

WELCOME!
DEMOCRATIC ATTITUDES AND REACTIONS TOWARD IMMIGRANTS IN
LATIN AMERICA'S EMERGING DEMOCRACIES

By

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Dissertation

Submitted to the Faculty of the
Graduate School of Vanderbilt University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements

for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

in

Political Science

August, 2010

Nashville, Tennessee

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This dissertation has its genesis in a graduate course on migration, a topic about which I have always been passionate. Because so many Colombian immigrants continuously arrive to Ecuador, my country of origin, I found myself asking, “Why is it that some Ecuadorians exemplify positive attitudes when the majority shows animosity towards this group?” I became interested in investigating the sources of such different attitudes among what seemed to be people of similar backgrounds. After having worked for the Latin American Opinion Project (LAPOP) on attitudes towards democracy, I started wondering if there was a relationship between democratic attitudes and how people react toward migrants. It became clear to me that this topic was perfect for my migration course, with Professor Jonathan Hiskey.

I cannot start without thanking Jonathan Hiskey for all of his support, kindness and patience throughout this long process that started in that course. He not only gave me the advice on how to improve my writing and arguments, but also gave me the courage to submit a paper for publication that I wrote for his class; this paper was miraculously accepted by the *Latin American Politics and Society* journal, and became the basis for this dissertation. I do not have enough words to thank Professor Hiskey for everything that he has done for me. He has not only been a remarkable advisor, but a great mentor and a true friend. Without his support, this project would not have been possible.

The same is true for Mitchell Seligson, whose knowledge and work ethic makes one wonder if anything that we do is enough to be as great as he is. He questions, pushes, demands, and even though sometimes we may feel like crying, he brings the best out in

us. He certainly not only teaches academic “stuff,” but he also teaches life lessons. I want to thank Mitch for giving me the opportunity to come to Vanderbilt. As one of the three Ecuadorians in the LAPOP program, I have felt privileged to support this amazing effort. Going from auditing data to pre-testing in the field, and to the writing of the reports, Mitch has given us first hand knowledge of how to conduct research. He armed us with powerful tools for the future. And, of course, I want to express gratitude to my two committee members, Katherine Donato and Liz Zechmeister, who gave me valuable advice and suggestions on how to improve this dissertation. They have been amazing role models!

I also want to thank my LAPOP colleagues for their continuous guidance throughout the process of this research. Special thanks go to Abby Cordova for her unconditional support. She has not only been a great colleague but a terrific friend. She encouraged me to keep on going when I felt like giving up. She continuously inspired me to become better and better. She is a great role model, not only as an academic, but as a human being. I also want to thank Dominique Zephyr, the statistics “guru,” who patiently answered all of my questions and addressed my doubts. He constantly teaches me and offers me great opportunities. It has been a true honor to work with him. I cannot leave without mentioning Alejandro Diaz. He was pivotal to the completion stage of this dissertation. He patiently and kindly sat down for hours to listen to my complaints and frustrations. I cannot thank him enough for clarifying my ideas, for encouraging me and pushing me to keep on going until the end. Also, my colleagues Fernanda, Rubi, Jose Miguel, Margarita, Brian, Gioconda, Arturo, Daniel Montalvo, Daniel Zizumbo, Mariana, and Mason were wonderful for putting up with me on a daily basis.

In addition, I want to thank the Department of Political Science at Vanderbilt for fostering such an academic environment. I am fortunate to have been part of such a group of amazing individuals and scholars. During my stay at Vanderbilt, I cannot have hoped for better Chairs than Neal Tate, Bruce Oppenheimer, and John Geer. A special acknowledgment goes to Marc Hetherington and Susanne Globetti, who have both given me valuable advice when I needed it most.

I also want to acknowledge Tonya Mills, Darlene Davidson, Tina Bemby and Natasha Bilbrey, all whom were victims of constant inquiries and requests, but who gently and uncomplainingly helped me in each of them. I would also like to thank Liz Leis at the Graduate School. She made the final stage of this process go smoother with her kind support.

Funding from a variety of sources made this project come to life. I am highly indebted to USAID for its financial support and to the Graduate School of Vanderbilt University for awarding me the “Social Science Dissertation Fellowship” and the “Dissertation Enhancement Grant.” In this regard, I also want to thank Neal Tate for allowing me to spend one year abroad at Sciences-Po in Paris, France. This time allowed me to conduct research in Europe, mostly in Spain, Belgium, and France. The collection of these data was crucial for the enhancement of my understanding of this topic.

I would like to thank my wonderful friends and family, without whom, this dissertation would have been impossible. I want to thank in particular Lana Alman, at one point my roommate and friend until today. Together we successfully made it through two courses. We shared countless nights of intellectual and personal discussions. I will never forget how we started having more “scientific minds” when the most insignificant event

was explained by “predictor” factors. She was the one who provided continuous intellectual support to my research. She has been brutally honest, but at the same time particularly helpful. I do not have words to express how much I appreciate everything she has done for me incessantly.

Finally, my family. They have been the pillars for the realization of many dreams, one of which was the culmination of this long journey. After coming back to Nashville from Paris, I asked my brother and his wife to host me for a few weeks, which turned into eight months. Patricio and Melina Orce with the company of my little nephew, Constantine, were essential in the provision of emotional support. They were there every day throughout the hardest times. When I thought it was impossible, they gave me the courage to continue. More than anything, I am mostly grateful for their love and understanding. Also, my parents- two individuals that made me into the person that I am today. I want to thank them for everything they have done in my life. Even though they were far away during this process, they still found a way to give me the strength to face adversity. They are the best parents one can ask for. They taught me patience, loyalty, courage, and perseverance. Last, God, who has endlessly enlightened my path.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

What are the causes and consequences of the wide range of native-born reactions to migrants around the world? With approximately 192 million people living outside their place of birth or citizenship (3% of the world's population),¹ migration has become one of the most important international phenomena of the 21st century. In the case of Latin America, emigration to developed countries has increased over 50 percent in the past ten years (Herrera 2005). And, even though the bulk of Latin American emigrants are leaving for developed countries, a significant amount of intra-regional migration has also occurred over the decades, with Peruvians and Ecuadorians emigrating to Chile, Paraguayans and Bolivians to Argentina, Nicaraguans crossing the border to Costa Rica, Central Americans moving to Belize, among others. This dissertation examines attitudes toward immigrants in the specific case of Latin America.

During roughly the same time period as the surge in migration, the Latin American region also underwent watershed changes in its political development. At the end of 1977, all but two of the Latin American countries were under authoritarian rule of one sort or another. Thirty years later that situation has reversed itself, with at least formally democratic regimes now the norm. With the demise of authoritarian rule in most of the countries of the Southern Cone, the end of armed conflicts in much of Central America, and the political liberalization of Mexico during the 1990s, a critical question facing scholars of this democratization process is the durability and quality of democracy

¹ <http://www.iom.int/jahia/Jahia/pid/3>

in the region. Having survived twenty years of oftentimes extreme economic volatility, persistently high levels of poverty and economic inequality, many scholars have proclaimed the region's wave of democracy is here to stay with a return of military rule highly unlikely. But the quality of these surprisingly durable democratic regimes remains in question, with events of recent years raising even more doubts about the democratic legitimacy of many of the region's political systems.

With the confluence of these two unprecedented events over the past three decades – a significant increase in migration and a monumental shift in the political development patterns of the region that has seemed to finally cement democratic rule as the norm across most of the Americas, it is somewhat surprising that few scholars have explored the connection between democracy and migration.

Because there is an increasing flow of immigration not only in Latin America, but across different regions around the world, it is extremely difficult for governments to enforce policies that would stop immigration immediately. Immigrants, therefore, become a new minority group in host societies. How citizens react to these new immigrant groups is essential in understanding how citizens may treat each other in the future and how these relationships may affect the quality of democracy more generally. Hence, the central questions of this dissertation are: What are the causes and consequences of the wide range of native-born reactions to migrants around the world? Why is it that some citizens express positive attitudes toward foreigners, while many others want to kick all migrants out of their country? What do these attitudes, both positive and negative, imply for a world increasingly defined by the movement of people

across national borders? My effort to answer these questions revolves around the connection between attitudes towards immigrants and more general democratic attitudes.

While democracy is highly supported both in developed and developing countries (Klingemann 1999; Puddington 2009), an increasing number of citizens under democratic political systems also enjoy better protection of their rights and these provide a basis for democratic attitudes (Peffley and Rohrschneider 2003). I contend that the attitudinal components of what many refer to as a democratic political culture contribute to a more migrant-friendly perspective among native-born citizens. This more welcoming environment in turn helps a democratic society more successfully manage a sudden influx of migrants than societies where anti-immigrant attitudes may in turn cause increased violence and threats to the rule of law and other critical features of democracy.

This chapter begins with a theoretical discussion of why support for democratic values may matter for attitudes toward migrants, followed by a brief discussion of Latin American migration's increasing political saliency at the national, regional, and international levels. It continues with a discussion of what has not yet been reviewed in both democracy and migration scholarship.² This chapter concludes with a discussion of the research design where the strengths and weaknesses of each of the concepts and measures employed in this study are examined as well as the basis on which the findings of my research will be evaluated.

² Both Latin American emigration and immigration. Emigration refers to the “exodus of people from their country of origin for settlement, usually permanently, in a new country” and immigration refers to the “movement of person across national borders for purposes other than travel or short-term residence” (9) in Messina, Anthony, and Gallya Lahav, eds. 2006. *The migration reader: exploring politics and policy*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner

Why Does a Democratic Political Culture Matter for Immigration?

Across the developing world, the massive influx of migrants, be they economic or political refugees, has historically placed tremendous pressure on a political system's capacity to respond to the increased strain on its infrastructure. Often these increased strains have manifested themselves in citizens' attitudes toward the emergent democracy itself, sometimes leading to calls for a more repressive response to the influx of migrants. For example, in one study, the relationship between immigration and authoritarian attitudes suggested that the fear of immigration had a significant effect on authoritarian attitudes (Seligson et al. 2006). That study concluded that the perception of a threat could have repercussions for the future of democracy since increasing levels of immigration can lead to an increase in political intolerance, activating authoritarian attitudes and thus supporting an authoritarian system. The study also pointed out that immigration brings positive elements to a democracy: immigrants stimulate commerce and capital, increase diversity, and introduce new ideas. Therefore, if the receiving country closes its borders, it stands to lose all these elements, which are essential in maintaining a stable democracy.

As a result of the potential link between immigration and system stress, it is useful not only to understand how immigration affects citizens' views toward democracy, but also how preexisting attitudes toward democracy might help prepare citizens to react to a dramatic increase in immigration in a more tolerant and democratic manner. By identifying the attitudinal correlates of more migration-tolerant citizens, scholars may also be taking an additional step in being able to better identify democratic attitudes in which democracy itself has a greater chance of survival. The fundamental thesis of this dissertation is that a strong democratic political culture matters for citizens' positive

treatment of foreigners because if anti-democratic responses to immigration escalate to the general population, it will likely erode social cohesion, increasing distrust and intolerant responses against minority groups that may erode the quality of democracy. This becomes especially relevant in today's world where the movement of people across borders is becoming the more and more salient.

Why is Migration Gaining Political Saliency in Latin America?

Latin America, a region that until the 1950s was considered a point of arrival for many Europeans, today has become one of the leading sending regions in the world with an increase from an estimated 1.6 million emigrants in 1960 to close to 11 million in 1990, suggesting an increase over 100 percent in the stock of Latin American emigrants.³ By 2005, 28.3 million persons emigrated, which corresponds to 5.1 percent of the region's population. At the same time, immigration in Latin America currently represents 5.8 million persons or one percent of the population.⁴

Furthermore, remittances have increased tremendously in the last decade reaching \$69.2 billion by 2008 from \$24.4 billion in 2002.⁵ These figures show how Latin American and the Caribbean has been the region with the most dynamic growth in the world in terms of reception of remittances: it accounted for 32.2 percent of the global total in 2002.⁶ In spite of the many challenges migrant workers and their families faced in 2008 as a result of the global economic crisis, the reception of remittances remains an

³ See, <<http://faculty.randolphcollege.edu/bbullock/335pdf/pellegrino.pdf>>

⁴ See, <<http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPROSPECTS/Resources/334934-1199807908806/LAC.pdf>>

⁵ See, <http://www.sela.org/public_html/AA2K4/ING/docs/Poleco/migra/Di3.pdf>

<<http://idbdocs.iadb.org/wsdocs/getdocument.aspx?docnum=1910986>>

<<http://www.ifad.org/events/remittances/maps/latin.htm>>

⁶ *Ibid*

important source of economic revenue in the region. The economic impact that these remittances have had on millions of individuals is well documented, representing more than half the income of 30 percent of remittance recipients, helping to keep these families out of poverty.⁷ At the macroeconomic level, migrant workers continue to make a remarkable contribution to their home countries. Seven of the region's nations receive 12 percent or more of GDP from their families abroad, such are the cases of Haiti, Guyana, Jamaica, Honduras, El Salvador, Nicaragua and Guatemala. In many of these countries, remittances have become the first or second revenue before exports, tourism, and foreign investment (UNDP 2009).

Consequently, various political, economic, and social actors at different levels, including international organizations, governments, and civil society have come to recognize the political and economic significance that migration has attained in recent years. Not only a considerable number of publications on the subject matter are emerging, but also conferences at the national, regional, and international levels are proliferating. One example of migration's international relevancy was revealed in former Secretary-General of the United Nations, Kofi Annan's statement, "International migration is a fundamental attribute of our ever-shrinking world. Managing this migration for the benefit of all has become one of the great challenges of our age" (Kofi Anna, Dec 19, 2005).⁸ Not long after his proposal, the Belgian government offered to host the first Global Forum on Migration and Development that took place in July, 2007 in Brussels and was followed by global meetings in 2008 and 2009 in Manila and Athens, respectively. Similarly, the International Organization for Migration (OIM) has played a

⁷ *Ibid*

⁸ See,

<<http://www.gcim.org/mm/File/Kofi%20Annan%20speaks%20on%20migrants%20day%2018.12.05.pdf>>

more active role in the assistance and development of migration policy around the world. For instance, membership rose from 67 states in 1998 to 127 states in 2009; during the same time period, field location grew from 119 to more than 440 and active projects from 686 to 2030, with much of its activity in Latin America.⁹

At the regional level, South America is experiencing important transformations with regards to international migration policy since the 1990s. With a significant percentage of its population now residing in the developed world and, to a lesser extent, in neighboring countries, an ascending number of bilateral agreements are taking place between South American and European countries as well as between intra-regional countries, focusing on reciprocity and co-responsibility (Domenech 2008; Gómez 2004; Mármora 2009; Sandoval 2004). All these changes have been occurring in the process of regional integration, such as la Comunidad Andina de Naciones and el Mercado Comun del Sur (MERCOSUR), and regional forums on migration as la Conferencia Regional de Migraciones, specifically known as el Proceso Puebla (1996) and la Conferencia Sudamericana de Migraciones (CSM) that have yearly met since 2000 (Domenech 2008; Sandoval 2004). As a matter of fact, I had the unique opportunity to attend the IX CSM meeting that took place in Quito, Ecuador in September, 21-22 of 2009. In this formal meeting attended by government officials representing 10 regional countries, the Declaration of Quito was put into effect.¹⁰

At the individual level, migrants have become more knowledgeable of their rights and have played a more active role in demanding them. Specifically, there has been a propagation of various migrant organizations in receiving and sending countries that

⁹ See, <<http://www.iom.int/jahia/Jahia/about-iom/organizational-structure/lang/en>>

¹⁰ For a detailed understanding of the points covered during this meeting, refer to <<http://www.senami.gov.ec/content/view/344/94/>>

concentrate their efforts in the assistance and protection of migrants and their families. From what used to be a concern over the brain-drain problem, now the focus is on the respect for migrants' human rights (Domenech 2008, Mármora 2009). Therefore, there is a growing interest by members of civil society and governments in topics related to migration. For example, governments of forty five countries around the globe ratified the United Nations Convention related to "Human Rights of Migrant Workers and their Families" that has been in effect since 1990. Eight of these 45 countries were from South America, corresponding to 80 percent of governments in the region (Mármora 2009, 28). Moreover, Conferences organized by members of civil society have taken place, such as "Jornadas Hemisfericas sobre Politicas Migratorias, carried out on a yearly basis since 2006. The purpose of these Conferences is to voice members of civil society in themes related to migration.¹¹ I also had the great opportunity to attend the III Jornada Hemisferica carried out in Quito, Ecuador in the days previous to the IX CMS meeting.

Another example of migrants' increasing visibility is that governments of sending countries have recognized the importance of granting voting rights to their citizens living abroad in their local elections (e.g., Colombia approves voting abroad in 1962, Peru in 1979, Brazil in 1988, Argentina in 1993, Venezuela in 1998, Uruguay in 2005, Mexico and Ecuador in 2006). At the same time, these governments are regularizing many thousands of immigrants domestically, allowing the concomitant expansion of emigrants and immigrants rights (Mármora 2009, 25). The latest instance of foreigners' regularization in Latin America occurred in Brazil with around 40,000 immigrants to be

¹¹ See, <<http://www.migranteecuadoriano.gov.ec/content/view/2604/393/>>

benefited by this measure. The majority among these immigrants originates from Bolivia (*El Comercio* 2009).¹²

All of these events point to the emerging political significance that migration has gained in recent years with a more active role of several actors at various levels, going from a higher participation by international organizations, governments, civil society to the formal recognition and extension of civil, social, economic, political, and cultural rights of emigrants and immigrants. In short, migration is increasing its role in the world. In practical terms, many countries and regions around the globe, including Europe and the U.S. need migration to cover labor shortages in the agricultural, construction, and industrial sector, among others (Donato and Bankston 2008). Other regions (e.g. Africa and Middle East), on the other hand, have faced wars or natural disasters that have produced a significant number of refugees in neighboring nations. Hence, it becomes essential to understand what the sources of immigrant opinion are and how citizens treat foreigners because it can be seen as an indication of how citizens may treat each other in the future. Given the broadness of themes related to migration, in this dissertation, I focus on the impact of democratic values on pro-immigrant sentiment in Latin America and the Caribbean. This subject has been largely unstudied in the context of the developing world in both migration and democracy scholarship.

What is Left Out From The Study of Migration and Democracy?

While the study of migration has mainly centered on its economic, social, and cultural effects, little attention has been paid to its political effects. Economists have looked at the impact of immigration on citizens' wages in host countries (Borjas 2003;

¹² See, <http://ww1.elcomercio.com/noticiaEC.asp?id_noticia=325443&id_seccion=5>

Borjas and Freeman 1992; Card 1990; Card 2001; Hatton and Williamson 2008) and as an important revenue source for the developing world in the form of economic remittances (Fajnzylber and López 2007; Wouterse and Taylor 2008). Sociologists and demographers have tended to focus on the impact of immigration on the cultural consequences in receiving countries (Blanco 2000; Huntington 2004; King 2000) or the impact of emigration on the erosion of family ties in sending states (Herrera and Carrillo 2005; Salazar 2007). Political scientists, however, have devoted little attention to the political effects of migration, with most concentrating either on migration-policy in receiving countries (Weiner 1985; Zolberg 1981) or the political integration of migrants into their host political system (e.g., voting behavior of Latinos in the U.S.) (Ramakrishnan 2005; Ramakrishnan and Espenshade 2001). The vast majority of this research has focused almost exclusively on the developed world without delving too much in its implications for the developing world.

By the same token, the study of democracy in Latin America has moved forward from transitions, to consolidation, and most recently to the quality of democracy as it has proven to persist as a form of government in the region during the past three decades (Altman and Pérez-Liñán 2002; Beetham 2004; Hagopian and Mainwaring 2005; O'Donnell 2004a; Powell 2004). Scholars that examine the quality of democracy have mainly focused on the various dimensions of a “good” democracy such as freedom, participation, competition, equality, rule of law, vertical and horizontal accountability, government responsiveness, and system support among the mass public (e.g., De Souza Briggs 2008; Diamond and Morlino 2004; Diamond and Morlino 2005; Hagopian and Mainwaring 2005; Hucheson and Korosteleva 2006; O'Donnell 2004b; Schmitter 2004).

Yet the rapid increase in emigration rates across the region rarely enter into the discussion of what helps or hurts the move toward higher quality democracies. Nor does the more case-specific phenomenon of high immigration rates in developing democracies receive much consideration. Students of democracy, furthermore, have focused on the sources that affect positively or negatively citizens' support for democratic values without paying too much attention to the implications of a strong democratic political culture.

What is The Relationship between Democratic Values and Attitudes toward Immigrants? Theory: A Brief Account

Traditionally, the literature on the formation and deepening of democratic values suggests that an increasing number of citizens under democratic political systems enjoy better protection of rights and these provide a basis for democratic attitudes (Peffley and Rohrschneider 2003). Similarly, democratic values have emerged across both the developed and developing world (Klingemann 1999; Puddington 2009; Inglehart 1988, 1990, 1997). However, there has been little research on the implications of support for democratic values.

In order to maintain stable democracies, not only is support for a democratic political system necessary, but also support for democratic values, such as political tolerance. More specifically, support for a democratic system does not necessarily mean that citizens are also tolerant toward minority groups who live under the same political system. While the majority of citizens support democratic rights, these same groups “are usually considerably less likely to extend these rights to disliked groups” (Peffley and

Rohrschneider 2003, 243). Therefore, stable systems could be at risk when the rights of the minorities are not guaranteed, given that if the support for the system is very high and political tolerance is low, a society could become authoritarian (Seligson and Córdova 1993). In addition, a possible outcome from high levels of system support is people's unwillingness to criticize their government's decisions whether they are right or wrong. This is seen as strengthening people's national identity and developing a sense of "blind" patriotism in which people tend to be less accepting of outsiders (Schatz, Staub, and Lavine 1999).

Some researchers contend that intolerant attitudes could put at risk those who are the target of political intolerance by manifesting itself in a general increase of violence against "unpopular" groups. Moreover, intolerance not only threatens established democratic systems, but it makes democratic transitions difficult by undermining the consolidation of democracy if citizens constantly target minority groups by for example denying basic human rights, supporting restrictive policies, and even responding in violent aggressive behavior against these minorities, undermining the social foundation of democracy (eg., Gibson and Duch 1993; Prothro and Grigg 1960; Sullivan, Pierson, and Marcus 1982).¹³ Citizens therefore must reconsider their differences toward "disliked groups" in order to coexist harmoniously under the same political system (Marcus et al. 1995). Political tolerance becomes a fundamental value for the consolidation of a democratic political culture, especially in countries where increasing levels of immigration have quickly turned immigrants into a "disliked" group.

¹³ For a more exhaustive study on political tolerance, see any of the works of Gibson and McClosky listed in the reference list.

Additionally, interpersonal trust is also significant because it allows for general interactions between individuals that come from dissimilar backgrounds and who hold different views and values, stimulating political tolerance (Córdova 2008). These actions are believed to reinforce democracy (Fukuyama 1995; Inglehart and Welzel 2005; Putnam 1993; Putman 2000; Uslaner 2002). For all of these reasons, citizens' support for democratic values becomes essential for the acceptance (or rejection) of immigrants who have become an important social component in the democratic political system of receiving countries.

Through extensive field research in Ecuador along with analysis of survey data collected across Ecuador and Latin America, I seek to tap into and understand how democratic values shape citizens' attitudes toward migrants.

Case Selection and Preliminary Evidence

As mentioned above, Latin America has become one of the leading sending regions in the world with approximately 28.3 million persons living abroad by 2005. At the same time, despite its lower levels of immigration compared to emigration levels, Latin America still faces intra-regional migration of about 5.8 million persons.¹⁴ Recent literature on migration, however, mainly focuses on the effects of migration in the advanced industrial world, while the subject of intra-regional immigration in the developing world remains little studied, with the exception of the large number of migrants to the oil rich states of the Middle East.

¹⁴ <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPROSPECTS/Resources/334934-1199807908806/LAC.pdf>




Figure 0.1. How about people from other countries coming here to work. Which one of the following do you think the government should do?

Figure I.1 shows a global view toward immigration policy by using data from World Values Survey 2000; more specifically, how citizens feel toward foreigners coming to work in their home countries. Latin American nations clearly stand out as having comparable immigrant perceptions to traditional immigration countries, such as Canada and the United States, and more recently, Spain. In fact, Latin American countries generally demonstrate more positive views toward immigration policy than do the United States, for instance.

Argentina and Chile show that no less than 45 percent of their populations believe that people from other countries should come as long as jobs are available. Mexico reveals the highest anti-immigrant sentiment out of the six countries, depicted by a significant number of its population (19 percent) agreeing to prohibit people from other countries to work in Mexico. These results may reflect some of the issues this nation

currently faces in terms of “transit migration.” Mexico has gradually become a country of transit for many migrants from Central America (e.g., Guatemala, Nicaragua, and Honduras) as a way to get to the United States. But because of the strengthening in security measures in the Mexican-American border, many of these migrants end up staying in Mexico (Cruz 2004; *El Comercio* 2010).¹⁵

In this dissertation, my objective is to examine attitudes toward immigrants in 14 countries in Latin America and the Caribbean, explained more extensively in the following section. In addition, one of the goals of this research is to study in more depth immigrant perceptions in one country, Ecuador, as this country is experiencing both sides of the same phenomenon (emigration and immigration); these points of exposure allows the researcher to have more leverage in establishing the causal mechanisms of the relationship between democratic support and immigrant opinion. This study examines the attitudes of Ecuadorian citizens as well as Ecuadorians emigrants. In the latter case, my intention is to evaluate if Ecuadorians emigrants show more positive attitudes toward foreigners in the country of origin given their condition as immigrants themselves in host societies. One would expect that immigrants by working and living in more developed societies will acquire new ideas and behaviors. If their experiences are positive, these individuals may be expected to have a greater support for democratic values and, in turn, a positive opinion toward immigrants in their country of origin. All these ideas will be tested in the Chapter focusing on Ecuador.

¹⁵ See, http://www.elcomercio.com/noticiaEC.asp?id_seccion=5&id_noticia=345745

Data and Methods

In this project, I attempt to incorporate attitudes toward immigration as a key subject in public opinion research on democracy in the context of the developing world, by combining the best of both quantitative and qualitative research. As it is widely accepted, quantitative methods allow for a more powerful theory testing and external validity relying on larger number of cases (King, Keohane and Verba 1994; Lijphart 1971). In contrast, qualitative research allows for theory development and internal validity with its focus on the analysis of smaller number of cases. With fewer cases, greater knowledge of each case is possible (Collier 1995; Mahoney and Goertz 2006; Tarrow 1995). This study, specifically, relies on a multi-method approach that combines the analysis of public opinion data with semi-structured interviews.

Quantitative Strategy

Because of the lack of a systematic approach of the literature on the consequences of a strong democratic political culture, this dissertation seeks to examine, for the first time, public opinion data from 14 countries in the Latin American and Caribbean region through the implementation of various statistical techniques. The survey data come from data collected by the Latin America Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) at Vanderbilt University. The AmericasBarometer 2008 dataset by LAPOP includes over 40,000 responses about political attitudes and behaviors of citizens in twenty-four Latin American and Caribbean countries as well as the United States and Canada. The restricted sample (including migration questions), however, consists of 24,255 respondents.

As a member of LAPOP, I had the unique opportunity to include two questions directly related to this research. Both of these questions were included in national surveys of the United States, Bolivia, Ecuador, Guatemala, Brazil, Chile, Argentina, El Salvador, Mexico, Panama, Dominican Republic, Belize, Venezuela, Uruguay, and Costa Rican and three more questions in the specific case of Ecuador. These questions were carefully reviewed by the LAPOP team and were pre-tested on the field in every country mentioned above, a procedure that has as an objective to ensure that respondents understand clearly the question. I personally carried out pre-tests at the initial stages of the questionnaire design in the Dominican Republic (December 2007). The survey items related to immigration included in these data are: *“To what degree do you agree that the (country) government provides social services such as healthcare, education, housing, to foreigners who come to live or work in this country? Strongly agree, somewhat agree, neutral, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree”* and *“Would you say that the people who come to live here from other countries do the jobs that (country’s citizens, e.g., Jamaicans) do not want to do, or generally take jobs away from (country’s citizens)?”*

Both measures have several advantages. For example, these items measure the degree of acceptance of immigrants in one’s country. One disadvantage is that it does not specify an immigrant group. But the fact that respondents are free to choose the immigrant group they see as most relevant in their daily lives render these items more accurate.

By the same token, as one of the goals of this research is to examine the case of Ecuador in more detail, I use the Ecuadorian 2008 LAPOP dataset which includes three extra items related to attitudes toward immigrants. The following questions ask: *“the*

problems of crime in Ecuador are deteriorated or improved by the people from other countries who come to live here?,” “Would you say that the Ecuadorian culture is generally weakened or enriched by the people from other countries who come to live here?” and “Would you say that it is good or bad for the Ecuadorian economy that people from other countries come to live here?”

Qualitative Strategy

The high-quality standard LAPOP employs on its surveys guarantees that the public opinion data is free from some of the issues often found when doing public opinion research in Latin America (Seligson 2005). Still, there are many limitations inherited in quantitative research that weakens its analytical leverage (Zaller 1992; Zaller and Feldman 1992). A more qualitative approach offers an effective way to address some of these issues by allowing an extensive analysis of what are individuals thinking when they provide answers.

With the purpose of gaining more theoretical leverage in migrants’ perceptions toward democracy and migration in Ecuador, several semi-structured interviews were carried out to complement the public opinion data analyses. The qualitative methods employed consist of semi-structured interviews with citizens (migrant organization leaders, Ecuadorian migrants, their families and friends back in Ecuador) in Ecuador.¹⁶ Other fieldwork activities include informal interviews with taxi drivers, restaurants owners, employees, etc.

¹⁶ Fieldwork activities were approved by Vanderbilt IRB on September 2008 (IRB #080958). A copy of the approval notification can be found in Annex A1.

Even though the bulk of the research included in this dissertation relates to field research in Ecuador (explained later), I also did fieldwork in Europe, as part of a larger project.¹⁷ This approach includes various semi-structured interviews and one group interview that were carried out in Spain, mainly in Madrid and Murcia, two cities where a high percentage of Ecuadorian migrants reside (Table I.1.).¹⁸

Table 0.1. Interviews Carried Out During Nov. and Dec. 2008 and April 2009 in Spain

<i>Face to Face Formal Interviews</i>			
	Madrid	Murcia	<i>Total</i>
Males	14	3	17
Females	11	9	29
<i>Total</i>	<i>25</i>	<i>13</i>	<i>37</i>

During the first stage of fieldwork in Spain, in November 2008, I held several interviews with females (7) and males (10) and one interview with the head of the National Secretariat for Migrants (SENAMI) in Madrid. In December 2008, I held four formal interviews with females and two with males and one group interview with middle-aged women in Murcia (5). During the same visit, I also was able to interview the president of the Federation of Ecuadorians in Murcia. Finally, in April of 2009, I interviewed few other Ecuadorians (3 males and 3 females) and the president of the Ecuadorian Association of Llano Grande in Madrid.

¹⁷ Overall, fieldwork in Madrid and Murcia took place in November-January 2008 and March-April 2009.

¹⁸ The figures for Madrid and Cataluña correspond to approximately 34.87% and 17.80% respectively, of the total Ecuadorian migrant population in Spain. See Herrera, Gioconda, Alicia Torres, Alberto Valle, Alexander Amezcuita, and Susy Rojas. 2006. *ECUADOR: Las cifras de la migración internacional*. Quito: UNFPA and FLACSO.

The collection of these data, in fact, sparked my interest in investigating further the sources of immigrant opinion in Latin America. Given that the original goal of my research in Europe was the better understanding of the impact of migration on migrants' political views and behaviors and how these views affect those left behind, the bulk of the questions asked were aimed toward this purpose. Few interviews dealt with questions on immigration in Ecuador, as they were not asked directly, but rather respondents willingly provided opinions related to this subject. These interviews helped me tremendously to gain greater knowledge on how citizen's exposure to migration themselves had an effect on their views of immigrants in their country of origin (Ecuador). In addition, I maintained numerous informal conversations with individuals and groups of all socioeconomic levels during my fieldwork. The topic of these talks, as well as that of the formal interviews, was their views toward their host country, the differences they perceived between their host countries and Ecuador, and their influence on those left behind. Therefore, by carrying out research in Spain - in the process of interviewing Ecuadorian migrants - I also established contacts with those left behind in Ecuador. This procedure facilitated a final set of interviews with their families and friends during the summer of 2009 and other individuals that helped me understand in more depth this topic (Table I.2).

The second stage of fieldwork took place in the Ecuadorian provinces of Pichincha, Loja, Azuay, and Cañar. Fieldwork activities in Ecuador were concentrated in various cities dealing with high rates of emigration as well as of immigration. I held fifteen interviews with common Ecuadorian males and females; and an interview with the mayor of Deleg in the province of Loja. A total of twenty interviews were also carried

out with common citizens in the provinces of Azuay and Cañar, including one priest of small town, Giron, in the province of Azuay and the sub-mayor of the city of Cañar (province of Cañar).

Table 0.2. Interviews Carried out During Summer of 2009 in Ecuador

<i>Face to Face Formal Interviews</i>					
	Loja	Azuay	Cañar	Pichincha	<i>Total</i>
Males	13	7	4	4	28
Females	6	8	1	6	21
<i>Total</i>	<i>19</i>	<i>15</i>	<i>5</i>	<i>10</i>	<i>49</i>

<i>Written Interviews Administered to University Students (Quito)</i>		
Male	57	57
Females	93	93
<i>Total</i>	<i>150</i>	<i>150</i>

Likewise, several members of the National Secretariat for Migrants (SENAMI) in Cuenca (capital of province of Azuay) and Quito were interviewed. Further, I decided to administer written-interviews to students of the Central University of Ecuador in Quito to improve my understanding of immigrant opinion among this portion of the population. Around 150 interviews were obtained from females and males of about 22 years old, on average. In few cases, students were 17-19 or 27-30 years old. The collection of these data allowed me to untangle some causal mechanisms behind the hypotheses formulated. Some of the questions employed during these interviews parallel those shown in the description of the quantitative data. Fieldwork in Ecuador took place from the beginning of August to the end of September, 2009.

The implementation of qualitative methods has many advantages, such as an in-depth analysis and interpretation of the meanings of various concepts one is trying to understand. In this case, it will deepen my understanding of how a strong democratic political culture may prepare citizens to react in a more tolerant manner. More importantly, approaching the study of migration through the implementation of both quantitative and qualitative analysis will help to minimize inaccurate and incomplete explanations (Brady and Collier 2004).

Chapter Overview

Chapter Two reviews scholarly literature related to public opinion toward immigrants in developed democracies and establishes the theoretical framework of the importance of democratic values for the sustainability of democracy through its impact on such citizen's attitudes as a positive reaction to a sudden influx of immigrants. I conclude with the hypotheses that derive from the theory.

Chapter Three focuses on the impact of support for democratic values on attitudes toward immigrants in Latin America. Given that not much systematic research has been done on the effects of support for democratic values in general and rather the focus has usually been on what affects these attitudes, the purpose of this chapter is to introduce a general analysis of the consequences of a strong democratic political culture in the Americas. I present the empirical analyses and a general discussion of the relationship between democratic values and immigration in the region.

Chapter Four concentrates on the analysis of four countries: Argentina, Chile, Costa Rica, and the Dominican Republic. Through a historical review of migration flows

and migration policy in these countries, in addition, to a brief overview of economic and political development, my desire is to bring about a better understanding on how context matter for immigrant opinion.

Chapter Five concentrates on the analysis of Ecuador as it presents a unique opportunity to study this phenomenon from its various dimensions. The objective of this chapter is to provide both quantitative and qualitative evidence for the impact of democratic support on immigrant sympathy in the specific case of Ecuador, a country that has experienced simultaneously a significant exodus of its population to the developed world (e.g., United States, Spain, and other European countries) and in a lesser extent to neighboring countries (e.g., Chile).

Chapter Six concludes with a discussion of the broader implications of this research. The discussion addresses the potential benefits that democratic values have for democratic quality in the region as well for the reduction of social conflict and distrust that can stem from increasing immigration in an unstable economic and political context.

Through an extensive analysis of what affects the formation of attitudes toward immigrants, I hope to elucidate the reasons of why maintaining and strengthening a democratic political culture in Latin America is fundamental, especially when many of these democracies still face many other challenges at present.

CHAPTER II

DEMOCRACY AND IMMIGRATION

A democratic citizen is one who believes in individual liberty and who is politically tolerant, who holds a certain amount of distrust of political authority but at the same time is trustful of fellow citizens, who is obedient but nonetheless willing to assert rights against the state, who views the state as constrained by legality, and who supports basic democratic institutions and processes
(Gibson, Duch, Tedin 1992, 332)

An initial conceptual step is to recognize that immigrants are neither strangers nor outsiders to their new communities
(Bach 1993, 170)

The study of immigration from the political science perspective has focused, for the most part, on the long and difficult process of immigrant political integration into a new culture, the economic and political system (Ramakrishnan 2005; Ramakrishnan and Espenshade 2001) or on migration policy in receiving countries (Weiner 1985; Zolberg 1981). Research from this standpoint, however, has paid little attention to the consequences that growing levels of immigration pose to democratic stability or to the consequences of democratic support for citizens' attitudes toward migration.

Given the understudied connection between immigration and system stress, it is useful not only to comprehend how immigration impacts citizens' feelings toward democracy, but also how preexisting attitudes toward democracy might help prepare citizens to respond positively and *democratically* to a dramatic increase in immigration. By evaluating what factors generate more migration-acceptant citizens, researchers may also be taking an extra step in the identification of democratic attitudes. As stated in the

first chapter of this dissertation, besides countless well-known benefits of a strong democratic political culture for democracy, support for democratic values matters for citizens' favorable reception of immigrants because it paves the way for a peaceful cohabitation between diverse groups that reside under the same political system, reducing social conflict. This in turn increases the quality of democracy, especially in a world increasingly characterized by the movement of people across borders.

Starting with Almond and Verba's (1963) seminal work on the *Civic Culture*, many subsequent studies sustain the idea that support for democratic values is necessary for the development, maintenance, and consolidation of democracy (e.g., Dahl 1971; Dahl 1989; Dahl 1998; Inglehart 1988; Wildavsky 1987). Some of these values, according to Robert Dahl, include (1) belief in the legitimacy of the institutions of democracy (public contestation and participation); (2) belief in the vertical relationship between government and the governed; (3) confidence in the capacity of the government to deal effectively with the country's problems; (4) high political and interpersonal trust; and (5) belief in the possibility and desirability of political cooperation in conjunction with a belief in the legitimacy of conflict. In short, a strong political culture depends on citizens' beliefs of their relationships vis-à-vis the government as well as with their fellow citizens. And, as it has been well established, without all these elements that are essential for a democracy, the quality of well established democracies may be eroded. In the context of Latin America, the quality of these democracies may be further corroded because of widespread problems of corruption and crime that affect this region, decreasing the legitimacy of these democracies.

When a significant arrival of immigrants takes place in receiving countries, it is extremely difficult for these governments to enforce policies that would stop immigration immediately (Andreas 1998-1999); immigrants, therefore, become a new minority group in host societies. From the perspective that sees the quality of a democratic system tied in important ways to how it treats its minority groups, then, it becomes crucial to understand variations in the manner immigrants are viewed and treated by native-born citizens. The fundamental thesis of this dissertation sees a democratic political culture, where citizens profess widespread support for democratic values, as an important determinant of how a society responds to a sudden influx of migrants. With a democratic political culture, the response to immigrants is one that seeks ways to successfully incorporate the migrants into the existing society and allow them to contribute to the betterment of the country as a whole. In situations where citizens do not exhibit high levels of support for the basic democratic values that make up a democratic culture, migrants will be more likely to face rising levels of nativist hostility, opposition to any government efforts to help migrants in their new country, and a heightened possibility of calls for authoritarian solutions to the “migrant problem.” When citizens express systematic hostile anti-immigrant attitudes, then, the quality of democracy further diminishes, especially in a region already touched by high levels of crime and corruption as it is that of Latin America.

It has been argued that if the perception of threat is intensified, it may trigger citizens’ “authoritarianism” by eliciting intolerant attitudes among the citizenry (Stenner 2005). And, in the context of high migration levels, it is not surprising that foreigners may be regarded as a threat to society’s values, background, culture, traditions, among others. This is the reason that high levels of support for democratic values matter in the

context of sudden surges of immigration because citizens are more likely to be prepared to react in a more *tolerant* and *democratic* fashion instead of engaging in aggressive behavior, including denial of basic human rights, endorsement of restrictive policies, and xenophobic responses (e.g., violent physical attacks against foreigners), undermining the foundations of a democratic society (Merolla and Zechmeister 2009). Thus, a strong democratic political culture enhances the quality of democracy because individuals will be willing to defend democracy and democratic values even amid dramatic unexpected events, such as high immigration surges.

This chapter attempts to incorporate attitudes toward immigration as a key subject in public opinion research on democracy. It begins with a scholarly literature review related to public opinion toward immigrants in industrial democracies, followed by the theoretical framework of the consequences of strong democratic political culture for the acceptance of minority groups in developing democracies. This chapter concludes with a discussion of the significance of this relationship for democracy in Latin America.

Public Opinion¹⁹

Public opinion data across the developed world suggests a higher number of citizens support stricter limits on immigration. In 2006, 42 and 49 percent of the population in Spain and the United States, respectively, agree to impose limits on immigration compared to 22 and 39 percent in 1999, according to the World Values

¹⁹ Clarke et al. (2001) emphasize the importance of public opinion because when immigration becomes a significant political issue, those attitudes have important policy implications, as shown in the cases of the United States, France, and most recently the European Union in general. Also, Money (1999) argues that “regional immigrant settlement patterns ensure that interest group disputes play out mainly at the level of gateway communities, whereas immigration policy making occurs at the national level. Thus, policy making may reflect either client politics or broader interest group demands, but policy shifts are likely only when immigrant communities becomes swing districts at the national level, causing national parties to pursue pro or anti-immigration voters” in Cornelius and Rosenblum (2005, 107).

Survey.²⁰ These signs of public discontent appear to have manifested themselves in stricter immigration policy around the world. For instance, the latest migration policy implemented in the European Union allows the detention of undocumented migrants for up to 18 months before deportation (*El Comercio* 2008; *New York Times* 2008). Most recently, at the time of this writing, a new legislation was approved by the Arizona's House of Representatives and signed by the governor. It authorizes the police to arrest foreigners suspected to be illegal (*New York Times* 2010).²¹ It is worth noting that if an issue is salient, such as immigration, it is more likely that citizens take that issue into consideration on election day by holding officials accountable for their preferences (Haider-Markel 1999; Tatalovich and Daynes 1998; *New York Times* 2010).²²

Although an increasing wealth of literature focuses on the formation of attitudes toward immigrants (see, e.g., Espenshade and Hempstead 1996; Palmer 1996; Citrin et al. 1997; and most recently Ward and Masgoret 2008; Wilkes et al. 2008), a related literature explores the formation of attitudes toward minorities and how perceptions of difference affect people's views of immigration as a whole. For instance, Morris (2000) is the first scholar to test inter-minority conflict theory in the U.S. context; this theory argues that there is a relationship between spatial proximity and animosity between racial and ethnic groups. Morris's findings, however, did not support the theory; instead, they showed that African Americans who lived in areas with a large Asian population were more supportive of immigration and therefore more likely to vote against Proposition 187, a California initiative (November, 1994) that denies public services to undocumented

²⁰ See, <http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/>

²¹ See, <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/15/us/15immig.html?pagewanted=1&sq=arizona%20immigration&st=cse&scp=1>

²² <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/17/world/europe/17barking.html>

immigrants, such as health care and public education. Similarly, Fetzer (2000), in his study of attitudes toward immigrants in the United States, France, and Germany, demonstrated that cultural marginality—that is, belonging to a minority group—increases positive opinions toward immigrants.

On the other hand, some research, surprisingly, indicates that Hispanic Americans living in areas with large illegal immigrant populations are more hostile to liberal immigration policies and often more likely to support individualism and patriotism than their Anglo-American counterparts (Burns and Gimpel 2000; De la Garza, Falcon, and Garcia 1996; Hood, Morris, and Shirkey 1997). By the same token, white voters in counties with large Latino populations demonstrate a stronger support for restrictive immigration policies, such as Proposition 187 (Tolbert and Hero 1996). Yet other studies find no evidence for differences in opinion toward immigrants by race. Indeed, the majority of citizens have negative views toward immigration regardless of their ethnic self-identification (Chandler and Tsai 2001). In addition, in ethnically diverse neighborhoods residents of all races tend to be more distrustful of each other, even when one belongs to the same ethnic group (Putman 2007).

Several investigations find that instead of personal economic conditions shaping opinions toward immigrants, it is beliefs about the national economy, concerns over taxes, and widespread negative feelings toward immigrants that galvanize restrictionist opinions. More specifically, those who believe that the national economy is stagnant or is not doing well are those who express negative views toward immigration (Burns and Gimpel 2000; Chandler and Tsai 2001; Citrin et al. 1997; Espenshade and Hempstead 1996; Pantoja 2006). Other studies, however, demonstrate that concerns over national

identity are more of a driving force of negative opinions than concerns over economic interests (Sniderman, Hagendoorn, and Prior 2004).

Furthermore, people are more likely to have negative views toward immigrants and to support more restrictive policies when they have to compete for jobs, especially lower-wage jobs (Borjas 1999; Borjas 1989; Gang, Rivera-Batiz, and Yun 2002; Mayda 2006; O'Rourke and Sinnott 2006; Scheve and Slaughter 2001; Tucci 2005). In contrast, others argue that rather than stemming from direct job competition, immigrant attitudes are a product of one's socioeconomic level; in general, individuals with higher levels of education are more likely to have positive views toward immigrants, irrespective of whether immigrants pose a threat to their jobs (Harris 2002, Pantoja 2006). In the case of Europe, people with higher education are generally more supportive of all types of immigration. This research concludes, therefore, that there is little connection between fears of labor market competition and negative views toward immigrants (Hainmueller and Hiscox 2007).

Similarly, people with more education are significantly more likely to accept other cultures, placing an important value on cultural diversity, and to believe that immigration benefits the national economy as a whole than those with less education (Gang, Rivera-Batiz, and Yun 2002; Hainmueller and Hiscox 2007; Harris 2002; Haubert and Fussell 2006; Pantoja 2006; Tucci 2005; Ward and Masgoret 2008; Wilkes, Guppy, and Farris 2008). The implications of this research for our understanding of attitudes toward immigration in developing countries are worrisome, because the absolute number of poor, less-educated people is prevalent in these countries. If these findings hold regardless of the country's development level, then we might expect to find widespread

anger and resentment toward immigrants in most developing countries, and such anger and resentment may quickly transform into a loss of support for the political system itself.

In order to understand better the role of contextual factors, besides individual level characteristics, researchers have also looked at the impact of the state of the economy, namely, economic development and unemployment rates; and the composition of the foreign population. Specifically, negative attitudes toward immigrants tend to be more pronounced in places with a large proportion of foreign born residents and where economic conditions are less prosperous (Gang, Rivera-Batiz, and Yun 2002; Kunovich 2004; McLaren 2003; O'Rourke and Sinnott 2006; Quillian 1995; Semyonov, Raijman, and Gorodzeisky 2006; Wilkes, Guppy, and Farris 2008). Moreover, the institutionalization of laws and policies that address certain ethnic traditions or cultures are found to have an influence on citizen tolerance of minorities (Weldon 2006). Thus far, studies of public opinion in developed societies indicate that citizens vary substantially in their views toward foreign-born citizens (Lapinski et al. 1997; Simon and Lynch 1999; Simon and Sikich 2007).

Research on attitudes toward immigrants has mostly been concentrated in established democracies with very little attention to the context of the developing world (Orces 2009). Furthermore, citizens' views on democracy rarely enter into the discussion of what influences citizens' acceptance (or rejection) of foreigners. In the following pages, I will argue that support for democratic values, that is, support for a strong democratic political culture is in fact a central part of the puzzle explaining attitudes towards immigrants. This study attempts to contribute to both migration and democracy

scholarships by providing, for the first time, a comprehensive examination of the effects of individual and national level characteristics on attitudes towards immigrants in Latin America, a region where intraregional migration has gone largely ignored, despite being an increasingly common feature of Latin America's demographics over the past forty years.

Theory: Support for Democratic Values and Pro-Immigrant Sentiment

Why is a strong democratic political culture important for both understanding attitudes towards immigrants and helping the move toward higher quality democracies amid high levels of migration in host societies? Because citizens are more likely to accept the presence of foreign-born residents when they express strong support for democratic values such as political support, interpersonal trust, political tolerance, belief in democratic legitimacy, and respect for human rights, among others (Norris 1999). In contrast, if citizens express low support for these values, the more likely they will reveal systematic hostile attitudes against foreigners, that in turn, may generate an environment supportive of authoritarian responses to the migration question (Hetherington and Weiler 2009; Merolla and Zechmeister 2009; Stenner 2005). As mentioned in the beginning of this chapter, authoritarian responses become especially relevant when social cohesion is threatened by citizens' aggressive behavior toward foreigners. These actions will lead to a profound social conflict that will prevent the move toward higher quality democracies, particularly in the context of weak democracies such as those found in Latin America and the Caribbean. This is the reason that citizens' support for democratic values matter for

the betterment of the quality of democracy because citizens will be prepared to react in a more tolerant and democratic manner amid high migration inflows.

Democratic values refer to those underlying components of a democratic political culture related to the relationships between individuals within a society, such as political tolerance and interpersonal trust. However, citizens' views toward democracy more generally may also be important factors shaping an individual's views toward migrants. Following Norris et al.'s (1999) conceptualization of democratic political support and the five dimensions they see as forming the basis for this concept -- political community, regime principles, regime performance, regime institutions, and political actors, I explore both the role of specific attitudinal elements of a democratic culture as well as the varying effects of each component of democratic political support on views toward foreigners.

It is important to note that Norris et al.'s five dimensions of a democratic political society may behave differently with respect to an individual's views toward immigrants. For instance, it is plausible that a person who has high levels of support for democracy in principle, which theoretically may be the basis for more positive attitudes towards immigrants, may have very negative views of regime performance, and these negative attitudes likely produce negative attitudes toward immigrants. Put differently, an individual could support democratic principles and democracy as a system of government, but still be very critical of its political institutions and authorities, and these two sets of attitudes could have contradictory effects on that person's views toward immigrants. Given the more fundamental nature of support for democracy and democratic principles, I view these as likely to trump other political system attitudes with

respect to how they help us understand attitudes toward immigrants. These ideas will be further explored in the following pages.

The remainder of this chapter first examines research on the various dimensions of democratic political support highlighted by Norris et al (1999). I then focus on each individual element and discuss the theoretical link to an individual's views towards immigrants. I continue with an assessment of how political tolerance and interpersonal trust may affect attitudes towards foreigners. Next, I highlight the important role that context plays in understanding reactions to immigrants and outline the theoretical impact of a country's levels of democracy and economic development. I conclude with a discussion of the implications of democratic values for the acceptance of foreigners and the prospects for high quality democracies.

Why is Democratic Political Support Important? A Multidimensional Concept

Democratic political support involves various dimensions such as support for the political community, regime principles, regime performance, regime institutions, and political actors (Dalton 2004; Dalton 2006; Easton 1965; Easton 1975; Easton 1976; Norris 1999).²³ This section begins with a brief literature review of each of the components of democratic political support, followed by the theoretical assessment of each of these dimensions on immigrant sympathy.

Research on the first level of democratic political support, namely, support for the political community suggests that citizens' degree of attachment to their political community reinforces democracy (Linz and Stepan 1996; Rustow 1970). If an individual

²³ David Easton (1965, 1975) concentrates in the analysis of political support by taking into consideration three dimensions: support for the political community, the regime, and the authorities.

feels a weak attachment to his/her political community, it also “implies a weak commitment . . . to the values and procedures that are central for that political system” (Moreno 2008, 3). Yet except for a limited number of studies, there is little empirical evidence on support for the political community across time and across nations and how it relates to support for democracy (Davidov 2009; Klingemann 1999; Moreno 2008; Smith and Jarkko 2001)

Conversely, there are ample indications of a worldwide increase in support for democracy as the best form of government—even in countries where problems of corruption and violence are widespread (e.g., Nigeria, Ghana, Zambia, Haiti, Guatemala, ex Soviet nations) or where democracy is weakened by domestic and international turmoil, exemplified by the crisis in Honduras.²⁴ Citizens across these nations continue to demonstrate fairly high levels of support for democracy in the abstract (e.g., Bratton and Mattes 2001; Pharr and Putnam 2000; Rose and Mishler 1996).²⁵

Despite an evolving scholarship substantiating various dimensions for democratic political support, the remaining components of this support (i.e. satisfaction with democracy, support for democratic political institutions, and support for political actors) appear in decline. This pattern does not come as a surprise in developing democracies because these countries still face internal problems—high levels of unemployment,

²⁴ On June 28 of 2009, President Manuel Zelaya attempted to hold a referendum to run for reelection albeit the Supreme Court’s refusal. Former President Zelaya, however, decided to go ahead with the referendum that challenged the Supreme Court’s decision. Later on, this institution ordered the detention of Zelaya by the military, even though it was also unconstitutional. Zelaya was arrested by the army at his home on the same day the referendum was intended to take place and sent into exile to Costa Rica. Zelaya attempted to reenter the country several times following his expulsion and finally entered the country on September 21, under the protection of the Brazilian Embassy. In the aftermath of the coup d’etat in Honduras, many countries around the world condemned this event. At the time of this writing, Porfirio Lobo was elected as the new president of Honduras. Zelaya, on his part, left Honduras to reside in the Dominican Republic, while the government granted amnesty to those members of the military who participated in the coup. See a detailed treatment of this case at www.infolatam.com

²⁵ For a variety of studies on this subject in Latin America, see www.lapopsurveys.org

corruption, crime and violence, to name a few. Yet erosion for this support is further registered in established democracies, namely, the United States, Britain, Canada, and France, among others (Dalton 2004; Dalton 2006). Does a global decline of democratic political support put democracy at risk? Some argue that with low levels of this support, democracy is undermined (Crozier, Huntington, and Watanuki 1975). Mounting evidence on this subject, however, suggests that critical citizens in fact help strengthen their systems, by allowing for the adaptation of democracy to citizens' shifting demands (Dalton 2004; Norris 1999), in contrast to the belief that democracy is at risk.

What do all these mean for democracy amid high levels of immigration? I suggested in the beginning of this chapter that support for democratic values matters because democratic citizens will respond in democratic ways to dramatic, unexpected events such as a sudden influx of immigrants. Such responses will, in turn, reduce the likelihood to allow a permissive environment of anti-democratic responses, sometimes galvanized during hard economic and/or political times (Merolla and Zechmeister 2009). And, in the case of democratic political support, one would anticipate that citizens' higher democratic support will lead to a more sympathetic view toward foreigners because citizens understand that democracy is important for the protection of minority rights even if these minority groups may be unpopular.

However, democratic political support is not a unidimensional concept as explained above, but rather consists of different elements that have opposite effects on immigrant opinion. As noted, individuals may score differently on these dimensions, with each reflecting distinct views towards immigrants as well. I will continue with a discussion of the theoretical expectations of each of the components of a democratic

political support: support for the political community, support for democracy in principle, and support for democracy in practice, that is, satisfaction with the way democracy works, support for institutions, and political authorities (Dalton 2004; Dalton 2006; Easton 1965; Easton 1975; Easton 1976; Norris 1999) and their linkage to immigrant opinion.

Support for the Political Community

Why is support for the political community important for the presence of immigrants in host societies? With an intensifying arrival of foreigners in receiving countries, citizens may express different attitudes toward their political system. Indeed, national identity is seen as belonging to an imagined political community “because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members... yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion” (Anderson 1983, 6; also see Blank, 2003). Yet, immigrants do not belong to this nation and a reaffirmation of immigrants’ perception as “outsiders” is at play (Sniderman et al. 2000).

Nationalism and patriotism are understood as two different dimensions of national identity. While nationalism “supports homogeneity within society, blind obedience, and idealized excessive valuation of one’s own nation; patriotism supports heterogeneous structures within the society and a critical distance to the state and the regime” (Blank and Schmidt 2003, 306). Following this logic, nationalistic attitudes lead to a feeling of national superiority and a belittling of minorities and outsiders (Hechter 2000; Kosterman and Feshbach 1989; Sniderman et al. 2000). Also, citizens who hold their nation very high may be uncritical of their political institutions and authorities, thus, accepting

political decisions whether they are right or wrong (Meloan 1999; Schatz and Staub 1997; Schatz, Staub, and Lavine 1999).²⁶

Patriotism, in contrast, is expected to increase tolerant attitudes provided that “patriotic citizens” are more conscious and more critical of their political system, especially if their leaders’ actions may pose a threat to democratic norms (Adorno et al. 1950; Schatz and Staub 1997). For them “the nation is not idealized, but is instead evaluated from the basis of a critical conscience” (Blank and Schmidt 2003, 291). Most importantly, the endorsement of authoritarian attitudes is widely rejected and rather support for democratic values is essential (Blank and Schmidt 2003). Both of these concepts have not only been distinguished theoretically, but also empirically (Davidov 2009). The relationship between national identity and attitudes toward immigrants leads us to expect that an elevated blind attachment of citizens to their nation (nationalism) will lead to negative views toward foreign born residents. On the contrary, higher levels of patriotism will lead to positive views toward this group because “patriotic citizens” understand the importance of social cohesion.

²⁶ *Social Identity theory* has served as a powerful instrument to explain much of attitudinal and behavioral denigration against particular groups as well as the rise of nationalism. It stems from various works by Tajfel and Turner (1979; 1986) and Tajfel (1981) and conjectures that the discrimination toward out-groups allows individuals to form and maintain positive social identities based on their in-group membership. Someone whose social identity or in the case of a nation—political identity, is threatened will most likely strengthen his/her identity through a positive differentiation of the in-group and a devaluation of the out-group. For a detailed review on this literature, see Brown (2000). Likewise, SIT has been useful to develop theories of *ethnocentrism* (Kam and Kinder 2007; Kinder and Kam 2010). There is also an extensive literature on various *group threat theories* that originated from Blumer’s (1958) theory of racial attitudes. He attempts to give a comprehensive explanation of racial prejudice. Other variations of group threat theories include *realistic group threat theory* that states that members of the dominant group believe that they are entitled to certain resources, and when those resources are threatened by a minority group, dominant group members are likely to respond with hostility. In contrast to GTT, these theories emphasize that hostility toward out-groups is the result of a “real threat.” Specifically, there is a real competition over resources (Bobo 1988; Bobo and Hutchings 1996). Some scholars have stretched this idea to *symbolic threat theory* which contends that not only a threat over economic resources is present, but also a threat to the values, morals, and traditions of the dominant group (Kinder and Sears 1981; Sears 1988). All of these theories have been extended to explain anti-immigrant sentiments (Chandler and Tsai 2001; Citrin et al. 1997; Quillian, 1995)

In this section I have examined how the two dimensions of national identity – nationalism and patriotism - may be related to attitudes toward immigrants in receiving democracies. Next, I look at how support for democracy in the abstract and support for specific dimensions of a democratic political support are also strongly related to attitudes toward immigrants.

Support for Democracy Principles and in Practice

In addition to a citizen's attachment to her political system, she will also exhibit varying degrees of support for democracy's basic principles (Bratton and Mattes 2001; Norris 1999; Pharr and Putnam 2000; Rose and Mishler 1996). With the global increase in democracy over the past three decades, more and more citizens of these new democracies have come to understand the virtues of a democratic political system; for instance, the protection of citizens' political rights and civic liberties—the right to vote, to be elected, to compete; the freedom of association, expression; and the requirement that elections are free and fair, etc. But how specifically can a citizenry cognizant of these rights contribute to democratic government? Rights consciousness contributes to democracy because it results in “greater demands by the citizenry for the advancement and protection of individual and collective political, social, and economic rights” (Gibson, Duch, and Tedin 1992, 344). In the case of immigrants, nationals will react more favorably toward migration because they understand that a crucial dimension of democracy is the protection of minority's rights. I anticipate, therefore, a positive direct relationship between support for democracy in the abstract and favorable views toward immigrants.

Democratic political support is also expressed by citizens' satisfaction with the way democracy works, support for democratic political institutions, and support for political authorities. Given that citizens in democracies develop the notion of certain rights vis-à-vis their political institutions and authorities, they expect to enjoy the same rights as every citizen living in the same political system (Almond and Verba 1963). Why is this relationship important? Citizen relationship with political authorities is significant because a rights-conscious population represents "an important check on the exercise of arbitrary power by governmental authorities" (Almond and Verba 1963, 483), that is, citizens will be willing to defend democratic governance while holding their authorities accountable. Likewise, elevated levels of rights awareness "constrain institutions within democracies; they define citizens as active participants in governance, not as passive recipients of governance" (Gibson, Duch, and Tedin 1992, 345). Therefore, a more rights-conscious citizenry will encourage the push toward higher quality democratic societies.

As indicated in the beginning of this section, an increasing scholarship reveals a decline in citizen satisfaction with democracy and a widening distrust in political institutions (e.g., legislatures, political parties, armed forces, etc.) and political leaders across countries. Individuals' growing dissatisfaction is seen as a result of their shifting demands for better quality democracies (Dalton 2004; Dalton 2006; Norris 1999). Those most dissatisfied with the way their democracy is working are more likely to pursue extralegal forms of political participation while more formal modes of participation are more common among those who trust the government and are supportive of the regime (Almond and Verba 1963; Inglehart 1997; Putman 1993).

Besides new, potentially more violent, modes of political participation, another consequence of growing levels of dissatisfaction with democracy in practice is an increase in opposition to foreign-born residents. A common expression of this dynamic is “If democracy can’t deliver for me, why should “outsiders” be allowed to make things even worse!” The foreign-born are seen as competitors for scarce resources while placing tremendous pressure on the political system’s capacity to respond to natives’ shifting demands. The same dynamic holds for those who distrust their political institutions and authorities: the more natives mistrust their main political institutions and leaders, the less likely they will tolerate the presence of immigrants. One reason for these unsympathetic feelings toward immigrants is that as citizens’ growing dissatisfaction with the performance of political institutions as well as their political leaders intensifies, the more they will blame their misfortunes on “outsiders” because immigrants may become, in citizens’ view, the cause of these political institutions and actors’ underperformance.

On the other hand, if citizens recognize that their institutions and governmental authorities are capable of satisfying their demands and if they relate the instrumental value of democracy with a “working democratic political system,” then, individuals will be less opposed to “outsiders” entitlement to resources and a peaceful life under the same regime. Citizens’ satisfaction with democracy in practice (including institutions and leaders) generates a more accepting culture for the arrival of immigrants because a working democracy proves to satisfy citizens’ needs and those of foreign born residents.

In short, democratic political support as expressed by support for the political community, regime principles, regime performance, regime institutions, and political actors has different consequences on how citizens view foreigners. I suggested that

individuals' higher attachment to their political community will translate into either positive opinions toward immigrants when related to patriotism and negative opinions when related to nationalism. Similarly, a higher support for democracy in the abstract and in practice (including trust in political institutions and actors) will lead to favorable views toward immigrants because natives understand that one of democracy's main features is the protection of minorities' rights.

In this section I looked at the relationship between different dimensions of democratic political support and attitudes toward immigrants. Next, I evaluate two democratic variables I consider are central in the discussion of a strong democratic political culture: political tolerance and interpersonal trust, and how they are related to pro-immigrant sentiment.

Why is Political Tolerance Important?

Support for a democratic system does not necessarily mean that citizens are tolerant toward minority groups who live under the same political system. While the majority of citizens support democratic rights, these same groups "are usually considerably less likely to extend these rights to disliked groups" (Peffley and Rohrschneider 2003, 243). Therefore, stable systems could be at risk when the rights of the minorities are not guaranteed, given that if the support for the system is very high and political tolerance is low, the society could become authoritarian (Seligson and Córdova 1993). In addition, a possible outcome from high levels of system support, as already discussed in the previous section, is people's unwillingness to criticize their government's decisions whether they are right or wrong. This is seen as strengthening

people's national identity and developing a sense of "blind patriotism" in which people tend to be less accepting of outsiders (Schatz, Staub, and Lavine 1999).

In order to maintain stable democracies and accelerate the move toward higher quality democracies, not only is support for a democratic political system necessary, but also needed is support for democratic values, such as political tolerance. If political tolerance, understood as the respect of citizens' right to express themselves politically whether we agree with them or not, is absent

"the marketplace of ideas is constrained, and competition among ideas cannot flourish. Without such competition, citizens may be denied the opportunity to support the political movements of their choice, political freedom may be lost, and democratic accountability may be undermined. Thus, the activities that must be tolerated in a liberal democracy are, at a minimum, those involving political competition—organizing, taking one's message to the people, competing in elections, etc" (Gibson 2006, 23).

Some researchers contend that intolerant attitudes could increase and could put at risk those who are the target of political intolerance (Gibson and Duch 1993; Prothro and Grigg 1960; Sullivan, Pierson, and Marcus 1982). Intolerant attitudes have important implications as "such attitudes and behaviors may threaten the very fabric of democracy by singling out particular groups as second-class citizens, which may lead to treatment and policies that deny equal rights and equal protection" (Merolla and Zechmeister 2009, 12). Citizens therefore must reconsider their differences toward "disliked groups" in order to coexist harmoniously under the same political system (Marus et al. 1995; Stouffer 1955). This is the reason that political tolerance becomes a fundamental value for the consolidation of a democratic political culture, especially in countries where

increasing levels of immigration have quickly turned immigrants into a “disliked” group.²⁷

Usually, political tolerance is thought as a belief that is linked to a larger set of views about democratic political institutions and processes. For example, citizens who believe in the main institutions of majority rule in which the protection of the rights of minorities is institutionalized, they are more likely to tolerate ethnic minorities (Weldon 2006) as well as their most despised political enemies (Gibson 2006). A corollary to this statement is that high levels of political tolerance will lead to a higher acceptance of foreign born citizens in spite of the fact that this group has turned out to be particularly unpopular. This section continues with the analysis of social trust.

Why is Social Trust important?

Social trust represents one of the main elements of social capital theory, which refers to the social connections, networks, and interpersonal trust that take place in communities and how these affect the way democracy works (Putnam 1993, 1995, 2000). Putman suggests that civic participation and interpersonal trust strengthen each other. For

²⁷ Along the lines of research on tolerance, there has been an increasing literature on authoritarianism suggesting that negative attitudes toward foreigners or immigration policy are the product of citizens’ authoritarian predispositions, which refers to citizens’ strong preference for conformity and uniformity (Feldman 2003; Feldman and Stenner 1997; Hetherington and Weiler 2009; Sniderman, Hagendoorn, and Prior 2004; Stenner 2005). Logically, immigrants are the epitome of difference, therefore, more likely to be perceived as a threat to social norms and values (Bobo and Hutchings 1996; Hetherington and Weiler 2009; Marcus et al. 1995). Stenner (2005) argues that authoritarianism becomes germane especially when social cohesion is threatened; more specifically, when the culture appears to be segmented by a growing presence of foreigners. Furthermore, authoritarianism, according to her, is harmful when the “out-group is denigrated” and the “ingroup is glorified.” In the case of foreigners, these are viewed as a threat to society’s traditions, eliciting intolerant attitudes among the citizenry. It is worth noting that authoritarian predispositions and attitudes are two different concepts, but strongly linked. While authoritarian predispositions refer to steady predispositions that tap into the extent to which an individual/s values group unity and obedience in contrast to individual autonomy and diversity, authoritarian attitudes are more broad opinions related to moral, political, and racial intolerance (Merolla and Zechmeister 2009, 77). The extent to which an individual holds authoritarian predispositions will predict levels of authoritarian attitudes.

the purpose of this study, I will focus on social trust and its influence in pro immigrant sentiments.

Numerous definitions of “social trust” can be found in the literature; for instance, Newton (1999) defines social trust as “the belief that others will, so far as they can, look after our interests, that they will not take advantage or harm us” (170). According to this author, trust is built upon imperfect knowledge as a person does not know how the other is going to react. In his words “trust involves a leap of faith” (171). Therefore, social trust is an important component of democracy because it allows for general interactions between individuals from dissimilar backgrounds and who hold different views and values. Specifically, a determinant characteristic of trust is that it takes place among individuals that may not know each other, but nonetheless may be willing to cooperate and participate collectively, while nurturing political tolerance (Córdova 2008), another fundamental democratic value discussed in the previous section. These actions will, in turn, strengthen democracy (Fukuyama 1995; Inglehart and Welzel 2005; Putnam 1993; Putman 2000; Uslaner 2002).

Social trust and civic participation also become germane vis-à-vis political trust. If citizens do not engage in civic activity, they may feel incapable of any political influence, and in turn, these feelings may cause a state of helplessness that can stimulate pessimism and distrust toward political authorities, governmental institutions, and the regime in general (Putnam 2000). Furthermore, under conditions of conflict or crisis (as a result of an external event), distrustful citizens may also harbor hostile attitudes toward those that they do not necessarily know because conflict or crisis may produce an environment of permanent suspicion among individuals. Merolla and Zechmeister

(2009), for instance, suggest that less trust could actually turn out to be positive because as citizens increase their sense of cautiousness, they may feel more efficacious and more secure, even though if these feelings do not solve the conflict. Yet less trust will induce individuals to “become relatively more hostile toward out-groups, intolerant, and punitive under the security crisis condition. In other words, individuals will become more authoritarian in times of crisis” (30), and following this logic, a sudden influx of immigrants may be perceived as a crisis. Putnam (2007) found that in the long run, ethnically diverse societies will have important cultural, economic, and developmental outcomes. In the short run, nonetheless, immigration will tend to diminish social capital.

How do the benefits of interpersonal trust relate to immigration? A reasonable outcome of low levels of trust, under conditions of conflict, is to react unfavorably toward the sudden arrival of foreigners because, as noted, immigrants may be perceived as a threat to society’s traditional values, backgrounds, etc.²⁸ For that reason, general interpersonal trust is of great value for the nourishment of pro-immigrant sentiments because citizens who are more trustful are generally more likely to give positive evaluations of groups that have traditionally faced discrimination, are more supportive of the legal order in society, and more likely to contribute to causes that help the less fortunate (Uslaner 2002). Therefore, an implication of trust on citizens’ attitudes is their willingness to accept the presence of foreign born residents given that immigrants may be viewed as a vulnerable group, in particular when they are new in the receiving society.

²⁸Most of the explanations related to hostility toward outgroups have relied on the perception of threat of an individual or group that is different in one characteristic or another from oneself (or group), leading to exclusionary attitudes towards foreigners (Kunovich, 2004; Quillian 1995; Raijman and Semyonov 2004; Semyonov, Raijman, and Yom-Tov 2002; Semyonov et al. 2004). According to this approach, discriminatory attitudes and prejudice against the out-group population can be a result of threats posed to the individual or the group in the economic and the social arena (Bobo and Hutchings 1996; Sniderman and Carmines 1997). There is a considerable literature on the sources of racial prejudice (Allport 1954, Blumer 1958, Bobo and Fox 2003; Bobo and Hutchings 1996, Sniderman and Carmines 1997, among others)

As a result, I anticipate that high levels of interpersonal trust will lead to more favorable views toward immigrants and immigration.

Now that I have examined the relationship between political tolerance, interpersonal trust, and attitudes toward immigrants, I turn to an individual's context as a source of reasons for his/her immigrant attitudes. I argue that not only do individual level characteristics matter, but also the economic and political environment within which one finds oneself explains these attitudes. I conclude this chapter with an evaluation of the impact of some national level characteristics such as economic development and democracy on immigrant perceptions.

Does context matter? Economic Development and Democracy

There has been a great deal of attention paid to the effects of contextual factors on regime type, such as economic development. Indeed, one of the main tenets of modernization theory is that as a country develops, the social structure becomes complex, labor processes commence to require the cooperation of employees, and various groups surface and organize (Lipset 1959; Lipset 1981). Consequently, the political system under question is no longer able to govern because the society has become too complex to control through authoritative means. More specifically, when modernization takes place, technological development increases freedom of information, civil society is more likely to emerge, while authoritative modes of government become less effective. In short, modernization will lead to an ongoing differentiation and specialization of social structures that result into a diversification of political structures that opens the way for democracy. The cycle of this modernization process is industrialization, urbanization,

education, communication, mobilization, and culminating with political incorporation (Boix and Stokes 2003; Epstein et al. 2006; Lipset 1959; Lipset 1981).

Furthermore, evidence suggests that once a country is democratic, economic development will prevent its breakdown (Przeworski et al. 2000; Przeworski and Limongi 1997). Therefore, economic development seems as an important factor for the persistence of democracy as a system of government. How, then, does economic development lead to pro-immigrant sentiment? All else equal, citizens that reside in prosperous countries will be more likely to view immigrants favorably as economic development will reduce conflict over resources, mitigating the perception of immigrants as a threat. Similarly, if development influences democratic processes and for that matter strengthens democracy, it is also feasible that citizens in developed countries will become socialized into a stronger democratic culture and thus even if they themselves hold less than democratic views, the effect of these undemocratic views on attitudes towards immigrants will be softened by the democratic culture surrounding them.

The actual levels of democracy in a country likely provide a better reflection of the political culture of that society. Beyond the well known and commonly accepted minimalist Schumpeterian approach to democracy which states that “the democratic method is that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decision in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people’s vote” (1976, 269), scholars of democracy have come to understand that democracy is much more than just elections. Democracy is the institutional arrangement under which individuals’ rights are protected, under which individuals “have multiple, ongoing channels for expression and representation of their interests and values,

including diverse, independent associations, and movements, which they have the freedom to form and join” (Diamond 1999, 35; also see Schmitter and Karl 1991; Dahl 1971; Dahl 1989; Dahl 1998, Dahl 2006). There are countless reasons to believe that the level or quality of democracy in a country will lead to more favorable views toward immigrants, precisely because citizens in high quality democracies understand that every person living under the umbrella of democracy needs to be protected.

In short, individual and national level characteristics matters in the formation of immigrant opinion. I have argued throughout this chapter that support for democratic values are essential for the acceptance of immigrants in host societies because citizens will be prepared to react *democratically* even when dramatic events take place, such as an unexpected influx of immigrants. I included into the discussion my theoretical expectations of the relationship between the different components of democratic political support and immigrant opinion. The following hypotheses derived from the theory:

H1. Individuals with higher support for democratic values, such as political tolerance and interpersonal trust, are more likely to view immigrants positively.

H2. Citizens who support democracy in the abstract and in practice will reveal more favorable views toward immigrants.

H3. Individuals with higher levels of patriotism will exhibit more favorable views toward immigrants.

H4. Alternatively, individuals with elevated levels of national pride will demonstrate negative opinions toward immigrants.

H5. Countries with higher levels of economic development and democracy will have higher averages of pro-migrant sentiments than less developed and democratic countries.

To sum up, support for democratic values matter for the acceptance of immigrants in host societies, especially in a world increasingly characterized by the movement of people across borders. In the following chapter, my objective is to provide descriptive statistics of the main variables. It concludes with the empirical testing of the strength of these relationships through the implementation of multilevel techniques.

CHAPTER III

DEMOCRATIC VALUES AND IMMIGRATION IN LATIN AMERICA

More than 20 million Latin American and Caribbean people reside outside their country of birth. Some three-quarters are in the United States; many of the remainder are in Argentina, Venezuela, Spain and Canada. Intra-Latin American migration to other Latin American countries is also increasingly important; including Central Americans moving to Mexico, Colombians to Ecuador and movements in both directions between Paraguay and Brazil.

(OECD 2009, 7)

What is the impact of democratic values on attitudes toward immigrants and what does this mean for a world increasingly characterized by migrations? In the previous chapter it was argued that the relationship between citizens' support for democratic values and attitudes toward immigrants will be better understood by taking into account citizens' attitudes towards democracy. Specifically, I argued that a strong democratic political culture is important for a more accepting culture when a sudden influx of immigrants occurs, especially because it is extremely difficult for governments of receiving countries to enforce policies that would stop immigration immediately (Andreas 1998-1999). Consequently, immigrants become an important new minority group in host societies. The way in which this new group is treated matters because if anti-democratic attitudes prevail among the general population, it may create a permissive environment of violent responses against foreigners, undermining social cohesion while eroding the quality of these democracies.

This chapter explores the sources of citizens' attitudes toward immigrants in the context of the developing world and tests the various ideas discussed in the previous chapter. To the best of my knowledge, no researchers have yet systematically examined attitudes toward immigrants in Latin America. This omission is not surprising as theoretical propositions regarding attitudes toward immigration have mainly assumed that immigration takes place only in developed countries. In fact, much of migration dynamics happen at the intra-regional level, in particular within regions that have been touched by civil wars, natural disasters, political and economic instability (OECD 2009). For example, the civil war in Sudan has generated a significant number of refugees in neighboring countries such as Chad and Uganda, both countries known for their low levels of development (Wihtol de Wenden 2009). By the same token, the economic and political instability in Latin America illustrated by the case of the armed conflict in Colombia has produced a humanitarian crisis that has resulted in one of the largest displaced populations in the world, with an estimated 3 million Colombians living outside their place of origin (USCRI 2006) and with a significant number of these emigrating to neighboring countries such as Ecuador and Venezuela.

Even though there is a growing movement of people across borders, no substantive studies have examined the consequences that growing levels of immigration pose to democratic stability or to the consequences of democratic support for citizens' attitudes toward migration in developing countries. In this chapter, I focus on an empirical assessment of the determinants of attitudes toward immigrants across Latin America, a region where the topic of immigration remains largely unexplored.

This chapter starts with a discussion of the dependent variables (i.e., attitudes toward immigrants) and their measurements, followed by a description of the main explanatory factors. It concludes with the empirical assessment of the sources of pro-immigrant sentiments in Latin America through an analysis of both qualitative and quantitative data.

Opinions toward Immigrants in Latin America

Prior literature on public opinion toward immigrants and immigration indicate that a significant number of citizens in developed countries have negative opinions toward immigrants (Lapinski et al. 1997; Simon and Lynch 1999; Simon and Sikich 2007). For example, recent public opinion data indicates that in 2006, 42 and 49 percent of the population in Spain and the United States, respectively, agree to impose limits on immigration compared to 22 and 39 percent in 1999. Similarly, there was a slight increase in the percentage of the Australian population (from 39%-41%) who agree with this same statement in a 10 year period (1995-2005).²⁹

In the case of developing countries, very little systematic research has been conducted on this subject. By employing data from 14 countries in Latin America I am in a position to examine, for the first time, attitudes toward immigrants by taking into account both individual and country level characteristics (e.g., economic development and a country's levels of democracy).

²⁹ See, www.wordvaluessurveys.org

Dependent Variables

The survey items related to immigration included in these data are: *“To what extent do you agree that the government should provide social services such as healthcare, education, housing, to foreigners who come to live or work in this country? Strongly agree, somewhat agree, neutral, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree.”*³⁰

Figure III.1 illustrates the percentage of the Latin American population that responded to this item. Almost 52 percent of the LAC population strongly or somewhat agrees that the government should provide social services to foreigners, while 15 percent feels neutral and 33 percent strongly or somewhat disagree with this statement. These preliminary results suggest that the majority of Latin Americans view immigrants positively when related to the provision of governmental services, in contrast to the majority of citizens in developed nations. The following item tapping into attitudes toward immigrants asks *“Would you say that the people who come to live here from other countries do the jobs that (country’s citizens, e.g., Jamaicans) do not want to do, or generally take jobs away from (country’s citizens)?”* In this instance, Figure III.2 demonstrates that the majority of Latin Americans (58%) view immigrants as a threat to local employment opportunities (taking jobs away from natives), while 42 percent believe that foreigners accept the jobs that citizens decline.

³⁰ This variable was recoded into 0 to 100 scale in order to simplify the analysis in this study




Figure 0.1. Support for Governmental Services for Immigrants in Latin America




Figure 0.2. Perception of Immigrants in the Domain of Job Security in Latin America

Among those individuals who reveal positive attitudes toward immigrants in both questions, Table III.1 shows that around 31 percent of the Latin American and Caribbean population seem to somewhat or strongly agree with the provision of governmental services for immigrants while at the same time believe that immigrants take jobs that citizens do not want. Around 28 percent of Latin Americans, on the other hand, display negative immigrant opinions in both measures, suggesting that the difference between both pro and anti-immigrant sentiment is relatively small. Only 13 percent of the population expressed neutral feeling toward foreigners.

Table 0.1. Percentage of Population that Scores High in Both Measures of Immigrant Sympathy

<i>Support for Governmental Services for Immigrants</i>	<i>Immigrants Take Jobs From Citizens</i>	<i>Immigrants Take Jobs Citizens Do Not Want</i>	<i>Total</i>
Strongly Disagree	17%	4%	21%
Somewhat Disagree	11%	4%	15%
Neutral	8%	5%	13%
Somewhat Agree	12%	16%	28%
Strongly Agree	8%	15%	23%
Total	56%	44%	100%

Source: Americas Barometer 2008 by LAPOP

What are the advantages of these immigrant opinion measures? Both measures have several advantages. For example, these items measure the degree of acceptance of immigrants in one's country by tapping, I will argue, two distinct dimensions of attitudes toward immigrants.³¹ The first variable taps citizens' views of the role of the government vis-à-vis immigration, while the second variable gauges, more directly, the degree to

³¹ The Cronbach's Alpha for both variables is 0.32, which offers evidence for this position.

which natives view immigrants affecting their lives, by explicitly looking into immigrants' impact on scarce resources such as jobs. One shortcoming is that these questions do not specify an immigrant group. But, the fact that respondents are free to choose the immigrant group they see as most relevant in their daily lives render these items more accurate. In the following section, the relationships of various indicators of strong democratic political culture and both dimensions of immigrant opinion will be presented, enhancing our understanding of the theoretical expectations exposed in Chapter II.

It has been established that attitudes toward immigrants remain particularly negative in the developed world (Lapinski et al. 1997; Simon and Lynch 1999; Simon and Sikich 2007). Here, some of our preliminary results suggest a widespread pro-immigrant sentiment in the Latin American context. This general view, however, conceals important variations at the country level, as illustrated by Figure III.3. Note that Bolivia emerges as the country with the lowest pro-immigrant sentiment in Latin America with an average of 45.2 points in a 0 to 100 scale, followed by Ecuador (49.3) and Guatemala (50.1). On the other side of the continuum, Uruguay is the country with the highest level of pro-immigrant sentiments with an average of 66.2 points on the same scale. Similarly, Costa Rica, Venezuela, Belize, and the Dominican Republic show positive opinions toward immigrants with an average above 60 points. It is noteworthy that the differences across countries are statistically significant and that these averages have been controlled for the main SES variables, such as gender, age, education, wealth and size of city-town in the country of destination.




Figure 0.3. Support for Governmental Services for Immigrants by Country

Pro-immigrant sentiments, when measured by respondents' perceptions of foreigners' impact on the job market, vary widely by country.³² Figure III.4 shows that 77.2 percent of the population in Costa Rica thinks that immigrants do not take jobs from citizens, the country with the highest pro-immigrant sentiment in the sample. On the other hand, Ecuador is the country that demonstrates the lowest level of pro-immigrant sentiment with only 29.2 percent of its population claiming having these positive views.

³² It is worth noting that the number of countries for this variable was reduced to 10, excluding Venezuela, Chile, Argentina, and Belize.

Put differently, Ecuador is the country with the highest anti-immigrant sentiment in the sample when related to job availability. Some of the fieldwork carried out in Ecuador during the summer of 2009 echoes these negative opinions:

“I think that they [immigrants] are occupying a position that should go to Ecuadorians. In other words, they are taking away our few sources of employment available for Ecuadorians.”

Interviewee C13, Quito, Ecuador
(Author’s translation)

“The people who come to our country affect our workers because foreigners offer cheap manual labor and businesses prefer these people than our own Ecuadorians in order to save money...”

Interviewee D6, Quito, Ecuador
(Author’s translation)

“It is harmful for Ecuadorians because these people are working in jobs that we could work and I think that there is a disloyal competition because they work for less, diminishing the value of manual labor”

Interviewee E14, Quito, Ecuador
(Author’s translation)

Most of the countries in the sample reveal percentages below the midpoint with only Uruguay (50.7%), the Dominican Republic (62%), and Costa Rica exceeding these. As in the previous section, these percentages were controlled for the main SES variables.

In order to tease out some concerns with regards to the notion that pro-(anti)immigrant sentiment, especially when related to job availability, is driven by unemployment rates rather than attitudes toward democracy more broadly, I also included

in Figure III.4 unemployment rates for all the countries in the sample in order to have a preliminary idea of how they are related to each other.




Figure 0.4. Perception of Immigrants Taking Jobs that Citizens Do Not Want by Country and National Unemployment Rates

First, we notice that Ecuador, the country with the lowest pro-immigrant sentiment in the sample also reveals one of the highest unemployment rates (8.7%), suggesting that perhaps there is some connection between unemployment and anti-

immigrant views when related to job availability. However, countries such as the Dominican Republic, Uruguay, and Guatemala, show the exact opposite relationship, with the Dominican Republic displaying the highest unemployment rate of 15.5 percent but also the highest pro-immigrant sentiment after Costa Rica. Uruguay also exhibits the same pattern, with more than 50 percent of the Uruguayan population manifesting pro-immigrant sentiments while experiencing high levels of unemployment of 7.6 percent. On the other hand, Guatemala, one of the countries with the lowest pro-immigrant sentiments, also shows very low unemployment rates. Are there reasons to believe that there are other factors that explain pro-(anti)immigrant sentiment when related to job availability besides unemployment rates?

With the evidence provided so far, it appears that the majority of Latin American citizens demonstrate fairly positive opinions toward immigrants when related to the provision of public services, such as healthcare, education, and housing. However, when examining the perception of immigrants taking jobs that natives do not want, the majority of Latin Americans responded negatively. Perhaps foreign-born residents are perceived as a threat over scarce resources such as employment and in the context of Latin America, it does not come as a surprise because of the many economic and political problems the region continues to experience. Nonetheless, unemployment rates do not appear to explain the whole picture, but rather open further discussion of other possible factors that influence the formation of immigrant opinion. I turn next to address some of these other factors.

The Role of Context on Opinions Toward Immigrants

Even though in Chapter II, the role of context was briefly discussed, in here, I expand on the theoretical and empirical connection between context and individual level responses to migration. A growing literature on immigrant opinion highlights the impact of community and country level characteristics, such as the effect of the state of the economy, namely, economic development and unemployment rates; and the composition of the foreign population (Gang, Rivera-Batiz, and Yun 2002; Kunovich 2004; McLaren 2003; O'Rourke and Sinnott 2006; Quillian 1995; Semyonov, Raijman, and Gorodzeisky 2006). In here, I continue exploring the effects of economic conditions (i.e., economic development), but at the same time introduce a central element, levels of democracy, to the discussion of a strong democratic political culture, largely overlooked in the past. I evaluate in the following paragraphs the impact of both economic development and democracy levels on the formation of attitudes toward foreigners.

Economic Development and Levels of Democracy

One cannot fully understand people's views toward foreigners without taking into consideration how context influences their opinions, particularly in an environment of high economic and political instability as is the region under analysis. For instance, it has been argued that the wealthier the population of a country is, the smaller the percentage of its population that is likely to be in competition with immigrants, because wealthy countries have fewer citizens employed in manual-labor jobs (Quillian 1995). And, as prior research indicates, usually migrants are thought to be in direct economic competition with low-wage employees and manual laborers (e.g., Borjas 1989; Borjas

1999; Mayda 2006; Scheve and Slaughter 2001). Yet, a recent report of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development argues the opposite (OECD 2009).

As the result of the 2008-2009 economic crisis of a magnitude not seen since the Great Depression, all regions of the world faced a pronounced decline in their GDP levels. Recent data from the World Bank (2010) show that after almost a decade of strong performance, GDP growth in Latin America and the Caribbean declined from an average of 5.5 to 3.9 percent between 2007 and 2008, and fell even further in 2009 (2.6%). The OECD projected Latin American's GDP to decrease by another 1.3 percent in 2010. This event will provoke an increase of 7 percent of poverty in the region, adding 39 more million persons to the overall number of existing poor Latin Americans (*El Pais*, 2009).³³ The implications of these figures are somewhat disturbing for our comprehension of immigrant opinion in Latin America; if poor people are added to the already underprivileged population, that would suggest that more Latin American citizens will be vulnerable to job loss and economic deprivation that, in turn, will result in the deepening of hostile attitudes toward foreigners.

In addition, another country level characteristic that I consider central in understanding the formation of immigrant opinions is a country's levels of democracy. As noted, democracy is the institutional arrangement under which individuals' rights are protected, under which individuals "have multiple, ongoing channels for expression and representation of their interests and values, including diverse, independent associations, and movements, which they have the freedom to form and join" (Diamond 1999, 35).

There are countless reasons to believe that the level of strength of democracy in a nation

³³ See

<http://www.elpais.com/articulo/economia/crisis/anulara/anos/lucha/pobreza/America/Latina/elpepueco/20091130elpepueco_14/Tes>

will lead to more favorable views toward immigrants, precisely because citizens in democracies understand that the rights of every person living under the umbrella of democracy need to be protected.

Table III.2 shows the levels of economic development and democracy by country. Notice that Chile, Uruguay, and Costa Rica emerge as the countries with relatively high rates in both measures, in sharp contrast to Guatemala, Ecuador, and Bolivia- countries that score at the lowest end.

Table 0.2. Economic Development and Democracy in LAC

Economic Development (GDP per capita Index) *		Level of Democracy (Inv. Freedom House Index) **	
Argentina	.828	<i>Chile</i>	12
<i>Chile</i>	.799	<i>Uruguay</i>	12
Mexico	.781	<i>Costa Rica</i>	12
<i>Costa Rica</i>	.772	Panama	11
<i>Uruguay</i>	.768	Belize	11
Brazil	.74	Brazil	10
Dominican Republic	.736	Argentina	10
Panama	.723	Dominican Republic	10
Belize	.712	Mexico	9
Venezuela	.7	El Salvador	9
El Salvador	.661	<i>Ecuador</i>	8
<i>Guatemala</i>	.638	<i>Bolivia</i>	8
<i>Ecuador</i>	.629	<i>Guatemala</i>	7
<i>Bolivia</i>	.557	Venezuela	6

*National wealth is measured using the UNDP's GDP index. This index is based on gross domestic product per capita in purchasing power parity terms in US dollars. The index can take values between 0 and 1. For details on how this index was constructed see UNDP's Human Development Report 2007/2008

**Freedom House Index 2007 is a composite measure of a country's level of democracy. It includes two measures of democracy: *political rights* and *civil liberties*. Both measures contain numerical ratings between 1 and 7 for each country with 1 indicating the "most free" and 7 the "least free." Here, following LAPOP's approach, both measures were inverted and combined into an index with lower values indicating "less free" and higher "more free." See www.lapopsurvey.org

As a matter of fact, economic development and democracy are highly correlated (0.66), indicative of how richer countries are generally more democratic (Przeworski et al. 2000). Thus, I anticipate that pro-immigrant sympathy will be higher in wealthier and

more democratic nations (as those exposed above) than in those that are poorer and less democratic.

Empirical Assessment³⁴

This study attempts to contribute to the literature on sources of attitudes toward foreigners by providing, for the first time, a systematic assessment of the determinants of pro-immigrant sentiment in Latin America, a region where the subject of immigration has not received proper attention. More specifically, by using data from 14 Latin American countries, I am in a position to examine the extent to which citizens' support for democratic values matter for immigrant-peaceful reception.

Main Independent Variables and Country Level Characteristics

³⁵

The main independent variables included in the following empirical analysis are: national pride, patriotism, support for democracy in principle, satisfaction with democracy, legitimacy of core political institutions, support for the current president administration, political tolerance and interpersonal trust, all of which were examined theoretically in Chapters II. Economic development and level of democracy are level 2 variables.

³⁴ A description of the data is found in Chapter I

³⁵ All the variables included in the model (independent and control variables) were recoded from their original scale (1-4, 1-5, 1-7; 1-10) into a scale from 0 to 100 for the purpose of simplifying interpretation. For a more detailed description of all the variables included in the index in this section, see the appendix.

Control Variables³⁶

The analysis in here also takes into account some control variables, such as the traditional socio-demographic factors: age (measured in years), education (years of education), gender (recoded into female = 1, male = 0), city size (measures size of cities from smaller to larger), occupation (unemployed=1, working=0, other=1), authoritarian attitudes (support for iron fist government=1, participation of all=0), threat from a minority (1-100), prejudice (1-100), perception of national and personal economic situation (1-100), impact of media (1-100), perception of personal insecurity (1-100), role of the State as a proxy for ideology (1-100), and the degree of connection to a migrant network (1-6).

Analysis

First, descriptive statistics are calculated: means for continuous and frequencies for dichotomous variables. Second, since the first dependent variable is a continuous variable, it would be appropriate to apply an ordinary least squares (OLS) linear regression model and a logistic regression model for the second dependent variable (a dichotomous variable) to estimate the effects of the predictor variables. However, because the purpose of this study is to evaluate not only the impact of individual-level, but also country-level characteristics, a multilevel statistical procedure is employed here, that allows the simultaneous modeling of explanatory factors at both levels (De Leeuw and Meijer 2008; Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal 2008; Raudenbush and Bryk 2002).

³⁶ The literature on migration considers these variables important determinants of the formation of attitudes toward immigrants. I decided to include these variables to assess the strength of my theoretical propositions while controlling for other factors the literature considers relevant.

Multilevel modeling differs from standard regression techniques in its ability to partition variance among multiple levels and obtain appropriate point estimates and confidence intervals accordingly. In this study, as noted, individuals are level one of the analysis and countries are level two. A more formal representation of the model employed in this study includes variables of my interest, allowing their slopes to vary across countries as described by the following equation:

$$(1) Y_{ij} = \beta_0 + \beta_1(\text{national pride})_{ij} + \beta_2(\text{patriotism})_{ij} + \beta_3(\text{support for democracy in principle})_{ij} + \beta_4(\text{satisfaction with democracy})_{ij} + \beta_5(\text{legitimacy})_{ij} + \beta_6(\text{governmental efficacy})_{ij} + \beta_7(\text{presidential approval})_{ij} + \beta_8(\text{political tolerance})_{ij} + \beta_9(\text{interpersonal trust})_{ij} + \beta_{10} \dots \beta_{22}(\text{control variables})_{ij} + e_{ij}$$

where Y stands for the dependent variable to be explained (i.e., support for governmental services for immigrants and the belief that immigrants do not take jobs from citizens), β_0 is the intercept which refers to the value that Y assumes when the covariates have a value of 0, $\beta_1(\text{national pride})_{ij}$ to $\beta_{23}(\text{wealth})_{ij}$ are the coefficients for each of my independent variables included in the model and e_{ij} stands for the residual, or more specifically, the variation in Y that is not explained by the model. This equation specifies a model for individuals i within countries j , which is a better suit for cross-national survey data. It takes into consideration the residuals for both individual and country level characteristics independently, dividing the error between both levels and allowing for a random-intercept that accounts for the country-specific error element (Raudenbush and Bryk 2002)

Because country-level characteristics are included, the specific country-level equation for the model intercept is as followed:

$$(2) \beta_{0j} = \gamma_{00} + \gamma_{01} * (\text{GDP per capita index})_{ij} + u_{0j}$$

$$(3) \beta_{0j} = \gamma_{00} + \gamma_{02} * (\text{DEMOCRACY})_{ij} + u_{0j}$$

Where γ_{00} in equation 2 is the country level intercept and γ_{01} is the effect of economic development on the model intercept (β_{0j}). Likewise, notice in equation 3 where γ_{00} is the country level intercept and γ_{02} is the effect of democracy on the model intercept (β_{0j}).

Table III.3 displays some descriptive statistics of the main variables analyzed in this dissertation. The mean for the independent and control variables ranges anywhere from 40 to 89 in a scale of 0 to 100; perceptions about the national economy show the lowest mean, and the highest mean corresponds to national pride. On scale from 0 to 6, the mean for migrant connection is of .08 and of 2.9 for the size of the city on scale of 1 to 5 (smallest to largest). The mean for wealth is of 4.2 on a 0 to 9 scale.³⁷ Similarly, age and education exhibit a mean of 40 years and 9 years, respectively.

In addition, women make up 52 percent of the sample and men make up 48 percent. The unemployed population is of 5.2 percent, but is actively looking for a job compared to 53 percent that is already in the labor force. Close to 71 percent of Latin Americans support a government with the participation of all, whereas only 29 percent support a government with an iron fist. Finally, the level 2 variables are GDP index with a mean of .71 on a 0-1 scale and the inverted combined Freedom House Index shows a mean of 9.5 on a 6-12 scale.

³⁷ The “wealth” index consists of a count of household assets and access to basic services at the household level. The list of assets in the survey includes durable goods, such as a TV set, a refrigerator, a car, and a computer, and access to basic services like clean water and sewage inside the house. For a more detailed description of this index, see www.lapopsurvey.org

**Table 0.3. Summary of Descriptive Statistics of Explanatory Factors:
Full Sample (N = 25,755)**

Individual and National Level Characteristics	Descriptive Statistics*	
	Mean	Std. Deviation
Independent Variables		
Support for the Political System		
Support for the Political Community		
National Pride	88.90	(22.40)
Patriotism	79.33	(24.51)
Support for Democracy in Principle	72.85	(28.44)
Support for Democracy in Practice	53.17	(23.69)
Legitimacy of Core Pol. Institutions	44.53	(23.40)
Perception of Governmental Efficacy	46.00	(27.01)
Presidential Approval	55.45	(24.87)
Political Tolerance	53.25	(28.22)
Interpersonal Trust	58.36	(29.67)
Control Variables		
Threat from a Minority	45.16	(33.53)
Prejudice	56.04	(37.85)
Role of State	70.22	(23.65)
National economic satisfaction	40.01	(22.86)
Personal economic satisfaction	47.66	(20.61)
Media effects	80.64	(30.49)
Perception of personal insecurity	41.65	(31.01)
Migration Connection Index (0-6)	.86	(1.53)
<i>Socioeconomic Demographic Variables</i>		
Age	39.58	(16.10)
Education	9.31	(4.63)
City size (from smallest to largest, 1–5)	2.9	(1.55)
Wealth (from 0-9)	4.2	(1.96)
	Percent	Observations
Gender	Male	48.11 (12,391)
	Female	51.89 (13,364)
Occupation	Unemployed	5.28 (1,276)
	Working	53.17 (12,844)
	Other	41.55 (10,037)
Authoritarian Attitudes	Iron Fist	28.79 (6,699)
	Participation for all	71.21 (16,571)
National Level Characteristics		
GDP Per Capita Index	.71	(.10)
Freedom House 2007 Added Scores (6-12) (Inverted)	9.5	(1.84)

* All the variables were recoded into 0-100 scale unless indicated otherwise
Source: AmericasBarometer 2008 by LAPOP

Results³⁸

Figure III.5 shows that both the individual characteristics of respondents and context—the wealth of the nation, measured by GDP per capita—affect attitudes toward immigrants in Latin America and the Caribbean. Each variable included in the analysis is listed on the vertical (y) axis. The impact of each of my variables of interest on pro-immigrant sentiment is shown graphically by a dot, which if located to the right of the vertical “0” line indicates a positive effect, and if to the left of the “0” line, a negative effect. If the effects are statistically significant, they are shown by confidence interval lines stretching to the left and right of each dot that do not overlap the vertical “0” line (at .05 or better). If they overlap the vertical line, the effects are statistically insignificant. The relative strength of each variable is indicated by standardized coefficients.

First, we observe that a strong political culture, gauged by support for democratic values and democratic political support, does have an impact on how citizens view immigrants. In this case, higher support for democratic values leads to a higher support for governmental services such as education, healthcare, housing, etc., for immigrants. When one looks at democratic political support specifically, (i.e., support for the political community, regime principles, regime performance, regime institutions, and political actors, Norris 1999), all its components become statistically significant with the exception of patriotism, which is shown by the confidence interval that overlaps the vertical line.

National pride falls in the predicted direction, whereas an intriguing finding, but one inconsistent with my expectations, is the negative effect of support for democracy on attitudes toward immigrants. This result may be explained by the possibility that when

³⁸ To have a better idea of the strength of the effects, see full models in the Appendix

citizens are asked if democracy is the best form of government compared to other alternatives, citizens may be thinking of their political system itself (regardless if it is fully democratic or not), sustaining certain arguments related to how some measures of system support have a problematic association with democratic norms. Among the components of democratic political support, perception of governmental efficacy is the one that reveals the strongest effect on pro-immigrant sympathy, followed by satisfaction with the way democracy works, presidential approval, and support for core political institutions.




Figure 0.5. A Multilevel Analysis of the Determinants of Pro-Immigrant Sentiment in LAC: The Impact of Economic Development, 2008

More evidence suggests that interpersonal trust and political tolerance increase favorable opinions toward foreigners. These findings substantiate research on how crucial is the role that democratic values play in reducing social conflict. As mentioned throughout this dissertation, interpersonal trust and political tolerance are essential for democracy because they increase citizens' willingness to cooperate and undertake collective action despite their differences in opinions, traditions, backgrounds, etc. (Córdova 2008; Gibson 2006).³⁹

Moving on to the examination of alternative accounts of immigrant opinion, key among these are the positive effects of a satisfactory perception of the national and personal economic well-being. Similarly, the degree of connection to a migrant network increases pro-immigrant sentiment that suggests that those who stayed behind better understand the issues that come with migration. In other words, citizens who are exposed to migration in one way or another will be more sympathetic of those that find themselves in the same situation. On the other hand, the perception of threat from a minority and prejudice decreases sympathetic attitudes, adding evidence to prior literature on these two concepts (e.g., Allport 1954, Blumer 1958, Bobo and Fox 2003; Bobo and Hutching 1996).

Moreover, the extent of exposure to the media, that is, the degree of citizens watching news on television diminishes pro-immigrant sentiment. This finding supports

³⁹ I anticipate some criticism with regard to my approach of explaining pro-immigrant sympathy with political tolerance. Some may argue that I am trying to predict tolerance with tolerance. However, after carrying out correlations between both of my dependent variables and the political tolerance index, evidence suggests that there is no association between both concepts. In addition, I also carried out correlations between each of the components of the political tolerance index and pro-immigrant sentiment. None of the correlations reached levels above 0.07. I went a step further to reduce some of these concerns by employing a factor analysis that suggest that while both items pertaining to each construct of immigrant opinion load quite strongly on the first factor, political tolerance loads mainly on the second factor, substantiating my argument that immigrant opinion and political tolerance gauge two different concepts.

the notion that more exposure to the media involves more visibility of immigrants' impact in the country and, as a result, people are influenced negatively (Chávez 2001; Izquierdo 2005; Orcés 2009). These results became statistically significant after controlling for perception of insecurity.

When looking at the SES variables, only age and unemployment reached statistical significance. Older individuals and the unemployed express lower levels of pro-immigrant sentiment compared to those that are in the work force, substantiating the negative effects of economic deprivation (e.g., Gang, Rivera-Batiz, and Yun 2001; Tucci 2005). Finally, note in Figure III.5 that economic development, measured by the GDP per Capita Index, has a significant positive impact on pro-immigrant sentiment (e.g., Quillian 1995; Semyonov, Rajzman, and Gorodzeisky 2006). Latin Americans who live in wealthier states, on average, render support for governmental services for immigrants.

Figure III.6 illustrates how the wealth of each country under examination influences views toward foreigners after controlling for individual level characteristics. For instance, Argentina is the richest nation in the region in terms of GDP per capita, according to the Human Development report by UNDP 2007/2008, and surfaces as the country with the highest support for governmental services for immigrants, in sharp contrast to Bolivia, the country with both lowest GDP per capita and pro-immigrant sentiment in the sample. Taking all these results together, the analyses carried out so far suggest that if a citizen from Bolivia with a given set of socio-economic characteristics were to move to Argentina, *ceteris paribus*, and none of his/her individual characteristics were to change, his/her support for governmental services for immigrants would be at

least 16 points higher than if this individual were to remain in Bolivia.⁴⁰ These findings give a pretty good idea of how context matter. Notice, furthermore, that apart from Bolivia, none of the countries in the sample present levels of pro-immigrant sentiment below the midpoint.




Figure 0.6. The Impact of Economic Development on the Support for Government Services for Immigrants in Latin America and the Caribbean, 2008

Figure III.6 also shows that Ecuador stands out as the country with both the lowest economic development and pro-immigrant sentiment after Bolivia. This case becomes particularly relevant as Ecuador, a country with a population of 14 million, is

⁴⁰ According to Freedom House 2009, Bolivia, a country of around 10 million inhabitants is considered *partly free* with a score of 3 in both political rights and civil liberties, which denotes less in both indicators. For more information, see www.freedomhouse.org

both a recipient and producer of immigrants and emigrants concurrently. It is estimated that 1 million to 1.5 million Ecuadorians have left the country (IOM 2009), while receiving approximately 600,000 displaced Colombians as the result of the armed conflict in this nation.⁴¹ Not only considerable numbers of Colombians are entering the country but also Peruvians and most recent Cubans are becoming significant minority groups in Ecuador. This finding is worrisome because Ecuador remains one of the poorest countries in the region in the midst of high migration surges, suggesting that a more hostile environment against foreigners will be more likely. Within this context, social conflict may be galvanized, resulting in a further erosion of Ecuadorian democracy, which is already hindered by high levels of corruption and violence. This case will be explored in more detail in Chapter VI.

Passing on to the analysis of the next dependent variable, the belief that immigrants do not take jobs from citizens, Figure III.7 shows that both individual level characteristics and a country's level of democracy matter when explaining pro-immigrant sentiment in Latin America and the Caribbean. Here, contrary to our previous results, the only key variables among democratic values and democratic political support that reached statistical significance are satisfaction with the way democracy works, support for core political institutions, presidential approval, and interpersonal trust, all of which increase the probability of having pro-immigrant sympathy.

When examining alternative explanations of immigrant opinion, most of the variables did not yield statistically significant results. Prejudice and the extent to which citizens are connected to a migrant network both decrease and increase respectively the

⁴¹ See, http://www.elcomercio.com/solo_texto_search.asp?id_noticia=220231&anio=2010&mes=3&dia=21.

probability of having positive views. In this model, in contrast to the previous one, the perception of insecurity becomes significant. As Latin Americans perceived heightened levels of insecurity, the less likely citizens are to believe that foreigners take the jobs citizens do not want, indicative of the linkage that citizens usually make between the rise of criminal activity with the rise of immigration (Palmer 1996). A surprising finding is the role of the state (as a proxy of ideology). It is believed that individuals who are considered more liberal vis-à-vis the role of the State are more likely to be in favor of immigration. In this analysis, the opposite is true: higher support for the role of the state decreases the probability of having favorable views toward foreigners.




Figure 0.7 . A Multilevel Analysis of the Determinants of Pro-Immigrant Sentiment in LAC: The Impact of Democracy, 2008

The results also exhibit the importance of socio-demographic factors. Wealth and higher levels of education increase the probability of having positive views toward immigrants, which highlights the dominant role that education plays as a mitigating factor of intolerant attitudes (Golebiowska 1995; Orcés 2008; Seligson, Córdova, and Moreno 2007). On the other hand, those who live in bigger cities are less likely to have pro-immigrant sentiments. The higher concentration of immigrants in metropolitan areas explains the lower probability of viewing them positively. Foreign-born citizens are perceived as a threat, especially in regard to job security given that the dependent variable gauges the belief if foreigners take or not jobs from citizens.

Finally, Figure III.7 and III.8 bring to light the importance of democracy for a strong democratic political culture. The levels of democracy matter when explaining pro-immigrant sentiment in this region. Indeed, both Figures suggest that Latin Americans who live in more democratic states, on average, tend to believe that immigrants do the jobs that citizens do not want. Put differently, the more democratic a nation is, the less likely its citizens will support the notion that immigrants take jobs from natives, a commonly accepted view. It is noteworthy that levels of democracy when related to individuals' support for the provision of governmental services for foreigners did not yield statistically significant results. I leave this outcome open for future research in this topic putting particular emphasis on the possible multidimensionality of attitudes toward immigrants, as discussed in the beginning of this chapter.

In Figure III.8 we observe that the most democratic countries and where the likelihood for higher pro-immigrant sentiment is registered are Uruguay and Costa Rica. Guatemala, in contrast, emerges as the less democratic nation in the constricted sample

and the one with the lowest probability of having positive opinion toward immigrants.⁴² For example, Uruguay and Costa Rica are considered “free” by the Freedom House organization with scores of 1 in both political rights and civil liberties, which is the highest rank on these indicators.




Figure 0.8. The Impact of Democracy on the Belief that Immigrants Do NOT Take Jobs From Citizens in Latin America and the Caribbean, 2008

As previously noted, in this dissertation these values were recoded, combined, and inverted so that higher values indicate higher levels of democracy. Taking all these results together, this analysis shows that if a citizen from Guatemala with a given set of

⁴² According to Freedom House 2009, Guatemala, a country of around 13,700 million inhabitants is considered *partly free* with a score of 3 in political rights and 4 in civil liberties, which denotes less political rights and civil liberties. For more information, see www.freedomhouse.org

socio-economic characteristics were to move to Uruguay or Costa Rica, other things being equal, and none of his/her individual characteristics were to change, the probability of this person to have positive opinions toward foreign born residents would be *at least* 32 percentage points higher than if this individual were to remain in Guatemala. These results are remarkable and validate further the significance of democracy as a system of government. Democracy allows for the deepening of a democratic political culture in which the protection of minorities is pivotal. Support for democratic values, therefore, reinforces social cohesion that makes the peaceful cohabitation of different minority groups (including foreigners) more likely. This, in turn, enhances the likelihood of stable democracies as well as increases the move toward higher quality democracies.

In the following pages, I will proceed with an in depth analysis of pro-immigrant sentiment in carefully selected countries. Chapter IV focuses on the cases of Argentina, Chile, Costa Rica, and the Dominican Republic. Included are the history of migration and migration policy of these countries and how they have affected immigrant opinion overtime. Chapter V devotes a detailed study of attitudes toward foreigners of Ecuadorian citizens in Ecuador and Ecuadorians citizens in Europe. The chapter incorporates qualitative research carried out in Europe and Ecuador (2008-2009). With both of these chapters I hope to elucidate further on the role that a strong democratic political culture plays in the formation of immigrant opinion. In Chapter VI, I conclude by summarizing my findings and discuss their implications and possible avenues for future research on this subject.

CHAPTER IV

INTRAREGIONAL MIGRATION: THE CASES OF ARGENTINA, CHILE, COSTA RICA, AND THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

*“Sixty percent of migrants in Latin American
originated from the region itself”
(ECLAC 2006, 21).*

Conventional wisdom suggests that the majority of migration flows in the past several decades have been from “South to North,” from developing countries to developed ones. While it is true that many international migrants follow this pattern, lost in much research on migration over the past thirty years is the fact that a significant majority of migration is best characterized as either “intra-South” or “intra-North” migration (UNDP 2009). International migration rates from developing to developed states have continuously been overestimated. According to the UNDP 2009 report on *Human Development and Mobility*, “only 37 percent of migration in the world is from developing to developed countries. Most migration occurs *within* countries in the same category of development: about 60 percent of migrants move either between developing or between developed countries” (21).⁴³ What this implies for research on migration is the presence of a far more complex and nuanced set of migrant-host country dynamics than previously thought.

In the case of Latin America, immigration is not a new phenomenon. It has always existed, starting with la *Conquista* and succeeded by the independence of Latin

⁴³ The remaining 3 percent move from developed to developing countries

American states that welcomed an important flow of European immigrants from the middle of the XIX to the beginning of the XX century. This type of migration had its genesis in the many political and economic problems Europe faced during that time as well as the active migrant recruitment policies of some Latin American governments. Movements across countries later became exemplified by intraregional migration that was primarily fluid on Latin American borders. This was known as “seasonal migration” due to its continuing characteristic of migrants going in and out of neighboring countries (Pellegrino 2003).

The majority of migrants in the region moved and still move in search for better jobs opportunities, particularly in the agricultural sector. Immigration took place in rural areas mostly and later on substituted urban emigration (Pellegrino 2003; Lara Flores 2008).⁴⁴ Migrants have also moved to escape from declining political stability (UNDP 2009). For example, Costa Rica has received a significant number of Nicaraguan immigrants throughout the last half century, many from which were weather refugees, including the aftermath of the Nicaraguan earthquake of 1972 and the Hurricane Mitch in 1998. Another example is Colombians moving to neighboring countries (i.e., Venezuela, Ecuador, and Panama) going from 600,000 in 1990 to 700,000 by 2000.⁴⁵ Furthermore, Argentina, a country that was the main recipient of European migration, now has become the favorite destination for Bolivians, Paraguayans, Chileans and Uruguayans. According

⁴⁴ It is noteworthy that while the Latin American region was characterized by immigration in the beginning of the XX century, by the end of the century, emigration has become the main trend in the region. Yet intraregional migration indicates a current tendency for augmentation (UNDP 2009)

⁴⁵ See www.unhcr.org

to ECLAC, by 2000, 60 percent of migrants in Latin America originated from the region itself, representing an estimated 3 million persons.⁴⁶

In the following pages, I will explore the development of migration flows and migration policies in four countries in Latin America: Argentina, Chile, Costa Rica, and the Dominican Republic. I will include a discussion on how political and economic events fueled migration rates across these countries and how support for democratic values influence the way citizens view fellow Latin Americans immigrants. I conclude with a multivariate analysis of the sources of pro-immigrant sentiments in these countries and the corresponding discussion of the main findings.

ARGENTINA

Migration Flows

Argentina has a long history of migration, with a significant number of Europeans arriving in the middle of the XIX century to the turn of the century—an estimated 7 million persons left Europe to take economic advantage of a prosperous Argentina (Lara Flores 2008, Solimano 2003). After 1940, the European migration wave was slowly replaced by immigration from nearby countries. The first migration flows to Argentina after World War II came largely from Bolivia, Chile, and Paraguay (1946-1950). These flows were low in numbers.

The immigration patterns intensified from 1956 to 60 as a response to a shortage in manual labor (specifically in the agricultural sector), resulting from the many developments in certain Argentinean economic sectors. Accordingly, it attracted a great

⁴⁶ www.eclac.org. International Migration.

number of foreign labor ready to fill the economic void (Bendini and Steimbregger 2008; Marshall and Orlansky 1983; Zalles Cueto 2002).

Nonetheless, it is impossible to understand migration flows to Argentina without taking into consideration the context in each of the sending nations that gave a way to these flows. For instance, a civil war in Paraguay (in 1947), succeeded by the 1954 coup d'état and the installation of the Alfredo Stroessner's dictatorship (1954-1989) generated a significant number of political exiles (Marshall and Orlansky 1983; Sondrol 1992; Sondrol 1997). Bolivia, on the other hand, experienced a revolution and the Agrarian Reform in 1952. These events had a detrimental impact on the economy and produced a significant number of economic migrants (Eckstein 1979; Garcia Arganaras 1992; Mann 1989). In Chile, the economy slowed down during 1956-1960, especially in the agricultural and construction sectors, also stimulating emigration rates (Marshall and Orlansky 1983).

The following years, Argentina was characterized by a decline in Chilean migration, but an increase in that from Paraguay and Bolivia. Even though this type of migration has remained high until recent years, Chilean migration gained more significance by 1970s as the result of the economic and political instability that the country was facing, most notably, with the instauration of the Pinochet dictatorship in 1973. These events spurred the emigration of many political exiles.⁴⁷

Argentina became the main destination for Bolivians, Paraguayans, Chileans, and Uruguayans until the 1990s (Benencia 2008; D'Andrea 2007). Most recently, immigration to Argentina has become more diversified in its nature. In the last three years there were approximately 700,000 persons that seek residency in the country, which

⁴⁷ See, <<http://www.freedomhouse.org>>

is over ten times the figure in the first few years of 2000. It is believed that most of this migration results from the great economic development that Argentina has experienced in recent times, attracting migration especially from less prosperous nearby countries. A case in mind is that of Bolivia with almost 233,464 immigrants by 2001, according to the census of that year.⁴⁸ Moreover, for the first time in decades, Paraguayans in Argentina have become greater in numbers than Bolivians. By the beginning of 2000, there were only 7000 Paraguayans residing in Argentina. By the end of the decade, in 2008, this number reached 290,000, more than a 4000% increase rate.⁴⁹

Lately, Colombians have become a more salient group in Argentina, going from only 500 at the beginning of 2000 to 5500 by 2008, an unexpected phenomenon. An explanation to rising levels of Colombian immigration is the worsening of the internal conflict in Colombia which has been accompanied by economic degradation. At the same time, there has been a tendency for higher numbers of Peruvians with approximately 140,000 and Chinese making up 35,000, a figure that is believed to be underestimated as many of them are in conditions of irregularity in Argentina.⁵⁰

Most recently, the new flow of migration has been characterized by the arrival of Africans. Even though this type of migration is not intra-regional, it is the more and more gaining notoriety. According to a Reuters' report,

⁴⁸ See, <<http://www.indec.gov.ar>>

⁴⁹ See, <<http://ningunhumanoilegal.wordpress.com/2009/02/09/argentina-inmigrantes>>

⁵⁰ Ibid

There are now more than 3,000 African immigrants living in Argentina, up from just a few dozen eight years ago. The number of asylum seekers each year has risen abruptly, to about 1,000 a year, and a third of them are African... We're seeing a steep increase in the number of Africans coming to the country and seeking asylum... Africans are expected to come to Latin America in increasing numbers... We're seeing a stable trend and it's still growing (*Reuters*, 2009).⁵¹

In short, Argentina has a long history of migration flows. At one point it was characterized by European migration mainly. At the present, however, the country is receiving migrants largely from nearby countries such as Bolivia, Chile, and Paraguay. But in order to understand recent migration trends in Argentina, it is important to look at the context in which these migration flows took place. We continue with the assessment of economic and democratic developments in Argentina and their relationships to migration.

The Role of Context

Argentina experienced unstable economic conditions during the 1980s. It started with the hyperinflation that lasted all the way through the first few years of the 1990s. In 1992, Argentina introduced a new currency which was fixed into a one to one ratio with the US dollar. All these events permitted Argentina to reach economic stability that made it more attractive for migrants (D'Andrea 2007). However, by the end of the decade, with the devaluation of the new currency—"el peso"—at the beginning of 2001, and an increase in foreign debt, the Argentinean economy collapsed and resulted in deepened

⁵¹ See, <http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE5AF0AG20091116?pageNumber=1&virtualBrandChannel=11621>

economic, social, and political crises, affecting migration flows. The crisis of 2001, specifically, resulted in high unemployment rates and structural poverty, not seen since its foundation (Damill, Frenkel, and Juvenal 2003; Damill, Frenkel, and Rapetti 2005).

The Argentinean economy has been in a process of recovery since 2005. An example to the solid economic stability Argentina has and continues to experience relates to the somewhat positive response to the 2008 global economic crisis. The Argentinean economy did not suffer the extent to which other nations and regions around the globe did. In fact, despite the economic deceleration Argentina experienced during 2009 after persistent economic growth for six years, it is expected full economic recovery by 2010.⁵²

Albeit the economic volatility and political problems that have defined Argentina throughout the years, it remains a net immigration country that attracts the largest number of migrants in the region. It represents around 5.6 percent of the total population, with the majority originating from neighboring countries (OECD 2009).

Furthermore, in terms of democracy, according to Freedom House 2009, Argentina is an electoral democracy with scores of 2 in both political rights and civil liberties, which represents elevated levels of democracy. Specifically, the Freedom House Index is a composite measure of a country's level of democracy that, as noted, includes two measures: political rights and civil liberties. It consists of numerical ratings between 1 and 7 for each country with 1 indicating the "most free" and 7 the "least free." Argentina's scores of 2 denote the significant steps that Argentina is taking toward a more consolidated democracy. Yet this country continues to cope with problems of

⁵² See, <http://www.infolatam.com/entrada/cepal_argentina_evito_la_contraccion_per-17807.html>

corruption (e.g., variety of corruption scandals during the last two Kichners' administrations).⁵³

Argentina was ranked 106 out of 180 countries surveyed in Transparency International's 2009 Corruption Perception Index, bested by Chile, Uruguay, Brazil, Colombia, and Peru, in the Southern Cone and solely doing better than Bolivia, Ecuador, Paraguay, and Venezuela, countries well known for their corruption levels.⁵⁴ These events also put strains on migration flows.

Argentinean Migration Policy: A Brief Overview

Argentinean migration policy has been colored by periods of both overture and restrictive procedures. For instance, in 1876, after a year of debate, Law No. 817 better known as the "Avellaneda Law" was implemented. Under this law, the General Department for Immigration was created under the tutelage of the Ministry of Interior. This law was liberal, permissive, and open to foreign born residents and it highlighted the need for agricultural labor in particular (Novick 2008, 135-137). Over the next decades, with the end of the Peronist Era—an era of greater power of the State—a period of political precariousness characterized Argentina. It started with the coup d'état and the installation of the military dictatorship from 1976 to 1983. During this period, an environment of highly repressive political control was established at all levels of Argentinean social and political life and eventually manifested itself into a restrictive migration policy reform (Domenech 2007). This reform was better known as the "Videla Law." Through these years, the general idea of the government was to move from an

⁵³ See, <www.freedomhouse.org>

⁵⁴ See, <www.transparency.org>

open migration policy to a more regulatory policy, favoring “qualified migration,” that is, migration from urban areas as well as that of professionals (Novick 2008).

One of the main features of the Videla Law (1981) was to prohibit undocumented immigrants the access to health services and education, obligating officials to denounce immigrants’ situation to public authorities (Novick 2008, Domenech 2007). It is worth noting that by 1980, Argentina had a population of 28 million, with approximately 6.8% of the foreign population, and from which, 39.6% corresponded to immigrants from neighboring countries. By 2001, Argentina had a population over 36 million people, with a foreign population of 4,2%, a clearly lower percentage than in previous years, but with more than 60% of migrants from neighboring countries (in Novick 2008, 137-141).

Because of declining economic conditions during 2000s, Argentina shifted from being a traditionally receiving migrant nation to a sending nation, with a significant number of its population leaving in search for better lives and labor conditions. According to the OECD (2009), nearly 500,000 Argentines emigrated to other countries by 2001, which represents 1.8% of the general population (16). Therefore, the Argentinean government felt the need to reform migration policy and for the first time in its history, the right to migrate became officially recognized under the new Law of Giustiniani (2004). During this period, migration policy turned to be more open, liberal, and inclusive. This law restored some rights for immigrants, denied under the previous law (e.g., access to education and health services). The main goal of current migration policy is the promotion of immigrants’ socio-economic integration (Novick 2008, Domenech 2007).

CHILE

Migration Flows

In contrast to Argentina, Chile does not have a history of immigration. Rather its significance has grown in recent years, with considerable immigration flows from Argentina and Peru, and in a lesser extent from Bolivia, Ecuador, and Colombia. A reason for Chile's increasing attractiveness as a country of destination for immigrants from nearby countries has been an improvement in Chilean political and economic indicators. These factors have rendered Chile as one of the most stable democracies in the region compared to other Latin American countries that instead have experienced deterioration in those same indicators (Aranda and Morande 2007; Martínez 2003; OCED 2009).

Chile has been mainly a net emigration country due to the lengthy Pinochet dictatorship that generated a significant number of political exiles. It is estimated that until 1990 the number of emigrants was anywhere from 400,000 to 500,000 (Martinez 1997; 2003). Accordingly, Chile remained an unattractive place for immigrants during that period (Mujica Petit 1999). By 2000, the bulk of Chilean emigrants represented around 4.1 percent of the total population, paradoxically, with Argentina as the main country of destination. It is calculated that around 207,380 Chileans live in Argentina, followed by 75,843 in the United States and less than 30,000 in other countries such as Sweden, Canada, and Australia (OCED 2009, 20). Other sources, furthermore, indicate that overall, Chileans residing abroad constitute anywhere from 800,000 to 1,000,000 (Stefoni 2002, 127).

Going back to the discussion of immigration from nearby countries, since 2002, Chile has seen an unprecedented influx of immigrants with approximately 185,000 persons from neighboring countries, most notably from Peru and Argentina (Martinez 2003, 15). Other accounts point to 250,000 immigrants living in Chile (Stefoni 2002, 127). Indeed, the Argentinean population represents around 26 percent of the total foreign population while the Peruvian population consists of 21 percent. Notwithstanding elevated levels of Argentinean immigration, Peruvians are estimated to be the fastest growing group in Chile, with an increase of over 395 percent rate over the period from 1992 to 2002 (Martinez 2003, 32). In 1998, according to la Direccion Nacional de Migraciones del Ministerio del Interior, Peruvians chose the United States as the first destination (194,054 persons), followed by Chile (159,353 persons), Bolivia (39,651 persons), and Argentina (27,601). During the first months of 1997 around 157,815 Peruvians entered Chilean soil (Mujica Petit 1999, 58).⁵⁵ Recent data (Census 2002) indicates that there are close to 37,860 Peruvians residing in Chile.⁵⁶

Bolivians, Ecuadorians, and Colombians, on the other hand, only represent 6, 5, and 2 percent, respectively, of the foreign population. Bolivians, for instance, went from 10,919 in 2002 to approximately 18,000 at the present, which is an increase of only 41 percent compared to the 395 percent increase rate of Peruvians, note above. Colombians, furthermore, is the most current group with a tendency to augment as a result of the worsening situation of the armed conflict in Colombia. From only 1514 Colombians in 1992, by 2002 they represented over 4000 residents in Chile (Aranda and Morande 2007, 61-76; Martínez 2003).

⁵⁵ Yet these figures need to be interpreted with caution as they only represent those who left Peru without taking into consideration their return.

⁵⁶ See, <http://www.ine.cl/canales/chile_estadistico/home.php>

In brief, even though Chile does not have a history of immigration, today is one of the nations with the highest immigration rates in the region, due to its solid economic and democratic development. Next, the role of context is examined in more detail.

The Role of Context

It is noteworthy that 10 years after the demise of the long military regime of General Pinochet (1973-1989), Chile became one of the most successful economies in the region with an average GDP growth of 7.2 percent per year from 1988-1997, real wages growing at a rate exceeding 5 percent per year, a decline in unemployment from almost 20 percent during the 1980s to 6 percent by 1997, and an inflation that reached 5 percent rate in 1997-1998 (Edwards and Edwards 2000, 183). In recent years, Chile continues to be stable economy. For instance, Chile had an average growth rate of 5 percent from 2002 to 2007. Likewise, inflation remained low with an average of 2.9 percent during the same five year period.⁵⁷ It is not until the 2008 global crisis that Chile experienced a slow down in economic growth, but it is expected to grow 4.5 percent by the end of 2010, according to ECLAC.⁵⁸ This permanent economic growth had made of Chile a country of attraction for migrants.

Similarly, in terms of democracy, Chile has undergone a continuing improvement in democratic indicators. According to Freedom House 2009, Chile reached a score of 1 in both political rights and civil liberties, mirroring those in well known established democracies such as the United States, Canada, and European countries.⁵⁹ Some allude Chilean success to continuing government efforts to fight corruption. In fact, Chile is the

⁵⁷ See, <http://www.edc.ca/english/docs/gchile_e.pdf>

⁵⁸ See, <http://www.infolatam.com/entrada/cepal_chile_economia_se_contraera_un_18_-17804.html>

⁵⁹ See, <www.freedomhouse.org>

nation with the lowest levels of corruption in Latin America, ranking 25 out of 180 countries, according to the Corruption Perception Index 2009.⁶⁰ Furthermore, in 2005, Chile passed a series of reforms that repealed any remaining prerogatives from the military rule, which restored the right of the president to remove top military commanders. By the same token, the Chilean Congress passed a series of anti-corruption and finance laws that contributed to better governance, and accordingly, allowed Chile to gain a reputation of one of the best-governed countries in the region.⁶¹

Chilean Migration Policy: A Short Overview

During the XIX century, Chile promoted non-restrictive migration regulations, facilitating border crossing, with very few restrictions. It is not until the end of World War II that Chilean migration policy became more structured. Still, Chile remained an unappealing place of destination compared to neighboring Argentina. As previously noted, the country did not attract many immigrants until the aftermath of the Pinochet dictatorship when an ongoing economic growth took place (Mujica Petit 1999).

The first law related explicitly to issues of migration was Law No. 1.094, better known as the “First Immigration Law” in 1975. This law embarks a comprehensive legal approach to migration in terms of length of stay, types of visas, pertinent authorities, etc.⁶² A number of modifications has been introduced since then. In 1996, Law No.19.476 modified migration issues related in particular to asylum and refuge by recognizing the principle of no devolution of those demanding asylum or refugee status

⁶⁰ See, <www.transparency.org>

⁶¹ See, <www.freedomhouse.org>

⁶² See, <http://www.bcn.cl/carpeta_temas/temas_portada.2006-05-16.1264867506>

and decriminalizes illegal entrance for this group.⁶³ In 1998, Law No. 19.581 created a category of entry for those immigrants that come from neighboring countries through the establishment of a “Neighborhood Border Card” (Tarjeta vecinal fronteriza), allowing entry and exit for those who presented the card.⁶⁴

Still, Chile’s administration in terms of migration policy has and continues to remain unclear. In 2000, through the publication of a memoir by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Chilean government recognized the lack of public policy when related to issues of migration (Aranda and Morande 2007, 64). Migration appears to have been addressed more bilaterally, that is, country specific. For instance, a bilateral relationship with Peru dates back to 1929, establishing the freedom of movement between the two neighboring countries. From that point forward, citizens of these nations exercise safe-conducts to transit with a duration of 6 months.

Because of a sudden influx of Peruvian migrants to Chile by the end of the 1990s, more restrictive procedures were put in place. For example, when the “Neighborhood Border Card” (Tarjeta vecinal fronteriza) was created in 1998, Peruvians were excluded from this category, leading to a rise in illegal migration. The government of Peru protested in light of these measures and from 1999, it was established that Peruvians no longer needed a visa for entry. Moreover, an amnesty in 1998 and 2008 regularized a significant number of undocumented immigrants where an estimated 20,000 immigrants are believed to benefit from these measures. In fact, Peruvians make up most of this group.⁶⁵

⁶³ Ibid

⁶⁴ Ibid

⁶⁵ See, <<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/7057521.stm>>

COSTA RICA

Migration Flows

Unlike Chile, but similar to Argentina, Costa Rica is another country that has a long history of migration. After its independence, the Costa Rican government promoted immigration, in particular from Europe. Its objective was to emphasize Costa Rican identity as a “white” nation while downplaying migration from other regions. With the construction of the railroad and United Fruit Company’s (UFCo) banana production at the beginning of XX century, foreign labor in Costa Rica was urgently needed (Alvarenga 2008, Castro 2008). While the government preferred mainly European migration to support the country’s booming agricultural activities, most Europeans settled in urban areas and dedicated themselves to other jobs. As a result, the Costa Rican government felt the need to bring other types of migrants (e.g., from China and the Caribbean). Some data suggests that from 1864 to 1984, the foreign population consisted primarily of Nicaraguans, Jamaicans, and Panamanians, and at last by Europeans (Alvarenga 2008, 12). In addition, foreign born residents went from representing only 2.6 percent of the total population in 1892 to 6.2 percent in 1927, most of which were Afro-Caribbean and Nicaraguans (Castro 2008, 26).

During the 1930s, because of the low demand for labor as a consequence of the economic crisis of the Atlantic Region, the promotion for European migration lost its relevancy and rather fueled pronounced anti-immigration, resulting in massive deportations of members of undesired groups. Consequently, in 1936, the Costa Rican government officially started regulating labor migration (Alvarenga 2008).

The aftermath of World War II brought back to Costa Rica the dream of a “whiter” nation as many Europeans once again saw Central America as a possible destination. Italy, specifically, faced a sharp economic decline during the 1950s which generated a significant number of emigrants. Costa Rica opened its doors to around 3,000 Italian farmers (Alvarenga 2008, 20). In subsequent years, this type of immigration diminished and it was not until 1980s and 1990s that Costa Rica had a significant influx of immigrants from neighboring Nicaragua (Castro 2008). Much of this new migration pattern resulted from the political and economic instability Nicaragua experienced throughout the Somoza and Sandinistas’ regimes as well as devastating natural disasters (e.g., 1972 earthquake, hurricane Mitch in 1998) (Morales 1999).

Nicaraguans primarily worked and still do in the coffee and banana industries. From 1927-1950 Nicaraguans represented 2.4 percent of the total population. By 1973 it had descended to 1.2 percent, but again leveled up to 1.9 percent by 1984. Still, the highest flow of Nicaraguans occurred in 2000 with more than 200,000 residing in various Costa Rican regions. This number represents almost 6 percent of the total population (Castro 2008, 26-30).

The overflow of Nicaraguans to Costa Rica in recent years has resulted in a variety of responses by the Costa Rican government, such as the authorization of Nicaraguan children in the educational system, the use of public health services, and the incorporation of Nicaraguans into various economic activities. Despite an overall acceptance of Nicaraguan migration, some allusions have been made to the potential problems this massive influx could generate:

The problem originates when immigration starts to exceed productive and social possibilities in the recipient country to integrate all the immigrant population. It could be that this country is close to it or that it has already reached that point, especially when we take into consideration the indicator of unemployment which is higher among Nicaraguans than Costa Ricans and the rest of immigrants

(Morales 1999, 8. Author's translation).

To sum up, Costa Rica has a long history of migration with its highest peak of Nicaraguan migration during the last decade as the result of the many political and financial problems this neighboring country keeps on experiencing. The following section, analyses the role of context in Nicaragua and Costa Rica to further our understanding of the question of intra-regional migration in Latin America.

The Role of Context

To better understand Nicaraguan migration, it is worthwhile to explore regional context within which these migration patterns exist. During the 1980s, Central America initiated a process of economic liberalization. Each of the countries promoted and diversified their economies, making the domestic economic environment more open to foreign investment. Despite the many advances that these countries made to ameliorate their economies, growth rates remained low. Costa Rica was one of the few countries (along with Panama) that responded better to these economic adjustments. For instance, more than 50 percent of new jobs were created in the formal sector, in sharp contrast to nations such as El Salvador and Nicaragua, two countries that were unable to generate even 10 percent of the jobs in the same sector (ECLAC 2003).

Besides the worsening of economic and political indicators in Nicaragua, this country also faced the most devastating natural disasters in Central American history. In 1972, Nicaragua endured one of the worst earthquakes up to that time. It caused 5,000 deaths, more than 20,000 were injured, and over a quarter million of Nicaraguans were left without homes (*New York Times*, 1973). Further, in 1998, Hurricane Mitch left the country in ruins and generated a significant number of environmental (climate) refugees (Morales 1999).

Costa Rica, on the other hand, continues to demonstrate consistent levels of economic and political stability, despite some recent concerns with its deterioration in human development indicators and an increase in violence (UNDP 2008). According to Freedom House 2009, Costa Rica received a score of 1 in both political rights and civil liberties (represents higher democracy levels) similar to those in well known established democracies. In terms of corruption, however, Costa Rica has been hindered by many corruption scandals. It ranked 43 out of 180 countries in the Corruption Perception Index in 2009.⁶⁶ Still, it remains one of the most stable democracies in the region, making it an attractive destination in Central America as evidenced by the highest percentage (9.5%) of immigrants in the region (OCED 2009, 25).

Costa Rican Migration Policy: A Short Overview

As noted, Costa Rica stressed the desire to bring mostly European migration at the end of the XIX century, directing many laws toward this goal. Even though there were no restrictions on immigration in 1871, in successive decades many laws were introduced to select particular migrant groups designated by the government. For example, in 1897,

⁶⁶ www.freedomhouse.org

specific ethnic groups were forbidden from entering Costa Rica, such as Chinese, Arabic, Armenian, among others (Alvarenga 2008).

Subsequent migration policy aimed at the same concept of selective immigration. In 1930, the Costa Rican government created “El Registro de Identificación Migratoria,” with the sole purpose of registering individuals who entered and exited the country. All immigrants were required to have an immigration identification card that was renewable every two years. If any individual entered the country without the appropriate documentation, this person was subject to deportation. Nonetheless, these measures were not applied equally to all foreigners, reinforcing the differences made between “desired and undesired” migration (Alvarenga 2008).

In 1998, the Costa Rican government declared a general amnesty to legalize any undocumented individuals who came from other Central American countries. This measure was mainly implemented as a response to the many consequences brought by hurricane Mitch throughout the region. The amnesty, with duration of six months from February 1st to July 31st of 1999, mainly focused on providing more opportunities and better living conditions to those affected by the natural disaster (Morales 1999, 13-15). Most recently, the Costa Rican government, as Chile did, recognized the lack of explicit public policy when related to issues of migration (Gatica 2008, 135).

Even though Costa Rica is primarily a country of destination, in recent years, emigration is becoming more normal, especially to the United States. It is estimated that around 87 000 Costa Ricans live abroad (OCED 2009). These figures demonstrate in some ways the difficulties of the country’s political system capacity to meet Costa Ricans demands, in addition to dealing with high immigration rates.

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

Migration Flows

Unlike the other countries in this study, the Dominican Republic has a long history of migration with a single country—Haiti—deeply embedded in Dominican society. Therefore, one cannot understand this subject without taking into consideration how context has defined Haitian migration in various aspects of Dominican political, economic, and social standards.

The Dominican Republic has faced persistent domestic conflicts, foreign occupation, and authoritarian regimes. For example, Haiti occupied the Dominican Republic for 22 years (1822-1844) leaving a legacy of confrontation between both states (Moya 1992). Similarly, in the beginning of the XIX century, Haiti and the Dominican Republic were occupied by the United States. During this period (1916-1924), North-Americans made investments in much of the Caribbean agricultural sector and in particular in sugar cane plantations, creating a need for agricultural labor. Consequently, guest programs were put in place for Haitians to live and work in the Dominican Republic.

But it was not until 1919 that a massive immigration of Haitians took place. This cross-border movement was known as a seasonal agricultural migration, very much like the *braceros* in the United States during the mid 1900s.⁶⁷ Haitian migrants worked mainly cutting sugar cane and resided in *bateyes* (communities where Haitian immigrants

⁶⁷ Bracero was a guest worker program under which Mexican citizens were recruited to work on US farms. For further information on Braceros' history, see, <http://migration.ucdavis.edu/RMN/more.php?id=1112_0_4_0>

reside specifically to work cutting sugar cane).⁶⁸ Likewise, they were subject to temporary contracts and limited to working/living in certain geographic areas. After the contract completion, Haitians were obliged to return to their home country. This situation, however, resulted in a significant number of undocumented migrants because many of them chose to stay instead. Furthermore, the conditions under which Haitians worked were deplorable, underpaid, precarious; not much different from what happens nowadays (Moya 1992; Reyes-Santos 2008; Vairac 2008).

After the U.S. occupation, the Dominican Republic experienced a period of relative peace until General Trujillo came into power establishing a dictatorship for over 30 years (1930-1961) and bringing with it a pronounced anti-Haitian sentiment. During this period, Haitians were portrayed as invaders posing a threat to Dominican culture, identity, traditions, economy, etc. More specifically, Trujillo institutionalized “anti-Haitian” ideology in much of every aspect of Dominican politics and society, which allowed the legitimization of nationalism and his authoritarian rule (Lozano 2008, Lilón 1999). Such anti-immigrant discourse led to the justification of the killing of thousands of Haitians in 1937. Some estimates suggest that total deaths ranged anywhere from 1000 to 35,000 (Reyes-Santos 2008, 21):

Trujillo’s government put an end to the occupation of land with the killing and expulsion of Haitians in the Fall of 1937. The massacre targeted peasants, agricultural laborers, domestic employees and little Haitian traders in small towns and rural areas, but it did not target those working at sugar cane fields, that way the continuity of sugar production was guaranteed. After the massacre and during many years after, the only work available for Haitians that cross the border was the cutting of sugar cane.

(Moya 1992, 20 Author’s translation).

⁶⁸ For further information, See, <<http://www.monografias.com/trabajos30/inmigracion-haitiana/inmigracion-haitiana.shtml#oroigen>>

Seasonal migration continued in subsequent years. Estimates of how many Haitians reside in the Dominican Republic today are insufficient, however. According to Wilfredo Lozano (1992), approximately 60,900 to 117,898 Haitians engaged in Dominican agriculture from 1987 to 1988. Later calculations, suggest that numbers may be as high as 500,000 (Lozano 2008, 32). Other sources give a more conservative number of only 56,583 Haitian migrants residing in Dominican soil by 2002 (OCED 2009).⁶⁹

Anti-Haitian sentiment has prevailed throughout Dominican Republic's political history. In the aftermath of the military coup in 1963, which led to civil war and U.S. involvement, a new constitution was established with Joaquin Balaguer elected as president in 1966. During his regime and subsequent administrations, the anti-Haitian discourse continued. A great example of how anti-immigrant sentiment mired Dominican's political life was the election of 1996. The campaign against presidential candidate Peña Gomez was based largely on his ethnic background. The election was heavily charged with Haitian antagonism and racism (Lozano 2008).

It has been widely recognized that Haitians migrate to the Dominican Republic in search of better living and working conditions. Over the last decade, new Haitian migration, unlike previous waves, is characterized by individuals who come from Haiti's urban areas. This type of migration has remained stable overtime (Silié, Segura, and Cabral 2002). Yet the ongoing abuse/mistreatment of Haitian immigrants continues to tarnish Dominican Republic's international reputation, especially since no public policy has been implemented to address this issue. According to Freedom House 2009, the situation has worsened:

⁶⁹ Other immigrant groups reside in the Dominican Republic, but in a significant lesser extent than that of Haitians. For example, according to the OCED report, there are around 3,091 Venezuelans, 2,227 Spaniards, 1,973 Cubans, 1,920 Puerto Rican, and others (16 528).

In 2007, a small, center-right political party filed a court case to strip citizenship from Sonia Pierre, a Dominican-born activist for Haitian rights, but backed down under international pressure. Several violent incidents against Haitians flared in Dominican towns close to the border in October 2008, with civilians chasing and beating Haitians—resulting in a number of deaths—despite the authorities’ efforts to protect some of the migrants. The situation is exacerbated by poor economic prospects in the Dominican Republic, which has intensified competition for work among local and migrant populations” (Freedom House 2009).

Further, with the devastating earthquake in Haiti that took place in January 2010, it is not surprising that Haitian migration will remain dynamic as the result of the worsening of living conditions in this country. Time projections to fully rebuild Haiti are estimated in no less than ten to fifteen years, according to the United Nations.⁷⁰ In short, Haitian migration to the Dominican Republic does not seem to slow down any time soon.

Role of Context

Albeit the Dominican Republic progress toward higher levels of democracy since the downfall of authoritarian rule, the country has not reached democratic consolidation. It scored 2 in both political rights and civil liberties, according Freedom House 2009. The country also grappled with many episodes of corruption, with the most recent scandal under Fernandez’s administration. Therefore, it is not unexpected that the nation ranked 99 out of 180 countries in the Corruption Perception Index 2009, bested by other nearby countries such as El Salvador, Guatemala, Panama, and Jamaica.⁷¹

⁷⁰ See: < <http://www.un.org>> and < <http://www.sabanews.net/en/news205664.htm>>

⁷¹ www.transparency.org

In economic terms, the Dominican Republic has been doing well even after the 2008 crisis. Real GDP growth was -0.7 percent in 2003 and by 2007 it grew to almost 11 percent, a significant increase in just a few years. Similarly, the inflation rate was low since 2005 (4.19%), reaching macroeconomic stability (Seligson et al. 2008, 3). Moreover, the Dominican Republic is one of the very few countries that endured the 2008 crises. In contrast to many other nations that experienced economic deterioration, the Dominican Republic grew by 2.5 percent in 2009 and it is expected that it will reach 3.5 percent growth by 2010 (ECLAC 2009).⁷²

It is noteworthy that the Dominican Republic is also a country of emigration, with approximately 13 percent of its population (around 750,000) currently living abroad. Dominicans have mostly emigrated to the United States (633,267) and in a lesser extent to European countries, namely, Spain and Italy (OECD 2009).

Dominican Migration Policy: A Short Overview

Throughout Dominican history, migration policy has largely been colored by a racist discourse. Haitians' status has primarily been highlighted as "non-Caucasians," thus, giving a way for a series of justifications for their ill-treatment by various sectors of Dominican society (Vairac 2008). Its maximum expression was reached by the massacre of 1937, already mentioned in the previous section. Much of migration policy in the Dominican Republic has been directed toward guest worker programs for the agricultural sector. Following the aftermath of the 1937 massacre, an ongoing seasonal agricultural migration prevailed under various agreements (i.e., 1952, 1959, 1966, 1978, and 1979). It

⁷² See, <http://www.infolatam.com/entrada/cepal_r_dominicana_soportito_el_temporal_d-17828.html>

facilitated cheap labor, most notably, working in sugar cane plantations. The last agreement took place in 1985 (Moya 1992, 20).

In 1997, a UN report indicated that Haitian women were extremely vulnerable because they are not recognized by the *bateyes* (community where Haitian immigrants reside to work cutting sugar cane) nor by the sugar cane field owners, all of which hinders their possibilities of obtaining legal status and benefits. Furthermore, their children are condemned to a situation of permanent precariousness and exploitation (Vairac 2008). In 2004, the latest migration law (Law No. 285-04) passed, stating that children born in the Dominican Republic from undocumented mothers cannot become Dominican nationals. This has created a social problem by denying these children access to any benefits.

The law also forbids the entrance of individuals who are mentally sick or have major diseases, unless they enter the Dominican Republic only for the purpose of receiving medical attention. Furthermore, individuals without a profession or who lack any skills are not to be admitted.⁷³ This law has remained controversial, bringing about the protest of many human rights organizations and various sectors of civil society, as well as international attention, pressuring the Dominican government to implement appropriate policies that will help to ease social conflict (Lozano 2008).

In short, while each of the countries in this study experience varying degrees of immigration, the context under which immigrants come and live in the host society, defines the migration agenda of each. The Dominican Republic is the country with the most deeply embedded history of migration and anti-immigrant discourse, while

⁷³ For a detailed information about this law, see, < http://www.phlaw.com/pubs/rejec/sp/res_285-04_Ley_General_de_Migracion.pdf>

Argentina and Chile show the most accepting atmosphere for immigrants illustrated by their liberal migration policies. Further, Costa Rican migration history appears to be more “selective” at the beginning, but turns to be more accepting of other types of migration thereafter.

In terms of migration flows, Argentina, Costa Rica, and the Dominican Republic had a long history of immigration. Although Chile constituted largely a net-emigration country, in recent times it has turned into a country of immigration, paralleling Argentina and Costa Rica, historically net-immigration countries. The Dominican Republic is the nation with both high emigration and immigration rates all through its history. Finally, each state has dealt with positive and negative periods of political and economic development that, in turn, have influenced migration flows.

In the final section of this chapter, I will explore public opinion toward immigrants in a comparative perspective in order to have a better understanding of the dynamics of pro-immigrant sentiment and how countries’ specific historical events and contexts matter when determining the sources of such sentiments. The main argument throughout this dissertation is that support for democratic values will lead to a more accepting environment for immigrants provided that host governments cannot enforce policies that will eradicate immigration right away, thus, foreign born residents become an important minority group in host societies. And, as noted throughout this dissertation, to accelerate the move toward higher quality democracies, the protection of minorities is imperative.

Public Opinion: An Empirical Assessment in Four Latin American Countries

In the next pages, I will explore some of the main theoretical relationships already analyzed in Chapter III. This section begins with an overview of attitudes towards immigrants in the four countries under analysis and concludes with the multivariate analysis and the corresponding discussion of the results.

Figure IV.1 shows that Costa Rica and the Dominican Republic emerge as the countries with the highest pro-immigrant sentiment in our small sample of four countries, with 66.4 and 64.3 percent respectively of its population agreeing strongly or somewhat to the notion that the government should provide basic services for immigrants (e.g., health care, education, housing). These results are particularly unexpected for the case of the Dominican Republic because as noted, this country has a deeply embedded history of migration and anti-immigrant discourse. But in terms of public opinion, Dominicans appear to express pro-immigrant sentiment in general. Argentina, on the other hand, shows the lowest pro-immigrant sentiment out of the four countries with almost 53 percent of citizens strongly or somewhat agreeing with immigrant governmental provision of services, followed by 55 percent of Chileans. It is worth mentioning that the majority of the population in the four countries reveals sympathy toward foreign born citizens, contrary to predictions that citizens in less developed societies convey more unreceptive attitudes than those in established democracies.

When observing closely the percentage of those who strongly or somewhat disagree with this support, almost 23 percent of Costa Ricans (the lowest percentage in the sample) express anti-immigrant opinions, compared to 27.2 percent of Argentineans, 30.3 percent of Chileans and 31.1 percent of Dominicans.




Figure 0.1. Support for Governmental Services for Immigrants by Country

Moreover, the Dominican Republic surfaces as the nation with a more polarized stand on immigration as expressed by the very low percentage of Dominicans revealing neutral views. Perhaps an explanation for these results is the ongoing anti-Haitian discourse and its political relevance throughout Dominican history. These events may have generated citizens that either favor or are against Haitian migration, leaving out any neutral sentiments. The rest of results indicate that around 20 percent of Argentines, 15 percent of Chileans, and 11 percent of Costa Ricans reveal neutral views, a significant higher number than those in the Dominican Republic. Next, we proceed with the multivariate analysis.

Multivariate Analysis

Through an ordinary least square regression model, I am able to examine the influence of support for democratic values on attitudes toward foreign born residents in Argentina, Chile, Costa Rica, and the Dominican Republic. Figure IV.4 shows the graphical representation of the effects. As noted in Chapter III, each variable included in the analysis is listed on the vertical (y) axis. If located to the right of the vertical “0” the line indicates a positive effect, and if to the left of the “0” line, a negative effect is demonstrated. If the effects are statistically significant, they are shown by confidence interval lines stretching to the left and right of each dot without overlapping the vertical “0” line (at .05 or better). If they overlap the vertical line, the effects are statistically insignificant. The relative strength of each variable is indicated by standardized coefficients.

First, Argentina arises as the nation with the strongest democratic political culture in terms of attitudes toward foreign born residents, substantiating some of my theoretical expectations laid out in Chapter II. Argentineans that exhibit a positive perception of governmental efficacy, elevated levels of political tolerance and interpersonal trust, reveal favorable views toward immigrants, as expressed by the dots located to the right of the vertical line and by their confidence intervals, which do not overlap the same line. Chileans also display immigrant sympathy when they perceive the government as efficient and when they trust core political institutions. These results corroborate with the thesis that when citizens recognize that their institutions and governments are capable of satisfying their demands then, natives will be less opposed to “outsiders” competition for

the same resources. Chile also imparts a marginal positive effect of satisfaction with democracy on pro-immigrant sentiment.




Figure 0.2. Support for Democratic Values: A Multivariate Analysis in Argentina, Chile, Costa Rica, and the Dominican Republic

On the other hand, and in opposition to my predictions, Costa Rica, the most historically stable democracy in the region, displays no effects on pro-immigrant sentiment. The only variable that becomes significant is support for democracy and against the predicted direction. Costa Ricans that express higher levels of support for

democracy convey negative attitudes toward foreigners, as illustrated by the dot located on the left side of the vertical line. This finding is surprising, especially in light of Costa Rica's strong democratic political culture throughout the last half century, rendering the country most apt to a welcoming environment for immigrants. Here, we find that there is no relationship between support for democratic values and immigrant sympathy, and that support for democracy elicits negative attitudes among the Costa Rican citizenry.

An explanation for these results may be the escalation of Nicaraguan migration during the last decade. Indeed, most of the current debate in Costa Rica has been surrounded by the idea that the deterioration of the quality of public services is due to immigration. However, studies have found that no such relationship exists (Bonilla-Carrion 2008; Gatica 2008). As Roger Bonilla (2008) points out,

“...from 1998, net-insurance has augmented in 5 percentage points for Nicaraguan homes and it has diminished by 5 point for Costa Ricans. When adjusting by the effect of taxpayers, it shows a higher decline among Costa Rican homes in 1998. From that year, the reason for net consultations has incremented by 43 percent in Nicaraguan homes, in contrast to 25 percent for Costa Rican homes. These results let us think of the possibility of the loss in the credibility of public institutions by the Costa Rican population, and similarly, it seems that the Nicaraguan population is investing more in public services, exactly how it should be in contributing regimes” (Bonilla 2008, 146, author's translation).

If Costa Ricans lose confidence in their public institutions, these feelings may quickly be transformed into a loss of support for democracy that, in turn, will end up in the general manifestation of anti-immigrant sentiment. This situation opens the door for

future research on the question of the overall impact of citizens' disenchantment with their political institutions on democracy, and their views on migration.

The Dominican Republic, furthermore, does not show any significant effects. A plausible explanation for the lack of significant findings in this country may be attributed to the fact that Haitian migration has been profoundly rooted in Dominican politics and society. Hence, it is likely that there is no variation in attitudes toward immigrants across individuals. Dominicans may express one sort of attitude toward immigrants and no matter how much support for democratic values they demonstrate, how educated individuals are, or what other characteristics individuals exhibit, the fact that they express the same type of attitude may render the results insignificant when running the multivariate model.

To assess more thoroughly the strength of the effects of support for democratic values and of other variables that may explain immigrant opinion, Table V.1 displays a comprehensive model by presenting only the significant effects. The full model with and without statistically significant effects are found in the Appendix. As indicated above, Argentina shows a more welcoming environment for immigrants than Costa Rica and the Dominican Republic.

Specifically, for one unit increase in interpersonal trust, political tolerance, and governmental efficacy among Argentinians, pro-immigrant sentiment will be increased, on average, by 15, 11, and 24 points, respectively, on a 0 to 100 scale. Moreover, an interesting finding is the negative impact of authoritarian attitudes: authoritarian individuals show, on average, 16 points less immigrant sympathy than those who are more democratic. This outcome underscores the notion that authoritarian individuals tend

to have strong preference for conformity and uniformity (Hetherington and Weiler 2009; Stenner and Feldman 1997; Stenner 2005). It does not come as a surprise that Argentineans who exhibit authoritarian attitudes will tend to dislike immigrants.

**Table 0.1. Determinants of Support for Governmental Services for Immigrants:
Ordinary Least Square (OLS) Regression**

	Argentina	Chile	Costa Rica	Dominican Republic
	Coef. (t)	Coef. (t)	Coef. (t)	Coef. (t)
Interpersonal Trust	0.150*** (3.57)			
Political Tolerance	0.109*** (3.36)			
Governmental Efficacy	0.235*** (3.93)	0.111** (2.73)		
Pol. Inst. Legitimacy		0.128** (3.14)		
Support for Democracy			-0.104** (-2.97)	
Authoritarian Attitudes	-0.164*** (-3.96)			
National Economic Satisfaction		0.082*** (3.57)	0.107** (2.84)	
Migration Connection Index			0.068* (2.23)	
Age			-0.068* (-2.30)	
Race ^a		0.068* (2.17)	0.078* (2.38)	
<i>Mestizo</i>				0.068* (3.80)
<i>Other</i>				
Female		-0.066* (-2.36)		
Wealth				0.069* (2.11)
Size of City/Town			-0.071* (-2.22)	
Unemployed ^b				
<i>Other (Students, housework, retirees)</i>		0.070* (2.20)		
Region ^c				
<i>Centro</i>	0.174** (3.22)			
<i>Urbano Central</i>			-0.094*** (-3.64)	
<i>Rural Central</i>			-0.083** (-2.56)	
Constant	-0.010 (-0.22)	-0.013 (-0.38)	0.016 (0.65)	0.026 (0.85)
R-Squared	0.208	0.129	0.097	0.068
Number of Obs.	844	1174	1151	1062

*p<.05 **p<.01 ***p<.001

a. The reference group is White

b. The reference group is individuals in the labor force

c. The reference group for Argentina=AMBA; Chile=Norte; Costa Rica=AMSJ; Dom Republic=Metropolitan

Note: This model takes into consideration the design of the sample.

Source: AmericasBarometer 2008 by LAPOP

Another finding in the Argentinean case is the variation on immigrant opinion by region. Argentineans who reside in the Central region tend to have more positive opinions than those who live in the Buenos Aires Metropolitan Region (AMBA). Because foreigners tend to cluster in greater numbers in metropolitan areas, it may elicit more negative attitudes among the citizenry than in regions with fewer immigrants (e.g., Quillian 1995; Kuvonich 2004; Semyonov, Raijman, and Gorodzeisky 2006; Tolbert and Hero 1996; Wilkes et al. 2008,).

In the case of Chile, one unit increase in the positive perception of governmental efficacy and the legitimacy of core political institutions increases immigrant sympathy among Chileans, on average, by 11 and 13 points, in that order, on a 0 to 100 scale, whereas the opposite is true for support for democracy among Costa Ricans. Furthermore, the more satisfied Chileans and Costa Ricans are with their national economic situation their positive views toward foreigners increase, on average, by 8 and 11 points, accordingly. This outcome corroborates with prior research stating that those who believe that the national economy is stagnant or is not doing well are those who express negative views toward immigration (Citrin et al. 1997; Espenshade and Hempstead 1996; Chandler and Tsai 2001; Pantoja 2006, Burns and Gimpel 2000). In addition, Costa Rican citizens display pro-immigrant sentiments depending on their connections to migrant networks.

When focusing the attention to the analysis of socio-economic demographic characteristics, race becomes a significant explanatory factor of immigrant opinion in Chile, Costa Rica, and the Dominican Republic. Mestizos exhibit, on average, more positive opinions than whites in the first two cases, while in the latter, other ethnicities

besides Blacks and mulattos reveal more pro-immigrant sentiment than whites. These results support previous studies where differences in opinion toward foreigners depend on race (Burns and Gimpel 2000; De la Garza, Falcon, and Garcia 1996; Hood, Morris, and Shirkey 1997). Women also demonstrate less favorable opinions than men in Chile.

Region is another determinant factor in Costa Rica. Those who live in the Urban Central and Rural Central areas of the country show more negative opinions toward immigrants than those who live in San Jose's Metropolitan Region (AMSJ). Further, Costa Ricans who live in bigger cities impart more unfavorable attitudes than those who live in smaller ones. Finally, job status and wealth seem to have an impact on pro-immigrant sentiment in Chile and the Dominican Republic, respectively. In Chile, students, retirees, and those who work at home show more favorable attitudes than those who are in the work force. By the same token, wealthy Dominicans exhibit immigrant sympathy.

In short, these results demonstrate how each country varies in its political culture vis-à-vis immigrant opinions. Our results indicate that a stronger democratic political culture is found in Argentina as expressed by the positive impact of many democratic values on immigrant sympathy. On the other hand, Dominican Republic's political culture does not show any influence on the same attitudes. As suggested in previous pages, this outcome may reflect how well embedded migration is in Dominican Republic's political and social life, therefore, generating little change in citizens' views toward immigrants. It is noteworthy that in Chile, a country with a shorter migration history, a higher positive perception of government efficacy and institutional legitimacy leads to higher pro-immigrant sentiment. These results highlight Chile's leading position

as a strong Latin American democracy. Consequently, it is not unexpected that Chileans are more likely to perceive immigrants favorably.

To conclude, Costa Rica emerges as the most surprising case out of the four countries under study. No impact of a strong political culture is revealed in this country, contrary to my expectations. These results may indicate that when a massive surge of immigrants takes place in a small country, such as Costa Rica, people's democratic attitudes may weaken, manifesting themselves in anti-democratic responses toward immigrants. These reactions may be explained by, as noted earlier, Costa Ricans loss of confidence in their public institutions to meet their basic needs, especially under conditions of high migration (i.e. Nicaraguan). These feelings, in turn, may quickly be transformed into a loss of support for democracy more generally, that, in turn, will end up in the general manifestation of anti-immigrant sentiment. One could even go further by arguing that hostile attitudes may deteriorate to the point of expressing itself in higher support for authoritarian alternatives in order to solve the "migration problem." This idea will be further explored in the following chapter by the in-depth analysis of Ecuador, both a small country and with high migration rates.

CHAPTER V

DEMOCRATIC VALUES AND PUBLIC OPINION TOWARD IMMIGRANTS: THE CASE OF ECUADOR

The country since 2000 has experienced deep demographic transformations and the migration dynamic—emigration and immigration—is a reality that is reconfigured in an adverse context as a result of a generalized crisis and it presents new challenges to an including coexistence based in the acknowledgement, respect, and validity of the rights of every person that resides in Ecuador.

*(Chávez and Betancourt 2007, 32
Author's translation)*

Ecuador experienced a 30 percent reduction in its gross domestic product and a considerable increase in poverty, from 45 to 71 percent, as a result of the economic and financial crisis of 1998–99 (Acosta 2006, 196). Consequently, a large number of Ecuadorians emigrated to Spain and a smaller number to Italy. In the last decade, it is estimated that 1 million to 1.5 million Ecuadorians have left the country in order to improve their individual and their families' living conditions (IOM 2009).

At the same time, Ecuador has become a country of destination in recent years. Neighboring Colombia has experienced an environment characterized by high levels of violence with the emergence of groups such as the FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia), the ELN (National Liberation Army), paramilitary organizations, and drug-trafficking networks, creating a humanitarian crisis that has produced a large influx of Colombian immigrants into Ecuador. Between 2000 and 2006, Ecuador received approximately 250,000 displaced Colombians because of the armed conflict, and it is

expected that this number will increase in upcoming years if the situation is not resolved.⁷⁴

When a massive influx of migrants – be they economic or political refugees – take place, it usually places a tremendous pressure on a political system’s capacity to respond to the increased strain on its infrastructure. Often times these increased strains have manifested themselves in citizens’ attitudes toward the emergent democracy itself, sometimes leading to calls for a more repressive response to the influx of migrants (Seligson et al. 2006). Provided the potential connection between immigration and system stress it is useful not only to understand how immigration influences citizens’ views toward democracy but also how preexisting attitudes toward democracy might help prepare citizens to react to a dramatic increase in immigration in a more tolerant and democratic manner.

The main argument of this dissertation is that citizen support for democratic values matters for “the question of migration” because it creates a favorable environment for foreign born residents. As demonstrated so far, citizens who support a strong democratic political culture understand the significance of the protection of minorities’ rights. And, when these rights are protected, the move toward higher quality democracies is more likely. If citizens, instead, create a hostile environment for immigrants, it could heighten violence and social distrust and even possibly ignite citizens’ support for authoritarian alternatives. For all these reasons, support for democratic values matter for a

⁷⁴ According to the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) only 135,000 Colombians are classified as refugees in Ecuador, and only 22,000 of these have formally requested asylum, probably because of fear or ignorance of the UNHCR system. At the same time, because of the worsening situation in Colombia, the increasing influx of Colombian immigrants in Ecuador has displaced many Ecuadorians in the country. The UNHCR has requested that other countries admit Colombians to relieve some of the stress on Ecuador and Venezuela. For a more detailed understanding of this issue, see *El Comercio* 2009 a and b; UNHCR 2009.

peaceful reception of immigrants that strengthens social cohesion and makes a diverse democratic society work. The present chapter seeks to offer a better understanding of the sources of attitudes about immigration in Ecuador through the implementation of both qualitative and quantitative data.

This chapter starts with some general descriptive statistics of immigration flows in Ecuador and reviews briefly the theoretical framework already discussed in Chapter II. A novel approach to the theory is the inclusion of the theoretical justification of the sources of immigrant opinion of Ecuadorians migrants residing abroad. It follows with the discussion of how important democratic values are for the acceptance of minority groups in host societies and the significance of this relationship in public opinion. The chapter concludes with the empirical assessment of these relationships.

Descriptive Statistics of Migration Flows

Even though the majority of immigrants in Ecuador are displaced Colombians, there has also been an economic migration due to some economic stability and development experienced in recent years with the introduction of the dollar as the national currency (since 2000). Some descriptive statistics of the bulk of immigration is shown in Table V.1.⁷⁵

In Table V.1, one observes the presence of around a little over a million immigrants in Ecuador, with 75 percent coming mainly from Colombia and Peru. Peruvians, as a matter of fact, see in Ecuador a country where they can improve their living conditions, attributable partly to the newly dollarized Ecuadorian economy.

⁷⁵ All this information could be easily accessed at www.senami.gov.ec

Table 0.1. Migratory Movement by Nationalities in Ecuador

Nationality	Entry	Exit	Balance	General Balance
Colombia	1.406.169	835.948	570.221	48,61%
Peru	685.252	373.075	312.177	26,61%
EEUU	1.191.464	1.172.023	19.441	1,66%
Others	1.938.676	1.667.410	271.166	23,12%
<i>Total</i>	<i>5.221.461</i>	<i>4.048.456</i>	<i>1.173.005</i>	<i>100%</i>

Source: Dirección Nacional de Migración (2000-2006) INEC Anuario Migración 2005

Prepared by: Coalition CTMF

A number of sources indicate that communities in the southern region of the country where many Ecuadorians emigrated have indeed become communities of reception. Many jobs are fulfilled by this type of immigration, particularly in provinces, such as El Oro, Azuay, and Loja (e.g., FLACSO 2008). Fieldwork in Loja, Ecuador, during the summer of 2009 supports these assertions:

“My father has always had workers but because many people left in search of better lives abroad, a lot of the manual labor left, so, there is no manual labor. As you know agriculture is important [in Loja] and a lot of people are needed to work in agriculture, therefore, Peruvians replace those who left. For Peruvians, Ecuador is like the United States because of the dollar. A Peruvian, when he was working for us, was telling me that by working three months in Ecuador, they are able to buy a motorcycle in Peru and a motorcycle in the Peruvian border is like a taxi. Imagine what it means to buy a motorcycle that in Peru is really difficult, there is a lot of poverty down there. Therefore, a lot of them came to replace the people who left”

Interviewee, C2, Loja, Ecuador
(Author’s translation)

Furthermore, recent accounts suggest an escalation of Cuban immigration. Even though estimates of this immigration are limited, when looking at the period of four months from January to April 2009, around 1,633 stayed in Ecuador (*El Expreso*

2009).⁷⁶ In addition, there are some claims that Cubans are getting into bogus marriages in order to acquire Ecuadorian citizenship (*El Hoy* 2008).⁷⁷ During 2009, an estimate of 1710 Cubans went to the Registry Office to get married with Ecuadorian citizens, representing an increase of almost 375 percent in one year. It is believed that this increment occurred after the suppression of visas for Cubans in 2008 (*El Comercio* 2009).⁷⁸ At the same time, a rise in reports over their illegality is registered. Fieldwork in Ecuador provides some evidence of people's view on this issue:

“When my nephew got married in the registry office, I saw a considerable number of Cuban males and Ecuadorian females waiting on-line to get married. At the end of the ceremony, we saw these same couples exchanging phone numbers. It was obvious that they were arranged marriages. Furthermore, something that was particularly interesting to me was that when we went to celebrate it [nephew's wedding] at a restaurant, one of the Cubans I saw at the registry office was there celebrating his marriage by himself with his other Cuban friends. Very very bizarre”

Interviewee, C1, Quito, Ecuador
(Author's translation)

“Cubans come here to marry young girls. In fact, I know that they go and look for girls in the Manuela Cañizares [public school], in schools like that, that are public to offer them money and to marry them in order to get visas...I am shocked by it...”

Interviewee, C5, Quito, Ecuador
(Author's translation)

⁷⁶ See, <<http://www.expreso.ec/ediciones/2009/06/01/especial/ecuador-atractivo-para-loscubanos/default.asp?fecha=2009/06/01>>

⁷⁷ See, <<http://www.hoy.com.ec/noticias-ecuador/denuncian-supuestos-matrimonios-arreglados-de-cubanos-en-ecuador-323148.html>>

⁷⁸ See, <http://ww1.elcomercio.com/noticiaEC.asp?id_noticia=323423&id_seccion=4>

Compared to other countries such as the U.S. traditionally considered a country of immigration with around 12.5 percent of foreign-born residents,⁷⁹ Ecuador, with a population of almost 14 million,⁸⁰ has reached an immigration of 10 percent during the period from 2000-2006 (Chávez and Betancourt 2007, 96). The majority, nonetheless, originates from Colombia making up around 50 percent of the foreign-born population in Ecuador. Thus, this chapter offers a historical description of Colombian migration to Ecuador. First, we look at Ecuador's location in relationship to the rest of the countries in the region with respect to their immigrant opinions.

Attitudes Toward Immigrants in Ecuador in Comparative Perspective

As recalled in Chapter III, Ecuador compared to other countries in the region is situated among those with the lowest positive attitudes or, in other words, with the highest negative views toward immigrants, being these differences statistical significant. Ecuador, as Guatemala and Bolivia, shows averages lower than 50 points in scale from 0 to 100, when positive attitudes are measured by citizens' support for governmental services for immigrants.

At the other extreme, Uruguay, Costa Rica, and Venezuela exhibited the highest levels of support for immigrant governmental services with averages higher than 64 on the same scale. Ecuador, moreover, in sharp contrast to Costa Rica, shows levels significantly lower than the rest of the countries with only 30 percent of its population supporting the notion that immigrants take jobs citizens do not want (that is, three fourths

⁷⁹ See, <<http://pewhispanic.org/files/factsheets/foreignborn2006/Table-1.pdf>>

⁸⁰ www.inec.gov.ec

of the population believe that foreigners take jobs away from Ecuadorians), while Costa Rica displayed the highest percentage of its population favoring this view (77.2%).

Ecuador is one of the countries with the lowest levels of acceptance of immigrants in the region, possibly as the result of an unexpected influx of a high number of displaced Colombians, and more recently, with the sudden arrival of Cubans. Fears to be displaced by foreigners at the job site or fears that the government will neglect citizens' needs if the government provides special services to immigrants elicit unfavorable immigrant perceptions among the Ecuadorian citizenry. These claims are further tested at the end of this chapter through a multivariate analysis, but first I offer a historical overview of Colombian immigration and immigrant public opinion in Ecuador.

Colombian Immigration and Public Opinion in Ecuador

Before the mid-twentieth century, the movement of immigrants from Colombia to Ecuador was insignificant. By the end of the 1950s and 1960s, however, when Ecuador's agrarian reform opened the labor market, a considerable number of Colombian farmers started to settle in the country to find better working conditions. In the 1960s, the number of immigrants doubled; it continued to grow during the 1970s and maintained the same levels during the 1980s (Rivera et al. 2007).

Earlier, the ten-year civil conflict known as *La Violencia* (1948–58) saw the death of more than three hundred thousand Colombians (Molano 2000). It ended in a compromise that resulted in a power-sharing agreement, the National Front (Holmes, Piñeres, and Curtin 2006). But important sectors of the society were left out of this new

agreement, a result that unleashed the rise of insurgent groups later on, such as the FARC and the ELN.

The FARC emerged during the 1970s from a peasant movement of only “about 500 people to an army of 3,000” (Molano 2000, 23). Today, “it is the dominant political force in over 50 percent of the country’s municipalities, fielding a guerrilla army of approximately 18,000 mostly peasant fighters” (Petras 2000, 134). In sharp contrast, the ELN’s founders, with a considerably smaller number of members, were university students, oil workers, and Catholic priests who defended liberation theology (Garcia-Pena 2000).

The presence of the guerrillas became more problematic when other actors, such as paramilitary organizations and drug-trafficking networks, committed violence. Armed groups might attack the civil population with the purpose of strengthening and expanding territorial control, amassing land, and extracting natural resources (*New York Times* 2009). Crimes against civilians also include “death threats, massacres, forced recruitment, temporary takeover of towns, and selected homicides” (Ibáñez and Vélez 2008, 661). Consequently, the conflict has become a significant humanitarian crisis, in which a massive number of Colombians have been internally displaced and later have migrated to neighboring countries (Camacho 2005; Guanipa Muñoz 2003; Guerrero, Rodríguez, and Molina 1995; Padilla Muñoz, Ponce, and Betancourt 2003; Trejos and Ochoa 2004).⁸¹ Today, Colombia has one of the largest displaced populations in the world, with an estimated 3 million persons living outside their place of residence, which corresponds to

⁸¹ The paramilitary groups are more effective at inflicting displacement, compared to the guerrillas. See Ibáñez and Vélez 2008.

almost 7 percent of the country's population and 29.1 percent of the rural residents. Women and children are the most affected (USCRI 2006).

Ecuador has experienced growth in Colombian immigration due to the armed conflict. According to the 2001 census, there are approximately 51,556 Colombians in Ecuador, living mainly in Pichincha (41.7 percent), Carchi (13.5 percent), Imbabura (12.5 percent), Sucumbios (8.3 percent), and Esmeraldas (6.9 percent), provinces that belong variously to the regions of the highlands, the Amazon, and the coast (see Trejos and Ochoa 2004, 73). Still, considering that the characteristics of the internal conflict are complex, it is nonetheless difficult to differentiate immigrants who are displaced from those who voluntarily leave the country for economic reasons.

As a result of the large influx of Colombian immigrants in Ecuador, negative perceptions and stereotypes toward this group have increased lately among the Ecuadorian population. For instance, there is a widespread perception that the presence of Colombians has augmented violence in Ecuador—crime rates, thefts, kidnappings, and so on (Martínez 2005). Similarly, Colombians are seen to be taking jobs from the general population and generating costs for the Ecuadorian government by taking advantage of health services and education (Camacho 2005; Rivera et al. 2007; Trejos and Ochoa 2004). Certain sectors of Ecuadorian society feel threatened by Colombians in the labor market. One reason for this widespread negative sentiment toward Colombians is the role that the mass media play in promoting restrictive actions against Colombians (Izquierdo 2005). In contrast, there are Ecuadorians who think that Colombians are hard workers, perseverant, kind, and savvy about how to sell and do business (Camacho 2005).

Because of all the aforementioned reasons that Ecuadorians become intolerant of Colombian immigrants or immigrants in general, why is it that some Ecuadorians have positive attitudes toward foreigners? What sets them apart from others with respect to their views toward immigrants?

Throughout this dissertation I have argued that a strong democratic political culture contribute to a more sympathetic view of immigrants in host societies. This more welcoming environment, consequently, helps a democratic society to more effectively handle a sudden surge of foreigners than nations where anti-immigrant attitudes may produce heightened violence and threats to various components of democracy. Furthermore, an anti-immigrant environment may increase citizens' support for authoritarian alternatives "to put an end" to the migration problem. For that reason, a strong democratic political culture understood as a high support for democratic values and democratic political support is essential for the persistence of democracy as a form of government

Core Hypothesis: Individuals with higher levels of democratic values are more likely to view immigrants positively.

Given that the goal of this research is to study in more depth immigrant perceptions in Ecuador as it is facing both sides of the same phenomenon (emigration and immigration); these points of exposure allows the researcher to have more leverage in establishing the causal mechanisms of the relationship between support for democratic values and the formation of attitudes toward immigrants. Before I turn to the empirical

description of my main dependent variables and the statistical analysis of immigrant opinion in the Ecuadorian context, I offer a brief overview of emigration and how it may influence emigrants' views toward immigration in Ecuador.

Ecuadorian Emigrants Views on Immigration in Ecuador

Ecuador has become the country of the Andean region with the highest percentage of emigration with respect to its population. Specifically, from 1999 to 2007, around one million of Ecuadorians have left the country which represents 7 percent of the Ecuadorian population or the equivalent to 14 percent of the EAP (Economically Active Population) (FLACSO 2008, 15). Almost 50 percent among these have moved to Spain, 33 percent to the United States and 9, 4 percent to Italy. These three countries host 89 percent of all the global Ecuadorian foreign population (FLACSO 2008, 33).

As noted in the introduction Chapter of this dissertation, the original intent of fieldwork research in Spain was aimed toward the study of social remittances, that is, “the ideas, behaviors, identities, and social capital that flow from receiving-to sending-country communities” (Levitt 1998, 927) as a part of a larger project. But as a result of some interviews in which the issue of immigration in Ecuador was willingly brought into light by some of the respondents, my interest on this topic grew tremendously.

This chapter attempts to show the significance of a strong democratic political culture on immigrant perceptions in Ecuador by adding to the discussion emigrants' views. The expectation is that Ecuadorian emigrants will be more sympathetic toward immigrants in Ecuador because they understand the difficulties that come with migration due to their condition as foreigners themselves. In addition, I suspect that immigrants by

working and living in more developed societies will acquire new ideas and behaviors. These individuals' exposure to migration, one would argue, is in part a product of the tension that emerges between an individual's attitudinal and behavioral "status quo" – that is, her accepted way of thinking and behaving politically – and the new ideas and behaviors that the individual is exposed to through migration (Black 1987; Levitt 2001; Ramakrishnan 2005; Ramakrishnan and Espenshade 2001). Whether such tension, if it emerges, will bring about negative or positive change (with respect to democratic attitudes and behaviors) depends on a variety of factors, first and foremost whether the individual himself/herself benefits from his/her exposure to migration. So for instance, if Ecuadorians moving to Spain have positive experiences living and working in a developed democratic economy, we might expect these individuals to have a greater support for democratic values and, in turn, a positive opinion toward immigrants in their country of origin. My fieldwork in Spain shows that this may be the case.

The following excerpts expose the opinions of Ecuadorian emigrants who reported having positive experiences living in Spain. The first passage illustrates the opinion of an Ecuadorian male residing in Spain for eight years. The second passage, on the other hand, shows the views of a recent Ecuadorian female migrant living in the Spanish capital for two years. The third passage, shows the opinions of an Ecuadorian female that lived in Spain for 5 years, moved to Ireland for one year, and currently resides in Luxembourg. All three respondents share the common feature of having experienced the benefits of living in a new nation that, in turn, may have an association with their sympathetic views toward immigrants in Ecuador.

“I think that people, who come to our country, come to seek a better future, a better life. And if they are good hard working people, they can easily be integrated. You also have to think that they need housing, food and that helps the domestic economy, and if they offered their services at lower wages and they work better than Ecuadorians that helps to the development of certain sectors...

Interviewee, Ma8, Madrid, Spain
(Author’s translation)

“The driving force for human mobility is the search for a better future. The vast majority of immigrants in Ecuador are Colombians and Peruvians, who attracted by several factors like the dollar, peace, and living costs have been installed legally or illegally in the country. The process of immigration in a country could be potentially good for society... Given the labor migration to countries like the U.S., Spain or Italy, a few sectors such as that of the flower sector were left without work and immigration [in Ecuador] somehow balanced the missing workforce. Unfortunately, violence has itself been a factor linked to migration, both by the composition of its members, as well as the techniques adopted by the criminals. Overall, I think that immigrants in Ecuador are the most vulnerable group that can positively contribute to the development of society, but within a framework of state control and planning...”

Interviewee, Ma10, Madrid, Spain
(Author’s translation)

Everyone has the right “to live” as one sees it fit and if the solution is not found in one’s local area, why not go somewhere else to look for a better life? Human beings are citizens “of the world”... In relation to Ecuador, we must remember that we are an imminent country of migration, with more than 1 million Ecuadorians abroad, so why not give the same opportunity that we find in other countries to those who now come to live in ours? This is a great opportunity to learn to be tolerant, to respect other cultures and also learn from their professional experience, etc... What we don’t understand is that no one is better or worse, just different and to accept those differences in one’s country is more difficult. Now that I am an immigrant myself and after a long time, I have noticed all this.

Interviewee, Lux1, Luxembourg
(Author’s translation)

All these passages depict the complexities of the migration phenomenon and how it can be turned into an agent for development. I contend that these ideas are connected to broader views of democracy itself and views of how a working democracy should handle this phenomenon. As noted before, if citizens recognize that their political system is capable of satisfying citizens demands, as it is most likely to be the case in the developed world (e.g., Spain), then, individuals are more likely to express less opposition to “outsiders” entitlement to resources and a peaceful life under the same regime. Moreover, individuals residing in developed democracies may relate the instrumental value of democracy with a “working democratic political system” increasing the recognition of certain rights vis-à-vis the political system and fellow citizens. Therefore, it is not surprising that emigrants who report having had good experiences in their host societies also express favorable views toward immigrants in their country of origin.

In contrast, if emigrants may in fact experience hostility from the part of their host community, then, I suspect higher opposition to immigrants in their country of origin. When I was conducting research in Murcia, Spain, I came across Miriam, an Ecuadorian residing in Spain for seven years. My interest was in understanding if her political views had changed since her arrival to this established European democracy after a life in the troubled Ecuadorian system.⁸² After several minutes of listening to her story, as she described the reasons behind her decision to leave Ecuador and the many difficulties she had to overcome to make this foreign city her new home, she mentioned that one of the biggest challenges she faced in her new country was the hostility expressed toward her

⁸² During my fieldwork in Europe I was able to explore further on the question of migration’s impact on individuals political attitudes and behaviors which will be examined in future studies. The objective of this section is to establish a possible connection between how individuals’ exposure to migration may have influenced their views toward democracy more generally and, consequently, perceive immigrants and immigration differently than otherwise do if they stayed in their home country.

from Spaniards. Most interestingly, however, was what she said next, recounting a conversation she had with her sister back home:

“The other day my sister was telling me that there are too many Colombians there [Ecuador] and I asked her if there were Bolivians, and she told me no. I told her anyway that all of them should leave because it is not their country, and they don’t do anything good”

Interviewee Mu1, Murcia, Spain
(Author’s translation).

This interview illustrates how a migrant who faces negative experiences under a “working democracy,” the more she or he will be inclined to express similar attitudes toward immigrants in her country of origin. Of course fieldwork data serve as an illustration and by no means represent the views of the whole population of Ecuadorian migrants abroad. My intention in here is only to elucidate on the theoretical connection behind broader views about democracy and attitudes toward immigrants.

By providing opinions of Ecuadorian emigrants as well as of those left behind and common Ecuadorian citizens, I hope to introduce additional evidence on the sources of favorable opinions toward immigrants in a developing democracy. The remaining of this chapter concentrates on the empirical assessment of immigrant opinion in 2008 and adds some preliminary evidence of recently available 2010 data. I draw some comparisons between 2008 and 2010 and conclude with the discussion of the findings.

How Do We Measure Attitudes Toward Immigrants?

As a member of LAPOP, I had the exceptional opportunity to include three more questions in the 2008 and 2010 Ecuadorian dataset that are directly related to this research and explained more extensively in Chapter I. The items take into consideration the social, economic, and cultural dimension of migration, presenting several advantages. For instance, they measure the degree of acceptance of immigrants in one's country by tapping into distinct aspects of attitudes toward immigrants, such as the economic, cultural, and social dimensions. One shortcoming, however, is that these questions do not specify an immigrant group. But still, the fact that respondents are free to choose the immigrant group they see as most relevant in their daily lives render these items more accurate. Moreover, during my fieldwork in Ecuador I had the opportunity to ask Ecuadorian citizens broader questions on migration. The questions asked were:

What do you think about immigration in Ecuador and why do you think that?

How did you arrive to this opinion? Newspapers? TV? Friends?

The advantage of this approach is to examine in general terms how individuals view immigration. What are the benefits and shortcomings of having a significant influx of foreigners in the country? And are there differences in opinion by group of immigration? My intention in asking these questions was to let respondents answer as freely as they wanted on their views on immigration without conditioning their responses to a specific topic or immigrant group. Some respondents may see the economy or job availability directly affecting their lives through migration, while others may see national

identity or culture associated to migration. Other respondents, furthermore, may spouse pro-immigrant sentiment as they may have families or friends abroad and understand better this phenomenon.

Ecuador is a country as much of emigration (with many residing in nations such as the United States, Spain, and Italy, among others) as it is of immigration with an increasing presence of many immigrant groups (e.g., Colombians who make up the highest percentage of foreigners, Peruvians, Cubans, Chinese, and Americans). This chapter proceeds with the empirical analysis of the data with a succinct introduction of how immigrant opinions may have been influenced by the 2008 economic recession.

Descriptive Statistics of Immigration Items

Table V.2 and V.3 displays some descriptive statistics related to immigrant opinion for the years 2008 and 2010. We want to know if there are significant differences between both years. If they are, the expectation is that a drastic event may have happened during this period that may have triggered more opposition against foreign-born residents. The specific case of the 2008 economic crisis comes to mind. Even though the Latin American and Caribbean region was not deeply affected by the economic recession as were advanced industrial democracies such as the United States, the European Union, and Japan to name a few,⁸³ it did have a moderate effect on the Ecuadorian economy.

Ecuador averaged an economic growth of 3.2 percent during the 2006-2007 periods, reaching a 6.5 percent in 2008. However, by 2009 it declined to -2.2 percent

⁸³ The US experience an economic growth decline of 2.5% in 2009, but it is expected to grow by 2.1% in 2010. Japan, in contrast, a nation that severely felt the consequences of the economic recessions (-5.4%) compared to other advanced industrialized nations is expected to grow only marginally in 2010 (0.9%). See, <http://www.un.org/esa/policy/wess/wesp2010files/wesp2010pr.pdf>

(World Bank 2010, 137). Predictions of an economic recovery are on the way suggesting that economic growth will arrive at a 1.7 percent by the end of 2010 and 3 percent by 2011 (World Bank 2010). Another natural impact of the economic crisis in Latin America and the Caribbean region is a significant decrease in remittances. Ecuador, for instance, experienced a 22.7 and 11.56 percent remittance reduction by the end of 2008 and 2009, respectively.⁸⁴ Still, Ecuador has been comparatively less affected by the crisis than other countries in the region with over 70 percent of Ecuadorian emigrants continuing sending remittances to Ecuador.⁸⁵ The question becomes: did the economic crisis have an effect on Ecuadorians views toward immigration? Is it possible that we see a rise in anti-immigrant sentiment in 2010 due to unfavorable economic conditions?

Table V.2 shows that in 2008, 46 percent of citizens “strongly agree” (19%) and “somewhat agree” (27%) that the Ecuadorian government offers services to immigrants. On the other hand, around the same percentage “strongly disagrees” (26%) or “somewhat disagrees” (15%) with the provision of these governmental services. Only 14 percent of Ecuadorians reveal a neutral view towards this topic. These results indicate Ecuadorians’ polarized stand on the role that the government should play vis-à-vis immigration. When we look at the 2010 data, the results remain virtually the same. There is very little variation in citizen’s views toward this topic during this period. Do we see the same trend with other migration items?

Table 0.2. Support for Governmental Services for Immigrants in Ecuador

	2008	2010	Change
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⁸⁴ See, http://www.elcomercio.com/noticiaEC.asp?id_seccion=6&id_noticia=268596

See, http://www.elcomercio.com/solo_texto_search.asp?id_noticia=218836&anio=2010&mes=3&dia=8

⁸⁵ See, <http://idbdocs.iadb.org/wsdocs/getdocument.aspx?docnum=2100503>

Strongly Agree (%)	18.91	18.38	-0.53
Somewhat Agree (%)	26.69	25.90	-0.79
Neutral (%)	13.58	14.76	+1.18
Somewhat Disagree (%)	15.20	16.69	+1.49
Strongly Disagree (%)	25.62	24.27	-1.35
<i>N</i>	2908	2954	

Table V.3 shows other descriptive statistics of attitudes towards immigrants related to job security, cultural identity, crime, and the economy. For instance, the top left portion of Table V.3 shows that 70 percent of respondents think that immigrants take jobs from Ecuadorians in 2008 and with an increase of one percentage in 2010. Conversely, only one third of the sample thinks that immigrants take jobs Ecuadorians do not want in both years. Some fieldwork in Ecuador supports the former:

“The people who come to Ecuador come here to earn in dollars, consequently, they take away job opportunities or jobs from Ecuadorians because they offer their services at a lower value to what Ecuadorians will charge for their work”

Interviewee, A7, Quito, Ecuador
(Author’s translation)

“I don’t think it is right that a lot of people from other countries come because they are taking jobs away from our own Ecuadorian brothers and sisters, consequently fueling the exit of our people abroad

Interviewee, F12, Quito, Ecuador
(Author’s translation)

Similarly, the right portion of Table V.3 shows that almost three quarters of the population thinks that immigrants weaken the Ecuadorian culture, while only one fourth of the sample agrees that Ecuadorian culture is enriched by foreign-born residents in 2008. There is a little change of 3 percentage points in 2010, suggesting that the same levels of this view continue during a two-year period. Contrary to the popular belief that there is no cultural threat perceived by Ecuadorians—as the racial and ethnic make-up of immigrants from neighboring countries (e.g., Colombia and Peru) is not substantially different from that of Ecuadorians, and Ecuadorian citizens may not reflect negative attitudes toward a specific ethnic group, like those expressed in developed countries (compared, for example, to U.S. citizens’ negative attitudes toward Mexican immigrants)—the present results indicate that Ecuadorians reveal fears of a threat to Ecuadorian culture and national identity despite immigrants’ ethnic similarities (Rivera et al. 2007).⁸⁶Qualitative data confirms some of these assertions:

“Unfortunately, people that come here from other countries are not the most prepared nor the most educated. They have come here to take our jobs and they want to impose their bad customs in our country”

Interviewee, E17, Quito, Ecuador

Moreover, the bottom right portion of Table V.3 shows that the majority of Ecuadorians (60%) believe that immigrants have a negative impact on the economy in 2008, with only few percentage points up in 2010 (67%), corroborating previous studies

⁸⁶ Furthermore, it is difficult to disentangle the question of xenophobic attitudes and racism in the developed world. Citizens may be presenting one or the other or both attitudes at once because immigrants, in addition to being foreigners, may also have a different ethnic-racial make-up from citizens in host societies.

where citizens tend to have negative opinions toward immigration, especially when they link the arrival of immigrants to the state of the national economy.

Table 0.3. Attitudes toward Immigrants Related to Jobs, the Economy, Culture and Crime Problems (2008-2010)

<i>Immigrant Opinion</i>		<i>Change</i>		<i>Immigrant Opinion</i>		<i>Change</i>	
Would you say that the people who come to live here from other countries:				Would you say that Ecuadorian culture is generally weakened or enriched by immigrants?			
	2008	2010		2008	2010		
Take Jobs Ecuadorians Don't Want (%)	30.07	28.64	-1.43	Enriched (%)	24.57	21.29	-3.28
Take Jobs From Ecuadorians (%)	69.93	71.36	+1.43	Weakened (%)	75.43	78.71	+3.28
<i>N</i>	2,704	2,748		<i>N</i>	2,678	2,550	
Do crime problems in Ecuador are worsened by immigrants that come to live here?				Would you say that it is good or bad for the Ecuadorian economy that immigrants live here?			
	2008	2010		2008	2010		
No (%)	10.35	25.33	+14.98	Good (%)	39.76	32.92	-6.84
Yes (%)	89.65	74.67	-14.98	Bad (%)	60.24	67.08	+6.84
<i>N</i>	2,695	2,823		<i>N</i>	2641	2494	

If the economy is doing well and people perceive it is making progress, then, attitudes toward immigrants tend to be positive. Conversely, when the economy is doing badly or it is stagnant, people tend to reveal negative attitudes toward foreign-born residents (Chandler and Tsai 2001; Citrin et al. 1997; Espenshade and Hempstead 1996).

This preliminary evidence shows little support for a rise in anti-immigrant sentiment among Ecuadorians even during hard economic times.

None of the variables examined so far show a significant increase in negative attitudes in 2010, contrary to our expectations. In fact, the bottom left portion of Table V.3, exhibits that the percentage of Ecuadorians expressing negative views toward immigrants when related to crime issues decrease significantly from 90 to 75 percent in 2008-2010, while those who express favorable views increase from 10 to 25 percent during the same period. Still, the majority of the population believes that crime problems are worsened by the influx of immigrants in both years, providing additional evidence for the link citizens make between a rise of criminal activity and immigration (Palmer 1996). Fieldwork in Ecuador complements both of these findings:

“In the last few years the arrival of too many foreigners has affected in a certain way the country’s economy because the majority comes to look for a job and they find it more easily than a person from here. At the same time, there is more crime which is terrorizing everyone. Insecurity is huge”

Interviewee, E13, Quito, Ecuador
(Author’s translation)

“On one hand, there are people who come to invest in businesses in order to do better economically and foment employment. On the other hand, there are people that come here to harm our country in terms of higher levels of robberies, insecurity, crime, alcoholism, tabaquism, rapes, etc.”

Interviewee, F10, Quito, Ecuador
(Author’s translation)

In addition, Ecuadorians associate specific immigrant groups to particular occurrences as noted above, that is, citizens make a linkage between the types of migration with the type of issue experienced in the country (Chávez and Betancourt 2007). These results suggest that citizens do differentiate between immigrant groups. They also are indicative that negative views persist; even if one group is perceived “more favorably” than the other, the overall opinion toward immigrants is negative (Sniderman et al. 2000).

“I think that some people come to work honestly in our country but the majority of foreigners are coming to cause harm. For example, due to the presence of Colombians, crime has augmented. Or Cubans come here in search for freedom that in their country of origin don’t have, but they are displacing Ecuadorian manual labor because they work for very cheap”

Interviewee, E18, Quito, Ecuador
(Author’s translation)

“They [immigrants] invade the Ecuadorian market. For example, the Chinese sell clothing and steal room for Ecuadorian merchandises”

Interviewee, F13, Quito, Ecuador
(Author’s translation)

In short, all the evidence provided so far points to a high anti-immigrant sentiment among the Ecuadorian citizenry even after taking into account the possible effects of the 2008 economic recession. Why, then, is it that some Ecuadorians exhibit immigrant sympathy? What sets them apart from others with respect to their views toward immigration? In the next pages, I attempt to answer these conundrums.

Who are those Ecuadorians Who Reveal Favorable Opinions toward Immigrants?

First, descriptive statistics are calculated: means for continuous and frequencies for dichotomous variables. Second, an ordinary least squares (OLS) linear regression model is applied to estimate the effects of the predictor variables, specifically, the effects of democratic values on pro-immigrant sentiment are examined after controlling for the traditional demographic factors, authoritarian attitudes, threat from a minority, prejudice, ideology, national and personal economic satisfaction, media effects, the perception of personal insecurity, and the degree of connectedness to a migrant network.

Table V.4 displays some descriptive statistics of the main variables analyzed in this chapter for the years 2008 and 2010. Statistically significant changes during this two-year period are depicted by the bolded figures in the last column on the right. The mean for the independent and control variables ranges anywhere from 34 to 95 in 0-100 scale in both years; the legitimacy of core political institutions shows the lowest mean. The highest mean, on the other hand, corresponds to national pride. It shows a statistically significant increase in 2010, illustrated by the last column on the right. On scale from 0 to 6, the mean for a migrant connection is of 1.02 and 0.95 in 2008 and 2010, respectively, and during the same time period, the size of the city (smallest to largest) presents a mean of 2.6 on 1-5 scale. The mean for wealth is of 3.8 on 0-9 scale in 2008, with no changes in 2010.⁸⁷

⁸⁷ The “wealth” index consists of a count of household assets and access to basic services at the household level. The list of assets in the survey includes durable goods, such as a TV set, a refrigerator, a car, and a computer, and access to basic services like clean water and sewage inside the house. For a more detailed description of this index, see www.lapopsurvey.org

Table 0.4. Summary of Descriptive Statistics of Explanatory Factors: Full Sample (N = 3,000)

Individual Characteristics	Descriptive Statistics*				
	2008		2010		Change
	Mean	Std. D	Mean	Std. D	
Independent Variables					
Support for the Political System					
Support for the Political Community					
National Pride	88.16	(24.71)	94.55	(14.91)	+6.39
Patriotism	72.64	(27.03)	NA	NA	NA
Support for Democracy in Principle	64.75	(28.27)	68.05	(27.14)	+3.3
Support for Democracy in Practice	52.83	(21.82)	51.70	(23.58)	-1.13
Legitimacy of Core Pol. Institutions	34.30	(18.73)	40.80	(20.51)	+6.5
Perception of Governmental Efficacy	46.80	(25.72)	50.56	(24.31)	+3.76
Presidential Approval	62.18	(22.05)	61.43	(21.83)	-0.75
Political Tolerance	46.04	(25.28)	50.49	(25.38)	+4.45
Interpersonal Trust	55.72	(30.28)	56.05	(31.57)	+0.33
Control Variables					
Threat from a Minority	52.75	(29.99)	48.73	(30.88)	-4.02
Prejudice	63.12	(32.11)	61.02	(35.69)	-2.1
Ideology (Role of State)	70.98	(25.30)	81.95	(19.04)	+10.97
National economic satisfaction	43.02	(21.62)	47.41	(20.75)	+4.39
Personal economic satisfaction	50.87	(19.66)	51.60	(18.62)	+0.73
Media effects	84.69	(25.01)	NA	NA	NA
Perception of personal insecurity	43.94	(29.71)	42.30	(30.39)	-1.64
Migration Connection Index (0-6)	1.02	(1.66)	.95	(1.55)	-0.07
Socioeconomic Demographic Variables					
Age	38.48	(15.46)	39.42	(15.77)	
Education	10.16	(4.25)	10.11	(2.19)	
City size (from smallest to largest, 1-5)	2.6	(1.49)	2.58	(1.46)	
Wealth (from 0-9)	3.8	(1.7)	3.9	(1.66)	
		Perc	Obs	Perc	Obs
		(%)		(%)	
Gender	Male	50.00	(1,500)	50.00	(1,500)
	Female	50.00	(1,500)	50.00	(1,500)
Race	White	8.62	(254)	10.28	(305)
	Mestizo	83.04	(2,448)	82.18	(2,439)
	Indigenous	4.14	(122)	3.13	(93)
	Others	4.21	(124)	4.41	(131)
Occupation	Unemployed	4.30	(128)	5.13	(154)
	Working	59.93	(1,783)	57.43	(1,723)
	Other	35.76	(1,064)	37.10	(1,113)
Region	Costa	44.23	(1,327)	43.90	(1,317)
	Sierra	39.83	(1,195)	39.70	(1,191)
	Oriente	15.93	(478)	16.40	(492)
Authoritarian Attitudes	Iron Fist	31.93	(904)	22.94	(672)
	Participation for all	68.07	(1,927)	77.06	(2,257)

* All the variables were recoded into 0-100 scale unless indicated otherwise

Source: AmericasBarometer 2008 and 2010 by LAPOP

Similarly, age and education exhibit a mean of 38 years and 10 years, in that order. Half of both samples consist of women and the other half by men. The percentage of unemployed Ecuadorians in 2008 is of 4.3 percent, with most of them actively looking for a job compared to 60 percent that is already in the labor force. Only a minor increase in the unemployed population (5.13%) is registered in 2010. Furthermore, in 2008, 68 percent of Ecuadorians support a government with the participation of all, whereas only 32 percent support a government with an iron fist. Surprisingly, there is a significant reduction of Ecuadorians who support a government with an iron fist (from 32 to 23 percent). The highest statistical significant change from 2008 to 2010 yet is that of the role of the state, with an increase of over 10 points. The rest of the variables have remained about the same during this time period with very few statistically significant changes.

Results

In this section, I will complement public opinion data with my own field research in Ecuador to provide a better assessment of the linkage between a strong democratic political culture and pro-immigrant sentiments. At the same time, in order to maintain comparability with previous Chapters, I decided to focus on the analysis of the same dependent variable employed throughout this dissertation, that is, support for the provision of governmental services for immigrants. In that way, comparisons can be drawn with other nations included in this study.⁸⁸

⁸⁸ Each variable included in the analysis is listed on the vertical (y) axis. The impact of each of those variables on attitudes toward immigrants is shown graphically by a dot, which if located to the right of the vertical “0” line indicates a positive effect, and if to the left of the “0” line a negative effect. If the effects are statistically significant, they are shown by confidence interval lines stretching to the left and right of

Figure V.2⁸⁹ displays the effects of support for democratic values on immigrant sympathy. Starting from bottom up and going on the predicted direction, we observe that interpersonal trust has a positive impact in 2008, while it did not yield statistically significant results in 2010. Interpersonal trust is essential for democratic societies because it allows for general interactions between individuals that come from dissimilar backgrounds and who hold different views and values, consequently, increasing political tolerance (Córdova 2008). These actions are believed to reinforce democracy (e.g., Fukuyama 1995, Putnam 1993, 2000, Uslaner 2002).

Political tolerance did not reach statistical significant effects in 2008. Fieldwork research in Ecuador, nonetheless, suggests that there are some citizens that do view political tolerance as a fundamental value for democracy. When asked what do you think of the rights to vote, run for office or give a speech of the people who constantly criticize the government or the form of government? Some interviewees said:

“I believe that in one way or the other, we all are citizens, and democracy is just that, the power for everyone who lives here. I totally approve with their right to vote, etc”

Interviewee, G2, Quito, Ecuador
(Author’s translation)

“Everyone has the right to express their opinions. As there are sectors in favor of the government, they are others that are not, and they should be respected...”

each dot that do not overlap the vertical “0” line (at .05 or better). If they overlap the vertical line, the effects are statistically insignificant. The relative strength of each variable is indicated by standardized coefficients.

⁸⁹ The 2010 data did not include variables related to patriotism or the effects of the media. I suspect that the substantive significance of the results without these variables will change only marginally.

With regards to immigration, the same individual responded:

“In mi opinion foreigners come to look for better opportunities the same way our migrants do in countries such as Spain, and I believe that they deserve respect...”

Interviewee, G14, Quito, Ecuador
(Author’s translation)

These responses illustrate the significance of political tolerance in eliciting attitudes of respect among the citizenry toward the rights of those individuals who do not necessarily agree or share the same views, traditions, and values than oneself.




Figure 0.1. Determinants of Support for Governmental Services for Immigrants in Ecuador (2008-2010)

Moreover, completely inconsistent with my expectations, the 2010 results show that higher levels of political tolerance, in fact, have a negative effect on pro-immigrant perceptions. These results are unexpected and open questions for future research in this topic. Is it possible that political tolerance may have different effects on other dimensions of immigrant opinion?

In addition, quantitative results indicate, in Figure V.2, that the perception of the government as efficient has a positive impact on immigrant sympathy in both years. They highlight the important role that the government plays in maintaining citizens' satisfaction with its role in fighting unemployment, poverty, corruption, etc. Therefore, it is natural that natives express positive views toward foreigners because they view the government as an agent to meet their own needs as well as that of immigrants. Fieldwork in Ecuador strengthens these views:

“The government has done a lot of good things such as creating programs to fight poverty, helping to give credits to people that want to start up their own business, giving houses to those in need, giving jobs to disable people in addition to promoting the value of kindness and other values”

The same respondent said:

“I think that a lot of people like to come here to live because it is a very calm country and generally things that can be harmful do not happen. In addition, Ecuadorians appreciate a lot of knowledge that are brought by foreigners and also they create sources of work because some of them come to put up their own businesses and this allows Ecuadorians to have a stable job”

Interviewee, G13, Guayaquil, Ecuador
(Author's translation)

“Everyone has the right to live somewhere and a job to live, but the governments of each country should first support their own people and not foreigners. Because if the people are doing ok then they could help foreigners”

Interviewee, D15, Quito, Ecuador
(Author’s translation)

Further, we see in Figure V.2, in the predicted direction, that national pride influences negatively immigrant perceptions (2008-2010). Qualitative research illustrates the strength of Ecuadorians attachment to their country. The following excerpt shows an interviewee’s answer to the following question: to what extent are you proud of being Ecuadorian?

To be an Ecuadorian is to have it in your blood; and I feel very very proud and honored to be an Ecuadorian because our people are people who have values, cultures that no other country has. In addition, our land is filled with flora and fauna that no other country possesses.

Interviewee, A11, Quito, Ecuador
(Author’s translation)

These results highlight that elevated levels of national pride may develop a sense of “blind patriotism” in which people tend to be less accepting of outsiders (Schatz, Staub, and Lavine 1999). A result that is striking and inconsistent with my expectations in 2008 is the relationship between support for democracy in principle (best for of government) and negative views toward foreigners (statistically insignificant in 2010): the higher support for democracy the lower pro-immigrant sentiment is revealed among the Ecuadorian citizenry. An explanation for these results may be the escalation of Colombian migration during the last decade. As a matter of fact, most of the current

debate in Ecuador has been surrounded the idea that the deterioration of quality of public services is due to immigration (Camacho 2005; Rivera et al. 2007; Trejos and Ochoa 2004). If Ecuadorians lose confidence in their public institutions, these feelings may quickly be transformed into a loss of support for democracy. And, in turn, wind up in the general manifestation of anti-immigrant sentiment.

These results echo those found in Costa Rica (results exposed in Chapter IV). In contrast to other nations examined thus far, both countries have faced a sudden surge of immigrants (e.g., Nicaraguans in Costa Rica and Colombians/Cubans in Ecuador) as a consequence of the internal conflicts experienced in these migrants' home countries. These events seem to have elicited negative associations between citizens' democratic norms and immigration. It could be that there is a turning point for natives' democratic attitudes in host societies and their views toward immigration, especially when significant migration flows take place in small countries. Immigrants may be viewed as placing tremendous strains in the system capacity to respond to citizens' demands. These outcomes, moreover, may manifest themselves in anti-democratic responses to solve the "migration problem" that, in turn, weakens the quality of democracy. I will look further into these explanations in the concluding chapter of this dissertation.

To assess more thoroughly the strength of the effects of support for democratic values and of other variables that may explain immigrant opinion, Table V.5 displays a more comprehensive model by presenting only significant effects. The full model with and without statistically significant effects are found in the Appendix. Table V.5 reports findings of the impact of having positive opinions toward immigrants in 2008 and 2010. Results in 2008 show that one unit increase in the levels of interpersonal trust and the

perception of governmental efficiency increases, on average, pro-immigrant opinion by 6 and 12 points on a 0 - 100 scale, respectively. On the other hand, a unit increase in support for democracy in principle and national pride will decrease, on average, immigrant sympathy by 7 points in the same scale.

Most of the control variables included in the model found in Table V.5 did not reach statistical significance, except for few socio-demographic factors. Older individuals and the unemployed express lower levels of pro-immigrant sentiment compared to those that are in the work force, validating research on the negative effects of economic deprivation (e.g., Gang, Rivera-Batiz, and Yun 2001; Tucci 2005). Yet these findings do not hold in 2010. Rather our results in 2010 show that the indigenous Ecuadorian population and those individuals who live in bigger cities tend to express more favorable opinions than Mestizos and those who live in rural areas.

Further, Ecuadorians who live in the Oriente and Sierra regions, show less pro-immigrant sentiment than those who live in the Coast. This evidence validates the argument that a higher immigrant presence brings out negative views among natives given that both regions hold the highest immigrant populations, noted previously. It is worth mentioning that all these results became statistically significant after taking into account the design effect of the sample.

Perception of insecurity and the degree of connection to a migrant network became significant in 2008. While the positive impact of the latter makes sense, the former is a result that is striking and inconsistent with my expectations.

**Table 0.5. Determinants of Support for Governmental Services for Immigrants in Ecuador:
Ordinary Least Square (OLS) Regression**

	2008		2010	
	Coefficient.	T	Coefficient.	T
Interpersonal Trust	0.059*	(2.23)		
Political Tolerance			-0.050*	(-2.38)
Governmental Efficacy	0.123**	(3.06)	0.165***	(3.35)
Support for Democracy	-0.069*	(-2.56)		
National Pride	-0.074*	(-2.24)	-0.118***	(-5.28)
Perception of Insecurity	0.092***	(3.29)	-0.075*	(-2.45)
Migration Connection Index	0.053*	(2.25)		
Unemployed ^a	-0.046*	(-2.22)		
<i>Indigenous</i> ^b			0.051*	(2.00)
Size of City/Town			0.094*	(2.43)
Age	-0.052*	(-2.12)	-0.067*	(-2.36)
Region ^c <i>Oriente</i>			-0.076**	(-2.83)
<i>Sierra</i>			-0.059*	(-2.01)
Constant	-0.035	(-0.71)	-0.009	(-0.38)
R-Squared	0.071		0.124	
Number of Obs.	2293		2293	

*p<.05 **p<.01 ***p<.001

a. The reference group is individuals in the labor force

b. The reference group is Mestizo

c. The reference group is Costa

Note: This model takes into consideration the design of the sample.

Source: AmericasBarometer 2008 and 2010 by LAPOP

There is no clear explanation for the linkage between higher levels of insecurity perceptions and pro-immigrant sentiment. So far, much of quantitative and qualitative research indicates that citizens associate a rise in criminal activity with the rise of immigration (Chávez and Bentancourt 2007; Palmer 1996); in quite opposition of what is found in 2008. We find in 2010, however, that an increase in insecurity perception leads to higher anti-immigrant sentiment, consistent with prior literature on this topic. Still, it remains unclear why we register a positive impact in 2008 and a negative impact in 2010. I leave this question up for future inquires.

In the case of the positive association between citizens' degree of connection to a migrant network and immigrant sentiment, the results go on the predicted direction in

2008 (did not reach statistical significance in 2010).⁹⁰ These results highlight the importance of the different sides of migration (emigration and immigration) in the daily lives of many Ecuadorians. I indicated earlier that the degree to which individuals are exposed to migration in general—be it with family abroad or the desire to live and work in a different country—will influence these citizens’ views on migration, most likely, by increasing their understanding of the dynamics of this phenomenon. Fieldwork in Ecuador supports the quantitative results:

“I believe that in the same way as Ecuadorians who go to work in Europe and the United States, the people who come to our country have the same right because they look for a better future”
Interviewee, D8, Quito, Ecuador
(Author’s translation)

“I think that migration is very good because we all deserve the opportunity to have or get a job by any means. I also think that it is good because there are Ecuadorians that also go to work in different countries and all of us have the same right. . . I have direct contact with them because I have familiars that have left the country because there is no work here and it is 8 years and we all know that to survive, we have to do whatever it takes”
Interviewee, G6, Quito, Ecuador
(Author’s translation)

These results clearly demonstrate that individuals who have direct experience with migration become more sympathetic to foreigners.

⁹⁰ The Migration Connection Index was created by Hiskey and Córdova (2008) to measure the degree of connection to a migrant network. The three survey questions used to create this index are:
(1) Do you have plans to leave the country to work or live during the next three years?
(2) Do you have close relatives who used to live in this household and are now living abroad??
(3) Does your family receive remittances from abroad?
For a more detailed explanation of this index’s theoretical and empirical approach, see Hiskey and Córdova (2008)

Do all these results tell us the whole story when related to citizens' democratic political culture and their views toward immigrants? Thus far, I have presented quantitative and qualitative evidence for the argument that a democratic political culture matter for immigrant reception as it helps to mitigate social conflict, making democracy endure. On the other hand, if citizens express persistent anti-democratic responses to the question of migration, it will create a hostile environment that may even galvanize citizens' support for authoritarian alternatives to stop the "migration problem." In the following section, I examine how anti-immigrant attitudes may decrease the quality of democracy and even pose a threat to democratic stability.

Support for Authoritarian Alternatives: Support for Military Coups

In this final section, a possible connection between anti-immigrant attitudes and support for authoritarian alternatives, namely, military coups is examined. We start from the premise that *anti-immigrant attitudes are the result of people's scoring low on various features of a democratic political culture*. I suggested earlier that a rise in anti-immigrant sentiments is bad for democracy because these feelings may translate into the support for fundamental violations of human rights. Few instances consist of citizens' engagement in aggressive behavior against foreigners, endorsement of restrictive policies, denial of basic human rights, etc, than in turn, undermine democracy.

Besides few examples already noted above, a recent anti-immigrant legislation in the U.S. was passed in the State of Arizona. It was approved by the House of Representatives and signed by the state's governor in April 23, 2010. It authorizes the police to arrest foreigners suspected to be illegal as well as sanction individuals who

transport undocumented immigrants, including family members. Specifically, it gives the police the power to arrest foreigners based only on “reasonable suspicion” and not actual evidence (*New York Times* 2010).⁹¹ This law is expected to increase racial profiling.

Another illustration of how extreme could anti-immigrant sentiments gets and, consequently, decrease the quality of democracies is if instances as the ones that follow spread to the general population. On the night of November 8, 2008, an Ecuadorian migrant was walking on the streets outside New York. He suddenly met a group of young U.S. citizens who were allegedly hunting to beat up migrants that night. The event escalated to such levels of violence, going from brutally beating him up to stabbing him several times that eventually ended with his life (*El Comercio* 2010).⁹² Another example of this aggressive behavior was the case of an Ecuadorian teenager who was brutally attacked by her fellow Spanish classmates in one of Madrid’s high schools during the summer of 2008. The incident turned gruesome when the teenager was left almost unconscious while her Spanish classmates stood and watched, shouted encouragement, and recorded it on their cell-phones.⁹³

In the Latin American context, Ecuadorians (ironically) have exhibited similar attitudes and acts of aggression toward immigrants, most tragically displayed in the event of April, 2008 when two Colombians were incinerated alive as a response to their allegedly criminal practices.⁹⁴ These are some of the examples of how anti-democratic

⁹¹ See, <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/15/us/15immig.html?pagewanted=1&sq=arizona%20immigration&st=cse&scp=1>

⁹² See, <http://beta.elcomercio.com/2010-04-16/Ecuadorianos/Ecuadorianos-en-el-Mundo/Noticia-Principal/marcelo-lucero.aspx>

⁹³ See, <http://www.elcomercio.com/noticiaEC.asp?id_noticia=317898&id_seccion=4>
<<http://www2.deia.com/es/digital/sociedad/2008/08/01/488279.php>>

⁹⁴ See, < http://www2.elcomercio.com/noticiaEC.asp?id_noticia=183214&id_seccion=4>

attitudes may translate into fundamental violations of human rights and, in turn, undermine democracy.

All these reactions to the migration question, therefore, lead us to expect that the more citizens' express anti-democratic responses toward immigrants, the more likely these reactions may not only weaken the quality of these democracies, but perhaps even allowing an environment highly supportive of authoritarian alternatives to put an end to the "migration problem." The following questions measure if citizens, under certain conditions, support military coups in Ecuador.

Now, changing the subject. Some people say that under some circumstances it would be justified for the military of this country to take power by a coup d'état (military coup). In your opinion would a military coup be justified under the following circumstances? [Read the options after each question]:				
JC1. When there is high unemployment.	(1) A military take-over of the state would be justified	(2) A military take-over of the state would not be justified	(88) DK	(98) DA
JC10. When there is a lot of crime.	(1) A military take-over of the state would be justified	(2) A military take-over of the state would not be justified	(88) DK	(98) DA
JC13. When there is a lot of corruption.	(1) A military take-over of the state would be justified	(2) A military take-over of the state would not be justified	(88) DK	(98) DA

These items tap into citizens' willingness to justify a military take-over under conditions of unemployment, crime, and corruption. An Index of Support for Military Coups (0-100) was created from these questions, which is used as the dependent variable in the analysis that follows. Figure VI.3 provides some evidence of how anti-immigrant attitudes may undermine democracy by increasing natives' support for military coups in 2010.

After controlling for other theoretical relevant variables that may be associated with the support for coups, the belief that immigrants increase crime problems leads to higher levels of this support, as shown by the dot located at the right side of the vertical line. This evidence is striking and consistent with my expectations. When natives perceive that foreign-born residents cause problems in their societies, they show authoritarian tendencies: a higher support for military coups. Still, none of the other immigrant items render statistically significant results suggesting that Ecuadorians are still willing to defend democracy even under conditions of high migration.




Figure 0.2. Impact of Anti-Immigrant Sentiment on Support for Military Coups (2010)

Only in the case of crime, Ecuadorians are more likely to support military coups. In the last few years, crime problems have increased in Ecuador considerably and citizens mostly think of Colombian and most recently Cuban immigrants as those executing such acts, demonstrated by my fieldwork in Ecuador.

This chapter has investigated in more-depth attitudes toward immigrants by adding to the discussion the views of Ecuadorians living abroad. In addition, I offered some support for the argument that anti-immigrant attitudes may undermine democracy by increasing support for authoritarian alternatives, illustrated by the support for military coups. In the next chapter, I put together my assertions and findings and conclude with the implications of what this research means for Latin American democracies more generally.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

Throughout this dissertation, I attempted to provide answers to the following questions: What are the causes and consequences of citizens' attitudes toward migrants in Latin America? Why is it that some citizens express positive attitudes, while many others want to get rid off them? What do these attitudes, both positive and negative, mean for a world increasingly characterized by the movement of people across borders? The main argument turned around the importance of the linkage between attitudes towards immigrants and more general democratic attitudes, a relationship that has been largely overlooked in the past. I have asserted repeatedly that the attitudinal components of what many refer to as a democratic political culture contribute to pro-immigrant views among native-born citizens. This more welcoming environment in turn helps a democratic society to more successfully handle an unexpected dramatic influx of migrants compared to those societies where anti-immigrant attitudes may cause increased violence and threats to the rule of law and other critical elements of democracy.

In Chapter I, an overview of the main ideas that drive this research was presented. It outlined the significance of a democratic political culture for the survival and quality of Latin American democracies through its positive impact on immigrant opinion as migration is becoming an increasingly feature of these less developed societies. The description of why migration has gained political saliency in recent years was exposed,

followed by the research design including the quantitative and qualitative approaches implemented in this dissertation.

Chapter II reviewed relevant literature with respect to public opinion toward immigrants in developed democracies and established the theoretical framework of the significant role that a democratic political culture plays for immigrants' reception in host societies and how it mattered for the quality of democracy. I hypothesized that individuals with higher support for democratic values, such as political tolerance and interpersonal trust, are more likely to view immigrants positively as they understand that one of the quintessential tenets of democracy is the respect of minorities' rights. I also theorized that citizens who support democracy in the abstract and in practice will express more favorable views toward foreign born residents. Furthermore, individuals with higher levels of patriotism will show more pro immigrant sentiment, whereas individuals with elevated levels of national pride will demonstrate negative opinions. I also included into the discussion the importance of national level characteristics: economic development and a country's levels of democracy. The key expectation for the role of context was that countries with higher levels of economic development and democracy will have higher averages of pro-migrant sentiments than less developed and democratic countries.

Chapter III presented a general assessment of the consequences of a strong democratic political culture in the Americas. Empirical analyses and a general discussion of these relationships were outlined. The main statistical techniques implemented in this chapter were multilevel analyses, highlighting the importance of context. In fact, the findings confirmed many of my expectations. First, context is a significant explanatory factor of immigrant opinion, adding more evidence to this area of research (Gang,

Rivera-Batiz, and Yun 2002; Kunovich 2004; McLaren 2003; O'Rourke and Sinnott 2006; Quillian 1995; Semyonov, Rajjman, and Gorodzeisky 2006; Wilkes, Guppy, and Farris 2008).

For instance, economic development and democracy elicit pro-immigrant sentiments among Latin Americans. Specifically, individuals who live in more developed and democratic societies exhibit more immigrant sympathy than citizens with the same characteristics in less developed and less democratic societies. When immigrant opinion is measured by support for the provision of governmental services for immigrants, after controlling for other factors, Argentina emerged as the most pro-immigrant country in the sample compared to Bolivia, the most anti-immigrant nation. Not surprisingly, Argentina is the country with the highest economic development in the region while Bolivia is among the poorest nations.

The same is true in terms of democratic development. We found that pro-immigrant opinion, when related to the belief that foreign-born residents do not take the jobs from native-born citizens, is greater in more democratic nations: Uruguay and Costa Rica, than less democratic societies such as Guatemala, considered partly free according to the Freedom House 2009.⁹⁵ These results offered additional support for the argument that democracy matters for the strengthening of social cohesion in increasingly diverse societies. However, when immigrant sympathy was measured by the support of governmental services, democratic development did not reach statistical significance. Because of data limitations across countries in the Americas, we were unable to explore further if democracy influences other dimensions of immigrant opinion, such as issues related to crime, the economy, and culture, as we did for the case of Ecuador.

⁹⁵ For more information, see www.freedomhouse.org

These are important areas for future research. For example, can we find the same relationships in the context of the developed world? Do more democratic nations in the developed world indeed present a more inclusive environment for immigrants than “less” democratic nations? Why do we see this emerging backlash against immigrants in many European countries and the United States, while in other countries such as Australia a more opening society for immigrants is more apparent? Does it have something to do with the weakening/strengthening of these countries democratic political culture?

Other cross national results included the positive impact of each of the components of democratic political support. Satisfaction with democracy, legitimacy of political institutions, governmental efficacy, presidential approval, all of these factors increment support for the provision of governmental services for foreigners and increase the likelihood to believe that immigrants do the jobs native-born citizens do not want. By the same token, support for democratic values, namely, political tolerance and interpersonal trust increase support for governmental services. When related to the belief that immigrants do not take jobs from native-born, only interpersonal trust increases the probability of having this view. National pride and support for democracy, on the other hand, reduce support for the provision of governmental services for foreign born-residents and did not yield statistically significant results for the belief that foreigners do not take jobs away from citizens. The former operated in the expected direction, whereas the latter was a surprising finding that also opens questions for further research.

Does support for democracy decreases when citizens perceived that immigrants put strains on the system’s capacity to meet natives’ needs? What is the mechanism behind support for democracy and immigrant opinion? Is it possible that support for democracy

is related differently to various dimensions of immigrant opinion? What is the direction of the arrow? Is it that immigration has an impact on democratic attitudes or is it that democratic attitudes affect the formation of immigrant opinion? Another avenue for future research is the implementation of structural equations to tease out concerns about endogeneity.

Chapter Five concentrated on the analysis of four countries: Argentina, Chile, Costa Rica, and the Dominican Republic. It offered a historical review of migration flows and migration policy in these countries as well as an overview of their economic and political development. The intention here was the provision of additional evidence for the significance of context in the formation of attitudes toward immigrants in Latin America, by specifically looking at these four countries. By implementing a multivariate regression analysis, the results in this chapter demonstrated that a stronger democratic political culture was found in Argentina, expressed by the positive impact of various features of a democratic political culture on pro-immigrant sentiment. The Dominican Republic, in contrast, did not yield any significant effects, suggesting that perhaps migration is so well embedded in this country's political and social life generating little change in citizens' views toward foreign born residents. Moreover, Chile, a country with a shorter migration history, showed a favorable perception of government efficacy and institutional legitimacy that led to higher immigrant sympathy. These results emphasized Chile's leading position as a consolidated Latin American democracy.

In this chapter, the most surprising case out of the four countries was that of Costa Rica. No support for the argument of a strong democratic political culture was found in Costa Rica, especially after providing some evidence in Chapter III in which democratic

development, measured by Freedom House, situated Costa Rica (alongside Uruguay) as the most democratic nation with pro-immigrant views. A possible explanation for these findings suggested that when a dramatic influx of immigrants takes place in a small country such as Costa Rica (or Ecuador), people's democratic attitudes may diminish, resulting in a more anti-immigrant sentiments. Citizens may fear that too many migrants pose a threat to the political system's capacity to meet non-migrants needs and no matter how democratic the country's political culture is; its citizens will remain hostile until getting habituated to the new arrivals. Perhaps these mechanisms also appear in the context of the developed world, as was the case of the United States with the arrival of many Germans, Irish, and Chinese immigrants in the turn of the XX century, later becoming successfully integrated into American society. Now, the challenge seems to incorporate many Latino immigrants. I argue that the same may take place in the context of developing countries as those found in Latin America, illustrated by the Costa Rican and Ecuadorian cases.

Chapter Five presented a unique opportunity to study migration from its various dimensions. Both quantitative and qualitative evidence for the positive impact of a democratic political culture on immigrant sympathy was provided. A novel approach in this chapter was the inclusion of the opinions of emigrants. I showed that Ecuador is as much a country of immigration as it is of emigration. It has experienced a significant mass departure of its population to the developed world (e.g., United States, Spain, and other European countries) and in a lesser extent to neighboring countries (e.g., Chile). At the same time, Ecuador is the recipient of a significant number of Colombians, Peruvians, and Cubans, among others.

This chapter also included some evidence for the argument that anti-immigrant attitudes undermine democracy by increasing support for military coups. Yet not all the items that measure immigrant sentiment became statistically significant when related to authoritarian tendencies. Ecuadorians are still willing to defend democracy even under conditions of high migration. Another avenue for future research is to look further into this question in other countries that have lately experienced a decline in democracy as well as a rise in levels of immigration; such is the case of Venezuela. In the same vein, it will be interesting to extend this kind of analysis to the developed world, especially as an increasing backlash against foreigners is taking place at present (exemplified by the proliferation of anti-immigrant policies in many of these nations).

In conclusion, why is it that a strong democratic political culture leads to more favorable views toward immigrants? One reason is that people who support a democratic political culture understand the importance of protecting the rights of minorities which allows for a more accepting environment that, in turn, accelerates the move toward higher quality democracies.

As immigration has become an important part of host societies in developed countries and lately in the developing world (e.g., Peruvians in Chile), it is crucial to understand the dynamics of how preexisting attitudes toward democracy might help prepare citizens to react to a dramatic increase in immigration in a more tolerant and democratic manner. This dissertation found that a strong democratic political culture remains a defining feature of immigrant opinion. Moreover, not only a democratic political culture matters for the acceptance of non-natives in host societies, but also a

country's levels of economic and democratic development are central in the formation of these attitudes.

Another implication of this dissertation is related to the measurement of opinions toward immigrants as an alternative evaluation of how democratic is the political culture of individuals. Thus far, a democratic political culture has been regarded as an output in the democratization process. In this dissertation, a democratic political culture is seen as an input in the acceptance of immigrants, leading to a harmonious coexistence between different cultures. While prior research has shown that individuals can be tolerant toward a variety of groups, they are not necessarily supportive of those that they dislike (e.g., Gibson 2006). When related to immigrant opinion, citizens in democratic societies may score very high in different democratic attitudes, but still express intolerant attitudes toward foreign born residents. In other words, while democratic norms are the more and more ingrained in many societies across the globe and the majority of citizens enjoy a better protection of their rights, many among these are not necessarily "democratic" when related to attitudes toward non-natives. With a world increasingly characterized by the movement of people across borders, to find different ways of measuring how foreign-born residents are viewed and treated may be, as noted, an alternative assessment of how democratic is the political culture of individuals who live under democratic regimes. And, at the same time it can be indicative of the quality of these democracies.


In terms of policy implications, it is widely demonstrated that education is a critical element for democracy because it enhances tolerance even among those who have negative feelings toward a specific group (Bobo and Licari 1989; Gibson 2006; Golebiowska 1995; Lawrence 1976; Orcés 2008). Therefore, it would be important for

governments, especially where immigrants are becoming a fast growing minority group, to implement programs that expand a better understanding of the migration question and that help find ways to turn migration into an agent for development in host societies. By creating programs that incorporate foreigners more successfully in receiving-countries, the move toward higher quality democracies is more feasible, reducing social conflict and distrust that can stem from increasing immigration in a volatile economic context as those found in Latin America.

Through an extensive analysis of what affects the formation of attitudes toward immigrants, in this dissertation I attempted to elucidate some of the reasons of why maintaining and strengthening a democratic political culture in Latin America is fundamental, especially when many of these democracies still face many other challenges at present. I hope that this study will open further research and debate on what I see as a topic of increasing significance not only for certain countries in Latin America, but much of the developing world where increasing migration rates (domestic or international) are taking place in the context of an ongoing democratization process. The challenge for further research, therefore, is to extend this kind of analysis to all Latin American countries and the developed world.

APPENDIX

IRB Approval

	Vanderbilt University Institutional Review Board	504 Oxford House Nashville, Tennessee 37232-4315 (615) 322-2918 Fax: (615) 343-2648 www.mc.vanderbilt.edu/irb
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September 5, 2008

Diana M. Orces, B.A.
Political Science
301 Calhoun Hall, Box 1817, Station B.
Nashville, TN 37235

Jonathon Hiskey
Political Science
322 Calhoun Hall 1817 Station B 37235-1817

RE: IRB# 080958 "The Impact of Migration on Democracy in Latin America"


Dear [Diana M. Orces, B.A.](#):

A designee of the Institutional Review Board reviewed the Request for Exemption application identified above. It was determined the study poses minimal risk to participants. This study meets 45 CFR 46.101 (b) category (2) for Exempt Review. Approval is extended for the Request for Exemption application dated 9/1/2008 for Principal Investigator [Diana M. Orces, B.A.](#).

Exempt studies do not require annual reviews, however, any changes to the research proposal must be presented to the IRB for approval before implementation.

DATE OF IRB APPROVAL: 9/5/2008

Sincerely,



[Rebecca Abel, B.S.](#)
[Behavioral Sciences Committee](#)

Electronic Signature: Rebecca Abel/VUMC/Vanderbilt : (86C83D7DAE2D12FF3C170B10D763F9B1)
Signed On: 09/05/2008 02:35:56 PM CDT

Orces, Diana M. IRB # 080958	1	09/05/2008
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Tables

Table A.1. Immigration and Emigration in Latin America and the Caribbean (14 countries)

Country	Immigration: Share of the population (%)	Emigration: International Movement Rate (%)
Belize	14.4	27.4
Costa Rica	10.2	9.7
Dominican Republic	4.1	10.4
Argentina	3.9	5.6
Venezuela	3.8	5.3
Panama	3.2	8.2
Uruguay	2.5	9.5
Chile	1.4	4.5
Bolivia	1.2	5.3
Ecuador	0.9	5.9
Mexico	0.6	9.5
El Salvador	0.6	14.6
Guatemala	0.4	5.2
Brazil	0.4	0.8

Source: ECLAC 2008

Table A.2. A Linear Multilevel Analysis of the Determinants of Pro-Immigrant Sentiment in LAC: The Impact of Economic Development, 2008

	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P>z	[95% Conf. Interval]	
GDP Per Capita Index	.1268	.0448	2.83	0.005	.0388	.2148
Other (<i>Student, Housework, Retiree</i>)	.0006	.0082	0.07	0.940	-.0155	.0168
Unemployed ^a	-.0170	.0074	-2.28	0.023	-.0316	-.0023
Mujer	-.0066	.0080	-0.83	0.405	-.0223	.0090
Wealths	.0095	.0101	0.94	0.347	-.0103	.0294
City of Size/Town	.0112	.0084	1.33	0.184	-.0053	.0278
Education	.0170	.0096	1.77	0.078	-.0018	.0360
Age	-.0276	.0082	-3.37	0.001	-.0437	-.0116
Migration Connection Index	.0429	.0076	5.60	0.000	.0279	.0579
Perception of Insecurity	-.0123	.0079	-1.55	0.122	-.0279	.0032
Effects of Media	-.0163	.0083	-1.95	0.051	-.0327	.0001
Personal Economic Satisfaction	.0366	.0086	4.24	0.000	.0197	.0536
National Economic Satisfaction	.0332	.0088	3.75	0.000	.0158	.0506
Role of State	-.0136	.0084	-1.62	0.105	-.0300	.0028
Prejudice	-.0267	.0083	-3.19	0.001	-.0431	-.0103
Threat of Minority Perception	-.0181	.0077	-2.35	0.019	-.0333	-.0030
Authoritarian Attitudes	-.0046	.0075	-0.62	0.539	-.0194	.0101
Interpersonal Trust	.0463	.0078	5.91	0.000	.0309	.0616
Political Tolerance	.0231	.0083	2.78	0.005	.0068	.0395
Presidential Approval	.0464	.0093	4.96	0.000	.0281	.0648
Governmental Efficacy	.0874	.0107	8.14	0.000	.0663	.1085
Core Pol. Institutions Legitimacy	.0384	.0098	3.92	0.000	.0191	.0576
Satisfaction with Democracy	.0687	.0083	8.24	0.000	.0523	.0850
Support for Democracy	-.0246	.0088	-2.78	0.006	-.0420	-.0072
Patriotism	-.0067	.0090	-0.74	0.457	-.0243	.0109
National Pride	-.0188	.0081	-2.32	0.020	-.0347	-.0029
_cons	.0064	.0413	0.16	0.876	-.0745	.0874

Random-effects Parameters	Estimate	Std. Err	[95% Conf. Interval]	
pais: Identity				
var(_cons)	.0220	.0093	.0095	.0507
var(Residual)	.9119	.0098	.8928	.9315
Mixed-effects REML regression			Number of obs	=
17046				
Group variable: pais			Number of groups	
= 14				
Obs per group:	min	= 732		
	avg	= 1217.6		
	max	= 2292		
Wald chi2(26)		= 969.78		
Log restricted-likelihood	= -23513.984	Prob > chi2	= 0.0000	
LR test vs. linear regression:	chibar2(01) = 259.02	Prob >= chibar2	= 0.0000	
a. The reference group is individuals in the labor force				
Source: AmericasBarometer 2008 by LAPOP				

Table A.3. A Logistic Multilevel Analysis of the Determinants of Pro-Immigrant Sentiment in LAC:

The Impact of Democracy, 2008

	Coef.	Std. Err.	Z	P>z	[95% Conf. Interval]	
Freedom House Index (inv)	.4562	.1682	2.71	0.007	.1265	.7860
Other (<i>Student, Housework, Retiree</i>)	-.0012	.0195	-0.06	0.948	-.0396	.0371
Unemployed ^a	.0159	.0223	0.71	0.477	-.0279	.0598
Female	-.0230	.0217	-1.06	0.289	-.0655	.0195
Wealth	.1393	.0275	5.06	0.000	.0853	.1933
City of Size/Town	-.0493	.0228	-2.16	0.031	-.0940	-.0045
Education	.1460	.0273	5.34	0.000	.0924	.1996
Age	-.0235	.0224	-1.05	0.295	-.0676	.0205
Migration Connection Index	.0556	.0204	2.72	0.006	.0155	.0957
Perception of Insecurity	-.0623	.0213	-2.92	0.003	-.1041	-.0205
Effects of Media	.0035	.0227	0.16	0.876	-.0411	.0482
Personal Economic Satisfaction	.0401	.0240	1.67	0.095	-.0069	.0871
National Economic Satisfaction	.0434	.0239	1.82	0.069	-.0034	.0903
Role of State	-.2002	.0250	-7.99	0.000	-.2493	-.1511
Prejudice	-.0903	.0229	-3.94	0.000	-.1352	-.0453
Threat of Minority Perception	.0226	.0208	1.09	0.276	-.0181	.0635
Authoritarian Attitudes	.0281	.0203	1.38	0.168	-.0118	.0680
Interpersonal Trust	.0611	.0208	2.94	0.003	.0203	.1019
Political Tolerance	-.0210	.0225	-0.93	0.351	-.0652	.0231
Presidential Approval	.1543	.0273	5.64	0.000	.1007	.2079
Governmental Efficacy	.0218	.0289	0.75	0.451	-.0349	.0786
Core Pol. Institutions Legitimacy	.0812	.0261	3.11	0.002	.0299	.1324
Satisfaction with Democracy	.1111	.0224	4.95	0.000	.0670	.1551
Support for Democracy	.0458	.0241	1.90	0.058	-.0014	.0932
Patriotism	.0376	.0250	1.50	0.133	-.0114	.0867
National Pride	-.0226	.0229	-0.98	0.325	-.0676	.0224
_cons	-.2623	.1614	-1.63	0.104	-.5787	.0540

Random-effects Parameters	Estimate	Std. Err	[95% Conf. Interval]
country: Identity			
var (_cons)	.2552	.1167	.1041 .6255
var (Residual)			

Mixed-effects logistic regression	Number of obs	=	12027
Group variable: pais	Number of groups	=	10
Obs per group:	min	=	629
	avg	=	1202.7
	max	=	2145
Wald chi2(26)	=	466.79	Integration points
=	7		
Log likelihood	=	-7376.2533	Prob > chi2
=	0.0000		
LR test vs. logistic regression: chibar2(01) =	433.67		Prob>=chibar2
=	0.0000		

a. The reference group is individuals in the labor force
Source: AmericasBarometer 2008 by LAPOP

Table A.4. The Impact of Economic Development on Support for Governmental Services for Immigrants in LAC, 2008

	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P>z	[95% Conf. Interval]	
GDP Per Capita Index	56.45	20.02	2.82	0.005	17.21	95.68
Mujer	-.3897	.5303	-0.73	0.462	-1.429	.6497
Wealths	.1939	.1848	1.05	0.294	-.1683	.5562
City of Size/Town	.2461	.1946	1.26	0.206	-.1352	.6275
Education	.1311	.0753	1.74	0.082	-.0165	.2789
Age	-.5892	.1853	-3.18	0.001	-.9524	-.2259
Migration Connection Index	.9860	.1784	5.52	0.000	.6362	1.335
Perception of Insecurity	-.0141	.0091	-1.55	0.122	-.0321	.0038
Effects of Media	-.0194	.0098	-1.98	0.048	-.0386	-.0002
Personal Economic Satisfaction	.0671	.0151	4.43	0.000	.0374	.0968
National Economic Satisfaction	.0514	.0138	3.71	0.000	.0242	.0785
Role of State	-.0214	.0135	-1.58	0.114	-.0479	.0051
Prejudice	-.0254	.0080	-3.19	0.001	-.0411	-.0098
Threat of Minority Perception	-.0197	.0082	-2.39	0.017	-.0358	-.0035
Authoritarian Attitudes	-.3709	.5966	-0.62	0.534	-1.540	.7984
Interpersonal Trust	.0554	.0093	5.94	0.000	.0371	.0737
Political Tolerance	.0296	.0106	2.79	0.005	.0088	.0504
Presidential Approval	.0707	.0142	4.98	0.000	.0428	.0986
Governmental Efficacy	.1157	.0141	8.16	0.000	.0879	.1436
Core Pol. Institutions Legitimacy	.0583	.0148	3.92	0.000	.0291	.0875
Satisfaction with Democracy	.1042	.0126	8.28	0.000	.0795	.1289
Support for Democracy	-.0305	.0110	-2.75	0.006	-.0523	-.0088
Patriotism	-.0102	.0130	-0.78	0.435	-.0358	.0154
National Pride	-.0303	.0131	-2.30	0.022	-.0562	-.0044
_cons	.3853	14.55	0.03	0.979	-28.14	28.91

Random-effects Parameters	Estimate	Std. Err	[95% Conf. Interval]	
pais: Identity				
Var(_cons)	27.88	11.87	12.1074	64.22
Var(Residual)	1164.35	12.62	1139.87	1189.36

Mixed-effects REML regression	Number of obs	=
17046		
Group variable: pais	Number of groups	=
14		
Obs per group:	min	= 732
	avg	= 1217.6
	max	= 2292
Wald chi2(24)		= 964.22
Log restricted-likelihood	= -84426.398	Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
LR test vs. linear regression: chibar2(01)	= 257.63	Prob >= chibar2 = 0.0000

a. The reference group is individuals in the labor force
Source: AmericasBarometer 2008 by LAPOP

Table A.5. The Impact of Economic Development on Support for Governmental Services for Immigrants in LAC, 2008

Country	Linear Prediction	Std. Error	[95% Confidence Interval]	
Mexico	62.1359	(1.92669)	[58.3596	65.9121]
Guatemala	54.063	(2.13696)	[49.8747	58.2514]
El Salvador	55.3615	(1.82297)	[51.7885	58.9344]
Costa Rica	61.6278	(1.81181)	[58.0767	65.1789]
Panama	58.8616	(1.44334)	[56.0327	61.6905]
Ecuador	53.5549	(2.27344)	[49.0991	58.0108]
Bolivia	49.4903	(3.51013)	[42.6106	56.37]
Chile	63.152	(2.18308)	[58.8733	67.4308]
Uruguay	61.402	(1.76426)	[57.9441	64.8599]
Brazil	59.8213	(1.51042)	[56.8609	62.7817]
Venezuela	57.5631	(1.47777)	[54.6668	60.4595]
Argentina	64.7892	(2.64756)	[59.6001	69.9783]
Dominican Republic	59.5955	(1.48792)	[56.6792	62.5117]
Belize	58.2406	(1.44168)	[55.4149	61.0662]

Dependent variable: immig1r Equation: immig1r Created variables: pred, err
Variable left as is: gdpind Covariates set to mean* See Table

Table A.6. The Impact of Democracy on the Belief that Immigrants Do NOT Take Jobs Away From Citizens in LAC, 2008

	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P>z	[95% Conf. Interval]	
Freedom House Index (inv)	.2700	.0995	2.71	0.007	.0748	.4652
Mujer	-.0340	.0402	-0.85	0.398	-.1128	.0448
Wealths	.0707	.0139	5.08	0.000	.0434	.0980
City of Size/Town	-.0312	.0145	-2.15	0.032	-.0596	-.0027
Education	.0299	.0056	5.29	0.000	.0188	.0411
Age	-.0141	.0140	-1.01	0.314	-.0418	.0134
Migration Connection Index	.0345	.0126	2.74	0.006	.0098	.0592
Perception of Insecurity	-.0020	.0006	-2.94	0.003	-.0034	-.0006
Effects of Media	.0001	.0007	0.17	0.866	-.0013	.0015
Personal Economic Satisfaction	.0019	.0011	1.68	0.094	-.0003	.0042
National Economic Satisfaction	.0018	.0010	1.80	0.071	-.0001	.0039
Role of State	-.0084	.0010	-7.99	0.000	-.0104	-.0063
Prejudice	-.0024	.0006	-3.93	0.000	-.0036	-.0012
Threat of Minority Perception	.0007	.0006	1.08	0.278	-.0005	.0019
Authoritarian Attitudes	.0611	.0441	1.39	0.166	-.0253	.1477
Interpersonal Trust	.0020	.0007	2.94	0.003	.0007	.0034
Political Tolerance	-.0008	.0008	-0.92	0.355	-.0023	.0008
Presidential Approval	.0061	.0010	5.64	0.000	.0040	.0082
Governmental Efficacy	.0008	.0010	0.75	0.451	-.0013	.0029
Core Pol. Institutions Legitimacy	.0036	.0011	3.13	0.002	.0013	.0058
Satisfaction with Democracy	.0047	.0009	4.94	0.000	.0028	.0065
Support for Democracy	.0016	.0009	1.89	0.058	-.0001	.0032
Patriotism	.0015	.0010	1.49	0.136	-.0005	.0034
National Pride	-.0010	.0010	-0.97	0.333	-.0030	.0010
_cons	-3.72	.9823	-3.79	0.000	-5.64	-1.79

Random-effects Parameters	Estimate	Std. Err	[95% Conf. Interval]	
country: Identity				
var(_cons)	.2553	.1168	.1041	.6258
Var(Residual)				

Mixed-effects logistic regression
 12027
 Group variable: pais
 Number of obs =
 Number of groups = 10
 Obs per group: min = 629
 avg = 1202.7
 max = 2145
 Wald chi2(24) = 466.24
 7
 Integration points =
 Log likelihood = -7376.5262
 Prob > chi2 =
 0.0000
 LR test vs. logistic regression: chibar2(01) = 435.17
 Prob>=chibar2 =
 0.0000

a. The reference group is individuals in the labor force
 Source: AmericasBarometer 2008 by LAPOP

Table A.7. The Impact of Democracy on the Belief that Immigrants Do NOT Take Jobs Away From Citizens in LAC, 2008

Country	exp(xb)
Mexico	.671335
Guatemala	.39116
El Salvador	.671335
Costa Rica	1.50944
Panama	1.15219
Ecuador	.512445
Bolivia	.512445
Uruguay	1.50944
Brazil	.879492
Dominican Republic	.879492

Dependent variable: immig2r Equation: eq1 Created variable: pred2
Variable left as is: freehinv Covariates set to mean: *See Table

Table A.8. Number of Observations by Country

Country	Freq.
Mexico	1,560
Guatemala	1,538
El Salvador	1,549
Costa Rica	1,500
Panama	1,536
Ecuador	3,000
Bolivia	3,003
Chile	1,527
Uruguay	1,500
Brazil	1,497
Venezuela	1,500
Argentina	1,486
Dominican Republic	1,507
Belize	1,552
Total	25,755

Table A.9. Summary Statistics, Mean Values by Country (2008)

Country	Years of Education	Age	Variables % Female	Size of City/Town	Wealth*
Argentina	10.887	36.651	51.30	3.616	5.321
Bolivia	9.945	36.897	49.70	2.515	2.932
Brazil	7.295	41.427	53.70	3.13	4.507
Chile	10.483	43.599	59.20	3.613	5.275
Costa Rica	8.160	40.779	51.10	2.532	5.629
Dominican Republic	7.316	41.171	54.80	3.114	3.679
Ecuador	10.168	38.485	50.00	2.606	3.824
El Salvador	8.396	38.451	52.10	62.298	3.604
Guatemala	6.007	39.414	49.80	2.328	2.941
Mexico	8.269	40.841	50.50	2.953	4.980
Panama	10.238	38.983	50.00	2.942	4.435
Belize	8.272	37.003	49.36	2.173	4.148
Uruguay	8.984	45.296	53.40	3.622	4.903
Venezuela	9.961	38.659	54.60	3.373	4.930
Total	9.317	39.589	51.88	2.903	4.239

* The “wealth” index consists of a count of household assets and access to basic services at the household level. The list of assets in the survey includes durable goods, such as a TV set, a refrigerator, a car, and a computer, and access to basic services like clean water and sewage inside the house.

Source: AmericasBarometer 2008 by LAPOP

Table A.10. Summary Statistics, Mean Values by Country (2008)

Country	Variables			Migration Connection Index
	Authoritarian Attitudes (%)	Threat from Minority	Prejudice	
Argentina	21.06	27.365	30.012	.392
Bolivia	20.64	48.104	63.932	1.267
Brazil	36.70	40.919	46.981	.216
Chile	38.54	46.930	50.117	.345
Costa Rica	36.38	48.588	54.541	.758
Dominican Republic	33.98	54.555	74.738	1.310
Ecuador	31.93	52.753	63.122	1.029
El Salvador	32.39	51.213	72.094	1.885
Guatemala	33.70	49.496	71.912	1.106
Mexico	26.47	46.124	53.614	.890
Panama	45.87	46.449	58.487	.585
Belize	11.88	48.022	62.787	.952
Uruguay	18.70	36.293	33.994	.461
Venezuela	19.53	41.496	61.761	.275
Total	28.78	45.167	56.045	.868

Source: AmericasBarometer 2008 by LAPOP

Table A.11. Summary Statistics, Mean Values by Country (2008)

Country	Media Effects	Perception of Insecurity	Variables National Economic Satisfaction	Personal Economic Satisfaction	Role of State
Argentina	77.348	57.304	46.111	53.012	78.583
Bolivia	73.061	47.603	42.472	49.698	73.703
Brazil	87.853	41.251	46.452	50.438	68.014
Chile	87.839	49.342	46.831	48.344	77.759
Costa Rica	89.121	34.527	43.132	50.00	71.440
Dominican Republic	77.715	39.493	36.239	39.833	79.492
Ecuador	84.699	43.941	43.021	50.878	67.788
El Salvador	80.074	41.512	28.483	40.342	75.779
Guatemala	66.330	39.563	31.964	44.389	67.218
Mexico	80.558	39.612	38.178	47.817	72.490
Panama	85.983	35.497	37.312	43.979	70.379
Belize	73.640	32.620	33.411	42.85	76.831
Uruguay	86.762	44.492	46.918	50.584	77.097
Venezuela	81.892	46.747	44.908	52.772	56.726
Total	80.640	41.659	40.011	47.664	70.221

Source: AmericasBarometer 2008 by LAPOP

**Table A.12. Determinants of Support for Governmental Services for Immigrants:
Ordinary Least Square (OLS) Regression**

	Argentina	Chile	Costa Rica	Dom Republic
	Coef. (t)	Coef. (t)	Coef. (t)	Coef. (t)
Interpersonal Trust	0.150*** (3.57)	0.048 (1.57)	0.039 (1.34)	0.031 (0.79)
Political Tolerance	0.109*** (3.36)	-0.056 (-1.65)	0.009 (0.26)	-0.024 (-0.77)
Presidential Approval	-0.046 (-1.31)	0.014 (0.46)	0.020 (0.51)	0.062 (1.35)
Governmental Efficacy	0.235*** (3.93)	0.111** (2.73)	0.036 (0.87)	0.087 (1.38)
Political Institutional Legitimacy	-0.071 (-1.87)	0.128** (3.14)	0.046 (1.26)	0.079(1.77)
Satisfaction with Democracy	-0.095 (-1.91)	0.042 (1.94)	0.025 (0.69)	0.005 (0.15)
Support for Democracy	0.038 (0.94)	0.011 (0.41)	-0.104** (-2.97)	-0.002 (-0.07)
Patriotism	0.008 (0.26)	-0.001 (-0.02)	-0.007 (-0.23)	-0.022 (-0.57)
National Pride	-0.057 (-1.31)	-0.033 (-0.96)	-0.034 (-1.00)	0.032 (0.91)
Authoritarian Attitudes	-0.164*** (-3.96)	0.010 (0.29)	-0.057 (-1.93)	0.033 (1.13)
Threat from Minority Prejudice	0.011 (0.27)	0.014 (0.54)	-0.054 (-1.81)	-0.022 (-0.80)
Role of State	-0.063 (-1.28)	-0.069 (-1.71)	-0.057 (-1.85)	-0.025 (-0.69)
National Economic Satisfaction	0.013 (0.25)	-0.020 (-0.68)	0.042 (1.22)	0.005 (0.16)
Personal Economic Satisfaction	0.023 (0.62)	0.082*** (3.57)	0.107** (2.84)	0.016 (0.32)
Effects of Media	0.076 (1.54)	-0.002 (-0.08)	0.009 (0.19)	0.013 (0.45)
Perception of Insecurity	0.023 (0.67)	-0.070 (-1.84)	-0.020 (-0.73)	0.031 (1.15)
Migration Connection Index	-0.060 (-1.92)	-0.048 (-1.59)	-0.027 (-0.84)	0.033 (1.04)
Age	0.011 (0.38)	0.048 (1.91)	0.068* (2.23)	0.037 (1.31)
Race ^a	0.006 (0.15)	-0.045 (-1.13)	-0.068* (-2.30)	-0.025 (-0.77)
<i>Mestizo</i>	-0.050 (-1.42)	0.068* (2.17)	0.078* (2.38)	-0.027 (-0.52)
<i>Indigenous</i>	0.039 (1.17)	0.033 (1.35)	0.036 (1.54)	
<i>Black</i>				0.054 (1.29)
<i>Mulatto</i>				0.046 (1.13)
<i>Other</i>	-0.043 (-1.07)	0.020 (0.50)	-0.042 (-1.85)	0.068* (3.80)
Female	-0.040 (-1.12)	-0.066* (-2.36)	-0.042 (-1.50)	0.009 (0.27)
Wealth	-0.068 (-1.89)	0.049 (1.37)	-0.052 (-1.72)	0.069* (2.11)
Size of City/Town	-0.005 (-0.10)	-0.049 (-0.88)	-0.071* (-2.22)	-0.031 (-0.53)
Education	0.041 (0.98)	0.067 (1.59)	0.024 (0.71)	-0.025 (-0.69)
Unemployed ^b	-0.028 (-1.06)	-0.041 (-1.52)	-0.042 (-1.50)	0.012 (0.44)
<i>Other (Students, housework, retirees)</i>	0.038 (0.81)	0.070* (2.20)	0.001 (0.04)	-0.017 (-0.43)

Region ^c	<i>Centro</i>	<i>Centro</i>	<i>Urbano Central</i>	<i>Norte</i>
	0.174** (3.22)	0.029 (0.50)	-0.094*** (-3.64)	-0.004 (-0.07)
	<i>NorthEast</i>	<i>Sur</i>	<i>Rural Central</i>	<i>Este</i>
	0.003 (0.06)	0.058 (1.00)	-0.083** (-2.56)	-0.043 (-0.92)
	<i>NorthWest</i>		<i>Urban Bajura</i>	<i>Sur</i>
	0.022 (0.39)		-0.034 (-1.07)	-0.036 (-0.84)
	<i>Cuyo</i>			
	0.071 (1.35)			
	<i>Patagonia</i>			
	-0.046 (-0.86)			
Constant	-0.010 (-0.22)	-0.013 (-0.38)	0.016 (0.65)	0.026 (0.85)
R-Squared	0.208	0.129	0.097	0.068
Number of Obs.	844	1174	1151	1062

*p<.05 **p<.01 ***p<.001

a. The reference group is White

b. The reference group is individuals in the labor force

c. The reference group for Argentina=AMBA; Chile=Norte; Costa Rica=AMSJ; Dominican Republic=Metropolitan

Note: This model takes into consideration the design of the sample.

Source: AmericasBarometer 2008 by LAPOP

Table A.13. Determinants of Support for Governmental Services for Immigrants in Ecuador: Ordinary Least Square (OLS) Regression

	2008		2010	
	Coefficient.	t	Coefficient.	t
Interpersonal Trust	0.059*	(2.23)	0.041	(1.59)
Political Tolerance	0.007	(0.22)	-0.050*	(-2.38)
Presidential Approval	0.033	(1.08)	0.042	(1.24)
Governmental Efficacy	0.123**	(3.06)	0.165*	(3.35)
Pol. Inst. Legitimacy	0.012	(0.29)	0.050	(1.45)
Satisfaction with Democracy	0.022	(0.83)	0.034	(1.39)
Support for Democracy	-0.069*	(-2.56)	-0.017	(-0.52)
Patriotism	-0.003	(-0.09)		
National Pride	-0.074*	(-2.24)	-0.118*	(-5.28)
Authoritarian Attitudes	-0.010	(0.32)	0.012	(1.64)
Threat from Minority	-0.023	(-0.88)	-0.011	(-0.55)
Prejudice	0.016	(0.46)	-0.036	(-1.52)
Role of State	-0.034	(-0.97)	-0.023	(-0.80)
National Econ. Satisfaction	-0.014	(-0.39)	0.020	(0.94)
Personal Econ. Satisfaction	0.040	(1.11)	0.048	(1.96)
Effects of Media	0.022	(0.62)		
Perception of Insecurity	0.092***	(3.29)	-0.075*	(-2.46)
Migration Connection Index	0.053*	(2.25)	0.035	(1.45)
Unemployed ^a	-0.046*	(-2.22)	0.003	(0.15)
<i>Other (Students, housework, retirees)</i>	-0.033	(-1.14)	-0.018	(-0.66)
Race ^b <i>White</i>	-0.017	(-0.75)	0.009	(0.36)
<i>Indigenous</i>	0.017	(0.48)	0.051*	(2.00)
<i>Other</i>	-0.012	(-0.53)	-0.037	(-1.69)
Female	-0.035	(-1.63)	0.017	(0.72)
Wealth	-0.036	(-0.97)	-0.003	(-0.10)
Size of City/Town	-0.035	(-0.68)	0.094*	(2.43)
Education	0.019	(0.63)	0.019	(0.74)
Age	-0.052*	(-2.12)	-0.067*	(-2.36)
Region ^c <i>Oriente</i>	0.041	(0.67)	-0.076*	(-2.83)
<i>Sierra</i>	-0.064	(-1.31)	-0.059*	(-2.01)
Constant	-0.035	(-0.71)	-0.009	(-0.38)
R-Squared	0.071		0.124	
Number of Obs.	2293		2293	

*p<.05 **p<.01 ***p<.001

a. The reference group is individuals in the labor force

b. The reference group is Mestizo

c. The reference group is Costa

Note: This model takes into consideration the design of the sample.

Source: AmericasBarometer 2008 by LAPOP

Sample Questionnaire

Version #18Q IRB Approval:060187

	<p>LOGO OF LOCAL INSTITUTION TO BE INSERTED HERE</p>
	 <p>VANDERBILT UNIVERSITY</p>

Democracy Audit: Country, 2008
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- | |
|--|
| <p>1. Sections in yellow are ones that require customization for each country, generally the insertion of the country name in place of the word “country.”</p> |
| <p>2. Sections in grey indicate optional questions that each country team may wish to include or exclude.</p> |
| <p>4. Each country team may, of course, propose to add individual country-specific questions not included in this draft version.</p> |

<p>Country: 1. Mexico 2. Guatemala 3. El Salvador 4. Honduras 5. Nicaragua 6. Costa Rica 7. Panama 8. Colombia 9. Ecuador 10. Bolivia 11. Peru 12. Paraguay 13. Chile 14. Uruguay 15. Brazil 16. Venezuela 17. Argentina 21. Dominican Republic 22. Haiti 23. Jamaica 24. Guyana 25. Trinidad 40. United States 41. Canada</p>
<p>IDNUM. Questionnaire number [assigned at the office]</p>
<p>ESTRATOPRI: Insert the names of the strata here</p>
<p>UPM _____</p>
<p>Province (or department) : _____</p>
<p>County (or municipality): _____</p>
<p>DISTRICT (or parish, etc.): _____</p>
<p>CENSUS SEGMENT _____</p>
<p>Sector _____</p>
<p>[CLUSTER]: _____ [A cluster cannot be larger than 8 interviews in urban towns, and 12 in rural areas]</p>
<p>UR 1. Urban 2. Rural</p>
<p>Size of place: 1. National Capital (Metropolitan area) 2. Large City 3. Medium City 4. Small City 5. Rural Area</p>
<p>Questionnaire language: (11) English INSERT OTHER LANGUAGES</p>
<p>Start time: ____ : ____ [Don't enter]</p>
<p>Date Day: ____ Month: ____ Year: 2006</p>

Q1. Sex (note down; do not ask): (1) Male (2) Female

A4 [COA4]. To begin with, in your opinion, what is **the most serious** problem faced by the country?
[DO NOT READ OUT THE RESPONSE OPTIONS; ONLY A SINGLE OPTION]

Water, lack of	19	Inflation, high prices	02
Roads in poor condition	18	Politicians	59
Armed conflict	30	Bad government	15
Corruption	13	Environment	10
Credit, lack of	09	Migration	16
Delinquency, crime, violence	05	Drugtrafficking	12
Human rights, violations of	56	Gangs	14
Unemployment	03	Poverty	04
Inequality	58	Popular protests (strikes, road blocks, work stoppages, etc.)	06
Malnutrition	23	Health services, lack of	22
Forced displacement of persons	32	Kidnappings	31
External debt	26	Security (lack of)	27
Discrimination	25	Terrorism	33
Drug addiction	11	Land to farm, lack of	07
Economy, problems with, crisis of	01	Transportation, problems of	60
Education, lack of, poor quality	21	Violence	57
Electricity, lack of	24	Housing	55
Population explosion	20	Other	70
War against terrorism	17	Doesn't know	88

Now, changing the subject...[After each question, repeat “every day”, “once or twice a week”, “rarely”, or “never” to help the respondent]

How frequently do you ...	Every day [Also accept almost every day]	Once or twice a week	Rarely	Never	DK
A1. Listen to the news on the radio	1	2	3	4	8
A2. Watch the news on TV	1	2	3	4	8
A3. Read the news in newspapers	1	2	3	4	8
A4i. Read the news on the Internet	1	2	3	4	8

SOCT1. How would you describe the country's economic situation? Would you say that it is very good, good, neither good nor bad, bad or very bad? (1) Very good (2) Good (3) Neither good nor bad (fair) (4) Bad (5) Very bad (8) Doesn't know
SOCT2. Do you think that the country's current economic situation is better than, the same as or worse than it was 12 months ago? (1) Better (2) Same (3) Worse (8) Doesn't know
IDIO1. How would you describe your overall economic situation? Would you say that it is very good, good, neither good nor bad, bad or very bad? (1) Very good (2) Good (3) Neither good nor bad (fair) (4) Bad (5) Very bad (8) Doesn't know
IDIO2. Do you think that your economic situation is better than, the same as, or worse than it was 12 months ago? (1) Better (2) Same (3) Worse (8) Doesn't know

Now, moving on to a different subject, sometimes people and communities have problems that they cannot solve by themselves, and so in order to solve them they request help from a government official or agency.

In order to solve your problems have you ever requested help or cooperation from...?	Yes	No	DK/DR
CP2. A member of congress/parliament	1	2	8
CP4A. A local public official (e.g, a mayor, municipal councilperson, provincial official)	1	2	8
CP4. Any ministry, public institution or state agency	1	2	8

NP1. Have you attended a town meeting, city council meeting or other meeting in the past 12 months? (1) Yes (2) No (8) Doesn't know/Doesn't remember
NP1B. To what degree do you think municipal officials pay attention to what people ask for in such meetings? (1) A lot (2) Some (3) Not at all (8) DK
NP2. Have you sought assistance from or presented a request to any office, official or councilman of the municipality within the past 12 months? (1) Yes (2) No (8) Doesn't know/Doesn't remember
SGL1. Would you say that the services the municipality is providing are...? [Read options] (1) Very good (2) Good (3) Neither good nor poor (fair) (4) Poor (5) Very poor (8) Doesn't know
SGL2. How have you or your neighbors been treated when you have dealt with the municipality? Have you been treated very well, well, neither well nor badly, badly or very badly? (1) Very well (2) Well (3) Neither well nor badly (4) Badly (5) Very badly (8) Doesn't know
LGL2. In your opinion, should the municipal government be given more money and more responsibility or should the national government assume more responsibility and provide municipal services? (1) More for the municipal government (2) National government should assume greater responsibility (3) Nothing should change [do not read] (4) More to the municipality if it provides better services [do not read] (8) Doesn't know/Doesn't respond

<p>LGL2A. Taking into account the current public services in the country, who should be given more responsibilities? [Read options] (1) Much more to the central government (2) Somewhat more to the central government (3) The same amount to the central government and the municipality (4) Some more to the municipality (5) Much more to the municipality (88) DK/DA</p>
<p>LGL2B. And taking into account the available economic resources in the country, who should manage more money? [Read options] (1) Much more the central government (2) Some more the central government (3) The same amount the central government and the municipality (4) Some more the municipality (5) Much more the municipality (88) DK/DA</p>
<p>LGL3. Would you be willing to pay more taxes to the municipal government so that it could provide better services or do you believe that it would not be worth it to do so? (1) Willing to pay more (2) Not worth it (8) Doesn't know</p>
<p>MUNI5. Have you ever participated in drafting the budget of the municipal government? (1) Yes, has participated (0) Has not participated (8) DK/DR</p>
<p>MUNI6. How much confidence do you have that the local /municipal government manages funds well? [Read the options] (3) A lot (2) Some (1) A little (0) None (8) DK/DR</p>
<p>MUNI8. Have you carried out any official dealings or requested any document at the municipal government in the past year? (1) Yes [Continue] (0) No [Go to MUNI11] (8) DK/DR [Go to MUNI11]</p>
<p>MUNI9. How were you treated? [Read the options] (1) Very well (2) Well (3) Neither well nor poorly (4) Poorly (5) Very poorly (8) DK/DR (9) N/A</p>
<p>MUNI10. Did they solve your problem or request? (1) Yes (0) No (8) DK/DR (9) N/A</p>
<p>MUNI11. [Ask to everyone] How much influence do you think you have on what the municipality does? Would you say a lot, some, little, or no influence? (1.)A lot (2) Some (3) Little (4) None 8. DK/DR</p>
<p>MUNI15. How interested do you think the mayor/municipal leader is in the people's participation in the work of the municipality? [Read options] (3) Very interested (2) Somewhat interested (1) Little interested (0) Not at all interested (8) DK/DR</p>

	Once a week	Once or twice a month	Once or twice a year	Never	DK
<p>CP5. Now, changing the subject. In the last 12 months have you tried to help to solve a problem in your community or in your neighborhood? Please, tell me if you did it at least once a week, once or twice a month, once or twice a year or never.</p>	1	2	3	4	8

I am going to read a list of groups and organizations. Please tell me if you attend their meetings at least once a week, once or twice a month, once or twice a year, or never. **[Repeat for each question “once a week,” “once or twice a month,” “once or twice a year” or “never” to help the respondent]**

	Once a week	Once or twice a month	Once or twice a year	Never	DK/DR	
CP6. Meetings of any religious organization? Do you attend them...	1	2	3	4	8	
CP7. Meetings of a parents' association at school? Do you attend them...	1	2	3	4	8	
CP8. Meetings of a committee or association for community improvement? Do you attend them...	1	2	3	4	8	
CP9. Meetings of an association of professionals, traders or farmers? Do you attend them...	1	2	3	4	8	
CP10. Meetings of a labor union? Do you attend them...	1	2	3	4	8	
CP13. Meetings of a political party or political movement? Do you attend them...	1	2	3	4	8	
CP20. [Women only] Associations or groups of women or home makers. Do you attend them...	1	2	3	4	8	9 (Male)

LS3. Changing the subject, in general how satisfied are you with your life? Would you say that you are...?
(1) Very satisfied (2) Somewhat satisfied (3) Somewhat **dissatisfied** (4) Very **dissatisfied** (8) DK

IT1. Now, speaking of the people from here, would you say that people in this community are generally very trustworthy, somewhat trustworthy, not very trustworthy or untrustworthy...? **[Read options]**
(1) Very trustworthy (2) Somewhat trustworthy (3) not very trustworthy (4) untrustworthy (8) DK

IT1A. How much do you trust people that you meet for the first time? **[Read options]**
(1) Totally trust them (2) Somewhat trust them (3) Trust them a little (4) does not trust them at all (8) DK

IT1B. Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people?
(1) Most people can be trusted
(2) One can't be too careful in dealing with people
(8) DK/DR

SHOW CARD # 1

L1. (Left-Right Scale) Now, to change the subject... On this card there is a 1-10 scale that goes from left to right. Nowadays, when we speak of political leanings, we talk of those on the left and those on the right. In other words, some people sympathize more with the left and others with the right. According to the meaning that the terms "left" and "right" have for you, and thinking of your own political leanings, where would you place yourself on this scale? Indicate the box that comes closest to your own position.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	
Left										Right

Collect Card # 1

IMMIG1. To what degree do you agree that the (country) government provides social services such as healthcare, education, housing, to foreigners who come to live or work in this country? **[Read options]**

- (1) Strongly agree
- (2) Somewhat agree
- (3) Neutral
- (4) Somewhat disagree
- (5) Strongly Disagree
- (8) DK

IMMIG2. Would you say that the people who come to live here from other countries do the jobs that (country's citizens, e.g., Jamaicans) do not want to do, or generally take jobs away from (country's citizens)?

- (1) Do the jobs that (country's citizens) do not want to do
- (2) Take jobs away from (country's citizens)
- (8) DK/DR

PROT1. Have you ever participated in a public demonstration or protest? Have you done it sometimes, almost never or never? [If he answered "Never" or "DK", Mark 9 in PROT2 and Go to CP5]	(1) Sometimes	(2) Almost never	(3) Never	(8) DK	
PROT2. And now thinking about the last 12 months, have you participated in a public demonstration or protest? Have you done it sometimes, almost never or never?	(1) Sometimes	(2) Almost never	(3) Never	(8) DK	(9) Inap

Now let's change the subject. Some people say that under some circumstances a military take-over through a coup d'état would be justified. In your opinion would a military coup be justified in the following circumstances? **[Read the options after each question]:**

JC1. When there is high unemployment.	(1) A military take-over would be justified	(2) A military take-over would not be justified	(8) DK
JC4. When there are a lot of social protests.	(1) It would be justified	(2) It would not be justified	(8) DK

JC10. When there is a lot of crime.	(1) It would be justified	(2) It would not be justified	(8) DK
JC12. When there is high inflation, with excessive prices increases.	(1) It would be justified	(2) It would not be justified	(8) DK
JC13. When there is a lot of corruption.	(1) It would be justified	(2) It would not be justified	(8) DK

JC15. Do you think that sometimes there can be sufficient grounds for the President to shut down the Congress or do you think there can never be sufficient grounds to do so?	(1) Yes	(2) No	(8)DK
JC16. Do you think that sometimes there can be sufficient grounds to dissolve the Supreme Court of Justice, ADAPT THIS TO EACH COUNTRY or do you think that there can never be sufficient grounds to do so?	(1) Yes	(2) No	(8)DK

VIC1. Now changing the subject, have you been a victim of any type of crime in the past 12 months?
(1) Yes [Continue] (2) No [Skip to VIC701] (8) DK/DR [Skip to VIC701]

AOJ1. Did you report the crime to any institution?
(1) Yes [Skip to VIC20] (2) Did not report [Continue]
(8) DK/DR [Skip to VIC20] (9) Inap (not a victim) [Skip to VIC20]

AOJ1B. Why did you not report the crime? [Do not read options]

(1) Does not work
(2) It is dangerous and afraid of retaliation
(3) Did not have any proof
(4) It was not that serious
(5) Did not know where to report
(6) Other reason
(8) DK/DR
(9) INAP

<i>[ASK TO EVERYONE]: Now, please think about what has happened to you in the past 12 months when responding to the following questions: [If responds "Yes," ask how many times. Write the number of times. If responds "No," write "0" zero.</i>	How many times? [Write down the number of times, if responded "No" write down 0, DK/DR=88]
VIC20. You were a victim of an armed robbery of property not including your car in the past 12 months? How many times?	
VIC21. Your house has been burglarized in the past 12 months? How many times?	
VIC27. In the past 12 months has any police officer mistreated you verbally, physically or assaulted you? How many times?	

AOJ8. In order to apprehend criminals do you think that the authorities should always respect the law or that occasionally they can skate close to the limits of the law?
(1) They should always respect the law (2) Can act on the margins occasionally (8)DK/DR

AOJ11. Speaking of the neighborhood where you live, and thinking of the possibility of being assaulted or robbed, do you feel very safe, somewhat safe, somewhat unsafe or very unsafe?
 (1) Very safe (2) Somewhat safe (3) Somewhat unsafe (4) Very unsafe (8) DK/DR

AOJ11A. And speaking of the country in general, how much do you think that the level of crime that we have now represents a threat to our future well-being? **[Read the options]**
 (1) Very much (2) Somewhat (3) Little (4) None (8) DK/DR

AOJ12. If you were a victim of a robbery or assault how much faith do you have that the judicial system would punish the guilty? **[Read the options]**
 (1) A lot (2) Some (3) Little (4) None (8) DK/DR

AOJ12a. If you were a victim of a robbery or assault how much faith do you have that the police would apprehend the guilty? **[Read the options]**
 (1) A lot (2) Some (3) Little (4) None (8) DK/DR

AOJ16A. In your neighborhood, have you seen anyone selling drugs in the past 12 months?
 (1) Yes (2) No (8) DK

AOJ17. To what extent do you think your neighborhood is affected by gangs? Would you say a lot, somewhat, a little or none?
 (1) A lot (2) Somewhat (3) Little (4) None (8) DK

AOJ18. Some people say that the police in this community (town, village) protect people from criminals, while others say that the police that are involved in the criminal activity. What do you think?
 (1) Police protect or
 (2) Police involved in crime
 (3) **[Don't Read]** Doesn't protect, but is not involved in crime or protect and involved in crime
 (8) DK/DR

Regarding the formal dealings that you or someone from your family has had with the following institutions at some time, do you feel very satisfied, somewhat satisfied, somewhat dissatisfied or very dissatisfied? **(REPEAT THE RESPONSE OPTIONS IN EACH QUESTION)**

	Very satisfied	Somewhat satisfied	Somewhat dissatisfied	Very dissatisfied	[Don't read] Didn't have any official dealings	DK/DR
ST1. The national police	1	2	3	4	9	8
ST2. The courts or justice system	1	2	3	4	9	8
ST3. The district attorney's office	1	2	3	4	9	8
ST4. The local or municipal government (mayor's office)	1	2	3	4	9	8

[Give card "A" to the respondent]

Now we will use a card...This card has a 7 point scale; each point indicates a score that goes from 1, meaning NOT AT ALL, to 7, meaning A LOT. For example, if I asked you to what extent you like watching television, if you don't like watching it at all, you would choose a score of 1, and if, on the contrary, you like watching television a lot, you would indicate the number 7 to me. If your opinion is between not at all and a lot, choose an intermediate score. So, to what extent do you like watching television? Read me the number. *[Make sure that the respondent understands correctly].*

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Not at all						A lot	DK

B1. To what extent do you think the courts in (country) guarantee a fair trial? (Read: If you think the courts do not ensure justice <u>at all</u> , choose number 1; if you think the courts ensure justice a lot, choose number 7 or choose a point in between the two.)
B2. To what extent do you respect the political institutions of (country)?
B3. To what extent do you think that citizens' basic rights are well protected by the political system of (country)?
B4. To what extent do you feel proud of living under the political system of (country)?
B6. To what extent do you think that one should support the political system of (country)?
B10A. To what extent do you trust the justice system?
B11. To what extent do you trust the Supreme Electoral Tribunal?
B12. To what extent do you trust the Armed Forces? [Don't use in Costa Rica, Panama or Haiti]
B13. To what extent do you trust the National Congress?
B14. To what extent do you trust the national government?
B15. To what extent do you trust the Federal Department of Justice?
B18. To what extent do you trust the National Police?
B20. To what extent do you trust the Catholic Church?
B21. To what extent do you trust the political parties?
B21A. To what extent do you trust the President/Prime Minister
B31. To what extent do you trust the Supreme Court?
B32. To what extent do you trust the local or municipal government?
B43. To what extent are you proud of being (nationality corresponding to country)?
B16. To what extent do you trust the State Attorney General?
B17. To what extent do you trust the Public Defender's Office?
B19. To what extent do you trust the Office of the Auditor General?
B33. To what extent do you trust the provincial/state governor?
B37. To what extent do you trust the media?
B40. To what extent do you trust indigenous movements?
B42. To what extent do you trust the Internal Revenue Service?
B50. To what extent do you trust the Constitutional Tribunal?
B46 [b45]. To what extent do you trust the anti-corruption commission?
B47. To what extent do you trust elections?
B48. To what extent do you believe that free trade agreement will help to improve the economy?

N1. To what extent would you say the current administration fights poverty?
N3. To what extent would you say the current administration promotes and protects democratic principles?
N9. To what extent would you say the current administration combats government corruption?
N10. To what extent would you say the current administration protects human rights.
N11. To what extent would you say the current administration improves the security of citizens?
N12. To what extent would you say the current administration combats unemployment?

Now I am going to read a series of sentences about [country's] political parties and then I will ask your opinion. We will continue to use the same scale of 1 to 7 where 1 means not at all and 7 means a lot. [Take back card A]

EPP1. Thinking of political parties in general, to what extent do [country's] political parties represent their voters well? 8. DK/DR
EPP2. To what extent does corruption exist within [country's] political parties? 8. DK/DR
EPP3. How often do political parties listen to the average person? 8. DK/DR
EC1. And now thinking of the Parliament. To what extent does the national legislature limit the power of the president? 8. DK/DR
EC2. To what extent do members the Parliament waste time discussing, debating and negotiating among themselves? 8. DK/DR
EC3. How important to the country are the laws passed by the parliament? 8. DK/DR
EC4. To what extent does the Parliament accomplish what you would hope for it to do? 8. DK/DR

M1. Speaking in general of the current administration, how would you rate the job performance of President NAME CURRENT PRESIDENT? [Read the options] (1) Very good (2) Good (3) Neither good nor bad (fair) (4) Bad (5) Very bad (8) DK/DR
M2. Now speaking of Congress/Parliament. Thinking in those members of congress as a whole, without considering the political parties to which they belong, do you believe that the Members of Congress/Parliament are performing their jobs very well, well, neither well nor poorly, poorly, or very poorly? (1) Very well (2) Well (3) Neither well nor poorly (fair) (4) Poorly (5) Very poorly (8) DK/DR

[Give card B]: Now we will use a similar card, but this time 1 means “strongly disagree” and 7 means “strongly agree.” A number in between 1 and 7 represents an intermediate score. I am going to read various statements and I would like you to tell me to what extent you agree or disagree with these statements.

Write a number 1-7, or 8 for those who don't know

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Strongly disagree						Strongly	Doesn't know
agree							

Taking into account the current situation of this country, I would like you to tell me how much you agree or disagree with the following statements, again using card B:

POP101. It is necessary for the progress of this country that our presidents/prime ministers limit the voice and vote of opposition parties, how much do you agree or disagree with that view?
8. DK/DR

POP102. When the Congress hinders the work of our government, our presidents/prime ministers should govern without the Congress. How much do you agree or disagree with that view?
8. DK/DR

POP103. When the Supreme Court/Constitutional Tribunal hinders the work of our government, it should be ignored by our presidents/prime ministers. How much do you agree or disagree with that view?
8. DK/DR

POP106. Our presidents/prime ministers must follow the will of the people because what the people want is always right. How much do you agree or disagree with that view?
8. DK/DR

POP107. The people should govern directly and **not** through elected representatives. How much do you agree or disagree?
8. DK/DR

POP109. In today's world there is a battle between good and evil, and people must choose between one of the two. How much do you agree or disagree that such a battle between good and evil exists?
8. DK/DR

POP110. Once the people decide what is right, we must prevent opposition from a minority. How much do you agree or disagree with that view?
8. DK/DR

POP112. The **biggest** obstacle to progress in our country is the dominant class or oligarchy that takes advantage of the people. How much do you agree or disagree with that view?

POP113. Those who disagree with the majority represent a threat to the interests of the country. How much do you agree or disagree with that view?
8. DK/DR

EFF1. Those who govern this country are really interested in what people like me think. How much do you agree or disagree?

EFF2. I feel that I understand the most important political issues of this country. How much do you agree or disagree.

ING4. Democracy may have problems, but it is better than any other form of government. To what extent do you agree or disagree with these statements?

PN2. Despite our differences, we (nationality) have many things that unite us as a country. How much do you agree or disagree with this statement?

DEM23. Democracy can exist without political parties. How much do you agree or disagree or disagree with this statement?

Now I am going to read some items about the role of the national government. Please tell me to what extent you agree or disagree with the following statements. We will continue using the same scale from 1 to 7.

ROS1. The (Country) government, instead of the private sector, should own the most important enterprises and industries of the country. How much do you agree or disagree with this statement?

ROS2. The (Country) government, more than individuals, is the most responsible for ensuring the well-being of the people. To what extent do you agree or disagree with this statement?

ROS3. The (Country) government, more than the private sector, is the primarily responsible for creating jobs. To what extent do you agree or disagree with this statement?

ROS4. The (Country) government should implement firm policies to reduce inequality in income between the rich and the poor. To what extent do you agree or disagree with this statement?

[Take back Card "B"]

PN4. In general, would you say that you are very satisfied, satisfied, dissatisfied or very dissatisfied with the form of democracy in country?
 (1) Very satisfied (2) Satisfied (3) Dissatisfied (4) Very dissatisfied (8) DK/DR

PN5. In your opinion, is country very democratic, somewhat democratic, not very democratic or not at all democratic?
 (1) Very democratic (2) Somewhat democratic (3) Not very democratic
 (4) Not at all democratic (8) DK/DR

[Give the respondent card "C"]
 Now we are going to use another card. The new card has a 10-point scale, which goes from 1 to 10, where 1 means that you strongly disapprove and 10 means that you strongly approve. I am going to read you a list of some actions that people can take to achieve their political goals and objectives. Please tell me how strongly you would approve or disapprove of people taking the following actions.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	88
Strongly disapprove							Strongly approve			Doesn't know

E5. Of people participating in legal demonstrations. How much do you approve or disapprove?

E8. Of people participating in an organization or group to try to solve community problems. How much do you approve or disapprove?

E11. Of people working for campaigns for a political party or candidate. How much do you approve or disapprove?

E15. Of people participating in the blocking of roads. Using the same scale, how much do you approve or disapprove?

E14. Of people seizing private property or land. How much do you approve or disapprove?

E2. Of people seizing factories, offices and other buildings. How much do you approve or disapprove?

E3. Of people participating in a group working to violently overthrow an elected government. How much do you approve or disapprove?

E16. Of people taking the law into their own hands when the government does not punish criminals. How much do you approve or disapprove?

[Don't take back card "C"]

Now we are going to talk about some actions the government can take. We will continue using a 1-10 scale. Please use card C again. On this scale, 1 means strongly disapprove and 10 means strongly approve.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	88
Strongly disapprove								Strongly		Doesn't know
approve										

D32. To what degree do you approve or disapprove of a law prohibiting public protests?

D33. To what degree do you approve or disapprove of a law prohibiting the meetings of any group that criticizes the [nationality] political system?

D34. To what degree would you approve or disapprove of the government censoring television programs?

D36. To what degree would you approve or disapprove if the government censored books in public school libraries?

D37. To what degree would you approve or disapprove if the government censored any media outlets that criticized it?

The following questions are to find out your opinion about the different ideas of people who live in country. Please continue using the 10 point scale [card C].

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	88
Strongly disapprove							Strongly approve			Doesn't know

D1. There are people who speak negatively of the (nationality) form of government, not just the government but the system of government. How strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people's **right to vote**? Please read me the number from the scale: *[Probe: To what degree?]*

D2. How strongly do you approve or disapprove that such people be allowed **to conduct peaceful demonstrations** in order to express their views? Please read me the number.

D3. Still thinking of those who speak poorly of the (nationality) for of government, how strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people being permitted **to run for public office**?

D4. How strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people appearing on television **to make speeches**?

D5. And now, changing the topic and thinking of homosexuals, how strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people being permitted to run for public office?

COLLECT CARD "C"

Now changing the subject...

DEM2. With which of the following statements do you agree with the most:

- (1) For most people it doesn't matter whether a regime is democratic or non-democratic.
- (2) Democracy is preferable to any other form of government
- (3) Under some circumstances an authoritarian government may be preferable to a democratic one.
- (8) DK/DR

DEM11. Do you think that our country needs a government with an iron fist, or that problems can be resolved with everyone's participation?

- (1) Iron fist
- (2) Participation for all
- (8) DK/DR

AUT1. There are people who say that we need a strong leader that does not have to be elected. Others say that although things may not work, electoral democracy, or the popular vote, is always best. What do you think?

[Read]

- (1) We need a strong leader who does not have to be elected
- (2) Electoral democracy is the best
- (8) DK/DR

AUT2. With which of the following statements do you agree the most: **[Read choices]**

- (1) As citizens we should be more active in questioning our leaders or
- (2) As citizens we should show more respect for the authority of our leaders
- (8) DK/DR

PP1. During election time, some people try to convince others to vote for a party or candidate. How often have you tried to convince others to vote for a party or candidate? **[Read the options]**

- (1) Frequently
- (2) Occasionally
- (3) Rarely
- (4) Never
- (8) DK/DR

PP2. There are people who work for parties or candidates during electoral campaigns. Did you work for any candidate or party in the last presidential elections of 2004?

- (1) Yes, worked
- (2) Did not work
- (8) DK/DR

Now, I would like for you to tell me if you consider the following actions as:

- 1) corrupt and should be punished; 2) corrupt but justified under the circumstances; or 3) not corrupt.

DC10. A mother of several children needs to obtain a birth certificate for one of them. In order not to waste time waiting, she pays the county or municipal clerk amount and currency of country equivalent to US\$5. Do you think that what the woman did is **[Read the options, and if answer "the municipal official has to be punished," Ask: and the mother?]**:

- 1) Corrupt and should be punished
- 2) Corrupt but justified
- 3) Not corrupt DK=8

DC13. An unemployed individual is the brother-in-law of an important politician, and the politician uses his influence to get his brother-in-law a job. Do you think the politician is **[Read the options]**

- 1) Corrupt and should be punished
- 2) Corrupt but justified
- 3) Not corrupt DK=8

	INAP Did not try or did not have contact	No	Yes	DK/DR
Now we want to talk about your personal experience with things that happen in everyday life...				
EXC2. Has a police officer ask you for a bribe during the past year?		0	1	8
EXC6. During the past year did any government employee ask you for a bribe?		0	1	8
EXC11. During the past year did you have any official dealings in the municipality/local government? If the answer is No → mark 9 If it is Yes→ ask the following: During the past year, to process any kind of document (like a license, for example), did you have to pay any money above that required by law?	9	0	1	8
EXC13. Are you currently employed? If the answer is No → mark 9 If it is Yes→ ask the following: At your workplace, have you been bribed within the past year?	9	0	1	8
EXC14. During the past year, have you had any dealings with the courts? If the answer is No → note down 9 If it is Yes→ ask the following: Did you have to pay a bribe to the courts within the past year?	9	0	1	8
EXC15. Have you use any public health services during the past year? If the answer is No → mark 9 If it is Yes→ ask the following: In order to receive attention in a hospital or a clinic during the past year, did you have to pay a bribe?	9	0	1	8
EXC16. Have you had a child in school during the past year? If the answer is No → mark 9 If it is Yes→ ask the following: Have you had to pay a bribe at school during the past year?	9	0	1	8
EXC17. Did anyone ask you for a bribe to avoid having the electricity shut off?		0	1	8
EXC18. Do you think given the way things are, sometimes paying a bribe is justified?		0	1	8

EXC7. Taking into account your own experience or what you have heard, corruption among public officials is [Read] (1) Very common, (2) Common, (3) Uncommon, or (4) Very uncommon? (8) DK/DR

<p>Now we want to know how much information about politics and the country is known by the people...</p> <p>GI1. What is the name of the current president of the United States? [Don't read, George Bush] (1) Correct (2) Incorrect (8) Do not Know (9) No Answer</p>
<p>GI2. What is the name of the President of Congress in country? [Don't read, insert name] (1) Correct (2) Incorrect (8) Do not Know (9) No Answer</p>
<p>GI3. How many provinces does the country have? [Don't read, insert number of provinces] (1) Correct (2) Incorrect (8) Do not Know (9) No Answer</p>
<p>NICARAGUA AND PANAMA ACCEPT WITH OR WITHOUT COMARCAS</p>
<p>GI4. How long is the presidential/prime ministerial term of office in country? [Don't read, insert number of years] ((1) Correct (2) Incorrect (8) Do not Know (9) No Answer</p>
<p>GI5. What is the name of the current president of Brazil? [Don't read, Luis Inacio Lula da Silva, also accept "Lula"] (1) Correct (2) Incorrect (8) Do not Know (9) No Answer</p>

<p>VB1. Are you registered to vote? [El Salvador, Costa Rica, Panama, Peru: Do you have an Identity Card?] (1) Yes (2) No (3) Being processed (8) DK</p>
<p>VB2. Did you vote in the last presidential elections of (year of last presidential elections)? (1) Voted [Continue] (2) Did not vote [Go to VB50] (8) DK [Go to VB50]</p>
<p>VB3. Who did you vote for in the last presidential elections? [DON'T READ THE LIST] 0. None (Blank ballot or vote canceled) X01. INSERT NAMES AND PARTIES X02. X03. Replace X with Country Code 77. Other _____ 88. DK/DR 99. INAP (Did not vote)</p>
<p>VB50. [Ask to everyone] Generally speaking, men are better political leaders than women. How much do you agree with that statement? (1) Agree very much (2) Agree (3) Disagree (4) Disagree very much</p>
<p>VB10. Do you currently identify with a political party? (1) Yes [Continue] (2) No [Go to POL1] (8) DK [Go to POL1]</p>
<p>VB11. Which political party do you identify with? [Don't read the list] X01. WRITE DOWN THE NAMES OF CURRENT POLITICAL PARTIES X02. X03. X04 Replace X with Country Code 88. DK/DR [Skip to POL1] 99. NA [Skip to POL1]</p>
<p>VB12. Would you say that your identification with that party [the party mentioned in VB11] is very weak, weak, not weak or strong, strong, very strong? (1) Very weak (2) Weak (3) Not weak, or strong (4) Strong (5) Very strong (8) DK/DR (9) INAP</p>

POL1. How much interest do you have in politics: a lot, some, little or none?
1) A lot 2) Some 3) Little 4) None 8) DK/DR

POL2. How often do you discuss politics with other people? (**Read the options**)
1) Daily 2) A few times a week 3) A few times a month 4) Rarely 5) Never
8) DK/DR

Now changing the subject, have you ever felt discriminated or treated unfairly because of your physical appearance or the way you talk in the following places:

DIS2. In government offices (courts, municipal offices)
(1) Yes (2) No (8) DK/DR

DIS4. In social events or meetings
(1) Yes (2) No (8) DK/DR

DIS5. In public places (such as on the street, in a mall, or in a store)
(1) Yes (2) No (8) DK/DR

VB20. [Ask to everyone] If the next presidential elections were being held this Sunday, for which party would you vote? [**Read options**]
(1) Wouldn't vote
(2) Would vote for the incumbent candidate or party
(3) Would vote for a candidate or party opposing the current administration
(4) Would go to vote but would leave the ballot blank or would purposely cancel my vote
(8) DK/DR

VB21. What is the way that you think you can have the most influence to change things? [**Read options**]
(1) Vote to elect those who support my position
(2) Participate in protest movements and demand changes directly
(3) Influence in other ways
(4) It is not possible to have influence in order to change things, it does not matter
(8) DK/DR

[**Give Card "D"**]

LS6. Please, imagine a ladder with steps numbered 0 to 10, where 0 is the lowest step and 10 the highest. Suppose that I tell you that the highest step represents the best life possible for you and the lowest step represents the worst life possible for you... **if the highest is 10 and the lowest 0, on what step of the ladder do you feel at this moment?** (ONLY ANSWER/SPONTANEOUS)

LS4. Considering everything that we have talked about this city/area, would you say that you are satisfied or unsatisfied with where you live?
(1) Satisfied (2) Unsatisfied (8) DK/DR

0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	88
Worst life possible [Take back Card "D"]										Best life possible	DK/DR

In this city/area where you live, are you satisfied or unsatisfied with ... [Repeat "satisfied" and "unsatisfied" after each question to help the respondent]

	Satisfied	Unsatisfied	DK/DR		
SD1. The public transportation system	1	2	8		
SD2. the streets and interstates	1	2	8		
SD3. The educational system and schools	1	2	8		
SD4. The quality of air	1	2	8		
SD5. The quality of water	1	2	8		
SD6. The availability of health services and health care	1	2	8		
SD7. The availability of good housing at affordable prices	1	2	8		
SD8. The attractiveness of the area	1	2	8		
SD9. Traffic	1	2	8		
SD10. The sidewalks or pedestrian areas	1	2	8		
SD11. The availability of parks, plazas, green areas	1	2	8		
SD12. The availability of recreational facilities	1	2	8		

Q2. How old are you? _____ years

Q3. What is your religion? [Do not read options]

- (1) Catholic
- (2) Mainline Protestant or Protestant non-Evangelical (Adventist, Baptist, Calvinist, The Salvation Army, Lutheran, Methodist, Nazarene, Presbyterian).
- (3) Non-Christian Religions (Jewish, Muslims, Buddhists, Hinduisms, Taoists).
- (5) Evangelical and Pentecostal (Pentecostals, Charismatic non-Catholics, Light of World).
- (6) Mormons, Jehovah's Witness, Spiritualists and Seventh-Day Adventists.
- (7) Traditional Religions or Native Religions (Candomble, Vodoo, Rastafarian, Mayan Traditional Religion).
- (4) None, secularist or atheist (Do not believe in God)
- (8) DK/DR

And now to finish up, I am going to ask you a few questions for statistical purposes.

ED. What was the last year of education you passed?

_____ Year _____ (primary, secondary, university) = _____ total number of years

[Use the table below for the code]

	1	2	3	4	5	6		
None	0							
Primary	1	2	3	4	5	6		
Secondary	7	8	9	10	11	12		
University	13	14	15	16	17	18		
Doesn't know/Doesn't respond	88							

Q5A. How often do you attend religious services? **[Read options]**

1. More than once per week 2. Once per week 3. Once a month 4. Once or twice a year 5. Never 8. DK/DR

[Show the list of ranges on Card E]

Q10. Into which of the following income ranges does the total monthly income of this household fit, including remittances from abroad and the income of all the working adults and children?

[10 deciles based on the currency and distribution of the country]

- (00) No income
- (01) Less than \$25
- (02) \$26- \$50
- (03) \$51-\$100
- (04) \$101-\$150
- (05) \$151-\$200
- (06) \$201-\$300
- (07) \$301-\$400
- (08) \$401-500
- (09) \$501-\$750
- (10) More than \$751
- (88) DK/DR

[COLLECT CARD E]

Q10A. Does your family receive remittances from abroad?

1. Yes 2. **[Go to Q10C]** No 8. DK/NA **[Go to Q10C]**

<p>Q10A1. [Only for those who receive remittances] How do you generally use the remittances? [Don't Read] 1. Consumption (food, clothing) 2. Housing (construction, repair) 3. Education 4. Community (schools repairs, reconstruction of churches/temples, community parties) 5. Health care 6. Savings/Investment 7. Other 8. DK/DR 9. INAP</p>
<p>Q10B. [Only for those who receive remittances] To what extent does the income of this household depend on remittances from abroad? [Read Options] (1) A lot (2) Some (3) Little (4) Nothing (8) DK/NA (9) Inap</p>
<p>Q10C. [Ask to everybody] Do you have close relatives who use to live in this household and are now living abroad? [If answer "Yes", Ask where] [Don't Read] (1) Yes, in the United States only (2) Yes, in the United States and in other countries (3) Yes, in other countries (not in the United States) (4) No [Skip to Q14] (8) DK/NA [Skip to Q14]</p>
<p>Q16. [Only for those who answered Yes to Q10C] How often do you communicate with them? (1) Everyday (2) Once or twice a week (3) Once or twice a month (4) Rarely (5) Never (8) DK/DR (9) INAP</p>
<p>Q14. [Ask to everyone] Do you have any intention of going to live or work in another country in the next three years? 1) Yes 2) No 8) DK/DR</p>
<p>Q10D. [Ask to everyone] The salary that you receive and total family income : [Read the options] 1. Is enough, so that you can save 2. Is just enough, but you can not save 3. Is not enough, you can not pay your bills 4. Is not enough, you can not cover your basic needs 8. [Don't read] DK/DR</p>
<p>Q11. What is your marital status? [Don't read options] (1) Single (2) Married (3) Common law marriage (4) Divorced (5) Separated (6) Widowed (8) DK/DR</p>
<p>Q12. How many children do you have? _____ (00 = none → Skip to ETID) DK.....88</p>
<p>Q12A. [If has children] How many children live with you at the present time? _____ (00) = none, (99) INAP (doesn't have children).</p>
<p>ETID. Do you consider yourself white, mestizo, indigenous, Afro-country (black), mulatto, or of another race? (1) White (2) Mestizo (3) Indigenous (4) Black o Afro-country (5) Mulatto (7) Other (8) DK/DR</p>

[NB; WRITE THE FIRST THREE LETTERS OF THE COUNTRY IN THE CODE OF THIS QUESTION. For example, for Costa Rica, it should be COSETIDA]

ETIDA. Do you think your mother is or was white, mestizo, indigenous, black or mulatto?

White [1] Mestizo [2] Indigenous [3] Black [4] Mulatto [5] Mulatto [7] Other DK/DR [8]

LENG1. What language have you spoken at home since childhood? (accept more than one option)
(X01) Spanish (X02) Indigenous language [NB; list the name of the most common indigenous languages (X04) Other (indigenous) (X05) Other foreign (8) DK/DR

[NB: WRITE THE FIRST THREE LETTERS OF THE COUNTRY IN THE CODE OF THIS QUESTION. For example, for Peru, it should be PERLENG1A]

[Only to be used in Mexico, Guatemala and Peru] LENG1A. Was another language spoken in your house when you were a child? Which one? (*Accept one response*)

(1) Spanish (2) Indigenous language [NB: list the name of the most common indigenous languages] (4) Other (indigenous) (5) Other foreign (7) None DK/DR [8]

[Use only in Mexico, Guatemala, and Peru]

LENG4. Speaking about the language that your parents knew, your parents speak or spoke:
(*Interviewer: if one of the parents spoke only one language and the other two, mark 2.*) [**Read the options**]

[1] Spanish only [2] Spanish and indigenous language [3] Indigenous language only
[4] Spanish and foreign language [8] DK/DR

WWW1. Talking about other things, how often do you use the internet? [**Read options**]

1. Everyday or almost everyday
2. At least once a week
3. At least once a month
4. Rarely
5. Never
9. DK/DR [**Don't read**]

R1. Television	(0) No	(1) Yes
R3. Refrigerator	(0) No	(1) Yes
R4. Conventional telephone (not cellular)	(0) No	(1) Yes
R4A. Cellular telephone	(0) No	(1) Yes
R5. Vehicle	(0) No (1) One (2) Two (3) Three or more	
R6. Washing machine	(0) No	(1) Yes
R7. Microwave oven	(0) No	(1) Yes
R8. Motorcycle	(0) No	(1) Yes
R12. Indoor plumbing	(0) No	(1) Yes
R14. Indoor bathroom	(0) No	(1) Yes
R15. Computer	(0) No	(1) Yes

<p>OCUP4A. How do you mainly spend your time? Are you currently...[Read the options]</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Working? [Continue] 2. Not working, but have a job? [Continue] 3. Actively looking for a job? [Go to MIG1/END] 4. A student? [Go to MIG1/END] 5. Taking care of the home? [Go to MIG1/END] 6. Retired, a pensioner or permanently disable to work [Go to MIG1/END] 7. Notworking and not looking for a job? [Go to MIG1/END] 8. DK/DR
<p>OCUPI. What is your main occupation or type of work? [Probe: what is your job about?] [Don't read the options]</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Professional, intellectual or scientist (lawyer, university professor, physician, engineer, architect, accountant, engineer, etc.) 2. Manager 3. Technical or mid-level professional (computer technician, school teacher, artist, athlete, etc.) 4. Skilled worker (machine operator, mechanic, carpenter, electrician, etc.) 5. Government official (member of government legislative, executive or judicial branches, or other government employee) 6. Office worker (secretary, receptionist, cashier, customer service representative, etc.) 7. Businessperson (entrepreneurs, salespeople, etc.) 8. Food vendor 9. Employee in the service sector (hotel worker, restaurant employee, taxi driver, etc.) 10. Farmer 11. Farmhand (works for others, does not own land) 12. Artisan 13. Domestic servant 14. Servant 15. Member of the armed forces or of the civil services (police, firefighters, etc.) 88. DK
<p>OCUPIA. In this job are you: [Read the options]</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. A salaried employee of the government or an independent state-owned enterprise? 2. A salaried employee in the private sector? 3. Owner or partner in a business 4. Self-employed 5. Unpaid worker 8. DK/DR 9. INAP
<p>OCUPI2A. How many hours do you normally work in your primary job? _____ [Mark number of hours] (88) DK/DR (99) INAP</p>
<p>OCUPI2. Would you like to work more, less or the same number of hours? (1) Less (2) Same (3) More (8) DK/DR (9) INAP</p>
<p>OCUPIC. Do you have health insurance through your employer? (1) Yes (2) No (8) DK/DR (9) INAP</p>

<p>Now I Would like to ask you some questions about your work situation during December of 2006</p> <p>OCUP27. –During this time did you have the same job you have now? (1) Yes [Skip to MIG1 / END] (2) No [Continue] (8) NS/NR [Continue] (9) INAP</p>
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<p>OCUP28. During this time period were you: [Read options]</p> <p>(1) Unemployed? [Continue]</p> <p>(2) Working? [Skip to MIG1 / End]</p> <p>(3) Studying? [Skip to MIG1 / END]</p> <p>(4) Taking care of the home? [Skip to MIG1 / END]</p> <p>(5) Other (retired, etc.) [Skip to MIG1 / END] (8) DK/DR [Skip to MIG1 / END] (9) INAP</p>
<p>OCUP29. Why were you unemployed during this time period? [Don't read options]</p> <p>(1) Voluntarily left previous job [Skip to OCUP31]</p> <p>(2) Ended temporary employment [Skip to OCUP31]</p> <p>(3) Was looking for a job for the first time [Skip to OCUP31]</p> <p>(4) The company where employed closed [Continue]</p> <p>(5) Laid off or fired [Continue]</p> <p>(8) DK/DR [Skip to OCUP31]</p> <p>(9) INAP</p>
<p>OCUP30. Did you receive any type of unemployment compensation from the company where you worked?</p> <p>(1) Yes [Skip to MIG1 / END]</p> <p>(2) No [Skip to MIG1 / END]</p> <p>(8) DK/DR [Skip to MIG1 / END]</p> <p>(9) INAP</p>
<p>OCUP31. During this time period were you looking for a job?</p> <p>(1) Yes [Continue]</p> <p>(2) No [Skip to MIG1 / END]</p> <p>(8) DK/DR [Skip to MIG1 / END]</p> <p>(9) INAP</p>
<p>OCUP31A During this time how long were you looking for a job?</p> <p>(1) Less than one month</p> <p>(2) Between one and three months</p> <p>(3) Between three and six months</p> <p>(4) More than six months</p> <p>(8) DK/DR</p> <p>(9) INAP</p>

<p>MIG1. During your childhood, where did you mainly live? In the country? In a town? Or in a city?:</p> <p>1. In the country 2. In a town 3. In a city 8. DK/DR</p>
<p>MIG2. Where were you living 5 years ago? [Read options]</p> <p>1. In the same municipality [Go to TI] 2. In another municipality in the country [Continue] 3. In another country [Go to TI] 8. DK/DR [Go to TI]</p>
<p>MIG3. The place where you lived 5 years ago was: [Read options]</p> <p>(1) A town or city smaller than this one</p> <p>(2) A town or city larger than this one</p> <p>(3) A town or city like this one</p> <p>(8) DK</p> <p>(9) NA (did not migrate)</p>

Time interview ended _____ : _____
TI. Duration of interview [minutes, see page # 1] _____

These are all the questions I have. Thank you very much for your cooperation.

I swear that this interview was carried out with the person indicated above.
Interviewer's signature _____ *Date* ____ / ____ / ____

Field supervisor's signature _____
Comments:

Signature of the person who entered the data _____
Signature of the person who verified the data _____

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