Feminist Policy Reforms in Korea: Strategies and Outcomes of the Women’s Movement in Korea

By

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To our Heavenly Parent, my mother and father

and

To my husband Toku, and my daughter Takami
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

In March 2005, various women’s groups in South Korea (hereafter Korea) that campaigned for the abolition of the Family Headship System (the *Hojuje* in Korean) held a celebratory banquet. The *Hojuje* is a traditional household system in Korea that prescribes rules regarding family registration, rights, and duties among family members. The system discriminates against women through patriarchal rules of headship succession and child registration. Thus, the abolition of the law was a long-time wish for women’s organizations in Korea since the law’s enactment fifty years earlier. After decades of political battle and intense mobilization from 1999 onward, the law was finally abolished in 2005.

Some policy reform efforts by Korean women’s organizations, however, never achieved expected results. For instance, feminist activists tried to revise the Special Act on Sexual Violence in 1999 to change the definition of sexual violence in the law to include any crime that violates one’s sexual autonomy. The same feminist groups that led the campaign to abolish the *Hojuje* conducted the campaign to revise the Special Act on Sexual Violence between 1999 and 2007, when progressive presidents held power. However, this feminist demand has still not been adopted in the law. Observing such variation in movement outcomes leads to the following research question: why did these campaigns produce different outcomes?

Conventional approaches to this inquiry examine campaigns using a political opportunity structure theory or a resource mobilization perspective. However, these widely accepted theories in social movement research do not explain the fact that the above campaigns produced different results under similar contexts of political opportunity structure and resource mobilization capacity. My dissertation study aims to explain the differences in campaign outcomes by examining social movement strategies and their influences on a movement’s political outcomes. In this introduction, I first introduce the Korean women’s movement and the eleven feminist policy campaigns examined in this research. After I provide
a brief overview of the literature, I discuss the data sources and analytic approaches used in my study. Finally, I provide an outline of this dissertation’s chapters.

The Korean Women’s Movement and Feminist Policy Campaigns

After surviving a civil war and decades of military dictatorships, Korean society started to experience political democracy in the late 1980s. As Korea transitioned to political democracy, progressive women’s groups gathered to form an independent women’s movement (Kim and Kim 2014). Various feminist groups desired to have a permanent umbrella organization that could powerfully influence national gender issues in Korea. This desire led to the founding of the Korean Women’s Association United (KWAU) in 1987, whose primary goal is to realize gender equality through the practice of feminism. The KWAU remains a national representative of the feminist movement in Korea.

Scholars of the Korean women’s movement note that one of the greatest achievements of the Korean feminist movement is the passage of important feminist laws (Kwon 2011; Lee and Chin 2007). A number of feminist policy reforms took place between the 1990s and the 2000s. During this time, the Korean feminist movement thrived due to its high mobilization capacity. Broad and welcoming political contexts also enabled the women’s movement to succeed. For instance, progressive presidents for two terms between 1998 and 2007 contributed to the advancement of gender policy in Korea (Cho 2008; Kim and Kim 2011; Shim 2007; Suh 2011).

The relationship between the feminist movement and the government, in fact, started to become more cooperative in 1993 when the first civilian government, Mun-Min-Jeoung-Bu launched (Kim and Kim 2014). Growing pressure from global society towards gender mainstreaming facilitated the Mun-Min-Jeong-Bu to establish gender policies that complied with the world standard (Kim and Kim 2014). Moreover, since the early 1990s the progressive women’s groups had begun to view the government as a

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1 Appendix C provides further information about the Korean women’s movement embedded in Korea’s recent history, social movement field, political structure, and gender policy development.
means and resource to advance women’s equal rights in society, rather than the enemy suppressing women’s lives (Kim and Kim 2014).

Optimal conditions for the Korean feminist movement, both internal and external, began to collapse around the late 2000s. With the emergence of a new conservative president, Lee Myung-Bak, in 2008 a political context that used to be open to the feminist movement began to close. In addition, the women’s movement had already started to demobilize due to the institutionalization of the movement during the progressive presidential regimes (Kim and Kim 2011). Although the first female president of Korea was elected in 2013, her conservative stance and lack of feminist consciousness did not benefit the feminist movement during her presidency.

My dissertation research pays close attention to the time period when the Korean feminist movement thrived and had a cooperative relationship with the government between 1993 and 2007. I specifically examine eleven feminist policy campaigns led by the KWAU between 1993 and 2007. These eleven campaigns dealt with various gender issues, including violence against women, equal employment, family/work reconciliation, family, and women’s representativeness in politics. Campaigns regarding violence against women challenged gender laws that prescribe definitions and rules for sexual violence, domestic violence, and sex trafficking/prostitution. To promote equal employment between men and women, feminist activists tried to establish legal provisions that prohibit indirect discrimination and sexual harassment at work. In an attempt to increase women’s participation in the workforce, feminist organizations also strived to enhance government support for childcare services and maternity protection. Family laws that discriminate against women and untraditional types of families were also the targets of feminist activism. Finally, establishing a gender quota system in politics was an ongoing effort of the Korean feminist movement to improve women’s representativeness in politics.

Seven out of the eleven campaigns examined in this research were successful, while the rest failed. By success, I mean that the gender bill reflecting feminist demands was enacted. On the other hand, when the government revised a gender law but did not adopt major suggestions from a feminist policy campaign, I consider that campaign unsuccessful. Comparing the eleven policy campaigns, I ask why
their campaign outcomes were different even though they were conducted in similar political contexts and led by the same women’s movement of that time. Surprisingly, few studies systematically examine this question by comparing different policy campaigns (Cho 2008; Kim 2007; Kwon 2011; Shim 2007).

**Brief Overview of the Literature: What Influences Feminist Policy Reform?**

**Feminist Policy Research**

Feminist policy researchers argue that a state is a leading actor/institution promoting women-friendly gender policies, and call such state action “state feminism” (Stetson and Mazur 1995). Feminist policy researchers also acknowledge the policy impact of women’s movements on such state feminism. They argue that the state alone typically does not establish feminist policies, but strong support from non-state institutions/actors, such as women’s movements, is also needed (Elman 1996; Stetson 2001; Weldon 2002).

What is lacking in previous feminist policy research is a theoretically-driven explanation of how women’s movements influence policymaking. Some researchers test whether the presence of a nationwide women’s organization or women’s movement autonomy from the state is significant to establishing women-friendly policies regarding violence against women (Elman 1996; Murphy 1997; Weldon 2002). However, such conditions (e.g., the presence of a social movement organization and its relationship to the state) do not explain how social movement activists actually strategize to influence policy reforms (McCammon 2012). In other words, strategies of social movements and their relations to policy changes have rarely been examined in past feminist policy research.

**Social Movement Scholarship on Political Outcomes**

Studies of social movements consider both the political contexts in which movements reside as well as the strength of the movements themselves as influencing factors to policy reform. Most scholars agree on the significance of favorable political contexts for the political success of a social movement (Amenta et al. 1992, 1994; Meyer and Minkoff 2004; Stearns and Almeida 2004). The same applies to women’s movements: political opportunities or openness to women’s movements lead to the creation of
women-friendly policies (Moghadam and Gheytanchi 2010; Soule and Olzak 2004). In their study of the Equal Rights Amendment movements in the U.S., Soule and Olzak (2004) find that the presence of political allies in favor of the ERA ratification increased the chance of social movement organizations’ effect on ratification. Even in a nondemocratic country like Morocco, support of feminist movements from a newly-elected president, whose political orientation was associated with socialism and a progressive ideology, facilitated the creation of the new Moroccan family law prescribing that husband and wife share joint responsibility for the family (Moghadam and Gheytanchi 2010).

In addition to the external factors affecting a social movement, researchers also note that the internal strength of a movement, measured by organizational membership or the level of mobilization, may influence the movement’s political outcomes. But the evidence about impact of movement strength on policy outcome is mixed (Kolb 2007). Some empirical studies on the U.S. women’s movement (McCammon et al. 2001; Murphy 1997) find no direct impact of membership size on policy outcomes, while Banaszak’s (1996) research on the U.S. suffrage movement shows a positive effect of membership size on the achievement of voting rights.

I suggest that these conflicting findings in the literature may be related to the issue of measurement. The previous research tends to measure a movement’s strength by its quantity or size. I argue that a movement’s strength can come not only from its size but also from its strategies. For example, depending on how members utilize given resources, one movement can be more impactful than another, possibly even one that has a larger membership (Ganz 2000). Such strategic aspects of movement strength have been examined in the literature on movement strategy. However, the role of strategy in the political consequences of social movements is one of the most under-theorized topics in social movement outcome literature (Kolb 2007, but see Amenta et al 2005; Ganz 2000; McCammon 2012).

In my attempt to fill this gap in existing scholarship, my study investigates movement strategies and their relations to campaign outcomes. I particularly examine coalition and framing strategies of the feminist policy campaigns in Korea. I also take into account political contexts influencing policy reform as previous research informs us that political conditions, in combination with social movement strategies,
influence policy change (Amenta et al. 1992, 2005; Cress and Snow 200; Soule and Olzak 2004).

Data and Methods

Case Selection

I select eleven legislative policy campaigns as cases to analyze what influenced their political outcomes. della Porta and Rucht (2002) define campaigns as “temporally bounded and strategically linked series of events and interactions directed at common goals” (della Porta and Rucht 2002: 3). The legislative campaigns in my study broadly fall in this definition of campaigns. However, I do not include all campaigns that qualify under this definition in my study. In other words, the campaigns included here are not the population of all feminist legislative campaigns in Korea between 1993 and 2007, although my samples do include the major feminist legislative campaigns that scholars note as important feminist achievements in Korea (See Kim 2005; Kwon 2011). Several factors determine the selection of the cases.

First, I wanted to include legislative campaigns with variation in their issue areas. Second, the presence of archival documents that chronologically recorded campaign processes and the availability of informants who could recall campaign activities affected my decision in creating the list of cases. Third, I wanted to include campaigns with variation in their political outcomes for comparison, and therefore my sample is a mixture of seven successful campaigns and four unsuccessful campaigns. Finally, any legislative campaigns where feminist activists simply reacted to or opposed government-initiated legislation were not selected as cases in this study, because my focus is on the active role of social movements in policymaking.

Data Sources

To study the eleven cases in my research, I gathered several types of data. The first type of data is archival documents stored in the KWAU. These documents include internal meeting minutes, press conference materials, public hearing handouts, public statements, and pamphlets for public education. By the early 2010s, the KWAU finished filing those documents that had been created over the past three decades and arranged them by policy issues or campaigns. Numerous studies of the Korean women’s
movement have used the KWAU’s annual reports for data collection, but no one has yet made use of these extensive documents. My dissertation is the first research study that utilizes these valuable resources to study the role of the progressive Korean women’s movement for women-friendly policy reforms in Korea. I was granted full access to the KWAU’s entire archive of documents during my three-month internship in the KWAU in 2013, and I acquired a large volume of archived documents totaling approximately 5,000 pages.

The second type of data is interviews with feminist activists. I interviewed at least three activists for each campaign, totaling 23 informants\(^2\). I selected individuals who participated in campaign meetings most frequently based on my review of the meeting minutes. Because many interviewees (14 out of 23) participated in multiple campaigns as core members, they provided multiple accounts of different campaigns.

In addition to these main data sources, I also gathered supplementary data from two different sources: media coverage and secondary scholarly work. I utilize newspaper articles in my investigation of verbal framing strategies in Chapter 3. Secondary scholarly work provides information for Chapter 4, such as the role of a political insider in some campaigns.

**Analytic Methods**

My dissertation is organized into three analytic chapters. Each chapter includes literature review and qualitative comparative analysis (QCA). QCA allows me to systematically identify multiple and combined causes of policy reforms when comparing a relatively small number of campaigns (Ragin 1987). Some social movement studies effectively use this method in investigating multiple factors, including strategy, to understand movement political outcomes (e.g., Cress and Snow 2000; McCammon 2012). I measure both outcome and explanatory variables dichotomously and therefore use crisp-set QCA.

\(^2\) Appendix A contains information about interview participants, including their names (first name abbreviated), campaigns they were involved in and their organizational affiliations.
Causal conditions (i.e., explanatory variables) examined for each analysis are selected using my literature review and both deductive and inductive reasoning. To conduct cross-case analysis, I initially used variable-oriented analysis strategy (Huberman and Miles 1994), which predicts strategic conditions by drawing on the literature about effective social movement strategies. Remaining open to discovering any patterns that emerge inductively, I found new patterns of strategies that were not addressed in previous research. After noting the presence and absence of each condition in the campaigns, I gathered information from my data deductively and coded accordingly.

In addition to QCA, I provide detailed qualitative analysis to further illustrate how certain combinations of strategies and political contexts influenced policy outcomes. My detailed qualitative analysis supplements the QCA results by offering narratives associated with each causal pathway to an outcome.

Outline of Dissertation

In Chapter 2, I explore how social movement coalition strategies contribute to the success or failure of eleven gender policy campaigns in Korea. My work critically engages the current literature on coalition outcomes in social movement research. My findings in the coalition chapter indicate that coalition characteristics, such as coalition size, form, and particularly the quality of its hub (a concept I introduce and develop in Chapter 2), greatly differ between successful and failed policy reform campaigns. My results advance scholarly understanding of coalition dynamics by showing when and how coalition characteristics influence social movements’ political outcomes.

In Chapter 3, I also analyze movement strategy, particularly the role of activist framing strategies. In this chapter I address the lack of attention in previous research to the interactive effects of frame qualities and the role of non-verbal framing activities in producing social movement political victories. I argue that frame qualities (e.g., frame articulateness and empirical credibility) tend to work together to produce political success. Additionally, I show that non-verbal framing activities, such as strategic silence and broad identity deployment in framing, are as important as verbal framing in persuading policymakers.
In Chapter 4, I investigate the interactive impact of women’s movement strategies and political contexts on policy reform, drawing on a political mediation model in social movement research. My findings in this chapter not only support the existing model but also challenge it. I argue that the political mediation model needs to be revised to reflect the shifting nature of political contexts and the involvement of opponents in policymaking. Moreover, my findings highlight the importance of a social movement’s strategies for policy change, which can even cause existing, unfavorable political contexts to favor the movement.

In Chapter 5, I summarize results from Chapters 2, 3, and 4 and address both theoretical contributions and limitations of my dissertation research. Then, I end the chapter by discussing implications for future research.
References


CHAPTER 2

EFFECTIVE MOVEMENT COALITIONS FOR LEGISLATIVE POLICY CHANGES:
A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF FEMINIST POLICY CAMPAIGNS IN KOREA

Introduction

Building a coalition is a popular strategy for social movement activists to increase their chances to win desired outcomes. The progressive women’s movement in Korea features consistent alliances with other social movements as well as coalitions within the women’s movement itself. Utilizing coalition strategies, feminist activists in Korea have sought to influence policymaking processes to create gender egalitarian laws in Korea (Kim and Kim 2011). However, not all attempts succeeded in achieving the intended political outcomes. This chapter starts with the empirical question of why coalitions in some legislative campaigns succeeded in winning new laws while others did not. Existing studies on coalitions provide insufficient theoretical and empirical bases to tackle this question, because the majority of the research examines how a coalition is formed or maintained and pays little attention to coalition outcomes (Staggenborg 2010; Van Dyke and McCammon 2010; Dixon et al. 2013; McCammon and Moon 2015). Even among the handful of studies of coalition outcomes, many investigate either a coalition’s impact on movement mobilization (Jones et al. 2001; Luna 2010; Maney 2000; Murphy 2005; Staggenborg 2015; Widener 2007) or the sustainability of a coalition (Arnold 2011; Beamish and Luebbers 2009; Krinsky and Reese 2006; Post 2015). Thus, the relationship between coalitions and social movements’ political outcomes has been under-examined in the current literature. (For exceptions, see Banaszak 1996; Dixon et al. 2013; McCammon 2012; Nelson and Yackee 2012).

Nevertheless, previous research provides some theoretical building blocks to start investigating which coalition characteristics affect political outcomes. Scholars agree that certain coalition qualities, such as trust among coalition members and the presence of problem-solving mechanisms, are important for coalitions to survive and produce intended outcomes (Arnold 2011; Beamish and Luebbers; 2009;
Dixon et al. 2013; Post 2015). Coalition continuity is another coalition characteristic that may affect coalition outcomes, but is much less studied in the coalition literature (For exception, see McCammon 2012).

The relationship between the coalition’s size and its outcome is disputed in the current literature. Some scholars argue that a broad coalition increases the chance for movement success by pressuring political decision makers with the power of a broader collection of people (Crawhall 2011; Nelson and Yackee 2012). Other scholars find that a broad coalition does not always lead to positive movement outcomes when other conditions for success are missing, such as dedicated leadership (Joyner 1982; Knoke 1990). Thus, a broad coalition may bring about a movement’s political success only in conjunction with other coalition conditions. Moreover, how a broad coalition is operated may influence the coalition’s success. As Jones et al. (2009) demonstrate that a certain type of coalition form (e.g., a coalition spearheaded by a key organization with a large number of assisting groups) is more effective than others in mobilizing protest participants, I suggest that there is a particular form of broad coalition, what I call a “double layer” of coalition, that makes a coalition effective.

Furthermore, I suggest that there is an additional coalition characteristic that may be important for a coalition success, but has yet to be recognized in existing scholarship. It is the presence of what I call a strong coalition hub. Since a coalition is collaborative work across various movement organizations, it is likely to be led by a group of leaders coming from different organizations. These leaders constitute a coalition hub, and I suggest that the strength of the hub may affect the coalition’s political outcome.

I acknowledge that movement political outcomes cannot be achieved solely by movement coalitions and that we should also take environmental factors (e.g., political opportunities) into consideration. For this reason, I investigate legislative campaigns that took place under a similar political context (i.e., democratic, progressive presidential regimes between 1993 and 2007) after the democratization of Korea. Holding a broad political context constant, I empirically examine eleven feminist legislative campaigns in Korea to explore when and how social movement coalitions produce positive political outcomes. Among the eleven cases, seven were successful and the rest failed. By
comparing successful and unsuccessful campaigns using qualitative comparative analysis (QCA), I demonstrate how a set of different coalition conditions jointly affects coalition outcomes.

I begin by discussing the definition of the key terms used in this study, including coalitions and coalition outcomes. I then review the literature on coalition characteristics associated with coalition outcomes and clarify my arguments at the end of each review. Next, I introduce the eleven legislative campaigns that I examine in this study. After providing a detailed discussion of the data and methods used for this research, I analyze how the interaction of some coalition’s conditions affected coalition success, and how the absence of those conditions was detrimental to coalition outcomes.

**Defining Social Movement Coalitions And Coalition Outcomes**

This study focuses on the relationship between social movement coalitions and their political outcomes. The term social movement coalitions is broadly defined as “cooperative efforts to work toward common goals” (Staggenborg 2015:387). Moreover, coalitions are different from networks because, unlike networks, organizations participating in coalitions conduct purposive collective actions together (Tarrow 2005). Coalitions are also different from mergers because, unlike mergers, groups in coalitions keep their organizational identities and structures intact (Zald and Ash 1966; McCammon and Moon 2015). Following this definition of coalitions, I examine alliances of social movement organizations that perform purposive activities for a common goal. Specifically, I study “enduring alliances” that are engaged in long-term activism for a legislative change, rather than “event coalitions” that are mobilized for particular protest events (Levi and Murphy 2006).

Concerning coalition outcomes, McCammon and Moon (2015) identify four types of coalition outcomes that have been discussed in the current literature: organizational changes, movement mobilization, political outcomes, and survival of coalitions. Among the four types, I investigate political outcomes of coalitions. Specifically, I assess coalitions’ political outcomes in terms of their success or failure in passing a bill that they proposed to the legislature. In other words, a coalition success in this study refers to the passage of a bill that the coalition proposed to the legislature. A coalition failure means
that either the coalition’s proposed bill did not pass in the Korean National Assembly or a bill different from the coalition’s proposal was eventually made into a law.

Since the terms coalitions and coalition outcomes can be interpreted in various ways, I delineated the specific terms used in this study. In the discussion that follows, I develop my theoretical arguments as I review the existing literature on the relationship between coalition characteristics and their political outcomes.

Coalition Characteristics And Their Influence On Political Outcomes

Below, I discuss four different coalition characteristics that are likely to produce a coalition’s political success. The first coalition feature, a strong hub, is an innovative concept that I introduce in this study, and has yet to be examined in the existing social movement coalition literature. The second characteristic, a “double layer” of coalition around the hub, is also a new concept that I developed based on the empirical evidence collected in this study as well as previous research. Finally, I consider the influence of two other coalition characteristics on coalition outcomes, positive internal dynamics among coalition members and coalition continuity, as other scholars have already studied.

A Strong Hub

Many coalitions are likely to have a key organization or a group of people leading the coalition. I suggest that having such a group, what I call a “hub”, may be important for a movement’s political success. I further argue that to be a strong hub requires three features, all of which are necessary for a hub to achieve its movement objectives. The three features are: professional cadre, “field” expertise, and policy knowledge.

A coalition may not be able to move forward without dedicated activists or a professional cadre. McCarthy and Zald (1977) define a professional cadre as “the individuals who are involved in the decision-making processes and devote full time to the organization” (1977:1227). In their study of

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3 “Field” (Hyun-jang in Korean) is a term commonly used by Korean feminist activists to describe locations where particular women’s grievances arise.
homeless social movement organizations, Cress and Snow (1996) show that a professional cadre of several core members in a homeless organization had strong influence on the viability of the organization. Professional activism involves numerous tasks including contacting and meeting with politicians, planning events, and writing public statements. As Joyner (1982) points out in her research on the ERA Ratification Project in Illinois, the pro-ERA movement in Illinois was hampered due to the lack of dedicated full time members who would respond to communications during the legislative process in a timely manner.

Besides the importance of a professional cadre for an effective coalition, I suggest that two additional features of hubs need to be present to have a strong hub: “field” expertise and policy knowledge. “Field” expertise refers to local knowledge about locations where particular grievances arise. Nepstad and Bob (2006) note that knowledge gained by activists through their interactions with indigenous communities in Mexico contributed to successful movement mobilization. Similarly, Ganz (2000) argues that a leadership team with salient local knowledge about routine problems of farm workers has more “strategic capacity” than a group lacking such knowledge, and consequently the former is more likely to succeed than the latter. Moreover, coalition members with this “field” expertise may be more motivated than others in the movement because they witness the desperation of people suffering from lack of legal protection. Ganz (2000) also suggests that activists’ strong motivation can increase “strategic capacity” of a leadership team to help it succeed.

Additionally, members in a coalition hub should be armed with knowledge about the policy being proposed, because legislative campaigns involve developing and tweaking bills in negotiations with lawmakers. This professional knowledge is different from “field” expertise because it requires different experiences, such as directly interacting with state actors. Lawyers, academic scholars, and even professional activists who have been studying certain policy areas as their specialty hold this knowledge. This group of policy experts can enhance the infrastructure of the movement and help it better communicate with lawmakers (Andrews 2001).
In sum, I suggest that coalition hubs equipped with these three features are stronger than others, and therefore their chances for success are higher than others. Some coalitions in this study had policy experts but lacked “field” experts or a professional cadre, while others had every feature needed to make a strong hub. Thus, this variation in a coalition hub will reveal how the presence of a strong coalition hub or the lack of it affected coalitions’ political outcomes.

**Coalition Size And Form: A “Double Layer” Of Coalition Around A Hub**

A small number of studies investigate whether coalition size matters for a movement’s political success, but they find contradicting results. Coalition size in this context refers to a coalition’s scope of membership organization. Some evidence shows that broad coalitions, that is, those with numerous organizational members, help movements succeed in their political goals (Banaszak 1996; Crawhall 2011). In her comparative research of the U.S. and Swiss suffrage movements, Banaszak (1996) finds that large pro-suffrage coalitions in the U.S. speeded the chance for the passage of suffrage legislation. Crawhall’s (2011) investigation of an indigenous people’s alliance across African nations also shows that a large-scale transnational coalition helped convince African states to endorse the 2007 UN Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous

On the other hand, others find that broad coalitions do not enhance chances for movement successes (Joyner 1982; Knoke 1990). Joyner (1982) observes that even strong collaborative efforts across various social movement organizations did not lead to the ratification of the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) in the State of Illinois. Joyner (1982) argues that although the ERA Project coalition in Illinois was large in size, issues such as inadequate financing and lack of dedicated leadership were obstacles to winning a victory. Knoke (1990) also argues that broad coalitions alone do not necessarily increase a movement’s chances to influence policy decisions.

Thus, a broad coalition may be an important condition for a movement’s political success, but only in conjunction with certain other coalition conditions. Moreover, there might be an additional feature that makes a broad coalition effective, for instance, how the coalition is operated. Comparing four different coalition forms in local social movements, Jones and his colleagues (2001) find that when a key
social movement organization is responsible for decision-making and strategic planning while other groups in the coalition mainly work for mobilization, that form of coalition was most successful in producing mobilization. In other words, a coalition spearheaded by a key organization working with a large number of assisting organizations is most likely to succeed. Building on this notion of an effective form of coalition, I suggest that a particular form of a broad coalition, a “double layer” of coalition around a hub, a term that I introduce as a new concept, increases the chance for a movement success.

Previous research has not investigated multiple layers or different types of coalition members that may exist within a large coalition. Given that a coalition is composed of various organizations, groups within the coalition may play different roles for the success of the movement. Depending on their roles, organizations may be grouped in two different layers: a grassroots layer and a symbolic layer. The grassroots layer is composed of locally based organizations that are connected to the hub in the same network (e.g., local feminist network). These local groups bring their grassroots power to the coalition. The symbolic layer is composed of large national organizations that represent various groups of individuals (e.g., labor unions). Their level of participation may be marginal, for instance, limited to petition signing. However, by embracing the value of these national organizations’ reputations, the coalition can claim that it represents a wide range of people and groups in society. Finally, the grassroots and the symbolic layers belong to one broad coalition as they are all connected to a coalition hub that brings them together under the banner of the same campaign.

In sum, I argue that a “double layer” of coalition around a hub may be an effective form of a broad coalition for a social movement’s political success. The strength of this coalition comes from the roles that each type of coalition member plays for the success of the movement.

Positive Internal Dynamics Among Coalition Members: Trust

Some researchers highlight the importance of quality relations among coalition members for successful movement outcomes. A working partnership is important because it helps resolve potential tensions that arise among allied groups. Comparing three different coalitions that support battered women in St. Louis, Arnold (2011) reports that the high degree of trust among members and the presence of
conflict-solving mechanisms were important qualities for establishing effective and long-lasting coalitions. Similarly, Post (2015) finds that collaboration between a national organization and local grassroots groups gained strength to influence federal policy issues (e.g., immigration) when equipped with mutual trust and respect among member organizations. The same principle applies to coalitions across social movements. Beamish and Luebbers (2009) note that despite differences in their positionality, such as race and class, a coalition of environmental justice and peace groups was able to achieve its stated objectives because the partner organizations worked together to affirm each movement’s cause and to build mutual commitment within the alliance. Dixon et al. (2013) also find that trust and shared goals among coalition members are essential for successful labor coalitions in the U.S. South.

This literature suggests that having shared objectives and mutual trust among coalition members may be one of the important conditions for a coalition success. It also indicates that the lack of positive internal dynamics among coalition members may be detrimental to a movement’s ability to achieve a successful outcome.

**Coalition Continuity: Ongoing Activism**

I also consider coalition continuity as one of the important coalition characteristics that may influence a political success. Staggenborg (1986) notes that coalition work involves ongoing cooperative efforts. However, some coalitions discontinue their activism or disband before reaching their goals, while others remain active until they achieve intended outcomes (Gillham and Edwards 2011; Mayer 2009). McCammon (2012) finds that continuous activism helped produce a movement success for some of the jury campaigns in the U.S. by allowing activists to develop strategic expertise. Thus, I argue that ongoing activism is important for a movement outcome, particularly for a legislative outcome, because legislation takes time.

**Feminist Legislative Policy Campaigns In Korea**

Since the late 1980s, the feminist movement in Korea has been the driving force to advance gender laws in Korean society (Kim and Kim 2014). The Korean Women’s Association United (KWAU)
was founded in 1987 by various feminist groups with the desire to have a permanent umbrella organization that exerts collective power in influencing national gender issues in Korea. Since then, the KWAU has been at the heart of the growing feminist movement in Korea by coordinating and supporting numerous legislative campaigns. Most feminist groups in Korea are closely linked to the KWAU as its member or affiliated organization. Moreover, the geographical proximity of a small nation and the shared legacy of the democracy movement enabled civil society groups in Korea to build strong solidarity and maintain cooperative relationship. Thus, feminist campaigns in Korea often take the form of a coalition that constitutes various civic organizations representing diverse regions and issue areas (Lee and Chin 2007).

All of the eleven legislative campaigns that I analyze in this study (summarized in Table 1) operated in the form of a coalition. I cluster these campaigns by their issue areas in the table.

The first issue area is violence against women. Four campaigns fall in this category: (1) a campaign for the enactment of the Domestic Violence Prevention Act, (2) a campaign for the amendment of the Domestic Violence Prevention Act, (3) a campaign for the amendment of the Special Act on Sexual Violence, and (4) a campaign for the enactment of the Anti-Sex Trafficking Act.

In a campaign for the enactment of the Domestic Violence Prevention Act, feminist activists aimed to establish basic legal foundations to punish perpetrators and protect victims of domestic violence through the enactment of the law. Korea Women’s Hotline, a member organization of the KWAU, launched the legislative campaign in 1994. As the KWAU joined the effort in 1996, creating a coalition composed of the KWAU’s other member organizations, the campaign gained nationwide momentum. Eventually, the campaign ended in success with the passage of the Domestic Violence Prevent Act in 1997.

After monitoring the execution of the law over the next five years, Korea Women’s Hotline, with the support of the KWAU, launched a legislative campaign in 2003 to amend the Domestic Violence Prevention Act with two main goals: highlighting the importance of victims’ human rights on the purpose  

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4 The list of coalition member organizations for each campaign is provided in Appendix B.
of the law and increasing the level of punishment to perpetrators. However, the campaign ended in failure when the two major demands were not reflected in the amendment of the Domestic Violence Prevention Act that passed in 2005 and the bill submitted by the coalition was disposed at the National Assembly in 2007.

Table 1. Feminist Policy Campaigns by Issue Areas

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue areas</th>
<th>The Name of Legislative Campaigns (Acronym; Campaign Period)</th>
<th>Major Agenda(s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2) A Campaign for the Amendment of the Domestic Violence Prevention Act (ADV; 2003–2007)</td>
<td>Emphasis on the protection of victims’ human rights and heightened level of punishment to perpetrators</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3) A Campaign for the Amendment of the Special Act on Sexual Violence (ASV; 1999–2007)</td>
<td>Removing a rule of mandatory reporting for prosecuting rape perpetrators &amp; Change of the definition of sexual violence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Work/Family Reconciliation</td>
<td>(1) A Campaign for the Amendment of the Maternity Protection Act (AMP; 2000–2001)</td>
<td>90 days of paid maternity leave</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2) A Campaign for the Amendment of the Childcare Act (ACA; 1999–2004)</td>
<td>Financial support for childcare according to family income status &amp; Increase in government spending for childcare support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Family</td>
<td>(1) A Campaign for the Abolition of the Family Headship System (AFHS; 1999–2005)</td>
<td>Abolishment of male priority in inheriting family headship &amp; Permission to change children’s family name to non-biological father’s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2) A Campaign for the Amendment of the Healthy Family Act (AHF; 2004–2007)</td>
<td>Expansion on the definition of family to include non-traditional types of families in the basic family law</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Another law designed to protect victims of violence against women is the Special Act on Sexual Violence. Korea Sexual Violence Relief Center (KSVRC) had been persistently engaged in the revisions of this law since 1993. However, a legislative campaign that involved the KWAU began to form in 1999. The primary goals of the campaign were to change the definition of sexual violence in the law to the violation of one’s right to sexual autonomy and self-determination and to remove a rule of mandatory reporting for prosecuting rape perpetrators. After numerous meetings and considerations among coalition members, a bill for the amendment was finally submitted to the National Assembly in 2007, but it was dismissed at the end of the regular session of the National Assembly without being discussed on the floor.

Finally, a campaign for the enactment of the Anti-Sex Trafficking Act began in 2000 and culminated in success in 2004. After a fire that killed brothel women who were confined in locked rooms in a city in Korea, the KWAU quickly launched a legislative campaign for the enactment of the Anti-Sex Trafficking Act in 2000. The goals of the campaign were to improve protection of victims of sex trafficking and to strengthen the punishment of pimp and brothel owners exploiting female victims by enacting the law.

The second feminist issue area in Korea is equal employment between men and women. The targeted law was the Equal Employment Act enacted in 1987. A campaign for the second amendment of the law began in 1994, when feminist groups decided to submit a bill drafted by them to the government which was executing its plan to revise the law that same year. Korean Women Workers’ Association and Womenlink, both of which are KWAU’s member organizations, led the campaign with the support of the KWAU’s executive office, labor unions, and a couple of legal experts. In 1995, a few weeks prior to the passage of the law, the coalition invited a wide spectrum of organizations, including conservative women’s groups, to submit a second petition to the National Assembly, but the efforts ended in vain. The

5 Although the enactment of this law was a significant achievement in the history of the Korean women’s movement, I do not include the campaign to enact this law in my dependent variable. I will discuss the reason for this decision in detail in the data and methods section.
6 The official English name of this law used by the Korean government is the Anti-Sexual Traffic Act. However, since it sounds awkward in English, I will use the revised term, Anti-Sex Trafficking Act.
primary demands of the campaign – to prevent indirect discrimination at work and to prohibit sexual harassment at work – were not reflected in the second amendment of the Equal Employment Act.

However, soon after the failure, a formal coalition body was established, with the organizations that helped with the second petition in 1995, to mobilize another campaign for the third amendment of the law. While the demands were the same as those of the previous campaign, the new campaign eventually succeeded in 1999.

The third issue area targeted by Korean feminist activists is work/family reconciliation. Two campaigns fall in this category: a campaign for the amendment of the Maternity Protection Act and a campaign for the amendment of the Childcare Act. While feminist activists in Korea had been discussing maternity protection at work since the 1990s, a legislative campaign to amend laws related to maternity protection officially began in 2000 with the creation of a coalition body that encompassed the KWAU, the KWAU’s member organizations, labor unions and conservative women’s groups in Korea. The primary goal of the campaign was to ensure a 90-day paid maternity leave by law. The campaign ended in success in 2001.

A campaign for the amendment of the Childcare Act also aimed to help women reconcile their work and family duties. Centered on the Korea Childcare Teachers Association (KCTA), a member organization of the KWAU, a legislative campaign began to form in 1999 to revise the Childcare Act to ensure significantly increased government spending on childcare. The KWAU and its member organizations interested in women’s employment and a male-centered NGO worked together with the KCTA to pass the amendment bill and succeeded in 2004.

The fourth issue area targeted by feminist activists in Korea is family. Two campaigns fall in this category: a campaign for the abolition of the Family Headship System and a campaign for the amendment of the Healthy Family Act. The campaign for the abolition of the Family Headship System launched in 19997 to challenge the deeply rooted patriarchal tradition in the Korean Family Law, which granted male

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7 The efforts to abolish the Family Headship System from the Korean Family Law have a long history dating back to the 1950s. After multiple revisions of the Family Law, the most recent one in 1989, the
priority in inheriting the headship position of family and did not allow children to take their family name from someone other than their biological father. A coalition for this campaign included a broad spectrum of NGOs in Korea, beyond feminist groups. The campaign finally ended in success in 2005 with the abolishment of the Family Headship System from the Korean Family Law.

A campaign for the amendment of the Healthy Family Act was mobilized to revise the law right after its enactment in 2004, because the law indicates the notion of “healthy” families, which potentially discriminates against non-traditional families (e.g., married couples by common law and single parent families) for being “unhealthy” and excludes them from the benefits of the law. A coalition body led the campaign, which was composed of the KWAU executive office, several university professors specializing in family social work, and members of a male-centered NGO, People’s Solidarity for Participatory Democracy. Despite the constant input from the coalition body to revise the law, the campaign died in 2007 soon after the bill submitted by the coalition was disposed at the National Assembly.

Finally, the last issue area is women’s representativeness in politics. The KWAU had been involved in the efforts of increasing women’s representativeness in politics since the 1990s, by tying to revise the Election Law multiple times to guarantee a certain percentage quota to female candidates in elections. In 2003, the KWAU began another campaign for the amendment of the Election Law with a specific goal: the law recommends political parties adhering to a 50% quota of female candidates using a zipper quota system to widen women’s representation in politics. A coalition body was formed to mobilize this campaign, which included conservative women’s groups as well as male-centered organizations in Korea. In the end, the campaign reached its goal by securing a 50% quota for female candidates in the law.

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8 Zipper indicates not only equal representation of male and female electoral candidates but also fairness in the relative order of nomination priorities in the list of proportional representation recommended by a political party. “Zipper quota system” means that a political party nominates male and female candidates alternately in the list of proportional representation. The order of nomination is important because nominees on the top of the list have a higher chance of getting elected than those on the bottom of the list.
Case Selection and Data Sources

Cases and Period of Analysis

I choose the Korean Women’s Association United (KWAU) as the starting point of my data collection, because KWAU has been the umbrella organization of progressive women’s groups in Korea since its establishment in 1987. It rallied various campaigns to advance Korean women’s rights with legislative revisions. Among many campaigns led by the KWAU, I select campaigns as cases that fall into the period between 1993 and 2007. I select this period for a number of reasons. First, the Korean progressive women’s movement thrived during these years, achieving many feminist laws and policies, but also failing to win some policy change that activists sought. Second, the year 1993 is the dividing point marking the end of the authoritarian regime and the beginning of the first civilian democratic government in Korea. That is, a political opportunity structure for social movements challenging the government opened in 1993 with the democratic reform, compared to the years prior to 1993. Third, I did not include campaigns after 2007 because the progressive women’s movement stagnated under the conservative Lee Myun-Bak Administration between 2008 and 2012.

Legislative Campaigns as Cases

My unit of analysis is a legislative campaign, and I select eleven legislative campaigns as cases to analyze what influenced their political outcomes. della Porta and Rucht (2002) define campaigns as “temporally bounded and strategically linked series of events and interactions directed at common goals” (della Porta and Rucht 2002: 3). The legislative campaigns in my study broadly fall in this definition of campaigns. However, I do not include all campaigns that qualify under this definition in my study. In other words, the campaigns included here are not the population of all feminist legislative campaigns in Korea between 1993 and 2007. Several factors determine the selection of the cases.

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9 The Special Act on Sexual Violence was enacted in 1993, which means that feminist activism aiming for the enactment of this law began prior to 1993. Although the passage of this law was a very important achievement in the history of the Korean women’s movement, I did not include this campaign in my sample because the campaign began in 1991, prior to the period of analysis in this study.
First, I included only feminist legislative campaigns with enduring coalitions led by the KWAU. What I mean by enduring coalitions is that these coalitions were engaged in long-term activism and were not simply coalitions mobilized for a particular protest event. For instance, I excluded feminist activism for the enactment of the Single-Parent Family Support Act for this reason. Although the KWAU and some of its member organizations organized a big event called the “Single-Parent Family Empowerment Festival” to pressure politicians to enact the law, no other series of strategic events followed afterwards. Since a campaign involves “a strategically linked series of events” (della Porta and Rucht 2002: 3), I did not include this type of event coalition in my sample.

Second, I wanted to include legislative campaigns with variations in their issue areas. Thus, the eleven campaigns in this study represent various feminist policy areas that the KWAU was involved in: (1) violence against women, (2) employment discrimination, (3) work/family reconciliation, (4) family, and (5) women’s representativeness in politics. Although policy areas listed here are not exhaustive, they capture most of the policy areas that the KWAU has concentrated its efforts on throughout its organizational history.

Third, the presence of archival documents that chronologically recorded campaign processes and the availability of informants who could recall campaign activities affected my decision in creating the list of cases. Since many campaigns in my study ended several years ago, with the oldest one completed twenty years ago, reconstructing the timeline of the campaigns was important to understand the campaign processes. In the end, I could only include campaigns for which documentation and testimonies from activists were available. Without these I was unable to reconstruct the timelines.

Fourth, I wanted to include campaigns with variations in their political outcomes for comparison, and therefore my sample is a mixture of seven successful campaigns and four unsuccessful campaigns. Locating successful campaigns was relatively easy because the KWAU lists its well-known legislative campaigns on its official website (www.women21.or.kr). Finding unsuccessful campaigns was more difficult because the KWAU does not advertise its failed legislative attempts on its website. Thus, relying
on my preliminary examination of archival data discussed below, I selected campaigns that were led by enduring alliances but that ended in failure.

Finally, I dropped two campaigns that I had initially selected for analysis after I learned from interviews that the legislative changes relevant to the campaigns were government-initiated rather than feminist-sponsored. When the government led legislative changes, the role of feminist activists in policymaking was quite limited. Similarly, any legislative campaigns where feminist activists simply reacted to or opposed government-initiated legislation were not selected as cases in this study, because my focus is on the active role of social movements, particularly movement coalitions, in policymaking.

Since I selected campaign cases for this study based on these rationales, the samples are neither random nor representative. Thus, the result of the study could potentially be biased because of the non-randomness of the cases. However, my samples do include the major feminist legislative campaigns that scholars note as important feminist achievements in Korea (See Kim 2005; Kwon 2011). Moreover, this study is the very first attempt to compare the outcomes of feminist legislative campaigns across various policy areas in Korea utilizing the KWAU’s archival documents. Detailed discussion of the data sources follows next.

Data Sources

My research is based on two types of data that I collected between 2013 and 2015. The first type of data is KWAU’s archival documents. These documents include internal meeting minutes, press conference materials, public hearing handouts, public statements, and pamphlets for public education. By the early 2010s, the KWAU finished filing documents that had been created over the past three decades and arranged them by policy issue or campaign. I was granted full access to the KWAU’s entire archive of documents during my three-month internship in the KWAU in 2013. During that time, I completed my data collection for the archival research, acquiring a large volume of archived documents totaling approximately 5,000 pages.

The second type of data is interviews with twenty-three feminist activists. I interviewed at least three activists for each campaign to learn about the campaign from diverse perspectives. To make sure
that these informants were core members in each campaign, I selected the individuals who participated in campaign meetings most frequently. Many interviewees (14 out of 23) participated in multiple campaigns as core members and therefore provided multiple accounts of different campaigns. Except for two telephone interviews, all interviews were conducted in person in Korea using a semi-structured interview format. I prepared questions specific to each campaign-coalition after reviewing archival documents.

Next, I describe how I operationalize each concept for my analysis, and then I discuss the specific data source for each measure.

**Analytic Techniques and Operationalization**

**Coding Processes**

Examining both interview and archival data carefully, I began my analysis by preparing chronological accounts of each campaign’s development from the beginning to the end. In the chronological accounts, I took note of various characteristics of the campaigns, particularly features related to coalitions. For instance, I recorded the composition of coalitions, the relationship among coalition members, and their division of labor. That is, I started my coding process with an inductive approach. From my data and these chronological accounts, I noted characteristics of coalitions during the legislative campaigns: (1) a strong hub, (2) a “double layer” of coalition around a hub, (3) positive internal dynamics among coalition members, and (4) ongoing activism. After noting the presence and absence of these four elements in the campaigns, I went back to the archival and interview data to gather information systematically from my data for each characteristic and for each campaign. I then constructed measures of each. Thus, my coding method changed from an inductive to a deductive approach.

**Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA)**

To analyze how the four coalition conditions affect campaign outcomes, I use qualitative comparative analysis (QCA). QCA uses Boolean algebra to detect a set of causal conditions leading to a

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10 Meeting minutes record all the names of the meeting participants.
particular outcome (Ragin 2008). QCA also allows for investigation of multiple routes to an outcome and is tolerant of small sample sizes (Ragin 1987). Thus, QCA allows me to identify multiple and combined coalition causes of movement political outcomes when comparing a relatively small number of campaigns. This method has been effectively used in other social movement studies examining multiple factors explaining movement political outcomes (e.g., Cress and Snow 2000; McCammon 2012).

QCA provides two types of test results: a necessity test and a sufficiency test. Ragin (2008) suggests conducting a necessity test prior to performing a sufficiency test in QCA because it is logical to scrutinize necessity prior to sufficiency. A necessary test reveals what causal condition must be present for an outcome to occur, but the necessary condition alone is not always sufficient to produce an outcome. Sufficiency tests show multiple conjunctural causations that lead to an outcome. Sufficient causal conditions (or combinations of causal conditions) are not necessary but they are sufficient to produce an outcome.

QCA results also display consistency and coverage scores of each causal path produced in an analysis. Consistency measures the theoretical relevance of a result, indicating the proportion of cases with a particular conjunction of causal conditions. Coverage score indicates the empirical relevance of the result (Ragin 2008:44-45). In other words, coverage shows how important the configuration of causal conditions is in explaining the outcome. Ragin (2008) suggests that a high consistency score (i.e., theoretical relevance) should be established first, and then the level of coverage (i.e., empirical relevance) should be assessed (Ragin 2008).

Lastly, results from QCA are presented in three different solutions: complex, parsimonious and intermediate solutions. The complex solution includes only empirically observed cases in the analysis and avoids using any simplifying assumptions, producing the most complex causal recipes. In contrast, the parsimonious solution uses cases that are empirically unobserved yet make sense to simplify the causal recipes without regard to theoretical or substantive arguments. As a type of middle ground, the intermediate solution selectively allows simplifying assumptions based on theoretical or empirical justification. Ragin (2008) recommends using the intermediate solution if a researcher can justify results
with both empirical and theoretical knowledge. I use the intermediate solution, following his suggestion.

Because all measures used in my analysis are dichotomous, I use the crisp-set QCA method, instead of the fuzzy-set QCA. Table 2 summarizes the presence and absence of the four causal conditions and the outcome for the eleven campaigns. In what follows, I describe how I operationalize these coalition characteristics, along with my outcome (campaign success or failure) for qualitative comparative analysis (QCA).

Table 2. Presence and Absence of Four Causal Conditions and Outcome Condition for Campaigns

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Campaign</th>
<th>Causal Conditions</th>
<th>Outcome</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Strong Hub (HUB)</td>
<td>Double Layer (DOUBLE)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EDV</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADV</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASV</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
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<td>EEA2</td>
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<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EEA3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMP</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACA</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFHS</td>
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<tr>
<td>AHF</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AEL</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Operationalizing the Conditions**

1. **A strong coalition hub**: A coalition hub refers to a group of people or organizations, which hold regular meetings for planning coalition campaign events and make executive decisions concerning the coalition. I operationalize *a strong coalition hub* by the presence of all three factors in the hub: *field expertise, policy knowledge, and professional cadre.* Field expertise refers to the presence in the hub of a key coalition activist who is familiar with grievances of women in particular issue areas because of his or her direct experiences with the women through counseling or advocacy work that supports women. I determined the presence of field expertise by using interview accounts where informants revealed the

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11 I use acronyms for campaign names. The full names of campaigns are presented in Table 1, along with the acronyms.
presence or absence of a field expert in each coalition hub. All coalitions, except for two, had a key activist with the field expertise.

*Policy knowledge* refers to the presence in the hub of a key coalition activist with professional knowledge about particular legal or policy areas, which allows the hub to develop legislative bills. For some campaigns, lawyers or academic scholars specializing in certain policy areas contributed this knowledge to the campaigns as active members of coalitions. For others, professional activists became experts in certain policies by studying and engaging in the policy areas for many years. I used both interviews and archival documents, such as meeting minutes, to determine the presence of policy knowledge in the hub. All coalitions had at least one key activist who had policy/legal knowledge.

*Professional cadre* refers to the presence of a professional activist who is dedicated to organizing events related to the legislative campaign and performing administrative work on a full time basis. When a coalition has double layers of coalition membership (i.e., symbolic and grassroots layers), professional cadre not only contributes to making a strong hub, but it also supports the other coalition members located at each layer. The presence of professional cadre was revealed through interviews. Eight coalitions had these dedicated professional activists, and the same eight coalitions had all three factors of making a strong coalition hub. Three coalitions lacked this type of personnel, and therefore they did not establish a strong coalition hub.

2. A “*double layer*” of coalition around a hub: This condition refers to the presence of two layers of coalition groups around the hub, the grassroots layer and the symbolic layer. Groups situated in the grassroots layer are locally based member organizations of the KWAU, which conduct local political activities. Coalition members in the symbolic layer are nationally based social movement organizations outside the KWAU’s feminist network. I located these different types of coalition members from KWAU’s annual reports that list the names of campaign events and participants in those events. Two campaigns in my sample had a “double layer” of coalition around the hub.

3. *Positive internal dynamics among coalition members*: This condition refers to the presence of shared objectives and trust among all coalition members. Informants talked about the relationship among
coalition members. Some informants revealed conflicts or disparate interests among coalition members, which indicates the lack of positive internal dynamics among coalition members. The degree of conflict varied from disagreement among key activists regarding a movement goal, to member organizations’ withdrawal from the coalition. Interview accounts reveal this information that written documents did not capture. Positive internal dynamics among coalition members are present in seven campaigns but absent in four other campaigns.

4. *Ongoing activism*: I operationalize *ongoing activism* based on whether campaign activities continued in the name of a coalition until a legislative decision was made. Both interviews and KWAU’s annual reports were used to determine the presence of ongoing activism. Coalitions in seven campaigns continued to conduct a series of events and activities to pressure legislators after they submitted a legislative bill to the National Assembly. Four coalitions were not very active after submitting the bill.

5. *Campaign’s political outcome*: A campaign success means the passage of a bill that the campaign proposed to the legislature in the National Assembly. A campaign failure means that either the campaign’s proposed bill did not pass or a bill proposed by parties other than the campaign was eventually made into a law. For instance, legislators revised the Special Act on Sexual Violence multiple times from 1999 to 2007, but since feminist groups’ demands (e.g., erasing a rule of mandatory report and changing the definition of sexual violence in the law) were not reflected in those revisions, I consider the campaign unsuccessful.

**Results**

I conducted separate analyses for two different outcome conditions – a campaign success and a campaign failure. For each outcome, I evaluated both necessity and sufficiency tests. A necessity test reveals what causal condition, if any, must be present for an outcome to occur, but the necessary condition alone is not always sufficient to produce an outcome. Sufficiency tests show the multiple conjunctural causations that lead to an outcome. Sufficient causal conditions (or combinations of causal conditions) are not necessary but they are sufficient to produce an outcome. QCA results also display
consistency and coverage information of necessary and sufficient conditions. Scholars of QCA suggest that the cut-off of consistency scores for necessary conditions should be 0.90 and higher, and the cut-off of consistency scores for sufficient conditions should be higher 0.80 and higher (Ragin 2008; McAdam et al. 2010). I first display QCA results for each outcome with the information of consistency and coverage scores. Then, I provide my detailed qualitative analysis based on interviews and archival records that further illustrates the coalition features and their effect on a campaign’s political outcome.

**QCA results**

My necessity test for a legislative success shows that a strong hub is necessary for a campaign success (with its consistency score of 1.0). It also means that a strong hub is present in all pathways leading to a success. Table 3 provides the four different combinations of coalition conditions for a success.

A solution coverage of 0.86 indicates that these configurations can explain 86% of the empirical cases in the outcome (six successful campaigns out of seven in this study).

### Table 3. Sufficient Conditions for Campaign Success: Intermediate Solution

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Path</th>
<th>Raw coverage</th>
<th>Unique coverage</th>
<th>Consistency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. HUB* DOUBLE*TRUST + (3 campaigns: EDV, AST, and AFHS)</td>
<td>0.428571</td>
<td>0.000000</td>
<td>1.000000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. HUB* DOUBLE*ONGOING+ (3 campaign: EDV, AST, and AFHS)</td>
<td>0.428571</td>
<td>0.000000</td>
<td>1.000000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. HUB<em>ongoing</em>TRUST + (2 campaigns: EEA3 and ACA)</td>
<td>0.285714</td>
<td>0.285714</td>
<td>1.000000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. HUB* ONGOING*trust (1 campaign: AMP)</td>
<td>0.142857</td>
<td>0.142857</td>
<td>1.000000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Solution coverage: 0.857143
Solution consistency: 1

* Denotes logical AND, + logical OR
Upper case letters mark presence, lower case absence, of condition
Frequency cut-off: 1, Consistency cutoff: 1
A campaign for the Amendment of the Election Law is not explained by these paths.

The first two pathways in Table 3 explain the success of three different campaigns: EDV, AST, and AFHS. All of the four coalition conditions tested in this study – HUB, DOUBLE, ONGOING, and
TRUST – are present in these campaigns, meaning that these campaigns succeeded as a result of the combined effect of all of the four coalition features.

The last two pathways in Table 3 demonstrate different patterns to a success. Three other campaigns were able to succeed, despite the absence of one coalition condition, either trust or ongoing activism. For instance, two campaigns, EEA3 and ACA, succeeded without the coalitions’ ongoing activism. Additionally, another campaign, AMP, succeeded even after a coalition experienced internal conflict. These last two pathways in Table 3 suggest that the presence of other coalition conditions may make up for the weakness caused by one missing condition, helping the campaigns succeed eventually.

However, the absence of many important coalition conditions can be detrimental to a campaign outcome, as demonstrated in Table 4. My necessity test for a campaign failure reveals that there is no necessary condition for a campaign to fail. Table 4 provides one combination of coalition conditions for a campaign failure. A solution coverage of 0.75 indicates that this configuration can explain 75% of the empirical cases in the outcome (three unsuccessful campaigns out of four in this study).

Table 4. Sufficient Conditions for Campaign Failure: Intermediate Solution

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Path</th>
<th>Raw coverage</th>
<th>Unique coverage</th>
<th>Consistency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>hub<em>double</em>trust</td>
<td>0.750000</td>
<td>0.750000</td>
<td>1.000000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1 campaign: ADV, ASV, and AHF)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solution coverage: 0.750000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solution consistency: 1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Upper case letters mark presence, lower case absence, of condition
* Denotes logical AND, + logical OR
Frequency cut-off: 1, Consistency cutoff: 1
A campaign for the Second Amendment of the Equal Employment Act is not explained by these paths.

The causal combination in Table 4 reveals that three causal conditions that are associated with a success (HUB, DOUBLE, and TRUST) are absent in three failed campaigns. That is, the absence of causal conditions producing a campaign success leads to a campaign’s negative outcome. Particularly, a strong hub (HUB) and a “double layer” of coalition around the hub (DOUBLE) are present in two pathways to a success, but absent in the pathway to a failure. Thus, I first highlight how HUB and
DOUBLE played important roles in producing successful campaigns, and how the lack of those features were detrimental to campaign outcomes. Then, I discuss the interactive effect of causal conditions that helped a campaign succeed despite the absence of one coalition feature.

**A Strong Hub**

A feminist campaign in Korea often begins with the inquiry of a KWAU member organization calling for national attention to a particular issue. The KWAU discusses this matter in its board or committee meeting. Once it is decided to launch a campaign, the KWAU invites interested organizations and individuals to join the campaign and create a coalition (*Interview with CEH, July 10, 2014*). In a coalition, a “field” expert usually comes from a KWAU member organization specializing in a particular issue area. One or two staff members in the KWAU executive office often play the role of full-time professional activists in the coalition. Finally, the KWAU invites a policy/legal expert to the coalition, who can help develop a legislative bill. When these three parties – activists with “field” expertise, full-time professional activists, and lawyers or scholars with policy/legal expertise – participated in the hub of the coalition, the coalition succeeded.

For instance, the campaign for the enactment of the Domestic Violence Prevention Act (i.e., the EDV campaign) began with the inquiry of Korea Women’s Hotline (KWH). KWH, a KWAU member organization, brought the issue of domestic violence to the KWAU in 1996. After the KWAU’s board members decided to take the issue as the business of the year, the KWAU soon created a broad coalition called “National Coalition to Establish the Enactment of the Domestic Violence Prevention Act” encompassing twenty two organizations that represent various groups in Korea. Informants commonly recall that three individuals in this coalition played central roles in leading the coalition-campaign, which I consider as members of a coalition hub: a “field” expert from KWH, a full-time professional activist from the KWAU, and a lawyer from Lawyers for a Democratic Party. These people held frequent meetings to plan and execute coalition campaign events as well as to prepare suggestions for a legislative bill. While working in collaboration, each party also contributed to leading an effective coalition by working on their own areas of expertise.
A “field” expert in the EDV campaign describes how the voice from the “field” motivated herself and others to make a legislative change:

“We tried to make the law because battered women really wanted it. The biggest strength of our organization, Korea Women’s Hotline, is that we work in the field. Even now, in the room next to ours, someone is getting counseled from our staff. Those people constantly requested the enactment of the law, saying “Please help us.” But, without the law we couldn’t. So, the strong demand from the field pushed us to make the law… In 1996 and 1997, we met and supported battered women who killed their abusive husbands. Doing such work, we got to know better about their situation. I think that the reason why we did not give up and pursued the bill until the end was because we were very much embedded in the field.” (Interview with CCS, July 1, 2014).

Because she had built personal relationships with victims of domestic violence, this key activist felt responsibility for, and even ownership of, the enactment of the law. A professional cadre in the EDV campaign also pointed out that a successful campaign like the EDV usually has a coalition partner deeply embedded in the field that invests its full capacity to the campaign’s cause (Interview with CYH, May 25, 2015).

The same applies to other campaigns that succeeded in the end: field experts in a hub were the most dedicated and motivated activists in the coalition. The presence of activists with field expertise was the driving force in the hub. Since they had direct, daily experiences with women who could benefit from new laws, they were very aware of the women’s desires and the necessity for new legislation. Even when other coalition members got sidetracked or became less active, these field experts did not falter. They remained persistent in their efforts to bring about a legal change. That is, they were the key driving force of their coalition-campaign.

If field experts were like the heart of a human body, professional cadres were like the hands and feet that made all actions possible. Informants commonly acknowledged the hard work of professional
cadres in all successful campaigns. Coordinating tasks for a coalition-campaign required full time dedication. For example, in a campaign for the amendment of Maternity Protection Act (i.e., AMP campaign), the hard work of a full time activist in the hub paid off when the opposition came to a critical moment. When the feminist bill was finally reviewed in the legislature, an opposing organization, Korea Employers Federation, released a series of public statements against the bill, causing legislators to postpone the passage of the bill two years later. The professional cadre in charge of the AMP campaign released counter-statements to debunk the Federation’s claims in a timely manner, and the bill eventually made a U-turn back to the legislature (Interview with KKSM, July 5, 2014).

In addition to executing campaign activities, another important task of a hub was to prepare a legislative bill that was both reflective of feminist demands and persuasive to legislators. Creating such a legislative bill required cooperation among key members in a hub. Particularly, the knowledge of policy/legal experts was essential to preparing a bill. Policy/legal experts provided the basic guidelines of writing new legislation based on the principles constituting the law. While field experts made suggestions for legislation based on feminist solutions gleaned from field experience, the legal experts had to turn these ideas into policy proposals. Sometimes the two groups did not agree. The field expert in the EDV campaign recalls her initial disagreement with a lawyer who wrote a legislative bill:

“In the Domestic Violence Prevention Act, there is a provision that says anybody can report domestic violence. When we suggested adding that provision in the law, our lawyer told us that such a provision isn’t necessary because it is obvious that any citizen of Korea can report a crime… But we still demanded it because in reality many people thought they were not eligible to make a criminal report of domestic violence happeing in other families … Although his reason was persuasive, we thought that provision was very important. So, we persistently demanded it and put it in the bill… He eventually told us that we decide the direction of the bill and that he would play the role of a technician who devises legal provisions. That was very humble of him to say that.” (Interview with CCS, July 1, 2014).
As this anecdote indicates, field experts proposed helpful, yet sometimes impractical, legislative solutions for women in need. But policy/legal experts, then, provided realistic legislative guidelines, while being sympathetic to feminist causes. Thus, the process of preparing a feminist bill involved lots of discussion among key members in a hub. The role of professional cadres in this process was to coordinate. They collected and considered various opinions from all coalition partners, placing high value on opinions from field experts, and eventually tried to create a feminist bill likely to pass in the legislature (Interview with CYH, May 25, 2015). In order to create a bill that would be both beneficial to women and persuasive to legislators, numerous internal meetings took place among field experts, professional cadres, and policy experts. Without consistent participation and discussion of all three parties, the campaign would not have created a bill that eventually passed in the legislature.

On the other hand, when a coalition hub was short of any of the three required features, the hub did not run in its full capacity to effectively lead the coalition. The campaign for the amendment of Domestic Violence Prevention Act is illustrative of the negative outcome of a weak coalition hub. This campaign was run by a coalition called “Research Committee for Violence Against Women Law” that resided within the KWAU’s Human Rights Committee. Key activists in this coalition were representatives from three organizations: Korea Women’s Hotline, Korea Sexual Violence Relief Center, and Womenlink. This composition of key members in the coalition hub indicates two reasons why professional activism was weak in this coalition. First, no KWAU staff members, who usually play the role of professional cadre, were part of this coalition hub. Second, all of the key activists were the directors or representatives of other organizations. As one of the key activists in this campaign recalls,

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12 Meeting minutes show that a couple of KWAU staff members occasionally participated in the coalition meetings, but none of them testified that they were core members in the coalition.
“For a coalition, people should spare extra time to do the work. But, frankly speaking, we did not have the “feet” for a movement. Even though we had some plans, they couldn’t be executed [without “hands and feet” to do administrative works].” (Interview with YKH, June 30, 2014).

In the end, the key members of the coalition could not fully dedicate their time to this campaign because they were leading other organizations. These leaders discussed having their subordinates participate in coalition meetings on behalf of themselves due to their busy schedules, but subordinates’ participation did not happen (Meeting minutes, February 5, 2004). Therefore, without a strong hub to lead the coalition, political success could not be achieved.

In sum, in all successful campaigns, field experts persistently pushed the campaigns forward as the driving force, while professional cadre worked with them to coordinate external events. Along with these key members, policy experts helped devise legislative bills. Through the collaborative work of these key members, strong hubs were established, which had the power of execution and a well-prepared legislative bill.

_A “Double Layer” of Coalition around a Hub_

My QCA results show that three out of seven successful campaigns in my sample operated in a form of a double-layer coalition, and all of the four failed campaigns lacked this form of a coalition. Based on these results, I argue that the “double layer” form is a type of a broad coalition that may increase the chance for a campaign success. Depending on the roles that coalition member organizations play, I grouped them in different locations within a “double layer” of coalition around the hub. Figure 1 illustrates this form of a coalition.

In a double-layer coalition, the hub is responsible for planning and organizing events for the entire coalition. Since the hub leads the coalition and does most of the coalition’s coordinating work, I locate it in the center of the circle in Figure 1 and color it in black to reflect its high density of activism.
The grassroots layer is situated immediately around the hub in Figure 1. It constitutes locally based feminist organizations connected to the KWAU, and they are likely to join the coalition led by the KWAU. Local groups may choose not to join the coalition because they want to prioritize their own agenda. However, when they do participate, they bring their grassroots power to the coalition. Since the coalition work done by grassroots groups is less than that of the hub, I color it in gray to reflect its intermediate level of activism.

The symbolic layer is situated in the outer ring of the coalition in Figure 1. Groups in this symbolic layer are usually large national, non-feminist organizations. By having these organizations as coalition members and embracing the value of their organizational reputation, the coalition represents a wide range of groups in society. I call this layer “symbolic” because their main contribution to the coalition is their symbolic presence (e.g., political representativeness) in the coalition. Thus, to reflect its low level of activism, I color it white in Figure 1.

The campaign for the abolition of the Family Headship System (i.e., the AFHS campaign) illustrates how a “double layer” of coalition around the hub operates to effectively lead a campaign. A key activist in the AFHS campaign explains collaborative relationship between the grassroots groups and the hub:

“Our campaign involved lots of activities on the street. Whenever we had outdoor events, every [local] organization took on their assigned roles in protesting on the street, collecting signatures
for a petition, and participating in a big protest event with thousands of people involved… We didn’t do it alone. The [local feminist] member organizations did it together with us… Once our strategies were set, our [local feminist] member organizations just needed to follow the plan together… When we wanted to collect signatures for a petition across the country, we distributed necessary documents to the local groups, and they collected signatures in their own regions. But, all the contents came from the hub.” (Interview with IKKS, June 30, 2014)

As described above, collecting signatures nationwide would have been difficult without the support of the local feminist groups. In the meantime, the local groups needed campaign materials to hand out to the public when trying to promote the campaign agenda. The hub provided such materials to the grassroots locals to be distributed across the country. The inclusion of these grassroots groups benefitted the campaign in three ways. First, the coalition became large in size and more than simply a coalition hub. Second, since the grassroots groups mobilized the campaign in their own regions, the larger campaign gained broader, nationwide public visibility. Third, the signatures for a petition gathered across the country were used to pressure the legislature to pass a feminist legislative bill.

In addition to grassroots groups, the AFHS campaign also mobilized 143 NGOs as coalition members, including major NGOs, labor unions, and conservative women’s organizations in Korea. Most of these organizations created the symbolic layer of the coalition. As the key activist in the AFHS campaign explains, groups in the symbolic layer only marginally worked for the coalition, while the hub did most of the actual coalition work.

“Other NGOs did not play a great role in the campaign. It was more like that their names themselves empowered the campaign. For example, when we publish policy proposals or present our demands to the National Assembly, doing it under the name of all progressive NGOs or not is very different… At that time, presenting our movement as a pan-NGO movement allowed us to gain higher public credibility.” (Interview with IKKS, June 30, 2014).
The hub invited non-feminist national organizations to the coalition in order to empower the campaign. Their actual participation was minimal in that they only lent their name to the campaign on most occasions. Meeting minutes during the campaign reveal that most of these organizations at the symbolic layer did not participate in regular strategic meetings, while key activists in the hub consistently partook in the meetings. However, the symbolic layer’s organizational names frequently appeared on the public statements under the name of the entire coalition, showing they signed on. In the end, their presence in the campaign broadened the campaign’s profile so that it represented diverse groups of civil society rather than just feminist organizations. Informants note that there were benefits in having these non-feminist NGOs at the symbolic layer. First, these nationally representative groups made the coalitions appear much larger in size and scope. Second, the broad scope of the coalitions gave them credibility, which made them more appealing to both politicians and the public.

Together, the hub, the grassroots layer, and the symbolic layer, in each of these two campaigns, formed a double layer of coalition. The hub did most of the coalition work, such as planning and organizing events, while members in the double layer empowered the coalition with increased mobilization capacity and enhanced public visibility and credibility.

An example of an unsuccessful campaign also demonstrates that the lack of the double-layer coalition form makes it difficult for a coalition to succeed. A campaign for the amendment of the Healthy Family Act (i.e., the AHF campaign) failed to create a double-layer coalition, because it lacked grassroots support. Local feminist groups were not fully supportive of the AHF campaign because many of them were not convinced about the problem associated with the definition of “healthy family” in the law. Many even questioned why the KWAU decided to launch the AHF campaign (Interview with PCOK, July 29, 2013). Thus, they did not actively participate in this campaign. Although the coalition had a symbolic layer constituting national organizations beyond the feminist network, the coalition could not secure grassroots power that could have helped promote the campaign’s cause to the public and pressure local politicians.
Besides the double-layer form, the AHF also lacked a strong hub and trust among coalition members. That is, the absence of three positive coalition features, associated with a success, jointly influenced the negative outcome of the AHF campaign. However, missing one coalition feature did not cause a campaign to fail, because other positive conditions compensated for the weakness caused by the missing condition, as demonstrated below.

**Combined Effect of Conditions for Campaign Outcomes**

A campaign for the amendment of the Maternity Protection Act (i.e., the AMP campaign) illustrates how a campaign can succeed as a result of combined effect of positive conditions. The AMP campaign was run by a coalition called “Coalition Council for Revision of Women Related Labor Law” that encompassed eight organizations. Two coalition partners, Seoul Women’s Trade Union and Federation of Korean Trade Unions, dropped out of the coalition during the time when the feminist legislative bill was ready to be reviewed in the National Assembly. These two organizations disagreed with the other coalition members regarding the issue of “protection v. equality”. In addition to ideological disagreement, there was mistrust among some coalition members (*Interview with KKS, July 5, 2014*). This conflict among coalition groups led to the withdrawal of the two member organizations from the coalition during the critical time of the campaign.

However, the coalition did not waver much after this setback because coalition members from those two groups were not part of a coalition hub. That is, the hub remained intact. Most of the core members in the hub were highly motivated field and policy experts with strong powers of execution. Informants note that field experts in this campaign had enough policy knowledge to prepare a legislative bill, thanks to their long-time dedication of helping female workers in the workplace. They came from organizations that ran counseling centers for female workers to share their grievances in the workplace. Thus, the experts knew about the policy impact on women workers and were very much determined to win the campaign. When the field activists were not available to promptly respond to surging opposition from Korea Employer’s Federation, the full-time professional cadre responded in time to debunk the
oppositional claims. This collaborative work among the key members made for a strong hub that led the entire coalition, and the hub remained strong even after the two groups left the coalition.

Moreover, ongoing activism led by a strong hub helped the coalition survive the internal conflict. The level of campaign activism did not decrease at all despite the withdrawal of the two groups from the coalition. Rather, the coalition mobilized even broader support from civil society by collecting the signatures of three hundred public figures to urge legislators to pass the bill. The coalition also organized eye-catching protest events to attract media attention to the campaign. This ongoing activism demonstrated the resilience of the campaign during the critical time when two groups left the coalition and the legislature was deliberating over the bill.

In sum, even after a coalition experiences internal conflict, a coalition centered on a strong hub can continue to mobilize campaign activities until a legislative bill finally passes. As a result of these combined factors, such a coalition can produce a positive outcome.

**Discussion and Conclusion**

Why do some legislative campaigns end in success and others in failure, even when the same groups of people spearhead the movements? To answer this question, I investigated the relationship between movement coalition conditions and their political outcomes, examining eleven feminist legislative campaigns in Korea. Overall, my study contributes to advancing scholarly knowledge on coalition conditions influencing movement political outcomes. The majority of research on coalitions has investigated factors that influence coalition building and maintenance (Staggenborg 2010; Van Dyke and McCammon 2010; Dixon et al. 2013; McCammon and Moon 2015). A handful of studies investigate coalition outcomes but they are mostly concerned with organizational outcomes (Lee 2011; Mix 2011; Wang and Soule 2012), mobilization outcomes (Jones et al. 2001; Luna 2010; Maney 2000; Murphy 2005; Staggenborg 2015; Widener 2007) or the sustainability of a coalition (Arnold 2011; Beamish and Luebbers 2009; Krinsky and Reese 2006; Post 2015). With few exceptions (Banaszak 1996; Dixon et al. 2013; McCammon 2012), coalitions’ political outcomes have been under-examined in the current
literature. Thus, my findings, summarized below, advance our understanding of coalitions by showing when and how coalition characteristics influence coalitions’ political outcomes.

A key finding in this study is that having a strong coalition hub can lead to a coalition’s political success. In all successful campaigns where feminist legislative bills passed in the National Assembly, feminist activists created strong hubs that were equipped with three features: field expertise, policy/legal expertise, and professional cadre. The presence of all three circumstances is the definition of a strong coalition hub. When any one of the three features was missing, hubs did not function properly to lead effective coalitions, and campaigns failed. It was also not unusual that key members in coalition hubs did most of the coalition work from planning protest events to preparing a suggested bill to submit to legislators. Thus, a coalition hub was the engine of the coalition. Oddly, the impact of a coalition hub or a group of key members of a coalition on its success has yet to be recognized in the existing social movement coalition literature. While the importance of leadership for the success of social movements has been reported in several studies (Morris and Staggenborg 2004; Nepstad and Bob 2006; Rucht 2012), little is known about the role of key activists in coalition leadership positions for a movement success. My study demonstrates that a group of dedicated professional activists with accumulated expertise in the “field” and the policy areas were the agents who allowed large coalitions to function and helped them win. Thus, more focus should be given to the role of a group of key activists in a coalition hub for a movement success.

Another coalition condition, a “double layer” of coalition around the hub, should be also acknowledged for its contribution to a coalition’s political success. My finding shows that a particular form of a broad coalition, a “double layer” of coalition around the hub, increases the chance for a coalition’s political success. This finding suggests that more study is needed to examine what organizational form of coalition is most suited for coalition success. Scholars have paid little attention to the impact of a coalition form on its outcome (Jones et al. 2001). As Jones et al. (2001) find in their study of coalitions’ mobilization outcomes, a certain form of coalition is more effective than others. In their study, they find that a coalition spearheaded by a key organization working with a large number of
assisting organizations is likely to succeed in mobilization. My study also shows that double layers of coalition beyond a hub were especially effective in bringing about coalition successes.

Other findings are consistent with results from previous studies (Arnold 2011; Dixon et al. 2013; McCammon 2012; Post 2015): a coalition’s ongoing activism and trust among coalition members are important to achieve its intended political outcomes. Besides confirming the existing knowledge, my study also highlights the interactive effect of different coalition conditions on a coalition’s political outcome. Campaigns were most likely to succeed when various coalition conditions, including a strong hub, coalition continuity, and trust among coalition members, were present, as they jointly influenced the campaign outcomes. Even with the absence of one condition, either ongoing activism or trust, some campaigns were able to succeed because the combination of other coalition conditions made up for the weakness caused by one missing condition.

Finally, this study points to directions for future research on social movement outcomes. As my findings indicate, coalition form, continuity, internal dynamics among coalition members, and the strength of a coalition hub interactively influence the political outcomes of social movements. More research is needed to examine the interaction of coalition conditions for their impact on movement outcomes. Comparative research across policy issues would also be helpful. Extant policy studies are mostly either single campaign case studies or cross-national research comparing the same policy issue. This study examined campaigns across different policy areas. Other scholars (Amenta et al 2010; Kolb 2007) have called for more systematic empirical research that compares movements across policy issues, and more research is needed to explore the conditions that affect successful coalitions across different policy matters.
References


CHAPTER 3

EFFECTIVE FRAMING STRATEGIES FOR LEGISLATIVE POLICY CHANGES:
A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF FEMINIST POLICY CAMPAIGNS IN KOREA

Introduction

Social movement scholars recognize the framing process as one of the central dynamics that influences the course of social movements (Benford and Snow 2000; McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 1996). Researchers show that a framing strategy is closely linked to positive outcomes for social movements, such as recruitment (Snow et al. 1986), favorable media coverage (Rohlinger 2002), and countering oppositions (McCaffrey and Keys 2000). A group of researchers are particularly interested in how the framing process influences a movement’s political outcomes (Cress and Snow 2000; Fujiwara 2005; McCammon et al. 2001, 2007; Paschel 2010). But, current research is limited in two ways.

First, I argue that scholars neglect to investigate the interactive effect of different frame qualities on movement outcomes. While framing researchers find that certain frame qualities are effective for a movement’s political success, they only investigate the independent effect of those frame qualities on movement outcomes. For instance, frame qualities, such as frame articulation and the empirical credibility of the frame, prove to be important in producing a movement’s political victory (Cress and Snow 2000; McCammon 2009), but researchers rarely ask whether the combination of both qualities can create better political outcomes for social movements. In this chapter, I suggest that frame articulation and empirical credibility of frame do not work independently to create positive movement outcomes. Rather, I suggest that these frame qualities work hand in hand when activists deploy effective framing strategies. In other words, a framing strategy lacking one of these frame qualities may not work as effectively as a strategy with both qualities.

Second, the existing scholarship on social movement framing primarily analyzes written contents of collective action frames, such as texts and discourses prepared by movement activists. Even when
researchers examine framing activities other than written contents of framing, they do not draw a clear line between framing contents and framing activities, using the generic term, “framing process” to describe both concepts (e.g., McCammon 2009; Snow and Benford 1988). In other words, scholars do not distinguish between what is said in framing (i.e., framing contents) and what is done in framing (i.e., framing activities). My study makes the distinction between the two. I define framing activities as deliberate, non-verbal choices that activists make as a way of signifying their movement for a target audience.

In this chapter, I focus on two types of framing activities to show how they help activists achieve their intended political outcomes. These framing activities are: 1) strategic deployment of broad identity in framing, and 2) strategic silence in framing. My research contributes to framing theory in two ways. First, I offer an interactive understanding of frame qualities that make framing contents effective. Second, with an emphasis on the distinction between framing contents and activities, my work examines how these two elements function together to create effective framing to bring about desired movement outcomes. By drawing empirically on eleven different campaigns of the Korean women’s movement, seven of which succeeded while the other four failed, I compare framing strategies across legislative campaigns to explain how they influenced each campaign’s political outcome.

I acknowledge that movement political outcomes cannot be achieved solely by movement framing strategies and that we should also take, for example, environmental factors (e.g., political opportunities) into consideration. This chapter, however, takes a preliminary step and focuses exclusively on the relationship between framing strategies and movement political outcomes. I will investigate combined factors of movement strategies and environmental conditions that may affect movement political outcomes in the following chapter.

In the section that follows, I review the literature on framing strategies associated with movement outcomes, while discussing the limitations that I identify in the previous studies. Next, I briefly introduce the eleven legislative campaigns that I examine in this study. After providing a detailed discussion of the data and methods used for this research, I analyze how framing strategies affect movement success.
Framing Strategies and Movement Outcomes

A subset of framing research examines how framing as a strategy influences movement outcomes (e.g., Chakravarty and Chaudhuri 2012; McAmmon 2009). Among several concepts of framing strategies that Snow and Benford introduce in their seminal works (Snow et al. 1986; Snow and Benford 1988, 1992), frame resonance is the most widely studied strategy and has been found to be an important strategy for movement success (Berbrier 1998; Ferree 2003; Kubal 1998; Maney 2001). In her assessment of other frame qualities, McAmmon (2009) demonstrates that frame articulation and empirical credibility of frame are also significant factors for a movement’s political victory. Drawing on McAmmon’s work (2009) as well as revisiting Snow and Benford’s original definition of those concepts, I suggest that these two frame qualities, frame articulation and the empirical credibility of the frame, tend to work together in making an effective framing strategy for a movement’s success. This interactive effect of frame qualities on movement outcomes has yet to be studied in the existing scholarship.

In addition to analyzing what is said in framing, I also examine what is done in framing to show how different framing strategies interactively influence movement outcomes. Specifically, I argue that two framing activities—1) strategic deployment of broad identity in framing, and 2) strategic silence in framing—are important framing strategies that may affect the outcomes of social movements.

Framing Contents: Intersection of Frame Articulation and Empirical Credibility

Cress and Snow (2000) and McAmmon (2009) demonstrate that frame articulation contributes to a movement’s political victory. In their study of fifteen social movement organizations (SMOs) for the homeless, Cress and Snow (2000) consider having a specific target for blame (an articulate diagnosis of problems) as a condition for frame articulation. For example, when the SMOs for the homeless frame “the government” as the target for blame, the authors count it as non-articulate framing because the government is not a specific target. On the other hand, when the SMOs highlight and demand solutions for specific issues, such as shelter conditions, they demonstrate articulate framing.
McCammon’s (2009) evaluation of frame articulation is focused on the structure of an argument. If a collective action frame contains an implicit or explicit “because” statement in it, McCammon views such a frame as being more articulate than others because it has “more argumentative power” for persuasion (2009:51). For instance, if a statement claiming women’s jury rights offers specific reasons why women should sit on juries, that statement is more persuasive and articulate than other statements that lack such reasoning. Both studies suggest that presentation of specific reasons for a political change in framing helps establish frame articulation.

According to Snow and his colleagues who originally defined frame articulation (Benford and Snow 2000; Snow 2004), “frame articulation involves the connection and alignment of events and experiences so that they hang together in a relatively unified and compelling fashion.” (Benford and Snow 2000:623). What is highlighted in this definition is the presentation of “events and experiences” in a meaningful fashion.

The importance of presenting “events and experiences” in framing is also emphasized by Snow and Benford in another frame quality, the empirical credibility of the frame (Snow and Benford 1988; Benford and Snow 2000). They define a frame’s empirical credibility as the fit between framing and events happening in the world. That is, claims that can be empirically verified are likely to appeal to target audience. Developing this conceptual tool furthermore, scholars demonstrate that empirical credibility is an effective frame quality for a movement’s success because it provides claims with concreteness and factual evidence (Gamson 1992; McCammon 2009; Leitz 2011). I argue that the specificity highlighted in frame articulation and the concreteness emphasized in the empirical credibility of the frame may not operate entirely independently of one another. I further argue that when these two frame qualities appear in the same claim, they are most likely to create effective collective action frames.

While conducting feminist legislative campaigns in Korea, activists occasionally released public statements targeting politicians and the media. The level of specificity and concreteness vary in those statements, making some more articulate and/or empirically credible than others. A public statement released on July 9, 1997 for the enactment of the Domestic Violence Prevention Act illustrates a
collective action frame that meets both conditions of frame articulation and empirical credibility. This statement begins by saying, “On May 21, 1997, Ms. Yoon-Sun who could not stand her husband’s violence that had lasted for eighteen years committed a crime of murdering her husband.” The statement later ends with the main demand of the claims-maker, “Therefore, we urge the Domestic Violence Prevention Act to be passed in the National Assembly…” This statement presents a specific reason for the enactment of the law (an articulate frame) as the claim-maker states the tragic ending of a victim of domestic violence, who could not rely on the law and so ended up punishing her abusive partner outside legal boundaries. The statement also provides concrete evidence (an empirically credible frame) that backs up the demand to enact the law by mentioning a recent incident in Korean society.

On the other hand, a public statement released on September 20, 2006 for the amendment of the Healthy Family Act illustrates a collective action frame that is only articulate but not empirically credible. In that statement, the claims-maker articulates, “This bill concerns how to operate family support programs in the central and local governments in Korea. Since the discussion of this bill has been delayed, the family support programs tailored to the needs of local governments and various types of families are not launched yet. To resolve this issue, the bill should be passed…” A specific reason for amending the law (an articulate frame) is provided in this statement as the claims-maker mentions the inability to launch programs to support different types of families in Korea. However, concrete or factual evidence, such as the actual needs of various types of families, mostly non-traditional families in Korea, is missing in this statement, making the claim less empirically credible. Comparing these two examples, the 970709 and 060920 statements, I argue that the former, which has both frame qualities, will be more effective for a movement’s success than the latter, which has only one desired frame quality.

Non-Verbal Framing Activity 1: Strategic Deployment of Broad Identity in Framing

In addition to the textual contents of framing, I also examine non-verbal framing strategies, that is, what activists do instead of say in framing their activism. The first non-verbal framing activity is strategic deployment of broad identity. A number of scholars show that framing and collective identity are closely linked to each other in the development and success of social movements. Hunt and his colleagues
(1994) find that the boundary work done by framing helps construct and maintain social movement actors’ collective identity. In addition to building solidarity among members, defining “who we are” signals a framed message to external audiences. Researchers argue that social movement activists strategically deploy identities to achieve a movement’s goals (Bernstein and Cruz 2009; Chakravarty and Chaudhuri 2012; Leitz 2011). Particularly when a social movement operates in a hostile discursive environment, the movement strategically presents its identity to be aligned with an acceptable identity (Einwohner 2008; Leitz 2011). For instance, in framing the Iraq War, the U.S. peace movement activists deployed the identity of war veterans to increase the legitimacy of their anti-war claim to counter the hegemonic rhetoric in support of the Iraq War (Leitz 2011).

In Korean feminist legislative campaigns, an identity deployment strategy is visible in the activists’ efforts to broaden their movement identity. Interview accounts with Korean feminist activists show that some intended to portray their legislative campaign as more than a solely feminist agenda by inviting male member organizations or conservative women’s groups to their campaign events. Many feminist activists believed that politicians would not be willing to accept legislative demands coming solely from feminist groups due to conservative cultural sentiment against feminism in Korea. In other words, they were concerned about the legitimacy of their claim as a sole feminist demand and attempted to resonate with the cultural climate by inviting non-feminist groups to their campaign activities.

Thus, I argue that the activists’ decision to broaden their identity as encompassing more than a solely feminist agenda is a type of framing strategy, which may be effective for a movement’s political outcome.

**Non-Verbal Framing Activity 2: Strategic Silence in Framing**

The second non-verbal framing activity that activists may utilize for movement success is strategic silence in framing. Studies of social movements rarely discuss the role of silence in contentious politics. When silence is mentioned in social movement research, it refers to either the silence of certain topics in the body of social movement literature (Aminzade et al. 2001) or silencing as a way of soft repression against social movement challengers (Ferree 2005).
As an exception, Rohlinger (2006 and 2014) considers silence as a social movement strategy. In her research, Rohlinger (2006 and 2014) demonstrates that strategic silence is one of the powerful media tactics used in abortion politics. According to her research (2006), the Planned Parenthood Federation of America decided to stay relatively silent on a polemical debate around partial-birth abortion, positioning itself away from controversial debate, taking a moderate stance of, among some, gaining legitimacy.

This silent strategy, as Rohlinger (2006) says, is less visible than other social movement strategies (e.g., protests). But, interview accounts of Korean feminist activists in this study reveal that they implemented a silent strategy in framing their campaign. Because participating in a contentious political debate may attract undesired attention or opposition to a social movement campaign, I argue that an activist’s decision to be quiet on a certain issue is a type of framing strategy, which can be effective for a movement’s political gain.

**Feminist Legislative Policy Campaigns in Korea**

The Korean Women’s Association United (KWAU) has been at the heart of the growing feminist movement in Korea as an umbrella organization of progressive women’s groups since the late 1980s. As its founding purpose was to facilitate collaborations among women’s movement organizations in Korea, the KWAU has coordinated and supported numerous campaigns designed to establish a gender-equalitarian society. Table 1 summarizes the eleven legislative campaigns that I analyze in this study. I cluster these campaigns by their issue areas in the table.

The first issue area is violence against women. The first two campaigns listed in Table 2 dealt with the Domestic Violence Prevention Act. A campaign for the enactment of the Domestic Violence Prevention Act was successful in establishing basic legal foundations to punish perpetrators and protect victims of domestic violence. A campaign for the amendment of the Domestic Violence Prevention Act followed five years after the law’s enactment because feminist organizations found that the law did not protect victims of domestic violence as intended. However, the amendment bill to protect victims’ human rights and increase punishment for perpetrators was never enacted.
Table 1. Feminist Policy Campaigns by Issue Areas

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue areas</th>
<th>The Name of Legislative Campaigns (Acronym; Campaign Period)</th>
<th>Major Agenda(s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2) A Campaign for the Amendment of the Domestic Violence Prevention Act (ADV; 2003–2007)</td>
<td>Emphasis on the protection of victims’ human rights and heightened level of punishment to perpetrators</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3) A Campaign for the Amendment of the Special Act on Sexual Violence (ASV; 1999–2007)</td>
<td>Removing a rule of mandatory reporting for prosecuting rape perpetrators &amp; Change of the definition of sexual violence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Work/Family Reconciliation</td>
<td>(1) A Campaign for the Amendment of the Maternity Protection Act (AMP; 2000–2001)</td>
<td>90 days of paid maternity leave</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2) A Campaign for the Amendment of the Childcare Act (ACA; 1999–2004)</td>
<td>Financial support for childcare according to family income status &amp; Increase in government spending for childcare support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Family</td>
<td>(1) A Campaign for the Abolition of the Family Headship System (AFHS; 1999–2005)</td>
<td>Abolishment of male priority in inheriting family headship &amp; Permission to change children’s family name to non-biological father’s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2) A Campaign for the Amendment of the Healthy Family Act (AHF; 2004–2007)</td>
<td>Expansion on the definition of family to include non-traditional types of families in the basic family law</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Another campaign regarding the issue of violence against women was a campaign for the amendment of the Special Act on Sexual Violence. Since the enactment of the law in 1993, some feminist organizations had attempted to revise two particular provisions in the law: the definition of sexual violence and a rule of mandatory reporting for the prosecution of rape perpetrators. The KWAU-
sponsored campaign began in 1999, and a bill for the amendment was finally submitted to the National Assembly in 2007. However, the bill was eventually dismissed without even being discussed on the floor.

The last campaign in the issue area of violence against women was a campaign for the enactment of the Anti-Sex Trafficking Act\textsuperscript{13}. The goals of this campaign were to improve protection for victims of sex trafficking and to strengthen the punishment of pimps and brothel owners exploiting female victims. The campaign began in 2000 and culminated in success in 2004.

The second issue area is equal employment between men and women. The targeted law was the Equal Employment Act enacted in 1987. Two consecutive campaigns challenged this law with the same demands: prevention of indirect discrimination at work and prohibition of sexual harassment at work. A campaign for the Second Amendment of the Equal Employment Act began in 1994 but ended in failure in 1995, when the revised law did not reflect the two feminist demands at all. A campaign for the Third Amendment of the Equal Employment Act followed soon after the second amendment of the law in 1995. After several years of political battle, the same demands for better protecting women at work were accepted in the third amendment of the law in 1999, leading to the campaign’s success.

The third issue area is work/family reconciliation. Two campaigns fall in this category and both ended in success. The first one, a campaign for the amendment of the Maternity Protection Act, aimed to ensure a 90-day paid maternity leave by law. A feminist legislative petition was submitted in 2000, and the bill was passed in 2001. The second campaign aiming to help women reconcile their work and family duties was a campaign for the amendment of the Childcare Act. This legislative campaign, supported by the KWAU, launched in 1999 to ensure significantly increased government spending on childcare. After the campaign submitted a legislative petition in 2001, the feminist petition was finally adopted and the law was amended accordingly in 2004.

\textsuperscript{13} The official English name of this law used by the Korean government is the Anti-Sexual Traffic Act. However, since it sounds awkward in English, I will use the revised term, Anti-Sex Trafficking Act.
The fourth issue area targeted by feminist activists in Korea is family. Two campaigns fall in this category. The first one, a campaign for the abolition of the Family Headship System, began in 1999\textsuperscript{14} to challenge the deeply-rooted patriarchal tradition of headship succession and child registration in the Korean Family Law. After the campaign submitted a legislative petition to suggest the abolition of the law in 2000, the law was finally abolished in 2005. The second campaign in this issue area was a campaign for the amendment of the Healthy Family Act. This campaign challenged the notion of “healthy” families in the law, which potentially discriminates against non-traditional families (e.g., married couples by common law and single parent families) for being “unhealthy” and excludes them from the benefits of the law. Despite the constant input from the campaign to revise the law for several years, the campaign ended in failure in 2007, when the feminist bill was disposed of at the National Assembly.

Finally, the fifth issue area is women’s representativeness in politics. In 2003, the KWAU launched a campaign for the amendment of the Election Law with a goal of securing a 50% quota of female candidates in the general election process, using a zipper\textsuperscript{15} quota system. The campaign submitted a policy suggestion to implement the zipper quota system in the election process in 2003. In the end, the campaign reached its goal by securing a 50% quota for female candidates in the law.

\textbf{Case Selection and Data Sources}

\textit{Case Selection}

The cases examined in this study are eleven feminist policy campaigns that took place between 1993 and 2007. This time period coincides with three presidential terms in Korea during which the political climate was favorable to the women’s movement and a number of feminist policies were enacted.

\textsuperscript{14} The efforts to abolish the Family Headship System from the Korean Family Law have a long history dating back to the 1950s. After multiple revisions of the Family Law, the most recent one in 1989, the topic of the abolishment of the Family Headship System remained silent for the next decade. The campaign resumed in 1999.

\textsuperscript{15} Zipper indicates not only equal representation of male and female electoral candidates but also fairness in the relative order of nomination priorities in the list of proportional representation recommended by a political party. “Zipper quota system” means that a political party nominates male and female candidates alternately in the list of proportional representation. The order of nomination is important because nominees on the top of the list have a higher chance of getting elected than those on the bottom of the list.
After narrowing down the period of analysis, a few other considerations determined the final selection of cases. First, availability of framing data influenced my choice of cases. Because my research involves content analysis of framing contents, the presence of a sufficient number of documents to be coded was important. Second, I considered variation in campaign’s issue areas and outcomes in order to select cases that could be compared and contrasted. Finally, I excluded campaigns that were government-initiated or reactionary to government-sponsored legislation, because my focus is on the active role of social movements in policymaking. Since my case selection was based on these rationales, the result of the study could be potentially biased because of the non-randomness of the cases. However, my samples do include the major feminist legislative campaigns that scholars note as important feminist achievements in Korea (See Kim 2005; Kwon 2011).

**Data Sources**

I collected three types of data to examine framing strategies utilized in each campaign. The first type of data is KWAU’s archival documents, including internal meeting minutes, public statements, and press conference materials. Access to the KWAU’s entire archive of documents during my internship in the KWAU allowed me to acquire a large volume of documents. The second type of data is interviews with feminist activists who were actively involved in the campaigns. My interviews with twenty-three activists provide multiple accounts of different campaigns, because many of them (14 out of 23) participated in more than one of the campaigns examined in this study. The third type of data is a set of newspapers. I selected news articles that contain direct or indirect quotes from feminist activists about the revision/enactment of each for which they campaigned. In collecting the news articles, I used the news database KINDS (Korea Integrated News Database System: [www.kinds.or.kr](http://www.kinds.or.kr)). It is an open data source easily accessible to online users, and the service provides nation-wide daily newspapers.

Next, I describe the analytic methods I use in this study, and then I discuss operationalization of each variable for my analysis.
Analytic Techniques and Operationalization

Coding Processes

My coding began with an inductive approach to finding emerging themes of framing strategies by examining interview and archival data. Drawing on the notes of campaign characteristics related to framing, I identified three framing strategies: (1) presence of both articulate and empirically credible frames, (2) broad identity deployment in framing, and (3) strategic silence in framing. After noting the presence and absence of these three elements in the campaigns, I went back to interview, archival, and newspaper data to gather information systematically for each characteristic and for each campaign. I then constructed measures for each characteristic. Thus, my coding method changed from an inductive to a deductive approach.

Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA)

To analyze how the three framing strategies influence campaign outcomes, I use qualitative comparative analysis (QCA). QCA is tolerant of a small number of empirical cases and detects a set of causal conditions leading to a particular outcome (Ragin 2008). QCA also identifies multiple and combined causes that produce a movement’s political outcome.

Two types of QCA results provide useful information to understanding how each causal condition or combination of conditions contributes to a particular outcome. A necessity test shows what condition must be present for an outcome to occur. A sufficiency test reveals multiple conjunctural causations leading to an outcome. QCA results also provide information regarding theoretical relevance of a result (via consistency score) and empirical relevance of a result (via coverage score). Finally, QCA allows a researcher to choose a solution to present from three different options – complex, parsimonious and intermediate solutions. In my report of QCA results, I present the intermediate solution because it is a recommended solution by Ragin (2008) when a researcher can justify results with both empirical and theoretical knowledge.

Because all measures used in my analysis are dichotomous, I use the crisp-set QCA method, instead of the fuzzy-set QCA. Table 2 summarizes the presence and absence of the three causal conditions...
and the outcome for the eleven campaigns. In what follows, I describe how I operationalize these framing characteristics, along with my outcome (campaign success or failure) for qualitative comparative analysis (QCA).

Table 2. Presence and Absence of Three Causal Conditions and Outcome Condition for Campaigns

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Campaign</th>
<th>Interaction of Articulate and Empirically Credible Frame (INTERACTION)</th>
<th>Identity Deployment (IDENTITY)</th>
<th>Strategic Silence (SILENCE)</th>
<th>Outcome</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EDV</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AST</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EEA3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMP</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACA</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFHS</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AEL</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADV</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASV</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EEA2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AHF</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Operationalizing the Conditions

1. Interaction of articulate and empirically credible frames: This condition refers to the presence of both articulate and empirically credible frame qualities in the majority of campaign-produced documents targeting politicians, media, public, or opponents. An “articulate frame” refers to the presence of a sentence or phrase articulating a specific reason(s) for a new legislation. A sentence indicating specific reasons includes explicit or implicit “because” statements (McCammon 2009). An “empirically credible frame” refers to the presence of concrete or factual evidence of what is happening in Korean society, which is presented in the form of “real” stories or statistics. Each campaign produced numerous documents during the campaign period, such as public statements and interviews with the media. Among these documents, I located and analyzed each document prepared to persuade external targets. In other words, I excluded documents prepared for or produced to summarize internal meetings.

16 I use acronyms for campaign names. The full names of campaigns are presented in Table 1, along with the acronyms.
17 “Majority” means that more than half of the documents have both frame qualities.
from my analysis, because texts in those documents are mostly activists’ intended discussions of the progress of the campaign. Six out of eleven campaigns produced the majority of their documents with both frame qualities, that is, both articulate and empirically credible frames.

2. *Strategic deployment of broad identity in framing:* This condition refers to the inclusion of both feminist and non-feminist groups in campaign activities\(^{18}\). Archival documents show the member organizations as well as one-time participating groups in each campaign. Interview accounts reveal why feminist activists invited those organizations to their campaign events. Based on these data, I determined whether a campaign was intended to frame itself as encompassing more than a solely feminist identity and to appeal to legislators. Most campaigns, all but three, were framed as more than solely feminist movements by the inclusion of diverse group members in their campaign activities.

3. *Strategic silence in framing:* This condition refers to an activist’s decision to be relatively silent about certain issues or topics related to their campaign. Informants talked about whether they intended to be quiet on specific matters to avoid potential opposition or controversy surrounding their campaign. For example, when activists decided not to make a fuss about legislators revising their bill as a condition of passing the bill, I coded that activists used a silent strategy. In other cases, when feminist activists chose not to use radical feminist language or not to advocate for a potentially controversial demand in consideration of a conservative audience, I coded it as the presence of a silent strategy. When activists did not feel the need for such a strategy, and therefore did not implement it, I also coded it as the absence of a silent strategy. Strategic silence in framing is present in six campaigns but absent in the other five campaigns.

4. *Campaign’s political outcome:* A campaign success means the passage of a bill that the campaign proposed to the legislature in the National Assembly. A campaign failure means that either the campaign’s proposed bill did not pass or a bill proposed by parties other than the campaign was eventually made into a law. For instance, legislators revised the Special Act on Sexual Violence multiple times.

\(^{18}\) This measure is different from a coalition measure that I use in Chapter 2, because the broad identity measure includes one-time and irregularly participating groups that are not actual members of an enduring coalition.
times from 1999 to 2007, but since feminist groups’ demands (e.g., erasing a rule of mandatory report and changing the definition of sexual violence in the law) were not reflected in those revisions, I consider the campaign unsuccessful.

**Results**

I conducted separate analyses for two different outcome conditions – a campaign success and a campaign failure. For each outcome, I evaluated both necessity and sufficiency tests. A necessity test reveals what causal condition, if any, must be present for an outcome to occur, but the necessary condition alone is not always sufficient to produce an outcome. Sufficiency tests show the multiple conjunctural causations that lead to an outcome. Sufficient causal conditions (or combinations of causal conditions) are not necessary but they are sufficient to produce an outcome. QCA results also display consistency and coverage information of necessary and sufficient conditions. Scholars of QCA suggest that the cut-off of consistency scores for necessary conditions should be 0.90 and higher, and the cut-off of consistency scores for sufficient conditions should be 0.80 and higher (Ragin 2008; McAdam et al. 2010). I first display QCA results for each outcome with the information of consistency and coverage scores. Then, I provide my detailed qualitative analysis based on interviews, archival, and newspaper records that further illustrates the framing features and their effect on a campaign’s political outcome.

**QCA results**

My necessity test for a legislative success shows that strategic deployment of broad identity in framing (IDENTITY) is necessary for a campaign to succeed (with a consistency score of 1.0). It means that IDENTITY is present in all pathways leading to a success. Table 3 provides the two different combinations of framing conditions for a campaign success. A solution coverage of 1 indicates that these configurations can explain 100% of the empirical cases in the outcome. The QCA results in Table 3 demonstrate that all successful campaigns produced positive political outcomes as a result of the combined effect of different framing conditions. For instance, the combination of effective framing contents (INTERACTION) and one of the non-verbal framing activities (IDENTITY)
explains most of the successful campaigns (six out of seven), as demonstrated in the first pathway. This result supports my expectation that framing contents and activities function together to create an effective framing strategy for movement outcomes. It also proves that what is done in framing is as important as what is said in framing. The second pathway in Table 3 particularly highlights the important roles that non-verbal framing activities (IDENTITY and SILENCE) play in producing a positive political outcome.

Table 3. Sufficient Conditions for Campaign Success: Intermediate Solution

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Path</th>
<th>Raw coverage</th>
<th>Unique coverage</th>
<th>Consistency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. IDENTITY*INTERACTION + (6 campaigns: AST, AFHS, AEL, ACA, EDV, EEA3)</td>
<td>0.857143</td>
<td>0.285714</td>
<td>1.000000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. IDENTITY*SILENCE (5 campaigns: AST, AFHS, AEL, ACA, AMP)</td>
<td>0.714286</td>
<td>0.142857</td>
<td>1.000000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Solution coverage: 1.000000
Solution consistency: 1.000000

* Denotes logical AND, + logical OR
Upper case letters mark presence, lower case absence, of condition
Frequency cut-off: 1, Consistency cutoff: 1

My QCA results for a campaign failure also show that lacking both effective framing contents and non-verbal framing activities is detrimental to campaign outcomes, as demonstrated in Table 4. My necessity test for a campaign failure reveals that there is no necessary framing condition for a campaign to fail. Table 4 provides two pathways leading to a campaign failure, which explains 100% of the empirical cases in the outcome.

Table 4. Sufficient Conditions for Campaign Failure: Intermediate Solution

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Path</th>
<th>Raw coverage</th>
<th>Unique coverage</th>
<th>Consistency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. interaction*identity (3 campaigns: ASV, ADV, and AHF)</td>
<td>0.750000</td>
<td>0.250000</td>
<td>1.000000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. interaction*silence (3 campaigns: ASV, ADV, and EEA2)</td>
<td>0.750000</td>
<td>0.250000</td>
<td>1.000000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Solution coverage: 1.000000
Solution consistency: 1.000000

Upper case letters mark presence, lower case absence, of condition
* Denotes logical AND, + logical OR
Frequency cut-off: 1, Consistency cutoff: 1
The results in Table 4 indicate that the absence of causal conditions producing a campaign success leads to a campaign’s negative outcome. All of the three framing conditions that are associated with campaign success are absent in two failed campaigns (ASV and ADV). The first pathway in Table 4 explains one additional case of an unsuccessful campaign: AHF. The second path explains the remaining case of failure: EEA2. Below, I discuss in detail how different framing conditions examined in this study played important roles in producing successful campaigns, and how the lack of those features were detrimental to campaign outcomes, highlighting their combined effect on campaign outcomes.

**Effective Framing Contents: Interaction of Frame Articulation and Empirical Credibility**

The first pathway for a campaign success in Table 3 explains most of the successful campaigns, six out of seven. It also supports my expectation that framing contents are most effective when they contain both articulation and empirical credibility frame qualities. Persuasive arguments should offer specific reasons for activists’ arguments that are backed with concrete evidence. In other words, when activists mention current events or statistics reflective of Korean society and use them as the reason for their argument, effective framing contents are established.

Most of the successful campaigns produced the majority of their claims-making documents with both frame qualities included. Examples below demonstrate the claims that contain both specific reasons (underlined) for feminist demands and concrete evidence (italicized) to support the arguments.

“…*There are only 16 Congresswomen among the entire number of 272 Congressmen in the Korean National Assembly, making up only 5.9% of the population…* Therefore, *we urge you to increase the number of proportional representatives and enact the mandatory prevision of a 50% quota of female candidates in the Election Law...”*  

(*January 20, 2004, Public statement, the AEL campaign*)
“...childcare facilities for children under three are short of supplies, considering the high demand. Particularly, only 12.8% of the need for infant care facilities is satisfied... Therefore, we urge the government to secure its budget to provide free childcare services for children under five...”
(February 7, 2001, Policy suggestion, the ACA campaign)

“49 days has passed since the fire incident that killed 14 confined women in an adult entertainment club in Gaebokdong, Gun-San City... the government should enact the Anti-Sex Trafficking Act immediately and prepare solutions to protect the human rights of victims of sex-trafficking/prostitution.
(March 18, 2002, Public statement, the AST campaign)

The first excerpt shows a typical feminist claim demanding a mandatory 50% quota system in election. The statistical figure 5.9% reflects low representation of women in the National Assembly, which helps the claims-maker articulate why the new legislation is needed to increase women’s participation in politics, and simultaneously establishes empirical evidence that women are poorly represented in politics. Similarly, activists demanding increase in government spending in childcare support also utilize statistical evidence that the current childcare service is inadequate to meet childcare needs, and this then provides gives the reason why the government should spend more money in providing childcare services through the new legislation.

Mentioning a dramatic event is another way that activists offer empirically credible and articulate frames. The AST campaign utilized this strategy most effectively. The fire that is mentioned in the third excerpt was a tragic accident that killed numerous prostitutes who were sleeping in rooms locked by pimps and who could not escape from the fire. Because a similar accident had happened in the previous year in the same city, this event attracted a lot of media attention. Strategic activists in the AST campaign made sure to mention the fire in framing their arguments, because the incident was not only factual
evidence of the horrible reality of a prostitute’s life in a brothel, but it also offered a specific reason to enact the Anti-Sex Trafficking Law, which was designed to protect victims of sex trafficking/prostitution.

On the other hand, when framing contents lack either one of these frame qualities campaigns are likely to fail. One example is the campaign for the amendment of the Special Act on Sexual Violence (i.e., the ASV campaign). Only one third of the statements released by this campaign contain both frame qualities, while the rest lack either articulated reasons for their argument or empirical evidence to support the argument. For instance, this campaign had a particular demand, which was the abolition of the Chinjogoe (a requirement of a complaint from the rape victim for prosecution) from the Special Act on Sexual Violence. However, why this requirement should be removed from the law was not always articulated in the campaign-produced documents. In several policy suggestions submitted to the government by the KWAU, the abolition of the Chinjogoe was always placed on the top of the listed suggestions as an immediate issue to resolve. This claim regarding the abolition of the Chinjogoe was often accompanied with reasons to support the argument. However, the problem was the mismatch between the claim and the supporting evidence. Looking at KWAU’s 2001 policy suggestions, one can see that three reasons for the revision of the law were provided: (1) the increasing number of sexual violence crime and counseling requests from the victims, (2) an increase in sexual violence crime on minors, and (3) ineffective procedures of victim protection. While the reasons provided here offer empirical evidence of sexual violence happening in Korean society, they do not speak of why the Chinjogoe has to be abolished from the law. In a statement where the reason for the abolition of the Chinjogoe is actually addressed, the reason is linked to the reality where many victims of sexual violence are threatened by the perpetrators not to file a complaint. However, the majority of the campaign-produced documents failed to articulate the reason why the abolition of the requirement is a better way to protect victims and thus should be reflected in the revised law.

In summary, my analysis above shows that collective action frames used in most successful legislative campaigns are both articulate and empirically credible, whereas frames used in unsuccessful campaigns lack one or both of the frame qualities. Thus, I argue that these two frame qualities tend to
work together in creating effective framing contents. Although these frame qualities are conceptualized distinctively (see Benford and Snow 2000) and examined independently in previous studies (see McCammon 2009), the results in Table 3 demonstrate that persuasive framing contents should have the interaction of both frame qualities to bring about positive movement outcomes.

**Effective Framing Activity 1: Strategic Deployment of Broad Identity in Framing (IDENTITY)**

Both pathways leading to campaign success in Table 3 demonstrate that strategic deployment of identity in framing (IDENTITY) is necessary for a campaign to succeed. On the other hand, the absence of IDENTITY is negatively associated with a campaign outcome, as demonstrated in Table 4. A closer look at the legislative campaigns supports these findings. All successful feminist legislative campaigns in my sample utilized the framing strategy of portraying the movement as more than solely a feminist mobilization, whereas most failed campaigns (three out of four) did not use this strategy.

Informants commonly acknowledge that framing their campaigns as an issue for all women or an issue for all of civil society was important in engaging their target audience. Three different interview accounts address a similar point:

“When there is strong opposition, we seek a broad coalition. Otherwise, they [opponents] say, “This is just your [feminist] position.” With the broad coalition, we say, “This is an issue that all women’s groups want to address.” Showing our unity [across women’s groups] is one of our strategies to pressure politicians. How strong of opposition we had against the 50% quota demand to female candidates in the election! Men [male politicians] thought that the quota system would take away their own spots.”

*(Interview with IKKS, June 30, 2014, the AFHS campaign and the AEL campaign)*

“When we invited reputable male civic group representatives to our protest events, we had a strategic intent to make our [AST] campaign viewed as a movement, not just pushed by women,
but as a movement that reflects the civil society’s desire to make better society.” (Interview with CYS, July 9, 2014, the AST campaign)

“In order to pass a [feminist] law, and to prevent any opposition from arising against the law, we believed that other NGOs should have interest in gender issues, become vocal about them, and collaborate with us for our success… If they [other progressive NGOs] do not agree with us, we thought that it would be impossible to persuade politicians and the general public to support us.” (Interview with CEH, July 10, 2014, the EEA3 campaign)

Informants cited in the above accounts are veteran feminist activists. From their experiences, they learned that framing a campaign solely as a feminist issue would not help them win a political victory. They planned in advance to prevent opponents or politicians from saying that they only represent feminist women. For instance, for the AFHS campaign and the AEL campaign, the KWAU worked with the biggest conservative women’s organization in Korea, the Korean National Council of Women, and framed the campaigns as issues for all women. Furthermore, to fight against the perception that the abolition of the Family Headship System only serves women’s interest, feminist activists organized and supported a group called “Daughter-Loving Daddy’s Gathering” to be formed. This group stated that men also want the system to be abolished because men as well as women are victims of the sex-discriminatory Family Headship System that enforces patriarchal burdens on men, and that they do not want to see their daughters suffering from the traditional system. Inclusion of male-centered groups in campaign events was a strategic move to frame the AFHS campaign as a matter for all of civil society’s interest.

On the contrary, the absence of IDENTITY negatively influenced campaign outcomes, as demonstrated in Table 4. Activists involved in unsuccessful campaigns recalled that they made a decision not to form a broad coalition, which would have expanded their campaigns to engage non-feminist members of civil society. An activist who participated in the ADV campaign says, “we thought we could do it ourselves without a broad coalition because it was not to enact a completely new law, but to revise
an existing law,” (Interview with CCS, July 1, 2014). Another activist in the AHF campaign states, “we did not try to expand our campaign beyond an association of the like-minded people or groups…. because other progressive groups in Korea may have had different [possibly conservative] ideas when it comes to the issue of family [which was the main focus of the campaign]” (Interview with PCOK, June 25, 2014).

As these accounts suggest, activists who were involved in failed campaigns did not frame their campaigns as far-reaching issues that affected non-feminist members of civil society, but instead worked closely with like-minded feminist groups.

In summary, in order to win a political victory, feminist activists in successful campaigns made sure to present the identity of their campaigns as a broad one, one that represented all women or all of civil society, so that politicians could not dismiss their demands as feminist protests. When they did not implement this strategy, campaigns were likely to fail.

**Effective Framing Activity 2: Strategic Silence in Framing (SILENCE)**

In addition to IDENTITY, strategic silence in framing (SILENCE) also contributed to campaign success. Interview accounts highlight the strong relation between the presence of SILENCE and positive campaign outcomes. The AMP campaign illustrates an example of how strategic silence in framing helped the campaign succeed. A key activist who led the AMP campaign recalls that she knew exactly what not to say in framing the campaign.

“In this campaign, there was a heated debate about parental leave, specifically 90 days of paid maternity leave. We picked that issue as our slogan and fiercely debated it over. However, in the meantime we quietly added another provision to our suggested bill to the legislature. That was a refined provision that states prohibition of indirect sex discrimination at work. This topic is not easy to understand, so the media didn’t really care about it. Nor did we want the news media to cover it, because, strategically, this provision about indirect discrimination at work could have caused more heated discussion than paid parental leave. If this issue had become more
conspicuous, corporations and businesses would have made a big fuss about it. So, we decided to pursue this provision very quietly. That was our strategy.”

(Interview with KKSM, July 5, 2014).

As explained in the interview accounts above, the goal of the AMP campaign was not only to achieve 90 days of paid maternity leave through the revision of the Labor Standard Act, but also to add a refined provision to prohibit indirect sex discrimination at work in the Equal Employment Act. That is, the campaign pursued revising two separate laws regarding women’s issues at workplace. However, activists in this campaign stayed relatively silent about indirect sex discrimination at work, because they expected that highlighting this issue might create controversy. Even in naming the campaign, activists strategically left out the issue of indirect sex discrimination at work, by calling it “A Campaign for the Amendment of the Maternity Protection Act.”

Other successful campaigns also chose to be silent on certain issues. During the AFHS campaign, activists were relatively quiet about their initial demand of allowing a married couple to decide which family name to give to their child, because they sensed that politicians as well as the public were uncomfortable with the idea of a child inheriting a mother’s family name (Interview with IKKS June 30, 2014). Additionally, in the AEL campaign, when legislators tried to increase the overall number of members of the National Assembly as a condition to meet the feminist demand for the zipper quota system for female candidates in elections, feminist activists decided to be silent on that matter, although it was against the general public’s sentiment (Interview with IKKS June 30, 2014). As these examples illustrate, strategic activists knew when to be quiet for the success of their campaign.

Not all campaigns needed or implemented this silent strategy. Activists who were involved in most unsuccessful campaigns (three out of four) recall that they were never put into a situation where they had to choose to be silent on certain topics in order to win. It may be that a silent strategy was unnecessary in those campaigns. Or perhaps the nature of the campaigns caused activists to think that silence was not an option for them to take. For instance, in the EEA2 campaign, activists did not choose
to be quiet about their demand of the prohibition of sexual harassment at work in the revised Equal Employment Act, although a government officer hinted to them that the government was not ready to consider revising the law regarding that issue (*Interview with CKJ, July 8, 2014*). Prohibiting sexual harassment at work by law was one of the core demands of the EEA2 campaign, and therefore being silent about this particular issue may not have been a feasible choice. The other two unsuccessful campaigns (the ADV and the ASV campaigns) also fought for progressive feminist demands, such as changing the definition of sexual violence in the Special Act on Sexual Violence. Activists in the ASV campaign note that they had no choice but to pursue their legislative goal, regardless of the cultural context, because defining sexual violence as the violation of one’s right to sexual autonomy and self-determination is a fundamental change to be made in the Special Act on Sexual Violence by the feminist standard (*Interview with LMK, July 14, 2014*).

In sum, strategic silence in framing was important to helping campaigns succeed, because it could prevent heated, possibly oppositional, debates from taking place during the campaign process. When it comes to the relationship between a silent strategy and campaign failure, the QCA result indicates a negative association between the two, and interview accounts further suggest that activists in many failed campaigns did not consider a silent strategy as an option to take for the success of their campaigns.

**Discussion and Conclusion**

In this chapter, I investigate the relationship between movement framing strategies and their political outcomes, examining eleven feminist legislative campaigns in Korea. Overall, my study advances scholarly knowledge on framing strategies influencing movement outcomes. Previous research neglects study of the interactive effect of different frame qualities on movement outcomes and tends to analyze only what is said in the framing process. The present study demonstrates how different frame qualities interact with each other to create effective framing contents and how non-verbal framing activities, together with persuasive framing contents, influence movement political outcomes.
A key finding in this study is that a combination of verbal and non-verbal framing strategies, not a single framing strategy, leads to a social movement’s political success. In many successful campaigns where feminist legislative bills passed in the National Assembly in Korea, both strategic framing contents and non-verbal framing activities worked together to create effective framing, producing desired campaign outcomes. When either condition was missing, campaigns failed.

Also, my analysis of the impact of framing contents on campaign outcomes shows that two frame qualities, frame articulation and the empirical credibility of the frame, tend to work together in creating effective framing contents. Previous studies conceptualize these frame qualities distinctively and investigate their effect on framing outcomes independently (Cress and Snow 2000; McCammon 2009; McVeigh et al. 2004; Paschel 2010). However, by analyzing empirical examples in this study, I find that the presence of both qualities together makes collective action frames more persuasive than frames with only either of the qualities. Although Snow and his colleagues introduce various qualities of collective action frames as distinct concepts (Benford and Snow 2000; Snow et al. 1986; Snow and Benford 1988, 1992), future research should pay close attention to how they work together to create powerful claims for a social movement.

In addition to framing contents, my findings also highlight the importance of non-verbal framing activities in influencing movement outcomes. It is difficult to find framing research that examines what activists actually do in framing their movement to achieve their goal (for exception see Fujiwara 2005). I attribute this tendency to two reasons. First, many framing scholars analyze only written texts prepared by activists, often times because of lack of interview or participant observation data. Second, even if they do examine non-verbal framing activities (e.g., frequency of using a particular frame), they do not make a clear distinction between what is said in framing and what is done in framing. By making this distinction, I suggest that we can broaden the range of framing activities and incorporate other strategies that were not captured under the category of framing into framing analysis to help us understand how framing influences movement outcomes. Drawing on both framing and strategy literature, I tested two non-verbal framing activities, and I found that they all matter for a movement’s political success. Particularly,
strategic deployment of identity in framing was necessary for all campaigns in my study to succeed. The other non-verbal framing activity, strategic silence, also contributed to the success of many campaigns, together with strategic identity in framing. Moreover, the absence of one of these non-verbal framing activities, in combination with the absence of effective framing contents, explains the negative outcomes of the other campaigns in my study. Thus, I argue that more focus should be given to the role of non-verbal framing activities for a movement success.

Finally, this study points to directions for future research on social movement outcomes. As my findings indicate, different framing strategies, broadly, verbal and non-verbal framing strategies can interactively influence the political outcomes of social movements. More research is needed to examine the interaction of framing strategies for their impact on movement outcomes. Comparative research across policy issues would also be helpful. Extant policy studies are mostly either single campaign case studies or cross-national research comparing the same policy issue. This study examined campaigns across different policy areas. Other scholars (Amenta et al 2010; Kolb 2007) have called for more systematic empirical research that compares movements across policy issues, and more research is needed to explore the conditions that affect successful movements across different policy matters.


CHAPTER 4

THE ROLE OF SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND POLITICAL CONTEXTS IN FEMINIST POLICY REFORMS IN KOREA

Introduction

Social movement scholars and political scientists broadly agree that both political contexts and social movements influence policymaking (Amenta et al. 2010; Banaszak 2010; Gelb 2003; Soule and King 2006). Recent scholarship, including research on gender policy, suggests that policy studies pay more attention to the interactive effect of political contexts and social movements in policymaking rather than investigating their political roles separately (Banaszak 2010; Franceschet 2004; McCammon 2012; Soule and Olzak 2004). This theoretical position is in line with the political mediation model that explains the political consequences of a social movement. According to the model, political contexts mediate the effectiveness of social movements on policy outcomes (Amenta et al. 1992, 1994, 2005). Numerous studies on gender policies (Elman 1996; McCammon 2012; Soule and Olzak 2004; Weldon 2002) also suggest that well-mobilized women’s movements produce positive policy outcomes when mediated by favorable political contexts.

In this chapter, drawing on the political mediation model, I test the role of social movements and political contexts in influencing gender policy change in South Korea. My findings offer a more sophisticated nuance to the model. The existing model does not consider the volatile nature of political contexts that could change during the process of policymaking. I contend that political circumstances may shift over the course of policymaking, influenced by social movement strategies. Furthermore, I argue that social movement opponents influence policy outcomes when their mobilizing power outweighs that of a social movement. Unlike the political mediation model (Amenta et al. 1992, 1994, 2005), which is primarily considered a state-centered explanation of political consequences of social movements, my analysis offers both state-centered and society-centered (i.e., social movement-oriented) explanations of
successful feminist policy reforms. While like some studies of the political mediation perspective, I conclude that the effectiveness of social movements on policy change depends on existing political contexts, my research also provides examples of where policy change requires strong strategic pressure from social movements, regardless of the existing political environment.

I investigate the role of social movements and political contexts in gender policy change by analyzing eleven feminist policy reform campaigns that took place between 1993 and 2007 in South Korea. There was a great increase in the number of gender egalitarian policies enacted in Korea between the early 1990s and the mid-2000s (Kwon 2011; Shim 2007). Moreover, Korean scholars commonly attribute many successful feminist policy reforms since the mid-1990s to the combined effect of the Korean women’s movement and broad political opportunities open to the movement (Jones 2006; Kim and Kim 2014; Kwon 2011; Lee and Chin 2007; Suh 2011). Thus, the Korean cases are good examples to test the relationship between social movement challengers and political contexts in influencing gender policy reform.

In the section that follows, I first review how the political mediation model explains the influence of political contexts and social movements on policy outcomes. Then, I introduce a revised political mediation model (which I call “political interaction model”) that reflects my arguments on the volatile nature of political contexts and the role of opponents in policymaking. Drawing on the political interaction model and feminist policy research, I also discuss possible factors that may influence feminist policymaking in Korea. Then, I briefly describe the eleven legislative campaigns that I examine in this study. After providing a discussion of the data and methods used for this research, I analyze how political contexts and social movements interactively affect a movement’s political outcomes.

**Political Mediation Model vs. Political Interaction Model**

The political mediation perspective in social movement research argues that the effectiveness of social movements on policy outcomes is mediated by institutional conditions, such as supportive political allies or structures of political institutions (Amenta et al. 1992, 1994, 2005). Many empirical studies
indicate the explanatory value of this model in investigating the relationship between political contexts and a social movement’s political outcomes (Amenta et al. 1992, 2005; Cress and Snow 200; Johnson 2008; Linders 2004; Soule and Olzak 2004).

Introducing the political mediation perspective, which is different from a political opportunity model, Amenta and his colleagues (1992) present the diagram, reproduced in Figure 1.

![Political Mediation Model](image)

Figure 1. Political Mediation Model (Amenta, Carruthers, and Zylan 1992:313)

Amenta and his colleagues (1992) locate a political context in the position of a moderator in the diagram above (for mediator-moderator distinction, see Avolio, Zhu, Koh, and Bhatia 2004; Baron and Kenny 1986). The role of a moderator is to determine the strength of the influence of a cause on an outcome, which, as a moderator, is what a political context does according to the diagram in Figure 1. Amenta and his colleagues’ (2005) further articulation of this model continues to describe a political context as a moderator. They write that “political conditions influence the relationship between a challenger’s mobilization and collective action on the one hand, and policy outcomes on the other” (Amental et al. 2005:519-520)19.

I suggest a revised version of the existing model by addressing three things not considered in the mediation model: 1) the model ignores the possible influence of a social movement on a political context,

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19 If a political context is a mediator, as specified on the model, when the political context is included in the model, the relationship between movement and outcome disappears. Amenta and his colleagues may have misnamed this model, calling it a political mediation model instead of a political moderation model.
2) it does not consider the volatile nature of a political context in policymaking, and 3) it does not address the role of a social movement opponent in policymaking. The diagram of the revised model which I call “political interaction model” is presented in Figure 2. Next, I describe its main characteristics.

First, the political interaction model considers the possibility of a social movement influencing a political context. Therefore, I include an arrow directed from a social movement to the political context in the new model. In the original model, this arrow does not exist, with an assumption that a political context exists independent of any social movement activities. However, some scholars, particularly those who study the relationship between a social movement’s framing strategies and political contexts, suggest that social movements can create new political opportunities through their framing activities (Alimi 2006; Noonan 1995; Stanbridge 2002). For example, Alimi (2006) finds that the Palestinian movement’s promotion of an action frame created a political opportunity that enabled the First Palestinian Intifada to arise. Thus, I propose that a political context may become more favorable to a social movement in the process of policymaking. In fact, without the hope of persuading lawmakers to support a social movement’s demand, social movement activists would not conduct any lobbying or protesting activities for policy reform. This first proposition that a social movement can influence a political context leads to my second proposition regarding the dimensions of political contexts.
Second, the political interaction model pays attention to the shifting and volatile nature of a political environment. The mediation model tends to focus on static aspects of a political context for policy change (Bosi, Giugni, and Uba 2016). A political context is a complex term that involves various dimensions of political openness to challengers that are outside politics (Meyer 2004). Gamson and Meyer (1996) note that there are volatile as well as stable elements of political opportunity. However, the existing studies drawing on Amenta and his colleagues’ political mediation theory heavily focus on the stable aspects of political conditions. Tarrow (1996) suggests that in order to study the variation in a social movement’s political outcomes, scholars should examine dynamic, shifting political contexts (e.g., the presence of influential allies) and their relation to the social movement outcomes rather than a relatively static political environment (e.g., the structure of the state). Tarrow makes this suggestion because short-term political opportunities may come and go even in the same national context, providing variation to explore. Although Amenta and his colleagues (2005) incorporate the measure of a short-term political context in their study, their approach is still structural and does not consider the shifting nature of political conditions during the process of policymaking. I propose that researchers should be attentive to the changing aspects of political conditions, especially those that can be influenced by challengers.

Finally, the political interaction model criticizes the absence of social movement opponents in the political mediation model. As Meyer and Staggenborg (1996) note, some policy issues such as abortion laws attract strong opposition from one movement against another, both of which attempt to work through lawmakers to achieve their political goals. However, few studies examine the impact of both social movements and their counter-movements on policy outcomes (Dixon 2008; Soule 2004). Only a couple of exceptional studies discuss how the movement-countermovement dynamics influence a movement’s political outcomes (Andrews 2001; Dixon 2008; Soule 2004). In Dixon’s (2008) research on the political battle between employers and labor movement actors in the 1950s of the U.S., he finds that the better-organized movement has a higher chance of exerting political influence on a labor policy. But the role of a political context is not incorporated in his research. Expanding on Dixon’s (2008) work, I propose that if, in the process of policymaking, both a movement and its opponent group reach out to politicians to
influence their position on a particular policy issue, then the better-mobilized or strategized side may win its political victory. Although not every social movement faces organized opposition from its adversaries, by adding the opponent factor to the model, I offer a comprehensive model that can capture the impact of movement-countermovement dynamics on policy change.

**Factors Influencing Gender Policy Reform**

Drawing on the “political interaction model” as well as feminist policy research, I discuss factors that may be associated with feminist policy change. First, I consider how the support of political insiders and the executive/legislative branch of the government may influence feminist policy reform. Second, I examine how a social movement’s strategies—strategies involving coalitions and framing—may affect its policy outcomes. Finally, I discuss how opponents of a social movement may influence feminist policy reform with their counter-activism against the movement in the process of policymaking.

**Political Contexts**

*Political insiders (femocrats):* A subset of feminist policy research shows that the impact of female politicians on feminist policymaking is not very promising (Bleijenbergh and Roggeband 2007; Mazur 2002; Weldon 2002). Bleijenbergh and Roggeband (2007) and Weldon (2002) find that the effect of the number of women in political office is weak in advancing gender policy. On the other hand, another group of feminist policy researchers argue that feminist politicians, as political insiders, play crucial roles in helping establish gender policies (Eisenstein 1996; Gelb 2003; Pettinicchio 2012). These findings suggest that it is not the mere presence of women in politics but the role of politicians who are dedicated to feminist causes that may influence feminist policymaking.

Social movement scholars also acknowledge the importance of political insiders in advancing progressive policy change, and this importance is particularly true for the political success of women’s movements (Banaszak 2005, 2010; McCammon 2012). McCammon (2012) finds that pro-women state legislators provided jury right activists in the U.S. with insider knowledge of how to strategize the jury movement for a political victory, which eventually helped them succeed. Banaszak (2010) notes that
feminist bureaucrats working in state agencies are also important political insiders to social movement activists. Feminist policy researchers call such feminist political allies, both those employed in government agencies and elected politicians working for gender policy, “femocrats” (Eisenstein 1996; Sawer 1990).

Some scholars conceptualize femocrats as social movement actors because they tend to be former activists who maintain their association with outside activists by representing social movements’ demands in the process of policymaking (for examples, see Banaszak 2010). While it is a valid point that femocrats share the same movement feminist identity as that of social movement actors, I focus more on their unique positioning, that is, their location. As politicians who are authorized to submit a legislative bill, femocrats can provide a political opportunity to outside challengers by introducing a feminist bill or persuading fellow lawmakers to sign on the bill. In addition, as these femocrats often face dilemmas between social movements’ demands and their political responsibilities in state bureaucracies (Stetson and Mazur 1995), I argue that they should not be treated the same as outside challengers who are not bound to the political duties of government employees. Thus, I consider the presence of femocrats as a political context rather than treating them as social movement actors in relation to social movement outcomes. I expect that the presence of femocrats provides a favorable political context to social movement actors to increase their movement’s chance for political success.

Support of Executive/Legislative Branch of the Government: Over the last couple of decades, feminist policy scholars have witnessed an increase in the number of nations that establish state agencies to further a feminist agenda. Stetson and Mazur (1995) call such government activity “state feminism” and measure it by the presence of a government agency assigned to promote gender equality (which is sometimes called “women’s policy machinery”). The Women’s Bureau of the Department of Labor in the U.S. in the late 1970s is an example of a women’s policy machinery. The Bureau engaged in supporting displaced homemakers programs in response to a feminist demand that the government should assist displaced homemakers in competing in the work force (Stetson and Mazur 2000). Several researchers find that a women’s policy machinery positively contributes to feminist policy development as a moderator.
between a women’s movement and its policy outcomes (Bleijenbergh and Roggeband 2007; Stetson 2001; Weldon 2002).

Like feminist policy researchers, social movement scholars also emphasize the importance of a political institution for policy reform (Amenta and Hafmann 2000; Giugni 2007; Soule and Olzak 2004). For instance, Giugni (2007) finds that the percentage of seats held by the Democratic Party in Congress has a positive effect on the passage of progressive policy reforms. Soule and Olzak (2004) also demonstrate that when members of state legislatures held liberal ideological positions, the Equal Rights Amendment in the U.S. was likely to be ratified in that state.

While I agree that support within a political institution is beneficial for a women’s movement, I raise an issue with the existing studies’ approach to such a factor. The previous research assumes that a political institution holds a general position, either liberal or conservative, to a progressive policy suggestion, but dismisses a possibility that the same political institution may support one feminist bill but not the other. As a growing number of political scientists note, different types of gender issues generate distinct reactions from political decision-makers (Gelb and Palley 1987; Mazur 2002; Htun and Weldon 2010, 2014). In analysis I show that the women’s policy machinery in Korea did not have equal support for each feminist policy bill introduced by the Korean women’s movement. In short, a political institution’s position on gender policy may not be the same across policy issues, which can be influenced by various factors such as social events, the head of the department at that time, and social movement strategies.

Focusing on this shifting nature of a political context, I expect that a government holds a specific position on a gender policy issue at a particular time, and its position influences feminist policymaking. In the case of Korea, both the executive and the legislative branches of the government have the authority to submit a bill for legislation. Therefore, I expect that a chance for feminist policymaking increases when there is strong support from either the executive body or the legislature, both of which have the power to enact policy.
**Social Movement Strategies: Coalition and Framing**

Many social movement studies consider whether the types of social movement activities, such as protesting and lobbying, make a difference in their political outcomes (Andrews and Edwards 2004; Johnson et al. 2010; Olzak et al. 2016). Others discuss how social movement strategies, particularly framing strategies, produce different political outcomes (Cress and Snow 2000; Ferree 2003; Kubal 1998; McCammon 2009). In the two previous chapters of the dissertation, I examine strategic conditions of coalitions and framing that are necessary for a social movement’s political success. In my investigation of coalitions, I find that having a strong coalition hub is essential for social movement campaigns to succeed. In examining framing strategies, I find that presenting broad collective identity in framing is a necessary condition for a movement’s success. Below I discuss how these social movement strategies may influence feminist policymaking through their relationships with political contexts.

**Effective Coalition Strategy:** Among the five different coalition conditions tested in Chapter 2, I find that a strong coalition hub is the necessary condition for a social movement’s political victory. A strong coalition hub refers to the presence of a group of people leading the coalition that is equipped with three features – professional cadre, field expertise, and policy knowledge. My research shows that coalition hubs with these three features have a higher chance for success than other coalitions that lack at least one of the three qualities.

Since my research on coalitions in the earlier chapter does not consider the political contexts pertaining to each policy campaign and the relation of the political contexts to a social movement’s coalition strategy in influencing policy reform, I test the combined effect of the presence of a strong coalition hub and political contexts in this study. Recent scholarship on political consequences of social movements shows abundant evidence for how the interaction between social movements and political contexts affects social movements’ political outcomes (Amenta et al. 2010). However, few studies assess the link between a social movement coalition strategy and political contexts, and the combined impact of those two factors on policy change. As an exception, McCammon (2012) finds that creating a coalition of
diverse groups, in combination with having political insiders, helped some state jury movements in the U.S. to achieve sweeping success in obtaining women’s jury rights.

Other studies provide some theoretical bridges to link the presence of a strong coalition hub to the coalition’s political success through political contexts. Cress and Snow (1996) find that a professional cadre, one of the features of a strong coalition hub, is important for a homeless movement’s success. In their research, a homeless movement led by a professional cadre of several core members was more organizationally viable than others, and its chance for success was the highest when the organizational viability was combined with a political condition favorable to the movement. A group of policy experts, another feature of a strong coalition hub, also proves to enhance the infrastructure of the movement and help it better communicate with lawmakers (Andrews 2001). Moreover, the presence of salient local knowledge (which I call “field expertise” as the last feature of a strong hub) also increases a movement’s chance for success by heightening its strategic capacity (Ganz 2000). This set of research suggests that a social movement, operated by a strong coalition hub, is likely to create strong mobilization capacity for its success. Therefore, I expect that when a campaign deploys an effective coalition strategy, in addition to having favorable political contexts, it is likely to succeed in policy reform.

*Effective Framing Strategy:* In addition to examining coalition conditions, I examine how framing strategies influence political outcomes for social movements in Chapter 3, and I find that presenting a broad collective identity in framing is necessary for movement success. That is, all successful feminist legislative campaigns in my study utilize the framing strategy of portraying the movement as more than a solely feminist mobilization as a way to resonate with conservative cultural sentiment against feminism.

My research on framing in the earlier chapter also does not examine specific political contexts for each policy campaign and the political environment’s relation to a social movement’s framing strategy in influencing policy reform. Thus, I test the combined effect of the presence of an effective framing strategy and political contexts in this study.
Many studies examine the importance of framing strategies, particularly frame resonance, for a movement’s successes (Ferree 2003; Fujiwara 2005; Kubal 1998; Maney 2001). A handful of research particularly emphasizes the interactive effect of framing strategies and political contexts on a social movement’s political consequences (Cress and Snow 2000; McCammon et al. 2001; Paschel 2010). Cress and Snow (2000) find that when activists for a homeless organization in the U.S. utilized an articulate framing strategy, in addition to having sympathetic allies, the movement was most likely to achieve intended political benefits. Paschel (2010) also argues that Afro-Colombian social movement activists succeeded in their policy reform for ethnic-racial rights when they deployed a resonant framing strategy, while taking advantage of a political window that was open to the movement in the 1990s.

This set of research suggests that the combination of an effective framing strategy and favorable political contexts to a movement increases the chance for the movement’s political success. Thus, I expect that when a campaign adopts an effective framing strategy and there is a political environment that is positive to the campaign, it is likely to succeed.

**Opponents**

A social movement’s opponents can be important stakeholders in the process of policymaking when they have a vested interest in the policy issue. This is particularly true for a women’s movement. For instance, abortion politics in the U.S. cannot be understood without mentioning the dynamics between a pro-choice women’s movement and a pro-life movement (Esacove 2004; McCaffrey and Keys 2000; Rohlanger 2002; Meyer and Staggenborg 1996). However, as I note previously, existing scholarship does not pay enough attention to how social movement opponents and their relationship with the movement influence policy change.

Only a small number of studies find the relationship between movement-countermovement dynamics and policy outcomes (Andrews 2001; Dixon 2008; Soule 2004; Soule and Olzak 2004). Soule and Olzak (2004) demonstrate that the number of anti-Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) organizations in a state was associated with the failure of ERA ratification in that state. Dixon’s (20008) work further discusses that the relative strength of the opposition to a social movement causes a negative outcome to
Drawing on the findings of the past research, I expect that a campaign is likely to succeed when its mobilizing power is stronger than that of its opponents.

**Feminist Legislative Policy Campaigns in Korea**

The Korean women’s movement has been involved in policy reforms for women’s rights and has made significant progress in policy campaigns. The Korean Women’s Association United (KWAU), the umbrella organization of progressive women’s movement organizations in Korea, was at the heart of these campaigns. The KWAU’s targeted policy areas included various topics, from violence against women to women’s representativeness in politics. I cluster the eleven legislative policy campaigns that I analyze in this study by their issue areas in Table 1.

The first issue area is violence against women. Four campaigns fall in this category: (1) a campaign for the enactment of the Domestic Violence Prevention Act, (2) a campaign for the amendment of the Domestic Violence Prevention Act, (3) a campaign for the amendment of the Special Act on Sexual Violence, and (4) a campaign for the enactment of the Anti-Sex Trafficking Act. The two enactment campaigns were successful, while the two revision campaigns were unsuccessful.

The second feminist issue area in Korea is equal employment between men and women. Two campaigns fall in this category: (1) a campaign for the Second Amendment of the Equal Employment Act and (2) a campaign for the Third Amendment of the Equal Employment Act. Both campaigns had the same demands, but only the third amendment campaign ended in success.

The third feminist issue area is work/family reconciliation. Two campaigns fall in this category: (1) a campaign for the amendment of the Maternity Protection Act and (2) a campaign for the amendment of the Childcare Act. Both campaigns aimed to help women reconcile between their work and family duties through the revised laws, which ended in success.

The fourth feminist issue area is family. Two campaigns fall in this category: (1) a campaign for the abolition of the Family Headship System and (2) a campaign for the amendment of the Healthy Family Act. While the former campaign ended in success with the abolition of the Family Headship
System in 2005, the latter campaign died in 2007 soon after the bill submitted by the campaign was disposed at the Korean National Assembly.

Table 1. Feminist Policy Campaigns by Issue Areas

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue areas</th>
<th>The Name of Legislative Campaigns (Acronym; Campaign Period)</th>
<th>Major Agenda(s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2) A Campaign for the Amendment of the Domestic Violence Prevention Act (ADV; 2003~2007)</td>
<td>Emphasis on the protection of victims’ human rights and heightened level of punishment to perpetrators</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3) A Campaign for the Amendment of the Special Act on Sexual Violence (ASV; 1999~2007)</td>
<td>Removing a rule of mandatory reporting for prosecuting rape perpetrators &amp; Change of the definition of sexual violence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(4) A Campaign for the Enactment of the Anti-Sex Trafficking Act (AST; 2000~2004)</td>
<td>Strengthened punishment for pimps and sex traffickers &amp; Enhanced protection for victims of sex trafficking</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Work/Family Reconciliation</td>
<td>(1) A Campaign for the Amendment of the Maternity Protection Act (AMP; 2000~2001)</td>
<td>90 days of paid maternity leave</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2) A Campaign for the Amendment of the Childcare Act (ACA; 1999~2004)</td>
<td>Financial support for childcare according to family income status &amp; Increase in government spending for childcare support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Family</td>
<td>(1) A Campaign for the Abolition of the Family Headship System (AFHS; 1999~2005)</td>
<td>Abolishment of male priority in inheriting family headship &amp; Permission to change children’s family name to non-biological father’s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2) A Campaign for the Amendment of the Healthy Family Act (AHF; 2004~2007)</td>
<td>Expansion on the definition of family to include non-traditional types of families in the basic family law</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The last issue area is women’s representativeness in politics. In 2003, the KWAU began a campaign for the amendment of the Election Law with a specific goal: the law recommends political
parties adhering to a 50% quota of female candidates using a zipper quota obligation to widened women’s representation in politics. In the end, the campaign achieved its political goal.

Case Selection and Data Sources

Case Selection

I selected eleven feminist legislative campaigns in Korea as cases to analyze what influenced their political outcomes. My sample is not the population of all feminist legislative campaigns that took place after the democratization of Korea. Several factors determined the selection of the cases. First, to hold a broad political context constant, I selected campaigns that fall into the period between 1993 and 2007. The year 1993 is the dividing point marking the end of the authoritarian regime and the beginning of the first civilian democratic government in Korea. That is, a political opportunity structure for social movements challenging the government opened in 1993 with the democratic reform, compared to the years prior to 1993. Therefore, there has been a great increase in the number of feminist policies enacted in Korea since the 1990s (Kwon 2011). However, the political opportunity structure closed when the conservative President Lee Myun-Bak took office in 2008, and consequently the feminist movement has stagnated since then. Second, considering the variation in campaigns’ issue areas I selected five different issue areas described earlier. Third, the presence of archival documents and the availability of informants who could recall campaign activities affected my decision in creating the list of cases. Finally, considering the variation in their political outcomes I selected seven successful campaigns and four unsuccessful ones. Since my case selection was based on these rationales, the result of the study could be potentially biased because of the non-randomness of the cases. However, my samples do include the major feminist legislative campaigns that scholars note as important feminist achievements in Korea (See Kim 2005; Kwon 2011).

Data Sources

My research is based on three types of data that I collected between 2013 and 2015. The first type of data is KWAU’s archival documents. These documents include internal meeting minutes, press
conference materials, public hearing handouts, public statements, and pamphlets for public education. I was granted full access to the KWAU’s entire archive of documents during my internship in the KWAU in 2013, and I acquired a large volume of archived documents totaling approximately 5,000 pages.

The second type of data is interviews with twenty-three feminist activists. To make sure that these informants were core members in each campaign, I selected the individuals who participated in campaign meetings most frequently. Many interviewees (14 out of 23) participated in multiple campaigns as core members and therefore provided multiple accounts of different campaigns. All interviews were conducted in Korean using a semi-structured interview format. I prepared questions specific to each campaign-coalition after reviewing archival documents.

The third type of data is scholarly articles, books, and theses that discuss legislative campaigns examined in this study. Some authors of the scholarly work were involved in those campaigns and offer detailed descriptions of political contexts as well as testimonies related to the campaigns. This information was used to supplement the other two data sources.

Next, I describe the analytic methods I use in this study and then I discuss operationalization of each variable for my analysis.

**Analytic Techniques and Operationalization**

**Coding Processes**

Based on my data sources, I first created chronological accounts of each campaign’s development. Then, I looked for any campaign characteristics that emerge inductively to maximize the information I could gather from my data. From my data and these chronological accounts, I noted political contexts and social movement strategies during the legislative campaigns: (1) presence of femocrats, (2) presence of supportive executive/legislative branch of the government, (3) presence of an effective coalition strategy, (4) presence of an effective framing strategy, and (5) presence of organized opposition. After noting the presence and absence of these five elements in the campaigns, I went back to the data to gather
information systematically from my data for each characteristic and for each campaign. I then constructed measures of each. Thus, my coding method changed from an inductive to a deductive approach.

*Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA)*

I use qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) to examine how the five conditions influence campaign outcomes. As a middle path between qualitative and quantitative research methods, QCA detects a set of causal conditions leading to a particular outcome (Ragin 2008). QCA also allows for identification of multiple and combined causes of movement political outcomes, such as the combination of a favorable political context and an effective coalition strategy, when comparing a relatively small number of campaigns.

Necessity and sufficiency test results of QCA reveal two types of information: 1) whether a particular causal factor should be present for an outcome to occur, and 2) whether there are multiple conjunctural causations leading to an outcome. QCA results also display information regarding theoretical relevance of a result (via consistency score) and empirical relevance of the result (via coverage score). Moreover, QCA also presents three different solutions – complex, parsimonious and intermediate solutions – so that a researcher can choose the best-fitted explanation to understand the empirical cases examined. In my report of the QCA results, I use the complex solution because it captures the complex nature of policymaking dynamics varied by gender issues.

Because I measure all conditions dichotomously, I use the crisp-set QCA method, instead of the fuzzy-set QCA. Table 2 summarizes the presence and absence of the five causal conditions and the outcome for the eleven campaigns. In what follows, I describe how I operationalize these conditions, along with my outcome (campaign success or failure) for qualitative comparative analysis (QCA).
Table 2. Presence and Absence of Five Causal Conditions and Outcome Condition for Campaigns

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Campaign</th>
<th>Causal Conditions</th>
<th>Social Movement Strategies</th>
<th>Opponents</th>
<th>Outcome</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Political Contexts</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Femocrat (FEMO)</td>
<td>Effective Coalition Strategy (COALITION)</td>
<td>Opponents (OPPOSE)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Government Support (GOV)</td>
<td>Effective Framing Strategy (FRAMING)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EDV²⁰</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADV</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASV</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AST</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EEA2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EEA3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMP</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACA</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFHS</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AHF</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AEL</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Operationalizing the Conditions

Causal conditions used for my analysis were selected based on theoretical consideration and qualitative examination of the data that I collected. There are five causal conditions and an outcome that I operationalize for Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA).

Five Causal Conditions

1. Femocrat(s): This condition refers to the presence of political insiders who were dedicated to introducing a feminist bill to the legislature and soliciting support of the bill from other lawmakers. These insiders include members of the Congress and state bureaucrats who maintain a close relationship with the women’s movement in Korea. All femocrats, except for one²¹, were former activists of the women’s movement in Korea. Interview accounts and secondary data reveal specific names of state actors who worked with social movement activists to advance gender policy reform in each campaign. Seven out of

²⁰ I use acronyms for campaign names. The full names of campaigns are presented in Table 1, along with the acronyms.
²¹ One femocrat for the AST campaign was not a former activist previously engaged in the women’s movement in Korea. However, one of her executive assistants was a former feminist activist who maintained a close relationship with the women’s movement and played a bridging role between the femocrat and the women’s movement. According to the assistant, the femocrat dedicated herself to supporting the AST bill, even jeopardizing her political position at some point of the campaign (Park 2005).
eleven campaigns had femocrats who supported the women’s movement from inside their spheres of political influence or control.

2. Government Support: I operationalize this condition by the presence of ardent support from the legislative or executive branch of the Korean government (beyond support from femocrats; see above). Because both Congress and executive agencies of the government have the authority to introduce and influence a legislative bill in the Korean National Assembly, support from either branch of the government indicates the presence of a favorable political context to the women’s movement. Interview, archival, and the secondary data sources reveal whether there was Congressional or a state agency’s support for each bill submitted to the legislature. If legislators from one of the major political parties had strong opposition to the bill, I consider the campaign lacking government support. Six out of eleven campaigns gained government support for a feminist bill.

3. Effective Coalition Strategy: An effective coalition strategy refers to the presence of a strong coalition hub, which I find necessary for a campaign to succeed in Chapter 2. A coalition hub is a group of people who holds regular meetings for campaign plans and makes executive decisions concerning the coalition. A strong coalition hub includes all three factors in the hub: field expertise, policy knowledge, and professional cadre. I determined the presence of the three qualities for a strong hub based on interview accounts and archival documents. Eight out of eleven campaigns utilized an effective coalition strategy.

4. Effective Framing Strategy: I operationalize an effective framing strategy as the presence of strategic deployment of broad collective identity in framing, which I find as a necessary condition for a campaign to succeed in Chapter 3. Broad collective identity in framing refers to the formation of a campaign encompassing organizations other than feminist groups. Using archival documents and interview data, I determined whether activists for each campaign framed their campaign as having more than a solely feminist identity to politicians. Eight campaigns were framed as more than solely feminist movements by the inclusion of male social movement organizations or conservative women’s groups.
5. **Opponents**: This condition refers to the presence of organized opposition. Informants talked about whether their campaign faced substantial opposition from business or conservative groups in Korea against their bill. The oppositional voice of lawmakers is not part of this measure because it is already reflected in the government support measure. Three out of eleven campaigns had opposition from organized groups against their feminist bills.

**The Political Outcome**

*Campaign’s political outcome*: A campaign success means the passage of a bill that the campaign proposed to the legislature in the National Assembly. A campaign failure means that either the campaign’s proposed bill did not pass or a bill proposed by parties other than the campaign was eventually made into a law. For instance, legislators revised the Special Act on Sexual Violence multiple times from 1999 to 2007, but since feminist groups’ demands (e.g., erasing a rule of mandatory report and changing the definition of sexual violence in the law) were not reflected in those revisions, I consider the campaign unsuccessful.

**Results**

I conducted separate qualitative comparative analyses for two different outcome conditions – a campaign success and a campaign failure. For each outcome, I evaluated both necessity and sufficiency tests. A necessity test reveals what causal condition, if any, must be present for an outcome to occur, but the necessary condition alone is not always sufficient to produce an outcome. Sufficiency tests show the multiple conjunctural causations that lead to an outcome. Sufficient causal conditions (or combinations of causal conditions) are not necessary but they are sufficient to produce an outcome. QCA results also display consistency and coverage information of necessary and sufficient conditions. Scholars of QCA suggest that the cut-off of consistency scores for necessary conditions should be 0.90 and higher, and the cut-off of consistency scores for sufficient conditions should be 0.80 and higher (McAdam et al. 2010; Ragin 2008). I first display QCA results for each outcome alongside the corresponding consistency and coverage scores. Then, I provide my detailed qualitative analysis based on interviews, archival, and
secondary data that further illustrates the interactive effect of political contexts, social movement strategies, and opponents on a campaign’s political outcome.

**QCA results**

My necessity test results show that effective coalition and framing strategies (COALITION*FRAMING) are present in all pathways leading to a success as necessary conditions for a success. The sufficiency test results in Table 3 reveal that there are two different combinations of causal conditions for a campaign success. A solution coverage of 1 in Table 3 indicates that these configurations can explain 100% of the empirical cases in the outcome.

Table 3. Sufficient Conditions for Campaign Success: Complex Solution

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Path</th>
<th>Raw coverage</th>
<th>Unique coverage</th>
<th>Consistency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. COALITON<em>FRAMING</em>GOV*oppose + (5 campaigns: EEA3, ACA, EDV, AST, and AEL)</td>
<td>0.714286</td>
<td>0.714286</td>
<td>1.000000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. COALITION<em>FRAMING</em>FEMO*OPPOSE (2 campaigns: AFHS and AMP)</td>
<td>0.285714</td>
<td>0.285714</td>
<td>1.000000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solution coverage: 1.000000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solution consistency: 1.000000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Denotes logical AND, + logical OR
Upper case letters mark presence, lower case absence, of condition
Frequency cut-off: 1, Consistency cutoff: 1

The QCA results in Table 3 demonstrate that all successful campaigns involved the combined effect of a favorable political context and social movement strategies. These results broadly support the basic assumption of the political mediation model that both state and non-state actors interactively influence the process of policymaking. For instance, the combination of effective social movement strategies (COALITION*FRAMING) and a political climate open to the women’s movement (GOV) explains many successful campaigns (five out of seven), as demonstrated in the first pathway. However, the political mediation model is inadequate to explain the logics behind the success of the other two campaigns (AHFS and AMP) that won a political victory despite the presence of strong opposition, as
shown in the second pathway. I argue that it is because the political mediation theory does not consider the role of opponents in the model.

Turning to unsuccessful campaigns, my necessity test for a campaign failure reveals the absence of government support (gov) as a necessary condition for a failure. The sufficiency test results in Table 4 find that there are three different combinations of causal conditions for a campaign failure, and they explain 100% of the empirical cases in the outcome.

Table 4. Sufficient Conditions for Campaign Failure: Complex Solution

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Path</th>
<th>Raw coverage</th>
<th>Unique coverage</th>
<th>Consistency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. coalition<em>framing</em>gov*oppose + (2 campaigns: ADV, ASV)</td>
<td>0.500000</td>
<td>0.250000</td>
<td>1.000000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. coalition<em>framing</em>gov*femo + (2 campaigns: AHF, ASV)</td>
<td>0.500000</td>
<td>0.250000</td>
<td>1.000000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. COALITION<em>FRAMING</em>gov<em>femo</em>oppose (1 campaign: EEA2)</td>
<td>0.250000</td>
<td>0.250000</td>
<td>1.000000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Solution coverage: 1.000000
Solution consistency: 1.000000

* Denotes logical AND, + logical OR
Upper case letters mark presence, lower case absence, of condition
Frequency cut-off: 1, Consistency cutoff: 1

The causal combinations in Table 4 show that the causal conditions associated with a success are absent in most failed campaigns. That is, lacking both effective strategies and favorable political contexts is detrimental to campaign outcomes. For example, the second pathway indicates that the combination of negative political contexts (gov*femo) and weak social movement strategies (coalition*framing) leads to a campaign failure. The third path particularly emphasizes the importance of political contexts for deciding a social movement’s political outcomes, because the EEA2 campaign failed under poor political contexts (gov*femo) despite its implementation of effective social movement strategies (COALITION*FRAMING).

The QCA results in Table 3 and 4 confirm the utility of the political mediation model, but they also suggest a limitation of the model, the lack of attention to the role of opponents. Below I provide my
qualitative analysis based on interview accounts to further illustrate the validity and the limitation of the existing political mediation model in explaining political outcomes of feminist policy campaigns. Additionally, I demonstrate how the political interaction perspective fits better than the mediation model for comprehensive understanding of feminist policymaking in Korea.

**The Importance of Existing Political Support for Policy Change: Mediation Model**

According to the political mediation model, the impact of social movement strategies depends on specific political contexts. That is, when the political climate is open to a social movement, the movement’s political success is relatively easy. But when there is little political support, the movement is less likely to succeed. This theory is supported in explaining political outcomes of some policy campaigns (EEA2, EEA3, and ACA) examined in my study.

Comparing the EEA2 and the EEA3 campaigns illustrates the importance of political contexts for movement political outcomes. Both campaigns had the same policy goals: regulations on indirect discrimination and sexual harassment at work. Moreover, the two campaigns implemented the same movement strategies by constructing strong coalition hubs and framing campaigns beyond feminist issues. However, the results were different. The EEA2 campaign did not win a political victory, while the EEA3 campaign succeeded with the same strategies. This result means that the social movement’s strategies did not matter so much for the outcomes of these very similar campaigns. But the difference in political contexts can explain their political outcomes. An activist who was involved in both EEA2 and EEA3 campaigns recalls the different political climates surrounding the same bill.

[By the time the EEA3 bill passed], the government came to realize that our society as well as the international community demands some legal system to regulate sexual harassment and indirect discrimination at work based on one’s sex. When I met government officers in 1995 [during the EEA2 campaign], they said, “We can’t take your issue.” Then, between the second and the third amendments of the Equal Employment Act, the government began to accept the constant demand of the non-government organizations [i.e., the women’s movement organizations]. During the
EEA3 campaign, the Ministry of Labor was very cooperative with us. (*Interview with CKJ, July 8, 2014*).

The KWAU’s evaluation of the EEA2 campaign also supports the interview accounts about the government’s unwillingness to support the EEA2 bill: “The Ministry of Labor and the Democratic Liberal Party [the ruling party at that time] object to including the new provisions in the Equal Employment Act, because the concept of sexual harassment is still fussy and evidence of indirect discrimination at work is not clear.” (*meeting minute, a date not specified, 1995*). The major issues challenged by the EEA2 campaign had just started to be addressed in Korean society at that time, for example, with the first workplace sexual harassment lawsuit being filed in 1993. Therefore, during the EEA2 campaign period between 1994 and 1995, state bureaucrats and lawmakers were not easily persuaded of the necessity of new provisions prohibiting sexual harassment and indirect discrimination in the workplace. Moreover, no female politicians played the role of femocrats influencing fellow party members to support the EEA2 bill at that time (Cheong 1998).

On the contrary, the political climate changed greatly during the EEA3 campaign. Lawmakers supported the feminist bill, including members of the political party representing the conservative voters of Korea. Unlike the EEA2 campaign, a couple of dedicated female legislators worked with the women’s movement to introduce the EEA3 bill to the legislature (Kim 2004). Therefore, feminist activists were able to receive support from both the government and femocrats for the EEA3 bill, which eventually passed in 1999.

The importance of existing political support is also found in the campaign for the Amendment of Childcare Act (ACA). In the early 2000s, when the ACA campaign was being held, the Korean government showed a strong interest in the issue of childcare because the fertility rate in Korea had been significantly decreasing (*Interview with CEH, July 10, 2014*). Encouraged by the former feminist activist and Minister of Gender Equality at that time, the government created a childcare master plan team within the Ministry of Gender Equality. In addition to having strong support of the government and the Minister
of Gender Equality, a femocrat, the ACA campaign was led by a strong coalition hub and utilized a broad collective identity strategy in framing. As a result, feminist activists were able to achieve their policy goal in revising the Childcare Act to increase government spending in childcare services.

To summarize, for some campaigns, political contexts were the most influential factors to their campaign outcomes, as is suggested in the political mediation model. When the government had much interest in a certain gender issue at a particular time, feminist campaigns succeeded with their strategic efforts. However, when the state was negative about reforming a particular gender policy, it was difficult for the movement to win its political battle.

**Shifting Political Support, Influenced by Effective Movement Strategies: Interaction Model**

While two campaigns (EEA3 and ACA) in the first pathway to success in Table 3 can be explained with the political mediation model, three other campaigns (EDV, AST, and AEL) in the same causal recipe have more stories to tell regarding the support of a political institution. Evidence shows that the legislative branch of the Korean government shifted its position towards these three campaigns from being indifferent to supportive during the process of policymaking. However, this change in the political context cannot be explained with the political mediation perspective, because the mediation model only concerns stable aspects of political contexts.

Examples of two campaigns, EDV and AST, illustrate the shifting political nature in the process of policymaking, which is influenced by social movement strategies. Informants involved in the EDV and AST campaigns unanimously recall that most lawmakers were not willing to show their ardent support for their bills in the beginning stage of policymaking, although they were not overtly opposed to them. However, as the QCA results show in Table 3, the successful EDV and AST campaigns eventually gained support from the government. According to feminist activists, it was their strategic efforts that changed the political context surrounding the EDV and AST bills.

No one could deny that the rights of those women [the victims of sex trafficking and sexual exploitation] were severely violated… [In the midst of the horrible news about violence against
women] no one dared to say that the Anti-Sex Trafficking law was unnecessary. Also, we [the women’s movement groups] pushed this issue very hard to politicians. In fact, [lawmakers] were kind of reluctant to help us, but they also couldn’t show their objection overtly. We continued to visit the offices of all 299 members of Congress to get their signatures on our bill… In the end, the ruling party and the oppositional party all signed on the bill. (Interview with CYS, July 9, 2014)

As stated above, in the AST campaign, legislators may not have supported the AST bill without persistent pressure from the women’s movement. Activists in the AST campaign specifically framed the campaign as one reaching beyond feminist mobilization to show off its broad collection of power to politicians. The same activist cited above notes that the women’s movement strategically framed the campaign as one representing the entire civil society, so that lawmakers had no choice but to accept the demand coming from Korea’s civil society. The coalition hub that led the AST campaign also exerted strong mobilizing power in various ways, from organizing various events to persistently reaching out to individual lawmakers.

Similarly, in the EDV campaign, an activist decided to put more pressure on lawmakers after hearing a politician saying, “No one in the National Assembly is opposed to the EDV bill, but there is also nobody who is willing to lead the bill.” (Interview with CCS, July 1, 2014). When politicians hesitated to show their support, the women’s movement increased the number of their activities targeted at politicians. The strong coalition hub that led the EDV campaign enabled persistent mobilization of the movement. Particularly, dedicated professional activists and field experts were the driving forces that mobilized numerous protest events before the National Assembly, sending a critical message to lawmakers who were not moving forward with the EDV bill.

On the contrary, the absence of effective social movement strategies hurt the outcomes of other campaigns with similar issues, because the campaigns could not shift negative political contexts to positive ones. The unsuccessful ADV and ASV campaigns contrast with the successful AST and EDV campaigns in this way. All four of these campaigns challenged issues regarding violence against women.
However, unlike the successful campaigns, the failed campaigns did not expand their coalitions to engage non-feminist members of civil society. Moreover, weak coalition hubs lacking a dedicated professional cadre led to the failed campaigns. As a result, the ADV and ASV campaigns’ mobilizing power to pressure politicians was very weak, making it difficult to shift the existing, non-supportive political context to one supporting the women’s movement.

In sum, when the government initially had low interest in some gender issues, the most important factor to the success of the campaign lay in the strategic action taken by the women’s movement. When a campaign utilized effective coalition and framing strategies throughout the campaign, it turned indifferent politicians into supporters of its feminist bill, eventually succeeding in policy reform. On the other hand, when such strategic activities were absent, the chance for a campaign’s political success was very low.

Dynamics between Social Movements and Opponents for Policy Change: Interaction Model

The political mediation model does not take into consideration the role that social movement opponents may play in policymaking. Results of my study show that two policy campaigns (AFHS and AMP) succeeded despite the presence of organized opposition, while another campaign (AHF) failed with the presence of opponents. These campaign outcomes cannot be explained with the political mediation model, which offers no theoretical room to consider social movement opponents in policymaking. A closer look at the dynamics between a social movement and its opponents in my study shows that their power balance in mobilization influences policy outcomes, moderated by the surrounding political contexts.

Examples of two campaigns, AFHS and AHF, illustrate movement-countermovement dynamics and their impact on policymaking. Both campaigns challenged traditional family values in Korea and faced opposition from organized groups\(^{22}\), particularly conservative groups. During the AFHS campaign, Confucian groups were at the forefront of the opposition. As for the AHF campaign, the Korean Senior

\(^{22}\) Although the condition OPPOSE is missing in the causal path to the failure of the AHF campaign, Table 2 shows that the AHF had opposition.
Citizens Association and the Korean Home Economics Association waged a counter-movement against the campaign.

Besides the fact that these groups created organized efforts against feminist campaigns, the strengths of their opposition were quite different. Feminist activists of the AFHS campaign recall that Confucian groups’ mobilizing power was relatively weak, compared to that of the women’s movement. On the contrary, the groups opposing the AHF campaign exerted stronger mobilizing power and influence on politicians than the feminist movement. This effort is illustrated by an activist’s description of the difference in mobilizing power between the women’s movement and its opponents in these two campaigns.

[During the AFHS campaign] we used a variety of methods to influence the public opinion. We even sent herbal tonics to legislators who supported us, and we held numerous press conferences and campaign events… On the other hand, during the AHF campaign, we didn’t have much mobilizing power rooted in the local areas. Although we held a press conference under the name of the 543 social welfare centers nationwide, the actual number of people gathered for the conference was only about 20 to 30 people. We could not show our mobilizing power… [On the contrary,] senior citizens’ groups had local branches in every region, and they were so powerful… When I had a chance to talk to a local politician, I sensed that he was afraid of the senior citizens’ groups’ influence [on elections]. (Interview with PCOK, July 29, 2013).

Opponents to the AHF were effectively mobilized to pressure legislators with local constituencies. In addition to the Korean Senior Citizens Association, the Korean Home Economics Association (KHEA), which had a vested interest in the Healthy Family Act, fought in solidarity to stop revising the law. The KHEA also worked closely with the Ministry of Health and Welfare with the support of the Ministry’s head of the department at that time.
On one hand, the feminist campaign for the Amendment of the Healthy Family Act (AHF) did not operate in the optimal condition for success. First of all, a strong coalition hub was not created to lead the campaign because the hub was lacking field experts who could be the engine and driving force of the campaign as the most motivating and dedicated activists. The AHF campaign also did not frame the movement beyond an association of like-minded women’s groups and failed to present a broadly representative identity to politicians. Finally, feminist activists of the AHF campaign could not secure political insiders who were willing to lead the feminist bill in the legislature. The combination of a non-favorable political context and stronger mobilization of campaign opponents made it difficult for the AHF campaign to achieve its political goal.

On the other hand, when the women’s movement exerted stronger mobilizing power than its opponents, and the surrounding political context worked in favor of the movement, it ended in success, as demonstrated in the AFHS campaign. Multiple informants recall that the political influence of Confucian groups, opponents to the AHFS campaign, was too weak to jeopardize the women’s movement by the time the AFHS bill was reviewed at the legislature. As the AFHS campaign proceeded, feminist activists sensed that the mobilizing power and political influence of Confucian groups were getting weaker and weaker. For instance, an organized group of Confucianists used to show up in KWAU sponsored events to protest, but the level and frequency of their counter-activism decreased as the feminist campaign progressed. While the mobilizing power of the opponents grew weak, feminist activists actively reached out to lawmakers, including the ones who were concerned about Confucian voters in their local areas. Led by a strong coalition hub, the AFHS campaign conducted numerous events to pressure legislators. The campaign also framed the abolition of the Family Headship System as a matter for all of civil society and not only a feminist’s, in order to persuade politicians.

In addition to strong mobilization of the AFHS campaign, the political environment worked favorably to the campaign. During the AHFS campaign, a prominent feminist activist was appointed to the Minister of Gender Equality, and she dedicated herself to passing the AFHS bill by soliciting support
from the members of the State Council and establishing a government-NGO collaborative task force team to abolish the Family Headship System.

To summarize, when both feminists and conservative groups held strong interest in policy reform, the campaign outcome depended on the balance of mobilizing power between the two competing groups, in addition to political contexts surrounding the campaigns. When a feminist campaign’s mobilizing power was much greater than that of its opponents, and it secured the ardent support of femocrats, the campaign was likely to succeed.

**Discussion and Conclusion**

In this chapter, I investigate the role of social movements and political contexts in influencing gender policy reform in South Korea through the lens of a political mediation model (Amenta et al. 1992, 2005). While my findings support the political mediation theory, they also address the limitations of the model. For some policy campaigns, the Korean government held a strong position on the challenged policy issues, and under such political context a social movement’s strategic efforts to influence policy reform did not matter much. This pattern of policymaking is supported by the political mediation perspective that highlights a state-centered role in policy change.

However, the political mediation model fails to explain political outcomes of other policy campaigns examined in this study. With respect to this matter, I offer a revised version called the “political interaction model” to overcome the issues associated with the political mediation model. First, my research finding, which is reflected in the political interaction model, shows that a social movement’s strategic action can sometimes change a political climate to be favorable to the movement, eventually helping the movement succeed. Previous studies provide empirical examples of social movement strategies opening new political opportunities for the movement (Alimi 2006; Noonan 1995). Consistent with this thread of research, my study demonstrates that some campaigns turned indifferent politicians into supporters of feminist bills through effective coalition and framing strategies, resulting in the
achievement of their political goals. Perhaps, a social movement’s strategic action is much more important for policy change than the political mediation model suggests.

Second, my research suggests that the volatile aspect of political contexts needs more scholarly attention in the study of policymaking. As demonstrated in my results, a political environment to some policy campaigns changed over the course of policymaking. Existing scholarship, including those who adopt the political mediation model in policy research, relies heavily on measuring the structural aspects of political contexts (Amenta and Hafmann 2000; Giugni 2007; King and Soule 2006; Soule and Olzak 2004). This tendency fails to capture the procedural aspect of policymaking by ignoring the changing and even volatile political contexts (Gamson and Meyer 1996; Tarrow 1996).

Third, the findings in this study, which are also reflected in the political interaction model, demonstrate the necessity of including movement-countermovement dynamics in the theoretical model of policymaking. My finding shows that when opposition existed against the feminist reforms proposed for the Korean family system, one feminist campaign won its political battle by creating a stronger mobilization than its opponent. Success was won because politicians chose to support the demand of the stronger group. On the contrary, when opponents of another feminist campaign mobilized more strongly than the feminist campaign, the opponents succeeded. The political mediation model cannot make sense of the different outcomes of these two campaigns because it simply does not consider the role of opponents in the theoretical construction. By adding the new element of political opposition to the theoretical model, the political interaction model provides a comprehensive formula to understand the process of policymaking that involves movement-countermovement dynamics.

Besides introducing a new model of political interaction in policy research, my research also offers new directions for future research. First, policy scholars should be more attentive to how the type of policy or issue area creates different mechanisms for policy change. Social movement scholars note that the political mediation model is only suitable for explaining certain types of policy changes because it was primarily developed with the examination of social welfare and economic policies (Burstein and Linton 2002; Soule 2004). My finding also supports this criticism, because the mediation model can
explain a campaign’s socio-economic policy issues, such as equal employment and childcare services, but it does not capture the process of policymaking regarding violence against women and family. Political scientists also acknowledge that different types of gender issues generate distinct reactions from political decision-makers (Gelb and Palley 1987; Mazur 2002; Htun and Weldon 2010, 2014). This may be attributed to the fact that different actors engage in different policy battles. Policies to protect victims of violence seldom attract organized opposition, whereas legislation related to religious doctrines usually involves competition between a progressive movement and its opponents. Thus, more consideration should be made according to the type of campaign issues in the study of policymaking.

My research also speaks to the existing knowledge on how social movement strategies influence political outcomes. Although a number of scholars pay attention to the importance of social movement strategies for movement outcomes, the focus is primarily given to types of strategies such as protesting or lobbying (Andrews and Edwards 2004; Johnson et al. 2010; Olzak et al. 2016) and framing strategies (Cress and Snow 2000; Ferree 2003; Kubal 1998; McCammon 2009; Paschel 2010). Systematic research on the impact of a movement’s coalition strategy on its political outcome has yet to be examined in the social movement literature with few exceptions (Dixon et al. 2013; McCammon 2012). Future research should investigate various types of strategies, including those involving coalitions, in understanding the relationship between social movements and political contexts in policy reform.

Finally, as my findings indicate, social movement strategies and political contexts can interactively influence the political outcomes of social movements. More research is needed to examine the interactive process of policymaking between a social movement and a state. Comparative research across policy issues would also be helpful. Extant policy studies are mostly either single campaign case studies or cross-national research comparing the same policy issue. This study examined campaigns across different policy areas. Other scholars (Amenta et al 2010; Kolb 2007) have called for more systematic empirical research that compares movements across policy issues, and more research is needed to explore the conditions that affect successful movements across different policy matters.
References


CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

Korean feminist activists commonly recall the abolition of the Family Headship System as one of the greatest achievements of the Korean women’s movement. Both activists and researchers agree that the success was due to the favorable political climate and intense mobilization of the women’s groups at that time. While this explanation is in line with conventional social movement perspectives for a movement’s success, it does not account for why other feminist policy campaigns that were led by the same movement organization under similar political contexts ended in failure. My dissertation research explores why various campaigns produced different results by examining social movement strategies and their influence on a movement’s political outcomes.

My findings reveal that there are clear differences in coalition and framing strategies between successful and unsuccessful campaigns. In addition to strategies, the political environment surrounding a policy campaign also matters for a campaign’s outcome. Below I summarize my findings in each chapter and discuss their theoretical contributions to relevant literature of feminist policy research and social movement studies. After addressing limitations of the research, I conclude this study with my suggestions for future research.

Summary of Findings

In Chapter 2, I investigate how social movement coalition strategies affected the Korean feminist movement’s political outcomes. Using a QCA method, I examine the impact of four different coalition strategies on feminist policy reforms. Two coalition conditions – a positive relationship among coalition members and ongoing activism – are found important for movement success, which is consistent with what previous studies suggest (Arnold 2011; Beamish and Luebbers 2009; Dixon et al. 2013; McCammon 2012; Post 2015). More importantly, my findings show that two other coalition conditions that have not
been studied in existing scholarship – a strong coalition hub and a “double layer” of coalition around a hub – play crucial roles in achieving a coalition’s political success.

A coalition hub is a new concept that I introduce in Chapter 2, drawing on my research findings. My study indicates that all successful campaigns share the characteristic of having a strong coalition hub. A coalition hub is a group of key activists leading the coalition, and I find that a strong coalition hub is influential for the coalition’s political success. A strong coalition hub is equipped with three different features: field experts, professional cadre, and policy experts. Field experts are the most motivated members of a coalition as they work closely with women affected by each policy issue. If field experts are like the heart of a human body, full-time professional cadres are like the hands and feet that make all actions possible. Finally, policy experts are the brains of the coalition, the members who devise a bill that can be made into an actual law or policy. When any of these features are missing in a coalition hub, the coalition does not operate effectively, just like a human body would not work properly without a functioning heart, hands and feet, and a brain.

Another coalition characteristic, a “double layer” of coalition around a hub, is also a new concept that I propose in Chapter 2. My research shows that double layers of coalition (a symbolic layer and a grassroots layer) around a hub contribute to some coalitions’ political successes. Coalition members in each layer play a unique role. Members in the symbolic layer benefit the campaign with their nationwide credibility, because they are well-known civic organizations. Coalition organizations in the grassroots layer empower the coalition by conducting local activities and increasing the coalition-campaign’s public visibility nationwide.

My introduction of these new coalition concepts, a strong hub and a “double layer” around a hub, advances scholarly understanding of coalition dynamics in social movement research. Previous studies on the relationship between coalitions and their political outcomes are not only small in number, but they also heavily focus on whether the size of a coalition matters for its success (Crawhall 2011; Knoke 1990; Nelson and Yackee 2012). My research findings suggest that the ways in which a coalition is operated or formed are more important for its political outcome than the magnitude of a coalition. Perhaps, more
consideration should be given to the qualitative aspects of a coalition, such as what kinds of capital or agency each coalition member brings to the entire coalition for its desired outcome.

In Chapter 3, I explore how the Korean women’s movement’s framing strategies influenced its political results. Specifically, I examine the interactive effect of frame qualities and the role of non-verbal framing activities in producing social movement political victories. I find that frame qualities such as frame articulateness and empirical credibility work together to produce political success. Previous research is primarily interested in the independent effect of each frame quality on movement outcomes. For example, Snow and his colleagues discuss various qualities of frames as distinct concepts (Benford and Snow 2000; Snow et al. 1986; Snow and Benford 1988, 1992). My study demonstrates that the combination of different frame qualities produces effective claims for a social movement, and therefore my study suggests the utility of an analytic approach that examines the interaction of frame qualities in framing research.

Additionally, I show that non-verbal framing activities are as important as the verbal contents of frames in persuading policymakers. In Chapter 3, I argue that the tendency to analyze written texts of social movement organizations narrows the range of framing activities to be examined. My findings reveal that strategic silence and broad identity deployment in framing are important non-verbal framing activities. Particularly, in all successful campaigns activists framed their campaign as more than a feminist mobilization to show that the campaign’s demand reflected the values important to larger civil society than just those feminist groups. They did so by inviting male-centered organizations into their protest sites or going to Congressional hearings with conservative women’s groups. I interpret this framing strategy as a deliberate effort to win a political victory, given that the feminist movement in Korea is still culturally marginalized, and broad identity framing can increase the legitimacy of the movement’s campaign. By examining non-verbal framing activities that have been neglected in previous research, my study broadens the range of framing strategies captured in framing analysis.

In Chapter 4, I examine the combined impact of social movement strategies and political contexts on policy outcomes of the Korean women’s movement. While my research draws on a political mediation
model (Amenta et al. 1992, 1994, 2005), it offers both support and criticism of the model. Consistent with the political mediation perspective, my finding shows that some campaigns produced desired outcomes thanks to the combination of effective social movement strategies and favorable political contexts, such as the presence of political insiders and government support of a feminist bill. Other campaigns, however, reached success in a way that cannot be explained with the political mediation model. Feminist activists in some campaigns had much more influence in the process of policymaking than what is suggested in the political mediation model. Particularly, when the Korean government held low interest in a certain gender issue, such as violence against women, feminist activists successfully turned indifferent lawmakers into supporters of a feminist bill through effective social movement strategies.

The role of the women’s movement is also found important in the analysis in Chapter 4 when the movement faces an organized opposition. Two feminist campaigns in my research won when they were able to create a stronger mobilization than their opponents, because politicians chose to support the demand of the stronger group. Yet, the political mediation model does not incorporate this movement-countermovement dynamic in its explanation of policymaking. Thus, my research encourages social movement scholarship to revise the widely-accepted model to better reflect both the role of social movements and their opponents in the process of policymaking.

Limitations

My study is not without its limitations. The cases examined in this study are legislative policy campaigns that ended several years ago, with the oldest one completed twenty years ago. Although some interviewees had clear memories of the campaigns, others had difficulty recalling details of activities after many years had passed. Internal meeting minutes and secondary scholarly work conducted by campaign participants were used to supplement limited memories and information. Still, my research may not have captured the entire picture of each policy campaign due to these limitations in data sources. In future research, a long-term ethnographic approach done while the campaign is unfolding will allow a researcher
to observe how social movement activists develop and deploy their strategy in the process of policy campaigns.

Another concern stemming from my research is the generalizability of the study given that it is based on the Korean women’s movement. A similar pattern of coalition or framing strategies and their positive impact on movement outcomes may or may not be found in other social movements, especially women’s movements in other countries. Particularly, considering that a coalition is an important strategy in social movements, the question of coalition characteristics examined in this study and their combined effect on social movement outcome has received little attention in social movement scholarship (McCammon and Moon 2015). Thus, more studies are needed to examine the relationship between coalition conditions and their political outcomes in other contexts before discussing the generalizability of coalition conditions. Since feminist mobilizations in numerous countries, including Western democratic countries (Stetson 2001) and non-Western, non-democratic countries (Htun and Weldon 2012), have contributed to the development of gender-egalitarian laws and policies in their respective countries, examining movement strategies in those countries will allow researchers to either confirm or confront my findings in order to advance our knowledge on social movement strategies’ impact on political outcomes.

**Implication for Future Research**

My dissertation research suggests new venues for future research on feminist policy research and social movement studies in three different ways: theoretical, methodological, and empirical.

Theoretically, feminist policy researchers have paid little attention to strategic aspects of social movement activism (Elman 1996; Murphy 1997; Stetson 2001; Weldon 2002). My findings indicate that the Korean women’s movement organization utilized different coalition and framing strategies for each policy campaign, and that these strategies mattered for campaign outcomes. Therefore, more research is needed to examine strategies of women’s movement activists and the impact of their strategies on campaign outcomes.
While social movement scholars have conducted a handful of studies on the relationship between movement strategies and their political outcomes, there is still room for improvement. Existing scholarship, including the present study, tends to investigate non-dynamic measures of social movement activism, which do not change over the course of social movement campaigns (Andrews 2001; Johnson et al. 2010). As McCammon (2012) suggests, a social movement may shift its strategy according to a changing political environment for the movement’s success. One informant in my study mentions that her organization changed its strategy for dealing with politicians from being “nice” to “assertive” after learning that no legislators were acting on its feminist bill. Considering that a policy campaign usually involves a long-term effort and that a political climate may evolve during the campaign period, the dynamic aspects of social movement strategy deserve more attention in social movement literature.

My research also makes a methodological contribution. My research compares policy reforms across issue areas within the same country. Extant policy studies are mostly either cross-national comparative studies or single campaign case studies. A single case study is difficult to generalize. Cross-national comparative research can be tricky because countries may have incomparable political and cultural conditions. Because my focus on different policy campaigns in Korea limits variation in political and cultural contexts across cases, it allows me to concentrate more on variation in strategies across campaigns. This methodological setting of comparative research within one country may also benefit researchers in their investigation of how factors other than political and cultural conditions influence the process of policymaking. One possible, additional factor is the type of policy. Although a growing number of political scientists note that there are different political dynamics across gender-related policy issues (Gelb and Palley 1987; Mazur 2002; Htun and Weldon 2010, 2014), there is little empirical research that compares how the process of feminist policymaking differs according to the types of gender issues involved. By comparing different policy campaigns conducted by the same organization, researchers may be better situated to investigate how the type of policy pursued influences policy reform.

Finally, since most of the research on women’s movements is focused on the Western world, my study of the Korean women’s movement offers important understanding of an empirical case in a new
environment. In many aspects, Korea is similar to Western-developed countries, according to the Human Development Index (HDI) published by the UN. However, when it comes to gender beliefs that affect feminist policies, gender beliefs in Korea are more conservative than in Western industrialized countries (Jones 2006). Thus, women’s movements in Korea are important cases for a gender policymaking model because Korea is both similar and dissimilar to Western countries. More empirical research on women’s movements in the non-Western world will help construct a generalizable theory of feminist policymaking and will present a new perspective to understand how gender policy is established.
References


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# APPENDIX

## A. List of Interview Participants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Campaigns involved</th>
<th>Organizational Affiliation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 1 Chung, C.S. (CCS) | 1) A Campaign for the Enactment of the Domestic Violence Prevention Act  
2) A Campaign for the Amendment of the Domestic Violence Prevention Act | Korea(n) Women’s Hotline                        |
| 3 Chi, E.H. (CEH)   | 1) A Campaign for the Enactment of the Domestic Violence Prevention Act  
2) A Campaign for the Enactment of the Anti-Sex Trafficking Act  
3) A Campaign for the Third Amendment of the Equal Employment Act  
4) A Campaign for the Amendment of the Childcare Act  
5) A Campaign for the Abolition of the Family Headship System  
6) A Campaign for the Amendment of the Election Law | Korean Women’s Association United                 |
| 4 Park, I.H. (PIH)  | 1) A Campaign for the Amendment of the Domestic Violence Prevention Act              | Korea(n) Women’s Hotline                        |
| 5 Lee, M.K. (LMK)   | 1) A Campaign for the Amendment of the Special Act on Sexual Violence               | Korea(n) Sexual Violence Relief Center           |
| 6 Choi, Y.A. (CYA)  | 1) A Campaign for the Amendment of the Special Act on Sexual Violence               | Korea(n) Sexual Violence Relief Center           |
| 7 Yu, K.H. (YKH)    | 1) A Campaign for the Amendment of the Domestic Violence Prevention Act  
2) A Campaign for the Amendment of the Special Act on Sexual Violence  
3) A Campaign for the Enactment of the Anti-Sex Trafficking Act  
4) A Campaign for the Amendment of the Healthy Family Act | Womenlink                                        |
| 8 Kim, K.O. (KKO)   | 1) A Campaign for the Amendment of the Special Act on Sexual Violence  
2) A Campaign for the Enactment of the Anti-Sex Trafficking Act  
3) A Campaign for the Abolition of the Family Headship System  
4) A Campaign for the Amendment of the Healthy Family Act | Korean Women’s Association United                 |
| 9 Cho, Y.S. (CYS)   | 1) A Campaign for the Enactment of the Anti-Sex Trafficking Act                     | Korean Women’s Association United                 |
| 10 Chung, M.R. (CMR)| 1) A Campaign for the Enactment of the Anti-Sex Trafficking Act                     | Gun-San Women’s Hotline                         |
| 11 Chung, K.J. (CKJ)| 1) A Campaign for the Second Amendment of the Equal Employment Act  
2) A Campaign for the Third Amendment of the Equal Employment Act | Womenlink                                        |
| 12 Kim, E.L. (KEL)  | 1) A Campaign for the Second Amendment of the Equal Employment Act  
2) A Campaign for the Third Amendment of the Equal Employment Act  
3) A Campaign for the Amendment of the Maternity Protection Act | Korean Women’s Development Institute             |
| 13 Lee-Oh, K.S. (LOKS)| 1) A Campaign for the Second Amendment of the Equal Employment Act  
2) A Campaign for the Abolition of the Family Headship System  
3) A Campaign for the Amendment of the Healthy Family Act | Korean Women’s Association United                 |
| 14 Yoon, J.S. (YJS) | 1) A Campaign for the Second Amendment of the Equal Employment Act  
2) A Campaign for the Third Amendment of the Equal Employment Act | Womenlink                                        |
| 15 Park-Bong, J.S. (PBJS) | 1) A Campaign for the Third Amendment of the Equal Employment Act  
2) A Campaign for the Amendment of the Maternity Protection Act | Womenlink                                        |
| 16 Kim-Ki, S.M. (KKS) | 1) A Campaign for the Amendment of the Maternity Protection Act                   | Korean Women’s Association United                 |
| 17 Kang, N.S. (KNS) | 1) A Campaign for the Amendment of the Maternity Protection Act  
2) A Campaign for the Amendment of the Childcare Act | Korea(n) Women’s Studies Institute               |
| 18 Lee, Y.K. (LYK)  | 1) A Campaign for the Amendment of the Childcare Act                               | Korea(n) Childcare Teachers Association          |
| 19 Park-Cha, O.K. (PCOK) | 1) A Campaign for the Amendment of the Childcare Act  
2) A Campaign for the Amendment of the Healthy Family Act  
3) A Campaign for the Amendment of the Election Law | Korean Women’s Association United                 |
| 20 Lee-Ku, K.S. (LKKs) | 1) A Campaign for the Abolition of the Family Headship System  
2) A Campaign for the Amendment of the Election Law | Korean Women’s Association United                 |
| 21 Song, D.Y. (SDY) | 1) A Campaign for the Amendment of the Healthy Family Act                          | Hoseo University                                 |
| 22 Yang-Yi, H.K. (YYHK) | 1) A Campaign for the Amendment of the Healthy Family Act | Womenlink                                        |
| 23 Son, Y.J. (SYJ)  | 1) A Campaign for the Amendment of the Maternity Protection Act                   | Korean Women Workers’ Associations United        |
### B. Organizational Field: Coalition Member Organizations for Each Campaign

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of Legislative Campaign (In Korean)</th>
<th>Coalition Member Organizations (In Korean)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1) A Campaign for the Enactment of the Domestic Violence Prevention Act (가정폭력방지법제정운동)</td>
<td>Korean Women’s Association United (한국여성단체연합), Citizens’ Coalition for Economic Justice (경제정의실천시민연합), Green Korea (녹색연합), MINBYUN-Lawyers for a Democratic Society (민주사회를 위한 변호사 모임), Professors for Democracy (민주화를 위한 전국교수협의회), Citizens’ Initiatives for Public Goods (신사회공동선충연합), Korean Association for Prevention of Child Abuse and Neglect (아동학대예방협회), Association of Physicians for Humanism (인도주의의사협회), Research Institute of the Differently Abled Person’s Right (장애인권익문제연구소), Korean Confederation of Trade Unions (전국민주노동조합총연맹), National Parents Association for Genuine Education (창교육을 위한학부모연대), People’s Solidarity for Participatory Democracy (참여민주사회시민연대), Catholic Priests’ Association for Justice (천주교정의구현전국연합), Federation of Korean Trade Unions (한국노동조합총연맹), Korean Seniors’ Hotline (한국노연의 전화), The Korean People Artist Federation (한국민족예술인 충연합), Korea(n) Legal Aid Center for Family Relations (한국가정법률상담소), Korean League of Women Voters (한국여성전국연합), Korean Producers &amp; Directors’ Association (한국프로듀서연합협회), Korean(n) Federation for Environmental Movements (환경운동연합), Practice of Economic Justice Buddhist Citizens’ Alliance (경제정의실천불교시민연합), Business &amp; Professional Women Korea (전문직여성클럽한국연맹)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) A Campaign for the Amendment of the Domestic Violence Prevention Act (가정폭력방지법개정운동)</td>
<td>Korean Women’s Association United (한국여성단체연합), Korean(n) Women’s Hotline (한국여성이전화), Womenlink (한국여성민우회), Korea(n) Sexual Violence Relief Center (한국폭력상담소), Korean(n) Differently Abled Women United (한국여성장애인연합)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) A Campaign for the Amendment of the Special Act on Sexual Violence (성폭력특별법개정운동)</td>
<td>Korean Women’s Association United (한국여성단체연합), Korean(n) Women’s Hotline (한국여성이전화), Womenlink (한국여성민우회), Korea(n) Sexual Violence Relief Center (한국폭력상담소), Korean Association of Women Theologians (한국여신학자협의회)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4) A Campaign for the Enactment of the Anti-Sex Trafficking Act (성매매방지법제정운동)</td>
<td>Korean Women’s Association United (한국여성단체연합), Korean(n) Women’s Hotline (한국여성이전화), Korean(n) Childcare Teachers Association (한국보육교사회), Korean(n) Sexual Violence Relief Center (한국폭력상담소), Korean Women Workers Associations United (한국여성노동자회협의회), Womenlink (한국여성민우회), Korea(n) Differently Abled Women United (한국여성장애인연합), Korean Association of Women Theologians (한국여신학자협의회), United Voice for the Eradication of Prostitution (매매중개를 위한한소리회), Sae-Woom-Teo (새우름), Women Making Peace (평화를 만드는여성회), Korean(n) Church Women United (한국여회여성연합회), Korean(n) Association for Christian Women for Women Minjung (기독여민회), Citizens’ Coalition for Economic Justice (경제정의실천시민연합), Green Korea (녹색연합), People’s Coalition for Cultural Reform (문화개혁을위한민주연대), People’s Solidarity for Participatory Democracy (참여민주사회시민연대), Korean(n) Young Men’s Christian Association (한국YMCA 전국연맹), Korean(n) Federation for Environmental Movements (환경운동연합)</td>
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<tr>
<td>5) A Campaign for the Second Amendment of the Equal Employment Act (남녀공정평등법 2차개정운동)</td>
<td>Korean Women’s Association United (한국여성단체연합), Korean National Council of Women (한국여성단체협의회), Korean(n) Sexual Violence Relief Center (한국폭력상담소), Federation of Korea(n) United Workers’ Unions (전국연합노동조합연맹), Naeil Newspaper Women’s Culture Center (내일신문여성문화센터)</td>
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<tr>
<td>6) A Campaign for the Third Amendment of the Equal Employment Act (남녀공정평등법 3차개정운동)</td>
<td>Korean Women’s Association United (한국여성단체연합), Korean National Council of Women (한국여성단체협의회), Korean Confederation of Trade Unions (전국민주노동조합총연맹), Federation of Korean Trade Unions (한국노동조합총연맹)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7) A Campaign for the Amendment of the Maternity Protection Act (모성보호관련법개정운동)</td>
<td>Korean Women’s Association United (한국여성단체연합), Womenlink (한국여성민우회), Korean Women Workers Associations United (한국여성노동자회협의회), Korean National Council of Women (한국여성단체협의회), Seoul Women’s Labor Unions (서울여성노동조합), Korean Women’s Trade Union (한국여성노동조합), Korean Confederation of Trade Unions (전국민주노동조합총연맹), Federation of Korean Trade Unions (한국노동조합총연맹)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 8) A Campaign for the Amendment of the Childcare Act  
(영유아보육법개정운동) | Korean Women’s Association United (한국여성단체연합), Korea(n) Childcare Teachers Association (한국보육교사협회), People’s Solidarity for Participatory Democracy (참여민주사회시민연대), Korea(n) Association for Christian Women for Women Minjung (기독여민회), Seoul Women’s Labor Unions (서울여성노동조합), Association of Directors to Practice Healthy Childcare Environment (건강한보육환경실천을위한 시장모임), Research Institute for Joint Childcare (공동육아연구원), Association of Catholic Study Groups (가톨릭공부방 연합회), Kwan-Ak Social Service (한국사회복지), Seoul Association of Study Groups (서울공부방연합회), Seong-Dong Giving Fund (성동회방나눔), Korean Busrugy Social Service Missionary Society (한국부스러기복지선교회) |
|---|---|
| 9) A Campaign for the Abolition of the Family Headship System  
(호주제폐지운동) | Korean Women’s Association United, including 33 affiliated organizations and chapters (한국여성단체연합), Korean National Council of Women, including 59 affiliated organizations and chapters (한국여성단체협의회), Korea(n) Legal Aid Center for Family Relations, including 29 chapters (한국가정법률상담소), Citizens’ Gathering for the Abolition of the Family Headship System (호주제폐지를 위한 시민의 모임), Green Korea (녹색연합), Korean National Mothers’ Association (대한여머니대한연합회), Women’s Association of Korean Medicine (한여의의사회), The Korean People Artist Federation (한국민족예술인총연합), Korean Confederation of Trade Unions (전국노동조합총연합명), MINBYUN-Lawyers for a Democratic Society (민주사회를 위한 변호사 모임), Citizens’ Association for Democratic Media (민주언론운동시민연대), Korea(n) Federation for Environmental Movements (환경운동연합) |
| 10) A Campaign for the Amendment of the Healthy Family Act  
(건강가정기본법개정운동) | Korean Women’s Association United (한국여성단체연합), Womenlink (한국여성민우회), Korea(n) Women’s Hotline (한국여성의전화), Korean Academy of Family Social Work (가족가정사회복지학회), Korean Association of Women’s Studies (한국여성학회), Cheon-Li-An Community for Women’s Studies (천리안 여학생학회), Catholic Priests’ Association for Justice (전주교정의구현전국연합), Korea(n) Young Men’s Christian Association (한국YMCA 전국연맹), Girl Scouts of Korea (한국걸스카우트연맹), Korea(n) Church Women United (한국교회여성연합회), Federation of Korean Trade Unions (한국노동조합총연합명), Korean(n) Federation for Environmental Movements (환경운동연합) |
| 11) A Campaign for the Amendment of the Election Law  
(여성정치할당제개정운동) | Korean Women’s Association United (한국여성단체연합), Korean National Council of Women (한국여성단체협의회), Womenlink (한국여성민우회), International Women’s Caucus – Korea Chapter (국제여성협연명한국본회), Korean Nurses Association (한국여성의전화), Korean Pharmaceutical Association-Women Pharmacist Association (한국의약사여성연합회), Young Women’s Christian Association of Korea (한국YMCA 연합회), Korea(n) Women’s Political Solidarity (여성정치세력민주연대), Won-Buddhist Women’s Association (원불교여성회), Korea(n) Church Women United (한국교회여성연합회), Korean Women Workers Associations United (한국여성노동자협회연합회), Korean Association of Women Buddhists - Headquarter (한국여성불교연합회중앙본부), Korean Beauty Care Association (대한미용사회중앙회), Korean League of Women Voters (한국여성유권자연대), Korea(n) Hotline (한국여성의전화), Korea(n) Differently Abled Women United (한국여성장애인연대), Korea(n) Women’s Political Caucus (한국여성정치연대), Korean Women Leaders Association (한국여성지도자연합회), Citizens’ Coalition for Economic Justice (경제정의실천시민연대), People’s Solidarity for Participatory Democracy (참여민주사회시민연대) |
C. Historical and Political Background of the Korean Women’s Movement

1. The Korean Women’s Movement and the Korean Women’s Association United (KWAU)

Embedded in Korea’s Recent History

After the establishment of the Republic of Korea (hereafter Korea) in 1948, it took several decades for political democracy to arrive in the nation. Under the authoritarian and military regimes from the 1960s to the 1980s, women made their voices heard in society in two different ways. One way was through women’s organizations that were administered by the authoritarian regimes. These women’s groups focused their activities on charity work, offered job training in women-friendly occupations, and provided various programs for housewives. Although these activities contributed to and aimed for women’s development in Korea, their support for the military regimes and their lack of feminist consciousness put them on the conservative end of the women’s movement in Korea. Most of these groups were members of the Korean Women’s Associations Council (KWAC), which represents conservative women’s groups in Korea. To this day, the KWAC is still the oldest and biggest women’s association in Korea.

The other way women’s voices were heard was through the efforts of progressive women’s labor organizations. As Korea became industrialized, a growing number of women, particularly unmarried young women, flocked to urban cities to work as factory workers. Poor urban women who had suffered from inhumane treatment in their factories organized strikes and protested for their basic rights as workers, but the authoritarian government responded with repression. Thus, their struggle was part of a larger democracy movement that rallied most dissident groups at the time, including college student groups, other labor unions, Christian leaders, and anti-regime politicians (Kim and Kim 2014). From this branch of the women’s movement fighting for democracy an autonomous progressive women’s movement began.

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to emerge in the early 1980s, and this mobilization culminated in the establishment of the Korean Women’s Association United (KWAU) in 1987.

In addition to women’s labor organizations, two other types of women’s groups—women intellectuals and progressive Christian women—were precursors to the formation of the KWAU. Women intellectuals were the people who participated in the democracy movement as student activists and studied Western feminist theories in colleges from the 1970s. Their knowledge and experience aligned with those of female student activists in the 1980s. The 1970s and 1980s intellectuals came together and this led to the foundation of the Women’s Society for Justice and Equality in 1983. The goal of this organization was to pursue women’s equality, development, and peace, and the KWAU inherited this organizational agenda incorporating it into its mission statement.

Progressive Christian women had also conducted organized activism from the 1970s to fight against the growing sex industry problem and the violation of human rights in Korea. As their theological background was based on the People’s Theology that seeks social justice under authoritarian rule, their activities shared common ground with other progressive women’s groups at that time.

Since the early 1980s, these three types of progressive women’s groups (union women, intellectuals, and religious women) started to make joint efforts to fight against discrimination and violence against women. For example, in 1985 they conducted a campaign to end the employer’s practice of requiring early retirement of female telephone operators at the age of 25. Moreover, they fought together to protest an incident of the sexual harassment of female university students in a police station and the sexual torture of a female labor movement activist. As they conducted these joint actions and witnessed how Korean women had been discriminated against, a growing awareness of patriarchy in Korean society emerged. The women’s organizations came to an agreement that a permanent umbrella organization was needed to create and sustain collective power to advance gender equality in Korea. As a result, twenty-one progressive women’s groups launched the KWAU in 1987, a permanent umbrella progressive women’s organization in Korea.
Because the KWAU’s founding purpose was to aggregate the power of progressive women’s organizations and it inherited experiences and ideologies from the preceding women’s movement in the 1970s and the 1980s, it quickly developed as a national representative of the feminist movement in Korea after democratization. It has served as a forum in which progressive women’s groups can collaborate to combat gender discrimination in Korea. Sizable feminist organizations, such as Womenlink, Korea Women’s Hotline, and Korea Sexual Violence Relief Center that house numerous chapters and members, have been the KWAU’s member organizations and worked through the KWAU whenever conducting important policy campaigns. Thus, the KWAU connects Korean feminist organizations to one another as the center of the feminist network in Korea.

As the KWAU is to the national representative of the Korean feminist movement, the Korean Women’s Associations Council (KWAC) is to the national representative of the Korean conservative women’s movement. Although having different roots, the relationship between the KWAU and the KWAC has not been antagonistic. While the KWAC worked for the authoritarian regimes prior to democratization, some of its activism included efforts to enhance women’s rights and status in Korea. Moreover, after the military rule came to an end in 1987, the gap between the two groups has narrowed, and they even form coalitions to conduct joint campaigns for the issues that are crucial to the development of women’s status in Korea, such as increasing women’s representation in politics. However, when it comes to issues concerning conservative ideology, such as the definition of family, the progressive and conservative women’s groups were at odds with one another, and took oppositional positions.

In sum, the KWAU has been at the forefront of fighting against gender discrimination in Korea as a network of progressive women’s groups in Korea, and it has also collaborated with the conservative women’s movement at times for the greater purpose of achieving gender equality in Korea.
2. The Progressive Women’s Movement within the Social Movement Field after the Democratization of Korea

The Korean democracy movement, the Peoples Movement (Minjung-un-dong in Korean), under the military regimes it resisted, framed its cause as a class struggle against a bourgeoisie and authoritarian capitalist government. College student groups, anti-government intellectuals, and labor activists led the Peoples Movement. As Korea transitioned to democracy in the late 1980s, civil society started to emerge, leading to the development of the civil society movement in Korea. In the meantime, the Peoples Movement became marginalized (Hong 2010). The civil society movement distinguished itself from the Peoples Movement by pursuing democratic social reforms through institutionalized channels rather than engaging in direct action and seeking radical revolution. Despite the differences in historical contexts, the civil society movement in Korea shares some similarities with the European New Social Movement in that it brings a diverse mix of issues, such as women’s rights, environment, and economic justice. These issues were largely ignored prior to the democratization. The emerging civil society began to address these issues by establishing new social movement organizations. Within a decade from when the first democratically elected president took office in 1987, most prominent civic organizations in Korea were established, including Citizens’ Coalition for Economic Justice, Green Korea, Korea Federation for Environmental Movements, and People’s Solidarity for Participatory Democracy. The Korean Women’s Association United (KWAU), which was founded in 1987, was one of those organizations that constituted the growing civil society movement in Korea.

Female college students and women labor activists who had previously participated in the democracy movement joined an autonomous progressive women’s movement after democratization. Although they formed an independent women’s movement, motivated by their criticism of women’s marginalized status and the patriarchal climate within the existing social movement organizations, they did not completely separate themselves from non-feminist, male-centered civic organizations. In fact, the shared legacy of the democracy movement made it possible for various civic groups to create collaborative relationships. A loose coalition across various organizations was one of the civil society
movement’s featured strategies, what they call “separate but together”. Thus, the history and development of the progressive women’s movement after democratization of Korea is in line with the progress of the general civil society movement at the time.

The civil society movement, striving for democratic social reforms in Korea, thrived during the three presidential terms (from 1993 to 2007) examined in my dissertation research. Sizable mobilization encompassing various civic organizations and the support of the democratic and progressive regimes enabled the civil society movement to accomplish meaningful social reforms. Many of the great successes of the women’s movement were also achieved through their collaboration with non-feminist civic organizations. For instance, the campaign to abolish the Family Headship System was conducted in the name of the Civic Association to Abolish the Family Headship System. The progressive women’s movement also contributed their organizational power to various civil society movement campaigns (e.g., a campaign to enact the Corruption Prevention Act) to eliminate legacies passed down from the authoritarian military dictatorship.

Labor unions still held their organized power and occasionally collaborated with civic organizations when their needs were met, although they were no longer the mainstream of the social movement in the democratized Korean society. For instance, whenever the progressive women’s groups challenged labor laws related to women, they formed a coalition with the two biggest associations of labor unions in Korea—Korean Confederation of Trade Unions and Federation of Korean Trade Unions—to maximize their collective power. Coalitions within the civil society movement as well as across social movements strengthened the movement’s mobilization capacity and gave them leverage to influence Korean legislation.

During the Roh Mu-Hyun Administration between 2003 and 2007, many social movement activists who had dedicated their lives to the democracy movement, followed by the civil society movement, entered politics. These individuals became political insiders to the social movements situated outside politics, and they helped many progressive laws pass during this time period, including the abolition of the Family Headship System. However, this trend also led to the institutionalization of the
movement, leaving the movement co-opted and demobilized to some degree. Furthermore, the conservative Lee Myung-Bak Administration that came after the Roh Mu-Hyun Administration in 2008 cut off numerous channels that the previous government had built with the civil society movement. Thus, the overall civil society movement since the mid 2000s has experienced stagnation, and this continued under the next conservative, Park Geun-Hye Administration.

3. Political System in South Korea and Legislative Process

Legislative processes vary depending on a nation’s political structure. Korea has a presidential system with three branches of government: legislative, executive, and judicial. The legislative branch consists of the single chamber system, called the National Assembly. While most countries that adopt a presidential system (e.g., U.S.) only allow the legislative branch to make laws, in Korea both the legislative and executive branches are authorized to propose a legislative bill. When a member of the National Assembly proposes a bill, he or she needs signatures of more than ten members of National Assembly. In order for the executive branch to propose a bill, it must go through multiple bureaucratic processes, requiring significant input from each government agency.

Once the bill is submitted to the legislature, the Chairman of the National Assembly sends the bill to a relevant standing committee for review. Standing committees are the places where political parties reveal their positions on the bill and negotiate over the issues that need to be addressed. Because standing committees play a gatekeeper role, bills that pass through this stage of legislation are likely to pass in the Assembly plenary session as well (Chun 2010). Before the proposed bill moves to the plenary session, it is always reviewed by the Legislative and Judiciary Committee to assess the bill’s possible conflict with the Constitution or existing laws. When the bill carries controversial elements that are not resolved in previous stages, the Legislative and Judiciary Committee may send the bill back to the standing committee that initially reviewed the bill.

If the bill passes through the Legislative and Judiciary Committee, it is discussed and voted on the floor of the National Assembly. In most cases, a bill that was already approved by a standing
committee passes in the plenary session because during the standing committee’s review session, any disagreements across political parties are resolved, otherwise the bill would not have moved up to the plenary session (Chun 2010). In order for the bill to pass on the floor, the majority of the Assembly members should be present in the session, and the majority of those present should vote for the passage. If the president then vetoes the bill, it is sent back to the Assembly. This time, the majority of the Assembly members should be present and two-thirds of those present must vote “yes”, and then the veto is overridden and the bill becomes law.

4. A Longer History of Gender Policy Development and Women’s Policy Campaigns in Korea

The policy campaigns examined in my dissertation are embedded in a longer history of gender policy development and women’s activism in Korea, a history taking place across several decades. Because my dissertation focuses on the feminist policy campaigns of a specific period (1993 to 2007), it offers limited information about the longer political, cultural, and movement contexts surrounding each policy development and women’s activism for gender policy change. Below I provide more in-depth history of the development of each gender policy and the role of the women’s movement within that history. I describe important social events, social movement organizational changes, and preceding activities that built the foundation for the eleven campaigns to emerge. For certain policies, I go back to their initial enactment to discuss how the women’s movement made the policy’s existence possible at first, even though later the women’s movement began to challenge those same policies.

1) Special Act on Sexual Violence (1991-2007)

Until the 1990s sexual violence was not conceived as a social problem (Suh 2009). As progressive women’s groups began to form independent women’s organizations from the late 1980s, and a series of sexual assault incidents were reported in the media, they started to pay attention to sexual violence against women. In 1991, there was a case involving a woman, Kim Bu-Nam, who murdered her rapist who had sexually assaulted her as a child. As women’s groups responded to this case, they felt the
need to enact a separate law, besides the criminal law, designed to protect victims of sexual violence and launched a campaign to enact the Special Act on Sexual Violence in 1991. Korea Sexual Violence Relief Center and Korea Women’s Hotline were at the forefront of this campaign, supported by other member organizations of the KWAU. The campaign organized numerous events to pressure the government, including public hearings, street rallies, petition signing, and press conferences. According to Hong (2006), this was the first legislative campaign that mobilized a variety of women’s groups as well as other civic organizations that emerged after the democratization of Korea.

The enactment of the Special Act on Sexual Violence in 1994 was undoubtedly one of the greatest achievements in the history of the Korean women’s movement. However, the victory was possible at the expense of some of the clauses the women’s groups sought to include in the law. Thus, campaigns to revise the law have followed since its enactment. The women’s movement organizations, particularly Korea Sexual Violence Relief Center, expressed regrets that two of their demands were not included in the Act.

The first problematic aspect of the new law was the requirement of a complaint from the victim in order to prosecute a perpetrator of sexual violence. Women’s advocates asserted that making rape prosecutable without a complaint from the victim is the right way to ultimately protect the victim as well as to realize a just society. The second issue was the definition of sexual violence. In the law established in 1994, sexual violence was defined as the crime of rape and sexual harassment. According to women’s groups, this definition failed to include various types of sexual violence, such as rape of men, marital rape, and sexual violence with no penetration involved. Thus, to prevent a wide range of sexual violence perpetuated on people regardless of their sex and gender, the women’s movement organizations steadfastly demanded revising the definition on the law to any crime that violates one’s sexual autonomy and self-determination.

Although the law was revised multiple times in the next two decades, the two major demands were not adopted in legislation until 2007, the last year of the pro-feminist presidency, followed by the next ten years of conservative regimes.

When women’s groups started to challenge the issue of violence against women in the early 1990s, there was a disagreement regarding the concept of gender violence. While Korea Women’s Hotline wanted to include wife beating in the definition of gender violence and legislate a law regarding violence against women, Korea Sexual Violence Relief Center preferred conceptualizing gender violence more narrowly and enacting a law focused on that narrow definition of sexual violence. After prolonged discussion within the women’s movement, the various women’s groups decided for the narrowly defined sexual violence in the proposed bill with the intent of conducting another campaign regarding domestic violence later (Nam 2002).

After the Special Act on Sexual Violence was enacted in 1994, Korea Women’s Hotline launched its own campaign for the enactment of the Domestic Violence Prevention Act to fulfill its initially intended goal. Activists aimed to establish basic legal foundations to punish perpetrators and protect victims of domestic violence through the enactment of the law. As the KWAU joined the effort in 1996, creating a coalition composed of the KWAU’s other member organizations, the campaign gained nationwide momentum. Eventually, the campaign ended in success with the passage of the Domestic Violence Prevent Act in 1997.

After monitoring the execution of the law over the next five years, Korea Women’s Hotline, with the support of the KWAU, launched a legislative campaign in 2003 to amend the Domestic Violence Prevention Act with two main goals: highlighting the importance of victims’ human rights in the law and increasing the severity of punishment to for perpetrators. However, the campaign ended in failure when the two major demands were not reflected in the amendment of the Domestic Violence Prevention Act that passed in 2005 and the bill submitted by the coalition failed to pass at the National Assembly in 2007.


The Anti-Prostitution Act was first established in 1961 in order to guide prostitutes back to the “right” path in society (that is, away from prostitution). As Korea was industrialized, a growing number of poor rural women flowed into the cities and their brothels, and the sex industry expanded dramatically
in the 1970s. After the Korea Japan Normalization Treaty, the sex industry flourished further with sex tourism from Japan. Observing these social phenomena, Christian women’s groups founded a shelter for women in the 1970s to prevent them from ending up in prostitution. This was the beginning of the anti-prostitution movement in Korea (Lee 2008). Additionally, Catholic women’s groups in the 1980s continued the anti-prostitution effort by helping former prostitutes gain job skills and receive medical services.

In 1986, a new organization, United Voice for the Eradication of Prostitution (UVEP), was formed and this group took a different approach from that of the religious women’s groups in the past. UVEP defined prostitution as a violation of human rights caused by poor social structures, and it focused its activities on lessening financial and physical hardship caused by abusive pimps (Lee 2008). Later, when progressive women’s groups centering on the KWAU launched a campaign to enact the Anti-Sex Trafficking Act in 2000, UVEP joined the campaign and helped prepare specific agendas tailored to the needs of victims of exploitative prostitution.

In 1995, the Korean government substantially revised the existing Anti-Prostitution Act in response to a growing concern over supervising women who escaped from prostitution. This action was taken after a fire in a rehabilitation center for former prostitutes revealed that the government-run facility was poorly managed. Still, the revised law was not designed to protect victims of forced prostitution.

In 2000, another incident involving fire occurred in which four prostitutes were killed in a locked house. The KWAU quickly sent an official request to the local police for a thorough investigation of the case and soon began a campaign for the enactment of a new law to replace the Anti-Prostitution Act. The suggested new law aimed to enhance protection of human rights of the exploited women who are the victims of prostitution. In other words, the intent of the law was to protect women and eradicate prostitution by approaching it as a social problem caused by the industry of prostitution and the oppression of women, instead of understanding prostitution as a result of the moral failings of the female prostitutes. The KWAU, working with other rights groups, organized a variety of protest events to
influence legislation of the new law, and its activism bore fruit in 2004 when the bill was passed in the National Assembly.


The Equal Employment Act was enacted in 1987, making it the first Korean law designed to ensure gender equality (Kim 2003). However, the law was established through a top-down process without any feedback from the women’s movement and it contained significant limitations. Thus, the women’s movement launched a campaign to revise the law soon after its enactment. Upon the government’s request, some women’s groups participated in revising the law for the first amendment in 1989. The first revised law was improved over the original law because it provided the definition of gender discrimination at work and prescribed equal pay for equal work (Kim 2004). However, there was still room for further improvement.

Several women’s organizations, particularly Womenlink and Korean Women Workers’ Association, both of which are the KWAU’s member organizations, were specialized in the issue of gender discrimination in the workplace, and continued their activities to revise the law. The second amendment campaign was focused on two issues. One was the growing trend of indirect discrimination in the workplace. The other issue was sexual harassment. The law revised in 1989 did not address problems associated with indirect discrimination and sexual harassment at work. A wide range of women’s groups, including conservative organizations, formed a coalition to resolve these issues by conducting a campaign for the second amendment of the law in 1993. Unfortunately, their major demands were not reflected in the second amendment of the law that took place in 1995.

The third amendment campaign followed soon after the second amendment. During the third amendment campaign, the coalition became bigger in size. Moreover, the issue of sexual harassment at work gained much media and public attention due to the development of a sexual harassment lawsuit involving a graduate student against her advisor in the top Korean university. In the end, when the government revised the law a third time in 1999, the feminist demands were adopted in the law by providing the definitions of indirect discrimination and sexual harassment at work.
A campaign for the fourth amendment was an extended effort from the third amendment campaign to include specific provisions regarding indirect discrimination and sexual harassment, and it ended in success in 2001. However, the campaign for the fourth amendment was not an independent campaign, but it was subsumed in a campaign for the amendment of the Maternity Protection Act, which I describe below.

5) Maternity Protection Act (1993-2001)

The topic of maternity protection first arose in 1993 as one of the primary businesses of the KWAU. Since then, the KWAU and other women’s organizations specializing in women’s employment have conducted research about maternity protection policies and continue to have internal discussions about this issue. However, their activities, although numerous, remained inconsistent until 2000.

A campaign for the amendment of the Maternity Protection Act launched in 2000 when the KWAU activists learned that the government was making plans to change the law to strengthen maternity protection to help women reconcile work and family duties. Because the women’s movement had paid attention to the issue and obtained sufficient knowledge about it for the past decade, the campaign was able to proceed quickly. Women’s groups, inviting associations of male labor unions and other civic organizations, created a coalition for the amendments of several laws relevant to women’s employment: 1) the Labor Standards Act, 2) the Employment Insurance Act, 3) the National Insurance Act, and 4) the Equal Employment Act. Technically, the fourth law, the Equal Employment Act, was not closely related to a 90-day paid maternity leave policy. However, the women’s movement attempted to quietly pass the fourth amendment of the Equal Employment Act, along with the other three laws concerning maternity policy. Therefore, the primary focus of the coalition’s activism was on ensuring a 90-day paid maternity leave by law, and the campaign led by the coalition was also called a campaign for the amendment of the Maternity Protection Act. This campaign strategy proved successful when the Equal Employment Act was revised together with the other laws to ensure a 90-day paid maternity leave in 2001.

As Korea went through rapid industrialization, more women, including married women, started to work outside the home, and the shortage in childcare facilities became a significant problem. Women’s groups, particularly Local Childcare Services Association, conducted activism to resolve this issue, while the government’s response was slow until 1990. In 1990, there was a shocking incident reported in the media that two children, ages 4 and 5, died in a home fire because their parents locked them in when going out to work, and the children could not escape. Women’s organizations politicized this incident to arouse public attention about the government’s childcare policy. In response to the growing public attention to this issue, the government enacted the Childcare Act in 1991, which prescribed that local and national governments as well as parents and guardians take responsibilities for childcare.

Because the government hurriedly made the law, women’s groups were not content with the law. Particularly, Local Childcare Services Association (its name later changed to Korea(n) Childcare Teachers Association) steadfastly conducted activism to revise the law from the time of its enactment in 1991. The revision of the law became a nation-wide movement goal when the KWAU put this matter on its business agenda in 1997. The same year, the government executed a plan to expand private-run childcare facilities rather than improving the public childcare system. This action was at odds with the women’s groups’ demand to increase government spending on childcare services. Korea(n) Childcare Teachers Association, supported by the KWAU and its networked organizations, launched a campaign to amend the Childcare Act in 1999. The campaign’s proposed bill did not pass while President Kim Dae-Joong was in the office. During the next presidential campaign, Roh Mu-Hyun, a candidate at the time, made an election pledge to completely revise the Childcare Act to strengthen the public childcare system. His promise was realized when the law was revised in 2004 under his administration.


Since the beginning of its enactment in 1954, the Korean Family Law had been attacked by both conservative and progressive women’s groups in Korea for its patriarchal features. The opposition to this law first came from a handful of women activists under the leadership of the first Korean female lawyer and leader, Lee Tae-Young. In 1956, Lee established the Korea(n) Legal Aid Center for Family Relations,
which became the leading organization aimed at the revision of the Family Law for the next fifty years. Along with other women’s organizations, they launched the Family Law Revision Movement the same year and achieved substantial results in 1962, 1977, and 1989.

The movement in the 1960s operated with a small number of activists and women’s organizations without extensive collaboration among organizations (Cho 1996). However, in the 1970s the movement transformed into a more systematically organized effort by creating a coalition of 61 member organizations. In the 1980s, the KWAU was established and became the leading power of the third Revision Movement. Coalitions with other influential organizations, such as labor movement organizations and male centered civic organizations, allowed the KWAU to strengthen organizational power to carry on the movement, which resulted in the most far-reaching revision in the Korean Family Law in 1989 (Kim 1991).

However, the Family Headship System survived fifty years of feminist attacks and multiple revisions of the Korean Family Law. The presence of the system was problematic from a feminist perspective because it was gender discriminatory in terms of the succession of the headship position and the registration of children in family. The system was established based on the Confucian value that only paternal lineage is passed down to the next generations. Activists asserted that the system helped preserve a culture in which boys are the preferred sex in Korea and propagated the patriarchal system with its bias against females in Korean society.

During the five-year period of pronounced mobilization from 2000 to 2004, the KWAU organized numerous events and activities to publicize their demand regarding the law as well as to reach out to the legislators. Those activities included collecting complaints from disadvantaged women and girls, holding awareness-raising activities on campuses, and even meeting with individual congressmen to survey them about their position on the issue. Finally, the campaign ended with success in 2005 when the National Assembly passed the bill that abolished the Family Headship System from the Family Law.

8) Healthy Family Act (2002-2007)
After the KWAU first announced its interest in proposing family support policies in 2002, it took two years for the organization to initiate substantial action towards the goal. Their efforts were a mobilization to stop the Ministry of Health and Welfare from introducing a new bill called Healthy Family Act. The Korean government was concerned about a decreasing birth rate and an increasing divorce rate, and the bill was intended to mitigate these trends. The feminist activists objected to this bill for two main reasons. First, the concept of family was defined narrowly in the bill, excluding nontraditional types of families such as domestic partnerships, common-law marriages, and single-parent households. Second, in the name of protecting and promoting “healthy” families, the bill tacitly imposed more responsibilities on women as caregivers in the families. However, the Healthy Family Act passed in 2004, and the feminist movement’s revision campaign followed.

The KWAU launched the revision campaign of the Healthy Family Act in 2004, simultaneously making efforts to enact a new legislation that dealt with alternative family support policies. In 2006, the new legislation called Family Policy Basic Act was prepared to replace the Healthy Family Act, and was introduced to the Gender and Family Committee in the National Assembly. Although it was passed in the standing committee, the bill remained on hold at the Legislative and Judiciary Committee in the National Assembly. The KWAU issued multiple statements to denounce the delay of the bill by the Committee. In the end, the bill was discarded by the legislature at the end of the 2006 session. One more attempt to pass the bill took place the following year, which was the last year of the pro-feminist presidency. This attempt also ended in vain.


As political democracy became established in Korean politics in the 1990s, women leaders came to realize that women’s representation in politics is crucial to advancing women’s rights and status. In order to increase the number of women entering politics, women’s groups conducted multiple campaigns to revise the Election Law to introduce a gender quota system. Both conservative and feminist women’s organizations worked together to achieve this political goal. The first coalition among women’s organizations took place in 1994, and it demanded a 30% quota of proportional representative female
candidates in the upcoming general election in 1995 (Cho and Kim 2010). Since then, women’s groups, particularly ones focused on women’s political involvement, continued to pressure lawmakers to promote a gender quota system during elections, and they made incremental progress in the legislature (Cho and Kim 2010).

In 2003, a large coalition among various women’s organizations was formed to help elect more women to the National Assembly during the 2004 general election. The coalition’s goal was to rewrite the law to recommend political parties adhering to a 50% quota of female candidates using a zipper quota system. In the previous general election in 2000, the law was revised to guarantee 30% quota to female candidates for proportional representation. In sum, the women’s movement gradually expanded political representation of women by pressuring lawmakers to revise the Election Law regarding the gender quota system.
References


