Partisan Social Norms in American Politics

By

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Introduction: Partisan Norms and American Politics

American politics is characterized by group identities. Before the Constitution was even written, the inhabitants of North America were split into large states and small states, Federalists and Anti-federalists, slave states and free states, Black and white. While the groups themselves have largely changed, Americans remain connected to one another largely through social groups.

One of the most important group identities to contemporary American politics is partisanship. Over the last several decades, countless political scientists have used theories of social identity to understand the way partisans behave (for example, see Green et al., 2004; Huddy et al., 2015). The application of these theories has been extraordinarily fruitful. Social identity theory has helped explain public opinion on a variety of issues (Bolsen et al., 2014), affective and social polarization (Iyengar et al., 2012; Mason, 2015), perception and choice of news sources, campaign activity and anger in politics (Huddy et al., 2015), political participation (Fowler and Kam, 2007), and even the way partisans interpret the political world (Bartels, 2002).

Although we know quite a lot about the consequences of holding partisan social identities, we know relatively less about the *content* of those identities. What does it mean to be a Republican or a Democrat? How do we decide who is a good partisan and who is not? How do we identify people in our group? According to Huddy (2013), the key to understanding the content of social identities are the norms those groups create. The large literature in psychology on group norms can help us understand the answers to some of these questions.

Beyond the ways norms enhance our understanding of partisanship as a whole, social norms are also important in their own right. Norms shape our behaviors in a wide

range of situations — do we tip the waiter? How much? Do we make eye contact with strangers? What do you say after someone sneezes? Partisan norms, if they exist, are likely to shape how we act in political (and maybe even non-political) situations. For example, how do we react when one member of our party criticizes another? How do we react when our representatives decide to compromise with the "other side" rather than sticking to their principles? Are there things we are uncomfortable saying in front of our co-partisan peers?

This dissertation aims to add to our understanding of group norms in the context of American partisan politics. In the remainder of this chapter, I explain what social norms are, how they develop, and how they are enforced. Chapter two helps us understand the content of partisan social norms using data from in-depth interviews and an original, nationally representative survey. Chapter three uses a novel data set of primary debate transcripts to demonstrate how partisan norms are used by party elites. In chapter four, I focus on the enforcement of partisan norms through social sanctions. Specifically, I use a survey experiment to show that partisans will electorally punish candidates who break partisan norms. In the concluding chapter, I discuss several open questions about partisan norms and how they might be studied in future work.

1.1 What are Partisan Social Norms?

As described above, political psychologists tend to understand partisanship as a social identity rather than a "running tally" where partisans select the party the comes closer to their own issue positions (Fiorina, 1981). Partisans form psychological attachments to partisan groups that have little to do with the policies those groups support. These groups are cognitively represented as prototypes - "fuzzy sets" of attributes that shape the way we view group members (Hogg and Reid, 2006). Some of these attributes describe the "average" group member, and other attributes describe the "ideal" group member. These prototypes tend to be shared socially, and when they are commonly accepted, they

become group norms (Hogg and Reid, 2006). To put it more simply, norms are the content of identities (Huddy, 2013). If we want to understand the content partisan identities, we need to incorporate the large psychological literature on group norms.

Norms have been conceptualized in a number of ways, but from a Social Identity perspective, norms have a very specific definition: a norm is a socially accepted group prototype. Not all norms are the same. Descriptive norms *describe* attitudes, traits, or behaviors of the group, while injunctive norms *prescribe* what attitudes, traits, and behaviors group members *should* display (Cialdini and Trost, 1998).

To better understand what norms are, it is useful to compare them to their "conceptual cousins" — values, stereotypes, and ideologies. Norms are closely related to values. While some use the terms *norm* and *value* interchangeably, there are clear differences between the two. As described above, norms are shared cognitive prototypes that either describe or prescribe behaviors, attitudes, or traits. Norms are also context-dependent, relatively specific, and some norms can change with relative ease. Values are similar to injunctive norms in that they define desirable "end-states of existence" (Rokeach, 1973), but values are much more abstract. Values describe "what is good and bad in the world" (Jacoby, 2006), while norms describe what is good and bad *in the group*. Values are also meant to be context-invariant, whereas norms may change depending on context. Values can become the foundation of some norms (Anoll forthcoming). Norms are the way that values are translated into specific prescriptions, and this translation may vary across groups. In other words, two groups holding the same value may develop very different norms. For example, Anoll (2018) shows that although both white Americans and minority Americans value civic participation, there is a much stronger norm of using unconventional methods of participation (e.g., protests) in minority communities.

Some types of norms are closely related to stereotypes. In fact, psychologists seem to agree that stereotypes and descriptive norms are the same thing. Recall that descriptive norms describe the behavior of the average group member. As Eagly and Karau (2002)

put it, "although the descriptive norms are thus synonymous with psychologists' usual definitions of stereotypes of group members, injunctive norms add a prescriptive element not traditionally included in the stereotype construct." (pg. 574). That said, stereotypes generally refer to descriptive norms imposed from *outside* the group, whereas descriptive norms could be defined by the group itself. Hence the word stereotype is amended when referring to stereotypes of one's self: self-stereotype. Injunctive norms, on the other hand, are very different from stereotypes. Recall that injunctive norms dictate how the ideal group member should behave. Those who break injunctive norms are usually sanctioned. Sometimes, stereotypes and injunctive norms are layered on top of each other. For example, gender stereotypes say women are charming and men are tough. These stereotypes are also injunctive norms, and when women are seen as mean or men are seen as weak, they are criticized and mocked. Other times, stereotypes are separated from injunctive norms. For example, Black men are stereotyped as aggressive, but Black men who are not aggressive are not socially sanctioned.

Norms are also related to personal beliefs, or in the political context, issue positions. According to Bicchieri (2016), social norms are personal beliefs plus normative expectations plus empirical expectations. In this framework, personal beliefs are what an individual believes is appropriate. Normative expectations are what the individual believes others in the group think is appropriate. Empirical expectations refers to how widespread the individual thinks this belief is within the group. In other words, what separates beliefs and issue positions from social norms is how an individual perceives the opinions of their fellow partisans. Although conceptually, the difference between norms and personal beliefs is simple, the two concepts can be difficult to pull apart observationally. For example, Republicans tend to be pro-life and Democrats tend to be pro-choice. Are those attitudes influenced by some partisan norm, or just based on personal beliefs? The unsatisfying answer is that we cannot really tell. However, some recent work has argued that even attitudes that seem critical to each party's worldview are actually influenced by

social context (Connors, 2019). As the coming chapters will show, some partisan norms are relatively divorced from specific policies, but others exist in a gray area where disentangling norms from issue positions is difficult.

Overall, what makes norms distinct from their conceptual cousins is that norms are *social*. A norm does not exist unless the majority of group members acknowledge it. There must be a *social* consensus. In simplified terms, a norm without social consensus is just a belief. Norms rarely have significant power to influence behavior unless other group members are willing to punish those who break them. There must be *social* sanctions. In simplified terms, a norm without social sanctions is just a stereotype. Norms are context-dependent and able to change to meet the needs of the *social* group. In simplified terms, a norm that cannot be changed is a just value.

1.2 How Norms Develop and Change

Several different forces govern the content of norms, and when these forces change, norms often change as well. This section will briefly explain some of these forces.

1.2.1 Norms and Functionalism

Sometimes norms develop to benefit the group. The functionalist norm literature in psychology describes this process. In one of the classic texts on social norms, Sumner (1906) argues that norms are customs that developed to meet needs of the group. Some norms directly help the group survive. For example, taboos against unprovoked aggression, infanticide, and incest help prevent the depletion or contamination of the group's gene pool (Triandis, 1994; Pepitone, 1976). Other norms mitigate free rider problems. Economic theories have long argued that people will behave in their own self-interest, creating problems when cooperation is necessary to accomplish group goals (Olson, 1965). And yet, humans do cooperate with one another. One explanation for this cooperation

is that societies create social norms that foster cooperation, and that people are willing to punish norm-breakers even when doing so is costly (Fehr et al., 2002). This theory argues that strong negative emotions towards norm-breakers make group members willing to "altruistically punish" them. For example, civic participation norms in the United States partially explain why many citizens perform the costly act of voting, and people are much more likely to turn out when they think their peers may discover that they have not (Gerber et al., 2008; Gerber and Rogers, 2009). Because the well-being of the group is endangered when these norms are broken, those who deviate from them may be punished particularly harshly (Feldman, 1984).

1.2.2 Norms and Positive Distinctiveness

Group norms may develop to help members positively distinguish themselves from outgroup members. Just as ingroups tend not to exist without a salient outgroup of comparison, group norms do not often develop independently of the outgroup. This is likely to be especially true of partisan groups, given the two-party nature of our political system and the repeated, institutionalized competition between the parties. Prototypes tend to conform to the metacontrast principle, "they maximize the ratio of intergroup differences to intragroup differences" (Hogg and Reid, 2006). This is perhaps the most dangerous way that norms develop, since the motivation to distinguish one's group sometimes leads to behaviors that are harmful to individuals or the group as a whole. For example, many adolescent groups develop group norms of substance abuse, and gangs may promote norms of violence Verkooijen et al. (2007). These harmful behaviors give groups an identity and strengthen relationships between group members through shared experiences and an experience of difference. Of the mechanisms explained thus far, this one leans most heavily on social identity theory. According to (Tajfel and Turner, 1986), maximum difference is more desirable than maximum ingroup benefit. Thus, these groups engage in behavior that makes them worse-off, but serves to distinguish them from other

groups. The metacontrast principle also helps explain the context-dependent nature of many norms. For example, our cognitive prototype of an average Republican might change depending on whether we are comparing them to Tea-party conservatives or liberal Democrats.

1.2.3 Norms and Elite Influence

Group leaders, high-status group members, and institutions can sometimes create or influence group norms (Taggar and Ellis, 2007; Wahrman, 2010). As described above, norms are based on cognitive prototypes. Often, group leaders embody these prototypes and provide a physical exemplar of group norms (van Knippenberg and Hogg, 2003). These leaders and high-status group members are generally given more leeway to break norms. High-status members who break norms are more likely to be seen as innovative rather than deviant, and some group members may even see leader non-conformity as a signal that norms should be changed (Wahrman, 2010). Institutions like the media may also shape perceptions of different groups in the way they choose to portray group members, but only when the institution is viewed as legitimate (Tankard and Paluck, 2016).

These three forces have significant influence over how norms develop within groups, and should lead to differences in norms between the Republican and Democratic parties. Some norms develop because they help the group survive or accomplish its goals. Other group norms may develop simply to differentiate the ingroup from the outgroup. If norms can be characterized as cognitive prototypes, elites likely have the greatest influence on group norms, since they are the most visible manifestation of those norms. These forces can also help us understand how norms have changed over time and perhaps even predict how they will evolve in the future. The bulk of this dissertation focuses on a snapshot of partisan norms between 2018-2020, but the final chapter will discuss how others might study partisan norms over time.

1.3 How Norms are Enforced

Norms can be incredibly powerful. As discussed above, social norms have persuaded people to behave in ways we now view as incredibly strange or even harmful, like foot binding and ritual human sacrifice (Sumner, 1906). While some social norms are enforced by laws, many rely on the expectation that adhering to norms brings social rewards and breaking norms brings social sanctions. This section sets aside the partisan context to describe some of the common ways group members are rewarded or sanctioned based on norm adherence, as well as the circumstances under which norm enforcement is more or less likely.

1.3.1 Social Sanctions

Sanctions are the most powerful motivating factor influencing norm adherence. Norms that have been codified into law can be enforced with state violence, but social norms tend to be enforced using social sanctions. Social sanctioning can be found in nearly every culture through thousands of years of history. In fact, Jane Goodall even observed social exclusion among chimpanzees (Goodall, 1986). Some of the first recorded examples of social sanctions come from the Greeks. In Athenian democracy, *ostrakismos* was the practice of forcing a citizen to leave Athens for 10 years using a popular vote. Those who returned early were killed, but after 10 years the individual was allowed to return and resume their normal life. We still use the word "ostracism" to refer to social shunning. Many other groups use various forms of social shunning: Iranian Qahr, Balinese Kasepekang, Amish Meinung, Jewish Cherem, and Catholic excommunication are all variants of the same practice - excluding group members based on failure to uphold group norms.

These forms of social sanctioning were often part of actual legal systems or were codified in scripture. Most modern groups have no official shunning practices, but more

casual social sanctions occur between group members all the time.[1] We have all sorts of names for social sanctions - we might "blacklist" someone, give them the silent treatment, or make them persona non grata. The internet has provided even more opportunities to punish group members. For example, Williams et al. (2000) argues that in the workplace, ignoring emails from a specific person or intentionally excluding them from email chains constitutes "cyberostracism." On social media, users have the opportunity to shame norm breakers in front of a large audience. Twitter, in particular, is know for "mobs" of people who will attack those they disagree with (Rost et al., 2016). The most severe of these attacks include "doxxing," or revealing personal information like the home address of the person under scrutiny (Chipidza, 2019).

Social sanctions seem to be very effective. They tend to make the feel guilt and shame (Posner and Rasmusen, 1999) or depression (Williams, 2002). In fact, MacDonald and Leary (2005) shows that social exclusion is often experienced as physical pain! As Dwight Schrute explained in the television show *The Office*, shunning is "like slapping someone with silence." Clearly these feelings are strong motivators, and should make the deviant much less likely to break norms in the future.

1.3.2 Social Rewards

Perhaps because the stick seems to be more powerful than the carrot (Andreoni et al., 2003), the majority of scholarly work on norm enforcement focuses on sanctions rather than rewards. Extant work has found that rewards and punishments have different effects. Rewards may work in small groups or for "elite" actions, while sanctions work better for unanimous cooperation (Oliver, 1980). Social rewards for norm adherence are also less varied than sanctions. Increased esteem within the group is the main reward enjoyed by those who conform to group norms. For example, Anoll (2018) shows that

[1] For example, according to one survey, 67% of Americans admitted to giving "the silent treatment" to someone they knew, and 75% said they had received the silent treatment from a loved one (Williams et al., 2000, pg. 9)

individuals who engage in norm-consistent behavior are consistently rated as more likable and respected than those who do not. Facebook also seems to think its users are motivated by these social rewards — for the past several elections, the site has allowed users to broadcast their status as a voter to their network of friends, who could "like" the announcement or use comments to indicate their approval.

1.3.3 Roadmap for the Dissertation

The remainder of this dissertation will examine how partisan norms fit into these existing frameworks. In chapter two, I argue that partisan norms exist, and that norms in the Republican party are different from norms in the Democratic party. I use in-depth interviews with partisans who are heavily involved in partisan politics as well as an original, nationally representative survey of "normal" members of both parties to show that a large proportion of partisans can articulate their party's norms. In chapter three, I begin to explore the ways that political elites use partisan norms to their advantage. Specifically, I compile a new data set that includes transcripts from presidential primary debates and show that primary candidates use norm-related rhetoric to enhance their perceptions among voters and to criticize their opponents. I also show suggestive evidence that candidates who use norm-related rhetoric are perceived more favorably by co-partisan debate viewers. In chapter four, I turn to social sanctions. I use an original survey experiment to show that many partisans electorally punish candidates who break partisan norms. In fact, some partisans seem to be willing to risk losing a general election by supporting unqualified primary candidates over candidates who deviate from party norms. In the final chapter, I address some of the most interesting remaining questions related to partisan norms, and give suggestions for how they might be answered. First, I use data from the American National Election Studies (ANES) as a starting point for discussions about how partisan norms have changed over time. Second, I use results of a pilot study to discuss how partisan social norms operate on social media.

Chapter 2

The Content of Partisan Norms

Social norms powerfully shape many of our attitudes and behaviors, from whether to tip your waiter, to how likely you are to participate in politics (Anoll, 2018; Gerber and Rogers, 2009; Gerber et al., 2008), to minimizing prejudice (Paluck, 2009). While there is a large literature in political science on the effects of social norms on behavior, there has been less attention to how these norms might differ by party. Do Democrats and Republicans have separate norms about how their group members should behave politically?

I argue that they do. Drawing on work in social psychology on social identity theory (Tajfel and Turner, 1986), as well as on the differential organizations of the parties (Grossmann and Hopkins, 2016) and Moral Foundations Theory (Haidt, 2013), I argue that Democrats and Republicans hold a set of distinct beliefs about what a "good" partisan does. In particular, I argue that Democrats are likely to emphasize caring for the disadvantaged, and Republicans are likely to emphasize a number of considerations including religious faith, love of country, strict adherence to "conservatism," and loyalty to party leaders.

Using discursive interviews, original survey data, and ANES open-ended data, I find strong support for my argument. I show that these norms are not only widely held by group members, but that they vary based on the strength of their identification with the group, the homogeneity of their political networks, and the extent to which they pay attention to political news.

2.1 Partisanship and Social Norms

Partisanship is, at its core, a type of social identity, less an expression of one's policy positions and more a psychological connection to a political party, likely as a result of early socialization (for e.g., see Campbell et al., 1980; Green et al., 2004; Huddy et al., 2015; Mason and Wronski, 2018). Much of this work has explored how partisan social identity influences behavior toward out-group members (Iyengar et al., 2019), but less work in political science explores the implications for how partisans see their fellow in-group members. Because partisanship is a social identity, it establishes a set of norms around how group members should behave. Groups tend to be cognitively represented by prototypes — "fuzzy sets" of attributes that shape the way we view group members (Hogg and Reid, 2006). Some of these attributes describe the "average" group member, and other attributes describe the "ideal" group member. Over time these prototypes are communicated through social interactions between group members. As they become more crystallized and generally accepted by group members, they become norms, which describe (descriptive norms) and prescribe (injunctive norms) attitudes and behaviors of group members. To put it more simply, norms are the *content* of identities (Huddy, 2013).

Extant work in political science has spent time identifying descriptive norms of the parties, often referring to them as stereotypes.[1] For example, Ahler and Sood (2018) show that Republicans are stereotyped as wealthy, old, and evangelical while Democrats are stereotyped as union members, black, and agnostic. Hayes (2005) argues that each party owns specific traits — Republicans are seen as better leaders and as more moral, and Democrats are seen as more compassionate and empathetic. Rothschild et al. (2018) use open-ended text to discover more granular partisan stereotypes. They find stereotypes

[1] Psychologists seem to agree that stereotypes and descriptive norms are the same thing. As Eagly and Karau (2002) put it, "although the descriptive norms are thus synonymous with psychologists' usual definitions of stereotypes of group members, injunctive norms add a prescriptive element not traditionally included in the stereotype construct." (pg. 574). That said, stereotypes generally refer to descriptive norms imposed from *outside* the group. Hence the word stereotype is amended when referring to stereotypes of one's self: self-stereotype.

based on traits, specific social groups, and ideology. Deichert (n.d.) finds that partisans also hold cultural stereotypes about the types of people in each party (e.g, business people are Republicans, hippies are Democrats).

In stark contrast, there is little or no work on *injunctive* partisan norms. Injunctive norms are particularly important given their role as strong motivators. Scholars have long attributed the motivational power of norms to fear of social sanction or desire for social reward. For example, Gerber et al. (2008) find that because there is a norm of civic participation in the United States, citizens who believed their neighbors would know whether they voted were much more likely to turn out. The same was not true when the authors appealed to personal satisfaction for complying with the norm. These fears of social sanction are not unfounded; group members can be punished quite severely when they fail to adhere to group prototypes (Terry and Hogg, 1996). In fact, under some circumstances, those who do not fit the prototype or break group norms are labeled "deviants" and may even be kicked out of the group entirely. With that in mind, my first goal is to identify injunctive partisan norms — those that describe ideal party members and which result in social sanctions when broken.

While there is a set of injunctive norms that the parties share rooted in concepts of good citizenship (i.e., one should participate in elections, be informed on the issues, and so forth), there are several reasons to expect distinct norms to exist in each party. First, partisan group norms may diverge as a result of geographic segregation. Existing work shows that more segregated communities facilitate norm communication (Anoll, 2018), and Democrats and Republicans do live in somewhat different areas (Bishop, 2009), even if politics exerts a relatively minor effect on the choice of location (Mummolo and Nall, 2016). The proliferation of partisan news shows and online political communities means that partisan segregation may even extend to news and entertainment (Levendusky, 2013), providing additional opportunities for party-specific norms to be communicated. More importantly, there are a number of individual differences between Repub-

licans and Democrats. Existing work shows significant differences between Republicans and Democrats in worldview (Hetherington and Weiler, 2018), psychological predispositions (Jost et al., 2003), personality traits (Gerber et al., 2010), views about what is "right" or "wrong" (Haidt, 2013), and even biological attributes (Hibbing et al., 2013). These differences in the way Democrats and Republicans think may impact the content of social norms in their respective parties.

Further, party-specific norms might arise because of differences in party structure and party coalitions. The Republican and Democratic parties have one major goal in common — obtaining and retaining political power. However, given major differences in their coalitions, their path to power may be quite different. The Republican party is fairly homogeneous; majority white, majority male, majority protestant. While still majority white, the Democratic party is a much broader coalition of smaller groups including racial minorities, the LGBT community, and union members. Unsurprisingly, this diverse coalition of groups has broad policy goals, including many single-issue interest groups. In order to win elections, they need to keep these disparate groups together. For example, Democrats might be focused on a single, unifying message that broadly appeals to the multitude of groups in the party. With a more homogeneous base, the Republican party might be less constrained by factionalism. By relying on their shared racial and religious identities, Republicans may be able to tolerate more normative differences.

2.2 Partisan Norms Among Party Elites

As discussed above, extant work has aimed to identify stereotypes or descriptive norms about each party, but little has been done to identify *injunctive* norms for each party. In other words, we know some things about the perceived characteristics of Democrats and Republicans, but we do not know much about what partisans think their fellow group members *should* believe or what they *should* do. Understanding injunctive norms is incredibly important since injunctive norms tend to be more predictive of behavior given

their enforcement via social rewards and sanctions.

Given the lack of existing theories or data on this subject, I chose to first conduct a number of discursive interviews with party leaders in Tennessee and New York. Discursive interviews provide an opportunity to explore questions about what makes a good or a bad partisan in-depth. They are particularly useful in this case because I had no strong priors about what sorts of norms I would find. Each interview gave me the opportunity to follow up when interviewees mentioned something unclear, or to ask them to talk more about the thought process behind their answers. Interview length varied, but most interviews lasted between 45 and 90 minutes. I selected interview subjects deliberately, pursuing interviews with people who were deeply involved in partisan politics. Most interviewees were members of the state party executive committees, but I also spoke to city councilors, state legislators, activists, and other party leaders. If partisan social norms exist, party elites are most likely to be aware of these norms and able to communicate them. Norms are communicated socially, and party elites spend significantly more time thinking about party politics and interacting with other group members in political settings compared to the average partisan. Party elites may also be seen as group prototypes, and are the most likely to model good group behavior (van Knippenberg and Hogg, 2003). Although research about the communication of political norms is sparse (but see Anoll, 2018), scholars of political communication argue that highly involved "opinion leaders" are responsible for dispersing opinions to less involved members of the public (Katz, 1957).[2] Given their heavy social involvement in the parties and their high levels of prototypicality, it makes sense to begin my search for partisan social norms among party elites.

I selected Tennessee and New York deliberately. Tennessee is a southern state where the Republican party has held the Governor's office and both chambers in the state legislature since 2011. Republicans have held both US Senate seats since 1995, and the last

[2]On the other hand, Toff and Suhay (2019) find that partisans are influenced by their co-partisan peers just as much as they are influenced by co-partisan elites.

Democratic presidential candidate to win Tennessee was Bill Clinton. Despite Republican dominance state-wide, Nashville is comfortably Democratic. The city is nearly 30% Black, relatively young, and median family income sits just over the national average at roughly $76,000. New York State is Tennessee's polar opposite with Democratic supermajorities in the State Senate and State Assembly, and a Democratic Governor since 2004. Like Tennessee, there are small pockets of minority party-controlled counties throughout the more rural parts of upstate New York. I conducted 10 interviews in Tennessee (five Democrats and five Republicans) and eight interviews in New York (four Democrats and four Republicans) in order to determine whether these distinct political and social contexts would lead to different perceived norms. For example, we might expect to observe greater tolerance for internal disagreement and criticism among the majority party in either state, since deviance is less politically costly to the party as a whole when unanimous agreement is not necessary to pass bills. On the other hand, Democrats in Tennessee and Republicans in New York may receive weaker signals about social norms since their social networks are more likely to be politically heterogeneous (Anoll, 2018).[3] Of course, there are weaknesses to discursive interviews. Because I only interviewed around 20 people, there are questions about how generalizable my conclusions are.[4] Additionally, because most of my interviews were conducted face-to-face, some subjects may have felt less comfortable sharing examples of bad partisan behavior or been more motivated to appear tolerant. However, as part of a broader research agenda, interviews are a logical starting point.

The content of these interviews varies, but questions were designed to identify norms using criteria recommended by Bicchieri (2016), who explains that the existence of a norm requires two things — first, there must be a personal normative belief — the group member must believe that a given behavior is appropriate or desirable. Second, there must

[3]In the end, I did not observe any major differences in the expression of partisan norms between New York and Tennessee, so I report the results of all my interviews together here.

[4]Because white men tend to be over-represented in many political institutions, my sample is mostly white, and mostly male. See Table A1 for more details about the interview sample.

be normative expectations — the group member must believe that others in the group believe a given attitude or behavior is appropriate or desirable. I designed my interview protocol (found in the appendix) with these two components in mind. For example, to probe personal normative beliefs, I asked questions such as, "What sorts of things do good Republicans/Democrats do?" and "What are some things you think members of your party do better than members of the other party?" To probe normative expectations, I asked questions like, "What percentage of your fellow party members would agree with your idea of what it means to be a good party member?"

I also asked questions designed to explore social rewards and sanctions, as these are inseparable from social norms themselves. The prospect of social sanctions is likely to magnify the force of injunctive norms, so a crucial part of identifying norms is figuring out what types of behaviors have expected consequences. To that end, I asked several questions about behaviors that would elicit punishments: "What sorts of attitudes or behaviors do you think are unacceptable for members of your party?" I also asked questions about what types of sanctions they might expect for breaking norms. For example, after asking subjects what sorts of things members of their party do, I asked them, "what do you think would happen if you didn't do these things" and "how would your relationships be affected if you didn't do these things?"

2.2.1 Political Participation — A Universal Norm?

Despite my main expectation that social norms would vary between the Republican and Democratic parties, there was one common theme about what makes a good member of the party. Democrats and Republicans in both Tennessee and New York agree that being a good party member means participating in politics, although participation was defined differently from person to person. The most common point was that good Democrats and Republicans should vote. Charlotte,[5] a member of the Tennessee

[5] All names have been changed to preserve anonymity. Quotes are edited for clarity and length.

Democratic Executive Committee, said voting, in particular, is a requirement for good Democrats: "You have to get out to vote. You are obviously very well aware of the issues within our state and nationally, with a lack of participation. Well, I think that if you really believe in something, you really, you know, getting out and voting."

Charlotte also believes good Democrats should contact their representatives and make their opinions known. She continues, "if you really believe in something, you really, you know, getting out and voting. Otherwise? I really think that standing up for what you really believe in, if you believe that we should have living wages, then don't sit in the background and and just shake your head. Our representatives need to know that we believe in a living wage, we believe in access to health care, we believe in common sense gun laws."

Republican interviewees had similar thoughts. David, a member of the Tennessee Republican Executive Committee, said that good Republicans need "more awareness, more involvement in the political process, and then ... attend events and the candidates and discuss issues and discuss philosophies and that type of thing."

Adam, a Democratic state legislator, felt that knowing who your representatives are and not being political spectators makes a good Democrat: "I think they should vote. They should. They should raise voters as children, they should be aware of who their representatives and government are and understanding at some level, what they, what their responsibilities are, and how to get in touch with them. I think they should, as much as possible help on campaigns and policy, fights that are central to the cause. And then, you know, I think, the way that I've, but I think they have to be participants and not spectators."

Like Charlotte, Adam mentioned that good Democrats should go beyond voting — they should advance "the cause" through helping on political campaigns and contacting their representatives.

Steven, a New York State Senator, felt it is important to find an issue that animates you

and get involved — "I think one important thing to do is to be active in your community. Get involved locally in some local Democratic political organization, engage in political issues and find one thing you're passionate about and dig in."

Calls for greater participation occasionally went beyond politics. Lucy, a prominent Tennessee Democrat, argued that we should be "involved in [our] local community. That is another, no matter what issues are important to you make sure that you're engaged and involved in your local community." Overall, elites in both parties seem to think that good party members are ones who are civically engaged.

Among elites, partisan norms seem to partially overlap citizenship norms. Dalton (2008) identifies four categories of citizenship norms: participation, autonomy (forming one's own opinions), social order (serve on jury, obey laws, etc.), and solidarity (support the needy). For my interviewees, only participation was seen as a partisan norm.[6] This makes sense — when partisan elites participate, they do so in pursuit of partisan goals. Norms of social order and autonomy are less related to partisan goals.

2.2.2 Norms in the Republican Party

Beyond the participation norm, there were fundamental differences in how Republicans and Democrats spoke about what would make someone a "good" or "bad" party member. Republicans displayed a relatively wide range of beliefs about what makes an ideal partisan. First, Republicans expect obedience to God and adherence to traditional morals and values. Second, many Republicans stress the importance of strict adherence to conservatism — usually spoken of in broad terms or held in contrast to socialism. Third, Republicans expect fellow partisans to respect, love, and be loyal to their country. This manifests in both a strong admiration for the founders and the Constitution as well as a general sense of patriotism. Finally, a smaller number of Republicans expect loyalty to party leaders, particularly the President.

[6] As I'll argue later, Democrats tend to view solidarity as a partisan norm as well.

Some Republicans see obedience to God as a duty of good Republicans. For example, Sally believes that most Republicans believe the country was established by God, and pushed back on the separation of church and state: "I believe our country was established by God, and most people in the Republican party do believe this. There's a few that don't but most believe our country was established by God ... That's another thing I think that is a foundation on the Republican side is that we also want to point to Scripture. And we don't believe that the separation of church and state is eliminating religion from everything. That is in our hearts and minds, our foundation. That's what makes us move, its what makes us thrive. It's how we make our decisions. So if you do that, how do you separate them? It's our moral compass."

According to Sally, most Republicans see religion playing a central role in the country's founding. Later, Sally went on to argue that "we [Republicans] live our lives based on scriptural truth, again, black and white." Again, Sally's perception was that Republicans are highly influenced by God and scripture. William, a Republican and former city councilor, compared Republicans to Democrats based in part on religion, " [we're] probably more religious, probably believe in traditional values, more church oriented." Beth, a member of the New York Republican State Committee, also felt that belief in God was an important part of being a good Republican. When I asked her why, she said "If you lie, cheat and steal, if you make babies, and you either abort them or abandon them, I think that that's disturbing to me. And that's a character that I don't wish to support."

A larger group of Republicans discussed the importance of strict adherence to a conservative ideology, although the meaning of "conservatism" varied from person to person. William, a former Republican city councilor, differentiated between good Republicans who follow conservative principles and bad Republicans who do not, "what the values are, are not always practiced by the membership, it goes back to what I would consider the values and we're fiscally conservative, so we try to watch where we spend our money ... very, very limited government." Later he lamented again, "our platform is

not what we practice."

Fiscal issues tended to be at the center of many of my conversations with Republican elites. Several interviewees seemed uncomfortable talking about social issues at all. For example, one Republican named Henry says he is "not a huge fan of, you know, like social issues, big divisive rhetoric. I just, I hate campaigns that rely on that type of stuff ... that's not my type of politics that I like to be involved in." Instead, he believes conservative positions on fiscal issues are at the center of the Republican party. When asked how he evaluates Republican primary candidates, Henry explained, "I would really want to look at their, you know, if they had a track record on fiscal issues." Similar to other interviewees, Henry had the sense that the modern Republican party has failed to live up to these fiscally conservative ideals, "I'm a fiscal conservative, but I am not sure that the bigger Republican party is there right now." At times, this commitment to conservatism manifested through admiration of the founders and the Constitution. To Republicans, the founders are the ultimate symbols of conservatism, and the Constitution is seen as a document that clearly supports conservative positions. When asked about the values of the Republican party, Sally immediately said, "Constitutional. We're the Constitutional party, in everything we point to, the First Amendment, free speech ... Second Amendment, everybody should have the right to bear arms and protect and defend themselves, ... then you know the right to life." Throughout the interview, Sally drew a line between Constitutional Republicans (good Republicans) and Republicans who she views as failing to uphold the Constitution (bad Republicans). Sally was particularly dismissive of Republicans who compromise to get things done, "when these issues get watered down — I'm a very black and white person, so when you start getting into shades of grey, its like, why bother? It doesn't have any good standing anymore ... Constitutional Republicans get upset when we start to move away from the Constitution into what people feel, think they want."

New York Republicans had similar things to say. Beth argued that we should all ac-

knowledge that, "I'm fortunate and you are too, that we were born in this country. I am in awe of what I believe our founders put together in those times, and I do believe they stand the test of time." Later in the interview, she talked about the importance of the freedom of speech, saying that college students shutting down conservative speakers was "in contradiction of the founding fathers principles." Clark, another New York Republican, began the interview by saying the Republican party was the "Constitutional party" and was the party pushing for adherence to the Bill of Rights.

Finally, some Republicans view loyalty to the party and its leaders as an important part of being a good Republican. In Tennessee, Bob Corker's 2017 spat with Donald Trump on Twitter was a big news story. Corker's approval rating dropped dramatically after criticizing the President, and he announced his retirement several months later. I asked several of my Republican interviewees what they thought about the situation, and whether they thought there was a place for criticism in the Republican party. Some interviewees said disagreements were normal and acceptable, but they tended to dislike when these disagreements are made public.

The reticence to support open criticism of a co-partisan seemed to stem from the idea that criticism from the inside hurts the party. Matt, a member of the Tennessee Republican Executive Committee, invoked Ronald Reagan, "I was a fan of Ronald Reagan. And he, he famously said, what he called the 11th commandment — Thou shalt not speak ill of another Republican. And I think he said it, you know, in humor, but I think there was a lesson there than in the history. Attacking members of their own party seldom works out good for the party as a whole."

Sally had a lot to say about Corker. When I mentioned the former Senator, she scoffed, saying, "I will defend his right to say those things, but do we like it? No. Do we want to vote him out? Yes." Later, Sally argued that "once a Republican has been nominated, you get behind that person." Sally made it clear that she supported the rights of people like Corker or Mitt Romney to criticize the President, but also made it clear what the

consequences would be — "it needs to take place at the ballot box. We the people should be deciding who represents us. They don't represent us." When I directly asked her whether Bob Corker was a good Republican, Sally said simply, "next question."

Beth, a New York Republican, also wished congressional Republicans wouldn't publicly criticize the President: "there's an old expression called don't air your dirty linen out there on the clothesline. And it's the same thing in a family. We've got a problem. We take care of it in the family. We don't have to go and stand in front of a microphone and blast away at people."

Republicans seem to have a complicated relationship with their own party. On one hand, they have a sense that the party is not being loyal to its values and that Republican elites in particular are not "ideal" group members. On the other hand, some Republicans have little patience with those who publicly criticize party leaders. Republicans also feel loyal to the founders and the Constitution, and view their commitment to conservative principles as a reflection of their loyalty to the Constitution and the founding fathers.

Because of the broad variety of norms in the Republican party, there is some internal disagreement about what it means to be a good Republican. While some Republicans believe adherence to traditional Christian morals and attention to the social issues they see as connected to those morals as most important, but other Republicans actively distance themselves from social issues. Future work should consider whether there are different normative factions within the Republican party, and how tensions between those factions affect Republican party politics.

2.2.3 Norms in the Democratic Party

Where it was difficult to uncover social expectations in the Republican party, Democrats see the question of what makes a good Democrat as an easy one. Simply put, Democrats in both Tennessee and New York focus on caring for people, particularly people who they view as vulnerable or marginalized in some way. Some interviewees talked about

this principle in broad terms. Emma, who leads a group for young Democrats in the state, says good Democrats "want to see everybody succeed." To Emma, that means investing in education and healthcare, and specifically that the government can help provide those goods, "you're going to find that Democrats are going to be willing to increase property taxes if it means making your education system better, or wanting to do something more of a public option with healthcare." Another interviewee, Charlotte, believes the Democratic party is " working for the average citizen, the common citizen, that goes to work every day, and, this is what we have tried to emphasize, is that we try to represent the everyday person." This was a common theme across my interviews with Democrats — we want to help the average, everyday person.

Many Democrats felt this quite strongly. Adam, a Democrat in the Tennessee state legislature, said he is willing to compromise quite a bit to get things done. But there is one line he wouldn't cross: "I mean, if I could be convinced that if somebody came in and said, We will, you know, double public education funding and pass Medicaid expansion, if you all will agree to x, like, what are the things that I would not agree to? It's not a huge list, like it really comes down to like democracy and caring for people."

Democratic interviewees viewed this desire to care for others through the lens of compassion. When I asked Emma what sorts of things Democrats tend to do better than Republicans, she said Democratic policies "exemplify compassion much more than Republican ideas." She also mentioned forgiveness as an important part of that compassion: "[we're] not trying to punish somebody for, we don't judge people on something they did on their worst day, but we're trying to make sure that they have better days in the future." Interestingly, Emma believes Democrats are "wired" for compassion — "I think compassion is a huge, huge part of it. And it's just how Democrats might be wired morally or ethically." Compassion and care are not just personal values, Emma sees them as a fundamental part of how Democrats think. Timothy, a former member of Hillary Clinton's campaign and current employee of a progressive nonprofit, believes "bad" Democrats

are ones who have "lost their sense of compassionate connection" to people, and thinks in general Democrats do a better job pushing for compassionate policies.

Lucy, a prominent member of the Tennessee Democratic Party organization, summed up the idea of caring for everyone eloquently: "we believe that everyone, no matter who you are, what you look like, where you live, who you love, how you pray, that everyone deserves and should have an opportunity to have a better life for themselves and their family."

Democrats tended to have a particular idea about what it means to care for people, as well as specific groups that they view as needing this care and protection. Care was often talked about in terms of equality — to care for someone is to make sure they have the same rights and opportunities as everyone else. Several Democratic interviewees expressed the belief that to be a good Democrats is to seek to rectify inequalities. Here's what Lucy had to say about correcting historical inequalities: "there were people that are being left behind and don't have access to the American dream. And, you know, those people should be valued as much as everybody else ... There are many people in this country who are being left behind and what Democrats believe is that, you know, part of our value system is that everyone should be lifted up. And, you know, given the hand up that they that they need to succeed, while we need to dismantle the systems of injustice and inequality and oppression that has existed in this country since its inception."

While Lucy did not name specific groups, others did. Three groups in particular stood out as targets of this goal to decrease inequality and ensure rights — women, racial minorities and the LGBT community. For example, Emma was adamant about protecting women's rights. When asked what makes a "bad" Democrat, Emma started by saying the Democratic party is a "big tent" — a wide range of different ideas are welcome in the party. After thinking for a moment, though, Emma decided that "personally, its hard for me to consider someone a good Democrat if they don't think I have autonomy over my body." Later, when I asked Emma what types of behaviors would disqualify a Democratic

candidate, she immediately mentioned accusations of sexual assault.

Adam was quite firm about making sure everyone feels welcome in the US — "I think we insist that America be a country for everybody. I don't think there's much room for debate on that one. Yeah. I think that applies to everybody — African-Americans, LGBT community, it just, it just freakin applies. And that's a, that's a hard and fast." Benjamin, an executive in the Manhattan Democratic party, expressed a similar sentiment:

> *... across genders, races, religions, national origins, just trying to get it so that everyone in every walk of life is equally respected and can be valued for their individual contributions to society. And without prejudice or bias or bullying or whatever it may be, and just to try to make, you know, the world of better cleaner, safer place for everyone.*

Nothing encapsulates the care norm better than my interview with Michael, a longtime fixture in the Tennessee Democratic party. When I asked Michael what makes a "good" Democrat, he showed me an old plaque titled, "Stewardship: The Tennessee Democrats' Creed."[7] The document lists seven points, each beginning with the phrase, "We will be faithful stewards of ..." and then listing a principle. When I asked which of the points was most important, the interviewee paused to look over the document before concluding that the final point was most important. It reads: "we will be faithful stewards of our freedoms of equality, religion and expression so that men and women of all races and faiths can live, follow their beliefs, and express their views without fear of discrimination or reprisal."

2.2.4 Policing Party Norms

As mentioned above, my interviews included a number of questions about what types of social sanctions befall those who break party norms. An interesting dynamic became

[7] It is worth noting that Oxford defines stewardship as "the job of supervising or taking *care* of something."

clear over the course of my interviews. Very few interviewees were willing to say they personally sanctioned party members for normative failures. On the other hand, most interviewees agreed that other members of their party *do* levy sanctions. Interviewees consistently said things like, "I don't have exactly like litmus tests for my friends or for candidates," "there's not like a litmus test," and "[the party] is a big tent. You know, there's folks that disagree on certain specific issues, and that's OK."

Despite their avowed acceptance of norm breakers within the party, many interviewees expressed discomfort with things they had experienced in their social lives. Beth, a Tennessee Democrat, told a story about wanting to play in a band with a young Republican: "...and people were watching, and later they said 'why would you do that?' Why not? And I'm not sure if it's like a joke, or like, 'people are gonna find out' like, and that is such a sad world that we live in." Later in the interview I asked Beth whether she ever felt like there were things she could not say among her co-partisans. Somewhat jokingly, she asked again whether her quotes would be kept anonymous.

Another interviewee talked about an acquaintance who felt very strongly about Republicans who would compromise on abortion, "a friend of mine is you know, a staunch anti-abortion person and he wont even talk to a Republican that you know, discusses the issue or may agree to the first three months or in case of rape or whatever."

Finally, Timothy told a story of a friend who began dating a Republican woman — "I have a good friend who's dating a Republican right now, a Democrat who's dating a Republican and was like, ostracized by friends? Which is, like, bizarre in some ways but yeah, I unfortunately see it a lot. But I also think that we're like, increasingly in a place where people with different views are, are just pushed out of our lives instead of engaged with. Yeah. And so yes, I've seen people that just like openly criticize or or alienate the people in their lives who have different views." Timothy was also concerned we would hold elected officials to these extremely high standards, "if we demand a 100% litmus test from every elected official we'll never make any kind of solid progress." When I asked

him whether he felt his more tolerant view or the "litmus test" view was more common among his fellow Democrats, Timothy lamented, "I think the litmus test view is becoming increasingly more common. This you know, if you don't agree with me, you're dead to me kind of approach." Although interviewees did not personally feel like they had to enforce party norms, they did seem to believe that others in their party were actively engaged in policing their fellow group members.

These interviews provided an excellent foundation for further inquiry. Based on my conversations with important Republicans, there seems to be a norm of adherence to some form of conservative ideology, respect for the Constitution and founding fathers, and obedience to God. Republicans who fail to live up to these norms were viewed negatively by interviewees. The Democrats I spoke to very clearly adhere to a norm of care for "the common man," and especially for historically vulnerable groups like racial minorities, women, and members of the LGBT community. Democrats who are seen as failing to protect and care for these groups or who behaved insensitively towards them are viewed as "bad" Democrats.

Beyond the differences I found in norm content, there was also an interesting difference in norm diversity. Nearly all Democrats talked about the care norm in some way — each of my interviews with Democrats was relatively similar. Republicans, on the other hand, seem to hold a diverse set of party norms. Some were dedicated to the party because they held strong opinions on a set of issues like the role of government, taxation, and support for small businesses. Others viewed the party as a vehicle for defending the Constitution or advocating for certain morals and values. This somewhat contradicts Grossmann and Hopkins (2016), who argue that coalitional differences lead the Republican party to focus on loyalty to ideological conservatism, while the Democratic party focuses on group loyalties. While their findings are true on some level, the Democratic party in 2020 appears to be much more normatively unified than the Republican party. If anything, Democrats seem to be coalescing around a single "ideology," while the Repub-

lican party is made up of several ideological factions.

This distinction makes sense given my theory as described above. The Republican party is demographically homogeneous[8] but has diverse policy goals; large corporations and poor rural southerners have very different political interests. While still majority white, the Democratic party is a diverse coalition of racial minorities, the LGBT community, and (some) union members. Despite their demographic differences, groups in the Democratic coalition have relatively similar policy goals (aid for the poor, protection against discrimination, etc.). These coalitional differences suggest different strategies for winning elections. The Democratic party holds different demographic groups together with a common message — care for one another. The Republican party is more homogeneous demographically and can rely on their shared racial and religious identities while appealing to a broader set of normative messages.

2.3 Do Ordinary Democrats and Republicans Share These Norms?

My results above highlight that partisan group leaders hold these norms, but do rank-and-file Democrats and Republicans share them as well? Although interviews provide a rich resource for developing hypotheses about the way partisans think about their party membership, the responsibilities associated with that membership, and what makes one a "good" group member, the interview subjects are (by design) very different from the "average" partisan. In order to assess the extent to which these norms exist among the general population, I conducted an online survey ($n = 1052$) using Lucid, which is a non-probability sample similar to those offered by other online vendors like Dynata and Qualtrics.[9]

[8] According to Pew, Trump voters were overwhelmingly white (88%), rural or suburban (88%) and not college educated (71%). See article here: https://www.people-press.org/2018/08/09/an-examination-of-the-2016-electorate-based-on-validated-voters/

[9] Coppock and McClellan (2019) replicated well-known surveys using Lucid and show that samples from Lucid are of comparable quality to similar platforms in terms of demographic and experimental benchmarks.

Using Lucid, I constructed a sample with similar distributions of age, gender, race, and geographic location compared to the U.S. population using recent census estimates. Using this sample, I conducted an original survey in November 2019. Each respondent was compensated by the vendor that directed them to the survey. The final sample included roughly equal numbers of men and women. The racial makeup of the sample was 75% white, 11% Black, 5.4% Hispanic, and 4.8% Asian. Because I wanted to include partisan leaners in my sample, I did not screen subjects according to partisanship. The final sample included more Democrats than Republicans (55% Democrats/45% Republicans). This compares favorably to estimates by Pew, which finds that among those who identify as partisans, 56% identified as Democrats and 44% identified as Republicans in 2017.[10] Those who identified as pure independents were not allowed to complete the survey, and therefore do not appear in the analyses below. Figure A1 displays the distributions of several key demographic variables for this sample.

After completing these demographic questions, respondents were asked to respond to a number of open-ended questions that mimic some of the questions used in my in-depth interviews. First, respondents were asked to describe what it means to be a good member of the party. For example, here is the full wording for Republican respondents:

> *Now we would like you to briefly describe what you feel it means to be a GOOD member of the Republican party. In other words, what would be an attitude, behavior, or trait that an ideal Republican would exemplify?*

If the respondent entered something in the text box, they were prompted to write about another attitude, behavior, or trait that an ideal party member would exemplify. This was repeated a total of three times or until the respondent left the text box blank. Next, respondents were asked to describe what makes someone a bad party member and about how these bad members are treated:

[10] https://www.people-press.org/2018/03/20/party-identification-trends-1992-2017/

Now we would like you to briefly describe what you feel it means to be a BAD member of the Republican party. In other words, what would be an attitude, behavior, or trait that would make you feel like someone doesn't belong in the Republican party?

Thinking about your answer to the previous question, How do you think your fellow Republicans would behave towards someone who acts like a "Bad" Republican?

Again, respondents were prompted three times or until they left the question blank. Finally, respondents were asked to compare the two parties:

What are some things that members of the Republican party do better than members of the Democratic party?

To summarize, respondents were asked three classes of questions — what makes a good group member, what makes a bad group member, and how one's own group compares favorably to the outgroup. To measure the presence of the party norms identified during my interviews, I hand-coded each response on a number of dimensions. In an effort to prevent bias in coding, I separated the open-ended responses from the rest of the dataset to avoid seeing the respondents' party identification. However, respondents sometimes mentioned their partisanship in the open-ended response.

2.3.1 What Makes a "Good" Party Member?

I first coded responses to questions asking respondents what they think it means to be a good partisan. To identify the "care" norm, I looked for mentions of helping or caring for people. I also indicated whether the respondent mentioned a specific group to care for. For example, saying that good Democrats "care about those in need" is a generic care statement, while saying good Democrats "care about improving gender equality" is a specific care statement. To identify the "God" norm, I looked for mentions of God, scriptures, "Christian morals," etc. For example, one respondent writes that good Republicans "would recognize the supremacy of God and what he reveals in his Word (aka the

Holy Bible)." To identify the "Country" norm, I looked for mentions of patriotism, the Constitution, the founding fathers, or anything about national pride, etc. For example, respondents who said good Republicans or Democrats "stand up for the Constitution," are "proud of our country," or "stand up for the freedoms the founding fathers believed in when they founded this nation" perceived the "Country" norm.

I broke "conservatism" into three distinct pieces to cover the wide variety of ways respondents evaluated others' adherence to conservatism. First, some respondents mentioned conservatism very generally, saying that "An ideal Republican is somewhat conservative in all ways." Second, some respondents mentioned that good partisans adhere to fiscally conservatism values like lowering taxes and deregulating businesses. For example, one respondent writes that a good Republican "prefers low taxes, supporting big business, and cutting social services." Third, some respondents said good partisans adhere to socially conservative values like opposition to abortion and same-sex marriage. Next, I identified adherence to the "Loyalty/Authority" norm by looking for statements indicating that ideal partisans are loyal to the party or to party leaders. For example, one respondents writes that a good Republican should "do the right thing and respect and support our POTUS." Another writes that a good Democrat should be "loyal to party candidates and platforms and vote for the same." Finally, I identified the participation norm by looking for calls to vote, campaign, learn about the issues, etc.

I begin by showing the proportion of respondents from each party that mentioned each norm. Figure 2.1 displays the proportion of Democrats and Republicans that were coded as mentioning each of the eight norms, with proportion on the y-axis. Note that any given respondent might have mentioned several norms, or no norms at all. As a result, the bars in Figure 2.1 do not add up to one.

Figure 2.1 makes several things immediately clear. First, Democrats and Republicans have very different ideas about what it means to be a good party member. Over 33% of Democrats mentioned something related the care norm, while just 8% of Republicans



Figure 2.1: What Makes a "Good" Partisan? Proportion of respondents who mentioned a given norm when asked what makes a good partisan.

mentioned the care norm. Even when Republicans did mention caring for others, they tended to do so in broad strokes rather than mentioning who, specifically, we should care for. Republicans had a much broader set of ideas about what it takes to be a good Republican — 33% mentioned adherence to at least one form of conservatism, 24% mentioned pride in the country, the Constitution, and the founders, and close to 15% mentioned the importance of obedience to God or Christian morals and values. Among the three types of conservatism mentioned, Republican respondents tended to speak generally about "conservative values" more often than they mentioned specific economic or social policies generally associated with conservative ideology.

Second, Figure 2.1 follows a pattern very similar to the patterns I found during my elite interviews — ordinary partisans and party elites seem to have similar ideas about what it means to be a good partisan. One significant difference between elites and the mass public was the extent to which participation was mentioned as an important part of being a good partisan. Whereas nearly all the elites I interviewed mentioned the importance of getting involved, only 5% of Republicans and 7% of Democrats mentioned participation. This is fairly intuitive; after all, I selected interviewees based on the fact that they were involved in party politics.

All together, 55% of partisans mentioned at least one of the norms I identified in my interviews when thinking about what it means to be a good partisan. The other half of respondents wrote a variety of other considerations unrelated to these norms. For example, 30% of Democrats and 27% of Republicans mentioned personality traits like honesty, trustworthiness, and kindness. A small proportion of respondents (roughly 4%) admitted they don't know much about partisan politics. The remainder wrote nonsense (e.g., "I feel happy," "when will this survey end?")

2.3.2 What Makes a "Bad" Party Member?

The second set of questions asked respondents what it means to be a bad partisan. My starting point for coding the responses to these questions was the same set of codes used to classify the good partisan questions above. There are reasons to expect that partisans' answers to the bad partisan questions might simply reflect the opposite of their answers to the good partisan questions. First, since the good partisan questions were always asked first, respondents may have been primed to evaluate bad partisans using similar standards. A few respondents explicitly said as much; for example, one respondent said a bad Republican is "just the opposite of what you just asked me." Second, some survey researchers have identified an "assimilation" effect among survey respondents when questions require significant cognitive effort. In other words, when respondents are asked difficult questions, they conserve cognitive resources by responding similarly to questions they perceive as connected. On the other hand, Schwarz et al. (1991) find evidence for a contrast effect when similar questions are asked in sequence. Respondents who are asked similar questions one after the other often attempt to give the interviewer new information, giving different answers to questions where interviewers might expect similar responses.[11]

To incorporate both of these possibilities, I began by using the same set of codes used to categorize the good partisan responses — care and group-specific care as Democratic norms, country, god, loyalty, and three types of conservatism as Republican norms, and participation as a universal norm. I then read through responses again, this time looking for responses that did not fit into any of these categories. In the end, the original codes did an excellent job categorizing most responses. I did make one change — I expanded the breadth of responses included in the loyalty category and added a related category that

[11]Within-respondent correlations between good and bad codes of the same category were fairly low (between .18 and .37) but were much higher than within-respondent correlations between good and bad codes from different categories. For example, the correlation between "good" fiscal conservatism and "bad" fiscal conservatism is .33, but the correlation between "good" fiscal conservatism and "bad" loyalty was only .05. This suggests that many respondents did answer the questions as opposites.

indicates responses that specifically mentioned public criticism of party leaders. The loyalty category now includes responses that mention loyalty explicitly as well as responses that mention that bad partisans vote against the party, do not stick to the party line, etc.

These responses were more difficult to code compared to the responses about what makes a good partisan, since respondents had to mention something about *breaking* a given norm. Some examples of responses in each category might illustrate this point. One respondent said a bad Democrat "Doesn't care about the less fortunate." Not all respondents were quite so clear; for example, I also decided to code respondents who said bad partisans are "misogynistic" or "racist" as mentioning the care norm. These respondents were also coded as mentioning group-specific care, since the insinuation is that racists and misogynists do not support or value certain groups.

Here again I broke "conservatism" into three distinct pieces to cover the wide variety of ways respondents evaluated others' adherence to conservatism. First, some respondents mentioned conservatism very generally, saying that bad Republicans were "too liberal." I also placed responses in the generic Conservatism category if they mentioned that bad Republicans were "socialists." Although this is technically an argument about fiscal policy, most respondents who mentioned socialism seemed to view it as symbolic of liberalism. For example, one respondent said bad Republicans "embrace all the socialist narratives," and also said they "are liberal in Republican clothes," and are "faithless Marxists." Second, some respondents mentioned that bad partisans fail to adhere to fiscally conservatism values like lowering taxes and deregulating businesses. Third, some respondents said bad partisans fail to adhere to socially conservative values like opposition to abortion and same-sex marriage.

The Country category included people who said bad partisans failed to uphold the Constitution or were not patriotic enough. For example, one respondents says bad partisans "don't believe we should follow the Constitution." Respondents who I placed in the God category said bad partisans "don't believe in God," don't "uphold Christian val-

ues," or "go against the Bible." Responses were coded as mentioning the Loyalty norm if they mentioned voting with the party, supporting the President, or if they explicitly mentioned disloyalty. For example, one respondent says that "A bad member of the Republican party is someone who doesn't go along with the party's platform or the party's leaders." Finally, the criticism category includes responses like "Criticizing and condemning the president is not being a good Republican" and "Bad mouthing all the candidates in the Democratic Party."[12]

The responses here display a similar pattern to that found above: Democrats place the care norm above all else, while Republicans mention a variety of norms. Among Democrats, roughly 21% mentioned the generic care norm and 11% mentioned caring for a specific group. Additionally, around 8% of Democrats mentioned the loyalty norm. None of the other partisan-specific norms measured were mentioned by more than about 3% of Democrats. When Democrats mentioned the care norm, they tended to focus on tolerance and care for three groups — the economically disadvantaged, racial minorities, and women. In contrast, about 5% of Republicans mentioned the care norm, and typically focused on whether the partisan in question cared about their *constituents*. In fact, some Republicans expressed contempt for caring for the disadvantaged. As one respondent put it, bad Republicans have "concern for the disadvantaged that are disadvantaged because they are to lazy to do anything but complain and beg."

Among Republicans, the most common norm mentioned was adherence to social conservatism (16%). In particular, many respondents in this group mentioned either abortion or illegal immigration. Same-sex marriage seems to have become less salient — only a

[12]Overall, partisans were more likely to mention partisan norms when asked about what makes a good partisan than when asked about what makes a bad partisan. While 55% of respondents mentioned at least one partisan norm when asked what makes a good partisan, only 44% mentioned a partisan norm when asked what makes a good partisan. This difference is partially explained by the order in which respondents answered questions. Each respondent was asked to respond to a total of eight open-ended questions throughout the survey, and each successive question garnered shorter responses than the last. Respondents mentioned norms less partially because they wrote less in these responses. The difference is also partially explained by the relative cognitive strain the two different questions require. For example, it is easy to think about the attributes of a lemon, but thinking about attributes that lemons do *not* have requires an additional layer of abstraction.

handful of respondents said supporting same-sex marriage makes you a bad Republican. The next most common norm mentioned by Republicans is loyalty (15%), and a significant number (7%) of respondents specifically said criticizing party leaders (especially President Trump) makes you a bad Republican. About 12% of Republicans mentioned what I call "generic" conservatism (12%). This is similar to Ellis and Stimson's (2012) symbolic conservatism, where some voters "have a strong affection for the symbols of conservatism" without necessarily holding conservative positions on key issues. Finally, about 11% of Republican respondents said bad Republicans are those who do not adhere to fiscal conservatism. Most often, they mentioned that bad Republicans try to raise taxes or believe in more government intervention.

When respondents did not mention norms, they generally talked about personality traits. In particular, respondents believed being dishonest or corrupt makes one a bad partisan. Altogether, 23% of Republicans and 24% of Democrats mentioned some negative personality trait. In contrast to the small number of responses that were left blank or indicated that the respondent did not know what makes a good partisan, a significant number (about 16%) of respondents gave no answer regarding what it means to be a bad partisan. This is partially because the longer people took the survey the shorter their answers became.[13]

[13]On average, respondents wrote 16.7 words in response to the good partisan question and 9.4 words in response to the bad partisan question.



Figure 2.2: What Makes a "Bad" Partisan? Proportion of respondents who mentioned that "bad" partisans break a given norm.

2.3.3 Sanctioning "Bad" Partisans

Finally, I asked respondents how their fellow partisans would behave towards "bad" partisans. To analyze these responses, I first skimmed several hundred responses and developed a coding scheme based on the most common responses. My final coding schema included seven categories representing four main types of sanctions. The first category included any responses that mentioned electoral consequences for norm breakers. Responses like "kick them out of office" or "they wouldn't win re-election" were placed in this category. The second category included responses that mentioned some form of persuasion. For example, one respondent said fellow partisans would "probably work to change their mind/behavior." The third category included three different types of social sanction — dislike (e.g., "They would highly dislike them"), shame (e.g, "Hopefully they would call this person out publicly for what he/she really is."), and avoidance (e.g., "I think they would avoid if not shun him or her."). The final group mentioned either tolerance of the deviant (e.g., "they would support their differences") or that the deviance would be ignored completely ("No reason to do anything.").

Figure 2.3 plots the proportion of respondents that mentioned each of these sanctions by party. As before, these proportions do not sum to 100 since some respondents mentioned more than one sanction and others mentioned none at all. Overall, 36% of respondents mentioned one or more sanctions would be levied against "bad" partisans.[14] The most common response from members of both parties was that their fellow partisan would react to "bad" partisans by talking to them and attempting to change their behavior. Democrats were somewhat more likely to use this approach than Republicans (12.6% vs. 10.8%, respectively). The next most common response was that "bad" partisans would face electoral consequences like being voted out of office or asked to leave

[14]These responses suffered many of the same issues as the responses to the "bad" partisan questions — many respondents were fatigued at this point and gave very short answers. Some answers suggested sanctions, but it was unclear which categories the response fit into. In other words, this is likely a conservative estimate of the proportion of respondents who would have mentioned social sanctions for bad partisans.



Figure 2.3: Proportion of Respondents Mentioning Each Type of Sanction

the party entirely. Roughly equal proportions of Democrats and Republicans mentioned electoral consequences. Next, the three types of negative social consequences (dislike, shame, and avoidance) garnered similar support. Republicans mentioned these types of social consequences about as often as Democrats, but there was little difference *between* the three types within each party. Among Republicans, roughly 6-7% of respondents mentioned each of the three, while 5-6% of Democrats mentioned each of the three. The least popular responses argued that deviants would face no negative consequences. Republicans expected their co-partisans to be somewhat more tolerant: 4.8% of Republicans and 2.4% of Democrats said their fellow partisans would do nothing, and 6.1% of Republicans and 4.7% of Democrats said their fellow partisans would tolerate the deviant or even celebrate their differences.

2.3.3.1 Approach-based and Avoidance-based Sanctions

One interesting distinction in the types of sanctions mentioned by respondents is that some advocate a strategy of approach — either persuading the deviant to come back to the fold, tolerating their differences, or shaming them in some way. The other set of consequences are avoidance-based — either by changing their evaluation of the deviant's character, shunning them, or kicking them out of the party completely. The distinction is important because approach and avoidance have different implications for resolving conflicts within the party. Approach-based sanctions like shame often lead to conformity (Suhay, 2015), and avoidance-based sanctions like ostracism are more likely to lead to disengagement or exit from the group (Masters, 1984).[15]

We might expect some types of people to prefer levying sanctions using one method over the other. There is a robust literature about approach and avoidance in a motivational context — some people are motivated by the desire to avoid negative consequences and others are motivated by the desire to gain positive consequences (Elliot, 2006). In

[15]On the other hand, (Gomez et al., 2011) find that ostracized group members sometimes become *more* attached to the group, attempting to regain social favor through strict conformity.

other words, are you driven to get the carrot or are you driven to avoid the stick? As it turns out, there are some systematic differences in motivation. Elliot and Thrash (2002) find that extraversion is positively correlated with approach motivation and that neuroticism is positively correlated with avoidance motivation. Shah and Gardner (2008) finds that avoidance motivation is correlated with attention to threatening cues, so those with more authoritarian personalities may be more motivated by avoidance. There is mixed evidence for gender differences, with Eschenbeck et al. (2007) finding that among adolescents, girls address conflicts with approach and boys address conflict with avoidance, and Anshel et al. (2010) finding the opposite. Anshel et al. (2010) also find that white athletes were more likely than Black athletes to cope with stress using approach. Janoff-Bulman et al. (2008) find that conservatism is associated with avoidance motives and liberalism is associated with approach motives. This is key, Republicans should used more avoidance-based sanctions and Democrats should use more approach-based sanctions.

The bulk of the approach-avoidance literature focuses on whether an individual is more likely to seek rewards or avoid punishment themselves rather than whether they tend to *use* approach or avoidance when someone else breaks the rules. However, there is literature on parenting styles, including "authoritarian" parenting which is more hierarchical and emphasizes obedience, and "permissive" parenting which emphasizes independence (Baumrind, 1966). One characteristic of authoritarian parenting is low responsiveness — authoritarian parents tend to ignore their children's feelings and do not explain how they make their decisions. For example, when a child asks why they have to go to bed, a permissive parent might say, "because if you don't you'll be tired tomorrow," while an authoritarian parent might say, "because I said so." We might expect that those who score more highly on an authoritarianism scale would be less likely to try to persuade deviants to come back to the fold and more likely to shun or avoid them. Beyond authoritarianism, we might expect other individual differences to be correlated with sanction types. For example, some people are more conflict-averse — when faced with

conflict, these individuals tend to avoid rather than seek resolution to the conflict (Leung, 1988). These people might select sanctions that do not require them to confront deviants.

Unfortunately, my survey did not include measures of authoritarianism or conflict aversion. However, it did include several measures that might be related to which types of sanction a respondent prefers. For example, Republicans tend to score higher on measures of authoritarianism than Democrats (Hetherington and Weiler, 2009), and place more value on conformity (Jost et al., 2003). Therefore, we might expect Republicans to support more sanctions across the board, and particularly punitive sanctions like shame or avoidance. Additionally, there is some evidence than women tend to be more conflict avoidant than men (Coffe and Bolzendahl, 2017), so we might expect women to be more likely to use social avoidance compared to men.

To test these predictions, I ran a series of OLS regressions using binary indicators for different sanction types as my dependent variables. If respondents said that they would react to bad partisans by avoiding them, shaming them, or losing respect/affection for them, they were coded 1 for the social avoidance indicator. Respondents who said they would attempt to persuade deviants of their wrongdoing or tolerate the deviant behavior were coded 1 for the social approach indicator. Respondents who said they would vote the deviant out of office or remove them from the party were coded 1 for the electoral sanctions indicator. Finally, those who said they would ignore or tolerate the deviance or do nothing were coded 1 for the tolerance indicator. For each model, the comparison group is respondents who would not levy any sanctions on the deviant. Table 2.1 summarizes the results of these regressions.

Overall, there were few significant differences between partisan, age, gender, or racial groups. Republicans were more likely to say they would ignore or tolerate the deviance. Republicans were also less likely to advocate social approach and more likely to advocate social avoidance. This is consistent with my prediction above, but these differences are not statistically significant. Men were less likely to suggest either social avoidance or

Table 2.1: Correlates of Different Sanction Types

	Dependent variable:			
	Electoral	Avoidance	Approach	Tolerate
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Republican	-0.016	0.041	-0.001	0.069^{***}
	(0.031)	(0.030)	(0.031)	(0.019)
Age	-0.0005	-0.001	-0.001	0.0001
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Male	0.023	-0.226^{***}	-0.110^{***}	-0.043^{**}
	(0.030)	(0.029)	(0.030)	(0.018)
Black	-0.049	0.074	0.041	-0.016
	(0.051)	(0.047)	(0.049)	(0.032)
Hispanic	-0.090	0.051	-0.033	0.021
	(0.067)	(0.063)	(0.067)	(0.041)
Constant	0.204^{***}	0.372^{***}	0.344^{***}	0.046
	(0.052)	(0.049)	(0.052)	(0.033)
Observations	691	784	785	648
R^2	0.004	0.087	0.033	0.031
Adjusted R^2	-0.003	0.082	0.026	0.023
Note:				*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

social approach. Men were also somewhat less likely to tolerate deviance. There were no significant age or racial differences in sanction types.

2.4 Individual Differences in Norm Perception

Existing work suggests that certain types of group members should be more likely to hold party norms. First, those with larger and more homogeneous political networks should be more sensitive to party norms. A growing body of work shows that social context and peer political networks shape our views about partisanship (Sinclair, 2012; Connors, 2019). Norms in particular are communicated socially, and homogeneous networks tend to facilitate norm communication (Anoll, 2018; Larson and Lewis, 2017). Those who have robust political networks are more likely to have norms communicated to them by their peers, particularly when those peers share their party affiliation. As a result, we would expect that partisans with more homogeneous political networks should be more attuned to partisan norms. Second, those who pay more attention to political news should be more sensitive to party norms. Elites play an important part in communicating social norms (McLaughlin et al., 2017), and political media is an important way that elites communicate with rank-and-file partisans. Existing work shows that the media can change the salience of an issue (Lenz, 2009), make people more certain of their beliefs (Levendusky, 2013), and polarize the public (Druckman et al., 2013). Those who pay attention to political news should have much clearer ideas about what "good" group members should believe and how they should behave.

To test these claims, I included a measure of network homogeneity and a measure of attention to political news in my Lucid study. The network measure is based on well-known work by Mutz (2006). First, each respondent was asked whether they had spoken with anyone about politics in the last six months. Those who responded in the affirmative were asked to give the initials of three individuals with whom they had talked about politics. Finally, respondents indicated the degree to which each individual's political

views differed from their own on a 5-point scale (not different at all to extremely different). I created a standardized additive scale using these three "difference" items such that higher scores indicate more political network homogeneity. The Lucid study also included an item which asked respondents how often they pay attention to political news on a four-point scale (Every day, a few times a week, a few times a month, never).

Using these measures, I separately model the relationship between individual-level norm salience and network homogeneity and attention to political news. First, I create measures of norm salience for Democratic and Republican norms.[16] For example, if respondents mentioned *any* of the Republican norms, they were coded as 1. If they mentioned *none* of the Republican norms, they were coded as 0 on the Republican norm salience measure. I decided to use a binary measure rather than a count to maintain a similar range for Republican and Democratic norms.

Figure 2.4 plots the marginal effect of attention to political news on norm sensitivity by party. As is clear from figure 2.1, Republicans are much more likely to mention Republican norms. Republicans who pay more attention to political news were also more likely to mention Republican norms than Republicans who do not pay attention to political news when asked what makes a good partisan. There was no significant relationship between attention and Republican norm salience among Democrats. For Democratic norms, the results are reversed — Democrats are much more likely to mention Democratic norms, and those who paid more attention to political news among Democrats were somewhat more likely to mention Democratic norms.

[16] I also ran these analyses for each individual norm. For the most part, the results are consistent across norms. Marginal effects plots for these individual norm analyses can be found in Appendix 3



Figure 2.4: Relationship between norm salience and attention to political news

These patterns are also present when respondents were asked what makes a "bad" partisan, although the differences between more attentive and less attentive respondents are smaller. The relative weakness of these results might be partially explained by the question used to measure attention. Some who indicated that they pay quite a lot of attention to political news may consume a balanced or non-partisan news diet, and others might consume only partisan news. The latter group should have a much clearer picture of party norms than the former.

Figure 2.5 plots the relationship between network homogeneity and Republican and Democratic norm salience when asked what makes a "good" partisan. For Republican norms, network homogeneity made a large difference. Among partisans with more heterogeneous political networks, Republicans were only about 30% more likely to mention one of the Republican norms. Among partisans with homogeneous political networks, Republicans were nearly 70% more likely to mention one of the Republican norms than Democrats. For the Democratic care norm, network homogeneity is even more important. In fact, among partisans with heterogeneous political networks Democrats were no more likely than Republicans to mention the care norm. Among partisans with homogeneous political networks, Democrats were 53% more likely to mention the care norm than Republicans. A similar pattern emerges from the "bad" partisan questions — Democrats and Republicans don't look very different in terms of norm salience when their political networks are heterogeneous, but those with homogeneous networks have very distinct ideas about what makes a partisan good or bad.

Overall, these results provide strong evidence for a relationship between network homogeneity and norm perception, and some evidence for a relationship between attention to political news and norm perception. Since social norms are communicated via personal political networks and by elites through political media, partisans with homogeneous political networks and who consume more political news are more likely to perceive and vocalize partisan norms.



Figure 2.5: Relationship between norm salience and network homogeneity

2.5 Discussion

Are there party specific norms that influence political behavior? Drawing on work on social identity theory, moral foundations theory, and the compositional bases of the parties, I argue that there are, with Democrats having a norm favoring care for and protection of the oppressed, and Republicans having several norms including adherence to various facets of conservatism, loyalty to and pride for the country, obedience to religious principles, and loyalty to the party and to party leaders. Using interviews and survey data, I show that both party elites and rank-and-file partisans hold these norms.

First, I showed that partisan social norms exist, and that they are broadly held by members of both parties, especially among those with homogeneous political networks and those with high levels of exposure to political news. While both Democrats and Republicans agreed that voting and upholding Democratic values like freedom of speech and religion are important parts of being a "good" party member, I also showed that some norms vary between parties. For Democrats, good party members are ones who strive towards justice for groups of people who have been marginalized. Those who demonstrate a lack of commitment to this goal risk censure. For Republicans, good party members are ones who are loyal to authority figures — first to God, then to the founders, and finally to conservatism and conservative leaders. Those who criticize these important authorities are not generally seen as Republicans in good standing.

On the other hand, it is worth noting that many partisans did not mention these partisan norms when asked what makes a group member good or bad. This begs the question — how widespread does a norm need to be before it has effects on the attitudes and behaviors of group members? In my survey, 55% of respondents mentioned at least one of the partisan norms I identified during my interviews. Is that enough? Future chapters will attempt to answer this question empirically, but there are several reasons to think that these norms are sufficiently widespread to be important. First, the measurement used here surely underestimates norm perception. Respondents volunteered these

norms without any prodding, and a much higher percentage might have agreed if I had explicitly asked whether, for example, a good Democrat cares for the downtrodden. Second, a large proportion of the public thinks very little about politics in general. In 2016, an ABC poll found that 40% of Americans could not identify Donald Trump or Hillary Clinton's running mates[17], and even after three years 12% of Americans reported having never heard of Mike Pence[18]. Given generally low engagement, it is perhaps surprising that so many partisans can volunteer these norms. Finally, partisans can be affected by social norms even if they cannot articulate those norms.

This chapter contributes to larger conversations in political science about how partisans make choices. Some have argued that although few rank-and-file party members hold coherent political ideologies (Converse, 1964; Kinder and Kalmoe, 2017), they do have deeply-held values that guide their political decisions (Zaller, 1992; Nelson and Garst, 2005). Others have challenged the deeply-held nature of political values, showing that our partisanship determines our values rather than the other way around (Goren, 2005) and that values can be moved by social influence (Connors, 2019). In other words, what we though were stable values actually look a lot like social norms. I have shown that social norms exist within political parties, and that partisans expect those who break those norms to be punished.

Of course, my work here is not done. The most obvious reaction to this chapter is, "so what?" How do these social norms affect real-world politics? The remainder of this dissertation will demonstrate how social norms affect politics at both the elite and mass levels. First, social norms may affect how elites communicate with members of their party. In primary elections candidates may use norm-related rhetoric to demonstrate their commitment to the party or to question the commitment of their opponents. In general elections, candidates may use norm-related rhetoric to generate enthusiasm among

[17]https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/40-percent-americans-vp-candidates/story?id=42497013

[18]https://nymag.com/intelligencer/2019/04/poll-12-percent-of-americans-never-heard-of-mike-pence.html

their co-partisans, increasing turnout. Chapter three explores the use of norms in primary debates, and the concluding chapter briefly discusses how norms might operate in general elections. Second, social norms should affect vote choice, particularly in primary elections. When party cues are not available, group members should select candidates based on which candidate is seen as a "good" partisan. Chapter four will take an in-depth look at how social norms affect voting decisions. Third, social norms should affect what members of the public are willing to say to their fellow partisans. During one of my first interviews, I asked a young woman whether she ever felt like she couldn't say certain things to her fellow partisans. Her immediate response was, "Is my name going to be attributed?" After assuring her that her response would be anonymous, she said, "Yeah, sometimes. It's such a tiring thing to be part of, because you have to manage your relationships with everybody. I lead [a political organization], and some people are thinking, hey, wouldn't it be fun to bring Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez to town? And I was kind of like, I don't really know if she falls in line with the majority of Democratic voters here. I don't know if that's a good idea. But I was worried about being perceived as too conservative. And so yeah, there are times that I have to feel like, do I bite my tongue here? Do I phrase it differently?" The concluding chapter will, in part, discuss the ways social norms might be related self-censorship.

Chapter 3

How Primary Candidates Use Partisan Social Norms

Social norms powerfully shape many of our attitudes and behaviors, from whether to tip your waiter (Mansfield, 2016), to how likely you are to participate in politics (Anoll, 2018; Gerber and Rogers, 2009; Gerber et al., 2008), to reducing prejudice (Paluck, 2009). Social norms are particularly powerful in group contexts — norms create the boundaries of acceptable group behavior, and those who fail to adhere to group norms may be punished (Hogg and Reid, 2006). In chapter 2, I argued that partisans hold their own social norms, and that Republican norms differ from Democratic norms. Specifically, I argued that Democrats have one predominant norm — to care for and protect members of vulnerable groups. Republicans have several norms, including respect for the United States and its symbols, obedience to God, and loyalty to the Republican party and its leaders.

These findings beg the question, "so what?" Partisan social norms are only interesting to political scientists insofar as they have an impact on politics. The object of this chapter is to explore one of the ways partisan social norms might impact political elites. I make two arguments. First, I argue that social norms permeate how political candidates communicate with the public, particularly during primary elections. Primary elections are battles to establish one's self as the candidate aligning most closely with partisan norms, either by emphasizing ones own normative actions or by emphasizing the normative failings of ones opponent. Second, I argue that social norms partially explain candidate evaluation by voters in primary elections. Partisan social norms lead Democrats and Republicans to systematically favor certain types of candidates and leaders.

To support my first argument, I use data from presidential primary debates from 2008, 2012, and 2016. I use several different text analytic methods and find that candidates do use normative rhetoric in political debates, and that Democrats and Republicans rely on

their respective partisan norms. I also find variation in norm use among candidates of the same party. In general, white and male candidates were less likely to use normative rhetoric than POC and female candidates, and candidates often focus on some norms more than others. To support my second argument, I supplement my debate data with data on public perception of candidate performance in each of the 2020 democratic primary debates. I find that generic care rhetoric had little to no effect on perceived debate performance, but Democrats who use care rhetoric about specific groups received a modest bump in perceived debate performance.

3.1 Social Norms and Primary Elections

Partisanship is, at its core, a type of social identity, less an expression of one's policy positions and more a psychological connection to a political party, likely as a result of early socialization (e.g., see Campbell et al., 1980; Green et al., 2004; Huddy et al., 2015; Mason, 2018). Much of this work has explored how partisan social identity influences behavior toward out-group members (Iyengar et al., 2019), but less work in political science explores the implications for how partisans see their fellow in-group members.

Because partisanship is a social identity, it establishes a set of norms around how group members should behave. Groups tend to be cognitively represented by prototypes — "fuzzy sets" of attributes that shape the way we view group members (Hogg and Reid, 2006). Some of these attributes describe the "average" group member, and other attributes describe the "ideal" group member. Over time these prototypes are communicated through social interactions between group members. As they become more crystallized and generally accepted by group members, they become norms, which describe (descriptive norms) and prescribe (injunctive norms) attitudes and behaviors of group members. To put it more simply, norms are the content of identities (Huddy, 2013). Partisan injunctive norms should guide how an ideal partisan thinks and behaves.

Norms in the Republican party differ from norms in the Democratic party. In chapter

2, I interviewed 18 partisan elites about what it means to be a "good" member of the party. The Democrats were very unified in their view that good Democrats care about others, especially groups that are marginalized in some way. Republicans were somewhat more diverse in their views; in general Republicans said good party members support party leaders, pursue conservative policies, are loyal to God and certain moral principles, and that they love the country and its symbols. After conducting these interviews, I conducted multiple large surveys that showed that these same norms are present in the general public.

These partisan norms can have significant impacts on behavior. For example, partisan norms likely affect partisan behavior in primary elections. Whereas presidential elections are, as Bartels (1988) puts it, "decided primarily by relatively stable partisan loyalties," presidential primary voters do not have the same partisan heuristic to help them decide between candidates. As a result, candidate strategies in primary elections are based on things like increasing name recognition (Parker, 2012), owning specific policies(Benoit et al., 2011), appearing competent (Green and Jennings, 2017), momentum (Bartels, 1988), and convincing the party that they are the most electable candidate (Abramowitz, 1989).

There are reasons to suspect that another strategy used by primary candidates is emphasizing their own prototypicality or questioning the prototypicality of their opponents. As Hogg and Reid (2006) argue, appearing more prototypical has the advantage of making group members "more likely to attribute their behavior to stable personality attributes that suit them to leadership." In other words, prototypical candidates should be seen as more capable leaders. Other work suggests prototypical candidates should also be more well-liked (van Knippenberg and Hogg, 2003). For these reasons, leaders tend to "talk up their own prototypicality," and "[vilify] contenders for leadership and [characterize] them as nonprototypical." (Hogg and Reid, 2006). Reicher and Hopkins (1996) demonstrate this in a political context and find that British politicians use their speeches to "accentuate the ingroup prototype and pillory ingroup deviants." While there is little schol-

arly work on this topic in the American political context, we observe this phenomenon regularly. Republicans often use the term "Republican in Name Only" (RINO) to refer to someone who calls themselves a Republican but engages in behavior that other Republicans dislike. For example, during primary season, conservative organizations like Club for Growth runs ads against candidates on their "RINO watch" list, or form "RINO Hunters Clubs."[1]

This emphasis on prototypicality is particularly useful during elections. The importance of norms and conformity tends to be heightened when a group is under threat (Christensen et al., 2004; Marques et al., 2001), as a political party is when they risk losing power for four years. Given the potential benefits of using normative rhetoric to establish candidate prototypicality, I expect many primary candidates will use normative rhetoric in their campaign communications.

> **Expectation 1:** Political candidates will attempt to communicate their prototypicality and adherence to group norms during political campaigns.[2]

Not all candidates will use normative language at similar rates, although based on existing literature it is unclear which types of candidates would use more normative rhetoric. On one hand, some group members are assumed to be prototypical, while others have to work harder to prove their belonging (Platow and van Knippenberg, 2001). We might expect that marginal group members would use more normative rhetoric in order to prove their commitment to the group. To understand which candidates are assumed to be prototypical, we need to understand another type of social norm — descriptive norms. Up to this point, the social norms I refer to are injunctive norms — norms that tell us what the "ideal" group member should do. Descriptive norms instead tell us what the "average" group member does, believes, or looks like. Descriptive norms are essentially stereotypes, although stereotypes are often assumed to be imposed by the

[1] https://web.archive.org/web/20120319163130/http://www.agenceglobal.com/article.asp?id=221

[2] Because this chapter is more descriptive than inferential, I think labeling these as expectations rather than hypotheses is more accurate.

outgroup, whereas descriptive norms are just as likely to be supported by the ingroup.[3] A growing body of work demonstrates that partisan stereotypes are incredibly strong. Rothschild et al. (2018) find that the public tends to think of Democrats as liberal, young, poor, educated, and non-white, while they think of Republicans as older, conservative, rich, white, and religious. Similarly, Ahler and Sood (2018) find that the public overestimates party-stereotypical groups in each party — thinking there are more non-white and LGBT Democrats, and more rich and Christian Republicans, than there are in reality.

Given these stereotypes, voters likely expect female and POC candidates to have advantages in the care norm, while older, white, and male candidates have to convince voters they care by speaking more about caring for the marginalized.[4] Among Republican candidates, minority candidates and candidates who are less religious may feel a greater need to affirm their commitment to Republican norms. In other words, candidates who are not stereotypical members of the party should rely more heavily on injunctive norms.

> **Expectation 2a:** Candidates who are less stereotypical of their party will use more normative language.

On the other hand, group members might assume that any individual who rises to the level of major party presidential candidate is fairly prototypical. To most people, Joe Biden is unlikely to be seen as a "marginal" Democrat. In fact, the opposite may be true

[3]Stereotypes are a subset of norms that, describe rather than prescribe behavior. As Eagly and Karau (2002, p. 574) put it, "although the descriptive norms are thus synonymous with psychologists' usual definitions of stereotypes of group members, injunctive norms add a prescriptive element not traditionally included in the stereotype construct." Stereotypes and norms serve different purposes. As described above, norms generally form to help the group accomplish its goals, affirm its values, or conform with group leaders. Stereotypes serve to make the world easier to understand and predict by helping us more quickly learn about individuals. Stereotypes and norms also have different consequences. Stereotypes can lead to flawed perceptions of an individual, but those who do not conform to stereotypes don't usually incur social sanctions. Norms do not usually lead to incorrect assumptions, but breaking a norm normally incurs punishment of some kind. Norms and stereotypes often stack on top of one another; thus, the stereotype that women are submissive and soothing became a gender norm that women *should* be submissive and soothing, and women who seem not to fit the norm are seen more negatively. The difference is seen more clearly when stereotypes are negative — Black men are stereotyped as being aggressive, but the vast majority of Black men who are *not* aggressive are not punished for their non-aggression.

[4]They may not just be expectations, but real differences in dedication to care. For example, Volden and Wiseman (2014) show that female legislators spend more of their effort on legislation related to women's issues.

— perhaps stereotypical group members should be *more* likely to use normative rhetoric. The logic here is simple. Campaigns strategically frame issues and candidate characteristics in ways that make their candidate look good (Schaffner and Sellers, 2009; Arbour, 2016). If stereotypical candidates are assumed to be more committed to upholding group norms, then bringing attention to those norms is a solid strategy.

> **Expectation 2b:** Candidates who are more stereotypical of their party will use more normative language.

As argued above, candidates will be motivated to use normative language if they believe it works. But why would normative language help primary candidates? Since primary voters cannot use party heuristics, they use other judgments. While electability tends to be the greatest predictor of positive candidate evaluation (Abramowitz, 1989), other factors like endorsements (Cohen et al., 2009; Pease and Brewer, 2008), momentum (Bartels, 1988) and even physical attractiveness (Bailenson et al., 2006; Rosar et al., 2008) sometimes play important roles. I argue that perception of prototypicality and norm adherence may also influence candidate evaluations. While there is little direct work on social norms in the context of primary elections, extant work in social psychology provides some evidence. For example, Brambilla et al. (2010) argue that individuals with high social status in a group are perceived as warmer and more competent than those who have lower group status, and Laustsen and Bor (2017) show that perceived warmth and competence are positively correlated with candidate evaluations. A large literature has established that group members who adhere to group norms are more well-liked and well-respected (Hogg and Reid, 2006; Anoll, 2018). Talking specifically about normative rhetoric, Reicher and Hopkins (1996) find that politicians who used prototype rhetoric and attacked in-party deviants were seen as more effective leaders. Primary candidates who use these strategies in campaign communications should enjoy more positive evaluations.

Expectation 3: Candidates who use more normative rhetoric will have more highly-rated debate performances among copartisan viewers, on average.

3.2 Use of Partisan Norms in Primary Debates

To explore these expectations, I largely rely on an original dataset of presidential primary debates during the 2012, 2016, and 2020 election cycles. These three elections provide an interesting variety of primary elections. In 2012, only the Republican primary held primary debates as the party tried to unseat an incumbent Democratic president. In 2016, both parties held primary debates — three Democrats fought to succeed a popular (within his party) president, and a large cohort of Republicans fought to dictate the future direction of the Republican party. In 2020, only the Democratic party held debates as large groups of progressive and establishment candidates sought to defeat the incumbent Republican. This variation in number of candidates and which party holds the White House means these data cover the most common primary election scenarios. The large candidate fields in 2016 and 2020 also provide variation between candidates, allowing for better analyses of individual differences in norm usage. Finally, more recent primary elections provide the most likely use of normative language. When the electorate is less polarized, primary candidates are more likely to try to appeal to undecided or even opposing partisan voters, emphasizing their qualifications and policy ideas. In a strongly polarized era, when opposing partisans are unlikely to be persuaded, candidates are more likely to mobilize their strong supporters. In other words, they can focus less on electability and more on enthusiasm.

To assemble this dataset, I first scraped transcripts of each debate from a number of different news outlets (NBC, CBS, Washington Post, New York Times, among others) and other sources (Rev.com, debates.org). I then cleaned each document and parsed them into a dataframe where each row is a statement. Each row also contains the speaker's name, an indicator variable for whether or not the speaker is a presidential candidate, as well as

debate-level information like date and location. The resulting dataframe contains 10,292 statements from 28 unique debates (11 Republican debates and 17 Democratic debates).[5]



Speaker	Text	Party
Elizabeth Warren	Senator Sanders believes a woman cannot be elected President.	D
Bernie Sanders	That is a mischaracterization of my statement.	D

Figure 3.1: Transcript Conversion Example

To determine whether and to what extent each statement contained normative rhetoric, I used two common text analytic methods, one "unsupervised" and one "supervised." Unsupervised methods make no assumptions about categories and can uncover new patterns in the data. Supervised methods classify text using input generated by the researcher, such as a dictionary or a set of hand-coded training data. Each of these methods has strengths and weaknesses, but together they tell a convincing story.

3.2.1 Unsupervised Model of Norm-Related Rhetoric

I begin by using a topic model, an unsupervised method that looks for common topics across texts without any priors about the content of the texts. Specifically I use a Structural Topic Model (STM), developed by Roberts et al. (2019). STMs have a major advantage over other topic models for social research — they allow inclusion of covariates in the model and produce measures of uncertainty. In other words, an STM could be used to conduct hypothesis tests to determine (for example) whether Democratic candidates are more likely to use certain topics compared to Republican candidates, or whether usage of certain topics has changed over time. At their most basic level, STMs identify a

[5]I also developed an open-source R package, *debates*, which includes these tidied transcripts as well as all presidential and vice presidential debate transcripts since 1960. Installation instructions and more can be found here: https://github.com/jamesmartherus/debates

user-defined number of latent topics in the corpus. Each topic is modeled as a mixture of word-probabilities, and each document is modeled as a mixture of topic-probabilities. Therefore, each word can appear in multiple topics, and each document can contain multiple topics. The user can then use topic probabilities or topic prevalence as document-level variables in hypothesis tests. I use an STM with 30[6] topics to model my debate data.

After running the model, I interpreted each topic using the most common words associated with the topic and using statements with high probabilities for the topic.[7] Table 3.1 displays my interpretation of these topics.[8]

[6]There are several tests to help identify an ideal number of topics for an STM. Without going into detail about each test, a "good" structural topic model would have low residuals, high semantic coherence, high held-out likelihood, and a high lower bound. Figure A4 in the appendix plots each of these four diagnostic indicators for topic models with the number of topics ranging from one to 50. The ideal number of topics appears to be around 30 — this is where decreases in residuals slow and decreases in semantic coherence accelerate.

[7]See this chapter's appendix for a more thorough treatment of topic interpretation.

[8]Topics in the table are listed in the order given by the topic model. Topic numbers do not correspond to prevalence.

Topic	Interpretation
1	Debate Administration
2	Federal Budget
3	Climate/Environment
4	References to Individuals
5	Gun Control
6	Debate Administration
7	Taxes/The Middle Class
8	References to Russia and the Supreme Court
9	References to Ronal Reagan
10	Foreign Policy
11	References to the Economy/Wall Street
12	Immigration
13	Money/Companies
14	Health Care
15	Middle East
16	Economy
17	Criminal Justice System
18	Symbolic Conservatism
19	Conservative-leaning Healthcare References
20	Electability
21	Generic References to United States
22	Unclear
23	Family/Education
24	References to Past Presidents and Presidential Candidates
25	Unclear
26	Black Americans
27	Debate Administration
28	Pronouns
29	Women
30	Generic References to United States

Table 3.1: Qualitative Interpretations of Each Topic

The most prevalent topics included references to one's self, other candidates and political figures (topics 24 and 28). Apart from these common topics, Democratic and Republican candidates talked about very different things. Figure A7 in the appendix shows the prevalence of each topic by party. The chart is sorted by Democratic topic prevalence, and the corresponding Republican chart shows how dissimilar conversations were between parties. Democratic candidates spoke much more about healthcare (topic 14), Blacks (topic 26), and education (topic 23) than Republican candidates, and Republican

candidates spoke much more about government spending (topic 2), Wall Street (topic 11), and the Constitution/faith (topic 18).[9]

The topics where Democrats and Republicans differed the most included rhetoric evocative of partisan norms. This type of rhetoric comes in a number of forms. Remember that norms describe the ideal group member, so language that suggests that the candidate is a "better" Republican or Democrat than their opponents constitutes norm-related rhetoric. For example, candidates might say things like "that's not how we do things in this party," or suggest that most members of the party would agree with them. Or, they might invoke a norm directly and criticize other candidates for not upholding the norm or for failing to bring up the norm sooner. Several of the topics described above contained clear uses of this sort of rhetoric.

Topic 2 tended to be a hotspot for norm-related rhetoric among Republican candidates. The statement with the highest probability in this topic was made by Rand Paul, who questioned Marco Rubio's commitment to conservatism:

> *"There was a conservative consensus for an amendment that I put forward called Trust but Verify ... and Marco sided and I guess was more sympathetic to Chuck Schumer and to the President than he was to conservative principles."*

Paul begins by suggesting that there was a consensus among conservatives, who all believed this amendment was a good idea. In other words, any good Republican should have agreed. Paul then casts Rubio as a dissenter and suggests he is closer to a Democrat than a Republican, tying him to Chuck Schumer and President Obama. This is a clear attempt by Paul to invoke the norm of loyalty to symbolic conservatism and suggest that Rubio has broken it.

Republicans also used Topic 18 much more than Democrats. Topic 18 contains statements about the Constitution, faith, and social issues like marriage equality and abortion. In 2012, Rick Santorum questioned Mitt Romney's views on same-sex marriage.

[9]This chapter's appendix includes a more thorough exploration of topic prevalence.

"Governor Romney ... was faced with a Supreme Court decision ... the court said that they did not have the power to ... rule same-sex marriage legal. Why? Because in the Massachussetts Constitution, it states specifically that only the Governor and the legislature can change marriage laws. So Romney was faced with a choice; go along with the court or go along with the Constitution. He chose the court and ordered people to issue gay marriage licenses.

Here, Santorum's goal is to paint Romney as a Republican in Name Only (RINO) siding with the liberal court on an issue that (at the time) was very important to many Republicans. Importantly, he does this by pitting Romney against the Constitution. He had a choice, and chose wrong. For Republicans, this disloyalty to the Constitution constitutes a serious breach of the country norm.

While the previous two topics consisted mainly of Republicans using norm-related rhetoric, Topics 12 and 26 consisted mainly of Democratic candidates discussing care-related topics. Topic 12 is all about immigration. Democratic candidates tended to agree with one another on immigration, and tended to criticize President Trump rather than each other. However, most Democratic candidates spoke about immigration through the lens of the care norm. For example, Tulsi Gabbard says, "our hearts break when we see those children at these detention facilities who've been separated from their parents." Gabbard uses "our," acting as spokeswoman for the group. Other candidates used words like "we" and "our" to talk about common feelings about immigration across the party.

Castro also used some normative rhetoric, "Watching that video of Oscar and his daughter Valeria is heartbreaking. It should piss us off. If I were president today, I would sign an executive order that would get rid of Trump's zero tolerance policy." Castro uses the normative "should," as in, Democrats should be angry that this happened. He then goes on to talk about how he specifically would right this wrong.

Finally, topic 26 included discussions about Black Lives Matter, racial injustice, and the importance of Black voters. Many statements in this topic involved candidates show-

casing their support from the Black community or calling for increased attention to racial injustice. Pete Buttigieg argued that "the Black voters who know me best are supporting me," and Joe Biden showcased his support from the Black caucus and the Black community in South Carolina. One statement in particular demonstrates how the care norm was used in this context. On February 19th 2020, Elizabeth Warren wasted no time attacking Michael Bloomberg for his involvement New York's Stop and Frisk policy. After Bloomberg apologized, Warren countered:

> *"... listen very closely to the apology. It's about how it turned out. No, this isn't about how it turned out. This is about what it was designed to do to begin with. It targeted communities of color. It targeted Black and brown men from the beginning."*

Here Warren clearly accuses Bloomberg of breaking the care norm — he supported a policy that specifically targeted and harmed a group that Democrats care deeply about defending. The attack was incredibly effective and was quoted by many news outlets. A Washington Post headline read: "Titanic, meet iceberg: Warren's 'devastating' attack on Bloomberg goes viral," and the Guardian published this one: "Cause of death: Elizabeth Warren." Overall, these four topics seem to include norm-related rhetoric.

Having identified several topics that correspond to partisan norms, I can determine whether the use of those topics by primary candidates differs between parties. Each candidate statement has a probability of being including each topic. In a series of OLS regressions, I use these probabilities as the dependent variable and a binary party indicator as the independent variable. Table 3.2 includes several topics that appear to include norm-related rhetoric — Topic 12 (Immigration), Topic 26 (Blacks), Topic 2 (Government Spending), and Topic 18 (Constitution, Faith)

Consistent with expectations, Democratic candidates were more likely to discuss topics associated with the Care norm, and Republicans were more likely to discuss topics associated with the God, Country, and Conservatism norms. I also estimated the model

Table 3.2: Partisan Differences in Topic Prevalence

	Dependent variable:			
	Topic 12 (Immigration)	Topic 26 (Blacks)	Topic 2 (Gov. Spending)	Topic 18 (Constitution/Faith)
Republican	-0.010^{***}	-0.014^{***}	0.027^{***}	0.025^{***}
	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Constant	0.044^{***}	0.025^{***}	0.019^{***}	0.010^{***}
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Observations	9,662	9,662	9,662	9,662
R^2	0.002	0.010	0.036	0.028
Note:				*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

with candidate and year fixed effects. Here, the results change somewhat. Partisan differences in prevalence of Topic 2 (government spending) and Topic 18 (Constitution/faith) get much larger, and partisan differences in Topic 12 (immigration) and Topic 26 (Blacks) are no longer statistically significant.

Topic models are excellent at identifying underlying patterns in text data, but they have some limitations. First, they can be affected by the number of topics selected. In my model, for example, some topics were clearly comprised of multiple ideas. Topic 8 talks about Russia, Vladimir Putin, and the Supreme Court, which seems like an odd pairing. Second, concepts that are woven into many different conversations may not show up. For example, Republican candidates may not talk about God explicitly for significant lengths of time, but they might imply the importance of their religious beliefs, how those beliefs affect their positions, etc. A topic model is unlikely to pick up on these more nuanced topics. In these situations, supervised models may be more effective.

3.2.2 Supervised Model of Norm-Related Rhetoric

To that end, I use logistic regression with LASSO regularization to identify normative rhetoric in debate performances. This particular algorithm is well-suited for classifying text data. While many classification algorithms are essentially "black boxes," logistic regression with LASSO regularization explicitly selects some features of the text and removes features that are not predictive. In other words, we can see exactly which words the classifier is using to make decisions. Text classifiers require training data that has been accurately coded, and then use the model generated using the training data to sort new texts. In order to train the classifier, I use the hand-coded Lucid survey responses discussed in chapter two. Classifiers like logit regression with LASSO regularization do not work directly with the text; instead, they use numerical matrices. From the text responses, I create a sparse matrix by counting the frequency of each word in a given response. I then create a separate model for each partisan norm. Figure A8 in the appendix displays the most predictive words from each model. For example, words like "Constitution," "patriotism," and "veterans" were among those most likely to identify use of the country norm.

Using these models, I then classify each debate statement. For each statement, the model output includes the probability that the statement uses rhetoric consistent with a given partisan norm. Figure A9 in the appendix displays the distribution of these probabilities by party. Using a probability of .25 as a cutoff,[10] table 3.3[11] lists the proportion of candidate statements that use rhetoric consistent with each norm, by party.

Across the board, the probability that any given statement including normative rhetoric appears to be quite low. But to put these percentages in context, each candidate makes

[10] Admittedly, the cutoff chosen here is fairly arbitrary. I originally used .5 as the cutoff, but upon reading a large selection of statements it became clear that even statements with probabilities as low as .15 included norm-related rhetoric. .25 seemed to be an appropriate compromise.

[11] Note to committee: you might notice that some of these numbers went down, despite using a lower probability threshold. This is the result of an error in the way I was dealing with missing data. I am confident that this current chart is correct.

	Norm	Democrats	Republicans
1	Generic Care	6.06	6.17
2	Group Care	1.19	0.30
3	God	0.15	0.65
4	Country	7.10	12.10
5	Social Conservatism	0.23	1.07
6	Fiscal Conservatism	0.68	3.80
7	Generic Conservatism	0.35	3.20
8	Loyalty	0.51	0.42

Table 3.3: Percentage of all statements that included normative rhetoric (probability $>$ .25)

about 30 statements per debate when there are many candidates on the stage and between 80 and 200 statements when there are only two candidates left. The average debate has 217 candidate statements. Using the .25 cutoff, that means an average Democratic debate includes around 12 appeals to the care norm, and the average Republican debate includes 24 appeals to the country norm. Whether or not these percentages are "small" is debatable, as is whether prevalence is the most useful measure. One thing to consider is that while norm-related statements might be relatively uncommon, they could have an outsized impact on the political environment (e.g., Warren's attacks of Bloomberg going "viral."). Because my Lucid data only include codes for specific partisan norms, I cannot directly compare the prevalence of normative rhetoric to, say, discussions about Medicare For All. However, I can use the topic model output to make some rough comparisons. Among Democratic candidates, the most common topic (topic 14) identified discussions about healthcare and just over 5% of statements by Democratic candidates used this topic. Among Republican candidates, the most common topic (topic 2) identified discussions about government spending and about 4.5% of statements by Republican candidates used this topic. With these benchmarks in mind, normative rhetoric is actually fairly common: The most-used Democratic topic is less than three times as prevalent as rhetoric associated with the group care norm, and the most-used Republican topic is only slightly more prevalent as rhetoric about the Fiscal Conservatism norm.[12] Another

[12]Prevalence might not even be the most important metric for assessing the importance of normative

consideration is that, as I will show below, some candidates use norm-related rhetoric at a rate much higher than the average.

Perhaps unsurprisingly, candidates from both parties talk quite a lot about "the country" during debates, although Republicans appear to invoke the country, patriotism, and the Constitution nearly twice as often. Democrats appear to talk about specific groups like women and racial minorities more often than Republicans. Republicans use words associated with all three types of conservatism much more often than Democrats, and are also more likely to talk about the importance of God and morality.

The model seems to have done a good job identifying normative rhetoric, as opposed to rhetoric about issues. As an illustration, I have included a number of statements here that were predicted to include normative rhetoric with a high probability. Democratic candidates used language to demonstrate their care for certain groups and to question other candidate's loyalty to those groups. For example, in a 2020 primary debate, Kamala Harris pointed out that:

> *"This is the sixth debate we have had in this presidential cycle and not nearly one word, with all of these discussions about health care, on women's access to reproductive health care, which is under full- on attack in America today. And it's outrageous."*

Senator Harris here positions herself as the one candidate who will not ignore women's reproductive rights. Elizabeth Warren attacked Michael Bloomberg more directly in another 2020 debate, saying:

> *"I hope you heard what his defense was. 'I've been nice to some women.' That just doesn't cut it. The mayor has to stand on his record. And what we need to know is exactly what's lurking out there. He has gotten some number of women, dozens, who*

rhetoric. Most Americans don't watch primary debates, and their only exposure to them is through soundbites or headlines in the media. A brief glance at the New York Times coverage of the Democratic primary debates includes headlines about Warren accusing Sanders and Bloomberg of sexism, Biden's commitment to selecting a female VP, etc. Future work could systematically identify which types of debate statements are most likely to be carried to a broader audience.

knows, to sign nondisclosure agreements both for sexual harassment and for gender discrimination in the workplace. So, Mr. Mayor, are you willing to release all of those women from those nondisclosure agreements, so we can hear their side of the story?"

Warren questions the way Mayor Bloomberg has treated women in the past, and suggests that he holds threatening legal power over them through nondisclosure agreements. Republican candidates used similar tactics to bolster their own credentials as good partisans or question the credentials of their opponents. After his loyalty to conservatism was questioned in a 2012 debate, Newt Gingrich fought back:

"I have a 90 percent American Conservative Union voting record for 20 years. I balanced the budget for four straight years, paid off $405 billion in debt. Pretty conservative. The first wealth entitlement reform of your lifetime, in fact, the only major entitlement reform until now was welfare. Two out of three people went back to work or went to school. Pretty conservative. First tax cut in 16 years, largest capital gains tax cut in American history, unemployment came down to 4. 2 percent. Pretty conservative. I think on the conservative thing, it's sort of laughable to suggest that somebody who campaigned with Ronald Reagan and with Jack Kemp and has had a 30- year record of conservatism, is somehow not a conservative?"

Gingrich uses the word Conservative seven times in this quote, and connects himself to Ronald Reagan — the most prominent and popular figure of conservatism. Overall, there is descriptive evidence that candidates from both parties do appear to use norm-related rhetoric — both to question the virtue of opposing candidates and to appear more virtuous themselves.

3.2.3 Candidate-Level Norm Use

Within parties, individual candidates varied widely in their use of normative language. Above I described competing expectations about which candidates might use

more normative language. On one hand, more stereotypical candidates might use *less* normative rhetoric since they are assumed to be prototypical, while marginal candidates use more normative rhetoric to establish their commitment to the group. On the other hand, stereotypical candidates might use *more* normative language if they think increasing norm salience will benefit them, while less stereotypical candidates might make other considerations (e.g., electability) more salient.

Using the output of my supervised model, I can begin to explore the use of norm-related rhetoric at the candidate level. Due to relatively low variation in race and gender among presidential candidates, I cannot make strong statistical claims using the debate data, but I can obtain some descriptive evidence by focusing on the 2020 Democratic field and the 2016 Republican field. Future research using candidates for state or local offices would include greater variability in candidate-level characteristics, and could answer these questions more effectively.

The 2020 Democratic primary featured an unprecedented amount of racial and gender diversity. Of the 29 major candidates, 6 were women and 7 were people of color. Of the 7 candidates receiving delegates, 3 were women. As described above, women and POC are stereotypically Democratic. Therefore, despite the fact that the Democratic party remains majority white, female and POC candidates are less "marginal" in terms of perceived prototypicality compared to male and white candidates. Were female and POC candidates more or less likely to invoke the care norm compared to white and male candidates? Table 3.4 shows the proportion of candidate statements that include care rhetoric or group care rhetoric.[13] Several interesting patterns stand out. First, female candidates occupy four of the top six spots. The top three candidates are all people of color. Biden, who eventually won the nomination, and Bernie Sanders, the runner up, were both in the lower half. In fact, the top three candidates used between two and four times as much

[13]Recall that care rhetoric tends to be generic, e.g., "it is important that we care for the most vulnerable among us." while group care rhetoric tends to talk about caring for specific groups, eg., "it is important that we care for the Black community." While both types of rhetoric speak to the care norm to some extent, an important part of the norm is that we care for specific groups that have been marginalized.

generic care rhetoric as Joe Biden and Bernie Sanders. Second, use of generic care rhetoric was not always accompanied by group-specific care rhetoric. Tulsi Gabbard, second only to Cory Booker in generic care rhetoric, used virtually no detectable group care rhetoric. Similarly, Michael Bennett exhibits a similar pattern. The distribution of group care scores is very skewed — a small number of candidates (Harris, Yang, and Castro) used two to three times as much group care rhetoric as most other candidates. These patterns suggest that descriptively prototypical candidates in the Democratic party seek to increase the salience of the care norm, where they are assumed to be strong.

	Candidate	Generic Care	Group Care	Woman	POC
1	Cory Booker	13.39	1.57	0	1
2	Tulsi Gabbard	13.24	0.00	1	1
3	Kamala Harris	10.47	5.23	1	1
4	Michael Bennett	10.00	0.00	0	0
5	Elizabeth Warren	9.07	2.02	1	0
6	Kirsten Gillibrand	8.96	5.97	1	0
7	Beto O'Rourke	7.84	0.00	0	1
8	Andrew Yang	7.69	2.20	0	1
9	Tom Steyer	7.69	0.00	0	0
10	Amy Klobuchar	7.30	1.27	1	0
11	Julian Castro	6.90	1.15	0	1
12	Joe Biden	4.46	1.07	0	0
13	Marianne Williamson	4.26	0.00	1	0
14	Bernie Sanders	3.17	1.06	0	0
15	Pete Buttigieg	3.08	0.28	0	0
16	Michael Bloomberg	2.15	2.15	0	0
17	Tim Ryan	1.75	0.00	0	0
18	Bill DeBlasio	0.00	0.00	0	0
19	Eric Swalwell	0.00	0.00	0	0
20	Jay Inslee	0.00	0.00	0	0
21	John Hickenlooper	0.00	0.00	0	0
22	Steve Bullock	0.00	0.00	0	0

Table 3.4: Use of Democratic Norms Among 2020 Candidates

The 2016 Republican field was relatively also relatively diverse. The field included a Black man in Ben Carson, a Hispanic man in Marco Rubio, and a woman in Carly Fiorina. The race also included Donald Trump, who at the time was not viewed as par-

ticularly conservative. He had identified himself as a Democrat in the past, and appeared to be socially progressive on issues like abortion and same-sex marriage. Republicans are stereotypically white and male. Therefore white candidates and male candidates are less "marginal" in terms of perceived prototypicality than POC and female candidates. Which candidates were most likely to invoke Republican party norms? Table 3.5 shows the proportion of candidates statement that include normative rhetoric. Perhaps the most interesting result is Donald Trump's near complete lack of normative rhetoric. Trump used little to no rhetoric associated with loyalty to conservative ideology, and did not mention God or morals at all. The only normative rhetoric Trump used with any regularity related to the country norm, where he still scored dead last. White male Republicans appeared to rely less on normative rhetoric than their non-white and female counterparts. Ben Carson ranks near the top of the field for appeals to fiscal conservatism and to the God norm. Marco Rubio scores near the top for appeals to social conservatism and destroys the competition on the country norm. Carly Fiorina scored in the middle of the pack for most norms. White Republicans tended to appeal more to conservatism in a generic sense — the top three candidates in this category were Chris Christie, Jeb Bush, and Rand Paul.

	Candidate	Fiscal	Social	Generic	God	Country	Woman	POC
1	Scott Walker	10.00	0.00	3.33	0.00	6.67	0	0
2	Mike Huckabee	5.26	0.00	0.00	0.00	10.53	0	0
3	Ben Carson	4.17	0.00	0.00	2.08	10.42	0	1
4	John Kasich	3.23	0.00	3.23	1.61	6.45	0	0
5	Marco Rubio	2.30	3.45	2.30	1.15	22.99	0	1
6	Chris Christie	1.89	0.00	5.66	0.00	15.09	0	0
7	Carly Fiorina	1.39	0.00	1.39	1.39	6.94	1	0
8	Ted Cruz	1.16	1.16	3.49	0.00	9.30	0	1
9	Jeb Bush	0.93	0.00	5.56	0.93	9.26	0	0
10	Donald Trump	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	5.26	0	0
11	Rand Paul	0.00	2.90	10.14	0.00	8.70	0	0

Table 3.5: Use of Republican Norms Among 2016 Candidates

The results here conflict somewhat with the results among 2020 Democratic candi-

dates. In 2020, Democratic candidates who were closer to the stereotypical Democrat used *more* normative language. In 2016, Republican candidates who were closer to the stereotypical Republican used *less* normative language. Perhaps non-white and non-male candidates feel more pressure to appeal to partisan norms regardless of party. Extant work argues that candidates from these groups are perceived as less qualified (Smith et al., 2007; Weaver, 2012), so perhaps they use normative appeals as an alternative strategy. Future work should explore individual-level use of normative rhetoric more fully.

3.3 Norm Use and Debate Performance

Having established that presidential candidates use normative rhetoric and that some candidates use more of it than others, I now explore whether the use of normative rhetoric is an effective campaign strategy. One way to determine whether normative appeals "work" would be to determine how general polling responds to norm use in debates. However, primary elections are complicated and polling may respond to any number of factors including momentum, media coverage, or campaign ads. Furthermore, only a small percentage of Americans watched each primary debate.[14] Fortunately, FiveThirtyEight and Ipsos conducted polls during the evening and morning after eight Democratic debates during the 2020 Democratic Primary. For each poll, the subjects were self-reported Democrats who said they had watched the debate and who were likely primary voters. In other words, the polls provide a sample of people who were actually exposed to normative rhetoric. In each poll, respondents were asked to rate the performance of each candidate in the debate on a 4-point scale (Very good performance, somewhat good performance, somewhat poor performance, very poor performance). I collected average debate performance ratings for each candidate in each of the eight debates where polls were conducted. Unfortunately, the full data for each poll are not publicly available,

[14]The first Democratic debate garnered just over 18 million viewers, and subsequent debates had between 5 and 10 million viewers. See https://deadline.com/2020/01/democratic-debate-ratings-cnn-1202831632/

so I am unable to explore respondent-level ratings or covariates like respondent party strength, age, gender, or race.



Figure 3.2: Norm Use and Debate Performance

Figure 3.2 plots these performance ratings against the average probability that a candidate's statements include generic care and group care rhetoric, along with a loess curve and 95% confidence interval. Again, I only have performance ratings for Democratic candidates in 2020, so I have restricted my analyses to these two Democratic norms. Above, I predicted that candidates who used more normative rhetoric would enjoy higher perceived debate performance among co-partisan debate watchers. Results are mixed. Candidates who used more generic care rhetoric had similar debate performance as candidates who used less generic care rhetoric. The downturn in performance at the upper end

of the scale can be attributed to a small number of high-care debates by generally unpopular candidates (Tulsi Gabbard and Tom Steyer). Candidates who used more group care rhetoric tended to have slightly higher debate performances.

In an attempt to control for the variation in baseline popularity of each candidate, I estimated a second model that controls for each candidate's standing in the polls on the day before the debate. Polling data was scraped from RealClearPolitics (RCP). I use RCP's five poll average[15]. This second model also includes candidate fixed-effects and the total word count for a given candidate. The results of this model are shown in Table 3.6. According to the model, candidates who used both types of care rhetoric tended to have their debate performances rated slightly higher, although the effects are not statistically significant.

Overall, this analysis provides partial (and very weak) evidence that candidates can benefit from using appeals to partisan norms. For Democratic candidates in 2020, being specific about *who* needs to be cared for appears to be a winning strategy.

[15]RCP's five poll average includes polls conducted by The Economist/YouGov, CNN, Morning Consult, IBD/TIPP, and The Hill/HarrisX

Table 3.6: Relationship Between Use of Norm-Related Rhetoric and Perceived Debate Performance

	Dependent variable:
	Perceived Performance
Care	.351
	(.490)
Group Care	.137
	(.124)
Words Spoken	.00002
	(.00001)
Polling	.005
	(.004)
Constant	0.286***
	(0.101)
Observations	47
R^2	0.006
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
	Standard errors are clustered.

3.4 Discussion

Do party elites use normative rhetoric during primary campaigns? Drawing on an original dataset of Democratic and Republican party primary debates, I show that presidential candidates do use normative language to bolster their own images and to attack other candidates. I also find that normative rhetoric is a tool of "minority" candidates — both women and people of color are more likely to use normative rhetoric than white men, perhaps reflecting how challenging it is to use an electability message as a minority candidate. I also find some evidence that using normative rhetoric improved candidate evaluations. Using data from several 2020 post-debate polls, I find that Democratic candidates who used more group care rhetoric had somewhat higher perceived debate performance.

These results are suggestive rather than conclusive — additional studies are needed to definitively study the use of partisan norms by political elites. Following are some limitations of my design and suggestions for how they could be improved upon.

First, the theoretical difference between normative rhetoric and rhetoric about specific issues is underdeveloped. The two are connected in ways that make it difficult to know when issue positions are influenced by norms and when they are not. Some discussions are clearly normative. Democratic candidates talk about police violence against Black men or about the gender pay gap, but rarely discuss specific policies to address those issues. Other discussions are much less clear. I have argued, for example, that Republicans believe it is important to adhere to principles of Conservatism. When Republican candidates say their opponents are less conservative than they are, is that normative or grounded in specific policy positions? I would argue that the quotes given above clearly represent normative rather than issue-based statements, but scaling that distinction in the text models has proven difficult. Clearly, more work is needed here.

Second, while debates provide some unique advantages for studying social norms, they also provide relatively less data than some reasonable alternatives. For example,

each election cycle brings with it thousands of new campaign ads. Where my debates data set includes many statements by presidential candidates, a data set of campaign ad transcripts could include statements from presidential, congressional, state-level, and local candidates. This would not only give additional statistical power to analyses, it would also provide an interesting opportunity to compare use of normative rhetoric between levels of government, by state-level characteristics, and more. For example, perhaps candidates from non-competitive states use more normative rhetoric than candidates from competitive ones, since they can rely more on energizing their base instead of pursuing moderate votes.

Third, the text analytic models chosen here could be improved upon. In particular, the LASSO Regularization could be improved in a number of ways. The training data was approximately 1000 open-ended survey responses, which I personally coded. Having additional coders who are blind to the research question would provide my codes with more validity. Additional coding categories could also improve the model, and might have allowed me to differentiate between (for example) normative rhetoric and issue rhetoric, electability rhetoric, etc.

Finally, the low number of total performance ratings (n = 62) make it difficult to say much about the relationship between norm use and performance. Future work could use more plentiful data sources. For example, journalists have examined how each candidate's twitter following expands after each debate. This could be used as an additional measure of debate performance. Traditional polling numbers could be used as a third measure.

This chapter makes a number of contributions, despite the descriptive nature of most of the analyses. First, I make a significant data contribution. Presidential debates are often discussed in scholarly work,[16] but the *content* of these debates is mostly ignored. The data set I have assembled makes it much easier to do study debate content, and is now

[16]In the last five years, three articles in the APSR, 31 articles in the AJPS, and 9 articles in the JOP use the phrase "presidential debates"

freely available online. This could be useful to any number of sub-fields within political science and beyond. For instance, scholars of gender might be interested in how often (and how long) female candidates speak compared to male candidates, how rhetorical strategies and issue content varies between candidate genders, or whether the gender of moderators affects debate dynamics.

This paper also makes a theoretical contribution to literature on campaigns by arguing that adherence to injunctive norms is an important and unstudied dimension on which voters evaluate candidates and on which candidates fight for advantage.

Finally, this chapter makes a methodological contribution. When training supervised text analytic models, researchers have tended to either use existing dictionaries, or enlist the help of crowd-sourcing platforms like MTurk. Dictionary methods tend to be inaccurate, and crowd-sourced coding is often prohibitively expensive for young researchers. An alternative used in this chapter is to use data that were previously coded for another purpose. For example, the ANES makes open-ended data available for several interesting questions, along with a vast array of codes for each response. By combining the open-ended text and codes, researchers could train models to study a number of important questions.

In this chapter, I have focused on how candidates use normative language to their advantage. But norms can affect primary elections in ways that are not under candidates' control — sometimes, candidates are caught breaking partisan norms. The next short chapter explores how elites who break partisan norms are punished by the electorate.

Chapter 4

Do Voters Punish Elites Who Break Partisan Norms? Experimental Evidence

In the previous chapter, I found that primary candidates tend to use normative rhetoric during debates to bolster their own prototypicality, and question the prototypicality of their opponents. By doing so, they hope to gain favorability. I find tentative evidence that normative rhetoric may improve perceived debate performance among co-partisans.

In this short chapter, I explore a different way partisan norms can influence primary elections — through norm-*breaking*. I argue that although all candidates have flaws, partisans see some flaws as less acceptable than others. Specifically, flaws or scandals that violate partisan group norms will make voters less likely to support the violator. To support my argument, I conducted an original survey experiment asking respondents to choose between pairs of primary candidates that had randomly assigned "weaknesses," including being unqualified and having broken various partisan norms. I find that Republican respondents were more likely to punish candidate who were critical of party leaders than were Democratic respondents. Democratic respondents were more likely to punish candidates who were critical of organizations associated with vulnerable groups [1] than were Republican respondents. In fact, Democrats on average preferred unqualified candidates over ones who were critical of #MeToo.

This could have profound impacts on the electoral process. Primary campaigns are always about compromise — primary voters often face a choice between candidates more closely aligned with their values and candidates that are more likely to win a general election. Legitimate arguments can be made for both choices, but if one party is willing to fall upon their sword to avoid flawed candidates and the other is not, the party that settles may start to win more often.

[1] #MeToo for Democrats, National Right to Life for Republicans

4.1 When Elites Violate Partisan Norms

While normative language can signal one's prototypicality or question the prototypicality of others, certain blunders or scandals sometimes signal that political elites have broken partisan norms. These scandals can have large effects on election prospects. Two recent events help illustrate how partisan norms might affect voting and candidate evaluations. First, in 2017 a photo surfaced of Senator Al Franken groping a sleeping woman, Leann Tweeden. In the weeks that followed, several other women came forward with allegations that Franken had engaged in inappropriate behavior during photo ops, including touching one woman's buttocks and kissing another on the cheek against her will. After calls to resign from within his party and amidst plummeting approval ratings,[2] Senator Franken eventually left the Senate. Contrast Franken's experience with the experience of several Republican elites. Roy Moore was accused of sexually assaulting multiple minors, yet received President Trump's endorsement and was defended by most Alabama Republicans.[3] President Trump himself was caught on tape admitting to sexual assault, and has been accused of assault by at least 17 women, but his campaign was not significantly affected. It appears that Democrats punish elites who break the care norm, but Republicans are reticent to do so.

Second, after announcing that he would not run for re-election in October 2017, Senator Bob Corker criticized President Trump on Twitter: "It's a shame the White House has become an adult day care center. Someone obviously missed their shift this morning." President Trump responded by saying things like, "People like liddle' Bob Corker have set the U.S. way back" and "Sen. Corker is the incompetent head of the Foreign Relations committee, and look how poorly the U.S. has done." The two proceeded to speak negatively about each other for several weeks. Using data from the Vanderbilt Poll,[4] I gathered approval ratings of Senator Corker by party identification from January 2011 to

[2] https://thinkprogress.org/franken-minnesota-poll-numbers-06a5f9eb786a/
[3] https://time.com/5018721/roy-moore-alabama-republican-party/
[4] Vanderbilt Poll



(a) Corker Approval by Party

(b) Corker Approval by Party Strength

Figure 4.1: Approval Ratings for Senator Bob Corker Over Time

May 2018. Figure 4.1a shows that for nearly 6 years, Senator Corker's approval among Republicans remained quite high – between 75 and 85%. A month after his fight with the President, Senator Corker's approval among Republicans plummeted to below 50%. Breaking down approval by strength of partisanship reveals a particularly striking decline among strong Republicans. In contrast, Nancy Pelosi, currently the highest-ranking member of the Democratic party and arguably the "strongest and most effective speaker of modern times,"[5] faced numerous attacks in the aftermath of the 2018 election. Several progressive house members were particularly critical; for example, Representative Ocasio-Cortez criticized Pelosi for singling out "newly elected women of color" for their progressive policy ideas. Though some Democratic members of Congress publicly expressed their disapproval of the attacks on Pelosi, Ocasio-Cortez and others who criticized Pelosi seemed not to suffer any serious consequences. A month after the spat, YouGov polled Ocasio-Cortez net favorability[6] at +37 among Democrats nationally.[7]

The social sanctions (or lack thereof) experienced by these political elites are unlikely

[5]Thomas Mann, as quoted in The Atlantic

[6]Net favorability is the percentage who approve minus the percentage who disapprove.

[7]https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/the-squad-probably-doesnt-have-to-worry-about-primary-challengers/

to be isolated incidents; after all, breaking social norms has led to social sanctions among virtually all human civilizations throughout history. In fact, Jane Goodall even observed social exclusion among chimpanzees (Goodall, 1986). Some of the first recorded examples of social sanctions come from the Greeks. In Athenian democracy, *ostrakismos* was the practice of forcing a citizen to leave Athens for 10 years using a popular vote. Those who returned early were killed, but after 10 years the individual was allowed to return and resume their normal life. We still use the word "ostracism" to refer to social shunning. Many other groups use various forms of social shunning: Iranian Qahr, Balinese Kasepekang, Amish Meinung, Jewish Cherem, and Catholic excommunication are all variants of the same practice — excluding group members based on failure to uphold group norms.

Although we no longer banish norm-breakers from society in quite the same way, social sanctions are alive and well today. For example, according to one survey, 67% of Americans admitted to giving "the silent treatment" to someone they knew, and 75% said they had received the silent treatment from a loved one (Williams, 2002, pg. 9). Recently, social media has provided even more opportunities to punish group members in front of large audiences. Twitter, in particular, is know for "mobs" of people who will attack those they disagree with (Rost et al., 2016). In his book, *So You've Been Publicly Shamed*, Ronson (2016) interviews several people who had lost jobs, had their spouses leave them, or been forced to live in hiding as a result of minor normative missteps on Twitter.

One of the places we might observe social sanctions as the result of partisan norm violation is during primary elections. During primary elections, the party tends to be less unified. Some partisans feel very strongly about specific candidates, and develop strong negative feelings towards other candidates. In a very real way, primary candidates at the presidential level are fighting over the future of the party. During times of conflict and when the future of a group is in unclear, group members tend to enforce norms more strictly (Benard, 2012). Group leaders are also particularly susceptible to severe social

sanctions. On one hand, high-status group members are less likely to be punished for mild norm-breaking. (Wahrman, 2010). For those with high levels of group cachet, a bit of deviance is perceived as "innovation, tolerable idiosyncrasy" or even cause for changing the norms themselves (Wahrman, 2010, also see Hollander (1958)). On the other hand, when high-status group members *are* sanctioned, they are usually sanctioned much more severely than rank-and-file group members (Wahrman, 1970).

H1: Candidates who break inparty norms will be punished electorally.

In chapter two, I argued that certain types of group members would be more likely to hold group norms. First, those with larger and more homogeneous political networks should be more sensitive to party norms. Norms are communicated socially, and homogeneous networks tend to facilitate norm communication (Anoll, 2018; Larson and Lewis, 2017). Those who have robust political networks are more likely to have norms communicated to them by their peers, particularly when those peers share their party affiliation. As a result, we would expect that partisans with more homogeneous political networks should be more attuned to partisan norms. Second, those who pay more attention to political news should be more sensitive to party norms. Elites play an important part in communicating social norms (McLaughlin et al., 2017), and political media is an important way that elites communicate with rank-and-file partisans. Existing work shows that the media can change the salience of an issue (Lenz, 2009), make people more certain of their beliefs (Levendusky, 2013), and polarize the public (Druckman et al., 2013). Those who pay attention to political news should have much clearer ideas about what "good" group members should believe and how they should behave. Group members are more likely to enforce norms when they are aware of them, so the negative effects of norm-breaking should be particularly pronounced among voters who have homogeneous political networks and voters who pay attention to political news. The mechanism is the same in both of these instances, but network homogeneity measures one's personal connections, while attention to news measures exposure to elite messaging.

H2: Voters with homogeneous political networks will be more likely to punish norm-breaking candidates.

H3: Voters who pay attention to political news will be more likely to punish norm-breaking candidates.

4.2 Do Voters Punish Candidates Who Violate Norms?

To systematically measure the impact of partisan norm violations on voting behavior, I conducted a survey experiment ($n = 1526$) in July 2019 where respondents viewed a series of facts about different fictional political candidates. Survey participants were recruited through Lucid, which is a non-probability sample similar to those offered by other online vendors like Dynata and Qualtrics.[8]

Using Lucid, I constructed a sample with similar distributions of age, gender, race, and geographic location compared to the U.S. population using recent census estimates. Each respondent was compensated by the vendor that directed them to the survey. The final sample included roughly equal numbers of men and women. The racial makeup of the sample was roughly 73% white, 13% Black, 8% Hispanic, and 7% Asian. Because I was interested in how partisans respond to violations of party norms, I restricted participation to partisans and partisan leaners. The final sample included more Democrats than Republicans (55% Democrats/45% Republicans). This compares favorably to estimates by Pew, which finds that among those who identify as partisans, 56% identified as Democrats and 44% identified as Republicans in 2017.[9]

Respondents were told that the candidates were competing in their party's primary for an important state-level office. Each set of facts includes the candidate's party (all candidates are from the respondent's party), occupation, prior government experience, and a key accomplishment. Finally, each candidate profile included one "criticism," where

[8]Coppock and McClellan (2019) replicated well-known surveys using Lucid and show that samples from Lucid are of comparable quality to similar platforms in terms of demographic and experimental benchmarks.

[9]https://www.people-press.org/2018/03/20/party-identification-trends-1992-2017/

the candidate is said to have broken either the leader or care norm. For example, one candidate is said to have publicly opposed a party leader (Donald Trump for Republican respondents, Barack Obama for Democratic respondents), and another reportedly said that #MeToo should pay more attention to due process (for Democratic respondents) or that the National Right to Life organization is too extreme (for Republican respondents).[10]

There was also a candidate who did not break either of the two norms, but was criticized as less qualified than other candidates. This is not a proper "control," but candidate qualification is one way voters evaluate candidates (McDermott, 2005), and qualifications are a common media narrative (Graber, 1972). Since we know voters find candidate qualifications important, comparing norm-breaking candidates with unqualified ones provides additional context. Candidate profiles were presented in pairs, and for each pair the respondent "voted" for one of the two candidates and indicated their affect towards each candidate using feeling thermometers. Respondents saw a total of three pairs, comprising every combination of the three candidates. Importantly, participants were told they were choosing between two candidates in their party's primary, so Republican participants always chose between pairs of two Republican candidates and candidates always had party-specific criticisms (e.g., Republican candidates always criticized National Right to Life rather than #MeToo). I treated each of these comparisons as an observation, and analyze the data to determine the effect of breaking these norms on vote choice behavior.[11]

[10]I use organizations that are affiliated with vulnerable groups rather than the groups themselves for several reasons. First, it allows the two sets of norm questions to be more comparable – both talk about criticizing a group or individual. Second, while almost no one would say it is appropriate to harm a member of these groups, reasonable people within the party might criticize these organizations for a variety of reasons. Third, the organizations are relatively divorced from specific policies, even though they are involved in policy areas. I selected #MeToo and National Right to Life because both movements focus on the protection of a specific group (#MeToo advocated for women's sexual safety and National Right to Life advocates for the rights of the unborn) and both have been criticized for going "too far." For example, #MeToo has been criticized by some on the left for ignoring due process and National Right to Life has been criticized by some on the right for their support of the "heartbeat" bill.

[11]The candidate choice experiment is similar to a conjoint experiment (Hainmueller et al., 2014), but I constrained the criticism field in order to obtain the maximum number of each pair of criticisms. For example, a classic conjoint experiment would allow two candidates to have the same criticism, or for some pairs of criticisms to appear more often. My design constrained the criticism field to always include two



Figure 4.2: Example of Republican Candidate Profiles

To explore how norm violations affect vote choice, I estimate the probability that a respondent will vote for each candidate in a given pair. Figure 4.3 plots the difference in probability of selection for each pair of candidates. In other words, figure 4.3 shows which candidate in each pair was preferred by respondents from each party.

Several patterns emerge. First, the candidate who breaks the leader norm consistently does better than the candidate who breaks the care norm. Even among Republicans, the candidate who criticizes a vulnerable group is punished more severely than the candidate who criticizes party leaders. However, criticizing party leaders seems to be a milder sin in the eyes of Democratic voters, as seen in the difference between parties in the top two rows. Second, the care norm generates significant differences in candidate selection between parties. When presented with a pair of candidates where one candidate was said to be unqualified and the other broke the care norm, Democrats chose the unqualified candidate on average, while Republicans did not. This is a strong result — many Democrats seem to be willing to risk losing a general election if the alternative is to nominate a candidate who fails to uphold the care norm.[12]

These results provide mixed results for my hypotheses – Democrats place greater em-

different criticisms, and to display all three possible combinations equally.

[12]Results for the feeling thermometer ratings exhibit similar patterns, although effect sizes and differences between Democratic and Republican respondents are generally smaller. Figure A10 in the appendix plots these effects.



Figure 4.3: Difference in probability of selection for each pair of candidates.

phasis on the care norm than Republicans, and Republicans place greater emphasis on the leader norm than Democrats when choosing a candidate. On the other hand, the care norm seems more powerful overall – when asked to choose between a candidate that broke the leader norm and one that broke the care norm, even Republicans selected the former far more often.

An alternative explanation for the partisan difference in sanctions against the candi-

date who broke the care norm is that Democrats viewed criticism of #MeToo as more serious than Republicans viewed criticism of NRLC. In other words, the treatment may have been stronger for Democrats than for Republicans. It is hard to separate the psychological difference from the difference in treatment strength, but it is also hard to imagine a vulnerable group that Republicans care about more than the unborn. After all, a quarter of Republicans said Supreme Court picks were the main reason they were willing to vote for Donald Trump,[13], and abortion was the most important issue for these "Supreme Court voters" [14]. If the NRLC was not a strong enough treatment, I am not sure one exists.

Ironically, despite Republicans' professed commitment to loyalty and morality, in this case Democrats were more likely to engage in moral absolutism. I discuss this further below, but one potential explanation is that the Republican "sin" was not grave enough. After all, in chapter two I found that loyalty was the weakest Republican norm. If I were to run this experiment again, I might have the Republican candidate say something disparaging about religion or about the founders. On the other hand, it is hard to argue that President Trump has successfully ended the careers of those who cross him. One possible reason Corker fared so differently from the hypothetical candidate in my experiment is that Trump fought back against Corker, making the spat part of the national news cycle. Another is that Corker's attacks on Trump were personal rather than political — rather than criticizing Trump for a policy decision, Corker essentially called him a toddler. In general, voters dislike "incivility" (Mutz, 2016) and Corker's comments may have crossed a line for many voters.

[13]https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/politics/wp/2018/06/26/a-quarter-of-republicans-voted-for-trump-to-get-supreme-court-picks-and-it-paid-off/

[14]https://www.vox.com/2018/6/29/17511088/scotus-2016-election-poll-trump-republicans-kennedy-retire

4.3 What Types of Group Members Sanction Norm-Breakers?

Hypothesis two argues that since norms are communicated socially, those with more homogeneous political networks will be more attuned to partisan social norms and therefore more likely to punish candidates who break those norms. To test this claim, my survey included a measure of network homogeneity based on well-known work by Mutz (2006). First, each respondent was asked whether they had spoken with anyone about politics in the last six months. Those who responded in the affirmative were asked to give the initials of three individuals with whom they had talked about politics. Finally, respondents indicated the degree to which each individual's political views differed from their own on a 5-point scale (not different at all to extremely different). I then standardized the scale, such that it runs from 0 (completely heterogeneous network) to 1 (completely homogeneous network). To improve interpretability, the analyses below use a binary version of the network measure indicating whether the respondent's network homogeneity is above or below the overall sample mean (.65). I used a model similar to the one used to test hypothesis one. The key difference is that this new model uses a three-way interaction between partisanship, experimental condition, and network homogeneity. Using the predicted probabilities from this model, I plot the difference in probability of selection for each pair of candidates, separated by party and by network homogeneity. Figure 4.4 plots these probabilities.

The strongest evidence for hypothesis two would be that those with high network homogeneity were much more likely to punish candidates who break partisan norms than those with low network homogeneity. For example, Republicans with highly homogeneous networks would be less likely to vote for candidates who broke the leader norm than Republicans with low network homogeneity.

The actual results provide mixed evidence for hypothesis two. Among Republican respondents, those with more homogeneous political networks were *less* likely to punish candidates who criticized party leaders compared to unqualified candidates. Republicans



Figure 4.4: Difference in probability of selection for each pair of candidates.

with high network homogeneity were also less likely to punish candidates who criticized vulnerable groups compared to unqualified candidates. In other words, Republicans with homogeneous networks were more skeptical of unqualified candidates overall — they seem to be interested in winning elections above all else.

Democratic respondents behaved more consistently with hypothesis two. Similar to Republican respondents, Democrats with high network homogeneity were less likely to vote for an unqualified candidate compared to one who broke the leader norm. When asked to choose between a candidate who broke the leader norm and one who broke the care norm, all Democrats chose the candidate who broke the leader norm on average; however, Democrats with homogeneous political networks were somewhat more likely to punish candidates who broke the care norm.

Hypothesis three argues that norms are communicated by party elites in the media, so partisans who consume more news should be more aware of partisan norms and thus more likely to enforce them. My survey included an item which asked respondents how often they pay attention to political news on a four-point scale (Every day, a few times a week, a few times a month, never). I standardized and reversed this measure such that it runs from 0 (never) to 1 (every day). the analyses below use a binary version of the attention measure indicating whether the respondent's attention to political news is above or below the overall sample mean (.74). To test this hypothesis, I use a three-way interaction between partisanship, experimental condition, and a binary variable indicating whether the respondent's attention to political news is above or below the sample mean. Using the predicted probabilities from this model, I plot the difference in probability of selection for each pair of candidates, separated by party and by attention to political news. Figure 4.5 plots these probabilities.

The results here are fairly consistent with hypothesis three. Among Republican respondents, those who paid more attention to political news were more likely to choose an unqualified candidate over one who broke the leader norm. More attentive Republicans



Figure 4.5: Difference in probability of selection for each pair of candidates.

were also more likely than less attentive Republicans to choose an unqualified candidate rather than one who criticized a vulnerable group, although on average neither group of Republicans preferred the unqualified candidate. The only significant difference between low and high-attention Democrats is that high-attention Democrats are less likely than low-attention Democrats to vote for a candidate who criticized #MeToo compared to a candidate who is unqualified.

4.4 Discussion

Do partisan norms influence political behavior? I find that for both Democrats and Republicans, breaking the norm of care for vulnerable groups is a deal-breaker. This is especially true for Democrats, who would rather choose an unqualified candidate than one who has broken the care norm. Criticizing party leaders is a much more minor sin for both Republicans and Democrats, although Republicans punish candidates for breaking the leader norm more than Democrats do.

Overall, the results for the care norm were much clearer than those for the leader norm. There are several reasons this might be the case. First, my interviews in chapter two suggested that the leader norm is real, but may be better named the "loyalty" norm. My survey measures asked respondents about the appropriateness of criticizing party leaders, but Republicans talked more about loyalty to conservatism in general and to the founders, the Constitution, and God. Ultimately, my survey measures may have been too narrow to accurately capture the norm that drives Republicans' behavior. Second, I chose to ask about criticizing Donald Trump because he is broadly recognizable and popular among Republicans, but he is also unusual in that several prominent Republicans have publicly criticized him. At the time of this writing, President Trump has been recently criticized by Mitt Romney, Bob Corker, Jeff Flake, Paul Ryan, and John McCain – all Members of Congress (and two Republican presidential nominees) who at one time were well-respected members of the Republican party.

The study had other limitations as well. As described above, we might expect those who pay attention to partisan-aligned news sources to be more in tune with partisan norms, and thus be more willing to punish those who break them. Rather than asking respondents how much attention they pay to *partisan* news, I asked them how much they pay attention to news in general. The relationship between general news viewership and partisan norms may be much different since partisans may be exposed to news that is aligned with the opposing party, or news that is relatively neutral. Future studies should measure news consumption from partisan news sources rather than general news consumption.[15]

These findings help us better understand how voters make decisions in primary elections. When party heuristics are not available, partisans seem to evaluate candidates at least partially based on partisan social norms. This may help explain the different sorts of candidates elected by each party. This work also contributes to larger conversations in political science about how partisans make choices. Some have argued that although few rank-and-file party members hold coherent political ideologies (Converse, 1964; Kinder and Kalmoe, 2017), they do have deeply-held values that guide their political decisions (Zaller, 1992; Nelson and Garst, 2005). Others have challenged the deeply-held nature of political values, showing that our partisanship determines our values rather than the other way around (Goren, 2005) and that values can be moved by social influence (Connors, 2019). In other words, what we thought were stable values actually look a lot like social norms.

These findings may also help predict how different events might affect future candidates. At present, the most relevant of these events is Tara Reade's accusations that the presumptive Democratic presidential nominee, Joe Biden, sexually assaulted her in 1993. These accusations put Democrats in an incredibly uncomfortable situation. Just two

[15]I considered combining the network and attention measures to make this analysis more robust. However, the two measures are actually negatively correlated (-.01), so combining them does not make much sense.

years prior, Democrats railed against Republicans' willingness to confirm Justice Brett Kavanaugh after he was accused of sexual assault when he was a teenager. At the time, Democrats were confident that, if placed in a similar position, they would never confirm such a man from their own party. Now that they are, some Democrats have stressed the differences in the two cases — Biden is demanding an investigation where Kavanaugh opposed one, and there are several inconsistencies in Reade's story. Most Democratic elites, including Kirsten Gillibrand, Stacey Abrams, and Elizabeth Warren say they believe Biden,[16] but have also said that Reade deserves to be heard. With stakes as high as the presidency, it seems that partisan self-preservation could outweigh partisan norms.

The Reade story is not over, and Biden seems to be responding differently than Kavanaugh in some ways. During Kavanaugh's confirmation proceedings, Senate Republicans and Kavanaugh himself strenuously resisted calls to further investigate Blasey Ford's allegations throughout the hearings. It wasn't until Jeff Flake had a change of heart and asked for a supplemental investigation that Republicans were compelled to allow a short, one-week investigation. In contrast, Biden has called for the National Archive to release any record of Reade's alleged complaint to the press.[17] On the other hand, Biden and the University of Delaware have resisted calls to release the Biden Senatorial Papers. If and when the turmoil of a pandemic and widespread riots in American cities begins to subside, and as the Democratic convention draws nearer, Biden is likely to face significant pressure by those in his own party to release these papers.

Norm-breaking behavior by political elites is likely to have larger effects when sanctions are less costly. For example, Biden might have been scrutinized more if the Reade allegations had gained steam when the field was larger. Because Biden had essentially clinched the nomination by that point, derailing his campaign would have meant Donald Trump had a much greater chance of winning the general election. Alternatively, sanctions may be less costly when applied state or local level officials. My respondents

[16] https://www.vox.com/2020/5/7/21248713/tara-reade-joe-biden-sexual-assault-accusation
[17] https://www.cnn.com/2020/05/01/politics/joe-biden-tara-reade-allegation/index.html

were told these were candidates for local office, and many of them chose to punish norm-breakers even when the alternative was unqualified. Sanctions are sometimes less costly outside of elections, when they can be applied to sitting officials. In the Franken case, a resignation meant that Minnesota's Democratic Governor could select Franken's replacement. Some have argued that Democrats wouldn't have called for Franken's resignation if the Governor had been a Republican.[18] Future work should continue to flesh out the circumstances under which partisan norms can constrain behavior, and when other considerations like winning elections will outweigh norms.

[18]See https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2019/07/29/the-case-of-al-franken. This is essentially what happened in the Bob Menendez case. New Jersey had a Republican governor, and Democrats did not call for Menendez to step down.

Chapter 5

Open Questions

This dissertation has made several arguments. In chapter two, I argued that just as social norms vary between different religious or ethnic groups, so too do they vary between political groups. Specifically, I argued that Republicans and Democrats are governed by different social norms. To support my argument, I began by conducting a set of in-depth interviews with Republican and Democratic elites in Nashville and New York City. I spoke to city council members, state senators, state party leaders, and many others who are deeply involved in their respective parties. These interviews made it clear that there are indeed major differences in social norms between Democrats and Republicans. In some ways, the differences are unsurprising. Democratic elites say that being a "good" member of the party means caring for a variety of marginalized groups; in particular, the poor, racial minorities, and women. Republican elites were somewhat divided, with various Republicans saying that being a "good" member of the party means some combination of loyalty to a version of conservatism, respecting the country and its symbols, and obedience to a (usually) Christian moral code. In other ways, the differences contradict common narratives in political science. One common narrative is that the Republican party is a vehicle for an ideological movement, while the Democratic party is a broad coalition of group interests. My findings suggest the reverse — the Republican party is demographically homogeneous but has diverse norms. Some Republicans evaluate group members by how closely they adhere to some version of conservatism, while others focus on patriotism, respect for the Constitution, etc. Modern Democrats, on the other hand, are demographically diverse but incredibly consistent in their message. After my interviews, I used an original, nationally representative survey to determine whether these same patterns hold among "regular" partisans. Using open-ended ques-

tions, I asked respondents questions similar to those in my interviews. I then hand-coded the responses based on the norms identified during my interviews. I find that partisan norms are not just an elite phenomenon — they extend to the general public.

Where do we see these norms in action? In chapter three, I showed that presidential hopefuls use norm-related rhetoric in primary debates. I first scraped transcripts of all primary debates from 2012-2020 from a variety of sources, and made a data set of these transcripts available to other researchers.[1] Using this set of transcripts, I used two computational text analytic methods to identify norm-related rhetoric, one unsupervised and one supervised. First, I fit a topic model to the transcripts, which identified thirty different topics in the corpus. Many of these topics included discussions of specific policy areas like health care. Others included discussions about candidate qualifications and electability. A small number of these topics also included norm-related rhetoric. Candidates often attacked their opponents using partisan norms, suggesting that their opponents had broken a norm or comparing themselves favorably to their opponents on specific norms. For example, Republicans often questioned their opponents loyalty to conservatism or to the Constitution and Democrats often questioned opponents' treatment of women or people of color. The second model used logistic regression with LASSO regularization to classify debate statements. To train the model, I used the codes generated by the open-ended survey responses from chapter two. This second model was able to more precisely measure the prevalence of norm-related rhetoric. I also argued that candidates who used more norm-related rhetoric in debates should receive higher debate performance ratings from co-partisan viewers than candidates who used less norm-related rhetoric, although evidence for this claim is murky at best.

In chapter four, I started to examine the main mechanism through which social norms exert their influence — social sanctions. I conducted an original survey experiment where respondents were asked to choose vote in hypothetical primary elections, where candi-

[1] In the 6 weeks since this data set was posted online, it has been downloaded several hundred times.

dates had broken different partisan norms. I found that Republicans were less likely to vote for a candidate who broke the norm of loyalty to party leaders compared to Democrats, and Democrats were less likely to vote for a candidate who criticized a marginalized group than Republicans. In other words, partisans sanctioned candidates who broke their party's norms.

While I am proud of the work described here, there are many other interesting questions related to partisan norms that I have not pursued. In the remainder of this chapter, I describe two big questions that other researchers could study more fully. First, how did partisan norms develop, how have they changed over time and how might they continue to change in the future? Norms are context-dependent social constructs, and the norms identified in chapter two represent a snapshot in time. Studying how current norms developed will help researchers make better predictions about future party behavior. Second, how do social norms affect relationships between partisans and their peers? In chapters three and four, I focused on how elites use norms and how the public sanctions those elites when they break norms. Another, perhaps more interesting question is how the "regular" partisans enforce norms among their peers. As social media has grown more popular, social sanctions have become more public, more vicious, and seemingly more common. Many researchers, pundits, and journalists have commented on phenomena like "callout culture" and "cancelling" of supposed wrong-doers, but very few have rigorously studied them, and even fewer have done so using theories of social norms. I expect that partisan social norms play a major role. Finally, I conclude by discussing the broader implications of this dissertation.

5.1 Temporal Norm Change

In chapter one, I described the forces that tend to shape norms. To review, norms develop to help a group meet its goals and to maintain positive distinctiveness from an outgroup. Norms can also be influenced by group leaders, who are often seen as the

model for group membership. In the partisan context, the group's main goal is to acquire and maintain power. In a democratic electoral system, that means garnering more votes in elections at every level of government. Positive distinctiveness is self-explanatory, but Republicans and Democrats should attempt to draw large distinctions between parties in ways that make them feel superior to the outparty. These forces are often carried out through powerful individuals in the party, particularly presidents and Congressional leaders. In other words, changes in party norms are most likely to occur when one of these powerful individuals feels that the party must adapt in order to maintain power and/or positive distinctiveness. In this section, I present a stylized history of partisan politics between 1980 and 2016. This is not meant to be an exhaustive history of party politics, the goal here is to describe different events and actors that may have led to some shift in partisan norms.

5.1.1 Changes in American Political Parties, 1980-2016

The Republican party has undergone many changes in the past 40 years. Prior to the 1980 Presidential election, the Republican party had struggled to gain power for decades thanks to Roosevelt's New Deal coalition and racial realignment. That changed in 1980 when Ronald Reagan defeated incumbent Jimmy Carter in a landslide. Reagan's message was one of increased defense spending and supply-side economics. Reagan was a new brand of Republican, one who successfully used business-friendly economic policy, foreign policy hawkishness, and an emphasis on Christian morals to craft a strong coalition. As far as norms go, we might expect to see the God norm become important to many Republicans in the early to mid-1980s. Jerry Falwell's moral majority was enormously helpful in getting Reagan elected, and an emphasis on Republicans adhering to Christian morals would help solidify that piece of the new Conservative coalition.

In the 1994, New Gingrich and Republican members of Congress released the "Contract with America," which emphasized economic issues and avoided social issues. Ac-

cordingly, we might see a decrease in emphasis on the God norm and an increase in emphasis on loyalty to economic conservatism.

Perhaps the next major shift in the Republican party came in the form of George W. Bush's "compassionate conservatism," which sought to use the free market to improve education, alleviate poverty, and improve social welfare. There might be an increase in use of generic care language by Republicans associated with this new emphasis on compassion. Bush was also a foreign policy hawk and presided over 9/11 and two major wars. I would expect that between 2000 and 2008, it became more important for Republicans to express patriotism and respect for national symbols like the flag, the Constitution, and certain founders.

During the Obama administration, the Tea Party movement gained steam in response to the President's expansion of government involvement in healthcare and to his use of fiscal stimulus. The Tea Party was concerned mostly with economic issues like lowering the national debt, and during the 2010 midterm elections many candidates supported by the tea party won seats in Congress. Many of these candidates had successfully primaried more moderate Republicans by questioning their loyalty to the Constitution and to conservative economic principles. During this era, Republican respondents might increasingly emphasize economic conservatism and the country norm.

Donald Trump has changed many norms in American politics, partisan and otherwise. He is not particularly conservative, moral, or loyal to other Republicans. In chapter three, I showed that in the 2016 primary debates, President Trump used virtually no norm-related language apart from a few appeals to the country norm. Republicans voted for him anyway. Time will tell whether Trump is an outlier, or part of a larger change in what it means to be a good Republican.

The Democratic party has also changed quite a lot since 1980. In the early eighties, there were still southern conservative Democrats, labor unions were still powerhouses in American politics, and the Democratic party had controlled both houses of Congress for

over 20 years. To the extent that Democrats at the time were talking about caring for an under-privileged group, they were likely talking about blue-collar workers and the poor.

In the 90s, Bill Clinton and the "New Democrats" responded to the popularity of Reaganomics by combining conservative economic policy with more liberal views on social issues. In particular, Clinton pushed for affirmative action and (initially) for the right of gay individuals to serve in the armed forces. At this point, the subjects of the group care norm likely shifted from the poor and lower middle class to racial minorities and the LGBT community.

During the end of the Obama administration and certainly after 2016, the Democratic party became much more progressive socially and economically. Movements like Black Lives Matter and #MeToo shone a spotlight on the plight of Black Americans and victims of sexual violence, while the Great Recession and Occupy Wall Street brought rising inequality to the forefront of public consciousness. Young members of Congress like Alexandra Ocasio-Cortez were elected to the House on ambitiously liberal platforms, and Democratic-Socialist Bernie Sanders was nearly the party's 2020 nominee. We should see that modern Democrats have increasingly mentioned care for racial minorities and women. We should also observe the return of class-based care rhetoric.

5.1.2 Exploring Norm Change in the ANES

Exploring temporal norm change fully could fill another dissertation, but we can take a preliminary look at how norms have shifted in the past few decades using open-ended data from the American National Election Studies (ANES) from 1984-2016. The ANES asks several open-ended questions every four years, with waves before and after presidential elections. One set of open-ended questions asks respondents whether there is anything about the Republican and Democratic parties that they like and whether there is anything they dislike. Respondents who answer affirmatively are asked to list what specifically they like and dislike about each party. While not as tailored to social norms

as my Lucid study, these open-ended responses are a reasonable proxy for social norms since in theory partisans will talk about the things that distinguish their party from the opposing party – the things they view themselves doing better than opposing partisans.

To identify norms in these open-ended responses, I compiled a social norm dictionary. To construct the dictionary, I began with Graham and Haidt's Moral Foundations Dictionary,[2] which includes words which refer to both care and loyalty. I then added words associated with the god, country, and conservatism norms from my hand-coding of the Lucid open-ends. These dictionaries can be found in this chapter's appendix.

Using this dictionary, I created an indicator variable for each norm, where the indicator had a value of one when a survey response included one of the dictionary words, and zero when it did not. Some statements included words from multiple norms and others included no norm-related words at all, so proportions do not always add up to one in the analyses that follow. It is important to note that because open-ended ANES responses may include information that could be used to personally identify respondents, the use of these responses is heavily restricted. To preserve anonymity, I coded a de-identified set of open-ended responses, produced the codes using the norm dictionary, and then ANES administrators merged the codes (but not the full responses) back into the full file. This will become relevant below, as I will not be able to determine, for example, whether temporal changes in norm use are the result of specific words being used more often.

To determine whether the patterns discovered in chapter two hold in the ANES data, I first plot the proportion of respondents who used each norm, by party (figure 5.1). The patterns in the ANES data look very similar to the patterns found throughout the first three empirical chapters — Democrats mentioned generic and group-specific care quite a lot, and hardly mentioned the country or God norms. Republicans used some generic care words but very little group-specific care words, and spoke about the conservatism, country, and God norms quite a lot. As I found in earlier chapters, the loyalty norm seems

[2]https://moralfoundations.org/wp-content/uploads/files/downloads/moral%20foundations%20dictionary.dic



Figure 5.1: Proportion of respondents who used words from each dictionary.

to be the weakest, and there is not much of a partisan difference in the use of loyalty words.

Next, I look at how these proportions have changed over time. Figure 5.2 displays the proportion of respondents who mentioned each norm by party for each year of the study. Mentions of generic care words like "compassion" and "empathy" seem relatively stable over time, and Republicans tend to use these words at similar rates as Democrats. Mentions of group-specific care words like "poor" and "Black" varied much more over time. Among Democrats, group-specific care was mentioned quite a lot between 1984 and 1994 before dropping steeply in 1996. Above, I mentioned that Clinton's "New Democrats" shifted to much more conservative economic policies. This drop in group care rhetoric may indicate that Democrats stopped talking about care for the poor during this time. The subsequent rise in group care rhetoric might be due to increasing emphasis on social justice rather than a return to care for the poor. Unfortunately, I am unable to interrogate these time trends at the word level, so I am unable determine whether the specific groups mentioned by Democratic respondents changed over time. Among Republicans, mentions of group-specific care were uniformly low except between 1992 and 2000, when they rose slightly. In 1996, Republicans actually used these words slightly *more* than Democrats. This increase among Republicans seems to occur too early to be attributed to "compassionate conservatism."

Among Republicans, use of the God norm was high between 1980 and 1992 before dropping sharply by 1996. Above, I mentioned that Gingrich's Contract with America emphasized economic issues over social ones, and predicted that we would observe an increase in usage of words associated with loyalty to conservatism and a decrease in words associated with obedience to God and moral principles. There is a significant drop in the God norm among Republicans between 1990 and 1996, but there is an even larger drop in the conservatism norm during the same time period. It is possible that were I able to separate economic and social conservatism, we would observe a different pattern.



Figure 5.2: Proportion of respondents who used words from each dictionary over time.

Surprisingly, neither Republicans nor Democrats change the degree to which they used words associated with the country norm over time. I had expected that respondents from both parties would use these words more often during international conflicts like the Gulf War, but that does not seem to be the case.

Here, as in my other surveys, neither Republicans nor Democrats used many words associated with loyalty to party leaders, and partisans from the past did not seem to think loyalty was any more important than modern partisans. To be fair, even if this norm were extremely important, it is the most difficult to measure accurately. Partisans are unlikely to admit to being sycophants or blind followers.

This exercise is meant to be a preliminary look at how norms change over time using one imperfect data source. Ultimately, I found some suggestive evidence that partisan

norms change over time with macro trends within the parties, but much more work will need to be done to understand how and why norms change. There are several different ways that future work could pursue this goal. First, more granular data could help identify norms more accurately. For example, a more detailed coding scheme could look at sub-categories within each norm; economic vs social conservatism, care for racial minorities vs. care for the poor, and respect for the Constitution vs. patriotism. Some of these codes are already freely available from the ANES. Alternatively, perhaps there is a survey with questions better suited for identifying norms. The ANES questions used here were not meant to measure normative beliefs — they asked respondents what they like about their party. Second, historical surveys can only go so far. Experimental work on norm change could be extremely fruitful at this time, particularly among Republicans. President Trump has broken every Republican norm a number of times. How does exposure to this norm-breaking behavior affect Republicans' evaluations of the President? How does it affect their perception of party norms? These questions about how and when elites can shape perceptions of norms among voters are among the most interesting, in my mind.

5.2 Partisan Norms and Social Sanctions in the Mass Public

Social norms gain their power through social sanctions and social rewards. Group members who fail to uphold norms are sometimes ostracized, shamed, or rejected from the group entirely. Chapter four explored how partisans react to political elites who break party norms, but there are still many open questions related to the enforcement of social norms, particularly norm enforcement between peers. This section briefly reviews existing work on social sanctions, discusses a pilot study I conducted about social sanctions and rewards on social media, and concludes by considering one important consequence of partisan norms and social sanctions.

5.2.1 The Importance of Social Sanctions

Social norms tend to be enforced via sanctions and rewards. Norms that have been codified into law can be enforced with state violence, but social norms tend to be enforced socially. Social sanctioning of some kind can be found in nearly every civilization throughout history. For example, Athenian Ostrikamos, Iranian Qahr, Balinese (Kaskepang), Amish Meinung, Jewish Cherem, and Catholic excommunication are all variants of the same practice — excluding group members based on failure to uphold group norms. In fact, Jane Goodall even observed social exclusion among chimpanzees (Goodall, 1986).

These sanctions serve an important role. They cause feelings of guilt or shame (Posner and Rasmusen, 1999) and dissuade would-be deviants from breaking group norms. Because they can have extremely negative effects on a group member's life, social sanctions are powerful deterrents. For example, public shaming can sometimes lead to depression Williams (2002), and MacDonald and Leary (2005) shows that social exclusion is often experienced as physical pain! As Dwight Schrute explained in the television show *The Office*, shunning is "like slapping someone with silence."

Despite the importance of social sanctions to theories of group norms, there does not seem to be a consensus about how to best measure social sanctions. Existing work uses a variety of games (Carpenter and Matthews, 2012; Fehr and Gächter, 2002), surveys (Anoll, 2018; Gerber et al., 2016; Traxler and Winter, 2012), and behavioral measures (Graziano et al., 2007). The creation of a standard measure of social sanctions would be a valuable contribution to the field. A good measure would include a number of sanctions of varying strength and specificity. In chapter two, I asked survey respondents how their fellow partisans would behave towards "bad" partisans. I identified five relevant categories of reactions — persuasion, dislike, shame, avoidance, and toleration. Using these five categories, researchers could create and validate a generalizable measure that uses new and existing survey items to tap these five categories. As an example:

Imagine that a member of your party that you know has [engaged in anti-normative behavior].

Which of the following will happen to this person? (select all that apply)

dislike Other party members will like/respect them less (Anoll, 2018; Gerber et al., 2016)

persuade Other party members will try to change them

shame Other party members will gossip about them (Bicchieri, 2016)

avoid Other party members will spend less time with them (Traxler and Winter, 2012)

tolerate Other party members would not mind.

5.2.2 Enforcing Norms on Social Media

Among younger partisans, social sanctioning is often carried out through social media. Tweet the wrong thing and you can expect to be insulted by your fellow partisans (Rost et al., 2016). These social media "call-outs" are popular because they are cheap and often receive high levels of engagement from other users. In fact, shaming someone on Twitter often serves not only to sanction the deviant but to increase the reputation of the accuser within the group. These online behaviors are important because they often lead to real-world change. At the macro level, both the Black Lives Matter and the Me Too movement began as "hashtags" on Twitter but led to large-scale protests across the country. At the micro level, many Twitter users who have said something inappropriate online have been fired from their jobs or estranged from their families Ronson (2016). Future work should study the use of social sanctions on social media and their effects.

To begin examining the ways that partisans react to their peers who break partisan norms online, I conducted an original survey experiment ($n = 219$) in April of 2019. I used a non-probability sample of undergraduates at a private southern university, largely recruited from intro-level political science classes. Participants were compensated with extra credit.

After answering several standard demographic questions, participants were asked whether and how often they use Twitter.[3] They were then asked to imagine they were

[3]60% of respondents reported having a Twitter account, and 28% reported using Twitter at least once

scrolling through Twitter and came across a number of tweets. For each tweet, respondents were asked how they would react (multiple response): "I would like this tweet," "I would keep scrolling," I would retweet this tweet," "I would unfollow this person," and "I would reply to this tweet." (respondents were also given the option to give the text of their hypothetical reply). These choices represent all the major actions a Twitter user could take when confronted with a tweet. Tweets were designed to look like the Twitter user interface, complete with a fake user name, a timestamp, etc. Images of these tweets can be found in this chapter's appendix. The first two tweets shown to respondents were warm-ups; one included a joke, and one made a comment about the Mars Rover. After these warm-up tweets, respondents were randomly assigned to react to a third tweet. There were two possible "treatment" tweets for Republican respondents and two parallel tweets for Democratic respondents, summarized in the table below:[4]

Respondent Party	Norm	Tweet Text
Republican	Care	I'm a lifelong Republican, but I don't think Northam should resign. Yes, he wore blackface, but that was a long time ago.
Republican	Party Loyalty	I'm a lifelong Republican, but we should really be more willing to compromise with Democrats. Surely conservatism isn't always the best option.
Democratic	Care	I'm a lifelong Democrat, but I don't think Northam should resign. Yes, he wore blackface, but that was a long time ago.
Democratic	Party Loyalty	I'm a lifelong Democrat, but we should really be more willing to compromise with Republicans. Surely liberalism isn't always the best option.

Table 5.1: Twitter Treatment Text

I expected that Republican respondents would be less likely to like or retweet the tweet

per day.

[4]At the time this survey was conducted, there was a controversy surrounding then-Governor Ralph Northam (a Democrat) after a college yearbook showed him wearing blackface at a Halloween party. Many Democratic leaders had called for him to resign, but Northam refused to do so.

about compromising with the opposing party compared to Democratic respondents, and more likely to unfollow the user. Conversely, I expected Democratic respondents would be less likely to like or retweet the tweet about blackface, and more likely to unfollow the user compared to Republican users. To test these expectations, I fit a set of models using each action (like, retweet, unfollow, ignore) as dependent variables. Tables 5.2 and 5.3 display the output of these models.

Table 5.2: Partisan Differences in Reaction to Loyalty Tweet

	Dependent variable:			
	Keep Scrolling	Like	Retweet	Unfollow
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Republican	0.098	0.167***	0.000	−0.186
	(0.160)	(0.053)	(0.000)	(0.150)
Constant	0.569***	0.000	0.000	0.353***
	(0.070)	(0.023)	(0.000)	(0.065)
Observations	63	63	63	63
R^2	0.006	0.139		0.025
Adjusted R^2	−0.010	0.125		0.009
Residual Std. Error (df = 61)	0.499	0.165	0.000	0.467
F Statistic (df = 1; 61)	0.375	9.876***		1.544
Note:				*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

There are very few observations to work with here, but there are some things we can learn. First, as in other chapters, it is clear here that loyalty is not a particularly "Republican" norm. Republicans were *more* likely to "like" the tweet about compromising with the opposing party. Republicans were also somewhat less likely to unfollow this user. Second, Democrats were less likely to like or retweet the statement about Governor Northam wearing blackface, and more likely to unfollow the user who made the statement.

Overall, these results suggest that partisan norms might influence online partisan behavior. However, I would change several pieces of the design if I were to conduct a larger study. First, I would use a more powerful Republican norm (maybe a Republican de-

Table 5.3: Partisan Differences in Reaction to Care Tweet

	Dependent variable:			
	Keep Scrolling	Like	Retweet	Unfollow
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Republican	−0.005	0.119*	0.077**	−0.156
	(0.151)	(0.070)	(0.035)	(0.139)
Constant	0.621***	0.034	−0.000	0.310***
	(0.065)	(0.030)	(0.015)	(0.059)
Observations	71	71	71	71
R^2	0.00002	0.040	0.064	0.018
Adjusted R^2	−0.014	0.026	0.050	0.004
Residual Std. Error (df = 69)	0.492	0.229	0.116	0.452
F Statistic (df = 1; 69)	0.001	2.881*	4.697**	1.272
Note:				*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

fending a flag-burner?). Loyalty appears to be incredibly important to Donald Trump, but most Republicans in the electorate do not seem to care much. Second, I would ask more interesting research questions. For example, can perceived group agreement change perceptions of norms? The setup used in this survey is flexible enough to answer this question with minimal adjustments. Most Democrats believe it is unacceptable to wear blackface; but, if respondents were shown a tweet by a popular Democrat who defended Governor Northam, and the tweet had many likes and supportive comments, the respondent might be less likely to pursue norm enforcement.

Beyond this study, it is important that future research continues to explore the effects of partisan norms. This is harder than it first appears since the power of norms is often negative rather than positive — norms prevent certain attitudes and behaviors at least as often as they cause them. The final section of this dissertation discusses one way we might start to understand this negative power.

5.3 Conclusion: Why Study Partisan Norms?

When I began writing this dissertation, I was originally motivated by examples of partisans being punished by their own; Senator Corker's plummeting approval ratings, Senator Franken's resignation, and the shaming of various public figures and private citizens on social media platforms like Twitter. At the time, I thought I could rely on existing work to discover the content of partisan norms and spend most of the dissertation studying these sanctions along with other important effects of partisan norms. In the end, the bulk of my time was spent on chapter two answering more basic, foundational questions related to partisan norms. I don't regret that shift, and chapter two is the piece of this project I am most proud of. That said, I think it's important to conclude by talking about the some of the bigger reasons partisan norms are important.

Partisan social norms are likely to influence electoral politics. In chapters three and four, I focused on primary elections. Primary candidates are largely vying for votes from their fellow partisans and comparing themselves against co-partisan candidates. In that environment where party identification is irrelevant, primary candidates sometimes use norms to appeal to voters. In general elections, normative appeals are much less likely to convince voters from the opposing party. After all, one function of norms is that they help parties differentiate themselves, so the use of Democratic norms may be decidedly unappealing to Republicans and vice versa. However, persuasion is not the only way candidates seek to win general elections, they also try to turn out their co-partisans. There are significant differences in turnout over time, and these differences can decide elections. In 2008, President Obama was able to turn out large numbers of Black voters that had not traditionally voted and won the election handily. Similarly, in 2016 President Trump broke the "blue wall" by energizing a group of whites without college degrees who normally turn out at lower rates. Using partisan norms is one way candidates could energize their co-partisans during general elections. This excitement is important long before election day as well. Voters who feel a real connection with candidates might volunteer for or

donate to the campaign.

Partisan social norms also influence our daily lives. For example, norms might influence the boundaries of appropriate political discussion, rendering certain views unacceptable. The interviews I conducted in chapter two suggested that even among party elites, some partisans are reticent to speak freely among their co-partisan peers. This sentiment was particularly common among the younger individuals I spoke to. For example, when I asked one young Democrat whether she ever feels afraid to say something around other Democrats, she immediately asked whether her name would be attributed to her comments. After being assured of her anonymity, she admitted that she often felt like she could not disagree with her peers on certain issues. Later, she also mentioned that she felt that she couldn't spend time with members of the opposing party without her co-partisans criticizing her. A young Republican said he felt like his fellow Republicans were becoming less tolerant of dissent. Norms have a strong impact on what partisans feel they can say, since giving opinions that violate norms are likely to be met with social sanctions. Perhaps the changes we see in the boundaries of acceptable political attitudes can be attributed to shifting partisan norms.

Humans are social creatures. To study any piece of human behavior without accounting for social context is to miss important motivations and explanations. In American politics, partisan social norms are a piece of that social context. They influence the political and non-political attitudes of Democrats and Republicans alike. Those who study American politics should continue to integrate theories of social norms into their models of partisan behavior.

Interview Protocol

Defining Self and Community

Tell me a little about yourself

- What do you do for work?
- What sort of things do you do outside of work?
- Tell me about your family

Tell me about the work you do on the executive committee

- How long have you been involved?
- Why did you join this organization?
- What are your responsibilities?

Social Norms

One of the things I am interested in is how people think about the meaning of their political community.

- What would you say are the values of your party?
- What do you like about being a member of your party? What do you dislike?

What kinds of things do members of your party do?

- What do you think would happen if you didn't do these things?
- How would you feel if you didn't do these things?
- How would your relationships be affected if you didn't do these things?

Tell me about someone in your party you look up to

- What did they do that made you look up to them?
- What sorts of things does a good party member do?

What are some things you think members of your party do better than members of the other party?

What are some things you think members of the opposing party do better than your party?

Social Rewards and Sanctions

Tell me about a bad member of your party

- What made you think they were a bad party member?
- What sorts of things does a bad party member do?

What sorts of things happen to bad party members?

- What are some ways party members might be punished when they go against the party's values?

Do you ever feel that you cannot say or do something because of what other (party members) might think?

- What sorts of attitudes or behaviors do you think are unacceptable for members of your part?

Who do you think should get to decide what the party stands for?

- How should they decide which values are most important?

Background Questions

Would you call yourself a strong (party member) or a not so strong (party member)?

What proportion of your friends would you say have political beliefs similar to yours?

Interview Sample Characteristics

	Tennessee	New York
White	8	5
Non-White	2	3
Female	4	6
Male	6	2
Democrat	5	5
Republican	5	3

Table A1: Interview Sample Characteristics

Lucid Survey Questions

Good Partisans Now we would like you to briefly describe what you feel it means to be a GOOD member of the Republican party. In other words, what would be an attitude, behavior, or trait that an ideal Republican would exemplify?

Bad Partisans Now we would like you to briefly describe what you feel it means to be a BAD member of the Republican party. In other words, what would be an attitude, behavior, or trait that would make you feel like someone doesn't belong in the Republican party?

Sanctions Thinking about your answer to the previous question, How do you think your fellow Republicans would behave towards someone who acts like a "Bad" Republican?

Comparison What are some things that members of the Republican party do better than members of the Democratic party?

Lucid Sample Characteristics



Figure A1: Sample characteristics of 2019 Lucid Study

Relationship Between Individual Norm Salience and Covariates



Figure A2: Norm Salience and Attention to Political News



Figure A3: Norm Salience and Network Homogeneity

How Primary Candidates Use Partisan Social Norms Appendix

Topic Model Information

Selecting a Number of Topics

STMs require the researcher to indicate the number of topics as a model parameter (K). Selecting K is more art than science, but several metrics assist in the selection of an appropriate number of topics. Held-out likelihood refers to the likelihood of the model on text not used to train the model. An ideal model maximizes held-out likelihood. The lower bound is a measure of overfitting. When the lower bound starts to decrease, overfitting is more likely. Residuals are the amount of variation in the text that the model does not explain. Residuals tend to be high in topic models, but an ideal model minimizes them. Semantic coherence is higher when high-probability words in a given topic frequently appear together. An ideal model maximizes semantic coherence.

I ran a number of topic models over a range of K from 1 to 50, and calculated each of these four metrics. Figure A4 shows the results of these models. Based on these diagnostics, I selected K = 30. At 30 topics, Residual reduction and held-out likelihood improvement decrease, and semantic coherence begins to plunge, making K = 30 a conservative choice.



Figure A4: Topic Model Diagnostics

Interpreting Topics

Before conducting statistical tests using topic models, some qualitative interpretation of topics is necessary. First, it is important to note that STMs are modeled using a sparse matrix of words where each row represents a separate text document and each column represents an individual word in the corpus. Therefore, each topic can be interpreted by identifying the most common words in each topic. For example, topic 14's most common words include "health," "care," "plan," and "insurance." This topic is clearly identify candidate statements that discuss healthcare. Figure A5 show the 10 most common words in each topic, and table 3.1 includes my qualitative interpretations of each topic. Topics include specific issues like gun control, health care, and government spending, references to groups like women and Black Americans, and more generic references to the country, nation, and the electoral system. One way to confirm these interpretations is to look at documents that exemplify each topic. Some of the identified topics represent a clear effort by candidates to demonstrate their electability. The clearest example is topic 20, which includes words like "win," "election," and "votes." For example, figure A6a shows the statement most highly associated with topic 20. Other topics may indicate the presence of normative rhetoric. For example, topic 26 includes words like "black," "african," and "police" suggesting that this topic includes calls for more care towards Black Americans, and criticizing the way police treat them. Figure A6b is one of the most exemplary statements in topic 26. The statement does appear to use normative rhetoric — it appears to question Mayor Buttigieg's commitment to racial equality. Some of these exemplars revealed incorrect initial interpretations. For example, I had originally interpreted topic 29 (with words like "women," "woman," "attack.") as a topic about care for and protection of women's rights. Upon examination of exemplary texts, it is clear that this topic is about abortion, and is used more by Republican candidates than Democratic ones.



Figure A5: Most Common Words by Topic

Topic 14 − Healthcare

Joe said that Medicare for all would cost over $30 trillion. Thats right, Joe. Status quo over 10 years will be $50 trillion. Every study done shows that Medicare for all is the most cost effective approach to providing healthcare to every man, woman, and child in this country. I, who wrote the damn bill, if I may say so, intend to eliminate all out of pocket expenses. All deductibles. All copayments. Nobody in America will pay more than $200 a year for prescription drugs, because were going to stand up to the greed, and corruption, and price fixing of the pharmaceutical industry. We need a health care system that guarantees health care to all people as every other major country does, not a system which provides $100 billion a year in profit for the drug companies and the insurance companies. To tell you how absurd the system is, tonight on ABC, the healthcare industry will be advertising, telling you how bad Medicare for all is, because they want to protect their profits. That is absurd.

Topic 26 − African−American

Your community of South Bend, Indiana has recently been in uproar over an officer− involved shooting. The police force in South Bend is now 6% black in a city that is 26% black. Why has that not improved over your two terms as mayor?

Figure A6: Examples of Exemplary Statements. These statements represent the highest probability documents for Topic 14 and Topic 26.

Topic Prevalence

Figure A7: Topic Prevalence by Party. Topics are sorted by prevalence in statements by Democratic candidates.

Norm Dictionaries

Below are the 6 different categories in the norms dictionary. Words were stemmed to capture different formulations (e.g., sympath matches sympathy and sympathetic).

Care Positive: safe, compassion, empath, sympath, care, caring, protect, shield, shelter, amity, secur, benefit, defen, guard, preserve

Care Negative: harm, suffer, hurt, endanger, cruel, abuse, damag, ruin, detriment, attack, annihilate, destroy, stomp, abondon, exploit

Care Group: women, color, poc, black, immigrant, lgbt, gay, lesbian, hispanic, asian, poor, average, downtrodden, disadvantag, common, minorit, divers

God: god, church, commandment, scripture, religion, christian, jesus, christ, moral, tradition, purity, pure, clean, sacred, holy, holiness, saint, wholesome, integrity, sin, ethic, principle, doctrin, evil, righteous

Country: founding, Constitution, founder, fathers, amendment, hamilton, washington, madison, jefferson, franklin, nation, country, military, national, pride, patriotic

Conservatism: gun, fiscal, spend, debt, conservati, limited, money, socialis, communis, preserv



Figure A8: Most Predictive Words For Each Norm Classifier



Figure A9: Distribution of Norm Probabilities by Party

Table A2: Relationship Between Norm-Related Rhetoric and Debate Performance

	Dependent variable:
	Performance Rating
Care	−0.624
	(0.531)
Group Care	0.243
	(0.303)
Words Spoken	0.0001***
	(0.00002)
Constant	2.801***
	(0.153)
Observations	59
R^2	0.263
Adjusted R^2	0.223
Residual Std. Error	0.217 (df = 55)
F Statistic	6.546*** (df = 3; 55)
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Do Voters Punish Elites Who Break Partisan Norms? Experimental Evidence Appendix

Lucid Survey Questions

Norm Identification

Personal normative belief: Do you believe it is appropriate for members of your party to criticize party leaders like Donald Trump (Barack Obama)?

Normative expectation: How many Republican elected officials would say it is appropriate for members of your party to criticize party leaders like Donald Trump? (Not many, some, quite a lot, almost all)

Perceived Sanctions

Next we would like you to imagine that a Republican (Democratic) elected official publicly criticized Donald Trump (Barack Obama). Which of the following is likely to happen to this elected official? (select all that apply)

- They will be liked less by other Republicans (Democrats)
- They will be respected less by other Republicans (Democrats)
- They will have a hard time being re-elected
- Other Republican (Democratic) officials will criticize them
- Other Republican (Democratic) officials will refuse to endorse them
- They will be impeached by other Republicans (Democrats)

Now imagine that a Republican (Democratic) elected official publicly criticized the National Right to Life organization (#MeToo Movement). Which of the following is likely to happen to this elected official? (select all that apply)

- They will be liked less by other Republicans (Democrats)
- They will be respected less by other Republicans (Democrats)
- They will have a hard time being re-elected
- Other Republican (Democratic) officials will criticize them
- Other Republican (Democratic) officials will refuse to endorse them
- They will be impeached by other Republicans (Democrats)

Candidate Choice Experiment

Next you will be asked to read some information about different candidates running for a local political office. You will be shown several pairs of candidates. For each pair, we will ask you to indicate which candidate you would vote for. We will also ask you to rate the candidates on a 0-100 scale known as a "feeling thermometer." You will be shown three (3) pairs of candidates.

[For each pair, respondents read profiles like the following:]

Candidate A		Candidate B
Conner Beck	Name	Jake McAllen
Republican	Party	Republican
Former City Comptroller	Experience	Former City Planner
43	Age	35
Attorney	Occupation	Small Business Owner
Helped reduce traffic in many parts of the city	Key Accomplishment	Helped fund improvements to local fire departments
Some have criticized this candidate for publicly opposing Donald Trump and other party leaders on several issues.		Detractors have criticized this candidate for saying the National Right to Life organization should be less extreme.



Figure A10: Difference in feeling thermometer rating for each pair of candidates.

Open Questions Appendix

Norm Dictionaries Used in ANES Analysis

Below are the 6 different categories coded in the ANES data. Words were stemmed to capture different formulations (e.g., sympath matches sympathy and sympathetic).

Care Positive: safe, compassion, empath, sympath, care, caring, protect, shield, shelter, amity, secur, benefit, defen, guard, preserve

Care Negative: harm, suffer, hurt, endanger, cruel, abuse, damag, ruin, detriment, attack, annihilate, destroy, stomp, abondon, exploit

Care Group: women, color, poc, black, immigrant, lgbt, gay, lesbian, hispanic, asian, poor, average, downtrodden, disadvantag, common, minorit, divers

God: god, church, commandment, scripture, religion, christian, jesus, christ, moral, tradition, purity, pure, clean, sacred, holy, holiness, saint, wholesome, integrity, sin, ethic, principle, doctrin, evil, righteous

Country: founding, Constitution, founder, fathers, amendment, hamilton, washington, madison, jefferson, franklin, nation, country, military, national, pride, patriotic

Conservatism: gun, fiscal, spend, debt, conservati, limited, money, socialis, communis, preserv

Twitter Experiment Stimuli

(a) Republican Care

(b) Republican Loyalty

(c) Democratic Care

(d) Democratic Loyalty

Figure A11: Twitter Experiment Stimuli

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