UNEVEN REPRESENTATION?

ANALYSIS OF DEMOCRATIC RESPONSIVENESS IN LATIN AMERICA

By

Margarita Corral González

Dissertation

Submitted to the Faculty of the

Graduate School of Vanderbilt University

in partial fulfillment of the requirements

for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

in

Political Science

December, 2013

Nashville, Tennessee

Approved:

Professor Elizabeth J. Zechmeister

Professor Manuel Alcántara

Professor Mitchell A. Seligson

Professor Zeynep Somer-Topcu

To my family

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Six years ago, I embarked on a journey that has significantly impacted my life. It has been a journey full of challenges, learning and new opportunities, which, without a doubt have helped me grow as a person and as a scholar. Leaving my country, my family and friends to come to the United States to pursue a doctoral degree was not easy but it certainly brought many good things to my life. This dissertation is one of the products of these six years in which I have been fortunate to meet wonderful people who have supported and helped me along the way and to whom I am extraordinarily grateful.

First, I would like to thank Manuel Alcántara for encouraging me to apply to a Ph.D. in the United States as a way to continue the academic path that I started at the University of Salamanca. He gave me the opportunity to join his Latin American Elite Project, to travel to Central America for six summers and to learn first-hand about Latin American politics. Working with Manolo sparked my interest for Latin American politics and instilled in me many of the things I know about the region. He has been a great support and mentor all throughout the fourteen years I have known him.

The Department of Political Science at Vanderbilt and the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) gave me a warm welcome and eventually became my home. I thank the professors, staff, and fellow graduate students for all the support and opportunities they have shared with me since 2007. I am especially grateful to Mitch Seligson for giving me the opportunity to work as a research assistant for LAPOP from the beginning; it has been a privilege to work for that impressive project and to form part of the family of LAPOPers. Participation in the various projects has given me the first-hand knowledge and experience that many scholars in the field of survey research would

envy. I am also thankful to Mitch for his interest in my research and for all the advice and encouragement he gave me along the way. I will never forget his classes and all I have learned from him.

In my second year, I was very fortunate that Liz Zechmeister joined the Department of Political Science and LAPOP. Since then, she has been an exemplary mentor and a wonderful advisor. From the first moment, she took interest in my research and believed in my capabilities. Liz always had a nice word of encouragement for me. She always had her door open and demonstrated a constant willingness to provide feedback and to discuss ideas under construction. I most graciously thank her for the opportunities to write with her and to be her Teaching Assistant for her Honors Public Opinion and Democracy in Latin America course. These opportunities have helped me learn different aspects of the academic career. She always works hard and keeps the interest of her students in mind. I thank her for her patience, encouragement and advice - not only academically but of a personal nature as well.

Next, I thank Zeynep Somer-Topcu for her interest in my research topic, her support and all the great ideas she has provided. I learned much about parties and representation in her classes. Thanks to her, I have not forgotten about European politics. We enjoyed many conversations about politics in Spain. Zeynep is a great example for young scholars.

Also, special thanks go out to Jon Hiskey, Cindy Kam, Marc Hetherington and Suzanne Globetti. They stood by me every step of the way and could have not been more supportive and helpful. I am also grateful for support from the administrative personnel at the Department of Political Science, Tina Bembry, Darlene Davidson, Nastasha Duncan

and Tonya Mills. They were always very helpful with navigating all the paperwork and with anything else that I needed. Additionally, I thank the Graduate School and the College of Arts and Sciences at Vanderbilt for supporting my fieldwork in Bolivia. A summer grant from this office allowed me to get to know a fascinating country and meet people like Elisa Canqui who opened the doors of her house and taught me so much about Bolivian politics. Thanks to Hillary Voth for the moments we shared there.

My acknowledgments would not be complete without mentioning my LAPOP colleagues. A great group of people welcomed me with open arms when I arrived in Nashville, and their parties and social gatherings made my transition a joy: Rubí Arana, who has been like a "mother" in the US, Fernanda Boidi, José Miguel Cruz, Abby Cordova, Juan Carlos Donoso, Daniel Montalvo, Daniel Moreno, Diana Orcés, Vivian Schwarz, and Dominique Zephyr. I thank Alejandro Diaz -Dominguez and Brian Faughnan with whom I started the PhD and with whom I shared an apartment for two years. Alejandro has been very supportive and a great companion in never-ending talks, walks, and meals, during which I have learned so much. Also thanks to all the friends who joined us later, with whom I shared great moments as well: Fred Batista, Mollie Cohen, Matt Layton, Arturo Maldonado, Mason Moseley, Gioconda Naranjo, Amy Erica Smith, Mariana Rodríguez, Daniel Zizumbo, and all the colleagues and friends who have been part of LAPOP. I am also fortunate to have worked with great friends like Nicole Hinton, Ana María Montoya and Georgina Pizzolitto. Thanks to my "Nashvillian" friends Juan Alonso and Sarah Clark who showered me with kindness, hospitality, joy, and love. I have learned something from each of these wonderful people and I know they will always be close to my heart.

My best friends in Spain also deserve some lines in these acknowledgments. Mónica, Virginia, Isabel, Eva, Mar y Patricia have been always cheering for me. It helps knowing that they are on the other side of the phone. They welcome me home with open arms and loving smiles every time I return to Spain. No matter where life takes us, we will always be there for each other.

Without a doubt, I would not have done any of this without the support of my parents, Simón and Margarita. They have been my main source of inspiration to complete this Ph.D. In spite of how hard the distance has been for them, they have always found a way to be there for me, wishing me the best for my future. My parents are my greatest teachers. From them, I learned the great lessons of life and they have helped to shape me into the woman I am today. Thanks to the best brother I could have, Miguel, for always being there for me. Miguel – *Te quiero mucho*. Thank you to my aunts, uncles, cousins and Laura and David for bringing happiness to my life.

Finally, I am grateful to Justin for being in Nashville with me, for his love and support and for our adventures together. He stood by me and encouraged me one-hundred percent while I finished the PhD. He helped me with all my questions and stayed with me in Nashville, all the while missing his beloved Boston. We faced all challenges together, laughed at his funny speeches at night and above all had lots of fun. He is a wonderful mate with whom to share a life. I am grateful for our new life in Boston and thankful for his mother Linda, his father Bryon and brothers Jon, Ryan, and Paul who have been so kind and welcoming and who have made me feel like part of their family.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES

LIST OF FIGURES

CHAPTER I

EQUALITY, POLITICAL REPRESENTATION, POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS AND PARTICIPATION

A number of studies have identified a crisis of representation that is undermining the quality of democracy in the Latin American region (Hagopian 2005; Mainwaring et al 2006). Political systems seem to have failed to fulfill citizens' expectations, a fact that has led in some cases to high and growing dissatisfaction with the main political institutions of representation. However, we might wonder if this failure of representation is affecting all groups within the population equally, regardless their level of income, or other socio-demographic characteristics that might position them differently in the political system, such as belonging to an indigenous population. In assessing the topic of political representation in Latin America, it is imperative that we understand the extent to which different subgroups are under-represented in Latin American politics and, as well, whether there are some institutional designs, namely with respect to the nature of and rules governing the electoral system, or cultural features (in particular, those of a participatory culture) that might lead to more equal representation outcomes than others.

To what extent are different groups of citizens evenly represented in Latin America? Under what circumstances do disadvantaged groups' interests manage to get represented? Government responsiveness to citizens' preferences, where citizens are seen as political equals (Dahl 1971), is fundamental to democratic quality and stability (Rueschemeyer 2004; Morlino 2004; Luna and Zechmeister 2005). However, this ideal is

not always met. Latin America is the region of the world with greatest economic inequality, largely if not entirely a function of political inequalities, and these inequities diminish democratic quality and make stability tenuous. Therefore, it is imperative that we understand the extent to which and the reasons why different subgroups are under-represented in Latin American politics, and the causes and consequences of this imbalance. This dissertation aims to address this issue first using a comparative approach by looking at a subset of countries in the region, and then, by focusing on the study of the case of Bolivia.

The objectives of this dissertation are to assess differences in the degree to which legislators represent the policy preferences of poor versus wealthy constituents across Latin America and, as well, to assess the degree to which certain institutional and/or cultural features affect that relationship. This study is novel in the sense of assessing political representation by looking at different subconstituencies instead of at the nation as a whole and also in the sense of addressing both perceptions of representation and, as well, substantive representation based on key policy issues in Latin America. It also contributes to the understanding of the role of political institutions and political participation when it comes to the representation of disadvantaged populations in the region. In order to assess these relationships I use data from two main sources. First, I use both elite and mass survey data to measure perceptions of legislators and their roles and policy stances. The elite data come from the surveys of the Parliamentary Elites of Latin America (PELA) Project conducted by the University of Salamanca (Spain) in the lower chamber of Latin American congresses in the summer and fall of 2010. The mass survey data come from different waves of surveys conducted by the Latin American Public

Opinion Project (LAPOP) at Vanderbilt University between 2004 and 2012. Second, and for the in-depth analysis of political representation in Bolivia, I make use of original data that I collected in 2011 during the course of fieldwork in this country where I conducted semi-structured interviews with legislators and measured their skin tone in order to measure descriptive representation. Furthermore, I take into account different institutional indicators such as the presence of leftist parties in congress, levels of proportionality, fragmentation, electoral district magnitude, effective number of parties, and levels of political participation based on the AmericasBarometer datasets. I argue that the presence of leftist parties, electoral features that create opportunities for keeping legislators accountable, and high levels of electoral turnout are related to smaller gaps in citizens' perceptions between whom politicians represent and should represent and to closer and also to closer substantive representation between legislators and poor sectors of the population. Nonetheless, there are variations in the extent to which these relationships hold, as I will present throughout this study.

This first chapter presents the theoretical framework on which the hypotheses and their empirical tests will be based. I outline the main theories on the relationship between inequality, political representation, political institutions and participation. This introductory chapter concludes by describing the outline of the rest of the dissertation.

Equality as Fundamental for Democracy

Defining democracy is a task that has filled numerous pages in political science, which expand on countless debates about the characteristics that define this key concept. Looking at definitions that go beyond minimalist requirements[1], the ideal of political equality is presented as a core element of modern democracies (Dahl 1971; Dahl 1989; Diamond 1999). Political equality means that the process assigns the same weight to citizens' preferences and interests (Dahl 1971; Verba 2001) or, as Rueschemeyer defines, it is "a condition in which all citizens have equal influence on the collective decision making of a political community" (2011, 819).[2] In other words, democracies are expected to treat citizens and their preferences as equals, with the same rights and opportunities to influence political decisions. Also, political inequality can refer to the outcome of policies, that is to say the extent to which a policy has an even effect across different groups of society (Ware 1981).

Political equality occupies an important place in discussions of democracy for both normative and empirical reasons. On the one hand, Dahl (2006) argues that political equality is a fundamental democratic principle because it meets standards of morality,

[1] Authors such as Schumpeter (1942) and Przeworski et al. (2000) opt for minimalist definitions that evolve around the idea of a system in which rulers are selected in competitive elections while broader conceptions include other dimensions related to freedom, participation, accountability or civilian control over the military, among others. See Dahl (1971) for a list of core requisites of democracy.

[2] The Working Work on Political Inequality integrated by members of the International Sociological Association and the International Political Science Association is concern about the lack of empirical studies on political inequalities, and encourage these kinds of analyses in order to understand how contemporary societies work. They present several definitions of political inequality such as "the extent to which groups are unequal in their influence over the decisions made in governance structures" or "the extent of the distance between those with a lot of potential influence and those with less". Source: http://politicalinequality.org/2010/06/22/statement-on-the-study-of-political-inequality/ (accessed on 6/15/2013).

prudence and acceptability. On the other one, political equality is a good that provides citizens a sense of belonging to the polity, and thus builds bonds and cooperation among the members of the community, by enhancing citizen involvement in decision making (Verba 2001; Jacobs and Skocpol 2005). As much as political equality is valued, the converse – political inequality – is viewed as problematic for democracy. Thus, as Tilly (1998) argues, political inequality threatens democracy to "the extent that people on the advantaged sides of categorical divides are small in number and rich in resources, they combine the incentive and the capacity to buy their way out of democratic processes…[and] the co-presence of a very few rich people and many very poor people encourages the buying of candidates, votes, and election judges, as well as extra electoral patronage" (224).[3]

In sum, political equality is a concept that has been addressed as a key value in democracy from a theoretical perspective. And, yet, it is rarely studied empirically (Ware 1981). Further, and despite its desirability, it is very difficult to find political equality in practice. Scholars have identified different reasons why political equality is difficult to achieve. One of these explanations is linked to political participation, which is "at the heart of political equality" (Verba 2001: 1) because it is a key means by which citizens express their preferences and needs. From this perspective, for public officials to equally consider citizens' preferences there has to be equal political activity (Verba 2001). However, the resources (time, money and skills) necessary to participate are not evenly distributed among the different groups in the population, which fuels inequalities in participation. Scholars have found that many citizens lack the skills to participate and the

[3] Tilly (1998) conceives of persistent social inequalities in terms of paired and unequal categories such as male/female, black/white or citizen/noncitizen.

more educated and knowledgeable are more likely to participate (Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996; Popkin 1991; Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock 1991). And, when there are inequalities in participation, the interests of privileged groups are more likely to be taken in to account (Jacobs and Skocpol 2005). Other scholars focus on the existence of different social and economic powers that lead to the existence of dominant groups. Specifically, economic inequality has an impact on political equality given that the wealthy are more likely to influence politics due to their power to control investments (Rueschemeyer 2011).[4]

In sum, modern democracies are based on the idea of principals (citizens) delegating the power to enact public policies to agents (public officials), in a relationship in which all citizens "*should* be equal to each other" (Powell 2004a, 274); italics added for emphasis). This system is built on the premise that governments enact policies that are congruent with the preferences of the citizenry. However, there are reasons to think that achieving this equality in political representation is subject to important limitations. In fact, it has been argued that "the disappointing performance of recently democratized political systems in Latin America seems largely due to a renewed weakness in the organized representation of subordinate interests" (Rueschemeyer 2011: 823). Therefore, the study of the way public officials represent the policy preferences of the electorate is key for the understanding of modern democratic processes.

Representation refers to the connection between those two poles: the mass public and governing elites. From a principal-agent perspective, public officials are agents that act on behalf of citizens, responding to public demands and fulfilling citizens'

[4] There are also theoretical arguments on how political equality could imply limiting freedom and government intervention (Dahl 2006, Verba 2001), which might impact core values of democracy.

expectations. The relationship between agents and principals is ruled by political accountability, which involves information from the former to the latter, and explanations and sanctions for decisions (Schmitter 2004). In other words, voting works as a reward-punishment mechanism; voters will take into account policy performance and will vote in line with their assessment (Downs 1957). Public officials, as voter seekers, will try to be elected by looking after their constituencies' interests.

Nonetheless, some of these ideal premises are not always met. As Lijphart (1997: 1) states "inequality in representation and influence are not randomly distributed but systematically biased in favor of more privileged citizens- those with higher incomes, greater wealth, and better education-and against less advantaged citizens". Why might underprivileged groups be underrepresented? Different theoretical approaches offer distinct explanations that lead to the same general expectation that poor citizens are underrepresented. Some of these perspectives, which will be expanded on below, focus on citizens' position and role in the political arena, their political ability (lack of interest, political knowledge, sophistication), and their political engagement or participation.

It is well known that citizens' influence over the political system is not equally distributed across groups. Different theories have identified how different segments of the population depending on their socioeconomic, demographic and political characteristics are better (or worse) positioned in the political arena, which makes it easier (or more difficult) to be heard and have their interests represented. On the one hand, decades ago elitist theories emphasized the differences between elites and masses (Michels 1911; Mosca 1939; Pareto 1935). This classic theory argues that power is in the hands of a minority, a unified and coherent group, who thanks to organization, political ability or

personal qualities is able to keep its domination over the masses. Nonetheless, the transformations that would take place within the social and economic structures were introducing changes in the composition of the elites, changes that questioned the validity of this classical theory and gave way to a "democratic elitism" (Etzioni-Halevy 1993). This new approach focuses on competition among different groups of elites for power. As Dahl (1961) argues, in any system there is a plurality of groups seeking power, while some others do not express interest in politics. With all this variety of groups, it is has been said that political systems are designed so that they favor the will of business and professional groups, and this then limits the influence of the general public (Schattschneider 1960). The resources available to these groups allow them to obtain what they want, even if their positions are against or in opposition to general public opinion (Wilson 1990; Wright 1996; Domhoff 1998). Public policy is determined by small groups, by interest organizations, and economic elites, given that the general public is not well positioned compared to the well-off elite. Taking into account citizens' unequal positions in the political system with respect to their ability to formulate their demands or to influence power, it might be expected that those with more economic resources are in an advantaged situation, and thus more likely to be heard by their representatives.

In other words, we could think that there is an underrepresentation of the poor that might be explained by some characteristics attached to that situation of deprivation, such as having fewer resources to participate in the political process, to understand politics or to be informed about politics or to express their preferences and control their representatives (L. Bartels 2008). These ideas are in line with what the classic

behaviorists started pointing out five decades ago, that most citizens are unable or unwilling to collect, understand, and/or incorporate abstract political information into a constrained belief system (Converse 1964). Therefore, citizens find it difficult to control their representatives and intervene in the policy-making process (Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996). In fact, recent studies have found that politicians tend to be more responsive to *opinion leaders*, that is to say to those who know about politics and are engaged in politics, given that this sector of the population might be more capable to communicate their preferences, and they are more likely to affect the selection of representatives(Adams and Ezrow 2009).

Furthermore, it is argued that citizens are incapable of holding consistent policy positions, which opens the door for elites to manipulate their weak views.[5] To the extent that those who are further down on the socio-economic ladder are those likely to hold coherent policy perspectives, then this lends a further reason to expect the quality of representation to be lower among poor versus wealthy constituents.

Latin America is one of the more economically unequal regions in the world, where the four poorest deciles encompass fifteen percent of the total income while the richest one takes one third of it (ECLAC 2010). Furthermore, this is a region characterized by an unequal access to education, especially to secondary education, which is related to socioeconomic conditions, geography and ethnic origin. As an example only an 8.3% of citizens between 25 and 29 years old have completed five years

[5] This relationship between knowledge and representation has been tested especially in the United States. Barabas and Wachtel (2009) find that when citizens are politically knowledgeable higher levels of representation are reached. In this case, citizens choose their representative by correctly knowing how their senator's positions on certain issues and by their agreement with that issue position. Some other researchers have highlighted the importance of expertise or being knowledgeable on certain issues to be represented. In this regards, Jacobs and Page (2005) show how foreign policy is shaped by business elites and experts while public officials are not responsive to the mass public, at least in this realm.

of postsecondary education (ECLAC 2010). Given this situation we might assume that not all citizens in Latin America have the same resources to, on the one hand, express their preferences and, on the other one, to be informed about politics and keep their representatives accountable. In sum, from a theoretical perspective, there are enough reasons to think that certain segments of the population are underrepresented, a situation that in theory should be reflected in actual measures of representation and which could also be reflected in citizens' perceptions. Nonetheless, we know that citizens' perceptions of their own abilities to influence politics (external efficacy) and to understand politics (internal efficacy) vary (Craig and Maggiotto 1982) and thus not all of them will be aware of political inequalities. The same factors that explain that underprivileged sectors are not represented might explain that they do not perceive such inequality. In other words, I expect that:

H1a.Some sectors of the population in Latin America perceive that public officials represent the interest of the better-off.

H1b. More wealthy citizens' policy preferences in Latin America are better represented compared to those who are less wealthy.

Recently, scholars have started taking political inequalities beyond theory and addressing them from an empirical perspective following what Saward (2010) identifies as "renewed demands for better representation of marginalized groups" (2). While only a few studies focus on perceptions of political inequalities, a growing body of empirical research focuses on substantive representation. Regarding perceptions of inequality, scholars find that acceptance of inequalities varies across countries and individuals (Svallfors 1997; Alesina and Giuliano 2009; Rueschemeyer 2011) and is higher in

countries such as the United States. However, in general terms, and specially as per studies conducted in the United States and Europe, it is found that citizens do not consider that governments represent people like them (Whitefield 2006; Rohrschneider 2005). Nonetheless, some groups, those ill informed and with fewer resources, find it difficult to connect inequalities and their own interests (Bartels 2005). Studies in Latin America have focused on evaluations of representative institutions (Boidi 2009) more than on perceptions on whom public officials represent. Chapter II will address the issue of perceptions of equality in representation in eleven countries in Latin America.

Regarding the expectation presented in H1b, some empirical research in the United States has indeed found that policy outcomes reflect affluent citizens' preferences more than poor or middle-income Americans (Gilens 2005; L. Bartels 2008) basically because affluent citizens support politicians' campaigns and help them to get a seat. This pattern not only holds at the national/federal level but also when looking at state legislatures: poor citizens are worse represented by state governments than wealthier ones (Flavin 2012a). Though limited in quantity and focused on a single case, some research focused on Latin America reaches similar conclusions, though adds additional reasons for such unequal outcomes with respect to representation. For example, a recent study by Taylor-Robinson (2010) on representation in Latin America, with a special focus on Honduras, finds that poor citizens lack the needed resources to monitor public officials (e.g., education, access to information) and to punish representatives who ignore their interests, which constrains the possibilities for being well-represented. Apart from these two main factors, the author finds under-participation in politics and in associations undermines representation among the poor.

In a related vein, another theoretical approach highlights the relationship between participation and representation. Political participation is a key element in any definition of democracy (Dahl 1971). This involvement covers a wide range of activities that include voting, working for candidates or parties, and participating in manifestations or protests, among others. Participation has seen by many scholars as a way to produce representative decisions and legitimacy in the system (Dalton 2004). Although there is no agreement on the level of participation necessary for democracies to work (Huntington 1968; Norris 2002), there is an agreement on its importance. One of the main forms of participation is voting. Through elections, citizens select public officials, and keep them accountable, which should have implications for the role of those representatives. In Lijphart's words (1997, 4) "who votes, and who doesn't has important consequences for who gets elected and for the content of public policies". Furthermore, it is not new to argue that representatives might not be committed to pay attention to those who do not vote (Key 1949). If this is the case, we could expect the system to unequally representative those who vote (or participate actively in politics) versus those who do not participate. Some authors have argued that the reason why we could expect more congruence between voters and representatives is because the former tend to select public officials who hold similar or close views and preferences (Miller and Stokes 1963; Erikson 1990). An alternative explanation is that through voting, citizens express their preferences and induce public officials to be responsive (Verba 2003). Studies have found a relationship between income and participation: "individuals who are below the median income in society are less likely to participate in elections, and those above the median income are more likely to do so" (Beramendi and Anderson 2008, 18). However,

empirical evidence on the relationship between participation and representation has shown mixed results. On the one hand, Ellis et al. (2006) find that in American politics, representatives do not respond differently to voters and nonvoters. And, further, Flavin (2012b) does not find that poor citizens voting in higher rates improve their chances of being better represented by their senators. On the other hand, Griffin and Newman (2005) find that senators in the United States are influenced more by voter preferences than nonvoter preferences. Nonetheless, in a later study, these authors find that the relationship between political participation and chances of being represented do not work the same way for all groups; specifically, they argue that voting does not increase the representation of blacks and Latinos in the United States (Griffin and Newman 2008). Despite these mixed findings, there is theoretical reason to expect that a participatory political culture will influence on the nature of representation in Latin America.[6] In fact, in the history of this region the poor and powerless on occasion have been able to mobilize against the political systems (Chalmers et al. 1997) to defend their interests. Therefore, we could posit that a participatory culture can help to overcome the expected situation of underrepresentation experienced by poor citizens. If a participatory culture promotes even representation citizens will be less likely to perceive inequalities. Where citizens are active, citizens' perceptions of their ability to influence politics increase (Finkel 1985) which will produce perceptions of equal representation.

The expectations I will test in this regard are as follows:

H2a. Where citizens participate more actively in politics, perceptions of unequal representation will be relatively lower.

[6] It is worth noting that some institutional factors such as compulsory voting might affect levels of political participation.

H2b. Less wealthy citizens are better represented under a participatory political culture (than they are under a less participatory culture).

I intend to test this cultural factor along with the institutional approach I develop below, in order to see what approach holds better for Latin America, that is to say, if institutional or cultural factors improve the situation of underrepresentation that the literature anticipates for poor citizens.

So far, we have seen how both the theory and the empirical evidence leave little doubt about the general disadvantaged position of those citizens with fewer resources with which to demand and secure political representation. And, as well, I have offered some reason to expect that participatory tendencies at both the individual and aggregate levels might attenuate conditions of inequality in representation. These expectations will be tested in Chapters II and III. I will assess the extent to which citizens perceive that poor citizens are under-represented and the extent to which their preferences match those of representatives. Having reviewed some fundamental postulates of political inequality, the next section focuses on political representation in general terms.

Some Postulates of Political Representation

Representation is undoubtedly one of the most critical elements in any democracy. Many of the political decisions that affect citizens are taken by their representatives, which makes the analysis of the nature and characteristics of representation especially relevant. Representation is a concept that has been analyzed

from many different perspectives and that has experienced many transformations over the last decades (Manin 1997; Ryden 1996).

This section presents the general framework and the main dimensions of representation that the literature has addressed over the last decades. As the reader will see, the main theoretical postulates in this extensive literature have been built considering advanced democracies and citizens as a whole. This research project takes into account these classic postulates but opts for a more nuanced approach, one that takes into account different segments of the population in new democracies and assesses the influence of electoral institutions on at least some aspects of democratic representation.

Basically, there are two main dimensions addressed by the literature[7]: the role played by representatives and the ways in which citizens are represented. While they intersect and affect one another, I will introduce each here in turn. The first dimension that the literature on representation addresses is the role of the representatives. The different kinds of roles that the representative can adopt are found in the ideas of Edmund Burke, who considered that "parliament is a deliberative assembly of one nation, with one interest, that of the whole, where not local purposes, not local prejudices, ought to guide, but the general good, resulting from the general reason for the whole".[8] As Eulau et al. (1959) point out, Burke's position combined two notions of representation, the *focus* of representation and the *style* of representation, that is to say, who parliamentarians represent (national or local interests), and what attitude they should adopt (dependent or independent).

[7] Other scholars prefer to distinguish between studies that focus on how votes are translated into seats and research addressing substantive representation, that is to say the extent to which citizens and representatives' issue preferences coincide (Powell 2004a).
[8] This is an extract from one of Burke's speeches, "Speech to the Electors of Bristol" of 1774. It can be found in Stanlis (1968).

Over time, the concept of representation has been affected by the emergence of political parties. Political parties gradually gained in importance, especially in Europe. However, as Thomassen (1994) indicates, it was difficult for theories of political representation to incorporate these new elements. Manin (1997) talks about party democracy. In this model of party government, the role of individual parliamentarians changed as they had to coordinate their actions and decisions with the other members of their same party; in part, competition changed from a competition among candidates to a competition among parties. Parties had to be disciplined and cohesive in order to implement the programs that political parties offered to the electorate.

Today in both advanced and most newer democracies, political representation by parties is a central component and, arguably, a key promise of the democratic political process. However, the degree to which legislators cater to their constituencies, their parties, or the nation as a whole in carrying out their representative duties may still vary. I return to this point below.

Regarding the second dimension (the ways citizens are represented), a now-classic perspective has been offered by Pitkin (1967), who considers that citizens are represented descriptively, symbolically and substantively.[9] She concludes that political representation is best achieved when legislators act "in the interest of the represented, in a manner responsive to them" (209) rather than sharing social or demographic characteristics with their represented. This idea is close to what later in the literature would be known respectively as mandate and accountability representation. Mandate

[9] Recent approaches to the study of representation talk about anticipatory (public official anticipates the preferences of votes trying to be responsive to them), gyroscopic (constituents find it difficult to control representatives) and surrogate (represented by someone you did not elect) forms of representation (Mansbridge 2003).

representation occurs "when politicians' and voters' interests coincide and/or when voters can reasonably expect that parties will do what they propose" (Przeworski, Stokes, and Manin 1999, 30). And as Achen (1978) points out, if the views of representatives and citizens are similar, representation is improved.[10]

In considering symbolic representation, some empirical and theoretical works have suggested that descriptive representation is not always evident nor always to be expected. As Duverger (1954) suggested, workers do not vote for workers as their representatives; rather, they prefer well educated candidates. Empirical analysis based on parliaments in Anglo-Saxon contexts showed that representatives had very different socioeconomic or demographic characteristics from citizens (Quandt 1969; Putnam 1973; Putnam 1976; Czudnowski 1982).[11] More specifically, as Matthews (1985) points out, "almost everywhere legislators are better educated, possess higher-status occupations, and have more privileged backgrounds than the people they 'represent'"(p.18). At the same time, scholarly attention to descriptive representation experienced a surge in the 1990s when many scholars looking at the United States considered that fair representation should allow social groups to define and defend their own interests (Young 1990; Phillips 1995; Mansbridge 1999; Williams 2000).

Most of the comparative empirical research on representation has focused on mandate representation, and has been carried out in advanced industrial democracies (Miller and Stokes 1963; Achen 1978; Dalton 1985; Converse and Pierce 1986). These

[10] An alternative perspective on substantive representation is offered by those who focus on the notion of "accountability representation," which assumes that voters reward incumbents who act in their best interests while the latter implement policies that will lead them to reelection (Przeworski, Stokes and Manin 1999). It is outside the scope of this project to examine representation in terms of output.
[11] Decades ago Elitist Theories emphasized the differences between elites and masses (Mosca 1939, Pareto 1935).

analyses try to capture the "congruence" between constituents' beliefs and the legislators' positions. Some other authors consider that correspondence between legislators' positions and constituent opinions does not have to exist on all the issues (Froman 1963; Kingdon 1989; Arnold 1990). Rather, this representation should be based on relevant policy dimensions, which are usually informed by ideology. In sum, "legislators should resemble their constituents ideologically" (Achen 1978: 481). In this regard recent studies focus on ideological or programmatic linkages, mainly in Europe (Powell 2004). In these societies the relationship between citizens and representatives is mainly based on ideological or programmatic commitments. This kind of linkage is believed to fuel democratic accountability and responsiveness (Kitschelt 2000).

However, in the case of Latin America, the scenario seems to be much more complex. Some analyses have found that in some countries the bonds between citizens and representatives are not driven by ideology or programmatic ties but by personalism or an individual candidate's qualities. This situation has led to systems characterized by loose party-society bonds, and weakly institutionalized forms of political representation (Roberts 2002). On the other hand, some other scholars find that in some countries political parties are ideologically and programmatic oriented (Alcántara 2004). Only a handful of studies have focused squarely on the question of how parties and representatives in Latin American establish their relationship with citizens (e.g., Roberts 2002; Crisp et al. 2004; Luna and Zechmeister 2005; Levitsky 2007; Kitschelt et al. 2010), but these mainly focus on a given country or, to the extent that they take a comparative perspective, focus on the nation as a whole.

In fact, most studies of political representation treat constituents as a whole, using average positions in a given district, partisans or country. This, however, is likely to overlook serious differences in terms of the degree to which different types of citizens are represented. As Achen (1978: 480) argues: "if regression coefficients were assumed equal only for groups of constituents (say, social classes or ideological bedfellows), the specification would be more realistic, and the differences in coefficients for different groups would measure the failure of representativeness."

In this regard, the study of representation is starting to change with the emergence of new studies in the United States and Western Europe in the last years which examine unequal representation or differential responsiveness. These new studies are taking into account a variety of groups: voters versus non-voters (Ellis, Ura, and Ashley-Robinson 2006), citizens sorted by income (Bartels 2008, Gilens 2005), activists, experts or opinion leaders versus the general public (Jacobs and Page 2005; Griffin and Newman 2005), party supporters and party elites (Dalton 1985), among others.

The basic idea behind these analyses is to evaluate legislative representation by measuring the extent to which political equality is reached among different groups. Most of these studies show that some groups have an advantage at the time of influencing policy outcomes or having their preferences represented. For instance, in the United States it is found that policy outcomes reflect affluent citizens' preferences more than poor or middle-income Americans (Gilens 2005, Bartels 2008). Jacobs and Page (2005) show that business leaders and experts have the greatest influence shaping foreign policy whereas the public has little or no influence.

However, we know little about the representation of different groups in Latin America. As a first contribution, then, this dissertation assesses the degree to which representation is unequally distributed across poor and rich groups in Latin America. In addition, while the topic of representation has received increased attention in the study of Latin American politics, few researchers have examined the topic from the perspective of the legislator and the focus of his/her representation (but see Marenghi and Garcia 2008). Moreover, while the role of electoral systems in enhancing political instability and democratic politics has been discussed in numerous ways, the literature has not treated, in particular with respect to representation in Latin America, the question of how these factors might affect representation. Apart from institutional factors, scholars have emphasized the relationship between political participation and representation (Verba 2003, Beramendi and Anderson 2008), and yet this has not been tested in depth in the case of Latin America. As additional contributions, then, this dissertation includes a detailed case study of the extent to which representation and legislators' understandings of their roles with respect to representation in Bolivia vary by institutions and electoral rules. This section has covered the basic approaches that scholars have used to address political representation in general terms. The next section addresses the relationship between political institutions and political representation and the opportunities that they might inflict for disadvantaged groups in society to be better represented.

Do Institutions Matter for Political Representation?

Variation in political representation does not take place randomly. Given the nature of institutions, defined as "the humanly devised constraints that structure political,

economic and social interaction" (North 1991, 97), it is seems only natural to think that institutions play a systematic and important role in the process of political representation.

Grounded in this premise, a broad literature has focused on the analysis of electoral rules and their effects. It is been shown that electoral rules not only translate votes into seats but also shape the incentives of political actors in ways that affect political competition, party organization and the kinds of ties between representatives and constituents, among other outcomes (see for instance, Duverger 1954; Rae 1967; Taagepera and Shugart 1989; Carey and Shugart 1995; Lijphart 1999).

This dissertation focuses on certain electoral institutions (i.e. the proportionality of the electoral system, the size of electoral districts and the effective number of parties[12]) and their relationship to perceptions of inequalities in political representation and to the substantive representation of poor citizens in Latin America. One of the main questions that emerges from the study of electoral systems and their relationship with representation is based in the fact that this research that it has produced mixed results, with scholars sometimes finding that electoral systems do not matter in the expected way (Ezrow 2010).[13] Thus, a key objective of this dissertation is to assess the extent to which, and when, electoral institutions matter for political equality in representation.

Most studies of political representation that assess the influence of electoral systems compare proportional representation systems versus majoritarian ones or single member district (SMD). These studies have yielded mixed results. Traditional studies argued that proportional systems enhance substantive representation (Huber and Powell

[12] The effective number of parties is not an institution *per se* but an institutional feature related to representation.
[13] Ezrow (2010) argues that "electoral systems matter for political representation through their influence on the balance between niche and mainstream party influence" (5).

1994, Powell 2000). However, recent scholarship finds that that relationship is unclear (Blais and Bodet 2006). Part of the explanation resides in the trade-off inherent in a choice between these systems (Powell 2000). While proportional formulas promote the inclusion of more groups, majoritarian formulas increase opportunities for monitoring public officials and for the clarity of responsibility necessary for accountability.[14] Therefore, on the one hand it could be expected that poor people might be better represented under proportional systems. On the other hand, majoritarian formulas may provide opportunities for making legislators accountable to the degree that they feel pressured to be responsive in order not to be punished in the next election. Therefore, one could expect a relationship between proportional systems and unequal representation, but the direction is unclear; tentatively, it could be said that:

H3a. In systems with larger degrees of proportionality, perceptions of unequal representation will be lower than in less proportional ones.

H3b. The larger the proportionality of an electoral system, the smaller the distance in policy preferences between the poor and legislators.

Chapters II and III will assess the extent to which rules regarding the proportionality of electoral systems affect both perceptions of inequalities in political representation and substantive representation.

Related to proportionality is the magnitude of electoral districts. Large districts in proportional representative systems tend to produce more proportionality at the aggregate level (Benoit 2001; Taagepera and Shugart 1989). However, district magnitude not only

[14] Proportional representation is also believed to enhance corruption given that is more difficult to monitor public officials. On the contrary systems that allow citizens to vote for individuals provide more opportunities to identify corrupt public officials and to punish them (Kunicová and Rose-Ackerman 2005).

influences proportionality at the aggregate level but also legislators' behavior. Whereas small districts are likely to produce disproportionality at the national level they also increase opportunities for enhanced accountability (Carey and Hix 2011). Small districts provide more opportunities for controlling representatives and building closer ties to them, which enhances accountability. Therefore, I expect that the more small districts there are in a political system, the fewer inequalities in representation citizens will perceive and the better the poor's preferences will be represented. These expectations can be stated as follows:

H4a. As the proportion of small districts grows, perceptions of unequal representation will be lower.

H4b. The larger the proportion of small districts, the smaller the distance in policy preferences between the poor and legislators.

Another institutional feature related to representation is fragmentation of the party system. This can affect citizens' views of the political system while providing the menu of options among which to select candidates. Whereas a large array of parties may provide a sense of having the possibility to have more options represented and thus more potential to be included in the system as well as greater the options to turn to when sanctioning incumbents (Taylor-Robinson 2010), a large number of parties can damage clarity of responsibility and bring more confusion to voters. Therefore, any a priori expectations on the impact of number of parties on political representation (perceptions and substantive representation) are unclear. Provisionally, it could be stated that:

H5a. As the number of parties in a political system grows, perceptions of unequal representation decrease.

H5b. The larger the number of political parties, the smaller the distance in policy preferences between the poor and legislators.

Finally, taking advantage of the mixed electoral system in Bolivia I will be assessing the impact of electoral institutions on the role that legislators assume when they are in office. Extant literature on the role of representation has shown that there is a wide variation across (Heitshusen, Young, and Wood 2005) and within countries (Stratmann and Baur 2002). Basically, these studies assess how legislators define the focus of their work, that is to say, whom they represent (mainly, national versus local interests)[15] (Eulau et al. 1959) and what explains that variation. Part of the literature considers that legislators' motivations are key to defining how they characterize their roles (Searing 1985). In this line, Fenno (1978) shows how representatives in the United States adopt a "home style" in order to secure their main goal of reelection. Representatives work to gain trust from their constituency, so that it is easy for them to explain and justify their decisions in Washington. This trust is gained thanks to their work within the district they represent.

Regardless of the motivation, the role a legislator adopts has important impacts on her behavior. For instance, those focused on local interest are more likely to spend more time in their constituencies, and more likely to vote against their political party than those who adopt a broader role (Searing 1985), or more likely to spend time on local party work rather than national party work (Studlar and McAllister 1996).

Apart from personal motivations, institutional features shape representational roles (which in turn also shape personal motivations). One of the institutions highlighted

[15] Some scholars emphasize the need for systems that allow for a balanced focused between national and parochial interests (Crisp 2006).

within the literature as having the largest impact on the role that legislators perform is the electoral system and, especially, the nature of districts. While multimember districts offer few incentives for developing a personal relationship in the district, because these imply a geographical overlap among several legislators (Heitshusen, Young, and Wood 2005), single member districts generate a series of incentives that bring representatives closer to their constituents. Additionally, under single member districts, the representative is identified as the spokesperson for the interests of the constituency (Vallès, Bosch, and Guardella 1997), and she might be more likely to engage in pork-barrel activities than representatives elected in multimember districts (Lancaster and Patterson 1990). Moreover, in these cases the candidate plays a fundamental role: her election depends on her own person more than on the political party to which she belongs. Parliamentary groups under these circumstances will be ill-disciplined; each member will be more concerned about the impact of their vote in her feud than about the instructions of the party (Duverger 1950).

Finally, apart from electoral institutions, political parties are also key institutions that influence political representation. In fact, they are instruments or vehicles of representation, given that they aggregate and channel citizens' demands, among other key functions (Mainwaring and Scully 1995). Leftist parties are expected to implement policies to redistribute wealth, and act in favor of those citizens in the lowest socioeconomic strata (Alvarez, Garrett, and Lange 1991). Even more, some scholars have argued that there are resources to overcome political inequality such as organization for collective action and certain institutions, as strong unions and leftist parties, which have reduced inequalities (Rueschemeyer 2011).

On the basis of the above discussion concerning the relevance of parties to representation and focusing in on the potential for parties of different ideological bents to have different impacts on representation, I posit that:

H 6a. *Where the left has a strong presence, perceptions of unequal representation will be lower than in countries with a weaker incidence*.

H 6b. *Where leftist parties have a strong presence, the distance between policy preferences between the poor and legislators will be smaller than in contexts where their incidence is weaker*.

The relationship between the left and the representation of marginalized sectors has been proved especially strong in Western democracies, being in part the responsible of the emergence of welfare states (Huber and Stephens 2010). Focusing on the context of Latin America, scholars talk of a rise of the left in recent decades, boosted in part by the social and economic inequalities created by the neoliberal economic policies decades ago (Cleary 2009; Hunter, Madrid, and Weyland 2010; Levitsky and Roberts 2011). Nonetheless, there are important differences in these leftist parties across countries, and in some countries the left has not been successful despite having a potential basis of support. The role of the left will be tested in this dissertation by looking at the effect it has on perceptions of representation and the representation of policy issues.

In sum, in this project I test two different theoretical perspectives that the literature has identified as relevant for representation: the nature of political institutions and political culture. On the one hand, I will test the influence of the electoral rules (in particular, contrasting those that tend to be candidate-centered versus party-centered), which theoretically affects the relative incentives politicians have to cater to the interest

of their district (as opposed to their party or the nation as a whole). The general expectation is that marginalized citizens will have more chances to be included in the dynamics of representation under electoral systems that favor close relationships between citizens and their representatives such as single member districts and open lists. In theory, then, rules that are more candidate-centered should lead to constituent-focused representation; however, it is arguably an open question whether that representation will be based on policy or descriptive characteristics of the constituency (e.g., social class or skin color), or both. Bolivia offers an exceptional case to explore these expectations in-depth. Indigenous populations, placed in the low ends of the socioeconomic strata, have been marginalized in the political system for decades. The existence of a mixed electoral system that allows for uninominal and plurinominal representatives in each of the nine departments offers a great opportunity to test the effects of the electoral system on the representation of underprivileged groups and on the role adopted by legislators in the national congress.

On the other hand, I will test the effect that an active and participant citizenry might have on representation. Through participation, citizens express their preferences and keep their representatives accountable. Therefore, we could expect that when there is an active citizenry and contacts between citizens and their representatives, policy congruence is improved. Finally, alongside these two foci - one on institutions and one on culture - I also examine the relevance of a strong left given that, on the one hand, these parties have been linked to underprivileged sectors of society, and on the other hand, Latin America has experienced a so called "rise of the left" in the last years. Therefore, it

is opportune to include a focus on these parties in this study of political inequality in the region.

Road Map and Summary of Key Findings

This final section of this introductory chapter presents the outline of the remaining dissertation. Chapter II focuses on perceptions of inequality in ten countries in Latin America. Specifically it assesses the extent to which citizens perceive that politicians defend the interests of well-off constituents and the gap between this perception and the ideal views that citizens hold on whom public officials should represent. Socioeconomic variables at the individual level and institutional characteristics at the national level, along with levels of political participation at the aggregate level are considered to test the extent to which they explain variations in this gap. I also examine the potential moderating influence of the presence of leftist parties in congress, the electoral system (proportionality, magnitude of the district) and the participatory culture at the national level (aggregate levels of voting and contacting public officials). Findings in this chapter suggest that there is a general perception that politicians tend to defend the interests of the better off and that wealth at the individual level and electoral rules matter for perceptions of political inequality. Specifically, being poor increases the likelihood of perceiving a larger gap between the actual and the ideal situation of political inequality. Regarding electoral rules, the results depict a clear relationship between the magnitude of electoral systems and perceptions of political inequalities: the larger the proportion of small districts in a political system, the smaller the gap in perceived political inequality.

Contrary to the expectation derived from the literature in Western democracies, the larger the number of parties in Latin America, the larger the levels of political inequality that citizens perceive. Also, the presence of leftist parties is related with lower levels of perceived political inequities in a robust way. Finally, high levels of electoral turnout are strongly related to lower levels of perceived political inequality.

The next chapter (Chapter III) measures and assesses mandate representation for distinct socio-economic groups in eleven countries. In other words, using data from the Parliamentary Elites in Latin America (PELA) project and the AmericasBarometer I assess and compare the extent to which there is or is not policy congruence between specific segments of the citizenry (poor *versus* rich) and their representatives in the national legislatures. After measuring political congruence I look at the extent to which institutional factors and levels of participation influence it. Consistent with expectations, in most countries, legislators' preferences are more closely related to the policy preferences of the better off than the underprivileged. However, the analyses in this chapter reveal that unlike in the case of perceptions, electoral institutions do not matter for policy representation, at least for policy representation as measured in this project. Only to some extent, in systems with a large number of small districts does the distance in the preferences between the poor and legislators decrease. Also, the larger the effective number of parties the larger the distance between the preferences of these two groups. Moreover, political participation and the presence of leftist parties seem not to be related to unequal representation in terms of policy preferences.

Finally, the last part of the project is devoted to an in-depth analysis of uneven representation and its relationship to electoral rules, institutions and political culture with

respect to the case of Bolivia. This country offers a great opportunity to examine different dimensions of representation in a setting characterized by large groups of poor, who are also indigenous. In addition to considering policy representation, I assess another dimension of representation, ascriptive. The data come from the sources already noted here, which I enhance with a new dataset coding the skin tone of legislators in the Bolivian congress. Further, the Bolivian electoral system allows me to assess the impact that a mixed rule system and levels of political engagement might have on the possibilities for this underprivileged group to be represented in congress, along policy or ascriptive lines, or both. Interviews with legislators in Bolivia allow additional insight into the questions raised in the first part of the dissertation and here with respect to how the representation priorities of legislators vary by the process by which they were elected and the nature of their district. I evaluate citizens' and legislators' perceptions and opinions on political representation. In so doing, I develop answers to these questions: Whom do Bolivian legislators believe they represent? Does the mixed electoral system influence perceptions of representation? While some legislators care about the nation as whole, others are more interested in representing their party, and others focus on their constituencies' preferences. Using the PELA data I test the relationship between these preferences and the nature of the electoral process (type of seat and district) that led to the legislators' election. Once again, results show a close relationship between electoral institutions and *perceptions* of representation. Single member districts impact the role that legislators take, such that legislators elected under this type of electoral rule tend to focus more on the interests or their districts (while those elected in proportional districts are more likely to adopt a national role). Also, citizens tend to trust SMD legislators more

than proportional ones. However, these electoral rules do not have significant impacts on policy representation nor on descriptive representation.

In short, this dissertation aims to address the issue of uneven representation in Latin America. In other words, I offer answers to the following questions: to what extent are different groups of citizens evenly represented in Latin America? Under what institutional circumstances do disadvantaged groups' interests manage to get (better) represented? Responses to these questions offer a new perspective on the study of political representation in new democracies, highlighting how electoral institutions shape citizens and legislators' attitudes towards political representation as well as the role of leftist parties narrowing gaps in unequal representation.

CHAPTER II

POLITICAL INEQUALITIES IN LATIN AMERICA FROM THE CITIZENS' VIEW

Do citizens in Latin America perceive political inequalities? What are the determinants of such perceptions? Despite the fact that modern democracies are based on the idea of political equality (Dahl 2006), extant scholarship suggests that this principle is difficult to achieve in practice (Verba 2003).[16] Barriers to political equality come from several fronts. On the one hand, citizens are differently positioned within social, economic, and political hierarchies that usually go together; that is to say, money can purchase political power, and political power can turn into political power (Verba, Nie, and Kim 1978). Thus, existing distributions of power and wealth can present important barriers to political equity. On the other hand, if citizens are to have equal influence, they require equal resources to exercise it. However, resources are not equally distributed among the population. Scholars have found that some citizens lack the skills to participate and, at least partially for this reason, the more educated and knowledgeable are more likely to participate (Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996; Popkin 1991; Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock 1991) and therefore have their interests expressed and represented.

Given these theories we could expect that citizens perceive inequalities in political representation. However, these perceptions might vary across citizens and countries. How do individual and contextual variables shape perceptions on political

[16] Verba (2003) also argues that achieving that political equality is desirable but also it might be too costly and have undesired consequences.

inequality in Latin America? Understanding these questions has important consequences for democracy. Scholars have found that perceptions on representation are related to system support (Muller 1970) and that perceptions of representativeness are even more important than perceptions of accountability when explaining satisfaction with democracy (Aarts and Thomassen 2008). Furthermore, these kinds of perceptions not only have an impact on other perceptions and/or evaluations but also on behavior. As Williams (2000) finds, subjective feelings of representation affect political participation, satisfaction with democracy and thus, political system stability.

This chapter addresses the issue of perceptions of inequality in Latin America by considering socioeconomic and political variables at the individual level as well as institutional variables (political parties and electoral systems) at the national level. It proceeds as follows. First, I review the theories that speak to political inequalities and present the main hypotheses. In the second and third sections, I present the survey data to assess those hypotheses in Latin America. Section four shows and discusses key findings from a set of analysis of perceptions on political inequality. The main conclusion I reach is as follows: citizens are likely to perceive that politicians tend to defend the interests of the rich and individual levels of wealth shape these perceptions. At the aggregate level, institutional features matter too; above all, a large number of small districts and a small number of political parties are related to small gaps in perceived political inequality. Also, when leftist parties hold a large share of seats in congress, and when citizens participate in elections, there are lower levels of perceived political inequities.

Perceptions of Political Inequality

Societies face inequalities in multiple overlapping arenas such that social, economic and political inequalities are interconnected. In fact, it has been argued that economic inequality leads to greater political inequality, given that it damages political interest and political participation (Solt 2008). Scholars from different disciplines agree that Latin America is one of the most unequal regions in the world, not only in terms of income but also in "access to services, power and influence, and, in many countries, treatment by police and justice systems" (Ferranti et al. 2004; Gootenberg 2010). Many of these inequalities stem from colonial legacies, primary-goods export economies, the region's disadvantaged insertion in the world market, elite control over the state and the culture, among other factors (Gootenberg 2010).

Looking at recent economic figures, we can observe that one of the main challenges in Latin America is the unequal distribution of income, which is concentrated in few hands. According to the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), the 10% of the population in the region accumulates 32% of all income whereas the poorest 40% receives only 15% (ECLAC 2013). As Table II.1 shows income inequality is especially high in countries such as Brazil, Guatemala, Honduras and Dominican Republic, while Venezuela and Uruguay are the least unequal countries when comparing Gini coefficients.[17] Nonetheless, Latin America has experienced declines in economic inequalities since 2000 thanks to the decrease in earning gaps, transferences to the poor and higher levels of education (López-Calva and Lustig 2010).

[17] Gini coefficients run from 0 to 1, figures closer to 1 mean more inequality.

Table II. 1. Income Distribution in Latin America (Gini Coefficient), 2011

Country	National	Urban	Rural
Argentina		0.492	
Bolivia	0.508	0.450	0.524
Brazil	0.559	0.550	0.532
Chile	0.516	0.515	0.478
Colombia	0.545	0.522	0.456
Costa Rica	0.503	0.493	0.473
Ecuador	0.460	0.434	0.437
El Salvador	0.454	0.424	0.402
Guatemala	0.585	0.547	0.526
Honduras	0.567	0.492	0.560
Mexico	0.481	0.456	0.450
Nicaragua	0.478	0.443	0.462
Panama	0.531	0.485	0.527
Paraguay	0.546	0.487	0.596
Peru	0.452	0.406	0.432
Dominican Republic	0.558	0.565	0.512
Uruguay	0.402	0.402	0.359
Venezuela	0.397		

Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC).
Data for 2011, except for El Salvador, Honduras, Mexico (2010), Bolivia, Nicaragua (2009) and Guatemala (2006).

However, little we know about the extent to which these economic inequalities translate into perceived political inequalities. As I stated in the previous chapter, political equality is a key principle in modern democracies. Despite the fact that political equality is not always easy to achieve, it is normatively desirable that political resources be relatively evenly distributed among different societal groups so that no particular, marginalized groups face difficulties exerting political influence and/or have their interests represented to a comparatively limited degree (Verba 2001). Given that many of the political resources are related to wealth, we could expect that in a region where economic resources are concentrated in few hands there are gaps in political equality.

This view has been expressed by others, with Renno (2010, 107) for example stating: "rich people enjoy better resources with which to defend themselves in the judicial system, to influence public policy, and to assure different treatment by the police." Therefore, we could expect that those in the upper positions of the income distribution in Latin America enjoy an advantaged situation in the political arena. But, is this portrait of an unequal political landscape shared by citizens? This chapter addresses this topic by breaking it into several more focused questions: Do citizens in Latin America perceive that political actors favor the better off? Do these perceptions match their preferences over whom politicians should defend? What factors explain these perceptions and preferences?

A first step in addressing this topic is to consider what is meant by perceptions of inequality. Extant scholarship offers several definitions of this concept. Robinson (1983) posits that "perceptions of inequality refer to people's impressions of the nature and extent of inequality in the opportunities available to particular social groups, in the treatment accorded them by other social groups and institutions, and in the conditions of life that they experience" (Robinson 1983, 345). In a simpler way, Adams (1965) affirms that "inequality exists for a person whenever he perceives that the ratio of his outcomes to inputs and the ratio of other's outcomes to other's inputs are unequal" (p. 280). Therefore, perceptions of inequality involve the comparison of the situation of different social groups regarding their opportunities in a particular situation. However, especially from studies on perceptions of income inequality, we know that it is important to assess levels of accepted inequality. In fact, there are tensions between ideal and real political inequality (Verba and Orren 1985). Studies on inequality compare perceptions and

values, with the latter capturing what an individual believes is the appropriate pattern of distribution in a society (Reis and Moore 2005). Briefly stated, citizens have ideas about how social situations are and how they should be. In other words, "there exist normative expectations of what constitute 'fair' correlations between inputs and outcomes" (Adams 1965, 279). A good deal of research focused on the degree of acceptance of inequality finds that it varies across countries, individuals (Lubker 2004; Svallfors 1997; Alesina and Giuliano 2009),[18] and over time (Rueschemeyer 2011). Therefore, in this chapter I focus on Latin American citizens' perceptions of and preferences over political inequality. After presenting both data on perceived and ideal levels of political inequality in ten countries in Latin America, I assess how institutional (parties and electoral systems) and cultural (participatory culture) factors relate to these views.

Do citizens Perceive Political Inequalities?

The data used in this chapter come from surveys of a subset of countries in Latin America conducted by the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) as part of the 2012 round of the AmericasBarometer. These surveys follow a complex design with a multi-staged, stratified probability sample of approximately 1,500 respondents per country.[19] The data allow me to assess citizens' views on political inequalities in their countries by looking at the responses to two questions about, first, whom they think politicians defend and, second, whom they should defend. I have data for ten countries

[18] For instance some of these studies find that English speaking countries accept inequality more than other countries in Eastern or Western Europe. Also, it has been found that Americans tend to tolerate inequalities in political influence (Verba and Orren 1985)

[19] The analyses in this chapter account for the complex nature of the design.

(Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Chile, Guatemala, Mexico, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela), in which the following two questions were asked to a split sample:[20]

> SOC12A. On this scale from 1 to10, where 1 means defending the rich and 10 means defending the poor, where are [country] politicians located?
> SOC12B. And using the same scale, where 1 means defending the rich and 10 means defending the poor, where would you like [country] politicians to be located?

These two questions tap into perceptions of inequalities in the political system, which is to say the extent to which politicians defend the interests of well-off constituents. They also allow me to compare how citizens see the actual versus the ideal situation, and therefore, to generate a measure of this political inequality gap. I will refer to this measure as "Perceived versus Ideal Representation Gap" (PIRG).

Figure II.1 shows the distribution of responses to the first question.[21] I recoded the variable into three categories so that from 1 to 3 it means "defending the rich", from 4 to 7 "neutral" and from 8 to 10 "defending the poor". As stated in Chapter I, following H1a it could be expected that "citizens in Latin America perceive that public officials represent the interest of the better-off". The figure shows that perceptions vary across countries. In seven countries the majority of citizens consider that politicians represent the rich's interest; Brazil, Guatemala and Colombia are the countries where citizens have

[20] This question was also asked in Canada and the United States but I am excluding these two cases from the analysis to focus on Latin America.

[21] Figure 1 in the appendix shows the results displaying the mean response for each question. I recoded both variables so that larger values reflect perceptions of systems as biased in favor of rich citizens. Figure 1 shows the results for the first question. The dots represent the estimated mean for each country with the light gray showing the 95% confidence interval around the estimate. In general, all countries score above the midpoint of 5, meaning that politicians are perceived as closer to defending the interests of the rich as opposed to the poor. Perceptions vary across countries, with statistically significant differences found between the countries at the top and countries at the bottom.

the greatest perceptions of biased systems, with percentages larger than 60%.[22] At the other extreme, we find Uruguay and Venezuela, where only 25.9% and 18.2%, of citizens, respectively, consider that politicians defend the rich. Furthermore, in two countries, Costa Rica and Venezuela, more than 20% of the population surveyed considers that politicians defend the poor. In fact, those three countries where more citizens perceive that politicians defend the rich are the countries with the largest income inequalities (See Table II.1). On the contrary, Costa Rica and Uruguay have been traditionally known for relatively egalitarian socioeconomic structures (Gootenberg 2010). Finally, in Venezuela the discourses appealing to the poor and the excluded by *chavismo* (Panizza 2005; Zúquete 2008) might have had an impact on perceptions on whom politicians defend. In fact, the correlation between the Gini index and citizens' perception that politicians defend the rich is 0.274 (sig. at $p<0.001$): large income inequality is related to more people believing that the system is biased in favor of the better off.

[22] Looking at the means on the 1-10 scale for these three countries it can be observed that their scores are statistically significant different from the six countries (out of 10) at the bottom of the ranking (See Figure 1 in Appendix).



Figure II. 1. Distribution of Perceptions of Whom Politicians Defend: the Rich vs. the Poor

Figure II.1 also shows evidence of variation within countries in the perceptions of political inequalities in the ten countries analyzed. What explains these differing perceptions? Who is more likely to believe that politicians defend the better off citizens? One factor that likely matters is the economic situation of the respondent. As I presented before, there are theoretical reasons to expect that wealthy constituents are more likely to be represented and shape policy outcomes and, therefore, there are reasons to expect that that those on the high end of the economic scale will be more likely to agree with the idea that politicians represent them, while poor ones are more likely to feel that their interests are not taken into account.

To test the relationship between wealth and perceptions of biased representation, I run an OLS regression with socioeconomic and demographic characteristics as

independent variables.[23] The dependent variable is the original variable SOC12a recoded so that larger numbers on the 1-10 scale mean that citizens perceive that politicians represent the rich. The results are presented in Figure II.2, in which each independent variable is listed on the vertical (y) axis. The impact of each of those variables on the perception of political inequality is shown by a dot, which if falling to the right of the vertical "0" line implies a positive contribution and if to the left of the "0" line indicates a negative impact. When the confidence intervals (the horizontal lines) do not overlap the vertical "0" line the variable is statistically significant (at $p < .05$ or better). The relative strength of each variable is indicated by standardized coefficients. Interestingly, the regression results show that the *only* variable that is statistically significant is the quintiles of wealth measure and in the expected direction[24]. However, when I examine each quintile on its own, I find that, contrary to expectations, those in the richest quintiles of wealth are *less* likely to believe that politicians defend their interests, compared to those in the middle category.[25] As a robustness check I ran a multinomial regression splitting the dependent variable into three categories (politicians defend the rich, the poor, and neutral) and the results show the same result (See Table 1 in Appendix). It appears that, despite the fact that most citizens in the majority of countries perceive biased politicians in favor of the wealthiest, being poor does not make citizens more likely to

[23] The variable "Size of Place of Residence," is recoded so that 0 means "Rural Area"; 1, "Small City"; 2, "Medium City"; 3, "Large City"; and 4, "National Capital (Metropolitan Area)." Thus, higher values represent larger urban settings. The variable quintiles of wealth is an index created from a series of questions, R series, based on household assets such as cell phone, TV, indoor plumbing, or vehicles, among others . See Córdova, Abby. 2009. "Methodological Note: Measuring Relative Wealth Using Household Asset Indicators." *AmericasBarometer Insights* 6. Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP). The model includes country fixed effects to account for differences at the national level.
[24] Figure 2 in Appendix shows the wealth variable without breaking the different categories of wealth.
[25] When I run the regression using dummy variables for each quintile of wealth, those in the two wealthiest groups are less likely to believe that politicians defend the interest of the rich compared to those in the middle category. (See Figure 1 in appendix). When looking at individual countries, Argentina, Costa Rica, Peru and Uruguay follow the pattern found in this aggregate model.

perceive such bias. This finding goes in line with what other scholars have found for other contexts, that is to say, citizens with low levels of education and income have more difficulties when making accurate connections about representation and the implications of polices (Bartels 2005).

These results suggest that the only effect is for those in the richest quintiles of wealth, who are less likely than the middle quintile to hold such perception of politicians defending the interest of the better off. While counter-intuitive, this result is consistent with the explanations that (Shapiro 2002) provides to explain why poor citizens seem to be tolerant to inequalities, such as the poor's unawareness of the rich's situation or considering that their situation is not that bad when compared to others or to their past situation.[26]

[26] Shapiro (2002) talks about an empathy gulf, framing effects, physical gulfs and anecdotal distractions that all act as factors influencing the attitudes of the poorest sectors towards inequality.



Figure II. 2. Socioeconomic and Demographic Determinants of the Perception that Politicians Defend the Rich

As noted above, studies on inequalities not only address perceptions but also normative views that reflect values, or how things should be. As with income inequalities, we can expect citizens and societies to be more or less inclined to accept political inequalities, and the second question on this issue from the 2012 AmericasBarometer allows us to assess the ideal levels of political inequality in these ten countries. As Figure II.3 shows, there are fewer differences among countries in perceptions of what should be, compared to perceptions of what is (Figure II.2). In all countries except for Costa Rica and Argentina, more than 50% of respondents consider that politicians should defend the poor. The average in all of them falls between 4.3 (Costa Rica) and 3.1 (Mexico) on the seven-point response scale.[27] This means that

[27] See Figure 3 in Appendix.

citizens consider that politicians should be tending towards the poor but the average tendency is not located all that far from the mid-point on the 1-10 scale.[28]



Figure II. 3. Citizens' Beliefs about Whose Interests Politicians should Defend

However, what is more interesting is to look at the difference between how citizens perceive the actual situation on representation and the ideal situation they would like. Subtracting individuals' responses to both questions (whom politicians defend and whom politicians should defend) we can measure the distance between perceptions and values, which gives us a measure of the gap in political equality in the country. Studies on inequalities highlight the importance of perceptions, which can be understood as a set of cognitions, norms and values (Reis and Moore 2005). These perceptions can influence other attitudes and the extent to which actors are willing to take action. If a person

[28] The appendix shows the distribution of the responses to the two questions (SOC12A and SOC12B) for each country. While the true midpoint is 5.5, many likely perceived "5" to be the midpoint.

perceives that politicians represent the rich and perceives that reality matches this ideal situation, then inequality in practice will not create any problem for her. On the contrary, if she perceives that politicians defend the interest of the rich while believing they should defend the interest of the poor, she might be more likely to be dissatisfied with the system and bring that dissatisfaction to bear on her political attitudes and behaviors.[29] Therefore, it is important to examine this gap between perception and preferences, which I call "Perceived versus Ideal Representation Gap" (PIRG). Figure II.4 shows this gap, which is the absolute difference between individuals' responses to the question on whom they think politicians defend and the one on whom they think politicians should defend. Looking at the average of this new variable, PIRG, by country we observe variation. Costa Rica is the country where the average difference between perceptions and values is the largest. In Colombia, Mexico, Brazil and Chile the distance between what citizens perceive and their ideal situation regarding political inequality is also relatively large. The mean in these countries is statistically distinct from the means in Uruguay, Argentina and Venezuela, where the distance between the actual situation and the ideal one is the lowest. These three countries with the smallest gap are the three countries where fewer citizens considered that politicians defend the interests of the better-off. This suggests that one way to narrow the gap (as measured by PIRG) is to have politicians who are effective showing that they care about the interests of the poor.

[29] In order to test these ideas I run a regression model to explain system support and satisfaction with democracy. System Support is an index created from the following 5 questions B1. To what extent do you think the courts in (country) guarantee a fair trial? B2. To what extent do you respect the political institutions of (country)?B3. To what extent do you think that citizens' basic rights are well protected by the political system of (country)?B4. To what extent do you feel proud of living under the political system of (country)?B6. To what extent do you think that one should support the political system of (country)? (See Booth and Seligson 2009) for more information on this index). In both models the variable PIRG was statistically significant even controlling for wealth, education, size of place, age and gender (at $p<.001$).



Figure II. 4. Perceived versus Ideal Representation Gap (PIRG) by Country

What explains citizens' perceptions of gaps in political inequality? As before, I start with an expectation that one's own economic situation plays a role in determining views of political inequality. In order to assess some of the determinants that might explain gaps in political representation, I run an OLS regression with the same socioeconomic and demographic variables included in the analysis shown in Figure II.2. The results are depicted in Figure II.5 and, once again, I find that the only statistically significant variable is wealth. In this case, the results are consistent with expectations when it comes to the way in which wealth matters: those in the lower quintiles of wealth

are more likely to think that there is a wider gap in political inequality than the one perceived by the wealthiest.[30]



Figure II. 5. Socioeconomic and Demographic Determinants of the PIRG

This relationship between wealth and the PIRG is clearly shown in Figure II.6. It shows the predicted values of that gap by quintile of wealth, while keeping the rest of variables constant at their mean. Those in the first quintile of wealth (the poorest) see that the difference between how politicians do defend and how they should defend is larger than the gap that is perceived by those in the fifth quintile (the wealthiest).[31] Therefore, as expected, the poor are more likely to think that the political system and public officials more specifically, are biased against their own interests. On the contrary, wealthy

[30] The mean for those in the first quintile (the poorest) is 3.06 while for those in the fifth quintile (the wealthiest) is 2.77. The difference is statistically significant at .001.
[31] When I run the same regression using dummy variables for wealth, I obtain the same results.

constituents do not see that that bias is that large. It is noteworthy how the role of wealth works differently when asking just about perceptions of political inequality than when looking at the PIRG. Being in the lowest quintiles of wealth has a greater impact on the PIRG than on mere perception of the current situation. It seems to be that when perceptions are taken alone they less meaningful than when contrasted with ideals or values.



Figure II. 6. Wealth and PIRG

This section has assessed the extent to which citizens in ten Latin American countries perceive that politicians tend to defend the interests of wealthy constituencies rather than the interest of the poor. While there is a general tendency to believe that politicians favor the rich, wide variation is observed among countries. Also, there is a gap

between what citizens see regarding representation and what they think it should be. In general, they would prefer more balanced systems that lean somewhat towards the poor. Among the socioeconomic variables used to explain these perceptions, only wealth is related to them, but interestingly, it has a different impact when looking at perceptions of the current situation than when considering the PIRG. Those in the lower quintiles of wealth are not more likely to perceive that politicians are biased towards the better off; however, when contrasting those perceptions with their ideal situation, they exhibit larger gaps than those in the highest quintiles of wealth. These results highlight the importance of comparing values to actual perceptions, given that citizens not only perceive situations but also have normative expectations on how things should work, in this case on how political representation should be distributed (Reis and Moore 2005, Adams 1965), and it seems that the latter is especially relevant for those in the lowest quintiles of wealth. However, apart from socioeconomic characteristics at the individual level, there might be other institutional factors affecting perceptions of representation. The next section will address that issue.

Perceptions of Unequal Political Representation and the Role of Institutions and Participation

As I stated in the previous chapter, one of the objectives of this dissertation is to assess the role of political institutions with respect to aggravating or mitigating perceptions of inequalities in representation. Political institutions and how firmly citizens are tied to them play an important role in representation (Verba et al. 1978). As Krishna (2008) argues "institutional links in the middle, which can facilitate information and

promote accountability between citizens and public officials" (155) as well as moderate and formalize poor citizens' demands, help the inclusion of those sectors in the political system.

In this section, I examine the relationship between four institutional characteristics and the PIRG: the presence of leftist parties, the proportionality of the electoral system, the size of electoral districts and the effective number of parties. As well, I assess the relationship between high system levels of participation and the gap. It is important to recognize that this latter factor might be the result of culture, institutions (e.g., compulsory voting), or both; rather than adjudicate among these different antecedent influences, I simply examine levels of participation in order to provide a more comprehensive picture. My main finding can be summarized as follows: a strong presence of leftist parties in congress and high levels of turnout are closely related to lower levels of the PIRG. However, a large effective number of parties does not translate into lower scores of the PIRG. Rather, the only electoral institutional factor that (modestly) reduces the gap in political representation is small districts. The more small districts the smaller the distance between citizens' perceptions of whom politicians represent and whom they should represent.

A key set of institutions in any political system consists of political parties, which perform essential roles such as aggregating and channeling citizens' demands and interests (Mainwaring and Scully 1995). In fact, many scholars have linked the performance of democratic regimes to the functioning of these institutions; in countries where political parties are responsible, accountable and respond to citizens' preferences, democracies have more chances to survive even under economic crisis or corruption

scandals. On the contrary, where political parties are weak and do not accomplish their functions, anti-system leaders can emerge and jeopardize democracy (Hagopian 2005). As Rueschemeyer (2011: 823) puts it, "the disappointing performance of recently democratized political systems in Latin America seems largely due to a renewed weakness in the organized representation of subordinate interests." Party systems in Latin America have experienced many changes in the last decades including fragmentation, polarization, ideological changes or the replacement of some parties by some others (Coppedge 2003; Sabatini 2002). More recently, scholars have focused on the rise of the left in the region (Cameron and Hershberg 2010; Panizza 2005; Seligson 2007; Hunter, Madrid, and Weyland 2010). Conventional wisdom states that left parties are closer to disadvantaged sectors in society, in particular the working class and those generally located on the lower end of the socioeconomic scale. Therefore, there are reasons to expect a relationship between leftist parties and inequality; in other words, "left institutions ought to have a more conscious commitment to political equalization and ought, as well, to have supporters from the lower parts of the SERL (socioeconomic resource level) scale that they want to mobilize" (Verba, Nie and Kim 1978: 144). Cleary (2006) argues that economic inequality in Latin America provides a wide support base for these parties, and that in countries where the left has not been successful despite inequality this is because they have elitist party systems and they lack an organizational basis for mass mobilization.

Given the theoretical importance of political parties to democratic representation and given the particular role that leftist parties are expected to play in addressing issues of inequality and fostering greater input by those less well off, I begin with an

expectation that there exists a relationship between perceptions of inequality and the presence of leftist parties in political systems in Latin America (H6a in Chapter I). In order to test this, on the one hand I consider the percentage of congress that is comprised of members from leftist political parties (x-axis), which was calculated by taking into account ideological self-positions of legislators. This measure is generally accepted as a valid way to classify political parties in Latin America (Alcántara 2004; Saiegh 2009) . I consider parliamentarians in office when the 2012 AmericasBarometer survey was conducted. Data comes from the Project on Parliamentary Elites in Latin America conducted by the University of Salamanca. This measure accounts for the percentage of seats of those parties which ideological mean falls below 5 on the traditional 1-10 scale.[32] On the other hand I consider the PIRG presented in the previous section, which is the mean of individual scores resulting from the absolute difference between individuals' perceptions of whom politicians defend and whom ideally politicians should defend (y-axis). Figure II.7 shows the relationship between both variables.

[32] For the case of Venezuela there are not elite data and therefore I considered the seats held by "chavistas". These parties are the following: Victory Front-PJ , UCR, Socialist Party, GEN and New Encounter (Argentina), PT, PSDB, PSB, PDT, PCdoB, PPS, PRB (Brazil), Coalition for Democracy (Chile), Alternative Democratic Pole (Colombia), Citizens' Action Party and Broad Front (Costa Rica), National Unity for Hope Party and LIDER (Guatemala), Democratic Revolutionary Party, Labor Party and Convergence Party (Mexico), Peru Wins Alliance, Possible Peru Party (Peru), Board Front and Independent Party (Uruguay).



Figure II. 7. Leftist Parties and the Gap in Political Inequality

The negative slope of the regression suggests that the stronger the presence of leftist parties in congress, the smaller the perceived gap in political inequality. The correlation is quite strong, and not driven by any particular outlier. These results are in line with the expectation that leftist parties have a "greater equalizing impact" (Verba et al. 1978), at least regarding *views* of inequality.[33,34,35]

[33] It is noteworthy to mention that the correlation between the GINI index and the perceived gap is .657. The larger the income inequality the larger the PIRG at the national level.

[34] It should be noted that, while the presence of leftist parties in the system is a significant predictor of lower values on the PIRG, that relationship should not translate down to the level of individual partisan supporters in a straightforward fashion. Rather, we should find that those who support leftist parties see a greater gap than others in this system. The extent to which an individual perceives a gap should provide motivation to support a left-leaning party. In fact, that is what I find when I run a regression analysis at the individual level having PIRG as the dependent variable. See results in Table 2 in Appendix.

[35] Polarization of the political system could be another measure to capture the presence of distinct and extreme options. However, the relationship between that index and PIRG is -0.066. (See Zechmeister and Corral 2013 for more information on this index).

The Role of the Electoral System

This section of this chapter addresses the influence of other institutional features related to the electoral system. Electoral systems translate votes into seats and introduce different incentives for political actors to behave in certain ways, such that electoral rules are commonly considered to one of the most influential institutional arrangements in the political system. One of the main features of an electoral system is the extent to which proportionality, or the extent to which the distribution of seats reflect the distribution of votes, is considered as a goal (Lijphart 1994). As electoral systems are more proportional citizens' preferences should better represented in the legislature. Following this line of argument, one can expect that as proportionality increases gaps in political inequality decreases (H3a). That is, if citizens perceive that electoral systems reflect the positions of all groups in society, they will have fewer reasons to perceive inequalities. Yet, as noted in the prior chapter, there are reasons to expect that majoritarian systems have features that also promote accountability, such as bringing representatives closer to citizens to the degree the former become more responsive to the latter as a way to gain reelection, or promoting clarity of responsibility. It is possible, then, the any effects of the different types of electoral rules will wash out in comparison. In order to test these expectations, I use Gallagher's index of proportionality[36] for each country and I cross that variable with the mean of the perceived gap in political inequality. Figure II.8 shows that relationship.

[36] Source: Gallagher 2013. Election indexes data set at http://www.tcd.ie/Political_Science/staff/michael_gallagher/ElSystems/index.php,



Figure II. 8. Disproportionality of the Electoral System and Gap in Political Inequality

The results do not indicate a clear relationship between disproportionality and the political inequality gap measure. Similar scores in the PIRG are found across different levels of proportionality. Related to proportionality is district magnitude, in other words, the number of representatives elected in each electoral circumscription. It has been found that large districts in proportional representative systems tend to produce more proportionality (Benoit 2001; Taagepera and Shugart 1989). However, district magnitude not only influences proportionality at the aggregate level but also legislators' incentives to behave in certain ways. While small districts tend to produce disproportionality they increase accountability (Carey and Hix 2011). Small districts provide more opportunities for controlling representatives and building closer ties to them, which enhances accountability. Therefore, I expect that the more small districts in a political system the smaller scores in the PIRG at the national level (H4a).



Figure II. 9. Size of Electoral Districts and Gap in Political Inequality

In order to test the relationship between the magnitude of the districts and perceptions about political inequality, I calculate the percentage of small districts in each political system (5 or smaller).[37] Figure II.9 shows that relationship indicating a statistically significant relationship between both variables. The smaller are districts in size, the more citizens are likely to perceive small gaps in political inequalities.

Fragmentation of the party systems is an institutional variable that has been shown to have important consequences for the dynamics of politics, as it indicates the

[37] Following Nohlen (1995) I consider "small districts" those electing 5 or less legislators. If I use the average district magnitude I find a similar relationship with a correlation of 0.36, the larger the district magnitude average the bigger the perceived gap.

extent to which political power is dispersed or concentrated (Sartori 1976). In theory, it affects citizens' views of the political system while providing the menu of options among to choose candidates. While the option to select among many parties can provide a sense of having the possibility to have more options represented and included in the system, it can undermine the clarity of responsibility and bring more confusion. As noted in the prior chapter (H5a), it is therefore difficult to establish clear a priori expectations for a relationship between fragmentation and political inequality. In order to test the relationship between the effective number of parties and perceptions of political inequality I calculate the measure by Laakso and Taagepera (1979) for each country and cross it with the mean for the perceived gap in political inequality.



Figure II. 10. Effective Number of Parties and Gap in Political Inequality

Figure II.10 shows that there is a clear linear, positive relationship between both measures, as the effective number of parties increases the gap between the actual and the ideal views on political representation increases. Therefore, it seems that having more parties in the system does not translate into feelings of inclusion for social groups based on their levels of income. Rather, those systems with fewer parties are those in which the political inequality gap is lowest.[38]

The Role of Participation at the Aggregate Level

One source of political inequality in representation that scholars have focused on is inequality in political participation (Lijphart 1997, Verba 2001). The assumption here is that if political participation influences government decisions, legislation and policies, these will tend to reflect the interests of those who are the most active. Therefore, in those systems with high participation, where citizens participate in the political process in relatively high numbers, there might lower levels of political inequalities. As stated in Chapter I, the expectation is that: "Where citizens participate more actively in politics, perceptions of unequal representation will be relatively lower" (H2a).

Citizens have a wide array of ways to get involved in politics; forms of political participation include voting in elections, participating in social and political organizations, working on campaigns, contacting public officials, attending political meetings, and being a member of a political organization (Verba and Nie 1972). These activities related to the electoral process are what scholars define as traditional or conventional forms of participation. Along with these institutionalized ways to

[38] It is worth noting that fragmentation in Latin America may be a proxy for party system instability, which may in turn have been fueled by system discontent. In fact, contrary to what happens in Western democracies, fragmentation in this region does not help to create coherent understandings of ideological labels (See Zechmeister and Corral 2013).

participate in politics we find non-conventional or non-traditional forms that include participating in protests, demonstrations or internet activism. In fact, many studies in Western democracies have found that while there are decreased levels of traditional participation (Dalton 2008; Pharr and Putnam 2000), non-traditional forms are becoming on the rise (Marien, Hooghe, and Quintelier 2010; Stolle and Hooghe 2011). In this section I will analyze the relationship between traditional forms of participation (turnout and index of contacting public officials) and the perception of political inequalities.

Undoubtedly, participating in elections is a key element in any democracy. Elections accomplish essential functions such as providing citizens the opportunity to choose public officials, to influence public policy and to control policymakers by pushing and rewarding them (Powell 2000). As an instrument of control, we could expect that where citizens are active participating at the voting booth politicians might feel they have to be responsible to them. In other words, where there are large levels of electoral participation, citizens may be more likely to perceive a shorter distance between whom politicians represent and whom they should. Given that I am interested in assessing the impact of a participatory culture I use the participation figures at the aggregate level. Figure II.11 shows that relationship. X-axis shows the percentage of citizens who voted in the last presidential election as reported in the 2012 AmericasBarometer survey.



Figure II. 11. Turnout and Gap in Political Inequality

Results show that at the aggregate level, the larger the turnout the lower the PIRG. The relationship (correlation of -0.54) is quite strong. Levels of participation in elections might be influenced by institutional features such as a compulsory voting, a rule that some scholars have pointed out as an instrument to reduce political inequalities and make popular mandates stronger (Lijphart 1997). In Latin America there is a wide variation in the rules regarding compulsory voting. In the sample of countries presented in Figure II.10, countries with the larger percentages of turnout happen to be those with compulsory rules (with Costa Rica as the exception, having low levels of participation despite compulsory voting rules).[39]

[39] Although there seems to be a relationship between turnout and electoral rules at the aggregate level, Maldonado (2011) found that at the individual level, compulsory rules did not produce differences among

Scholars have pointed out that "the poor have less input to public policy than any other class. As a result, their interests are ignored" (Beeghley 1986, 505) and that political participation could help those who otherwise feel that their points of view are not represented to enhance their sense of political efficacy (Ikeda, Kobayashi, and Hoshimoto 2008). Therefore we could expect that where the poor participate more, the PIRG is smaller. In fact, the correlation between turnout of those in the first quintile of wealth and the PIRG is strong: -0.44. Therefore, there is a connection between turnout at the aggregate level and perceptions of representation, and this holds as well when we examine turnout levels among the poorest sector in the region, which supports the idea that participation can be a vehicle to moderate inequalities in representation, at least in terms of perceptions.

Nonetheless, voting is not the only form of political participation. As I said at the beginning of this section there are other conventional forms of participation, such as contacting public officials, participating in meetings of political parties, in political campaigns among others. I create an index based on three questions in the 2012 AmericasBarometer that capture the percentage of citizens who contacted any public officials asking for help.[40] The same as with turnout, we could expect that where citizens are relatively more active in contacting pubic officials, the PIRG is smaller. Figure II.12 shows the relationship between these two variables. In this case, I find a weak relationship and interestingly in the unexpected way. This relationship could reflect

---

citizens in the factors that influence voter choice when comparing those living in one or the other kind of system.

[40] These questions are CP2 In order to solve your problems have you ever requested help or cooperation from a member of congress CP4. A local public official or local government for example, and NP2. Have you sought assistance from or presented a request to any office, official of the municipality within the past 12 months? In a factor analysis these three questions fall in one factor and the alpha is .45. Other variables related to political participation did not fall into a single factor.

differential experiences with respect to the result of contacting public officials; that is, if there is a perception that poor individuals do not receive the same response from contacting public officials, then this might explain the weak and positive relationship between proportion of individuals who contact and size of the inequality gap. The result could also be driven by a general tendency for higher levels of grievances (such as perceptions of unfairness in the system) to translate into more contact.



Figure II. 12. Contacting Public Officials and Gap in Political Inequality

That same weakly positive relationship is found when I only consider those citizens in the first quintile of wealth. In this case, the correlation is 0.08.[41] Taken as a

[41] The reader might wonder how is the relationship between non-conventional forms of participation such as participating in protests. The relationship is very similar to that found when taking into account the index

whole, the results suggest that the principal form of political participation related to the PIRG is electoral participation.

Finally, the relationship between participation and perceptions of unequal representation can be analyzed at the individual level. In fact, one might object that addressing the relationship between perceptions of political inequality and participation or support for a leftist party at the aggregate level could result in ecological fallacy (for a discussion on ecological fallacy see Seligson 2002). At the individual level, there is reason to suspect that behavior might be related to perceptions and therefore the subject deserves an analysis at the individual level. The three next models in Table II.2 account for the role of participation and voting for leftist parties at the individual level. First, we could expect a relationship between linkages to the left (by self-identification and by voting to left parties) and perceptions of political inequality. In fact, we see in Model 1 and 2 that both variables have a statistically significant impact on this perception. Those who identify themselves as leftist[42] and those who voted for the left in the last presidential election are more likely to perceive a wider difference between how they see the actual situation on representation and the ideal situation they would like to have.

on contacting public officials. The correlation between aggregate levels of participating in protests (PROT3) and the PIRG is 0.26. Restricting the sample to the poorest citizens yields a correlation of 0.17.

[42] The variable ideology is based on the traditional left-right self-identification scale where 1 means left and 10 right.

Table II. 2. Individual and Institutional Determinants of Perceived Political Inequality Gap

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3	
	Coef.	Std. Err	Coef.	Std. Err	Coef.	Std. Err
Quintiles of Wealth	-0.188***	0.036	-0.170***	0.034	-0.176***	0.034
Education	0.001	0.012	-0.005	0.011	-0.003	0.011
Size of Place of Residence	0.041	0.044	0.028	0.042	0.028	0.042
Female	-0.059	0.073	-0.034	0.064	-0.064	0.066
Age	0.008	0.027	-0.023	0.024	-0.025	0.025
Ideology	-0.041**	0.017				
Voted for the Left			0.299**	0.899		
Participated in Protest					0.002*	0.001
Contacting Public Officials					0.000	0.009
Voted in the last election					0.002**	0.001
Political Interest					-0.004**	0.001
Mexico	2.075***	0.261	2.316***	.2511	2.324***	0.250
Guatemala	1.219***	0.234	1.662***	.2256	1.664***	0.230
Costa Rica	2.179**	0.298	2.471***	.2661	2.437***	0.263
Colombia	2.272***	0.244	2.467***	.2428	2.476***	0.242
Peru	1.816***	0.238	1.896***	.2257	1.842***	0.227
Chile	1.818***	0.265	2.085***	.2463	2.049***	0.250
Uruguay	0.610***	0.196	.7309***	.1856	0.738***	0.189
Brazil	1.992***	0.251	2.062***	.2420	2.043***	0.243
Argentina	0.890***	0.242	.8934***	.2244	0.851**	0.229
Constant	3.306***	0.283	3.038***	.2575	3.123***	0.263
N	6324		7651		7498	
R-squared	0.05		0.06		0.063	

Significant at ***p<0.01 **p<0.05, **p<0.10

It is important to note that this relationship could go in the opposite direction, that is to say, that those who perceive a wider gap in political inequality are more likely to vote for leftist parties. We also observe that political participation in elections is not related to perceptions of inequality in the expected way. This finding does not support the

theory that suggests that through participation citizens might shrink the gap in political inequality. We could expect a correlation between participating in protests and perceiving larger gaps in the political system regarding whom public officials represent. In fact, that is what we find in the case of Latin America. We could also expect that being in contact with local officials might shape perceptions of inequalities; however, as it happened when analyzed at the national level such relationship does not exist. Finally, those with greater political interest are less likely to perceive gaps in political inequality.[43]

Conclusion

This chapter has shown that citizens in ten Latin American countries do not perceive that politicians defend the interests of the wealthy and the poor evenly. However, perceptions on whose interests are defended vary across countries and individuals. At the individual level it is noteworthy that wealth is the only sociodemographic factor related to perceptions of unequal representation. On the one hand, those in the wealthiest quintiles of wealth are less likely to consider that politicians defend their interests, compared to those in the middle quintile. On the other hand, being poor is only related to perceiving a gap between the actual and the ideal situation of political inequality. Also, at the individual level voting for leftist candidates or parties is related to perceiving a larger gap in political representation. Along with the fact that there is a correlation between presence of leftist parties in the political system and lower levels of perceived political inequalities, we might think that these parties shape perceptions of

[43] When we look at the inverse relationship, perceiving political inequalities is related to participation in protest and community involvement but not to participating in municipal meetings.

inequality. Citizens might see them as vehicles for shrinking the distance in the representation of poor versus rich constituents. Electoral institutions are key factors to have into account when addressing political representation. We have seen that the level of proportionality does not have any impact on perceptions of political inequality. The magnitude of electoral systems appears as a relatively significant factor, in the sense that as the number of small electoral districts increases the gap in political inequality diminishes. Small districts might be having the impact of generating tighter bonds between citizens and representatives where citizens see politicians as caring about them. In small districts public officials have more incentives to respond to their constituents as control and clarity of responsibility is enhanced in contrast to large districts. Finally, one institutional feature that seems to have a large impact is the effective number of parties. It seems that a large number of parties in congress does not translate into perceptions of more inclusive systems. In fact, in countries with low number of parties, citizens perceive low levels of political inequality.

Finally, a participatory culture, at least in terms of turnout, is strongly related to perceptions of political inequality. However, other forms of political engagement do not seem to have any relationship with perceptions of political inequality, at both the aggregate and individual level. Thus, overall, the analyses in this chapter support this primary conclusion: citizens in the majority of countries analyzed consider that politicians defend the interests of the wealthy and wealth at the individual level as well as institutional features rules matter for perceptions on political inequality, with particularly noteworthy results found for small districts and the presence of leftist parties. The next

chapter will assess the extent to which there are inequalities in substantive representation as well as the role of political institutions.

CHAPTER III

POLITICAL INEQUALITIES IN LATIN AMERICA: ARE THE POORS' PREFERENCES REPRESENTED IN CONGRESS?

To what extent are the poor's policy preferences represented in Latin America? Are legislators' stances on important issues closer to the wealthiest citizens? What is the role of political institutions explaining policy congruence? These are some of the questions I address in this chapter. Different theoretical approaches suggest that poor citizens are more likely to be underrepresented than wealthier ones. On the one hand, there is the idea of an "elite dominance" in democracies, where a small group of people has the power to shape and determine political outcomes (Higley and Gunther 1992). Representatives usually come from a selective group of citizens characterized by higher levels of education and wealth than those they represent (Matthews 1985; Sullivan, Walsh, and Gibson 1993). On the other hand, another perspective suggest that poor citizens lack the resources to control and monitor their representatives (Delli Carpini 1996), do not hold coherent policy preferences (Converse 1964) and participate less in politics (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995), and therefore elected officials have few incentives to represent them.

While inequities in policy representation may exist, it may also be the case that certain institutional arrangements can introduce incentives for public officials to represent underprivileged citizens, especially those that make sanctioning (that is say, institutions that enhance citizens' ability to reward and/or penalize representatives' behavior keeping

them accountable) more feasible (Taylor-Robinson 2010). Furthermore, it may be that political mobilization can help poor citizens to have their voices heard and induce representatives to respond to their demands (Chalmers et al. 1997). As shown in the prior chapter, high levels of electoral turnout are strongly predictive of smaller gaps between individuals' responses to the question on whom they think politicians defend and the one on whom they think politicians should defend. Taking into account these two perspectives, one emphasizing institutions and the other mobilization, this chapter assesses the extent to which poor citizens in fourteen Latin American countries are underrepresented in substantive terms and the role of political institutions and civic culture (participation) in the way different groups are represented.

In the previous chapter we saw that citizens in Latin America, although with some variations across countries, perceive that political systems are biased against poor citizens. In 7 out of 11countries analyzed[44], the majority of citizens reported that politicians defend the interest of the rich. However, little we know about whether this bias is also found when looking at more objective measures of representation. In this chapter I address substantive representation by analyzing the levels of congruence between citizens (poor versus wealthy) and legislators taking into account their preferences over the role of the state in the economy and their attitudes towards gay marriage. Before analyzing levels of congruence and the role of political institutions and political participation, the next section presents an overview of the group of citizens that are the object of study in this chapter: the poor in Latin America. Then, I review how scholars have addressed different aspects of representation, such as definitions of

[44] Note that in the previous chapter, the analyses focus on ten countries, Constraints in the elite and citizens data sets do not allow me to focus on those same countries in this chapter.

congruence and responsiveness and their measurements. Finally, I present how I measure substantive representation and the data I use and describe the main findings. The main finding is that, in fact, in Latin America there are some (but not always all-encompassing) areas in which the preferences of the poorest and the wealthiest are statistically different, especially regarding the role of the state as owner of the main industries of the state and regarding attitudes towards gay marriage, and that legislators are closer to preferences of the wealthier citizens in most countries and on most issues. However, few institutional characteristics seem to mitigate the underrepresentation of the poorest in the region.

The Poor in Latin America

Studies of political representation have rarely looked at different groups within a given society. Only recently, and especially in the United States, have scholars really begun to focus on the extent to which less affluent citizens are represented (Bartels 2008; Rigby and Wright 2013; Flavin 2012a; Gilens 2005).[45] In the case of Latin America, a rare exception is work by Taylor-Robison (2010), which assesses the extent to which the poor count, paying special attention to the case of Honduras. Before the emergence of these recent studies, discussions evolved around the idea that poor citizens and democracy did not go hand in hand, given a presumed lack of interest, and more intolerant, authoritarian and extremists positions (Lipset 1960; Barro 1996; Landa and Kapstein 2001). Also, studies in industrialized democracies found that poor people participate less than more affluent ones (Lijphart 1997; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady

[45] Other scholars focus on other subconstituencies such as those who participate (John D. Griffin and Newman 2005; Martin 2003; Ellis, Ura, and Ashley-Robinson 2006), business leaders (Jacobs and Page 2005) or opinion leaders (Adams and Ezrow 2009).

1995), which could affect their ability to control and keep public officials responsive to their demands. Running contrary to those studies, research in developing countries has shown that poor people value and support democracy and participate more than what conventional wisdom would predict (Krishna 2008). Looking at eight Latin American countries, Booth and Seligson (2008) find that individual wealth is not related to political participation, with education instead more influential across in many forms of involvement. Evidence about low income citizens' support for democracy in Latin America yields mixed findings; for instance, while Carlin (2006) finds that income has a positive effect on support for democracy, recent studies do not show a clear pattern between wealth and support for democracy (Seligson, Smith, and Zechmeister 2012). Regardless of the empirical evidence, scholarship that takes on a normative perspective strongly endorses inclusive democracies in which all groups are represented (Dahl 2000). This emphasis on inclusion in politics often complements a perspective favoring inclusion in the economic realm; as one scholar put it, an "exclusionary style of development conspires against the integrative principle which is implicit in every definition of citizenship or democracy" (Vilas 1997).

Poor citizens make up a large proportion of societies in Latin America. Despite the fact that poverty has been decreasing in the last years, 168 million were living under the line of poverty, which represents 29.4% of the Latin American population (ECLAC 2012). As Table III.1 shows, poverty figures vary by country, from levels below 10% in countries such as Uruguay and Chile to more than half of the country population in countries like Guatemala, Nicaragua and Honduras. Percentages of citizens living in

indigence are also worrisome in some countries.[46] Some of these high rates of poverty and inequality can be attributed to market reforms derived from the so-called Washington Consensus in the late 1980s in the region (Korzeniewicz and Smith 2000). Thus, in the mid-1990s, as the era of neoliberalism was on the verge of receding, more than 45% of the region's population lived in poverty (ECLAC 2012). In recent years, governments across the region have implemented different programs, such as income transfer programs (i.e. non-contributory pensions), conditional transfer programs, and integrated anti-poverty programs, with the objective of reducing poverty and inequality (Barrientos and Santibáñez 2009). Despite some success of these programs, the poor still make up a large proportion of Latin Americans.

[46] ECLAC defines indigence as "the income necessary to meet the minimum daily caloric requirements of an individual. This line is based on the local cost of a basic basket of goods and is distinct for urban and rural areas. A poverty line is derived by assuming that a remaining portion of the income must be spent on essential non-food items and the total food and non-food components represent a multiple of the extreme poverty line. In the ECLAC case the poverty line is around 1.75 times the extreme poverty line in rural areas and around 2.0 times the extreme poverty line in urban areas"(ECLAC 2009, 24).

Table III. 1. People Living in Poverty and Indigence in Latin America, *circa* 2010

Country	Poverty (%)	Indigence (%)
Argentina	8.6	2.8
Bolivia	42.4	22.4
Brazil	24.9	7.0
Chile	11.5	3.6
Colombia	37.3	12.3
Costa Rica	18.5	6.8
Ecuador	37.1	14.2
El Salvador	46.6	16.7
Guatemala	54.8	29.1
Honduras	67.4	42.8
Mexico	36.3	13.3
Nicaragua	58.3	29.5
Panama	25.8	12.6
Paraguay	54.8	30.7
Peru	31.3	9.8
Dominican Republic	41.4	20.9
Uruguay	8.6	1.4
Venezuela	27.8	10.7

Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), http://www.cepal.org/prensa/noticias/comunicados/9/48459/tabla-pobreza-indigencia-en.pdf, Accessed July 2, 2013
Data for 2010, except for Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Nicaragua (2009) and Guatemala (2006). Data for Argentina refers to urban areas

Given the high incidence of poverty in Latin America, and its theoretical implications for democracy, the study of this sector of the population merits in-depth research. The main objective of this chapter is to assess the extent to which poor citizens' policy preferences in Latin America are represented[47] and how institutions affect that degree of representation. But, who are these citizens? Delimiting poor citizens is challenging, as measuring poverty is not an easy task. The World Bank has defined poverty as "the lack of, or the inability to achieve, a socially acceptable standard of

[47] Some authors argue that poor citizens do not care about being represented in policy terms but about particularistic services and local infrastructure (Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007).

living" (Bellu and Liberati 2005, 1).[48] Given that many aspects can undermine the ability to achieve that standard of living, we are faced with a multidimensional concept that is difficult to measure, and that might have different meanings by country and over time (Bellu 2005).

A review of extant scholarship indicates that poverty is often measured by using both monetary indicators (income, consumption) and non-monetary indicators (health, education and assess) and/or objective and subjective measures (Klugman 2002), each with their advantages and disadvantages.[49] For instance, in developing countries income has been proven to be an imperfect measure given that in rural areas peasants provide for their needs without relying on the formal economy or monetary assets, and when monetary exchanges are present they might be seasonal (Bratton 2008). Also, survey questions on income yield high rates of non-response and biased reporting. In order to avoid these problems, to identify the poor in Latin America I use a survey measure based on a combined index of household assets developed by the Latin American Public Opinion Project (Córdova 2009).[50] The core focus of my study will be those citizens in the first quintile of such index. When we look at the characteristics of this group we see that for the whole sample, more than 70% of those in the first quintile declare having an

[48] This definition is similar to the one by Sen (1985) who saw poverty as the inability of functioning in society.

[49] In an attempt to capture all the dimensions of poverty, other scholars have created an index that combines objective and subjective measures (Mattes, Bratton, and Davids 2003). This index of Lived Poverty combines the responses to how many times people have failed to meet basic needs such as food, water, medicines, electricity, fuel to cook and cash.

[50] This index is composed of a series of questions (the AmericasBarometer's"R" series) that ask respondents if their household have the following items: television, refrigerator, landline, cellular phone, vehicle, washing machine, microwave oven, motorcycle, indoor bathroom, computer, flat panel TV, and internet.

income[51] equivalent to less than $100 a month.[52] Also, almost 60% of those in this lowest quintile have no formal or primary education.[53]

Measuring Substantive Representation

Responsiveness is a core element in many definitions of democracy. In theory, representation means that public officials respond to the needs and preferences of citizens who are seen as equal (Dahl 1971; Verba 1996).[54] In fact, some scholars consider that the quality of a democracy can be measured by the extent to which governments are responsive to citizens' policy preferences (Powell 2004b). The importance of this requisite is such that it affects citizens' evaluations of the political regime (Kitschelt et al. 1999) and therefore its legitimacy, which is especially relevant in new democracies (Luna and Zechmeister 2005). What is more, one of the ways in which democracies can foster their consolidation is by improving representation and public accountability of institutions of representation such legislatures (Diamond 1996). In fact, Latin American democracies have been defined as '*delegative democracies,*' where pubic officials once in power act in an unconstrained way, with few incentives to be responsive to citizens' preferences on issues (O'Donnell 1994). In recent studies of this region scholars have

[51] Using this measure I have less non-response rates than using the question on income, than in the majority of countries have non-response rates between 10 and 20 %.
[52] The 2010 round of the AmericasBarometer asked respondents about their monthly income giving them 10 response brackets ranging between 0 (no income) and 10 (more than $751).
[53] Some authors use education as an indicator of poverty when assessing the opinions of poor citizens in Latin America (Taylor-Robinson 2010).
[54] Huber and Powell (1994) highlight congruence as one of the main democratic virtues, considering that "congruence between the preferences of citizens and the actions of policy makers constitutes a major claim and goal of liberal democracy" (p.292).

identified a crisis of representation by looking at the growing levels of dissatisfaction with the institutions of representation, mainly parties and parliaments, and emphasizing broken linkages between citizens and public officials (UNDP 2004; Hagopian 2005; Mainwaring, Bejarano, and Leongómez 2006; Boidi 2008; Corral 2008; Carrillo and Petri 2009). However, representation has not been subjected to many systematic tests, with scholars pointing more often to the lack of empirical studies on representation in Latin America (Mainwaring, Bejarano, and Leongómez 2006). A key limitation in studies of representation is that "a comprehensive exploration of representation requires data from those who are supposed to represent and those who are to be represented" (Marsh and Norris 1997, 159).[55] Likely due to the challenges of finding adequate data for such an undertaking, few studies in Latin America combine data from citizens and representatives to explore representation (Luna and Zechmeister 2005; Otero Felipe and Rodríguez Zepeda 2010; España Nájera and Martínez Rosón 2010; Zechmeister and Corral 2011).

Representation is a broad concept and difficult to measure given all the different dimensions that it entails. One of the ways citizens can be represented is substantively, which relates to the extent to which their policy preferences are reflected in the political arena. Scholars have used different terms to capture this ideal. In their seminal work on representation in the United States, Miller and Stokes (1963) talk about policy congruence to refer to the extent to which constituents and legislators share the same positions on several issues. In a similar fashion, other authors talk about concurrence that refers to "the extent to which citizens and leaders in the community choose the same "agenda of community priorities" (Verba and Nie 1972, 302). Another of the terms that

[55] Converse and Pierce (1986) expressed in the same direction when affirmed that in order to study political representation we need to compare the preferences of citizens and political elites.

scholars have linked to congruence and representation in general is responsiveness. In Pitkin's (1972) terms, political representation is best achieved when public officials act "in the interest of the represented, in a manner responsive to them" (p.209). In this vein, Eulau and Karps (1977) refer to policy responsiveness as "the structure in which district positions on policy issues, specified as some measure of central tendency or dispersion, are related to the policy orientation of the representative-attitudinal or perceptual- and to his subsequent decision-making conduct in a given field or policy" (p.242).[56] While concepts of congruence and concurrence imply a more static view of representation, responsiveness implies a dynamic process,[57] not only focused on the extent to which the principal and the agent share the same preferences but on the extent to which those preferences change and how they are implemented through specific public policies.[58] This idea is close to what also in the literature is known, respectively, as mandate or accountability representation. Mandate representation occurs "when politicians' and voters' interests coincide and/or when voters can reasonably expect that parties will do what they propose" (Przeworski, Stokes, and Manin 1999, 30).[59] In addition, we find approaches that highlight the importance of programmatic linkages; in this case, "principals are represented by their agents through programmatic linkage if there is congruence between the policies preferred by each party´s voters and its corresponding

[56] They also consider service responsiveness (pursuing particulate benefits for a group), allocation responsiveness (providing public goods favoring potential voters) and symbolic responsiveness (appealing to symbols and emotions so that citizens feel represented).
[57] See Powell (2004b) for a complete schema on the process of democratic responsiveness.
[58] It is outside the scope of this project to examine representation in terms of output.
[59] An alternative perspective on substantive representation is offered by those who focus on the notion of "accountability representation" which assumes that voters reward incumbents who act in their best interests while the latter implement policies which will lead them to reelection (Przeworski, Stokes and Manin 1999). See also (Manin 1997).

politicians and if there is between-party divergence such that each party appeals to a different subset of voters" (Kitschelt et al. 2010, 16–17).

Finally, studies differ in terms of the object of representation. While some focus on dyadic representation, that is to say they consider the relationship between one's representative and her constituency (Miller and Stokes 1963, Achen 1978), others assess collective representation (Weissberg 1978), which is to say "representation in terms of institutions collectively representing a people" (p.535).[60] When looking at collective representation, a series of studies assesses the extent to which there is dynamic representation, which exists if representatives respond and move their positions in accord with public opinion (Stimson et al. 1995, Erikson et al, 2002, Wlezien 2004, Adams, Ezrow, and Somer-Topcu 2011).[61] Furthermore, given the importance of parties in some regions, especially in Western Europe, some studies of representation take into account parties and voters, following the principles of the responsible party model (Dalton 1985, Thomassen and Schmitt 1999, Holmberg 2000, Adams, Ezrow, and Somer-Topcu 2011)[62]. As Dalton (1985) suggests there is an interactive linkage between voters and parties, in which voters select the party that best represents their interests, and parties

[60] In fact, Weissberg (1978) considers that citizens are better represented by congress as a whole than by individual members. (Hurley 1982)finds that collective representative trumps dyadic representation when considering the representation of one's preferences but not when analyzing satisfaction with policy outcomes.

[61] Hill and Hurley (1999) found that public officials are not only influenced by citizens' opinions, but also shape them.

[62] Scholars have argued that the type of political party matters in the puzzle of representation (Adams et al. 2006) (Adams et al. 2006). Specifically, niche parties might behave differently compared to mainstream parties. In general terms, it has been found that niche parties are more responsive to their supporters than mainstream parties (Kitschelt 1994). In this same line Adams et al. (2006) demonstrate that niche parties behave differently in that they are more concerned with keeping the loyalty of their supporters, given that when they moderate their positions towards the general public, they are punished in the electoral booth.

change to capture the interest of voters or convince their supporters to accept their positions.[63]

In this chapter I focus on congruence and, in particular, with respect to the poor. Thus, I focus on the extent to which policy preferences of underprivileged sectors of the population in Latin America correspond to the preferences of their representatives in congress. This is a first step assessing representation in Latin America and, even though knowing if preferences are translated into concrete policies would be ideal, if the views of representatives and citizens are similar, representation is improved (Achen 1978).

However, when we say that citizens' and representatives' preferences should be aligned, what kind of preferences are we referring to? How can we measure political preferences? Multiple studies in political science rely on the use of ideological identifications as a way of capturing political preferences. From this perspective, ideology is conceptualized spatially "as a matter of location on a left-right or liberal-conservative continuum" (Knight 2006, 625). These labels constitute a summary of the multidimensional and complex political arena and, thus, help individuals navigate the political system (Fuchs and Klingemann 1990). However the use of ideological identifications to locate people in a policy space can be problematic since their meanings and significance varies across individuals and countries (Converse 1964; Kinder and Sears 1985; Huber 1989). In Latin America, some have shown that left-right labels have different meanings for citizens and elites (Zechmeister and Corral 2011), and also, that the ability of citizens to locate themselves using this schema and the meanings they confer to these labels are influenced by contextual factors such as volatility,

[63] Some scholars have focused on governments instead of members of legislative bodies (Thomassen 1994; Wessels 2007) .

fragmentation and polarization (Zechmeister and Corral 2013). While at the elite level, ideology seems to undergird political competition (Alcántara and Rivas 2007) and party competition (Kitschelt et al. 2010), at the citizenry level there are comparatively weak linkages between ideological labels and vote behavior (Zechmeister forthcoming). Taking into account these limitations and those mentioned by Powell (2009), such as the influence of local discourses when using these labels and the different meanings across countries, I suggest that a more accurate portrait of representation in Latin America will rely on other measures.[64]

Another, though related, aspect we have to consider in the study of representation is how to capture the preferences of citizens and public officials. Extant literature reveals a wide variation of sources, each with their strengths and limitations.[65] Thus, scholars differ by relying on public opinion data (Golder and Stamski 2010, Luna and Zechmeister 2005), expert surveys (Bakker et al. 2012), elite surveys (PELA), party platforms such as the Party Manifesto (McDonald, et al. 2004, McDonald and Budge 2005, Ezrow 2007, Laver and Benoit 2006, Budge and McDonald 2007, Adams et al. 2011), or roll call votes (Clinton 2006).

A final, and key aspect, is choosing the measure with which to capture the extent to which citizens' and public officials' preferences or positions are close to each other, or not. In fact, in the recent years a debate over which approach is most appropriate has developed, with some attributing differences across studies to differences in measurement. That said, while Golder and Stramski (2010) argue that part of the difference in results can be explained by the measure used, Powell (2009) considers that

[64] Studies on Western Europe rely more on the use of this scale when analyzing political representation (Huber and Powell 1994).
[65] See Powell (2009) for a review on the different sources used to measure political representation.

discrepancies arise not only due to how congruence is measured but because of the time or period under analysis.

In brief, measures to assess policy congruence vary across studies. Some scholars have relied on correlation coefficients (Miller and Stokes 1963, Weissberg 1978), assuming that the higher the correlation the higher the congruence. Some have criticized this approach given that it does not capture the distribution of preferences, which may lead to biased estimations (Achen 1977); instead, Achen (1978) proposes three measures - proximity, centrism and responsiveness- as a way to capture the relationship between the legislator and the mean opinion in the constituency, or how they respond to the mean preference. In other words, a representative's behavior is a function of the citizens' mean preference . Bartels (2008: 254) measures political equality by regressing roll call votes for each representative on the opinions of her constituents, divided by the number of respondents from her circumscription, and controlling for the party of the legislator. Others compare the distribution of voters' opinions with the opinion distributions of representatives (Holmberg 1999). In the case of Latin America we find the use of variance (Luna and Zechmeister 2005) as a way to capture how far citizens and legislators' positions are spread out. A more recent approach is the use of a many-to-many measure of congruence by Golder and Stamski (2010), which captures the degree to which the "collective body of representatives reflects the ideological preferences of the citizens" (p. 10) by calculating differences in the cumulative distribution functions of citizens and representatives' preferences.[66]

[66] The formula is congruence=$\sum |F_1(x) - F_2(x)|$ where $F_1(x)$ and $F_2(x)$ are the cumulative distribution functions. The closer to zero the larger the congruence.

Following Golder and Stramski's (2010) advice on the importance of defining and choosing the measure based on the question and objective, I assess the distribution of preferences using their many-to-many measure of congruence, given that this measure captures the degree to which the "*collective* body of representatives reflects the ideological preferences of the citizens" (10). I am interested in the extent to which parliaments, the whole representative body, in Latin America reflect the positions of poor versus rich citizens. This way I avoid the problem of having to identify which parties citizens voted for (the AmericasBarometer does not ask that question and the question on party identification yields many non-response rates) and also the problems of using a central measure such as the mean or median legislator (Powell 2009). In fact, many studies on representation focus on the median legislator as a way to compare her distance with the median citizen[67] (Powell and Vanberg 2000; McDonald, Mendes, and Budge 2004). The median legislator is a key actor able to determine legislative outcomes, hence the focus on her (Krehbiel 1998).

One of the main concerns in the study of substantive representation is the lack of identical questions and scales to capture citizens' and representatives' preferences (Powell 2004a). Avoiding this problem, this study relies on both elite and mass survey data that contain the same question wording for the variables of interest. The data for representatives will come from the Parliamentary Elites of Latin America Survey (PELA) conducted by the University of Salamanca (Spain) in the lower chambers of 18 Latin American. For the purposes of this analysis 14 countries will be analyzed. The analyses will only include the countries sharing the same questions, which are the following:

[67] The median mandate theory poses that the purpose of elections is to "communicate where the median voter stands" (McDonald and Budge 2005, 12).

Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Peru and Uruguay. The data employed to analyze citizens' preferences will come from the AmericasBarometer 2010 involving face-to-face interviews conducted in all mainland Latin American countries carried out by the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) at Vanderbilt University. For three countries I will use the data from the AmericasBarometer 2012 (El Salvador, Guatemala and Nicaragua) given that the elite survey data with the same questions were collected in 2012. See Table 1 in the appendix to see the fieldwork dates and sample sizes for both kinds of data sets. Citizens' data match legislative periods at the time the surveys were conducted.

As suggested above, although many studies in Western democracies rely on an empirical measurement of the concept of ideology, which proxies policy preferences with positions along a left-right or liberal-conservative continuum, I opt to analyze concrete questions on policy preferences. This choice comes after some studies that suggest that the meaning of left-right differs from country to country and between citizens and legislators (Zechmeister and Corral 2010; Zechmeister and Corral 2013) in Latin America. Some other authors consider that correspondence between legislators' positions and constituent opinions does not have to exist on all issues (Arnold 1990, Kingdon 1981, Froman 1963). Rather, this representation should be based on relevant or salient policy dimensions. In the case of Latin America, the more relevant issues are those preferences related to the continuum state-market, to the democratic regime, and to morality and religion (Luna 2007, Kitschelt et al. 2010).

Given that the role of the government in the economy is a salient issue dimension in Latin America, the positions of both citizens and representatives in this regard will be used to test policy congruence, paying special attention to underprivileged groups. As a secondary dimension, the project will also take into account preferences over social values – specifically, support for gay marriage, which is an issue that has become relevant in the public debate in the region (Pierceson, Piatti-Crocker, and Schulenberg 2013). In the last few years three countries have legalized gay marriage: Argentina, Brazil and Brazil, along with the city of Mexico, DF. Intense debates have arisen in countries such as Colombia (where congress rejected a law legalizing gay marriage), Ecuador (where the president expressed his rejection to the idea) and Costa Rica, among others.[68]

The following questions will be employed, which appear in both the mass and elite questionnaires:

[68] For more information see http://www.elespectador.com/noticias/actualidad/el-matrimonio-homosexual-se-abre-paso-america-latina-articulo-438207
http://www.elmundo.es/america/2013/05/15/brasil/1368619221.html
http://www.elnuevoherald.com/2013/05/23/1483276/correa-rechaza-matrimonio-gay.html

ROS1. The (Country) government, instead of the private sector, should own the most important enterprises and industries of the country. How much do you agree or disagree with this statement?
ROS2. The (Country) government, more than individuals, should be primarily responsible for ensuring the well-being of the people. To what extent do you agree or disagree with this statement?
ROS3. The (Country) government, more than the private sector, should be primarily responsible for creating jobs. To what extent to do you agree or disagree with this statement?
ROS4. The (Country) government should implement strong policies to reduce income inequality between the rich and the poor. To what extent do you agree or disagree with this statement?
ROS5. The (Country) government, more than the private sector, should be primarily responsible for providing retirement pensions. How much do you agree or disagree with this statement?
ROS6. The (Country) government, more than the private sector should be primarily responsible for providing health care services. How much do you agree or disagree with this statement?

The responses to these questions are given based on a 1-7 scale where 1 indicates "strongly disagree" and 7 "strongly" agree. Therefore, larger values mean a position more in favor of state involvement.

In order to capture positions in regards to social values, as noted above, I assess attitudes towards gay marriage. The question in both questionnaires was worded as follows:

D6. How strongly do you approve or disapprove of same-sex couples having the right to marry?

Responses to this question were given on a 1-10 scale where 1 means "strongly disapprove" and 10 "strongly approve." Larger scores mean greater support for the right of homosexuals to get married.

Before assessing the extent to which representatives share the same preferences (regarding the role of the state and support for gay marriage) as two sub-constituencies

(the poorest and richest) in Latin America, I run a principal factor analysis for each country to see if these preferences can be combined into indexes in order to simplify the analysis of six items. When considering the six questions on the role of the state for each country, all variables except the one on the state as the owner of the most important industries load on the same factor. Table 2 in the appendix shows that this factor has high scale reliability in all countries for both citizens and legislators. Therefore, I combine them into a single additive variable that I call the Role of the State Index. Thus, I will focus my analysis on the study of three variables: preferences over the role of the state as owner of the main industries, the role of the state index, and attitudes towards gay marriage.

Studies on inequalities in representation should first take into account the extent to which there are significant differences across groups, given that "where preferences are identical, there is no basis for inequality" (Soroka and Wlezien 2008). Table III. 2 shows the countries in which the poorest and wealthiest differ in their policy preferences regarding the three areas of study. In order to test these differences statistically, I use the post-estimation lincom command to test the hypothesis that the difference between the means for poor and rich citizens equals 0. Table III.2 shows the mean and the linearized standard error using the *svy* command, which is used to account for the complex nature of the sample.

Table III. 2. Differences between the Policy Preferences of the Poorest and the Wealthiest in Latin America

	State as Owner of main industries		Role of the State Index		Support for Gay marriage	
	Poor	Rich	Poor	Rich	Poor	Rich
Argentina	4.947(.178)	4.93(.173)	27.59(1.185)	29.77(.492)*	5.62 (.250)	6.60(.272)**
Bolivia	4.92 (.088)	4.22 (.139)***	27.46(.489)	26.76(.464)	3.34(.153)	3.38(1.99)
Brazil	4.87(.213)	4.04(.180)**	29.77(.644)	28.44(.348)*	4.23(.261)	5.40(.297)**
Chile	5.12(.134)	4.63(.140)**	31.60(.307)	29.72(.391)***	3.90(.203)	4.94(.250)**
Colombia	4.44(.111)	3.48(.144)***	30.54(.361)	29.26 (.314)**	3.62 (.190)	4.89(.223)***
Costa Rica	5.19 (.130)	4.47 (.239)**	32.36(.234)	30.57(.406)**	2.50 (.183)	3.24(.231)**
Dominican Republic	4.721(.149)	3.92(.144)**	30.39(.349)	30.39(.319)	2.70(1.68)	3.07(.165)
El Salvador	4.58(.135)	3.85(.149)***	24.35(.252)	23.73(.228)*	1.71(.146)	2.40(.254)**
Guatemala	4.09(.115)	3.88(.132)	21.68(.29)	21.70(.372)	2.55(.192)	2.67(.227)
Honduras	4.98 (.095)	4.54 (.111)**	27.37 (.459)	26.04(.468)**	2.63 (.113)	3.45 (.172)***
Mexico	4.23 (.130)	3.42 (.138)***	28.82 (.427)	28.57 (.368)	4.10 (.206)	5.19 (.209)***
Nicaragua	4.401(.121)	3.65(.155)**	25.28(.202)	24.62(.373)	2.37(.225)	3.22(.301)**
Peru	4.77(.130)	4.49(.135)	27.39(.435)	28.19(.416)	2.85(.199)	3.61(.168)**
Uruguay	4.64(.147)	4.01(.186)**	32.30(.229)	29.23(.501)***	4.68(.266)	6.5(.244)***

Note: * significant at p<.10 **p<.05 ***p<.001. In parenthesis standardized Std. Error

The results show some variation across countries. The dimension on which we find more differences between the poorest and the wealthiest citizens in Latin America is the one that captures preferences over the state as the owner of the main industries. In all countries, the underprivileged sectors of the population show, on average, a greater preference for a more involved state in the economy (larger values mean a stronger preference for the involvement of the private sector on the economy, the scale ranges from 1 to 7). These differences are especially significant in the cases of Bolivia, Colombia, El Salvador and Mexico. Only in Argentina, Guatemala and Peru are there not

statistically significant differences between these two subsets of the population. However, when we look at the index on the role of the state, differences are not as marked: on this measure the poorest and the richest share similar views, with both strongly inclined toward a state that cares about providing basic services and diminishing inequalities (values on the Table for this index are the product of an additive scale where larger values mean a more active role of the state). Only in eight countries are there some differences, weak in most of them, except for Chile and Uruguay in which we find the most significant differences.

The fact that poor citizens tend to prefer a larger involvement of the state goes in line with studies based on theories of self-interest, which state that economically vulnerable citizens, such as recipients or at risk of being recipients of social welfare programs, are more likely to support "big government" (Hasenfeld and Rafferty 1989, Coleman 2001). The underlying argument is that citizens are not going to support government programs "where they do not think that they will benefit and where do not think the beneficiaries are legitimate" (Sanders 1988:323).

Finally, we find statistically significant differences regarding attitudes towards gay marriage in most countries. As exceptions, Bolivia, Dominican Republic, and Guatemala do not display differences. In general, the poorest citizens hold more anti-gay marriage attitudes, although in some countries support for gay marriage is low for both groups.

Guatemala is a noteworthy case, in that there are not differences between the wealthiest and the poorest citizens on any of the three policy dimensions considered. Guatemala is one of the most divided societies in Latin America, but these results suggest

that the main cleavage may be ethnicity and not wealth. In fact, when I look at the ladinos and indigenous' preferences, I find statistically significant differences between those two groups in their preferences over the role of the state as owner of the main industries and in their attitudes towards gay marriage.[69] In another two countries (Peru and Bolivia) with large indigenous populations, I only find only one dimension on which there are statistically significant differences between rich and poor citizens. When I look at the differences between whites and indigenous in Peru, I find statistically significant differences in the two dimensions related to the role of the state, with indigenous populations preferring a larger involvement of the state.[70] The case of Bolivia will be in-depth addressed in Chapter IV.

So far, this section has identified possible areas in which there might be unequal representation, that is to say in most countries, the poor and the rich's preferences over the role of the state in the economy are different as well as when focusing on attitudes towards gay marriage. I next measure congruence using the many to many measure explained above as a way to test the extent to which the poor are underrepresented As stated in Chapter I, there are reasons to believe that poor citizens would be underrepresented in Latin America:

H1b. More wealthy citizens' policy preferences in Latin America are better represented compared to those who are less wealthy.

[69] On the preference over the role of the state as owner of industries, the mean for ladinos is 3.84 and 4.24 for indigenous (the difference is statistically significant at p=0.002). Regarding attitudes towards gay marriage, mean for ladinos is 2.59 and 2.19 for indigenous (the difference is statistically significant at p=0.03).

[70] The mean for whites in the "state as owner" is 4.54 and 5.26 for indigenous being the difference statistically significant at p=0.014. Meanwhile, considering the index of the role of the state, the mean for whites is 26.93 and for indigenous 29.25, being the difference statistically significant at 0.014.

Table III. 3 presents the measure of congruence where there are statistically significant differences at $p<0.05$ or better.

Table III. 3. Measuring Congruence by Poor versus Rich Populations in Latin America

	State as Owner of main industries		**Role of the State Index**		**Support for Gay marriage**	
	Distance between the Poorest and Legislators	Distance between the Richest and Legislators	Distance between the Poorest and Legislators	Distance between the Richest and Legislators	Distance between the Poorest and Legislators	Distance between the Richest and Legislators
Argentina					1.334	**0.463**
Bolivia	**0.632**	0.936				
Brazil	2.543	**1.716**			0.603	**0.565**
Chile	1.543	**1.135**	7.367	**5.428**	**0.731**	1.681
Colombia	0.9501	**0.6779**	6.3485	**5.0914**	**0.6446**	0.8676
Costa Rica	2.5565	**1.8414**	4.7248	**3.0735**	0.854	**0.2563**
Dominican Republic	1.2743	**0.5726**				
El Salvador	0.9776	**0.3111**			1.6517	**0.9551**
Guatemala						
Honduras	1.8068	**1.3716**	3.0092	**1.6564**	**1.0981**	1.9196
Mexico	1.4495	**0.6387**			1.8955	**0.8451**
Nicaragua	1.5525	**0.8042**			0.6911	**0.6552**
Peru					1.0925	0.3405
Uruguay	**0.5071**	0.8682	6.0374	**3.056**	2.1619	**0.8414**

Table III. 3 shows the results of the many-to-many measure of congruence by Golder and Stramski (2010), which captures the differences in the cumulative distribution of preferences.

$$\text{Congruence} = \sum | (F1(x)-F2(x) |$$

where $F1(x)$ and $F2(x)$ are the cumulative distribution functions for citizens and representatives' preferences (See Golder and Stramski 2010, p.96).

The closer to zero, the larger the congruence. Figures in bold show which subgroup legislators are the closest to, the poorest or the wealthiest, in their countries. For example, taking the case of Argentina on the issue of support for gay marriage, we see that legislators are closer to the wealthy, with a score of 0.46 in the many-to-many measure of congruence, a score that is smaller than the one we get when we compare legislators and those in the lowest quintile of wealth (1.334) As expected, legislators are closer to preferences of the wealthier citizens in most countries and on most issues. Regarding preferences over the role of the state as the owner of main industries, in all countries except for Bolivia and Uruguay, representatives are closer to those in the fifth quintile (the wealthiest). Distances from the poor are especially pronounced in Brazil and Costa Rica. With respect to the index on the role of the state, in the five countries where there are statistically significant differences between the two groups of citizens, legislators' preferences are closer to the wealthier ones. Finally, regarding attitudes towards gay marriage, only in three countries, Chile, Colombia and Honduras, are the poor closer to legislators than the wealthier[71]. Table 3 in the appendix shows the distributions graphically. What explains these differences across countries? The next section looks at institutional variables to answer that question.

Explaining Gaps in Representation: The Role of Institutions

As we have seen in the previous section, there is some evidence of representational inequalities in Latin America but, as well, these gaps vary across countries. A key goal of this project is to assess the extent to which institutions can

[71] If I use the distance between the median voter and the median legislator results do not vary.

effectively reduce political inequalities. Thus, in the remainder of this chapter I focus on features of the electoral systems that are theorized to influence representation. As in Chapter II, I also examine the role of leftist parties. In addition, I consider the potential relevance of a highly participatory culture in some countries within Latin America. The question examined here is as follows: do institutional arrangements and/or high degrees of participation (which might be related to institutions or to culture) reduce the distance between poor citizen's preferences and their representatives?

Institutions play a key role in any democracy: they affect actions, beliefs, and norms, and therefore influence political results (Przeworski 2004). For this reason, some have reasoned that institutions might influence the relationships that develop between citizens and representatives. However, "the institutions literature is underdeveloped with respect to the nature of the relationship between the elected official and the constituency" (Taylor-Robinson 2010). In fact, most studies focus on how institutions, especially electoral institutions, translate votes into seats rather than on exploring the connections between citizens and their representatives (Duverger 1954, Rae 1971, Taagapera and Shuggart 1989, Cox 1997). Some studies assess the role of electoral institutions by focusing on legislators alone, looking at their role or the focus of their representation (e.g., if they consider they represent the whole nation, or local constituencies) or their behavior in congress (Heitshusen, Young, and Wood 2005, Stratmann and Baur 2002; for Latin America, see Kerevel 2010, Montero and Marenghi 2006, Marenghi 2011).

Studies of representation link it to accountability, and different electoral rules favor greater levels of accountability. Institutions introduce incentives for legislators to behave in different ways and there are rules that make them more accountable to citizens.

In this sense, Krishna (2008) argues that institutions can help poor citizens' demands to be heard and "facilitate information and promote accountability between citizens and public officials" (p.155). In this same line, Taylor (2010) finds that where institutions allow for monitoring and sanctioning legislators, the poor's trust in legislatives is comparatively higher.[72]

Following from this line of argument, this section assesses the extent to which certain features of the electoral system influence the distance between the poor and legislators. The focus is on institutions that are theorized to create incentives for accountability and monitoring. I will assess the effect of proportional versus single member districts electoral systems, the proportionality of the system, the magnitude of the districts, fragmentation of the legislature and the type of lists.

The expectation for the effects of proportional versus SMD is mixed, given the trade-off inherent in a choice between these systems (Powell 2000). While proportional formulas encourage the inclusion of more groups, majoritarian formulas allow for the clarity of responsibility necessary for accountability. Therefore, we could think that poor people might be better represented under proportional systems, but at the same time majoritarian formulas give them more power to make legislators accountable in a way that these would feel pressured to be closer to them in order not to be punished in the next election.

And, in fact, looking at the studies that have analyzed the relationship between proportional formulas and representation we find mixed evidence. While classic studies found a relationship between proportional representation and correspondence in the

[72] In fact, as Duverger (1951) pointed out, electoral systems have the ability of creating both mechanic and psychological effects.

opinions of representatives and citizens (Huber and Powel 1994, Powell 2000), recent studies do not find such a clear relationship (Blais and Bodet 2006, Golder and Stamski 2010).

The preliminary hypothesis laid out in Chapter I was stated as follows:

H3b. The larger the proportionality of an electoral system, the smaller the distance in policy preferences between the poor and legislators.

I measure how proportional a system is by making use of the Gallagher Index (or Least Squares Index). This measure captures the extent to which the percentage of votes a party receives is translated into the same percentage of seats in congress. Larger scores in this index mean that there is a high disproportion between votes and seats. The next three figures show the relationship between this index and the distance between the poor and the legislators across countries for each of the policy dimensions resulting from the many-to-many measure of congruence by Golder and Stramski (2010) presented in Table III.3 (first column).



Figure III. 1. Disproportionality and Distance between the Poor and Legislators on their Preferences over the Role of the State as Owner of Main Industries



Figure III. 2. Disproportionality and Distance between the Poor and Legislators on their Preferences over the Role of the State (Index)



Figure III. 3. Disproportionality and Distance between the Poor and Legislators on their Attitudes towards Gay Marriage

The results do not show a strong relationship between these two variables. To put the finding in words: there is no evidence that in Latin America the degree of disproportionality influences the extent to which there exist representation gaps between legislators and the poor.

Another feature theorized to create incentives for legislators to better represent citizens is the type of list. Open lists allow voters to choose which person they want to hold a seat in congress from a list of candidates. Thus, they can be used by voters to sanction particular legislators, while in a party list system "only people who can influence the composition of the party's list can sanction legislators, so legislators have an incentive to represent those people who have an influence with the party leaders controlling nominations…and rich people have tools to influence" (Taylor-Robinson 2010, 41). In the countries under analysis, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Honduras and Peru have some sort of open list to elect representatives. It could be expected that in these countries distances between the poor and legislators are smaller. However, when I look at how close the poor citizens are to legislators in these countries, the strongest relationship is found regarding attitudes towards gay marriage, that is to say, in systems with open list rules, distances are smallest (correlation 0.57).[73] In brief, generally speaking list type does not appear to influence political inequality gaps between legislators and the poor in Latin America.

In addition, some scholars have argued that the magnitude of the districts is an important characteristic shaping representation. District magnitude refers to the number of representatives elected in each electoral district. In theory, small districts have the

[73] The relationship between the type of list and the distance between the poor and legislators is weaker when looking at the role of the state. Correlations are -.26 in the case of the state as the owner of the main industries and -.06 regarding the index on the role of the state.

impact of increasing levels of accountability (Carey and Hix 2011). The smaller are districts (under five)[74], the more opportunities for control and accountability that could translate in closer relationships between citizens and representatives.

As mentioned in Chapter I, we could expect that: *The larger the proportion of small districts, the smaller the distance in policy preferences between the poor and legislators (H4b).*

The following three figures show the relationship between the percent of "small" districts in a political system and congruence between the poor and legislators in the three policy areas considered in this chapter.



Figure III. 4. Small Districts and Distance between the Poor and Legislators on their Preferences over the Role of the State as Owner of Main Industries

[74] As in the previous chapter I follow Nohlen's (1995) criteria to classify districts.



Figure III. 5. Small Districts and Distance between the Poor and Legislators on their Preferences over the Role of the State (Index)



Figure III. 6. Small Districts and Distance between the Poor and Legislators on their Attitudes towards Gay Marriage

These results show a large relationship in the expected direction in the case of preferences over the role of the state as owner of the main industries and attitudes towards gay marriage.[75] Thus, whereas disproportionality did not help explain gaps in political representation across legislators and poor in Latin America, district magnitude does.

As in the previous chapter I also consider fragmentation, which in theory affects citizens' ability to sanction legislators. As the number of parties increases, citizens have more "choices of parties and politicians with a reasonable chance of winning a seat in the legislature. This enhances opportunities to sanction an incumbent" (Taylor 2010, 42). We could therefore expect that as the number of parties increases the distance between the poor and legislators would decrease (H5b). Figures III.7, III.8 and III.9 show the relationship between the effective number of parties and the distance between poor citizens' preferences and legislators on the three policy arenas addressed in this chapter.

[75] If I use the average district magnitude the relationship is less clear: State as owner =0.252, Role of the State index -0.840, Attitudes towards gay marriage 0.333.



Figure III. 7. ENP and Distance between the Poor and Legislators on their Preferences over the Role of the State as Owner of Main Industries



Figure III. 8. ENP and Distance between the Poor and Legislators on their Preferences over the Role of the State (Index)



Figure III. 9. ENP and Distance between the Poor and Legislators on their Attitudes towards Gay Marriage

Interestingly, the results show an unexpected relationship between the number of parties and congruence. Having more parties in the system does not translate into closer relationship between the poor and legislators, except in the case of gay preferences where the correlation is -.0505. As in the previous chapter, fragmentation does not have the expected relationship that literature has found in western democracies. It could be thought that fragmentation in Latin America produces a feeling of instability in the system. Finally, another institutional feature that could have an impact on the representation of the poor is the presence of leftist parties in congress. These parties are traditionally in favor of issues that concern underprivileged citizens. Luna and Zechmeister (2005) show how at the aggregate level, representation is positively correlated with the strength of leftish parties. And, as shown in the prior chapter, I find

that the presence of leftist parties is an important indicator of reduced gaps in political inequalities.

The expectation, as stated in Chapter I is that "*Where leftist parties have a strong presence, the distance between policy preferences between the poor and legislators will be smaller than in contexts where their incidence is weaker" (H 6 b).*

Figures III.10, III.11 and III.12 present the extent to which we can confirm "equalizing impact" of leftist parties (Verba et al. 1978) when measuring substantive representation. The x-axis shows the percentage of left political parties in the congresses calculated by taking into account ideological self-positions of legislators (see Chapter III).



Figure III. 10. Percentage of Leftist Parties and Distance between the Poor and Legislators on their Preferences over the Role of the State as Owner of Main Industries



Figure III. 11. Percentage of Leftist Parties and Distance between the Poor and Legislators on their Preferences over the Role of the State (Index)



Figure III. 12. Percentage of Leftist Parties and Distance between the Poor and Legislators on their Attitudes towards Gay Marriage

From these three figures it can be said that there is a weak relationship between the presence of leftist parties and substantive representation. The relationship goes in the expected direction in Figure III.10, that is to say the more leftist parties in congress the more congruence between the poor and legislators, but correlation is weak.

The Role of Participation in Reducing the Political Representation Gap

Apart from institutional factors, scholars have emphasized the relationship between political participation and representation (Verba 2003, Beramendi and Anderson 2008). High levels of participation can be a product of institutions, culture, or both. As noted in earlier chapters, disentangling these complex antecedents is outside the scope of this project; instead, the focus here is on whether high levels of participation have the favorable effects on representation that have been suggested in extant works but which have not been tested for in depth in the case of Latin America. The objective of this last section, then, is to assess the extent to which the representation of the poorest in the region varies by different levels of political participation. The main finding is that there is a weak relationship between participation and levels of congruence between the poor and legislators.

Some empirical research in the United States has indeed found that policy outcomes reflect affluent citizens' preferences more than poor or middle-income Americans (Gilens 2005, Bartels 2008). Affluent citizens support politicians' campaigns and help them to get a seat and, therefore, legislators are disproportionally responsive to the wealthy. Though limited in quantity and focused on a single case, some research

focused on Latin America reaches similar conclusions, though adds additional reasons for such unequal outcomes with respect to representation. For example, a recent study by Taylor-Robinson (2010) on representation in Latin America, with a special focus on Honduras, finds that poor citizens lack the needed resources to monitor public officials (e.g., education, access to information) and to punish representatives who ignore their interests, which constrain the possibilities for being well-represented. Apart from these two main factors, the author finds that a lack of participation and reduced tendencies to form or participate in associations can undermine representation among the poor.

In this same vein, another theoretical approach highlights the relationship between participation and representation. Political participation is a key element in any definition of democracy (Dahl 1971). This involvement covers a wide range of activities that include voting, working for candidates or parties, and participating in manifestations or protests, among others. Participation has been seen by many scholars as a way to produce representative decisions and legitimacy in the system (Dalton 2004). Although there is no agreement on the level of participation necessary for democracies to work (Norris 2002, Huntington 1968), there is an agreement on its importance. As noted in the previous chapter, one of the main forms of participation is voting. Through elections, citizens select public officials, and keep them accountable, which might have some consequences for the role of those representatives. Furthermore, the choice of voting or not has also consequences for the kind of enacted policies (Lijphart 1997). Furthermore, it is not new to argue that representatives might not be committed to pay attention to those who do not vote (Key 1949). If this is the case, we could expect representation levels to be unequal across those who vote (or participate actively in politics) and those who do not

participate. Some authors have argued that the reason why we could expect more congruence between voters and representatives is because the former tend to select public officials who hold similar or close views and preferences (Erikson 1990, Miller and Stokes 1963). An alternative explanation is that through voting, citizens express their preferences and induce public officials to be responsive (Verba 2003). Recent studies have found a relationship between income and participation: "individuals who are below the median income in society are less likely to participate in elections, and those above the median income are more likely to do so" (Beramendi and Anderson 2008:18). However, empirical evidence on the relationship between participation and representation has shown mixed results. On the one hand, Ellis et al. (2006) find that in American politics, representatives do not respond differently to voters and nonvoters. On the other hand, Griffin and Newman (2005) find that Senators in the United States are influenced by voter preferences rather than nonvoter preferences. In short, there are theoretical reasons to expect that that political participation will affect representation, but the empirical evidence to date is mixed and, in the Latin American case, quite limited.

To establish a baseline expectation to assess, I posit that a participatory culture could generate the incentives for the representatives to respond to citizens' interests (see H2b and discussion in Chapter I). In the history of Latin America, the poor and powerless have been able to mobilize against the political systems (Chalmers et al 1997) to defend their interest. Therefore, it is possible that a participatory culture in this region helps to overcome the expected situation of underrepresentation enjoyed by poor citizens.

To assess this expectation, I take into account the same variables regarding participation I assessed in the previous chapter at the aggregate level, that is to say

electoral turnout and an index of contacting public officials. Figure III.13, III.14 and III.15 show the relationship between electoral participation and congruence regarding the role of the state as owner of the main industries, the index of the role of the state and attitudes towards gay marriage, respectively. X-axes show the percentage of citizens who voted in the last presidential election.



Figure III. 13. Electoral Participation and Distance between the Poor and Legislators on their Preferences over the Role of the State as Owner of Main Industries



Figure III. 14. Electoral Participation and Distance between the Poor and Legislators on their Preferences over the Role of the State (Index)



Figure III. 15. Electoral Participation and Distance between the Poor and Legislators on their Attitudes towards Gay Marriage

From those three figures it can be stated that in general terms there is a weak relationship between large levels of turnout in the elections and substantive congruence. Although the relationship goes in the expected direction, that is to say, the more people participate in elections, the small the distance between legislators and the poor, the correlations are relatively weak. The same pattern is found when I restrict the sample to the electoral participation of citizens in the first quintile (the poorest).[76]

As I explained in the previous chapter I have created an index of contacting public officials, capturing the percentage of citizens who asked help by contacting members of congress and/or local public officials (See Chapter II). It can be expected that where citizens are more active contacting public officials, political congruence is larger.



Figure III. 16. Contacting Public Officials and Distance between the Poor and Legislators on their Preferences over the Role of the State as Owner of Main Industries

[76] The correlations are -.378, 0.70, and 0.164 respectively, none of which is statistically significant.



Figure III. 17. Contacting Public Officials and Distance between the Poor and Legislators on their Preferences over the Role of the State (Index)



Figure III. 18. Contacting Public Officials and Distance between the Poor and Legislators on their Attitudes towards Gay Marriage

As with electoral participation, Figures III.16, III.17 and III.18 show that there is a weak relationship between contacting public officials and substantive political congruence. This weak relationship can be also observed when looking at levels of poor citizen contacting public officials, and when looking at levels of participation in protests (analyses not shown here for the sake of space). The correlations between participating in protests and congruence between attitudes of poor citizens and legislators are -.503, -0.09, .27, respectively, though none of these is statistically significant.

Conclusion

Different theories and empirical results from studies in advanced democracies suggest that certain segments of the population, mainly the wealthy, are better represented than others (Bartels 2008, Barabas and Wachtel 2010, Jacobs and Page 2005). Some of the explanations for this unbalance are based on some characteristics attached to deprivation, such as having fewer resources to participate in the political process, to be able to understand politics, to be informed about politics or to express their preferences and control their representatives (Bartels 2008). Given this situation, we might expect the same situation occurs in less developed countries. In fact, this chapter has shown that in that with the clear exceptions of Bolivia and Uruguay, in the rest of countries in Latin America, legislators' preferences are closer to those of the wealthiest than to the poorest (at least on preferences related to the role of the state and attitudes towards gay marriage). Contrary to what I found in the previous chapter, few institutional arrangements are substantively related to higher levels of political congruence at the

aggregate level. The clearest relationships are found when focusing on preferences over the role of the state as owner of the main industries of the country. The strongest relationships are found between small districts and the effective number of parties. On the one hand, the more small districts in a system the closer the distance between the poor and legislators. On the other hand, the larger the effective number of parties the larger the distance between them considering this kind of preference. Finally, there is a modest relationship between levels of turnout and congruence regarding the role of the state as owner of the most important industries. In any case, the relationships are not as strong as in the case of perceptions of representation.

CHAPTER IV

ELECTORAL RULES AND POLITICAL REPRESENTATION IN BOLIVIA

To what extent can different institutional arrangements mitigate against the political marginalization of historically under-represented groups? While previous chapters focused mostly on the poor, as a historically marginalized segment of society in a region that has significantly high levels of inequality, I extend this focus in this chapter to consider not only the poor per se, but also the indigenous. As noted in the previous chapters, in some countries in Latin America a key division in society is not necessarily between the poor en masse and the rich, but between those with indigenous identities and others. The chapter addresses this topic by examining, for the case of Bolivia, subjective perceptions of legislators' roles and objective measures of policy and descriptive representation. The principal argument tested in this chapter is that electoral rules that incentivize a close relationship between the legislator and her constituency will cultivate comparatively better outcomes with respect to legislators' representative focus and outcomes.

The case of Bolivia was selected for several reasons. First, the country's mixed electoral system creates a congress comprised of legislators elected by two different sets of electoral rules. That is to say, 70 members of the Chamber of Deputies are elected in single-member constituencies using the first-past-the-post rule and 53 in multimember

districts through a proportional election rule.[77] Second, Bolivia is country in which a large proportion of the population – the indigenous - has been located in a historically disadvantaged position characterized by fragmentation, cultural and political marginalization, and economic deprivation (Van Cott 2003). It is also an interesting country for a third reason: from 2006 to present day, Bolivia's executive seat has been occupied by the country's first indigenous president, Evo Morales, who was brought to power on the basis of a broad social movement (MAS) and whose election into office may have represented a sea change with respect to the representation of the indigenous in Bolivia. Therefore, this case allows me to assess the impact of two distinct types of electoral rules on the representative outcomes, in particular as they relate to a traditionally marginalized population that is sufficiently large and discernible for analysis within a critical political moment for the country.

This dissertation is motivated by the fact that there is widespread agreement that political institutions matter. Political institutions provide the electoral rules by which governments are elected and the constitutional rules that determine the division of powers and the distribution of powers between central and local governments (World Bank 2002). They also solve collective action problems, and structure preferences and policy choices (Schiermann and Benoit 1989). In short, institutions matter because they affect actions, beliefs, and norms, and therefore influence political results (Przeworski 2004). However, and despite agreement on the centrality of institutions in any democracy, and on their role in structuring and defining the rules of the game, their effects are not always as strong as one might expect (Kitschelt et al. 2010; see also previous chapters in this

[77] Bolivia has nine districts corresponding to the nine departments (states) in the country. There are other seven seats reserved for indigenous populations elected in seven special circumscriptions using majority rule. For more details, see *Ley n 026, Ley de 30 de junio de 2010*.

dissertation). In this chapter I focus on the potential effects of institutions on three dimensions of political representation: perceptions, substantive and descriptive representation.

One of the institutions with the largest impact on political representation is the electoral system. Electoral systems not only translate votes into seats but also have important effects on many other elements of the political system (Cox 1997, Norris 1997). Among other influences, they shape the relationship between citizens and representatives (Carey and Shugart 1995), generating incentives for close or distant bonds between them. This feature of the electoral rules generates the expectation that legislators elected through different electoral systems might have different attitudes and behaviors in their role as representatives. Specifically, legislators elected in single member districts have more incentives to represent and take into account their specific, geographically-defined electoral circumscription rather than the nation as a whole. Assuming they adapt their campaign style to the peculiarities of the electoral rule through which they are elected, one would then expect legislators from single member districts, compared to those elected by the proportion of party votes received at the national level, to report being less attuned to broader constituencies and, at the same time, expect citizens to feel closer to these representatives. In the sections that follow, I first test this question: Is there evidence that legislators' perceptions of their roles vary according to the type of seat they hold? And, moreover, do citizens hold different opinions about distinct types of legislators? As I will show, the data return an affirmative answer to these questions, which in turn provides initial support to the expectation that there are important differences between legislators based on the process by which they are elected.

But do these perceptions translate into differences in objective measures of representation under different types of legislators? In a second set of analyses, I assess the degree to which legislators represent the policy preferences of poor versus rich constituents as well as indigenous versus non-indigenous constituents. Modern democracies are based on the idea of principals (citizens) delegating the power to enact public policies to agents (public officials), in a relationship in which all citizens "should be equal to each other" (Powell 2004: 274). This system is built on the premise that governments enact policies that are congruent with the preferences of equal citizens. However, different social groups are not seen as equal in most political systems; rather, some groups (typically those with more resources) are able to exert greater policy influence (Gilens 2005, Bartels 2008). And, yet, are there other circumstances in which the situation of the disadvantaged groups with respect to political representation is improved? Specifically, do institutions matter? If electoral institutions matter in the ways described above, then one would expect that variation in the rules by which legislators are elected has consequences for the representation of historically marginalized and underprivileged groups. As noted, single member districts generate a series of incentives which bring representatives closer to their constituents. It is assumed that the reduced geographic scope of this kind of district fosters close connections between them. Additionally, the representative will be more likely to feel more integrated into the community she represents, taking care of the demands of her constituents personally. The representative is often seen as the spokesperson for the interests of the constituency (Vallés and Bosch 1997). This line of scholarship supports the expectation that underprivileged groups in Bolivia will be better represented through their single-member

representatives. As I will show, however, there is little evidence that institutions matter in this regard in Bolivia. Instead, analyses of the congruence between legislators' policy stances on economic and social issues and citizens' stances on those same issues reveal two important factors: first, strikingly, comparisons between the poor and the indigenous, on the one hand, and the rich and the non-indigenous, on the other hand reveal only slight differences in general policy orientations and, second, to the extent that there are differences, the underprivileged do not appear to be better represented by single member district representatives than proportional representation legislators.

If institutions are not very consequential with respect to the ways in which policy preferences are represented by legislators in Bolivia, then is there perhaps another dimension on which we can see an effect of institutions on patterns of representation? In a third and final set of analyses in this chapter I examine descriptive representation (via skin tone) in Bolivia in order to assess whether different electoral rules predict differences on this particular dimension of representation. This kind of representation is important especially when it comes to historically marginalized groups because it fosters feelings of inclusion and increases levels of trust in the political system (Young 1990, Phillips 1995, Williams 1998, Mansbridge 1999). Most prior studies of indigenous populations in Latin America have focused in general terms on the incorporation of indigenous groups and politicians into the political systems (Birnir and Van Cott 2007, Van Cott 2005, Warren and Jackson 2003) and not on the role that different electoral rules play achieving political representation. In a manner similar to the previous discussion and tests, given the close connections that single member districts tend to generate, one could expect that representatives elected in single member districts are

more likely to share the skin tone of this group than those elected through proportional ones. As the data show, there is little evidence that the electoral rules matter in this regard in Bolivia.

The data used in this chapter come from the following sources. First, I use both elite and mass survey data to measure perceptions of legislators and their roles and policy stances. The elite data come from the surveys of the Parliamentary Elites of Latin America (PELA) Project conducted by the University of Salamanca (Spain) in the lower chamber in the fall of 2010. Mass survey data come from different waves of surveys conducted by the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) at Vanderbilt University between 2004 and 2010 in Bolivia. Second, I make use of original data that I collected in 2011 during the course of fieldwork in this country that was focused on assessing legislators and their roles. In the first place, I created a novel dataset by recording the skin tone of legislators; I map this onto the AmericasBarometer measures of skin tone among the mass public in order to measure descriptive representation. In addition, I complement the analyses in this chapter with qualitative data obtained from over 45 semi-structured interviews with legislators in Bolivia I carried out during the course of my fieldwork. Before turning to the data and analyses, however, the next two sub-sections, first, provide further discussion of the notion that institutions matter (for at least some political outcomes) and, second, present a more thorough introduction to and justification of the case of Bolivia.

Do Institutions Matter for Political Representation?

Variation in political representation does not take place randomly. As noted on Chapter I, institutions shape political interactions (North 1991) and therefore play a systematic and important role in the process of political representation. Grounded in this premise, a broad literature has focused on the analysis of electoral rules and their effects. It is been shown that electoral rules shape the incentives of political actors in ways that affect political competition, party organization and the kinds of ties between representatives and constituents, among other outcomes (see for instance, Duverger 1954, Rae 1971, Taagapera and Shuggart 1989, Carey and Shuggart 1995, Lijphart 1999). Regarding the role of representation, it is been shown that there is a wide variation across (Heitshusen, Young, and Wood 2005) and within countries (Stratmann and Baur 2002). As I mentioned in Chapter I these studies of representation assess how legislators define the focus of their work, that is to say, whom they represent (mainly, national versus local interests) (Eulau et al 1959) and what explains that variation. Part of the literature defines this kind of research as motivational, since the way politicians characterize their roles depends on their purposes (Searing 1985). In this line, Fenno (1978) shows how representatives in the United States adopt a "home style" in order to secure their main goal of reelection. Representatives work to gain trust from their constituency, so that it is easy for them to explain and justify their decisions in Washington. This trust is gained thanks to their work within the district they represent.

Regardless of the motivation, the role a legislator adopts has important impacts on her behavior. For instance, those focused on local interest are more likely to spend more time in their constituencies, and more likely to vote against their political party than those

who adopt a broader role (Searing 1985), or to more likely to spend time on local party work rather than nation party work (Studlar and McAllister 1996).

Apart from personal motivations, institutional features shape representational roles. One of the institutions highlighted within the literature as having the largest impact on the role that legislators perform is the electoral system and, especially, the nature of districts. While multimember districts offer few incentives for developing a personal relationship in the district, because these imply a geographical overlap among several legislators (Heitshusen, Young and Wood 2005), single member districts generate a series of incentives that bring representatives closer to their constituents. Additionally, under single member districts, the representative is identified as the spokesperson for the interests of the constituency (Vallés and Bosch 1997), and she might be more likely to engage in pork-barrel activities than representatives elected in multimember districts (Lancaster and Patterson 1990). Moreover, in these cases the candidate plays a fundamental role: her election depends on her own person more than on the political party to which she belongs. Parliamentary groups under these circumstances will be ill-disciplined; each member will be more concerned about the impact of their vote in her district than about the instructions of the party (Duverger 1950).

Mixed-member electoral systems are a subcategory of electoral systems that combine both single member districts and multinomial ones. More specifically, they are electoral systems in which "seats are allocated in two (or more) overlapping sets of districts, such that every voter may cast one or more votes that are employed to allocate seats in more than one tier" (Shugart and Wattenberg 2001b, p. 10). Among the advantages of such electoral systems is that they generate incentives for close

relationships between citizens and their representatives and accountability between them at the single-member district, while keeping disciplined and policy consistent parties, with a fair representation at the national level (Colomer and Negretto 2005). Therefore, we could expect that this kind of electoral rule generates different incentives for both types of legislators and produces distinct roles. It is likely that representatives chosen under single member districts have more incentives to establish a close relationship with their voters and therefore adopt a role focused on their constituency. This electoral rule can also impact the way candidates conduct their campaign. It can be the case that candidates under the proportional list take advantage of the resources provided by the party while single-member candidates have to appeal their electorate directly using a candidate centered strategy. From the citizens' side, it could be expected that the electoral rule also influences their opinions about the different kinds of legislators; if they see that the single member representative is closer, this can influence their trust in them.

As some scholars have pointed out, mixed electoral systems "serve as crucial experiments" (Shugart, Valdini and Suominen 2005) or offer the opportunity to conduct controlled comparisons (Moser 2001, Moser and Scheiner 2004) studying the relationship between electoral institutions and legislative behavior. In other words, these kinds of studies allow us to hold constant institutional and cultural characteristics at the national level while introducing some variance at the level of electoral rules. Nonetheless, analyses about the effect of mixed-electoral systems on legislative behavior show somewhat inconclusive results. On the one hand some scholars find in Western democracies that representatives elected in single member districts have more of a constituency focus than parliamentarians chosen in multimember districts (Heitshusen,

Young and Wood 2005) and that they are more likely to be members of committees that allow them to focus on their local constituencies (Stratmann and Baur 2002) than those elected through proportional representation. On the other hand, analyses in new democracies show a less clear impact of mixed-electoral systems on voting behavior (Haspel, Remington, and Smith 1998, Herron 2002, Smith and Remington 2001) or party discipline (Kerevel 2010). Therefore more studies on the impacts of this kind of electoral system on representatives are needed, especially in new democracies.

In the case of Latin America, only few countries have mixed electoral systems: Mexico, Venezuela and Bolivia and few studies have addressed the effects of this kind of electoral system in the region. For instance, Kerevel (2010) assesses the impact of the mixed-member electoral system on legislators in Mexico. While she finds that PR legislators are more likely to have control over key leadership positions, there are few differences on party discipline between single member representatives and proportional ones. The same null effect on party discipline has found in Venezuela (Crisp 2007). This kind of electoral system was applied for the first time in the elections of 1997 as a consequence of the lack of responsiveness, accountability and confidence in the political system (Mayorga 2001). Nonetheless, little we know about the effects that the introduction of this electoral systems has had in the political system. Ardaya (2003) argued that SMD Bolivian legislators work harder, and get closer to voters than those elected in PR. A recent study by Centellas (2009) focuses on some of the impacts on the political system as a whole, which has aggravated the existing regional cleavages in Bolivia, increased the regional polarization and contributed to the instability of the party system. Sanchez and Rivas (2013), using interviews to legislative advisors, find that the

main difference between those elected in SMD and those in PR is in their relationship with the party, with the SMD legislators more autonomous, but both kind of legislators are found to care about their districts. However, despite these extant studies, we know very little about the relationship between the mixed-electoral system and the role of representatives and descriptive and substantive representation.

As mentioned in Chapter I, apart from the role of representatives and its implications, scholars have focused on the way citizens are represented. As mentioned before, Pitkin (1972) provides an excellent typology of types of representation, in which she distinguishes between descriptive, symbolic and substantive representation. She concludes that political representation is best achieved when legislators act "in the interest of the represented, in a manner responsive to them" (209) rather than sharing social or demographic characteristics with their represented. This (former) idea is close to what later in the literature would be known as mandate representation. Mandate representation occurs "when politicians' and voters' interests coincide and/or when voters can reasonably expect that parties will do what they propose" (Przeworski, Stokes and Manin 1999, 30). And as Achen (1978) points out, if the views of representatives and citizens are similar, representation is improved.[78] From a principal-agent perspective, public officials are the agents who act on behalf of citizens, responding to public demands and fulfilling citizens' expectations. The relationship between agents and principals is ruled by political accountability. This relationship involves the transmission of information from the former to the latter, along with explanations for making decisions

[78] An alternative perspective on substantive representation is offered by those who focus on the notion of "accountability representation" which assumes that voters reward incumbents who act in their best interests while the latter implement policies which will lead them to reelection (Przeworski, Stokes and Manin 1999). It is outside the scope of this project to examine representation in terms of output.

subject to sanctions (Schmitter 2004). In other words, voting works as a reward-punishment mechanism: voters will take into account policy performance and will vote in line with their assessment (Downs 1957). Public officials, as vote seekers, will try to be elected by looking after their constituencies' interests. However, political institutions, especially electoral rules, shape representatives' motivations to represent citizens' policy preferences. Single member districts encourage legislators to focus on the needs of their constituents while proportional representation might make representatives more responsive to their party's interest than to the preferences of their constituencies.

Although some scholars highlight the importance of substantive representation, that is to say the extent to which citizens and representatives' issue preferences coincide (Powell 2004), we cannot deny the relevance of descriptive representation. Descriptive representation is present when a citizen shares ascriptive characteristics such as gender, race, or ethnicity, among others, with her representative (Pitkin, 1972). The presence of this kind of representation has beneficial impacts on democracy given that it "reduces distrust and increases democratic legitimacy" and "furthers the substantive representation of interests by improving the deliberation" (Mansbridge 1999: 654). Therefore, assessing the extent to which descriptive representation takes place in a political system is important, especially in those systems where sectors of the population have been traditionally excluded. Most of the studies on descriptive representation are focused on the United States, with many scholars advocating that fair representation should allow social groups to define and defend their own interests (Young 1990, Phillips 1995, Williams 1998).

As with both the roles assumed by representatives and substantive representation, electoral systems also theoretically ought to influence descriptive representation. In fact, scholars have shown a connection between proportional electoral systems and ascriptive representation. For example, Norris (1997) finds that proportional systems promote the inclusion of minority parties and minority social groups in the system and the presence of more women in congresses. However, little is known about the relationship between mixed-electoral systems and descriptive democracy. Drawing from the theoretical perspective offered by institutionalists and, in particular, those focused on the effects of differing electoral rules, one might expect that citizens have a greater opportunity to select representatives who look like them when they have the opportunity to select their single member representative.

The next section presents some information about the case of Bolivia and expands the discussion of representation to take into account different disadvantaged groups in that society.

Bolivia: Diversity and Representation

Bolivia offers a great opportunity to explore the relationship between a mixed electoral system and the role of representatives on the one hand, and substantive and descriptive representation on the other one. The diversity within the country allows us to assess the extent to which important subgroups of the population are being represented as well as the impact of the electoral rules. As I stated above, modern democracies are normatively based on the idea of citizens being considered as equals with respect to their

interests being taken into account. Therefore, the analysis of political representation in a country where important sectors of the population, indigenous peoples, have been traditionally marginalized, becomes especially meaningful. Bolivia's political system has experienced many changes over the last decades. The traditional party system created after 1985 was affected by a crisis of dissatisfaction during the 1990s, a decade characterized by economic crisis, feelings of social exclusion, inequality and structural poverty (Domingo 2005). The beginning of the century was accompanied by a series of social protests and political instability that would end years later in the restructuring of the political system. Traditionally excluded sectors asked for their inclusion in the political arena while traditionally included actors had difficulties forming a government. The 2002 elections reflected the exhaustion of the old system and the first signs of tangible political change. The Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS) emerged as a major player channeling indigenous and other dissatisfied sectors' demands. After years of political unrest and uncertainty, in 2006, Evo Morales became president of the country, inaugurating a new time marked by new rules that would affect the economic and political development of Bolivia (for a description of the transformations in the political system, see for instance Araníbar 2009; Haro 2011). This new situation and context offers a great opportunity to assess the extent to which traditionally marginalized actors have been incorporated in the political system and the role of political institutions in this process.

According to the 2001 census, the indigenous in Bolivia represent almost half of the population (49.95%) with about 4 million people.[79] This percentage varies across the

[79] Other sources raise this percentage to 62% (The World Bank 2005, Indigenous Peoples, Poverty and Human Development in Latin America: 1994-2004). Recently the results of the 2012 census were released

nine departments into which the country is divided. As the map in Figure IV.1 shows, in five out of the nine departments –La Paz, Oruro, Cochabamba, Oruro, Potosí and Chuquisaca- more than fifty percent of the population is indigenous based on the census data collected in 2001. On the contrary, the departments of the so-called *Media Luna* (the so-called "half moon", because of the geographic positioning of the departments) – Pando, Beni, Santa Cruz and Tarija- have less than 25% of indigenous populations in their territories.

(http://www.ine.gob.bo/pdf/boletin/NP_2013_2.pdf). However, these results have generated controversy and will be checked by international organisms. According to these recent figures, 69% of Bolivians do not affirm belonging to any of the 36 indigenous peoples. The question on ethnic identity did not include the category mestizo (see http://www.americaeconomia.com/politica-sociedad/politica/cuestionado-censo-2012-de-bolivia-sera-evaluado-por-organismos-internacio, http://www.la-razon.com/sociedad/Censo-bolivianos-pertenecer-pueblo-indigena_0_1879612128.html http://internacional.elpais.com/internacional/2013/08/06/actualidad/1375814823_694555.html)



Figure IV. 1. Indigenous Population by Department

One of the defining characteristics of Bolivia's indigenous populations, apart from their traditional exclusion from the political arena[80], is a history of economic deprivation. In 2004, poverty rates were much higher among the indigenous than the non-indigenous population (74% versus 53%), as well as extreme poverty rates (52% versus 27%). The indigenous are afflicted not only by poverty but also by economic inequality. In Bolivia, 10% of the population consumes 22 times more than the poorest 10%, and among the poorest 50%, two thirds of them are indigenous (The Word Bank 2005).

Thus, in Bolivia poverty and indigenous identity overlap to a considerable degree. Given the significant levels of economic and social inequality that characterize the

[80] However, I recognize that this topic is much more complex, and that indigenous groups had an important role in the 1952 Revolution. Also, in the 1980s and 1990s there were indigenous organizations with some presence in the political system (See Alcántara Sáez 1999).

indigenous in Bolivia, it is particularly relevant to consider the extent to which such disparities are reflected in the political arena, specifically with respect to representation.

As stated, the main argument tested in this chapter is that electoral rules that incentivize a closer relationship between the legislator and her constituency will cultivate comparatively better outcomes with respect to legislators' representative foci and with respect to levels of substantive and descriptive representation. In this case, I consider "better" to mean that citizens are closer to their single member district representatives than to the proportional ones regarding their preferences over the role of the government in the economy and in terms of their ethnic characteristics. The electoral rule, specifically the mixed electoral system, in Bolivia offers the ideal condition to test this kind of hypothesis.

Law 026 of June, 2010 describes the main features of Bolivia's mixed-electoral system.[81] In each of the nine departments, half the legislators are elected in single member districts and half in proportional circumscriptions. Currently, there are 130 deputies of whom 70 are elected in single member districts, 53 in multimember districts and 7 in special indigenous districts. The magnitude of proportional districts varies according to the population of the department. It ranges from 13 in La Paz to 1 in Pando. Table IV. 1 shows the distribution of the seats in the Chamber of Deputies of the Plurinational Legislative Assembly by kind of circumscription.[82]

[81] Although this electoral rule was first established in 1996, the new law in 2010, taking into account the new constitution of 2009, introduces some new features such as the inclusion of seven special circumscriptions reserved for indigenous populations.

[82] The Plurinational Legislative Assembly is composed of two chambers: the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies. This chapter focuses on the latter given its greater political relevance.

Table IV. 1. Distributions of Seats at the Chamber of Deputies in Bolivia

Department	Single Member Districts	Proportional Representatives	Special Circumscription	Total
La Paz	15	13	1	29
Santa Cruz	13	11	1	25
Cochabamba	10	8	1	19
Potosí	8	6	1	14
Chuquisaca	6	5	0	11
Oruro	5	3	1	9
Tarija	5	3	1	9
Beni	5	3	1	9
Pando	3	1	1	5
TOTAL	70	53	7	130

The remainder of this chapter will assess the extent to which this electoral arrangement generates different incentives for single member district legislators and proportional ones and produces comparatively better outcomes with respect to legislators' representative focus and substantive and descriptive representation. The following section present the data used to test these hypotheses.

Data

In order to assess the relationship between the electoral system, the role of representatives and descriptive representation in Bolivia I rely on three kinds of data. The data for representatives come from the surveys of the Parliamentary Elites of Latin America (PELA) Project conducted by the University of Salamanca (Spain) in the lower chamber in the fall of 2010 among 97 Bolivian deputies taking into account the party distribution of the chamber[83] (the distribution of the interviews by party was: 66 MAS, 26

[83] Table 1 in appendix shows the distribution of legislators by party and circumscription.

PPB and 5 Other parties). I complement these survey data with quantitative and qualitative data from the semi-structured interviews that I conducted in the summer of 2011 among 45 legislators in Bolivia. Interviews were conducted face-to-face in the offices of the Chamber of Deputies. 28 representatives belonged to MAS, 13 to PPB-Convergencia and 3 to UN and 1 to AS. 22 were proportional representatives and 23 were elected in single member districts.

Citizens' opinions about their representatives come from different waves of surveys conducted by the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) at Vanderbilt University between 2004 and 2008 in Bolivia. The data employed to analyze citizens' descriptive and substantive representation come from the AmericasBarometer 2010, based on face-to-face interviews conducted in 26 countries[84] in the Western hemisphere carried out in the first half of 2010. The sample for Bolivia is of 3,018 respondents, and is composed of nine strata representing the departments of the country. The survey was conducted primarily in Spanish, but also in Quechua and Aymara for monolingual speakers of these indigenous languages.

A Close Relationship? How Bolivian Legislators and Citizens Perceive Political Representation

Whom do Bolivian legislators believe they represent? Do the representatives selected in single-member districts and those selected at the department level behave differently? How do citizens perceive political representation in Congress? These are some of the questions addressed in this section. If institutions matter in the ways

[84] Interviews are face-to-face with the exception of the United States and Canada where the survey administered via a web interface.

anticipated by the theories presented above, we would expect that the mixed-electoral system produces different incentives among legislators depending on the rule through which they are elected. Given that uninominal districts allow for close relationships between legislators and citizens (Heitshusen, Young, and Wood 2005), we could expect that in Bolivia representatives elected in single member districts have more of a local focus than parliamentarians chosen in multimember districts. Also, they might be more likely to take into account their constituents rather than other actors in the political system. Finally, and given that under single member districts legislators do not depend as much on the political party to which they belong, we could expect that candidate-oriented campaigns is what defines their electoral success. Regarding citizens' views, we could expect that they consider that single member legislators represent them better than proportional legislators. We could also expect that citizens have more confidence in former than in the latter.

In order to test these expectations I rely on elite and public opinion surveys as well as on qualitative data from semi-structured interviews with legislators. The first part of the analysis focuses on the views that Bolivian legislators have regarding whom they represent while performing their job. The PELA survey asked members of congress whom they represent by giving them four options: the political party, all the voters in their district, party voters, or all Bolivians. Figure IV.2 shows the results for the current legislature in Bolivia taking the whole chamber as a whole.



Figure IV. 2. Whom Do Bolivian Legislators Believe They Represent?

As we can observe, the majority of legislators interviewed, more than 65%, have a national focus, in that they consider that they represent all Bolivians. Less than 25% of legislators report a focus based on their district. Finally, only 10% of them say they represent the political party they belong to or the party supporters. However, does the electoral system have any impact on how legislators define the focus of their role?



Figure IV. 3. Focus of Representation by Type of Legislator in Bolivia, 2010

Figure IV.3 presents results for that same question but now taking into account the kind of district through which the legislator was elected. Despite the fact that the most popular response is "all Bolivians", single-member district legislators are more likely to say that they represent their districts than the proportional ones. This relationship between the local focus and the electoral system is statistically significant at $p<0.05$.

Nonetheless, we could wonder about the extent to which this institutional variable fades when taking into account other variables that the literature has pointed to in explaining the role of legislators. One of the most relevant variables in this regard is "ambition," or the desire to be reelected. Classic works by Matthew (1974) and Fenno (1974) highlight how legislators' main goal is to seek reelection which is the main force conditioning their behavior in office. Following this line of thought, several studies have shown an impact that the desire of being reelected has on the role that legislators adopt (Wood and Young 1997, Soule 1969). Does this ambition influence the role that Bolivian

legislators adopt? Table IV.2 shows the result of a multinomial regression that includes both the kind of circumscription through which legislators were elected (*Uninominal*, meaning single member district, versus plurinominal as the baseline for that measure) and their personal ambition of being reelected[85] along with other controls such as ideology, the party they belong to, and their department.

Table IV. 2. Multinomial Logistic Regression of the Role of Representatives in Bolivia

	Represent the District vs. Represent all Bolivians		**Represent Party or Party Voters vs. Represent all Bolivians**	
	Coefficient	Standard Error	Coefficient	Standard Error
Uninominal	1.561**	0.705	-0.669	0.880
Ideology	0.046	0.058	-0.850*	0.501
Seeks Reelection	0.399	0.913	-41.046	1.170
MAS	-1.880	1.327	-2.480	1.839
PPB[+]	-0.829	1.395	-2.015	1.879
La Paz	-0.472	1.519	18.397***	2.540
Santa Cruz	-1.600	1.488	19.110***	2.512
Cochabamba	-1.971	1.705	20.353***	2.642
Potosi	-0.519	1.571	19.796***	2.296
Chuquisaca	-0.429	1.585	-22.203	1.250
Oruro	-42.943	1.140	19.343***	2.592
Tarija	-1.335	1.811	19.394***	2.497
Beni[++]	-1.335	1.811	-22.696	1.590
Constant	0.116	1.876	-16.685***	.
Pseudo R^2	0.238			
N	84			

Source: PELA 2010. ***p < .001; **p < .05; *p < .1, two-tailed. [+] "Other parties" is the category of reference. [++] Pando is the department of reference.

[85] The PELA questionnaire asks deputies if after this period they would like to continue in politics (question EXPP1). If they answer yes, they are asked about what position they would like to hold .The options they are given are: President of the Republic, mayor, and executive position in the regional government, in the national government, work for a public firm, legislator, or any other that they specify.

As the table depicts with the row highlighted in gray, this relationship between being elected in a single member district and adopting a local focus remains even after controlling for ambition.[86] That is to say, single-member district legislators are more like to affirm that they represent their district than the whole nation or their party. The impact of this variable is larger than traditionally important variables defining representatives' behavior, such as "seeking reelection". Therefore, institutions, and the electoral rules in this case has an impact on how legislators conceive their role in Congress in Bolivia.

The semi-structured interviews I conducted among legislators in Bolivia provide further evidence about the relevance of the electoral rule for how they conceive the focus of their representation. When legislators were asked who they represented, 12 out of the 22 proportional legislators said that they represent the *whole country*, that they have a national responsibility. In contrast, 5 of them indicated that they represent their department whereas 3 –all from the opposition- pointed out the party as the focus of their presentation. Finally two of them mentioned specific interest or groups, such as disabled people or the youth. Taking into account those elected in single member districts, 15 out of 23 stated that they represent their *district* while the rest 8 pointed out the whole nation. The majority of SMD legislators, when explaining the differences between the two kinds of legislators, highlighted how they are more legitimate (in their words) given that they are elected directly whereas the proportional ones are presented under the same list of the President. As some of them said, they are more independent from the party, work alone, closer to the voters, and have more responsibilities given the direct vote from the people.

[86] Running a regression using the variable EXPP1 (if they would like to continue in politics) instead of "seeking reelection" yields similar results (see Appendix). That is to say, pursuing any kind of political activity is not relevant in the case of Bolivia and it does not cancel the impact of the institutional variable.

In brief, these interviews illuminate a clear difference in the focus of the representation by different kinds of legislators.

The influence of institutions on legislators' perceptions of their representative role can also be assessed through analyses of whom they take into account when they perform their role as representatives. The PELA project asked legislators about this issue. Among a list, they have to select which groups/individuals are more influential when it comes to their political decisions. Figure IV.4 shows the results. As we can see, the mixed-electoral system leads to significant differences with respect to taking into account the opinion of the district. Legislators elected in single member districts are more likely to say that they listen to the citizens in their districts the most, in comparison to those elected in proportional districts (57.42% versus 32.43%). The kind of electoral district is also important regarding the role legislators give to political parties. Proportional legislators are more likely to say that they pay attention to party voters compared to uninominal representatives. In fact, no single-member district representative said they take their party into account, whereas 13.51% of those elected in proportional districts say they take their party into account first.



Figure IV. 4. Whom Do Legislators Report Taking into Account the Most?

Finally, because of this difference in incentives across the two types of representatives, we might expect differences in the factors that explain their election. We know that proportional legislators depend more on political parties given that these decide candidates' order on the ballot. On the other hand, single member district candidates depend more on their own abilities and charisma to be selected than proportional ones.



Figure IV. 5. Factors that Explain Legislators' Election

Figure IV.5 shows the responses to a question that asked legislators to identify the main factor that helps explain their election. Out of seven factors mentioned in the PELA survey, respondents had to choose one. Although the main factor mentioned by both single member district and proportional legislators is their past experience, there are statistically significant differences on one of the factors: the electoral campaign.

Single member district legislators are more likely to point out their own electoral campaign as a key factor in their electoral success. In fact, this element was frequently raised during the personal interviews I had with legislators in Bolivia. When asked about the differences between single member district and proportional legislators, almost all of the representatives elected in single member districts pointed out how they had to organize their own campaigns which involved much more resources than those spent by proportional legislators. "Proportional legislators go under the umbrella of the president

and they do not need to do a political campaign, but citizens elect us directly, they look for our picture on the ballot, and therefore we have to spend more time and resources on our own campaign if we want to be elected" said one of the legislators.[87] They highlighted how proportional legislators took advantage of appearing on the same list as the presidential candidate: "in some areas where our presidential candidate had a lot of supporters, legislators did not even bother to campaign or to show up in electoral events while I had to walk to the last corner in my district seeking votes," complained one of the SMD representatives. Proportional legislators were also aware of this situation, as one of them mentioned: "single member district deputies have more duties with citizens; I can go unnoticed, but they cannot."

However, it could be said that that there is a counter-argument, which is that different types simply are attracted into different rules, so it is a selection issue, and not an institutional one. This argument might hold; however, institutions are still important to the degree that they allow this type of sorting and self-selection into roles to take place. Also, parties know where to locate their candidates so that they can assure the seats. In fact, the interviews with legislators underlined differences in the process of selection for SMD and proportional legislators; 90% of the legislators explained how SMD candidates go through a bottom-up process where social organizations at the local level have great influence in nominating them and, in contrast, proportional legislators go through a top-down process where the structures of the party or even the party leader has the largest influence selecting them. Put succinctly, on the basis of the evidence reported here and this logic, we cannot deny the impact of institutions on creating distinctions between

[87] All translations from Spanish to English are my own.

legislators in the ways that they conceive of their role and duties and, as well, the interests they serve.

The evidence in this section demonstrates that electoral rules have an impact on representatives' perceptions of their roles and behavior in Bolivia. Single member districts offer different incentives from proportional rules, which has an impact on who is more important to them and on the different strategies they have to follow in order to gain a seat in Congress.

Next, I test the impact of electoral rules on how citizens perceive their representatives. Several rounds of the AmericasBarometer –from 1998 to 2004- asked Bolivians who represents them better: single-member district representatives or proportional ones.



Figure IV. 6. SMD Legislators are Perceived to Represent Citizens Better

As Figure IV.6 shows, the vast majority of citizens consider that single member district legislators represent them better. Also, as we observe in Figure 6, Bolivians also trust single member district legislators more than proportional ones. The difference of means is statistically significant at $p<0.05$. Therefore, the electoral rule is generating the perception among citizens that single member district legislators are closer to them, which also translates into larger confidence towards them (see Figure IV.7).



Figure IV. 7. Citizens' Trust in Legislators Varies by Type

In sum, this section has shown how political institutions, electoral rules to be more specific, have an important impact on legislators' and citizens' perceptions about political representation in Bolivia. Single member district legislators devote more attention to their district and adapt their behavior in line with the nature of the process through which they are elected. Also, citizens perceive this kind of representative as closer to them. Do these perceptions translate into tangible differences in political representation under these two difficult types of electoral rules? The next section

addresses this question assessing the extent to which the impact of electoral rules holds in the case of substantive representation.

Substantive Representation in Bolivia

Two of the theoretical premises of modern democracies are, first, that politicians' and voters' interests align as representatives act as the public's political agents (Achen 1978, Przeworski, Stokes and Manin 1999) and, second, that all citizens "should be equal to each other" in that process (Powell, 2004: 274). In other words, in ideal form, governments enact policies that reflect the balance of preferences among all citizens. However, in reality, most scholars agree that some groups - typically those with more resources - are able to exert greater policy influence (Gilens 2005, Bartels 2008). If institutions matter in shaping the incentives that vote seeking legislators face with respect to attending to different constituencies (Fenno 1978, Mayhew 1974), then it is possible that different electoral rules produce different representational outcomes for disadvantaged groups. Specifically, because single member districts encourage legislators to be particularly attentive and response to their constituents, while proportional representation tends to focus representatives on their party as a whole, we may find different patterns of representation of the poor across these types of institutions. In this section I assess this proposition with the case of policy representation in Bolivia.

One of the main concerns in the study of substantive (policy) representation is the lack of identical questions and scales to capture citizens' and representatives' preferences (Powell, 2004). I avoid this problem by relying on elite and mass survey data that both

contain the same question wording for the variables of interest. Although many studies in Western democracies rely on an empirical measurement of the concept of ideology, which represents policy preferences, using the positions along a left-right or liberal-conservative continuum, I will opt for concrete questions on policy preferences. This choice comes after some studies that suggest that the meaning of left-right differs from country to country and between citizens and legislators (Zechmeister and Corral 2010, Zechmeister and Corral 2012) in Latin America.

In the ideal case of high levels of representation, it is not necessary that all the preferences or positions of citizens and representatives are the same on *all* issues, rather that they are similar on salient issues. In the case of Latin America, the more relevant issues are those preferences related to the state-market continuum, to the democratic regime, and to morality and religion (Luna 2007). In the specific case of Bolivia, the role of the state has been particularly visible in political discourse in the last years, especially when President Evo Morales announced the nationalization of key sectors for the Bolivian economy such as gas and oil industries,[88] or more recently when the government took control over the electricity grid.[89]

Given that the role of the government in the economy is a salient issue dimension in Latin America (see also Kitschelt et al. 2010), the positions of both citizens and representatives in this regard are used to test policy congruence, in a series of analyses that pay special attention to underprivileged groups. As a secondary dimension, I also take into account preferences over social values (support for gay marriage). This topic of same-sex marriage has also entered the political agenda in the recent years. This issue has

[88] Bolivian newspapers report extensively on the process of nationalization that took place in 2006. See for instance *El Diario* May, 3, 2006.
[89] See *The New York Times* May 1, 2012.

been discussed in congress, notably when an opposition legislator recently forged a project to legalize gay civil unions.[90] The specific questions used in the analyses, with shared wording across the elite and mass surveys, are as follows:

ROS1. The Bolivian government, instead of the private sector, should own the most important enterprises and industries of the country. How much do you agree or disagree with this statement?
ROS2. The Bolivian government, more than individuals, should be primarily responsible for ensuring the well-being of the people. To what extent do you agree or disagree with this statement?
ROS3. The Bolivian government, more than the private sector, should be primarily responsible for creating jobs. To what extent to do you agree or disagree with this statement?
ROS4. The Bolivian government should implement strong policies to reduce income inequality between the rich and the poor. To what extent do you agree or disagree with this statement?
ROS5. The Bolivian government, more than the private sector, should be primarily responsible for providing retirement pensions. How much do you agree or disagree with this statement?
ROS6. The Bolivian government, more than the private sector should be primarily responsible for providing health care services. How much do you agree or disagree with this statement?
D6. How strongly do you approve or disapprove of same-sex couples having the right to marry?

Within the survey, responses to the role of the state (ROS) questions are given on a 1-7 scale where 1 means (strongly disagree) and 7 (totally agree). Responses to the same-sex marriage question are given on a 1-10 scale where 1 means strongly disapprove and 10 strongly approve.

As stated above, democracies are not only theoretically premised on the idea of substantive representation but also on the idea of equality. On the one hand, scholars identify poor citizens as an underprivileged group whose policies preferences are not taken into account to the same degree as others (Gilens 1998, Bartels 2008). On the other

[90] See *La Prensa* May 24, 2012.

hand, indigenous populations have been traditionally excluded from the political arena in Latin America. This chapter focuses on these two groups. Even though much of the indigenous population in Bolivia is poor, the AmericasBarometer data in Table IV.3, shows that there are poor citizens who are not indigenous and vice versa. Most citizens identify themselves as *mestizos* (2,169 out of 2,856). Nonetheless, looking at those who fall into the poorest quintile, 25.29% are indigenous versus the 4.33% who identify as white. At the other extreme, 7.17% of those in the wealthiest end are indigenous versus 11.58% who are white.

Table IV. 3. Wealth and Self-Identification in Bolivia

Ethnic Self-Identification	**Wealth Quintiles**					
	Poorest	**2**	**3**	**4**	**Richest**	**Total**
White	4.33 %	5.55 %	4.90 %	7.96 %	11.58 %	194
Mestizo	68.89 %	72.94 %	78.95 %	79.65 %	80.15 %	2,169
Indigenous	25.29 %	20.00 %	14.70 %	11.50 %	7.17 %	456
Others	1.5 %	1.51 %	1.44 %	0.88 %	1.1 %	37
Total	601	595	551	565	544	2,856

Source: AmericasBarometer by LAPOP, 2010

I will assess the extent to which poor and indigenous citizens in Bolivia are represented by their legislators. First, I will assess whether or not the policy preferences of those citizens in the first quintile of wealth[91] are close or not to the preferences of the national representatives compared to the preferences of those in the fifth quintile of wealth. Then, I will take into account the difference between single member district

[91] I will use the variable wealth in the AmericasBarometer which takes into account household assets. See Córdova 2009. This measure has the advantage of not having as many missing values as income. 15% of respondents did not answer to the question on income, while we have 98% of respondents in the wealth measure.

legislators and proportional ones. Finally, I will repeat the same analysis considering indigenous versus white respondents.

A first assumption that needs testing is the expectation that different groups have different policy preferences. Theories on self-interest state that economically vulnerable citizens, recipients or at risk of being recipients of social welfare programs are more likely to support a stronger presence of the government or state (Hasenfeld and Rafferty 1989, Coleman 2001). The underlying argument is that citizens are not going to support government programs "where they do not think that they will benefit and where do not think the beneficiaries are legitimate" (Sanders 1988:323). Therefore, we could expect that poor citizens (versus rich) and indigenous (versus non indigenous) hold different attitudes towards the role of the state. Table IV.4 shows the differences between those in the lowest quintile of wealth and those in the highest one regarding their policy preferences, following the same procedure as in Chapter IV.As the difference of means test shows, only in two areas there are statistically significant differences: the state as owner of the main industries, as the main responsible for reducing income inequalities. Unlike in Chapter IV I opt to analyze all the items on the role of the state separately to study the case of Bolivia more in-depth. Although both groups prefer a strong role of the state, poor citizens prefer a larger involvement.

Table IV. 4. Differences in policy preferences between poor and rich citizens in Bolivia

	Mean for Poorest	Mean for Wealthiest	Difference
State as owner of main industries	4.92	4.22	0.70*
State responsible for ensuring the well-being of the people	5.23	5.28	0.05
State being responsible for creating jobs	5.49	5.36	0.13
State should reduce income inequality between the rich and the poor	5.42	5.07	0.34*
State should provide retirement pensions	5.46	5.41	0.047
State responsible for providing health care services	5.72	5.69	0.035
Support for Gay Marriage	3.34	3.38	0.04

Note: based on postestimation test (lincom). Differences passing a significance threshold of $p<0.05$ are marked with an asterisk.

In the same way, Table IV.5 presents the differences between those self-identified as white as those self-identified as indigenous. In this case there are statistically significant differences in the state as owner of main industries, the state as responsible ensuring the well being of the people and the state as responsible for reducing income inequalities between the rich and the poor. Indigenous citizens are more likely to favor a strong involvement of the government in the economy.

Table IV. 5. Differences in policy preferences between indigenous and white citizens in Bolivia

	Mean for Indigenous	Mean for Whites	Difference
State as owner of main industries	5.11	3.80	1.30*
State responsible for ensuring the well-being of the people	5.43	5.15	0.28*
State being responsible for creating jobs	5.42	5.58	0.15
State should reduce income inequality between the rich and the poor	5.21	5.51	0.30*
State should provide retirement pensions	5.46	5.58	0.12
State responsible for providing health care services	5.60	5.76	0.16
Support for Gay Marriage	3.11	2.95	0.16

Note: Differences passing a significance threshold of $p<0.05$ are marked with an asterisk.

With this picture of policy preferences among different groups of the society in Bolivia, I now turn to assess the congruence between citizens and legislators in these same areas. Measures to assess policy congruence have varied across studies. Some scholars have relied on correlation coefficients (Miller and Stokes 1963), absolute distances between positions and regression coefficients (Achen 1978). Bartels (2008: 254) analyzes political equality regressing roll call votes for each representative on the opinions of her constituents divided by the number of respondents from her circumscription, controlling for the party of the legislator. I start by presenting the extent to which citizens and legislators' policy preferences are aligned using the Golder and Stramski's (2010) many-to-many measure of congruence. The following figures show the distribution of preferences of citizens and legislators as a whole, following the Golder

and Stramski (2010) measure of congruence. This measure captures the degree to which the "collective body of representatives reflects the ideological preferences of the citizens" (p. 10). This measure of congruence compares the cumulative distribution functions (CDFs) of citizens and their representatives. A country has a high level of congruence between citizens and representatives when the CDFs of these two are similar and the distance between them is small. Therefore, I will compare the poor' and the representatives' cumulative distributions versus the wealthy and the representatives' ones. While in Chapter IV I focused on the distance between the poor and legislators, here I analyze the distance between the poor, the wealthy and legislators and I expect the latter to be similar and closer, compared to the former.

Table IV. 6. Policy congruence in Bolivia by Wealth

	Congruence Poor/Legislators	**Congruence Rich/Legislators**
State as owner of main industries	**0.632**	0.937
State responsible for ensuring the well-being of the people	0.968	**0.915**
State being responsible for creating jobs	0.477	**0.435**
State should reduce income inequality between the rich and the poor	**0.882**	1.205
State should provide retirement pensions	0.539	**0.467**
State responsible for providing health care services	0.483	**0.453**
Support for Gay Marriage	0.957	**0.916**

Looking at Table IV.6, we observe that rich citizens are closer to legislators as a whole, at least in five of the items considered here. Poor citizens are closer to legislators in two items, the state as owner of main industries and the state being the main responsible for reducing income inequalities, items on where there were statistically significant differences between poor and rich citizens.

Table IV. 7. Policy congruence in Bolivia by Ethnicity

	Congruence Indigenous/Legislators	Congruence White/Legislators
State as owner of main industries	**0.535**	1.042
State responsible for ensuring the well-being of the people	**0.739**	1.076
State being responsible for creating jobs	0.479	**0.451**
State should reduce income inequality between the rich and the poor	1.205	**1.148**
State should provide retirement pensions	0.648	**0.564**
State responsible for providing health care services	**0.381**	0.587
Support for Gay Marriage	**0.718**	1.011

Does the mixed electoral system have any impact on substantive representation? The following sets of figures represent the CDFs of rich/poor citizens and single member/proportional district legislators. I only present those cases where there are significant differences in the preferences of poor/versus rich citizens, that is to say,

regarding the role of the state as owner of the main industries, and as responsible for reducing inequalities.



Figure IV. 8. Congruence on the Role of the State as the Owner of Industries by Type of Legislator and Levels of Wealth

Figure IV.8 presents the CDFs of rich/poor citizens and single member/proportional district legislators regarding the role of the state as the owner of the main industries of the country. The solid lines represent the legislators (black for SMD and grey for proportional) and the dashed for citizens in the lowest and highest quintiles of wealth. Results show that the closest distributions are between those in the poorest quintile and proportional representatives (0.24), followed by the poorest and the SMD representatives (0.49). On the other hand, the preferences of those in the wealthiest quintile are worse represented, and they are closer to proportional legislators (0.46) than

to the SMD (1.197). In this case, contrary to the expectation, neither of the two groups of citizens is closer to the SMD.



Figure IV. 9. Congruence on the Role of the State Reducing Inequality by Type of Legislator and Levels of Wealth

Figure IV.9 presents the CDFs of rich/poor citizens and single member/proportional district legislators regarding the role of the state as the main responsible for reducing income inequality in the country. Again, wealthy citizens are less well-represented than the poor ones, and preferences of proportional representatives are closer to citizens than SMD's preferences (0.60 versus 1.00 for the poorest and 0.94 versus 1.34 for the wealthiest).

What happens when we assess policy congruence by taking into account self-identified ethnicity? Figures IV.10 , IV.11 and IV.12 present the CDF for the three issues

on which there were statistically significant differences between indigenous and white populations.



Figure IV. 10. Congruence on the Role of the State as the Owner of Industries by Type of Legislator and Race

Figure IV.10 presents the CDFs of white/indigenous citizens and single member/proportional district legislators regarding the role of the state as the owner of the main industries of the country. Again, the solid lines represent the legislators (black for SMD and grey for proportional) and the dashed for citizens, longer for indigenous and shorter for whites. Results show that the closest distributions are between those in the indigenous and SMD (0.21) followed by the indigenous and proportional representatives (0.52). The preferences of those identified as white are worse represented, especially considering SMD (1.29) compared to proportional ones (0.55). In this case, only indigenous are closer to the SMD legislators.



Figure IV. 11. Congruence on the Role of the State as Responsible for Ensuring Well-Being by Type of Legislator and Race

Figure IV.11 presents the CDFs of rich/poor citizens and single member/proportional district legislators regarding the role of the state as the main responsible for ensuring the well-being of the people. Again, white citizens are worse represented than the indigenous ones, and preferences of proportional representatives are barely closer to both groups of citizens than the preferences of SMD legislators (0.71 versus 0.72 for indigenous and 1.09 versus 1.08 for whites).



Figure IV. 12. Congruence on the Role of the State as Responsible for Reducing Income Inequality by Type of Legislator and Race

Finally, Figure IV.12 presents the CDFs of rich/poor citizens and single member/proportional district legislators regarding the role of the state as the main responsible for reducing income inequality. In this case, both whites and indigenous are closest to the proportional representatives (0.80 and 0.94) than to the SMD legislators (1.27 and 1.34).

In sum, we have seen how the electoral rule does not have a homogenous influence across the different policy aspects, with the outcome sometimes contrary to what theory would expect. Theory would suggest that SMD legislators are closest to citizens, but we have seen that this is not always the case. Further, we find that poor citizens, contrary to which much of the literature suggest are better represented that wealthy ones, at least in Bolivia.

Descriptive Representation in Bolivia

The importance of institutions can also be assessed by considering descriptive representation. The case of Bolivia also allows me to assess this type of representation following the same hypotheses and using similar analyses to those discussed above. Descriptive representation has received an increasing amount of attention from scholars, especially looking at the extent to which political systems have incorporated indigenous sectors in recent decades (Sieder 2002, Van Cott 2005, Yashar 2005, Lucero 2008). The literature has identified disadvantaged groups that traditionally have played a limited role in politics, such as women and, in the case of Latin America, indigenous populations. Most of the research on these two groups has been approached from a descriptive perspective of representation. In Pitkin's terms (1972), when representation is defined as "standing for", we are referring to descriptive representation which occurs when "a person or thing stands for others by being sufficiently like them" (p. 80). The importance of descriptive representation emerged in the 1990s when many scholars looking at the United States considered that fair representation should allow social groups to define and defend their own interests (Young 1990, Phillips 1995, Williams 1998, Mansbridge 1999).

This dimension of descriptive representation is analyzed in this section of the chapter. I will assess descriptive representation by taking into account the skin color of both legislators and citizens. I will use a measure developed by Professor Edward Telles of Princeton University's Project on Ethnicity and Race in Latin America (PERLA). This measure is based on a skin color palette that ranges from 1 to 11 with lower numbers

representing lighter skin tones and larger numbers corresponding to darker tones. This measure was used in the last round of surveys of the AmericasBarometer. Then, I used this same scale to create my own data set on the skin color of preventatives in Bolivia.[92] The use of this skin color palette allows me to have the same measure across samples.

I assess the extent to which the mixed-electoral system has any impact on descriptive representation. As I stated above, we could expect that citizens are closer to single member district legislators than to proportional district members. I analyze this by calculating the absolute distance between a citizen's skin color and the skin color of both of her representatives (plurinominal[93] and uninominal). Table 4 in the appendix presents those results.

The fact that citizens are closer in skin tone to their uninominal representatives varies from department to department. In only five cases, i.e. La Paz, Santa Cruz, Oruro, Pando and Beni, citizens are closer to the SMD representative than to the mean of the proportional ones. Therefore, the evidence is not as strong as we would have expected. In Tarija, for instance, citizens are closer in skin tone to the proportional representatives than to the SMD representative ones.

These analyses do not take into account parties or citizens' partisan preferences. As has been addressed in previous chapters, parties to the left seem to have an impact in different dimensions of political inequality, especially when analyzing perceptions of unequal representation in Latin America. The case of Bolivia offers a great opportunity to

[92] In neither case respondents or legislators see the color palette. Interviewers from the AmericasBarometer were asked to code the skin color at the end of the interviews. I coded the skin color of legislators while the Secretary of the Chamber called the roll. When we compare skin tones with self-identification, we observe a relationship between these two forms of measuring race (See Table 3 in Appendix.).
[93] I calculated the mean of the proportional legislators' skin tone.

test the relationship between a strong presence of a leftist party[94] and representation of underprivileged groups. We might expect that parties capture part of this descriptive representation. In fact, when we measure the skin tone of citizens and elites by taking into account the party with which they identify and they party to which they belong, I find both statistically significant differences among parties and a strong correlation between parties and skin tone. Both MAS and MAS supporters have the darkest skin tone (above 5) and the difference with the rest of parties is statistically significant (at $p<0.05$). Therefore, it seems that parties are capturing the ethnic divide as we would expect in contemporary Bolivia, and as Table IV.8 shows.

Table IV. 8. Skin Tone and Political Parties in Bolivia

	Legislators			**Citizens**		
Party	Mean	St Dev	N	Mean	St dev	N
MAS	5.61	1.03	88	5.2	1.39	1267
AS	4	1.41	2	4.78	1.39	46
PPB	4.16	1.11	37	4.55	1.4	383
UN	3.33	9.57	3	4.58	1.39	72
Correlation	0.871					

Finally, another way to assess the relevance of electoral rules is to look at the party dominating the legislative arena and to see where it is more successful. Figure IV.13 depicts a map of Bolivia divided into its nine departments with the percentage of both types of legislators that the MAS party has in each department. The gray departments are those where the majority of citizens are indigenous according to the 2001 census.

[94] For a typology of leftist parties in Latin America see Levitsky and Roberts (2011). These authors define MAS as a new political movement with dispersed authority that has a strong control over natural resources and calls for income redistribution.



Figure IV. 13. MAS Success by Type of Circumscription

The map shows how MAS was more successful in those departments with larger proportions of indigenous populations. In most of them, the party was especially successful wining the single member districts. In departments such as La Paz, and Oruro, the party won all of them. However, in the *Media Luna* departments, it was relatively more successful winning proportional seats than the majoritarian ones. Therefore, we could say that the electoral rules do not have uniform effects across the country. Further, it is clear that there is a relationship between the ethnic characteristics of the region and the performance of parties across different kinds of circumscriptions.

Conclusion

The chapter addresses the extent to which different institutional arrangements affect political representation and more specifically the representation of historically under-represented groups in Bolivia. It has examined subjective perceptions of legislators' roles and objective measures of policy and descriptive representation. The principal argument tested here is that electoral rules that incentivize a close relationship between the legislator and her constituency will cultivate comparatively better outcomes with respect to legislators' representative focus and substantive and descriptive representation.

Analyses have shown how institutions do not have a uniform impact across all the dimensions examined. While the electoral rules have a large impact on citizens' and legislators' perceptions, there is little evidence that institutions matter for substantive and descriptive representation. Measures of the congruence between legislators' policy stances on economic and social issues and citizens' stances on those same issues reveal that in fact that the poor and the indigenous are better represented than the rich and the non-indigenous. Further it is the case that citizens are not always closer to single member district representatives than to proportional legislators. In a similar manner, only in half of the cases, representatives elected in single member districts are more likely to share the skin tone of citizens than those elected through proportional ones. However, as the data shows, it seems to be that the electoral rules somehow mediate the relationship between the ethnic characteristics of the departments and the performance of the majoritarian party across different kinds of circumscriptions. This last finding will

require further analysis and assessing the extent to which other institutions such as political parties have an impact on substantive and descriptive representation in Bolivia.

Finally, it is worth noting that institutions, as found in Chapters II and III, have the strongest effects on perceptions. It seems that institutions impact the attitudes of both citizens and legislators, and this impact is larger than the one over substantive representation, at least as I have measured it in this dissertation. Also, it has been clear across all chapters that leftist parties matter for perceptions on representation and substantive representation. The next chapter summarizes the main findings of this dissertation and opens new avenues of research.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

Political systems in Latin America seem to have failed to fulfill citizens' expectations, which has led to high and growing dissatisfaction with the main political institutions of representation, and to some scholars to point out to a crisis of representation (Hagopian 2005; Mainwaring et al 2006). This dissertation has looked at the issue of political representation in the region with different eyes, focusing on the extent to which this failure of representation is affecting all groups within the population equally. More specifically, this study has focused on the extent to which perceptions of unequal representation and substantive representation vary between those in the lower socioeconomic strata and those in higher one. Furthermore, my dissertation has addressed the question of whether there are some institutional designs (namely with respect to the nature of and rules governing the electoral system) and/or cultural features (in particular, those of a participatory culture) that might lead to more equal representation outcomes than others.

This final chapter reviews the main findings in this study, and highlights how it relates to different aspects of representation and proposes further analysis to complement what it has been presented here.

As it has been presented through the dissertation, different theoretical approaches argue that poor citizens lack the means and resources to hold public officials accountable

and, given their lack of participation and ability to influence politics, representatives are under-responsive to this sub-group (Bartels 2008, Taylor-Robinson 2010).

One of the first objectives of my dissertation was to assess the degree of this unequal representation by looking at both perceptions and substantive representation in Latin America. Chapter II focused on perceptions and found that as expected, citizens in ten Latin American countries do not perceive that politicians defend the interests of the socioeconomically advantaged and disadvantaged evenly. Interestingly, those in the wealthiest quintiles of wealth are less likely to consider that politicians defend their interests. Apart from assessing perceptions about whom public officials represent, Chapter II focused on the perceived gap between the actual and the ideal situation of political inequality. In this case, those in the lowest quintiles of wealth were more likely to perceive a larger gap in their perceptions between the actual and the ideal situation. Chapter III started by assessing the extent to which the preferences of the poor in Latin America are reflected in legislators' preferences, as the literature for advanced democracies has suggested. It showed that in that with the exceptions of Bolivia and Uruguay, in the rest of countries in Latin America, legislators' preferences are closer to those of the wealthiest than to the poorest (especially regarding preferences related to the role of the state and attitudes towards gay marriage).

However, apart from assessing levels of underrepresentation, the second objective of the dissertation was to examine the role of political institutions in these representational dynamics. When addressing perceptions of representation, I found that leftist political parties have a large impact. There is a strong correlation between the presence of leftist parties in the political system and lower levels of perceived political

inequalities. It could be argued that citizens see these kinds of parties as vehicles for shrinking the distance in the representation of poor versus rich constituents. Also, electoral institutions are key factors to have into account when addressing political representation. Results have shown that the level of proportionality does not have any impact on perceptions of political inequality. The magnitude of electoral systems appears as a relatively significant factor, in the sense that a large number of small electoral districts is related to lower gaps in political inequality. Small districts, that is to say districts electing 5 or less representatives, might be having the impact of generating tighter bonds between citizens and representatives where citizens see politicians as taking them into account. In smaller districts public officials have more incentives to respond to their constituents as control and clarity of responsibility is enhanced in contrast to large districts. Finally, one institutional feature that seems to have a large impact is the effective number of parties. However, contrary to some expectations, large numbers of parties in congress does not translate into perceptions of more inclusive systems. In fact, in countries with low number of parties, citizens perceive low levels of political inequality. This finding may suggest that fragmentation has different impacts in Western democracies and newer ones. While evidence from older democracies suggests that fragmentation creates a sense of inclusion and more points of view represented in the system, in Latin America it might be a sign of instability. Certainly, the impact of fragmentation in Latin America is a topic that requires further research. Lastly, a participatory culture, at least in terms of turnout is strongly related to perceptions of political inequality.

Taking into account substantive representation, few institutional arrangements are related to higher levels of political congruence at the aggregate level. The clearest relationships are found when focusing on preferences over the role of the state as owner of the main industries of the country. The strongest relationships are found between small districts and the effective number of parties. On the one hand, the more small districts in a system the closer the distance between the poor and legislators. On the other hand, the larger the effective number of parties the larger the distance between them considering this kind of preference. Finally, there is a somehow strong relationship between levels of turnout and congruence regarding the role of the state as owner of the most important industries. In any case, the relationships are not as strong as in the case of perceptions of representation.

Finally, the last part of my project was devoted to an in-depth analysis of uneven representation and its relationship to electoral rules, institutions and political culture with respect to the case of Bolivia. This country offers a great opportunity to assess the impact of electoral institutions on political representation given the existence of a mixed electoral system which creates a congress comprised of legislators elected by two different sets of electoral rules. Also, Bolivia is a good example of a country with a large proportion of indigenous peoples, who have been historically marginalized, culturally and politically and have suffered economic deprivation (Van Cott 2003). Therefore, this case allowed me to assess the impact of political institutions the representation of traditionally marginalized populations. In addition to considering policy representation, I also assessed ascriptive representation (using skin tone). Analyses have shown how institutions do not have a uniform impact across all the dimensions examined. While the electoral rules have

a large impact on citizens' and legislators' perceptions, there is little evidence that institutions matter for substantive and descriptive representation. Measures of the congruence between legislators' policy stances on economic and social issues and citizens' stances on those same issues reveal that in fact that the poor and the indigenous are better represented than the rich and the non-indigenous. Further it is the case that citizens are not always closer to single member district representatives than to proportional legislators. In a similar fashion, only in half of the cases, representatives elected in single member districts are more likely to share the skin tone of citizens than those elected through proportional ones. However, as the data shows, it seems to be that the electoral rules somehow mediate the relationship between the ethnic characteristics of the departments and the performance of the majoritarian party across different kinds of circumscriptions. This last finding will require further analysis and assessing the extent to which other institutions such as political parties have an impact on substantive and descriptive representation in Bolivia.

Expanding the analysis on Bolivia to the rest of my research to other Latin American countries constitutes one part of what I intend to accomplish in the future. Following the same methodology to measure descriptive representation by coding the skin color of legislators in the eleven countries[95] object of my dissertation, I will be able to assess the extent to which representation in Latin America is based on policy or descriptive characteristics of the constituency (e.g., social class or skin color), or both.

As I mentioned before, some scholars have pointed out a crisis of political representation in Latin America and how it may erode the quality of democracy (Hagopian 2005; Mainwaring et al 2006). However, this link has not been tested

[95] Congress web pages contain the pictures of legislators that will allow me to code their skin color.

systematically. Over the last decade several studies show growing levels of discontent with democracy in the region (UNDP 2004) and with the institutions through which representation is formally channeled, political parties (Corral 2008) and parliaments (Carrillo-Flórez and Petri 2009); this dissatisfaction has contributed to the so called crisis of representation. However, none of the studies has tested the extent to which the (lack of) correspondence between citizens and legislators´ policy preferences affects attitudes towards democracy at the individual level. Only, Luna and Zechmeister (2005) show how at the aggregate level, representation is positively correlated with the institutionalization of the party system, the strength of leftish parties and economic development, whereas it is negative related to perceptions of fraud and poverty.

What I intend to assess is the relationship between differences in the way subgroups of the population are represented and their attitudes towards democracy and political institutions. I expect that citizens who have their interests aligned with their representatives will show higher levels of support for democracy, satisfaction with democracy and trust in the main institutions of political representation (namely political parties and parliaments).

My dependent variables will relate to four dimensions: system support, satisfaction with democracy, trust in political parties and trust in parliaments. The dependent variables will be measure using responses to questions included in the 2010 wave of surveys in the AmericasBarometer. Through regression analyses I will test the relationship between policy representation and these attitudes towards democracy. Also, I will test the extent to which the attitudes of marginalized citizens (poor and indigenous

groups) towards democracy is mediated by how well (or bad) their policy preferences are represented by their legislators.

Finally, this dissertation has sidelined one of the topics that arise when talking about the representation of poor sectors, and that I would like to address in further research. Some scholars argue that those with lower income are more interested in getting particularistic benefits than in being represented substantively (Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2000, Griffin and Flavin 2010). Also, others argue that some institutional arrangements such as open list are link to practices such as clientelism and pork barrel (Ames 1995, Samuels 2002). Using the survey data from the University of Salamanca´s Latin American Elite Project (PELA), I would like to provide some evidence in that regards, assessing clientelism from the perspective of congressmen. The survey has some items that will allow me to assess the extent to which legislators in Latin America offer gifts/goods in exchange for votes, and under which circumstances this practice is more common. Many scholars have argued that poverty, inequality or other lower social indicators are strong predictors of clientelism (Brusco, Nazareno and Stokes 2004; Desposato 2001). By looking at the levels of poverty in each district I will be able if legislators representing the poorest districts are more likely to engage in clientelar practices. I will also be able to assess the effect of district magnitude in clientelism.

Finally, there are other factors that may shape perceptions of political inequality that I would like to explore in further research, such as the role of political elites discourse, the style of leadership and the role of mass media.

In sum, recent studies emphasize the need of more studies on political representation, especially with respect to how political actors establish their links with

citizens and how they accomplish their functions and satisfy citizens' needs. In the end, political representation theoretically has important consequences for the quality of democracy (Hagopian 2005). My research agenda speaks to current levels of representation across key groups in Latin America; factors that increase representation; and, the potential consequences of representation for democratic attitudes.

The analysis of representation is especially relevant in a region like Latin America where the gap between citizens and those who staff their political institutions could lead to increasing calls to attenuate or even end liberal, representative democracy and replace it with other, less democratic forms of government. In the end, I find strong evidence that electoral rules have important influences on perceptions of citizens and of legislators regarding representation, but few substantial effects on actual substantive representation (measured as either policy or via descriptive measures in the case of Bolivia). Other factors matter more than mere electoral rules. Two of these are the electoral mobilization of citizens and the presence of leftist parties who place priority on matters of political inclusion.

APPENDIX

Chapter II. Appendix

Figure 1. Citizens' Perceptions of Politicians Defending the Rich



Figure 2. Determinants of the Perception that Politicians Defend the Rich Using Quintiles of Wealth



Table 1. Multinomial Regression. Who do politicians defend?

	Rich		Poor	
	Coef.	Lin. Std. Error	Coef.	Lin. Std. Error
Quintiles of Wealth	-.0770**	.0238	-.0425	.0324
Education	-.0032	.0081	-.0304**	.0115
Size of Place of Residence	-.0106	.0277	-.0316	.0369
Female	-.0418	.0521	.0367	.0726
Age	-.0131	.0189	-.0161	.0240
Mexico	1.799***	.1896	-.0525	.1952
Guatemala	1.790***	.1683	-1.064***	.2571
Costa Rica	1.964***	.1783	.5818**	.1930
Colombia	1.805***	.1756	-.8441***	.2107
Peru	1.697***	.1763	-.4268**	.1912
Chile	1.429***	.1901	-.8267**	.2553
Uruguay	.3199	.1841	-.5763**	.1780
Brazil	2.063***	.1747	-.5336**	.2185
Argentina	.8209***	.1800	-.6321**	.2071
Constant	-.7675***	.1879	-.1056	.2120
N	7739			
F	16.69			

Note: Country of Reference: Venezuela. Category of Reference: Neutral Perception
Significant at ***p<0.01 **p<0.05, **p<0.10

Figure 3. Citizens' Perceptions of Politicians Defending the Rich (Ideal Situation)



Figure 4. Distribution of Responses to Questions on political inequality




Colombia
45
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
Poor
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
Rich
Actual
Ideal


Costa Rica
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
Poor
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
Rich
Actual
Ideal


Guatemala
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
Poor
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
Rich
Actual
Ideal


Mexico
50
40
30
20
10
0
Poor
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
Rich
Actual
Ideal


Peru
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
Poor
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
Rich
Actual
Ideal


Uruguay
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
Poor
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
Rich
Actual
Ideal


Venezuela
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
Poor
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
Rich
Actual
Ideal

Table 2. Sociodemographic determinants of the PIRG

	Gap	
	Coef.	Lin. Std. Error
Quintiles of Wealth	-.079***	.015
Education	-.0073	.015
Size of Place of Residence	.0127	.021
Female	-.0064	.010
Age	-.0087	.012
Mexico	.140***	.015
Guatemala	.098***	.013
Costa Rica	.147***	.016
Colombia	.1472***	.014
Peru	.1173***	.014
Chile	.127***	.015
Uruguay	.046***	.011
Brazil	.130***	.015
Argentina	.057***	.014
Constant	-.332***	.034
N	7751	
F	19.04	

Note: Country of Reference: Venezuela.
Significant at ***p<0.01 **p<0.05, **p<0.10

Chapter III. Appendix

Table 1. Description of Citizens and Elite Survey Samples

	AmericasBarometer			PELA			
	N	Sampling error	Fieldwork date	N	Sampling error	Fieldwork date	Legislature
Argentina	1,505	±2.5%	March-April 2010	70 (257)	±7,88	March-July 2010	2009-2013
Bolivia	3,018	±1.8%	February-March 2010	97 (130)	±5,09	September-October 2010	2010-2014
Brazil	2,882	±1.8%	March-April 2010	129 (513)	±8,38	April-July 2010	2007-2011
Chile	1,965	±2.5%	March-May 2010	86 (120)	±6,03	June-July 2010	2010-2014
Colombia	1,506	±2.5%	April-May 2010	91(165)	±7,32	December 2010-April 2011	2010-2014
Costa Rica	1,500	±2.5%	January-February 2010	56 (57)	±0,00	June-July 2010	2010-2014
Dominican Republic	1,500	±2.5%	February-March 2010	78 (183)	±8,91	Feb.-April 2011	2010-2014
El Salvador	1,497	±2.5%	April-May 2012	62 (84)		Summer 2012	2012-2015
Guatemala	1,479	±2.5%	March-April 2012	87 (158)	±6.79	March-April 2012	2012-2016
Honduras	1,596	±2.5%	January-February 2010	91 (128)	±5.84	March-April 2010	2010-2014
Mexico	1,562	±2.5%	January-February 2010	98 (500)	±9.27	August-December 2010	2009-2012
Nicaragua	1,686	±2.4%	February-March 2012	52 (91)	±7.71	April-May 2012	2012-2017
Peru	1,500	±2.5%	January-February 2010	80 (120)	±4.76	August-September 2010	2006-2011
Uruguay	1,500	±2.5%	March-April 2010	79 (99)	±5.01	May-June 2010	2010-2015

Table 2. Reliability Coefficients for the Role of the State Index, for citizens and legislators

	Alpha for Citizens	Alpha for Legislators
Argentina	0.9053	0.778
Bolivia	0.8834	0.726
Brazil	0.8174	0.675
Chile	0.8553	0.858
Colombia	0.8143	0.861
Costa Rica	0.8352	0.775
Dominican Republic	0.7566	0.794
El Salvador	0.7092	0.804
Guatemala	0.8506	0.536
Honduras	0.8913	0.716
Mexico	0.7758	0.645
Nicaragua	0.7604	0.534
Peru	0.8705	0.792
Uruguay	0.7828	0.791

Table 3. Congruence between Legislators and Poor/Rich Citizens in Latin America

Argentina



Bolivia



Brazil





Chile







Colombia





Costa Rica





Dominican Republic



El Salvador





Honduras







Mexico





Nicaragua





Peru



Uruguay







Table 4. Electoral Systems in Latin America and Institutional Features

	Type of list	Formula	LSQ	ENP	Average District Magnitude	% Small Districts
Argentina	Close party list	d'Hondt			10.7	41.66
Bolivia	Close party list		3.76	1.85	5.88	92.6
Brazil	Open list	Hare	3	9.32	19	0
Chile	Open list		6.87	5.64	2	100
Colombia	Limited open list	d'Hondt	7.01	4.95	4.84	72.72
Costa Rica	Close party list	Hare	4.96	3.9	8.14	57.14
Dominican Republic	Open list	d'Hondt	6.18	2.01	5.59	78.12
El Salvador	Close party list	Hare	3.36	3.19	6	64.28
Guatemala	Close party list	d'Hondt	9.33	4.14	6.58	62.5
Honduras	Open list	Hare	2.58	2.3	7.11	44.44
Mexico	Close party list		10.46	2.75	40	65.57
Nicaragua	Close party list	Hare	6.41	1.8	5	72.22
Peru	Open list	d'Hondt	13.23	3.97	4.8	88
Uruguay	Close party list	Hare	1.1	2.65	5.1	89.47

Chapter IV. Appendix

Table 1. Distribution of Legislators by Party

	Proportional Representative	Single Member District	Special Circumscription
MAS-IPSP	33	49	6
PPB-Convergencia	17	19	1
Unidad Nacional	3		
AS		2	
Total	53	70	7

Table 2. Multinomial Logistic Regression of the Role of Representatives in Bolivia

	Represent the District		Represent Party or Party Voters	
	Coefficient	Standard Error	Coefficient	Standard Error
Uninominal	1.382**	0.690	-0.831	0.890
Ideology	0.040	0.048	-0.792	0.485
Seeks Political Position	-0.202	0.829	-1.253	1.085
MAS	-1.732	1.344	-2.798	1.860
PPB[+]	-0.598	1.415	-2.333	1.839
La Paz	-0.114	1.522	17.845***	2.749
Santa Cruz	-2.222	1.535	18.588***	2.939
Cochabamba	-2.065	1.711	19.597***	2.942
Potosi	-0.346	1.581	19.459***	2.650
Chuquisaca	0.016	1.559	-12.667	1.570
Oruro	-33.998	1.270	19.217***	3.073
Tarija	-0.799	1.612	18.913***	2.821
Beni[++]	-1.285	1.802	-14.197	1.880
Constant	0.358	2.161	-15.035	.
Pseudo R^2	0.237			
N	85			

Source: PELA 2010. ***p < .001; **p < .05; *p < .1, two-tailed. Reference category: Represent All Bolivians. [+] "Other parties" is the category of reference. [++] Pando is the department of reference

Table 3. Relationship between self-identification and skin color

Self-identification	Mean (skin color)	Std. Dev.	N
White	3.30	3.30	198
Mixed	4.91	1.33	2213
Indigenous	5.65	1.31	463
Black	6.56	2.44	16

Source: AmericasBarometer 2010

Table 4. Are citizens closer to uninominal or plurinominal legislators?

District	Citizen's skin tone	Uninominal's skin tone	Plurinominal's skin tone	Distance to Uninominal (absolute value)	Distance Plurinominal (absolute value)
La Paz					
1	5.75	6	4.69	**0.25**	1.06
2	5.7	6	4.69	**0.3**	1.01
3	4	7	4.69	3	0.69
4	6.43	7	4.69	**0.57**	1.74
5	6.3	5	4.69	**1.3**	1.61
6	5.95	6	4.69	**0.05**	1.26
7	4.62	6	4.69	1.38	0.07
8	5.16	5	4.69	**0.16**	0.47
9	6.38	6	4.69	**0.38**	1.69
10	4.07	7	4.69	2.93	0.62
11	3.91	4	4.69	**0.09**	0.78
12	3.37	4	4.69	**0.63**	1.32
13	6.75	6	4.69	**0.75**	2.06
14	3.50	3	4.69	**0.5**	1.19
Santa Cruz					
15	5.4	6	3.9	**0.6**	1.5
16	6.34	7	3.9	**0.66**	2.44
17	5.2	3	3.9	2.2	1.3
18	4.35	5	3.9	0.65	0.45
19	5.1	5	3.9	**0.1**	1.2
20	5.37	6	3.9	**0.63**	1.47
21	6.8	6	3.9	**0.8**	2.9
22	5.25	3	3.9	2.25	1.35
23	5.07	3	3.9	2.07	1.17
Cochabamba					
24	3.98	5	4.62	1.02	0.64
25	4.15	6	4.62	1.85	0.47
26	4.32	5	4.62	0.68	0.3
27	5.46	5	4.62	**0.46**	0.84
28	5.4	6	4.62	**0.6**	0.78
29	3.99	4	4.62	**0.01**	0.63
30	4.24	5	4.62	0.76	0.38
31	4.06	6	4.62	1.94	0.56
32	3.93	6	4.62	2.07	0.69
33	3.99	4	4.62	**0.01**	0.63

District	Citizen's skin tone	Uninominal's skin tone	Plurinominal's skin tone	Distance to Uninominal (absolute value)	Distance Plurinominal (absolute value)
Oruro					
34	5.28	6	6.33	**0.72**	1.05
35	5.7	5	6.33	0.7	0.63
36	4.85	5	6.33	**0.15**	1.48
37	3.59	5	6.33	**1.41**	2.74
38	4.43	5	6.33	**0.57**	1.9
Chuquisaca					
39	5.2	7	5	1.8	0.2
40	5.27	6	5	0.73	0.27
41	5.06	6	5	0.94	0.06
42	5.7	5	5	0.7	0.7
43	4.98	3	5	1.98	0.02
44	5.16	4	5	1.16	0.16
Potosi					
45	4.81	4	5.83	**0.81**	1.02
46	3.77	6	5.83	2.23	2.06
47	4.7	6	5.83	1.3	1.13
48	4.7	7	5.83	2.3	1.13
49	5.16	5	5.83	**0.16**	0.67
50	5.34	6	5.83	0.66	0.49
51	5.04	7	5.83	1.96	0.79
Pando					
52	5	5	6	**0**	1
53	4.73	6	6	**1.27**	1.27
54	4.65	5	6	**0.35**	1.35
Tarija					
55	4.47	6	5.3	1.53	0.83
56	3.85	6	5.3	2.15	1.45
57	5.4	6	5.3	0.6	0.1
58	4.68	6	5.3	1.32	0.62
59	4	6	5.3	2	1.3
Beni					
60	4.54	4	3.66	**0.54**	0.88
61	5.33	4	3.66	**1.33**	1.67
62	4.36	6	3.66	1.64	0.7
63	6.15	5	3.66	**1.15**	2.49
64	4.76	5	3.66	**0.24**	1.1

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Aarts, Kees, and Jacques Thomassen. 2008. "Satisfaction with Democracy: Do Institutions Matter?" *Electoral Studies* 27 (1) (March): 5–18.

Achen, Christopher. 1978. "Measuring Representation." *American Journal of Political Science* 22 (3): 475–510.

Adams, J. Stacy. 1965. "Inequity in Social Exchange." In *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology*, edited by Leonard Berkowitz, 2:267–299. New York: Academic Press.

Adams, James, Michael Clark, Lawrence Ezrow, and Garrett Glasgow. 2006. "Are Niche Parties Fundamentally Different from Mainstream Parties? The Causes and the Electoral Consequences of Western European Parties' Policy Shifts, 1976-1998." *American Journal of Political Science* 50 (3) (July 1): 513–529.

Adams, James, Lawrence Ezrow, and Zeynep Somer-Topcu. 2011. "Is Anybody Listening? Evidence That Voters Do Not Respond to European Parties' Policy Statements During Elections." *American Journal of Political Science* 55 (2): 370–382.

Adams, James F, and Lawrence Ezrow. 2009. "Who Do European Parties Represent? How Western European Parties Represent the Policy Preferences of Opinion Leaders?"." *Journal of Politics* 71 (1): 206–223.

Alcántara, Manuel. 2004. *¿Instituciones o Maquinas Ideológicas? Origen, Programa y Organización de Los Partidos Latinoamericanos*. Barcelona: ICPS.

Alcántara, Manuel, and Cristina Rivas. 2007. "Las Dimensiones de la Polarización Partidista En América Latina." *Politica y Gobierno* XIV (2): 349–390.

Alcántara Sáez, Manuel. 1999. *Sistemas políticos de América Latina: América del Sur*. Madrid: Tecnos.

Alesina, Alberto, and Paola Giuliano. 2009. "Preferences for Distribution". Discussion Paper 2170. Social Science Research Network Research Paper. Collection, Harvard University.

Alvarez, R. Michael, Geoffrey Garrett, and Peter Lange. 1991. "Government Partisanship, Labor Organization, and Macroeconomic Performance." *The American Political Science Review* 85 (2) (June 1): 539–556.

Ames, Barry. 1995. "Electoral Strategy under Open-list Proportional Representation". A*merican Journal of Political Science*39 (2): 406-433.

Ardaya, G. 2003. Diputados Uninominales. Otra forma de representación. La Paz. ILDIS.

Araníbar, Antonio. 2009. "Bolivia: De La Crisis y La Inflexión a la Gestión del Cambio." In *Crisis y Cambio en América Latina*. UNDP. Buenos Aires: Siglo XXI Editores.

Arnold, Douglas. 1990. *The Logic of Congressional Action*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Bakker, R., C. d. Vries, E. Edwards, L. Hooghe, S. Jolly, G. Marks, J. Polk, J. Rovny, M. Steenbergen, and M. A. Vachudova. 2012. "Measuring Party Positions in Europe: The Chapel Hill Expert Survey Trend File, 1999-2010." *Party Politics* (November 29).

Barabas, Jason, and Joseph Wachtel. 2009. "Political Knowledge, Representation, and the Mass Media." Paper Presented at MPSA Conference in Chicago.

Barrientos, Armando, and Claudio Santibáñez. 2009. "New Forms of Social Assistance and the Evolution of Social Protection in Latin America." *Journal of Latin American Studies* 41 (01): 1–26.

Barro, Robert J. 1996. "Democracy and Growth." *Journal of Economic Growth* 1 (1) (March 1): 1–27.

Bartels, Larry. 2008. *Unequal Democracy: The Political Economy of the New Gilded Age*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Bartels, Larry M. 2005. "Homer Gets a Tax Cut: Inequality and Public Policy in the American Mind." *Perspectives on Politics* 3 (01): 15–31.

Beeghley, Leonard. 1986. "Social Class and Political Participation: A Review and an Explanation." *Sociological Forum* 1 (3): 496.

Bellu, Lorenzo Giovanni. 2005. "Impacts of Policies on Poverty. Generalised Poverty Gap Measures". New York: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, FAO.

Bellu, Lorenzo Giovanni, and Paolo Liberati. 2005. *Impacts of Policies on Poverty. The Definition of Poverty*. New York, NY: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, FAO.

Benoit, Kennet. 2001. "District Magnitude, Electoral Formula, and the Number of Parties." *European Journal of Political Research* 39: 203–224.

Beramendi, Pablo, and Christopher Anderson. 2008. *Democracy, Inequality and Representation*. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.

Birnir, Jóhanna Kristin, and Donna Lee Van Cott. 2007. “Disunity in Diversity: Party System Fragmentation and the Dynamic Effect of Ethnic Heterogeneity on Latin American Legislatures” *Latin American Research Review* 42 (1): 99-125

Boidi, María Fernanda. 2009. “The Missing Connection: Trust in Legislatures in Latin America”. Nashville: Vanderbilt University.

Boidi, María Fernanda. 2008. “Throw Them All Out"? Attitudes Toward Political Parties in the Americas.” In *Challenges to Democracy in Latin America and the Caribbean: Evidence from the AmericasBarometer 2006-2007*, edited by Mitchell A. Seligson. Nashville: Vanderbilt University.

Booth, John A., and Mitchell A. Seligson. 2008. “Inequality and Democracy in Latin America: Individual and Contextual Effects of Wealth on Political Participation.” In *Poverty, Participation, and Democracy: A Global Perspective*, edited by Anirudh Krishna. New York: Cambridge University Press.

———. 2009. *The Legitimacy Puzzle in Latin America: Political Support and Democracy in Eight Nations*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Bratton, Michael. 2008. “Poor People and Democratic Citizenship in Africa.” In *Poverty, Participation, and Democracy*, edited by Anirudh Krishna. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Brusco, Valeria, Marcelo Nazareno, and Susan Stokes. 2004. "Vote Buying in Argentina." *Latin American Research Review*.39(2):66-88.

Cameron, Maxwell A, and Eric Hershberg. 2010. *Latin America’s Left Turns: Politics, Policies, and Trajectories of Change*. Boulder [Colo.]: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Carey, John M, and Simon Hix. 2011. “The Electoral Sweet Spot: Low-Magnitude Proportional Electoral Systems.” *American Journal of Political Science* 55 (2): 383–397.

Carey, John M, and Matthew Soberg Shugart. 1995. “Incentives to Cultivate a Personal Vote: A Rank Ordering of Electoral Formulas.” *Electoral Studies* 14 (4) (December): 417–439.

Carlin, Ryan E. 2006. “The Socioeconomic Roots of Support for Democracy and the Quality of Democracy in Latin America.” *Revista de Ciencia Política (Santiago)* 26 (1) (January): 48–66.

Carrillo, Fernando, and Dennis Petri. 2009. *Quality of Democracy and Parliamentary Reform in Latin America: How Europe Can Help*. Stockholm: International IDEA.

Centellas, Miguel. 2009. “Electoral Reform, Regional Cleavages, and Party System Stability in Bolivia.” *Journal of Politics in Latin America*.

Chalmers, Douglas, Carlos Vilas, Katherine Hite, Scott Martin, Kerianne Piester, and Monique Segarra. 1997. *The New Politics of Inequality in Latin America. Rethinking Participation and Representation*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Cleary, Matthew R. 2006. "Explaining the Left's Resurgence." *Journal of Democracy* 17 (4): 35–49.

Clinton, Joshua D. 2006. "Representation in Congress: Constituents and Roll Calls in the 106th House." *The Journal of Politics.* 68 (2): 397–409.

Colomer , J. M. and Negretto , G. L . 2005. "Can Presidentialism Work Like Parliamentarism?" *Government and Opposition* 40: 60 – 89.

Converse, Philip. 1964. "The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics." In *Ideology and Discontent*, edited by David Apter. New York: Free Press of Glencoe.

Converse, Philip E, and Roy Pierce. 1986. *Political Representation in France*. Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.

Coppedge, Michael. 2003. "Party Systems, Governability, and the Quality of Democracy in Latin America." Paper presented at the conference on "Diagnosing Democracy: Methods of Analysis, Findings, and Remedies" Santiago de Chile, April 11-13, 2003.

Córdova, Abby. 2009. "Methodological Note: Measuring Relative Wealth Using Household Asset Indicators". 06. Insights Series. Nashville: Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP).

Corral, Margarita. 2008. "(Des)confianza en los partidos políticos en América Latina." *Revista de Ciencia Política* 28 (2).

Cox, Gary. 1997. *Making Votes Count: Strategic Coordination in the World's Electoral Systems*. New York: Cambridge Univ. Press.

Craig, Stephen, and Michael A. Maggiotto. 1982. "Measuring Political Efficacy." *Political Methodology* 8 (3): 85–109.

Crisp, Brian. 2006. "The Nature of Representation in Andean Legislatures and Attempts at Institutional Reengineering." In *The Crisis of Democratic Representation in the Andes*, edited by Scott Mainwaring, Ana Maria Bejarano, and Eduardo Pizarro Leongómez. California: Stanford University Press.

Crisp, Brian F., Maria C. Escobar-Lemmon, Bradford S. Jones, Mark P. Jones, and Michelle M. Taylor-Robinson. 2004. "Vote-Seeking Incentives and Legislative Representation in Six Presidential Democracies." *The Journal of Politics* 66 (03): 823–846.

Crisp, Brian. 2007. “Incentives in Mixed-Member Electoral Systems. General Election Laws, Candidate Selection Procedures, and Cameral Rules”. *Comparative Political Studies*. Vol. 40. No.12: 1460-1485.

Czudnowski, Moshe. 1982. *Does Who Governs Matter? Elite Circulation in Contemporary Societies*. DeKalb, IL: Northern Illinois University Press.

Dahl, Robert A. 1989. *Democracy and Its Critics*. New Haven:Yale University Press.

———. 2006. *On Political Equality*. New Haven:Yale University Press.

Dahl, Robert Alan. 1961. *Who Governs?: Democracy and Power in an American City*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

———. 1971. *Polyarchy: Participation & Opposition*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

———. 2000. *On Democracy*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Dalton, Russell J. 2004. *Democratic Challenges, Democratic Choices: The Erosion of Political Support in Advanced Industrial Democracies*. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press.

Dalton, Russell J. 1985. “Political Parties and Political Representation Party Supporters and Party Elites in Nine Nations.” *Comparative Political Studies* 18 (3) (October 1): 267–299.

———. 2008. *Citizen Politics: Public Opinion and Political Parties in Advanced Industrial Democracies*. Washington, DC: CQ Press.

Delli Carpini, Michael X, and Keeter. 1996. *What Americans Know About Politics and Why It Matters*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Delli Carpini, Michael X, and Scott Keeter. 1996. *What Americans Know About Politics and Why It Matters*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Desposato, Scott W. 2001. "Legislative Politics in Authoritarian Brazil". *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, 26 (2):287-317.

Diamond, Larry Jay. 1996. “Is the Third Wave Over?” *Journal of Democracy* 7 (3): 20–37.

———. 1999. *Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Domhoff, Willam. 1998. *Who Rules America? The Clinton Years*. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall.

Domingo, Pilar. 2005. "Democracy and New Social Forces in Bolivia." *Social Forces* 83 (4): 1727–1743.

Downs, Anthony. 1957. *An Economic Theory of Democracy*. New York: Harper.

Duverger, Maurice. 1950. "I. L'influence des systèmes électoraux sur la vie politique." *Académique* (January 1): 11–68.

———. 1954. *Political Parties: Their Organization and Activity in the Modern State*. New York: Wiley.

ECLAC. 2009. "Income Poverty and Unsatisfied Basic Needs". New York, NY: ECLAC. http://www.eclac.org/publicaciones/xml/0/38190/L949.pdf.

———. 2010. "ECLAC - Social Panorama of Latin America 2010." http://www.eclac.org/cgi-bin/getProd.asp?xml=/publicaciones/xml/1/41801/P41801.xml&xsl=/dds/tpl/p9f.xsl&base=/tpl-i/top-bottom.xslt.

———. 2013. "Social Panorama of Latin America 2012." http://www.cepal.org/cgi-bin/getProd.asp?xml=/publicaciones/xml/4/48454/P48454.xml&xsl=/tpl-i/p9f.xsl&base=/tpl/top-bottom.xsl.

———. *Una Década de Desarrollo Social En América Latina, 1990-1999*. ECLAC. Santiago de Chile: 2004.

Ellis, Christopher R., Joseph Daniel Ura, and Jenna Ashley-Robinson. 2006. "The Dynamic Consequences of Nonvoting in American National Elections." *Political Research Quarterly* 59 (2) (June 1): 227–233.

Erikson, Robert S. 1990. "Roll Calls, Reputations, and Representation in the U. S. Senate." *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 15 (4) (November): 623.

Erikson, Robert S., Michael B. Mackuen, y James A. Stimson. 2002. *The Macro Polity*. Cambridge University Press

España Nájera, Annabella, and Mar Martínez Rosón. 2010. "Political Representation in Central America." Presented at LASA Conference in Toronto.

Etzioni-Halevy, Eva. 1993. *The Elite Connection: Problems and Potential of Western Democracy*. Cambridge, MA: Polity Press.

Eulau, Heinz, and Paul D. Karps. 1977. "The Puzzle of Representation: Specifying Components of Responsiveness." *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 2 (3) (August 1): 233–254.

Eulau, Heinz, John C. Wahlke, William Buchanan, and Leroy C. Ferguson. 1959. "The Role of the Representative: Some Empirical Observations on the Theory of Edmund Burke." *The American Political Science Review* 53 (3) (September): 742.

Ezrow, Lawrence. 2010. *Linking Citizens and Parties: How Electoral Systems Matter for Political Representation*. Comparative Politics. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.

Fenno, Richard F. 1978. *Home Style: House Members in Their Districts*. New York: Longman.

Ferranti, David M. De, Guillermo Perry, Francisco Ferreira, and Michael Walton. 2004. *Inequality in Latin America and the Caribbean: Breaking with History?* World Bank Publications.

Finkel, Steven E. 1985. "Reciprocal Effects of Participation and Political Efficacy: A Panel Analysis." *American Journal of Political Science* 29 (4) (November): 891.

Flavin, Patrick. 2012a. "Income Inequality and Policy Representation in the American States." *American Politics Research* 40 (1): 29–59.

———. 2012b. "Does Higher Voter Turnout Among the Poor Lead to More Equal Policy Representation?" *Special Issue: National and State Politics: A Current Assessment* 49 (4) (December): 405–412.

Froman, Lewis A. 1963. *Congressmen and Their Constituencies*. Chicago, IL: Rand McNally.

Fuchs, Dieter, and Hans-Dieter Klingemann. 1990. "The Left-Right Schema." In *Continuities in Political Action*, edited by Kent Jennings and Jan W. Van Deth. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.

Gilens, Martin. 2005. "Inequality and Democratic Responsiveness." *Public Opinion Quarterly* 69 (5) (January 1): 778–796.

Gootenberg, Paul. 2010. "Latin American Inequalities. New Perspectives from History, Politics and Culture." Durham: Duke University Press.

Griffin, John D., and Brian Newman. 2005. "Are Voters Better Represented?" *Journal of Politics* 67 (4): 1206–1227.

Griffin, John David, and Brian Newman. 2008. *Minority Report: Evaluating Political Equality in America*. American Politics and Political Economy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Hagopian, Frances. 2005. "Government Performance, Political Representation, and Public Perceptions of Contemporary Democracy in Latin America." In *In The Third Wave of Democratization in Latin America: Advances and Setbacks*, edited

by Frances Hagopian and Scott Mainwaring.Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Haro, Ana. 2011. “Bolivia: Las Elecciones de 2009. Tomando Posiciones Para El Desarrollo de La Constitución.” In *América Latina: Política y Elecciones Del Bicentenario (2009-2010)*, edited by Manuel Alcántara and Laura Tagina. Madrid: Centro de Estudios Políticos y Constitucionales.

Haspel, Moshe, Thomas F. Remington, and Steven Smith. 1998. “Electoral Institutions and Party Cohesion in the Russian Duma.” *The Journal of Politics* 60 (2): 417-39

Heitshusen, Valerie, Garry Young, and David M. Wood. 2005. “Electoral Context and MP Constituency Focus in Australia, Canada, Ireland, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom.” *American Journal of Political Science* 49 (1) (January): 32–45.

Herron, Erik S. 2002. “Mixed Electoral Rules and Party Strategies Responses to Incentives by Ukraine’s Rukh and Russia’s Yabloko”. *Party Politics* 8: 719-733.

Higley, John, and Richard Gunther. 1992. *Elites and Democratic Consolidation in Latin America and Southern Europe*. Cambridge University Press.

Hill, Kim Quaile, and Patricia A. Hurley. 1999. “Dyadic Representation Reappraised.” *American Journal of Political Science* 43 (1) (January 1): 109–137.

Holmberg, Sorem. 2000. "Issue Agreement" in P. Esaiasson and K. Keidar. Beyond Westminster and Congress. Columbus: Ohio State University Press.

Holmberg, Sorem. 1999. “Collective Policy Congruence Compared.” In *Policy Representation in Western Democracies*, edited by Willam Miller, Roy Pierce, Thomassen Jacques, Richard Herrera, Sorem Holmberg, Peter Esaiasson, and Bernhard Wessels. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Huber, Evelyne, and John D. Stephens. 2010. *Development and Crisis of the Welfare State: Parties and Policies in Global Markets*. University of Chicago Press.

Huber, John D. 1989. “Values and Partisanship in Left-Right Orientations: Measuring Ideology.” *European Journal of Political Research* 5 (17): 599–621.

Huber, John D., and G. Bingham Powell. 1994. “Congruence Between Citizens and Policymakers in Two Visions of Liberal Democracy.” *World Politics* 46 (3) (April 1): 291–326.

Hunter, Wendy, Raúl L Madrid, and Kurt Gerhard Weyland. 2010. *Leftist Governments in Latin America: Successes and Shortcomings*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Huntington, Samuel P. 1968. *Political Order in Changing Societies*. Yale University Press.

Hurley, Patricia A. 1982. "Collective Representation Reappraised." *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 7 (1) (February): 119.

Ikeda, Ken'ichi, Tetsuro Kobayashi, and Maasa Hoshimoto. 2008. "Does Political Participation Make a Difference? The Relationship Between Political Choice, Civic Engagement and Political Efficacy." *Electoral Studies* 27 (1) (March): 77–88.

Jacobs, Lawrence R., and Benjamin I. Page. 2005. "Who Influences U.S. Foreign Policy?" *American Political Science Review* 99 (01): 107–123.

Jacobs, Lawrence R., and Theda Skocpol. 2005. *Inequality and American Democracy: What We Know and What We Need to Learn*. Russell Sage Foundation.

Key, Valdimer Orlando. 1949. *Southern Politics in State and Nation*. A. A. Knopf.

Kerevel, Yann. 2010. "The Legislative Consequences of Mexico's Mixed-Member Electoral System, 2000–2009". *Electoral Studies*. 29, 691-703

Kinder, Donald, and David Sears. 1985. "Public Opinion and Political Action." In *Handbook of Political Psychology*, 3rd ed., 659–742. New York: Random House.

Kingdon, John. 1981. *Congressmen's Voting Decisions*. New York: Harper & Row

Kingdon, John W. 1989. *Congressmen's Voting Decisions*. University of Michigan Press.

Kitschelt, Herbert. 1994. *The Transformation of European Social Democracy*. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press.

———. 2000. "Linkages Between Citizens and Politicians in Democratic Polities." *Comparative Political Studies* 33 (6-7) (September 1): 845–879.

Kitschelt, Herber, Zdenka Mansfeldova, Radoslaw Markowski, and Gabor Toka. 1999. *Post-Communist Party Systems. Competition, Representation, and Inter-Party Collaboration*.Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

Kitschelt, Herbert, Kirk Hawkins, Juan Pablo Luna, Guillermo Rosas, and Elizabeth Zechmeister. 2010. *Latin American Party Systems*. Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics. Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press.

Kitschelt, Herbert, and Steven Wilkinson. 2007. *Patrons, Clients and Policies: Patterns of Democratic Accountability and Political Competition*. Cambridge University Press.

Klugman, Jeni. 2002. *A Sourcebook for Poverty Reduction Strategies*. Washington, D.C: World Bank.

Knight, Kathleen. 2006. "Transformations of the Concept of Ideology in the Twentieth Century." *American Political Science Review* 100 (04) (November 28): 619.

Korzeniewicz, Roberto Patricio, and William C. Smith. 2000. "Poverty, Inequality, and Growth in Latin America: Searching for the High Road to Globalization." *Latin American Research Review* 35 (3) (January 1): 7–54.

Krehbiel, Keith. 1998. *Pivotal Politics: a Theory of US Lawmaking*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Krishna, Anirudh. 2008. *Poverty, Participation, and Democracy: a Global Perspective*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Kunicová, Jana, and Susan Rose-Ackerman. 2005. "Electoral Rules and Constitutional Structures as Constraints on Corruption." *British Journal of Political Science* 35 (04) (August 22): 573.

Laakso, Markku, and Rein Taagepera. 1979. "'Effective' Number of Parties A Measure with Application to West Europe." *Comparative Political Studies* 12 (1) (April 1): 3–27.

Lancaster, Thomas D., and W. David Patterson. 1990. "Comparative Pork Barrel Politics Perceptions from the West German Bundestag." *Comparative Political Studies* 22 (4) (January 1): 458–477.

Landa, Dimitri, and Ethan B. Kapstein. 2001. "Inequality, Growth, and Democracy." *World Politics* 53 (2): 264–296.

Levitsky, Steven. 2007. "From Populism to Clientelism? The Transformation of Labor-Based Party Linkages in Latin America." In *Patrons, Clients, and Policies. Patterns of Democratic Accountability and Political Competition*, edited by Herbert Kitschelt and Steven Wilkinson. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Lijphart, Arend. 1997. "Unequal Participation: Democracy's Unresolved Dilemma." *The American Political Science Review* 91 (1) (March): 1.

———. 1999. *Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries*. Yale University Press.

Lipset, Seymour Martin. 1960. *Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics*. Garden City, N.Y.,: Doubleday.

López-Calva, Luis Felipe, and Nora Lustig. 2010. *Declining Inequality in Latin America: A Decade of Progress?* Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press.

Lubker, Malte. 2004. “Globalization and Perceptions of Social Inequality.” *International Labour Review* 143: 91.

Luna, Juan P., and Elizabeth J. Zechmeister. 2005. “Political Representation in Latin America A Study of Elite-Mass Congruence in Nine Countries.” *Comparative Political Studies* 38 (4) (May 1): 388–416.

Luna, Juan Pablo. 2007. "Representación política en América Latina: el estado de la cuestión y una propuesta de agenda". *Política y Gobierno* Vol. XIV. N 2. Pp 391-435

Mainwaring, Scott, Ana Marâia Bejarano, and Eduardo Pizarro Leongómez. 2006. *The Crisis of Democratic Representation in the Andes*. Stanford University Press.

Mainwaring, Scott, and Timothy Scully. 1995. *Building Democratic Institutions: Party Systems in Latin America*. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press.

Maldonado, Arturo. 2011. “Compulsory Voting and the Decision to Vote”. 63. Insights Series. Nashville: Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP).

Manin, Bernard. 1997. *The Principles of Representative Government*. Cambridge University Press.

Mansbridge, Jane. 1999. “Should Blacks Represent Blacks and Women Represent Women? A Contingent ‘Yes’.” *The Journal of Politics* 61 (03): 628.

———. 2003. “Rethinking Representation.” *The American Political Science Review* 97 (4) (November 1): 515–528.

Marenghi, Patricia, and Mercedes Garcia. 2008. “The Conundrum of Representation.” In *Politicians and Politics in Latin America*, edited by Manuel Alcántara. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Marien, Sofie, Marc Hooghe, and Ellen Quintelier. 2010. “Inequalities in Non-institutionalised Forms of Political Participation: A Multi-level Analysis of 25 Countries.” *Political Studies* 58 (1): 187–213.

Marsh, Michael, and Pippa Norris. 1997. “Political Representation in the European Parliament.” *European Journal of Political Research* 32 (2): 153–164.

Martin, Paul S. 2003. “Voting’s Rewards: Voter Turnout, Attentive Publics, and Congressional Allocation of Federal Money.” *American Journal of Political Science* 47 (1) (January): 110–127.

Mattes, Robert, Michael Bratton, and Yul Derek Davids. 2003. “Poverty, Survival and Democracy in Southern Africa”. 23. Afrobarometer Working Papers. Afrobarometer.

Matthews, Donald R. 1985. “Legislative Recruitment and Legislative Careers.” In *Handbook of Legislative Research*, edited by Gerhard Loewenberg, Samuel Patterson,, and Malcolm Jewell. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Mayorga, Rene Antonio. 2001. “Electoral Reform in Bolivia: Origins of the Mixed-Member Proportional System”. In Matthew Shugart and Martin P. Wattenberg. *Mixed-Member Electoral Sytems. The Best of Both Worlds?* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

McDonald, Michael D., and Ian Budge. 2005. *Elections, Parties, Democracy: Conferring the Median Mandate*. Comparative Politics. Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press.

McDonald, Michael D., Silvia M. Mendes, and Ian Budge. 2004. “What Are Elections For? Conferring the Median Mandate.” *British Journal of Political Science* 34 (01): 1.

Michels, Robert. 1911. *Political Parties: A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern Democracy*. New York: Collier Books.

Miller, Warren E., and Donald E. Stokes. 1963. “Constituency Influence in Congress.” *American Political Science Review* 57 (01): 45–56.

Morlino, Leonardo. 2004. “‘Good’ and ‘bad’ Democracies: How to Conduct Research into the Quality of Democracy.” *Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics* 20 (1): 5–27.

Mosca, Gaetano. 1939. *The Ruling Class*. McGraw Hill Book Company, Inc.

Moser, Robert. 2001. *Unexpected outcomes: Electoral systems, political parties, and representation in Russia*. Pittsburgh, PA: Pittsburgh University Press

Moser, Robert G. and Ethan Scheiner. 2004. “Mixed Electoral Systems and Electoral System Effects: Controlled Comparison and Cross-National Analysis." *Electoral Studies.* 23(4):575-599.

Muller, Edward N. 1970. “The Representation of Citizens by Political Authorities: Consequences for Regime Support.” *The American Political Science Review* 64 (4) (December 1): 1149–1166.

Nohlen, Dieter. 1995. *Sistemas Electorales y Partidos Politicos. Politica y Derecho*. Mexico: Fondo de la Cultura Economica.

Norris, Pippa. 1997. "Choosing Electoral Systems: Proportional, Majoritarian and Mixed Systems." *International Political Science Review*, 18(3): 297-312

Norris, Pippa. 2002. *Democratic Phoenix: Reinventing Political Activism*. Cambridge University Press.

North, Douglass C. 1991. "Institutions." *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 5 (1) (February): 97–112.

O'Donnell, Guillermo A. 1994. "Delegative Democracy." *Journal of Democracy* 5 (1): 55–69.

Otero Felipe, Patricia, and Juan Antonio Rodríguez Zepeda. 2010. "Measuring Representation in Latin America: A Study of Ideological Congruence Between Parties and Voters." Paper Presented at the APSA Conference in Washington D.C.

Panizza, Francisco. 2005. "Unarmed Utopia Revisited: The Resurgence of Left-of-Centre Politics in Latin America." *Political Studies* 53 (4): 716–734.

Pareto, Vilfredo. 1935. *The Mind and Society*. New York: Harcourt, Brace.

Pharr, Susan J., and Robert D. Putnam. 2000. *Disaffected Democracies: What's Troubling the Trilateral Countries?* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Phillips, Anne. 1995. *The Politics of Presence*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Pierceson, Jason, Adriana Piatti-Crocker, and Shawn Schulenberg, ed. 2013. *Same-sex Marriage in Latin America: Promise and Resistance*. Lanham, Md: Lexington Books.

Pitkin, Hanna Fenichel. 1967. *The Concept of Representation*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press.

Popkin, Samuel L. 1991. *The Reasoning Voter*. 2nd ed. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Powell, G. Bingham. 2000. *Elections As Instruments of Democracy: Majoritarian and Proportional Visions*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

———. 2004a. "Political Representation in Comparative Politics." *Annual Review of Political Science* 7 (1): 273–296.

———. 2004b. "The Chain of Responsiveness." *Journal of Democracy* 15 (4): 91–105. d

———. 2009. “The Ideological Congruence Controversy The Impact of Alternative Measures, Data, and Time Periods on the Effects of Election Rules.” *Comparative Political Studies* 42 (12) (December 1): 1475–1497.

Powell, G. Bingham, and George S. Vanberg. 2000. “Election Laws, Disproportionality and Median Correspondence: Implications for Two Visions of Democracy.” *British Journal of Political Science* 30 (3) (July 1): 383–411.

Przeworski, Adam. 2004. “Institutions Matter?” *Government and Opposition* 39 (4): 527–540.

Przeworski, Adam, Michael E. Alvarez, Jose Antonio Cheibub, and Fermamdo Limongi. 2000. *Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-being in the World, 1950-1990*. Cambridge Studies in the Theory of Democracy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Przeworski, Adam, Susan C. Stokes, and Bernard Manin. 1999. *Democracy, Accountability, and Representation*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Putnam, Robert. 1973. *Beliefs of Politicians: Ideology, Conflict and Democracy in Britain and Italy*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

———. 1976. *The Comparative Study of Political Elites*. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall.

Quandt, William B. 1969. “The Comparative Study of Political Elites”. Santa Monica: Rand Corporation.

Rae, Douglas W. 1967. *The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Reis, Elisa P., and Mick Moore. 2005. *Elite Perceptions of Poverty and Inequality*. London: Zed Books.

Renno, Lucio. 2010. “Inequalities of Political Information and Participation. The Case of the 2002 Brazilan Elections.” In *Indelible Inequalities in Latin America*, edited by Paul Gootenberg and Luis Reygadas. Durham: Duke University Press.

Rigby, Elizabeth, and Gerald C. Wright. 2013. “Political Parties and Representation of the Poor in the American States.” *American Journal of Political Science* 57 (3): 552–565.

Roberts, Kenneth M. 2002. “Party-Society Linkages and Democratic Representation in Latin America.” *Canadian Journal of Latin American & Caribbean Studies* 27 (53) (January 1): 9.

Robinson, Robert V. 1983. “Explaining Perceptions of Class and Racial Inequality in England and the United States of America.” *The British Journal of Sociology* 34 (3) (September 1): 344–366.

Rohrschneider, R. 2005. “Institutional Quality and Perceptions of Representation in Advanced Industrial Democracies.” *Comparative Political Studies* 38 (7) (September 1): 850–874.

Rueschemeyer, Dietrich. 2004. “Addressing Inequality.” *Journal of Democracy* 15 (4): 76–90.

———. 2011. “Political Equality.” In *International Encyclopedia of Political Science*, edited by Bertrand Badie, Dirk Berg-Schlosser, and Leonardo Morlino, 819–824. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, Inc.

Ryden, David K. 1996. *Representation in Crisis: The Constitution, Interest Groups, and Political Parties*. New York: SUNY Press.

Sabatini, Christopher. 2002. “The Decline of Ideology and the Rise of Quality of Politics in Latin America.” *World Affairs* 2 (165): 106–110.

Saiegh, Sebastian M. 2009. “Recovering a Basic Space from Elite Surveys: Evidence from Latin America.” *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 34 (1): 117–145.

Samuels, David. 2002. Progressive ambition, federalism, and pork barreling in Brazil.Legislative politics in Latin America, eds. Scott Morgenstern, Benito Nacif. New York: Cambridge University Press

Sanchez, Francisco and Cristina Rivas. 2013. El impacto de las circunscripciones electorales uninominales y plurinominales en la actividad distrital y partido: el caso de Bolivia. Paper presented at LASA conference in Washington DC.

Sartori, Giovanni. 1976. *Parties and Party Systems*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Saward, Michael. 2010. *The Representative Claim*. Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press.

Schattschneider, Elmer Eric. 1960. *The Semisovereign People: a Realist’s View of Democracy in America*. Carlsbad, CA: Holt, Rinehart and Winston.

Schiemann, John W, and K. Benoit. 1997 "*The Origins of Hungary's 1989 Electoral Law*," Center for International Affairs Working Paper No, 97-5, Harvard University, Cambridge

Schmitter, Philippe C. 2004. “The Ambiguous Virtues of Accountability.” *Journal of Democracy* 15 (4): 47–60.

Schumpeter, Joseph. 1942. *Capitalism, Socalism and Democracy*. New York, NY: Harper.

Searing, Donald D. 1985. "The Role of the Good Constituency Member and the Practice of Representation in Great Britain." *The Journal of Politics* 47 (02): 347–381.

Seligson, Mitchell A. 2007. "The Rise of Populism and the Left in Latin America." *Journal of Democracy* 18 (3): 81–95.

Seligson, Mitchell A., Amy Erica Smith, and Elizabeth J. Zechmeister. 2012. *The Political Culture of Democracy in the Americas, 2012: Towards Equality of Opportunity*. Nashville: Vanderbilt University.

Sen, Amartya. 1985. "A Sociological Approach to the Measurement of Poverty: A Reply [Poor, Relatively Speaking]." *Oxford Economic Papers* 37 (4): 669–76.

Shapiro, Ian. 2002. "Why the Poor Don't Soak the Rich." *Daedalus* 131 (1) (January 1): 118–128.

Shugart, Matthew and Martin Wattenberg (eds). 2001. *Mixed Member Electoral Systems: The Best of Both Worlds?*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Shugart, Matthew S., Melody E. Valdini and Katie Suominen. 2005. Looking for Locals: Voter Information Demands and Personal Vote-Earning Attributes of Legislators under Proportional Representation." *American Journal of Political Science* 49(2):437-449

Smith, Steven and Thomas Remington. 2001. *The Politics of Institutional Choice: The Formation of the Russian State Duma*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University.

Sniderman, Paul M, Richard A Brody, and Philip E Tetlock. 1991. *Reasoning and Choice: Explorations in Political Psychology*. Cambridge; New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press.

Solt, Frederick. 2008. "Economic Inequality and Democratic Political Engagement." *American Journal of Political Science* 52 (1) (January): 48–60.

Soroka, Stuart N., and Christopher Wlezien. 2008. "On the Limits to Inequality in Representation." *PS: Political Science & Politics* 41 (02) (March 28).

Soule, John W. 1969. Future Ambitions and the Behavior of Incumbent State Legislators. *Midwest Journal of Political Science* 13 (3): 439-454.

Stanlis, Peter. 1968. *Edmund Burke: Selected Writings and Speeches*. Gloucester: Peter Smith Publisher.

Stimson, James A.,. Michael B. Mackuen, y Robert S. Erikson 1995. "Dynamic Representation." *The American Political Science Review* 89(3): 543-565

Stolle, Dietlind, and Marc Hooghe. 2011. "Shifting Inequalities." *European Societies* 13 (1) (February): 119–142.

Stratmann, Thomas, and Martin Baur. 2002. "Plurality Rule, Proportional Representation, and the German Bundestag: How Incentives to Pork-Barrel Differ Across Electoral Systems." *American Journal of Political Science* 46 (3) (July): 506.

Studlar, Donley T., and Ian McAllister. 1996. "Constituency Activity and Representational Roles Among Australian Legislators." *The Journal of Politics* 58 (1) (February 1): 69–90.

Sullivan, John L, Pat Walsh, and James L Gibson. 1993. "Why Politicians Are More Tolerant: Selective Recruitment and Socialization Among Political Elites in Britain, Israel, New Zealand and the United States." *Brit. J. Polit. Sci. British Journal of Political Science* 23 (01).

Svallfors, Stefan. 1997. "Worlds of Welfare and Attitudes to Redistribution: A Comparison of Eight Western Nations." *European Sociological Review* 13 (3) (December 1): 283–304.

Taagepera, Rein, and Matthew Soberg Shugart. 1989. *Seats and Votes: The Effects and Determinations of Electoral Systems*. New Haven u.a.: Yale Univ. Pr.

Taylor-Robinson, Michelle M. 2010. *Do the Poor Count?: Democratic Institutions and Accountability in a Context of Poverty*. Penn State Press.

Thomassen, J. J. A. 1994. "Empirical Research into Political Representation: Failing Democracy or Failing Models?" In *M. Kent Jennings, T.E. Mann (Eds.) Elections at Home and Abroad, Essays in Honor of Warren Miller*, 237–265. Ann Arbor: Michigan University Press.

Thomassen, Jacques and Hermann Schmitt. 1997. "Policy Representation." *European Journal of Political Research* 32: 165-184

Tilly, Charles. 1998. *Durable Inequality*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

UNDP. 2004. *La Democracia en América Latina: hacia una democracia de ciudadanas y ciudadanos*. Aguilar, Altea, Taurus, Alfaguara S.A.

Vallès, Josep M., Agustí Bosch, and Agustí Bosch Guardella. 1997. *Los sistemas electorales y gobierno representativo*. Barcelona: Ariel, Editorial S.A.

Van Cott, Dona Lee. 2003. “Institutional Change and Ethnic Parties in South America.” *Latin American Politics and Society.* 45, 2: 1-39.

Van Cott, Dona Lee. 2005. *From Movements to Parties in Latin America: The Evolution of Ethnic Politics*. New York: Cambridge University Press

Verba, Sidney. 1996. “The Citizen as Respondent: Sample Surveys and American Democracy Presidential Address, American Political Science Association, 1995.” *The American Political Science Review* 90 (1) (March 1): 1–7.

———. 2001. “Thoughts About Political Equality. What Is It? Why Do We Want It?” Inequality Summer Institute, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University.

———. 2003. “Would the Dream of Political Equality Turn Out to Be a Nightmare?” *Perspectives on Politics* 1 (04): 663–679.

Verba, Sidney, and Norman Nie. 1972. *Participation in America: Political Democracy and Social Equality*. New York: Harper and Row.

Verba, Sidney, Norman H. Nie, and Jae-on Kim. 1978. *Participation and Political Equality: A Seven-Nation Comparison*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Verba, Sidney, and Gary R Orren. 1985. *Equality in America: The View from the Top*. Cambridge, Mass.; London, England: Harvard University Press.

Verba, Sidney, Kay Lehman Schlozman, and Henry E. Brady. 1995. *Voice and Equality: Civic Voluntarism in American Politics*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Vilas, Carlos. 1997. “Participation, Inequality, and the Whereabouts of Democracy.” In *The New Politics of Inequality in Latin America*, edited by Douglas Chalmers, Carlos Vilas, Katherine Hite, Scott Martin, Kerianne Piester, and Monique Segarra. New York: Oxford University Press.

Ware, Alan. 1981. “The Concept of Political Equality: A Post-Dahl Analysis*.” *Political Studies* 29 (3): 392–406.

Warren, Kay and Jean Jackson. 2003. *Indigenous Movements, Self-Representation, and the Sate in Latin America.* Austin, TX: University of Texas Press

Weissberg, Robert. 1978. “Collective Vs. Dyadic Representation in Congress.” *The American Political Science Review* 72 (2) (June 1): 535–547.

Wessels, Bernhard. 2007. “Political Representation and Democracy.” In *The Oxford Handbook of Political Behavior*, edited by Russell J Dalton and Klingemann Hans-Dieter, 833–849. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Whitefield, S. 2006. “Mind the Representation Gap: Explaining Differences in Public Views of Representation in Postcommunist Democracies.” *Comparative Political Studies* 39 (6) (August 1): 733–758.

Williams, Melissa. 1998. *Voice, Trust and Memory: Marginalized Groups and the Failings of Liberal Representation*. Princeton: Princeton University Press

Williams, Melissa S. 2000. *Voice, Trust, and Memory: Marginalized Groups and the Failings of Liberal Representations*. Princeton University Press.

Wilson, Graham K. 1990. *Interest Groups*. Oxford, UK; Cambridge, Mass., USA: Blackwell.

Wlezien, Christopher. 2004. “Patterns of Representation: Dynamics of Public Preferences and Policy.” *Journal of Politics* 66: 1–24

Wood, David, and Garry Young. 1997. “Comparing Constituency Activity by Junior Legislators in Great Britain and Ireland*”. Legislative Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 22 , No. 2. pp 217-232

World Bank. 2002. *World Development Report 2002: Building Institutions for Markets*. Washington, D.C., Oxford University Press.

Wright, John R. 1996. *Interest Groups and Congress: Lobbying, Contributions, and Influence*. New Topics in Politics. Boston: Allyn and Bacon.

Young, Alison. 1990. *Femininity in Dissent*. New York: Routledge.

Zechmeister, Elizabeth, and Margarita Corral. 2010. “The Varying Economic Meaning of ‘Left’ and ‘Right’ in Latin America”. 38. Insights Series. Nashville: LAPOP Vanderbilt University.

———. 2011. “Evaluando la Representación por Mandato en América Latina a través de las Posiciones en la Escala Izquierda-derecha y de las Preferencias Económicas.” In *El Papel Del Poder Legislativo En América Latina,* edited by Manuel Alcántara and Mercedes Garcia. Zaragoza: Fundación Manuel Giménez Abad.

Zechmeister, Elizabeth J., and Margarita Corral. 2013. “Individual and Contextual Constraints on Ideological Labels in Latin America.” *Comparative Political Studies* 46 (6) (June 1): 675–701.

Zúquete, José Pedro. 2008. “The Missionary Politics of Hugo Chávez.” *Latin American Politics and Society* 50 (1): 91–121.