered presidential terms preceding elections that were not free and fair, nor has it covered ongoing presidential terms. Following the cases in the dataset, new presidents like Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil and several administrations in other countries have had high profile cases of wrongdoing related to Covid-19 (e.g., in Peru and Argentina). This shows that executive politics in Latin America are unfortunately still involved in malfeasant behavior. As the press continues to expose it, future scholars should continue to build on this dataset and others to explore not only implications for elections and presidential approval, but for the rise of populism, contentious politics, and democratic attitudes in general.

Chapter 6: Conclusion

This dissertation theorizes about and finds evidence that there are potentially serious consequences to the political system when the news media reports about politicians' misdeeds. Specifically, the focus is on consequences beyond those for the particular politician involved. In the immediate aftermath of a political scandal or case of wrongdoing, a politician him or herself may to respond by making excuses, justifying behavior, denying it or making concessions (Chanley et al. 1994). Politicians may even resign in response to pressure from co-partisans or the public. Numerous studies find that after reading about particular different types of wrongdoing, people react by reducing their evaluations of warmth, competence, and morality towards individuals involved (Funk 1996; McDermott, Schwartz, and Vallejo 2015; Żemojtel-Piotrowska et al. 2017). Individual executives may witness their approval ratings drop (conditional on the economy) (Carlin, Love, and Martínez-Gallardo 2015), and politicians may lose support or even lose elections when their wrongdoing is reported by the press (Basinger 2013). Yet, the implications of these individuals' misbehavior for the broader health of the political system have been less explored. In focusing on how publicized misconduct affects party evaluations, the party system as a whole and electoral behavior, I add to a growing body of literature on wrongdoing's spillover effects and broader implications for democracy (see Bowler and Karp 2004; Kumlin and Esaiasson 2012; Lee 2018; Maier 2011; von Sikorski, Heiss, and Matthes 2020; von Sikorski and Herbst 2020).

Chapter 2 focuses on the fallout of moral scandals that are marked by hypocrisy, within the context of the United States. I found that Republicans, not Democrats, felt more coolly towards their own party when their in-party congressmen was implicated in scandal compared to when they resigned. Nearly four years after the scandals that embroiled Tim Murphy and John

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Conyers, it is unclear to what extent the findings in the paper would still hold. Four years of the Donald Trump presidency has changed not only how Republican identifiers or leaners may act, but also how Republican politicians respond to scandal. After being accused by multiple women of sexual harassment and assault, at best Trump ignored the allegations and at worst he denied them, making disparaging remarks towards the women who accused him of these transgressions. Throughout his presidency, Trump seemed to openly admit to different types of wrongdoing, and yet deny that he did anything wrong while claiming that he could do whatever he wanted because he was president. Current Florida congressmen Matt Gaetz—who has been accused of trafficking in minors, corruption, and drug use—has taken a page from the Trump playbook by denying everything, and continuing to drum up controversy and media attention. Tim Murphy may have chosen not to resign if he had been implicated in his scandal in 2021. Admitting wrongdoing and resignation may now be out of fashion for Republican politicians.

I would anticipate some different findings for the Democratic side in 2021 as well. When allegations of sexual harassment emerged against New York Governor Andrew Cuomo, who had become a popular political figure in the early months of the Covid-19 pandemic in 2021, quite a few already were calling for Cuomo to resign. Cuomo seemed to mimic the Trump playbook, as Gaetz has, by denying and downplaying the allegations, and riding out the scandal for as long as he could. As it became clear that Cuomo would be impeached and an investigation found over ten women giving detailed accounts of his harassment, Cuomo did resign. Other Democratic politicians have been much quicker to resign during scandal including Senator Al Franken for sexual harassment and Congresswomen Katie Hill.[79] Democratic voters and leaners are fairly critical of their own politicians who are implicated in wrongdoing, and I would anticipate that

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[79] It is important to note that one prominent Democratic politician, Virginia Governor Ralph Northam, adopted the "ride it out" approach and will finish out his term in 2021 after a blackface scandal.

they would feel worse about their party after reading about a hypocritical scandal and better

when the scandalous politician is pushed out in 2021. Although I anticipate changes in the way

partisans act towards scandal in 2021, I still would hypothesize differences within different

political party identifiers as partisan identifiers follow cues from their leaders. Because of the

vastly distinct response of Republican and Democratic politicians, Republican and Democratic

partisans are also quite likely to react differently to in-party and out-party scandals.

What are the potential future avenues for the study of political scandals and cases of

publicized misconduct in the United States? The context of the current political situation must be

taken into consideration. Polarization, already heightened at the beginning of the Trump

administration, has only deepened in many ways. In the Brazilian context, PT party identifiers

tended to jump ship when high profile politicians were implicated in wrongdoing (Baker et al.

2016). Yet, in the United States, partisans may remain steadfast in their support of their side in

the face of scandal even as scandals may continue to be associated with lower levels of approval

for institutions like Congress (Bowler and Karp 2004). If Congress continues to have low

approval ratings no matter what, and the president's approval is basically shaped almost entirely

by partisanship, future work should investigate how misconduct affects other political attitudes.

Furthermore, in the context of intense polarization and high levels of partisanship (and partisan

leaners), can scandals change political attitudes? Who is most likely to respond to scandals in

this context? Finally, moving beyond the scope of Chapter 2 and focusing on the implications of

Chapters 3 and 4, it is worth briefly discussing the impact of the scandal-tainted Trump

presidency on American political attitudes and behaviors. Trump's tenure demonstrated that an

American presidency tainted by wrongdoing and misconduct does not necessarily lead to less

political activity and disaffection at the polls. Indeed, there was widespread participation in

protests and more participation in the 2018 midterms and 2020 general elections than other recent electoral contests. This suggests that exposure to malfeasance may have some salutary impacts on American democracy. Yet, the American public may begin to feel "scandal fatigue" (Kumlin and Esaiasson 2012), which may lead to more shrugged shoulders than picket signs at new cases wrongdoing.

Chapters 3 and 4 focus on presidential wrongdoing in the Latin American region. In Chapter 3, I find that party systems become more volatile and more crowded as presidents are implicated in wrongdoing. The chapter provides evidence that not only will an incumbent's party be negatively impacted, but the entire party system may be shaken up. The chapter can only show the relationship between incumbent wrongdoing and party system stability in the short term. Future work can use process tracing and case studies to investigate long-term effects of misconduct on party systems. As many Latin American democracies are still relatively young compared to other parts of the world, even seeing how presidential elections are impacted two or three elections following misconduct could be very insightful of the long-term effects of wrongdoing on democracy. Furthermore, in a number of cases I found that the president's party did not even run for reelection. Can a malfeasant incumbent president's party survive in the legislature or at the subnational level even if it does not field a candidate for president? Can a party that was previously tainted by incompetence make a comeback? Future investigations of the long-term effects of wrongdoing can help us answer these important questions.

Chapter 3's focus is on competition in the presidential party system, not the legislative party system. The legislature and president must work together to pass legislation and, if presidential wrongdoing shakes up the legislative party system in a similar way to the presidential party system, it may be more challenging for a president to pass policy. I found that

the presidential party system became more fragmented. If this is true about the legislative party system, then presidents who ultimately prove victorious may have few co-partisans in the legislature. In Peru and Guatemala, both countries that have experienced presidential misconduct and highly fragmented party systems, presidents who win a majority in the two round system following a malfeasant incumbent often have won a very low percentage of the vote in the first round. Their parties may only control 10-20% of the legislature, which means they must team up with a fragile coalition of parties. This makes governing more challenging, suggesting that a previous incumbent's malfeasance may have ripple effects for governance in a subsequent president's term. Although presidential elections are not always concomitant with legislative elections, it should be the prerogative of scholars to assess how wrongdoing may also trickle down or spillover to legislative elections.

Chapter 4 probes how wrongdoing may shape political participation in a subsequent presidential election. I find that voter turnout is unaffected by wrongdoing in voluntary voting systems, contrary to my expectations. However, invalid voting is higher in compulsory voting systems when the president is involved in a case of publicized misconduct. This suggests that, at least in compulsory systems, voters feel more withdrawal towards the electoral process in general when incumbents are malfeasant compared to when they are clean. Chapter 3 finds that those who do cast a valid ballot tend to support non-incumbent options, newer parties, and the electorate spreads their support across more candidates when incumbents are malfeasant. This means that those who win presidential elections following malfeasance are less likely to have a mandate than those who win when incumbents are clean (at least in compulsory systems). In compulsory systems, do presidents whose terms begin following a case of serious wrongdoing

have more difficulties with popularity and with enacting their political agenda? This question is one to explore in future research.

Chapter 4 relies on some individual level assumptions without delving into individual level data. What can we learn from individual level analyses? Different types of voters, in both compulsory and voluntary systems, may have different reactions to presidential wrongdoing. On the whole valid participation may drop off, but some groups of voters may fight by supporting opposition candidates, while others feel turned off and abstain. In compulsory systems invalid voters may also be a mix of voters who would prefer to abstain but do not want to bear the costs, and voters who are genuinely lodging a protest vote in hope that the winner of an election starts addressing the needs of the mass public. Importantly, individual level analyses can begin to uncover the mechanisms. Perhaps as I anticipated, individuals who become disaffected by incumbent wrongdoing are the ones who abstain or cast a null/blank vote, while individuals who are enraged are more likely to turn out and cast a valid ballot for an opposition candidate.

Beyond electoral and public opinion outcomes, wrongdoing may have other impacts on political behavior. The literature on political protest in Latin America has often focused on low quality institutions (Moseley 2015) and opposition to neoliberalism (Arce and Bellinger 2007; Bellinger and Arce 2011). Mostly absent in the conversation are cases of corruption scandals. Large swathes of people have turned out to protest presidents in Honduras and Guatemala after they were embroiled in serious cases of publicized wrongdoing. Much of the literature on political participation and wrongdoing has centered on elections, but a growing literature has started to analyze contentious politics and other forms of political participation (Školník 2020). Nevertheless, this literature has focused on perceptions of corruption and corruption victimization rather than cases of wrongdoing. There are important opportunities here to study

the link between executive misconduct and protest beyond Latin America, as huge protests inspired by malfeasant leaders have taken place from Romania to Algeria to Korea. Yet, in most cases, wrongdoing does not provoke such a strong reaction by the public. Why does misconduct sometimes lead to such an explosion of anger and other times not? I anticipate that wrongdoing has the potential to be the spark of protest movements when the mass public also feels other grievances towards politicians and the political system writ large. Further research would help us understand political behavior and accountability in unique ways.

Scholars should continue to research whether and when politicians are held accountable for wrongdoing. However, this dissertation has demonstrated that the fallout of a particular case of wrongdoing can extend far beyond the political career of an individual politician. The reaction of the public may very well be to lower approval ratings and vote for the opposition over a malfeasant or scandal-ridden incumbent. However, wrongdoing by high-level political figures can shake up a party system and, ultimately, may have the potential to undermine faith in democracy. Even if an individual politician is not reelected or resigns before the end of their term, the public may lose confidence in the system and decide to withdraw from politics altogether. Alternatively, a disillusioned public may be drawn to populist figures with weak democratic credentials who position themselves as outsiders and messianic figures that are the only ones capable of reforming a broken system. Nevertheless, wrongdoing may merely be punished by the public in a subsequent election, in which a malfeasant party or politician is replaced by an ostensibly cleaner option. That said, sometimes wrongdoing may not be punished at all, but rather ignored (or less plausibly, rewarded).

It is incumbent upon scholars to continue researching about under which circumstances can wrongdoing have ripple effects beyond narrow accountability. This dissertation suggests that

new and fragile democracies may particularly vulnerable to instability in the aftermath of wrongdoing, but older democracies may also experience cracks and weakening especially when other elements of the democracy are simultaneously weakening. Supporting politicians who avoid using their office for private gain, act above the law, and engage in hypocritical transgressions makes sense because of a normative desire for good leadership, but also because these behaviors distract from politicians' jobs of policymaking and governing. The integrity of leaders therefore often transcends an individual election and is key to the health of any democracy. In the worst case scenarios, exposure of malfeasance from politicians at the top can result in inchoate and volatile party systems, political deadlock, and a withdrawn public or a public that is attracted to non-democratic forms of government. No politician will be perfect, but when average people are inundated with news stories of rent-seeking and self-serving politicians, that holds the potential to spell disaster and spur on political chaos even in the most resilient of democracies.

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Table A2.1: Descriptive Statistics of Study 1

VARIABLES	(1) N	(2) mean	(3) sd	(4) min	(5) max
Age	507	39.05	12.86	19	83
Democrat (and Leaners)	507	0.558	0.497	0	1
Republican (and Leaners)	507	0.294	0.456	0	1
Partisan	507	0.852	0.355	0	1
Female	507	0.467	0.499	0	1
Hispanic	507	0.0533	0.225	0	1
Black	507	0.0592	0.236	0	1
Asian	507	0.0828	0.276	0	1
Some College +	507	0.485	0.500	0	1

Table A2.2: Descriptive Statistics of Study 2

VARIABLES	(1) N	(2) mean	(3) sd	(4) min	(5) max
Age	504	38.64	12.64	18	99
Democrat (and Leaners)	504	0.552	0.498	0	1
Republican (and Leaners)	504	0.308	0.462	0	1
Partisan	504	0.859	0.348	0	1
Female	504	0.450	0.498	0	1
Hispanic	504	0.0456	0.209	0	1
Black	504	0.0734	0.261	0	1
Asian	504	0.0794	0.271	0	1
Some College +	504	0.573	0.495	0	1

Table A2.3: Difference-in-Proportions and Difference-in-Means Tests between 2018 ANES Pilot Study (Unweighted) and Pooled MTurk Sample

	Prop(MTurk)	Prop(ANES)	Diff.	Std. Error
Female	0.4590	0.5596	-0.1006[***]	0.0186
Hispanic	0.0495	0.0988	-0.0493[***]	0.0091
Black	0.0663	0.1020	-0.0357[***]	0.0099
Asian	0.0811	0.0184	0.0627[***]	0.0090
Partisan	0.8556	0.7940	0.0616[***]	0.0137
Democrat	0.5549	0.4544	0.1005[***]	0.0185
Republican	0.3007	0.3396	-0.0389[**]	0.0173
College	0.8764	0.6912	0.1852[***]	0.0139
	Mean(MTurk)	Mean(ANES)	Diff.	Std. Error
Age	38.8467	49.4764	-10.6297[***]	0.5939

Table A2.4: Multinomial Logit Testing Balance Between Groups

VARIABLES	(1) Murphy	(2) Conyers
Treatment 2		
Female	-0.171	0.0971
	(0.226)	(0.222)
Education	0.0660	-0.157
	(0.120)	(0.129)
Black	-0.913*	-0.485
	(0.513)	(0.417)
Hispanic	-0.524	0.0416
	(0.547)	(0.495)
Asian	-0.0544	-0.315
	(0.402)	(0.395)
Age	-0.00375	0.000559
	(0.00893)	(0.00901)
News Consumption	0.253	-0.312*
	(0.159)	(0.171)
Democrat	0.191	-0.327
	(0.344)	(0.327)
Republican	0.323	-0.688*
	(0.372)	(0.357)
Constant	-0.615	1.591*
	(0.815)	(0.855)
Treatment 3		
Female	-0.115	0.0316
	(0.225)	(0.225)
Education	0.00212	-0.0883
	(0.119)	(0.130)
Black	-0.295	-0.435
	(0.431)	(0.429)
Hispanic	0.196	-0.571
	(0.461)	(0.575)
Asian	-0.469	-0.814*
	(0.441)	(0.450)
Age	-0.00166	-0.00523
	(0.00883)	(0.00914)
News Consumption	0.196	-0.110
	(0.157)	(0.171)
Democrat	-0.0418	-0.147
	(0.328)	(0.347)
Republican	0.00295	-0.0902
	(0.359)	(0.366)
Constant	-0.125	0.876
	(0.800)	(0.866)
Observations	507	504
LR chi2(16)	11.32	15.49
p	0.881	0.628

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A2.5: Republican Party Feeling Thermometer by Strength of Partisanship (H1 Extension, Study 1)

VARIABLES	Republican Thermometer
Treatment 2	2.424
	(7.191)
Lean Republican	-21.64***
	(6.773)
Weak Republican	-19.71***
	(6.605)
Treatment 2 * Lean Republican	-3.945
	(10.14)
Treatment 2 * Weak Republican	-2.378
	(9.573)
Constant	73.48***
	(4.084)
Observations	99
R-squared	0.237

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: Treatment 1 and Strong Republicans are the baselines.

Table A2.6: Republican Party Feeling Thermometer by Strength of Partisanship (H2 Extension, Study 1)

VARIABLES	Republican Thermometer
Treatment 3	1.338
	(6.691)
Lean Republican	-25.59***
	(7.020)
Weak Republican	-22.09***
	(6.447)
Treatment 3 * Lean Republican	0.349
	(9.555)
Treatment 3 * Weak Republican	5.736
	(8.535)
Constant	75.90***
	(5.507)
Observations	103
R-squared	0.287

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: Treatment 2 and Strong Republicans are the baselines.

Table A2.7: Democratic Party Feeling Thermometer by Strength of Partisanship (H3 Extension, Study 1)

VARIABLES	Democratic Thermometer
Treatment 2	1.840
	(4.390)
Weak Democrat	-11.10**
	(4.848)
Lean Democrat	-29.10***
	(5.085)
Treatment 2 * Weak Democrat	-2.628
	(6.558)
Treatment 2 * Lean Democrat	8.836
	(8.131)
Constant	74.81***
	(3.066)
Observations	188
R-squared	0.213

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: Treatment 1 and Strong Democrats are the baselines

Figure A2.1: Plot of Interaction Between Strength of Party Identification and Treatment (H1 Extension, Study 1)

Figure A2.2: Plot of Interaction Between Strength of Party Identification and Treatment (H2 Extension, Study 1)

Figure A2.3: Plot of Interaction Between Strength of Party Identification and Treatment (H3 Extension, Study 1)

Table A2.8: Democratic Party Feeling Thermometer by Strength of Partisanship (H1 Extension, Study 2)

VARIABLES	Democratic Thermometer
Treatment 2	2.106
	(4.793)
Weak Democrat	-15.57***
	(4.640)
Lean Democrat	-16.26***
	(5.299)
Treatment 2 * Weak Democrat	4.017
	(6.749)
Treatment 2 * Lean Democrat	-21.24***
	(7.561)
Constant	71.74***
	(3.152)
Observations	197
R-squared	0.257

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: Treatment 1 and Strong Democrats are the baselines.

Table A2.9: Democratic Party Feeling Thermometer by Strength of Partisanship (H2 Extension, Study 2)

VARIABLES	Democratic Thermometer
Treatment 3	-3.982
	(4.930)
Weak Democrat	-11.55**
	(4.613)
Lean Democrat	-37.50***
	(5.077)
Treatment 3 * Weak Democrat	3.192
	(6.808)
Treatment 3 * Lean Democrat	10.18
	(7.438)
Constant	73.84***
	(3.399)
Observations	177
R-squared	0.324

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: Treatment 2 and Strong Democrats are the baselines.

Table A2.10: Republican Party Feeling Thermometer by Strength of Partisanship (H3 Extension, Study 2)

VARIABLES	Republican Thermometer
Treatment 2	-4.725
	(9.945)
Weak Republican	-2.725
	(6.639)
Strong Republican	20.89***
	(7.083)
Treatment 2 * Weak Republican	17.89
	(11.90)
Treatment 2 * Strong Republican	7.448
	(12.15)
Constant	54.06***
	(5.079)
Observations	101
R-squared	0.227

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Note: Treatment 2 and Strong Republicans are the baselines.

Figure A2.4: Plot of Interaction Between Strength of Party Identification and Treatment (H1 Extension, Study 2)

Figure A2.5: Plot of Interaction Between Strength of Party Identification and Treatment (H2 Extension, Study 2)

Figure A2.6: Plot of Interaction Between Strength of Party Identification and Treatment (H3 Extension, Study 2)

Table A2.11: Republican Party Feeling Thermometer by News Consumption Among
Republicans (H1 Extension, Study 1)

VARIABLES	Republican Thermometer
Treatment 2	0.179
	(5.226)
Very Closely Follow News	13.49**
	(6.272)
Treatment 2 * Very Closely Follow News	-14.89*
	(8.555)
Constant	57.28***
	(3.813)
Observations	99
R-squared	0.063

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A2.12: Republican Party Feeling Thermometer by News Consumption Among
Republicans (H2 Extension, Study 1)

VARIABLES	Republican Thermometer
Treatment 3	7.126
	(4.971)
Very Closely Follow News	-1.405
	(5.632)
Treatment 3 * Very Closely Follow News	4.613
	(8.078)
Constant	57.45***
	(3.460)
Observations	103
R-squared	0.053

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A2.13: Democratic Party Feeling Thermometer by News Consumption Among Democrats (H3 Extension, Study 1)

VARIABLES	Democratic Thermometer
Treatment 2	1.013
	(4.163)
Very Closely Follow News	-1.827
	(4.611)
Treatment 2 * Very Closely Follow News	7.191
	(6.596)
Constant	64.85***
	(3.008)
Observations	188
R-squared	0.015

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Figure A2.7: Plot of Interaction Between Following News and Treatment on Republican Party
Feeling Thermometer (H1 Extension, Study 1)

Figure A2.8: Plot of Interaction Between Following News and Treatment on Republican Party
Feeling Thermometer (H2 Extension, Study 1)

Figure A2.9: Plot of Interaction Between Following News and Treatment on Democratic Party
Feeling Thermometer (H3 Extension, Study 1)

Table A2.14: Democratic Party Feeling Thermometer by News Consumption Among Democrats
(H1 Extension, Study 2)

VARIABLES	Democratic Thermometer
Treatment 2	-3.094
	(4.076)
Very Closely Follow News	4.194
	(5.107)
Treatment 2 * Very Closely Follow News	-1.457
	(7.150)
Constant	61.24***
	(2.783)
Observations	197
R-squared	0.010

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A2.15: Democratic Party Feeling Thermometer by News Consumption Among Democrats
(H2 Extension, Study 2)

VARIABLES	Democratic Thermometer
Treatment 3	-0.428
	(4.338)
Very Closely Follow News	2.737
	(4.948)
Treatment 3 * Very Closely Follow News	1.974
	(7.337)
Constant	58.15***
	(2.945)
Observations	177
R-squared	0.006

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A2.16: Republican Party Feeling Thermometer by News Consumption Among
Republicans (H3 Extension , Study 2)

VARIABLES	Republican Thermometer
Treatment 2	6.373
	(5.813)
Very Closely Follow News	-2.157
	(6.769)
Treatment 2 * Very Closely Follow News	6.348
	(9.930)
Constant	59.91***
	(3.525)
Observations	101
R-squared	0.038

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Figure A2.10: Plot of Interaction Between Following News and Treatment on Democratic Party
Feeling Thermometer (H1 Extension, Study 2)

Figure A2.11: Plot of Interaction Between Following News and Treatment on Democratic Party
Feeling Thermometer (H2 Extension, Study 2)

Figure A2.12: Plot of Interaction Between Following News and Treatment on Republican Party
Feeling Thermometer (H3 Extension, Study 2)

Table A2.17: Republican Party Feeling Thermometer (H1, Study 1)

VARIABLES	(1) Republican Thermometer	(2) Republican Thermometer (No Pittsburgh Media Market)
Treatment 2	-1.870	-1.891
	(2.686)	(2.707)
Republican	45.96***	45.58***
	(3.347)	(3.383)
Treatment 2 * Republican	-3.167	-2.986
	(4.604)	(4.638)
Age	0.0814	0.0818
	(0.0862)	(0.0866)
Education	-0.424	-0.376
	(1.144)	(1.151)
Female	0.294	0.00818
	(2.224)	(2.242)
Black	-2.392	-2.469
	(4.934)	(4.950)
Hispanic	-6.384	-6.586
	(5.073)	(5.089)
Asian	-3.343	-3.525
	(4.081)	(4.096)
Constant	14.90**	15.01**
	(6.558)	(6.606)
Observations	287	284
R-squared	0.590	0.586

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Note: Treatment 1 is the baseline.

Table A2.18: Republican Party Feeling Thermometer (H2, Study 1)

VARIABLES	(1) Republican Thermometer	(2) Republican Thermometer (No Pittsburgh Media Market)
Treatment 3	0.842	0.714
	(2.645)	(2.654)
Republican	43.31***	43.16***
	(3.148)	(3.159)
Treatment 3 * Republican	7.694*	7.825*
	(4.445)	(4.453)
Age	-0.0285	-0.0280
	(0.0851)	(0.0852)
Education	-0.450	-0.467
	(1.092)	(1.093)
Female	2.145	2.050
	(2.191)	(2.197)
Black	6.878	6.824
	(5.059)	(5.065)
Hispanic	-3.654	-3.724
	(5.046)	(5.052)
Asian	-2.843	-2.934
	(4.428)	(4.434)
Constant	16.03***	16.28***
	(6.109)	(6.126)
Observations	292	291
R-squared	0.619	0.618

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Note: Treatment 2 is the baseline.

Table A2.19: Democratic Party Feeling Thermometer (H3, Study 1)

VARIABLES	(1) Democratic Thermometer	(2) Democratic Thermometer (No Pittsburgh Media Market)
Treatment 2	-1.240	-0.902
	(4.288)	(4.312)
Democrat	39.07***	39.18***
	(3.838)	(3.869)
Treatment 2 * Democrat	5.667	5.176
	(5.278)	(5.305)
Age	-0.0676	-0.0636
	(0.0988)	(0.0990)
Education	1.659	1.756
	(1.311)	(1.316)
Female	6.730***	6.987***
	(2.550)	(2.564)
Black	6.981	7.222
	(5.657)	(5.662)
Hispanic	-0.281	0.0158
	(5.816)	(5.821)
Asian	-2.936	-2.596
	(4.679)	(4.686)
Constant	16.39**	15.34*
	(7.793)	(7.869)
Observations	287	284
R-squared	0.503	0.503

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Note: Treatment 1 is the baseline.

Table A2.20: Democratic Party Feeling Thermometer (H1, Study 2)

VARIABLES	(1) Democratic Thermometer	(2) Democratic Thermometer (No Detroit Media Market)	(3) Democratic Thermometer (No Detroit Media Market)	(4) Democratic Thermometer (No Detroit Media Market or Conyers Race Correct)
Treatment 2	0.0910	0.113	0.996	1.119
	(4.480)	(4.527)	(5.602)	(5.648)
Democrat	42.15***	41.62***	39.01***	40.10***
	(3.667)	(3.714)	(4.728)	(4.795)
Treatment 2 * Democrat	-3.598	-2.021	-1.401	-1.886
	(5.455)	(5.531)	(6.903)	(6.946)
Conyers Race Correct			-7.213	
			(5.955)	
Treatment 2 * Cyrs Race Correct			-6.151	
			(9.516)	
Democrat * Cyrs Race Correct			6.135	
			(7.541)	
Treatment 2 * Democrat * Race Correct			2.974	
			(11.67)	
Age	-0.0749	-0.0635	-0.00715	0.0677
	(0.106)	(0.107)	(0.111)	(0.150)
Education	0.188	0.0830	0.384	-0.221
	(1.528)	(1.544)	(1.567)	(2.068)
Female	4.435*	5.012*	4.134	5.216
	(2.593)	(2.633)	(2.673)	(3.321)
Black	-10.20**	-10.64**	-10.22**	-13.50**
	(4.863)	(4.872)	(4.879)	(6.137)
Hispanic	-8.108	-8.323	-6.045	-19.23**
	(5.919)	(5.921)	(6.011)	(9.369)
Asian	3.465	2.669	3.325	6.601
	(4.466)	(4.538)	(4.547)	(5.991)
Constant	21.30**	21.32**	20.91**	20.18*
	(8.943)	(9.025)	(9.307)	(11.63)
Observations	298	288	288	181
R-squared	0.449	0.451	0.461	0.434

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Note: Treatment 1 is the baseline.

Table A2.21: Democratic Party Feeling Thermometer (H2, Study 2)

VARIABLES	(1) Democratic Thermometer	(2) Democratic Thermometer (No Detroit Media Market)	(3) Democratic Thermometer (No Detroit Media Market)	(4) Democratic Thermometer (No Detroit Media Market or Conyers Race Correct)
Treatment 3	4.629	4.742	1.978	1.733
	(4.561)	(4.554)	(5.320)	(5.137)
Democrat	37.43***	38.06***	36.44***	36.50***
	(4.215)	(4.245)	(5.123)	(4.994)
Treatment 3 * Democrat	-3.924	-4.120	-2.403	-2.369
	(5.670)	(5.691)	(6.973)	(6.726)
Conyers Race Correct			-13.90*	
			(7.555)	
Treatment 3 * Cyrs Race Correct			9.125	
			(10.20)	
Democrat * Cyrs Race Correct			8.526	
			(8.837)	
Treatment 3 * Democrat * Cyrs Race Correct			-6.469	
			(12.25)	
Age	-0.0663	-0.0600	-0.00877	0.0357
	(0.112)	(0.112)	(0.115)	(0.145)
Education	1.749	1.626	1.901	2.742
	(1.555)	(1.583)	(1.606)	(2.054)
Female	3.717	3.564	2.812	2.573
	(2.717)	(2.730)	(2.750)	(3.303)
Black	-11.34**	-9.677*	-9.210	-9.406
	(5.658)	(5.769)	(5.767)	(7.500)
Hispanic	-4.208	-5.122	-2.698	-6.607
	(6.563)	(6.488)	(6.599)	(10.81)
Asian	11.85**	10.87**	11.02**	12.88**
	(5.535)	(5.478)	(5.477)	(6.422)
Constant	14.25	15.05	15.93	10.66
	(9.275)	(9.357)	(9.729)	(11.88)
Observations	273	264	264	164
R-squared	0.402	0.415	0.427	0.448

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Note: Treatment 2 is the baseline.

Table A2.22: Republican Party Feeling Thermometer (H3, Study 2)

VARIABLES	(1) Republican Thermometer	(2) Republican Thermometer (No Detroit Media Market)	(3) Republican Thermometer (No Detroit Media Market)	(4) Republican Thermometer (No Detroit Media Market or Conyers Race Correct)
Treatment 2	-3.717	-3.844	-6.584*	-6.805*
	(2.894)	(2.979)	(3.793)	(3.948)
Republican	40.85***	40.34***	37.47***	36.59***
	(3.383)	(3.460)	(4.408)	(4.612)
Treatment 2 * Republican	10.73**	10.55**	13.92**	14.65**
	(5.032)	(5.153)	(6.435)	(6.681)
Conyers Race Correct			-9.661**	
			(4.527)	
Treatment 2 * Cyrs Race Correct			8.882	
			(6.247)	
Republican * Cyrs Race Correct			8.771	
			(7.030)	
Treatment 2 * Republican * Cyrs Race Correct			-11.34	
			(10.88)	
Age	-0.204**	-0.202**	-0.166	-0.285*
	(0.0974)	(0.0994)	(0.103)	(0.145)
Education	-3.890***	-3.923***	-3.832***	-3.682*
	(1.410)	(1.438)	(1.461)	(1.990)
Female	2.705	3.391	2.683	2.377
	(2.393)	(2.453)	(2.492)	(3.194)
Black	-0.886	-1.209	-1.686	-3.423
	(4.486)	(4.539)	(4.548)	(5.903)
Hispanic	4.289	4.187	5.513	-10.21
	(5.460)	(5.517)	(5.604)	(9.012)
Asian	-3.743	-4.558	-3.947	-10.66*
	(4.120)	(4.228)	(4.239)	(5.763)
Constant	44.27***	44.45***	45.99***	51.36***
	(7.960)	(8.127)	(8.396)	(11.05)
Observations	298	288	288	181
R-squared	0.553	0.547	0.555	0.527

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Note: Treatment 3 is the baseline.

132

Recruitment Procedure and Data Audit

For Study 1, I posted a HIT on MTurk on November 17, 2017 asking for participants to complete a 3 minute survey about political attitudes. Participants were required to be in the United States, have a HIT Approval Rate greater or equal to 95%, and have more than 1000 HITs approved. Participants were paid $.40 to complete the study—slightly higher than the federal minimum wage $7.25/hour, or about $8/hour if workers finished the task in the time estimated. I fielded the survey over two days November 17-18th (135 on the 17th and 401 on the 18th). There were no significant differences of demographic characteristics between the respondents from the 17th to the 18th in a two-tailed test.

I received a total of 536 responses. I eliminated five respondents retook the survey with the same MTurk worker ID, and 9 participants whose GPS coordinates (provided by Qualtrics) were outside of the United States. In addition, I used the getIPinfo function from the rIP package in R to test if any IP addresses were associated with VPS or if any additional IPs not flagged by Qualtrics were located outside of the United States, as these respondents have been shown to be of low quality and potentially fraudulent data sources (Kennedy et al. 2020). This package uses three different sources IP Intel, IP Hub and Proxy Check to determine if IP addresses are these potentially fraudulent cases. I used both IP Hub and Proxy Check, which had quite similar results. Using these, I eliminated an additional 15 respondents (14 whose IPs were associated with VPS and one additional IP located outside of the US). The final total of valid responses was 507.

For Study 2, I followed with a similar procedure, posting a HIT on MTurk on March 2, 2018 asking for participants to complete a 3 minute survey about political attitudes. Participants needed to have the same qualifications (in the United States, have a HIT Approval Rate greater or equal to 95%, and have more than 1000 HITs approved), and were paid the same (40 cents). Those who participated in Study 1 were prohibited from participating in Study 2. The survey was completed on the same day that it was fielded (March 2, 2018).

I recruited 539 people in total. I eliminated three participants who did not finish the survey after they indicated they were not US citizens. As in Study 1, I eliminated the participants whose GPS coordinates (provided by Qualtrics) were outside of the United States, 15 in total. I then used the getIPinfo function again, analyzing the IP addresses with IP Hub and Proxy Check. I removed an additional 17 respondents, (16 whose IPs were associated with VPS and one additional IP located outside of the US). The final total of valid responses was 504.

Other work (Ahler, Sood, and Roush 2018), has suggested that duplicate IP addresses or duplicate GPS coordinates may also be fraudulent data. I followed Kennedy et al (2020), who do not eliminate duplicate IP addresses and duplicate GPS coordinates that were not flagged by IP Hub and Proxy Check. Nevertheless, I checked the robustness of my results by (1) eliminating duplicate IPs, and (2) removing duplicate IPs and duplicate GPS coordinates.

After eliminating respondents whose GPS coordinates were outside of the United States from Qualtrics and using the IP Hub and Proxy Check packages, I found 16 respondents had an IP address that they shared with at least one other person, and 45 respondents had duplicate GPS

coordinates in Study 1. Eliminating these participants drops the dataset down by 48 respondents. H1 finds support at p < .1 in a one-tailed test when I drop duplicate IPs (M1: 62.1 and M2: 56.3), but when I drop duplicate GPS coordinates and duplicate IPs, H1 is not supported. H2 remains robust to only dropping duplicate IPs (M1: 56.3 and M2: 65.4, p < .05 in a one-tailed test) and duplicate GPS coordinates (M1: 57.2 and M2: 64.6, p < .05 in a one-tailed test). H3 falls just short of significance when I drop duplicate IPs (M1: 63.9 and M2: 68.1, p = .1001 in a one-tailed test), and dropping both duplicate IPs and GPS coordinates (M1: 63.6 and M2: 68.0, p = .1019 in a one-tailed test).

In Study 2, I found six respondents had an IP address that they shared with at least one other respondent, and 44 respondents had duplicate GPS coordinates. Eliminating these participants drops the dataset down by 44 respondents (the duplicate IPs were all nested within duplicate GPS coordinates) to N = 460. H1 and H2 still find no support after eliminating duplicate IP addresses, and both duplicate IP addresses and GPS coordinates. H3 still retains support at p < .05 in a one-tailed test when I eliminate duplicate IPs (M1: 59.3 M2: 67.3), but falls shy of statistical significance (p = .102 in a one-tailed test) eliminating GPS coordinates and duplicate IPs (M1: 61.0 M2: 67.0).

In sum, even after dropping additional potentially fraudulent respondents, H2 retains support in Study 1, and in one of two specifications H3 retains support in Study 2. This is consistent with the least conservative approach to tackling potential fraud in MTurk—only eliminating respondents' whose GPS coordinates were shown to be out of the United States from Qualtrics.

Appendix Chapter 3

Table A3.1: Presidents and Wrongdoing in Latin America

Country	Years of Term	President (Interim)	Wrongdoing	Oversight
Argentina	1999-2003	Fernando de la Rúa (Adolfo Saá/ Eduardo Duhalde)	Bribery to Pass Labor Reform (Vote Buying in Congress)	Congress
Argentina	2003-2007	Néstor Kirchner	Overseas Bank Account in Switzerland	Federal Judge
Argentina	2007-2011	Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner	Campaign Finance Violations involving Venezuelan Business interests	Federal Judge
Argentina	2011-2015	Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner	La ruta de dinero K	Federal Judge
Argentina	2015-2019	Mauricio Macri	Favoritism for Family Business	Public Prosecutors
Bolivia	2002-2006	Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada (Carlos Mesa/ Eduardo Rodríguez Veltzé)	*None Investigated*	NA
Bolivia	2006-2009	Evo Morales	*None Investigated*	NA
Bolivia	2009-2014	Evo Morales	*None Investigated*	NA
Brazil	1998-2002	Fernando Henrique Cardoso	Undeclared Campaign Donations; Favoritism of Telebras	Attorney General; Public Prosecutors
Brazil	2002-2006	Lula da Silva	*None Investigated*	NA
Brazil	2006-2010	Lula da Silva	*None Investigated*	NA
Brazil	2010-2014	Dilma Rousseff	*None Investigated*	NA
Brazil	2014-2018	Dilma Rousseff (Michel Temer)	Petrobras/Odebrecht (Rousseff)	Attorney General; Police; Congress
Chile	2000-2006	Ricardo Lagos	Use of Public Money from the Ministry of Public Works in Campaign	Judicial
Chile	2006-2010	Michelle Bachelet	*None Investigated*	NA
Chile	2010-2014	Sebastián Piñera	*None Investigated*	NA

Table A3.1: Presidents and Wrongdoing in Latin America (cont.)

Country	Years of Term	President (Interim)	Wrongdoing	Oversight
Colombia	1998-2002	Andrés Pastrana	Illicit Campaign Finance	Electoral Tribunal
Colombia	2002-2006	Álvaro Uribe	Connection to Paramilitary Members	Attorney General
Colombia	2006-2010	Álvaro Uribe	1) Connection to Paramilitaries 2) Vote Buying in Campaign to Amend Constitution for Reelection	1) Congress; 2) Supreme Court
Colombia	2010-2014	Juan Manuel Santos	*None Investigated*	NA
Colombia	2014-2018	Juan Manuel Santos	Odebrecht Funding Campaigns (2010 and 2014)	Attorney General
Costa Rica	1998-2002	Miguel Angel Rodriguez	Campaign and Personal ties to drug trafficker	Congress
Costa Rica	2002-2006	Abel Pacheco	Campaign Finance violations: multiple foreign sources/private companies	Congress
Costa Rica	2006-2010	Oscar Arias	*None Investigated*	NA
Costa Rica	2010-2014	Laura Chinchilla	*None Investigated*	NA
Costa Rica	2014-2018	Luis Guillermo Solís	Cementazo: Favoritism for Chinese cement companies	Congress
Dominican Republic	2000-2004	Hipólito Mejía	*None Investigated*	NA
Dominican Republic	2004-2008	Leonel Fernández	*None Investigated*	NA
Dominican Republic	2008-2012	Leonel Fernández	*None Investigated*	NA
Dominican Republic	2012-2016	Danilo Medina	*None Investigated*	NA
Dominican Republic	2016-2020	Danilo Medina	Ties to Odebrecht with Campaign	Public Prosecutor
Ecuador	1998-2002	Jamil Mahuad (Gustavo Noboa)	Illegal Campaign Donations from Private Banker	
Ecuador	2002-2007	Lucio Gutiérrez (Alfredo Palacio)	Illicit Campaign Donations/Ties to Drug Traffickers	Congress
Ecuador	2007-2009	Rafael Correa	*None Investigated*	NA
Ecuador	2009-2013	Rafael Correa	*None Investigated*	NA

Table A3.1: Presidents and Wrongdoing in Latin America (cont.)

Country	Years of Term	President (Interim)	Wrongdoing	Oversight
Ecuador	2013-2017	Rafael Correa	*None Investigated*	NA
El Salvador	1999-2004	Francisco Flores Perez	*None Investigated*	NA
El Salvador	2004-2009	Antonio Saca	*None Investigated*	NA
El Salvador	2009-2014	Mauricio Funes	*None Investigated*	NA
El Salvador	2014-2019	Salvador Sanchez Cerén	*None Investigated*	NA
Guatemala	2000-2004	Alfonso Portillo	Tax Evasion and Embezzlement with Panamanian Bank Accounts	Congress
Guatemala	2004-2008	Oscar Berger	*None Investigated*	NA
Guatemala	2008-2012	Álvaro Colom	*None Investigated*	NA
Guatemala	2012-2016	Otto Pérez Molina (Alejandro Maldonado)	1) La Línea Case – Customs bribery scheme 2) Ties to Fraud in Social Security Institute	Congress/ Attorney General
Guatemala	2016-2020	Jimmy Morales	Illicit Campaign Financing	Attorney General
Honduras	1998-2002	Carlos Flores	*None Investigated*	NA
Honduras	2002-2006	Ricardo Maduro	*None Investigated*	NA
Mexico	2000-2006	Vicente Fox	Illicit Campaign Finance	Electoral Tribunal; Attorney General
Mexico	2006-2012	Felipe Calderón	*None Investigated*	NA
Mexico	2012-2018	Enrique Peña Nieto	Casa Blanca Case – Use of Government Contractors to Build Luxury Mansion	Anti-Corruption Body
Nicaragua	2002-2007	Enrique Bolaños	1) Illicit Campaign Finance 2) Taking Extra Salary from State (as VP)	1) Comptroller/ Attorney General/ Judges 2) Comptroller/ Attorney General
Nicaragua	2007-2012	Daniel Ortega	*None Investigated*	NA

Table A3.1: Presidents and Wrongdoing in Latin America (cont.)

Country	Years of Term	President (Interim)	Wrongdoing	Oversight
Panama	1999-2004	Mireya Moscoso	Use of State Funds to Finance Election	Electoral Court
Panama	2004-2009	Martín Torrijos	*None Investigated*	NA
Panama	2009-2014	Ricardo Martinelli	Illicit Surveillance of Political Opponents	Attorney General
Panama	2014-2019	Juan Carlos Varela	Odebrecht Donations to Campaign	Attorney General
Paraguay	1998-2003	Raúl Cubas (Luis Gonzalez Macchi)	1) Contraband bulletproof BMW discovered 2) $16 million dollar embezzlement	1) Congress 2) Congress
Paraguay	2003-2008	Nicanor Duarte	Illicit Enrichment	Comptroller
Paraguay	2008-2013	Fernado Lugo (Federico Franco)	*None Investigated*	NA
Paraguay	2013-2018	Horacio Cartes	*None Investigated*	NA
Peru	2001-2006	Alejandro Toledo	Falsification of Signatures to Register Party	Congress
Peru	2006-2011	Alan Garcia	*None Investigated*	NA
Peru	2011-2016	Ollanta Humala	1) Odebrecht/Petrobras Links 2) Donations from Venezuela to President's Party	1) Congress 2) Congress
Uruguay	2000-2005	Jorge Batlle	*None Investigated*	NA
Uruguay	2005-2010	Tabaré Vázquez	*None Investigated*	NA
Uruguay	2010-2015	José Mujica	*None Investigated*	NA
Uruguay	2015-2020	Tabaré Vázquez	*None Investigated*	NA
Venezuela	1998-2000	Hugo Chávez	*None Investigated*	NA
Venezuela	2000-2006	Hugo Chávez	Embezzlement of $2.3 million; BBVA financing of Campaign	Congress

Table A3.2: Analyses using Generalized Least Squares and Panel Specific AR(1)

VARIABLES	(1) Inc Vote	(2) Tot Vol	(3) Type A	(4) Type B	(5) ENPC
Wrongdoing	-0.0560**	0.0924***	0.0831***	0.0127	0.573***
	(0.0256)	(0.0287)	(0.0267)	(0.0169)	(0.160)
Incumbent Candidate Running	0.139***	0.0804**	0.0785**	0.00513	-0.342*
	(0.0330)	(0.0406)	(0.0368)	(0.0196)	(0.201)
GDP Growth	0.0105**	-0.00105	0.00403	-0.00584	-0.0190
	(0.00535)	(0.00651)	(0.00522)	(0.00395)	(0.0323)
Horizontal Accountability	-0.0864	0.0772	0.0488	0.0860*	0.646**
	(0.0613)	(0.101)	(0.0877)	(0.0491)	(0.308)
Interim Finished Term	-0.1000***	0.197***	0.136***	0.0241	0.811***
	(0.0387)	(0.0515)	(0.0481)	(0.0264)	(0.256)
Incumbent Party Running		-0.198***	-0.338***	0.150***	-0.0816
		(0.0473)	(0.0417)	(0.0299)	(0.294)
Lagged ENPC		0.0471***	0.0190	0.0289***	-0.640***
		(0.0149)	(0.0135)	(0.00770)	(0.0916)
Lagged Incumbent Vote Share	-0.450***				
	(0.142)				
Constant	0.138	0.306***	0.371***	-0.106**	1.446***
	(0.0976)	(0.0974)	(0.0880)	(0.0536)	(0.475)
Observations	63	70	70	70	70
Number of Countries	17	18	18	18	18

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A3.3: Volatility, Change in Effective Number of Presidential Candidates and Wrongdoing
(Only When Incumbent Party Runs)

VARIABLES	(1) Total Volatility	(2) Party Replacement	(3) Stable Party	(4) Δ ENPC
Wrongdoing	0.129***	0.118***	0.0113	0.606**
	(0.0334)	(0.0320)	(0.0254)	(0.217)
Incumbent Candidate Running	0.104**	0.105**	-0.000786	-0.342
	(0.0486)	(0.0358)	(0.0298)	(0.274)
GDP Growth	-0.00229	0.000849	-0.00314	-0.0608**
	(0.00632)	(0.00692)	(0.00622)	(0.0266)
Horizontal Accountability	0.0188	-0.0369	0.0557	0.731*
	(0.0996)	(0.0952)	(0.0585)	(0.368)
Interim Finished Term	0.202**	0.146	0.0562	0.232
	(0.0803)	(0.0840)	(0.0478)	(0.566)
Lagged ENPC	0.0468**	0.0224	0.0244*	-0.444
	(0.0211)	(0.0201)	(0.0130)	(0.270)
Constant	0.124	0.0626	0.0615	0.982
	(0.106)	(0.103)	(0.0530)	(0.701)
Observations	63	63	63	63
R-squared	0.407	0.314	0.188	0.367

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A3.4: Wrongdoing and the Dependent Variables
(Only When Incumbent Party Runs and No Interim Presidents)

VARIABLES	(1) Δ Incumbent Vote Share	(2) Total Volatility	(3) Party Replacement	(4) Stable Party	(5) Δ ENPC
Wrongdoing	-0.0757**	0.138***	0.108***	0.0303	0.314
	(0.0340)	(0.0356)	(0.0319)	(0.0263)	(0.190)
Incumbent Candidate Running	0.134***	0.0954*	0.0942**	0.00116	-0.455*
	(0.0339)	(0.0516)	(0.0386)	(0.0296)	(0.261)
GDP Growth	0.00927*	0.00254	0.00675	-0.00421	-0.0324
	(0.00491)	(0.00735)	(0.00665)	(0.00676)	(0.0236)
Horizontal Accountability	-0.101**	-0.0267	-0.0580	0.0313	0.643
	(0.0436)	(0.0955)	(0.0915)	(0.0554)	(0.390)
Lagged Incumbent Vote Share	-0.482*				
	(0.232)				
Lagged ENPC		0.0769***	0.0422**	0.0347*	-0.289
		(0.0109)	(0.0148)	(0.0187)	(0.298)
Constant	0.169	0.0489	0.00440	0.0445	0.633
	(0.131)	(0.0831)	(0.0952)	(0.0552)	(0.702)
Observations	56	56	56	56	56
R-squared	0.433	0.412	0.295	0.179	0.277

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A3.5: Change in Incumbent Vote and Total Volatility with Alternate Economic Controls

VARIABLES	(1) Δ Inc Vote	(2) Δ Inc Vote	(3) Δ Inc Vote	(4) Tot Vol	(5) Tot Vol	(6) Tot Vol
Wrongdoing	-0.0535*	-0.0541*	-0.0640**	0.108***	0.110***	0.103**
	(0.0269)	(0.0271)	(0.0258)	(0.0325)	(0.0338)	(0.0357)
Incumbent Candidate Running	0.130***	0.126***	0.107***	0.116**	0.0838	0.102*
	(0.0289)	(0.0306)	(0.0357)	(0.0513)	(0.0565)	(0.0584)
GDP Growth			0.0127*			0.00143
			(0.00642)			(0.00761)
Inflation (Logged)	0.0175		0.0137	-0.0210		-0.0285
	(0.0181)		(0.0172)	(0.0175)		(0.0213)
Unemployment		0.00703	0.00799		0.00524	0.00797
		(0.00549)	(0.00652)		(0.00732)	(0.00892)
Horizontal Accountability	-0.134***	-0.174**	-0.164**	0.0293	-0.0122	-0.0202
	(0.0428)	(0.0672)	(0.0653)	(0.0920)	(0.119)	(0.110)
Interim Finished Term	-0.133*	-0.143**	-0.131**	0.207**	0.182**	0.199**
	(0.0662)	(0.0648)	(0.0569)	(0.0821)	(0.0656)	(0.0746)
Lagged ENPC	-0.00280	0.00590	-0.000531	0.0494**	0.0563**	0.0577**
	(0.0410)	(0.0357)	(0.0299)	(0.0211)	(0.0198)	(0.0220)
Lagged Incumbent Vote Share	-0.540	-0.518	-0.551*			
	(0.331)	(0.309)	(0.300)			
Incumbent Party Running				-0.194***	-0.182***	-0.190***
				(0.0295)	(0.0246)	(0.0332)
Constant	0.226	0.201	0.161	0.330***	0.272**	0.296**
	(0.267)	(0.231)	(0.203)	(0.0987)	(0.113)	(0.118)
Observations	62	63	62	69	70	69
R-squared	0.450	0.457	0.490	0.508	0.496	0.521

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A3.6: Type A and Type B Volatility with Alternate Economic Controls

VARIABLES	(1) Party Replacement	(2) Party Replacement	(3) Party Replacement	(4) Stable Party	(5) Stable Party	(6) Stable Party
Wrongdoing	0.0929***	0.0991***	0.0866**	0.0147	0.0109	0.0161
	(0.0309)	(0.0306)	(0.0338)	(0.0230)	(0.0244)	(0.0230)
Inc Cand Running	0.115**	0.0917*	0.1000*	0.000873	-0.00797	0.00165
	(0.0420)	(0.0502)	(0.0489)	(0.0275)	(0.0265)	(0.0298)
GDP Growth			0.00661			-0.00518
			(0.00706)			(0.00592)
Inflation (Logged)	-0.0147		-0.0182	-0.00622		-0.0103
	(0.0229)		(0.0236)	(0.0108)		(0.0112)
Unemployment		0.00314	0.00596		0.00210	0.00201
		(0.00748)	(0.00842)		(0.00304)	(0.00355)
Horiz. Accountability	-0.0314	-0.0586	-0.0600	0.0607	0.0464	0.0398
	(0.0845)	(0.103)	(0.0880)	(0.0571)	(0.0616)	(0.0620)
Interim Finished Term	0.153*	0.132*	0.153*	0.0543	0.0495	0.0469
	(0.0812)	(0.0640)	(0.0769)	(0.0464)	(0.0464)	(0.0484)
Lagged ENPC	0.0261	0.0302	0.0303	0.0233*	0.0261*	0.0275*
	(0.0197)	(0.0187)	(0.0204)	(0.0114)	(0.0137)	(0.0145)
Inc Party Running	-0.330***	-0.319***	-0.325***	0.136***	0.136***	0.135***
	(0.0372)	(0.0380)	(0.0398)	(0.0300)	(0.0284)	(0.0295)
Constant	0.407***	0.368***	0.358**	-0.0766	-0.0960	-0.0613
	(0.0999)	(0.114)	(0.127)	(0.0723)	(0.0793)	(0.0819)
Observations	69	70	69	69	70	69
R-squared	0.542	0.522	0.552	0.244	0.242	0.263

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A3.7: Change in Effective Number of Presidential Parties with Alternate Economic
Controls

VARIABLES	(1) Δ ENPC	(2) Δ ENPC	(3) Δ ENPC
Wrongdoing	0.531**	0.542**	0.576**
	(0.219)	(0.222)	(0.236)
Incumbent Candidate Running	-0.313	-0.281	-0.204
	(0.258)	(0.247)	(0.255)
GDP Growth			-0.0510
			(0.0333)
Inflation (Logged)	-0.0706		-0.0493
	(0.0636)		(0.0968)
Unemployment		-0.0342	-0.0407
		(0.0416)	(0.0487)
Horizontal Accountability	0.755*	0.972**	0.942**
	(0.384)	(0.379)	(0.387)
Interim Finished Term	0.687	0.711	0.683
	(0.602)	(0.598)	(0.604)
Lagged ENPC	-0.482	-0.518*	-0.508*
	(0.282)	(0.254)	(0.252)
Incumbent Party Running	-0.178	-0.189	-0.213
	(0.754)	(0.689)	(0.725)
Constant	1.121	1.188	1.483
	(1.389)	(1.294)	(1.342)
Observations	69	70	69
R-squared	0.340	0.346	0.357

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A3.8: Wrongdoing and the Dependent Variables with Interaction for Female Incumbent

VARIABLES	(1) Δ Incumbent Vote Share	(2) Total Volatility	(3) Party Replacement	(4) Stable Party	(5) Δ ENPC
Wrongdoing	-0.0638*	0.0960**	0.0781*	0.0179	0.650**
	(0.0341)	(0.0374)	(0.0375)	(0.0279)	(0.244)
Female Incumbent	-0.0371	-0.00751	-0.0180	0.0105	0.581
	(0.0262)	(0.0688)	(0.0633)	(0.0347)	(0.399)
Wrongdoing * Female Incumbent	0.0630	0.109	0.139*	-0.0304	-0.987*
	(0.0683)	(0.0736)	(0.0796)	(0.0496)	(0.560)
Incumbent Candidate Running	0.138***	0.0918*	0.0916**	0.000218	-0.359
	(0.0318)	(0.0515)	(0.0396)	(0.0306)	(0.240)
GDP Growth	0.00811	-0.00182	0.00262	-0.00444	-0.0232
	(0.00569)	(0.00519)	(0.00700)	(0.00617)	(0.0337)
Horizontal Accountability	-0.104**	0.00952	-0.0430	0.0525	0.568
	(0.0488)	(0.110)	(0.0954)	(0.0589)	(0.412)
Interim President	-0.122**	0.185**	0.137*	0.0487	0.649
	(0.0512)	(0.0801)	(0.0741)	(0.0457)	(0.546)
Incumbent Party Running		-0.197***	-0.333***	0.135***	-0.154
		(0.0264)	(0.0380)	(0.0289)	(0.786)
Lagged ENPC		0.0522**	0.0269	0.0253*	-0.469
		(0.0197)	(0.0186)	(0.0122)	(0.275)
Lagged Incumbent Vote Share	-0.474*				
	(0.233)				
Constant	0.166	0.322**	0.392***	-0.0706	1.129
	(0.128)	(0.118)	(0.118)	(0.0721)	(1.521)
Observations	63	70	70	70	70
R-squared	0.459	0.506	0.545	0.252	0.361

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Figure A3.1: Predicted Values of Party Replacement Volatility from Interaction of Female Incumbent with Wrongdoing

Figure A3.2: Predicted Values of Δ ENPC from Interaction of Female Incumbent with Wrongdoing

Note: Figures have 90% Confidence Intervals

Table A3.9: Wrongdoing and the Dependent Variables with Lagged Volatility

VARIABLES	(1) Δ Incumbent Vote Share	(2) Total Volatility	(3) Party Replacement	(4) Stable Party	(5) Δ ENPC
Wrongdoing	-0.0575*	0.0980***	0.0916**	0.0129	0.509**
	(0.0288)	(0.0304)	(0.0347)	(0.0238)	(0.221)
Incumbent Candidate Running	0.134***	0.0739	0.0856**	-0.00194	-0.377
	(0.0359)	(0.0482)	(0.0303)	(0.0306)	(0.286)
GDP Growth	0.00826	-0.00337	0.00225	-0.00491	-0.0307
	(0.00523)	(0.00512)	(0.00712)	(0.00582)	(0.0322)
Horizontal Accountability	-0.112**	0.0223	-0.0288	0.0511	0.703*
	(0.0469)	(0.0856)	(0.0886)	(0.0583)	(0.391)
Interim Finished Term	-0.122*	0.177**	0.130	0.0501	0.611
	(0.0590)	(0.0808)	(0.0774)	(0.0434)	(0.585)
Incumbent Party Running		-0.174***	-0.305***	0.128***	-0.166
		(0.0244)	(0.0277)	(0.0271)	(0.784)
Lagged ENPC		0.0393*	0.0204	0.0241*	-0.481*
		(0.0216)	(0.0212)	(0.0123)	(0.256)
Lagged Total Volatility	0.0204	0.160**			0.196
	(0.0804)	(0.0634)			(0.550)
Lagged Incumbent Vote Share	-0.462**				
	(0.207)				
Lagged Type A			0.0982		
			(0.0623)		
Lagged Type B				0.0674	
				(0.116)	
Constant	0.156	0.288**	0.360***	-0.0665	1.105
	(0.111)	(0.103)	(0.110)	(0.0706)	(1.503)
Observations	63	70	70	70	70
R-squared	0.456	0.511	0.528	0.252	0.342

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A3.10: Wrongdoing and the Dependent Variables with Institutional Controls

VARIABLES	(1) Δ Incumbent Vote Share	(2) Total Volatility	(3) Party Replacement	(4) Stable Party	(5) Δ ENPC
Wrongdoing	-0.0502	0.114***	0.107***	0.00713	0.570**
	(0.0297)	(0.0359)	(0.0340)	(0.0232)	(0.253)
Incumbent Candidate Running	0.128***	0.0977*	0.0872**	0.0104	-0.392
	(0.0324)	(0.0533)	(0.0364)	(0.0301)	(0.285)
GDP Growth	0.00981	-0.00209	0.00432	-0.00641	-0.0227
	(0.00567)	(0.00573)	(0.00670)	(0.00602)	(0.0310)
Horizontal Accountability	-0.164**	0.00644	-0.102	0.108*	0.126
	(0.0615)	(0.113)	(0.0941)	(0.0592)	(0.511)
Interim Finished Term	-0.121**	0.187**	0.141*	0.0456	0.611
	(0.0522)	(0.0804)	(0.0718)	(0.0429)	(0.561)
Incumbent Party Running		-0.188***	-0.312***	0.124***	-0.191
		(0.0302)	(0.0354)	(0.0282)	(0.769)
Lagged ENPC		0.0489*	0.0172	0.0318**	0.452
		(0.0239)	(0.0221)	(0.0146)	(0.279)
Plurality	-0.0461	-0.00952	-0.0619	0.0524	-0.471**
	(0.0361)	(0.0460)	(0.0431)	(0.0320)	(0.219)
Concurrent Leg Elections	0.00212	0.0117	0.00990	0.00181	0.293
	(0.0224)	(0.0540)	(0.0426)	(0.0281)	(0.178)
Lagged Incumbent Vote Share	0.555**				
	(0.232)				
Constant	0.200	0.317**	0.446***	-0.129	1.681
	(0.147)	(0.129)	(0.114)	(0.0901)	(1.402)
Observations	63	70	70	70	70
R-squared	0.585	0.491	0.535	0.285	0.556

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A3.11: Wrongdoing and the Dependent Variables with All Controls

VARIABLES	(1) Δ Incumbent Vote Share	(2) Total Volatility	(3) Party Replacement	(4) Stable Party	(5) Δ ENPC
Wrongdoing	-0.0604**	0.0845*	0.0840**	0.00703	0.615**
	(0.0249)	(0.0406)	(0.0368)	(0.0233)	(0.245)
Incumbent Candidate Running	0.0967**	0.0773	0.0768	0.0126	-0.290
	(0.0431)	(0.0639)	(0.0464)	(0.0330)	(0.347)
GDP Growth	0.0135**	-0.000744	0.00741	-0.00746	-0.0471
	(0.00622)	(0.00672)	(0.00723)	(0.00631)	(0.0289)
Inflation (Logged)	0.0141	-0.0300	-0.0164	-0.0135	-0.0649
	(0.0183)	(0.0245)	(0.0259)	(0.0116)	(0.122)
Unemployment	0.00792	0.00956	0.00565	0.00376	-0.0372
	(0.00802)	(0.00910)	(0.00942)	(0.00366)	(0.0537)
Interim Finished Term	-0.135**	0.181**	0.141*	0.0453	0.651
	(0.0603)	(0.0792)	(0.0768)	(0.0430)	(0.609)
Incumbent Party Running		-0.190***	-0.311***	0.117***	-0.166
		(0.0396)	(0.0349)	(0.0335)	(0.768)
Lagged ENPC		0.0461*	0.0188	0.0327*	0.390
		(0.0238)	(0.0238)	(0.0171)	(0.245)
Plurality	-0.0432	0.00182	-0.0490	0.0528	-0.524*
	(0.0323)	(0.0346)	(0.0377)	(0.0309)	(0.267)
Concurrent Leg Elections	0.00772	0.0308	0.0143	0.0162	0.259
	(0.0382)	(0.0470)	(0.0516)	(0.0274)	(0.284)
Female Incumbent	0.000780	0.0250	0.0289	-0.00869	-0.101
	(0.0389)	(0.0387)	(0.0467)	(0.0174)	(0.284)
Horizontal Accountability	-0.213***	-0.0455	-0.123	0.0831	0.343
	(0.0689)	(0.113)	(0.0934)	(0.0602)	(0.513)
Lagged Total Volatility	0.0162	0.156**			0.261
	(0.0664)	(0.0696)			(0.542)
Lagged Incumbent Vote Share	0.495**				
	(0.232)				
Lagged Type A			0.0875		
			(0.0707)		
Lagged Type B				0.0701	
				(0.136)	
Constant	0.175	0.280**	0.412***	-0.128	2.052
	(0.145)	(0.113)	(0.113)	(0.0950)	(1.294)
Observations	62	69	69	69	69
R-squared	0.612	0.543	0.569	0.306	0.570

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A3.12: Seemingly Unrelated Regression — Change in Incumbent Vote, Total Volatility and Change in ENPC

VARIABLES	(1) Δ Incumbent Vote Share	(2) Total Volatility	(3) Δ ENPC
Wrongdoing	-0.0549*	0.129***	0.604***
	(0.0299)	(0.0315)	(0.208)
Incumbent Candidate Running	0.138***	0.103**	-0.344
	(0.0296)	(0.0462)	(0.261)
GDP Growth	0.00899*	-0.00249	-0.0619**
	(0.00526)	(0.00595)	(0.0259)
Horizontal Accountability	-0.102**	0.0163	0.717**
	(0.0446)	(0.0942)	(0.348)
Interim Finished Term	-0.113**	0.200***	0.218
	(0.0496)	(0.0757)	(0.526)
Lagged Incumbent Vote Share	-0.391*		
	(0.215)		
Lagged ENPC		0.0493***	-0.431*
		(0.0186)	(0.249)
Constant	0.118	0.119	0.957
	(0.119)	(0.0991)	(0.650)
Observations	63	63	63

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** $p<0.01$, ** $p<0.05$, * $p<0.1$

Appendix Chapter 4

Table A4.1: Summary Statistics

	N	Mean	SD	Min	Max
Turnout (Registered Voters)	70	70.41	12.87	40.10	94.55
Turnout (Voting Age Population—VAP)	70	70.03	14.54	43.88	99.27
Invalid Voting (Percent of Votes Cast)	68	5.183	4.067	0.660	18.12
Valid Voting (Percent of Registered Voters)	68	66.67	12.09	36.59	89.16
Valid Voting (Percent of VAP)	68	66.21	13.66	40.04	95.99
Enforced Compulsory Voting (Dummy)	70	0.286	0.455	0	1
Presidential Wrongdoing	70	0.457	0.502	0	1
Plurality System	70	0.314	0.468	0	1
Concurrent Elections (Presidential/Legislative)	70	0.800	0.403	0	1
Incumbent Candidate Running	70	0.229	0.423	0	1
Unemployment (ILO)	70	6.577	3.383	2.201	17.48
Population (Logged Lagged 1 year)	70	16.54	1.162	14.98	19.15

Table A4.2: Correlation Matrix of Dependent Variables

Variables	Turnout	Turnout VAP	Invalid	Valid	Valid VAP
Turnout					
Turnout VAP	0.92*				
Invalid	0.2	0.2			
Valid	-0.97*	0.78*	-0.05		
Valid VAP	-0.8*	0.97*	-0.03	0.81*	

Table A4.3: Robustness Check (Inclusion of Effective Number of Presidential Candidates)

VARIABLES	(1) Registered	(2) VAP	(3) Invalid Vote	(4) Valid	(5) Valid VAP
Wrongdoing	3.247	4.194	-0.985	4.210	5.053
	(2.881)	(3.720)	(0.802)	(2.989)	(3.619)
Compulsory	16.81***	23.54***	2.099	15.39***	20.58***
	(3.565)	(5.573)	(1.533)	(3.349)	(5.716)
Wrongdoing * Compulsory	-1.306	-1.505	4.726*	-5.434*	-5.320
	(2.721)	(4.240)	(2.631)	(2.954)	(5.025)
Plurality	-1.657	-0.535	-0.637	-0.0977	-1.124
	(3.520)	(5.799)	(1.141)	(3.465)	(5.714)
Concurrent Elections	10.95*	4.559	0.397	10.30	3.217
	(5.425)	(6.048)	(1.378)	(6.030)	(6.651)
Logged Population	-2.120**	-2.700*		-2.814***	-2.819*
	(0.863)	(1.384)		(0.782)	(1.451)
Incumbent Running	4.566	2.805	1.623	3.339	1.728
	(2.740)	(2.938)	(0.950)	(2.977)	(3.351)
Effective Number of Candidates	-2.028*	-2.149**	1.375***	-2.510**	-3.074***
	(1.105)	(0.848)	(0.319)	(1.025)	(0.886)
Unemployment			-0.256*	0.519	-0.0779
			(0.133)	(0.367)	(0.618)
Constant	96.64***	109.1***	1.288	103.2***	113.0***
	(12.45)	(22.72)	(2.055)	(13.22)	(24.86)
Observations	70	70	68	68	68
R-squared	0.582	0.569	0.609	0.519	0.492

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A4.4: Robustness Check (Controlling for Incumbent Party Running)

VARIABLES	(1) Registered	(2) VAP	(3) Invalid Vote	(4) Valid	(5) Valid VAP
Wrongdoing	2.431	3.285	-0.598	3.294	3.857
	(2.783)	(3.752)	(0.633)	(2.969)	(3.962)
Compulsory	18.51***	25.27***	0.630	17.84***	23.48***
	(3.606)	(5.421)	(1.641)	(3.560)	(5.752)
Wrongdoing * Compulsory	-2.342	-2.946	4.566**	-5.998*	-6.377
	(3.306)	(4.343)	(1.728)	(3.050)	(4.570)
Plurality	0.425	1.742	-1.904	2.467	2.127
	(3.314)	(5.472)	(1.483)	(3.429)	(5.903)
Concurrent Elections	8.785*	2.430	2.273*	7.383	-0.113
	(4.604)	(5.749)	(1.158)	(5.181)	(6.584)
Logged Population	-2.050**	-2.640*		-2.750***	-2.771*
	(0.915)	(1.353)		(0.801)	(1.443)
Incumbent Candidate Running	4.948	3.345	1.764	3.342	1.909
	(3.170)	(3.568)	(1.133)	(3.624)	(4.280)
Incumbent Party Running	3.125	2.239	-4.846***	6.252*	6.401
	(3.560)	(4.745)	(1.268)	(3.478)	(4.774)
Unemployment			-0.301*	0.621	0.0628
			(0.171)	(0.378)	(0.613)
Constant	87.01***	99.94***	9.562***	88.98***	96.90***
	(15.34)	(22.75)	(1.718)	(14.29)	(23.97)
Observations	70	70	68	68	68
R-squared	0.563	0.551	0.607	0.499	0.462

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A4.5: Robustness Check (Controlling for Turnout and Valid Voting in Invalid Models)

VARIABLES	(1) Invalid Vote	(2) Invalid Vote	(3) Invalid Vote	(4) Invalid Vote
Wrongdoing	-0.121	-0.0544	-0.0299	0.0353
	(0.567)	(0.650)	(0.486)	(0.623)
Compulsory	2.786	3.545*	3.544**	4.213**
	(1.837)	(1.809)	(1.510)	(1.760)
Wrongdoing * Compulsory	5.535**	5.471**	4.560**	4.573**
	(2.398)	(2.387)	(2.145)	(2.154)
Plurality	-2.163	-2.173	-1.814	-1.886
	(1.502)	(1.394)	(1.302)	(1.249)
Concurrent Elections	2.230	1.532	2.587*	1.470
	(1.629)	(1.356)	(1.405)	(1.153)
Incumbent Running	1.426	1.315	1.448*	1.232*
	(0.949)	(0.841)	(0.732)	(0.645)
Unemployment	-0.331*	-0.388**	-0.280*	-0.362**
	(0.185)	(0.180)	(0.159)	(0.160)
Turnout Percent	-0.0932			
	(0.0618)			
Turnout VAP Percent		-0.101**		
		(0.0348)		
Valid Percentage			-0.149**	
			(0.0604)	
Valid VAP Percentage				-0.141***
				(0.0321)
Constant	11.22**	12.46***	13.67***	14.38***
	(4.366)	(3.419)	(4.138)	(3.195)
Observations	68	68	68	68
R-squared	0.547	0.571	0.620	0.642

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A4.6: Robustness Check (Invalid Vote as Percentage of Registered Voters and VAP)

VARIABLES	(1) Invalid Vote	(2) Invalid Vote VAP
Wrongdoing	-0.0510	-0.0600
	(0.413)	(0.479)
Compulsory	1.882	2.220
	(1.314)	(1.381)
Wrongdoing * Compulsory	4.414*	4.696**
	(2.083)	(2.184)
Plurality	-1.588	-1.534*
	(0.955)	(0.855)
Concurrent Elections	1.216	1.012
	(0.958)	(0.974)
Incumbent Running	0.850	0.971
	(0.731)	(0.757)
Unemployment	-0.264*	-0.282**
	(0.127)	(0.125)
Constant	3.885**	3.988**
	(1.651)	(1.579)
Observations	68	68
R-squared	0.630	0.647

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** $p<0.01$, ** $p<0.05$, * $p<0.1$

Table A4.7: Robustness Check (Random Effects)

VARIABLES	(1) Registered	(2) VAP	(3) Invalid Vote	(4) Valid	(5) Valid VAP
Wrongdoing	1.478	1.902	-1.057***	2.488	2.246
	(2.298)	(3.061)	(0.338)	(2.285)	(3.045)
Compulsory	19.44***	26.23***	2.308	18.83***	22.02***
	(4.366)	(6.152)	(2.120)	(4.617)	(6.639)
Wrongdoing * Compulsory	-2.060	-4.055	3.369**	-5.798**	-5.462
	(3.228)	(4.180)	(1.530)	(2.830)	(4.531)
Plurality	0.805	2.787	-1.377	2.547	1.857
	(3.621)	(5.220)	(1.580)	(4.017)	(5.575)
Concurrent Elections	5.477	-2.362	1.539**	2.113	-4.902
	(5.193)	(4.068)	(0.672)	(5.899)	(3.241)
Logged Population	-2.105**	-2.123		-2.821**	-2.042
	(1.015)	(1.665)		(1.225)	(1.934)
Incumbent Running	4.017	2.882	0.100	2.687	2.358
	(2.521)	(2.858)	(0.617)	(2.585)	(3.256)
Unemployment			-0.137	0.466	-0.502
			(0.0929)	(0.488)	(0.450)
Constant	93.67***	97.52***	4.827***	101.1***	99.00***
	(15.31)	(25.69)	(1.807)	(18.97)	(30.93)
Observations	70	70	68	68	68
Number of Countries	18	18	17	17	17

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A4.8: Robustness Check (Panel Corrected Standard Errors)

VARIABLES	(1) Registered	(2) VAP	(3) Invalid Vote	(4) Valid	(5) Valid VAP
Wrongdoing	2.303	3.194	-0.261	2.930	3.485
	(3.030)	(3.380)	(0.879)	(3.394)	(3.558)
Compulsory	18.28***	25.10***	1.043	17.34***	22.96***
	(3.502)	(3.654)	(0.986)	(3.597)	(3.617)
Wrongdoing * Compulsory	-3.345	-3.666	6.070***	-7.819*	-8.241**
	(4.145)	(3.830)	(1.482)	(4.601)	(4.177)
Plurality	0.631	1.890	-2.353***	3.015	2.688
	(2.438)	(2.788)	(0.698)	(2.618)	(2.628)
Concurrent Elections	9.274***	2.781	1.328	8.609**	1.142
	(3.230)	(3.262)	(0.932)	(3.409)	(3.352)
Logged Population	-2.092***	-2.670**		-2.899***	-2.924**
	(0.794)	(1.134)		(0.836)	(1.238)
Incumbent Running	5.342*	3.627	1.178	4.222	2.810
	(2.896)	(3.822)	(0.867)	(2.813)	(4.132)
Unemployment			-0.351***	0.697**	0.140
			(0.111)	(0.283)	(0.344)
Constant	90.18***	102.2***	6.147***	95.71***	103.8***
	(12.64)	(19.10)	(1.145)	(13.92)	(21.79)
Observations	70	70	68	68	68
R-squared	0.559	0.549	0.507	0.480	0.447
Number of Countries	18	18	17	17	17

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A4.9: Robustness Check (Generalized Least Squares)

VARIABLES	(1) Registered	(2) Registered	(3) Invalid Vote	(4) Valid	(5) Valid VAP
Wrongdoing	1.037	1.831	-1.089**	1.087	2.531
	(1.813)	(1.632)	(0.432)	(1.803)	(1.545)
Compulsory	19.81***	27.60***	2.602**	16.76***	23.45***
	(3.658)	(3.132)	(1.077)	(3.314)	(3.505)
Wrongdoing * Compulsory	-2.596	-3.685	4.506***	-5.699	-7.124*
	(4.073)	(2.906)	(0.839)	(3.944)	(3.636)
Plurality	2.152	4.580	-2.208**	4.457**	3.011
	(1.975)	(2.881)	(1.005)	(1.952)	(2.714)
Concurrent Elections	5.761**	0.468	-0.323	5.890**	-0.268
	(2.256)	(3.155)	(0.905)	(2.930)	(3.367)
Logged Population	-1.657**	-3.124***		-2.320**	-3.160***
	(0.812)	(1.122)		(0.909)	(1.217)
Incumbent Running	1.498	0.945	0.513	0.344	0.929
	(1.864)	(1.888)	(0.499)	(1.887)	(1.994)
Unemployment			-0.201**	0.961***	0.146
			(0.0862)	(0.296)	(0.327)
Constant	85.38***	110.1***	7.139***	86.96***	108.3***
	(13.48)	(19.15)	(1.554)	(14.77)	(19.07)
Observations	70	70	68	68	68
Number of Countries	18	18	17	17	17

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1