

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The Rationale for My Dissertation

The phrase “σῶμα Χριστοῦ” (body of Christ) in Pauline letters, especially in 1 Corinthians 12:27, has been read by many scholars¹ as a metaphor for an ecclesiological organism of unity aiming at overcoming the problems raised by diversity, while some other scholars read it primarily in connection with Pauline theology as a metaphor related to ethical exhortation and/or mission.² An ecclesiological, metaphorical organism approach overlooks the ethical meaning of the body of Christ and condones society’s dominant ideology of hierarchical “unity” which is promoted by the Greco-Roman rhetoric of *homonoia* (concord). The shadow side of this approach is multifold. First, the “body of Christ” functions as an

¹ See Margaret Mitchell, *Paul and the Rhetoric of Reconciliation: An Exegetical Investigation of the Language and Composition of 1 Corinthians* (Louisville: Westminster/John Knox Press, 1992), 20-64. Mitchell reads 1 Corinthians as a deliberative rhetoric in which the “body of Christ” is a central metaphor for an organism. See also C. K. Barrett, *A Commentary on the First Epistle to the Corinthians* (New York: Harper & Row, 1968), 20-64; 65-68; 157-164; 266-270.

² See Ernst Käsemann, *Perspectives on Paul*, trans. Margaret Kohl (Philadelphia, Fortress Press, 1971), 102-121. See also E. Schweizer, *The Church as the Body of Christ* (Richmond: 1964), 23-40; “The Church as the Missionary Body of Christ,” *NTS* 8 (1961), 5; “Σῶμα κτλ” in *TDNT* 7 (1971):1074-80.

exclusive boundary marker that silences the voice of marginality in the community and society. Second, by limiting its notion of the body of Christ to a language concerning “belonging,” this approach leads to a narrow, rigid, closed conception of community. Third, and consequently, such a boundary marker blocks the possibility of an ethical interpretation of the “body of Christ” in the community and in the larger context of society – especially in the context of power conflicts both inside the community and outside of it.

Dissatisfied with such an ecclesiological rendering of the body of Christ, this dissertation seeks to re-claim, with some other scholars such as Käsemann and E. Schweizer,³ a Pauline theology or ethics based on a different connotation of the “σῶμα Χριστοῦ” -- which lies in Christ’s life, death and resurrection. Accordingly, one can read σῶμα Χριστοῦ as a liberating, ethical space in which believers can associate their faith and life with Christ’s cross and resurrection in their concrete life contexts. However, with postmodern sensitivity, my efforts in this dissertation go one-step further; I will deconstruct the Pauline texts and the community they reflect with attention to the voices of marginality. In the following, I will explain why a postmodern approach to the text, its community, and its readers is crucial to the task of biblical interpretation.

Often, biblical scholars, treating the text as an object distant from their own social

³ For a full discussion, see Chapter II.

location or theological views, blind themselves to the broad and deep connotations of the text found in the horizon that brings text and readers together. Dramatically turning its course in the 1970s, biblical interpretation is moving away from a Eurocentric, “objective” model to one of liberation and postmodern deconstruction.⁴ This shift begins with the recognition that readers employ a diversity of analytical approaches that can be related to different methodology. It continues when interpretive choices are exposed and analyzed in view of ethical responsibility. Accordingly, biblical studies, along with literary and cultural studies, raises a new set of ethical, hermeneutical questions related to readers. All these questions set the postmodern agenda that focuses on community, gender, ethnicity, and geopolitics.⁵

Caught in this wave of postmodern yearning, I will register my own voice of postmodern “de(re)construction”⁶ along those of many practitioners of biblical hermeneutics.

⁴ Neighboring disciplines such as new literary criticism and postcolonial theories have had a decisive impact on biblical studies in the way that traditional hermeneutics began to give way to a new paradigm of postmodern hermeneutics. See Antony Easthope, *Literary into Cultural Studies* (London; New York: Routledge, 1991), 19-25, 47-51, 74-74, 107-125. Fernando F. Segovia, *Decolonizing Biblical Studies: A View from the Margin* (Maryknoll, New York: Orbis Books, 2000), 3-50; also the rest of chapters.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ To begin with, the neologism of *de(re)construction* refers to both theory and practice. The theme of de-construction and re-construction runs through the whole dissertation and will become clear gradually. Suffice it to say now: de-construction and re-construction should take place continuously; there is no sense of “being done once-and-for-all.” Rather, the task always demands a new way of de-construction and re-construction. De-construction and re-construction are mutually bound in service of community for all. De-construction itself is not a goal or a means to achieving re-construction. As Derrida put, “deconstruction is not a method or some tool that you apply to something from the outside. Deconstruction is something which happens and which happens inside.” See Jacques

While recognizing the diversity inherent in postmodernism, my own version of postmodern biblical hermeneutics specifically emphasizes both de-construction and re-construction beyond power or identity politics.⁷ In an effort to re-cover the authentic, diversified sense of global community beyond fragmented community, this dissertation primarily engages biblical hermeneutics that involve theories and practices of biblical interpretation.⁸ For this engagement, I need to make explicit my own worldview and social location, thus inviting other readers to re-think their own place in the journey of faith or life. By doing so, the goal of this dissertation is to seek a better, more healthy hermeneutics with which the world of peace and justice for “all” is envisioned. In fact, that vision is an age-old promise and mission - once taken by Abraham, Jesus and Paul – and we continue to tread this stony, narrow road.

In my life and academic study, I have always wondered why I should be engaged in biblical studies. The more I ponder my life and biblical studies, the more I realize that I am

Derrida, “The Villanova Roundtable,” in John D. Caputo, ed. *Deconstruction in a Nutshell: A Conversation with Jacques Derrida* (New York: Fordham University Press, 1997), 9. See also his *Memoires: For Paul de Man*, Trans. Cecile Lindsay, Jonathan Culler, and Eduardo Cadava (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), 124. Rather, de-construction already contains re-construction and vice versa. Therefore, one should think of de(re)construction as an inseparable, ongoing work of both theory and practice.

⁷ Derrida, “The Roundtable,” 16. See also Margaret A. McLaren, *Feminism, Foucault, and Embodied Subjectivity* (New York: SUNY Press, 2002), 117-127.

⁸ Derrida coins the phrase “relationless relation” in expressing our relation to others, community, state, and the world. Derrida envisions the world of being different, relationless, but of relatedness due to relationless. This is a paradox but important in our imagination of the world relations including our personal relationships with others. Derrida, “The Roundtable,” 14.

reading “myself” in the Bible (and in the “world”) along with the joyful challenge of reading “with others.”⁹ I am no longer interested in finding a single “truth”¹⁰ as Pilate asks Jesus “what is truth?” but in the diversity of truths in our life today (John 18:38).¹¹ Jesus “came into the world to testify to the truth” (John 18:37), which must involve “others” with whom I read the Bible, joining in the common struggle for meaningful, faithful existence in the midst of an unfaithful, hopeless world. In a way, the hermeneutical key is “others” that constitutes my (our)

⁹ Derrida, “The Roundtable,” 13. See also Paul Ricoeur, *Oneself as Another*, trans. Kathleen Blamey (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1992), 21-23.

¹⁰ Cartesianism promotes a perspective of dualism, reductionism and positivism by which philosophical universalism could take root. In the end, “truth” is the opposite of otherness and difference. See Bryan Turner, *The Body and Society: Explorations in Social Theory* (London: Thousand Oaks, CA.: Sage Publications, 1996), 9-13. See also Walter, Lowe, *Theology and Difference: The Wound of Reason* (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1993), 74: “. . . the question of truth is more than a question: it is a reality. And it is a reality which has hold of us.” See also James S Hans, *The Question of Value: Thinking Through Nietzsche, Heidegger and Freud* (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1989), 123-24; John D. Caputo, *Radical Hermeneutics: Repetition, Deconstruction, and the Hermeneutic Project* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1987), 7.

¹¹ Diversity is the uppermost issue for today’s theological reflections and in biblical studies. I use this term as closely related to pluralism. Theodore Brelsford put it as “the irreducible diversity of human life in all its aspects; the existence of distinctively different races, cultures, communities, traditions, views, values, etc.” See Theodore Brelsford, “Christological Tensions in a Pluralistic Environment: Managing the Challenges of Fostering and Sustaining both Identity and Openness” in *Religious Education* 90.02:174-89. In biblical studies, a new biblical approach to reading the Bible through the lens of diversity is revolutionizing our understanding about God, the world, and human beings. The typical case can be found in the works of scholars who read the episode of the tower of Babel (Gen. 11) as a punishment for hegemonic unity (monoculture, mono-language, empire-like) rather than as a punishment for human arrogance. In other words, God scatters people so that they might live in/with diversity. See Bernhard W. Anderson, “The Tower of Babel: Unity and Diversity in God’s Creation” in *From Creation to the New Creation: Old Testament Perspectives* (Minneapolis: Augsburg Fortress, 1994), 165-178.

stories.¹² This kind of experiential, intrinsic connection of me to the world and the Bible creates space for conversation with the past (history, literature, interpretation), which challenges me to re-imagine an alternative world that honors life¹³ and bodiliness (human mortality as well) as God's gift. With this location of "me" in the world, I always keep in mind the "world" that I come from, and the "world" for which I live. This world involves our interpretation of where and who we are and what we are up to.

The world we live in now is severely fragmented by religion, race, culture, gender, class, and the various ideologies that accompany them, and we urgently need to analyze the rationales or ideologies behind such divisions of community because divisions of community affect all people. Here in the U.S., for example, the struggles related to race, class, and culture are obvious and re-emerge every day. A minority of people in each community busy themselves with keeping their own share of the pie bigger to the detriment of the majority of people in the communities -- the poor, third world immigrants, and strangers. Every Sunday the color line is very clear. People of the same color or culture flock together for worship and social cohesion,

¹² Brian K. Blount, *Cultural Interpretation: Reorienting New Testament Interpretation* (Minneapolis: Augsburg Fortress, 1995), 1-8.

¹³ Douglas Knight, "The Ethics of Human Life in the Hebrew Bible," in *Justice and the Holy: Essays in honor of Walter Harrelson*, eds. Douglas A. Knight and Peter J. Paris (Atlanta: Scholar Press, 1989), 82. Knight states that God is "the giver of life (Deut 30:19; Job 33:3), the fountain of life (Ps 36:9) and of living waters (Jer 2:13; 17:13), the preserver of life (Ps 64:1)."

and often remain in their comfort zones while building walls that exclude others. The conditions of the poor and the unfortunate become estranged and hopelessly marginalized because the conception of community is too limited to embrace all of them. The world situation has become darker than in any time in history because of dividing and destructive ideologies. This phenomenal division is often hidden in the guise of multiculturalism or globalism where people are told they are in, but, in fact, they have no choice but to follow a global, harmful economic and political system. Therefore, my central questions concern who defines community and who is served by this definition.

In this world of hurt and fragmentation, I seek a world of redemption, as Paul did (Rom 8:23). Feeling hope and despair about the world and my country, Korea, once united, and now torn apart by war and conflicting ideologies, our Diaspora people today live their destiny in many parts of the world including the USA. We need redemptive healing through which many people can come together to celebrate their place. My heart and mind cannot rest as I think about the then-young Korean men and women, last century, taken away from their homes to serve the insatiable thirst of Japanese colonialism. Some are dead and others still alive. Some of us, including me, live away from home by choice in our search for a better life. But living in the U.S. as a border person, I come across ambiguities in my identity and ask where I should

belong. Can I say, like Diogenes the Cynic (404 – 323 BCE), “I am a citizen of the world?”¹⁴ Am I like Paul, who says, “Wretched man that I am! Who will rescue me from this body of death?” (Rom 7:24). Certainly, my heart searches for the meaning of life, body, and the community. As both Korean and American, or beyond these identities, at times I feel no sense of belonging anywhere because my identity seems ambiguous or hybrid. However, I do not deplore my border identity, but see it as a creative marginality, as bell hooks observes, through which I can contribute to the redemptive healing of the scattered, battered, and ruined bodies of our people and of others in the world by re-imagining a community and a world for “all.”¹⁵

Body of Christ and Today: Inter-contextual Reading

One of the greatest concerns I have about both Christianity and biblical studies lies in the tendency to claim Christ as a boundary-marker – an arrogant and exclusivistic claim. Many times in history, such exclusivism (in the name of the church as the body of Christ) has caused

¹⁴ Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of Eminent Philosophers*, trans. R. D. Hicks (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2000), 6. 63. The used form is “κοσμοπολίτης” from which cosmopolitan is derived. The question is how or why Diogenes used such term cosmopolitan. If Laertius’ writing is authentic, “cosmopolitan” originated with Diogenes. As I will show in Chapter III, the voice of Diogenes the Cynic seems to decry all sorts of the hegemonic body politics that suppresses human dignity, equality, and freedom. Diogenes answered the beautiful thing in the world is “Freedom of Speech” (παρρησια) (6.69).

¹⁵ bell hooks, *Yearning: Race, Gender, and Cultural Politics* (Boston: South End Press, 1990), 149-52. I use the notion of “all” in my dissertation similar to a gathering of all differentiations, not a gathering of the unified whole, totality, or any universalism.

great evil, such as the Crusades, the holocaust, wars, racism, sexism, homophobia, and classism. Imagined “others” are treated as no-bodies, and as targets of the types of Christian mission fueled by “universalism.” Unfortunately, a prevalent reading of *soma christou* (body of Christ) in 1 Corinthians, as an organism metaphor, contributes to this exclusivism by seeking to unify the church community at the price of diversity, marginalizing others and their vision of community. Such a unity-oriented language is a double-edged sword, destructive both within the community and in its relationships with other people. In the community, it repudiates differences and diversity. It also separates the church from the world, by functioning as a boundary-marker. However, the body of Christ (as metaphor for those associated with the crucified one) can be identified with many broken human bodies and communities through history and culture. The problem arises with our preoccupation with “belonging,” which leads to a kind of sectarian mentality that caused many conflicts throughout history, and today, as is seen in ethnic cleansings or the Palestinian conflict. As we see today all kinds of sectarian movements in world politics, I cry: where is hope? Is there no other way to conceive of the world and the body of Christ?

My provisional thesis regarding the metaphor of the body of Christ shifts from unity to diversity. I have problems with the language of unity as Derrida has.¹⁶ Who speaks about

¹⁶ Derrida, “The Roundtable,” 12-15.

unity? Is unity an essential goal? Alternatively, is it an ideologically disguised political rhetoric of control? Does Paul really emphasize unity as we today conceive of it? Does Paul adopt the metaphorical organism sense of the body used by the Stoics? Instead of a static, objective metaphorical understanding of “body,” I propose to conceive of “body of Christ” as a dynamic metaphor, as a “living body.” I think that it is urgent in the world today to recognize diversity and difference with respectful disagreement and soft-borders. Indeed, from the perspective of the powerless or the marginalized, unity is not the solution to their predicaments because it becomes a rhetoric of power that sacrifices diversity. Often in the context of centralized powers like imperialism or neo-colonialism, diversity may be allowed insofar as it serves unity; it is a kind of *la flora-de-la-mesa* (the flower on the table). As such, diversity is never truly weighed when we think, practice and imagine the body of Christ (*soma christou*) as shown in the traditional ecclesiologies –the static, objective views of “the body of Christ” as the church (1 Cor. 12:27). Now, by virtue of grassroots’ voices and postmodern scholarship, the traditional make-up of community rhetoric (objectivism plus hierarchy, for example) is being challenged. The new voices from the margins confront injustice and inequality in the community and the world.

Indeed, I will argue that the Corinthian community’s divisiveness does not result from a lack of “unity” but from a failure on the part of its members to acknowledge and respect the

diversity present in the community. This problem can be exemplified by those members who maintain hard-boundaries resulting from a hierarchical construction of the body based on the idolatry of power, honor, and wealth. If this assessment of the cause of the divisiveness in the Corinthians community were to be plausible, reading 1 Corinthians as a discourse advocating unity would compound the problem rather than solve it because resorting to unity without true diversity cements the hierarchical power structure with more rules or norms placed on the community. For me, rather, unity for Paul is not the goal or purpose of his letter because unity is a language of society – destructive and oppressive; unity is a result of diversity but it is not fixed or stay permanently.

It is with this suspicion about “unity” that I turn to 1 Corinthians, a text that I and other Christians view as Scripture. In view of the world I describe, an intentional re-imagining of the “body of Christ” based on diversity is crucial. Thus, my study will need to examine closely ideological issues such as those concerning the construction of the structures of authority and power within the community itself as well as between the Christian community and other communities, and those concerning the problem in the communities to which Paul writes. Does the divisiveness that Paul’s letter seeks to address regarding the Corinthian or the Roman communities result from a lack of unity or a lack of respect for diversity? While recognizing, in light of the history of interpretation, that this letter can be interpreted as a call to unity, I want to

explore if there is an alternative way to read this text. Another possibility is to pay closer attention to Paul's theological and ethical challenge of Corinthians' narrow vision of community so that they live up to the "body of Christ" – understood as the crucified *body* of Christ.¹⁷ Therefore, the crucial question is, Can Paul be read as doing something else than advocating "unity" in 1 Cor 12:27, as most scholars interpret it? What is the "body of Christ" to Paul? To the mixed audience of the Corinthians? To us today?

My Hermeneutical Lens

"Holism" is my theological, hermeneutical key to the understanding of the biblical text. I grew up on multi-religious soil in Korea where various religions coexist discordantly, and each religion leaves indelible marks on my flesh and blood.¹⁸ People of my village lived with ancestor traditions, such as ancestor worship and the celebration of special days (for example, Lunar New Year, Full Moon Day). Daily life, I remember, was nothing other than living in a community in which even a little bread is shared with one another in a common living space of solidarity. Even a little news spreads in a second, and all people respond immediately in one

¹⁷ James Hollingshead, *Household of Caesar and the Body of Christ: A Political Interpretation of the Letters from Paul* (Lanham: Univ. Press of America, 1998), 191, 205-9.

¹⁸ For a brief history of Korea, see Daniel M. Davies, "The Impact of Christianity upon Korea, 1884-1910: Six Key American and Korean Figures," *Journal of Church and State* 36 (1994): 795-820.

way or another, giving a helping hand to the needy, weeping together in sorrow, laughing together in days of celebration. There life together seems natural. If one hurts his leg, the community suffers just as Paul imagines an intimate, loving relationship in the community (1 Cor 12:14-26). I also see Buddhist monks walking through our village, and hear what they teach: (a) empty yourself; (b) live simply; (c) be merciful; (d) get away from worldly desires; and (e) do not kill living beings – even little insects. These teachings correspond to Paul’s declarations that: (a’) Christ emptied himself (“emptied himself, taking the form of a slave, being born in human likeness. And being found in human form” Phil. 2:7); (b’) I learned how to live simply (“I know what it is to have little, and I know what it is to have plenty. In any and all circumstances I have learned the secret of being well-fed and of going hungry, of having plenty and of being in need” Phil. 4:12); (c’) “Let your gentleness be known to everyone. The Lord is near” (Phil. 4:5); (d’) Do not live according to the flesh (Rom. 8:3-9); (e’) Creation itself will be set free from decay (Rom. 8:21).

Among other things, honoring the life of all living beings has been a seedbed for our thought and behavior for more than a thousand years. Often our people are called “people of peace” and we like to wear a white robe, which for us is a symbol of peace. Confucianism, similarly, teaches us the value of human life. One of the remarkable features of Confucianism lies in its practical earthly concerns as Confucius relates to his

disciples: “while you do not know life, how can you know about death?”¹⁹

However, I was very confused in my adolescence when the church taught me to separate from our communal way of life. The central teaching of the church at that time – and still today among many Korean churches-- was very exclusivist: you go to heaven through the savior Jesus; otherwise, you go to hell. The purpose of being a Christian was and still is to get salvation, defined as going to heaven after death. Such a teaching has shattered all our traditional values and culture, drawing a sharp dividing line between Christians and non-Christians, and between heaven and earth. There is no grey ground in between these two: either one belongs to the ecclesiological body or not. Yet there is no clear ethics concerning how to live out the *Christic* body. The irony is that those who think they have eternal life now live with more worldly desires of wealth, success, and long life. It is a double blessing: eternal life, and material blessings in this world. The underlying ideology might run like this: “now our eternal destiny is guaranteed; we will live forever unlike non-believers; and our present life is also blessed with all good things. So we have the feeling that we are superior to non-believers.” The biggest problem with this kind of attitude is its dualistic view of life. Devaluing earthly life, even as one enjoys

¹⁹ Lao Zi, *The Analects*, ch.11: “Chi Lu asked about serving the spirits of the dead. The Master said, ‘While you are not able to serve men, how can you serve their spirits?’ Chi Lu added, ‘I venture to ask about death?’ He was answered, ‘While you do not know life, how can you know about death?’”

it as a blessing, results in an ethical crisis in which believers do not feel responsible for worldly matters. The biggest trap for such Christian believers is that they think they will have a better, transcendent life beyond this earthly life, without living up to the life and death of Christ.

To be consistent with my theological and cultural perspective of holism, I have chosen to focus my study of Paul's letters on the theological concept of the "body of Christ." The basic question is, Is it legitimate and plausible to interpret Paul's texts about the "body of Christ" from the perspective of a "holistic" religious outlook and of an inter-religious, intercultural dialogue of Christianity with the other dominant religions rather than from an exclusivistic perspective? On this point, my dissertation includes two steps: (1) an identification of the particular theological categories and questions which are needed from my perspective to make sense of Paul's concept of "*soma christou*" – and therefore to choose the other concepts and passages in Paul's letters that are relevant for interpreting "*soma christou*"; (2) a recognition of the distinctiveness of the theological categories and questions I propose to use as compared with the theological categories and questions which are commonly used in Western scholarly interpretations of Paul's concept of "*soma christou*."

Methodological Considerations

Interpretation is an interactive process between three interpretive dimensions: the textual, contextual and hermeneutical dimensions.²⁰ As scriptural criticism points out, there is no interpretation of the Bible that does not involve these three dimensions; any interpretation is thus a result of this interaction. With this paradigm many different interpretations can be legitimate (be grounded in one or another of the significant dimensions of the text), plausible (make hermeneutical or theological sense), and potentially be a valid choice in a particular context. Scriptural criticism is important because it becomes possible to recognize the legitimacy and the plausibility of interpretations performed in different cultural settings with different religious perspectives. Rather than exclusively accepting as legitimate those interpretations that reflect a Western cultural point of view or those interpretations that reflect an elitist European-American academic perspective, it becomes possible to account for the views of religious experiences of people from other classes and in other religious settings. Then, since there is a choice among diverse legitimate and plausible interpretations, the

²⁰ Grenholm, Cristina and Daniel Patte, "Overture: Reception, Critical Interpretations, and Scriptural Criticism," in *Reading Israel in Romans: Legitimacy and Plausibility of Divergent Interpretations*, Vol.1. Eds. Cristina Grenholm and Daniel Patte (Harrisburg, PA: Trinity International Press, 2000), 1-54. See also James Aageson, *Written Also for Our Sake: Paul and the Art of Biblical Interpretation* (Louisville: Westminster/John Knox Press, 1993), 3-18.

question of the relative value of the choice of an interpretation and of the ideological perspective it involves as it addresses a certain life-context (e.g., whether or not it is liberating or oppressive) can be raised.

I am not suggesting that any interpretation is valid or goes without check. Rather, a critical study can and must open the possibility of an assessment of whether the interpreted product is ethically healthy and communally sensitive in the given context. Critical interpreters cannot be detached; they cannot remain in splendid isolation but must assume their responsibility, with others in a particular life-context, for their interpretations and their effects. Each dimension requires a thorough analysis in order to grasp with ethical sensitivity - the interaction between written text (analytical), life-text (contextual) and life-religious-experience text (hermeneutical) that the given interpretation reflects.

With this three-dimensional interaction, *soma christou*, especially in 1 Corinthians 12:27 (and in Rom 12:5), and in contrast to the Deutero-Pauline letters (i.e., Eph 4:12; Col 1:18), does not exclusively or necessarily refer to a hierarchical, ecclesiological body of Christ. In fact, in Paul's letters, the body of Christ is also associated, by analogy, to Jesus' physical body, and metaphorically, to those who "live Christ" or live "in Christ" (*en christo*). For instance, Paul directly relates Christ to a metaphor about living in Phil

1:21 and Gal 2:20 and in Gal 2:19 (being crucified with Christ). The phrase *en christo* or *en christo Iesou* is repeatedly found in Paul's undisputed letters.²¹ Moreover, in 1 Cor 12:27 "you are the body of Christ," the subject is "you," and the "body of Christ" is the predicate in the nominative case, suggesting that one of the possible interpretations is as a metaphor for a way of life. "You" and the body of Christ are one; for "you" (as Christian believers) living is being the body of Christ. This is what Paul expresses more directly in 1 Cor. 12:27, and Rom. 6:11 "living for God in Christ Jesus" (*zontas de to theo en christo Iesou*), in addition to Phil. 1:21 and Gal.2:20. There are other closely related metaphorical phrases: such as "you are God's temple" (1 Cor. 3:16) and "you are a new creation (2 Cor. 5:17).

In the Deutero-Pauline letters, such as in Eph 4:12 and Col 1:18, the believers are predicated to the body of Christ and they are supposed to build it up (*eis oikodomen tou somatos tou christou*, Eph. 4:12) – in contrast to the body of Christ being predicated to the believers (as in the undisputed letter). This suggests that the metaphor of the body of Christ as the church is no longer a metaphor for a way of life, but a metaphor for a "building," or an institution. My point is that in the Deutero-Pauline letters the body of

²¹ Rom. 6:11, 23; 8:1, 10; 12:5; 15:17; 16:3, 7, 9, 10; in 1 Cor. 1:30; 3:1; 4:10, 15, 17; 15:18, 22; 16:24; 2 Co. 1:21; 2:14, 17; 3:14; 5:17, 19; 12:2, 19; Gal. 1:22; 2:4, 16; 3:14, 26, 28; 5:6; Phil. 1:1, 26, 29; 2:1, 5; 3:3, 9, 14; 4:7, 19, 21; 1 Thess. 2:14; 4:16; 5:18; Phlm. 1:8, 20, 23.

Christ is the church as an institution, whose head is Christ; the body of Christ is an organism with a head and therefore characterized by a hierarchy. Conversely, in the authentic Pauline letters such as 1 & 2 Corinthians, Romans, and Galatians, the body of Christ can be interpreted as a metaphor for a way of life, similar to Jesus' way of life (and death) in his body. Furthermore, concerning ideological criticism, interpreters' choices should be carefully examined. In view of the polysemy of the text, the key interpretative issue is not to show that they are "wrong" and to attempt to find the correct or "objective" meaning of the text (in this case regarding the body of Christ, an impossibility). Rather, the question is, What is at stake for them in their choices?

Procedure

I will use two critical methods: an inter(con)textual criticism and a literary critical method that focuses on the figurative discursive structure of 1 Corinthians. With an inter(con)textual method, I will do the following: a) relate the figure "body of Christ" in 1 Corinthians with other Pauline letters to clarify Paul's theology of Christ crucified; b) compare the concepts, ethics and images of the "body of Christ" between Pauline letters (especially 1 Corinthians, and Romans) and Deutero-Pauline letters; c) analyze the semantic field of body in intersections with Greco-Roman literature, mystery religions,

Hebrew Bible and Jewish tradition; d) assess Paul's texts, and contexts, in terms of our present life context, and vice versa. The literary critical method will focus on the figurative discursive structure of 1 Corinthians to understand how the figure of "body of Christ" plays in the letter in the context of conflicting voices in the text and the community.

What follows is a roadmap for my dissertation. In Chapter II, I will briefly review the history of interpretation of the "body of Christ" scholarship on the "body of Christ," focusing on ecclesiological organism, Christological, and corporate-solidarity approaches. Chapter III, *Hermeneutics of Body*, breaks into several parts. First, I will analyze scholarly conceptions of "community" which focus on the body politic such as boundary, identity, and power relations. Second, continuing from the discussion of the body politic, I will visit three postmodern thinkers – Derrida, Ricoeur, and Foucault – who will help in a deconstruction our own view of body and the body politic. Then, struggles for body in culture will be discussed in a contemporary setting in the hopes of finding the common ground for solidarity with the marginal voices in history and culture. Then, using the insights of postmodern hermeneutics and contemporary cultural sensitivity, in Chapter IV, I will analyze the body politics of the Greco-Roman and the Jewish world, exposing their ideologies of body and body politics. An extensive study of the hermeneutics of "body"

will establish a hermeneutical foundation for Chapter V, in which, first, I will study the contextual problems wed to different body politics in the Corinthian community, analyzing conflicting voices in the community. Then, in Chapter VI, I will focus on the phrase “body of Christ” while comparing its use between the Pauline and deuteron-Pauline letters, and then on the figure of “body of Christ” in 1 Corinthians to see how it plays in the text in view of multiple, conflicting voices in the community. In Chapter VII, I will expand the discussion of diversity in terms of the “in Christ” formula in Pauline letters, and I will show how the study of “in Christ” will affect the understanding of the body of Christ. Finally, conclusion follows in Chapter VIII.

CHAPTER II

HISTORY OF INTERPRETATION OF THE “BODY OF CHRIST”: ECCLESIOLOGICAL ORGANISM, CHRISTOLOGICAL, CORPORATE- SOLIDARITY APPROACHES

In the previous Chapter, I raised interpretive issues about the body of Christ ranging from theology to ethics. That is, the problem lies in the fact that a majority of interpreters of Paul have read the body of Christ metaphor narrowly in terms of an exclusivistic salvation perspective (Bultmann, Barrett) or in terms of a unity-centered (*homonoia*) organism (Mitchell). At the other end of the interpretive spectrum of the “body of Christ” metaphor, we find the Christological approach of Albert Schweitzer and Käsemann.²²

²² Methodologically, we need to understand the phrase “body of Christ” as a metaphor where scholars such as Käsemann, Robinson, and others, deny that it is a metaphor, thus simply reject the view that it is a specific kind of metaphor, namely a metaphor for an ecclesiological organism. Following Paul Ricoeur’s definition in *The Rule of the Metaphor: Multi-disciplinary Studies in the Creation of Meaning in Language*, (trans. R. Czerny, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1978, p.7), saying that “body of Christ” is a metaphor is not simply saying that the relationship of “something” (a community, a believer’s life) to Christ is like the relationship between church and his body (or vice versa). It is also saying that this relationship to Christ is also unlike the relationship between Christ and his body (or vice versa). Thus saying that “each of them is the body of Christ, in that each is the physical complement and extension of the one and the same Person and Life” (J.A.T. Robinson, *The Body*, p.51), is still interpreting “body of Christ” as a metaphor – although not as a metaphor for an ecclesiological organism.

Scholarly approach to the interpretation of the body of Christ metaphor can be regrouped into three broad interpretative schools: those who interpret the body of Christ metaphor as an ecclesiological organism, as Christological, and as concerning corporate-solidarity. However, I do not assume that scholars on the same camp agree with one another on every thing concerning the body of Christ. Thus, this subdivision in these broad interpretive schools is a generalization. Yet, I hope that subdivision will highlight and contrast different views of the body of Christ metaphor while at the same time probing their social location or context. For this purpose, I will show limitations or potential danger of each interpretation in view of postmodern sensitivity, which focuses on minority's struggle for liberation and justice.

Since Jewett analyzed the Pauline uses of the "body" (*soma*), I will not repeat him here;²³ instead, by focusing on the "body of Christ" as a metaphor, I will analyze how scholarly interpretive angles (choices) are related to the interpreters' life context, hermeneutical and theological views as well as to their textual, analytical methods. However, I want to make clear that this Chapter only prefaces the rest of chapters in which I will discuss fully about the body of Christ.

From the outset, I must say that I am most concerned about the first interpretive

²³ Robert Jewett, *Paul's Anthropological Terms: A Study of their Use in Conflict Settings* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1971), 209-225.

school, because it does more harm than the other two. By reducing the body of Christ to a mere ecclesiological organism, it makes exclusive claim about the body of Christ as boundary marker. In fact, the last two interpretive schools, opposing the idea of a mere ecclesiological organism, view the body of Christ as Christ's work symbolized through the cross and resurrection or as the term for corporate solidarity keeping in mind Jews and gentile relations. In this regard, these latter interpretive schools side with me to claim that the body of Christ is more than an ecclesiological organism. However, my interpretation goes one step further to claim the body of Christ as a liberating, ethical space, which will be dealt throughout my dissertation. Then what follows is, in order: First, I will examine the variety of approaches, interpreting the body of Christ as an ecclesiological organism. Second, I will analyze the Christological with its pros and cons. Third, I will discuss the corporate-solidarity approach. Lastly, I will present a summary of these three interpretive approaches along with my critique of each.

Ecclesiological Organism Approach

I regroup here the interpretations that view the body of Christ as an ecclesiological organism by various scholars who use different methods to read the Corinthian texts, for example through socio-rhetorical or social-scientific methods. I will

discuss here the interpretations of the body of Christ metaphor by Horsley, Theissen, Neyrey, and Mitchell. Despite their differing concerns or theological views, as we will see later, all the scholars in this approach conclude that Paul views the body of Christ as an ecclesiological organism that sets strong or exclusive boundary against others. This approach can be broken into five sub-readings. The first sub-reading derives from Horsley's liberation reading according to which the Corinthian body plays the role of anti-imperial movement.²⁴ The second sub-reading comes from Theissen's sociological or functional reading according to which the Corinthian "body" is a place of "love patriarchalism."²⁵ The third sub-reading comes from Neyrey's sociological or anthropological reading according to which the Corinthian "body" is a "bounded system" of a symbolic world.²⁶ The fourth sub-reading comes from the socio-rhetorical tradition according to which the Corinthian body as a metaphoric organism should be understood

²⁴ Richard Horsley, "1, 2 Corinthians," in *Postcolonial Biblical Criticism: Interdisciplinary Intersections*, eds. Moore, Stephen D. and Fernando F. Segovia (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, forthcoming). See also Richard Horsley, *1 Corinthians* (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1998), 173. Neil Elliott, "Paul's Letters: God's Justice against Empire" in *The New Testament – Introducing the Way of Discipleship*, ed. Wes Howard-Brook and Sharon H. Ringe (Maryknoll: Orbis Books, 2002), 122-147.

²⁵ Gerd Theissen, *The Social Setting of Pauline Christianity: Essays on Corinth*, trans. John H. Schütz (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1982), 36-37, 96-99, 121-140. Dale Martin, *The Corinthian Body* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995), 92-96.

²⁶ Jerome Neyrey, *Paul, in Other Words: A Cultural Reading of His Letters* (Louisville, Ky.: Westminster/John Knox Press, 1990), 116.

in light of the Greco-Roman high-class rhetoric.²⁷ The fifth sub-reading comes from Bultmann's ecclesiological, existential reading of the body. Among these sub-readings, the socio-rhetorical one draws our attention because it explicitly emphasizes the unity/concord (*homonoia*) of the community at the price of diversity and views ethics as based on this unified body of Christ. To name a few scholars of this sub-reading, Barrett, Dunn, Furnish, Mitchell, and Witherington read the body of Christ as a unified organism.²⁸ For them the body politic and "unity" themes are a key to reading 1 Corinthians. From this perspective, we can see that the other sub-readings have the same kind of view in this regard, as they presuppose a confrontational, oppositional boundary between the body of Christ as a community and society, rather than conceiving the body as a way of life or as a space for life and struggle. I will now turn to each of these sub-readings.

First, Horsley is concerned about the problems of political and economic

²⁷ See Mitchell, *Paul and the Rhetoric of Reconciliation*, 20-64. See also Barrett, *1 Corinthians*, 292-3.

²⁸ Ibid. See also James Dunn, "'The Body of Christ' in Paul" in *Worship, Theology and Ministry in the Early Church: Essays in Honor of Ralph P. Marti*, ed. Michael J. Wilkins and Terence Paige. JSNT Supp. 87, 146-162; See also James Dunn, *The Theology of Paul the Apostle* (Grand Rapids, MI; Cambridge, U.K.: Eerdmans, 1998), 533-564. See Victor Furnish, "Theology in 1 Corinthians" in *Pauline Theology* vol. II. Ed. David M. Hay, (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1993), 59-89; Ben Witherington, *Conflict and Community in Corinth: A Socio-rhetorical Commentary on 1 and 2 Corinthians* (Grand Rapids, Mich.: W.B. Eerdmans, 1995), 261.

domination and oppression in the Roman Empire.²⁹ The primary issues have to do with how to survive in the face of severe threats, persecution and general difficulties in society. Horsley reads the text as a social construction in the context of the Roman Empire in which the Corinthian community's political or social struggle is manifested. Therefore, as a social historian, Horsley sees the body of Christ as a metaphor for the anti-Roman Empire, placing *ecclesia* as a counter-assembly to the society's social or political assemblies. Certainly, this reading has great merits, interpreting 1 Corinthians against the backdrop of oppression by the Empire. However, in his reading there is no difference between the body of Christ and *ecclesia*. This reading leans sides with a typical tendency of liberation interpretation in specific social, political situations. But his interpretation is problematic because it ends up sacrificing the rich meaning of the "body of Christ," which can include Christian ethics or a hermeneutic horizon that embraces "others" through a self-critique of its own group, as I will expound in the following chapters. As I will argue, the Pauline conception of the community is broad enough to include all, whether Jews or gentiles, the Empire or the local governments. The basis of theology and ethics in Paul does not need to be built on oppositional, militaristic division between "us"

²⁹ Richard Horsley, "1, 2 Corinthians," (forthcoming). See also Horsley, "Rhetoric and Empire – 1 Corinthians" in *Paul and Politics: Ekklesia, Rsrael, Imperium, Interpretation*, ed. Richard Horsley (Harrisburg, Penn.: Trinity Press International, 2000), 72-102.

and “them,”³⁰ as modern western interpreters do. Rather, I will argue, Paul’s basis of theology and ethics can be viewed as more like a de-constructive and re-constructive mode of power that aims at a loving community for all.

Second, Theissen reads the texts sociologically, viewing the Corinthian community as the product of a conservative, hierarchically bound society in which the Corinthian body is a place of “love patriarchalism.”³¹ For Theissen, using sociological functional categories of status, the metaphor “body of Christ” refers to social cohesion and/or is a means of community legitimation. Similarly, Martin views “body of Christ” as referring to “benevolent patriarchalism.” Ironically, Martin’s reading is ambivalent. On the one hand, Paul opposes the dominant society’s ideology of a hierarchical “body” by his body of Christ analogy (12:12-26), and on the other, Paul stays within a hierarchical view of the body (church), accepting the order of the body as a given.³² Because of this kind of functional approach, Theissen has a narrow view of the community in which the body of Christ still functions as an organism metaphor for unity; his method remains in the reductionist framework of a sociological approach in

³⁰ Hermeneutically, liberal as well as conservative scholars work with a notion of a confronting dichotomy between “us” and “them” in their theorization and theology. There is a logic of “either/or.” But my rendering of Pauline theology, which will be tested in this dissertation, is postmodern de(re)construction of our world, which envisions all in the cosmos.

³¹ Theissen, *Pauline Christianity*, 36-37, 96-99, 121-140; Martin, *The Corinthian Body*, 92-96.

³² Martin, *The Corinthian Body*, 94.

which status conflicts remain the primary problem for the Corinthian community. In this way, Theissen's concerns primarily cover internal conflicts, those that mirror society, seeing the intra-dynamics of the Corinthian community in terms of social status/class. For him, the Corinthian problems are the result of social conflict between the rich and poor, the upper class and the lower class. Theissen does not envision that a hierarchical social body could be questioned; rather, he is interested in the social function or role of a community that is operative in the larger social body, and needs to maintain the status quo of society. Out of this functionalist concern, his reading remains within the interplay of social forces in the community. In contrast, Martin, though using Theissen's sociological insight, criticizes the ideological construction of the "body" in society and in the Corinthian community.

Neyrey's sociological-anthropological reading, influenced by Mary Douglas' seminal work *Purity and Danger* on cultural anthropology,³³ views the body of Christ as "a bounded system" to be contrasted with the uncontrolled body.³⁴ For Neyrey, Paul's concerns have to do with maintaining unity or order, fearing that the disorder and disunity will ruin the society and the community, as well as members of the community. Because

³³ Mary Douglas, *Purity and Danger: An Analysis of the Concepts of Pollution and Taboo* (London; New York: Routledge, 2000), 114-5.

³⁴ Neyrey, *Paul, in Other Words*, 116.

of such fears and concerns about disunity, according to Neyrey, Paul asks the community to control their body. In this reading, human body is a sociological, psychological respondent intrinsically connected with outer force of society or the community. As a result, the role of human agency or subjectivity is reduced to a receptive passivity, and this sociological-anthropological reading does not address the internal problem of hierarchy, injustice, and inequality in the community or in the society in general. Though the method's insight is great, the result or application of its method to the real community ends up with the conception of a rigid and closed community, in which individuals have no role of agency to act on to achieve equality and justice.

Similarly, the primary concern in the socio-rhetorical interpretive tradition is with the unity of the community and overlooks the existence of marginalized people who struggle for justice. With the view of the metaphor "body of Christ" as a body belonging to Christ, and thus as an organism, what is at stake in this interpretive tradition is about Christological boundary, which serves as a means to distinguish those who are in Christ and those who are out. Therefore, their first concern aims to fend off the unnecessary dangers of immoral, unethical, secular life styles on the one hand, and on the other, to defend "pure Christian faith" in the face of pluralism.³⁵ Though scholars in this tradition

³⁵ I use "pure Christian faith" close to the ethos of German idealism and its current scholarship, which emphasizes a forensic notion of faith and salvation once-and-for-all that misses a more deeper

rarely make explicit their social location or life context, one can still recognize their agenda or issues; For example, Mitchell, in her book *Paul's Rhetoric of Reconciliation*, never considers the voices of the community or society other than the voice of elite in society. Treating the body of Christ as a metaphor for an ecclesiological organism in the same way as Stoic *homonoia* speech, Mitchell reads the Corinthian letter and its community³⁶ as a deliberative rhetorical discourse that seeks to establish *homonoia*, concord and unity.³⁷ Then, one can hear only the voice of the elite that is concerned with unity, and one subsequently ignores other voices in the text, for example: the voices of women, slaves and other marginalized people.³⁸ Mitchell, viewing factionalism as the cause of disunity and without asking why factionalism occurred (a question that would have brought up a marginalized perspective), ended up with a superficial notion of the

understanding of faith in terms of diversity and ethics. Paul's faith (theology) and ethics rather deconstructs power language, symbol, and ritual, in any form of all that does not attend to the voice of the marginalized.

³⁶ See more details about Stoic *homonoia* and Greco-Roman world philosophy in Chapter III. See also Mitchell, *Paul and the Rhetoric of Reconciliation*, 20-64; 65-68; 157-164; 266-270.

³⁷ Ibid. See also Charles A. Wanamaker, "A Rhetoric of Power: Ideology and 1 Corinthians 1-4" in *Paul and the Corinthian Church*, Eds. Trevor J. Burke and J. Keith Elliott (Leiden: Brill, 2003), 119-122. From a rhetorical perspective this constitutes a *topos* of concord (*peri homonoias*) which was well-known *topos* among both ancient politicians and rhetoricians." See Elizabeth Castelli, *Imitating Paul: a Discourse of Power* (Louisville: Westminster/John Knox, 1991), 15.

³⁸ Evidently, Mitchell's textual method relies on *homonoia* speech (elite discourses or philosophy in Greco-Roman world) that does not consider the other ends of voices. Mitchell, *Paul and the Rhetoric of Reconciliation*, 20-64. My main suspicion to this kind of rhetorical pursuit is backed by postmodern hermeneutical theory and practices in the real world - Greco-Roman world that I will discuss in Chapter IV to show conflicting voices in society.

rigid community without taking into account the diversity and complexity of a community struggling with the issue of power, injustice, and control in society at large. A more practical, hermeneutical question could be: Is unity the solution to the problems in this community and society?

This kind of concern for “unity” as the problem in Corinth is widespread throughout the scholarship on 1 Corinthians. Scholars base their interpretation on a philosophical assumption related to Kantian ethics and its deontological approach from the perspective of which diversity or difference is an obstacle to a harmonious community. So here in the socio-rhetorical interpretive tradition, the life issues seem to center on the issue of unity in the sense of sameness and uniformity. Precisely because of this concern about unity, strong boundaries are erected between the unity-honoring group and the diversity-honoring group,³⁹ which indeed results in judging others in the community based on their particular theological views.⁴⁰

³⁹ I use the terms of unity- and diversity-honoring group as follow: the former group is from elite, high class, and the relatively powerfully positioned in the community on in society whereas the latter group, one way or another, is from lower social strata, or from most of silenced voices in the community or in society.

⁴⁰ Tan’s reading of Romans 14-15 in light of a Chinese perspective reminds us of Paul’s view of community centered on the relational aspects of the Christian community so that Paul’s exhortation to the community is not to judge others based on external practices such as eating or not eating certain food. See Tan Yak-Hwee, “Judging and Community in Romans: An Action within the Boundaries” in *Gender, Tradition and Romans: Shared Ground, Uncertain Borders*, eds. Grenholm, Cristina and Daniel Patte (Harrisburg, PA.: Trinity Press International), 39-62 (forthcoming).

In a similar context with Mitchell, Gundry and Barrett (though Gundry and Barrett do not clearly use the Greco-Roman rhetoric of *homonioia*), emphasize the theological nature of the body of Christ as unity.⁴¹ Thus, they read the text as a “window” through which to see the historic revelation of the Christ event, an event that unifies all members of the church in Christ. Gundry, criticizing Bultmann’s individualistic interpretation of the body of Christ, relates the body of Christ to the earthly church and to the community of members.⁴² Gundry clearly emphasizes the historical nature of the body of Christ, which is characterized by unity.⁴³ Barrett also views the body of Christ theologically, treating 1 Corinthians as a work of systematic theology, which addresses a single situation – community fragmentation – that needs to be resolved through unity.⁴⁴ Therefore, without necessarily relating to the *homonioia* speech of the Greco-Roman body politic, Barrett understood the metaphor of the body of Christ as referring to the Corinthian church as an ecclesiological organism. To reach this conclusion, 1 Cor 12:12-27 is read in terms of a body analogy common in ancient society. Another strong theological assertion for reading the body of Christ as the community

⁴¹ Robert Gundry, *Soma in Biblical Theology with Emphasis on Pauline Anthropology* (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1976), 232; Barrett, *1 Corinthians*, 287-292.

⁴² Gundry, *Soma*, 223-244.

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ Barrett, *1 Corinthians*, 42-49; 148-9; 292-3.

(unity) comes from Paul's own sense of authority and power with which he exhorts divisive community members to be one. Barrett's construction of the metaphor of the body of Christ is twofold: he relates Paul's metaphor to a contemporary context and interprets it in terms of a particular philosophical school (Stoics).

Bultmann's interpretation of the body of Christ is peculiarly ecclesiological with a characteristic of cosmic, eschatological, existential Church, which is the body of Christ:⁴⁵

But Paul may also express the supramundane, eschatological character of the Church in Gnostic terminology. He is doing so when he calls it the "*body of Christ*" (1 Cor 12:27) or "one body in Christ" (Rom 12:5). These terms express both the unity of the Church and the foundation of this unity in an origin transcendent to the will and deed of individuals and hence express its transcendental nature. The *ecclesia* is not a club in which like-minded individuals have banded together, ... it is not a conglomeration of the Spirit-endowed, each of whom has and enjoys his private relationship to Christ. It is just this misconception, which has emerged in Corinth, that Paul combats in 1 Cor 12:12-30. In doing so, he secondarily designates the Church as an organism (*soma*), using this metaphor from the classic Greek tradition, ... But he uses that association only secondarily (v. 14-26). Primarily he is describing the Church as the "body of Christ." ... It is not the members that constitute the body of Christ. ... Christ is there, not through and in the members, but before they are there and above them. Thus the body of Christ is, to speak Gnostically, a cosmic thing.

As seen above, Bultmann's view of the body of Christ metaphor is not based on an organism idea borrowed from the classic Greek tradition; rather his emphasis is purely on the theological meaning of the Church as the body of Christ. For my purpose though, his

⁴⁵ Bultmann, *Theology of New Testament*, vol.1, trans. Kendrick Grobel (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1951), 309.

interpretation of the body of Christ metaphor leads to the same result as that of the preceding scholars using an ecclesiological organism perspective; the body of Christ is limited to the notion of the Church. Interestingly, Bultmann's view of the body of Christ hardly leaves any room for ethical exhortation to the community, much less room for theological reflections on Christ's life, death, and resurrection in terms of marginal experience or diversity. His view of the body of Christ remains within the existential frame that downplays the realistic, social or political world. For example, Bultmann states that:⁴⁶

Since the Congregation is withdrawn from the world, this world's distinctions have lost their meaning (Gal 3:28; 1 Cor 12:13), ... The indifference of worldly distinctions also emerges in the admonition: "let each one remain in the state in which the call of God encountered him" (1 Cor 7:17-24) –i.e. the negation of worldly differentiations does not mean a sociological program within this world; rather, it is an eschatological occurrence which takes place only within the eschatological Congregation.

What really matters for him is each individual's decisive, existential faith in Christ, a new existence in an eschatological congregation (the body of Christ) separated from the world.

Christological Approach

As opposed to the first interpretive school focused on the ecclesiological body or organism, in the interpretive school using a Christological approach the body of Christ is

⁴⁶ Ibid.

not identified with the church or the community (organism); rather, the focus is on an actual, personal union between Christ and believers. Scholars in this approach for example include A. Schweitzer,⁴⁷ Käsemann,⁴⁸ and J.A.T. Robinson.⁴⁹ Above all, these scholars construe the body of Christ as Christ's own body, not the church or community. In this Christological approach, an emphasis is put on Christ's dying and rising; each individual believer is asked to be united with Christ, not in a metaphorical organism sense. Rather, each individual believer, mysteriously or ethically, is to live with the power of the Spirit (the mystical body of Christ), in the realm of the lordship of Christ (Käsemann) or already in the messianic kingdom of God ('eschatological now' by A. Schweitzer).

First, opposing the Hellenistic-influenced understanding of the mystical body of Christ that focuses on "subjective or mystical" experience,⁵⁰ Albert Schweitzer views the body of Christ as corporeal-apocalyptic, with the idea of bodily union between the believer and Christ, as he put:⁵¹

The enigmatic concept, which dominates that mysticism, of the "body of Christ" to which all believers belong, and in which they are already dead and risen again,

⁴⁷ Albert Schweitzer, *The Mysticism of Paul the Apostle*, trans. William Montgomery (New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1931), 293-333.

⁴⁸ Käsemann, *Perspectives on Paul*, 108-9.

⁴⁹ J.A.T. Robinson, *The Body: A Study in Pauline Theology*, SBT 1/5 (London: SCM, 1952), 51.

⁵⁰ Schweitzer, *Mysticism*, 116-117.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*

is thus derived from the pre-existent Church (the “Community of God”). ... The relationship of faith in Christ to union with Christ is for him thus: that belief in Christ being present, union with Christ automatically takes place under certain circumstances, that is to say, when the believer causes himself to be baptized. ... The peculiarity of the Pauline mysticism is precisely that being-in-Christ is not a subjective experience brought about by a special effort of faith on the part of believer, but something which happens, in him as in others, at baptism.

As such, for Schweitzer, “the Elect [individual believers] no longer carry on an independent existence, but are now only the Body of Christ,” in which the Elect “form a joint personality, in which the peculiarities of the individuals, such as are constituted by race and sex and social position, have no longer any validity.”⁵² In this way, Schweitzer has an emphasis on christologically unified body in what he describes as the antithesis to the Law through being in Christ.⁵³ ‘Being in Christ’ does not allow individual difference of believers; “Grafted into the corporeity of Christ, he loses his creatively individual existence and his natural personality”⁵⁴ because the Elect forms “an actual entity”⁵⁵ with Christ.

Schweitzer, however, made it clear that the *ethics* of “being-in-Christ” should be emphasized in Paul’s mysticism as he warns:⁵⁶

The great danger for all mysticism is that of becoming supra-ethical, that is to say, of making the spirituality associated with the being-in-eternity an end itself. ...

⁵² Ibid., 118.

⁵³ Ibid., 123-5.

⁵⁴ Ibid., 125.

⁵⁵ Ibid., 127.

⁵⁶ Ibid., 297.

Even in Christian Mysticism, whether medieval or modern, it is often the semblance of ethics rather than ethics itself which is preserved. There is always the danger that the mystic will experience the eternal as absolute impassivity, and will consequently cease to regard the ethical existence as the highest manifestation of spirituality.

Schweitzer “expounds his [Paul’s] ethic as the putting into operation of the dying and rising again with Christ” in Gal 5:13-6:10 and Romans 5:1-8:17.⁵⁷ In the former, Paul exhorts the Galatians to return to their life in Spirit by deserting the works of the flesh.⁵⁸ In the latter, Paul’s ethic endures suffering and dying with Christ in order to be “purified and liberated from the world.”⁵⁹ As such, Paul’s ethic emphasizes the action, suffering, and liberation (from the world) as Paul formulates the “essential character of the ethical” in ways that exemplify “sanctification, giving up the service of sin, living for God, bringing forth fruit for God, serving the Spirit.”⁶⁰ Notably, Schweitzer shifts from a view of the body of Christ metaphor as referring to a mere organism to a view of the body of Christ centered on soteriology and ethics, focusing on a kind of apocalyptic ethics of now in which believers live and die with Christ. Schweitzer does so by distinguishing Pauline mysticism from Hellenistic mystical, subjective experience (supra-divine experience).⁶¹

⁵⁷ Ibid., 301.

⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁹ Ibid., 302.

⁶⁰ Ibid. References can be found: 1 Thess 4:3; Rom 6:6, 11, 13; 8:5, 12-14; 12:1; 1 Cor 6:20; 1 Cor 13; Gal 5:13-14.

⁶¹ Ibid.

For Schweitzer, the most significant textual dimension is its inter-textual connection with Jewish apocalypticism.⁶²

Similarly, Käsemann has a strong suspicion about the church as human institution; the church cannot be identified with the body of Christ as he put clearly:⁶³

The unavoidable starting point seems to me the necessity of breaking away from the view once current (at least among Protestants), that in describing the church as the body of Christ, Paul, who inclined to bold statements, was using a beautiful metaphor.⁶⁴ ... The influence of the Stoic notion of organism, which (as in Menenius Agrippa's famous fable) permits a community to be described as a body, will hardly be denied by anyone, especially since 1 Cor 12:14ff is clearly a reflection of it. But this is hardly enough, in view of the statement in 1 Cor 12:12, with its sacramental substantiation in the following verse. For Paul does not simply establish the fact that the church is a body; the argument is a Christological one, as in Rom 12:4: it is with Christ himself (to take the most cautious interpretation) as it is with the body; 'in Christ' the church is a body.

Käsemann, dissatisfied with Bultmann's individualistic, existential interpretation of the body of Christ that limits itself to individual freedom and salvation in the face of great social evil with Nazi's nationalism, turns to the importance of obedience of the church to the rule of Christ and the Spirit enacted through sacrament.⁶⁵ Furthermore, Käsemann includes the notion of cosmic redemption through the lordship of Christ: "Denn die Kirche ist die Welt, sofern sie in Christus dorthin zurückgestellt wurde, wovon sie in

⁶² Schweitzer, *Mysticism*, 37-40.

⁶³ Käsemann, *Perspectives on Paul*, 103-105.

⁶⁴ P.S. Minear, *Images of the Church in the New Testament* (Philadelphia, Westminster Press, 1961), 173ff.

⁶⁵ Käsemann, *Exegetische Versuche und Besinnungen*, Vol. I. (Göttingen, 1960), 16.

Adam gefallen war.”⁶⁶ In this way, the body of Christ becomes “gesamt Aeon”⁶⁷ and “a new world or, better, a new creation in universal dimension.”⁶⁸ Notably, Käsemann makes fundamental distinction between Christ and the church in the way that “Christ is there before the church and he is not absorbed into that church”⁶⁹ as he rejects the views of scholars claiming that the church is Christ.⁷⁰ In this way, Käsemann contrasts nicely with Bultmann in terms of differing contextual emphasis; Käsemann envisions cosmic salvation through the lordship of Christ while Bultmann overemphasizes individual, existential concerns to the detriment of the wider community. He certainly changes the existentialist interpretation of *soma* “from relationship to one’s object-self to relationship with other.”⁷¹ Accordingly, Käsemann interprets the metaphor “body of Christ” as belonging to *parenesis*, to warning that the body of Christ is not the church itself but is Christ’s body in which believers are united with Christ and through which they live a somatic life, including all aspects of worldly relations.⁷²

⁶⁶ Käsemann, *Leib und Leib Christi, Eine Untersuchung zur paulinischen Begrifflichkeit* (Tübingen: 1933), 185.

⁶⁷ Käsemann, *Leib and Leib Christi*, 184.

⁶⁸ Käsemann, *Perspectives on Paul*, 108.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, 116.

⁷⁰ For example, Nygren’s statement: ‘the church is Christ as he is present among and meets us upon earth after his resurrection.’ See A. Nygren, *Christ and His Church*, trans. Alan Carlsten (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1956), 96.

⁷¹ Gundry, *Soma*, 225.

⁷² Käsemann, *Perspectives on Paul*, 116-7.

To put it somewhat too epigrammatically, the apostle is not interested in the church *per se* and as a religious group. He is only interested in it in so far as it is the means whereby Christ reveals himself on earth and becomes incarnate in the world through his Spirit. The human body is the necessity and reality of existential communication; in the same way, the church appears as the possibility and reality of communication between the risen Christ and our world, and hence is called his body. It is the sphere in which and through which Christ proves himself *Kyrios* on earth after his exaltation. It is the body of Christ as his present sphere of sovereignty, in which he deals with the world through Word, sacrament and the sending forth of Christians, and in which he finds obedience even before his parousia.

As seen above, Käsemann states that “the motif of the body of Christ in Paul only crops up in paraenetic contexts”⁷³ whereas in the Deutero-Pauline letters “the doxological way of speaking about the body of Christ is dominant.”⁷⁴ Furthermore, the rule of Christ through the Spirit extends to the whole cosmos because of his theological view of the body of Christ, which rules the cosmos. For Käsemann, however, there hardly seems to be a role of individual subjectivity in which a person should make decision on oneself as one can see in Bultmann’s existential interpretation. Overall, Käsemann’s notion of *soma* remains the same as Bultmann’s: the body of Christ has a transcendental origin and thus it is “a transcendent aeon or sphere”⁷⁵ although Käsemann insists that Paul counters the Gnostic use of *soma*.⁷⁶ For example, in his view of the lordship of Christ, the counter-

⁷³ Ibid., 117-8.

⁷⁴ Ibid., 118. Detailed analysis of difference between the Pauline letters and the Deutero-Pauline letters will be dealt in Chapter IV.

⁷⁵ Käsemann, *Perspectives on Paul*, 117.

⁷⁶ Ibid., 103-117.

claim of the salvific event in Christ is made against the rule of the primal man as such.

Käsemann also sees the body of Christ as a subjective genitive – the body upon which Christ is the Lord.

The contributions that Käsemann has made are crucial to my interpretation because he distinguishes the church and the body of Christ, and underscores the paraenetic contexts of the body of Christ. Paul exhorts the Corinthian community to live up to the life, death, and resurrection of the Christ, as I will emphasize in Chapter VI and VII. Yet, as I mentioned, my attempt is to go one-step further by including a postmodern understanding of body, ethics and theology (see Chapter III).

Wedderburn is not satisfied either with an understanding of the body of Christ as a metaphor for an ecclesiological organism because for him the crucified body is a basis for unity, in which each individual lives with Christ.⁷⁷ For him too, what believers lack is an active living of the Christ as a moral vision. Each individual should live as Christ lived, by giving up his/her life. This approach concerns primarily the role of individual Christians living in a world of division and conflict. While unity of the believers and Christ is emphasized, the believers' ethical role is not disregarded. Wedderburn emphasizes Christ's body (crucifixion and resurrection) in which believers are united

⁷⁷ A.J.M. Wedderburn, "The body of Christ and related concepts in 1 Cor" in *Scottish Journal of Theology*, 24 (1971): 74-96.

with Christ.⁷⁸ In other words, unity with Christ is based on Jesus' work, especially his cross and love.⁷⁹ Wedderburn clearly distinguishes between the body of Christ and the church, saying that the body of Christ cannot be simply identified with the church. His point is to reject the understanding of body of Christ as an ecclesiological organism metaphor by employing the literal sense of Jesus' crucifixion and resurrection as the basis of unity.⁸⁰ He also has a universal perspective concerning Christ's redeeming work, which is accomplished by one Christ, crucified and raised, with whom believers are united.⁸¹ Wedderburn reads the text symbolically, focusing on the crucified and resurrected Christ as a basis of unity.⁸² For similar reason, Cerfaux rejects the view that a "social body" be the body of Christ, and emphasizes the "physical" body of Christ.⁸³ Cerfaux's translation of 1 Cor 12:27 demonstrates his view of the body of Christ: "You are a body, a body which is that of Christ (dependent on him, and in which his life flows)."⁸⁴ Believers are united with Christ individually and unity is based on one person, Jesus' work, especially his cross.

⁷⁸ Wedderburn, "The body of Christ," 74-96.

⁷⁹ Ibid.

⁸⁰ Ibid.

⁸¹ Ibid.

⁸² Ibid.

⁸³ L. Cerfaux, *The Church in the theology of St Paul* (New York: Herder, 1959), 274.

⁸⁴ Ibid., 277.

Similarly, J. A. T. Robinson emphasizes the personal union with Christ.⁸⁵ For Robinson what matters is solidarity between individuals and the body of Christ. His notion of solidarity is not about Jews-gentile relations. Accordingly, Robinson rejects the Greek understanding of the dualistic, negative view of the body (*soma*) and relates *soma* to holism in the Old Testament tradition. Furthermore, Robinson states that the church as the body of Christ *is* the “resurrection body of Christ.”⁸⁶ But at the same time, Robinson especially points to “the body of the Cross” which is a basis of the believers’ union with Christ as he echoes Albert Schweitzer’s:⁸⁷

The body of Christ is no longer thought of by him as an isolated entity, but as the point from which the dying and rising again, which began with Christ, passes over to the Elect who are united with him. ... Christians have died in, with and through the crucified body of the Lord (have a share, that is, in the actual death that He died unto sin historically, ‘once for all; (Rom 6:10) because, and only because, they are now in and of His body in the ‘life that he liveth unto God,’ the body of the Church. It is only by baptism into Christ, that is ‘into (the) one body’ (1 Cor 12:13), only by an actual ‘participation in the body of Christ’ (1 Cor 10:16), that a man can be saved through His body on the Cross.

Robinson, as is clear from the above quotes, states that the body of Christ in 1 Cor 12:27 is “as concrete and as singular as the body of the Incarnation. His [Paul’s] underlying conception is not of a supra-personal collective, but of a specific personal organism.”⁸⁸

⁸⁵ Robinson, *The Body*, 51.

⁸⁶ Robinson, *The Body*, 51.

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, 47.

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, 51.

While going against the understanding of “body of Christ” as an ecclesiological organism, Robinson does not take into account the socio-economic, political dimensions of suffering in the world in his view of the body of the Cross. Rather, his theological lens remains within the traditional categories of Christology, as Schweitzer or Käsemann also do, at the sacrifice of the view of diversity and complexity of human life.

Corporate-Solidarity Approach

In this approach, the body of Christ metaphor is construed as a corporate body, a collective body of God. I will discuss here interpretations of scholars that include E. Schweitzer, Wheeler Robinson, and W.D. Davies. The relation of the church to this body varies depending on scholars. This approach traces back to Wheeler Robinson, who studied the “Hebrew conception of corporate personality” in the Old Testament.⁸⁹ According to him, group or community has primacy over individuals, as he describes characteristics of corporate personality:⁹⁰

(1) the unity of its extension both into the past and into the future; (2) the characteristic “realism” of the conception, which distinguishes it from “personification,” and makes the group a real entity actualized in its members; (3) the fluidity of reference, facilitating rapid and unmarked transitions from the one to the many, and from the many to the one; (4) the maintenance of the corporate idea even after the development of a new individualistic emphasis within it.

⁸⁹ Wheeler Robinson, *Corporate Personality in Ancient Israel* (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1980), 25-60.

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, 27.

The idea of a “corporate” body is carried over to that of the Second Adam (Jesus), who re-forms the community of God’s people. Because of its overall emphasis on continuity and solidarity with the entirety of human beings as a body, this approach tends to have a broader conception of the community, as we see from the so-called “New Perspective” in Pauline scholarship.

Eduard Schweizer views Adam as a patriarchal figure representing all humans, and thus sees Christ’s body including all in Christ through “substantial subjectivity in the form of activity in the concrete world.”⁹¹ Eduard Schweizer finds a lack of participation in Christ, especially a lack of participation with the cross of Christ, a universal mission mandated by Christ.⁹² Interpreting the body of Christ “as a missionary body, i.e., as an extension of the incarnation through evangelistic activity,” he views the universal church body as service, and to achieve this mission, he reads the metaphor of the body as part of *parenesis* by emphasizing the physical realism of the body of Christ on the cross.⁹³ He states that the congregation is dependent on the historical Christ event; the body of Christ is not identified physically with the church.⁹⁴ Rather he reads the body of Christ as the body on the cross, emphasizing the historical salvific event of Christ on

⁹¹ Schweizer, “The Missionary Body of Christ,” 5; “Σωμα κτλ,” 1074-80.

⁹² Schweizer, *The Church as the Body of Christ*, 23-40.

⁹³ Ibid.

⁹⁴ Ibid.

which “you” Christians depend. E. Schweizer clearly emphasizes the physical nature of the body of Christ, which becomes the basis for the corporate community of the body of Christ. For E. Schweizer, the phrase “in Christ” is a double-edged sword in the sense that it implies both a way of life in Christ and, as a result, a belonging to the (crucified) body of Christ.

W. D. Davies also sees the “body of Adam” as including all those who are in Adam, just as all need to be unified in Christ: Greek and Jew, male and female. Adam symbolically represents a real oneness of humankind (the “body” of Adam including all humankind), so the body of Christ, the new Adam, represents the oneness of the new humanity being incorporated in Christ.⁹⁵ W. D. Davies approaches the texts for their symbolism and inter-textual dimension with Rabbinic Judaism, whereby he finds a strong connection between the corporate nature of the body of Adam and of Christ.

Summary and Critique

Where we consider these three types of approaches to the interpretation of the metaphor “body of Christ” with our concern for the interpretations that exclude the marginalized and deny diversity, it appears that the Christological approach and the

⁹⁵ W. D. Davies, *Paul and Rabbinic Judaism: Some Rabbinic Elements in Pauline Theology*, 4th Ed. (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1980), 57.

corporate-solidarity approach are opening up possibilities although will not fully address our issue. But the ecclesiological organism approach needs to be rejected because it completely silences marginalized voices. The Christological approach has a critical, contextual consciousness about the apocalyptic time of now, and it asserts that Christians have to follow the will of God through the Spirit. Overall, scholars taking this approach have a great grasp of the believers' ethical responsibility as they live in a world torn apart. However, the common trap in this approach is to disregard the voice of others in terms of culture and religion. The vision of community and Christian life is limited to the discussion of traditional Christian theology in the sense of exclusivism, or forensic salvation, in which faith becomes the condition of salvation. The conception of community is narrow and closed. With the notion of "universalism" through faith in Christ, this approach cannot contemplate "diversity" in terms of how to live in relation with others.

In contrast, the corporate-solidarity approach seems to embrace a larger conception of the community with the theme of solidarity or reconciliation in the Jewish context. However, the phrase "in Christ" seems also to serve as a boundary marker. Ultimately, therefore, there is not much room for diversity and for intercultural or inter-religious encounters. Finally, the ecclesiological organism approach most rigidly

conceives of the community as it is based on “unity” which minimizes the meaning or role of Christ’s life and death for believers. In this approach, Paul is viewed as a socially conservative, elite, Roman Stoic rhetorician, who seeks peace and unity at the expense of diversity or difference in the community. What emerges from this approach is that Paul is the protector of patriarchy and social hierarchy. However, we can read 1 Corinthians, not from a single voice (a deliberative rhetoric of Paul) but from the angle of diversity and/or difference. Namely, 1 Corinthians can be legitimately understood as a multi-voiced *textus*, weaved through Paul’s replies to the reply of the Corinthians (both written letters and verbal reports to Paul) in which quotations from Paul’s opponents are part of the letter.⁹⁶ As such, we can re-construct bits and pieces of Paul’s handling of the Corinthian conflict differently than the socio-rhetorical model based on the Stoic notion of “unity.”

Actually, the proponents of the ecclesiological organism approach do not seem to make explicit their social locations or the role that these locations play in their hermeneutical choices. Why, for example, do scholars who embrace the ecclesiological organism view of “body of Christ” exclusively hear, in the dialogue between Paul and the Corinthian community, the elite voice of the *homonoia* (concord) speech, which is used to maintain the status quo in society? Because of this “unity” oriented approach, the

⁹⁶ Odell-Scott, *Paul's Critique of Theocracy*, 7-13.

“body of Christ” has been held captive for a long time, while serving ecclesial interests and legitimizing the powerful in society and the church. The fossilized body of Christ as a metaphor for a unified organism precludes other possibilities of meaning that would open the opportunity for cross-cultural dialogue with “others.”

To recognize this possibility, we must turn away from the text’s elite discourse, and discern the minority voices in the text, as one more readily does when associating oneself with the marginalized, rather than with the elite and the powerful who strive to maintain the status quo. The minority, marginalized voices in the text are clear and powerful: the weak (1:27; 4:10), “a slave to all” (9:19), “the rubbish of the world” (4:13), Christ crucified (1:23; 2:2), all of those who suffer like Christ and hope for the redemption of the community even in the midst of their liminal, marginal experience – just as Christ necessarily did. Christ crucified is a symbol and the power of God that reaches out to the downtrodden, the dregs of the world. In a nutshell, accounting for the crucified body as a dimension of the body of Christ provides us with a vision of the body of Christ in radical association with the broken bodies in the world. To get at this kind of radical sense of the body of Christ as expressed in 1 Corinthians, we must first envision “*Hermeneutics of Body*.” Thus, in the next chapter, I will expound in detail views of the body and community through history and culture. In the process, I will explore the hermeneutical choices made by biblical scholars and unleash an important but marginalized voice, long silenced or unheard because of the hegemonic body politic and dominating voice of the high class and power.

CHAPTER III

HERMENEUTICS OF BODY

The hegemonic body politic of “unity” or “concord” (*homonoia*) has dominated history and interpretation at the sacrifice of the marginalized, democratic voice. What is at stake is how to legitimate the marginalized, democratic voices in the community, and to revive such important voices in history. “Marginalized” connotes both a bizarre condition of life and a creative energy for freedom and justice, while “democratic” implies a body politic based on universal love without an imperial notion. Indeed, from my conviction and experience in theological education, what is at stake is not a search for an absolute, universal hermeneutics but an ethically responsible hermeneutics that challenges interpreters to see a broader conception of the community, as the result of listening to the marginalized voices in literature and history. The challenge lies in the fact that people, both ancient and today, do not want to hear these voices, out of self-preservation or ideology.

With such concerns and tasks in mind, I need to explain the title *Hermeneutics of Body*, because it delimits the scope, goal and content of this chapter. I use the term *hermeneutics* to designate an art of interpretation with a particular postmodern sensitivity,

one requiring a self-critical, context-conscious, and de(re)constructive approach.⁹⁷ The readers need to be self-critical, to be aware of both the context of the text and their own context, to deconstruct and reconstruct both the text and its readers. I use the term “postmodern” to refer primarily to the works of Derrida, Foucault and Ricoeur, who made extensive attempts to deconstruct traditional epistemological frameworks about language and historiography, and to reconstruct human reality based on egalitarian, emancipating, human embodiment. The genitive construction (“*of body*”) implies two things: in an attributive sense, this hermeneutics is ‘body-like’ (embodied); in an objective sense, this hermeneutics is about the body. “Body-like” is an adjective form, conceiving the body as a site of “living,” resistance, transformation, a condition for living, and for multidimensional embodiment.⁹⁸ For some times, the “body” has been an important topic for postmodern thinkers such as Foucault and feminists.⁹⁹ “Of body” designates a sense of direction for hermeneutics; it aims at postmodern embodiment, and rejects a unitary, hierarchical, or dualistic notion of the body. I do not suggest that there is a singular postmodern approach. However, I propose a specific, positive approach leading toward liberation and equality for all people while at the same time allowing

⁹⁷ Grenholm and Patte, “Overture,” 1-54.

⁹⁸ McLaren, *Feminism*, 19-79.

⁹⁹ Ibid.

diversity and humble openness. Thus, I reject nihilism or relativism according to which “anything-goes.” The challenge is how to live out a spirit of postmodernity that focuses on the ethics of interpretation. Thus for me, the postmodern (embodiment) hermeneutics should serve as an interpretive lens that focuses sharply on the struggles of the marginalized who have long been forgotten or unheard by interpreters. This kind of hermeneutics shifts our attention from a hierarchical, dualistic body to an embodied perspective focusing on the experience of the downtrodden, while problematizing the interpreters’ ideological stances that have kept them from seeing low culture’s struggle for justice.¹⁰⁰ Throughout this chapter, a *proleptic* question is whether Paul would use a hegemonic voice or a democratic, marginalized voice, or something else.

Having stated the overall goal for this chapter, what follows is a detailed map with which I will lay out a hermeneutics of body from a “postmodern” perspective. In the first part, I will analyze scholarly traditions about the conception of community in order to

¹⁰⁰ Feminists unfreeze traditional male-centered hermeneutics that does not see a radical voice (or theology of Paul) in the text. See Kathy Ehrensperger, “New Perspectives on Paul: No New Perspectives on Romans in Feminist Theology?” in *Gender, Tradition and Romans: Shared Ground, Uncertain Borders*, eds. Grenholm, Cristina and Daniel Patte (Harrisburg, PA.: Trinity Press International), 227-258 (forthcoming). She states: “Because a feminist theology seeks to elucidate in the Christian tradition both reasons for hope, justice and liberation, and the open and hidden history of distortion and domination, it has the obligation to be aware of its own presuppositions and limitations.” See also Segovia, *Decolonizing Biblical Studies*, 34-52. See also Daniel Patte, “Can One be Critical Without Being Autobiographical? The Case of Romans 1:26-27” in *Autobiographical Biblical Criticism: Academic Border Crossings – A Hermeneutical Challenge*, ed. Ingrid Rosa Kitzberger (Leiden: Deo Publishing, 2003), 34-59.

understand how differing strategies affect the body politic in terms of boundary, identity, and power relations in the community and society. Then, I will discuss the postmodern thinkers' de(re)constructions of the body. The last part concerns the intercontextual issues of the body about which we find a historical, ethical connection to the past, and about which there are common struggles and solidarity in the present. For this I will present current, postmodern de(re)constructions of the body in feminist and cultural studies.

Conception of the Community

The “historical” or “social” (primarily historical-critical, sociological or social-scientific approaches) paradigm, under the banner of scientific objectivism, sacrifices the diversity and complexity of the communities in history and culture without seriously considering their own social location or hermeneutical/theological choices.¹⁰¹ At first, it seems that history and historical social realities can be traceable and definable according to Christian thought. But when one does not pay attention to the issues raised by the postmodern-sensitive agenda such as geopolitics, sexuality, and ethnicity, one recognizes that one has exclusively attended to the voice of hegemony.¹⁰² In the following, I will

¹⁰¹ Grenholm and Patte, “Overture,” 1-54.

¹⁰² The main cause of the hegemonic way of interpretation lies in how Paul is described. From the ethos of German idealism and Tübingen school (using Hegelian dialogical analysis of history), Paul is portrayed as a person “motivated by a Hellenistic desire for the One, which among other things produced an ideal of an universal human essence, beyond difference and hierarchy” as Boyarin puts it. Boyarin, *A Radical Jew*:

analyze and contrast different approaches to the construction of community: the “theological” or historical” approach, the history of religions school approach, the social-scientific approach, and the postmodern approach.

The “theological” or “historical” Approach

Within this approach, two branches stand out. First, German idealism-influenced theological branch is closely related to the general political, philosophical agenda in the nineteenth century, which is a search for pure or absolute truth.¹⁰³ Representative of this period is F. C. Baur, influenced by the Hegelian dialectic of thesis-antithesis-synthesis,

Paul and the Politics of Identity, 181. Ehrensperger points out such a tendency: “The ideological basis for this Pauline universalism is in fact found in Platonic philosophy and its dualistic perception of the world.” From this kind of logic reading Paul as a person promoting universal human being, there is “no room for difference and particularity” because “this Christian hierarchical universalism” denies “equality and equal rights to those who are different from this Western Christian man as the ideal of universal identity.” See Ehrensperger, “New Perspectives on Paul: No New Perspectives on Romans in Feminist Theology?” 227-258. See also Vincent Wimbush, “Reading Texts as Reading Ourselves: A Chapter in the History of African-American Biblical Interpretation” in *Reading from this Place*, vol.1, eds. Fernando F. Segovia and Mary Ann Tolbert (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1995), 95-108. See also Mary Ann Tolbert, “Reading for Liberation” in *Reading from this Place*, vol. 1. See also Ahn Byung-Mu, “Jesus and the Minjung in the Gospel of Mark” in *Voices from the Margin*, ed. R.S. Sugirtharajah (London: ORBIS/SPCK, 1997), 85-104. See also Kwok Pui Lan, “Discovering the Bible in the Non-biblical world” in *Voices from the Margin*, 289-305.

¹⁰³ F.C. Baur, *Paul: His Life and Works*, trans. E. Zeller (London: Williams and Norgate, 1873), 268-320. See also Baur, *The Church History of the First Three Centuries*, trans. Allan Menzies, vol.1 (London: Williams and Norgate 1878), 1-43; 61-65.

found “real, pure” Christianity in Paul’s stance against Judaism.¹⁰⁴ In other words, “Christianity” is seen through the lens of an ‘either/or’ logic as Baur sets in opposition Gentile Christians and Jewish Christians.¹⁰⁵ After all, European continental philosophy stands on its idealism, as Heidegger states: “it is not German idealism which has collapsed; it was the age (*Zeitalter*) which was not strong enough to remain equal to the grandeur, the breadth, and the original authenticity (*Ursprünglichkeit*) of this spiritual world, that is, to realize it truly, which means something different from simply applying maxims and ideas.”¹⁰⁶ As a result, their project of “pure religion” legitimates the hegemonic voice of “unity” both in society and in the church because it does not leave room for difference and diversity but require sameness of identity or “pure unity.”¹⁰⁷

¹⁰⁴ Ibid.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid.

¹⁰⁶ Quoted in Derrida, *Of Spirit: Heidegger and the Question*, trans. Geoffrey Bennington and Rachel Bowlby (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989), 60. See also Robert Jewett, *Paul the Apostle to America: cultural trends and Pauline scholarship* (Louisville, KY: Westminster/John Knox Press, 1994), 3-31.

¹⁰⁷ Jacques Derrida, “The Roundtable,” 12-15. Derrida distances himself from all unity-oriented discourses or of mere multiplicity: “Pure unity or pure multiplicity—when there is only totality or unity and when there is only multiplicity or disassociation—is a synonym of death,” Derrida, “The Roundtable,” 13. Rather, he posits an identity of self-differentiation through radical thinking. After interview with Derrida, John Caputo observes rightly about him: For Derrida, there is no “*Wesen* and no *telos* but only *différance*, no deep essence to keep things on course but a certain contingent assembly of unities subject always to a more radical open-endedness that constantly runs the risk of going adrift.” Caputo continues: Derrida rejects “Hegel’s notion of a dialectical unity-in-difference” because it is “archeoteological” and assumes higher principles or the Spirit. See Caputo, *Deconstruction in a Nutshell*, 117.

By contrast, Bultmann de-emphasizes the historical nature of Christianity and demythologizes New Testament materials to make existential sense of them for modern readers.¹⁰⁸ But his project ends up with the same either/or logic, not seeing the world outside Christianity. For Bultmann, this happens because his theology is based on a forensic understanding of salvation for which faith is the condition for an authentic existence in Christ.¹⁰⁹ Diversity in culture was not the point for him; rather, his interest was still in “unity” language; “in Christ” is a boundary marker. For this reason, I call German scholarship in this period a search for “pure religion,” one that simply denies diversity in human life.

Accordingly, the salvation history perspective focuses on “history” but primarily with Christological interest, not including the other aspects of history or other cultures. For example, Munck, in his book *Paul and the Salvation of Mankind*, views Paul as “the Apostle to the Gentiles” and “the central figure in the story of salvation.”¹¹⁰ In exegesis of Rom 9-11, Munck clearly puts the history of salvation into a historical frame in terms of the meaning of the Gentile mission: “the fullness of the Gentiles, which is Paul’s aim, is the decisive turning-point in redemptive history. With that there begins the salvation of

¹⁰⁸ Rudolf Bultmann, *Kerygma and Myth*, trans. Reginald H. Fuller (London, S.P.C.K., 1962-64), 208-9.

¹⁰⁹ Bultmann, *Theology of the New Testament*, vol. 1, 270-285. See also Bultmann, *The Presence of Eternity: History and Eschatology* (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1975), 41, 138-155.

¹¹⁰ Johannes Munck, *Paul and the Salvation of Mankind* (Richmond: John Knox Press, 1960), 49.

Israel and the coming of Antichrist, and through it the coming of Christ for judgment and salvation, and so the end of the world.”¹¹¹ Munck places Paul’s specific role in this salvation history: “Paul’s apostolic consciousness in its eschatological form stands at the center of his personality and theology in quite a different way than is usually supposed.”¹¹² In fact, Munck’s view of salvation history corrects the Tübingen school’s hypothesis that Pauline Christianity replaces (or counters) the Petrine Christianity (Jerusalem church) because for Munck the real difference does not lie in theological issues but only in strategic matter about the order of mission. The apostles in Jerusalem insisted their mission to the Jews first whereas Paul believed that the Gentile mission would lead to the salvation of Israel.¹¹³ However, Munck reduces Pauline theology of salvation to an inflexible paradigm of salvation history at the expense of diverse or complex situation of Paul and his community and society in general, in which conflicting voices reside in the form of social, political, economic, cultural, and religious struggles.

Similarly, Cullmann approaches the New Testament through a salvation-historical perspective according to which the centerpiece of faith does not change over time; faith

¹¹¹ Ibid., 49. See also *Christ and Israel: An Interpretation of Romans 9-11* (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1967), 3-22.

¹¹² Munck, *Paul*, 42.

¹¹³ Ibid.

and salvation are historical in nature and progress toward consummation.¹¹⁴ Cullmann's understanding of history contrasts with Bultmann. For Bultmann faith involves personal, existential decision-making on the part of the individual regardless of the historical faith of Jesus, whereas Cullmann historicizes faith through the perspective of salvation history at the price of other aspects of history and salvation in Jesus' ministry. For example, Cullmann does not emphasize Jesus' primary ministry of justice for all people in the present.¹¹⁵ In the same vein, he does not envision that Paul's ministry or theology could expand into a radical theology of inclusion of all "in Christ," which is to live like Christ.

Here with Derrida we need to question the metaphysical concept of history, and be aware that history is "not only linked to linearity, but to an entire *system* of implications (teleology, eschatology, elevating and interiorizing accumulation of meaning, a certain type of traditionality, a certain concept of continuity, of truth)."¹¹⁶ For Derrida, Althusser's critique of "the Hegelian concept of history and of the notion of an expressive totality aims at showing that there is not one single history, a general history, but rather histories *different* in their type, rhythm, mode of inscription."¹¹⁷

Mostly, this theological/historical approach paid no attention to a broad, diverse,

¹¹⁴ Cullmann, *Salvation in History*, tr. Sidney G. Sowers (New York: Harper & Row, 1967), 65; 19-83.

¹¹⁵ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁶ Derrida, *Positions*, 56-60.

¹¹⁷ Derrida, *Positions*, 57-58.

complex “text” in the way Derrida conceives of it: “What I call *text* is also that which ‘practically’ inscribes and overflows the limits of such a discourse. *There is* such a general text everywhere that this discourse and its order (essence, sense, truth, meaning, consciousness, ideality, etc.) are *overflowed*.”¹¹⁸ Instead, scholars in this approach apply one category of “community” to the text of scripture (as “theology and history”). As a result, the historical critical methods’ negligence of “our” world and “us” as interpreters further limits their capacity to see the diversity in life and in the text.¹¹⁹

History of Religions School Approach

The history of religions school, heavily drawing on to the contemporary religious milieu of early Christianity, leads to a narrow and rigid interpretation of history and the Christian gospel and mission. Thus Bousset claims: “But – if there is to be only one religion – it is Christianity which must be the religion of the progressive nations of the earth. . . . Christianity is the only living religion that concerns us.”¹²⁰ A corollary of this view of Christianity automatically excludes other communities in other cultures.

¹¹⁸ Ibid., 59. See also Roland Barthes, “Theory of the Text” in *Untying the Text: A Post-Structuralist Reader*, ed. Robert Young (Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1981), 31-49.

¹¹⁹ Munck, *Paul*, 49. See also Cullmann, *Salvation in History*, 65; 19-83.

¹²⁰ Wilhelm M. Bousset, *What is Religion?* Tr. F. B. Low (New York and London: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1907), 267, 269.

Similarly, Troeltsch states: “Christianity must be understood not only as the culmination point but also as the convergence point of all the developmental tendencies that can be discerned in religion. It may therefore be designated, in contrast to other religions, as the focal synthesis of all religious tendencies and the disclosure of what is in principle a new way of life.”¹²¹ In this view, there is no room for dialogue with “others.” Likewise, fusing theology with culture, Troeltsch claims the invincibility of Christianity in Western culture: “The personalistic redemption-religion of Christianity is the highest and most significantly developed world of religious life . . . and having disclosed a wealth of potentialities in its fusion with the culture of antiquity and *that of the Germanic tribes of western Europe*” (Italics are mine and for emphasis).¹²² In the same vein, Bousset continues: “We hold fast with all our power to the faith of the Gospel in a personal, heavenly Father – *a faith which conquers the world and rises high above this world*, yet takes us into the world and the world’s work. We carry this idea of faith into our modern knowledge, into our representation of God” (italics mine).¹²³ Here one can see the double sided character of this school. Using a “scientific,” comparative research of background culture or religions, the interpretive result views Hellenistic culture as a backdrop of

¹²¹ Ernst Troeltsch, *The Absoluteness of Christianity and the History of Religions*, tr. David Reid (Richmond: John Knox Press, 1971), 114.

¹²² *Ibid.*, 117.

¹²³ Bousset, *Religion*, 294.

“distinct” Christianity. Bousset’s claim of Christian “superiority” over the “world” – in culture or religions - is based on the thesis that Hellenistic Christianity is distinct from primitive Palestinian Christianity. According to him, the use of “Κυριος” in Hellenistic cultic setting influenced Pauline theology and ministry, which is very different from Palestinian Christianity, in which apocalyptic imagery of the Son of Man is at the center.¹²⁴ As a corollary, Paul is portrayed as a true inheritor of “pious” Hellenistic Christianity and culture in which Paul’s theology and religiosity is shaped as Bousset states: “Thus for Paul Christ becomes the supra-terrestrial power which supports and fills with its presence his whole life. And this Christ piety of the apostle is summed up for him in the one great ever recurring formula of *en Kyrio einai*,”¹²⁵ which is not derived from the earthly life of Jesus of Nazareth. By all this, Bousset insists that Paul and Hellenistic Christianity are superior, higher, spiritualized form of religious life than that of primitive Christianity in Palestine. However, today, his view of opposition between Hellenistic Christianity and Palestine Christianity does not stand any longer for exegetical reasons, for example: the use of title *Kyrios* is not limited to the Hellenistic, Gentile communities only.¹²⁶

¹²⁴ Wilhelm Bousset, *Kyrios and Christos*, trans. John E. Steely (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1970), 46-55.

¹²⁵ Bousset, *Kyrios*, 154.

¹²⁶ Schuyler Brown, Book Review, *Catholic Biblical Quarterly* 33 (02):242-243. Glenn Hinson, Book Review, *Review and Expositor* 68 (04):548-549.

As Baur theologized Christian history in a Hegelian way, so Bousset promotes a specific form of Christianity found in piety or the spirit that tends to leave aside the ethics of Christian life based on Jesus' life, death and resurrection. I suspect that Bousset's dichotomy leads to the claim that Europe is a descendant of Hellenistic culture and Pauline Christianity and is thus superior. From my perspective, however, it is interesting to see such a "either/or" logic between Hellenism and Judaism. I further suspect that Bousset's claim (and German idealism in general) is reminiscent of European imperialism and colonialism based on the same ethos of piety, while not taking into account the holy presence of God in other culture, forgetting Jesus' proclamation of the "realm of God" (*basileia theou*) for the most marginalized people –social outcasts, sinners.

Käsemann is another example of the history of religions school. He uses the gnostic myth as the contemporary religious milieu to read Paul. In so doing, he makes a different theological choice that emphasizes the cosmic scale of redemption and lordship in Christ.¹²⁷ Shifting from Bultmann's existential, individual aspects of faith and salvation, Käsemann focuses on the cosmic community in Christ. But the weaker part of his interpretation of the body of Christ lies in his conception of the community that

¹²⁷ E. Käsemann, *Leib and Leib Christi*, 50ff; 181. See also Gundry, *Soma*, 225.

remains surrounded in Christological boundaries, leaving no room for the individual role of decision-making emphasized by Bultmann's existential interpretation.

The Sociological or Social-scientific Approach

The sociological or social-scientific approach is similar to the theological or historical one in terms of objectivity.¹²⁸ As a result, the marginalized voices are set aside or neglected to focus on the elite, dominant, hierarchical voice in society. For the sociological/social-scientific approach, the emphasis is on the meta-coherence of society, which takes the status quo for granted without considering the significance of the unheard voices in society. Accordingly, in this view, Paul is also pictured as a father (a *paterfamilias*), “responsible for exercising authority as well as maintaining order, peace and concord within his own family.”¹²⁹

The sociological or social-scientific approach, based on social functions, views society as a living organism, which has its own life.¹³⁰ Durkheim, the pioneer of

¹²⁸ David Horrell, *The Social Ethos of the Corinthian Correspondence: Interests and Ideologies from 1 Corinthians to 1 Clement* (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1996), 9-59.

¹²⁹ Trevor J. Burke, “Paul’s Role as ‘Father’ to his Corinthian ‘Children’ in Socio-Historical Context (1 Corinthians 4:14-21),” in *Paul and the Corinthians: Studies on a Community in Conflict*, Eds. Trevor J. Burke and J. Keith Elliott (Leiden: Brill, 2003), 107. See also S.J. Joubert, “Managing the Household: Paul as paterfamilias of the Corinthian Household” in *Modeling Early Christianity: Social Scientific of the New Testament in its Context*, ed. P.F. Esler (London: Routledge, 1995), 213-23.

¹³⁰ See E. Durkheim, *The Division of Labor in Society*, trans. George Simpson (New York: Free press,

functionalism sociology, states that “society is nothing unless it be one, definite body, distinct from its parts.”¹³¹ As “theology” is a hermeneutical centerpiece for the historical approach, here in the sociological (social-scientific) tradition, “society” is the only reference to which all other aspects of human existence, such as the transcendental, personal (subjectivity), or psychological dimension are sacrificed. For this school, the text of the New Testament is a product, not primarily of historical conditioning but of social and cultural conditioning. As a result, scholars in this tradition are more concerned with social and cultural forces that determine the lives of individuals, who are thought to be voiceless or mere reactors to society’s social forces.¹³² A few observations regarding this school of thought are in order. First, the “sociology of knowledge” presents a “symbolic universe,” a socially constructed world in which individuals must conform to social norms while being protected under the sacred canopy.¹³³ In this paradigm,

1933), 79-80. He uses Rousseau’s *Social Contract* to advocate for a social body. See Durkheim, *Montesquieu and Rousseau: Forerunners of Sociology* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan press, 1960), 76-115.

¹³¹ Ibid.

¹³² For the sociology of sect, see Anthony J. Saldarini, *Matthew's Christian-Jewish community* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), and *Pharisees, Scribes and Sadducees in Palestinian Society: A Sociological Approach* (Wilmington, Del.: M. Glazier, 1988). For the sociology of knowledge, see Peter Berger, *The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge* (New York: Anchor Books, 1990). 92-128. See also Peter Berger, *The Sacred Canopy: Elements of a Sociological Theory of Religion* (New York: Doubleday, 1967), 21-40.

For the functionalist approach, see Theissen, *Pauline Christianity*, 36-37, 96-99, 121-140.

¹³³ Berger, Peter and Thomas Luckmann, *The Social Construction of Reality*, 92-128. See also Peter Berger,

individuals have no voice in society except in as much as they follow socially constructed meanings. The problem is that the social norms tend to have a hegemonic (hierarchical) voice, to which individuals must conform bracketing out their *own* subjectivity or agency to change the society – as Peter Berger acknowledges in *A Rumor of Angels*.¹³⁴

Neyrey stands in this line of thought according to which individuals do not have true agency. From his anthropological perspective, individual bodies are mere respondents to society as social body.¹³⁵ By this reduction, unfortunately, one can miss the voice of the marginalized who are treated as voiceless or are invisible, staying in the system of the social body.¹³⁶

The “conflict” theorists (as in the “sociology of sects”) see the community in conflict with other parts of society, basing their views on Marx who treats society as a site for class struggle. However, because of an arbitrary, dichotomous division between “the ruling” and “the ruled” at the expense of diversity or complexity, and a definition of community in terms of its border with the rest of society, this model also suffers methodological limitations.

The Sacred Canopy, 21-40.

¹³⁴ Peter Berger, *A Rumor of Angels* (Garden City, N.Y.: Double and Company, Inc., 1969), 42-5.

¹³⁵ Neyrey, *Paul, in Other Words*, 104-5. See also Douglas, *Purity and Danger*, 114-5.

¹³⁶ *Ibid.*

The Postmodern Approach

Thus far, I have suggested the rigid conception of the community found in the historical, sociological, or social-scientific approaches; all of them posit strong boundary markers, be they theology, history, or society. Their methodological limitations, along with their own ideological social stands, lead to an inevitable exclusion of “others.” However, with postmodern sensitivity, the interpretive angle shifts toward the readers, who play a pivotal role in constructing the meaning of the text, not in the sense that any reading goes but in the sense that readers are responsible, text-based, context-conscious, and self-critical reading. Through this kind of sensitivity to both readers and text, one may see, hear, and speak to the invisible persons or the silenced voices in the community. In a postmodern view, there is no single sense of community as a unified whole¹³⁷ as opposed to Durkheim’s view, in which religion is “a unified system of beliefs and practices . . . which unite into one single moral community called a church, all those who adhere to them.”¹³⁸ By contrast, for us, the question is: Who defines the community? Who writes the history?¹³⁹ More specifically, does equality, freedom or justice exist in

¹³⁷ The view of social organism as unity is strong in functionalism, especially in E. Durkheim.

¹³⁸ E. Durkheim, *The Elementary Forms of Religious Life*, trans. Karen E. Fields (New York: Free press, 1995), 44.

¹³⁹ Walter Lowe, *Theology and Difference*, 5. See also Johann Baptist Metz, *Faith in History and Society: Toward a Practical Fundamental Theology*, trans. David Smith (New York: Seabury Press, 1980), 28-29.

the community and in society? Clearly, the “voices from the margins”¹⁴⁰ should question the conception of the community when it does not embrace the marginalized voices.¹⁴¹

This is what feminist studies do as they examine both the text and the readers, pointing out the androcentric and/or patriarchal construction of the Christian communities.¹⁴² Similarly, postcolonial studies problematize unequal power relations between colonizers and the colonized. Feminists and postcolonial theorists push to broaden the conception of the community to include all people. Indeed, a postmodern approach leads to emancipation with a new understanding of the community, which is a community for “all” – based not on an “either/or” and “inside/outside” notion of community but on an inclusive notion encompassing “all differences” in the community.¹⁴³ The postmodern, post-colonial and feminist understanding of community should not be monolithic but diversely complex and with a notion of “hybridity.”¹⁴⁴ In

¹⁴⁰ Elaine Wainwright, “A Voice from the Margin: Reading Matthew 15:21-28 in an Australian Feminist Key” in *Reading from This Place*, vol.2, 132-153.

¹⁴¹ Derrida, “The Roundtable,” 13; see also Derrida, *Points*, 348.

¹⁴² See Elisabeth Schüssler Fiorenza, “Rhetorical Situation and Historical Reconstruction in 1 Corinthians,” in *NTS* 33 (1987): 386-403; *In Memory of Her: A Feminist Theological Reconstruction of Christian Origins* (New York: Crossroad Press, 1983). See also Antoinette Clark Wire, *The Corinthian Women Prophets: A Reconstruction through Paul’s Rhetoric* (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1990), 116-134. Wire points out that Paul suppresses women Christians who radically proclaim their freedom in Christ.

¹⁴³ See Jung Young Lee, *Marginality: the Key to Multicultural Theology* (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1995), 29-76. Lee claims that multicultural theology should be based on a perspective of “in-both” and “in-beyond.” See also David Odell-Scott, *Paul’s Critique of Theocracy*, 21-23.

¹⁴⁴ Homi Bhabha, *The Location of Culture* (London and New York: Routledge, 1995), 4, 114-5, 219, 242.

this regard, one should allow for a creative, “intervening space” in which people struggle to locate themselves in encountering others, and begin to identify common goals, but without sacrificing the creative tensions of living in ambiguity and uncertainty in our life.¹⁴⁵ Bell hooks also confirms the power of marginality by distinguishing the chosen and involuntary marginality.¹⁴⁶ Marginal power is an affirmation of one’s marginal status as a third space and a re-creation of hope. Similarly, Fanon argues that he is an agent of change;¹⁴⁷ everything is changing. In this struggle to locate a sense of community and culture, what is at stake is the creative “invention into existence.”¹⁴⁸

Comparison of Different Approaches

By way of summary, and to contrast the views of body politic of traditional approaches with that of the postmodern one, I will offer a broad-brush comparison in terms of boundary, identity, and power/structure in the community and society.

Therefore, the newly conceived community is not a single community based on a single category.

¹⁴⁵ Ibid. See also hooks, *Yearning*, 149-152.

¹⁴⁶ Ibid.

¹⁴⁷ Frantz Fanon, *Black skin, white masks*, trans. Charles Lam Markmann (New York, Grove Press, 1967), 229, 230.

¹⁴⁸ Ibid.

Boundaries

I use boundary to refer to socially hierarchical boundary that defines the existence of the marginalized both in society and Pauline communities. As seen before, these boundaries, whether theological or social, remain fixed due to theological or social concerns that keep the boundaries intact, which boils down to a rigid, narrow, hierarchical sense of community.¹⁴⁹ Social science or sociological perspectives never question the existence of these boundaries but explain them away by resorting either to grand narrative or to the mechanisms of society in which the voice of the marginalized is not heard. The main way of thinking in this tradition is that society at all macro level decides for individuals at the micro level, as is clear in Mary Douglas' scholarship according to which individuals have no agency to change the world or challenge existing boundaries.¹⁵⁰ Therefore, in this system of thought, the whole concern is about how to maintain the community or society based on social functions as Theissen does when he speaks of love patriarchy - a moderate functionalism according to which a few rich or upper class people maintain the Pauline communities. The sociological social-scientific

¹⁴⁹ Munck, *Paul*, 49. See also Cullmann, *Salvation in History*, 65; 19-83.

¹⁵⁰ Douglas, *Purity and Danger*, 114-5. In contrast with Douglas, Fiorenza acknowledges agency of women who opposed society's hierarchical, patriarchic voices in Pauline communities. Fiorenza, *In Memory of Her*, 79-80; idem, "Rhetorical Situation and Historical Reconstruction in 1 Corinthians," 386-403; See also Wire, *The Corinthian Women Prophets*, 116-134. I agree with Fiorenza's reconstruction of women voice as agency but I do not agree with her view of Paul. I read Paul as egalitarian throughout my dissertation.

approaches envision high boundaries (norms) based on social functions or conflict that is required to maintain the status quo of society. Evidently, the existence or experience of the marginalized never takes priority or full attention in the social science or sociology school because the marginalized are invisible, hidden behind the “big” people in society or in the community.

The picture presented here is plausible only if Paul holds such a view of dominant society as hierarchically divided by boundaries between the rich and the poor or between the genders. Though I agree with the so-called New Consensus that Pauline Christianity in the urban setting is composed of a cross-section of urban population ranging from slaves to upper class, I do not agree with Meeks, Theissen or Martin on their view of functionalism (love patriarchy) which allows hierarchical boundaries. The key depends on the character of the Pauline communities where Paul’s theology and ethics are embedded. As I will show in the chapters below, Pauline theology does not necessitate this kind of social boundaries; it can be interpreted as a radical theology of “community for all” based on de(re)construction. Paul can be read as a strong advocate for egalitarianism based on a radical theology of Christ crucified, as I will discuss in chapter V and VI.¹⁵¹ This picture is plausible when one reads the voice of the

¹⁵¹ See Ched Myers, “Balancing Abundance and Need,” *The Other Side* 34 (1998), no.5. Elliott, “Paul’s Letters,” 122-147. Horsley, “Rhetoric and Empire,” 72-102.

marginalized along with Paul's theology and ethics. Therefore, the real question is not so much who comprises the Pauline communities as what is in the mixture of Pauline communities and how we understand it.

Unfortunately, social history or sociologist perspectives explained Pauline congregations, using "status inconsistency," functionalism, social deviance group theory, all of which lead to support the status quo of society and the community.¹⁵² From this perspective, Pauline community does not challenge social boundaries found in hierarchy or women's degradation.¹⁵³

The postmodern approach questions the existence of boundaries by asking: "Who sets boundaries? Who controls?." Along with that suspicion about boundaries, feminists defy the fixation of boundaries in any sorts, acknowledging "the deeply haunting presence of *ambivalence* and *ambiguity* which runs through all attempts of interpretation and existential transformations."¹⁵⁴ Feminist or liberation movements challenge a highly built boundary constructed by men or elites, and their doctrines, and challenge a traditional notion of the community based on hierarchy that legitimates an

¹⁵² Wayne Meeks, *The First Urban Christians: The Social World of the Apostle Paul* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983), 74-75; 164-170.

¹⁵³ Fiorenza, *In Memory of Her*, 79-80.

¹⁵⁴ Ursula King, "Feminist Theologies in Contemporary Contexts: A Provisional Assessment" in eds. Sawyer and Collier *Is there a Future for Feminist Theology?* (Sheffield : Sheffield Academic Press, 1999), 109. Regarding the fluidity of boundaries, see Bhabha, *The Location of Culture*, 34-5, 114-5.

unequal power relationship in the community.¹⁵⁵ Therefore, there should be no definite, absolute, or permanent boundaries.¹⁵⁶ Rather, boundaries should blur and change to include all in the conception of a community and in its practices.¹⁵⁷

Identity

The question of identity concerns the personal, individual sense of who these individuals are both for themselves and the community. In a theological/historical approach, personal identity is fixed and singular; it depends on where one belongs. If one belongs to an orthodox community, that person's identity stays the same and is set over against "others" outside the group. In other words, personal identity is established or labeled by belonging to a specific group and in order to stay in that community its members are forced to follow certain norms. However, as Tan observes, regarding her multicultural context of Singapore, such a dichotomous "either/or" view of identity between Christian and Chinese is misleading. For her the hermeneutical key to understanding Pauline texts about whether "to eat or not eat" (1 Cor 14:1-15:13) does not

¹⁵⁵ Fiorenza, *In Memory of Her*, 79-80; idem, "Rhetorical Situation and Historical Reconstruction in 1 Corinthians," 386-403; See also Wire, *The Corinthian Women Prophets*, 116-134.

¹⁵⁶ Mark G. Brett, "Interpreting ethnicity," in *Ethnicity and the Bible*, ed. Mark G. Brett (Boston: Brill Publishers, 2002), 3-22.

¹⁵⁷ Bhabha, *The Location of Culture*, 34-5, 114-5.

lie in a separation logic of who is right or wrong (either/or) but in “community relationships” where the naming of identity or fighting for who is right or wrong does not stand any longer.¹⁵⁸ The key point is not a kind of sectarian mentality of where one belongs but a communal view of how to relate to each other in the community, in this case between the “strong” and the “weak” in Paul’s text.¹⁵⁹

In the sociological, social-scientific approach as well, an individual identity remains singular or fixed. The only difference with the theological approach lies in the way identity is defined. In the case of the historical theological approach, identity is defined in terms of theological or historical categories, whereas in the sociological approach it is defined in terms of sociological categories related to the body politic. In the postmodern approach, however, the notion of identity varies. Here identity is thought of in terms of a hybridity that rejects a singular construction of identity. Through the demise of fixed, singular, monolithic identity politics,¹⁶⁰ a postmodern approach views identity as a floating, “intervening space.”¹⁶¹ This is a double-edged sword. Postmodern identity

¹⁵⁸ Tan, “Judging and Community in Romans,” 39-62.

¹⁵⁹ Ibid.

¹⁶⁰ It is important to recognize a postmodern sense of politics that rejects identity politics based on an either/or dichotomy.

¹⁶¹ Bhabha, *The Location of Culture*, 34-5, 114-5. See also Nicole Wilkinson Duran and Derya Demirer, “1 Corinthians 11 in Christian and Muslim Dialogue” in *Global Bible Commentary*, ed. Daniel Patte (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 2004), 451-4.

involves a strong sense of self-identity, which can help the spirit of emancipation. On the other hand, one's identity needs to be constantly re-created as it re-creates a new hybridity in dialogue with others in the community and society. In this line, Yeo's cross-cultural hermeneutics emphasizes cross-cultural dialogue and engagement between the gospel and culture - a space for re-living the gospel in a new way.¹⁶²

Structure or Power Relationship

Structure or power relationships differ according to the differing approaches. In the theological/historical approach, there is a clear sense of hierarchical relationship within the community with the conviction that a unique, historical revelation is established and handed down through the "rightful" (or theocratic) leadership of the church.¹⁶³ There is also a sense of hierarchy that the church is an agent of God, a bearer of truth, with an ultimate power upon the world.¹⁶⁴ Consequently, there is a perception of a hierarchy between church and society with a notion that the world is God's for which

¹⁶² K.K. Yeo, "Cross-tradition and Cross-gender Hermeneutics": A Confucian Reading of Romans and a Critical Reading of Confucian Ethics" in *Gender, Tradition, Romans*, 63-80 (forthcoming).

¹⁶³ This kind of claim can be easily found in the German idealist scholarship of the Tübingen school.

¹⁶⁴ Schweitzer, *The Church as the Body of Christ*, 23-40, and his "The Church as the Missionary Body of Christ," 5. Wilhelm Bousste, *Kyrios and Christos*, 46-55; *What is Religion?* 267-9. See also Troeltsch, *The Absoluteness of Christianity*, 114.

the community of faith (the church) takes center stage.¹⁶⁵ The sense of “theocracy” is strong both in the church and in society.¹⁶⁶ Ironically, however, in this approach, there is no clear sense of resistance or protest against social injustice or corruption. This silence and this lack of resistance toward society perpetuate the internal hierarchical structure by condoning the very same hierarchical, abusive power in society, at the cost of the marginalization of women, the poor and the weak.¹⁶⁷

The sociological social-scientific approach does not lead to theocracy as the theological, historical approach does. Yet it presupposes a hierarchical structure within the society based on functions or conflicts.¹⁶⁸ The sociological analysis of social functions in a given society does not fully cover or account for the diversity or

¹⁶⁵ E. Schweizer, idem. J.A.T. Robinson, *The Body*, 51. See also L. Cerfaux, 274, 277. See also H. Schlier, *The Relevance of the New Testament* (New York: Herder and Herder, 1968), 22-25. Wedderburn, “The body of Christ and related concepts in 1 Cor” in *Scottish Journal of Theology*, 24 (1971): 74-96. See also “salvation history” scholars such as Munck and Cullmann. Munck, *Paul*, 49. Cullmann, *Salvation in History*, 65; 19-83.

¹⁶⁶ Odell-Scott points out the problem of theocracy both in interpretation of Pauline letters and in church practice of sacred authority, explaining that the English term church is derived from Greek *kuriake* meaning “belonging to the Lord.” Odell-Scott rightly observes the theocratic tendency in the Pauline context and in the text along with interpreters. He suggests that Paul’s theology must be understood in terms of Paul’s critique of the power language and of language about belonging and being dominated. See Odell-Scott, *Paul’s Critique of Theocracy*, 1-5.

¹⁶⁷ There are many examples of this tendency. Under the dictatorship in Korea for example, most of churches did not protest the central government for its injustice, and implicitly called for obedience to the dictatorship’s authority in the church from their members. Silence about injustice supported the dictatorial power in the church.

¹⁶⁸ Theissen, *Pauline Christianity*, 36-37, 96-99, 121-140. Martin, *The Corinthian Body*, 92-96.

complexity in society and the community.¹⁶⁹ In the postmodern approach, both the conception of community and the power structure are re-examined to move toward emancipation and re-creation of the community for “all” with power shared.¹⁷⁰ In the postmodern approach, due to its ethos, everything is tested: whether it is a matter of personal concerns, community, society or nation.¹⁷¹ All kinds of politics, whether of identity politics or gender politics,¹⁷² should be tested through the prism of differentiation.¹⁷³

¹⁶⁹ Ibid.

¹⁷⁰ Derrida, “The Roundtable,” 15. Douglas K. Harink, *Paul among the Postliberals: Pauline Theology beyond Christendom and Modernity* (Grand Rapids, MI.: BrazosPress, 2003), 242-48.

¹⁷¹ Derrida, “The Roundtable,” 13-15.

¹⁷² I use here “identity politics” in the sense that scholars or practitioners of politics advocate one identity against the other by making distinctions between oppressors and oppressed, as one can see from one strand of feminism where radical feminists stand in opposition to men. See McLaren, *Feminism*, 1-17.

¹⁷³ Derrida, “The Roundtable,” 13-15. Derrida emphasizes self-differentiation of identity, culture, and community from itself and with others. The condition of being different is a basis of substantial community. The following quotation helps to clarify what he states: “Sometimes the struggles under the banner of cultural identity, national identity, linguistic identity, are noble fights. But at the same time the people who fight for their identity must pay attention to the fact that identity is not the self identity of a thing, this glass, for instance, this microphone, but implies a difference within identity. That is, the identity of a culture is a way of being different from itself; a culture is different from itself; language is different from itself; the person is different from itself. Once you take into account this inner and other difference, then you pay attention to the other and you understand that fighting for your own identity is not exclusive of another identity, is open to another identity. And this prevents totalitarianism, nationalism, egocentrism, and so on” (p.13).

Body in Postmodern De(re)construction (Derrida, Foucault, Ricoeur)

For a long time in history, since Platonic dualism, the “body” has been a site of oppression, a symbol of individual social status, and a metaphor for social concord or hierarchical unity.¹⁷⁴ In the Roman Empire, for example, sexuality is controlled with concerns about social order: “Stoic attitudes to marital intercourse deliberately stared past the possibility of erotic satisfaction to the grave and purposive gestures of the public man. . . . Even the marriage chamber was to be ‘a school of orderly behavior.’”¹⁷⁵ In addition, the bodies of the slaves in the Greco-Roman world became objects of economic property and of public execution. A discovery of a wall inscription from *Puteoli* suggests how the execution of slaves took place at the price of almost nothing.¹⁷⁶ This advertisement hints that slave bodies are at the mercy of masters and executed like waste in society.¹⁷⁷

¹⁷⁴ Peter Brown, *Society and Body: Men, Women, and Sexual Renunciation in Early Christianity* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988), 21-22.

¹⁷⁵ Brown, *Society and Body*, 21. See Plutarch, *Conjugalia Praecepta* 47.144F. Brown states: “pagan and Christian alike, the upper classes of the Roman Empire in its last centuries lived by codes of sexual restraint and public decorum that they liked to think of as continuous with the virile austerity of archaic Rome.”

¹⁷⁶ I give special thanks to Prof. Laurence Welborn who provided me with ample references about this inscription as well as keen insights on the topic of slavery and crucifixion in the Greco-Roman world. See *L'année épigraphique* (1971): 88. See also O. F. Robinson, “Slaves and the Criminal Law,” *Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung für Rechtsgeschichte* 98 (1981): 223-27; T. P. Wiseman, *Catullus and His World: a Reappraisal* (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 7-8; K.R. Bradley, *Slavery and Society at Rome* (Cambridge [England]; New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 166.

¹⁷⁷ Bradley, *Slavery*, 166.

As Martin observed, the body has also played a role in determining individual social status in the ideology of the upper class in the Greco-Roman society.¹⁷⁸ The strong and healthy body is a symbol and an ideology for the upper class' glorification and social control.¹⁷⁹ The other side of that ideology points to the oppression of the weaker bodies, who are mainly slaves or women.¹⁸⁰ Likewise, the use of the body as a strong metaphor for social body (social concord) was very popular in high culture in the Greco-Roman world as discussed earlier.¹⁸¹ This metaphoric use of social body and its subsequent emphasis on "unity" or "concord" is a ruling ideology that cements the hierarchical social body.¹⁸² A majority of scholars today read this dominant voice of hierarchical ideology as the background for Paul's theology and ethics.¹⁸³ However, I will argue throughout my dissertation that Paul opposes this dominant, hierarchical voice by the counter-image of Christ crucified. Are slaves not humans – voiceless and invisible? Nevertheless, if we can read the Aesop traditions freshly, while keeping in mind this critiquing spirit, there is a voice of silence, a silent philosophy.¹⁸⁴ There are certain voices that call for change as

¹⁷⁸ Martin, *The Corinthian Body*, 3-86.

¹⁷⁹ Ibid.

¹⁸⁰ Ibid., 139-162.

¹⁸¹ Mitchell, *Paul and the Rhetoric of Reconciliation*, 20-64; 65-68; 157-164; 266-270. Martin, *The Corinthian Body*, 38-46.

¹⁸² Ibid.

¹⁸³ Ibid.

¹⁸⁴ B.E. Perry, *Aesopica*, vol. 1, (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1952), 35-77. *Aesop's Fables with a*

we will see from popular or low culture and resistant Cynic philosophers such as

Diogenes of Sinope (412-323 BCE).¹⁸⁵

Derrida

Given the intellectual history that I mentioned above, including both text (Greco-Roman world) and interpreters in history, our first postmodern figure, Derrida, arrives to critique logocentrism and a singular construction of meaning that fails to account for multiple contexts and an interaction of signifiers.¹⁸⁶ Meaning is not a given in the text but is negotiated, as he says: interpretation is “a knot of negotiation” full of “different rhythms, different forces, different differential vibrations of time and rhythm.”¹⁸⁷

Meaning is “technical and representative” as Derrida continues:¹⁸⁸

Life of Aesop, trans. John E. Keller and L. Clark Keating (Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 1993), 10. See also Paolo Scarpi, “The Eloquence of Silence: aspects of a power without words” in *The Regions of Silence: Studies on the Difficulty of Communicating*, ed. M. G. Ciani (Amsterdam : J.C. Gieben, 1987), 19-40.

¹⁸⁵ According to Diogenes Laertius, Diogenes of Sinope was a Greek Cynic philosopher, pupil of Antisthenes, and was born in Sinope and lived in Athens. He emphasized the simple life, criticizing conventional wisdom. When Alexander the Great asked what he might do for him, Diogenes said, “Only step out of my sunlight.” His daylight search “for an honest man” with a lantern is striking to his contemporaries. See Diogenes Laertius, 6.20-81.

¹⁸⁶ Derrida, “Différance” in *Margins of Philosophy*, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1982), 1-27. See also his interview, “The Roundtable,” 1-28.

¹⁸⁷ Derrida, *Negotiations*, 29.

¹⁸⁸ Jacques Derrida, *Of Grammatology*, trans. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974), 9. Derrida also states “...one is always working in the mobility between several

All signifiers, and first and foremost the written signifier, are derivative with regard to what would wed the voice indissolubly to the mind or to the thought of the signified sense, indeed to the thing itself.....The written signifier is always technical and representative. It has no constitutive meaning.....This notion remains therefore within the heritage of that logocentrism which is also a phonocentrism: absolute proximity of voice and being, of voice and the meaning of being, of voice and ideality of meaning.

Therefore, rejecting a singular notion of the body and the text,¹⁸⁹ Derrida introduces a *différance* connoting two things: to defer or to differ. Meaning should not be taken as permanent and each meaning should be different in contexts. Derrida states that “*différance* is the name we might give to the ‘active,’ moving discord of different forces, and of differences of forces, that Nietzsche sets up against the entire system of metaphysical grammar, wherever this system governs culture, philosophy, and science.”¹⁹⁰

For Derrida deconstruction is possible because the written text is not a correct or genuine mirror of reality. Therefore, the search for a fixed meaning is an illusion. Rather, meaning, in its most faithful form that allows for a self-critical, humbling spirit, is a negotiation between readers, signifiers and contexts.¹⁹¹ Derrida does not believe in one,

positions, stations, places, between which a shuttle is needed.” Jacques Derrida, *Negotiations: interventions and interviews, 1971-2001*, edited, translated, and with an introduction by Elizabeth Rottenberg (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002), 12.

¹⁸⁹ Derrida, “*Différance*,” 1-27.

¹⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, 18. See also Derrida, “The Roundtable,” 12-15.

¹⁹¹ Derrida, *Negotiations*, 29.

fixed, universal meaning in any written text.¹⁹² This critique is twofold. One is to deconstruct the text. Another is to revolutionize the concept of text, the boundary of the text, which includes written and unwritten texts such as cultural location. Not only is the written text deconstructed but its readers as well. The best term to account for his meaning search can be found in the neologism “différance.”¹⁹³ Hermeneutically, it is possible to pursue a multiple, complex meaning without claiming to have a single, universal truth/knowledge about the body.¹⁹⁴ More importantly, deconstruction itself is not a method but a spirit or meta-critique of logo-centrism.¹⁹⁵ In the end, deconstruction itself is not a purpose; Derrida’s ultimate interests lie in the vision for a just world, and the reconstruction of such a world based on more diversified views and contexts.¹⁹⁶

Foucault

Foucault, our second postmodern figure, is the first person to place the body at the center of our intellectual inquiry.¹⁹⁷ The old paradigm that Foucault rejects is the

¹⁹² Ibid.

¹⁹³ Derrida, “Différance,” 1-27.

¹⁹⁴ Derrida, “The Roundtable,” 12-15.

¹⁹⁵ Ibid., 9.

¹⁹⁶ Ibid., 12-15.

¹⁹⁷ Foucault discusses body from a perspective of “power.” His works show the consistent theme of embodiment and a rejection of any kind of oppressive power, social or political, local or state. Foucault’s works can be regrouped by three categories: i) Archaeological works include *The Birth of the Clinic* (New

mechanical or dualistic, hierarchical view of the body based on unified, transcendental subjectivity.¹⁹⁸ With this old paradigm, science-driven Enlightenment establishes the body as an object while Platonic hierarchical dualism posits the body as a heavy burden and prison cell. However, Foucault, seeing the body as connected to a wide web of political and personal struggle, deplores the manipulation and oppression of human bodies by the hegemonic power of society.¹⁹⁹ For him, as McLaren points out, the body is “more than the locus of subjectivity; it is the very condition of subjectivity.”²⁰⁰ In other words, his hermeneutic of body aims at re-covering the body from social control. For this goal, Foucault centers on knowledge, power and subjectivity.²⁰¹ His first period works show that knowledge is not neutral; production of knowledge becomes a tool for

York: Vintage Books, 1973), *The Order of Things* (New York: Vintage Books, 1973), *The Archaeology of Knowledge* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1972); ii) genealogical works include *Discipline and Punish* (New York: Vintage Books, 1995), *The History of Sexuality v.1* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1978); and iii) ethical works include *The Use of Pleasure* (New York: Vintage Books, 1990), *The Care of the Self* (New York: Vintage Books, 1988). See also McLaren, *Feminism*, 4.

¹⁹⁸ Foucault, *The Order of Things*, 385-6; *The Archaeology of Knowledge*, 54, 73.

¹⁹⁹ Foucault, *History of Sexuality I*, 88-96; “Truth and Power,” “Two Lectures,” “The Eye of Power,” “Power and Strategies,” and “Body/Power,” in *Power and Knowledge* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1980); “Intellectuals and Power,” “Power Affects the Body,” and “Clarifications on the Question of Power” in *Foucault Live: interviews, 1961-1984* (New York: Semiotext, 1996); “Afterword: The Subject and Power,” in *Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics*, Hubert L. Dreyfus and Paul Rainbow (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), 208-226.

²⁰⁰ McLaren, *Feminism*, 83.

²⁰¹ Foucault, *The Order of Things*, 385-6; *The Archaeology of Knowledge*, 54, 73. See also McLaren, *Feminism*, 4.

social control and legitimation: “the exercise of power perpetually creates knowledge and, conversely, knowledge constantly induces effects of power.”²⁰² Then, in his second period works, Foucault turns to “power,” which he understands as a network operating through discourses, institutions, and other practices in culture.²⁰³ Power exercises on human bodies: “What was then being formed was a policy of coercions that act on the body, a calculated manipulation of its elements, its gestures, its behavior. The human body was entering a machinery of power that explores it, breaks it down and rearranges it... Thus, discipline produces subjected and practiced bodies, ‘docile’ bodies.”²⁰⁴ In his last period works, he moves to the question of subjectivity, and ethics. In the last works such as in “The Ethic of Care for the Self as a Practice of Freedom,” Foucault focuses on subjectivity that individuals may alter power relationships with the spirit of resistance against society’s unitary, hegemonic, disciplinary practices of power on individual bodies.²⁰⁵ McLaren rightly points out Foucault’s hermeneutical shift to the importance of the human body as a site for resistance, transformation, and agency.²⁰⁶

²⁰² Foucault, ‘Body/Power’ and ‘Truth and Power,’ in ed. C. Gordon *Michel Foucault: Power/Knowledge* (U.K.: Harvester, 1980), 52.

²⁰³ Foucault, *Discipline and Punish*, 138-9.

²⁰⁴ Ibid.

²⁰⁵ Foucault, “The Ethic of Care for the Self as a Practice of Freedom” in *The Final Foucault*, eds. J. Bernhauer and D. Rasmussen (Cambridge: Mass.: MIT Press, 1988), 298.

²⁰⁶ McLaren, *Feminism*, 117-162.

Ricoeur

Our last postmodern figure, Ricoeur, advocating the hermeneutics of “balance, others, and intersubjectivity,” emphasizes the dialogical nature of text and reader in terms of balance, asserting that both text and reader play together in the making of meaning.²⁰⁷

The text does not lose its intrinsic value or essence while the readers sit idly; but the reader must interact with the text because, for Ricoeur, “the task of philosophy is to avoid the skepticism that doubts everything while at the same time abandoning the ideal of total certainty.”²⁰⁸ For Ricoeur, an important hermeneutical question concerns the question of “who: who speaks? Who acts? Who tells a story? And who is the subject of moral imputation?”²⁰⁹ This is a mutual process between the text and reader. Neither dominates.

In this kind of creative tense-full relationship between the text and the reader, the centerpiece of hermeneutical process is the role of “others”:²¹⁰

“The polysemy of otherness, . . . will imprint upon the entire ontology of acting the seal of the diversity of sense that foils the ambition of arriving at an ultimate

²⁰⁷ See Ricoeur, *Oneself as Another*, 23: “As credence without any guarantee, but also as trust greater than any suspicion, the hermeneutics of the self can claim to hold itself at an equal distance from the cogito exalted by Descartes and from the cogito that Nietzsche proclaimed forfeit. The reader will judge whether the investigations that follow live up to this claim.” See also Richard Cohen and James Marsh, eds. *Ricoeur as Another: The Ethics of Subjectivity*, 5.

²⁰⁸ Richard Cohen and James Marsh, eds., *Ricoeur as Another: The Ethics of Subjectivity*, 5: “Ricoeur’s goal is to develop a hermeneutic of the self that bridges the gap between the cogito and the anti-cogito. Cogito: Descartes and Husserl. Anti-cogito: Nietzsche, Marx and Freud.”

²⁰⁹ Paul Ricoeur, *Time and Narrative*, Vol. III, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988), 246.

²¹⁰ Ricoeur, *Oneself As Another*, 21-23.

foundation, characteristic of the cogito philosophies.”

The role of “others” can be found in narrative, which is broadly defined to include discourses, personal stories, and others’ stories.²¹¹ One’s identity or story is never one’s own; it is co-dependent and interrelated with that of others. This thought is made possible when Ricoeur conceives two sides of identity: an *idem*-identity (sameness, character) and an *ipse*-identity (self-affirmed identities, sense of selfhood, promise keeping).²¹² Because personal identity is never one’s own but a mutual business, a narrative identity is formed from the dynamic relationship between an *idem*-identity and an *ipse*-identity. As Cohen succinctly put it: “So the dialectic of sameness and selfhood has two poles: character, where sameness and permanence of dispositions constitute selfhood; and promising, where selfhood is maintained in spite of change, or in the absence of sameness.”²¹³ An *idem*-identity is genetic and distinguishable over time, like character. However, in situations like a quagmire in life, Ricoeur introduces another aspect of identity by asking questions such as “Who am I?” (an *ipse*-identity, affirmed selfhood), “what should I do?” or “how can I be faithful or committed to a life of us and you?” The essential question is, Who am I in relation to you? Through this question, intersubjectivity comes in one’s own identity. Because of his balanced, others-oriented hermeneutics, Ricoeur’s ethics of “lived

²¹¹ Ibid., 147-148; 165-168.

²¹² Ricoeur, *Oneself As Another*, 121-125.

²¹³ Richard Cohen and James Marsh, eds., *Ricoeur as Another: the Ethics of Subjectivity*, 15.

body” (*corps propre*) stands out as he put it.²¹⁴

“That is, of a body which is also my body and which, by its double allegiance to the order of physical bodies and to that of persons, therefore lies at the point of articulation of the power to act which is ours and of the course of things which belongs to the world order.”

In summary, each “postmodern” scholar has different hermeneutical or contextual concerns. Derrida is more concerned about the abusive use of the text as a weapon for imperial, dominant, hegemonic control of human life; Foucault throws sharp light on the condition of the body, analyzing social, political, philosophical control of the body in history. Ricoeur, dissatisfied with a single/narrow sense of discourse divided between the text and the reader, tries to overcome that gap both through a more balanced understanding of the text and through intersubjectivity. These three figures together shed new light on the body hermeneutics. First, they all critique a narrow sense of the community and of ethics by deconstructing the written text (Derrida), by de(re)constructing the body (Foucault) and by emphasizing the role of otherness in a narrative identity (Ricoeur).

However, Ricoeur, with his focus on “narrative” text, does not fully account for the voice of “others” from the marginalized or for unequal relationships in society. He considers somewhat naively “others” and personal identity as an individual level of

²¹⁴ Ricoeur, *Oneself as Another*, 111.

reciprocity in human relationship, resembling the Aristotelian ethics of reciprocity. In other words, Ricoeur does not seriously analyze socio-economic, political or cultural aspects of identity and subjectivity, as contrasted with Foucault's extensive analysis of the body and society. With this limit, however, Ricoeur's hermeneutic anthropology based on the narrative identity awakens our sense of responsible ethics to the degree that human existence is never complete without others. Together with Derrida and Foucault, Ricoeur gives us a new eye to analyze the community, history, the text, and readers from a marginalized perspective. Often, the hermeneutical problem is that interpreters do not easily recognize the hidden, marginalized voice.

Body in Culture

In this section, maneuvering the contemporary cultural struggles witnessed in feminist and inter-cultural studies, I pose similar questions raised in the investigation of history, community, worldview of the Greco-Roman and the Jewish world. The conflicting voices within our society and the communities continue down today, as we, readers of history, find our own interpretive choices. Where should we stand in the history of interpretation and how do we read history? Thus, in this section my aim is twofold. It is to sharpen our hermeneutical eyes so that we may find solidarity with the voices of marginality -- in the conflicting context of the hegemonic body politics and the

democratic-inclusive body politics.

Feminist struggle for “body”

Postmodern discourses about body, namely, a resistant, transformative voice of the marginalized continues today in culture²¹⁵ and feminist studies in particular.²¹⁶

While there are divergent voices within the feminist movement, many postmodern feminists support Foucault’s idea about the body and his critique of meta-narratives and social norms.²¹⁷ McLaren appreciates Foucault’s contribution to the feminists struggle for egalitarian, resistant, transformative body in society and points out three significant parallels between feminism and Foucault on the issue of the body: “both reject mind/body dualism; both view the body as a site of political struggle, and both view the body as central to subjectivity and agency.”²¹⁸ Feminists and Foucault believe that

²¹⁵ Segovia observes that new hermeneutics require cultural studies, which problematizes the “enduring construct of a universal and informed reader.” See Segovia, “‘And They began to speak in Other Tongues’: Competing Modes of Discourse in Contemporary Biblical Criticism,” in *Reading from this Place* Vol. 1, 29-30.

²¹⁶ See McLaren, *Feminism*, 81. She states that “the body plays a central role in contemporary feminist theory. . . . the body – as a source of knowledge, as a site of resistance, and as the locus of subjectivity.” See also Susan Bordo, *Unbearable Weight: Feminism, Western Culture and the Body* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), 3-5.

²¹⁷ See McLaren, *Feminism*, 1-17 for divergent voices within feminism.

²¹⁸ McLaren, *Feminism*, 82.

“subjectivity is embodied.”²¹⁹ Unlike Kant and other Enlightenment thinkers, Foucault refuses transcendental consciousness and dis-embodied body, and instead emphasizes the double-edged character of the human body – its vulnerability and subjectivity. The former comes from both external (social, political, cultural) threats and internal, hermeneutical weakness (or suspicion) that human beings cannot stand beyond their bodiliness. The latter comes from the conviction that embodied subjectivity can be achieved through de(re)construction of body.

In fact, some feminists go further to call for ecological justice, which requires a perspective of embodiment extended to nature.²²⁰ There is no hierarchy between human beings and nature but a feeling of “cosmic connectedness.”²²¹ Even some ask for reverence for life, mortality, limitedness, transience as God’s design.²²² Opposing the Platonic dualistic view of women’s body as sin or evil,²²³ feminist theology argues that “death is a natural part of life” and “the acceptance of finitude and death for a life – and

²¹⁹ Ibid., 76.

²²⁰ Maaïke de Haardt, “Transience, Finitude and Identity: Reflecting the Body dying,” in *Begin with the Body: Corporeality Religion and Gender*, eds. Jenneke Bekkenkamp and Maaïke de Haardt (Leuven: Peeters, 1998), 12-29.

²²¹ Ibid.

²²² Carol Bynum, “Why all the Fuss about the Body: A Medievalist perspective,” in *Critical Inquiry*, vol.22, 1 (1995): 1-33.

²²³ Paula M. Cooley, Sharon A. Farmer and Mary Ellen Ross, eds. *Embodied Love: Sensuality and Relationship as Feminist Values* (Cambridge & New York: Harper & Row, 1987), 3-4.

body-affirming theology, also for transforming all kinds of hierarchical dualistic thinking as well.”²²⁴ “Reverence for life” begins with “the need for a sense of finitude.”²²⁵ The denial of finitude and death is equal to the denial of God. Overall, feminism moves toward a more holistic, ethical, and ecological approach to life for the “body.”

Cultural Struggle for “Body”

There are also cultural struggles for living with “body.” In this section, first, I will trace Confucianism’s impact in Korea in terms of how it has affected, both positively and negatively, our sense of community, our particular sense of community, which is a body.

In our world the relational aspects of community based on love lie at the center of our life and thinking.²²⁶ In *Great Learning* (Confucian teachings) the notion of community is clearly summarized in these phrases: *su-shin, je-ga, chi-guk, pyong-chon-ha* (修身 濟家 治國 平天下).²²⁷ *Sushin* means training the self (literally disciplining

²²⁴ Carol Bynum, “Why all the Fuss about the Body: A Medievalist perspective,” 1-33.

²²⁵ Carol Christ, “Reverence for Life: the need for a sense of finitude,” in *Embodied Love*, ch.3.

²²⁶ In another way of looking at communal aspects, there is an important virtue or perspective, *chung-yung*, which can be translated as “balanced” life or “enduringly undeviating, genuine living.” See Archie J. Bahm, *The Heart of Confucius: Interpretation of Genuine Living (Chung Yung)* (Berkeley: Asian Hermeneutics Press, 1992), 50-53. The perspective of *chung-yung* maintains the community’s health in harmony with individuals.

²²⁷ Transliteration of Chinese characters differs depending on the country or region. I follow Korean pronunciation and provide corresponding Chinese characters to clarify their meaning.

oneself); *je-ga* managing home; *chi-guk* ruling the nation; *pyong chon-ha* governing the whole world. These phrases clearly show the connection between individuals and the larger communities, starting from oneself, to a family, a nation and to the whole world. Confucius based his idea about human communities on an inseparable and harmonious relationship between them. In Confucius' view, the purpose of *su-shin* is to build home with virtues, to rule the nation and to govern the whole world. Confucius finds the essence of human beings in a nexus of intrinsic living together. Individuals, home, the nation and the whole world are interdependent on each other. There is no concept of body outside its intrinsic relation to the whole world.

The centrality of human communities in their relatedness is well expressed in the Confucian concept of love “*in*” (仁).²²⁸ This word consists of two ideograms: “person” and “two.” “*In*” is often translated as ‘human-relatedness,’ ‘co-humanity,’ ‘virtuous humanity,’ ... or ‘love’.²²⁹ Let me explain. In our Korean culture, human beings are conceived as relational and thus as community beings. There are no individuals without communities. Such individuals are not independent but interdependent. In our culture, therefore, a good human being is a person who relates well with other persons in communities. Interrelatedness is part of the Confucian notion of love. This relational

²²⁸ “*In*” is Korean pronunciation. “*Ren*” is an equivalent Chinese transliteration.

²²⁹ Bahm, *The Heart of Confucius: Interpretation of Genuine Living (Chung Yung)*, 50-53.

human existence and love is also expressed in the Chinese word for human beings, *in-gan*, composed of two characters: 人 (*in*)²³⁰ + 間 (*gan*). *In* means a human being, whose character is made of two sticks (two individuals), signifying that becoming human needs two persons (one supports the other, and vice versa). Therefore, in our culture, the very concept of personhood is not an autonomous and independent individual; rather, to become humans requires plurality. The next character, *gan*, means “in-between” or “relation.” In other words, people are supposed to interact with one another in communities. Furthermore, our attitude and lifestyle toward the community are embedded in our vernacular; for example, I often use “we” (*woori* in Korean) instead of “I.” Rarely would one say “my car,” but ordinarily it is “our car, our school, our pastor, our teacher, our country, our church, our home, our kids, our spouse.” Our language projects the deep sense of community embedded in our culture.

However, it should be admitted that Confucianism has also had negative historical effects on the construction of the “body” through hierarchy and patriarchy, summarized in *samgang-oryn* (three cardinal principles, and five ethical norms).²³¹ It has been especially detrimental to the health of society when the *samgang-oryun* is used to support a dominating ideology of ruling at the sacrifice of the grassroots including women. The

²³⁰ Different Chinese characters can be transliterated in the same way.

²³¹ *Sushinso* (the Book of Self-Cultivation published in Chinese in 1431 and Korean in 1481).

three cardinal principles (*samgang*) include 1) loyalty to ruler, 2) filial piety to parents, and 3) wife's fidelity to husband; the five ethical norms (*oryun*) deal with human relationships: 1) love between parents and children, 2) faith between rulers and people, 3) distinction between husband and wife, 4) order between elders and juniors, and 5) trust between friends. Especially, women did not have equal rights with men as seen in *Samjongjido* (women's three things to obey): 1) obeying her father before marriage, 2) obeying her husband after marriage, and 3) obeying her sons after the death of her husband. Therefore, women were always dependent on men. In response to this kind of conventional, principle-oriented, dualistic Confucianism, Neo-Confucianism emerges and takes on an ethical orientation. Classic Confucianism largely remained in hierarchical dualism between heaven and earth, believing in the transcendental principle (*li*), which applies to everybody, as in the Kantian deontological approach. The human problem in this tradition is a lack of learning or of correct knowledge. But Wang Yang Myung's Neo-Confucianism emphasizes the unity of knowing and action along with the suspicion that knowing itself is not sufficient. Therefore, Wang put more weight on concrete reality as an ethical reference. Wang's unity of knowing and action leads to Confucianism's immanent transcendence, that is, radical humanity who can know and act simultaneously. Wang allows for human agency or subjectivity through which humans can accomplish

moral good.

I have taken a long route, from ancient to today, from the West to the East, to show “postmodern” and cultural hermeneutics about/of body, which is the search for a hidden marginalized voice in history and today. In the next chapter, I will analyze constructions of body in the Greco-Roman and the Jewish world.

CHAPTER IV

CONSTRUCTION OF BODY IN THE GRECO-ROMAN AND THE JEWISH WORLD

Construction of *Body* in the Greco-Roman World

There is a continuing tendency for scholars to read the dominant, elite discourses in the Greco-Roman world as the primary, legitimate voice in their construction of the body politic.²³² Their assumption is that the dominant voice (“high culture”) appeals to the public, including the slaves and the marginalized as if there were no other voices than the one represented by the high culture. The term “high culture” is rather elusive; I use it to denote upper class ideologies expressed in their philosophy, social rhetoric, and ruling ideologies. Martin’s *The Corinthian Body* contains helpful discussions about the upper class ideologies though I do not agree with his dichotomous analysis between the upper class (the strong) and the lower class (the weak).²³³

For me the weakness of Martin’s analysis lies in his reasoning about each class’s

²³² There are too many scholars to name who are emphasizing this kind of rhetorical approach to Paul. See Barrett, *1 Corinthians*, 31. See also Mitchell, *Paul and the Rhetoric of Reconciliation*, 20-64. See also Theissen, *Pauline Christianity*, 36-37, 96-99, 121-140, and Wayne Meeks, *Urban Christians*, 74-75, 164-70. These scholars’ common assumption is that Paul is a follower of the dominant society.

²³³ Martin, *The Corinthian Body*, 69-86.

ideological attachment. For example, according to his discussion about disease etiology, the strong has an etiology of balance/imbalance whereas the weak have to do with “invasion” etiology. It is difficult to accept this simple division of etiology for the reason that the strong (upper class) might also have concerns about outer forces that cause disease. In reality, they also know there are uncontrollable elements or forces that bring diseases though they do not express them publicly because they fear appearing weak and losing their dignity. Even today, with the very scientific, mechanistic worldview, some high-class people (rich and powerful) still go to fortunetellers or shamans to deal with outer spiritual forces. In the ancient, less scientific worldview, it is hard to imagine making a simple division as such.

Martin seems to ignore the importance of the distinction between “reality” and “rhetoric.” Reality is much more complex than he appears to presuppose, and rhetoric requires a thorough analysis to expose the ideologies behind it – ideology being understood in Althusser’s sense: “Ideology is a *representation* of the imaginary relationship of individuals to their real conditions of existence” (italics for my emphasis).²³⁴ Reality is more complex than the dichotomy-constructed world in which the upper/strong as agents control or rule society (balance/imbalance etiology), whereas

²³⁴ Louis Althusser, *Essays on Ideology* (London: Verso, 1984), 36.

the low/weak pose as passive recipients defending their body without giving due voice or subjectivity to the marginalized. In other words, the “hierarchical” division of the strong and the weak prevents us from seeing the marginalized as a resistant voice. An implication is that what the weak have to do is to stay in the system of hierarchy, being satisfied with their master’s benefaction with the hopes of protection from possible peril or disease. However, this reality can be constructed in other ways – in other ideology. It is unfair not to listen to the voices of the marginalized while highlighting the voices of the high culture, and their emphasis on “unity” or “concord.” In fact, the dominant rhetoric of *homonoia* (concord) is not the only ideological view to have power and effect on culture. Meaning also takes form in a complex relationship of which the non-elite, low culture’s voices are also part. Dougherty and Kurke emphasize the “multiplicity and more embodied practices perspective: non-elites or marginalized elements in culture.”²³⁵

Bonnell and Hunt also pinpoint the importance of the meaning dimension residing in complex narratives:²³⁶

“Narrative provides a link between culture as system and culture as practice. If culture is more than a predetermined representation of some prior social reality, then it must depend on a continuing process of deconstruction and reconstruction of public and private narratives. Narrative is an arena in which meaning takes

²³⁵ Carol Dougherty and Leslie Kurke, Eds. *The Cultures within Ancient Greek Culture: Contact, Conflict, Collaboration* (Cambridge, U.K.; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 10.

²³⁶ Victoria E. Bonnell and Lynn Hunt, Eds. *Beyond the Cultural Turn: New Directions in the Study of Society and Culture* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), 17.

form in which individuals connect to the public and the social world, and in which change therefore becomes possible.”

Having stated the importance of the postmodern approach to the Greco-Roman world, I will now discuss two representative understandings of the body in the Greco-Roman world: the hegemonic body (high culture) and the democratic-inclusive body (marginalized voices). While these typographies are certainly not exhaustive ways of analyzing “body” in the Greco-Roman world, I think, this simple division will help us to examine the underpinning ideologies for each body politic.

Body Politics of the Hegemonic Body

The hegemonic body of high culture²³⁷ does not include the voices of low culture because of its interest in maintaining power and control of society. The high culture of the Greco-Roman society, disregarding the bodies of women and slaves, cared only about the body politics in service to the power of the aristocrats and the Empire.²³⁸ Seneca, for example, prioritizes Nero’s absolute power over the state (people), never thinking the other way around.²³⁹ He emphasizes only the emperor’s unifying role for the hegemonic

²³⁷ The body politics of the hegemonic body has deep roots in Plato’s Republic in which philosophers rule the state with reason (aristocracy: “the government of the best”). Plato’s view of soul is also hierarchical as it presupposes the rule of aristocracy. See *Respublica*, 439C-441B; 543.

²³⁸ Similarly with the previous note, case will be made through the investigation of Plato, Aristotle, Seneca and Cicero, to name a few.

²³⁹ Seneca, *De Clementia* 1.4.1.

body.²⁴⁰

The hegemonic body represents the voice of high culture, with its roots traced back to Plato and Aristotle. Plato (472 – 347 BCE) in *Phaedo* establishes a hierarchical dualism²⁴¹ where the soul takes the uppermost priority over the body, which is the prison for the soul.²⁴² Plato's *Timaeus* expounds his theory about the hierarchical cosmic body in which differing forms (*ideas*) of living bodies exist in the universe.²⁴³ Furthermore, Plato divides the soul into three parts, that is, the reasonable (*logistikon*), the courageous (*thumoeides*), the appetitive (*epithumetikon*).²⁴⁴ The first part is eternal and immortal; the other two parts are mingled with the material body. The varying degree of combinations of the soul and material body determines the ranks of men and things in the world. Plato

²⁴⁰ Ibid. 1.4.2-3.

²⁴¹ I take seriously Plato's hierarchical, dualistic worldview that influenced the interpretation of history and theology. For instance, Plato's dualism between the pure ideas and the current cosmos and between the body and the soul is carried over to Newton's (1642-1727) mechanical worldview of body and nature, and Descartes' (1596-1650) ontological dualism between mind and matter. Finally, the Reformation takes on rationalism, devaluing rituals, emotions or feelings. See Frederik B. O. Nel, "An Ecological Approach to the Quest for New Horizons in the Christian view of Sexuality," in *Religion and Sexuality*, eds. Michael Hayes, Wendy Porter and David Tombs (Sheffield, UK: Sheffield Academic Press, 1998), 380-404.

²⁴² Though Plato sets a radical division between the body (*soma*) and the soul (*psyche*), his dualism is different from Cartesian ontological dichotomy between matter and non-matter, body and the spirit (mind). For Plato even the soul is of matter (three distinct forms of soul). See Martin, 3-37.

²⁴³ *Timaeus*, 40A: "And these Forms are four, -- one the heavenly kind of gods (i.e. the stars); another the winged kind which traverses the air; thirdly, the class which inhabits the waters; and fourthly, that which goes on foot on dry land." Quoted from trans. by R. G. Bury (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1929).

²⁴⁴ *Respublica*, 439C-441B.

evidently reveals his highly stratified ideal state in which the philosophers become the rulers because they are supposed to have the higher soul.²⁴⁵ According to him, the human body is also hierarchically structured; the head is the most divine part of the body, ruling the rest of the body.²⁴⁶ The head, the superior part, represents the male while the female constitutes the weaker part of humanity.²⁴⁷ Barbarians and slaves are less human.²⁴⁸

Aristotle's view is similar to Plato's in the sense that both promote the hierarchical view of the cosmos and humans alike. Aristotle's worldview centered on *nous* (mind) as the divine element. Male is superior to female, women being "a deformed male."²⁴⁹ Man is "hot, fertile, perfectly formed and contributes soul to the generation of a new being; woman is cold, infertile, deformed and contributes the body."²⁵⁰ As seen above, in the world of Plato and Aristotle, there is no conception of equality between men and women, between Greeks and barbarians, between masters and slaves.²⁵¹ They show no concern for the weak of society. Rather, their philosophy contributes to cementing the structure of the status quo of the Greco-Roman world.

²⁴⁵ *Respublica*, 370A-B.

²⁴⁶ *Timaeus*, 44D; 90A, B.

²⁴⁷ *Timaeus* 42B; *Leges* 781A.

²⁴⁸ *Respublica*, 469B-471C.

²⁴⁹ Ioan P. Culianu, "Introduction: The body reexamined" in *Religious Reflection on the human body* (Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1995), 1-18. See also *Thraede*, 209.

²⁵⁰ Martin, *The Corinthian Body*, 32.

²⁵¹ Aristotle, *Politica* 1260a13.

Stoicism developed more systematically to support a ruling, dominant philosophy or an ideology for the high culture (elite, ruling class). The Stoics believed that the cosmos is a unified body bound by the spirit (*pneuma*).²⁵² The Stoic poet Manilius explains:²⁵³

This fabric which forms the body of the boundless universe, together with its members composed of nature's diverse elements, air and fire, earth and level sea, is ruled by the force of a divine spirit; by sacred dispensation the deity brings harmony and governs with hidden purpose, arranging mutual bonds between all parts, so that . . . the whole may stand fast in kinship despite its variety of forms.

Furthermore, differing qualities of the spirit rank every thing in the cosmos.²⁵⁴ The Stoics believed that the world is ordered by reason (*nous*), which “pervades every part of the world . . . Only there is difference of degree; in some parts there is more of it, in other less.”²⁵⁵ In it, the wise should rule the foolish because the wise has *logos*.²⁵⁶ Notably, the human body was a microcosm, becoming an intrinsic part of the hierarchical cosmos in which body parts run as a “hierarchical chain of command.”²⁵⁷ The Stoics never

²⁵² Alexander of Aphrodisias, *De mixitione* 223.25, 224.14; Plutarch, *De communibus notitiis contra stoicos* 1085C-D; *De stoicorum repugnantibus* 1053F, 1054A; Galen, *De historia philosophica* 21.2 (*Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta* ed. by Arnim: SVF 1.153).

²⁵³ Manilius, *Astronomica* 1.247-54; Manilius goes on to say further: “the entire universe is alive in the mutual concord of its elements.” Manilius, 2.63-68.

²⁵⁴ Diogenes Laertius, 7.139; Sextus Empiricus, *Adversus mathematicos* 9.130; Philodemus, *De Pietate* c.11 (SVF 2.1076).

²⁵⁵ Diogenes Laertius, 7.138-9.

²⁵⁶ Seneca, *De beneficiis* 1.10.3-4; 4.27.1-3.

²⁵⁷ Martin, *The Corinthian Body*, 30.

challenged the status quo of society based on power, inequality, and on the slavery system, instead emphasizing the ideal of one-world and the unity of human beings. Thus, the Stoics urged political unity and acceptance of “natural” hierarchies in the social body.²⁵⁸ Interestingly enough, for Stoics, unity and hierarchy go hand in hand. Furthermore, they avoided the topic of slavery by internalizing or spiritualizing it through the moral quality of life without looking at the experience of the low culture (the marginalized or the oppressed).²⁵⁹ According to Cicero, slavery is defined as slavery to one’s desires: “Or look again at others, petty, narrow-minded men, or confirmed pessimists, or spiteful, envious, ill-tempered creatures, unsociable, abusive, and brutal; others again enslaved to the follies of love, impudent or reckless wanton, headstrong and yet irresolute, always changing their minds.”²⁶⁰ Similarly, Seneca avoids the issue of slavery by emphasizing inner self-control and closing his eyes to the external conditions of life:²⁶¹

It is a mistake for anyone to believe that the condition of slavery penetrates into the whole being of a man. The better part of him is exempt. Only the body is at the mercy and disposition of a master; but the mind is its own master, and is so free and unshackled that not even this prison of the body, in which is confined, can restrain it from using its own powers, following mighty aims, and escaping

²⁵⁸ Mitchell, *Paul and the Rhetoric of Reconciliation*, 157-164. See also Martin, 38-46. References to the society as a body can be found in the speeches of Aristides and Dio Chrysostom. Aristides, *Or.* 17.9; 23.31, 61; 24.16-18, 38-39; 26.43; Dio Chrysostom, *Disc.* 17.19; 34.18, 20, 22; 38.11-12; 39.5; 41.9.

²⁵⁹ Epictetus, *Dissertationes*, 4.1.3.

²⁶⁰ Cicero, *De Finibus* 1.18.61. Regarding the issue of slavery and freedom, see also Dio Chrysostom, *Discourses* 14 on slavery.

²⁶¹ *Ibid.*

into the infinite to keep the company with the stars. It is, therefore, the body that Fortune hands over to a master; it is this body that he buys, it is this that he sells; that inner part cannot be delivered into bondage. All that issues from this is free; nor, indeed, are we able to command all things from slavery, nor are they compelled to obey us in all things; they will not carry out orders that are hostile to the state, and they will not lend their hands to any crime.

Cicero and Seneca focus on such inner virtues as true moral quality. In this view, slavery is not a moral problem; the problem is each individual's inability to deal with any difficulties whether one is a slave or not.²⁶² Because of this kind of hierarchical worldview, the Stoics and high culture emphasized the rhetoric of *homonoia* (concord) to the public.²⁶³ The fable of Menenius Agrippa's speech, retold by Livy, a Roman historian in the first century BCE, also reveals the ideology of the ruling class.²⁶⁴ In the fable, the lower body parts (hands, feet, etc) rebelled against the stomach because the stomach consumes everything without working at all. The point of complaint and rebellion is unfairness or inequality. But the rebelling parts are told to continue to work for the body; otherwise, not only the stomach but the whole body will be destroyed. The rhetoric of the

²⁶² Interestingly enough, this internalizing attitude of moral view has a resonance with Plato's view that the rational part of the soul controls the lower parts of the soul. *Respublica* 431A.

²⁶³ For more detailed information and discussion about the political use of the body metaphor in Greco-Roman discourse, see Mitchell, *Paul and the Rhetoric of Reconciliation*, part III, *passim*. See also D. Martin, *The Corinthians Body*, 38-68, 92-96. These scholars see this organism body metaphor as a dominant political discourse that advocates concord (or group harmony). For more about political discourse of concord, order and unity, see also Dio Chrysostom *Discourses* 34.19; 38.11-14; 39.5; Aristides, *Orations*. 23.40, 53, 73, 75; 24.47.

²⁶⁴ Livy, *History of Rome* 2.32.8-12.

fable emphasizes the hierarchical unity of the social body. But the question is, Did this rhetoric of “concord” (or unity) take into account the marginalized or the oppressed group? How did they respond to it?

In addition to the high culture’s philosophical discourses, the hegemonic body clearly appears with specific examples of the ruling ideologies and political strategies. Augustus’ power in the Roman Empire calls for one man’s rule, which is supported by an ideology of peace and security that no-body can bring to the empire except through the hegemonic body, whose head is Augustus himself. After the victory of the civil war in 31 BCE, Octavius earned from the Senate two important positions, *princeps* and *Augustus*, with a variety of existing positions (consul 13 times, *pontifex maximus* in 12 BCE, tribune for life in 22 BCE, imperator or commander-in-chief).²⁶⁵ With these various titles, Augustus became the head of the hegemonic body. In fact, Augustus’ achievements were recognized through various symbolic acts and literary works. For instance, every military triumph showed a great march bringing bandits and slaves. In addition, many splendid building projects were also initiated to show his glory and for maintaining power. Virgil’s *Aeneid* is an ideological product that legitimates the Roman Empire’s ideology of peace and security. The Roman way of hierarchical order can bring peace and security, while

²⁶⁵ See Augustus's own descriptions of his achievements in *Res Gestae Divi Augusti*, trans. P.A. Brunt and J.M. Moore (London: Oxford University Press, 1967), 18-37.

subjugating all others to this rule.²⁶⁶

Lastly, mystery religions need our attention as well; mystery religions contain double-sided effects of asserting the voice of hierarchy in the group, and egalitarian, personal religious experience of group members.²⁶⁷ As the word mystery is derived from the Greek word *myein* (“to close”) referring to the lips and the eyes,²⁶⁸ secret cults play a role of solidifying in-group members against the outsiders. There are often strong hierarchies in the mystery religions as in mysteries of Mithras in which women are not accepted.²⁶⁹ In this sense, the mystery cults contain the elements of the body politics of the hegemonic body that favors those who had experienced the *mysterion*.²⁷⁰ Except for a few cases of rebellions against the dominant system, mystery religions took the form of social clubs without a sense of resistant spirit.²⁷¹

In summary, the body politics of the hegemonic body does not consider the voices

²⁶⁶ For example, Augustus brags about his rule of peace: “I made the sea peaceful and freed it of pirates. In that war I captured about 30,000 slaves who had escaped from their masters and taken up arms against the republic, and I handed them over to their masters for punishment.” See *Res Gestae*, 31. Klauck observes that the imperial cult serves as a symbolic tool to stabilize “the structure of power, in which the ruler and his subjects had their established positions.” Hans-Josef Klauck, *The Religious Context of Early Christianity*, trans. Brian McNeil (Edinburgh, U.K.: T&T Clark Press, 2000), 327.

²⁶⁷ Antonia Tripolitis, *Religions of the Hellenistic-Roman Age* (Grand Rapids, MI; Cambridge, UK: William B. Eerdmans, 2002), 1-46.

²⁶⁸ Marvin W. Meyer, “Mystery Religions,” in *ABD* IV: 941-945.

²⁶⁹ Tripolitis, *Religions of the Hellenistic-Roman Age*, 51, 58-59.

²⁷⁰ *Ibid.*

²⁷¹ *Ibid.*, 22-25.

of low culture and disregard them because its philosophical, ideological thinking is based on hierarchical dualism that low class should serve the high class. Because of this kind of body politics, the voices of low culture do not have attention from both high culture and readers.

Body Politics of the Democratic-inclusive Body

There were no special societies for slaves but they still could go to the public festivals or theater. This fact leads us to a need to read the underside story of these persons. The body politic of the “democratic body” comes not from the high culture or from mystery religions. The democratic voice is the most marginalized voice, never materialized or organized, by contrast to the previous two voices. As opposed to the high culture, which has a strong power basis or structure in society, this democratic-inclusive body is voiceless, formless, seemingly silent, docile, an un-organized body. It is also contrasted with the mystery religions (the mixed body), which has its own system (organization, and structure). That is why scholarship has not paid close attention to this voice until postmodern, postcolonial sensitivity brings to the forefront this potential, hidden voice in the Greco-Roman world. Indeed, this voice is the most marginalized; slaves cannot find the right place to claim their voice for freedom and a universal vision

for all human beings. It is, however, possible to re-construct this meager but strong, resistant voice from the bottom.

For this re-construction, first, the Cynics' philosophy must be re-examined in the context of resistance and the democratic body. Diogenes opposed the hegemonic body and protested against the dominant discourse and ideology by performing unconventional acts.²⁷² Unfortunately, scholars normally do not take serious his anti-conventional wisdom and the spirit of protest against the hegemonic body. At best, as today, we use "cynic" to refer to something pejorative, the voice of cynics is considered a kind of anomaly, a mere oppositionist, or an anti-society radical. But from a marginalized perspective, this voice sounds like thunderstorm.

This voice is a clear protest against the hegemonic body, as we see in the Emperor Julian's suppression of the Cynics, who were considered as a danger to the Empire.²⁷³ This fact is evidence that the Cynics' teachings consisted "in a very public, visible, spectacular, provocative, and sometimes scandalous way of life."²⁷⁴ The teachings or behaviors of the Cynics draw such a strong contrast with the teachings of the hegemonic

²⁷² Diogenes Laertius, 6.20-81. See also Klauck, *The Religious Context of Early Christianity*, 378.

²⁷³ Michel Foucault, "The Cynic Philosophers and Their Techniques," The Seminar given by Foucault. <http://foucault.info/documents/parrhesiasts/foucault.diogenes.en.html>, 10/19/2004.

²⁷⁴ Ibid. Lucian also says there are many of the Cynics: "The city swarms with these vermin, particularly those who profess the tenets of Diogenes, Antithenes, and Crates."

philosophers such as the Stoics who emphasized a kind of logo-centrism or mere rhetoric without action. Philosophers in the Platonic, Aristotelian, and Stoic traditions emphasized “a doctrine, text or at least to some theoretical principles of their philosophy . . . But now in the Cynic tradition, the main references for the philosophy are not to the texts or doctrines, but to exemplary lives.”²⁷⁵ In other words, the Cynics tried to embody their teachings, challenging the dominant society’s hegemonic body. So often, the Cynics used a theater or any public place to draw the attention of the public, thus delivering a radical message of freedom for all.

Foucault points out that “Cynic *parrhesia* (free speech or truth-telling) had recourse to scandalous behavior or attitudes which called into question collective habits, opinions, standards of decency, institutional rules.”²⁷⁶ The Cynics used “another *parrhesiastic* technique as well, viz., the ‘provocative dialogue,’ which can be found in the Fourth Discourse on Kingship of Dio Chrysostom of Prusa (40 – 110 CE).”²⁷⁷ In the sense of public “truth telling,” Paul resembles the preaching of the Cynics when he uses public places to preach Christian freedom.²⁷⁸ Indeed, Diogenes problematized the idea of

²⁷⁵ Foucault, “The Cynic Philosophers and Their Techniques.”

²⁷⁶ Ibid.

²⁷⁷ Ibid.

²⁷⁸ McLaren, *Feminism*, 152. See also F. Gerald Downing, *Cynics, Paul and the Pauline Churches: Cynics and Christian Origins II* (London; New York: Routledge, 1998), 1-25.

democracy that does not give “equal place to all forms of parrhesia, even the worst.”²⁷⁹

Paul also embodied all his teachings in his life.²⁸⁰ As will be clear in the next chapter, Paul’s theology or ethics is based on his living experience with Christ, who died for the world. Paul always emphasizes that his preaching is about Christ crucified (1 Cor 1:23). Paul confesses that he carries in his body the death of Jesus (2 Cor 4:10; Gal 6:17).

From the resistant, transformative voice of the Cynics, one can say that the Cynics envisioned a bigger community for “all” that includes slaves. One can find such a hope from Diogenes of Sinope (404 – 323 BCE) who when “asked where he came from, he replied, ‘I am a citizen of the world.’”²⁸¹ This is indeed a different kind of cosmopolitanism, nothing like the hegemonic, hierarchical body politic of concord. Rather, it promotes indiscriminating care and rights for all. Laertius narrates:²⁸²

Diogenes would ridicule good birth and fame and all such distinctions, calling them showy ornaments of vice. The only true commonwealth was, he said, that which is as wide as the universe. He advocated community of wives, recognizing no other marriage than a union of the man who persuades with the woman who consents. Diogenes also “used to make fun of good birth and distinctions of rank and all that sort of things, calling them decorations of vice. The only correct political order was, he said, that in the whole world.

²⁷⁹ Foucault, “Parrhesia and the Crisis of Democratic Institutions.” See also McLaren, *Feminism*, 145-164.

²⁸⁰ Paul’s theology is based on an embodiment of Christ, which appears throughout his letters, as I will show in Chapter VI the use of body in the Pauline letters.

²⁸¹ Diogenes Laertius, 6. 63.

²⁸² Diogenes Laertius, 6.72.

Second, to attend to the voice of the marginalized, one should deconstruct the dominant and popular literature to hear the underside voice of the slaves who were often crucified by masters for any reasons. Slaves' crucifixion shows evidence that they were a threat to the system of hierarchy in which the upper class has hegemonic control of their destiny. Slaves are considered non-bodies or worthless, and are so crucified easily by the system. Juvenal *Satires* gives us the case in which a powerful wife orders her slave crucified.²⁸³

"Crucify that slave!" says the wife. "But what crime worthy of death has he committed?" asks the husband; "where are the witnesses? who informed against him? Give him a hearing at least; no delay can be too long when a man's life is at stake!" "What, you numskull? you call a slave a man, do you? He has done no wrong, you say? Be it so; this is my will and my command: let my will be the voucher for the deed."

From the above story, we do not hear directly the voice of a slave. But from her husband's questions and the slave's silence one can hear the voice of resistance hidden in this story; the husband feels sympathy for the innocent slave, asking for time to judge. The silence of the slave does not mean that there is no voice at all; apparently, nobody recorded the voice of the slave in this case. It is a one-sided story without having the voice of the slave. Therefore, readers have to re-construct the historical scene with a postmodern sensitivity.²⁸⁴ It is the readers' burden to hear the voice of resistance from

²⁸³ Juvenal, *Satires* 6.219ff.

²⁸⁴ Walter Brueggemann, *Texts under Negotiation: the Bible and Postmodern Imagination* (Minneapolis:

below. From the perspective of the marginalized, one can hear a silent voice of suffering death in this story. Indeed, in the Greco-Roman time, crucifixion is the most horrible form of punishment and normally did not apply to Roman citizens and, in particular, to members of the upper class but to foreigners or the lower classes, slaves in particular.²⁸⁵

The cross was called “the ‘terrible cross’ (*maxuma mala crux*) of the slaves in Plautus.”²⁸⁶

Cicero even avoids talking about the crucifixion, much less to mention of the cross and the executioner because it is too harsh and in bad taste for normal Roman citizens to talk about it. For instance, Cicero defends Ribirus Postumus, a Roman nobleman and senator threatened with the penalty of crucifixion:

"How grievous a thing it is to be disgraced by a public court; how grievous to suffer a fine, how grievous to suffer banishment; and yet in the midst of any such disaster we retain some degree of liberty. Even if we are threatened with death, we may die free men. But the executioner, the veiling of the head and the very word "cross" should be far removed not only from the person of a Roman citizen but his thoughts, his eyes and his ears. For it is not only the actual occurrence of these things but the very mention of them, that is unworthy of a Roman citizen and a free man." (Rab. Perd. 16; italics added)

Under the Roman Empire, slaves are real victims of this punishment and have no legal protection.²⁸⁷ Crucifixion was used in response to cases of rebellion or dangerous

Fortress, 1993), 1-25.

²⁸⁵ See Martin Hengel, *Crucifixion: in the Ancient World and the Folly of the Message of the Cross* (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1977), 51-63.

²⁸⁶ Ibid., 7. *Thesaurus Linguae Latinae*, Leipzig 1900. IV, 1259: Plautus, *Captivi* 469; *Casina* 611; *Menaechmi* 66, 849; *Poenulus* 347; *Persa* 352; *Rudens* 518; *Trinummus* 598.

²⁸⁷ Even under “ordinary” conditions, slaves had little legal protection as seen in Juvenal, *Satires* 6.223.

criminals as the means of ultimate control of people and state.²⁸⁸ However, in reality, Romans primarily applied the form of crucifixion to the slaves as the *servile supplicium* (“the slaves punishment”).²⁸⁹ Above all, Plautus (184 BCE) records plenty of the Roman crucifixions of slaves, and portrays the cruel humors of their culture²⁹⁰ such as found in “gallows-bird” or “hangdog.”²⁹¹ The lower classes protest against the cruel form of inhumanity as one can read a confession of Sceledrus in the *Miles Gloriosus* (written about 205 B.C.): “I know the cross will be my grave: that is where my ancestors are, my father, grandfathers, great-grandfathers, great-great- grandfathers.”²⁹²

Third, one should also examine the context and wisdom of the Aesop traditions, which criticizes the dominant hegemonic body. From the *Life of Aesop*,²⁹³ one can gain important insights about his silent but strong voice against the dominant, hegemonic,

See Tacitus, *Annales* 13.32. 1; Petronius, *Satires* 53.3. Suetonius, *Caligula* 12.2 and *Domitian* 11. 1; Tacitus, *Histories* 2.72.2; 4.3.2; 4.11.3.

²⁸⁸ See Livy’s reports about slaves’ crucifixion: 22.33.2; 33.36.3; Appian (BCiv. 1.120) states that Crassus crucified more than 6000 slaves along the Via Appia between Capua and Rome.

²⁸⁹ Tacitus, *Histories* 4.11; 2.72; *Scriptores Historiae Augustae* 15 12.2; 4.6. Horace, *Satires* 1.8.32; Livy 29.18.14; 29.9.10.

²⁹⁰ Plautus, *Aularia* 522; *Bacchides* 584; *Persa* 795; Terrence, *Eunuch* 383; Petronius, *Satyricon* 126.9.

²⁹¹ “Gallows-bird” (*cruciarius*) in Seneca the Elder, *Controversiae* 7.6.2f., 6; Apuleius, *Metamorphoses* 10.7.5. “hangdog” (*patibulatus*) in Plautus, *Mostellaria* 53; Apuleius, *Metamorphoses* 4.10.4. (ThLL IV, 1218).

²⁹² Plautus, *Miles Gloriosus*, 372-373.

²⁹³ *Aesop’s Fables with a Life of Aesop*, trans. John E. Keller and L. Clark Keating (Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 1993), 7-51.

logos-centered wisdom. Even without words, Aesop could communicate well. For example, while Aesop was mute, he could prove that he was not guilty when accused of stealing and eating his master's figs.²⁹⁴ He showed his innocence by drinking water and then putting his fingers down his throat to induce vomiting. What comes out from this were not the figs but only water. His accusers did the same, and proved guilty. Likewise, when Aesop encountered the lost priestess of Isis, he communicated with her by signs. Some actions do indeed speak louder than words. Even Xanthus, the slave owner of Aesop, admits that there is silent philosophy, saying that his students must not believe that philosophy relies on words alone. Communication can exist without words, and people without speech. Startling is the perspective that the Aesop traditions evoke the "eloquence of silence."²⁹⁵

In summary, the body politics of the democratic-inclusive body does not have enough material evidences such as literary products produced by elite or high culture. However, the lack of material evidence for the body politics of the democratic-inclusive body cannot erase the voices of the marginalized as I sketched above, for example through Aesop traditions, the voices of the Cynic philosophers, and from the voices of slaves unheard but audible through new hermeneutics that focuses on the dormant voices

²⁹⁴ Ibid., 10.

²⁹⁵ Paolo Scarpi, "The Eloquence of Silence: aspects of a power without words," 19-40.

of low culture.

“Body of Christ” with the Greco-Roman World

Before moving to the construction of the body politics in the Jewish world in the next section, it is essential to investigate Paul’s use of the body of Christ in the Greco-Roman social, political context. In this section, my task is to see how Paul intersects with the conflicting voices in the Greco-Roman or Jewish world. The question is, Whose voice does Paul seem to represent, the hegemonic or the marginalized, democratic voice? Earlier, I implied that Paul would take the voice of the marginalized, calling for the community for “all.” Recall that socio-rhetorical scholars in particular view Paul as primarily influenced by the Stoic ideal of unity or concord (*homonoia*). In this view, Paul is an authoritative rhetorician and a social conservative who does not challenge hierarchical, patriarchal society. But from a perspective of “voices from the margins,” I read Paul’s preaching of Christ crucified (1 Cor 1-4) in intertext both with the Cynic philosopher’s (Diogenes of Sinope) anti-conventional acts and *parrhesia* (free speech or “truth telling”), and grassroots’ (slaves) voices recorded in literature including theatre plays. First, Diogenes represents a voice from the margins, taking the side of the silenced such as slaves and women. Accordingly, *parrhesia* can be understood as a sheer critique

of the hegemonic body and as a form of performative speech to transform the world. In this way, Diogenes deconstructs the conventional wisdom of social, hierarchical unity. Similarly, Paul's preaching of Christ crucified also plays a role of deconstructing the conventional wisdom of power, honor, and hierarchical unity. Paul's ethical challenge to the community and society is to participate in Christ's death through others-centered (God-centered) love and sacrifice.

Second, the real question is how Paul can overlook the crucifixion of the slaves and Jews while preaching the Christ crucified. Varro mentions the "rotting corpses" of the crucified.²⁹⁶

If this moisture is in the ground no matter how far down, in a place from which it *pote* 'can' be taken, it is a *puteus* 'well' (or pit); . . . From *putei* 'wells' comes the town name, such as *Puteoli*, because around this place there are many hot and cold spring-waters; unless rather from *putor* 'stench,' because the place is often *putidus* 'stinking' with smells of sulphur and alum. Outside the town there are *puticuli* 'little pits,' named from *putei* 'pits'; because there are the people used to be buried in *putei* 'pits'; unless rather, as Aelius writes, the *puticuli* are so called because the corpses which had been thrown out *putescebant* 'used to rot' there, in the public burial-place which is beyond the Esquiline.

Horace also speaks of the "whitened bones" of the crucified.²⁹⁷

How can I recount in gory detail how those shades, exchanging words with Sagana, set all that dismal space echoing with their melancholy grating voices? And how those two stealthily buried in the ground a wolf's beard and the tooth of a spotted snake? And how the flames sputtered and soared when the wax puppet was burned? . . . How you would have laughed and taken delight in seeing

²⁹⁶ Varro, *Ling. Lat.* 5.25.

²⁹⁷ Horace *Satires* 1.8.8-13.

Canidia's teeth and Sagana's high-piled wig spilling to the ground together with their magic herbs and love-knots – all that necromancy dropping from their arms.

Juvenal speaks of the morsels of flesh of the crucified which the carrion birds plucked from the crosses to feed their young.²⁹⁸ The Roman novelist Chariton also records a vivid description of the crucifixion of a group of slaves:²⁹⁹

They were discovered and all securely fastened in the stocks for the night, and when day came the estate manager told Mithridates what had happened. Without even seeing them or listening to their defense he immediately ordered the sixteen cell-mates to be crucified. They were duly brought out, chained together at foot and neck, each carrying his own cross. The executioners added this grim public spectacle to the requisite penalty as a deterrent to others so minded.

As seen above, the experience of the “cross” in the Greco-Roman world cannot be spiritualized as the Roman comic poet Plautus writes.³⁰⁰ Despite comic elements, the contents of the plays are reflections of the real people, whose experience can be associated with Christ's cross manifest in believers. Those plays are real, shameful experiences of the lowest people in the Roman world, who were often killed and mistreated, naked and invisible. The account of the crucifixion of the runaway slave in the “Laureolus” mime shows such bizarre scene of crucifixion:

In a farce called "Laureolus," in which the chief actor falls as he is making his escape and vomits blood, several understudies so vied with one another in giving evidence of their proficiency that the stage swam in blood. A nocturnal

²⁹⁸ Juvenal *Satire* 14.77-78.

²⁹⁹ Chariton, *Chaireas and Callirhoe* 4.2. in Ed. & trans. G. P. Goold (Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press, 1995).

³⁰⁰ See Eric Segal, *Roman Laughter: The Comedy of Plautus* (London: Oxford University, 1987), 137-69.

performance besides was rehearsing, in which scenes from the lower world were represented by Egyptians and Aethiopians.

For the high-class people the plays are a source of humor because they are not like those tragic characters; however, the lowest people may shed tears because they are like the characters in the play.

The crucifixion of Jews is also recorded by Josephus and Philo. Josephus testifies that the Sadducean high priest, Alexander Janneus (in office 103-76 BCE), crucified eight hundred Pharisees while their wives and children are slaughtered before their eyes as they are hung and dying.³⁰¹ Josephus also witnesses the crucifixion during Titus' siege of Jerusalem, calling it "the most wretched of deaths."³⁰² Philo records the scene of crucifixion that at the time of Caligula (37-41 CE) a number of Jews were tortured and crucified in the amphitheatre of Alexandria to entertain the people:³⁰³

But this man did not order men who had already perished on crosses to be taken down, but he commanded living men to be crucified, men to whom the very time itself gave, if not entire forgiveness, still, at all events, a brief and temporary respite from punishment; and he did this after they had been beaten by scourgings in the middle of the theatre; and after he had tortured them with fire and sword; and the spectacle of their sufferings was divided; for the first part of the exhibition lasted from the morning to the third or fourth hour, in which the Jews were scourged, were hung up, were tortured on the wheel, were condemned, and were dragged to execution through the middle of the orchestra; and after this beautiful exhibition came the dancers, and the buffoons, and the flute-players, and all the other diversions of the theatrical contests.

³⁰¹ Josephus, *Jewish Antiquities* 13.380-83 and *Jewish War* 5.449-51.

³⁰² Josephus, *Jewish War* 7.203.

³⁰³ Philo, *Falccus* 84-85.

The Roman historian Tacitus also records the brutal crucifixion of Christians during Nero's time: "mockery of every sort was added to their deaths. Covered with the skins of wild beasts, they were torn to death by dogs. Or they were fastened on crosses and, when daylight faded, were burned to serve as lamps by night."³⁰⁴

The point that I make is simple. How could we believe that Paul would disregard the experience of the most vulnerable, the slaves and victims of the Empire when he talks about Christ crucified? How can we believe that Paul would side with the hegemonic body politic based on the Stoic ideal of unity or a Hellenized dualistic philosophy between body and soul? From this perspective, it appears that Paul's theology of "body of Christ" deconstructs society's wisdom, power and glory. On this backdrop of Paul's context in the larger Greco-Roman and Jewish world, Paul's theology can be found in "yes" to life: "For in him every one of God's promises is a 'Yes'. For this reason it is through him that we say the 'Amen,' to the glory of God" (2 Cor 1:20). From this perspective, Paul believes that all destructive forms of oppression in society could be stopped through the re-visioning of an alternative community for all (society) based on love, sacrifice, others-centered "community" ethics. Paul can be confident in God's gracious work for many people: "Yes, everything is for your sake, so that grace, as it

³⁰⁴ Tacitus, *Ann.* 15.44.4

extends to more and more people, may increase thanksgiving, to the glory of God” (2 Cor 4:15). Indeed, Paul presents an alternative worldview through Christ’s sacrificial love in the present, which necessarily conveys radically social message that there is no slave or free “in Christ”; all are free, children of God. God says yes to life in the midst of deathlike hopelessness in the world. God’s affirming of life is yes to all people.

Construction of *Body* in the Jewish World

As I demonstrated different constructions of body in the Greco-Roman world, I can posit same questions in the Jewish world whether Paul took the view of the body politics of the hegemonic body or that of the democratic-inclusive body. The tension for Paul lies in the fact that he lived in the Jewish world, a world in which his religiosity, ethics, and theology are deeply rooted. The question is whose voice Paul seems to carry among various choices in the world. In the following, I will review Jewish traditions and literature in order to understand in a broad way the conflicting voices behind them.

One can trace the hegemonic body (voice) of the royal ideology of ancient Israel monarchy recorded in the Hebrew Bible. This hegemonic voice intersects with an ancient Southwestern Asian royal ideology shown in literature, buildings, and political and religious practices, primarily aiming at legitimizing and maintaining royal power. The usual royal propaganda emphasizes the “benefits of peace, security and wealth” for the

people.³⁰⁵ In return, the royal powers require that people obey the center or the royal bureaucracy. In so doing, the royal power uses various ways to perpetuate such an ideology to the populace, for example, through religious symbolism (the temple, the robes of kings or priests, and various rituals), literature and buildings (palaces, fortified cities). According to archaeological data, the Solomonic buildings at Meggido, Hazor and Gezer express the power of the monarchy through impressive gates.³⁰⁶ Likewise, the royal ideology of the Davidic Kingdom wins the Northern Kingdom and sets up the hegemonic body. Later, Nehemiah, reflecting on the Davidic royal ideology as a glorious time, leads people to Jerusalem to rebuild the wall of Jerusalem; so their identity and boundary are set over against others. The Temple in Jerusalem becomes the symbol of Davidic royal power and ideology, which make possible the hegemonic body to run forever. An implication is that Jerusalem is the only godly royal place where the temple is a symbol of God's presence and protection. This royal ideology, complexly enough, has a double function: one to legitimate the royal court and another for the people's security from foreign invasions or internal wars. In fact, this social, political order (the hegemonic body) certainly demands many sacrifices from ordinary people. From the socio-economic

³⁰⁵ Keith W. Whitelam, *The Israelite Kingship: The Royal Ideology and Its Opponents, in the World of Ancient Israel*, ed. R. E. Clements (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 121.

³⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, 133.

point of view, it is impossible to maintain a hegemonic body without putting a heavy burden on the people. Considering the hierarchical, stratified society, with an economy so dependant on labor, we can infer the sacrifices they made.

In conclusion, though the context differs from culture to culture, royal ideology takes similar steps to maintain power and the state.³⁰⁷ Namely, the king, as head of the nation state, must reign as a guarantor of peace and justice while asking for total obedience to the rule of law.³⁰⁸ In this way, the royal bureaucracy gains the upper hand by manipulating the state business and enjoys all power. Especially in chaotic situations like wars in ancient Southwestern Asia, royal ideology can easily drive people to cooperate with the royal court and bureaucracy.³⁰⁹ Merriam's notion of *miranda* and *credenda* in politics is suggestive. For *Miranda* an emotional appeal to the temple could represent the visible features of glory or success, and *credenda* as a rational resort points to the actual practice of temple sacrifices and other festivals through which God provides

³⁰⁷ Henri Frankfort, *Kingship and the Gods: A Study of Ancient Near Eastern Religion as the Integration of Society and Nature* (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1948), 342. See also Paula M. McNutt, *Reconstructing the Society of Ancient Israel* (Louisville: WJK; London: SPKC, 1999), 181.

³⁰⁸ Frankfort, *Kingship and the Gods*, 342; McNutt, *Reconstructing the Society of Ancient Israel*, 172; Roland De Vaux, *Ancient Israel*, vol. 1: *Social Institution*, (New York & Toronto: McGraw-Hill, 1965), 108-11.

³⁰⁹ Shemaryahu Talmon, *King, Cult and Calendar in Ancient Israel*. *Collected Studies*. (Jerusalem, 1965), 67.

sanctity and daily necessities for all people.³¹⁰ In the following, I will scan a few examples of the tensions or conflicting voices in the Hebrew scripture and in its history.

A Few Examples

In the Pentateuch, one can observe various, conflicting voices, using the documentary hypothesis about the four main sources (J, E, D, P), which sheds new light on different communities in different times that bring different ideologies.³¹¹ I would argue that P's voice is hegemonic while J (the oldest source) and/or E come from an embodiment perspective. For example, P's voice in the creation accounts 1:1-2:4a has a view of a transcendent God, who "creates" an orderly, priestly world by the word of God, whereas J's voice in the creation accounts 2:4b-25 has a view of an anthropomorphic God, who "forms" human beings from dust. According to a majority of scholars, P is responsible for the final literary product of the Pentateuch for which the final editors

³¹⁰ Charles E. Merriam, *Political Power, its Composition and Incidence* (New York and London: McGraw-Hill, 1934), 102-136.

³¹¹ This does not mean that Paul knew about the different sources of J E D P. My point here is to show simply many voices in the text. G.W. Anderson, *A Critical Introduction to the Old Testament* (London: Duckworth, 1994), 29-56. See also Thomas W. Mann, *The Book of the Torah: the narrative integrity of the Pentateuch* (Atlanta: John Knox Press, 1988), 2-9. J stands for the Yahwist (from the German *Jahwist*), usually dated back to the time of Davidic-Solomonic empire (1000-922 BCE). E stands for the Elohist, with its origin in Northern Kingdom (850 BCE). D stands for the Deuteronomist, and its main sources come from Deuteronomy through 2 Kings (620 BCE). P stands for Priestly (after exile, 587 BCE).

(redactors) used various literary strands or oral traditions to “create” a coherent narrative.³¹² Therefore, the final work of the Pentateuch, as a product of post-exilic redactors, reflect their own exile experience, which re-shapes their theology based on a strong monotheistic, hierarchical perspective - an “orderly” world in one God.³¹³ In the meantime, D’s voice carries a notion of the mixed body; on the one hand, just like P, it purports to be a hegemonic voice in terms of monotheism and hierarchical worldview. On the other hand, there are humanitarian laws for the marginalized.³¹⁴ The hegemonic voice can be found in “the book of the covenant” (Exod 20:18-23:33) and continues in Deuteronomy. The form of covenant in Deuteronomy between God and Israel is based on a system of reward and punishment (Deut 7:9-12), which does not account for the existence of the poor, and the marginalized people. Here one can see the hegemonic voice from the covenant whereas the voices of the poor or the marginalized are unheard. In addition, the social system of hierarchy and inequality is not questioned at all. The covenant does not fully consider the existence of “others” in the world (culture or other

³¹² Ibid.

³¹³ Anderson, *A Critical Introduction to the Old Testament*, 45-47.

³¹⁴ Humanitarian laws in Deuteronomy are for the good of all the people (6:24; 10:13; 12:28); the stranger, fatherless, and widow (10:18, 19; 24:17-22); social justice and equity (16:18-20; 25:13-16); animals and the environment (5:14; 20:19, 20; 22:6, 7; 23:12-14; 25:4); the weakest members of society (15:1-18; 24:10-15); combining justice (19:20; 25:1) with mercy (25:2, 3).

religions) as in Deut 7:1-5 and elsewhere.³¹⁵ In it, the Israelites are commanded to defeat foreigners in Canaan and “utterly destroy them . . . show them no mercy . . . break down their altars, smash their pillars, hew down their sacred poles, and burn their idols with fire” (7:2-5).

Another set of resistant voices comes from the wisdom literature such as Job or Ecclesiastes. It is enough to take Job as an example. As mentioned earlier, the conventional wisdom runs with a system of reward and punishment, which is the backbone of the Deuteronomic school. That is, “if you obey the law, you will prosper; if not, you will perish.”³¹⁶ But Job questions such a simplistic claim, because in life, as we see from Job, there is innocent suffering or unexplainable darkness that human beings cannot fathom or control. Likewise, the writer of Ecclesiastes also questions the conventional wisdom: “. . . no one can find out what is happening under the sun. However much they may toil in seeking, they will not find it out; even though those who are wise claim to know, they cannot find it out” (8:16-17). In fact, Job’s friends represent the voice of traditional theology that God controls everything under the rubric of reward and punishment (4:17; 5:8). But Job opposes such a rubric. In a sense, Job’s cry is a voice

³¹⁵ Deut 12:29-31; 13; 15; 16:21f; 17:2-7; 18:9-14.

³¹⁶ Leo G. Perdue, *In Search of Wisdom: Essays in memory of John M. Gammie* (Louisville: W/JKP, 1993), 89.

of the powerless because he suddenly lost all: health, family, and reputation.³¹⁷ He challenges the narrow theology that does not attend to the bizarre, gloomy conditions of life as in Job, and to narrow-minded society based on “if-then” logic, under which the powerful, the rich have control of both economic and theological resources. As a result, they do not see the real suffering of the poor or the oppressed in the world.³¹⁸ Rather, they find blame for the poor or the oppressed, relating the cause of their misfortune to sin. However, Job questions such a system in the hegemonic discourse through which the powerful, the rich, the elite, or the ruling class are legitimated for their success or reward.

In prophetic literature as well, divergent voices are re-covered. The eighth century prophet, Amos, is a typical voice of social critique against the hegemonic body of oppression and control.³¹⁹ Not from nobility but from the low culture, Amos, a shepherd, is an international prophet uttering prophetic judgments against the whole world, from Damascus to Moab (Amos 1:3-2:3). Then he unfailingly warns Judah and Israel that the expected “day of the Lord” (5:18-20) will be a day of doom for the rich and upper class

³¹⁷ Gustavo Gutiérrez, *On Job: God-talk and the Suffering of the Innocent*, trans. Matthew J. O’Connell (Maryknoll, N.Y: Orbis Books, 1998), 12-13; 39-40.

³¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 39-40.

³¹⁹ Shalom M. Paul, *Amos: a commentary on the Book of Amos* (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1991), 1-30. See also Abraham J. Heschel, *The Prophets: an introduction*, vol.1 (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1962), 20-23; Delbert R. Hillers, *Micah: a commentary on the Book of the Prophet Micah* (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1984), 4-10.

because “they sell the righteous for silver, and the needy for a pair of sandals” (2:6).

Kings and royal prophets dominated national resources and discourses without having social, economic justice for all people (7:10-17). They “trample the head of the poor into the dust of the earth, and push the afflicted out of the way” (2:7). Amos asked them to hear the voice of God, which flows to the marginalized, making sure that all have enough water of justice: “let justice roll down like waters, and righteousness like an ever-flowing stream” (5:24). His sheer critique of justice while raising up the voice of the poor and the oppressed is indeed a view from the low culture, and it concerns a sense of holism that religion is not about mere festivals or offerings but about justice for all. That is why Amos clearly attacks the royal ideology of the status quo: the rich become richer, and the poor become poorer. The day of the Lord is for all to share power and resources, and until then, it is incomplete.

The post-exilic community and its literature also contain divergent, conflicting voices. For example, prohibition of foreign marriages is mentioned and condemned with the threat of the expulsion of foreign wives (Ezra 9:1-15; 10:1-44; Neh 13:23-31). For this, Boyarin sympathetically defends such practices when the state is in crisis, stating that there is nothing wrong with ethnocentrism in the context of survival.³²⁰ In contrast,

³²⁰ Boyarin, *A Radical Jew*, 242.

Fewell reads from a socio-political perspective of marginality that foreign women and children were victims.³²¹ From her reading, the threat of expulsion based on purity law and reform is a hegemonic voice that controls the land of post-exilic period while excluding “others” in the land.³²² In fact, there was a marginalized voice of Jonathan, son of Asahel, “who, with a few others, opposed Ezra’s proposed removal of foreign wives and their children” (Ezra 1:1-44).³²³ Against this move of ethnic purification and hegemonic control of the land and the people, Ruth and Jonah are counter-voices and emphasize the love of God for all people.³²⁴

Apocalyptic literature also shows traces of voices resistant to the Roman Empire at a moment of national and theological crisis. Antiochus IV ridiculed Israel by desecrating the Temple in Jerusalem and killed many righteous Jewish people. This reflects the theological crisis; it seems that a system of reward and punishment did not work. Therefore, what comes after this crisis is a theology of resurrection for the righteous as a reward; on the other hand, the theology of the resurrection propels resistance against the evil Empire with the conviction that the future is God’s and God

³²¹ Danna Nolan Fewell. “Ezra and Nehemiah,” in *Global Bible Commentary*, 127-134.

³²² Ibid.

³²³ Ibid., 128.

³²⁴ Jon D. Levenson, “The universal horizon of biblical particularism,” in *Ethnicity and the Bible*, ed. Mark G. Brett (Boston: Brill Publishers, 2002), 143-169.

will rectify things twisted and corrupted. Through the apocalyptic literature, the common claim is the fact that Israel cannot die out; God will rectify the world. In this way, the voice of the apocalyptic literature is an actual resistant voice against the dominant, controlling, hegemonic body politics of the Empire.³²⁵ Apocalyptic literature does not promote escapism in this view.³²⁶ Instead, “the eschatological myth dramatizes the transfiguration of the world and is not mere poetry of an unthinkable a-temporal state.”³²⁷ In this reading, apocalypticism can be the voice of the marginalized for liberation and justice.

The first century Judaism is another example in which the differing voices have in conflict with each other.³²⁸ Differing groups have differing views as to how to deal with national and religious crises: Sadducees, Scribes, Pharisees, Essenes, Zealots, the Jesus movement, and many voiceless ordinary people.³²⁹ The Sadducees clearly preferred the hegemonic body politics because of their high social status. Zealots took arms to resist the Roman Empire and Hellenization. The voice of the Zealots is close to a democratic

³²⁵ Horsley, “Rhetoric and Empire,” 93-95.

³²⁶ Amos Wilder, “Eschatological Imagery and Earthly Circumstance,” in *NTS* 5 (1958-59): 229-45. See also Rollin A. Ramsaran, “Resisting Imperial Domination and Influence: Paul’s Apocalyptic Rhetoric in 1 Corinthians,” in *Paul and the Roman Imperial Order*, 89-101.

³²⁷ Wilder, “Eschatological Imagery and Earthly Circumstance,” 231.

³²⁸ Patte, *Paul’s Faith*, 87-121.

³²⁹ *Ibid.*

voice because it clearly resisted the oppression of the Roman Empire and they risked their lives to do so. Essenes opposed the current leadership of the Jerusalem temple and withdrew into the desert, waiting for the final victory in a cosmic war. This voice is also resistant but it becomes far more hegemonic, exclusivistic, theocratic, forming a separate, disciplined community in the desert.

In summary, though complex, historical examples of such conflicting voices in Jewish history and in its literature are widespread, and serve as the backdrop for Paul. The central question is: Whose voice does Paul seem to represent? Does Paul turn away from his ethnicity, heritage, and religiosity as a Jewish person? Does he start a new religion of universalism based on ideal of unity, just like a contemporary political leader or philosophers in Hellenistic culture?

Throughout this chapter, I tried to show multiple, conflicting voices in the Greco-Roman and the Jewish world as a plausible context and a background for Paul. We will now have a close look at the texts of Paul, his community and society from a postmodern, cultural hermeneutics – a critical reading gauge that I developed in Chapters III and IV, which calls for an embodied perspective of humans, nature and all in all. That search continues with Paul and his ministry contexts in Chapter V to which I now move.

CHAPTER V

READING 1 CORINTHIANS WITH DIFFERENT UNDERSTANDINGS OF ITS CONTEXT

In the previous chapter, I attempted to show divergent voices in conflict in the Greco-Roman and Jewish world, implying that, for Paul, there were several possibilities to understand the community as body. Hegemonic voices represent an ideology of community as a hegemonic body. Yet, there were also marginalized voices that represent an ideology of community as a democratic-inclusive body. Therefore, Paul had a choice, and we, as readers also, have a choice in reading him. Paul's discourse could reflect the hegemonic voices of "unity or concord" (*homonoia*), and ignore the marginalized voices. Or vice versa, Paul's discourse could reflect the marginalized voices calling for a democratic-inclusive community, as a challenge to the hegemonic voices (still present in his discourse, but as what he is rejecting). The postmodern hermeneutics of embodiment sheds new light and revives the hidden voice of the marginalized people with a broader conception of the community.

The hermeneutics of "marginality and embodiment" that I explored in Chapter III and IV will provide the framework for reading 1 Corinthians and other Pauline letters. In

this chapter, therefore, one of my main aims is to see whether Paul can be legitimately read as a person uplifting the democratic, marginalized voice in dealing with the Corinthian situations and the world in which he lived. For this, we need to see how Paul handles the different voices in the Corinthian community, including those of the larger society of the Greco-Roman and/or Jewish world. Another goal of this chapter is to elucidate Paul's theological framework (not in the dogmatic or systematic sense) or ethics that would support an affirmation of the voices of the low or marginalized. Specifically, focusing on the image of "body" and "body of Christ" (12:27), I will de-construct the conventional views of Paul's theology and ethics to show that they are based on certain interpretive choices, among other possibilities offered by the texts of Paul's letters.

I will proceed first with an analysis of Paul's immediate contexts in Corinth to identify the varieties of burning issues that demand Paul's attention and the attention of members of the community. I will also attempt to situate Paul and the community in the larger contexts of Corinth and the Greco-Roman world. Second, I will read inter-textually the "body of Christ" in 1 Corinthians with other Pauline letters to see whether there are overlapping concerns with respect to the use of the language of "body" and/or "body of Christ" in each letter. Third, I will contrast Paul's use of "body of Christ" with that of the Deutero-Pauline letters. Lastly, I will draw attention to the discursive figurative structure

in 1 Corinthians by examining the figure of the body of Christ.

Preliminary Thesis

From the outset, I need to restate my thesis. In his letter to the Corinthians (1 Corinthians), Paul uses extensively the image of “body,” referring especially to Christ’s physical body – his crucified body (1:17-18, 23; 2:2; 10:16; 15:3). Paul’s *soma christou* in 1 Corinthians (12:27) can thus be read as a central expression of Paul’s theology of the cross, his ethics of radical participation in Christ’s death, and his hermeneutics of chosen marginality. From this perspective, *soma christou* in 1 Cor 12:27 (as contrasted with the Deutero-Pauline letters; Eph 1:22-23; Col. 1:18) does not refer to a hierarchical, ecclesiological body of Christ. One needs to pay attention to the fact that Paul associates the body of Christ, by analogy, to Jesus’ physical, crucified body, and metaphorically, to those “living Christ,” living “in Christ” (*en christo*) or “becoming like him in his death” (Phil 3:10). For instance, Paul directly presents Christ as a figure of living in Phil. 1:21, Gal. 2:20 and Gal. 2:19 (being crucified with Christ). Very differently from an ecclesiological organism, the “body of Christ” in 1 Corinthians can be read as a main theme of the letter by recognizing that the crucified body of Christ is one manifestation of the body of Christ. Notably, the body of Christ in 1 Cor 10:16 has the definite article

appearing twice to emphasize the crucified “body of Christ” (κοινωνία τοῦ σώματος τοῦ Χριστοῦ, “a sharing of the body of the Christ,” the body of Christ is the object of the sharing). However, there is no definite article in 12:27 (ὁμεῖς δὲ ἐστε σῶμα Χριστοῦ), which shifts our attention to the subject “you,” taking the force of an exhortation to the community: “You are ‘body of Christ’ and personally limbs for it.” *Soma christou* is then understood not as a possessive genitive (the body belonging to Christ) but as an attributive genitive.³³⁰ As the phrase “body of sin” (Rom 6:6) means a “sinful body” when it is read as an attributive genitive, so *soma christou* can be read as referring to a “Christic body,” the community’s Christic embodiment. Therefore 1 Cor 12:27 can be read with the force of an exhortation: “you” (the subject, plural) should strive to be Christ-like, to live out the Christic-body through imitating Christ’s *kenotic* love/sacrifice in “your” bodies (1:18-2:16; 2 Cor 4:7-12; Rom 12:1). Living and dying through/in Christ de-constructs the self and the community that are based on vain glory, on self-serving claims and use of power, on wisdom, and on knowledge. Positively, this embodiment of Christ’s death finds its concrete, ethical expression in an *agape* vision of the community in ch.13. This vision challenges the Corinthians to re-construct their community based on a radical embodiment of mutual respect, *kenotic* love, and diversity.

³³⁰ For example, Gordon Fee takes it as possessive genitive. Gordon Fee, *God’s Empowering Presence: the Holy Spirit in the Letters of Paul*, (Peabody, MA: Hendrickson, 1994), 188.

The crucified body of Christ as God's power shames human boasting, power, knowledge and wisdom, and thereby nullifies the image of unity in sameness. Paul, as a cultural figure, standing between the society and the community, emphasizes the egalitarianism from the community out to the society, challenging the Corinthian community and the Corinthians society characterized by a centripetal force of unity in sameness. The teaching of this letter provides "corrective glasses" through which both the Corinthian community and "we" today find a clearer vision of the community for "all," living and dying like Christ. At this point, two issues require comment: Paul's radical interpretation of the cross (Christ crucified) being identified with the lowly experience in the world (1 Cor 4:13); Paul's embodiment theology that is his ethics based on Christ's death.

**The Corinthian Context and Issues:
The "dis-embodiment" of the Christic Body**

In my analysis of the Corinthian contexts and issues, I will emphasize the "political" Paul and the "political" community.³³¹ Paul cannot be separated from the politics, culture, economy and all aspects of human life, whether in the Greco-Roman or in the Jewish world – his world. Everything he states, explicitly or implicitly, echoes back to this world and vice versa. Put differently, Christ crucified whom he mentions in 1:17-

³³¹ Hollingshead, *Household of Caesar and the Body of Christ*, 139. See also Neil Elliott, *Liberating Paul: The Justice of God and the Politics of the Apostle* (Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis Books, 1994), 93-124; 189.

18; 1:23; 2:2; 10:16; 15:3 should affect the Greco-Roman and Jewish world in Corinth in a certain way. However, typically in mainline scholarship, Paul is viewed as a narrow-minded bigot (a social conservative) who exclusively cares for his own community, or as a Hellenized person with an ideal of unity of the whole world at the expense of the diversity of life in culture.³³² The tendency is to limit Paul's thinking or concerns to systematic theology or ecclesiology without taking into account Paul's worldview and ethics from a holistic point of view.³³³ Unfortunately, those scholars trying to tie Paul to either the Greco-Roman or the Jewish world usually fall in the trap of making Paul a triumphant, systematic theologian, the great founder of Christianity, at the expense of Paul's deepening theology or ethics for the downtrodden through a radical theology of the cross.³³⁴ I propose to probe Paul and his community in the larger Greco-Roman context to see how Paul's "body of Christ" theology or ethics resonates among the mixed audience of the community and of the society of that time. In fact, the community at Corinth is not an enclave or a self-enclosed unit, separated from the world. Rather, it is an open-ended entity or even a process, in terms of which Paul envisions the whole world as

³³² Jewett, *Paul the Apostle to America*, 3-31.

³³³ For example, E. Earle Ellis conceives of Christ crucified mainly as a theological category without relating it to the experience of the poor or slaves, for instance. E. Earle Ellis, "Christ Crucified" in *Reconciliation and Hope*. Ed. Robert Banks (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1974), 69-75.

³³⁴ Kathy Ehrensperger, "New Perspectives on Paul: No New Perspectives on Romans in Feminist Theology?," 227-258.

a livable space of transformation with God's love and Christic embodiment. In other words, Paul's theology or ethics cannot be put in the narrow confine of a community closed upon itself in which the rule of dichotomy works by separating the community from the world. Paul's theology or ethics can be understandable only when it embraces the real world as a whole; that real world is God's creation, a creation that needs transformation and redemption (Rom 8:23).³³⁵

Given this kind of worldview and Paul's participation in it, the critical issues in the Corinthian community and society have to do with ideological conflicts,³³⁶ reflecting all kinds of construction of power from an ideological point of view: political, economic, cultural, psychological, and individual conflicts.³³⁷ The source of the hegemonic voice at Corinth in these conflicts has been understood as the upper class (socio-economic), enthusiasts, pre-Gnostics, a party of the "royal Christ" or libertines.³³⁸ All these are

³³⁵ Robert Jewett, "The Corruption and Redemption of Creation: Reading Rom 8:18-23 within the Imperial Context" in *Paul and the Roman Imperial Order*, ed. Richard Horsley, (Harrisburg; London; New York: Trinity Press International, 2004), 25-46.

³³⁶ Louis Althusser, "Ideology and Ideology State Apparatuses," in *idem, Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays*, trans. Ben Brewster, (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1971), 155-162. I use Althusser's notion of ideology that includes an imaginary relation to the real world.

³³⁷ For specific cases of conflicts, see C.K. Barrett, "Sectarian Diversity at Corinth" in *Paul and the Corinthians: Studies on a Community in Conflict*, Eds. Trevor J. Burke and J. Keith Elliott (Leiden: Brill, 2003). See also C.K. Robertson, *Conflict in Corinth: Redefining the system*, (New York: P. Lang, 2001), 10.

³³⁸ In earlier scholarship, F.C. Baur views Paul's main opponents as Judaizers whereas Lütgert thinks they are enthusiasts or Jewish Gnostics. See W. Schmithals, *Gnosticism in Corinth. An Investigation of the Letters to the Corinthians* (Nashville: Abingdon, 1971), 286-87. For the review of history of scholarship on

plausible interpretations. Especially, 1 Cor 5:1-11:34 deals with the problem posed by Corinthian cases of dis-embodiment of the Christic body.³³⁹ In the conflict at Corinth, the marginalized voice has been understood as coming from women, slaves, foreigners, and strangers - many of the nameless, weak people in Corinth. Indeed, Corinthian issues include all aspects of human life; conflicts are about issues regarding economics, sexuality, gender, community order, gifts, worship, and resurrection. All these are plausible understandings of these conflicts. From all of this complexity and diversity in the community and society arises conflict that calls for analysis. Among other possible interpretations, I propose to emphasize that, for Paul, living in the world of power conflict, the real issue has to do with how to construct a community of “all” (not in the sense of the Stoic “unity,” or “universal humanity” at the sacrifice of diversity) of the Christic body. In this interpretation, Paul’s solution is very different from the one that the

this matter, see William Baird, “‘One Against the Other’: Intra-church conflict in 1 Corinthians” in eds. Robert T. Fortna and Beverly R. Gaventa, *The Conversation Continues: Studies in Paul and John* (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1990), 116-36. But this perspective is abandoned by many and now a majority of scholars thinks that Paul deals with internal factions within the Corinthian congregation. I do think, however, that the Corinthian problems or conflict cannot be restricted to either inter- or intra-church conflict. Though Paul apparently deals with internal problems, the implication of Paul’s handling of power conflicts extends to society and the Empire as a whole.

³³⁹ In terms of how to resolve the Corinthian problems of conflict, my approach is different from Polaski and Castelli, who locate Paul’s revelatory power as a solution. Mine emphasizes Paul’s theology of weakness based on Christ’s death. See Sandra H. Polaski, *Paul and the Discourse of Power*, (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1999), 23-51. See also Elizabeth A. Castelli, *Imitating Paul*, 21-33.

world provides, which is a dominating power, an overpowering wisdom, at the sacrifice of diversity or justice for all people.

Divisions

How to understand the factions mentioned in 1:12 is critical to our re-construction of the Corinthian community. Some scholars consider there are only three factions (Paul's, Apollos', and Cephas') without counting Christ's faction as a possible cause of divisions.³⁴⁰ The general interpretive practice has assumed that "I belong to Christ" (1:13) was offered as a way to unify the church into a community in which members have the same mind and judgment.³⁴¹ However, there are some problems with that conclusion, as I will now show.³⁴² The Greek verb μεμερισται³⁴³ can be either a middle or a passive voice ("Has Christ distributed himself?" vs. "Has Christ been divided?"). In view of the logical connection between 1:12 and 1:13, we may expect negative rhetorical questions for all factions mentioned in 1:13. Namely, "Has Christ distributed himself?" (No!) "Was

³⁴⁰ Scholars who do not consider the Christ party as a possible faction include Hans Dieter Betz and Margaret Mitchell, both of whom view the Christ party as the real body of Christ. Betz, Hans Dieter and Margaret Mitchell, "1 Corinthians," *ABD* I. 1141.

³⁴¹ Odell-Scott, *Paul's Critique of Theocracy*, 33.

³⁴² *Ibid* 40-43.

³⁴³ *Ibid*. μερίζω conveys the sense of 'to divide' as in 'to separate' but it is more than that: a sense of distribution, dealing out, apportioning of something to someone (1 Cor 1:13; 7:17, 33-4; 2 Cor 12:13; Rom 12:3). In contrast, σχίζω conveys a sense of "to divide."

Paul crucified for you?” (No!); “Were you baptized in the name of Paul?” (No!). “In this way, the first negative rhetorical question becomes a critique of the fourth self-declaration (‘I belong to Christ’).”³⁴⁴ Then the answer is “No!” Nobody can exercise theocratic power by calling on the authority of Christ. Nobody represents Christ. Everyone only strives to live or die like Christ. What is essential is to boast of Christ crucified. Therefore, the traditional translation that “Has Christ been divided” (1:13) is not the only possible one. The other possibility (middle voice) is plausible when one recognizes that Christ is not equal to the church or the community in Paul’s thinking (such ideas comes only in later Deutero-Pauline letters!). Therefore, it would seem more helpful, exegetically and theologically, to think of four factions including the Christ party, which exercises “theocratic” power in the community. Thus, certainly, the principal cause of the Corinthian conflict should include the Christ party, which reinforces the hegemonic power based on birth, region, tradition, and patriarchy.³⁴⁵

In his analysis, Odell-Scott carefully distinguishes between the voice of hegemony and Paul’s theology of egalitarianism and diversity.³⁴⁶ For example, women’s

³⁴⁴ Odell-Scott, *Paul’s Critique of Theocracy*, 63.

³⁴⁵ My difference with Odell-Scott is the constitution of the Christ party. Odell-Scott relates it to James, the brother of Jesus. I think, from the ideological point of view, the force of the Christ party seems to come from various constructions of power in the name of Christ. I do think, however, James-connection or Jerusalem connection is part of that.

³⁴⁶ Odell-Scott’s argument is based on his sophisticated literary analysis of the first Corinthians in view of

head covering and their being silenced in the text must be the voice of opponents, who oppose Pauline radical message of equality and freedom based on Christ's self-sacrifice and self-giving love. Paul's response to the hegemonic voice is a reversal of conventional wisdom (overpowering "others"), that is, a radical challenge to it by Christ crucified, which is a folly and non-sense to the "powerful" hegemonic body (1:10-4:21). Therefore, unlike other scholars, who have chosen the other alternative, from this perspective it is hard to say that 1:10 ("you be united in the same mind and the same purpose") is a thesis statement of 1 Corinthians because the issue or problem in the community is not a lack of "unity" but an overpowering, hegemonic ideology of "power" over against the weak – the women's voice of freedom and equality. Indeed, in 1:10 the Cartesian understanding of *νοῦς*, translated as "the mind" in the sense that there is no diversity or any difference is, problematic because *νοῦς* can be understood as "disposition" through which members should live to imitate Christ.³⁴⁷ As such, disposition is an every day decision-making and life-struggle. *Γνωμῆ* also means "will, sentiment, accord, resolve, and judgment."³⁴⁸

Therefore, Paul's concerns regarding the community is not necessarily with a mere lack of the Stoic sense of "unity" that does not allow differences or diversity but with

layers of textual cloth, that is, a weaved text consisting of verbal reports (1:11; 5:1), written reports (7:1; 8:1; 12:1), and of other matters (likely reported) (ch.11, 15).

³⁴⁷ Odell-Scott, *Paul's Critique of Theocracy*, 67. See also "*νοῦς*" in *TDNT* Vol.IV, 951-960.

³⁴⁸ *Ibid.*

hierarchical *homonoia* (concord). The key is respect and living the life of Christ (the Christic body). In fact, as I mentioned in the previous chapter, the language of “unity” or “concord” is part of the rhetoric employed by the high culture to dominate society.

Sexual Immorality

Scholars who follow a forensic, a Christological, or a social science (socio-rhetorical) interpretation of the body and of fornication have variously interpreted the issue of sexual immorality mentioned in 5:1-13 and 6:9-20. The forensic understanding presupposes a two-step ethics according to which individuals should keep the body from fornication because “to have extramarital sexual intercourse is to repudiate the relationship of belonging to the body of Christ.”³⁴⁹ As Conzelmann observes, keeping the purity of the body is a duty for a person belonging to Christ, not in the sense of belonging to an ecclesiological organism but of having a “real connection” of members (μελη) with Christ.³⁵⁰ In contrast, the Christological approach emphasizes a personal, relational connection with the body of Christ, as Käsemann does when he highlights the lordship of Christ that should include the realistic sense of the body that denotes “corporeality of human life, organic to the creation, claimed by God as his own right, yet

³⁴⁹ Hans Conzelmann, *1 Corinthians*, trans. James W. Leitch (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1975), 111.

³⁵⁰ *Ibid.*

threatened by the cosmic power.”³⁵¹ For Käsemann, becoming one body (ἐν σῶμα) with the prostitute or with the Christ (6:16-17) decides one’s life in the body of Christ -- “the realm into which we are incorporated with our bodies and to which we are called to render service in the body, i.e. total service, service which embraces all our different relationships in and to the world.”³⁵² On the other hand, social science or socio-rhetorical understanding emphasizes boundary of the community (as the body of Christ) against the pagan world. According to Mitchell, “the insiders are μέλη Χριστοῦ, but the prostitute is clearly not (6:15) ... She is beyond the boundary and is indeed a threat to the health of the whole community.”³⁵³ Here there is a big emphasis on the community’s unity achieved through fending off sexual immorality. Similarly, Neyrey views fornication as pollution; what is necessary is to control the body to maintain pure body.³⁵⁴ All are plausible interpretations. While the forensic, social-scientific, and rhetorical interpretations emphasize the body as “unity,” which is very different from my view according to which the body is meant to live for God in all aspects of life. In this regard, Käsemann’s reading is similar to mine in terms of his emphasis on “relational” language of bodily union as stated above, but is different because he does not give a person human agency with a

³⁵¹ Käsemann, *Essays on New Testament*, 129.

³⁵² *Ibid.*, 130.

³⁵³ Mitchell, *Paul and the Rhetoric of Reconciliation*, 120.

³⁵⁴ Neyrey, *Paul, in Other Words*, 115.

view of two-step ethics. In my view, the issue is related to the “power” -- with which some immoral people exercise their freedom irresponsibly at the expense of the whole community, echoing a Corinthian slogan that “all things are lawful” (6:12; 10:23). Indeed, this libertine attitude is an example of excessive individualism,³⁵⁵ by which the sexually immoral people do harm to the community – the majority of whom live as vulnerable people on the margin of society with little protection of their bodies. The question for Paul is this: what is his solution to the people on the margin – like prostitutes, slaves whose bodies are ruined by the powerful? Then 5:13 can be an affirmation of the body that is for the Lord; to live for the Lord is more than a unity for the community or maintaining purity of the community; it is to listen to the voice of the marginalized.

Marriage-related Matters

A Corinthian slogan³⁵⁶ in 7:1 (“it is well for a man not to touch a woman”) is the evidence that asceticism can be regarded as a hegemonic power used to control the household, the community, and society as Brown suggests in his book *Body and*

³⁵⁵ Horsley, “How can some of you say that there is no resurrection of the dead?’ Spiritual Elitism in Corinth,” *Novum Testamentum* (1978): 203-31.

³⁵⁶ Jouette M. Bassler, “1 Corinthians,” in *Women’s Bible Commentary* eds. Carol Newsom and Sharon Ringe (Louisville: W/JKP, 1998), 413.

Society.³⁵⁷ In my interpretation of Paul, along with Odell-Scott, Paul corrects the view of hegemonic, hierarchical power relationship between husband and wife, pointing to the sanctity of marriage to serve the God of community and love (7:14; 32-35).³⁵⁸ In this perspective, Paul can be read as supporting interdependent marriage relationships, which challenges the hegemonic, ascetic practice of the Greco-Roman world as well as of the Corinthian community because a healthy marriage relationship is not about who has more power (hegemonic) but about the mutual, interdependent relationship in the context of service to God. As the Corinthians “were bought with a price” (7:23), everything that they do, every step they take, and every breath they breathe, must be related to sanctifying God, who requires a holistic living to bring about the transformation and redemption of the world. As 7:14-16 expresses, the idea of sanctity can be applied to the unbelieving spouse-relationship because, as mentioned earlier, Paul’s world can be read as not separated between holy and profane but to be sanctified through the Spirit. Therefore, what they have to do is “remain with God” under any circumstances (7:17-24). Therefore, as God’s body of sanctity, they should not become “slaves of human masters” (7:23); instead, “in whatever condition you were called, there remain with God” (7:24). “Remaining with God” can be understood in a passive sense that you do nothing; but it

³⁵⁷ Peter Brown, *Society and Body*, 21-22.

³⁵⁸ Odell-Scott, *Paul’s Critique of Theocracy*, 176.

can be also understood in a positive sense of a command according to which the Corinthians should stay with God's initiative (the Spirit of God moves you about as if in the same way the wind blows as it chooses; John 3:1-16). Similarly, in my reading, Paul can be read as challenging social conservatism and nullifying human constructions of power: "remain with God" implying "see what God is doing." My reading of "remain with God" is contrary to that of Bartchy who views Paul as a socially conservative.³⁵⁹ My reading is close to Braxton, who reads ambiguity in the text as "an intrinsic feature of the text" that allows for challenging slavery; 7:22a ("called in the Lord") can be read to affirm the essential ministry of justice.³⁶⁰

Eating Meat Sacrificed to Idols

Regarding the eating of meat sacrificed to idols and of eating in idol temple (8:1-13), we can still see the conflict between those who have "knowledge" of freedom ("all things are lawful") and those who have weak consciences. Such "knowledge puffs up; but love builds up" (8:1). A necessary knowledge is to care for others: "take care that this liberty of yours does not somehow become a stumbling block to the weak" (8:9).

³⁵⁹ S. Scott Bartchy, *First-Century Slavery and 1 Corinthians 7:21*, SBL Dissertation Series 11, 1973. 175-83.

³⁶⁰ Brad Braxton, *The Tyranny of Resolution: 1 Corinthians 7:17-24* (Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 1999), 220-234.

Therefore, God will recognize such a person doing for others (8:2-3). Otherwise, the consequence will be great; not caring for the weak is the same as sinning against Christ: “you sin against Christ” (8:12). It is striking, indeed, that the weak and strong should live together with respect for each other. Identification of Christ with those weak members is a sign that there is no complete community if any one is excluded. From this holistic point of view, members should live with respectful difference between “knowledge” and conscience. The hegemonic voice of objective knowledge cannot exist at the sacrifice of “others.” God can know those who live with this kind of sensitivity to the existence of “others” (8:3). One can see here a community spirit: “If food is a cause of their falling, I will never eat meat, so that I may not cause one of them to fall” (8:13). From this community perspective, freedom can be sacrificed for others (8:24). For this spirit of living in community, Paul becomes a slave to all, sacrificing his rights (9:19-23).

As seen above, in my interpretation, the issues in 8:1-13 turn to the question of how to deal with “others” including culture and religion in general (10:1-33). As opposed to the traditional misuse of this text (ch.8, 10) as a cultural, theological boundary, especially in 10:14 (“flee from the worship of idols”), what is at stake is not a mere denial of any religion or culture as such. Rather, for my view, the problem arises due to the “participation” with demons (10:20), for example participating in destructive, hegemonic

practices in paganism and in the community. Instead, “partnership” with God is important; “God is faithful . . . you were called into *the fellowship* of his Son, Jesus Christ our Lord” (1:9) (emphasis mine). Fellowship can mean various things as scholarly interpretations should. Most of interpreters read fellowship in this context as referring to a theological boundary from the perspective of historical or sociological understanding of the community. But for my interpretation, “fellowship” (participation) with his Son, God requires that members discern whether their acts do good or harm to the community and society because ‘Christ’ is closely related to the sacrificial, faithful obedience to God in Paul’s vocabulary. The technical meaning or use of “Christ” in Pauline letters in general requires another debate. As will be shown later in the chapter, the image of Christ in 1 Corinthians as a whole emphasizes Christ crucified (especially in 1 Cor 1-4; 11:23-26), which has to do with the fellowship of Christ, as it is symbolized in the communion of bread and wine in the context of community. In my reading, the issue is not whether members of the community eat or not certain food or food offered to idols. Rather, the key is how to live holistically to the will of God, which calls for the fellowship of Christ. Because of this emphasis on the fellowship of Christ, members of the community should not be hostile toward others: “give no offense to Jews or to Greeks or to the assembly of God.” What is most important is, “so, whether you eat or drink, or whatever you do, do

everything for the glory of God” (10:32). For this goal, Paul again turns to the spirit of community by declaring: “just as I try to please everyone in everything I do, not seeking my own advantage, but that of many, so that they may be saved” (10:33).

Rights of Paul

Though some scholars see chapter 9 as a “digression”³⁶¹ or an “interruption”³⁶² because for them chapter 9 deals with something other than in chapter 8 where idol meat is a central object of concerns. Likewise, Willis sees chapter 9 as “a real defense in response to real attacks on Paul’s apostleship and/or how his apostolic work was conducted.”³⁶³ However, the conflicting power context of chapter 8 (between the strong and the weak in the case of eating meat) can also be read as continuing in chapter 9. That is, in chapter 8, one should make sure that the liberty of the weak in the community is respected;³⁶⁴ similarly in chapter 9, Paul’s egalitarian community should be extended to all in such a way that no one can be excluded from the “free” gospel of Christ (9:12, 18),

³⁶¹ Barrett, *1 Corinthians*, 200. Barrett sees this chapter 9 as the apostolic defense.

³⁶² Conzelmann, 151. Conzelmann finds a new theme in chapter 9, which is the apostleship of Paul.

³⁶³ Wendell Willis, “An Apostolic Apology? The Form and Function of 1 Corinthians 9,” *JSNT* 24 (1985), 33.

³⁶⁴ Harry Nasuti, “The woes of the prophets and the rights of the apostle: the internal dynamics of 1 Corinthians 9,” *CBQ* 50 (1988): 246-264. Nasuti sees the thematic continuance between chapter 8 and chapter 9 in terms of the correct use of liberty.

which violates a social system of reciprocal, patron-client system. Paul makes it clear that he is called to make the gospel available for all by becoming “a slave to all” (9:19) and “all things to all people” (9: 22). Whereas Barrett and Conzelmann emphasize Paul’s apostleship in chapter 9, as mentioned before, my reading is based on a socio-economic and marginalized perspective according to which the voice of marginalized people is taken seriously in the larger context of the Greco-Roman patron-client system. In other words, how can we understand Paul’s statement of 9:12-22 in this context? If the patronage system is socially popular and seemingly unavoidable,³⁶⁵ Paul might have two options: either rejects or accepts it. If he accepted the patronage system, he should not have rejected financial support from the Corinthians. But the text shows the opposite in verse 18. Seemingly, Paul rejected the whole patron-client system. The implication of this rejection is greater than we normally think. In fact, from the perspective of the rich or socially powerful, Paul’s not taking money from benefactors can mean a social death for him. It is interesting to see the tendency of scholarship that focuses on individual-centered theology focusing on Paul. For example, Barrett credits Paul to be a great

³⁶⁵ Malina, Bruce and Richard Rohrbaugh, *Commentary on the Synoptic Gospels* (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2003), 388. Malina and Rohrbaugh describe this patronage system as “socially fixed relations of generalized reciprocity between social unequals in which a lower-status person in need (client) has his needs met by having recourse for favors to a higher-status, well-situated person (patron). By being granted the favor, the client implicitly promises to pay back the patron... The client relates to the patron as to a superior and more powerful kinsman, while the patron looks after his clients as he does his dependents.”

theologian because Paul gave up all, not boasting of what he did. Similarly at a rhetorical level, Polaski reads 9:3-18 as Paul's voluntary renunciation of rights to emphasize Paul's authority and power.³⁶⁶ But from a marginalized perspective, and against the backdrop of a Greco-Roman patron-client system in which benefactors (likely the rich in Corinthian community) control the beneficiaries (likely the poor), Paul's not taking any support from the Corinthians can be read as a voice of opposition to the hegemonic, unequal body politics.³⁶⁷ Put differently, Paul's renunciation of his rights is more than a theological or rhetorical point that focuses on the person of Paul. As seen in the Lord's Table (11:17-34), the context around Paul and the Corinthian community certainly shows conflict in the community and outside, which includes economic, ideological conflicts between unequal. From this perspective, Paul's "independent" spirit becomes a means for egalitarianism based on the free gospel of Christ for all. His opposition to the client system is clear in 9:15-22, in which he emphasizes that the gospel is "free" to all (9:18); it cannot become a

³⁶⁶ Sandra Hack Polaski, *Paul and the Discourse of Power*, 104.

³⁶⁷ Ched Myers, "Balancing Abundance and Need," *The Other Side* 34 (1998) No.5. Myers observes: "Paul, however, recognized patronage as the glue that held in place all the oppressive relationships of the empire. Following the Christ who had been executed by that empire, Paul instead embraced the status of a "slave" (the lowest social class), in order that he might serve all people equally, un beholden to those of high political or economic standing (I Cor 9:18-23)." He continues: "It was expected that Paul would support his pastoral ministry in Corinth by positioning himself as an "in-house philosopher" sponsored by a wealthy patron. Paul, however, refused to become a client of the rich. Instead, he insisted instead on supporting himself through a trade (I Cor 9; see I Thess 2:9). For this he was severely criticized by the Corinthian aristocracy, both for offending the patron class and for lowering his prestige by working with his hands."

weapon to control others or a privilege to discriminate or exclude others. To demonstrate the power of “the gospel of Christ” (9:12) that includes “all” people, Paul adapts himself to all living conditions (9:19-22), for example by being “under the law” (v.20) or “outside the law” (v.21).

The bold statement in 9:15-22 resoundingly speaks about the resistant voice to the patron-client system, and protests against the hegemonic voice in the community (between the strong and the weak as observed in chapter 8, 10, and 11). In this line of thought about “independence” and binding love for all, Paul sounds for the community and society a voice of opposition to the patron-client system and to the logic of “reward-punishment” (9:4-14).³⁶⁸ According to this reading in 9:4-14, Paul does not emphasize that he has rights; Rather, his rhetorical point is to challenge the logic of reward or economy based on unequal relationships because his reward is a free gospel to all. In other words, logically, it does not make sense to those who believe that rights follow benefits. But those who are marginalized in the community and in society do not have rights that bring benefits. Paul, in my reading from the margin, therefore, eloquently speaks for those who stand in the system based on unequal relationships.

³⁶⁸ K.C. Hanson and Douglas E. Oakman, *Palestine in the time of Jesus: Social Structures and Social Conflicts* (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1998), 72.

Women's Head Covering

Regarding disputes over women's head-covering (11:1-16), scholarly exegesis converges over five interpretive possibilities:³⁶⁹ 1) Paul wants to limit women's hair styles because he is concerned about the confusion of gender difference at Corinth;³⁷⁰ 2) Paul is following the social convention of hierarchy or unequal relationship (so women's change of head-covering is considered a radical disobedience to the social convention);³⁷¹ 3) Paul seeks to limit such practices due to some disturbing acts by women at the worship;³⁷² 4) it is not Paul's own voice but an interpolation by later editors;³⁷³ or 5) Paul quotes the hegemonic, patriarchal voice of the opponents (11:4-7) to counter it.³⁷⁴ Each position has its own merits. Given my interpretive angle of "voice analysis" in the community, the last possibility sounds healthy and consistent with Paul's overall theology

³⁶⁹ Wire, *The Corinthian Women Prophets*, 220-3. She gives an overview of recent scholarly interpretations about the issue of women's head covering.

³⁷⁰ Barrett, *1 Corinthians*, 249-251. See also Conzelmann, 186, 191. Jerome O'Conner-Murphy, "1 Corinthians 11:2-16 once Again," *CBQ* 50 (1988): 265-274. O'Conner-Murphy sees the Corinthian problem limited to specific behavior of "how they dressed their hair" and Paul argues for gender difference, not a subordination of women.

³⁷¹ Jouette Bassler, "1 Corinthians," 416-417. Wire, *The Corinthian Women Prophets*, 130-131.

³⁷² Fiorenza, *In Memory of Her*, 233.

³⁷³ Garry W. Trompf, "On Attitudes toward Women in Paul and Paulinist literature: 1 Corinthians 11:3-16 and its Context," *CBQ* 42 (1980): 196-215. See also Wm. O. Walker, "1 Corinthians and Paul's Views regarding Women," *JBL* 94 (1974): 94-110. Both of whom insist that 11:2(3)-16 is an interpolation.

³⁷⁴ Odell-Scott, *Paul's Critique of Theocracy*, 168-172. See also Patte, *Paul's Faith*, 232-241; 339-341.

in his letters.³⁷⁵ The exegetical, literary clue to make this option possible comes from v.11, “nevertheless, in the Lord woman is not independent of man or man independent of woman. . . . but all things come from God” (11:11-12). In other words, Paul deconstructs his opponents’ gender hierarchy (7:9) through God’s power that requires people to live interdependently. In v.16, Paul confirms that there is no such custom to regulate head covering or gender relations apart from God. God’s initiative nullifies all human construction of power based on gender hierarchy.

The Lord’s Supper

In the passage about the Lord’s Supper (11:17-34), there is more complexity than normally thought, ranging from economic to ideological conflicts. Probably, one of the plausible answers can be found within the spectrum of power conflicts. In terms of conflict, sociological insights help us see the picture of social, economic conflicts in the community, which seems to take place at the Lord’s Supper.³⁷⁶ Given a cultural, social

³⁷⁵ Odell-Scott, *Paul’s Critique of Theocracy*, 168-172. Odell-Scott, “Let the Women speak in Church: An Egalitarian Interpretation of 1 Cor 14:33b-36,” *BTB* 13 (1983): 90-93. See also his “In Defense of an Egalitarian Interpretation of 1 Cor 14:34-36: a reply to Murphy-O’Conner’s Critique,” *BTB* 17 (1987): 100-103.

³⁷⁶ Witherington notes that the normal practice at Roman symposia (notorious for turning into drunken orgies) was “to rank one’s guests in terms of social status, with those of higher status eating with the host in the dining room and others eating elsewhere and getting poorer food.” Ben Witherington, *Conflict and Community*, 241.

atmosphere of eating and fellowship, the host is usually powerful and honored as benefactor.³⁷⁷ Likewise, the Lord's Supper might be such an occasion for a social, religious gathering.³⁷⁸ Understandably, those who can afford to come early are the rich, while the poor come late or do not attend at all because of the need to work.³⁷⁹ From the socioeconomic point of view, the hegemonic voice comes from those rich, high-class people.³⁸⁰ For Theissen, it is desirable for the rich to provide such a benevolent place through which the community and society as a system functions well.³⁸¹ Theissen does not criticize hierarchical society or the community in which the poor have to work late to make a living because Theissen believes that love patriarchy is a social basis for the community. The interpretive grounds for a socially conservative position comes from an understanding of the leading figures in the text, such as Crispus – the official of the synagogue (Acts 18:8), Gaius – the owner of the house church (Acts 19:29; Rom 16:23), and Erastus – the city treasurer in Corinth (Rom 16:23), who might have assumed the role of leaders (patrons).³⁸² However, such an exegetical result is dubious if one can re-

³⁷⁷ Ibid. See also Myers, "Balancing Abundance and Need," *The Other Side* 34 (1998) No.5.

³⁷⁸ Ibid.

³⁷⁹ Theissen, *Pauline Christianity*, 36-37, 96-99, 121-140. Martin, *The Corinthian Body*, 92-96.

³⁸⁰ Myers, "Balancing," no.5.

³⁸¹ Theissen, *Pauline Christianity*, 36-37, 96-99, 121-140.

³⁸² Ibid., 73-76. See Paul Sampley, "1 Corinthians," in *The New Interpreter's Study Bible*, ed. Walter J. Harrelson (Nashville: Abingdon, 2003), 2040.

examine the leading figures' motivation to join the Christian community. What is at stake for these leading figures to be involved in the community? They could risk their social reputation or strengthen their sense of identity without losing their dignity or their position of power in society and the community. Theissen finds no conflict between their social value of hierarchy (status) and life in Christian communities. However, the other way of reasoning is also plausible. If they sense a loss of reputation by participating in the Christian community, which is comprised mainly of low class people, why would they come to the community of the poor? It is unlikely that they would join in or establish the Christian community if we consider the makeup of the people at Corinth and the city as the capital of the Roman province of *Achaia*, called "wealth without culture,"³⁸³ re-founded in 46 BCE by Julius Caesar. There seems to be an overflow of people such as Rome's freed persons with lots of immigrants.³⁸⁴ Again, if the socially high class wants to preserve its reputation or sense of honor, they would not come to this lowly community. But if they did come to the community at a significant social cost, they are not conservative and thus do not reflect the picture of conservative, functional, hierarchical Paul, as described by Theissen.

Due to the limitations of the sociological approach as such, especially their view

³⁸³ Alciphron, *Letter* 15:2; *Letter* 24.

³⁸⁴ Strabo, *Geography* 8.6.20.

of communities as defined by boundaries (insiders and outsiders, and hierarchy), we should recognize other possibilities that may have caused divisions. Barrett suggests a list of possible groups: “a Paul party, Apollos party, Cephas, Christ (doubtful), sexual freedom party (ch.7), celibate party (ch.7), Gnostic freedom to eat food sacrificed to idols, some abstain from eating food sacrificed to idols, a Cephas, James and Jerusalem party (ch.9), the rich and the poor, the charismatics (doubtful party), doubters of the resurrection.”³⁸⁵ Indeed, Paul’s concerns are not merely about food or economic means as in Theissen’s analysis; rather, Paul criticizes those who (not the rich only) are “powerful” in order to subordinate others with certain ideologies such as proto-gnostic (ascetic) and libertines (licentiousness).³⁸⁶ By analogy to modern experience, it is probable that people in the same faction sit together around the table, sharing their food with in-group members. For whatever reasons, Paul’s concerns are about the hegemonic voices in the community, whose picture can be imagined with several factions suggested in 1:12.³⁸⁷ The point for Paul is that the Christic body, a community living Christ’s

³⁸⁵ Barrett, *1 Corinthians*, 295.

³⁸⁶ Fiorenza, “Rhetorical reconstruction,” 386-403.

³⁸⁷ One of hegemonic voices comes from those who speak in tongue. Regarding “spiritual gifts,” the key issue concerns power conflicts among those who claim superior gifts such as speaking in tongues (14:1-32). Those who have charismatic gifts exercise the hegemonic power in the community as described in ch.14. I will skip the discussion of spiritual gifts until later in the chapter. Actually, the problem is deeper than a mere fight for superior gifts. What really concerns Paul is the hegemonic voice’s effect on the community by those who claim to have superior gifts such as speaking in tongues, which resonates with society’s

sacrifice, is not lived out even at the very community event of the Lord's Supper, which is supposed to be the most holy community event.

Resurrection

Power conflict also appears with the issue of the resurrection in chapter 15. Some Corinthians denied the "resurrection of the dead" (15:12). For example, enthusiasts claim that they already lived resurrection in the present.³⁸⁸ For example, people of the Sophia tradition or spiritual elitism denied the resurrection.³⁸⁹ Consequently, the hegemonic voice dominates others based on their experience, on higher knowledge or wisdom. Indeed, the Sophia tradition can become an ideology of power based on hierarchical dualism between heaven and earth; the heaven represents transcendental knowledge or wisdom whereas the earth represents "bodily" life on earth.³⁹⁰ Because of this dualistic language according to which bodily life is degraded, the life of the low class, slaves does not improve and their voices are unheard. In this context, Paul deconstructs the "power" of the hegemonic voice in a realized eschatology or of those who belong to the divine

hegemonic voice lying in the rhetoric of eloquence or concord without concern for the voiceless of many people.

³⁸⁸ Richard Horsley, "Spiritual Elitism in Corinth," *Novum Testamentum* (1978): 203-31.

³⁸⁹ Ibid.

³⁹⁰ Ibid.

Sophia tradition, through God's power. As will be clear later in the next chapters, the issue of the resurrection can be interpreted as part of the issues surrounding the Corinthian power conflict. Paul is not in a systematic theology mode and expounding the nature of resurrection; he responds to those who seek power by a paradoxical, deconstruction statement: "I die everyday!" (15:31). Dying is necessary to be resurrected (15:36-50). Notably, Paul clearly denies the idea of "fleshly" resurrection because he believes that obsessions with "fleshly" things may involve a sort of "denial of death."³⁹¹ Flesh things represent a power to grab earthly things and to keep them forever. Grabbing power of hegemony at the expense of others means that those "powerful" people do not want to die (to give up). That thought of "undying" is in opposition to Paul's confession that "I die everyday" (15:31); because for Paul "dying" can be a connotation of dying of Christ – as shown in the institution of the Lord's Supper (11:23-26) – that the body of Christ is given out for many. In this line of thought, "flesh and blood" (15:50) can be understood designating a power grab on earth by not taking care of others. Likewise, in my interpretation, Paul seems to locate the human problem in the denial of death, in the sense that they want to maintain their fleshly life forever. This selfish, fleshly desire seeks a body that does not die in their desire. Therefore, some Corinthians who are

³⁹¹ Ernst Becker, *The Denial of Death* (New York: Free Press, 1973), xii.

interested in such a fleshy life ask, “How are the dead raised? With what kind of body do they come?” (15:35). To those who seek fleshy power Paul responds: “Fool! What you sow does not come to life unless it dies” (15:36). If we recall those who are interested in knowing “what kind of body,” we can relate these people to a group of people who want to prolong their earthly, human power into the future. To oppose the power language based on earthly, physical body (σῶμα ψυχικόν), a new phrase, “a spiritual body” (σῶμα πνευματικόν), is coined (15:44).³⁹² Indeed, the construction of the “spiritual body” is oxymoronic, nonsensical to the ears of Greeks because spirit and body (or flesh) cannot go together.³⁹³ As is clear, the point of Paul’s discourse here is not to describe the status of the resurrection as such but to reject the human construction of power based on the idea of a flesh resurrection. Indeed, in my reading, Paul’s theology is based on dying, which is a deconstructive power against those who seek “powers” or prolong their “living” at the expense of others.

Thus far, I have analyzed the Corinthian issues from the perspective of power

³⁹² Brian Schmisek, “The Spiritual Body: Paul’s Use of the Term Soma pneumatikon in 1 Cor 15:44,” Ph.D. Dissertation. The Catholic University of America, 2002, 94. In Pauline Literature, Paul uses *pneuma* 120 times whereas he uses *psyche* 11 times only. Schmisek points that Paul uses *pneuma* “to speak of the Spirit of God rather than the human spirit; *pneuma* as a way to refer to the self; to refer to that aspect of the person that is open to receive the Spirit of God; to express the presence and power of God.” In the Old Testament as well, the spirit of God is referred to as “God’s creative, life-giving, prophetic, energizing power in the life of an individual and the community.”

³⁹³ Ibid., 138-149.

conflict and showed the underlying ideology of dominating others. The depth of the problems in the Corinthian situations seems to be a lack of “living/dying like Christ.” In the next chapter, I will investigate the imagery of the “body” and the “body of Christ” in 1 Corinthians to show the importance of “living/dying like Christ” in the Corinthian context of power conflicts.

CHAPTER VI

THE “BODY OF CHRIST” IN 1 CORINTHIANS

Among various, plausible interpretations about the body (four approaches to the conception of community and two kinds of body politics in the Greco-Roman and the Jewish world as explored in preceding chapters), and the “body of Christ” (three approaches to the “body of Christ” as explored in Chapter II), my interpretation of 1 Corinthians as discussed in Chapter V opens the possibility to envision the “body of Christ” as a metaphor for “living” for a democratic-inclusive body – a body that can be lived through an imitation of Christ, a Christic body. Therefore, the essence of my interpretation is that Paul uses the metaphor “body of Christ” in 1 Corinthians as a call for an ethical exhortation to the community that struggles in the context of power conflicts. From this perspective, it is essential to proceed to a close reading of “body” and “body of Christ” in 1 Corinthians, to show that this interpretation is not only plausible, but also legitimate, i.e., grounded in Paul’s text.³⁹⁴

³⁹⁴ In the seven Pauline letters, “body” (σῶμα, excluding σαρκος or μελος) occurs 83 times among which 63 percent (52 times) occurs in 1 Corinthians only (1 Cor 5:3; 6:13, 15-16, 18-20; 7:4, 34; 9:27; 10:16f; 11:24, 27, 29; 12:12-20, 22, 24-25, 27; 13:3; 15:35, 37-38, 40, 44, 53-54). If we include 12 occurrences in 2

Paul's Use of the "body" in 1 Corinthians

In my analysis of 1 Corinthians, the terms for "body" are used to designate "the physical body," "the holistic dedicated body," and "the Christic body." The issue of "physical body"³⁹⁵ is debatable. For instance, in 1 Cor 5:3-5, Paul asks the community "to hand this man over to Satan for the destruction of the *flesh*, so that his spirit may be saved in the day of the Lord" (1 Cor 5:5). Conzelmann reads the destruction of the flesh as death and as thrusting "out of the body of Christ into the realm of wrath."³⁹⁶

According to this interpretation, to keep the "holiness of the church," the man who committed such a sexual immorality deserves death and expulsion. This interpretation posits a dualistic anthropology that the spirit may be saved apart from the flesh. This attitude justifies religious expulsion or excommunication. Similarly, Mitchell interprets that the man who committed a sexual immorality must be expelled to maintain unity, as

Corinthians, 1 and 2 Corinthians together account for 77 percent of the term "body." The additional occurrences are 13 times in Romans, 1 time in Galatians, 3 times in Philipppians, and 2 times in 1 Thessalonians. Though this percentage does not necessarily show the importance of the concept of the "body" in each letter, the heavy use of this term in 1 Corinthians (52 times out of 83) suggests that there is something urgent about the "body" in this letter. That urgency can be understood with Paul's exhortation according to which the Corinthians should live Christ in their bodies to honor the weak and the marginalized.

³⁹⁵ 1 Cor 5:3-5; 13:3; 15:37-38, 44. The sense of physical body appears throughout Pauline and Deutero-Pauline letters: Rom 1:24; 4:19; 2 Cor 5:6-8; 12:2-3; 7:5; Eph 5:28-29; Col 1:22; 2:5, 11; Heb 3:17; 9:10.

³⁹⁶ Conzelmann, *1 Corinthians*, 97-98. Barrett, *1 Corinthians*, 126. Ernst Kasemann, "Sentences of Holy Law in the New Testament," *NT Questions*, 66-81.

the Greco-Roman world does.³⁹⁷ However, in my interpretation, the destruction of the flesh should be understood as a figurative way to emphasize the giving up of the flesh desires, self-seeking pleasure, dominating power, but not a destruction of the physical body itself. From my perspective, what Paul opposes is the Corinthian slogan that “all things are lawful” (6:12; 10:23) that takes the form of spiritual elitism or hegemonic oppressive control in the Corinthian community. In my interpretation, expelling the offender is not a key; the unity achieved through the act of expelling is a “forced one” just as in the Greco-Roman world. “Body” (or flesh) in 1 Corinthians is not dualistic or disrespectful. Rather, the problem (or the cause of evil) lies in not putting to death the deeds of the flesh, as 1 Cor 15:44 can be interpreted. “It is sown a physical body; it is raised a spiritual body;”³⁹⁸ In this verse, there is an interrelation between body and spirit: The spiritual body occurs only when a physical body is “sown” in the sense of dying to self-seeking power. Then, “his spirit may be saved” can be understood as an outcome of his denouncing of such horrible sexual immorality.

³⁹⁷ Mitchell, *Paul and the Rhetoric of Reconciliation*, 112. See also Neyrey, *Paul, in Other Words*, 116.

³⁹⁸ Other Pauline letters also emphasize the figurative sense of putting to death the deeds of the flesh, whereas the Deutero-Pauline letters do not have. In this figurative sense, persons do not live according to the spirit but according to the flesh. See also Rom 6:6 (sinful body), 12 (body of passion); 7:24 (body of death); 8:23 (redemption of bodies); 2 Cor 7:1 (defilement of body); 1 Thes 4:4 (sin-ruled body). The fact that the Deutero-Pauline letters do not have the notion of a sinful body suggests that the writers or editors (Deutero-Pauline communities) shifted to the use of a social body or to the dualistic anthropology according to which the spirit is higher than the flesh.

The “holistic body” dedicated to God appears in 1 Cor 6:13 (body for the Lord), 6:15-18 (body not for a prostitute), 6:19 (a temple of the Spirit), 6:20 (glorify God in your body), and 7:34 (total commitment).³⁹⁹ For Conzelmann’s concept of a holistic body is grounded in the fact that “to have extramarital sexual intercourse is to repudiate the relationship of belonging to the body of Christ.”⁴⁰⁰ Likewise, Conzelmann interprets the phrase “members (μελη) of Christ” (1 Cor 6:15) as referring to a “real connection” with Christ.⁴⁰¹ Mitchell sounds almost the same with Conzelmann except for her methodological approach to the body of Christ derived from the Greco-Roman *homonoia* (concord, unity).⁴⁰² It is clear from her interpretation that outsiders (prostitutes) are never part of the body of Christ and are “a threat to the health of the whole community.”⁴⁰³ In

³⁹⁹ This notion of “holistic body” dedicated to God appears in Romans: “members” as instruments of wickedness or of righteousness (6:13), “members” for sanctification (6:19), live by the Spirit or put to death the deeds of the body (8:10-11, 13), as a living sacrifice (12:1). In Philippians, Paul identifies the sinful and spiritual body: “the body of our humiliation” and “it may be conformed to the body of his glory, by the power that also enables him to make all things subject to himself” (2 Cor 3:21). This one verse contains both the negative and the positive body; but there is hope if one can live by the power of God. This positive body appears much stronger in 1:20: “. . . Christ will be exalted now as always in my body, whether by life or by death.” There is also the notion of the holistic body in 1 Thessalonians: “May the God of peace himself sanctify you entirely; and may your spirit and soul and body be kept sound and blameless at the coming of our Lord Jesus Christ” (1 Thess 5:23). Paul’s tripartite division of spirit, soul and body should be regarded as an expression of holism rather than a scientific division.

⁴⁰⁰ Conzelmann, *1 Corinthians*, 111.

⁴⁰¹ Conzelmann, *1 Corinthians*, 111, note 21.

⁴⁰² Mitchell, *Paul and the Rhetoric of Reconciliation*, 118-121.

⁴⁰³ *Ibid.*

contrast with both Conzelmann and Mitchell's interpretations, my interpretation focuses on the figurative sense of "members of Christ." "Members of Christ" should live like Christ, as persons united with Christ, in a holistic, total commitment to the Lord. Thus being "members of Christ" involves honoring those who are weak, poor, oppressed, marginalized in the community and outside of it. In this view, κολλασμοι (to unite, join, stick to) in 1 Cor 6:16-17 can be understood as a living metaphor pointing to the importance of total commitment. With this view of a living metaphor ("members of Christ" in the sense of "limbs of Christ"), then, the verses of 1 Cor 6:13, 15-20; 7:34 do not speak about a two-step ethic according to which "members" should keep their bodies holy because of their membership in the body of Christ and should exclude "others," such as prostitutes. By contrast, as a living metaphor, the phrase "members of Christ" does not exclude but rather include prostitutes; they should not be treated as prostitutes but as "members" of Christ. From this perspective, the issue is not a lack of unity or uniform behavior but a lack of respect for others and a lack of total commitment to live like Christ as *members* of Christ.

Lastly, the "Christic body"⁴⁰⁴ who lives and dies like Christ is my interpretation

⁴⁰⁴ In Pauline letters, one can find a sense of the Christic body – to live and die like Christ. First, in Romans there is consistent theme about this Christic body: "died to the law through the body of Christ" (Rom 7:4), one body and many members in Christ (Rom 12:4-5). Paul's use of body in Romans is complex. Paul speaks negatively and positively about the body, depending on how believers respond to the Spirit.

of the body of Christ in 1 Cor 12:27. As I analyzed in Chapter II the three interpretive

The negative body is sinful, sin-ruled, and needs redemption that involves putting to death the deeds of the body through the Spirit. The positive body is a Spirit-ruled body (Rom 8:10-11, 13). Believers can embody Christ in their bodies by imitating Christ's faithfulness (Rom 3:22). Furthermore, the "body of Christ" in Rom 7:4 is set in opposition to the "body of sin" in Rom 6:6 ("that our old self was crucified with him so that the body of sin might be destroyed, and we might no longer be enslaved to sin"). The body of sin can be understood as a "sinful body" (ruled by sin), and the body of Christ can be understood as a *Christic body* (attributive genitive) (Rom 6:6). Sinfulness is overcome by dying to the "law, sin and flesh" (Rom 6:11-14) as Christ did in his earthly ministry, in the sense that the hegemonic, oppressive power of the law, sin and flesh should not dominate the voice of the marginalized people. The hope is to live up to the grace of God, which is to die to the law (as the power of sin). Indeed, the above general comments account for the specific interpretation of these phrases and verses in Romans. For instance, there are several interpretive choices regarding the connotations of "law," "flesh," "sin," "dying to the law," etc. There are many plausible interpretations. For instance, there is a forensic interpretation according to which salvation is accomplished once-and-for-all by Christ for those who have faith in Christ apart from the law. In this perspective, the law cannot give salvation while faith in Christ gives salvation. By contrast, my interpretation turns to a question which is neglected in the forensic interpretation; the question of "dying to what kind of law." My interpretation raises the question of power as expressed in body politics; it is concerned with people involved in the practice of the law and the power dynamics involved in this practice in the time of Paul and in the context of Pauline community. Second, there is only one occurrence of the term "body" in Galatians in which one can find strong sense of the Christic embodiment: "from now on, let no one make trouble for me; for I carry the marks of Jesus branded on my body" (Gal 6:17). Paul's tone sounds bitter in this verse; and that is understandable in view of the letter's polemical context where another gospel was preached (Gal 1:6-7). The point Paul makes in this angry situation is his realistic, bodily confession that he "carry the marks of Jesus branded on my body" (Gal 6:17). In other words, he lives out the very spirit of Jesus in his body, making sacrifices for the people he serves. Indeed, here also, we see a strong sense of Christic embodiment. With flesh (σάρξ) often interchangeable with body (σῶμα), the idea of Christic body is very clear in Gal 2:20: "it is no longer I who live, but it is Christ who lives in me. And the life I now live in the flesh I live by faith in the Son of God, who loved me and gave himself for me." Especially in the polemical context between Jewish Christians and gentile Christians, Paul's confession mentioned in Gal 2:20 sounds big to the ear of the hegemonic voice because such a confession requires a death of hegemonic power. There is also a strong sense of the Christic body in 2 Corinthians: "always carrying in the body the death of Jesus, so that the life of Jesus may also be made visible in our bodies" (2 Cor 4:10).

approaches to the “body of Christ” in 1 Corinthians (ecclesiological organism, Christological, and corporate-solidarity approaches), my approach centers on the body of Christ re-imagined as the “Christic body” (*now you are body of Christ*) (1 Cor 12:27). This phrase does not have the definite article as compared to the phrases: “for building up **the** body of Christ” (Eph 4:12); “offering of **the** body of Christ” (Heb 10:10). In both cases, *the* body of Christ (with the definite article) is used as an object of the verb “to build up” and of the verb “to offer” (Heb 10:10).⁴⁰⁵ In contrast, in 1 Cor 14:4, what is built up is not the body of Christ but the *ecclesia*.⁴⁰⁶ In 1 Cor 12:27, the body of Christ (which does not have the definite article in Greek) alluding to the life and death of Christ (a Christic body) is the predicate subject: “you are *body of Christ*” – in the sense that as a “Christic body,” you (agent) are to live like Christ. In the Deutero-Pauline letters, the relationship between Christ and the church is as between husband and wife, envisioned as a hierarchical relationship, whereas in 1 Cor 7:4, the relationship between husband and

⁴⁰⁵ In Deutero-Pauline letters, there is a strong sense of the body of Christ as an organism. For example, there are verses related to this ecclesiological organism: “reconciliation in *one* body” (Eph 2:16), “members of the *same* body” (Eph 3:6), “*one* body and *one* Spirit” (Eph 4:4), “body’s growth” (Eph 4:16), “members of *his* body” (Eph 5:30), and “called in the *one* body” (Col 3:15). Church as an institution (organism) is equal to the body of Christ whose head is Christ (Eph 4:12; 5:23; Col 1:18, 24; 2:19).

⁴⁰⁶ In 1 Corinthians, the body of Christ is shared in the sense that believers participate in the work of Christ: “a sharing of the blood and the body of Christ” (10:16-17); “my body for you” (11:24); “the importance of Christ’s sacrifice” (11:27, 29); “body analogy *with Christ*” (12:12); “act of baptism and drinking” (12:13); and “body analogy pointing to the attitudes of Christic body” (12:14-26).

wife is mutually binding and interdependent.

In summary, in my interpretation, from the context of power conflicts, primary concerns have to do with a metaphor for “living” rather than for an organism. How to live out the gospel of Christ with the body is a central key to the Pauline theology and ethics;⁴⁰⁷ because the Corinthian context requires reconciliation, not a unity, but

⁴⁰⁷ Pauline theology can be understood from the perspective of the marginalized as promoting the democratic and egalitarian body politics, with no partiality based on sex, gender, ethnicity, and class (Gal 3:28). See Downing, *Cynics' Paul*, 11-22. Brad Braxton, *No Longer Slaves: Galatians and African American Experience*, (Minnesota: The Liturgical Press, 2002), 94-95. This does not mean an erasure of differences in the community but an erasure of inequality or the hegemonic voice. Regarding Pauline ethics, it is a “perfectionist” view according to which individuals must realize the *body* of Christ in their bodies by imitating Christ’s self-giving love and sacrifice. Therefore, in my view of Pauline ethics according to which there is only one-step ethics in which “living” of the Christic body is emphasized. For two-step ethics, see Gordon Fee, “toward a theology of 1 Cor” in *Pauline Theology* vol. II. Ed. David M. Hay, (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1993). Paul’s faith is not dualistic between faith and action; rather, faithfulness as ongoing trust in God must complete the law of love, equivalent to the law of God, and the law of Christ. Likewise, presenting bodies as a living sacrifice (Rom 12:1) is not a second-step (“indicative to imperative”) that believers should take after conversion or faith but means a one-step ethics with which believers faithfully live according to the Spirit. This kind of one-step ethical view challenges most exegetical commentators, who view Rom 12:1 as an ethical exhortation, as a result of faith “in Christ” (Rom 3:21-26). But in my interpretation, Paul’s theology and ethics cannot be separated from each other. It is much clearer in 1 Corinthians in which Paul deconstructs human wisdom, power and vain glory, and reconstructs the community through the living of the “body of Christ.” On the other hand, the view of theology or ethics in the Deutero-Pauline letters is based on the metaphor of a social body, whose head as Christ is “the beginning” (Col 1:18; similarly, Eph 1:23). With a view of high Christology, the husband is the head of the wife, just as Christ is to the church in a hegemonic body politic. In the Deutero-Pauline letters, a universal ethics gain weight that all people must follow rules or authority (deontological view). The worldview of Deutero-Pauline is whether to follow Christian norms, which tend to be formalized in theocracy or hierarchy. There is no sense of diversity or embodiment found in dying with Christ. Rather, here, Christ died “once and for all” as in a forensic interpretation of salvation. The implication is that “as you belong to this community, then you have to do your duty.” There is also a strong boundary drawn between members

reconciliation made possible only through living like Christ. The hope is not a mere asceticism but giving one’s “body” to God through a holistic commitment. The focus on body as a place of “living” is much clearer when the body is related to a “living” of the “Christic body” (12:27).

Table 1: Summary of “body” in Pauline and Deutero-Pauline Letters

Item	Pauline	Deutero-Pauline
Metaphor of body	Embodiment of Christ	Ecclesiological organism (social body)
View of body	Holistic	Dualistic
Body politic	Democratic-inclusive	Hegemonic (hierarchy)
Gender relationship	Mutual dependency	Patriarchy
Ethics	One-step	Two-step
Reform voice	Counter-hegemonic	Accommodating society
Historical context	Community formation	Community institutionalized
Boundary	Open and embracing	Inflexible and hard

**“Body of Christ” (Christic body) in 1 Corinthians:
Figurative, Discursive Structure**

In the preceding analysis of Paul’s use of the term “body” in 1 Corinthians, I showed several interpretive choices while giving my position based on Paul’s ethical exhortation to the community in conflict, for which the solution is not a unity but a Christ-like living and dying. In this section, I turn to the use of the *figure*, “body of

of the community and the rest of the world. There is no sense of protest against the hierarchical system itself. What matters is order or authority in the community. The idea of the Christ-ruled church as the “true” social body relativizes all other institutions at the sacrifice of Christic embodiment.

Christ,” in 1 Corinthians. This figure, like all figures, involves a twofold semantic investment, since it brings together and thus transforms the (expected) views of the audience as enunciatee and the different views of the author as enunciator. This twofold semantic investment is easy to recognize in the case of metaphors, which are a particular kind of figures that makes explicit its two semantic fields, as Patte shows based on Ricoeur and Greimas.⁴⁰⁸ For instance, the metaphors “war is a chess-game” brings together the semantic fields of actual war and of a game, which are posited as having something in common (a common semantic feature that actually changes according to the discourse in which the metaphor is used). Similarly Heschel’s metaphor, “Sabbath is a palace,”⁴⁰⁹ brings together a religious semantic field and a secular-luxury semantic field. How are these two semantic fields interrelated for Heschel? Heschel gives us a clue by providing us with a more complete formulation: “Sabbath is a palace *in time*.” His discourse about the proper understanding of Sabbath emphasizes time, against Philo and the Romans’ emphasis on space; thus, it is through the semantic feature of ‘time-as-contrasted-with-space’—half of which is from Heschel and the other half from his

⁴⁰⁸ Daniel Patte, *The Religious Dimensions of Biblical Texts: Greimas’s Structural Semiotics and Biblical Exegesis*. Semeia Studies. (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1990) 141-158. Patte presents in detail the two following examples.

⁴⁰⁹ As an example, Patte, *op. cit.*, pp. 148-158 analyzes the book by Abraham J. Heschel, *The Sabbath: Its Meaning for Modern Man* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Young, 1951).

interlocutor, Philo in this instance—that Heschel constructs his metaphorical figure. This is true of any figure, including those that Paul constructs through his discourse to the Corinthians (1 Corinthians). Paul constructs his figures—including the figure that is at the very center of his discourse, namely ‘the body of Christ’—by bringing together his view of the subject matter (his semantic field) and his interlocutors’ view to the same subject matter (their semantic field, as he envisions it).

How these two semantic fields are brought together, and how Paul constructs his figures, including “body of Christ,” can readily be recognized when one pays close attention to the discursive structure of his text. Without going into the arcane of structural semiotic analysis, one can readily recognize that, among other things (emphasized in other interpretations), through his letter Paul aims at *transforming the views of his intended readers about certain topics*. For this, he cannot but first speak about these topics *in a way that will make sense for his interlocutors*; he allows them to speak; he gives them voice. Then, progressively Paul transforms their view of these topics, by introducing other voices, reaching the end of his discourse when he can at last present these given topics *in the different way in which he wants his interlocutors to understand them*. This recognition that these are several voices in the text, several view points, is essential for my purpose, since it allows to hear the voices of people who have been

silenced by attributing everything to a single voice, Paul's.

This multifold “semantic discursive structure” of a discourse can be recognized in a first approximation by paying attention to what Patte (following Greimas and others) calls “inverted parallelisms”: the presentation of a topic from one perspective (the addressees’) at the beginning of a discursive unit and, at the end of this unit, the presentation of the same topic (parallelism) from a different perspective (from an *inverted* perspective).⁴¹⁰ Thus, I will begin by presenting and explaining the overall discursive structure of 1 Corinthians. Then, looking closer at main features of this discursive structure of 1 Corinthians I will emphasize the way in which Paul constructs the figure of the body of Christ in 1 Corinthians. As we shall see, this will then allow me to clarify aspects of Paul's theology and ethics which are otherwise invisible and ignored and then to show how the centrality of Christic embodiment perceived from the perspective of the marginalized is indeed rooted in the text of 1 Corinthians as a discourse seeking to address power conflicts in Corinth.

Beside other plausible interpretations of 1 Corinthians, which think that the problem Paul sees in Corinth is “division” and “diversity” and that the “unity” is the

⁴¹⁰ See Daniel Patte, *Structural Exegesis for New Testament Critics*. Guide for Biblical Scholarship. (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1990), 9-22. See also his systematic analysis of the Gospel of Matthew using this principle; Daniel Patte, *The Gospel according to Matthew: A Structural Commentary on Matthew's Faith*. (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1987; reprinted in 1991; Trinity Press International reprint, 1996).

solution to these conflicts,⁴¹¹ my reading suggests that “diversity” is the solution that Paul proposes for the power conflicts⁴¹² brought about by an exclusive, hierarchical view of the community as the body of Christ. In my view, this power conflict occurs from all corners of the community and outside of it. As I showed earlier in Chapter II and III, scholars’ reading of the body of Christ in 1 Corinthians differs depending on the scholars’ contextual, theological and analytical choices. For example, the socio-rhetorical tradition (as found for instance in Mitchell) chooses its hermeneutical choice in the concept of unity, which is derived from the Greco-Roman rhetoric of high class. In such a case, the problem that Paul sees in Corinth is caused by “division” and solved by “unity.” In contrast, I view the problem that Paul sees in Corinth as caused by hierarchical, unifying views of the body politics to be solved by an affirmation of diversity in an inclusive body of Christ. The figures that Paul constructs and that an analysis of the discursive structure of the letter reveals (as we shall see) posit a body of Christ which is a democratic-inclusive body that results from the de(re)construction of power ideology by Christ crucified that Paul’s discourse itself “imitates” (1 Cor 11:1, where he declares that he is an imitator of Christ).

⁴¹¹ See scholarly approaches to the interpretation of the body of Christ in Chapter II. Mitchell is a typical example of reading the body of Christ in terms of Greco-Roman rhetoric of social unity (*homonioia*).

⁴¹² As Odell-Scott also suggests, see Odell-Scott, *Paul’s Critique of Theocracy*, 125.

With this hermeneutical emphasis along with the sharpening context of power conflict, my reading of 1 Corinthians as a whole (focused on its discursive structure, centered on the image of “body of Christ,” as we shall see), will make alive the voices of the marginalized in the community and in the text. By considering the role of the figure “body of Christ” in Paul’s discourse to the Corinthians, I will show how this discourse affirms the diversity of people (a democratic-inclusive community) and exhorts the community to live like Christ (to be a Christic body, to embody Christ), not as a social, hierarchical body based on unity. This exegetical choice to focus on the discursive structure of 1 Corinthians results in the following outline of the letter. In this figurative structure, the figure “you are body of Christ” (12:27) points to the way in which the community should live out the Christic body, which requires death of human wisdom, and of any attitude and life style that presuppose or condone hegemony that does not attend to the voice of the marginalized.

Outline of the Discursive Figurative Structure of 1 Corinthians

1:1-17 PAUL, APOSTLE OF CHRIST JESUS, AND THE CORINTHIANS, SANCTIFIED IN CHRIST JESUS

- x 1:1-9 Called as apostle of Christ and called as partners of Christ
- x' 1:10-17 United in the gospel of "the cross of Christ" and its power

1:18-4:21 THE CROSS AS GOD'S POWER EXEMPLIFIED BY THE CORINTHIANS AND EMBODIED BY PAUL

- A 1:18-31 The cross, God's wisdom and power
 - x 1:18-25 Christ crucified, the power of God and the wisdom of the world
 - x' 1:26-31 The Corinthians chosen by God through Christ crucified
- B 2:1-4:7 Paul's Faith in Christ crucified
 - x 2:1-16 Paul's endeavor to embody Christ crucified in his ministry
 - y 3:1-15 The cross as foundation of the community
 - x' 3:16-4:7 The Corinthians' failure to embody Christ crucified
- A' 4:8-21 Paul's embodying Christ crucified, a model for the Corinthians

5:1-11:34 THE CORINTHIANS' FAILURE TO EMBODY CHRIST CRUCIFIED, PAUL'S EXHORTATION TO THE CORINTHIANS CALLING FOR PARTICIPATION IN CHRIST CRUCIFIED

- A 5:1-6:20 The Corinthians' failure to live Christ crucified
 - x 5:1-13 Sexual immorality as a case of failure
 - y 6:1-11 Lawsuit among believers as a case of failure
 - x' 6:12-20 Solution: "live Christ crucified as members of Christ"
- B 7:1-8:13 Paul's advice to the Corinthians, who do not embody Christ crucified in their social, community life
 - x 7:1-40 "Remain with God" in the calling of God as a slave of Christ, not as slaves of human beings
 - x' 8:1-13 Christ "died" for all in the community; Paul's embodiment of Christ crucified through self-control (not eating meat)
- C 9:1-22 Paul's living Christ crucified by becoming weak
- B' 9:23-11:1 Paul's exhortation calling for participation in Christ crucified
- A' 11:2-34 Community worship and Lord's Supper through participating in Christ crucified
 - x 11:2-16 Egalitarian worship service
 - x' 11:17-34 Proclaiming and participating in Christ crucified

12:1-15:11 EXHORTATION: THE CORINTHIAN BODY AS *CHRISTIC* EMBODIMENT

- A 12:1-30 Diversity in the Corinthian body (gifts, services, activities), baptized into one body; the

Corinthians as Christic body, Christic embodiment

x 12:1-3 Jesus as Lord

y 12:4-11 Gifts of the Spirit for all (equals)

x' 12:12-30 In order to be the body of Christ, crucified for "others"

B 12:31-13:13 The Corinthians as loving body

A' 14:1-15:11 The Corinthians called to build a loving community

x 14:1-19 In order to be the body of Christ, pursue love and build up a community

y 14:20-40 Gifts of the Spirit for all (equals): a hymn, a lesson, a revelation, a tongue, an interpretation

x' 15:1-11 Christ as Lord, died and raised for us

15:12-58 AS CHRIST CRUCIFIED WAS RAISED, SO THE CRUCIFIED BODY OF THE CHRISTIANS WILL BE RAISED

A 15:12-20 Christ crucified has been raised from the dead

B 15:21-49 The power of the resurrected Christ at work for all the children of Adam (not merely believers), since the crucified and risen Christ is the new Adam

A' 15:50-58 A new kind of body; imperishable (after crucified death) for the "body of Christ"

16:1-24 CONCLUSION

A 16:1-4 Show your love of the Christ crucified: collection for the saints

A' 16:5-24 Corinthians, stand firm in your faith

In the following, I will briefly explain the above figurative structure by showing how its key thematic and figurative features focus on the figure of the body of Christ.

1:1-17 PAUL, APOSTLE OF CHRIST JESUS, AND THE CORINTHIANS, SANCTIFIED IN CHRIST JESUS

This first figurative unit has inverted parallelisms between 1:1-2 and 1:12-17. 1

Cor 1:1-2 presents Paul as an apostle of Christ Jesus, and the Corinthians as sanctified in Christ Jesus [*en Christo Iesou*] and saints. But 1:12-17 underscores that being an apostle of Christ (in Paul's case) and sanctified in Christ Jesus (in the Corinthians' case) involve

more than membership or belonging. The Corinthians should not say either “I belong to Paul,” or “I belong to Apollos,” or “I belong to Cephas,” or “I belong to Christ” (1:12). This is not what *en Christo Iesou* means; it does not mean “belonging to a party,” an ecclesiological body. Similarly, being apostle does not mean baptizing (understood as making members of an ecclesiological body) but to bring and manifest the good news of “the cross of Christ” which has power and should not be emptied of its power. Thus, being “in Christ” does not mean to belong to an ecclesiological body; the gospel is centered on the cross of Christ as power.

The first sub-unit of 1:1-9 (x) has parallels between “Paul being called as apostle of Christ” (1:1) and the Corinthians being “called into the fellowship of his Son, Jesus Christ our Lord” (1:9). Thus, the *koinonia* in which the Corinthians are called is like Paul’s apostleship, in the sense that the Corinthians have partnership (are partners)⁴¹³ with Christ. The second sub-unit of 1:10-17 (x’) introduces the cross of Christ, which is a true basis of unity. Being united in the same mind and the same purpose (1:10) is not a matter of belonging to an ecclesiological body, but rather it is a matter of having a mind and purpose framed by the same gospel that does not empty the cross of Christ of its power (1:17).

⁴¹³ The New Jerusalem Bible appropriately translates, “called you to be partners with his Son Jesus Christ our Lord.”

1:18-4:21 THE CROSS AS GOD'S POWER EXEMPLIFIED BY THE CORINTHIANS AND EMBODIED BY PAUL

In this second figurative unit the cross of Christ, introduced in the first figurative unit (1:1-17), is further emphasized. This second figurative unit has inverted parallelisms between 1:18-31 and 4:8-21.

In 1:18-31 (A) the cross of Christ is shown to be the center of Paul's message as a manifestation of God's power (1:18-25, x)—“the message about the cross is foolishness to those who are perishing, but to us who are being saved it is the power of God” (1:18)—and exemplified by the Corinthians' own cross-like experience at the time of their call (1:26-31, x')—“God chose what is foolish in the world to shame the wise; God chose what is weak in the world to shame the strong; God chose what is low and despised in the world” (1:27-28).

In an inverted way (the second part of a broad chiasmic construction), 4:8-21 (A') first shows in 4:8-13 Paul's own cross-like experience—“as though sentenced to death . . . fools for the sake of Christ (dia. Cristou) . . . weak . . . in disrepute . . . We have become like the rubbish of the world, the dregs of all things, to this very day” (4:9-13)—as a way of life that the Corinthians have abandoned (contrasting with their original experience); then the sub-unit concludes (4:14-21) emphasizing that by embodying the cross, by sharing in the crucified body of Christ, Paul's message also share in the power

of the cross—“For the kingdom of God depends not on talk but on power” (4:20, cf. 1:18)—and thus the crucified-like Paul has authority as an apostle and father of the Corinthians (4:15), and thus he is in a position to exhort them: “be imitators of me” (4:16). Imitating Paul means sharing with him in the crucified body of Christ (4:8-13).

Then, the sub-unit 2:1-4:7 (B, the body of the figurative unit 1:18-4:21) deals with Paul’s endeavor to embody Christ crucified in his ministry (2:1-16, x), even as the Corinthians fail to do so by conceiving of themselves as belonging to one party or another, that is as being members of an institutional body (3:16-4:7, x’). Far from conceiving of themselves as “belonging” to a party or another, they should recognize that “all is yours, and you are of Christ, and Christ is of God” (umeij de. Cristou(Cristoj de. qeoul, 3:22-23).

In 2:1-16 (x), Paul affirms that he proclaims (2:2) and embodies (2:3) only Christ crucified, which is the power of God (2:4-5) and the wisdom of God (2:7,)—rather than proclaiming the mystery of God with lofty words of wisdom –the wisdom of this age (2:2, 11-14). Thus in 3:1-15 (y) when Paul speaks of the foundation of the community, “that foundation is Jesus Christ” (3:13); in the perspective of this figurative organization of these passages, this phrase must be understood as referring to Jesus Christ crucified. It is Christ crucified, as proclaimed, which is the foundation of the community in which

“God’s fellow workers” are equal (3:9) without dominating each other (without hegemonic attitudes) and without being arrogant by claiming “I belong to Paul” or “I belong to Apollos,” (3:4). Conversely, those who do not live on the foundation of Christ crucified are people of the flesh and infants in Christ (3:1-3) as is clear because they behave according to human inclinations (3:3).

Then in 3:16-4:7 (x') Paul urges the Corinthians to remember that as a community they are God’s temple—“Do you not know [ouk oidate plural] that you are [este plural] God's temple and that God's Spirit dwells in you [en umih plural]?” (3:16), and therefore that the only things they can boast about are gifts of God. But for this as a community they have to live as God’s temple in which the Spirit dwells. As the concluding unit (A', 4:8-21) shows, living as God’s temple involves imitating Paul’s embodiment of Christ crucified (4: 8-13). Thus in 4:15-16 Paul exhorts the Corinthians to imitate “his [my] ways *in Christ Jesus*” (taj odouj mou taj en Cristw/ 4:17) that is, to imitate his Christic way of life, being and living in Christ crucified.

5:1-11:34 THE CORINTHIANS’ FAILURE TO EMBODY CHRIST CRUCIFIED, PAUL’S EXHORTATION TO THE CORINTHIANS CALLING FOR PARTICIPATION IN CHRIST CRUCIFIED

This figurative unit has multiple layers of inverted parallelisms, which take up the issue of the Corinthians’ failure to embody Christ crucified in their lives (especially in

marriage, community, and social life; 5:1-6:20, A) and exhort the Corinthians to participate in Christ crucified (11:2-34, A').

The overall inverted parallelism in 5:1-11:34 can be found between 5:1-6:20 (A) and 11:2-34 (A', community worship and the Lord's Supper as participation in Christ crucified).

In 5:1-6:20 (A) as a sub-unit there is an inverted parallelism between 5:1-13 (x, sexual immorality) and 6:12-20 (x', glorifying God in your body), while in the middle section, 6:1-11 (y), presents the role of the Corinthians who have to live through sanctification and justification for the Lord Jesus Christ (6:11: "But you were washed, you were sanctified, you were justified in the name of the Lord Jesus Christ and in the Spirit of our God"). The Corinthians failed because they did not live up to the Lord (Christ crucified) and the Spirit. Thus, in 6:12-20 (x'), the solution is to "live Christ crucified" as members of Christ (6:12-20).

Concerning the inverted parallelism between 5:1-6:20 (A) and 11:2-34 (A', community worship and the Lord's Supper as participation in Christ crucified), for our purpose it is enough to take note of the inverted parallelism between 11:17-34 and 5:1-13.⁴¹⁴ The community becomes a community of Christ crucified when its members truly

⁴¹⁴ Much would need to be said about the relationship between 11:2-16 and 11:17-34, and 11:2-16 and 6:12-20. But for our present purpose it is enough to focus on the primary inverted parallelisms between Ax

participate in the Lord's Supper (11:17-34). This true participation in the Lord's Supper is to share Christ crucified in the sense that "our paschal lamb, Christ (crucified), has been sacrificed" (5:7) for us, so that they "celebrate the festival, not with the old yeast, the yeast of malice and evil, but with the unleavened bread of sincerity and truth" (5:8).

The second bracket of inverted parallelisms (B - B') can be found between 7:1-8:13 (Paul's advice to the Corinthians, who do not embody Christ crucified in their social, community life) and 9:23-11:1 (Paul's exhortation for the gospel of participation in Christ crucified) while having the middle section, 9:1-22 (C), that emphasizes Paul's living Christ crucified by becoming weak with the weak.

Within 7:1-8:13 (B) there is also an inverted parallelism between 7:1-40 (x) and 8:1-13 (x'). That is, social life or marriage life can run with mutual agreement (7:1-16) but its ultimate purpose has to do with not sinning against Christ who died for the weak (8:11-13). Thus, Paul says he would never eat meat if food is a cause of someone's falling (8:13).

Within 9:23-11:1 (B') there is also an inverted parallelism between 9:23-27 and 10:31-11:1. In 9:23-27, Paul's becoming weak is for the gospel (of Christ), which is explained as "God-centered" (10:31) and "others-centered" (10:32-33) along with his

(5:1-13) and A'x' (11:17-34) and the center of the chiasmic figurative structure C (9:1-22).

exhortation to “be imitators of me, as I am of Christ” (11:1). Why can he say this? As is expressed in the very center of this unit (C, 9:1-22) Paul’s entire ministry is an embodiment of Christ crucified. He lives Christ crucified to make the gospel available to all. Even though Paul is free and has authority as an apostle (9:1), he does not exercise his power and rights because of the gospel of Christ; rather, Paul becomes “a slave to all” (9:19) and becoming “all things to all” (9:22).

12:1-15:11 EXHORTATION: THE CORINTHIAN BODY AS *CHRISTIC* EMBODIMENT

This figurative unit also has inverted parallelisms between 12:1-30 (A) and 14:1-15:11 (A') while having 12:31-13:13 (B') in the middle. In 12:1-30, the Corinthians as a Christic body, a Christic embodiment have a diversity of gifts, services, and activities. Then, having varieties of them in the community should mean that the Corinthians are called to build a loving community using its gifts of the Spirit for the sake of and with others (14:1-15:11). Then, the middle section 12:31-13:13 (B') shows a picture of a loving community based on Christ crucified, which is to live for and with others as Christ crucified (12:12-30, Ax'). Within the said inverted parallelisms there are several more inverted ones: 12:1-3 (Ax) with 15:1-11 (A'x') clarifying what saying “Jesus is Lord” meaning it refers to Jesus as the Lord who died and who was raised; 12:4-11 (Ay) with 14:20-40 (A'y) clarifying the gifts of the Spirit that are equal, and that all have these gifts

for the sake of others; 12:12-30 (Ax') with 14:1-19 (A'x) in terms of the meaning of the body of Christ (dying for others and pursuing love).

15:12-58 AS CHRIST CRUCIFIED WAS RAISED, SO THE CRUCIFIED BODY OF THE CHRISTIANS WILL BE RAISED

This figurative unit has also an inverted parallelism between 15:12-20 (A) and 15:50-58 (A') while having 15:21-49 (B) in the middle. The proclamation that the Christ died for us and was raised from the dead (15:12-20) should mean that those who live Christ crucified wear a new kind of body (15:50-58). Then in 15:21-49, the power of the resurrected Christ is at work for all the children of Adam since the crucified and risen Christ is the new Adam.

16:1-24 CONCLUSION

This last figurative unit is to conclude the whole letter with the last exhortation to the Corinthians in terms of showing “your love” for the saints (16:1-4, A) and standing firm in “your faith” (16:5-24, A').

**Exploring the Theological Themes of
Three Figurative Body Discourses in 1 Corinthians**

Given the above figurative structure of 1 Corinthians, the letter can be subdivided into three thematic parts, respectively focused on the themes of the cross (1:18-4:21; 5:1-

11:34), the community (12:1-15:11) and transformation (15:12-58).⁴¹⁵ From this perspective, we will now investigate how the three key theological themes—the cross, the community, and transformation—are constructed in Paul’s figurative structure as they are related to faith, love and hope. The following Table seeks to suggest the complex role of the “body figures” in the letter and does not necessarily indicate chronology or causal relations from left to right; rather, it seeks to suggest the interrelationship of the three main “body figures”: Christ crucified as body figure, the community as body figure, and the resurrection as body figure. In this section, based on the above figurative structure, I will discuss the theological themes of each figurative discursive unit in detail.

Table 2: Body Figures

	The cross (1:18-4:21; 5:1-11:34)	The community (12:1-15:11)	Transformation (15:12-58)
<i>Image of body figure</i>	Christ crucified as foundation of faith, of Paul’s apostleship, of the Corinthians as saints (1:18-4:21), and of the community (5:1-11:34)	The Corinthian <i>body</i> as Christic embodiment	Resurrection <i>body</i> as living through Christ crucified
<i>Theology of body figure</i>	Faith	Love	Hope

⁴¹⁵ Victor Paul Furnish subdivides the letter as follows: 1:18-2:16; 12:4-13:3; 15. The fundamental difference with Furnish is that, for me, “body” does not function as a metaphor for an ecclesiological organism. See Victor Furnish, “Theology in 1 Corinthians,” 59-89. See also Victor Furnish, *The Theology of the first letter to the Corinthians*, (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 15-18.

The Cross (1:18-4:21; 5:1-11:34)

In 1:18-4:21, the image of the crucified body of Christ (1:23; 2:2) plays a central role, primarily doing two things: it provides a symbolic identification with the liminal experience of the marginalized (slaves in particular), and deconstructs human powers, wisdom, charismatic gifts, self-seeking glory, or dominating “unity.”⁴¹⁶

Regarding symbolic identification with the liminal experience of the marginalized, if Paul’s audience primarily comes from low culture as indicated in 1:26 (“not many of you were wise by human standards, not many were powerful, not many were of noble birth”), a majority of people would have had no choice but to associate their suffering, and marginal experience with the “crucified Christ.” The idea of the cross is foolish to the Greeks but is God’s power to those who suffer in the world (1:18). For them, therefore, the crucified Christ is a window through which they see the world differently, finding a redemptive message in God, who values all life, with nobody left out. Paul asserts: “But God chose what is foolish in the world to shame the wise; God chose what is weak in the world to shame the strong; God chose what is low and despised in the world, things that are not, to reduce to nothing things that are, so that no one might boast in the presence of

⁴¹⁶ Hollingshead, *Household of Caesar and the Body of Christ*, 208: “Paul’s ethic is driven by the idea of giving up authority or power for the sake of others” also must suffer and die (Rom 8:35-37). See also Alexandra R. Brown, *The Cross and Human Transformation: Paul’s Apocalyptic Word in 1 Corinthians*, (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1995), 22-23.

God” (1:27-28).

Regarding the deconstruction of human powers and wisdom, Paul clearly sets up a series of oppositions: Christ crucified as foolishness vs. Christ crucified as God’s power (1:18); the wisdom of the wise, the wisdom of the world vs. the wisdom of God (1:19-21); knowing God through wisdom vs. knowing God through the foolishness of the proclamation of the cross (1:21); Christ crucified as a stumbling block and foolishness vs. Christ crucified as God’s power and God’s wisdom (1:23-4); God’s foolishness vs. human wisdom; God’s weakness vs. human strength (1:25); proclaiming the mystery of God in lofty words or wisdom vs. proclaiming Jesus Christ, and him crucified (2:2); we are fools for the sake of Christ vs. you are wise in Christ (4:10); we are weak vs. you are strong; you are held in honor vs. we are held in disrepute (4:10). Through all these oppositions, the image of Christ crucified (the crucified body) de-constructs human powers, because for Paul the human problem has to do with a “denial of death,” denial of sacrifice, and the pursuit of a life in glory at the expense of others. Paul himself emphasizes that he does not boast except in Christ crucified (2:2), whom he preaches. Paul says he dies on the cross, putting to death the deeds of the flesh.

The crucified body, as a figure of comfort for the downtrodden in the community and as a figure of God’s power, becomes the basis of the Corinthian community, one

which should live out the gospel of dying love, while remembering the historical past of Jesus' faithfulness. As seen in the above figurative structure of ch.1-4, a spirit-ruled embodiment of Christ (2:6-16) is the key to the community. In other words, for Paul, the spirit-ruled person is a body ruled by the Spirit of God, and at the same time, a crucified body, as is the case with Paul himself (2:1-5). In Chapter 3, Paul foregrounds the Corinthians who boast in human wisdom and power: "for you are still of the flesh. For as long as there is jealousy and quarreling among you, are you not of the flesh, and behaving according to human inclinations?" (3:3). Paul further charges them by asking: "Do you not know that you are God's temple and that God's Spirit dwells in you?" (3:16). Lastly, asking the audience to imitate him (4:1), Paul sternly charges them to return to a "crucified living" just as Paul himself embodies in his life (4:1-21). Paul asks the Corinthians to imitate him because he lives in Christ crucified (4:16-17). Paul thoroughly expresses his theology or ethics in Christ crucified (4:9-13): ". . . as though sentenced to death, . . . a spectacle to the world, . . . fools for the sake of Christ, . . . hungry and thirsty, . . . poorly clothed and beaten and homeless, . . . weary, . . . reviled, . . . persecuted, . . . like the rubbish of the world, the dregs of all things, to this very day."

In 5:1-11:34, dealing with all kinds of failures to embody Christ crucified (sexual immorality, lawsuit, marriage life, food offered to idols, and the Lord's Supper), Paul

proposes as a solution that the Corinthian community and their social life be cross-like.

As shown in the figurative structure, the Corinthians (6:1-11) should live through sanctification and justification because of the Lord Jesus Christ. In continuation, in 6:12-20, the solution is posed clearly in terms of living Christ crucified as “members of Christ” because some Corinthians did not live up to the Spirit, who requires sanctification and justification. In 6:15 (“Do you not know that your bodies are members of Christ? Should I therefore take the members of Christ and make them members of a prostitute? Never!”), “members” does not connote members of the community in an organism sense. Rather, from the perspective of the figurative structure of the text, and the centrality of the figure of Christ crucified, it can mean to live like Christ, in solidarity with Christ, who showed his faithfulness through suffering death (Christ crucified). The climactic point in terms of Paul’s exhortation to live with Christ crucified appears at the end of this unit 5:1-11:34, namely, in 11:17-34 in which true transformation can happen through participating in the death of Christ, embracing all people regardless of gender, class and any other sort of characterization.

To further support the claim of the cross as a solution, Paul explains in the middle of this unit why bearing of the cross is necessary (9:23-11:1) and how he himself experiences the death of Christ in his life and ministry (9:1-22). The reason for taking the

cross is the gospel, which is God-centered, and others-centered (“So, whether you eat or drink, or whatever you do, do everything for the glory of God. Give no offense to Jews or to Greeks or to the church of God,” 10:31-32). For the sake of this gospel of Christ Paul becomes Christ-like, and “all things to all people” (9:19-22). Thereby, Paul asks the Corinthians: “be imitators of me, as I am of Christ” (11:1). Similarly, earlier in 4:16, Paul already gives an exhortation “be imitators of me” right after his mention of his Christ-like, cross-like experience (4:10-15). Paul makes it clear that he preaches only Christ crucified (2:2) and that he does it even through death-like, foolish experience (4:10-16). In both instances, Paul gives a clear clue to the Corinthians why they should imitate him; it is because Paul embodies in his life the death of Christ. In this perspective, “being imitators of me, as I am of Christ” (11:1) has nothing to do with membership in a community; rather, it is being Christ-like; it is having a Christ-like experience because Paul talks about his status as “being all things to all people” just as Christ was.

The Community (12:1-15:11): The Corinthian Body as *Christic* Embodiment

The Corinthian body as “body of Christ” (12:26) connotes two things: a metaphor for living (like Christ), a community or *ecclesia* embodying Christ in their bodies. It is important to distinguish between Paul’s use of “body of Christ” as Christic embodiment

and “ecclesia” (1 Cor 14:4) as an assembly or an institution. In the ecclesia, all kinds of people, differentiated in terms of gender, class, and ethnicity, should live up to the spirit of Christ, especially in Christ crucified, which deconstructs the Corinthian cases and reconstructs the community of diversity for all (12-14). In the figurative system of 1 Corinthians, this figure of the body (12:12-26) should not be read as an organism metaphor but as a figure which promotes the embodiment of Christ culminating in v.27: “now you are *body of Christ* and individually *limbs* for it”). “You” should embody Christ in your bodies through dying with Christ. The parsing of v.27 (present, indicative, second person, and plural) emphasizes the Corinthian embodiment of the Christic body: “you” (plural) are agents to live out “body of Christ” (*soma christou*), which does not have the definite article as opposed to Eph 4:12 (“build up the body of Christ”). These agents should work hard to include more people in the love of Christ, and to live out the gospel of Christ in their bodies. It is an urgent business of “now” (*de*) in verse 27 that shifts the mood dramatically from body analogy (12:12-26) to an exhortation for the community (12:27). Now the Corinthian community should live the “body of Christ” in their social, community life. For Paul, bodily life is relational, involving all aspects of human life as Janssen put it:⁴¹⁷

⁴¹⁷ Claudia Janssen, “Bodily Resurrection (1 Cor 15)?: The discussion of the resurrection in Karl Barth, Rudolf Bultmann, Dorothee Selle and Contemporary Feminist Theology” in *JSNT* 79 (2000:61-78). Sölle

Paul employs ‘body,’ ‘members,’ ‘weapons,’ and ‘you yourselves,’ as parallel expressions: they do not designate separate parts of the human organism, but existence as a whole. To exist means bodiliness, being defined and conditioned, a lack of freedom, being integrated into structural contexts of injustice and sin. To be soma means, therefore, that nothing in life is neutral. We are relational beings, related to one another. ‘In Christ,’ however, we become capable of righteousness: this is what Paul affirms in Rom 6:12-14.

With this kind of holistic bodily life, Paul envisions a community of Christic embodiment, which requires believers (members of the community) to place their members –their capabilities, potential, active commitment – at the service of ongoing community life.⁴¹⁸ The Corinthian community as an agent of Christic embodiment cannot stop her work or wait idly for a mere future consummation. Rather, it is an ecclesia of loving community, which should live out Christ in their bodies. 12:31-13:13 therefore serves the purpose of building up the loving community to which I now move.

also put it well: “Ich bin aus Erde gemacht, das heißt, eine holistische, eine ganzheitliche Betrachtung vorauszusetzen. . . . daß die anthropologischen Grundbegriffe wie Seele, Leben, Hauch, Nieren, Hery, Geist, Mut, Sinn mehr oder weniger austauschbar sind, weil sie eben nicht Organe oder etwas Spezielles am Menschen meinen, sondern jeweils seine Ganzheit, seine biologisch-geistig-soziale Existenz. ” Dorothee Sölle, “Der Mensch zwischen Geist und Materie: warum und in welchem Sinne muss die Theologie materialistisch sein?“ in eds. Willy Schottroff and Wolfgang Stegemann, *Der Gott der kleinen Leute: sozialgeschichtliche Bibelauslegungen*, Bd 2: Neues Testament, (München : Christian Kaiser Verlag, 1979), 18.

⁴¹⁸ Sölle, “Der Mensch zwischen Geist und Materie,” 35.

A Loving Body (12:31-13:13)

The primary teaching of 12:31-13:13 concerns the community's love, vision and action. The loving community is more than a sum of autonomous individuals who decide individually;⁴¹⁹ rather, this community is being transformed into the "body of Christ" in the sense of becoming a Christic embodiment based on faith, love and hope. It bears all things, believes all things, hopes all things, endures all things, not rejoicing at wrong, and not insisting on its own (13:7).

As readers of the Pauline texts, it is urgent to recover the sense of community of God's loving care and diversity through the change of our vision. Often times, our vision is too narrow in scope and excludes others. True vision should be wide enough to embrace all people in different communities.

Turning to the theological aspects of the community based on diversity, if God is community, what does this community mean or why is it important to the relation

⁴¹⁹ Dennis P. Hollinger, *Individualism and Social Ethics*, (Boston: University Press of America, 1983), 15. Individualism can be "defined in a way that an individual is capable of anything apart from community, and precedes community or society as a whole." Robert Bellah, *Habits of the Heart*, (New York: Harper & Row, 1985), 37: "such folk owe no man anything and hardly expect anything from anybody. They form the habit of thinking of themselves in isolation and imagine that their whole destiny is in their hands." In fact, it should be noted that modernity's principal creed has to do with an autonomous self-individual who can decide everything for the community. Therefore, an emphasis is placed on each individual as a self-sufficient being, but not on the community as a whole, and the conviction is that if this self-sufficient-being is well educated and smart enough, larger communities would be finely progressing. This conviction is a myth of the Enlightenment, which blocks our vision of living together in community.

between love and community? The image of God (Gen 1:26) can be construed as an intra-divine loving relationship in community where the triune God freely gives and receives back in a *kenotic* way.⁴²⁰ For Hampson *kenosis* is self-sacrifice, and according to her, women's selflessness makes their abusive situations even worse.⁴²¹ Coakley, however, in dialogue with Hampson, affirms *kenosis* as a constructive element for women's empowerment in a different way; Coakley finds the goodness of *kenosis* in terms of God's vulnerability and the mysterious power in which Jesus walked the way of *kenosis*. The point is that divine *kenosis*, expressed and embodied through Christ, is a necessary element in living out the Christic body. Tracy similarly affirms that "the divine reality must be intrinsically relational."⁴²² This is the divine mystery of love re-discovered in Christ, who freely gives (*kenosis*) his body for the community (Phil 2:5-8; 2 Cor 8:9). In the same way, we are to live for the community. This is not an option; rather, it is God's way of dealing with humanity of all. God wants humans to live in the community, respecting each other and helping one another, which is the meaning of God

⁴²⁰ Daphne Hampson, "On Autonomy and Heteronomy" in *Swallowing a Fishbone?* Ed. Daphne Hampson. (London: SPCK, 1996), 1-16. Sarah Coakley, "Kenosis and Subversion" in *Swallowing a Fishbone?* Ed. by Daphne Hampson, (London: SPCK, 1996), 82-111. See also Aristotle Papanikolaou, "Person, *kenosis* and Abuse: Hans Ur Von Balthasar and Feminist Theologies in Conversation" in *Modern Theology* 19(2003): 41-65.

⁴²¹ Hampson, "On Autonomy and Heteronomy," 1-16.

⁴²² David Tracy, "God is Love: The Central Christian Metaphor" in *Living the Pulpit*, July-September (1992):310-11. Vol.1.

making human beings in the image of God (Gen. 1:26).

A loving (holistic) community cannot stand still but should move on and strive for an eschatological fulfillment of now, through faith, hope and love. Such a loving community can be imagined with an analogy of a tri-wheel cart, having each wheel represented by faith, hope and love. In this image, the order in the relationship between faith, hope and love is not important; each wheel is equally important. This cart can move along with faith, hope and love; if one wheel is missing, the cart is incomplete and cannot move forward toward the future. The vision or image of community I try to express is well represented by this metaphor of the tri-wheel cart. In a community perspective, faith, hope, and love are interrelated and should work together for the common goal, which is to move the community forward, making it alive for all people under any circumstances.⁴²³ *Loving* has a basis on Christ-like *faith* living the faithfulness of Jesus; and this faithful loving continues toward an eschatological fulfillment with *hope*.⁴²⁴ We also must take this faithful and hopeful loving seriously because our life should bear fruit

⁴²³ Paul uses faith, hope and love at the same time in other places: “your work of faith and labor of love and steadfastness of hope in our Lord Jesus Christ” (1 Thess 1:3); “...your faith in Christ Jesus and of the love which you have....of the hope laid up for you in heaven” (Col. 1:4). In Paul’s mind, faith, hope and love should work together in Christian community.

⁴²⁴ Patte, *Paul’s Faith*, 232-241. Daniel Patte emphasizes the typological aspects of faith, which have to do with Paul’s conviction of faith and with ours as well.

now through Christ-like living and loving.⁴²⁵

Paul's basic concern for the Corinthian community is how to re-build a loving community embodying Christ crucified. Such a community, for Paul, is an urgent matter because the community was so divisive, boasting of its spiritual gifts for example in ch. 14. The urgent need for them is to re-emphasize the importance of love as the goal of the community building. Paul's appealing to love is the most effective way of dealing with the situation of divisions. What is at stake is that the Corinthian community needs to become a loving and caring community without fighting for spiritual hegemony.

Actually, all of chapter 13 is about the community of faith, hope and love.

Paul's concern is always with the community as a whole, as shown in the address of the letter: "to the church of God which is at Corinth, to those sanctified in Christ Jesus, called to be saints together with all those who in every place call on the name of our Lord Jesus Christ" (1 Cor. 1:2). My point is that, even in chapter 13, the key theme is not love alone but love as related to faith and hope in the tri-wheel cart analogy. In this way, Paul strikes a balance between faith, hope and love, seemingly emphasizing the importance of love, but only in the context of the holistic emphasis on the community. Individually, faith, hope or love cannot stand on its own; they need each other; all are equally important and

⁴²⁵ Ibid.

should work together toward the one goal of building a loving community.

I will quickly paraphrase 1 Cor 12:31-13:13, so as to show the emphasis on community life it includes.

12:31-13:3 Love should be understood in terms of Christ crucified (1:23; 2:2) in whom one can find Christ's concrete love for the poor and the downtrodden (1:27). It is more than lofty words or human wisdom or knowledge. It is a real empathy associated with the rock-bottom experiences of the poor and the social outcasts. This love is not a solitary event done by Christ, once and for all, leaving no room for the community to practice love. Indeed, Paul challenges the community to love each other (12:12-31). Even all-powerful faith or speaking in tongues, understanding all knowledge and mysteries are useless without love (13:1-2) in the community, in which all members should be important and respected (12:12-26). Without love, "I am nothing" and "I gain nothing" (13:2-3), because love matters in community. Faith without love is nothing! Faith without love is incomplete.

13:4-7 Such love is not an individual or psychological thing. Rather, it denotes relational, others-oriented, community love whose characteristics include being "patient, kind, and not being arrogant or rude" (13:4). "Love does not seek its own" (13:5) shows a community perspective and vision. Love points to the community, which is an essential

task. Such community love does not rejoice at wrong, but rejoices in the right (13:6).

Furthermore, such community-oriented love is an action verb (expressed in a verb form, not a noun).⁴²⁶ Love works for others, and it is not self-centered. This love covers all things, believes all things, hopes all things and endures all things (13:7). In other words, this love, together with faith and hope must go through “all things” (*panta* “all things” is used four times) in any circumstances. This use of *panta* emphasizes the ongoing struggle of Christian communities with faith, hope and love.

13:8-13 Such love never ends (13:8) as the community is ongoing until the end.

Prophecies pass away, tongues cease, and knowledge also passes away. Love is complete; knowledge and prophecy are incomplete (13:9). Love is complete in the sense that it binds the community, so that the community can continue to strive for an eschatological fulfillment whereas knowledge and prophecy can be childish ways that cause members of the community to fight over the hegemony of the community without striving for the community of love (13:11). Therefore, faith, hope, and love abide (13:13a). These three are not separate, but move like one, as in the image of the tri-wheel cart. Faith, hope, and

⁴²⁶ In my own translation of verses 4 through 7, I tried to show aspects of verb, in fact, all these are verb forms used, not adjectives: “Love waits patiently and is kind; love does not envy; love does not boast itself, is not puffed up; 5 does not behave rudely, does not seek its own, is not irritable, thinks no evil; 6 does not rejoice at wrong, but rejoices in the truth; 7 Love protects (covers) all things, believes all things, hopes all things, endures all things.”

love should remain together, work together, and then, only then, can the eschatological community move forward to the future without losing the power of love in the present, believing all things through all difficulties. In other words, this verse gives us a complete picture or dynamics of the community on the constant move.

However, there are some exegetical problems in 13:13. The first part of 13:13a says, “And now faith, hope, and love abide, these three,” and 13b says, “*and* the greatest of these is love.” I chose to translate *de* as “*and*.” The conjunction “and” creates two clauses in an equal relationship. Some translations such as NIV and RSV translate it into “but,” emphasizing love as the most important thing among the three. Yet, Paul does not seem to say that love is the greatest one among other things. In his mind, faith, hope and love go side by side in a holistic community context. From a community perspective, I can paraphrase the last verse as follows:

Brothers and sisters, in the community, faith, hope, and love abide all the time, and I am troubled by your lack of vision of the community as such (since you are preoccupied with spiritual hegemony). I again ask you to love each other in the community, believing all things and hoping all things in any circumstances. Please remember, as I first said in verse 13:1-3, faith without love is nothing. Remember that love builds up.

My point is that 13:13b cannot be isolated by emphasizing love as the greatest of all without considering Paul’s community context. “The greatest among these three is love” does not stand on its own, but only in the context of the community gathered by faith and

hope that, without love, collapses and is incomplete.

The Comparison of “LOVE” Readings

Thus far, I have attempted to read the love chapter (1 Cor 13) from a community-diversity perspective. Below I will compare my reading with other prominent readings as presented by Werner Jeanrond and others, to elucidate my reading in the contemporary life context. The question is: how do we construct “love” when we read 1 Corinthians 13? I will argue that my reading in terms of *Christic* community based on the figurative analysis of 1 Corinthians best fits Paul’s hermeneutics and ethics in the power conflict. I also argue that my reading will be most helpful in today’s context where individualistic, disembodied faith demonizes “others” without living out the gospel of Christ crucified.

Reading 1: Love as a Divine Gift (Forensic, Individualistic model)⁴²⁷

In Reading 1, the hermeneutical frame is structured by a forensic understanding of God’s salvation according to which believers having faith are declared righteous, “once

⁴²⁷ This reading is based on a forensic understanding of God’s love and salvation. Proponents of this reading are Luther, Bultmann, and Nygren, for example. Andres Nygren, *Agape and Eros*, Part 1. trans. A.G. Herbert (London & New York: The Macmillan Co., 1932), 21-56. Werner G. Jeanrond, “Love” in *The Oxford Companion to Christian Thought*, ed. Adrian Hastings, Alistair Mason and Hugh Pyper (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 395-397.

and for all,” through Christ’s vicarious death. In this reading, love in chapter 13 is from godly origin. Love, *agape*, is first of all God’s love for human beings, an unconditional gracious love, -- a forgiving love. Love, *agape*, is also what should characterize the life of those who benefited from God’s love, not because they have the ability of loving in this way but because it is given to them, in their personal relationship with God. It is another and the most important gift of the Spirit (12:31).

Scholars consider chapter 13 an inserted hymn, not Paul’s own work.⁴²⁸

Likewise, as in most of English translations, the characteristics of love are envisioned as qualifiers of an entity, and translated as “love is patient; love is kind” (despite the fact that the characteristics of love are expressed with verbs in 13:4).⁴²⁹ The translation difficulty lies in the fact that English does not have corresponding verb forms to the Greek verbs in 13:4; this fact reinforces the view of divine source of love in Reading 1.⁴³⁰

In this Reading 1, love is not ours at all. It remains God’s love and God’s gift to us.

However, this hermeneutical frame is different from the perspective of my conceptual

⁴²⁸ Conzelmann, *1 Corinthians*, 217-231. Barrett, *1 Corinthians*, 297, 299.

⁴²⁹ Μακροθυμέω (present, active, indicative, “wait patiently”); χρηστεύομαι (present, middle, indicative, “to be good and kind”); ζηλόω (present, active, indicative, “to rival”); περπερεύομαι (to boast oneself); φυσιόω (present, passive, indicative, “to puff up”).

⁴³⁰ There is a reading that synthesizes *agape* and *eros*, with a moderate view of God’s love and human’s. See W. Stanley Johnson, “Christian perfection as love for God” in eds. Leon O. Hynson and Lane A. Scott, *Christian ethics: an inquiry into Christian ethics from a biblical theological perspective*, (Anderson, Ind.: Warner Press, 1983), 97-113.

choice and from the perspective of a reading of 1 Corinthians focused on its figurative structure. Mine is community-centered view of love, which emphasizes the human part of love as necessary and good, whereas Reading 1 hinges on an individual-centered view of love where a personal relationship with God is the most important. But this is forgetting that the text of 1 Corinthians also emphasizes the central role of the community. From this perspective, where the community is first, this love cannot only concern personal relationships. Indeed, the notion of love should be a very vision of the community where members should be capable of loving and be responsible. Reading 1's conceptual choice is framed by a forensic understanding of God's gracious gifts (such as faith, salvation and love) through Christ's death *instead of us*, Christ being punished instead of us. Thus in Reading 1, believers feel secure about their sense of identity because salvation and God's love are guaranteed forever through Christ's vicarious death. My reading of 1 Corinthians is not based on a forensic understanding of salvation. Rather, believers have to embody God's love in their body today. In other words, God's love or salvation is not an object that we can possess "once and for all"; but it is actualized everyday, moving forward to the end time of now.

Reading 1 has served the interests and the needs of people concerned about personal sinfulness or lack of worthiness. However, this interpretation of God's love in a

forensic and individualistic context does not contribute to envisioning the holistic community, or listen to the voice of “others” – whether economic, theological, social, or cultural. Moreover, this kind of forensic understanding further contributes to excluding others, because in this narrow vision of the community one needs to have this faith in Jesus to belong to the community. This way of reading can hurt people who do not have such “sure” faith as they have. There is no possibility to have dialogue with others.

Reading 2: Love as Command, Morality, and Ethics⁴³¹

Reading 2 complements Reading 1 in that it emphasizes an ethical responsibility based on a forensic understanding of love; God’s gracious love for us call for a response such as thanksgiving and obedience to God. Thus in Reading 2, actions of love (13:4-7) is a legitimate response to once-and-for-all love of God. The human problem here is a lack of obedience to God. Reading 2 is an indicative-imperative model (“become what you are”) while my reading is not a two-step ethics (from identity to practice) based on duty or indebtedness but a one-step ethics based on the vision of the community with all people included in their diversity.⁴³² In my reading, there is no dichotomy between

⁴³¹ This reading is based on, more or less, Jewish, Catholic, and Kierkegaardian views of love. See Werner G. Jeanrond, “Love,” 396.

⁴³² Victor Furnish, “Belonging to Christ: A Paradigm for Ethics in First Corinthians” in *Interpretation* 44 (1990):145-57.

identity and practice. Our life in the community shapes our identity. That is why I call my ethical view a one-step ethics.

Reading 2 is very helpful for those who lack an ethical sense of who they are, and motivates them to participate in God's ongoing work. While Reading 1 does not emphasize the ethical part of loving as a second step, Reading 2 spells out the ethical responsibility though a responsibility limited to the individual level. Yet, Reading 2 involves also a danger of legalism or being overburdened by carrying out the command to love.

Reading 3: Love as a Radical Challenge (Liberation, Feminists)⁴³³

Reading 3 calls the attention to the fact that selflessness or self-sacrifice is a hindrance to the liberation of women and the poor. Reading 3 is based on liberation and feminist interpretations of love in which love has to do with radical change of power, with radical transformation of human lives.⁴³⁴ As feminists point out, love should point to the self-affirmation and empowerment of the oppressed and the marginalized. Therefore, actions of love (13:4-7) should point to the liberation of women and the poor.

⁴³³ Aristotle Papanikolaou, "Person, Kenosis and Abuse: Hans Urs von Balthasar and Feminist theologies in conversation" in *Modern Theology* 19 (2003):41-65. See also Hampson, "On Autonomy and Heteronomy," 1-16. Sarah Coakley, "Kenosis and Subversion," 82-111.

⁴³⁴ Ibid.

In feminist thinking, the cross is not a symbol of self-sacrifice but the cost of discipleship to pay for equality and empowerment of people. In this reading, self-emptying (*kenosis*) is a bad thing because it will worsen the abusive situations they suffer through accepting the status quo. On the other hand, liberation theologians draw our attention to the social dimension of Christian love, as Gustavo Gutierrez explains:⁴³⁵

The tendency to consider Christian love only in terms of one-to-one relationships has been criticized by theologians of political, liberationist, and ecological orientations alike. Love must not be reduced to a private sentiment, nor to a mere object of belief. Love must inspire and guide Christian faith, hope and action for the coming of God's kingdom.

Likewise, 1 Cor. 13 is read through the eyes of the marginalized, and liberation theologians, examining the symbolically subversive and transformative message of radical love (13: 1-3). Love does not rejoice at wrong, but rejoices in the right. Such radical love demands to bear all things, believe all things, hope all things, and endure all things.

Reading 3 is very helpful for the liberation movements concerned with women, the poor and the marginalized. One marked difference with mine has to do with the conception of the community, as I discussed in Chapter III. My conception of the community embraces all people, whether poor or rich, whereas Reading 3 exclusively favors the reading for the poor based on identity politics.

⁴³⁵ Werner G. Jeanrond, "Love," 395-397.

Reading 4: Love as in Interpersonal Faith⁴³⁶

Reading 4 is close to my conception of faith and love. Faith is not a condition for love as in a forensic understanding. Faith is an imitation of Christ crucified and does not absolutize anything. Faith is necessarily interpersonal, because it is only through others who are Christ-like for us that we can have faith—being freed from our bondage to the “rulers of this age” and other idolatrous “powers” (1 Cor 2:8; 15:24). Thus, faith is envisioning interpersonal manifestations of God’s power through which fellow human beings experience the goodness of God’s love and freedom. The interpersonal aspect of faith changes our attitude towards others. What is at stake in the community is to accept others as they are, namely as Christ for us, and them counting them better than one is. This reading is close to my conception of the community where mutual respect and humbleness is the key to the healthy community, is based on a different understanding of faith, which is interpersonal and typological.⁴³⁷ For Patte, Paul’s typological thinking opens up the possibility for dialogue with others without claiming an absolute faith. As opposed to the much later typological understanding of the Alexandrian school, Paul’s typology focuses on a type, a promise, a fulfillment of Jesus, which continues to live

⁴³⁶ Patte, *Paul’s Faith*, 232-241.

⁴³⁷ Typological thinking has its origin in early Jewish Apocalyptists and Qumran, and was developed in the 2nd-4th centuries.

through believers.⁴³⁸ In this perspective, action of love (13:4-7) is a manifestation of faith; it is recognizing others as Christ for us, viewing them as better than ourselves not because they are like us (in the community) but because they are unlike us. Thus, a loving community of faith should continue through hope in the fulfillment of God's love (13:13).

My interpretation is close to Patte's in which Jesus, as a type of God's faithfulness, did not solve all human problems "once and for all." Jesus, Paul and other leaders of the church, as well as ultimately all the members of the community who are *not like us*, and outsiders who are not like us are all possible Christ-like manifestations. We should see others as better than us, and love them as persons to whom we are indebted. Thus, Christ invites us to join him in a journey of faith, hope and love in the community where all of them are interrelated and interdependent for their existence. The existence of "others" are not something to overcome but to live through because from them we all learn Christ-like life.

In view of a modern individualistic faith context, what is at stake is how to reconstruct a community for "all" – in which the rich and the poor, the happy and unhappy gather together in acknowledging others, comforting and being comforted, challenging and being challenged. In this regard, my community-centered reading helps us to re-

⁴³⁸ Patte, *Paul's Faith*, 232-241.

envision such an open community for all –beyond identity politics, affirming “others” (13:1-3), yet seeing the vision of common humanity based on the image of Christ manifested through “others.”

The Corinthians, Called for Building a Loving Community (14:1-15:11)

In this block of figurative discourse, one can see Paul’s exhortation that the community live and love in the spirit of affirming the existence of others who do not speak in tongues (14:2). Chapter 14 spells out the concerns about the hegemonic control in the community by those speaking in tongues without acknowledging the existence of others in the community (14:6-12). In this kind of power conflict in the community, chapter 14 begins with “Διώκετε τὴν ἀγάπην” (“pursue or seek after love”), a present, active, imperative, second person plural. The parsing reinforces the importance and urgency of love in the context of community building: Corinthians (“you” plural) should seek (imperative) love now, a continuation of Paul’s discourse on love in chapter 13. In 14:6-12, Paul is not concerned with a lack of order (hierarchy), a lack of “unity,” or a lack of specific spiritual gifts; rather, his concern is how to use those spiritual gifts in the context of a loving ecclesia (not individualism) and through a Christic embodiment of faith, love and hope. Thus in 14:6-32 Paul gives specific cases and instructions regarding

how to encourage each other, not exercising one's own gifts to show one but to build up the ecclesia.

Against this backdrop of the community context of conflict, the women degrading passage (14:34-35) can be viewed as the voice of the patriarchal group exercising hegemonic control whereas 14:36 is Paul's rebuttal reply as Odell-Scott argues, though scholarly interpretations differ on this matter.⁴³⁹ I suggest, along with other scholars, that 14:34-35 is Paul's quotation from the opponents' letter from Corinth or from verbal reports delivered to Paul.⁴⁴⁰ In this view, 14:36, as Paul's critique of the hegemonic, patriarchal voice, should be translated with the RSV "What! Did the word of God begin with you? Or are you the only ones to have received it?"

As Christ Crucified was Raised, so the Crucified Body of the Christians Will be Raised (15:12-58)

Confession of hope in the resurrection body (or "spiritual body") is a major theme in chapter 15. In view of a struggling, conflicting community, Paul advises the community to trust in God with patience (15:35-49). Looking at the community of the

⁴³⁹ Odell-Scott, *Paul's Critique of Theocracy*, 176. On this debate see, D.W. Odell-Scott, 'Let the Women Speak in Church: An Egalitarian Interpretation of First Corinthians 14:33b-36,' in *Biblical Theology Bulletin* 13.3 (1983): 90-93; 'In Defense of an Egalitarian Interpretation of First Corinthians 14:34-36: A Reply to Murphy-O'Connor's Critique,' in *BTB* 17.3 (July 1987), 68-74; and 'Editor's Dilemma,' *BTB* 30.2 (2000): 68-74.

⁴⁴⁰ Odell-Scott, *Paul's Critique of Theocracy*, 176.

past from the present, the necessity of the cross, and of the believers' Christ-like dying to the flesh (15:3, 31, 35-36, 42-44) is re-emphasized throughout the chapter. Like a seasonal change, dying itself is necessary to live again in the Spirit: "You" should sow the body or flesh (dying like Christ) and then expect a "spiritual body" (15:35-36)-- Paul's oxymoronic confession of a new body, personal and communal. While Paul may be read as a systematic theologian who expounds the truth of resurrection in the future, he can also be read as a "practical" theologian who puts more weight on the present life of conflict caused by ideologies both inside and outside. The future is not excluded from Paul's thinking and imagination as past and future time is not separated from the present. Paul actually expresses through the body metaphor in this chapter concerns the present life because, in my reading, the body imagery⁴⁴¹ of death and resurrection can be a protest against all evil and an affirmation of manifestation of God in the community and society.⁴⁴² The body imagery is a symbolic representation of God's world in which reality is expressed in the present tense – especially in 15:35-44 (God gives it a body, ... what is sown, what is raised, ...). With this present tense, the present reality of the

⁴⁴¹ The use of body imagery with nature (15:42-44) can be an expression of Paul's theology of death and resurrection lying in the context of the contemporary social, community issues, which include self-seeking glory or power as I discussed earlier.

⁴⁴² John Gager, "Body-symbols and social reality: resurrection, incarnation and asceticism in early Christianity," *Religion* 12 (1982): 345-363. See also Claudia Setzer, "Resurrection of the Dead as Symbol and Strategy" in *Journal of the American Academy of Religion* 69:01:65-95.

physical body and of the spiritual body is expressed in a parallelism in 15:42-44:

What is sown is perishable	What is raised is imperishable
Dishonor	Glory
Weakness	Power
Physical body (sown)	Spiritual body (raised)
Physical body	Spiritual body

Notable in the above parallelism is that the second column results from the first column and all this happens in the present tense; Thus all this might refer to the Corinthian situation of power conflict as discussed earlier. Seen in this way, we can infer that those who think they have “immortal” bodies and who seek power should perish because “what you sow does not come to life unless it dies” (15:35). Those who affirm the resurrection of the dead through a living of death (self-emptying and others-affirming) put on immortal and imperishable bodies by contrast with those who seek power (not wanting to die). With this recognition that the Corinthian issue is interconnected with the oppression of the poor, the weak and women, what Paul says about the resurrection can refer to a transformation of socio-political and economic body in which people virtually live on the edges of the Empire, and on the threshold of the communities.⁴⁴³ In other words, the body (σῶμα) can be understood holistically in the context of real life where bodies are

⁴⁴³ Gager, “Body-symbols and social reality: resurrection, incarnation and asceticism in early Christianity,” 345-363.

humiliated, tortured, limited, and sickened by various powers, social or physical.⁴⁴⁴

Living in human mortality together with unwanted bodily suffering or torture forms a backdrop for the rhetoric of the resurrection of the dead. Paul's interest is not merely in the future status of resurrection or the question of "with what kind of body" (15:35), as many readers understand the resurrection as the resurrection of the flesh or body from a historical perspective.⁴⁴⁵ Rather, as we glean from his writings (2 Cor 4), Paul probably witnessed many broken bodies, ravaged women, and the bodies of children, including his own experiences on the margins, feeling hunger, affliction, etc. However, in 15:34, we see "the splendor of God's power, which will transform all things" and which says 'yes' to the worthless bodies, exploited by war, terror, slavery or inhumane acts.⁴⁴⁶ One cannot deny the context of Paul's own life. He shares in the experience of living under the Empire, and at Corinth, where he "has these ravaged bodies before his mind's eye, and when he speaks of splendor (*δοξᾶ*, Rom 8:18), he sees the bodies of children who starve

⁴⁴⁴ Jon Sobrino, *Christ the Liberator: a view from the victims*, trans. Paul Burns, (Maryknoll, New York: Orbis Books, 2001), 47-53.

⁴⁴⁵ Resurrection of the flesh does not appear in the NT but resurrection of the dead does (Matt 22:31; Lk 20:35; Acts 4:2; 17:32; 23:6; 24:21; 26:23; Rom 1:4; 1 Cor 15:12, 13, 21; Heb 6:2; 1 Pet 1:3). Church fathers such as Clement, Ignatius, Didache, Polycarp, Justin Martyr, Irenaeus and Tertullian also spoke of the resurrection of the flesh. Origen, however, denied the resurrection of the corporeality. Reformers such as Luther shared a similar understanding. For a detailed survey on this topic, see Brian J. Schmisek, "The Spiritual Body: Paul's Use of *soma pneumatikon* in 1 Corinthians 15:44," 2-47.

⁴⁴⁶ Janssen, "Bodily Resurrection," 61-78. See also Braxton, *The Tyranny of Resolution*, 186-209.

and women who are raped. He assures them that they are valuable, that they bear the resurrection in themselves, and that they are temples of the Holy Spirit (1 Cor 3:16; 6:19).⁴⁴⁷

From this perspective of social and community conflict, Paul's use of "spiritual body" counters hegemonic, dominating ideologies, destructive power over human bodies by affirming God's power, God's 'yes' to the body and to life (15:24-25). In this sense, a "spiritual body" is a counter-argument against the ideology of "physical" body seeking "flesh" power that they believe is immortal. A spiritual body is a counter-body to the fleshly body that does not want to die but to live at the sacrifice of others. Paul says the seed must die to bring forth a new life, which is a spiritual body – a kind of body, not a kind of flesh. It is God's realm, enlivened by God's power or the Spirit. Therefore, the point is not to assert a dualism between the body (or flesh) and the spirit but about God's power, God's mystery, God's "yes" to the world (the downtrodden, the hopeless, the many silenced voices in the communities). For this way of living in the Spirit, what we need is to let the Spirit rule our body. Believers have to reject the selfish fleshy desires or dominating ideologies that seek to control others.

As is clear now, in my reading, the message of the resurrection and of a spiritual

⁴⁴⁷ Ibid.

body “does not promote a better life after death; rather, it shows how resurrection can transform the present life”⁴⁴⁸ without escaping the present struggles or concerns in bodily life. That is, the time of resurrection is “in an instant, in the twinkling of an eye” (15:52). There are scholarly disagreements on the interpretation of this phrase. According to Karl Barth, resurrection did not yet come into reality but it is part of reality already. For him, resurrection is the object of hope and faith, and the death of the body is necessary to have resurrection in the future.⁴⁴⁹ Bultmann, however, understands it in the present term, something happening already in the world, not as a future reality from which present reality is separated by *krisis* or judgment, but rather as a present reality, which can be experienced individually or existentially. Bultmann continues to say that, “When Paul speaks of the resurrection of the dead, it is clear that he means to speak of *us*, of our reality, of our existence, of a reality in which *we* stand.”⁴⁵⁰ Bultmann’s contextualization of the resurrection message validates individualism because he considers resurrection as an individual event and existence, remote from the every day political, economic, downtrodden life of ordinary people. In contrast, Barth allows room

⁴⁴⁸ Janssen, “Bodily Resurrection,” 61-78.

⁴⁴⁹ Karl Barth, *The Resurrection of the Dead*, Trans. H. J. Stenning (New York: Fleming H. Revell, 1933), 125-213.

⁴⁵⁰ Rudolf Bultmann, *Faith and Understanding I*, ed. with an introduction by Robert W. Funk, trans. Louise Pettibone Smith (London: SCM Press, 1969), 81.

for engaging justice in this world because resurrection is not yet available and it must come partially in this world with the struggles of living between now and then. However, Barth fails to elaborate on the bodiliness of resurrection because of his conception of death as a turning point, which entails “the tendency to devalue bodily life.”⁴⁵¹ However, “resurrection requires a place where the contradictions of life are resolved. . . . a place that supplies the strength to confront the tension between our experience of the present and the promise of life, in order that this tension may not shatter us.”⁴⁵² Sölle too points out their neglect to resolve the question of “bodiliness” that includes physical or spiritual limitedness as humans and specific cases of the oppressed body.⁴⁵³ A careful investigation of the text, one that honors the realistic, somatic life situation at Corinth does not suggest a solution based on a mere future comfort or promises. Rather, Paul says, resurrection should happen “in a moment” “in the blink of an eye, at the last trumpet.” It is God’s time, not a chronological time as seen in other NT writings as well as the OT. This transformation will take place “in an instant, in the blink of an eye.”

For the Corinthians resurrection involves a somatic existence in their daily life settings⁴⁵⁴ – facing an endless struggle full of uncertainties and ambiguities. Resurrection

⁴⁵¹ Janssen, “Bodily Resurrection,” 61-78.

⁴⁵² Ibid.

⁴⁵³ Sölle, “Der Mensch zwischen Geist und Materie,” 18.

⁴⁵⁴ To be *soma* involves very concrete ideas: ‘In einem sterblichen Leib wohnen, richtiger Leib-sein,

should happen in the community in the present, which includes all aspects of bodily life, and at the same time, allowing for God's mystery or power to come into their bodily struggle. Such a commitment to live according to the Spirit is to live as a spiritual body through God's power, which is already part of their bodily life. That is what Paul asks the Corinthians to live.

As we have seen from the figurative discursive structure, the figure of the body of Christ crucified plays a central role in deconstructing the language of "unity," "belonging," and "power" (1:27-31). Paul's ethical theology requires a twofold step process (not chronological): the first step is to de-construct the ideology of "unity" of the strong; the second one is for all Corinthians (strong or weak) to accept the "dying" of Christ as the basis for a new community. The "dying" person, like Paul himself (15:31), does not boast of anything but of the death of Christ; nothing can be absolutized because of the cross -- only in the sense of "dying," "Christ lives in me" and "Christ is the source of your life in Christ Jesus" (1:30). In other words, the "dying" Christ is the norm for our life, which is to live with him, by dying with him. This fundamental spirit of dying with Christ is the basis for community diversity, formed with the spirit of Christ (12:12-26), whose ethic is grounded in the love of Christ (ch.13), and whose vision is to see and live the future in the present with hope of a new body (ch.15).

bedeutet, abhängig zu sein" (Sölle, "Der Mensch zwischen Geist und Materie," 32). The concept of 'body' on which Paul builds adopts this positive view of the creaturely condition, and is the key to the understanding of resurrection that is visible in 1 Cor 15.

CHAPTER VII

“IN CHRIST” (Ἐν Χριστῷ) AS A HERMENEUTICAL KEY FOR DIVERSITY⁴⁵⁵

As I have argued throughout my dissertation, the “body of Christ” can be re-imagined through Christ crucified, which then points to a Christic body, which members in the ecclesia should live out in their bodies in the most concrete life situations. Then, diversity springs out, because Christic life requires death-like experience with Christ and others, and does not dominate others. Rather diversity based on the cross affirms life in any situation. It is God’s “yes” to all. This is what Christ lived and died for, namely to affirm life in all forms. In a clear paradigm shift, diversity no longer refers to attitude or policy but to a fundamental, theological re-reflecting of life and the community where the existence of “others” is a condition and a blessing for all in the community. Without them, the community is incomplete because there is no room for manifestations of Christ-like experiences. Diversity grows out of *death-with-and-for-others* experiences, in relation with all people in culture. Free from an imperial perspective, the diversity

⁴⁵⁵ Part of this Chapter was presented at the Annual Meeting of Society of Biblical Literature, San Antonio, TX, 2004.

paradigm recognizes differences in culture or in the community with a far broader conception of the community. In this way, the category of “body” as a metaphor for living becomes a cross-cultural common denominator through which a more acceptable, ethical community will become a reality. As Christic body, we can create more room for true dialogue between cultures with struggling space for co-existence, and co-dependent human life based on diversity.

In this chapter, I will deal with diversity and intercultural issues. But before that, I have one more task - which is to deconstruct the traditional understanding of the famous Pauline phrase, “in Christ,” because this phrase has been understood to solidify Christian “unity” and served as boundary at the expense of true diversity. Therefore, I will first review the current scholarship about “in Christ,” then I will suggest an alternative interpretation of “in Christ” from a diversity perspective.

Scholarly Interpretations of “in Christ”

Pauline scholarship,⁴⁵⁶ implicitly or explicitly, frequently treats the formula “in Christ” as a boundary maker. Thus Dodd equates “to be baptized” with “to be in Christ,” and “to be in Christ” as “to be in the church” (the body of Christ).⁴⁵⁷ A typical case of

⁴⁵⁶ See Barclay B. Williams, *Christ in You: A Study in Paul's Theology and Ethics* (Maryland: University Press of America, 1999), 110-115.

⁴⁵⁷ See C. H. Dodd, *The Epistle of Paul to the Romans*, (New York: R. Long & R. R. Smith, 1932), 87. See

this boundary marker can be found in the interpretation of “only in the Lord” in 1 Cor 7:39. A majority of scholars interpret *μόνον ἐν κυρίῳ* as limiting a widow’s remarriage to a fellow Christian. Likewise, the NIV translates: “A woman is bound to her husband as long as he lives. But if her husband dies, she is free to marry anyone she wishes, but he must belong to the Lord.” Among these interpreters are Tertullian, Cyprian, Jerome, and Calvin, to name a few.⁴⁵⁸ Among modern scholars, Raymond Collins emphatically points out the necessity of marriage within a social group, stating endogamy as a culturally consistent form in the Greco-Roman or Jewish world.⁴⁵⁹ G. Fee adds to this tradition by stating that “. . . from such a radically different perspective and value system from that of a pagan husband, . . . a mixed marriage, where two becomes one, is simply unthinkable.”⁴⁶⁰ However, a small minority insists that she needs only to stay within the community while not forgetting her Christian duties.⁴⁶¹ All are plausible interpretations. However, still another interpretation is possible because 7.12-14 suggests that Paul holds no negative view about mixed marriage. Instead, the believer-spouse will effect the

also R. Bultmann, *Theology of the New Testament*, vol.1, 309.

⁴⁵⁸ Tertullian, *Against Marcion*, 5.7; Cyprian, *Testimony*, 3.62; Jerome, *Epistles*, 123.5; Calvin, *First Epistle*, 168.

⁴⁵⁹ Raymond F. Collins, *First Corinthians*, (Collegeville, Minn.: Liturgical Press, c1999), 303.

⁴⁶⁰ Gordon Fee, *The First Epistle to the Corinthians* (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans Publ., 1987), 356.

⁴⁶¹ J.B. Lightfoot, *Notes on the Epistles of Paul* (Grand Rapids: Baker Book, 1980), 225.

sanctification of an unbeliever-spouse.⁴⁶² In this positive view, “only in the Lord” is an opened-ended invitation and exhortation to live like Christ in the present – a time of difficulties and tensions caused by community and social conflicts. In this view, “in the Lord” can be a qualitative term; her remarriage should be Christ-like.

If “in Christ” is understood as a boundary marker, diversity is denied or eliminated in favor of “unity,”⁴⁶³ which takes various forms, such as the illusion of the melting pot theory or an etiology of “sameness.”⁴⁶⁴ Behind the melting pot theory or the etiology of sameness lies an ideology of “unity” in which pressure for sameness or assimilation becomes “a weapon for cultural imperialism.”⁴⁶⁵ Overall, this view of “in

⁴⁶² Odell-Scott, *Paul's Critique of Theocracy*, 89-90.

⁴⁶³ The ideology of unity often takes a form of unitary or unilateral imposition. For the concept or the role of ideology in contemporary society and culture see Louis Althusser, *Essays on Ideology*, 36 and see John B. Thomson, *Ideology and modern culture: critical social theory in the era of mass communication* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1990), 58. There is no pure, objective unity but an ideologized unity. In fact, the question is about whose unity: Western unity or melting into western culture or Western Paul. However, the fairytale “the Town Musicians of Bremen” tells us of true face of diversity. The ass, the dog, the cat and the cockerel work together to make a ghost look to chase off people and indeed the differences between them exist. Klara Butting, “Pauline Variations on Genesis 2.24: Speaking of the Body of Christ in the context of the Discussion of Lifestyles” in *JSNT* 79 (2000): 79-90.

⁴⁶⁴ David Sibley, *Geographies of Exclusion*, (London: Routledge, 1995), 23-24. bell hooks, *Black Looks: Race and Representation*, (Boston: South End, 1992), 167. Seminal texts of postcolonialism such as Said's *Orientalism* and Fanon's *The Wretched of the Earth* concern the western imperialism and domination (social, political, cultural). See also Lian Gearon, “The Imagined other: Postcolonial Theory and Religious Education” in *British Journal of Religious Education* 23.2:98-106.

⁴⁶⁵ Ricardo Garcia, *Teaching in a Pluralistic Society: Concepts, Models and Strategies*, (New York: Harper & Row, 1982), 46.

Christ” as a boundary marker contributes to a narrow or an exclusive vision of community, and serves only to separate Christians from non-Christians.⁴⁶⁶ However, I read “in Christ” from a postmodern,⁴⁶⁷ cultural perspective with my social location of minority/marginalized person,⁴⁶⁸ which then for me creates an “intervening space” of “in Christ.”⁴⁶⁹ Therefore, “in Christ” can be a space for struggling and a time for a meaningful existence here and now in the midst of prevalently dualistic, and dichotomous Christian discourses in Christology, eschatology, ecclesiology and soteriology.⁴⁷⁰ Before turning to my view of “in Christ,” we need to survey the scholarly interpretations regarding “in Christ.”

⁴⁶⁶ For example, see Kelly Chong’s survey on ethnic congregation’s sociological behavior in relation to its own identity and outside community. Kelly H. Chong, “What it means to be Christian: the Role of religion in the construction of ethnic identity and boundary among second-generation Korean Americans” in *Sociology of Religion*, Washington: Fall 1998. 59.3:259-287.

⁴⁶⁷ Postmodernity is an ambiguous concept. I use it here as a way to challenge a given tradition to come up with more ethical, communal interpretation for all. Postmodernity is an open space and time for us to live today. In this regard, Mark Taylor rightly grasps the difficulty of postmodernity: “postmodern trilemma” in which he includes tradition/identity (keep), plurality (celebrate), and domination (resist). See Mark Kline Taylor, *Remembering Esperanza: A Cultural-political theology for North American praxis* (Maryknoll, N.Y: Orbis, 1990), 31.

⁴⁶⁸ Marginality is difficult to live but it can be the source of empowerment and the spirit of resistance as bell hooks and Jung Young Lee suggest in their books. Bell hooks, *Black Looks: Race and Representation* (Boston, MA: South End Press, 1992), 167. Jung Young Lee, *Marginality*, 59-76.

⁴⁶⁹ Bhabha, *The Location of Culture*, 7.

⁴⁷⁰ Sally R. Munt, “Framing Intelligibility, Identity, and Selfhood: A Reconstruction of Spatio-Temporal Models” in *Reconstruction* (special issue) *Auto/bio/geography: Considering Space and Identity*, vol. 2. No.3. <http://www.reconstrucction.ws>, Bowling Green State University, Summer 2002.

The interpretative difficulties regarding the phrase, “in Christ,” lie in the dative construction of ἐν Χριστῷ, which connotes various things. This dative can connote local relations, instrumental relations, temporal relations, modal relations, it can be descriptive, and it can mean ‘in the presence of.’⁴⁷¹ Among other things, Deissmann, one of the earliest figures to propose a controversial interpretation of “in Christ,” understood the phrase in a purely local sense, namely as the mystical union/relationship with Christ. What really matters in that mystical union is a personal, subjective experience with the Christ; any reference to a Christian ethic or an objective reality of “in Christ” (as with an instrumental dative referring to the role of Christ) are lacking.⁴⁷² Neugebauer, however, replaces this kind of subjectivism with an objective reality of Christian existence and of God’s work in Christ (death and resurrection). He defines “in Christ” as “defined/determined by the eschatological event of the cross and resurrection, drawn in this history and *en kurio* as defined/determined by the circumstances that Jesus Christ is Lord of human history and as such calls for actions.”⁴⁷³ However, Wedderburn critiques Neugebauer’s objectivistic approach that seeks to define “in Christ” by circumstances

⁴⁷¹ AJM Wedderburn, “Some Observation on Paul’s use of the Phrases ‘in Christ’ and ‘with Christ’ in *JSNT* 25 (1985): 83-97.

⁴⁷² Michel Bouttier, *En Christ: étude d’exégèse et de théologie Pauliniennes*, Presses Universitaires de France, Paris: 1967), 45.

⁴⁷³ Fritz Nuegbauer, “Das Paulinische ‘in Christo’” in *NTS* 4 (1957-8): 124-38.

such as the eschatological events, and insists that “in Christ” is not the definition of such objective circumstances.⁴⁷⁴ For Wedderburn, the phrase “in Christ” defines “the circumstances in which something is or happens (objective genitive) and the circumstances which are thus defined may be the time, the place, the manner, etc.”⁴⁷⁵

Again, for Neugebauer what is at stake is the basis of the church (ecclesiology, eschatology), Christ’s salvific work (Christology, soteriology). In the same vein, Bultmann and Bornkamm emphasize that “in Christ” is an ecclesiological formula: “to belong to the Christian church is to be ‘in Christ’ or ‘in the Lord’ . . . and Christian congregations may also be called congregations ‘in Christ.’”⁴⁷⁶

Albert Schweitzer falls between the two extremes that these “subjective” and “objective” approaches are.⁴⁷⁷ For him, “in Christ” is more than a mystical subjective

⁴⁷⁴ Wedderburn, “Some observations on Paul’s use of the Phrases ‘in Christ’ and ‘with Christ’” in *JSNT* 25 (1985): 83-97.

⁴⁷⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁷⁶ Bultmann, *Theology of the New Testament*, vol. 1, 311. Günter Bornkamm, *Paul*, trans. D.M.G. Stalker (New York, Hagerstown, San Francisco, London: Harper & Row, 1971), 155.

⁴⁷⁷ See Schweitzer, *Mysticism*, 388. Similarly but with different reasons, Andrie du Toit insists that “in Christ” has both objective and subjective uses depending on its uses in each letter. Under the title of “metaphorical local,” he breaks down into two sub-sets, which are “Christ as the realm of God’s salvational presence” (Rom 3.24; 6.23; 8.2, 39; etc) and “Christ/Lord as the realm of Christian’s new existence.” The latter again breaks into two modes of indicative (Rom 6.11; 8.1; 1 Cor 1.2-5; 4.10; 11.1; 15.18, 22; 16.24, etc) and imperative (Rom 9.1; 1 Cor 7.39; 9.1, 2; 15.31, 58; Gal 5.10). See also Andrie du Toit, “‘in Christ,’ ‘in the Spirit’ and Related prepositional phrases: Their relevance for a Discussion of Pauline Mysticism” in *Neotestamentica* 34.2 (2000): 287-298.

reality; it involves both a subjective and an objective present reality. Namely, “in Christ” points to the quality of an eschatological life here and now (the subjective reality of a union with Christ) and to the messianic community in Christ (the objective reality). In fact, Schweitzer expresses ethical concerns about the Lutheran dichotomy between faith (as internal) and the law (as external), and about a dualistic view of time opposing now and then (*parousia*). Thus, Schweitzer incorporates two realities in the present-ness of “in Christ”; to be “in Christ” is to live the eschatological time here and now “in Christ.”⁴⁷⁸ Similarly, Käsemann and Beker view “in Christ” as both subjective and objective realities – by emphasizing the apocalyptic new aeon in Christ and the lordship of Christ.⁴⁷⁹ Overall, all these scholars see “in Christ” as a composite reality of subjective and objective realities in Christ. “In Christ” refers to a new identity for Christians (benefits of redemption, transformed new life) who can make an exclusive claim for Christology, eschatology, soteriology, and ecclesiology. There is no room for “otherness” or “diversity” in these claims. For example, Keck’s apocalyptic interpretation of Paul centered on “two-age” relativizes differences of culture.⁴⁸⁰ According to him, Paul’s two-

⁴⁷⁸ Schweitzer, *Mysticism*, 380.

⁴⁷⁹ Käsemann, *Perspectives on Paul*, 102-121 and *Essays on New Testament Themes*, 129. See also J. C. Beker, *The Triumph of God: The Essence of Paul’s Thought*, (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1990), 70-71. See also Andrie du Toit’s, “‘in Christ,’ ‘in the Spirit’ and Related prepositional phrases: Their relevance for a Discussion of Pauline Mysticism,” 287-298. Schweitzer, *Mysticism*, 380.

⁴⁸⁰ Leander Keck, “Paul as Thinker,” *Interpretation* 47 (1993): 27-38.

age thinking involves four features.⁴⁸¹ First, “this age and the age to come express a dualistic vision of reality that devalues the whole of history in light of the radical future.”⁴⁸² Second, “the character of the radical future exposes the flaws in the present age.”⁴⁸³ Third, “the two-age theology is a theology of discontinuity.”⁴⁸⁴ Fourth, “the two-age thinking relativizes all internal differences and regards them as but variations on a single theme.”⁴⁸⁵

The metaphorical organism approach (for which the body of Christ is an ecclesiological organism) turns to society as an entity (the community) to understand the very concrete reality of life in the community (from the bottom up). Then the body politics of “unity” is a basis for reading 1 Corinthians. For example, 1 Cor 3:23 (ὕμεις δὲ Χριστοῦ, “you of Christ”) and 15:22 (οὕτως καὶ ἐν τῷ Χριστῷ πάντες ζῶσποιοηθήσονται, “all shall be made alive in Christ”) are read as supporting the theme of unity. Therefore, members of the community “in Christ” of “of Christ” should maintain the same thought and culture (a kind of melting pot in this sense) without cultural or convictional differences.⁴⁸⁶ Barrett’s reading of Gal 3:28 pursues this idea of

⁴⁸¹ Ibid., 30-32.

⁴⁸² Ibid., 30.

⁴⁸³ Ibid., 31.

⁴⁸⁴ Ibid., 31.

⁴⁸⁵ Ibid., 32.

⁴⁸⁶ Mitchell, *Paul and the Rhetoric of Reconciliation*, 288.

sameness: “in Christ” the differences of sex, race, and class are erased.⁴⁸⁷ By contrast, Odell-Scott rejects the conventional view of the hierarchical body as ecclesiological organism, and views the “body of Christ” as “a gathering of differences,” which is the locus of Christ, in whom people respect each other and recognize the differing voices.⁴⁸⁸ Coming back to those for whom “in Christ” refers to belonging to an ecclesiological organism, for them the phrase, “in Christ,” excludes as in 1 Cor 7:39, where the phrase “in the Lord” is read as prohibiting widows from re-marrying with non-Christians.⁴⁸⁹ This is following the way in which ethnic minority groups solidify their own boundaries against the outside society. Following this ecclesiological organism model complements well a forensic interpretation of Paul on salvation; in order to benefit from the “grace” (gracious forgiveness) of God “in Christ” one needs to be a member of the community, defined by its rigid boundaries. Only those who are “in Christ” and adopt the doctrines or confessions of the church can benefit from the guaranteed salvation promised to the

⁴⁸⁷ Barrett, *1 Corinthians*, 31. See also Conzelmann, *1 Corinthians*, 212-4. Conzelmann states that in the body of Christ (church) there are no differences (physical and social) and that unity determines parts.

⁴⁸⁸ Odell-Scott, *Paul's critique of Theocracy*, 21-23. Odell-Scott de-constructs Corinthians' hierarchy and power claims. See also Braxton, *No Longer Slaves*, 95.

⁴⁸⁹ Paul Sampley reads for example “in the Lord” as a strict boundary marker. See Sampley, notes in *New Interpreter's Study Bible*, 2047. Widows should marry only fellow believers. However, in fact, there is another possibility to read this “in the Lord.” What is required for a re-marrying widow is not to distinguish who is “in Christ” and who is not; rather, the criteria or the challenge is as to whether one can commit one's life (and body) to the Lord.

body of Christ (the church). The traditional, theological interpretations of 1 Corinthians and of the phrase, “in Christ,” share this forensic view of salvation. All benefits (eschatological salvation) belong to those inside the church, i.e. its members. Here faith is a condition for salvation based on an historical truth claim; salvation was effected “once and for all” on the cross by Christ (once upon a time). Believers must put themselves to the benefit of the cross by becoming members of the Church, by being “in Christ.” Christ is the means through which benefits are guaranteed. It follows that ethics is viewed as part of a two-steps process: “from indicative-to-imperative” (“become what you are).”⁴⁹⁰

As I have argued concerning the scholarship about the “body of Christ,” the metaphorical organism approach considers “in Christ” as a category of “belonging” to the body-politic. The socio-rhetorical interpretive tradition, in particular, draws our attention because it explicitly emphasizes the unity or concord (*homonoia*) as a characteristic that the community should have, and because it reads the body of Christ as a unified organism.⁴⁹¹ In this case, once again, “in Christ” is read to support the theme of unity, for example in 1 Cor 3.23 (“you of Christ”) and 15.22 (“all shall be made alive in Christ”). Similarly, those scholars who think that Paul is primarily influenced by Hellenism (especially Stoicism) put Paul in line with the universalism of Stoic unity,

⁴⁹⁰ Schweizer, “*σωμα*,” 1064. Mona Hooker, “Interchange in Christ and Ethics” in *JSNT* 25 (1985): 3-17.

⁴⁹¹ Mitchell, *Paul and the Rhetoric of Reconciliation*, 20-64.

which is hierarchical. In this perspective, Paul is a person who advocates for a Hellenized, universal humanity “in Christ”: “Paul was motivated by a Hellenistic desire for the One, which among other things produced an ideal of a universal human essence, beyond difference and hierarchy. This universal humanity, however, was predicated (and still is) on the dualism of the flesh and the spirit.”⁴⁹² Then, the so-called baptismal formula in Gal 3:28 is understood as eradicating difference or diversity, limiting it to the meaning of “universal body” at the sacrifice of a deeper, ethical meaning of Pauline theology or ethics.

As I mentioned earlier, the so-called “new perspective” in Pauline studies shifts our attention to the context of Jewish-Gentile relations (or conflicts) in Paul’s time, and the hermeneutical key to reading Pauline texts is a broader covenantal community where Jews and Gentiles are included in Christ. The metaphor of “in Christ,” along with a sense of vocation, refers to the household belonging to the God who loves them. In other words, the focal point of Paul’s ministry is not theological individual salvation or righteousness as such but relations between Jews and Gentiles.⁴⁹³ Indeed, the “new perspective” in

⁴⁹² Boyarin, *A Radical Jew*, 181.

⁴⁹³ Because of Krister Stendhal’s monumental essay on Paul, “The Apostle Paul and the Introspective Conscience of the West” in *Harvard Theological Review* 56 (1963): 199-215, and E. P. Sander’s modification of Jewish understanding about faith and salvation, many scholars now have a new perspective emphasizing the Jews-Gentile relation. The important metaphor in this approach is “community” in which Jews or Gentiles become one. See also Stanley Stowers, *A Rereading of Romans: Justice, Jews, and*

Pauline interpretation is a turning point demanding from us to rethink “community” and Paul’s relationship language in which we find common space with “others.” It may seem that the new perspective is superficial because it fails to show how to “become one,” and does not emphasize reconciliation (with God) and what is urgently needed to bring about such reconciliation. Yet from this perspective “in Christ” does emphasize ethical “living” through total commitment to God as I expounded in Chapter IV. That is, if one lives like Christ (understanding “in Christ” as a modal relation), one can welcome differences, and actually actively recognize the differing voices in the community.⁴⁹⁴ In the following, I will examine 1 Corinthians to see how, from this perspective, “in Christ” plays a role in the letter.

Gentiles, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997), 1-33.

⁴⁹⁴ Odell-Scott, *Paul’s Critique of Theocracy*, 21-23. Odell-Scott de-constructs Corinthians’ hierarchy and power claims.

“In Christ” in 1 Corinthians: An Alternate Reading⁴⁹⁵

My reading of the Corinthian context posits conflicting voices – conflict between those who are “wise in Christ” (as sarcastically stated by Paul in 4.10) and those who are “sanctified in Christ Jesus” (1.2). The “wise in Christ” seek to maintain their power through wisdom or knowledge while those “who are sanctified in Christ Jesus” are foolish enough not to claim their own place as such. Paul identifies himself with the most foolish people: “when slandered, we speak kindly. We have become like the rubbish of the world, the dregs of all things, to this very day” (4.13). In the Corinthian community exists the phenomenon of “denial of death”⁴⁹⁶ by some “strong” Corinthians.⁴⁹⁷

For the strong, “in Christ” is a boundary marker, because they claim that they are

⁴⁹⁵ “In Christ” appears in 1 Corinthians as follows: 1.2 (those who sanctified in Christ Jesus); 1.4 (God’s grace in Christ Jesus); 1.30 (Christ is the source of our life in Christ Jesus: wisdom, righteousness, sanctification and redemption); 3.1 (infants in Christ); 4.10 (you are wise “in Christ”); 4.15 (ten thousand guardians in Christ, but not the father); 4.17 (to remind you of my ways in Christ Jesus); 15.18 (those who have died in Christ have perished); 15.19 (If for this life only we have hoped in Christ); 15.22 (For as all die in Adam, so all will be made alive in Christ); 15.31 (I die every day! That is as certain, brothers and sisters, as my boasting of you-- a boast that I make in Christ Jesus our Lord; 16.24 (My love be with all of you in Christ Jesus).

⁴⁹⁶ Becker, *The Denial of Death*, xii. He put the contemporary problem: “The root of humanly caused evil is not man’s animal nature, not territorial aggression, or innate selfishness, but our need to gain self-esteem, deny our mortality, and achieve a heroic self-image.”

⁴⁹⁷ “The strong” is rather a composite term, which may include all power-seeking Corinthians. I am against the simple dichotomy of the rich and the poor (in economic/social term) proposed by Theissen, who analyzes Corinthian situations (conflicts) in terms of economic, social status conflict. Theissen, *Pauline Christianity*, 36-37, 96-99, 121-140.

“wise in Christ” (4.10-16), whereas Paul sarcastically accepts his own foolishness on behalf of Christ. In fact, Paul uses “in Christ” here somewhat negatively to suggest that his opponents (the strong) claim their own place “in” Christ as a privileged boundary marker.⁴⁹⁸ The “strong” people (the rich, the knowledgeable, the wise, enthusiasts, libertines) reject the message of Christ crucified because it is an unconventional way of life, the most foolish way of life (1.18-2.16), while promoting their own ideology of unity, unilateralism, individualism, based on a monoculture and mono-language.⁴⁹⁹ In other words, these people deny “death,” just as Ernest Becker points out regarding the contemporary phenomena of “denial of death.”⁵⁰⁰ From this perspective, these “strong” people reject Paul’s ministry of reconciliation grounded in the death of Christ,⁵⁰¹ egalitarianism, and diversity (as seen in Chapter V and VI).⁵⁰² In fact, the aim of the

⁴⁹⁸ These opponents are probably from Christ’s own family or close followers of Jesus. See Odell-Scott, *Paul’s Critique of Theocracy*, 47.

⁴⁹⁹ These voices of individualism, unilateralism, and unity, again, can be reconstructed from the whole letter, such as found in the rejection of the message of the Christ crucified. Throughout the letter, they are involved in the conflicts of hegemony (claiming their own place) as I analyzed in Chapter V.

⁵⁰⁰ Becker, *The Denial of Death*, vii.

⁵⁰¹ Odell-Scott, *Paul’s Critique of Theocracy*, 161.

⁵⁰² The cases for these strong people’s rejection of Paul’s ministry of reconciliation include the lawsuit (ch.6) (through which the powerful people control the community), and the Lord’s Table where the rich dominate the table fellowship (ch.11). Most of all, the strong voices of the opposition to Paul’s ministry can be heard from the complexly woven text of Corinthians as Odell-Scott insists in his book *Paul’s Critique of Theocracy*: they are the voices of hierarchy (women’s subordination) and theocracy (Christ’s family).

strong is to unify the whole community under their own hegemonic power “in Christ.”⁵⁰³

In the meantime, the oppressed, slaves and poor cannot claim their own place in the community conceived according to the strong’s logic regarding what it means to be “in Christ.” Notably, what these downtrodden people want is not a dominant voice of unity, unilateralism, or individualism, but mutualism, diversity, and communalism as Paul argues: what is at stake is co-dependency between husband and wife (ch.7), building up of the loving community (ch.13) based on faith, love and hope. Over against the opposing voices of the unity group and the diversity group, Paul offers a meditation by emphasizing the rhetoric of God’s power, of Christ crucified, and of the power that supports the cause of diversity.⁵⁰⁴ Furthermore, Paul deconstructs the ideology of “unity” of “the strong” in Corinthians by the image of Christ crucified, to re-construct a community of “dying” and “diversity.”⁵⁰⁵

⁵⁰³ Odell-Scott, *Paul’s Critique of Theocracy*, 17. See also Giorgio Agamben, *Homo sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life*, translated by Daniel Heller-Roazen (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1998), 120. Agamben problematizes the state of exception, which can be so destructive with justification of power.

⁵⁰⁴ Overall, this egalitarian understanding of diversity is centrifugal, emanating from God and directed toward all people, whereas the society’s centripetal force of hierarchical unity pushes the community to conform to monoculture and unity. See also Bernhard W. Anderson, “The Tower of Babel: Unity and Diversity in God’s Creation,” 165-78.

⁵⁰⁵ The central symbol in 1 Corinthians is the Christ crucified, who is the symbol of weakness and the power of God, the foolishness and wisdom of God (1:18-2:5). Paul repeatedly emphasizes the preaching of the Christ crucified (1:23; 2:2) -other Pauline texts as well- and his “ways in Christ Jesus” (4:17), in whom he dies every day with boasting of the death of Christ (15:31).

“In Christ” as a Modal Relation with Christ: Dying with Christ

Because of their “Western” preoccupation with “belonging” language, biblical scholars emphasize the abstract, ontological, body politic of “in Christ,” in which no true diversity is allowed. As shown in the history of scholarship, “in Christ” has been understood as a phrase referring to ecclesiology. I am proposing here that “in Christ” should be read exactly in the opposite way; referring not to “belonging” (the community), but as an expression referring to “non-belonging” and to a way of life as a “*Christic*” body.⁵⁰⁶ Unlike the majority of scholarly readings of 12:27 in which “body of Christ” is understood as a possessive genitive (“body belonging to Christ”), my reading posits an attributive genitive as I showed in Chapter V.⁵⁰⁷ Accordingly, the body of Christ in 12:27 as a *Christic* body points to Christ’s life, death and resurrection. In fact, throughout the letter, the theme of the death of Christ is prevalent. From this perspective, in 12:27 Paul exhorts the Corinthian community to live this *Christic* body. Living this *Christic* body is

⁵⁰⁶ Deissmann and others who follow the mystic tradition minimize the believer’s personhood once united with Christ. In other words, individual differences melt into Christ. In addition, there is no active role of agency like Christ. However, Ricoeur and Yagi remind us that intersubjectivity or the role of individual believers as agents is crucial in our selfhood and Christian life. Especially, Yagi, from a Zen Buddhist perspective, suggests that believers can have Christ’s life/experience/views through living the Christ, radically identified with him. Seiichi Yagi, “I in the words of Jesus” in *Voices from the Margins*, 1st edition. Ed. by R.S. Sugirtharajah (London: SPCK, 1991), 330-351.

⁵⁰⁷ Examples of such attributive genitive: “body of sin” (Rom 6:6) means a “sinful body” when it is read as an attributive genitive and soma Christou can be read as referring to a “*Christic* body,” a space/time for the community’s Christ-like work.

none other than dying with Christ (see Paul's baptism metaphor in terms of death).⁵⁰⁸

Because he lives this Christic body, Paul dies every day with Christ, not in the sense of accepting or condoning oppressed, tortured life, but as a way of confronting and overcoming self-seeking powers that oppress, marginalize and torture others. Paul suffers an unwanted crucifixion, all sorts of degradation and persecution originating with the community and society. That is why he says: "I die every day (15:31)." For Paul to die with Christ is more than an individual experience of mystical spirituality; it has to do with sharing the experience of the one who suffered the death of a slave, who experienced the extreme limits of human suffering and rejection. In other words, when Paul talks about Christ crucified (1:23; 2:2), he probably thinks of the slave's death too, which is a daily shame and a liminal experience between life and death.⁵⁰⁹ Therefore, "in Christ" one experiences the margins of humanity, the borders of the human. Based on this understanding of Paul's radical identification with Christ crucified, one can see Paul's emphatic theology of dying with Christ and sharing it with others in their most

⁵⁰⁸ Odell-Scott, *Paul's Critique of Theocracy*, 22. See also Liddel-Scott, *Lexicon*, 305-306. "Pre-liturgical, pre-Christian usage of βαπτίζω in Greek means quite literally 'to dip,' 'to immerse,' 'to bury' in a liquid, 'dipping cloth in dye.'" Odell-Scott put it: "mistakenly, *baptizo* came to be understood in the hermeneutical tradition of the institutional church as a ritual cleansing which purifies the person and signifies the 'ENTRY' of the person being 'baptized' into the body of Christ."

⁵⁰⁹ Martin Hengel, *Crucifixion*, 1-10. For a liminal experience and shame, see Agamben, *Remnants of Auschwitz*, 87-135.

unfortunate situations. As such, Christ crucified or “dying with Christ” should not be romanticized or spiritualized at an individual, psychological, existential or mystical level. For Paul it is participating with the lowly people through Christ. In that sense, for Paul the cross is not a once-and-for-all event that guarantees “salvation” through a sacrificial atonement (instead of “me”). For Paul, dying with Christ is a realistic, radical sharing of the experiences of those who suffer like Christ.⁵¹⁰ Accordingly, Paul reminds the community of his “ways in Christ Jesus,” which is “dying” love (4:17). Paul also recommends the widows to re-marry “in the Lord,” which is not a belonging language but a Christ-like attitude and commitment to have a way of life marked by dying (7:39). All shall be made alive in Christ (that is, to live like Christ) and all die in Adam (that is, to live like Adam) (15:22). In addition, one can see this kind of dying love in moral sexuality (5:1-13), which emphasizes mutual bindings (mutual dying) in Christ (7:1-7) and mutual commitment.⁵¹¹

⁵¹⁰ From this perspective of radical participation with those who suffer like Christ, Mel Gibson’s movie *The Passion of the Christ* posits no ethical, participatory implications for Christians to be engaged in violence-rampant world today. In the movie, Christ’s suffering was pictured absolutely necessary (the more suffering, the better) for salvation. Then the question is, so what is the Christian responsibility or ethics?

⁵¹¹ See Klara Butting, “Pauline Variations on Genesis 2:24: Speaking of the Body of Christ in the context of the Discussion Lifestyles.”

“In Christ” as a “Third Space-Time”⁵¹²

From the perspective of diversity and of a modal relation with Christ concerning a live marked by a Christ-like dying, I move to a concluding discussion of “in Christ” as a postmodern/postcolonial space and time. The traditional, theological, doctrinal, ontological, ecclesiological and “indicative-imperative” approach to “in Christ” fossilizes the Christian identity into a fixed, exclusive entity. By contrast, my postmodern reading de-constructs, or delays the meaning of “in Christ” by re-thinking the image of “in Christ” as postmodern space and time.⁵¹³ The primary space and time of our thinking and acting is not simply fixed, abstract, or linear but changing, concrete and circular.⁵¹⁴ The postmodern space and time can be termed a “third space” of struggling community, moving toward emancipation and justice for all. This space and time is not a given from “above” but is realized, though not clearly or perfectly, when humans live in it in their continuous struggle with difficulties.⁵¹⁵ In this sense, “in Christ” as the third space and

⁵¹² Homi Bhabha, *The Location of Culture*, 4, 114-5, 219, 242. Bhabha terms a “third space,” “being in the beyond,” and “in-between space” to express a resistant and creative space. In addition, I emphasize “third” as non-belonging space and time that no one or group dominates. Therefore, Trinh T. Minh-ha points out the importance of resistance in this struggle to find subjectivity. See Minh-ha, “Cotton and Iron” in *Out There: Marginalization and Contemporary Cultures*, eds. Ferguson Russel, Martha Gever, Trinh T. Minh-ha & Cornel West, (New York: M.I.T. Press, 1990), 327-336.

⁵¹³ Jacques Derrida, “Différance” in *Deconstruction and Context: Literature and Philosophy*, Ed. Mark C. Taylor (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986), 396-420.

⁵¹⁴ Elizabeth Grosz, *Space, Time, and Perversion*, (New York: Routledge, 1995), 92, 214.

⁵¹⁵ Henri Lefebvre, *The Production of Space*, trans. Donald Nicholson-Smith, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991), 6,

time serves as a locus for a Christ-like life for believers, who locate their experience of “dying and living” in Christ. This space and time point to the living of the “Christic body” in the here and now.

In sum, my reading of “in Christ” in 1 Corinthians is based on a close look at the text (as a symbolic world) and involves the recognition that the text has multiple dimensions, and that it can be read from multiple contexts, and hermeneutical stances as scriptural criticism states. I argue that a central hermeneutical key for reading 1 Corinthians is diversity (not unity), and that Paul’s argument for diversity for “all” aims at de-constructing the ideology of power or/and unity of the strong by the image of Christ crucified (1:27-31) and to re-construct the life of diversity by living out the Christic body. The attempts to grasp this Christic body in the context of plurality lead to a new space and time of “in Christ,” eventually allowing for the totality of God’s involvement in our life, with a recognition of others’ truths, with a humble understanding that truths are provisional and confessional (see 1 Cor 13:9-13).⁵¹⁶ More importantly, what really

11, 59, 73. Lefebvre corrects Kantian ideals of consciousness by the notion of the lived space, social space. Pierre Bourdieu’s concept of *habitus* points to a kind of space-body in which culture is inscribed. See Pierre Bourdieu, *An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology*, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992), 133.

⁵¹⁶ See Jin Arai, “Religious Education in “Christ-with-Culture” from a Japanese Perspective” in *Religious Education* 91.2:222-237, and see also Brelsford, “Christological Tensions in a Pluralistic Environment: Managing the Challenges of Fostering and Sustaining both Identity and Openness,” 174-89. See also Krister Stendahl, “Religious Pluralism and the Claim to Uniqueness” in *Education as transformation: religious pluralism, spirituality, and a new vision for higher education in American*, eds.

matters in this context is to live the “third space and time” of a Christ-like life and death.

This is what being a *Christic body* is.

CHAPTER VIII

CONCLUSION

In the Introduction, I raised interpretive questions about the body of Christ as to whether there is only one reading or other readings that are equally legitimate, plausible and valid. To answer these, I employed a method of postmodern de-construction that seeks to re-claim both the democratic-inclusive body politics and its embodiment in community and society in most concrete terms. Namely, by de-constructing the hegemonic body politics of society, community, and readers, I made it clear that marginalized voices in community and society equally constitute community with “subjectivity” (agency). More importantly, siding with Foucault and Derrida, I emphasized a “beyond-identity politics,” which can be possible in reading 1 Corinthians as a discourse of de(re)construction of community and identity. For this goal, I laid out hermeneutical, contextual grounds. My point was that Paul’s theology or ethics is congruent with a postmodern de(re)construction of identity, community and society, especially in the context of power conflicts. Paul’s theology of Christ crucified becomes a centerpiece to both de-reconstruction and re-reconstruction of community because it is

God's power that equalizes unequal relationships on the one hand, and on the other hand, it demands the life of dying for others as I developed the "theology of dying" of 1 Corinthians. This can be expressed in the following antitheses: rejecting denial of "death," affirming life of death; rejecting the self-closed community, affirming open community for "all"; rejecting dualism between earth and heaven, and spirit and body, and between present and future, affirming bodiliness with a sense of God's mystery in a weak body that easily breaks.

In the following, I will give further thoughts to the issue of diversity and difference. Difference or diversity arises from the complexity of reality in our life, and on the other hand, it comes from God's creation purpose that people live with cross-cultural sensitivity and engagement. Though I used "difference or diversity" interchangeably, I now want to make a distinction between the two. Phenomenal differences themselves (whether cultural differences or any other kind of differences) do not automatically constitute diversity. Differences, whether positive or negative, must come into critical dialogue with each other, within what I call the postmodern space and time of "in Christ" in which openness and humbling spirit come together. In that regard, diversity is an attitude, a theology, and an ethics that make possible this kind of dialogical space and

time.⁵¹⁷ In this sense, diversity does not simply allow for all differences, as they are, as if they had ontological value or presence. By distinguishing between diversity and difference in this way, we can have a sense of balance between being critical and self-critical while affirming and celebrating differences or diversity.

Accordingly, diversity should be a decisive interpretive key through which we can struggle with the text, the community and the society. The goal is to live with “relationless relation,” as Derrida says.⁵¹⁸ History evinces an uneasy, rocky road that involves taking a diversity perspective in our thinking and living. As discussed earlier, “diversity” in this very specific sense has rarely been a reality in human history because the ideal of “unity” (based on hierarchical, hegemonic body politics) does not allow for true diversity. Because of this hegemonic unity, Paul criticizes various constructions of power and ideologies in the Greco-Roman world and the Corinthian community.

My notion of diversity does not mean nihilism or relativism with which anything goes without ethical responsibility or sensitivity for the community of all people.⁵¹⁹ Irresponsible individualism should not be condoned under the cover of diversity. Rather, the perspective of diversity requires cross-cultural engagement with each other. I believe

⁵¹⁷ Derrida, “The Roundtable,” 12-15.

⁵¹⁸ Ibid., 14.

⁵¹⁹ Walter Lowe, *Theology and Difference*, 128.

that is why, as opposed to the common reading of the Tower of Babel in Genesis 11, God scatters people into different parts of the world so that they live through diversity and challenge by moving away from monoculture (hierarchical society, mono-language, mono-system of economy) is essential. In fact, diversity involves accepting a cost of incompleteness and vulnerability, because it arises only after the death of self-seeking power. For Paul, human problems arise when one denies dying. Dying is living. This is what Paul contemplates in the mystery of death and resurrection in 1 Cor 15:35-45: “What you sow does not come to life unless it dies” (15:36).

I have come full circle now by moving back to intercultural issues and questions that I raised in the Introduction: Christians’ exclusive claim of salvation along with a strong boundary set over against “others.” Focusing on the new category of “body” as a metaphor for “living,” I suggested that Christians should live out the Christic body in their bodies to reconstruct the loving *ecclesia*, not based on a singular notion of unity but with diversity or respect for one another. If one can envision such a loving community through “dying” to love all, we can relate to each other with a sense of common humanity. Christians can learn from others – both Christians and non-Christians. One should change one’s attitude or thinking that diversity or difference is something undesirable or an obstacle to overcome. Rather, differences in culture or in religion are a blessing and a

challenge to humanity in the long run because human desire to unify “things” or to dominate others runs fast enough to bleed others under the cover of an idealistic universalism.

As a historical reminder to those who study seriously intercultural, inter-religious issues, I take as an example Protestant Korean mission in the nineteenth century as a failure, especially in relation to culture and religion. If the mission is examined through the perspective of diversity and Christic embodiment, the mission failed because its paradigm is based on a narrow conception of community, with various constructions of dualism between the gospel and culture, heaven and earth, and so forth, in which no gray is allowed, much less diversity. For example, Underwood, an American missionary in the nineteenth century to Korea, worked as a faithful errand to the world, inspired by the American ideal of individualism and modernization, without taking seriously intercultural or inter-religious issues from a diversity or embodiment perspective.⁵²⁰ Underwood’s vision in his book *The Call of Korea* comes true as present-day Korean missionaries through the world do the same things that Underwood did a century ago in Korea.⁵²¹ What they take is ardent “faith” just like the nineteenth century missionaries in Korea,

⁵²⁰ Horace G. Underwood, *The Call of Korea: Political, Social, Religious.*, (New York: Young People’s Missionary Movement of the United States and Canada, 1908).

⁵²¹ Ibid.

with the fervent support from the Korean church. An irony is that the public in Korea do not trust the church any more because there seems to be no real “gospel” of diversity, which is to include all, to love all, to die for others, not to exclude, not to kill, not to impose any thing to others. In this sense, there is enough dis-embodiment of Christ in Korea.⁵²² The primary goal of mission is not to propagate the cheap, “spiritual” gospel that does not involve a sense of diversity and respect for local culture in the real, sociopolitical world. From the perspective of a Christic body in which diversity resides, the Christian mission would need to affirm all forms of diversity while at the same time it should test the differences and their fruits. Distinction should be made between Christianizing the world and living the gospel in the sense of the Christic body. The former is a voice of unity, control, much the same as the hegemonic voice of the Tower of Babel, in which everybody must speak the same language.

A challenging question for all Christians is: Do we live out the gospel of Christ, in the form of the radical message that we carry the death of Christ in our bodies? This good news, the gospel of Christ, is God’s “yes” to the world, all people, because God is not just the God of the Israelites but also of Gentiles (Rom 3:29). Today, God calls people to work for a livable, peaceful world full of diversity and differences.

⁵²² Yung Suk Kim, “Korea, South, Christianity in” in *Cambridge Dictionary of Christianity*, ed. Daniel Patte (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming).

Do You Love Me?

Through a little cottage
the bland, uncaring wind blows,
a candle fire wanes,
a baby sits on a sick-bed
breathing a deadly silence of peace
a brisk voice shouts:
“do you love me?”
not “where are you from?”

“Do this for all”
“again, do you love me?”
“do this love for all people”
“do all, sick or healthy,
poor or rich, strong or weak,
all”

Sisters and brothers,
Fathers and mothers,
“Nothing can separate us
from the love of God,”
“do you believe this, my son, my daughter?
do this love for all, my companion!”

Suddenly,
the melting, sweet wind blows to unfreeze all,
it blows through the seasons,
in the spring - a time to wake up, a time to tell the people
of hope that God breathes into all.
only then we live together,
only then we are resurrection,
only then we find you in our heart,
in our walking,
in our dreaming,
like ever-rising sun in the morning;

in the desolate winter – a time to wait
for a hope yet to be realized;
in the sweaty summer – a time to work out
a garden for all;
in the falling fall – a time to thank God, and each other.

My daughter!
Do you feel this power of ever-new, ever-fresh dews?
My son!
Do you feel this joy of the loving wind –
in the past, present and future seamlessly
flowing into our heart of spring,
whispering that we are one and different,
the same glaring sun rising in Panama and Korea,
the same bluish ocean of the Pacific in Fiji and in America,

It is a mystery of love -
a mystery of a fragile peace,
a mystery of ever-challenging difference,
a mystery of this life,
a mystery of you and me;

Around the circle of bonfire
we feel it, we live it -
only then we say it enough;
enough is all, for all creation;
only then, doves and eagles fly in their sky,
together, we fly into the same sky;
only then, we feel the power of mystery of God everyday,
today and tomorrow, yesterday and today,
like an ever-flowing river we too flow.

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