

PERMANENT WAR ON PERU'S PERIPHERY: FRONTIER IDENTITY AND THE
POLITICS OF CONFLICT IN 17TH CENTURY CHILE.

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This dissertation argues that rather than making a concerted effort to stabilize the Spanish-indigenous frontier in the south of the colony, colonists and indigenous residents of 17th century Chile purposefully perpetuated the conflict to benefit personally from the spoils of war and use to their advantage the resources sent by viceregal authorities to fight it.

Using original documents I gathered in research trips to Chile and Spain, I am able to reconstruct the debates that went on both sides of the Atlantic over funds, protection from pirates, and indigenous slavery that so defined Chile's formative 17th century. While my conclusions are unique, frontier residents from Paraguay to northern New Spain were also dealing with volatile indigenous alliances, threats from European enemies, and questions about how their tiny settlements could get and keep the attention of the crown. I also hope to shed new light on what the residents of the frontiers themselves were saying about their world, rather than relying on the important but somewhat muddled impressions of historians and statesman who have national legacies in mind.

To Carroll and Matthew. For their love, patience and for allowing me to pursue a profession I am passionate about.

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LIST OF FIGURES

Figure	Page
1. Extent of the Inca Empire	10
2. Cities and forts founded in 16 th -century Chile.....	12
3. Almagro's route	32
4. Approximate Distribution of Chile's 16 th -Century Indigenous Population.....	34
5. The Araucanía.....	82

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
DEDICATION	iii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	iv
LIST OF FIGURES	vi
Chapter	
I. INTRODUCTION	8
II. “TRABAJOS DE LA GUERRA Y TRABAJOS DEL HAMBRE.” THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE FRONTIER IN 16 TH -CENTURY CHILE	29
“The Araucanía” and Araucanians.....	33
<i>Indios de Guerra</i>	37
III. LABOR AND THE BALANCE OF POWER. CHILE’S FRONTIER ECONOMY RESISTS VICEREGAL NEEDS	65
Oñez de Loyola Disrupts the Colonial Pact.....	95
IV. FRONTIER EXPERIMENTS: JESUITS, MYTHS AND SLAVERY IN POST-CURALABA CHILE.....	101
V. PROFITEERING ON THE FRONTIER: THE POVERTY OF THE <i>VIDA FRONTERIZA</i> MEANS WEALTH FOR AN UNSCRUPULOUS FEW	137
VI. CONCLUSION: AN EARTHQUAKE RATTLES PERU AND SENDS RIPPLES THROUGH CHILE’S FRONTIER ECONOMY	177
BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	193

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

For more than three hundred years, the Araucanian indigenous group in southern Chile remained unconquered by both Spanish and later Chilean authorities.¹

Araucanian resistance began almost immediately after the Spanish arrived in the region in the 1540s and did not end until the 1880s when Chilean soldiers returned from the War of the Pacific to put down the last major Araucanian offensive.

This “War of Arauco” as it would come to be called took its name from the region where most of the conflict would center.² Not satisfied with decreasing spoils from the conquest of Peru, a number of Spaniards and their indigenous auxiliaries marched through the forbidding Atacama Desert and founded Santiago de Chile in 1541. After finding gold in rivers near Santiago, a smaller group of Spaniards moved steadily south in search of more placer mining possibilities, erecting first a fort then the town of Concepción near the mouth of the Bío-Bío River in 1550. It was at the Bío-Bío

¹ The Araucanians are also known as “Mapuche,” and now refer to themselves as such. Mapuche means “people of the earth” in Mapudungun, but the term only sporadically appears in 16th and 17th century sources. The Spanish had various terms to refer to these Indians, usually based on the region from whence they sent representatives in peace talks, but the most universal term was “Araucano” or “Auca.” In a recent article Guillaume Boccara correctly pointed out that both “Mapuche” and “Araucano” are flawed, and instead uses the term *reche* meaning “true people” to refer to the inhabitants of this area. Guillaume Boccara, “Etnogénesis Mapuche: Resistencia y Reestructuración Entre los Indígenas del Centro-Sur de Chile (Siglos XVI-XVIII),” *Hispanic American Historical Review* 79:3 (August 1999). *Reche* was used and understood by the Spanish, but it too is imperfect as it refers to the masses or individuals and does not include this region’s political or religious leaders. Tomás Guevara, *Historia de la civilización de Araucanía, Tomo I, Antropología Araucana* (Santiago: Imprenta Cervantes, 1900), 186. “Reche” is becoming more widely used among Chilean historians, but “Araucanian” remains more universal.

² The colonial Province of Arauco was bordered by the Pacific and the Andes to its west and east, and by the Toltén and Maule Rivers on the north and south. I will also use the more loosely defined “Araucanía” in this study.

River where this steady movement southward would stall, and the Spanish war of conquest would become one of Araucanian resistance.³

Two main factors prompted this development. First, no significant deposit of precious metals was discovered in Chile, immediately relegating the new colony to the Spanish Empire's economic periphery. The aforementioned placer mines were quickly exhausted, and no major gold vein was ever discovered. In the meantime, the discovery of the "silver mountain" of Potosí in 1545 soon would help triple the amount of silver arriving in Seville.⁴ This meant that although the crown had no intention of abandoning Chile (it had potential as a breadbasket for Peru's silver mines), it would see only modest settlement and few resources. By 1549, there were only 500 colonists in all of Chile.⁵ Second, Araucanian resistance had stopped the advance of the Inca Empire at the Bío-Bío and a century later the river and the residents to its south thwarted another empire. (See map below.) However, lacking large scale political institutions, the scattered Araucanians had no territorial aspirations north of the Bío-Bío. Therefore, with neither the Spanish nor Araucanians enthusiastic about penetrating the Bío-Bío, something of a permanent frontier began

³ The Spanish "spiritual conquest" also slowed at the Bío-Bío. There were members of a number of regular orders in Chile by the 1550s, but their work was concentrated near Santiago. The founding of the Dioceses of La Imperial (1560) and San Bartolomé (Chillán) (1590) produced few results. In the 1590s, the newly-arrived Jesuit order began to seek a more active role. In 1595 two Jesuits set out for the Araucanía under the government of Martín de Loyola, who believed the Jesuits could aid in the "pacification" of the region. Rolf G. Foerster, *Jesuitas y Mapuches, 1593-1767* (Santiago, Chile: Editorial Universitaria, S.A., 1996), 48-50.

⁴ Lyle N. McAlister, *Spain and Portugal in the New World: 1492-1700* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984), 229.

⁵ Tracing population numbers for the rest of the century becomes a difficult task with miscegenation and the abandonment of Spanish settlements. The most reliable numbers are those of Spanish arrivals, but it becomes more difficult to track their movements and offspring once they set foot in Chile. Diego Barros Arana, *Historia general de Chile: Tomo I* (Santiago: Editorial Universitaria, 1999), 263.



Figure 1. Extent of the Inca Empire⁶

to straddle the river. Soon, what began as a skirmish line had become a region of frontier negotiation where trade flourished. Strawberries, lima beans, corn, potatoes, blankets, feathers, and metal trinkets had begun to change hands in regular Spanish-Araucanian trade fairs as early as the 1550s.⁷ Miscegenation also brought the Spanish and Araucanians closer, as Spanish women were scarce.⁸ This contact was facilitated by the presence of Spanish towns in Araucanian territory and by the forced settlement of Araucanians in “pueblos de indios” or “reducciones” near Spanish towns or forts.⁹

⁶ Adapted from: <<http://www.peru-explorer.com/history.htm>>

⁷ Leopoldo Saez-Godoy, ed. *Géronimo de Vivar: Crónica y relación copiosa y verdadera de los Reinos de Chile (1558)* (Berlin: Colloquium Verlag, 1979), 164.

⁸ Sergio Villalobos cites the percentage of Spanish female settlers arriving between 1536 and 1565 as 23%. Sergio Villalobos, “Tres siglos y medio de vida fronteriza,” in *Relaciones fronterizas en la Araucanía*, ed. Sergio Villalobos et al. (Santiago: Ediciones Universidad Católica de Chile, 1982), 39

⁹ Ibid. The Spanish established towns like Valdivia (founded in 1552), Osorno (1558) and Castro (1558) as part of the initial conquest and their economic role within the empire was still unclear. Forts like Tucapel (1552), and Purén and Arauco (1553), and Lebu (1557) were constructed to protect these tenuous settlements. Osvaldo Silva Galdames, *Atlas de Historia de Chile* (Santiago: Editorial Universitaria, 1983), 45.

In the first decades of Spanish settlement, surviving on the frontier was the priority for these small towns even if it meant trading with the indigenous “enemy.” By 1565 Chile had seen the arrival of only 1,500 Spaniards, who dotted settlements over the 1,000 kilometers between Coquimbo and Concepción.¹⁰ (See map below).

Without frontier exchange, this scattered colonization of the Araucanía likely would not have escaped the fate of Nombre de Jesús and Rey Don Felipe. These two settlements in the Strait of Magellan were never re-supplied and disappeared soon after their 1584 founding.¹¹ With colonists recognizing their weakness, modest efforts to forge a frontier economy in the Araucanía began to bear fruit. It even appeared that the consistently frustrated attempts of the Catholic Church to evangelize the Araucanians were having some success.¹²

However, all belief that the frontier would evaporate a generation after the conquest was dashed by massive Araucanian rebellions in 1598 and again in 1655 which returned an air of instability to the region. It is my goal to address the connection between these rebellions and the fact that both the Spanish and Araucanians cultivated and benefited from the simmering war of resistance on the frontier.

Most of Chile’s southern settlements had existed only a generation when they were attacked by the Araucanians in 1598 and subsequently abandoned. While there

¹⁰ Tomás Thayer Ojeda, *Formación de la sociedad chilena y censo de la población de Chile en los años de 1540 a 1565* (Santiago: Prensas de la Universidad de Chile, 1939), 320.

¹¹ Silva Galdames, *Atlas de Historia de Chile*, 44.

¹² The founding of the Dioceses of La Imperial (1560) and San Bartolomé (Chillán) (1590) produced few results, but the newly-arrived Jesuit order began to seek a more active role in the 1590s. In 1595 two Jesuits set out for the Araucanía under the government of Martín de Loyola, who believed the Jesuits could aid in the “pacification” of the region. Foerster, *Jesuitas y Mapuches*, 48-50.



Figure 2. Cities and forts founded in 16th-century Chile. (Cities are represented by circles, forts by triangles.)¹³

¹³ Silva Galdames, *Atlas de Historia de Chile*, 45.

were many peripheral, or frontier areas throughout the Spanish Empire, only in Chile's case did the crown feel it necessary to send (and fund) a permanent army. On other frontiers, *vecinos* were expected to form militias and provide for their own defense. The crown called for a professional army in Chile after the colony was shaken by the Araucanian assault of 1598 and a subsequent attack by Dutch privateers on the island of Chiloé in 1600. While many historians have argued that frontiers are usually transitory,¹⁴ the presence of the permanent army would make Chile a notable exception. While the 16th century was one of surviving the frontier, and developing patterns of interaction, the arrival of a permanent army in the 17th century brought major investment and significant settlement to the Araucanía. The "Army of Arauco" as it became known, was established in the first decade of the 17th century and established forts at different points along the Bío-Bío River. The army had two primary functions, to protect Chile's tenuous frontier estancias and missions from any Araucanian advance and to drive away pirates interested in the Peruvian silver that funded the army and for that matter, Spain's entire American colonial venture. On three occasions in the 16th century, European pirates, including Francis Drake, had slipped through the Strait of Magellan and threatened Chile. These three breaches of the Pacific did more psychological than real damage to the viceroyalty, as the pirate activity was brief but served to confirm that the southern door to Peruvian silver could indeed be forced open. The 1600 Dutch attack was more worrisome however, as it raised the prospect that European enemies would ally with the Araucanians and establish a stronghold in Chile.

¹⁴ Bernd Schröter, "La frontera en hispanoamérica colonial: un estudio historiográfico comparativo," *Colonial Latin American Historical Review* (2001:Summer), 367.

While the Army of Arauco was designed to drive off pirates and finish the conquest, its real contribution to the colony had less to do with its professional duties and more to do with the role of these soldiers as residents on a developing frontier. The crown created the army as a temporary force that would finish off the Araucanian threat. However, for a number of reasons the Army of Arauco never mounted a significant campaign, instead focusing on smaller raids and contributing to the climate of negotiated violence that characterized the permanent frontier. As the seventeenth century moved along, an end to the conquest seemed farther and farther afield and residents of the frontier and the colony in general continued to take advantage of this increasingly permanent frontier. By cultivating a fear of pirates and to some extent of indigenous rebellion, residents of the frontier could count on more funds from the viceroy even as they embezzled them and used them to conduct illegal slave taking campaigns.

David Weber has recently reminded us that the Hapsburg crown's lack of an overall strategy for its American frontiers meant that it was up to residents of far-flung outposts like Chile to craft their own political and cultural systems.¹⁵ Through my research I have found that ultimately, both Spanish and Araucanian residents on the frontier, as well as officials in Santiago and Lima did not want to see an end to the War of Arauco. The war and the frontier life that it had created benefited them too much.

Frontier interaction began as a war of conquest where both parties had tried to eliminate one another. However, once a balance of power was established, both sides

¹⁵ David J. Weber, *Bárbaros: Spaniards and their Savages in the Age of Enlightenment* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005), 8.

in the War of Arauco purposefully kept the conflict simmering for most of the 17th century and helped make the War of Arauco a permanent one. For the Spanish, the most effective way to make the frontier disappear would have been through settlement, yet there was neither the will nor the resources for a major colonization south of the Bío-Bío. Neither was there a significant advance of a line of Catholic missions south of the Bío-Bío until the late 18th century. There were Jesuits and Franciscans in the region during the 17th century, but their activity was limited to periodic excursions from larger Spanish settlements. The Araucanians on the other hand also benefited from the ebb and flow that was frontier exchange. The presence of the Spanish helped them financially through trade, raids and gifts, and helped their leaders gain power by proving that through their interaction with Spanish officials that they were on an equal level with their supposed conquerors. After the 1560s then, neither side made a real and lasting commitment to victory, as the War of Arauco provided resources that would have been lacking without the attention the conflict brought.

Since this frontier negotiation was not limited to Chile, studying other 16th and 17th century frontiers has helped structure my research. New Mexico was one of these frontier areas that historians of the United States had disregarded as “vacant” during its colonial period. Fortunately the work of Bolton and more recently David Weber, James Brooks, Dan Usner and others has revealed that there was in fact a vibrant exchange economy in the region. While many have cited the Pueblo Revolt of 1680 as evidence of a lack of Spanish hegemony in the region, only recently have scholars moved past that dramatic moment to truly reveal how “this antithesis between the

Spanish pick and the English hoe... has been greatly overworked.”¹⁶

James Brook’s multiple award winning *Captives and Cousins* traces several centuries of development in the southwest borderlands and argues among other things that the mountains of the region were not a barrier to societal development. Instead the “Sierras de Sangre de Cristo, Jémez, Sandía, and Magdalena (linked) landscapes and societies” in the southwest, much like the cordillera between Chile and Argentina did.¹⁷ Also important for my work is Brooks’ description of how frequently and how formally the Spanish used “just war” to turn indigenous slavery into a legitimate and lucrative staple of the frontier economy. In Chile and in New Mexico alike, the fact that Spanish and indigenous residents of the frontier received little direct economic assistance from the crown did not preclude them from thriving as a multi-ethnic society, even if they had to use extra-legal means to do so. In fact, the very lack of direct contact with royal authorities was what emboldened these frontier residents to develop permanent patterns of indigenous slave taking and trading.

Perhaps the most well known American frontier existed in northern New Spain. There the Spanish set up their “silver arc,” a network of presidios established to protect the silver mining economy from the “savage” Chichimec peoples. While it is understandable that the torture and mutilation of Spanish prisoners at the hands of the Chichimec are the most dominant images of this area’s colonial history, the silver arc remains one of the earliest examples of how creole societies survived and self-

¹⁶ Herbert Bolton, “Defensive Spanish Expansion and the Significance of the Borderlands,” in *The Idea of Spanish Borderlands*, ed. David J. Weber (New York: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1991), 2.

¹⁷ James F. Brooks, *Captives and Cousins: Slavery, Kinship and Community in the Southwest Borderlands* (Chapel Hill: UNC Press, 2002), 117. Margarita Gascón has written extensively on the Cordillera de los Andes as a bridge rather than a barrier. Margarita Gascón, “Comerciantes y redes mercantiles del siglo XVII en la frontera sur del Virreinato del Perú,” *Anuario de Estudios Americanos*, 57:2, (July/December, 2000): 413-448.

conceptualized when they were so far from the imperial spotlight. In both Chile and New Spain it was frontier residents themselves who initiated dialogue with the crown about and sought solutions for their unique legal, military and economic circumstances.¹⁸ Much as was the case in Chile's programs of *reducción* and "defensive war," "the mestizo warrior-diplomat (in New Spain) fashioned an enduring and humane peace in a unique frontier setting."¹⁹

The so-called "Guaraní frontier" which developed in territory now split between Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay, also held many similarities to the Chilean case. Jesuits in both Chile and the River Plate area first unwittingly exposed to, then tried to protect Araucanians and Guaraní from slave raiders. Aborigines in both areas were concentrated into Jesuit designed *reducciones* which made them both easier to catechize and unfortunately to kidnap.²⁰ A general lack of Spanish settlement also characterized both Chile and the Guaraní frontier, producing "an intense process of miscegenation" and in the latter case, "adoption of the native language."²¹

¹⁸ Also see Jane Landers' work on Spanish Florida. It was at Fort Mosé near St. Augustine, where a group of runaway African slaves took full advantage of their liminal existence by contributing to a frontier militia and creating a permanent community. The uncertainty and permissiveness of living between two empires, near volatile Indians, and during the height of Caribbean piracy allowed free blacks in the area to thwart preconceptions, and become entrepreneurs and soldiers. Jane Landers, *Black Society Spanish Florida* (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1999), 35, 204. See Alan Gally, "Jonathan Bryan's Plantation Empire: Land, Politics, and the Formation of a Ruling Class in Colonial Georgia," *The William and Mary Quarterly*, 3rd Ser., Vol. 45, No. 2 (Apr., 1988) for similar economic opportunities on the neighboring Georgia frontier.

¹⁹ Philip Wayne Powell argues that the leadership of a handful of first generation Americans was essential to Spanish survival in the region. He writes extensively of Miguel Caldera, who used his local knowledge to author a fragile peace with the Chichimec as the 16th century came to a close. Caldera's plan involved "protection and defense of the pacified peoples, provisioning and gift-giving," agricultural help to the Chichimec in an attempt to reform their nomadic existence, and "religious conversion." Philip Wayne Powell, *Mexico's Miguel Caldera: The Taming of America's First Frontier, 1548-1597* (Tucson: The University of Arizona Press, 1977), 22, 205.

²⁰ Barbara Ganson, *The Guaraní Under Spanish Rule in the Río de la Plata* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003), 45.

²¹ *Ibid.*, 29. Tens of thousands of Chileans still count Spanish as their second language, but *mapudungún* (the language of the Araucanians) was never used as widely as Guaraní.

Looking at comparative cases is however most helpful in terms of reminding us of the Chilean frontier's uniqueness. First of all, Chile did not have the pressures of territorial competition that we saw in Louisiana or Spanish Florida. While it is true that the Dutch and English occasionally appeared in Pacific waters, the Spanish-Araucanian interaction had a longer incubation period than did that of the Spanish and Seminole or French and Choctaw. Second, while the New Spanish silver arc moved north and *paulistas* (slave raiders) made the Guaraní frontier unstable, the story of frontier life in Chile was one of permanence. Spanish settlement did not progress further south, nor did the Araucanians drive the Spanish back toward Santiago. Patterns of war making, slave taking and trade, rather than disappearing over time became more frequent and more widespread. Soon the frontier economy was not simply one of subsistence, but became integrated into the viceroyalty's all-important silver extraction. As Chile moved toward the 18th century, Araucanians and Spanish creoles defined success not as assimilation or conquest, but as a negation or frontier pact which bridged the physical and cultural territory between two societies.²²

Chile also is unique in that during the national period, the legacy of the frontier was not regarded as a threat. In Argentina for example, it was not long after 19th-century ethnographers like Lucio Mansilla reported back about little-known frontier groups like the Ranqueles, than these same groups were attacked in future president

²² Leonardo León dedicates chapters to a handful of increasingly powerful 18th century frontier *toquis* (chieftains) in, Leonardo León, *Los señores de las cordilleras y las pampas: Los Pehuenches de Malalhue, 1770-1800* (Mendoza, Argentina: Universidad de Congreso, 2001). Also see Leonardo León, *Maloqueros y conchavadores*. Kristine Jones has also written a number of articles on 18th century frontier raiding economies in Chile and Argentina. See, Kristine Jones, "Comparative Frontier Raiding Economies, North and South," in *Contested Ground: Comparative Frontiers on the Northern and Southern Edges of the Spanish Empire*, Ed. by Donna J. Guy and Thomas E. Sheridan (Tucson: Univ. of Arizona Press, 1998).

Julio Roca's extermination campaign.²³ In Chile on the other hand, the frontier south had become quite powerful politically even before the wars of independence began. Chile's liberator, Bernardo O'Higgins was from the southern frontier town of Chillán, and many of the new republic's leaders had earned their stripes as officers on the Araucanian frontier. The Araucanian frontier was not only a source of leadership experience, but for some statesmen their indigenous enemy provided an example of democracy that Chile could follow. After all, "only the standard of Aruacanía opposed the banners of the House of Austria."²⁴ Trying to be consistent with this rhetoric, O'Higgins made overtures to the Araucanians, reminding them of their shared creole heritage and claiming that the Spanish were a common enemy. He and other statesmen held optimism for the future in attempting to create a "reformed and ideal state" where whites and Indians could build on this common heritage.²⁵ This sense of "common heritage" would not have existed without Chile's long frontier experience.

While historians have been looking at frontier development for centuries, "frontier studies" as a sub-discipline has its roots in the writings and politics of Domingo Faustino Sarmiento and Frederick Jackson Turner. In simplest terms, for Sarmiento the frontier was a threat to the Republic of Argentina, while for Turner it was an opportunity for the United States.

During his 1840s exile in Chile, the Argentine author and future president Sarmiento wrote a scathing critique of his new nation's celebration of frontiersmen

²³ Lucio Mansilla, *Una excursión a los indios Ranqueles* (Buenos Aires : Editorial Universitaria, 1966).

²⁴ Simon Collier, *Ideas and Politics of Chilean Independence: 1808-1833* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967), 213-14.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, 215-16.

and argued that these “American Bedouins” on the outskirts of Buenos Aires were stifling progress. Sarmiento added that all civilizations, whether native, Spanish or European, were centered in the cities” and worried that Argentina was losing intellectual and social ground to non-urban denizens. The statesman lamented that the “fusion” of the Spanish, indigenous and African “families” had produced “a homogenous whole” characterized by a “love of idleness and incapacity for industry.” For Sarmiento, only the growth of the city and “education and the exigencies of social position” could “succeed in spurring (the homogenous whole) out of its customary pace” and rescue Argentina from the clutches of the *bárbaro*.²⁶

Like Sarmiento’s *pampa*, Frederick Jackson Turner’s North American frontier was a mostly vacant area defined by its low population density. Both authors gave little agency to the residents who lived outside of Turner’s “settled area.” Turner did concede that the frontier had some merit as a laboratory for “Americanization,” where the wilderness changed settlers of European stock through its opportunities for problem solving.²⁷ In other words, neither author celebrated frontier culture, but Turner the historian differed from Sarmiento the statesman in his belief that the frontier’s political and social legacies were too important to try and erase with a “civilization” campaign.

We also have to remember that nineteenth century writers were often influenced by scientific racism and often engaged in stereotyping of indigenous actors on the

²⁶ Domingo Faustino Sarmiento, “Civilization or Barbarism?,” trans. by Mrs. Horace Mann in *The Argentina Reader: History, Culture, Politics*, ed. by Gabriela Nuzeilles and Graciela Montaldo (Durham: Duke University Press, 2002), 85-87. See Weber, *Bárbaros: Spaniards and their Savages in the Age of Enlightenment*, for a discussion of the larger implications of this term.

²⁷ Frederick Jackson Turner, “The Significance of the Frontier in American History,” in *The Frontier in American History* (New York: Dover Publications, 1996), 2-4.

frontier. Only recently have historians begun to refute the idea that residents of the frontier were stereotypes and that American residents had little to say about the frontier until the national period. In fact, there are a number of other examples of where “the fringes” in the minds of statesmen and historians had actually been centers of economic and even intellectual activity from the early years of the Spanish Empire. Prominent frontier figures on both sides of the line like Miguel Caldera in Mexico and Pelantaro and Francisco Núñez de Pineda in Chile were the foot soldiers of national consciousness that liberal reformers and historians of the 19th century did not recognize or might not even have known about.

Fortunately, more recent scholarship from multiple disciplines has reminded us of the cultural give and take of frontier life and how this played a central role in the development of national and regional identities.²⁸ Herbert Bolton deserves most of the credit for developing the study of comparative frontiers. He was the first to argue that historians of the United States and historians of Latin America had much to learn from sharing information about their similar colonial frontiers.²⁹

Study of the Chilean frontier of course began in the colonial period, and more recent work by anthropologists and historians has continued to probe the illusive question of why the Araucanians resisted conquest for centuries. In the 19th century the polymath José Toribio de Medina published dozens of primary source volumes on

²⁸ One interesting sub theme is how this rejection or acceptance of the other is manifested through cannibalism. Oswald de Andrade celebrated how the Tupí-Nambá and in turn Americans “ingested” the other in his “Anthropophagite Manifesto.” http://www.coleccioncisneros.org/st_writ.asp?ID=17&Type=2 More recently, Guillaume Boccara has made some fascinating observations about Araucanian cannibalism, its meanings and ramifications for the *vida fronteriza*. Boccara, “Etnogénesis Mapuche,” 425-461.

²⁹ Herbert Eugene Bolton, *Wider horizons of American History* (New York: Appleton-Century co., 1939)., Bolton, “The Mission as a Frontier Institution in the Spanish-American Colonies,” *The American Historical Review*, 23 (Oct. 1917): 42-61.

Chile's colonial past, and had thousands more documents transcribed into the archive that now bears his name. The French scholar Claudio Gay made similar documentary contributions during the post-independence period. Tomás Guevara opened a flurry of 20th-century writings on the frontier with his multivolume synthesis of Araucanian history, politics and culture, *Historia de la civilización de Araucanía*. The historian and literary scholar Ricardo Latcham led the next generation, reviving interest in the Spanish-Araucanian epic *La Araucana*, and taking a closer look at the diversity of Chile's indigenous groups at first contact.³⁰

Some of the earliest work on the Chilean frontier in English came from Alfred Tapson, Eugene Korth and through the translation of Natan Wachtel's *The Vision of the Vanquished*.³¹ The work of these scholars paralleled that of Chile's first *indigenista* generation, which included Alvaro Jara, Mario Góngora, and Guillermo Furlong. Chile's most eminent historian, Sergio Villalobos recently lent his considerable prestige to the study of Chile's *vida fronteriza* (frontier life), and to the work of younger scholars like Leonardo León, Guillamme Boccarra, Margarita Gascón, Jorge Pinto, and Mario Orellana.³² U.S. scholars Kristine Jones and the

³⁰ Ricardo Latcham, "Los indios de la Cordillera y la Pampa en el siglo XVI," *Revista Chilena de Historia y Geografía* (1929).

³¹ Alfred J. Tapson, "Indian warfare on the Pampa during the Colonial period," *Hispanic American Historical Review* 42:1 (Feb. 1962) pp. 1-28. Nathan Wachtel, *The Vision of the Vanquished, The Spanish Conquest of Peru Through Indian Eyes*, trans. by Ben and Siân Reynolds (Hassocks, Sussex: The Harvester Press Limited, 1977).

³² See Jorge Pinto Rodríguez. *Misioneros en la Araucanía, 1600-1900: Vol. I* (Bogotá: Consejo Episcopal Latinoamericano, 1990). Alvaro Jara, *Guerra y sociedad en Chile: La transformación de la Guerra de Arauco y la esclavitud de los indios* (Santiago: Editorial Universitaria, 1971). Leonardo León Solís, *Maloqueros y Conchavadores en Araucanía y las Pampas, 1700-1800* (Temuco: Ediciones Universidad de la Frontera, 1990). Mario Góngora, *Encomenderos y estancieros: Estudios acerca de la constitución social aristocrática de Chile después de la Conquista, 1580-1660* (Santiago: Editorial Universitaria, 1971). Mario Orellana Rodríguez, *Historia y antropología de la isla de La Laja* (Santiago: Editorial Universitaria, 1992). Margarita Gascón, "Comerciantes y redes mercantiles del siglo XVII en la frontera sur del Virreinato del Perú," *Anuario de Estudios Americanos*, 57:2 (July/ December 2000): 413-448.

anthropologist Tom Dillehay are also doing important work on Chile's indigenous past.³³

It is impossible to generalize the findings of more than a century of scholarship, but for our purposes I will focus on one common argument about Araucanian resistance that helps frame my own. Many of the aforementioned scholars have embraced the idea that Araucanian society went through fundamental changes in the 16th century, allowing them to reject the Spanish advance both militarily (Wachtel) and culturally (Boccarra).³⁴ I fully agree with this finding, but there is an underlying assumption in most scholarship that the Spanish were actively pursuing a military victory in their conflict with the Araucanians. However, León, Jones and others have revealed that the "War of Arauco" was in fact composed of more trade and negotiation than actual battles. My research has allowed me to take this argument a step further and claim that both the Spanish and Araucanians purposefully extended the conflict to establish a permanent frontier. In my sources I came across repeated occasions where the both the Spanish and Araucanians argued in favor of maintaining a simmering military conflict. Without the threat of the War of Arauco, the Spanish would have lost monetary support from the viceroy and the Araucanians would have been cut off from the gifting and trade cycle that was so important to their politics and economy.³⁵

³³ Kristine Jones, "Comparative Ethnohistory and the Southern Cone," *Latin American Research Review* 29:1 (1994): 107-118. Tom Dillehay, *Araucania: presente y pasado* (Editorial Andrés Bello: Santiago, 1990).

³⁴ Wachtel, *The Vision of the Vanquished*. Boccarra, "Etnogénesis Mapuche."

³⁵ When we refer to the "Spanish" and "Araucanians" we really mean the officials that drive policy for both groups. We must not ignore the fact that as the war drew on, life for subalterns on both sides of the Bío-Bío often improved very little and in some cases got worse. It was the slaves, captives, women, children, farmers and foot soldiers in this region who bore the brunt of the conflict, while captains, governors and *lonkos* saw the lion's share of the benefits.

Chapter one of this dissertation is a discussion of how Chile's conqueror, Pedro de Valdivia, ironically laid the framework for the permanent frontier. Realizing that Chile would not yield the quantities of precious metals that would Peru, Valdivia figuratively beat swords into plowshares by turning his conquerors into farmers and ranchers. Valdivia's hope was that Chile's rich soil and access to plentiful indigenous labor would attract a new generation of Spanish settlers and ensure its economic survival. Lautaro, Valdivia's Araucanian opponent led a stunning assault against the Spanish, but neither he nor his allies sought to press their advantage and take territory north of the Bío-Bío.

Chapter two traces the formation of Chile's frontier economy. *Encomenderos* rejected a less lucrative but more stable wheat economy and instead used their Indians in gold mining and cattle raising. Over time both Araucanians and colonists realized that the War of Arauco actually brought economic benefits and both set about establishing patterns of war and peacemaking. In general a permanent frontier was established by the turn of the century where the Araucanians and neighboring groups were neither to be incorporated, nor left to their own devices. The cultural and economic exchange on the frontier had developed its own momentum and own rules that confounded the viceroy and other "outsiders."

Chapter three describes a number of experiments the crown and viceroy formulated to address the frustrating stalemate along the Chilean frontier. The crown legalized, then abolished, then legalized again the enslavement of rebel Araucanians. It created a 2,000 man strong professional army along the Bío-Bío. Spain also supported a "Defensive War" organized by Jesuits. Finally, it sponsored expeditions

to the mythical city of Caesars to find and conquer an imaginary indigenous group that was providing aid to the Araucanians. These experiments demonstrated that Spain had recognized and was willing to address the problem of the Araucanian frontier, but all that these changes accomplished was to reveal how entrenched the colonial pact had become and how difficult the economic, military and cultural patterns along the frontier would be to break.

Chapter four describes how in the mid-17th century the frontier actually became an economic boon to powerful and unscrupulous officials who were willing to violate the frontier's "colonial pact." Both the Spanish and their indigenous informants exaggerated the presence of European enemies in Chile and the extent of their alliances with the Araucanians. Sightings of Dutch or English privateers, real or imagined, had to at least be investigated by the viceroy. The arrival of a search party meant at the very least supplies and reinforcements for the Spanish and gifts for information and cooperation for the Araucanians. Under the exaggerated threat of European pirates, the viceroy turned a blind eye to Chilean mis- and malfeasance. Governors and army officials loafed, embezzled and or misused funds, and conducted illegal slave raids knowing that the viceroy could not risk cutting off aid to Chile. The avarice of one Chilean governor in particular prompted a disastrous rebellion by *indios amigos* in 1655. This attack revealed how newly arrived Spanish officials and *indios rebeldes* alike could affect the carefully crafted colonial pact that existed between creole Spaniards and most Araucanians.

This study ends in the 1680s, when a major earthquake in Peru changed Chile's economic role in the viceroyalty and in turn marked the beginning of a new period of

sedentary agriculture which brought fewer raids along the frontier. However, I will explore in my conclusion how the legacy of the frontier persists even in modern Chile. As a Latin Americanist in the United States I have explored the relationship that the Chilean frontier had to the Potosí silver mines without worrying about national rivalries that still exist among historians in Peru and Chile. At the same time, I will argue that I am making an important contribution to the colonial historiography of both nations. My interest has not been declaring a winner of the War of Arauco, but instead in chronicling how, and explaining why both sides wanted to keep it alive.

Beyond statements affirming Spanish and Araucanian desire to maintain a permanent frontier, the actions of both parties also serve as evidence of their desire to keep the war alive. When Spanish settlements penetrated Araucanian territory, the Araucanians attacked but fell back. In response, the Spanish were understandably timid; their offensives rarely were more than summer raids and they failed to repopulate many abandoned settlements until the republican period. Times of peace allowed both sides to gain strength for future campaigns, while without occasional military victories over worthy adversaries both sides would have been hard-pressed to gain the support of their peers and of their superiors alike.

Finally, we must recognize that part of the importance of the *vida fronteriza* came in the fact that its residents found it difficult to gain credibility or notoriety outside of the Araucanía. Colonists in Chile found themselves at a double disadvantage; having the stigma of living both in the “barbarous” and culturally backward Americas and among the “savage” Araucanians.

No one knew this better than Francisco Núñez de Pineda y Bascuñán, the most prominent creole of Chile's 17th century and author of *Cautiverio feliz*. Núñez de Pineda was born in Chillán to a prominent Spanish officer and was captured by the Araucanians in 1629, early in his own military career. Núñez de Pineda was the captive of Maulicán for a number of months where he participated in all facets of Araucanian life. Decades later he published his account of his captivity in an attempt to defend his legacy after the story had become lampooned in a Lima theatrical production. As a former captive and as a creole, Núñez de Pineda was well positioned to combat a growing Spanish disillusion with American reality, "...whose colonial societies seemed to bear little resemblance to the European utopias."³⁶

There was an increasing feeling in Europe and America that the "colonists had become colonials"³⁷ and were experiencing an unfortunate "transculturation." The Franciscan Bernardino de Sahagún in New Spain mentioned that Spanish individuals in the colonies were beginning to act like Indians, a trend which was even truer for creoles.³⁸ The Spanish feared losing their battle for America to the "wild man" of European Medieval legend, an uncultured rural dweller who was known to carry away women and children. The wild man mostly reflected the Spanish view of "savage Indians," but increasingly the Spanish were beginning to fear this character not only was a "nemesis" but also as "a possible destiny."³⁹

Much of *Cautiverio feliz* then was dedicated to refuting predictions of colonial society's impending doom. Núñez de Pineda's text also had to combat the

³⁶ Ralph Bauer, "Imperial History, Captivity, and Creole Identity in Francisco Núñez de Pineda y Bascuñán's *Cautiverio feliz*," *Colonial Latin American Review* 7:1 (1998), 62.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, 66.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, 62-63.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, 68.

predominating European literary tradition that portrayed two American worlds, with Europe as the “geo-cultural center.”⁴⁰ Núñez de Pineda exaggerated aspects of both indigenous and Spanish societies to distance creoles from the extremes and, expand the “space in between.”⁴¹ The author not only disassociated himself from *peninsulares* and their abuses and mismanagement, but also kept indigenous society at arm’s length. He described his rejection of indigenous women as love interests and his disdain for the indigenous clothes he was forced to wear during his captivity, as evidence against the idea that Chilean culture was just a form of *mestizaje*. He was motivated by the fear that creoles would become “naked, Indianized,” and “white savages.”⁴² Rejection of both cultures and the establishment of a third was his aim and the aim of many of his creole contemporaries.

⁴⁰ Ibid., 69.

⁴¹ Ibid., 72.

⁴² Ibid., 72-74.

CHAPTER II

“TRABAJOS DE LA GUERRA Y TRABAJOS DEL HAMBRE.” THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE FRONTIER IN 16TH-CENTURY CHILE

“All this was done so that messengers could be sent to His Majesty who would bring news of me and of this land, and to Peru so that more help would be sent to enter and populate it (Chile); because without gold, it has been impossible to bring (settlers), and even with them there has been no shortage of work here.”⁴³

The Spanish founded Santiago de Chile in 1541, a full twenty years after Hernán Cortés conquered the Aztec Empire. Most of Chile’s conquerors had taken part in the dismantling of the grand Inca Empire in Peru. Based on this background, Chile was a bit of a disappointment to its first Spanish residents. Chile had a significant indigenous population, but there was no empire, and little gold.⁴⁴ Much of its territory was covered by dense forest or dry desert and a frigid and unknown ocean bordered all of it. This was compounded by the fact that the Aconcagua chief and former Spanish prisoner Michimalongo led an attack on Santiago only a few months after its founding and left the settlement a smoldering ruin.⁴⁵ Chile’s first Spaniards would not have an easy time making the new colony as attractive as New Spain or Peru to the crown and future settlers. However, its Spanish conquerors, led by Pedro de Valdivia decided to cast their lot with the new colony.

⁴³ Pedro de Valdivia, Letter to Emperador Carlos V, Concepción, 15 October 1550, <<http://www.cervantesvirtual.com/servlet/SirveObras/>>. My translation. All translations are mine unless otherwise noted.

⁴⁴ Recent estimates put pre-Columbian population of Chile at one million, with 500,000 living to the south of the Bío-Bío river. José Bengoa, *Historia del pueblo Mapuche* (Santiago: Ediciones Sur, 1985), 15

⁴⁵ H.R.S. Pocock, *The Conquest of Chile* (New York: Sten and Day, 1967), 94.

Things quickly became even more difficult for the men who had given up healthy rewards in Peru for the unknown territory to the south. When the Spanish push southward ran into indigenous resistance and disappointing mineral yields, Valdivia and his successors knew that they would have to adapt their tactics to maintain the interest of both the crown and the colonists in this far-flung territory. By 1560, residents of Chile's south had turned the stalled conquest from a weakness to a trump card to play against more productive colonies in Peru, New Spain and the Caribbean. On the ground, the frontier where the conquest stalled became a shared means of subsistence between Chile's colonists and indigenous inhabitants. In histories and official correspondence the precarious frontier kept Chile present in the minds of an insecure crown and scrambling viceroys. This frontier life would define Chile's place in the Spanish Empire, in the Viceroyalty of Peru and in the minds of its own residents for more than a century.

The success of Spanish conquerors in the north of Chile gave Valdivia no indication that his enterprise would soon experience major setbacks. With the help of Prince Paullu, the Inca Manco Capac's brother, Diego de Almagro led the first Spanish exploration of Chile from Peru in 1535 and conquered the Andean provinces known to the Inca as Purumauca, Antalli, Pincu, Cauqui and Arauco.⁴⁶ The Spanish also borrowed strategies from the Inca to quickly subdue the Atacama, Diaguita, Huarpe and Picunche Indians.⁴⁷ (See figure 4) However, Almagro soon fell out of favor in the former Inca districts by bringing violence and forced labor in the newly

⁴⁶ Inca Garcilaso de la Vega, *Historia general del Peru: Segunda parte de los Comentarios Reales, Tomo I* (Lima: Editorial Universo S.A, 1970), 175.

⁴⁷ Villalobos, "Tres siglos de vida fronteriza," 24. Horacio Zapater, *La búsqueda de la paz en la Guerra de Arauco: Padre Luis de Valdivia* (Santiago: Editorial Andrés Bello, 1992), 73.

discovered territory. Almagro responded to the murder of three of his men by “arbitrarily (putting) to death several leading inhabitants of the district of Coquimbo” and enslaving others.⁴⁸

At the eastern entrance to the Aconcagua valley, which would become the gateway to Chile’s capital, Almagro decided to turn back to Peru but not before hearing from his scouting expeditions. One of these expeditions reached, and named the port of Valparaiso, while another led by Gómez de Alvarado went southward.⁴⁹ De Alvarado reported that the further he traveled, the worse the terrain became. Chile was increasingly cold, barren, and full of large and muddy rivers. De Alvarado’s pessimism carried over into his description of the region’s indigenous inhabitants. He said of one group, (probably the Huarpes) that they dressed in nothing but pelts and ate only roots. Unwittingly building a case for their enslavement, he also likened them to the Arab nomads of the Moorish occupation of Iberia.⁵⁰

Alvarado’s opinion of Chile’s indigenous inhabitants was undoubtedly worsened when his group met armed resistance as they moved further south in 1536. The Spanish fought off an attack at the Maule River and were engaged in the “skirmish” of Reinoguelén at the junction of the Ñuble and Itata rivers. This battle represented the first Spanish contact with the indigenous group that would come to be known as the *Araucanos* or “Araucanians.”⁵¹ The events at Reinoguelén resulted in the deaths of two Spaniards and the capture of scores of Araucanians.⁵²

⁴⁸ Eugene Korth, *Spanish Policy in Colonial Chile: The Search for Social Justice, 1535-1700* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1968), 23.

⁴⁹ Pocock, *The Conquest of Chile*, 31.

⁵⁰ Fernández de Oviedo y Valdés, *Historia General y Natural de las Indias*, 143. This collective and quite negative view of nomads persists to some extent today, and would have an important presence in the Spanish accounts of groups like the Huarpe and Pehuenche who lived in the southern Andes.

⁵¹ “Arauco” is derived from “ragco,” meaning “muddy water,” in Mapudungun (the language of the




Figure 3. Almagro's route⁵³

Araucanians) and "Auca," from the Quechua term "purun aukas," meaning "enemy, rebel or wild." Guevara, *Historia de la civilización de Araucanía, Tomo I*, 9-10. Carlos Aldunate del Solar, *Cultura Mapuche* (Santiago: Editorial Gabriela Mistral, 1978), 13. Ragco became the region of "Arauco" where Pedro de Valdivia established a fort in 1553 near the Carampangue River. (The Carampangue River feeds into the "Bahía de Arauco" or Bay of Arauco.)

⁵² The Araucanians would soon be well known across the Spanish Empire, but Gómez de Alvarado left Chile still thirsting for more adventure and lamenting, "there was only one Peru." Pocock, *The Conquest of Chile*, 33.

⁵³ Silva Galdames, *Atlas de Historia de Chile*, 33.

“The Araucanía” and Araucanians

Less than a decade after the founding of Santiago, Pedro de Valdivia and his lieutenants continued south where near the Bío-Bío River they found a region that was more heavily populated but less politically organized than the Almagro-conquered north. The high population density in the south was made possible by an abundant food supply which included fish, guanacos, pine nuts (in mountainous areas) seals, corn, beans and *cochayuyo*, an ocean plant.⁵⁴ Chroniclers encountered Indians who feasted on shellfish, calling them savages and *comilones* (gluttons) because they ate without restraint. Accustomed to eating pickled cod, the Spanish had apparently forgotten the flavor of fresh shellfish and the fact that it had to be eaten immediately after it was caught.⁵⁵

The Spanish also began to understand that the region’s marked geographical features had produced a diverse array of ethnic and linguistic groups. Although they were in constant contact with one another, mountain peoples such as the Pehuenche, Chiquillán, and Puelche were racially, culturally and linguistically distinct from both the neighboring Araucanians of the plains and the Patagonians to the south.⁵⁶

⁵⁴ Bengoa, *Historia del pueblo Mapuche*, 15.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 25.

⁵⁶ Salvador Canals Frau, *Las poblaciones indígenas de la Argentina: Su origen - su pasado - su presente* (Buenos Aires: Editorial Sudamericana, 1953), 357. Raul Molina, *Territorio y Comunidades Pehuenches del Alto Bío-Bío* (Santiago, Chile: Corporación Nacional de Desarrollo Indígena, 1996), 11. The plains peoples include: the Araucanians, the Huilliche, and the Picunche. *Territorio y Comunidades Pehuenches del Alto Bío-Bío*, 11.




Figure 4. “Approximate Distribution of Chile’s 16th-Century Indigenous Population”⁵⁷

Despite their ethnic differences, the geographical propinquity and mobility of these groups would have made it difficult for the casual observer to tell them apart. The Araucanía is no more than half the size of California making it very possible for the Spanish to encounter members of various groups in the same day. Most Indians in Chile’s south were divided into small, kin-based settlements, scattered seemingly

⁵⁷ Silva Galdames, *Atlas de Historia de Chile*, 31.

haphazardly about the region's green hills, making it difficult for the Spanish to define them politically or geographically.⁵⁸ The indigenous people of Chile's south also had a well-developed trade network, meaning that mobility and inter-group contact were well established in pre-Colombian times. Contact and mobility were further increased almost immediately by the arrival of Spanish horses, making the task of identifying, let alone controlling these groups a difficult one.⁵⁹

While the Araucanians were not the only denizens of the Araucanía, they were the region's most populous and most well known group. The abundance of food and relative lack of precious stones and metals meant that competition for resources was scarce and led to the existence of a fairly egalitarian Araucanian society. Also, the large-scale, empire-supporting farming that existed in the north was not necessary and would have been difficult to maintain in the Araucanía. The population of the plains was too dense to support large tracts of land dedicated to agriculture, and the Araucanians practiced "slash and burn" (*tala y roce*) farming which required large plots to lie fallow for significant periods. In slash and burn farming a mixture of small plots is required, with one always in the production stage, providing enough food to maintain an individual family unit. Slash and burn economies cannot support the concentrated populations that sedentary agricultural can, but conceivably could be incorporated into a larger community with a diversified commerce or transit

⁵⁸ Dillehay, *Araucania: Presente y Pasado*.

⁵⁹ The conquistadors would come to regret using Araucanians to care for their horses; the Indians quickly overcame their fear of these strange beasts, and developed a ring-like stirrup that gave these barefoot riders better maneuverability than Spanish horsemen in their battles between the two groups. Louis de Armond, "Frontier Warfare in Colonial Chile" in Weber and Rausch, eds. *Where Cultures Meet*. Alonso González de Nájera, *Desengaño y reparo de la Guerra de Chile* (Santiago: Editorial Universitaria, 1970), 26-28.

economy. There was certainly inter-regional trade in pre-Colombian Chile, but never a large enough population to make it a primary means of survival.⁶⁰

Each Araucanian family generally maintained its own farmland, without a need for large group labor or town-like settlements. The need of each family for a large amount of land meant neighboring dwellings (*rukas*) were within sight, but never next to one another.⁶¹ The maintenance of space between individual *rukas* and *ruka* communities was reinforced by the belief that curses or poisoning would befall the families who kept their dwellings and fields too close together.⁶²

This settlement pattern had an important effect on Araucanian political hierarchy. The absence of a central village meant the absence of a central authority. A *lonko*, usually an elder or descendent of a previous leader served as the head of a familial unit, but his power was limited.⁶³ A *machi* or shaman was important in Araucanian ceremonies, but had little day-to-day influence. In times of war, a *toqui* or warrior chief was named to make strategic decisions, but in times of peace he had little power.⁶⁴ Although war often brought a *toqui* to power, it ultimately limited Araucanian hierarchy as conflicts over land made political organization more difficult.⁶⁵ Lineage-based clans came together and made decisions at bi or tri-annual meetings called *reguas* or *cahuines*. While some political discussion went on at these gatherings, their central feature was a reciprocity ceremony. More infrequent were

⁶⁰ *Araucania: Presente y Pasado*, 42-43

⁶¹ *Ibid.*

⁶² Dillehay, *Araucania: Presente y Pasado*, 206.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, 41.

⁶⁴ Carlos Aldunate del Solar, *Mapuche, Seeds of the Chilean Soul: An exhibit at the Port of History Museum at Penn's Landing, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, March 27-June 30, 1992*, trans. by Richard C. Baker, Peter W. Kendall (Santiago: Museo Chileno de Arte Precolombiano, 1992), 43.

⁶⁵ *Araucania: Presente y Pasado*, 44.

larger gatherings of several *cahuines*.⁶⁶ In these *levos*, clans traded, contracted marriage, performed religious ceremonies and made or organized wars.⁶⁷

The scattered settlement pattern kept the Araucanians out of the Inca Empire and would make their conquest by the Spanish equally difficult.⁶⁸ The Spanish had found that the centralization of power and of settlement in indigenous empires made them vulnerable to political collapse over questions of succession and to demographic collapse due to European diseases. In Peru for example, power was so concentrated in the Inca himself that the power struggle between Huascar and Atahualpa and Atahualpa's subsequent murder sent the empire crashing down. Empires were also usually surrounded by jealous and angry neighbors who the Spanish enlisted as their allies. In Mexico the Tlaxcalans were instrumental to the fall of the Aztecs. The lack of a central seat of power in Chile's south assured that regional indigenous rivalries (of which there were many) did not have larger implications.⁶⁹

Indios de Guerra

While Valdivia was able to found a handful of towns in the Araucanía, his progress was slowed by Araucanian resistance. By the 1550s much Spanish-Araucanian conflict was evolving into the "War of Arauco," a seemingly eternal

⁶⁶ A number of Spanish *cronistas* referred to *reguas* and *cahuines* as "juntas" or "reuniones" (meetings). The terms could refer to both the meeting itself or the place where it took place. For the Spanish the *cahuin* was more of a space but the Araucanians understood it as an action, or a ceremony. Zapater, *La Búsqueda de paz en la Guerra de Arauco*, 89-90.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*

⁶⁸ J.H. Elliot explains that "the very absence in other parts of mainland America of the conditions prevailing in the civilizations of the Andes and central Mexico" had much to do with the slowing of conquest in peripheral areas like the Yucatán and the Araucanía. J.H. Elliot, "The Spanish Conquest and Settlement of America," in *The Cambridge History of Latin America: Vol I*, ed. by Leslie Bethell (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 186-87.

⁶⁹ José Bengoa, *Historia del pueblo Mapuche*. (Santiago: Ediciones Sur, 1985), 24.

struggle between the two sides that lent itself to dramatic stories (factual and fictitious) of combat and adventure on the eve of the “Golden Age” of Spanish literature. Many of Valdivia’s contemporaries even admitted their admiration of Araucanian battlefield tactics, one commenting that they were so organized in combat that it was almost as if they had prepared against the Romans.⁷⁰ Accustomed to quick conquests, struggles against the Araucanians became an important conundrum for Spanish governors, writers and soldiers alike.

As members of Diego de Almagro’s expedition had reported, the Araucanians had developed a reputation as bellicose long before the Spanish had contact with them. The Inca called the Araucanians *purun aukas*, meaning “enemy, rebel or wild.”⁷¹ The Spanish were probably not surprised then when the Araucanians resisted Valdivia’s first attempts to push south of the Bío-Bío River. But neither were they worried initially. After all, there was no indication that the fate of the Araucanians would be any different from that of the Diaguitas, Atamaceños and Picunches who all unsuccessfully took up arms against the Spanish during the initial conquest. It soon became apparent however that the Araucanians had a number of circumstances in their favor that their northern neighbors did not. The longer the Spanish took to advance, the more the Araucanians pressed these advantages.⁷²

⁷⁰ Jerónimo de Vivar, *Crónica de los Reinos de Chile* (Madrid: Dastin, S.L., 2001), 250.

⁷¹ Carlos Aldunate del Solar, *Cultura Mapuche* (Santiago: Editoria Gabriela Mistral, 1978), 13. Although the Araucanians were not incorporated into the Inca Empire, the Chilean aborigines were not necessarily culturally dissimilar to those in Peru. See for example comparisons between Chavín-Huántar and Araucanian iconography and ceremonial space in Dillehay, *Araucania: Presente y Pasado*.

⁷² Villalobos, “Tres siglos de vida fronteriza,” 26-27. See my M.A. thesis, “People of the Pine: The Course of the War of Arauco and its Effects on Spanish views of the Pehuenche” (Vanderbilt University, 2001) for a discussion of the Araucanians and the noble savage myth. We should note that there were Diaguitas, Atamaceños, Picunches and Araucanians allied with the Spanish. Hundreds of Picunches served as auxiliaries in the earliest Spanish campaigns into the Araucanía and at least one

The fact that the Araucanians were mainly hunter-gatherers meant that unlike groups in the north, they were not dependent on crops from irrigated valleys vulnerable to Spanish takeover. The south's rainy climate and multiple river crossings often rendered Spanish arms useless, rotting their gunpowder and dampening their fuses. In the desert north there were never such problems with ammunition neither were there forests to hide in when the Spanish approached. Chile's south was full of forests.⁷³ For the first years of contact, the Araucanians even avoided the catastrophic plagues that had already begun to wipe out their northern neighbors.⁷⁴

Although Spanish disease would eventually weaken Araucanian war making capacity, the arrival of the horse gave them a window of opportunity before disease caused them to retreat. The first great Araucanian victory over the Spanish in 1553 was led by Lautaro, Pedro de Valdivia's former groom who understood the horse's strategic potential. Through theft and natural population increase the Araucanians soon had hundreds of their own horses. They quickly became superb riders and developed saddles made of small pieces of wood and wool cushions, which were lighter than those of the Spanish. This meant that Araucanian horses didn't tire as fast, and that the Araucanian cavalry could outrun the Spanish almost without fail.

significant Araucanian general was an ally of the Spanish. Despite these nuances, it wasn't until the turn of the 17th century that the Spanish started to divide the Araucanians into *indios rebeldes* or *indios de guerra* and pacified *indios amigos*. As we will see in future chapters, this was done more to legitimize the enslavement of *indios rebeldes* than it was to protect the allied *indios amigos*.

⁷³ Villalobos, "Tres siglos de vida fronteriza," 25-26.

⁷⁴ It was actually an Araucanian assault northward into Spanish territory in the 1550s that led to a typhoid plague among the aborigines. The typhoid epidemic of the 1560s killed 100,000 people, but most of the deaths occurred to the north of the Bío-Bío. Bengoa, *Historia del pueblo Mapuche*, 30. It is hard to say whether the scattered settlement pattern of the south prevented disease from spreading, or prevented accurate data about its devastation to be collected. In any event, the Araucanians were affected much less than the Pichunche.

The Araucanian horse's burden was also lighter because the riders used little metal in their weapons or riding implements.⁷⁵ Ironically, with Spanish *estancias* and missions moving further into the Araucanía to control the Indians, indigenous communities were becoming more mobile and more evasive on horseback.

The war with the Spanish not only created a warrior class and changed the organization of Araucanian society. More warriors were available with the appearance of a type of "Indian mercenary" who worked for a pre-arranged payment.⁷⁶ Warriors began to ascend through the ranks of Araucanian society, something unseen in peacetime when social status was largely hereditary. An *ulmen* could become a *toqui* through his war deeds. After the arrival of the Spanish a *toqui* could become a *gentoqui*, or "possessor of the stone hatchet, a symbol of his function."⁷⁷ *Toqui* also referred to a stone hatchet. Thus, through the ritual murder of a Spaniard with *toqui*, a *gentoqui* retained a constant reminder of the source of his power and his title. According to Guillaume Boccara, the hatchet could be "considered as an ancestor or as a part of a petrified mythical ancestor."⁷⁸ (The Inca used similar sacred objects (*huacas*) to expand their power.) The Araucanians revered their ancestors, and the fact that they were present in ritual murder, integrated violent conflict even more into Araucanian society. The hatchet was a tremendously

⁷⁵ Louis de Armond, "Frontier Warfare in Colonial Chile" in David J. Weber and Jane M. Rausch, eds. *Where Cultures Meet. Frontiers in Latin American History* (2nd ed.; Wilmington, DE: Jaguar Books, 1994); Alonso González de Nájera, *Desengaño y reparo de la Guerra de Chile* (Santiago: Editorial Universitaria, 1970), 26-28.

⁷⁶ Robert Charles Padden, "Cultural Adaptation and Militant Autonomy among the Araucanians of Chile" in *The Indian in Latin American History: Resistance, Resilience and Acculturation*, John E. Kicza, ed. (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources, Inc., 1993), 78.

⁷⁷ Boccara, "Etnogénesis Mapuche," 435.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, 435.

powerful symbol of leadership that helped re-organize Araucanian society around these new war chiefs.

For many indigenous cultures, acculturation meant a break with the past. The Araucanians however, "...linked the old and the new in a movement one may describe as a dialectic, in which the past was both preserved and restructured." In fact, "...an entire society was restructured and a new equilibrium created, although this was accompanied by constant war against the Spanish."⁷⁹ Resistance to the Spanish became an integral part of this changing Araucanian culture. Horses gained a religious significance for their value in combat. The scattered tribal existence was abandoned in order to be able to muster more quickly.⁸⁰ The Araucanians also began to grow wheat instead of corn, for both practical and symbolic reasons. It was part of the cultural incorporation process, and could be harvested before Spanish summer raids.⁸¹ It has also been suggested that they turned to cannibalism as a rejection of Christianity.⁸² The Araucanian use of guns and tactical adaptation was similar to that of the plains Indians in the United States, who like the Araucanians were not conquered until the nineteenth century.⁸³ Youths learned war strategy through

⁷⁹ Wachtel, *The Vision of the Vanquished*, 197-199.

⁸⁰ The Maya of the Yucatán had a similar reaction to Spanish invasion. The scattered existence of Maya populations made conquest slow going for the Spanish, but they did form larger alliances when it was to their advantage, namely in the Maya Revolt of 1546 when the Spanish were driven out of Mérida by thousands of Maya gathered from all over the peninsula. The similarities to the Chilean conquest did not end there. The Spanish were forced to re-conquer "allied" groups of Maya and Araucanians when the indigenous groups broke their oaths of allegiance. The Maya region's lack of natural resources also made it difficult to sustain both Spanish campaigns and settlements there, a well-known problem to Chile's relatively sparse inhabitants. Inga Clendinnen, *Ambivalent Conquests: Maya and Spaniard in Yucatán, 1517-1570* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 25, 31, 42.

⁸¹ Wachtel, *The Vision of the Vanquished*, 196.

⁸² Tapson, "Frontier Warfare in Colonial Chile," 119.

⁸³ John H Parry and Robert G. Keith, eds. *New Iberian World: A Documentary History of the Discovery and Settlement of Latin America to the Early 17th century* (New York: Times Books, 1984), Vol. 5, 372. *New Iberian World*, 372.

games.⁸⁴ A restructuring in almost all levels of society is uncommon among indigenous societies in the Spanish sphere of influence, and enabled the Araucanians to hold off the Spanish.⁸⁵

The relatively dense population of the Araucanía had led to some conflict among indigenous groups before the Spanish arrived.⁸⁶ The lack of a formal justice system meant that conflicts were often solved by the same “vendettas” that were later used against the Spanish. However, within Araucanian culture a system of exogamy and “double parentage” or “double descent” (*dobles filiación*) “assured the persistence of peace” by containing disputes within families.⁸⁷

The Araucanians also managed to keep their alliances with other indigenous groups from being counter-productive, an achievement aided by a common antipathy for the Spanish. Initially, the Pehuenche entered into multiple and fleeting alliances with Hispanic-Creole settlers, but the strain of war with the Spanish ultimately brought the Araucanians and Pehuenche closer.⁸⁸ Later, the Spanish would seek to make peace with the Araucanians through “flattery,” but the tactic would backfire. Instead of bettering the Spanish relationship with the Araucanians, these Spanish gifts entered the Pehuenche-Araucanian trade cycle and strengthened economic ties between the two indigenous groups when a spirit of cooperation was not enough.⁸⁹

Under the pressure of Spanish arms, indigenous groups responded by expanding an efficient and rather covert system for constructing military alliances. Many

⁸⁴ Ibid., 436.

⁸⁵ Wachtel, *The Vision of the Vanquished*, 199.

⁸⁶ Villalobos, “Tres siglos de vida fronteriza,” 24.

⁸⁷ Osvaldo Silva Galdames, “Guerra y trueque como factores de cambio en la estructura social,” in *Economía y comercio en América Hispana*, Guillermo Bravo Acevedo, ed. (Santiago: Departamento de Ciencias Históricas, Facultad de Filosofía y Humanidades, Universidad de Chile, 1990), 84.

⁸⁸ Orellana, *Historia y antropología de la Isla de la Laja*, 36.

⁸⁹ Silva Galdames, “Guerra y trueque,” 93.

Spanish colonists also mentioned the passing of an arrow among Araucanian and other allied groups as a call to arms, a challenge that “(the Araucanians) receive without wasting time or pondering reasons against it, move to make cruel war against their land’s enemies.”⁹⁰ Through this challenge the news that war was on was quickly spread to thousands of Araucanians.

Undoubtedly Pedro de Valdivia did not entirely appreciate the depth of these changes in Araucanian society, but he did recognize that adjustments would have to be made on his side of the Bío-Bío if the Spanish were to survive growing resistance. The fact that Valdivia had willingly accepted the challenge that Chile presented perhaps made him ideally suited to respond to it. Valdivia had served the crown in Flanders and Italy, and turned down offers of spoils from the victory against the Inca to seek further conquests in Chile.⁹¹ Valdivia’s contemporaries and modern historians alike were at a loss to understand why Valdivia would do so, but a closer look will reveal that this decision made sense on multiple levels. First of all, Valdivia and the members of his expedition instantly became royalty in the “Kingdom of Chile.”⁹² Valdivia rewarded almost all of the members of his 150-man expedition with *encomiendas* and began attempts to erase Chile’s reputation as a poor and desolate land.⁹³ J.H. Elliot considers these rewards “disappointing” and indeed they were according to Peruvian antecedents.⁹⁴ However, as was common in other

⁹⁰ Diego Arias de Saavedra, *Purén Indomito* (Leipzig: A. Franck, 1862), 211.

⁹¹ Mario Ferreccio Podesta, “Prologo” in *Cartas de Relación de la Conquista de Chile* (Santiago: Editorial Universitaria, 1970), 12.

⁹² The colony was referred to as *El Reino de Chile* or “The Kingdom of Chile” almost universally by the 17th century.

⁹³ See Tomás Thayer Ojeda and Carlos Larraín de Castro, *Valdivia y sus compañeros* (Santiago: 1950), for brief biographies of the 150.

⁹⁴ J.H. Elliot, “The Spanish Conquest and Settlement of America,” 186.

Spanish colonies, these *encomenderos* would be the source of Chile's elite for centuries to come.

Secondly, as a conqueror, Valdivia needed a challenge.⁹⁵ After participating in such dramatic European campaigns as the Battle of Pavia, Valdivia had missed out on the initial conquest of Peru and was rewarded more for his loyalty in the subsequent civil war than his skill as a soldier. Therefore, Valdivia gave up his *encomienda* and his silver mine in Peru in exchange for the title of Lieutenant Governor in the stalled conquest of Chile. With 1,000 Indian "auxiliaries," 150 Spanish soldiers and three Christian missionaries in tow, Valdivia arrived in Chile's central valley in 1541.⁹⁶ Valdivia thus became the first Spanish governor of Chile to seek glory in a desolate land against the "noble savage" Araucanians. In fact, Valdivia himself would have a hand in crafting both the vision of Chile and of its indigenous inhabitants that would become dominant throughout the colonial period and beyond.

Valdivia was also very aware of the crown's economic needs. The fact that the conqueror had rejected his Peruvian *encomienda* did not prevent him from rewarding the members of his Chilean expedition with indigenous labor and access to metals. Valdivia forced the Aconcagua chief Michimalongo to provide 1,200 Indians to work

⁹⁵ Ernesto "Che" Guevara was just one of many who have tried to explain what made conquerors like Valdivia tick. Guevara posited that Valdivia "belonged to that special class of men...in whom a craving for limitless power is so extreme that any suffering to achieve it seems natural." He added that his decision to leave Peru "symbolize(d) man's indefatigable thirst to take control of a place where he can exercise total authority. That phrase, attributed to Caesar, proclaiming he would rather be first-in-command in some humble Alpine village than second-in-command in Rome, is repeated less pompously, but no less effectively, in the epic campaign that is the conquest of Chile." Ernesto "Che" Guevara, *The Motorcycle Diaries: Notes on a Latin American Journey*, trans. and ed. Alexandra Keeble (New York: Ocean Press, 2003), 85.

⁹⁶ *Icarito*. "Pedro de Valdivia" [online encyclopedia]; available from http://www.icarito.cl/medio/articulo/0,0,38035857_172985985_182699539_1,00.html. Thayer Ojeda, *Formación de la sociedad chilena*, 320.

the new colony's first significant placer mine at Marga-Marga.⁹⁷ Once released from Spanish custody however, Michimalongo continued to torment the Spanish, leading the aforementioned 1541 assault of Santiago.⁹⁸ This event set in motion a long pattern in Chile of Indian rebellion against forced labor.

The extraction of enormous mineral wealth on the backs of the indigenous was of course not unique to Chile and was quickly becoming a trend across the Americas, aided by loopholes in measures designed to protect aborigines. Long before they set foot in Chile, or in the Americas for that matter, the Spanish had developed guidelines for the categorization and treatment of indigenous peoples. These guidelines began to be developed centuries before in the cross-cultural encounter that was the Crusades. To the Spanish, captive Muslims had attacked Christendom and *ipso facto* Christianity itself, and were to be treated as slaves in the context of this "just war." But how should the Iberians treat the West Africans encountered by the Portuguese in the 13th century who had no exposure to Christianity? This conundrum was addressed by the writings of Cardinal Henry of Susa (Hostiensis). Hostiensis postulated "when Christ came into the world, temporal as well as spiritual lordship over all its peoples passed immediately to Him." According to his argument, those that did not accept Christianity were "recalcitrant" persons against whom a just war could be waged.⁹⁹

⁹⁷ Pocock, *The Conquest of Chile*, 84-85.

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, 94.

⁹⁹ McAlister, *Spain and Portugal in the New World*, 52. Once it was rationalized, "just war" saw a rather seamless transition to the Americas largely because of its long tradition in Europe. There are several examples of how concepts, strategies and traditions were transferred piecemeal from the Crusades to the Conquest. In an example relevant to our South American case, the Spanish referred to the Jurie Indians of Jujuy as "alárabes" (or "A la Arabe") believing that the members of this semi-nomadic Andean group resembled Arabs. Gonzalo Fernández de Oviedo y Valdés, *Historia General*

Queen Isabella and her successors chose a more forgiving tone when it came to the inhabitants the Americas. She argued that the indigenous inhabitants of the Americas had “become vassals of the Crown and as such were free,” and even had Columbus free the Indians he brought back to Spain with him. However, there were two important exceptions to this freedom. Indians could be legally enslaved in a “just war” where they had attacked or rejected Spanish authority and could remain slaves if they were already in the service of other Indians.¹⁰⁰

Those Indians who were not immediately enslaved did not fare much better. These “pagans” were funneled into the *repartimiento* system where they were distributed to Spanish conquerors to be cared for, put to work and instructed in the Christian faith.¹⁰¹ In many areas the *repartimiento* and *encomienda* co-existed and in others the latter replaced the former. What links them in all areas however is the fact that neither ever became a means of protecting Indians. Instead, *encomenderos* often abused the Indians under their care. Many denounced the mistreatment, but there was little action taken in the Americas to stop it.¹⁰²

The crown and the church did at least acknowledge the problem of forced labor. The bull *Sublimus Deus* was issued in 1537 as a response to reports of Spanish cruelty in the Americas, but it had little immediate effect in Chile or anywhere else in the Indies. The bull would however influence future debate by declaring that the Indians were “true men” and were not to be enslaved.¹⁰³

y Natural de las Indias, Biblioteca de Autores Españoles, Vol. 121 (Madrid: Ediciones Atlas, 1959), 133.

¹⁰⁰ McAlister, *Spain and Portugal in the New World*, 155-56.

¹⁰¹ McAlister defines *repartimiento* as an “allotment” of Indians. *Ibid.*, 81.

¹⁰² *Ibid.*, 19.

¹⁰³ Pope Paul III, *Sublimis Deus*, June, 1537, Trans. by Stafford Poole in *ibid.*, xxvii-xxviii.

Seeing that their contemporaries in the Caribbean and New Spain had essentially been given *carte blanche* to abuse the region's Indians, the Spanish conquerors of Peru employed great cruelty in their destruction of the Inca Empire. They demonstrated that they too saw the Indians as "inferior and impure heretics."¹⁰⁴ The Spanish did not wantonly destroy everything Inca however, recognizing that they could usurp some of the fallen empire's administrative techniques. In Peru, the Spanish pattern of employing conquered Indians in manual labor projects worked relatively seamlessly, as *encomenderos* became the new beneficiaries of the Inca *mita* system of labor obligations, organized into local *ayllus* (family groups).¹⁰⁵

It soon became apparent that *encomenderos* were doing a miserable job fulfilling their obligation to protect and instruct the Indians entrusted to their care, unable even to keep them alive. As thousands of Indians in Peru began to succumb to over-work and disease, the *encomiendas* could no longer be evenly distributed along *ayllu* lines. The *encomenderos* were forced to violate a number of *encomienda* regulations in order to keep up with labor demands, principally among them the prohibition on moving Indians from one place to another in their attempt to create larger concentrations of mineworkers.¹⁰⁶ This trend worried the crown and prompted additional yet equally unsuccessful attempts to control the *encomienda* institution. In the meantime, it was clear that even with the shell of a tribute collecting empire in place the Spanish could not or would not adhere to *encomienda* guidelines. In the imperfect situation that was the conquest of far-flung Chile, *encomenderos* had even freer reign and regulations were blatantly ignored.

¹⁰⁴ Christine Hunefeldt, *A Brief History of Peru* (New York: Facts on File, 2004), 42.

¹⁰⁵ J.H. Elliot, "The Spanish Conquest and Settlement of America," 183.

¹⁰⁶ Korth, *Spanish Policy*, 27.

The crown had anticipated an attempt by *encomenderos* to resist all control to their authority “transform themselves into a European-style hereditary nobility.”¹⁰⁷ In an attempt to avoid class divisions among the conquistadors, the crown made nobles out of very few of them. The crown also took steps to keep *encomiendas* non-hereditary, reinforcing the idea of service and reward. He who most served the crown would be rewarded, in this case with an *encomienda*.¹⁰⁸ Competition for *encomiendas* curbed feudalism, but still hurt crown authority in that it led to political infighting and in some cases civil war.

Responding to *Sublimus Deus* and further reports of Spanish abuses in the Indies, Charles V issued the “New Laws” in 1542, which reinforced the royal ban on indigenous slavery¹⁰⁹ and dictated that *encomiendas* would revert to the crown upon the death of their holder.¹¹⁰ While the New Laws did slow enslavement of Indians to some degree, the latter provision infuriated *encomenderos*.¹¹¹ Peru’s *encomenderos* openly defied the crown when the New Laws arrived in the Americas. The Pizarro brothers and their contemporaries rebelled against and eventually killed Peru’s first

¹⁰⁷ Elliot, “The Spanish Conquest,” 194.

¹⁰⁸ Jara, *Guerra y sociedad*, 43-47

¹⁰⁹ Henry Stevens, ed. *The New Laws of the Indies* (London: The Chiswick Press, 1893).

¹¹⁰ Elliot, “The Spanish Conquest,” 194.

¹¹¹ Indigenous slavery persisted even into the 18th century in a handful of regions, especially in frontier areas like the south of Chile where African slaves were hard to come by and where imperial authority was weak. One of the causes of the Acaxee rebellion of 1601 in Nueva Vizcaya was Acaxee frustration over Spanish slave-taking raids. Susan M. Deeds, “Indigenous Rebellions on the Northern Mexican Mission Frontier: From First-Generation to Later Colonial Responses,” in *Contested Ground*, 36-37. In the early years of the 18th century, the Choctaws and Chicksaws sought an alliance with the French at Mobile to strengthen their defenses against British slave dealers from Carolina and the new Spanish presence at Pensacola. Daniel Usner, *Indians, Settlers, and Slaves in a Frontier Exchange Economy: The Lower Mississippi Valley before 1783* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1992), 17-19. While the French may have protected the Choctaw, they were soon involved in the indigenous slave trade, buying Apache women and children from the Pawnee. Brooks, *Captives and Cousins*, 61. Even as late as the 1780s, the Spanish sought to end their “just war” against the Apaches by shipping captives as slaves to Havana. Richard Slatta, “Spanish Colonial Military Strategy and Ideology,” in *Contested Ground*, 90-91.

Viceroy Blasco Núñez Vela whose unenviable task was trying to rein in the siblings' power.¹¹²

The revolt in Peru kept the crown from paying much attention to some of the same *encomendero* defiance in Chile. As in the rest of the Americas, demand for indigenous labor in Chile stemmed from the Spanish distaste for manual labor, the small Spanish population, a shortage of African slaves, and a lack of beasts of burden.¹¹³ It was not impossible to get African slaves in Chile but there was much higher demand and more capital to purchase them in the ports of Lima and later Buenos Aires.¹¹⁴ Interruptions in the trans-Atlantic trade and local plagues kept demand up in Buenos Aires while many of the slaves that made it across the Andes into Chile often ended up in Lima.¹¹⁵ At one point, the Governor of Chile even declared that anyone taking an African slave from Chile to Lima would be fined 500 pesos.¹¹⁶

¹¹² Hunefeldt, *A Brief History of Peru*, 49.

¹¹³ Diego Barros Arana estimated that Chile had no more than 500 Spanish residents in 1550. Tracing population numbers for the rest of the century becomes a difficult task with miscegenation and the abandonment of Spanish settlements. Diego Barros Arana, *Historia general de Chile: Tomo I* (Santiago: Editorial Universitaria, 1999), 263. The next significant arrival of Europeans did not come until 1605 when 1,000 reinforcements arrived for the Army of Arauco. (See chapter three.) Archivo General de Indias, (Hereafter "A.G.I.") Chile, 4. Consultas de la Junta de Guerra. 1602-1699. Letter from *junta*, Madrid, 4 October, 1606.

¹¹⁴ Africans were instrumental in the armies of conquest in Peru, and their importation to this colony had begun even before the Spanish discovered Chile. Juan Valiente, a well-known figure in early colonial Chile, was a free black member of the expeditions of both Diego de Almagro, the "discoverer of Chile" and Pedro de Valdivia, Chile's "conqueror." Free blacks, slaves and mulattos even had important roles in the War of Arauco. Rolando Mellafe, *La introducción de la esclavitud negra en Chile, tráfico y rutas* (2d ed.: Santiago: Editorial Universitaria, 1984), 45-49.

¹¹⁵ Africans trickled into Chile at a steady rate, meaning by the 1630s there were a number of African confraternities that participated in Santiago processions. Alonso de Ovalle, *Historica relacion del Reino de Chile, Escritores Coloniales de Chile* (4th ed.: Santiago: Editorial Universitaria, 1974), 85-86. Della M. Flusche and Eugene H. Korth, *Forgotten Females: Women of African and Indian Descent in Colonial Chile, 1535-1800* (Detroit: Blaine Ethridge Books, 1983), 6.

¹¹⁶ Liliana Crespi, "Comercio negrero en el Río de la Plata durante el siglo XVII. Comerciantes y rutas de distribución hacia las provincias internas, Chile y Perú." Presented at "Reunión: La ruta del esclavo en hispanoamerica, San José, Costa Rica, 24-26 febrero, 1999.

The crown did try and reduce a need for African slaves by protecting Chile's indigenous population, stipulating that aborigines were not to be forced to work in placer mines. If Chile's Indians decided voluntarily to work in the mines the crown mandated that they were to be paid a percentage of the gold they extracted. However, little was or could be done from Spain to see that this royal order was enforced. In fact, the same order began with a statement on how important gold mining was to the royal treasury and a promise of royal help in aiding the extraction of the metal.¹¹⁷ Therefore comes as no surprise that Chilean *encomenderos* treated Indians as de facto slaves, helping them make a fortune in placer mining.¹¹⁸ Since this type of mining involved being partially immersed in water most of the day even in the winter months, it was not long before local workers began succumbing to these terrible conditions.¹¹⁹ A seventeenth century Augustinian and Indian advocate claimed there had been as many as 300,000 Indians between La Imperial and Valdivia providing gold to the crown, most of whom disappeared due to "plague, continued wars and calamities."¹²⁰ To replace these workers, *encomenderos* repeated the actions of their contemporaries in Peru and began to openly violate prohibitions against moving *encomienda* Indians, forcing them hundreds of miles from their homes to work on

¹¹⁷ Real cédula comunicada al adelantado don Jerónimo Alderete, gobernador de Chile, sober beneficiar las minas de aquella provincia, 4 September, 1555, in *Colección de documentos inéditos para la historia de Chile desde el viaje de Magallanes hasta la Batalla de Maipo: 1518-1818: Tomo XXVIII*, ed. J.T. Medina (Santiago: Imprenta Elzeviriana, 1901), 24.

¹¹⁸ Jara, *Guerra y sociedad*, 28-29.

¹¹⁹ Alvaro Jara, "Importación de trabajadores indígenas en el siglo XVII," *Revista Chilena de Historia y Geografía*, 124 (1956): 179.

¹²⁰ Miguel de Aguirre, *Población de Valdivia: Motivos y medios para aquella fundación, defensas del Reino del Perú para resistir las invasiones enemigas en mar y tierra, paces pedidas por los indios rebeldes de Chile, acetadas y capituladas por el gobernador; y estado que tienen hasta nueve de Abril del año de 1647*, in *Colección de historiadores de Chile y documentos relativos a la historia nacional: tomo xlv, los Holandeses en Chile*, ed. Sociedad Chilena de Historia y Geografía (Santiago: Imprenta Universitaria, 1923), 75.

their estancias and in their mines.¹²¹ In one case, *encomienda* Indians from the trans-Andean province of Cuyo would make a seasonal trek over the hundreds of kilometers between Santiago and La Serena.¹²²

Much of this permissiveness can be explained by the actions of Pedro de Valdivia. Circumstances dictated that Valdivia keep his *encomenderos* on the longest of leashes. For example to avoid rebellion after the viceroy failed to re-supply Chile for years, Valdivia freed all the members of his expedition of their debts, dramatically tearing up the sheets upon which the debts were recorded.¹²³ For a time, Valdivia even left Chile, traveling to Peru in 1548 to join the side of the Viceroy against rebellious *encomenderos*.¹²⁴ Upon his return to Chile, Valdivia continued to design his legacy and Chile's around the strength of *encomenderos* and access to indigenous labor. Valdivia saw enough gold extracted to keep the interest of royal authorities and attract reinforcements, but knew that enough had not been discovered (nor would it be) to compete with Peruvian precious metals.

Although Valdivia was able carve out a uniquely Chilean legacy, no one in the Spanish Americas of the 16th century could escape the long shadow of Potosí's silver mountain and it did not take long for the great irony that was Chile's economic relationship with Peru to present itself. Chile owed its existence to Peru's silver mines, but the colony constantly was pitted against the viceregal capital for resources and control of its future. First of all, Potosí's "mountain of silver" consumed "mules

¹²¹ Ibid., 28-31. The removal of Indians from their homes, with or without their consent had been banned by the Ordinances of Toledo in 1528 and reinforced in 1541. Ibid., 23, 27.

¹²² The historian Mario Góngora claims that this practice helped create a class of itinerant workers in Chile known as the *roto* or *huaso* that had a major presence in the republican period and that even exists in some form to this day. Mario Góngora, "Vagabundaje y Sociedad Fronteriza en Chile (Siglos XVII a XIX)" *Cuadernos del Centro de Estudios Socioeconómicos* 2 (1966), 5.

¹²³ Vivar, *Crónica de los Reinos de Chile*, 160.

¹²⁴ Pocock, *The Conquest of Chile*, 145.

from Córdoba, coca from Cuzco” and would soon attract “Indian slaves from Southern Chile.”¹²⁵ While Peru provided a potential market for Chilean tallow (for candle making), and to a lesser extent wine, corn and wheat,¹²⁶ it also competed with Chile for laborers and had its own supply of wheat that drove Chilean prices down.¹²⁷

There were also security considerations in Chile’s relationship to Peru. Potosí silver was loaded onto ships at the Peruvian port of Arica, just north of Chile, making that port vulnerable to pirates. Even as the Araucanians presented more and more problems, the crown could not abandon Chile and ignore the need to protect its precious metal and the territory from which it was extracted.

With these developments in mind, Valdivia decided that his, and Chile’s gift to the crown would not be riches, but suffering and sacrifice. Valdivia could not follow the path of the Pizarros whose exploits brought much prestige to the crown, but eventually hubris caused them to rebel. Instead, Valdivia and his *encomenderos* would make the crown proud by beating their swords into plowshares and establishing an indelible settlement in Chile through their hard work. Valdivia began to laud the fertility of Chile’s soil and hoped this new *encomendero* class would use the huge tracts of land he had granted them to develop into productive ranchers and farmers. Valdivia saw the earth and the people as fertile and exploitable. His language reflected a need for settlement, and not the epic descriptions of military glory employed by most conquerors.

¹²⁵ Lewis Hanke, *The Imperial City of Potosí: An Unwritten Chapter in the History of Spanish America* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1956), 29.

¹²⁶ Barros Arana, *Historia general: Tomo I*, 131.

¹²⁷ Jara, “Importación de trabajadores indígenas,” 183. Demetrio Ramos, *Trigo Chileno, navieros del Callao y hacendados Limeños entre la crisis agrícola del siglo xvii y la comercial de la primera mitad del xviii* (Madrid: Instituto “Gonzalos Fernández de Oviedo,” 1967), 9.

“I saw to it that the *yanaconillas* and Indian servants that we brought to Peru were put to work in the mines, and they did help us with good disposition. We carted them food from the city twelve leagues away, sharing what we had for our own sustenance and that of our children; the food we had sown and harvested with our own hands and work.”¹²⁸

Valdivia was quick to realize that Chile was the end of his travels, (his wife was on her way to join him from Spain when he died)¹²⁹ and his success there depended on getting others to settle around him.¹³⁰ His letters as a result, painted “an extremely idealistic portrait of Chile.”¹³¹

Valdivia placed so much emphasis on attracting settlers because he and many members of his expedition felt that this propaganda was essential to their very survival. Geronimo de Vivar, one of Valdivia’s soldiers, wrote that after four years with no re-supply, the colonists’ clothing was in tatters and most had begun to wear beaver and sea lion pelts. Vivar added that no mass had been held for five months as the Spanish had run out of wine. The lack of re-supply also meant that “the main focus of (colonists) was planting and growing to be able to maintain and perpetuate this land for His Majesty,”¹³² which left little time for exploits on the battlefield. Therefore, the exploits that colonists in Chile would relate to the crown had little to do with glory, and everything to do with survival. Valdivia and Vivar expressed the value of their “labors of hunger” (*trabajos del hambre*) rather than the usual “labors of war” (*trabajos de la guerra*). *Trabajos de hambre* were carried out with much sacrifice and little glory. As such, sacrifice replaced glory as a means of gaining

¹²⁸ <<http://www.cervantesvirtual.com/servlet/SirveObras/>>

¹²⁹ Pocock, *The Conquest of Chile*, 45.

¹³⁰ Giorgio Antei, *La Invención del Reino de Chile: Gerónimo de Vivar y los Primeros Cronistas Chilenos* (Bogotá: Instituto Caro y Cuervo, 1989), 31-33.

¹³¹ *Ibid.*, 31.

¹³² Jerónimo de Vivar, *Crónica de los Reinos de Chile*, 159.

favor with and gifts from the crown.¹³³

While the Spanish did scramble to grow their own food, a lack of re-supply from the viceroy meant that their survival in Chile depended on economic and cultural exchange on the frontier that would permanently link the Spanish and Araucanians. The *indios de servicio* in the central valley had already demonstrated that without their help, the Spanish suffered “great calamities...” as they were devoid of “commerce with other kingdoms.” These calamities occurred after Michimalongo’s revolt inspired *indios de servicio* to literally run for the hills, where they would be out of the reach of *encomenderos*.¹³⁴ While resistance in the central valley was fleeting, more constant resistance near the Bío-Bío meant that the Spanish would have to be sustained by a mixture of *indios de servicio* and resources from Indians and areas that were not under their hegemony. This exchange of resources was not always cordial but brought the Spanish and Araucanians together nonetheless. For example, the fact that the Araucanians had taken dozens of Spanish captives meant that not only were the Spanish duty bound to try and rescue the captives, but that miscegenation on both sides of the Bío-Bío was creating a generation of mestizo children. These children would come to define the legacy of the frontier long after Lautaro and Valdivia were gone.¹³⁵

In addition to cultural developments, raids from both sides created a kind of frontier economic codependence. While the Spanish failed to subjugate the

¹³³ Lucía Invernizzi Santa Cruz, “‘Los trabajos de la guerra’ y ‘Los trabajos del hambre’: Dos ejes del discurso narrativo de la Conquista de Chile (Valdivia, Vivar, Góngora Marmolejo),” *Revista Chilena de Literatura* 36 (1990): 7-9.

¹³⁴ Pedro Mariño de Lobera, *Crónica del Reino de Chile* (Santiago: Editorial Universitaria, 1970), 26.

¹³⁵ As a means of demonstrating their commitment to the aforementioned rejection through incorporation, the Araucanians would occasionally return female Spanish captives “naked below the waist and pregnant.” Stephen E. Lewis, “Myth and the History of Chile’s Araucanians,” *Radical History Review*, 58 (Winter 1994), 119.

Araucanians as a whole, they did take a number of Indian captives who were to replace declining numbers of Picunche and Huarpe laborers.¹³⁶ On the other hand, the Araucanians would often look forward to Spanish summer raids when they could seize swords, armor and gunpowder. In desperate times, the Spanish were even known to trade gunpowder to the Indians for food.¹³⁷ Although war was understandably the focus of most Spanish sources, in daily life on the frontier there were infinitely more moments of Araucanian and Pehuenche traders traveling down from the mountains, or Spanish ranchers searching for lost livestock in the foothills, than there were moments of epic battle. The paths of the Araucanians and Spanish crossed quite often, and although they did not always get along, their relationship based on mutual benefit kept them coexisting for the greater part of a century.

We should not give the impression that the Spanish stayed the course in Chile only because they were obligated. Despite diminishing returns, the Spanish had not given up on the prospect of future gold extraction. Even without gold, there was economic growth “in the form of the growing Peruvian market for agricultural produce” leading to the existence of “modestly prosperous farming communities in the fertile valleys north of the river Bío-Bío.”¹³⁸

Myth also maintained optimism about Chile’s future. In 1552 and 1553 Valdivia sent Gerónimo de Alderete, Francisco de Villagra and Pedro de Villagra on separate expeditions to find the “Lost City of Caesars” and the “North Sea,” or the Atlantic Ocean.¹³⁹ The Villagra cousins explored a good deal of the mountains of Neuquén,

¹³⁶ Wachtel, *The Vision of the Vanquished*, 194.

¹³⁷ Tapson, “Frontier Warfare in Colonial Chile,” 120.

¹³⁸ Elliot, “The Spanish Conquest,” 186-87.

¹³⁹ Alvarez, *Neuquén, su historia, su geografía, su toponimia* 27-28.

the region lying directly to the south of Cuyo, before they were interrupted by Valdivia's death and had to return to Chile. The Spanish had long heard of and imagined a large and rich empire in the Andes, but it took them over thirty years to reach Cuzco. Couldn't the same thing happen in Chile?

Chilean settlers also felt that there still was plenty of indigenous labor to be had for both metal extraction and farming.¹⁴⁰ Chilean colonists continued to look for labor on the eastern slope of the Andes¹⁴¹ and still held out hope that the Araucanians could be converted into laborers on a wider scale. Although their settlements were scattered they could be organized under Spanish control as Pedro de Valdivia demonstrated when he divided *encomiendas* of conquered Araucanians according to their own *levos*. Araucanian labor would now be even easier to divide, as the Indians had developed larger and more organized territorial divisions to defend themselves against the Spanish.¹⁴² The Spanish had also observed that the Araucanians even had at least a rudimentary labor tribute system. *Ruka* construction was performed by teams of laborers or *cullas* who received a feast or *mingaco* as payment when the dwelling was completed.¹⁴³

Finally, Chilean colonists realized that a frontier existence didn't necessarily equate to failure or a lack of opportunity. Often, just the opposite is the case. While in Europe and American urban areas the frontier was the domain of the aforementioned "wilde man," frontier residents in Chile and all over the Americas

¹⁴⁰ Villalobos, "Tres siglos de vida fronteriza," 19.

¹⁴¹ David Rock, *Argentina 1516-1987* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987), 12.

¹⁴² Zapater, *La búsqueda de la paz*, 89-90.

¹⁴³ Dillehay, *Araucania: Presente y Pasado*. *Mingaco* labor was instrumental in many Spanish and Chilean public works projects until 1821, especially in the construction of churches. *Mingaco* still exists in some outlying areas. Diego de Rosales, *Historia General del Reino de Chile, Flandes Indiano, Tomo I* (2nd ed., Santiago: Editorial Andrés Bello, 1989), 145.

saw it differently.¹⁴⁴ Whether it was elite families operating in Brazil's massive captaincy grants, venture capitalists in colonial Georgia, or Valdivia in Chile, frontier denizens realized and at least tried to convince colonial authorities and European monarchs that the frontier could be a source of wealth and prestige and that these far-flung territories were worth keeping.¹⁴⁵ In some cases colonists were able to use legal channels to expand their influence, but in Chile frontier residents profited from the frontier by often unscrupulously expanding the campaign against the Araucanians. The expansion of military operations would allow officials to skim from soldier salaries and supplies and to engage in illegal slave taking raids.

Ultimately though, it was a military balance of power which made this frontier exchange both necessary and possible. This balance of power was most dramatically illustrated in 1553 when Pedro de Valdivia was killed by a group of Araucanians led by Lautaro. Armed with the euphoria of the victory over Valdivia and the knowledge that the Spanish would return to the south if not driven out of Chile, Lautaro led an Araucanian offensive in 1557. After months of northward marching, Lautaro was nearing Santiago when he was headed off by the Spanish and killed in a battle with the new governor, Francisco de Villagra.¹⁴⁶ Lautaro had brought organization and confidence to his army, revamping battle tactics to focus on long campaigns rather than brief and regional skirmishes, and convincing his troops that the Spanish and their horses were separate beasts.

¹⁴⁴ Bauer, "Imperial History, Captivity and Creole Identity."

¹⁴⁵ Alida C. Metcalf, "Family, frontiers, and a Brazilian community" in Weber & Rausch, eds. *Where Cultures Meet*. Gally, "Jonathan Bryan's Plantation Empire."

¹⁴⁶ René León Echaiz, *El Toqui Lautaro* (Santiago: Talleres de Ricardo Neupert, 1971), 40

While Lautaro indeed failed to drive the Spanish out of Chile, *indios rebeldes* for generations performed ceremonies rejecting Spanish authority much like the one surrounding the death of Valdivia. Diego de Rosales, a 17th-century Jesuit missionary and historian collected accounts of the killing from Araucanians and Spaniards and wrote the most extensive and most accepted account of the killing.

Hearing that Valdivia had been ambushed, fourteen cavalrymen were sent to assist him. Seven were killed, their heads cut off and shown to the captured Valdivia.

“An infinite multitude had congregated...women, children and elders along with the troops of soldiers, that there were, they made a ring, and planted in the middle of the *Toques*, the lances, and arrows, making a great circle, the chiefs and ancients from all around, they called to bring out Valdivia, and in the middle of the wheel, they would take his life.”

Valdivia was felled by a blow to the head with a club. With that, his captors

“...raised their voices, and their lances over dead body, stomping the earth with their feet, and making it shake, to make it understood that the earth trembled with their bravery. Upon this one arrived, and ripping him open from the throat to the chest with a knife, he reached his hand into him, and removed the heart by ripping it out, and while beating, and squirting blood, he showed it to everyone, and smearing the *toquis* and the arrows with blood, he cut it into small pieces, that all the chiefs ate, and the rest licked up the blood, and all of those in the group that touch a part of the body, are sworn to unite their arms, and to have their hearts against the Spanish. They cut off his head soon after and made flutes from his thighbones and (his head) put on a stake, they sang a victory song around it, and had a long celebration with toasts and acts of joy, at seeing their nation liberated.” Later, “..they left the body for the birds and wild animals, and took the head and nailed it to the door of the house of the great Caupolicán, principal author of this trophy, and around it put the heads of some Spaniards, distributing others among different provinces, to bring devotion to them. They even used the heads of the horses as trophies. Finally, they cooked the head of Valdivia, and while all were intoxicated yet solemn, Caupolicán took out the head, and drank *chicha* from the skull, offering a toast to all of the chiefs greater than him. This head kept watch outside of his house, as if it were a link to an ancestor, and they pass it down to his descendants.” (Even in times of peace the Araucanians would not

give this skull back to the Spanish, no matter what the offered price.) “When there is to be an uprising, they take it out to provoke rebellion.”¹⁴⁷

The Araucanians understood that there were two levels of Spanish power, that of leaders and that of the collective society that supported them. The Araucanians took care of the leaders through ritual murder, but could not “kill” Spanish society. Instead, they tried to dominate it. They did this in a variety of ways. First of all, when warriors returned from an expedition against the Spanish, they would often dress like the enemy. “...During combat the warriors did everything possible in order to capture an object that would symbolize the other.”¹⁴⁸ The Araucanians also began to use iron, let their beards grow, and incorporate horses into their warfare and ceremonies. This way, the Araucanians could “assimilate the qualities” of the Spanish and in turn be less culturally dominated by them. Another step in this plan was to fully integrate lower-ranking Spanish captives into Araucanian society. They were not allowed to speak Spanish, wore Araucanian clothes, were shaved and put to work. Female captives were given to Araucanian men, and *mestizo* children were fully integrated into indigenous society.¹⁴⁹ This integration was even more effective when we take into account the Spanish fear that American born colonists were descending into savagery.¹⁵⁰ By integrating Spanish symbols into their culture, the Araucanians robbed them of their power. This was one half of the process of rejection through incorporation. The other was exocannibalism.¹⁵¹

¹⁴⁷ Rosales, *Historia General del Reino del Chile, Flandes Indiano*, 437-438.

¹⁴⁸ Boccara, “Etnogénesis Mapuche,” 437.

¹⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 439.

¹⁵⁰ Bauer, “Imperial History, Captivity, and Creole Identity.”

¹⁵¹ Boccara, “Etnogénesis Mapuche,” 439.

According to Clifford Geertz, when a ritual incorporates a feast of some kind, these “sensuous symbols”¹⁵² of food and drink make the ritual easier to remember and understand. Catherine Bell might add that Valdivia’s ritual murder was effective because it “communicated on multiple sensory levels.”¹⁵³ There was shouting, stomping of the feet, the gruesome murder itself and the feasting. Most importantly, all of the community was involved.

The eating of the heart was not just a sensory experience, but a spiritual one as well. For the Araucanians, the heart or *Piuke* “...was considered the place of decision, will... and feelings.” This means that the best way for the Araucanians to “assimilate the qualities of the enemy” was to literally “digest” him. The consumer achieved a “symbolic gaining of the life substance of the captive’s body.” The making of flutes out of Valdivia’s leg bones also begins to make sense in the context of this incorporation of qualities. *Mapudungun* is the Araucanian language. The verb *dungun* means to both talk and to play music. By playing the bone flutes, the soul of Valdivia would have been made to “sing or speak,” providing the Araucanians with more Spanish knowledge and power. Contacting their dead through music was an important Araucanian practice. Perhaps the contacting of the Spanish dead would have lead to greater assimilation.

Decapitation also was involved in assimilation. The head was a “symbol of the enemy’s bravery... and the source of his prestige.” The person in possession of a severed head absorbed some of its qualities, as thought and perception were believed to reside there. As mentioned, the skull was incorporated into traditional Araucanian

¹⁵² Clifford Geertz, *Negara: The Theatre and State in Nineteenth Century Bali* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980), 103.

¹⁵³ Catherine Bell, *Ritual Theory, Ritual Practice* (Oxford University Press, 1992), 160.

rites as a drinking vessel. The Araucanians would also often make a hat from the jawbone of a Spanish victim. This procedure evolved from the tradition of wearing the jaw of and absorbing the traits of a ferocious animal. This cap displayed a warrior's bravery and ferocity.¹⁵⁴ There is also the possibility that this decapitation was a response to a Spanish act. Michimalongo's 1541 attack on Santiago was stopped only by the legendary actions of Inés de Suárez, Pedro de Valdivia's mistress and the first European woman in Chile. Suárez demoralized the attackers by decapitating several of their captive chiefs, and throwing their bodies toward the attackers.¹⁵⁵

This throwing of the body resembles a deeply symbolic Araucanian gesture. When the Araucanians were through with the heart, head, and bones of a sacrificial victim, what remained of the body was "flung with disdain toward his territory of origin."¹⁵⁶ Once the Araucanians had incorporated all the spiritually significant parts of the body into their society, they had achieved what David Kertzer calls "condensation," whereby one symbol "can represent and unify a rich diversity of meanings."¹⁵⁷ The throwing of the body was the last and most important meaning to be extracted from this singular symbol. By throwing it, the Araucanian made it known that this ceremony was ultimately a rejection of Spanish power. The fact that the body was thrown from whence it came suggests that this ceremony developed after the Spanish had arrived. All Araucanians, despite any political rivalries, came from the same place. The Araucanians would not need to incorporate uniquely

¹⁵⁴ Boccara, "Etnogénesis Mapuche," 438.

¹⁵⁵ Osvaldo Silva Galdames and José Luis Schroeder Gutiérrez, *Historia de Chile Ilustrada* (Santiago: La Tercera, 1998), 78.

¹⁵⁶ Boccara, "Etnogénesis Mapuche," 438.

¹⁵⁷ David I. Kertzer, *Ritual, Politics, and Power* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988), 11.

Araucanian qualities from the heart or skull of one of their own. This ritual developed its meaning in its response to the “other” that came from “over there.”

As a successful rite of rebellion must do, the value of Araucanian ritual killing went beyond the ceremony itself. The ritual killing was part of the larger creation of a warrior class. As mentioned, the rite was a sacrifice to Pillán, the Araucanian creator god who was said to have a great respect for warriors. Pillán took *ulmenes* (family heads) who died fighting the Spanish to heaven, and sent the souls of these dead warriors to lead the living chiefs. The pink color of the sky during sunsets was said to be the blood of warriors mixed with the sun.¹⁵⁸ It appears that the “cult of Pillán” became stronger as the war continued.

Another part of ritual murder that unified the warrior cult was the gift. As in Marcel Mauss’ example of Pacific island cultures, “...gifts are rendered, received and repaid both obligatorily and in one’s own interest, in magnanimity, for repayments of services, or as challenges or pledges.”¹⁵⁹ In Araucanian warrior culture a gift usually functioned as a challenge. The giving and returning of heads, bodies, captives, etc., created a competition among warriors of various family units. The debt cycle could only be closed when a gift was returned, i.e. when another Spaniard was killed.

However, Lautaro’s death demonstrated how the power of a *toqui* was also restricted by these very factors. If a *toqui* were killed, there was usually no immediate successor, explaining why the Araucanian uprising stalled with Lautaro’s demise. Lautaro’s power came directly from Valdivia’s blood on his *toqui* (hatchet)

¹⁵⁸ Rolf. G. Foerster, *Jesuitas y Mapuches 1593-1767* (Santiago: Editorial Universitaria, S.A., 1996), 91.

¹⁵⁹ Marcel Mauss, *The Gift: Forms and Functions in Archaic Societies*, trans. by Ian Cunnison (London: Cohen & West Ltd., 1954), 27. Also see Brooks, *Captives and Cousins* and Natalie Zemon Davis, *The Gift in Sixteenth Century France* (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 2000).

and none of his lieutenants would have had such a direct connection to killing and the subsequent usurpation of the enemy's powers. *Toquis* were also regional, meaning that the complicated alliances that were forged in general uprisings just as easily could fall apart as Araucanian troops advanced through and especially out of the Araucanía. Part of Lautaro's defeat must also be attributed to disease. A typhoid outbreak around this time killed as much as one third of the Araucanian population. Its effect on the battlefield was the most dramatic and the most damaging as Spanish soldiers witnessed Araucanians succumbing to vomiting spells as they prepared for battle.¹⁶⁰

By 1560 then, both the Spanish and Araucanians knew that they had reached a balance of power on the frontier and that neither would be able to emerge as a clear victor in the War of Arauco.¹⁶¹ Two important reactions to this stalemate would come to define the frontier for decades to come. First of all, both sides would accept that they would be defined by their relationship to the frontier "other." The Araucanians were divided between *indios de guerra* and *indios de paz*, but the former were defined by their rejection of, and the latter by their negotiation within Spanish culture. The Spanish recognized that without trade with the Araucanians and without access to their labor, they could not survive economically. Secondly, neither side was willing to let the viceroy or the crown in on their little secret; that the war would not be won by either side. Colonists exhorted the crown to keep sending resources dedicated to ending the War of Arauco, knowing full well that the crown could not

¹⁶⁰ Ricardo Ferrando Keun, *Y así nació la frontera: conquista, guerra, ocupación, pacificación. 1550-1900* (Santiago: Editorial Antartica, S.A., 1986), 74. Pocock, *The Conquest of Chile*, 228.

¹⁶¹ Hal Langfur describes how a similar "absence of decisive force" in late-colonial Brazil led to a stalemate but actually prompted more violence. Hal Langfur, "Moved by Terror: Frontier Violence as Cultural Exchange in Late-Colonial Brazil," *Ethnohistory* 52:2 (Spring 2005): 259.

send a massive army to a faraway land with little economic potential. At the same time they knew that the crown did not want to lose Chile and that they could count on at least some clothing, settlers and weapons. *Indios de guerra* needed fresh Spanish victims in their gifting cycle and also benefited from their own raids of the very Spanish supplies that were meant to defeat them. On the other hand, both *indios de paz* and repentant *indios rebeldes* could expect gifts every time a new Spanish governor arrived. By 1560 colonists had come to realize that they needed both the frontier and the war to have a significant role in the viceroyalty's economic and strategic concerns.

CHAPTER III

LABOR AND THE BALANCE OF POWER. CHILE'S FRONTIER ECONOMY RESISTS VICEREGAL NEEDS

“This province is where great generals are confirmed and where great captains are born.”¹⁶²

As we saw in the previous chapter, scholars of the Spanish conquest of the Americas have quite successfully explained what on the surface seemed to be one of the great incongruities of the era. Why did the seemingly powerful Aztec and Inca empires fall so readily to a handful of Spanish conquerors, while groups like the Araucanians and Chichimecs who “weaker” economically, politically and numerically resist conquest for centuries?¹⁶³

By 1560, Spanish residents of Chile had come to the realization (although modern historians may express it differently) that it was not only easier to conquer concentrated empires, but the transition to a post-conquest society was easier if some of the edifices of empire were left in place.¹⁶⁴ Again the phrase, “there is only one Peru” came to mind for Chilean colonists. This time the admonition reminded them

¹⁶² Biblioteca Nacional de Chile (Hereafter “BN”), Tomo 109, Pieza 1784. Letter from the Governor of Chile Alonso García Ramón a S.M. el Rey, Río de la Laja, 11 January 1607.

¹⁶³ See James Lockhart’s multitude of works on this subject including: *The Men of Cajamarca: A Social and Biographical Study of the First Conquerors of Peru* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1972) and (ed.) *We People Here: Nahuatl Accounts of the Conquest of Mexico* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993).

¹⁶⁴ Steve J. Stern, *Peru’s Indian Peoples and the Challenge of Spanish Conquest: Huamanga to 1640* (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1982), 28-33.

that they would have to build their political and cultural authority from the ground up and would experience resistance every step of the way.

Many acknowledged that Chile's conquest had in effect ended with the death of its conqueror, and on both sides of the Bío-Bío adjustments were made to deal with this new reality. For many, the story of the 16th century is that of the "War of Arauco;" a failed conquest and a tale of barbarous deeds from both sides. The 16th century was also regarded as one of economic failure by *encomenderos* in Peru who wanted Chile to provide food so that their Indians could be freed up to work in mines. For them, every year the War of Arauco persisted was a year of decreased profits for Peru.

Indeed, there was fighting, and there was abuse, but as Richard White reminds us, within a "war" the periods of actual armed conflict are very brief and can blur our attempts to understand frontier exchange. On the Bío-Bío frontier or in White's "middle ground" even episodes of violence are not always acts of war. Violence was often "inextricably bound up with commerce" in that it was an "option both for acquiring goods and for protecting them."¹⁶⁵ What really took place then during the first decades of the War of Arauco was frontier acculturation through negotiation.

This stalemate was a sobering situation, but one that Valdivia had prepared the colony for and one which became quite successful in defining its own rules and procedures during the latter half of the 16th century. The events of the late 16th century would lay the groundwork for a society and an economy that would grow quite accustomed to frontier negotiation or the "colonial pact" and would resist the

¹⁶⁵ Richard White, *The Middle Ground: Indians, Empires and Republics in the Great Lakes Region, 1650-1815* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 75.

needs of the viceregal center. The lessons of the 16th century would allow many in the 17th to purposefully perpetuate frontier warfare to benefit from it.

While Lautaro and other *indios rebeldes* of the Araucanía deserve a good deal of credit for holding off the Spanish, the region offered challenges apart from indigenous resistance. First of all, the region was hard to get to.¹⁶⁶ One option for arriving at the front began with a walk of more than a week from Santiago to the port of Valparaiso, where soldiers would board a ship for Concepción. The voyage to Concepción was not usually a long one, but could be plagued with bad weather and unfavorable winds. Once in Concepción, the soldiers had another several-day trek to the front. This process of course required ships, which were not plentiful in the sixteenth century. Another option was to walk south for months from Santiago. A shortage of horses and indigenous porters meant that the soldiers were usually tired before they reached the front, some of them even drowning while trying to ford one of the regions' many turbid rivers.¹⁶⁷ For a while in the 16th century there was even talk of moving the capital south from Santiago to be closer to the War.

Many of the initial adventure seekers who arrived with Valdivia had settled down or been killed, and it was soon up to a few hundred new and mostly unhappy arrivals to pursue the war. Being at the tip of the Spanish empire meant that their pay, provisions and food were all insufficient. Some soldiers had actually been banished to Chile. When soldiers wintered in Santiago, instead of gaining strength, many

¹⁶⁶ It took Pedro de Valdivia more than a year to communicate his founding of Santiago and discovery of gold to Peru, as the ship that he was having built to deliver the news was destroyed by coastal Indians.

¹⁶⁷ *Desengaño y reparo de la Guerra de Chile*, 50.

succumbed to disease, while others deserted.¹⁶⁸ Those soldiers not conscripted were often aspiring bureaucrats who recognized that volunteering for the War of Arauco was the best way to gain the governor's favor. These volunteers usually were leaving behind lands and families, reducing their willingness to stay for a long campaign.¹⁶⁹ Many "soldiers" were in fact *encomenderos* from haciendas near Santiago who took their own *indios de servicio* to the front. When they returned to Santiago in the winter, the Indians often fled or stayed in the south.

Despite these difficulties, or perhaps because of them, residents of the frontier had scratched out a means of survival by the 1560s. Life on the frontier represented a delicate balancing act that only the residents understood, and that was easily interrupted by newly arrived governors. Father Juan de Torralba wrote from Santiago in 1569 that in the aftermath of Lautaro's attack, Governor García Hurtado de Mendoza had returned stability to the colony and had earned the respect of the *indios de guerra* through his success against them on the battlefield. For Torralba, the greatest threat to frontier stability was the revolving door that was the governorship. No sooner did experienced administrators and commanders like Hurtado de Mendoza gain the respect of colonists and Indians, than they submitted details of their exploits to the crown and were sailing north. In fact, Hurtado de Mendoza's success in Chile later helped him become the Viceroy of Peru. Torralba argued that Hurtado de Mendoza's successors failed to live up to his legacy and did little to protect *indios amigos* or gain the respect of *indios de guerra*. According to Torralba, one of these incompetent replacements ignored the military advice of colonists and instead placed

¹⁶⁸ Tapson, "Frontier Warfare in Colonial Chile," 119.

¹⁶⁹ *Desengaño y reparo de la Guerra de Chile*, 53.

his inexperienced associates in charge of the “pacification of the Indians.” According to Torralba, in 1568 these inexperienced soldiers went without “order or consultation” to retake a fort and instead provoked a counterattack.

This pattern was one that would persist for more than a century in Chile. Experienced governors who understood the *vida fronteriza* would leave, only to be replaced by green administrators who in their desire to pad their *hoja de servicio* (service record) would upset the balance of the frontier. During the rest of the 16th century and for most of the 17th then there was a constant tension between new arrivals or *peninsulares* who wished to make a name for themselves on the frontier, and creoles, mestizos, and *indios amigos* who knew and lived on the frontier and bore the brunt of the cavalier attitude of many of these new governors. As Father Torralba put it, incompetent governors and judges were making life impossible for “poor men and officials who have nothing more than their jobs, disturbing their wives, homes and children and taking goods from merchants without paying for them.”¹⁷⁰

This is not to say that creole *encomenderos* did not have a role in angering Araucanians by perpetuating “personal service.” By the 1560s placer mining was yielding diminishing returns, and indigenous labor was becoming scarce.¹⁷¹ Despite this decline in available labor however, *encomenderos* resisted making changes that would reverse it. Albeit for disparate reasons, officials in both Peru and Chile wanted to limit personal service which saw Indians paying tribute to the crown through their

¹⁷⁰ Juan de Torralba, Carta de fray... al Rey indicando las causas que han influído en el alzamiento general de los indios, 13 June, 1569, *Colección de Documentos Inéditos para La Historia de Chile. Segunda Serie. Tomo I. 1558-1572*, ed. José Toribio Medina (Santiago: Fondo Histórico y Bibliográfico J.T. Medina, 1956), 230-31.

¹⁷¹ Elliot, “The Spanish Conquest,” 186-87.

labor, rather than in specie or goods. This practice had been banned on several occasions as it equated to *de facto* slavery.

Officials in Peru rallied against it since it delayed the advent of Chile as a provider of foodstuffs. Under personal service the profit margin in mining was exponentially higher than it would have been in agriculture or ranching. As long as *encomenderos* were not obligated to pay their workers in gold, as they were legally bound to do, they would ignore less profitable but more stable industries. Fewer Indians dedicated to agriculture in Chile meant fewer exports to Peru. The crown of course did not discourage gold extraction in Chile, but this was a minor industry compared to what Potosí was producing. As far as the viceroy was concerned, the “*carrera* (Spanish merchant fleet) lived and died by silver” and the role of other colonies was to support Potosí through the Pacific “inshore” trade.¹⁷² The viceroy could not help that some silver disappeared through internal transactions and smuggling, but he was perturbed when colonies like Chile made its extraction more difficult.

Viceregal regulation of *encomiendas* had begun disastrously with the murder of Núñez de Vela, but by the 1550s new viceroys were bold enough and the situation was desperate enough for them to make another attempt at curbing abuse. Chilean and Peruvian officials alike had observed that personal service was largely responsible for the decline of Indian labor whether through death and disease or rebellion. Thus, in 1557 the viceroy appointed a member of the Audiencia de Lima, Hernando de Santillán y Figueroa to observe and improve the treatment that Indians in Chile

¹⁷² Murdo J. MacLeod, “Spain and America: the Atlantic trade 1492-1720,” in *The Cambridge History of Latin America: Vol I*, ed. Leslie Bethell (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 368.

received. Santillán first traveled to La Serena where local and imported Indian workers were dying from the harsh conditions of nearby mines. Santillán quickly sought to remedy this situation by declaring that Indians could not be used as beasts of burden, that no more than a fifth of Indians from a given *encomienda* could be used in gold washing, and that workers would get a weekly salary in the form of “one-sixth of the ore they extracted.” Santillán also pronounced that Indians were to be fed and clothed properly, that no additional tribute was to be exacted, and that they were to attend mass. As he left La Serena, Santillán “set free all the *yanaconas* attached to *encomiendas*, noting that if they voluntarily consented to work in the mines, their Spanish employers would have to provide them with food, implements, and a salary amounting to one-fourth of the product of their labor.”¹⁷³

As he moved south to Santiago, Santillán found conditions to be even worse than those in La Serena. There the *oidor* observed the treatment of Indians and the local political climate for months and developed a set of regulations collectively called the Tasa de Santillán that he believed would be acceptable to both the crown and Chile’s *encomenderos*. The *tasa* began to phase out Indian porters, and arranged for domestication of draft animals. It limited the number of months per year Indians could work in mines and set punishment guidelines for non-conforming *encomenderos*. In 1558 Santillán also traveled to Concepción, Valdivia, Osorno and Villarrica where he established similar ordinances dealing with Araucanian laborers.¹⁷⁴

¹⁷³ A *yanacona* in this case referred to a war captive, but at times the term was used universally to describe an Indian laborer. Ibid., 31-32.

¹⁷⁴ Korth, *Spanish Policy*, 35.

Some portions of the Tasa of Santillán were effective. In one gold mine for example, better working conditions under the *tasa* increased production dramatically. However, Chile's relative lack of mining, large scale agriculture, pastoral, and handicrafts economies continued to make it difficult for Indians to pay tribute with anything but personal service. The *tasa* was designed to obligate *encomenderos* to produce wheat, corn and barley. Ideally, this increased farm production would reduce the portions of tribute paid by personal service and would help address the colony's poverty which had deepened through its dedication to volatile placer mining.¹⁷⁵ Ultimately, while the Tasa de Santillán and future ordinances made provisions for Indians to pay their tribute in specie or farm products, they never completely eliminated personal service on paper or in practice.¹⁷⁶

Chilean *encomenderos* would eventually abandon placer mining as deposits were depleted, but they continued to resist dedicating their efforts to agriculture. Colonists argued that for one, wheat production was not profitable. With Chile's modest population, there was little domestic demand for grains. Also, Peru continued to have its own abundant and cheap supply, sabotaging the capital's need to have Chile pull its weight. *Encomenderos* also rejected farming because their militia obligations kept them away from their lands for months every year. The great irony and source of frustration for the colonists was that the crown wanted them to be in two places at once. The same colonists that were serving on the frontier were those who were supposed to be providing supplies for the campaigns. The absence of these landowners not only decreased production, but made their haciendas vulnerable to

¹⁷⁵ Ramos, *Trigo Chileno*, 5-6.

¹⁷⁶ The "Tasa de Gamboa" replaced the Tasa de Santillán in 1580 but was no more successful than its predecessor at limiting abuse of Indians.

attack, especially for those closest to the frontier. The most vulnerable haciendas were of course the most important to the war effort because of the relative fertility of the soil and proximity to the frontier. All of these factors made it unprofitable for Chile to maintain a surplus of grains, leaving the colony constantly on the verge of shortages. Chile was even obligated to import wheat on a number of occasions, an embarrassing and very telling development for a colony with optimal farming conditions.¹⁷⁷

With gold mining fast becoming a thing of the past, and agriculture proving unappealing, *encomenderos* turned to ranching for their livelihood. Despite the prospect of cattle theft, ranching was better suited to the volatile frontier. Ranching provided quicker returns when peace broke out, and only saw a slight decline in times of war as the industry provided food and transport for soldiers.¹⁷⁸ Ranching would also eventually provide profitable exports in the form of tallow and jerked beef for the Potosí mines.

The fact that ranching is not labor intensive did not mean that *encomenderos* released Indians from their tribute obligations. By the 1560s *encomienda* Indians performed almost all manual tasks in Chile, working on construction projects, and carrying all manner of things within and between cities. Female Indians in particular often worked as domestics.¹⁷⁹ The *encomienda* system was designed to protect and instruct Indians under Spanish care, but as we saw in chapter one, it rarely worked out that way as *encomenderos* openly violated its provisions to turn a greater profit. Indian porters and mineworkers especially suffered when their *encomenderos*

¹⁷⁷ Ramos, *Trigo Chileno*, 8-10.

¹⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, 11-12.

¹⁷⁹ Barros Arana, *Historia general: III*, 101.

overworked them by greatly exceeding limits on weight of loads, hours worked, distance traveled, and minimum age.¹⁸⁰

Pedro de Valdivia and Peruvian officials shared the very unlikely notion that Chilean *hidalgos* would turn into farmers.¹⁸¹ The same seigniorial attitude that kept the colonists from farming also meant that they remained steadfast in their defense of personal service. Those who had suffered through the above mentioned difficulties were even less willing to give up tribute through indigenous labor that was their only real reward. Over time, *encomenderos* realized that they could have their cake and eat it too by playing up this sacrifice without giving up the benefits of personal service. *Encomenderos* eventually began to accept that Valdivia and the Araucanians had begun to turn these would be conquerors into settlers. They would continue to support the aforementioned sense that economic hardship would make sacrifice their gift to the crown.

This economic suffering and sense of sacrifice was not just a way of life for *encomenderos*, but became important in defining their role in the viceroyalty. By the 1560s, letters from Chile constantly referred to shortages and violence due increasingly to the War of Arauco. This tone of suffering and sacrifice was further solidified after the publication of the “first American epic,” Alonso de Ercilla’s *La Araucana*.

¹⁸⁰ Korth, *Spanish Policy*, 23-27.

¹⁸¹ Peru never really gave up their idea that they should be importing their wheat, as price fluctuations and population growth decreased supply and increased demand. For periods of the 17th century Peru imported wheat from Jamaica. Ironically, it took a devastating 1687 earthquake which crippled Peru’s internal production for the capital to finally see the much anticipated import of Chilean wheat. *Ibid.*, 24.

As Prince Philip's page, Ercilla had traveled a good deal as a young man. He had accompanied the future monarch to England for his wedding with Mary Tudor, and in his early twenties set out for Chile. Ercilla arrived in Chile in 1558 where he stayed for seventeen months.¹⁸²

Ercilla was sent to the front and engaged in combat with the Araucanians. However, his closest brush with death came not in combat, but in a Spanish ceremony. In a moment of confusion during a ceremony celebrating the coronation of the same Prince Philip, Ercilla touched his sword in the presence of Governor García Hurtado de Mendoza.¹⁸³ Ercilla and another soldier were immediately sentenced to death by the governor for this gross breach of etiquette. Fortunately for Ercilla, the sentence was commuted to a short prison term at the last minute. Ercilla wrote in *La Araucana* that he had "been next in line, turned over to the sharp knife against his throat..."¹⁸⁴ As a result of this incident, Governor Mendoza was left out of *La Araucana* entirely.

After his run-in with the governor, it was clear to Ercilla that any further advancement in Chile was impossible and he returned to Spain. It was there where Ercilla wrote most of *La Araucana* and where the epic was first published in 1569.¹⁸⁵

Ercilla the soldier saw few victories for the Spanish during his brief stay in Chile, his epic reflecting the voice of a frustrated adventurer. *La Araucana* also typified the sentiments of Ercilla's vanquished contemporaries, and contributed to a myth of the

¹⁸² Roque Esteban Scarpa, *Prologo Breve*, in *La Araucana*, by Alonso de Ercilla (Santiago: Editorial Andrés Bello, 1983), 7-8.

¹⁸³ Philip II was crowned in 1555, but the news did not reach Chile until 1558. *La Invención del Reino de Chile*, 162.

¹⁸⁴ Quoted from *La Araucana* in *Prologo Breve*, 7.

¹⁸⁵ Collier, *Ideas and Politics*, 27.

“noble or barbaric savage.” Losing commanders had to elevate the status of their victorious foes in order to somehow explain the failure.¹⁸⁶

“Never has a king subjected
Such fierce people proud of freedom,
Nor has alien nation boasted
E’er of having trod their borders;
Ne’r has dared a neighboring country
Raise the sword and move against them;
Always were they feared, unshackled,
Free of laws, with necks unbending.”¹⁸⁷

Ercilla’s experiences and impressions not only influenced his style, but also the content of his epic. *La Araucana*’s favorable treatment of Araucanian leaders may also have had to do with Ercilla’s conflicts with his own superiors. He anticipated criticism in his prologue saying, “... to some people it would seem that I am somewhat inclined toward the Araucanians, relating their ... bravery more extensively than necessary when it comes to barbarians.” Ercilla explained his admiration by arguing that “...with pure valor and perseverance they have maintained their freedom...” despite their limited weaponry and lack of large scale political organization.¹⁸⁸

On the other hand, Ercilla did not do injustice to the Spaniards in his account. Much of his deference for the Araucanians lay in the fact that they “have defended their land against such fierce enemies as the Spanish.”¹⁸⁹ In addition, his original intent was not to make heroes out of his enemies, but to make sure that the

¹⁸⁶ Stephen E. Lewis, “Myth and the History of Chile’s Araucanians,” *Radical History Review*, 58 (Winter 1994): 114.

¹⁸⁷ Charles M. Lancaster and Paul T. Manchester, translators, *The Araucaniad: A Version in English Poetry of Alonso de Ercilla Zúñiga’s La Araucanica*, in John H Parry and Robert G. Keith, eds. *New Iberian World: A Documentary History of the Discovery and Settlement of Latin America to the Early 17th Century* (New York: Times Books, 1984), Vol. 5, 377.

¹⁸⁸ *Prologo Breve*, 6.

¹⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, 6.

achievements of his fellow Spaniards did not become lost in “perpetual silence.”¹⁹⁰

The War of Arauco seemed to provide all the elements Ercilla needed to create a popular epic; a bloody conflict in a faraway land between two very different but equally matched armies, with plenty of tales of chivalry and tragedy. Ercilla drew together actual events, classical literary influences and glorified language to create an epic that holds a permanent and important place in world literature.

As did Valdivia before him, Ercilla understood that Spain was at the height of its arrogance and that the actions of a handful of soldiers against savages half a world away would gain little attention. Thus he needed to cast a wider net, “mixing the war of Arauco with the brilliant actions of Lepanto and Saint Quintín.”¹⁹¹ Thus, *La Araucana* became a mixture of Ercilla’s observations and examples of sixteenth century literature, adopted and falsified as autobiographical by the author. Ercilla’s sense of poetic license prompted him to quote Araucanians who he probably never met in the context of events that happened before he arrived in Chile. The liberties that Ercilla took sparked still-unresolved debates about *La Araucana*’s usefulness as a historical document.¹⁹²

More important to our discussion is how Ercilla was able to bring the War of Arauco to life through text. The descriptions of Araucanian bravery and military ability expanded Spanish interest in the Americas, while their success at stalling the

¹⁹⁰ Ibid., 5.

¹⁹¹ Eduardo Solar Correa, *Semblanzas Literarias de la Colonia* (Santiago: Editorial Difusion Chilena S.A., 1945), 27.

¹⁹² Giorgio Antei refers to the legendary and possibly fictional contest in which Caupolicán carried a tree trunk on his shoulders for days to become the next *toqui*. Ercilla reconstructed conversations that took place among Araucanians during this contest, despite the fact that another chronicler (Pedro Mariño de Lovera) had written about this event in 1551, two years before Ercilla arrived in Chile. *La Invención del Reino de Chile*, 177.

Spanish advance worried the crown.¹⁹³ Ercilla gave future chroniclers, adventurers and officials a wonderful template through which to maintain the interest of royal officials in Spain and Peru, and keep resources headed in Chile's direction aimed at ending this epic struggle.

While Valdivia used sacrifice and Ercilla heroism as their principal themes, both constantly referred to the desolation and desperation on the Chilean frontier. Whether focusing on *trabajos de la guerra* or *del hambre* future authors would always stress the pressing need for more resources, especially if their future was tied to the far-flung colony.

With the mixed success of Santillán's efforts, labor conditions continued to deteriorate and Chile's indigenous population continued its decline. One late 16th century observer noted that the indigenous population of Santiago had dwindled to 4,000 from its peak of 60,000. Both the Council of Indies and officials within Chile suggested the large-scale import of African slaves to avert a crisis, but this solution never got beyond the planning stages.¹⁹⁴ Gold was no longer being extracted because even though the Spanish were obsessed with it, they couldn't eat it. The remaining *encomienda* Indians had to be employed in food cultivation. There were so few Indian "auxiliaries" available to the army that the only goal of raids against the Araucanians became securing enough porters to conduct the next campaign. There

¹⁹³ See Daisy Tipodas Ardanaz, ed. *Lo indiano en el teatro menor español de los siglos XVI y XVII*, in *Biblioteca de autores españoles desde la formación del lenguaje hasta nuestros días* (Madrid: Ediciones Atlas, 1991) for a discussion of how traveling theatre companies in 17th century Spain inspired a popular fascination with everything Araucanian. Inspired by a desire to remedy Chile's difficulties and fascinated by Ercilla's description of the colony, in 1599 Bernardo de Vargas Machuca, a Spanish captain and veteran of several European wars unsuccessfully petitioned the king for the governorship of Chile. Barros Arana, *Historia general: Tomo III*, 252-53. His case was not an atypical one in Cervantes' heyday.

¹⁹⁴ Korth, *Spanish Policy*, 36-38.

could be no long-term strategy of conquest without a significant pool of auxiliaries. This scarcity existed despite the fact that *indios de servicio* preferred accompanying the army to serving more intense and longer periods of labor in placer mines or in agriculture. Some observers even claimed that *indios de servicio* were interested in prolonging and even expanding the war to keep the freedom that working with the Spanish army offered.¹⁹⁵ Observers also noted that those Indians who had not yet been reduced also “tried to maintain the war and preferred death in battle to becoming subjects of a people who had committed so many wrongs against them without justice or reason.”¹⁹⁶

Nonetheless, the Spanish continued to advance eastward and southward from Santiago, founding frontier cities like Chillán and Mendoza close to groups of unconquered peoples who could be enslaved, evangelized or both. With the decline of placer mining in Chile’s south, and further Spanish encroachment, more and more Araucanians were being shipped northward. There were already *yanaconas* serving *encomenderos* in La Serena by the 1550s and in the 1570s a number of Araucanians were shipped from the front in Chile’s south, to Coquimbo and Peru. By 1573 this practice was so common and so many Indians from Chile were dying in transit to Peru, that the king felt it necessary to remind viceregal officials that such transport was illegal.¹⁹⁷ While the king’s message may have been heard at least temporarily in Peru, the illegal movement of Araucanians continued within Chile. In 1578 dozens of Indians and six “principal *caciques*” of Arauco were expelled to La Serena where

¹⁹⁵ In chapter four we discuss how in the 17th century Spanish soldiers were angered that *indios amigos* were both profiting from the sale of Indian prisoners and collecting a salary.

¹⁹⁶ Torrabla, Carta de fray... al Rey, 13 June, 1569, 230.

¹⁹⁷ Alvaro Jara, *Guerra y sociedad en Chile y otros temas* (3rd ed.: Santiago: Editorial Universitaria, 1984), 152.

they were put to work in mining and agriculture.¹⁹⁸ With the Spanish moving closer word soon spread among unincorporated Indians of the poor treatment that Indian workers received. Hernando de Santillán observed that the prospect of personal service meant that “native women preferred to let their offspring die (fighting the Spanish) rather than see them seized later for service in the mines.¹⁹⁹ Ironically then, increasing Indian resistance to *reducción* efforts increased the likelihood that if captured they would not only be subject to personal service but might be enslaved as prisoners in a “just war.”

Despite these risks, many *indios de servicio* believed that their most attractive option was rebellion. Especially near the Bío-Bío, the presence of Araucanian *indios de guerra* often inspired revolts by Indian laborers. Especially worrisome for Spanish *encomenderos* were nomadic mountain groups like the Pehuenche. These mounted aborigines would conduct occasional raids on Spanish *estancias* and spirit away a handful of colonists or *indios de servicio* to the safety of rugged mountain passes. Often the Pehuenche were involved in larger attacks led by *indios de servicio* or Araucanians, as was the case in a 1579 attack. In response to this joint attack, the future Governor of Chile Martín Ruíz de Gamboa founded the city of Chillán as a “bulwark against the plains and mountain Indians.”²⁰⁰

Because of their relative autonomy as mountain dwellers, the Pehuenche also demonstrated to other aborigines that they could maintain some economy even in a Spanish controlled economy. The Pehuenche controlled access to salt deposits in the cordillera and as a result, had a great deal to say in terms of how much or how little

¹⁹⁸ Ibid., 154.

¹⁹⁹ Korth, *Spanish Policy*, 32.

²⁰⁰ Orellana. *Historia y antropología de la Isla de la Laja*, 36.

jerked beef Chile exported to Peru. Pehuenche control of mountain passes also increased their autonomy as the Spanish searched for Caesars and tried to improve ties with Buenos Aires.²⁰¹ As time progressed some Araucanians produced ponchos for export while others maintained a pre-colonial subsistence economy. Despite drastic economic changes, the *vida fronteriza* did provide some alternatives for *indios de guerra* and *indios rebeldes*.

²⁰¹ Sergio R. Villalobos, *Los Pehuenches en la vida fronteriza* (Santiago, Chile: Ediciones Universidad Católica de Chile, 1989), 29. Orellana. *Historia y antropología de la Isla de la Laja*, 29.




Figure 5. The Araucanía (The dotted lines represent the boundaries of Pinto Rodríguez's frontier "commercial circuit.")²⁰²

²⁰² Map adapted from: Jorge Pinto Rodríguez, "Producción e intercambio en un espacio fronterizo. Araucanía y Pampas en el siglo XVIII" in Jorge Silva Riquer & Antonio Escovar Ohmstede, eds., *Mercados indígenas en México, Chile y Argentina* (Desarrollo Gráfico Editorial: Mexico City, 2000), 158.

Old Enemies in a New Land

In 1578 Spain's greatest enemy dropped anchor in the Chilean port of Valparaiso. However, Sir Francis Drake had not yet earned his fame as the scourge of the Spanish Empire and Valparaiso was so isolated that the unsuspecting crew of the lone Spanish ship in the harbor dropped a line to Drake's launch. Drake eventually pillaged the port and his haul was significant for such a small settlement, but the wide and lasting impact of his arrival had little to do with what he took.²⁰³ The Spanish were more concerned that a European enemy had penetrated the Magellan Strait, the Spanish Empire's primary Pacific bulwark, exacerbating whatever ill might have been plaguing each of Spain's Pacific colonies.

In Chile the ill was the War of Arauco, and Drake's arrival made pleas for more troops, more resources and the legalization of indigenous slavery all the more urgent. Drake's landing especially resonated with the viceroy, who was charged with raising many of the troops and money sent to Chile. An Indian war in Chile seemed, and indeed was quite distant from goings on in Lima. However, the viceroy soon took greater interest in Chile when he realized that if and when the War of Arauco were won, the colony could be an "outer wall" in the Pacific, slowing European enemies as they followed the scent of the king's silver.²⁰⁴

While the War of Arauco continued however, the appearance of English enemies in Chile raised the prospect of a European-indigenous alliance against the Spanish.

²⁰³ Drake's loot consisted of 2,000 jugs of wine, 60,000 gold pesos; a silver chalice, two cruets, and one altar cloth from the port's chapel, and oregano, licorice and walnuts. Benjamín Vicuña Mackenna, *Historia de Valparaiso: Tomo I*, in *Obras Completas, Volumen Tercero* ed. by La Universidad de Chile (Santiago: Dirección General de Prisiones, 1936), 68. Richard Hakluyt, *The Principal Navigations, Voyages, Traffiques and Discoveries of the English Nation. Volume XI*. (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1904), 113.

²⁰⁴ Pinto Rodríguez, "Producción e intercambio en un espacio fronterizo," 150.

Authorities in Chile were already starting to worry about increasing pan-indigenous movements against them after the Pehuenche and Araucanians *indios rebeldes* joined forces in the aforementioned 1579 attack.

For the first forty years of Spanish colonies on the Pacific, Patagonian winds had been sufficient protection. Drake proved that this was no longer the case and raised the possibility of Spanish settlement in the Patagonia and the Strait of Magellan. The crown had believed settlement of the territory would actually attract pirates, but soon made an about face when it became apparent that fortifications could provide an early line of defense against anything from a trickle to a steady stream of pirates seeking Peruvian silver. In the 1530s and 40s there had been a number of expeditions to the strait and Patagonia, but attempts to settle the strait were few and had for all intents and purposes been suspended since 1563 when the crown declared that *entradas* would need royal approval. Chilean colonists also supported a renewal of settlement activities on the continent's tip. Such settlements would protect the Chilean coast and would provide a base from which to conquer the mythical Indians of Caesars.²⁰⁵

The first steps toward settlement came when Pedro Sarmiento de Gamboa led an expedition to Tierra del Fuego from Callao in 1579. Sarmiento de Gamboa explored several possible fort sites, and crossed the Atlantic to report his findings to Spain. Meanwhile, the 1580 re-founding of Buenos Aires prompted a renewed interest in the Caesars and a westward expedition led by Juan de Garay.²⁰⁶ As the 1580s arrived then, Chile was faced with growing military threats, a labor shortage and no real solution to deal with either one. In 1581 Chile's Governor-elect Alonso de

²⁰⁵ Álvarez, *Neuquén, su historia, su geografía, su toponimia*, 23.

²⁰⁶ Shields, *The Legend of the Caesars*, 23.

Sotomayor would begin to appreciate Chile's predicament even before he had set foot in the colony. With Drake's landing fresh in his mind, Philip II ordered the outfitting of a twenty-one-ship fleet in Seville by July of 1581. The plan was for the fleet to sail to through the Magellan Strait and establish a settlement there. The remainder of the expedition would continue on to Chile where the colony's new governor would disembark with reinforcements for the War of Arauco. The expedition was immediately beset with difficulties however, and by the time it began its Atlantic crossing five months late, it had already lost eighty men and four ships. Further problems were to follow, prompting its leaders to abandon the Magellan Strait route and land at the newly re-founded port of Buenos Aires. Sotomayor led the reinforcements overland to Mendoza where he they had to wait until the spring thaw to enter Santiago. Sotomayor and the remaining 400 soldiers finally arrived in Santiago in September of 1583. The crossing took well over two years and brought two hundred casualties long before the arrivals had seen any combat.²⁰⁷

Sotomayor was unimpressed with the state in which he found the colony. Desertion was rampant, especially among *Limeños* who tired of the discipline in such a faraway place. (In Lima in 1570 the viceroy had solicited soldiers for the Chilean front, promising them silver, arms, clothes, victuals and "other necessities for the campaign." He got one volunteer.)²⁰⁸ Some even switched sides, attracted by the "freedom" of Araucanía and taking advantage of the frequent contact between groups on the frontier.²⁰⁹

²⁰⁷ Barros Arana, *Historia general: Tomo III*, 21-27.

²⁰⁸ Jara, *Guerra y sociedad*, 100.

²⁰⁹ Góngora, "Vagabundaje y Sociedad Fronteriza en Chile," 38(n).

Sotomayor said that the soldiers who managed to stay at their posts were spoiled, “free and licentious.” Even though his reinforcements were bedraggled, “naked and lost” the incumbent soldiers expected that his arrival meant their “relief and fulfillment of their pretensions.” While the soldiers were getting what they wanted, the royal coffers were bare and didn’t come close to covering the salaries of royal officials (including Sotomayor’s). Supplies were thin, and the *vecinos* were “consumed.” In light of such scarcity, Sotomayor’s first act was to send a captain to Lima armed with a royal *cédula* authorizing more reinforcements, arms, clothing, and money to “begin as soon as possible a new campaign against the Araucanians.”²¹⁰

Sotomayor also found that the Chilean *encomenderos* and Church officials had long ago taken sides in a power struggle with the governor at its center.²¹¹ A “rain of accusations” had been leveled against Sotomayor’s predecessor, Martín Ruíz de Gamboa after he had tried to restrict *encomendero* power through his own *tasa*. Ruíz de Gamboa’s last year had been an ineffective one as he spent most of it imprisoned or on trial in Santiago defending himself against his political enemies who welcomed Sotomayor with open arms. The incoming governor soon found himself caught up in the battle between opposing *encomenderos*, taking back a number of *repartimientos* Ruíz de Gamboa had given, and repealing the *Tasa de Gamboa*.²¹²

If the Sotomayor reinforcements were insufficient, there was still hope that a fortification of the Strait of Magellan would cover up the Chilean chink in the viceregal armor. Sarmiento de Gamboa returned to South America in 1584, creating

²¹⁰ Barros Arana, *Historia general: III*, 28.

²¹¹ The secular clergy were generally in favor of personal service restrictions, but the Dominicans in Santiago sent a representative to Lima to defend the *encomenderos* affected by the *tasa de Gamboa*. Ibid., 31.

²¹² Ibid., 29-31.

two settlements on the Strait of Magellan, Nombre de Jesús and Rei don Felipe.²¹³ A total of 277 people were left to settle Nombre de Jesus; 251 men, 13 married women, and 11 children. Geographically, cutting off access to the Strait made good sense, but weather doomed the experiment. Along with the cold came the famous Tierra del Fuego wind, making navigation and re-supply in particular extremely difficult.

On Sarmiento's first support expedition to Nombre de Jesús a sudden storm obligated the crew of his ship to cast off and leave their anchor behind. Sarmiento was forced to sail on to Brazil, leaving several families who planned to be relocated standing on the beach. This was the last time Sarmiento would see Nombre de Jesús. Once in Brazil Sarmiento tried to return, but was shipwrecked off of Bahía, surviving only by holding onto a floating board with his African slave and a priest. After this failure, Sarmiento set off to Spain to appeal for help for the colonists in person, and to ask why none of his written petitions had been answered. On this voyage however, Sarmiento was captured by the English. The ransom for his return to Spain was not paid until 1589. He died in Spain three years later. Meanwhile, the hundreds of settlers in Tierra del Fuego were completely abandoned. Only fifteen men and three women eventually survived the harsh Antarctic winters.²¹⁴

This disaster revealed that while the viceroy may have been understandably concerned about pirates, the real threat to colonists in Chile was not European enemies, but starvation. We remember for example that Valdivia's newly founded Santiago was almost abandoned after Michimalongo's 1541 revolt left the Spanish

²¹³ Rei don Felipe was provided with six canons at its founding, showing us that the fortification strategy was to begin immediately. Barros Arana, *Historia general: III*, 78.

²¹⁴ José A. del Busto Duthurburu. *Siglo XVI - Historia Externa, Tomo III, Vol. 2.*, in *Historia Maritima del Peru*. (Lima: Editorial Ausonia, 1975), 584-89.

without Indian allies. Also, it was not uncommon for Spanish frontier soldiers to trade gunpowder to the Araucanians for food. In general, when the Spanish were without Indian help, they fared as badly as the residents of Nombre de Jesus who saw little help from the strait's sparse and scattered native population. The irony here is that while thousands were killed on both sides of the War of Arauco, without the economic and cultural exchange of the *vida fronteriza* the Spanish may have disappeared from Chile anyway.

In the meantime, colonists further north may also have been feeling figuratively abandoned if not literally. Governor Sotomayor pleaded with the crown to remedy the fact that the army was in rags and lacked powder, which threatened his ability to mount even a brief summer campaign. (They did manage one, but with little to show for it.) There was more bad news with the revelation that Chile's economy brought in no more than 22,000 pesos yearly and that the treasury was in debt for more than 300,000.²¹⁵ In the same year a plot by a number of destitute soldiers was uncovered in which they had planned to take over forts at Angol, Bio Bío, Chillán and even Santiago, collecting all the discontented soldiers along the way and marching over Andes to return to Spain. The conspirators were executed.²¹⁶

Without outside support, colonists turned to myth to improve their situation.²¹⁷ In 1586 the Governor of Tucumán, Juan Ramírez de Velasco proposed a small investigation to determine whether there was in fact a “dazzling” city called “Linlín” led by a “powerful Inca” with 200,000 Indians and 30,000 Spaniards as his

²¹⁵ Barros Arana, *Historia general: III*, 33.

²¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 39.

²¹⁷ Myths of the seven cities of Cibola and the Fountain of Youth kept Spanish hopes flickering in equally desolate regions of New Spain and Florida.

subjects.²¹⁸ Ramírez de Velasco believed that if Linlín could be found, its residents would end their support of the Araucanians and could provide Spanish settlers with provisions, curing the ills of both Sotomayor and Sarmiento de Gamboa.²¹⁹

By the time another Englishman Thomas Cavendish, who had been with Drake on his expedition, landed near Valparaíso in 1587 Chile had made little progress against its indigenous enemies and was still ill-prepared to meet this sea borne threat.²²⁰

Again, the viceroy sent troops to respond to the pirate landing, and again Governor Sotomayor regarded the reinforcements as insufficient. It was perhaps very fitting then that the captains of the ships carrying the pirate-hunting troops were instructed to avoid all contact with enemy ships, as the transport vessels weren't outfitted for combat.²²¹

As a next step, Sotomayor sent his brother Luis to Spain, hoping that a first-hand account could express the urgency of the need to end the War of Arauco and that his brother would bring the resources that would make it possible. However, in 1587 Spanish ships were hard to come by as most of them preparing to invade England. Luis de Sotomayor would have to wait at least a year for the stunning events of 1588 to play out before his petition would be heard.

Interestingly enough, the rout of the Spanish Armada in the English Channel did not cripple the crown's ability to support its American colonies. Fearing that the English would press their advantage and try to take Spanish possessions in the

²¹⁸ Álvarez, *Neuquén, su historia, su geografía, su toponimia*, 33.

²¹⁹ Robert Hale Shields, *The Legend of the Caesars and the Patagonian Expedition of Gerónimo Luis de Cabrera, 1620-1621*, Unpublished PhD. dissertation, University of California, Berkeley, [1940?], 49.

²²⁰ Barros Arana, *Historia general: III*, 91.

²²¹ *Ibid.*, 80-81.

Americas, the Spanish scrambled to ready ships for the Indies. In June of 1589 Luis de Sotomayor arrived in Panama with seven hundred men that were destined for the Chilean front. Here the story took a surprising twist. Accompanying Sotomayor was none other than García Hurtado de Mendoza the former Governor of Chile who had just been named Viceroy of Peru and Marquis of Cañete. Surely if anyone would assure that these troops made it to the front, it would be a former Governor of Chile and someone who had faced the Araucanians personally. Instead, the marquis had the seven hundred “auxiliaries” turn right around and accompany the millions of pesos of silver that were being readied for shipment to Spain. Instead of 700 soldiers, among them veterans of European campaigns, Chile would get two hundred conscripts from in and around Panama. The marquis explained to the *cabildo* of Santiago that he understood Chile’s situation and as such had sent two hundred “select” and well equipped soldiers who when joining those already on the front would “be more than enough” to conquer and populate the Araucanía.²²²

There are a number of reasons why the marquis might have shorted Chile five hundred soldiers. First of all, the crown could ill afford another economic disaster like the defeat of the *armada* and as such all hands were needed to protect the 1589 silver fleet. Secondly, the marquis had been in close quarters with many Chilean officials and perhaps believed that like Alonso de Ercilla, they were exaggerating the merits of the Araucanians. According to one historian, the marquis “thought he knew Chile better than anyone” and believed that the colony needed much less than its officials were asking for.²²³ Thirdly, the marquis had proposed that the Indians on

²²² Ibid., 83-86.

²²³ Ibid., 148.

Chile's coastal islands be removed and sent to work in Santiago and La Serena.²²⁴

This plan would address both Chile's labor shortage and pirate threat, and the viceroy wanted to give it time to work. Finally, the marquis may have been protecting his legacy. Governor García Hurtado de Mendoza was left out of *La Araucana* because of the punishment he had levied on Ercilla. Hurtado de Mendoza had responded to this omission by commissioning his own version of the conquest, a stilted account called *Arauco Domado* (Araucania tamed) in which he was the hero and conqueror of the Araucanians.²²⁵ Whatever his motives, the marquis had showed little urgency in meeting Chile's needs and reinforced the colony's low rank on the viceregal list of priorities. Future viceroys would show even more indifference to Chile's plight, prompting authorities in Chile to respond with even more exaggerated claims about the threats they faced from their enemies and royal neglect.

Disappointing as it was, Chilean colonists were not shocked by the indifference of the viceroy and as the last decade of the century arrived they settled even deeper into the relative stability of the *vida fronteriza* or what other authors call the "colonial pact." Both Spanish colonists and *indios rebeldes* had acknowledged that a clear victory was impossible in the short term, and the Spanish even began to talk peace rather than conquest.²²⁶ Spanish missionaries were also able to establish themselves in the region by the 1590s, a development that would have been impossible in

²²⁴ Ibid., 104-105.

²²⁵ Lewis, "Myth and the History of Chile's Araucanians," 118.

²²⁶ Pinto Rodríguez, "Producción e intercambio," 154. The term "pacto colonial" usually appears in references to the 18th century when parleys were more frequent and more formal. However, this relationship undoubtedly had its roots in the developments of the 17th century.

wartime. By 1590 the Dominicans, Mercedarians, and Franciscans had at least two-dozen missionaries divided among the principal settlements in the Araucanía.²²⁷

The Araucanians had even made admirers out of two Jesuit missionaries who had set out to evangelize the Indians in 1595. Fathers Aguilera and Vega wrote that the Indians spoke of their conditions and Spanish abuses clearly and reasonably. The Jesuits for their part were able to communicate to the Araucanians that they came seeking “neither gold nor silver” and were instead interested in furthering the evangelization of the Indians by limiting Spanish abuses.²²⁸ The colonial government recognized the confidence that the Jesuits had among the Araucanians, and began to use the priests as mediators.

Despite the relative tranquility that existed in the region, illegal slave taking and indigenous abuse in general were still proving a disruptive force. Governor Martín García Oñez de Loyola gave orders that peaceful Indians were not to be abused and even enlisted the help of the above-mentioned Jesuits to smooth over this “bad treatment.”²²⁹ But by the 1590s the illegal transport of Indian slaves had been disrupting the region’s indigenous population for twenty years. Eugene Korth called the Araucanía of the late 16th century “a clearinghouse for the deportation of slaves to the mines and *encomiendas* of Santiago, La Serena, and Peru. By the 1590s “reduced” Indians were being “crowded into hulls in a fashion that resembled Negro slavers” in Valdivia and sent to Valparaiso and points north.²³⁰ Making matters worse was the fact that more domestic labor was soon needed when the Audiencia of Lima

²²⁷ Ibid.

²²⁸ Foerster, *Jesuitas y Mapuches*, 54.

²²⁹ Ibid.

²³⁰ Korth, *Spanish Policy*, 75.

eliminated import tariffs on Chile's most important farm products like wheat, flour, fruits, and bacon.²³¹

The new threat of European pirates did little to slow slave-taking trends. When the viceroy sent a ship to Arauco to watch for European enemies in 1592 the sailors offered to help should any skirmishes with the Indians arise. Sure enough the sailors were soon off to join a Spanish raid in which a number of Indian prisoners were taken. There is no direct evidence that the captives were taken to Peru, but previous trends would suggest that they were likely sold into slavery there.²³² The implicit message to the viceroy was that if Lima didn't take pirate threats seriously (the ship was a response to Cavendish's arrival **five years** earlier), neither would Chilean colonists. They would instead use the late and insufficient reinforcements to take more indigenous slaves.

Governor Oñez de Loyola took his post in 1593 and brought an impressive résumé. He was the nephew of Saint Ignatius, was married to an Inca princess, and had defeated and executed the leader of a major indigenous rebellion in Peru. It stood to reason then, that he had big plans for Chile. Oñez de Loyola was one of the few governors of Chile to strongly speak out against the practice of enslaving Indian prisoners of war. The governor denounced growing slave export, arguing that the shipment of Indian slaves from Valdivia was becoming quite regular.²³³ Many of these slaves had even come to the Spanish as allies and instead were placed in

²³¹ Barros Arana, *Historia general: III*, 31,35.

²³² Jara, *Guerra y sociedad*, 156.

²³³ *Ibid.*, 178.

irons.²³⁴ Oñez de Loyola also criticized his eventual successor for branding *indios de guerra* on the face and sending some of them to Arica where his brother had a vineyard.²³⁵ Oñez de Loyola also commissioned a report on the mutilation of indigenous slaves to prevent their escape. The Spanish would regularly cut off the front of a slave's foot and or cut a nerve that connected the foot to the leg, meaning that the affected person could only walk by dragging his foot.²³⁶

Oñez de Loyola also heard complaints about how miscegenation through the capture of Araucanian women continued to be a source of ire along the frontier. Fray Agustín de Cisneros, the Bishop of La Imperial wrote to Oñez de Loyola that “many soldiers, carry off female Indians for immoral purposes.”²³⁷ Prostitution and concubinage often accompany armies, and with the number of young female Indians captured by the Spanish there is no reason to expect that things were any different along the Chilean frontier.²³⁸ In all fairness to the Spanish however, we must remember the scores of Spanish women who had been and continued to be captured by the Araucanians and Pehuenches.²³⁹

²³⁴ The Spanish soldier Diego Serrano and Pehuenche chief Juan Millanchingue had agreed to attack a rebel tribe together. When Millanchingue arrived with his people to carry out the attack, Serrano had all of them imprisoned. Villalobos, *Los Pehuenches en la vida fronteriza*, 30. The soldier-poet Diego Arias de Saavedra referred to the incident in his *Purén Indomito*. “Llegado a él, a los demás vendieron como a esclavos herrados de Guinea, dándolos a quien más por ellos dieron, que creo que no habrá quién esto crea; cual ésta otra maldad gentes no vieron en todo cuanto el delfico rodea, ni codicia tan grande que hiciese que por esclavo el libre se vendiese.” Arias de Saavedra, *Purén Indomito*, 527.

²³⁵ Jara, *Guerra y sociedad*, 162.

²³⁶ *Ibid.*, 251(n).

²³⁷ Korth, *Spanish Policy*, 75.

²³⁸ Margarita Gascón, “Frontier Societies: A View from the Southern Frontier of the Indies” *International Seminar on the History of the Atlantic World, 1500-1800*. Harvard University, Working Paper No. 02-04., 21. (Used with permission of the author).

²³⁹ See Susan Migden Socolow, “Spanish Captives in Indian Society: Cultural Contact along the Argentine Frontier, 1600-1835,” *Hispanic American Historical Review*, 72:1 (February 1992): 73-99. Socolow's article is a fascinating study of captive taking on the other side of the Andes where Spanish women were still being kidnapped to bolster indigenous populations in the pampa well into the republican era.

Oñez de Loyola even tried to reduce the power of the seemingly untouchable *encomenderos*, denouncing a petition made by a number of Santiago *vecinos* to attach *encomienda* Indians to an hacienda and to make the *encomienda* hereditary. The petition even asked that this perpetuity be transferable from one *encomendero* to another. According to Oñez de Loyola, this would “open the door” for the “depopulation” of Chile’s southern cities since new Indian laborers would be much more valuable.²⁴⁰

Oñez de Loyola helped reveal that while slave taking raids were supposed to secure southern cities against attack by Indians, they were instead making them more vulnerable. As Santiago and other cities in the north demanded more labor, southern interests began to ship out the same Indians who had fed and supported the army on their campaigns. While their food and supplies diminished, the Army of Arauco was called upon to conduct additional raids, leaving them ill prepared to deal with any Indian attacks.

Oñez de Loyola Disrupts the Colonial Pact

Oñez de Loyola also proved determined to get the viceroy’s help against English pirates. After learning that Richard Hawkins had anchored his *Dainty* in Valparaiso harbor in 1594, Oñez de Loyola sent an emissary to the Audiencia of Lima rather than the stingy Hurtado de Mendoza to ask for help. The *audiencia* eventually sent 300 more conscripts from Tierra Firme and Panama along with 40,000 pesos, but not without a new mandate from the viceroy stating that the Governor of Chile could not

²⁴⁰ Ibid., 178-79.

recruit the colony's *vecinos* and *moradores* for the war effort.²⁴¹ This measure effectively nullified any help the reinforcements brought, as Chile depended on the temporary manpower and extra financial contributions from *vecinos* to keep the front supplied during frequent difficult periods. From the perspective of officials in Chile, the viceroy had tied them up in knots by not providing them with the resources they needed or even allowing them to gather them on their own. Without excusing illegal slave-taking raids, we see that Chilean colonists were increasingly limited in their ability to keep the War of Arauco economically and strategically viable through legal means.

Undeterred, Oñez de Loyola sent another emissary to Spain in 1595. The dying Philip II could not attend to his affairs and the Council of Indies could offer little more than a plan and “a promise” of future assistance.²⁴² Hurtado de Mendoza's successor Luis de Velasco proved no more willing to fortify Chile against pirate threats. He maintained that the best way to deal with pirate landings was with local militias that could be quickly gathered to drive them off, even though Hawkins had already proved this strategy to be obsolete.²⁴³ Like his predecessors, Velasco continued to argue that the difficult Magellan run combined with the problems of re-supplying on a desolate Chilean coast would provide sufficient natural protection for Chile and Peru against European enemies.²⁴⁴

²⁴¹ Barros Arana, *Historia general: III*, 149.

²⁴² *Ibid.*, 161.

²⁴³ Hawkins knew that the Spanish could only defend themselves on land, and as such did not disembark in Valparaiso when he anchored the *Dainty* there in 1594. Instead, he captured the Spanish ships that were in the harbor, holding their cargoes for ransom. Del Busto Duthurburu. *Siglo XVI - Historia Externa, Tomo III, Vol. 2.*, 609.

²⁴⁴ Peter T. Bradley, *The Lure of Peru: Maritime Intrusion into the South Sea, 1598-1701* (New York, St. Martin's Press, 1989), 26.

Despite being turned away by the crown and viceroy, Oñez de Loyola was determined to bring more stability to Chile. He wanted to make strides against *indios rebeldes*, improve the treatment of *indios reducidos* as we have seen, and release a number of illegally taken indigenous slaves. While the second of these measures reduced tensions to some degree, further encroachment into the Araucanía made the *indios rebeldes* nervous and the release of captives was regarded as a sign of weakness. The “colonial pact” was kept stable by an equal power relationship between the Spanish and *indios rebeldes*, so in 1598 when the Araucanian *lonko* Pelantaro correctly observed that the Oñez de Loyola had overextended Spanish forces he attacked.²⁴⁵

Governor Oñez de Loyola himself had taken the point in the Spanish push into the Araucanía and he and his men ventured into the Valley of Curalaba in 1598. Some authors say he was ambushed, some say his attackers only happened upon him, but all agree that he was killed by a small group of Araucanians who left only one Spaniard alive. Most also concur that Oñez de Loyola was decapitated, his head becoming the inspiration for the subsequent assault.²⁴⁶

Although this was a most brutal act, its effectiveness in rallying the Araucanians was undeniable. As we saw in chapter one, the Araucanians would absorb the traits of the enemy and the head was a “symbol of the enemy’s bravery... and the source of his

²⁴⁵ Silva Galdames, *Atlas de historia de Chile*, 48.

²⁴⁶ Guevara, *Historia de la civilización de Araucanía*. Ovalle, *Historica relacion del Reino de Chile*. González de Nájera, *Desengaño y reparo de la guerra del Reino de Chile*. These are just four of the many sources that discuss the assassination of the governor in detail.

prestige.”²⁴⁷ As a result, the governor’s assassin, Pelantaro, became the recognized leader of the assault.²⁴⁸

The soldier-poet Diego Arias de Saavedra was one of the Spanish defenders of Chillán during the Pelantaro-led attack and described it in his poem, *Purén Indómito* (Purén Untamed).²⁴⁹

“The din, the rumble the horrific scream,
the mob, bedlam, the clamors
the barbarous shouting,
without end the fears increase:
no one defends their miserable house
against the perfidious traitors,²⁵⁰
they flee unarmed and naked,
of fright and fear deaf and dumb.”²⁵¹

After the assault, Arias de Saavedra and a few fellow soldiers set out in pursuit of the attackers, eventually finding them waiting in ambush with stones and arrows ready.

“Twas so terrible and vigorous the stoning that, not being of such great strength nor of such fine refuge the helmet, my head was cut to pieces; it was my cursed luck to be senseless for a good hour, without being able to walk straight, nor be useful for more than an hour.”²⁵²

As mentioned in chapter one, the Spanish presence had led to the development of the *lonko* system by which a temporary alliance among scattered Araucanian and even Pehuenche and Conco (Chiloé’s aborigines) groups was rapidly formed. In both this case and in that of the Pueblo Revolt in New Mexico, the Spanish overlooked the

²⁴⁷ Boccara, “Etnogénesis Mapuche,” 437-438.

²⁴⁸ Silva Galdames, *Atlas de historia de Chile*, 48.

²⁴⁹ Purén is a region of Araucanía. The term is also often used to describe its inhabitants. “Purén” and “Araucania” are often interchangeable.

²⁵⁰ These traitors were a handful of Christianized Indians who gave strategic help to the Pehuenche before their assault. *Los Pehuenches en la vida fronteriza*, 30.

²⁵¹ Arias de Saavedra. *Purén Indómito*, 301.

²⁵² Villalobos, *Los Pehuenches en la vida fronteriza*, 32.

potential of scattered groups to ally. In Chile, the *lonko* system and smoldering resentment of the Spaniards²⁵³ were able to turn hundreds of small kin groups into a 6,000-man army that between 1598 and 1602 forced the Spanish to abandon not only Chillán, but Osorno, Valdivia, Villarrica, La Imperial, Santa Cruz, and Arauco.²⁵⁴ According to one author, this so-called “Disaster of Curalaba” meant the deaths of more than three thousand Spaniards and the capture of more than five hundred women and scores of children and priests.²⁵⁵

The Disaster of Curalaba revealed two important lessons. One, that the colonial pact had become instrumental in governing the conduct of colonists and Araucanians alike. Two, that if the norms of the pact were broken there would be violent consequences. The Araucanians knew there was little they could do about their declining population, and legal status, but after 1598 they were confident that they could fend off territorial incursions that violated the colonial pact.

By 1598 Spanish governors and missionaries had learned that reputation went a long way among the Araucanians, and that any incursions outside of Spanish settlements had to be made very delicately. Governor Loyola and Spanish Jesuits alike entered the Araucanía in the 1590s with the great fervor of reformers and tipped the balance of power that was the colonial pact. Both had good intentions, but the

²⁵³ Leading the assault on Chillán were the Pehuenche who sought revenge for their betrayal by Diego Serrano and took half of the settlement’s women captive. Arias de Saavedra, *Purén Indómito*, 304.

²⁵⁴ Diego de Ocaña, *Relación del viaje a Chile, año de 1600, contenida en la crónica intitulada “A través de la América del Sur”* (Santiago: Editorial Universitaria, 1995), 42. This 6,000 soldier figure is Father Ocaña’s own estimate, but based on the observations of other chroniclers and on the destruction caused we can say almost without a doubt that the invading army was composed of thousands of soldiers. Villarrica and Arauco held out during the initial assault, but were abandoned a few years later. Villarrica would not be refounded until the 19th century.

²⁵⁵ Alonso González de Nájera, *Desengaño y reparo de la guerra del Reino de Chile*, in Marqués de Miraflores & D. Miguel Salva, eds. *Colección de documentos inéditos para la historia de España: Tomo XLVIII*, (Madrid: Imprenta de la Viuda de Calero, 1866), 124.

Jesuits had already made the Araucanians feel invaded when Loyola wandered into the Valley of Curalaba and provided Pelantaro with the perfect opportunity to make a name for himself and “restore the fatherland” as he put it. Pelantaro later would boast that he would not stop until he had “driven all Spaniards out of Chile” or had Spanish women “making chicha and dressing in blankets.” He knew full well however that the Spanish would not disappear and that he in fact needed them to bolster his power. His murder of Loyola had turned him into a *gentoqui* and converted his rivals like Aganamón into his lieutenants. This is best revealed by the fact that a decade later during the “Defensive War” he would make peace with the Spanish. In chapter three we will see that during the Defensive War, the best way to gain recognition on the frontier was by to bring hundreds of Araucanians to be catechized. Pelantaro recognized this and took advantage of the opportunity, just as he had done in 1598.²⁵⁶

²⁵⁶ Diego de Rosales, *Historia General del Reino de Chile, Flandes Indiano, Tomo II* (2nd ed., Santiago: Editorial Andrés Bello, 1989), 688, 958.

CHAPTER IV

FRONTIER EXPERIMENTS: JESUITS, MYTHS AND SLAVERY IN POST-CURALABA CHILE

“The Spanish never put their (shoulder) into the *reducción* nor conversion with as much endeavor as they had in getting the enslaved Indians to work, ... our entire attention (was) upon capturing slaves and selling them while we informed his Majesty that we had achieved a great deal in his Royal Service, calling vices ‘virtues’ and greed ‘piety’ and procuring that all the provinces (in Chile) were angry and in revolt.”²⁵⁷

While the Pelantaro-led assault of 1598 was catastrophic for Chile, news of the event caused barely a ripple in Peru where the murdered Governor Loyola had been nothing short of a hero. One of the most dramatic reactions came not from the government, but from a group of Lima’s prominent women. They showed concern for the plight of the hundreds of Chilean women taken captive during the assault, some of whom may have been relatives or acquaintances.²⁵⁸ These *Limeñas* collected alms to clothe any of the “forgotten and helpless captives” who they hoped would be freed.²⁵⁹ The new viceroy Luis de Velasco quickly promised three hundred men, but left it up to Loyola’s replacement to find them and take them to Chile. The new

²⁵⁷ A.G.I. Chile,129. Expediente relativo al Ejército de Chile y su situado. 1680-1699. No. 12 in in Memoria de los ynstrumentos que el lco D. Pablo Vazquez de Velasco Cavo del orden de Santio y fiscal de la R. Auda de Chile remite a su Magd. en comprobazion de lo que en carta de 25 de Septe de 1690 escribe en orden a lo obrado en la distibuzion del situado del exto de chile y de los fraudes y malas administraciones que reconosco y experimento en el dispendio del caudal de dho situado y lo dmas que en dha carta se contiene. Maestre de Campo Geronimo de Quiroga. Letter to Licenciado Don Pablo Vazquez de Velasco...Fiscal de la Real Audiencia ... de Chile. Concepción, 28 February, 1690

²⁵⁸ Gonzalez de Nájera says 500 Spanish women were taken captive. Ibid., 124.

²⁵⁹ Ibid., 128.

governor Francisco de Quiñones only managed to scare up 130 volunteers despite promises that they would be paid and allowed to return to Peru whenever they wished. Like Pedro de Valdivia and other governors before him, Quiñones would remind the crown of how he had sacrificed by spending money out of his own pocket to get the troops to Chile.²⁶⁰

The crown finally managed to send 500 reinforcements through Buenos Aires in 1601, but they reached Mendoza in such poor shape that they had to be outfitted with proper clothing while before they could cross into Chile in the spring.²⁶¹

Chile's colonists were still trying to put down the Araucanian assault of the previous year when the captain of the Dutch ship *Fidelity*, Baltasar Cordes, led the remnants of a larger Dutch expedition in an attack on Castro, Chiloé's principal port.²⁶²

Most of the Indians of Chiloé were "reduced," but just before the Dutch arrived they joined the general uprising. According to the account of Diego de Rosales, it was the Chiloé Indians who solicited Dutch assistance with their own plan to attack Castro. As Cordes and thirty musketeers approached Castro they revealed the Indians' plan to Spanish officials in the hope that the colonists would re-supply them in exchange for the information. The Spanish accepted the deal and provided the Dutch with gunpowder and ammunition. However, when the Spanish sent envoys to plan an attack on the Indians, Cordes sprung a trap and had them killed. Cordes and

²⁶⁰ Barros Arana, *Historia general: III*, 195.

²⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 274.

²⁶² Kris Lane, *Pillaging the Empire: Piracy in the Americas, 1500-1750* (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1998), 75.

his men then advanced on Castro, sacked it, killed Spanish men who had found refuge in a church, killed the local priest, “*usando de humanidad con las mujeres.*”²⁶³

Spanish reinforcements from Osorno eventually drove the Dutch out of Castro and killed thirty of the Indian leaders who had assisted them. Captured or deserting Dutch sailors were interviewed *ad nauseum* about the plans for their voyage, which meant that officials in Chile and Peru were well aware of Dutch motives. This Dutch threat from the south is quite ironic when we consider that Magellan’s motivation for finding the strait that bears his name was an alternate route to the East Indies. This Spanish sponsored expedition had only paved the way for a century of Dutch and English navigation of the route when Spanish attention shifted to American gold and silver.²⁶⁴

While the attack on Castro was a blow to the entire viceroyalty, there were signs that it would not be easy for the Dutch to gain a toehold or even establish trading relationships in Chile. First of all, the attack on Chiloé was essentially an afterthought and an act of desperation. While the goal of the five-vessel expedition of “contrabandists” under Jacob Mahu was to explore and trade in the “South Sea,” they did not come close to reaching the Pacific intact. Mahu himself died off the coast of Africa, and the expedition only went downhill from there. The ships became separated, and a number of them were lost or had turned back by the time Cordes landed in Chiloé.²⁶⁵ Secondly, there was no guarantee that the Indians of Chile would ally with the Dutch or even give them free passage for that matter. Three- dozen members of Mahu’s scattered expedition landed in Arauco six months before the

²⁶³ Rosales, *Historia general: II*, 721-73

²⁶⁴ W.S. Barclay, *The Land of Magellan* (New York: Brentano’s Publishers, 1926), 39.

²⁶⁵ Lane, *Pillaging the Empire*, 74-75.

Castro attack. After what seemed as a welcome banquet, the inebriated Dutch were slaughtered by their Araucanian hosts.²⁶⁶ In fact, the Dutch did not necessarily have major territorial aspirations in Chile. The Dutch saw Chile and the islands off its coast mostly as a stopping-off point on their way to Callao or the Moluccas, or a base from which to search for the mythical other “southern continent.”²⁶⁷

However, the lack of major Dutch territorial aspirations did not stop skittish Chilean officials from ruminating about a Dutch takeover of the entire continent, which would begin when they were able to dislodge the Spanish from Chile. For Chilean colonists the fact remained that their European and domestic enemies had, however temporarily, formed an alliance. Although little thought was ever given to Chiloé in the rest of the colony, this example of a potential alliance would remain in the minds and in the missives of Chilean officials for most of the century and would govern much of the colonial-viceregal-imperial relationship and discussion of resources, which was just as Chile wanted it.²⁶⁸ The viceroys of Peru consistently showed a lukewarm commitment to the War of Arauco, (especially after 1598) but this time their silver lifeblood could be threatened by a Dutch outpost in the Araucanía, and they had to act. For the viceroys, the failure to win War of Arauco meant a failure to establish Chile as the aforementioned “outer wall of the Pacific” against pirates.²⁶⁹

²⁶⁶ Rosales, *Historia general: II*, 720.

²⁶⁷ Ralph Lee Woodward, *Robinson Crusoe's Island: A History of the Juan Fernández Islands* (Chapel Hill: UNC Press, 1969), 18-21.

²⁶⁸ This was not the first time concerns over pirates and aborigines coincided. Pedro de Valdivia showed a great desire to “plant His Majesty’s banner” in the Strait of Magellan and settle the area to keep non-Spaniards out. However, the expedition he sent to begin this project had to turn back when Valdivia was killed. Pedro de Valdivia. Carta al emperador Carlos V, Santiago, 26 de octubre de 1552. <<http://www.cervantesvirtual.com/servlet/SirveObras/>>

²⁶⁹ Pinto Rodríguez, “Producción e intercambio en un espacio fronterizo,” 150.

Colonists were very aware of the fact that whereas the destruction of seven Spanish settlements by the Araucanians warranted only 300 ragtag reinforcements, the appearance of a severely depleted Dutch fleet prompted Viceroy Velasco to gather eight armed vessels at Callao and send three of them south to search for more possible breaches of the Strait. Velasco then complained to the crown that these eight ships were not sufficient and would need more resources from Spain to defend Peru against the “Dutch or other foreigners.”²⁷⁰

The story of the early 17th century then became one of how to deal with the combined Dutch-Araucanian threat and what this meant for the *vida fronteriza*. It took the events of 1598-1600 (most importantly the appearance of the Dutch of course) for the crown to decide that instability on the Chilean frontier had lasted long enough and now posed a very real threat to Peruvian silver. The crown would now sponsor a series of experimental ways to end the War of Arauco including the creation of a permanent army, the establishment of a “Defensive War” and the legalization of indigenous slavery. While these experiments were important in revealing the commitment of the crown and viceroy to protecting their silver, to residents of Chile they were a lesson in how the War of Arauco and fear of pirates could become a permanent source of resources for a flagging frontier economy. Ultimately the crown failed to realize how important the *vida fronteriza* had become to Chile. Therefore, attempts by Spanish officials to erase or move the frontier instead became a means by which colonists and aborigines could to solidify its importance through permanent war.

²⁷⁰ A.G.I. Lima,34. Cartas y expedientes de virreyes de Perú. 1600-1604. #28. Letter from V.R. Luis de Velasco. Dated Lima, 28 December, 1601.

While Viceroy Velasco initially reacted quickly to the Dutch attack, scaring up reinforcements and appealing to the crown for help, further action would have to wait for Philip III to get up to speed after the recent death of his father. When Phillip III did respond, very little was done to protect Chile from pirates. The crown suggested that the Callao to Valparaiso supply run be carried out in the winter months thinking that pirates would not brave the Strait in winter, but Chile was essentially back to square one, relying on the no longer impenetrable barrier of the Strait for its protection. There were simply no available ships in the Pacific fleet to provide permanent defense. Therefore, future Chilean colonists knew that they would never be adequately protected from Spain's European enemies. However, this didn't prevent them from squeezing future viceroys for fortifications and troops now that the English and Dutch had done them the favor of getting Lima's attention.

As the 17th century wore on, it became apparent that Chile would need to be able to frighten the crown to secure ever limited resources. The 1588 defeat of the Spanish Armada and the 1598 death of Philip II were the most recognized but not the only indicators that the primacy of Hapsburg Spain was on the verge of a sharp decline. The bankruptcy of the royal treasury in 1596 signaled that Philip II's grand imperial ventures would at the very least have to be put on hold and that prospects for any further expansion looked bleak.²⁷¹ Begrudgingly acknowledging Spain's weakness, Philip II had allowed Archduke Albert of the Netherlands to at least nominally rule the Low Countries, and had made peace with Charles IV.²⁷² All of this meant that toward the end of the 16th century, the Spanish American Empire "closed in on

²⁷¹ J.H. Elliot, *Imperial Spain: 1469-1716* (London: Penguin Books, 1963), 287.

²⁷² *Ibid.*, 290.

itself.”²⁷³ It was no accident that the 17th century spawned the tale of *Don Quixote*, where what began as a glorious crusade ended in humiliation.²⁷⁴

Chile also sank rather deeply into this “century of disillusionment,” not for mere economic reasons, but also because of the strategic and psychological effects of the Disaster of Curalaba. The assault of 1598 was a watershed event in the War of Arauco. The Spanish had managed to extract some mineral wealth from the south, but their tenuous settlements were now gone. Previous images of glorious battles between two noble armies had yielded to those depicting a bloody stalemate between two tired forces. This significant defeat helped the Spanish crown and Chilean colonists alike reflect on why the conquest was failing.

Although *La Araucana* is set apart from other colonial accounts because of its epic style and rhyme scheme, Alonso de Ercilla was by no means the only author to poeticize the Araucanian war. Some decades later, the soldier-poet Diego Arias de Saavedra used *La Araucana* as a model for his own epic entitled, *Purén Indomito*. Although the two epics contain many similarities, the tone of *Purén Indomito* reminds us that the scenes in *La Araucana* represent only a brief period in the long and painful war of Arauco. Much of what Arias de Saavedra writes reflects the disillusion following the 1598 assault. Ercilla’s vision of an epic struggle between the worshipers of God and *Pillán*,²⁷⁵ turned into a divisive power struggle within a

²⁷³ Ibid., 291-92.

²⁷⁴ Ibid., 299.

²⁷⁵ Pillán was the Mapuche creator who had great respect for warriors. Foerster, *Jesuitas y Mapuches*, 91

Spanish society that was “...losing sight of Christian virtue.” In Purén Indomito, “...war is wretched, cruel, terrifying; God’s punishment for the sins of the Spanish.”²⁷⁶

The frustration with the stalemate was also expressed in the account of Alonso González de Nájera. González de Nájera was a Spanish soldier who arrived in the aftermath of the 1598 rebellion, was wounded, and commissioned to write an account of what he observed.²⁷⁷ His *Desengaño y reparo de la Guerra de Chile* includes tales of cannibalism and Araucanian bloodlust, images undoubtedly influenced by the fact that his own page was killed and eaten by the Araucanians. Referring to Araucanian victory celebrations, González de Nájera said, “...there is great joy in the victory, especially if they take with them the severed heads of Spaniards or prisoners, that for them back on their land, and among their own, is more than a Roman triumph.”²⁷⁸

Although the translated title of his account is *Disillusion and Remedy of the War in Chile*,²⁷⁹ González de Nájera saw no easy way to end this war. He said quite frankly that the Spanish should give up the illusion of ending the conflict through dialogue, “Because even though making peace (something that is incredibly difficult) is possible, given the means and the forces necessary to do it, it will never be that the Indians maintain it, nor that war will cease until the end of time.” González de Nájera showed his frustration at the broken promises and trickery of the Araucanians, but also realized that the Spanish gave them two options; resistance enslavement. The

²⁷⁶ Mariano Rodríguez Fernández, “Estudio Preliminar,” in Diego Arias de Saavedra, *Purén Indómito* (Concepción: Universidad de Concepción, 1984), 99-102.

²⁷⁷ The inspiration for Alonso González de Nájera’s descriptions of Chile’s difficulties in *Desengaño y reparo de la guerra del Reino de Chile*, was a 1607 report he was sent to personally deliver to the Council of Indies by the Governor of Chile. Marques de Miraflores and Miguel Salva, introduction to *Desengaño y reparo de la guerra del Reino de Chile*, 8. I have used the 1970 edition of this text unless otherwise noted.

²⁷⁸ González de Nájera, *Desengaño y reparo de la Guerra de Chile*, 24.

²⁷⁹ Lewis, “Myth and the History of Chile’s Araucanians,” 117.

Spanish soldier mentioned that despite their brutal actions, he “refuses to call them barbarians,” impressed with their deftness in negotiating truces to their favor.²⁸⁰

After 1598 the more critical tone of Franciscan missionaries in Chile was beginning to take precedence over that of their Jesuits colleagues who had tried to point out the merits Araucanian culture and politics. The Franciscan Pedro de Sosa, in his *Memorial del peligroso estado espiritual y temporal del Reino de Chile*, (Memoir of the perilous spiritual and temporal state of the Kingdom of Chile) talked of his frustration with the Araucanians and argued that their violence, and their habit of killing missionaries in particular, had much to do with their struggles.

“The Araucanians are rebels, they flee the Spanish and make war on the Christian Indians, wasting the fruit of so many years of hard work. The rebel Indians have been offered peace and good treatment as given to friendly Indians, but as they are barbarians and live without government, republic or law, they do as they please. Being impossible to put them in *reducciones*, there remains no other solution than to make war on them. Saint Augustine would have approved it, and the gospel calls a mercenary the pastor that sees the wolf and leaves the sheep.”²⁸¹

Father Sosa added that missionaries could not continue to allow these Araucanian “wolves” to continue to prevent the “reduced sheep” from hearing the word.

Christian martyrs did not help the spread of the gospel. Father Sosa mentioned that Saint Paul, upon hearing that many wanted him dead, asked to be given soldiers for his protection. Sosa believed that his contemporaries should have done the same.²⁸²

Even the election of a decorated soldier and enthusiastic diplomat as Chile’s new governor failed to bring Chile out of the post-Curalaba doldrums. New governor

²⁸⁰ González de Nájera, *Desengaño y reparo de la Guerra de Chile*, 49.

²⁸¹ Pinto Rodríguez. *Misioneros en la Araucanía*, 103.

²⁸² *Ibid.*, 103

Alonso de Ribera did all he could to get the colony back on its feet. He set up a mill near Santiago to provide blankets and other materials for surviving soldiers. He also had cart making operations set up in Concepción and Santiago to make sure that these new domestically generated supplies could get to the front.²⁸³

But Ribera was never able to enlist the help of Santiago merchants to turn the economy around. Tired of supporting a losing cause, the merchants had begun to move away from supplying soldiers in the Araucanía and had were increasingly involved in export to Potosí.²⁸⁴ Ribera tried to get them re-involved, but a 1604 Santiago flood left *vecinos* both unwilling and now unable to help.²⁸⁵ Ribera also sought more help from the viceroy and crown, and even sent a recruiter to Lima to round up the troops that the viceroy couldn't deliver.²⁸⁶

Ribera's recruiter had a difficult task ahead, as the "Disaster of Curalaba" left Chile in dire need of any and all resources for the front. According to one estimate the Spanish troops were outnumbered at least twenty to one, a ratio that was increasing yearly as casualties outpaced reinforcements.²⁸⁷ Even when they weren't in battle Spanish soldiers suffered. In one extreme case, the starving inhabitants of a Spanish fort were forced to use their dead as bait to attract dogs to kill and eat.²⁸⁸

This climate of pessimism within the colony and the kingdom combined with events in Chile prompted Philip III to take a step that would have been unthinkable a half-century earlier during the up swell of the conquest. In 1604 the crown decided

²⁸³ Barros Arana, *Historia general: III*, 309.

²⁸⁴ Margarita Gascón, "Frontier Societies: A View from the Southern Frontier of the Indies," 11.

²⁸⁵ Barros Arana, *Historia general: III*, 323.

²⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, 309.

²⁸⁷ González de Nájera, *Desengaño y reparo*, 150.

²⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, 124.

that Chile would have the only permanent and professional army in the Indies, funded yearly by the treasury of the Viceroyalty of Peru. This permanent army on the Bío-Bío was the only exception to Spain's military strategy in its other American territories which followed the "presidio-fuerte-milicia" model.²⁸⁹ Chile had never solidified its frontier with a line of presidios or a series of advancing forts. Its tenuous settlements had already been abandoned on a number of occasions and the crown felt that a professional army needed to replace the frequently overrun *vecino*-based militia. The Dutch attack on Chiloé of course further convinced the crown to make this drastic decision.

This "Army of Arauco" would be a force of 2,000 and would receive a yearly *situado* (salary or payment) of 212,000 ducats.²⁹⁰ Governor Ribera brought a portion of this new *situado* with him on his way to Chile and had more than 1,000 new troops from Spain and New Spain at his disposal the year he took office.²⁹¹

Not surprisingly, there were difficulties in raising enough troops to fill the army's 2,000 spots. However, it was now abundantly clear that "the abandonment of this remote outpost of empire (Chile) seemed an impossible option, not least because of its strategic position controlling the straits of Magellan."²⁹² While the Army of Arauco's principle task was securing Chile against the *indios rebeldes*, colonists were well aware that they had the Dutch to thank for the decision to establish the

²⁸⁹ Schröter, "La frontera en hispanoamérica colonial," 380.

²⁹⁰ Barros Arana, *Historia general: III*, 363.

²⁹¹ Philip III ordered the Viceroy of New Spain to send 400 troops to Chile. 154 arrived in 1605. Barros Arana, *Historia general: III*, 338-39.

²⁹² *Ibid.*, 366-67.

permanent force.²⁹³ In the meantime “a miniature war of Flanders was in the making,”²⁹⁴ a long and grueling European campaign of which Ribera was a veteran.

Ribera welcomed the reinforcements, but pointed out that he could not pay them. He had only received a portion of the promised *situado* from Lima and Viceroy Hurtado de Mendoza had prohibited colonists in Chile from covering the difference.²⁹⁵ Ribera might have been even more concerned about this salary shortage if he had thought he was getting professional soldiers. He called his new troops “poorly disciplined” and said that the ranks were marked by “confusion and barbarism” and hardly resembled a Spanish military unit.²⁹⁶ Alonso González de Nájera, who had recently been a part of this “confusion and barbarism,” agreed. He argued that if the Spanish were to win the war, royal officials would have to stop punishing Lima’s “miscreants” by sending them to serve on the Chilean frontier.²⁹⁷

These complaints revealed some important truths about Chile and the future of the Army of Arauco. As one historian put it, the establishment of the *situado* was “a true recognition of the absence of real revenue in Chile.”²⁹⁸ There was no real wage economy in Chile until the crown established the Army of Arauco, and even then much of the *situado* arrived not in specie but in supplies.²⁹⁹ In other words, if Chile could have paid for its own war, the crown would have obligated the colony to do so.

²⁹³ Margarita Gascón, “La frontera sur del virreinato del Perú en el siglo XVII. Recursos, catastrophes y estrategias imperiales” (paper presented at the Encuentro de historiadores Argentinos y Peruanos, Lima, Sept. 2004), 4.

²⁹⁴ Elliot, “The Spanish Conquest,” 187.

²⁹⁵ Ibid.

²⁹⁶ Jara, *Guerra y sociedad*, 131.

²⁹⁷ González de Nájera, *Desengaño y reparo*, 451. (1866 edition).

²⁹⁸ Jara, *Guerra y sociedad*, 133.

²⁹⁹ Most specie in the 16th century was tied up in administration of the colony and very rarely passed from employer to employee. The Army of Arauco did change this somewhat, but it was not until a class of itinerant mestizo laborers developed in the 18th century and began to replace *encomienda* labor that Chile had anything close to a wage economy. Sergio Villalobos, et al. *Historia y geografía de Chile* (Santiago: Editorial Universitaria, 1984), 72.

Also, administrative snafus, embezzlement, and economic dry spells in Lima would make it unlikely that Chile would ever receive the soldiers and the resources it was supposed to in consecutive years.³⁰⁰ So at the beginning of the 17th century, Chile had few resources of its own, but would sporadically receive a large chunk of money and hundreds of soldiers from Peru or from Spain via Buenos Aires.³⁰¹ These factors would prompt Chilean officials to exaggerate and even provoke threats to scare Lima into rushing the *situado* and reinforcements to them.

Poorly disciplined troops and a lack of resources began to turn the Army of Arauco into something very different than what the crown had envisioned. While the permanent army was supposed to end the Araucanian threat, what it really did was to bring more unscrupulous entrepreneurs to Chile. There they could now count on a *situado* to skim from and could maintain a more permanent presence in the Araucanía where they would be in constant contact with potential indigenous slaves. Among the thieves, rapists and murders that ended up in the ranks of the Army of Arauco was a

³⁰⁰ Barros Arana, *Historia general: III*, 366-67. In 1606 the crown responded to complaints about low salaries. 212,000 ducats would be sent yearly from Peru, and a 2,000-man army was established. But as of 1609 not enough reinforcements had arrived from Peru to expand campaigns beyond those of previous years. Before the Army of Arauco, Lima's yearly contribution varied and was supposed to be given "in moderation." Jara, *Guerra y sociedad*, 99. According to one viceroy, the 212,000 annual ducats represented about seventeen percent of Lima's spending. This seventeen percent does not count money sent to bring reinforcements from Spain or for reinforcements against pirates. This spending was especially worrisome to the viceroy because he was sending only about a million ducats to the king, but spending a million and a quarter. Relación que el Príncipe de Esquilache hace al Señor Marqués de Guadalcazar sobre el estado en que deja las provincias del Peru. 1621, in *Colección de las memorias o relaciones que escribieron los Virreyes del Perú acerca del estado en que dejaban las cosas generales del reino. Tomo I*. Ed. by Ricardo Beltrán y Rózpide. (Madrid: Imp. Del Asilo de Huérfanos del S.C. de Jesús, 1921), 291-93. Also see John Te Paske, "The Costs of Empire Spending Patterns and Priorities in Colonial Peru, 1581-1820," *Colonial Latin American Historical Review* 2: (Winter 1993), pp. 1-34.

³⁰¹ Zacarias Moutokais argues that the arrival of *navios de registro* in Buenos Aires, (ships from Spain with special permission to land in Buenos Aires) transformed the Rio de la Plata economy. Most of the first *navios* were carrying troops or supplies for the Army of Arauco. So the Chilean frontier was not only an economic resource in its own colony, but also helped Buenos Aires grow after it was re-founded in 1580. Zacarias Moutokais, "Power, Corruption, and Commerce: The Making of the Local Administrative Structure in Seventeenth-Century Buenos Aires" *The Hispanic American Historical Review* 68:4 (Nov., 1988): 771-801.

woman disguised as a man. After escaping a convent in the Spanish town of her birth and hiding for two years under the noses of her family and neighbors disguised as a young man, Catalina de Erauso made her way to Sanlúcar where she paid her way onto a ship bound for Panama.³⁰² According to her manuscript, Erauso herself arrived in Chile with a questionable background, not as a suspected woman, but as a rabble-rouser who was prompted to join the army after killing a man in Peru.³⁰³ In about 1603 Erauso made her way from Lima to Concepción where she and her fellow soldiers were "...well received due to the lack of people that there were in Chile."³⁰⁴ Erauso served for fifteen years in Indian wars in Peru and Chile.³⁰⁵ Some documents place Erauso in a battle for the port of Valdivia, a battle that the Spanish ultimately lost, but after which she gained the title of *alférez*.³⁰⁶ She led her company for six months after the death of her captain, but any possibilities for her own ascension to captain were lost after she lynched a traitorous "Captain of Indians."³⁰⁷ Later, she was injured in a mounted assault on the Purén Valley.³⁰⁸

³⁰² Angel Esteban, introduction in, Catalina de Erauso, *Historia de la Monja Alférez, ..., escrita por ella misma* (Madrid: Ediciones Cátedra, 2002), 93(n).

³⁰³ *Ibid.*, 109.

³⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, 111.

³⁰⁵ "Memorial de la Monja Alférez, Doña Catalina de Erauso con la relación de sus méritos y servicios y pidiendo se le conceda un entretenimiento de 70 pesos de a 22 quilates al mes en la ciudad de Cartajena de Indias," in Pedro Rubio Moreno ed., *La Monja Alférez Doña Catalina de Erauso: Dos manuscritos autobiográficos inéditos de su autobiografía conservados en el Arhivo de la Santa Iglesia Catedral de Sevilla* (Seville: Ediciones del Cabildo Metroplitano de la Catedral de Sevilla, 1995).

³⁰⁶ *La Monja Alférez Doña Catalina de Erauso: Dos manuscritos autobiográficos inéditos*, 106.

³⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, 107.

³⁰⁸ *Ibid.* Two soldiers who served with her gave sworn declarations that she in fact was wounded at Purén. Both gave the declarations in Lima after she had confessed that she was a woman and was facing punishment for the murders she had committed. Certificación de Don Francisco Pérez de Navarrete. (1624), and Certificación de Don Juan Cortés de Monroy. (1625), in *La Monja Alférez Doña Catalina de Erauso: Dos manuscritos autobiográficos*.

The War of Arauco was not only an important part of Erauso's life, but was very useful to her picaresque narrative.³⁰⁹ The popularity of *La Araucana* meant that for peninsular Spaniards, the Chilean frontier attracted "...only cruel adventurers who fled dark pasts and knights abused by their bad fortune."³¹⁰ Such cruel adventurers were thrust into the "rugged world of the South American frontier"³¹¹ where a Spanish audience could imagine them engaged in frequent duels and other illicit activities. Erauso supported this notion when she stated, "...we always had our weapons in hand, because of the great invasion of the Indians."³¹² Erauso's experience in Chile demonstrates how widespread the frontier's reputation had become, and how this reputation could translate in reward to those who (even questionably) served or had served there.³¹³

³⁰⁹ Some argue that Erauso's autobiography is actually an apocryphal text. (See discussion in Rima R. Vallbona, "Realidad histórica y ficción en *Vida y sucesos de la Monja Alférez*" (PhD. diss., Middlebury College, 1981), 5-20; and Diego Barros Arana, "La Monja Alférez-Algunas observaciones críticas sobre su historia-Noticias desconocidas acerca de su muerte," *Revista de Santiago* I (1872), 219-20.) In the A.G.I. I searched the admittedly incomplete records of soldiers in the Army of Arauco during Erauso's supposed tenure there, and none of the names matched any of her three aliases. However, if she did make up her participation in the War of Arauco, this simply means that the idea of the Chilean frontier was powerful enough in Spain to get someone a pension who had never been there.

³¹⁰ Raul Morales Alférez, *La Monja Alférez: Crónica de una vida que tuvo perfil de romance* (Santiago: Excelsior, 1938?), 40. *La Araucana* spawned a number of imitators that continued Spanish literature's fascination with the War of Arauco. Spanish Baroque playwrights were so interested in the New World, that any mention of the Americas in a source caused it to be labeled as exclusively about the Americas. For example, the fact that *La Araucana* contained passages on Spanish victories in Europe was of little interest to playwrights of the time. In fact, Héctor Brioso Santos calls *La Araucana* one of the principal "sources of the *lopesca* works regarding the Americas." Indeed, the *lopesca* genre's namesake, Lope de Vega first had his *Arauco Domado* published in 1625. The play went through three more printings in the same decade. Héctor Brioso Santos, *América en la prosa literaria española de los siglos XVI y XVII*, (Huelva, Spain: Diputación Provincial de Huelva, 1998), 38-40, 97-98. There were no less than six Spanish plays written in the seventeenth century set in Arauco. Five of them were written within the first thirty years of the century, at the height of Catalina de Erauso's fame.

³¹¹ Jerome R. Adams, *Notable Latin American Women: Twenty-Nine Leaders, Rebels, Poets, Battlers and Spies, 1500-1900* (Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Company, Inc., 1995), 49.

³¹² *Historia de la Monja Alférez*, 113.

³¹³ The crown eventually granted Erauso a pension, largely because of her service in the War of Arauco. She lived off of the pension in her final years as an anonymous mule herder in New Spain.

Beyond the questionable skill of the Spanish infantry, a change in Araucanian tactics also limited the effectiveness of the army. Improved Araucanian horsemanship allowed them to abandon their “fortified war” in favor of more mobile, more flexible, and smaller scale raids called *malones* or *malocas*.³¹⁴ The Spanish responded with more raids of their own, partly because they did not have the resources for a sustained campaign and partly because concern shifted from capturing territory to taking prisoners. These factors would turn the Army of Arauco, designed for a few sustained and decisive campaigns, into “a slave-hunting machine” which would eventually conduct hundreds of smaller raids.³¹⁵

Before turning to slave-taking raids on a larger scale, Chilean residents had to address the fact that indigenous slavery was illegal in the Americas. For years colonists in Chile had pushed for the legalization of indigenous slavery, but after the attack of 1598 petitions became more frequent and more detailed. The Council of Indies became an advocate for permitting the practice in Chile and outlined four important benefits that enslaving prisoners of war might bring to the colony. First, the soldiers in the War of Arauco would be certain of spoils. Second the new slaves would lessen the “personal service” burden of *indios amigos*.³¹⁶ Third, the council

³¹⁴ León Solís, *Maloqueros y conchavadores*, 15. The Araucanian language (*mapudungún*) term “*maloca*” was commonly used to describe a raid from either side well into the 18th century.

³¹⁵ Jara, *Guerra y sociedad*, 149.

³¹⁶ The term *indios amigos* is a bit misleading as at least in the beginning, the aborigines did not help the Spanish out of “friendship.” In the late 16th century most *indios amigos* were in fact *encomienda* Indians aiding their *encomendero* perform his obligatory military service. By the 17th century, most *indios amigos* were no longer attached to *encomiendas* and had a good deal of autonomy as long as they lived near a Spanish settlement or with a Spanish *capitán de amigos* supervising them. Groups of *indios amigos* were scattered throughout Chile’s central valley and the Araucanía, so mapping their settlements or counting them would be more than difficult. However, we do know that the *indios amigos* serving as soldiers on the Spanish side in the War of Arauco far outnumbered troops of European extraction. Some chroniclers added that *indios amigos* were essential for their quantity and quality, as with their local knowledge and zeal in battle, one *indio amigo* soldier was worth a dozen of his Spanish allies. Andrea Ruíz-Esquide Figueroa, *Los indios amigos en la frontera Araucana*

theorized that the freed *indios amigos* could return to farming where they would alleviate Chile's food shortages. Finally, captive Indians could be Christianized, a "great spiritual good."³¹⁷ After extensive debate and at the urging of Chile's governors, in 1608 the king legalized indigenous slavery.³¹⁸

Although the crown had now legalized enslavement of indigenous prisoners of war, and sent an army to the Chilean frontier, Philip III was still willing to listen to less violent and more cost effective proposals for ending the War of Arauco, like the one introduced by the Jesuit Luis de Valdivia. Father Valdivia began working to end personal service and enslavement in Chile in 1605. Part of his strategy involved building support of the viceroy against Chilean governors who permitted slave raids that interfered with his plans for peace with and with his evangelization of rebel Araucanians.³¹⁹ Since Valdivia had met several past Viceroy's of New Spain in Lima he most likely knew the ins and outs of failed aggressive pacification efforts on the Chichimec frontier, and wanted to try something different in Chile. Father Valdivia was also inspired by inroads being made without the help of an army by his Jesuit brethren in Paraguay among the Guaraní. Father Valdivia also recognized that slave raids had destabilized and defeated peace efforts on all three frontiers.³²⁰

(Santiago: Editorial Universitaria, 1993), 23. *Indios rebeldes* and *indios de paz* had not been *reducidos* (conquered) by the Spanish, but as the name suggests, *indios de paz* had no quarrel with the Spanish and helped them occasionally.

³¹⁷ BN. Manuscritos Medina. Tomo 113. Pieza 1946. Consulta llevada al consejo de Indias para que se tengan por esclavos los indios que se cautivaren, fecha en Madrid a 28 de Marzo de 1610. Consejo de Indias, Madrid 17 Nov., 1607. Fojas 252-53.

³¹⁸ A.G.I. Lima 40. Real provisión del 26 May, 1608 en que se dieron por esclavos los indios de Chile. Fojas 218-219. It was not until 1610 that the decree was "officially promulgated in Chile." Korth, *Spanish Policy*, 111.

³¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 118-19.

³²⁰ Foerster, *Jesuitas y Mapuches*, 133.

Undaunted by the order of 1608, Valdivia pushed a plan that became known as the “Defensive War.” The Army of Arauco would remain in place, but all new campaigns would be suspended and resources would be dedicated to fortifying existing forts north of the Bío-Bío River. Maintaining the army in the region would keep the Spanish from looking weak and would prevent assaults from *indios rebeldes*, but the suspension of campaigns would allow for more missionary work and would build trust between the Jesuits and Araucanians. The king liked the plan because it required no significant spending or troop increases, and addressed the perennial problems of mistreatment of *indios de paz* and personal service. He decided in 1610 that “defensive warfare ought to be tried for a period of three or four years.”³²¹

In 1612 the viceroy “ordered the cessation of offensive warfare,” and gave Valdivia exceptional powers for an ecclesiastic and a religious one at that, naming him “Visitor General of Chile.” The viceroy also informed the Governor of Chile and the *audiencia* that Father Valdivia was not subject to their authority. The viceroy named the Bío-Bío River as the frontier and decreed that no Spanish infantryman was to cross it under the penalty of death. The Defensive War also meant forbidding non-violent contact, particularly trade and romantic relationships between Spanish soldiers and Araucanian women. Finally, the viceroy suspended the polemical 1608 “slavery decree.”³²²

The king armed Father Valdivia with another *cédula* addressed to the “Chiefs of Araucanía” in which he said, “I have been informed that the occasion and causes that you have had for rebelling and continuing the war for so many years have been some

³²¹ Ibid., 122-23.

³²² Ibid., 130-31.

humiliations and poor treatments that you received from the Spanish during which time you were living peacefully.” The king added that such abuses were against his will and that of his predecessors, who all had wished that the Indians be treated, “like free men, as you are no lesser than the rest of my Spanish vassals.” The king assured the Indians they could trust Father Valdivia and go to him for what they needed.³²³

Father Valdivia set out to “revindicate” the Indian in Chile after the 1598 attack. Like his Jesuit predecessors, Valdivia believed that the Araucanians were misunderstood and ready to be converted. He even excused the 1612 killing of two Jesuits by the Araucanian Anganamón as an accident and claimed that there was no danger among the Araucanians. Valdivia believed that the kidnapping of Jesuits could actually help evangelization efforts, arguing “as prisoners their work would bear fruit, making the Indians understand the will of the Crown.”³²⁴ A fellow Jesuit supported Valdivia’s claims, adding that the abuses committed against the Araucanians were rarely discussed.³²⁵

Father Valdivia did not enter into this project blindly however and knew that there were chiefs he would have a hard time bringing into the fold. Valdivia believed that the “most bellicose” and the key to the war was the Ilicura Regua, led by the elderly chief Untablame. Aware of the enormity of his project Father Valdivia enlisted the help of both “political and ecclesiastic authorities” and took Governor Alonso de Ribera with him on his 1612 Araucanian peacemaking journey, later dubbed the

³²³ “Real cédula para los caciques de la Araucanía, en favor del P. Luis de Valdivia.” in *Historia física y política de Chile: Documentos. Tomo Primero*. (Paris: Imprenta de Maulde Y Renou, 1846) 261.

³²⁴ Letter signed by Alonso de Ribera, Governor of Chile, Concepción, Oct. 25, 1613, *Historia Física y Política de Chile: Documentos. Tomo Segundo* (Paris: Imprenta de Maulde Y Renou, 1846), 297.

³²⁵ Pinto Rodríguez. *Misioneros en la Araucanía*, 66.

“Parley of Paicaví.”³²⁶ The parley ranged deep into the Araucanía and over several days the Spanish talked to and made peace with leaders from dozens of separate groups. During the parley there were prisoner exchanges and disarmament agreements.

The parley revealed the surprising civility that existed between these two groups who had committed such atrocities on one other. One particular Araucanian group sent a procession of over seventy men to the parley, dressed in an elaborate and traditional manner, with the front fifteen in the procession carrying *canelo* branches.³²⁷ One of the defining moments of the Parley of Paicaví for Valdivia was seeing Untablame at the front of the procession of the seventy-three peace offering chiefs.³²⁸ Father Valdivia added that while he was among Untablame’s people “no weapon had been touched, nor have we seen any of their sentinels, nor have we lost a single horse.” Instead, “(the) Indians of the land of war came to trade and communicate with us, selling us strawberries, lima beans and potatoes.”³²⁹

Valdivia’s Defensive War would last much longer than the three or four years the king had imagined, but its success was limited largely by the same factors that made it necessary in the first place. Many colonists believed that a defensive war would provide very little defense. Residents of towns in or near the Araucanía expected

³²⁶ Zapater, *La búsqueda de la paz*, 30.

³²⁷ Father Luis de Valdivia. “Relación de lo que sucedió en la jornada que hicimos el Sr. presidente Alonso de Ribera gobernador deste reyno y yo desde Arauco á Paycavi á conducir las paces de Illicura última regua de Tucapel y las de Puren y la Imperial, escrita por mi el Padre Luis de Valdivia al salir de Paycavi de vuelta á Lebo.” in *Historia Física y Política de Chile: Tomo Segundo*, 285.

³²⁸ Padre Luis de Valdivia, “Relación de lo que sucedió en la jornada que hizimos el señor Presidente Alonso de Ribera, Governador deste Reyno, y yo, desde Arauco a Paicaví, a concluir las pazes de Elicura, ultima Regua de Tucapel, y las de Purén, y la Imperial. Escrita por mi el Padre Luis de Valdivia, al salir de Paicaví, de vuelta a Levo,” in *Americana Series; photostat reproductions by the Massachusetts Historical Society: no. 223*. [Lima?, 1613?]

³²⁹ *Ibid.*, 289.

threats, but denizens north of the Bío-Bío were concerned that a lack of campaigns would allow *indios rebeldes* to gather strength and mount a major offensive. The town of Mendoza was not even threatened in the chaos after 1598, but residents became worried a decade later with rumors that groups on the eastern slope of the cordillera had allied with the Araucanians.³³⁰ Even in Coquimbo, 1000 kilometers to the north of the front, “nothing (was) talked about but the war.”³³¹ One official added that the 1612 death of Valdivia’s contemporaries was not as a misunderstanding, but evidence of Chile’s “dangerous state.”³³²

Any new projects dealing with the War of Arauco had to address labor needs and the excesses of personal service. The Defensive War was no exception. Before going on to design the Defensive War, Father Valdivia had lived near the town of Mendoza where he proselytized among the Huarpe for years, calling them the “most miserable and absent-minded people I have seen in my life.”³³³ Long after Valdivia had left the region and set out to vindicate the Araucanians, the demographic catastrophe among the Huarpe continued and was even exacerbated when Spanish raids against the Araucanians were discontinued under Valdivia’s plan.

In 1613 the *cabildo* of Mendoza asked for *licencias* for 1,000 African slaves in order to relieve “the few aborigines that remain.”³³⁴ That same year the Viceroy of

³³⁰ Ibid.

³³¹ González de Nájera, *Desengaño y reparo*, 26.

³³² A.G.I. Patronato 229. R.28 Guerra, socorro y pacificación del reino de Chile. 1607-1622. 17 January 1613. Pedro Lipsberguer. (Procurador general en la Audiencia de Chile). Testimonios de las diligencias que la ciudad de Sant.o Cabeça del Reyno de Chile hechos para que la Real Audiencia diese aviso a Su Magd del estado peligrroso de aquel Reyno y la respuesta que se dio. 16 January, 1613. Peticion del procurador del Reyno de Chile ante la audiencia ... sobre que diese aviso a su magd del estado del Reyno por estar tan peligroso. Foja 1.

³³³ Foerster, *Jesuitas y Mapuches*, 41.

³³⁴ B.N. M.M. Pieza 1980. Instrucciones del cabildo de la ciudad de Mendoza al Padre fray Pedro de Sosa, sobre lo que ha de pedir y suplicar en la corte de S.M. el Rey para la tranquilidad de la

Peru supported the import of African slaves to reduce the “personal service” burden on Indians in Chile.³³⁵ Also in 1613, Juan Fernández de Castillo and other residents of La Serena asked for both indigenous prisoners of war and African slaves claiming that war and disease had decimated the town’s population. The petitioners argued the entire colony would benefit by removing these captives 150 leagues away from the front where they could work extracting gold and copper and actually recover some of the money lost on the war they had prosecuted. The petitioners did not stop there, asking that in addition to the indigenous captives 1,000 African slaves be imported through Buenos Aires to serve the *vecinos* and residents of La Serena.³³⁶

As we saw in chapter one however, simply asking for African slaves did not mean they would ever arrive in Chile, and the labor shortage continued.³³⁷ Unable to count on African slaves, colonists sought domestic sources of labor on both sides of the Bío-Bío. So without African slaves and with the continuing disappearance of groups north of the Bío-Bío, the only source for labor remained the Araucanians who were now off limits, and other groups like the Pehuenche and Puelche who were relatively secure in the cordillera.³³⁸

provincia. 2 May, 1613. Foja 49.

³³⁵ A.G.I. Lima 36. Cartas y expedientes de virreyes de Perú. 1611-1615. Marqués de Montesclaros. Letter to S.M. Callao. 17 April, 1613. Foja 57.

³³⁶ B.N. M.M. Pieza 1981. Juan Fernández de Castillo. Instrucciones ... de La Serena al muy Reverendo..., guardián de la casa y convento de San Francisco de la ciudad de Santiago, sobre las cosas que necesita el Reino de Chile. 1 Abril 1613. Fojas 52v.-53v.

³³⁷ African slave import for mining and hacienda work gradually grew, and by 1620 the black and “mestizo de color” population of Chile had reached 22,000. But even these numbers were not sufficient. In a 1626 declaration, the Cabildo de Santiago claimed that 4,000 African slaves were needed to “compensate for the diminished number of Indian workers.” Mellafe, *La introducción de la esclavitud negra en Chile*, 226. Della M. Flusche and Eugene H. Korth, *Forgotten Females: Women of African and Indian Descent in Colonial Chile, 1535-1800* (Detroit: Blaine Ethridge Books, 1983), 6.

³³⁸ See my M.A. thesis for the changing Spanish relationship with these mountain groups.

Valdivia's plan had reduced spending burdens for the king and viceroy, but the Defensive War was not an economic plan. Chile had become so dependent on personal service that the instead of stopping the practice, the Defensive War merely increased demand for indigenous labor and encouraged more raids. In only the first fourteen months of the Defensive War four slave-taking raids penetrated the Bío-Bío frontier.³³⁹ The fact that raids continued made Valdivia's attempts to gain the trust of the Araucanians nearly impossible.

Another factor complicating the Defensive War was the reappearance of Spain's European rivals off the coast of Chile. The misfortunes of the Mahu expedition in 1600 and a truce between Spain and Dutch rebels had kept the South Sea fairly quiet. This tranquility was ruptured in 1615 when the viceroy wrote that pirates had been spotted near Brazil. He also sent an expedition to the abandoned port of Valdivia to investigate a report that the Dutch had taken it. The expedition found nothing and the viceroy admitted that such accounts were often inaccurate, but the worst possible course of action was ignoring them.³⁴⁰ In the same letter however, the viceroy added that the only place he expected to encounter and confront pirates was off the coast of Callao and that the length of the Pacific coast and a lack of resources meant that he would have to leave everything south of Callao "defenseless against (pirate) invasion." The viceroy admitted that even the port of Arica could not be protected, despite the fact that most silver destined for Callao was loaded there.³⁴¹

³³⁹ Korth, *Spanish Policy*, 156.

³⁴⁰ A.G.I. Lima 36. Cartas y expedientes de virreyes de Perú. 1611-1615. Marqués de Montesclaros. Num.20, lib. VII is letter from V. to Sm.S. dated Callao, 2 March, 1615. Fojas 129-129v.

³⁴¹ *Ibid.*, foja 130v.

Appropriately, a new wave of Dutch ships was arriving in the Pacific as the viceroy was writing of the threat they presented. Only a month after the viceroy's patrol had returned to Callao, Chile's governor wrote that Spanish sailors had seen five enemy ships anchored off Chile's coastal island of Santa María.³⁴² The sailors had indeed spotted the fleet of Joris von Speilbergen who raided up and down the Pacific coast from 1614-17. Speilbergen stopped at the islands of Mocha and Santa María before sacking a Valparaiso deserted in anticipation of the Dutch invasion. Spielbergen then went north and in what seemed like an attempt to prove the viceroy's point, landed in Arica and encountered no resistance. Fortunately for the Spanish, the silver fleet had recently left, but Spielbergen set off in hot pursuit of the metal bearing ships.³⁴³

Although he stopped only briefly in Chile, what Speilbergen did next did have important consequences for the colony. Nearing Callao, Speilbergen planned to capture the "incoming viceroy" as he too was approaching the port from the northeast.³⁴⁴ The attempt was foiled when the Spanish were alerted to the presence of the Dutch fleet, but after nearly being captured himself, the new viceroy would be much less apt to continue defensive experiments like Valdivia's.

Since his administration was almost ended by Dutch privateers before it began, the viceroy Francisco de Borja y Aragón was understandably more active in addressing threats from European enemies in the South Sea.³⁴⁵ The viceroy fortified

³⁴² A.G.I. Lima 36, num. 33-B. Alonso de Ribera to Viceroy of Peru. Concepción, 30 May 1615. Rosales, *Historia general: Tomo II*, 945.

³⁴³ Lane, *Pillaging the Empire*, 80.

³⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 82.

³⁴⁵ The viceroy also entertained a proposal from the ubiquitous Governor of Buenos Aires Province, Hernandarias to settle the Strait of Magellan. His plan called for a string of inland settlements

Callao, renewed patrols from the Armada del Mar del Sur and even addressed the possibility of European and Indian alliances in Chile.³⁴⁶

To his credit, Borja did not abandon the Defensive War. He sent reinforcements to Concepción above the Bío-Bío, when they could have gone to Valdivia or Arauco, violating the frontier. He also continued the campaign against personal service. The viceroy sent a special envoy to help Governor Lope de Ulloa y Lemos combat forced labor and explained that although Chile's *vecinos* wouldn't like being stripped of personal service, they would eventually understand that his motives were the right ones.³⁴⁷

At the same time, Borja wasn't nearly the supporter of Father Valdivia that his predecessor had been. He argued that while the Defensive War had brought less armed conflict, he didn't think it had changed the conduct or beliefs of Araucanians. Although the Dutch did not attempt to take any territory in Chile, their meeting with Anganamón inspired him to again join with Pelantaro in an assault against the Spanish.³⁴⁸ The attack killed a number of *indios amigos* and prompted many Spanish soldiers to defect, where among the enemy "they expected to live more comfortably" and hoped that eventually they could leave Chile by sea or by crossing the Andes. If these soldiers believed they would live more comfortably among the enemy, it comes

connected to outposts along the Strait, rather than the sea-based link that had failed so miserably when Sarmiento tried it. Hernandrias posited that with these new outposts in place, no European enemy would be able to navigate the Strait without being spotted and that the Indians of Chile would make peace with the Spanish, after finding themselves "completely surrounded." Shields, *The Legend of the Caesars*, xxvii-xxx.

³⁴⁶ Lane, *Pillaging the Empire*, 84.

³⁴⁷ A.G.I. Lima 38. Cartas y expedientes de virreyes de Perú. 1618-1619. (Francisco de Borja y Aragón, Príncipe de Esquilache.) V. to S.M. 27 March, 1619, Lima. Foja 455v.

³⁴⁸ Diego Rosales claimed that the Dutch were close enough to say to the residents of Concepción, "What are you doing Spaniards? Don't fall asleep, there are Moors on the coast." Rosales, *Historia general: Tomo II*, 947-49.

as no surprise that governor Ribera complained to the king in same year a about lack of reinforcements. Defection and scarcity were compounded by a shipwreck off Valparaiso in which much gunpowder was lost.³⁴⁹ The viceroy noted that the calm of the Defensive war was giving Anganamón time to gather gold and other gifts to give to the Dutch in the event of their promised return.³⁵⁰

The viceroy also argued that the best way to put pressure on *indios de guerra* was through the establishment of new settlements.³⁵¹ Many residents in Chile agreed, and were worried that the Dutch would take advantage of the lull during the Defensive War to populate the Araucanía. Colonists noted that although the Spielbergen expedition was in Chile only briefly, the Dutch brought carpenters along.³⁵² Carpenters were of course commonplace on any long voyage, but to skittish Chilean authorities their presence meant plans for settlement.

While Father Valdivia had differences of opinion with the viceroy, Borja did not directly interfere with his work. The same cannot be said for the governors of Chile who served during the Defensive War. No governor liked yielding so much authority to Valdivia, much less when the Jesuits drew 12,000 ducats from the Army of Arauco's *situado* for their mission of peace.³⁵³ Valdivia especially butted heads with Governor Ribera, who had accompanied the Jesuit to his early parleys. Ribera refused to sign Valdivia's *relación*, claiming that the priest had made several agreements

³⁴⁹ Barros Arana, *Historia general: III*, 118.

³⁵⁰ A.G.I. Lima 38. V. to S.M. 27 March, 1619, Lima. Fojas 455v-56.

³⁵¹ Ibid., foja 456v.

³⁵² Rosales, *Historia general: Tomo II*, 945.

³⁵³ Gascón, "La frontera sur del virreinato del Perú," 9.

without his knowledge or consent (which he technically didn't need) and later cited the governor as a witness to them.³⁵⁴

According to the declaration of Captain Luis Góngora Marmolejo, it was not only governors who found Father Valdivia's tactics heavy-handed. A former Spanish captive had come to Góngora in tears, claiming that Valdivia had become angry with her for declaring the truth about her experience. Góngora had also been told by a number of *caciques* that Valdivia had success in pacifying *indios de guerra* not with his words but because he spoke them with "lance in hand."³⁵⁵ Finally, Anganamón claimed that his aforementioned murder of three Jesuits was revenge for the flight of a handful of Araucanian women to a Spanish fort and their subsequent baptism.³⁵⁶ This reveals that for some Araucanians, the "spiritual conquest" of the Defensive War was more disruptive and more intrusive than the sporadic military conquest of previous decades.

Even if Valdivia had not come off as intrusive, there is little evidence that he could have accounted for the individual will of all Araucanians leaders, especially with a limited Spanish presence in Araucanian territory. Although the *toqui* system allowed quick alliances to be formed and aid the parley process, each Araucanian *regua* still operated independently. Jealousy, rivalry and ambition had just as much impact in Araucanian culture as it did in Spanish. For example, Araucanian captives loyal to Anganamón testified that much of his motivation for his attacks was not a

³⁵⁴ Alonso de Ribera, Concepción, Oct. 25, 1613. in *Historia Física y Política de Chile: Documentos. Tomo Segundo* by Claudio Gay (Paris: Imprenta de Maulde Y Renou, 1846), 295.

³⁵⁵ A.G.I. Patronato 229. R. 45. Guerra, socorro y pacificación del reino de Chile. 1607-1622. Patronato, 229, R(amo). 45. Declaraciones de los intérpretes de los indios de Chile, sobre el estado de aquella guerra, enviadas a su Majestad y Consejo de Indias. Declaration of Luís de Góngora Marlolejo, March 1614, Santiago.

³⁵⁶ Francisco de Núñez de Pineda y Bascuñan, *Cautiverio Feliz y razón individual de las guerras dilatadas del Reino de Chile* (Santiago: Editorial Universitaria, 1973), 80-84.

hatred of the Spanish, but jealousy of Pelantaro's prominence. When Anganamón decided to conduct a raid and interrupt the peace of the Defensive War he was aware that most Araucanians wanted to maintain the truce. Therefore, there was no incorporation ceremony before or after the attack, and its leaders communicated in secret.³⁵⁷

This secrecy was necessary because the Spanish would frequently pay for information. We have seen that indigenous alliances were often fleeting, and one Spanish official reported that he paid two Indians for informing him that *indios de guerra* on the other side of the cordillera had carried out two large juntas and were preparing an attack.³⁵⁸ All this meant that the same Jesuit attempts to gain the trust of some groups raised the ire of others. With colonists anxious to return to offensive war, and pockets of *indios rebeldes* still springing up, the odds were stacking against Valdivia and his Jesuit contemporaries.

To be fair to the Jesuit, there was little hope that a defensive war could regulate all aspects of the well-entrenched *vida fronteriza*, especially when violence was such an expected part of this interaction. For years residents of the frontier had been expecting and adjusting to the pillaging and captive taking that occurred with "lance in hand." As James F. Brooks points out in the context of the American Southwest, only focusing on the "corrosive" effects of frontier violence "diffuses its major contributions to inter-cultural trade, alliances, and communities among groups often antagonistic to Spanish... modernizing strategies."³⁵⁹ This statement also applies to

³⁵⁷ Rosales, *Historia general: Tomo II*, 965.

³⁵⁸ Juan Luis Espejo, *La provincia de Cuyo del Reino de Chile: I* (Santiago: Fondo historico y bibliográfico José Toribio Medina, 1954), 57.

³⁵⁹ Brooks, *Captives and Cousins*, 36.

Araucanian society where captive Spanish soldiers became integral to inter-group relationships and “ethnogenesis.”³⁶⁰ The sons of Araucanian men and Spanish women made up much of the Araucanian hierarchy and were afforded a unique status by the Spanish. Araucanians and mountain groups like the Pehuenche also benefited materially from their raids, taking Spanish horses and weapons.³⁶¹ One author wrote of a case where a group of Araucanians had captured so many Spanish arms and horses that from a distance they looked like Spanish cavalry. In one case, a Spanish company had to abruptly retreat when they realized that the party they were approaching was not a stray Spanish unit, but a group of well-equipped Araucanians.³⁶²

Spanish raids not only garnered slaves but also Araucanian crops that helped the Spanish weather frequent shortages. These raids also brought more relationships between Spanish soldiers and Araucanian women, whether they were captives or free women who maintained relationships with Spanish soldiers from nearby forts or encampments. Both the Spanish and the Araucanians tried to avoid rampant miscegenation, usually to no avail. Dozens of Spanish raids were principally attempts to rescue Spanish women and girls, but after living among and often forming Araucanian families, many refused to go with the Spanish. The Jesuit Alonso de Ovalle referred to this situation when he lamented “...seeing violated the living temples of God, and the blood of those old Spaniards and Christians, mixed with that of those gentile barbarians who, ... have had enough mestizo children that they

³⁶⁰ For more on ethnogenesis and Spanish captives in indigenous societies see Boccara, “Etnogénesis Mapuche” and Socolow, “Spanish Captives in Indian Societies.”

³⁶¹ Villalobos, *Los Pehuenches en la vida fronteriza*.

³⁶² Rosales, *Historia general: Tomo II*, 805.

already represent an entire generation.”³⁶³ Despite these reactions to miscegenation, individuals could do little to stop its growth, set in motion by the fact that only a quarter of Chile’s early colonists were women.³⁶⁴

The Defensive War’s imposition of the Bío-Bío border also interrupted more traditional trade, especially in towns like Chillán that lay to the north of the river. We saw in chapter two that authorities founded Chillán to restrict indigenous alliances. However, its location between Pehuenche and Araucanian territory also had made it a trading center. Every summer, groups would travel to Chillán to trade blankets and shirts they had made in exchange for animal skins, and stones.³⁶⁵ Francisco Núñez de Pineda related his memories of trade fairs in his native Chillán.

“In the old days, (when I was) a boy, these Puelches³⁶⁶ continued coming to our lands to attend their expositions of stones that they had brought, their pelts of striped tigers, pine nuts, hazel nuts, and other things. Some arrived from the state of Arauco, that old and grand place, where through free trade and negotiation the Araucanians bought everything. The Puelches also brought some poisonous arrows when they had wars with others and these they sold to our Indian friends to rub on their lances against their enemies.”³⁶⁷

³⁶³ Alonso de Ovalle, *Historica relación del Reino de Chile* (Santiago: Instituto de Literatura Chilena, 1969), 284.

³⁶⁴ Villalobos, “Tres siglos y medio de vida fronteriza,” 39.

³⁶⁵ Declaration given by Captain Pedro Pérez, foja 269. The stones are referred to as *pedras bezares*, which were well known throughout Europe by the sixteenth century. These apparently are actually the kidney or gall stones of deer or goats. These animals were actually hunted for the stones which were sold as a remedy against “poisons and fainting.” The stones were sometimes ground into a powder. They were also associated by this author with mountain peoples, whether in India, the Middle East, or Greece. It is possible that this witness merely thought he saw the stones because the Pehuenche were mountain people, but this is less likely when we see that he is not the only chronicler to mention their use among the Pehuenche. Dr. Nicoloso de Monardes, *Dos libros, el uno que trata de todas las cosas que traen de nuestras Indias Occidentales, que sirven al use de la Medicina, y el otro que trata de la Piedra bezaar, y de la Yerba Escuaerconera. Compuestos por el doctór...Medico de Sevilla* (Seville: Hernando Díaz, 1569). See also Ovalle, *Historica relación del Reino de Chile*.

³⁶⁶ Like most writers of his time, Núñez de Pineda did not distinguish Pehuenche and Puelche. Since Núñez de Pineda spent his childhood in Chillán, these would have been Pehuenche.

³⁶⁷ Francisco Núñez de Pineda y Bascañán. *Suma y epilogo de lo mas esencial que contiene el libro intitulado: Cautivero feliz, y guerras dilatiadas del Reino de Chile*. (Santiago: Ediciones Universidad Catolica de Chile, 1984), 73-75.

Despite setbacks, Valdivia had outlasted his critics and was still moving forward in his campaign against indigenous slavery, gaining the release of hundreds of indigenous captives taken illegally during the Defensive War. Father Valdivia conducted mass baptisms of Araucanians during his peace parleys, and the relative calm allowed an expansion of the ranching economy and a resurgence of agriculture.³⁶⁸ However, a conflict with the Jesuit provincial in Paraguay caused Valdivia to return to Spain rather abruptly in 1619. The Defensive War continued despite Valdivia's absence, but his successors, although quite capable inherited a project that began to decline with the departure of its architect.³⁶⁹ Valdivia's departure did not change his legacy however. Valdivia had used the frontier as a source of tremendous authority and lasting fame, as did his predecessors and as would missionaries and soldiers yet to arrive.

In Valdivia's absence, the imagination of colonists and the purse strings of the crown were somewhat freer. The crown would once again support expeditions to the mythical city of Caesars in the Patagonia, this time to investigate the claim that rebel Araucanians were being secretly backed a runaway Inca community there. Little activity had come in the search for the city since 1604 when the future Buenos Aires governor Hernandriás led an expedition that turned up little.³⁷⁰ However, in 1620 his son-in-law, Jerónimo Luis de Cabrera, led a larger expedition from his own *encomienda* near Córdova in search of Caesars.³⁷¹

³⁶⁸ Rosales, *Historia general: Tomo II*, 950.

³⁶⁹ Korth, *Spanish Policy*, 159-61.

³⁷⁰ Shields, *The Legend of the Caesars*, vi.

³⁷¹ Álvarez, *Neuquén, su historia, su geografía, su toponimia*, 23

Cabrera left Río Cuarto, a settlement south of Córdova with 160 soldiers, arms, and supplies, carried by ox carts and on horseback.³⁷² The expedition moved south across the pampa, eventually turning inland at the Negro river. Their progress was slowed by difficult terrain as they approached the eastern slope of the Andes, when Cabrera left his carts and sent thirty men forward on horseback.³⁷³

A Chilean-born sergeant volunteered to lead this smaller party as his curiosity was piqued by the fact that even though no Spaniard had ever set foot on this eastern side of the cordillera, they had come across Indians who showed them Spanish lance wounds and spoke “the language of Chile.”³⁷⁴ The party crossed the cordillera and came close to the abandoned Chilean cities of Osorno and Villarrica. From there the party returned to give word of their findings to the main expedition. Cabrera was intrigued and began to consider that this route to Chile could be used to “take the cities that the Indians had abandoned and finish the war.”³⁷⁵ By this point however, the expedition’s leaders decided to turn back, believing that they had become over-extended and reminding themselves that they had “not come to finish the Chilean war, but to discover the Caesars.”³⁷⁶

³⁷² Declaration given by Captain Pedro Pérez to Pedro de Torres, Royal Scribe, Córdova, 21 July, 1625. B.N. Biblioteca Medina, Manuscript Volume 128, pieza 2309, foja 255.

³⁷³ Juan Francisco Jiménez, “Encomenderos arruinados, incas fugitivos, beliches y corsario holandeses” *Anuario IEHS* 13 (1998):182-184.

³⁷⁴ Shields, *The Legend of the Caesars*, 1. The members of the Cabrera expedition commented on how much contact the regions’ indigenous groups had with each other. First of all, there was little geographic distance between cultures. The expedition began to the south of Córdova using Pampa Indians as guides, and later had the help of Puelche to guide them through the mountains. Abandoned by the Puelche, they continued a few miles further and encountered the Huilliche. A few soldiers who had been sent off to find missing horses reported back that they had come across houses, which probably belonged to the Araucanians. Declaration given by Antonio Márques, Córdova, 23 July, 1625, B.N. Biblioteca Medina, Manuscript Volume 128, pieza 2309, foja 282.

³⁷⁵ B.N. Manuscritos Medina. Tomo 129: Pieza 2317. Carta del Licenciado don Alonso Pérez de Salazar a S.M. el Rey, fecha en Lima en 24 de Junio de 1628, foja 42.

³⁷⁶ *Ibid.*

Although jealousy and lack of resources prevented Buenos Aires and Santiago from cooperating on the War of Arauco and Caesars, this expedition had an impact in both colonies.³⁷⁷ First of all, it raised the possibility that the War of Arauco could be prosecuted from the south and east. This hurt the Defensive War's cause as the line of forts on the Bío-Bío was now revealed to be less effective as both a point from which to launch offensives and a bulwark against indigenous movement. Instead of finding Caesars, this expedition raised more questions about where it might be and provided an impetus for further exploration. In Córdova, where the expedition originated, Caesars was thought to be "on the other side of the mountains" in Chilean territory,³⁷⁸ while in Chile, Caesars was envisioned as tucked away somewhere deep in Tierra del Fuego. This phenomenon seems to suggest colonists kept the mythical city as far away as possible, on a "permanent frontier" that would lead to further expeditions and more funds. The surprising closeness between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans again raised the possibility that a string of settlements in the Patagonia could warn Lima of European enemies approaching by sea.³⁷⁹

On cue, a Spanish-Dutch truce ended in 1621 and the Dutch West India Company was "chartered with belligerent commerce in mind." The modest aspirations of the Dutch in the Pacific were now a thing of the past, and expeditions would be armed and "were not prohibited from stealing the enemy's most prized possessions in lieu of

³⁷⁷ Cabrera claimed that Chileans tried to stop his expedition, hinting that they may have been jealous that they were never able to breach the cordillera where his Sergeant had. Shields, *The Legend of the Caesars* lxviii.

³⁷⁸ B.N. Manuscritos Medina. Carta del Licenciado don Alonso Pérez de Salazar, 39.

³⁷⁹ News of the Spanish expedition first arrived in Chile not through official channels, but overland through a network of paid indigenous spies. Members of the Cabrera expedition also noted that the Indians of the Pacific island of Chiloé had contact with and could understand the Indians of the mountain valley of Cután. Both examples demonstrated the possibilities of east-west communication. Shields, *The Legend of the Caesars*, xviii, lxvi, xxi.

a forced sale.”³⁸⁰ Although the Dutch never came close to dislodging the Spanish from the Americas, pamphleteers in the Low Countries inspired sailors to try. Just as the truce was ending, the first Dutch translation of *La Araucana* was also published. While in Spain interest waned in Ercilla’s epic as the crown tired of the War of Arauco, the text and everything Araucanian was just beginning to capture the Dutch imagination as “the invincible spirit of the Chilean warriors...had obvious appeal to a patriotic Netherlander.”³⁸¹ Dutch authors warned that if the United Provinces were defeated by the Spanish, the Dutch would soon replace the Indians as laborers in the mines of Potosí. Others contributed to renewed hostilities by arguing that a Dutch victory in the Americas would drive the Spanish out of the Low Countries.³⁸²

Important for Chile was the fact that “the perception of the Indian-as-ally still retained considerable currency within the Dutch imagination.” The backers of the so-called Nassau Fleet that arrived in the Pacific in 1624 were counting on a Dutch-Indian alliance to ignite a full-scale revolt in the Americas that would “oust the Spanish decisively from the New World.” The ten ship, 1,500 man fleet carried with it all sorts of “letters of alliance” to convince Indians to rebel.³⁸³

The Nassau fleet sailed along Chile’s coast, but did not stop in the colony nor was it even observed before the Dutch attacked Callao.³⁸⁴ Even though the Dutch avoided Chile, there would be repercussions for the colony. Chile’s governor said in a 1624

³⁸⁰ Lane, *Pillaging the Empire*, 67.

³⁸¹ Ibid., 205-06. After a printing in 1632, *La Araucana* went unpublished for 100 years. Collier, *Ideas and Politics*, 27.

³⁸² Benjamin Schmidt, *Innocence Abroad: The Dutch Imagination and the New World, 1570-1670* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 192.

³⁸³ Ibid., 198.

³⁸⁴ Word circulated that the Dutch raised black sails as they passed Chile to avoid detection. There had been some unconfirmed sightings of fifteen Dutch ships off Chile’s central coast. This information made it to the Viceroy of Peru who was able to prepare for and fend off the Dutch attack in May of 1624. Barros Arana, *Historia general: Tomo IV*, 139-40.

letter to the king, “if (the Dutch) were to take Valdivia, it would mean the destruction of these coasts of Peru, Panama and Mexico. To prevent such a (takeover) this port must be populated.”³⁸⁵ The viceroy reiterated this threat in a letter to the king, adding that Indians had taken over Valdivia, making it easier for the crown’s European enemies to gain a foothold there and interrupt both inter-colonial and transatlantic commerce. The viceroy also opined that the fortification of the port was crucial but that the cost of such a project was prohibitive.³⁸⁶

Since the port of Valdivia lay well below the Bío-Bío, the Nassau fleet also contributed to the demise of Father Valdivia’s project. Even though it was clear the Defensive War was on its last legs, outgoing viceroy Borja warned his successor not to give into requests from Chile to return to offensive war. He was convinced that the War of Arauco had lasted for seventy years largely because of mistreatment of *indios de servicio*, and that the offensive war would simply be an excuse to a return to “banditry.” Instead of taking territory, raids “robbed and took slaves” and made evangelization efforts impossible.³⁸⁷

Governors of Chile responded with the Council of Indies’ argument that the only way to motivate soldiers was with the spoils, namely Indian captives, of the “offensive war.” Governor Luis Fernández de Córdova claimed that since captive taking was suspended during the Defensive War, many soldiers who had constantly

³⁸⁵ B.N. Manuscritos Medina. Tomo. 126. Pieza 2267. Carta de don Pedro Osoreo de Ulloa a S.M. el Rey, fecha en la ciudad de Concepción a 20 de Abril de 1624. Fojas 16-17.

³⁸⁶ A.G.I. Lima 40. N. 3, lib. IV. Letter from V. to S.M., Los Reyes, 30 April, 1624. Foja 212.

³⁸⁷ Ricardo Beltrán y Rózpide, ed. Relación que el Príncipe de Esquilache hace al Señor Marqués de Guadalcázar, 261-63.

put their lives in danger for the crown were granted tiny and unprofitable *encomiendas* and ended up penniless.³⁸⁸

On April 13, 1625 the incoming viceroy officially ended the Defensive War by ordering, “all Indians taken in the War (of Arauco) be declared and possessed as slaves.”³⁸⁹ The Defensive War had succeeded in pacifying some previously unincorporated groups, and lasted much longer than anticipated, but it failed largely because the permanence of the *vida fronteriza* caused the Araucanians and the Spanish to disregard the new restrictions on crossing the Bío-Bío.³⁹⁰ The expedition to Caesars discovered new territory, but rather than defining the frontier, it opened more possibilities for frontier interaction. The Army of Arauco brought much needed resources to Chile, but it was inadequately supplied and insufficiently prepared for the exigencies of a fluid conflict. The reappearance of pirates also confirmed the importance of sending resources to the frontier, as the Dutch actively if unsuccessfully sought alliances with Araucanians. Therefore, the crown’s frontier experiments of the early 17th century only served to reveal that a set of unwritten rules for the *vida fronteriza* had gotten in the way of their success. By the mid-seventeenth century these rules became more formalized and actually made the viceroy’s job more difficult. Continued pirate threats meant that the viceroy had to continue sending resources to the frontier even if he knew they were being used inappropriately by soldiers and government officials alike.

³⁸⁸ A.G.I. Chile, 19, R. 7, N. 71. Cartas de Gobernadores. Carta de Luis Fernández de Córdoba, Gobernador de Chile. 1 February, 1627. Concepción

³⁸⁹ A.G.I. Chile 57: Expediente de la libertad de los indios esclavos de guerra. 1674-1683. Order from Viceroy of Peru, April 13, 1625.

³⁹⁰ As we have seen, Spanish raids sought captives to replace a decreasing indigenous population in towns to the north. Soldiers became frustrated with the Defensive War as they lost the “advantages of the pillaging... that came with the Offensive War and raids.” Rosales, *Historia General: Tomo II*, 909.

CHAPTER V

PROFITEERING ON THE FRONTIER: THE POVERTY OF THE *VIDA FRONTERIZA* MEANS WEALTH FOR AN UNSCRUPULOUS FEW

“We walked the nine or ten leagues to Concepción and we all were on foot, . . . there were more than two thousand five hundred of us, all crying and having a difficult time, and there were many stillbirths on that road, the mothers forced to bury their children there as they could not carry them.”³⁹¹

The momentum of the *vida fronteriza* had sunk the Defensive War, and with the era of experiments over, colonists and Araucanians alike became all the more dedicated to permanent war. The story here is of that of colonists taking advantage of the *vida fronteriza*'s formalized economy, its cultural interaction, and its steady flow of resources from the viceroy. Colonists were confident that these resources would keep coming when the Dutch takeover of the port of Valdivia reminded the viceroy that he had to keep sending resources even if he was being bilked. With excessive profiteering in the mid-17th-century tension increased between frontier residents (creoles, missionaries and *indios amigos*) who wanted to hold the colonial pact together, and “outsiders” peninsular Spaniards and *indios de guerra*) who gained no advantage from holding the pact together. Both groups wanted to maintain the attention of and funding from the viceroy, but for disparate motives.

Chilean officials began to see their 17th century task as one of keeping the War of Arauco alive despite predictions from viceroys that the Army of Arauco would finish

³⁹¹ A.G.I. Escribanía, 932 B. Pieza 8. Testimony of Juana de Sotomayor. Ciudad de los Reyes. 18 November, 1655. Foja 81.

off the *indios rebeldes* in less than a decade. These officials needed the War of Arauco to take slaves and to skim from the *situado* and discovered the best way to hold the viceroy to his yearly commitments was by reporting on and playing up threats to Potosí silver. (Which after all was a threat to Chile as well since this is where the *situado* came from.) Chile's colonists not only sent constant warnings regarding threats from Araucanians, the city of Caesars and Europeans, but also looked for and played up any signs of what would be a disastrous alliance between any of these enemies.

The principal motive for keeping the War of Arauco alive was its access to Araucanian prisoners of war. We saw that enslaving prisoners of war was temporarily banned during the Defensive War, but few bans ever really put a dent in this practice. Earlier in the century the viceroy had issued a less than effective ban on the practice in response to reports that indigenous slaves taken in Chile were living in Callao, Los Reyes and other parts of Peru, some of them being branded on the face. But even two years after the ban, Alonso González de Nájera wrote that on his way back to Spain he witnessed Araucanian prisoners of war being sold publicly in the viceregal capital of Los Reyes.³⁹² On one occasion, the Governor of Chile, Alonso García de Ramón boasted that when thirty *caciques* reneged on a peace settlement, he had twenty of them killed, and sent the remaining ten to "clean the viceroy's stables."³⁹³ One author of the period estimated that well over 1,000 slaves were taken during García Ramón's term, most of which came after the ineffective ban.³⁹⁴

³⁹² Jara, *Guerra y sociedad*, 167, 181.

³⁹³ *Ibid.*, 177.

³⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, 175-77.

With the temporary ban on indigenous slavery lifted in 1625, Governor Luis Fernández de Córdova wasted little time in organizing a number of raids. The governor claimed that a number of Indians offered peace when they heard that offensive war had returned. When the same “reduced” Indians did not adhere to the conditions of peace, the governor led a rare wintertime attack on the offending groups, eager to display his zeal. Fernández de Córdova added that he was also able to procure the return of a number of Spanish captives, some of whom were held for more than twenty-five years and who provided valuable intelligence about the enemy.

Despite his initial slave taking-enthusiasm, the governor also expressed reservations about offensive war, claiming that all this success had earned him more enemies.³⁹⁵ Fernández de Córdova believed that with the will of God and His Majesty he would defeat these “infidels” but wondered whether he could continue to depend on resources from the crown as the war intensified. Much of this concern came from his mistrust of the viceroys who he said, “weakened the hand of the governors here (in Chile)” with their conflicting orders. As evidence, the governor added that more than eighteen months had passed since the last reinforcements arrived and asked for “some reinforcements of 800 to 1,000 well-armed men, most of whom would be married.” He also requested that the crown help him rebuild Chile’s destroyed settlements and “conclude this war because... almost from (Chile’s) discovery our enemies have proved to be equal or superior to European soldiers. If

³⁹⁵ A.G.I. Chile, 19, R. 7, N. 72. Cartas de Gobernadores. Carta de Luis Fernández de Córdova... 1 February, 1627 Concepción.

we are not especially vigilant, every day our forces are diminished as theirs grow and the prospect of building more towns and forts becomes all the more difficult.”³⁹⁶

Viceregal reluctance to aid Chile probably had to do with the fact that many viceroys benefited from the spoils of the War of Arauco. A lack of other resources in Chile would make more colonists turn to indigenous slave export to Lima, and solve Peru’s (and the viceroy’s) labor problems. The Bishop of Santiago Francisco de Salcedo wrote that Indians from the War of Arauco were sent to the daughters of the Viceroy Marques de Guadalcazar in Lima.³⁹⁷ The marquis’ successor argued that Chile would be more secure if *indios rebeldes* could be removed from the colony, where they could not escape and easily return to torment the Spanish. He added that in Lima (quite conveniently for the viceroy) the slaves could be better “instructed and informed” and prepared for a possible return to Chile as *indios amigos*.³⁹⁸

While the viceroy and some *encomenderos* and soldiers in Chile continued to argue that the offensive war would make Chile safer, events put a damper on this theory. With no reinforcements, Chile’s *vecinos* were obliged to perform the dual roles of soldier and head of household. With the *vecinos* away at war, city infrastructure projects and the *vecinos*’ own families and family farms would be neglected, and war making ability and supply chains would be weakened.³⁹⁹

Governor Fernández de Córdoba claimed that rumors about “European enemies”

³⁹⁶ Ibid., fojas 3v-4v.

³⁹⁷ A.G.I. Chile,60. Cartas y expedientes de los Obispos de Santiago y Concepción. 1564-1633. Bishop of Santiago, Francisco de Salcedo. Letter to S.M. Santiago, 20 January, 1630.

³⁹⁸ A.G.I. Lima, 46. Cartas y expedientes de virreyes de Perú. Num. 7. El V. a S.M., inconvenientes de que los indios que se cautivan en la guerra de Chile se saquen a vender fuera de aquella provincia. Lima. 24 November, 1635.

³⁹⁹ A.G.I. Chile,19,R.7,N.71. Cartas de Gobernadores. Carta de Luis Fernández de Córdoba, Gobernador de Chile. 1 February, 1627. Concepción.

(later substantiated) were making unpaid soldiers even more restless and that he personally had to put down two potential mutinies.⁴⁰⁰

Fernández de Córdova's fears that these raids would produce more enemies proved justified when the *toqui* Lientur led a significant raid against Chillán in 1628. The governor described the attack as coming from "behind the cordillera" and added that the Indians captured "two Spanish Moors" and some *indios amigos*.⁴⁰¹ A punitive expedition was organized against the offenders who Fernández de Córdova called "Puelches," adding that they came under the guise of being friendly. Not only had the Puelches accompanied the "Aucaes" (or Araucanians) during the raid, but they gave them food and supplies. The punitive expedition eventually caught up to these Puelches in "rough terrain," killing or capturing more than 140 of them. For entering in this alliance with the rebel Araucanians, Fernández de Córdova said that the Puelches were to be considered "just as much our enemies as the others," but did add that their skill as archers could make them valuable *indios amigos* if "reduced."⁴⁰²

The return of offensive war also meant more ritual murders of Spanish soldiers. Captain Francisco Núñez de Pineda was captured in the raid on Chillán and believed that as the son of a Maestro de Campo, his days were numbered. Instead, Núñez de

⁴⁰⁰ Archivo Nacional de Chile. (Hereafter "A.N.") Fondo Morla Vicuña, Vol. 19, N. 34. Carta de D. Luis Fernández de Cordova. Da noticia de los Indios de la otra banda de la cordillera. 1629. Foja 247.

⁴⁰¹ A *toqui* was something of an Araucanian field marshal. Guevara, *Historia de la civilización de Araucanía, Tomo I*, 186. The title of *toqui* was one of many Araucanian adaptations to the Spanish presence. The *toqui* led a number of smaller Araucanian sub-groups but the position was not permanent. Thus the Araucanians could quickly assemble large numbers led by a *toqui*, but just as quickly dissolve into their smaller familial groups making them hard to pursue and capture in large numbers.

⁴⁰² A. N. Morla Vicuña, Vol. 19 N. 34. Carta de D. Luis Fernandez de Cordova: Da noticia de los Indios de la otra banda de la cordillera. 1629. Fojas 245-246.

Pineda was sold to a captor who spared his life, but was forced to witness the death of a fellow soldier.

“Putapichun had commanded the unfortunate Spaniard to start gathering sticks from the ground. The captive had begun to gather sticks, and with each one repeated the name of a “brave” Spaniard. The captive was new to the war and thus was not aware of which Spaniards were known among the Mapuche. Thus Putapichun had prompted him, naming Pineda’s father, Alvaro Maltincampo first. After the speech, when the captive had collected a number of sticks, Putapichun had him drop the sticks into a hole one by one, again repeating the names of brave Spaniards. When he had dropped all twelve of his sticks into the hole, they told him to cover it with dirt. While he was doing this, he was given a heavy blow to the head, that dashed his brains out with the hatchet or the studded club, that was used as the insignia that they call *toqui*.”

Putapichun went on to explain the reasons behind the ritual.

“Our goal is none other than to exalt our names, and affix the *toquis* and ancient insignias of our dear nation with the blood of opinionated Spaniards, and solicit an effort to expel them from our lands. Today it seems that our Pillán... is favorable and propitious, as good fortune has followed us in the two raids we have made,...We (make this) sacrifice to our Pillán for the great successes he has brought us.”⁴⁰³

We see in this example that despite the brief period of peace under Father Valdivia’s watch, the Araucanians too had returned to offensive war. Through the burying of sticks we see in this ceremony a rejection of Spanish “reputational” power.⁴⁰⁴ We have seen throughout how powerful the reputation of a militarily successful Spanish governor or commander could become. In this case the Araucanians used the reputation of Núñez de Pineda’s father as a way to reject Spanish authority in the midst of increased Spanish raids. The Spanish captive had to

⁴⁰³ Núñez de Pineda, *Cautiverio Feliz*, 38-39. This killing occurred at least a full generation after Pedro de Valdivia’s death and hundreds of kilometers away. The common elements in the two ceremonies make it appear that despite these differences in distance in time, the ritual killing ceremony described in chapter one had become well ingrained across the Araucanía territory.

⁴⁰⁴ Barry Barnes, *The Nature of Power* (University of Illinois Press, 1988), 9.

recognize the power of the now deceased Alvaro Núñez de Pineda and other Araucanian antagonists and subsequently bury them in effigy. The Araucanians may have believed that only a Spaniard could “bury” these reputations.

At the same time Chillán was being attacked, threats from outside the colony continued. In 1628, 500 “well mounted Serranos (an Indian group with territory east of Buenos Aires),” raided Buenos Aires armed with lances, bows and arrows, bolas and slings.⁴⁰⁵ Also, the recent Dutch takeover of Bahia prompted the viceroy to worry about the European enemies “infesting” Peru and Chile. He added that with this growing threat, the *situado* needed to be sent on time.⁴⁰⁶ Again on cue, in 1628 Alonso Pérez de Salazar warned the king of rumors that seven or eight ships were approaching the Magellan Strait.⁴⁰⁷ In 1629 the Governor of Buenos Aires warned of Dutch plans to invade South America’s interior by sailing up a number of its rivers in forty flat-hulled ships that were being readied in Flanders.⁴⁰⁸

In general then, indigenous assaults and pirate threats continued to erode any progress made toward peaceful solutions to the War of Arauco. Governor Fernández de Córdova realized that he would have to act decisively to keep the recently renewed offensive war from getting out of hand and assuring that only *indios rebeldes* were enslaved. Captain Domingo de Eraso had warned that while *indios rebeldes* could be

⁴⁰⁵ Roberto H. Marfany, *El indio en la colonización de Buenos Aires* (Buenos Aires: Talleres Gráficos de la Penitenciaría Nacional de Buenos Aires, 1940), 44. These two assaults may not have been a coordinated effort, but the fact that they came in the same year reveals how thorough indigenous equine superiority had become, and how vulnerable it made Spanish cities.

⁴⁰⁶ Lima 40. Cartas y expedientes... 1624-26. (Diego Fernández de Córdoba, Marques de Gaudalcázar.) V. to S.M. Acuerdo general que el Vrey hizo sobre la cantidad de situado que se enbio a Chile citado en la carta de Guerra °33.Los Reyes, 8 Jan. 1625. (Num. 5), foja 211.

⁴⁰⁷ BN. Manuscritos Medina. Tomo 129: Pieza 2317. Carta del Licenciado don Alonso Pérez de Salazar a S.M. el Rey, fecha en Lima en 24 de Junio de 1628, foja 37v.

⁴⁰⁸ A.G.I. Charcas,28,R.3,N.34 Cartas de Gobernadores. Carta de Francisco de Céspedes, Gobernador de Buenos Aires. Buenos Aires, 23 October, 1629, foja 1.

controlled by war, the more difficult task was treating *indios de paz* with respect and eliminating their personal service obligations. Otherwise a war against the *indios rebeldes* would be “unreasonable and unjustified.”⁴⁰⁹ Sure enough, in order to cover up the illegal sale of *indios amigos*, some soldiers had already begun to falsify documents and much worse, brand them. To try and end the branding of non-slaves, Fernández de Córdova ordered that any soldier participating in said practice would be banished to the island of Chiloé for four years. He also mandated that all slaves legally caught in war were to be branded within three months of their captivity and their ages were to be recorded.⁴¹⁰ However, another example demonstrates how rare it was for both personal service and illegal slave taking to be combated simultaneously. Fernández de Córdova apparently was able to restrict illegal slave taking only after winking at other forms of abuse. An official in Mendoza complained that with Fernández de Córdova’s permission, *encomenderos* were violating the crown’s 1622 order (and the 1542 New Laws) by moving Huarpes in collars and restraints across the cordillera from the province of Cuyo into Santiago.⁴¹¹ The Bishop of Santiago compared Chile’s Indians to the Israelites and wrote of the sad plight of a number of Huarpes who to escaped their *encomenderos* in Santiago only to freeze to death in mountain caves while trying to return to their families. According to the bishop, the *encomenderos* were also neglecting their obligation to catechize the Indians working for them and as a result many Huarpes did not even know how to make the sign of the

⁴⁰⁹ Domingo de Eraso, Papel sobre la esclavitud de los indios de Chile. Del capitán... , in *Colección de documentos inéditos para la historia de España: Tomo L*. Marques de Miraflores y D. Miguel Salva, eds. (Madrid: Imprenta de la Viuda de Calero, 1867), 228. (This document is undated, but Eraso died in Chile in 1637 and wrote of events in the early 17th century. It was most likely written between 1600 and 1615.)

⁴¹⁰ Diego de Rosales, *Flandes Indiano. Tomo II*. 1018.

⁴¹¹ A.G.I. Chile 60, Cartas y expedients de los Obispos de Santiago y Concepción. Letter from Captain Domingo Sánchez Chaparro, Mendoza, 27 February, 1627.

cross. The bishop resolved that future violators of the 1622 order would be subject to a fine and excommunication.⁴¹²

Discussions in Spain gave little hope that a peaceful solution to slave taking and the war in general was at hand. While twenty years earlier the Council of Indies had rallied support for the Defensive War, it was now the king's War Council that led a discussion of what was to be done in Chile. In the wake of the attack on Chillán, the council recommended that 300 soldiers for Chile be sent with the new Governor of Buenos Aires.⁴¹³

Concerns about Chile's safety were also increased by the viceroy's response to threats. In a 1629 letter the Viceroy Luis Fernández de Cabrera gave perhaps one of the most honest, but for Chile one of the most discouraging assessments of his ability to protect his Pacific coast. Instead of building settlements in the Strait of Magellan or even something as simple as a series of watchtowers along the coast of Chile, the viceroy proposed that more resources be dedicated to gathering intelligence on ships leaving European ports. He added that no matter what steps were taken, European enemies would still be very much able to reach Callao without being spotted and that there was little he could do to prevent a "very small number of (enemies) from sacking and burning Arica, Pisco, Paita and Guayaquil and every other coastal settlement." He added that these coastal cities were not on par with those in Europe but instead were no more than "settlements of reed houses with a few built of

⁴¹² A.G.I. Chile 60, Cartas y expedients de los Obispos de Santiago y Concepción. Letter from Francisco de Salcedo Obispo de Santiago to S.M., Dated Stgo., 16 May 1626.

⁴¹³ Chile,4. Consultas de la Junta de Guerra. 1602-1699. Madrid, 20 August, 1630.

boards.” This meant that in the event of an invasion “the *vecinos* could easily gather up their belongings and flee inland.”⁴¹⁴

Despite the offensive war’s obvious problems and excesses, few favored peaceful solutions when all signs indicated that more threats were to come and that the viceroy could not protect Chile. These threats merely became an excuse to conduct more raids and demand more resources from the crown. Rather than making Chile safer, the offensive war and a more consistent *situado* merely increased embezzlement and caused a major revolt of *indios amigos*.

When the Defensive War ended, slave taking went from being a nuisance to being a principal economic activity. Governors of Chile split their time between raids and peace parleys, but none of them harbored any illusions about ending the War of Arauco quickly. With this in mind, the king and viceroy complained that the *situado* was being wasted, but could not eliminate it because of sporadic but very real pirate threats. In this era of political and military uncertainty, governors and officials took more risks, engaged in more abuse, and embezzled more money from the *situado* as they didn’t know when indigenous slavery would be outlawed again or whether the next year’s *situado* would even arrive at all. Despite a 1655 rebellion caused by gubernatorial excess, illegal slave raids and embezzlement continued because the conditions that created them didn’t change. This pattern was only interrupted when an earthquake in Peru interrupted Lima’s demand for Chilean slaves and instead created a demand for Chilean wheat cultivated by local, stable, and even paid laborers; not unlike the *encomienda* labor system that Pedro de Valdivia had

⁴¹⁴ A.G.I. Lima 42. Cartas y expedientes de virreyes de Perú. 1629. (Luis Fernández de Cabrera, Conde de Chinchón.) N. 26, V. a S.M. Lima, 31 October, 1629.

envisioned 150 years earlier. Since indigenous slave taking never really ceased, the Spanish were ready to conduct large-scale raids only five years after they were legalized. The king's War Council boasted that the army under Governor Francisco Laso de Vega captured four hundred Indians in three separate raids between 1631 and 1633.⁴¹⁵ The increased slave taking also meant that officials who lost ground against *indios rebeldes* were vilified. Governor Angel Peredo was accused of putting his successors in a bind by returning Indian captives to their homes. Critics saw Peredo's policy of "tolerance" as a sign of weakness and an opportunity to rebel.⁴¹⁶ Anger against Peredo grew when he did not deliver the compensation promised to the owners of returned slaves.⁴¹⁷ Meanwhile, a 1634 royal *cédula* reiterating the ban on personal service made indigenous war captives more valuable, as they *could* be forced to work without compensation.⁴¹⁸ We see then that indigenous slavery had become so important to Chile that Peredo's attempts to restrict it were regarded as a threat not only to the security of the colony but to its economy as well.

While many continue to argue that offensive war would make Chile safer, all indications were that it was making the colony more volatile. For one, offensive war brought new indigenous alliances against the Spanish. It was precisely because of slave taking raids that groups like the Tehuelches later gave up their neutrality and allied with Araucanian *indios rebeldes*.⁴¹⁹ While the threat of offensive war

⁴¹⁵ A.G.I. Chile 4. Consultas de la Junta de Guerra. 1602-1699. Madrid, 20 September, 1633. Laso de Vega was so eager to conduct raids because he profited from the sale of indigenous slaves to the tune of 200,000 pesos. Villalobos, "Tres siglos y medio de vida fronteriza," 39.

⁴¹⁶ A.G.I. Chile 55. Expediente de los excesos del Gobernador Francisco Meneses. (1664-1668). Testimony from Maestre de Cmapo General Geronimo de Molina Vasconcelos, Concepción, 23 March, 1665. Fojas 2v.-3.

⁴¹⁷ Ibid., fojas 4-20.

⁴¹⁸ Barros Arana, *Historia general*, IV: 245.

⁴¹⁹ Guillermo Furlong, S.J. *Nicolás Mascardi, S.J. y su carta-relación. (1670)* (Buenos Aires:

prompted some Indians to seek peace, others fought harder when they got wind of the treatment that captured *indios rebeldes* received. Also, practices like facial branding produced more mistrust among both the *indios amigos* and *rebeldes* and in some cases led to the branding of Spanish captives out of revenge.⁴²⁰ The viceroy suggested in 1633 that this practice be discontinued in favor of slightly less inhumane hand branding,⁴²¹ but the practice dragged on as any decision on an outright ban was left to the king.⁴²² Finally, removing *indios rebeldes* from Chile merely expanded the War of Arauco beyond the Araucanía. On at least two occasions captive Indians took over the very ships that were to remove them from the colony, once in Valparaiso and once in Coquimbo.⁴²³

Just as Governor Alonso García Ramón had warned decades earlier, soldiers and officials on the Spanish side were doing more trading of indigenous slaves and less fighting and governing. Certain governors were contributing to this trend, attempting to boost soldier morale by eliminating the *quinto* on sales of enslaved war captives.⁴²⁴ According to one 1640 letter from a member of the *Audiencia* de Chile, there was

Ediciones Teoría, 1963), 20-21.

⁴²⁰ A.N. Morla Vicuña. Vol. 50. Pieza 26. Carta de Nicolás Blanco de Santillán a S. M., de 7 de mayo de 1633, sobre la marca que se le pone en el rostro a los indios esclavos. Foja 206.

⁴²¹ A.G.I. Lima, 44. Cartas y expedientes de virreyes de Perú. 1633. Luis Fernández de Cabrera, Viceroy of Peru. N. 4 lib. 4. Letter to S.M. In N. 4 lib. 4 is V. to S.M. Duda sobre si se han de herrar en el rostro los indios que se cautiven en la guerra de Chile. Lima, 6 de Abril, 1633. Foja 300v. The practice was banned by the viceroy in 1635. Slaves considered a flight risk could still be branded. A.G.I. Lima, 47. Cartas y expedientes de virreyes de Perú. 1635-36. N.1, lib III. Auto from Viceroy. Ciudad de los Reyes. 16 October, 1635. Foja 340v.

⁴²² B.N. Manuscritos Medina. Tomo 133. Pieza 2413. Junta de Guerra del Consejo de Indias. Sobre que los indios, varones o hembras, que se tomen prisioneros en las guerras de Chile se tengan por esclavos. Madrid. 24 Abril, 1635. Fojas 47-51.

⁴²³ A.G.I. Lima, 46. Num. 7-A. Cartas y expedientes de virreyes de Perú. El Gobernador de Chile Don Francisco Lasso de la Vega contradice los inconvenientes que el fiscal alega para vender fuera de aquella provincia los indios cautivados en la guerra. 15 April, 1633.

⁴²⁴ Jara, *Guerra y sociedad*, 233. Quite ironically, the only other comparable incentive would have been permission to leave Chile or retire. Authorization to do so was even sold by some unscrupulous governors.

also a vibrant black market slave trade between the *indios amigos* who often captured the slaves, and the “war ministers” and soldiers who bought them. While some of these transactions were legal, very rarely were they reported or were required taxes paid. This *oidor* was also annoyed that in cash-strapped Chile, the *indios amigos* were both collecting a salary as soldiers and making money in this racket.⁴²⁵

While some *indios amigos* were making a profit in this trade, other *indios amigos* and *indios de paz* were being victimized by Spanish soldiers who were now less discriminating about whether they were raiding friend or foe.⁴²⁶ The Jesuit Diego de Rosales worked frequently among the Puelche, and argued that they were often attacked by the Araucanians and Spanish alike, as they “were not warlike, and did not have arms other than arrows.” In typically paternalistic tone he added that they were easier to capture “because they were more humble, and less courageous.”⁴²⁷

Finally, slave raiding was given even more impetus when the Portuguese revolution of 1640 interrupted the activities of Portuguese African slave traders and raised prices for Chile’s indigenous slaves. Costs shot up from 250 pesos per slave to 600 and 700 pesos during this period.⁴²⁸

The prevalence of slave taking raids meant that for the first time since the conquest of Chile, there was little talk of a major offensive and quick end to the War

⁴²⁵ A.G.I. Chile 35. Cartas y expedientes de personas seculares. 1632-1660. Francisco de la Fuente Villalobos. Letter to V.M. 4 de Abril, 1640, Concepción.

⁴²⁶ A 1631 letter from the *audiencia* stated that soldiers were not only enslaving *indios de paz* but were stealing their horses, mules and oxen as well. A.G.I. Chile, 10, R.3, N.10\3. Cartas de Audiencia. Santiago 6 April 1631, foja 4r.

⁴²⁷ Rosales, *Historia general Tomo :II*, 1293-94.

⁴²⁸ As late as 1686 there was no drop in prices to pre-1640 levels. A list of prices in: B. N., Archivo de la Real Audiencia, Volumen 1805, pieza 1a, page 21, lists among others, “Una negra criolla, de 34 años, en 800 pesos, Un esclavo mulatto, de 16 años, en 650 pesos, Una zamba esclava, de 6 años, en 300 pesos.” Quoted in Domingo Almunategui Solar, “La trata de negros en Chile” *Revista Chilena de Historia y Geografía* 91: No. 46, (1922), 33-34.

of Arauco. Governor Francisco Laso de Vega (1629-39) was one of the last in his office to brag to the king that he could pacify the Araucanians by the end of his administration. Instead, all he left his successor Francisco López de Zúñiga were exaggerated accounts of his campaigns. Another ex-governor explained that the Army of Arauco's activities had become limited to disorganized raids, where they would fall upon the first group of Indians they found, take prisoners and flee toward Spanish territory. Instead of increasing Spanish control of the region, these Spanish hit and run techniques emboldened the Indians and weakened the morale of Spanish soldiers.⁴²⁹ López de Zúñiga saw little hope for ending this cycle, arguing that without "more supplies, more troops, a larger *situado* and settlement, it would be impossible to reduce the *indios rebeldes*." He believed that with Chile's limited resources "the armed subjection of Indians would absolutely impossible."⁴³⁰

If the Araucanians could not be defeated militarily and had outlasted the Defensive War, the only thing left to try was a mixture of dialogue and military campaigns. A series of rather anomalous parleys was initiated. These were peace missions, but the uncertainty of the *vida fronteriza* required that they be initiated by hundreds of well-armed troops. These troops were usually accompanied by the Governor of Chile who upon reaching a strategic spot within the Araucanía would send out emissaries to spread the word that he wanted to negotiate.⁴³¹

As their unorthodox composition would suggest, these parleys had mixed results. Without fail, scores of Araucanian, Puelche and Pehuenche *reguas* would arrive

⁴²⁹ A.G.I. Lima, 46. Cartas y expedientes de virreyes de Perú. N. 4, lib. II. Memorial y parecer que el Oidor Luis Merlo de la Fuente, gobernador de Chile, dio al V. sobre los medios para la pacificación del reino de Chile. Lima. 1 May, 1635. Foja 257.

⁴³⁰ Barros Arana, *Historia general: Tomo IV*, 262.

⁴³¹ *Ibid.*, 263-64.

peacefully to the Spanish camp, promise to come out of hiding and live near colonists, and leave with gifts in hand. Some of these promises were kept, but just as many were fleeting; broken by *indios rebeldes* seeking further gifts or greedy colonists seeking slaves.⁴³² While some groups broke peace agreements made at these parleys, others never entered into them and many didn't even know that the parleys were being held.⁴³³

The parleys could also create more problems than they solved by muddling Spanish understandings of friend and foe and interrupting indigenous daily life.⁴³⁴ In one example, to avoid confusion over neighboring *indios amigos* and *indios rebeldes*, the Spanish declared that anyone on the “rebel” side of a local river could be enslaved. However, this border was an arbitrary one and on the “friendly” side there was nothing to eat. Two *indio amigo caciques* complained that Spanish soldiers enslaved their people simply because they had crossed the river in search of food. Diego de Rosales explained this to the governor, who to his credit nullified the border declaration.⁴³⁵

Another element working against “peaceful” groups like was the fact that the only arena for dialog with Spanish officials was through these peace parleys. Since the ostensible goal of these gatherings was to draw up Spanish-*indio rebelde* truces, attendance at a peace parley was bound to label *indios amigos* as *rebeldes*. In one

⁴³² This “buying peace” had already been tried with little success on the Chichimec frontier in northern New Spain.

⁴³³ Espejo, *La provincia de Cuyo del Reino de Chile: I*, 146.

⁴³⁴ Ibid.

⁴³⁵ Rosales, *Historia general: Tomo II*, 1295.

such example, the Puelches came to the parleys not to offer peace, which the Puelches had never broken, but to “acknowledge the king, as his vassals.”⁴³⁶

The parleys were instituted because of Spanish weakness, and in many ways they reinforced Spanish limitations by revealing the extent of Araucanian autonomy. For example, while the Spanish believed that their incursions were forcing *indios rebeldes* to seek peace, historians argue that it was really the indigenous who were inviting the Spanish to participate in their internal parleys.⁴³⁷ The Spanish believed that God had interceded in their favor by causing the 1640 eruption of Villarrica Volcano and frightening the *rebeldes* into seeking peace at the Parley of Quillín in 1641. Dozens of *rebeldes* groups did participate in the parley, but only because they were “animists” and “pragmatists” and as such were moved both by the eruption and by their need for food.⁴³⁸

While the Indians that attended these parleys were technically capitulating to the crown’s authority, in reality they gave up very little. The Indians knew that governors came and went, and each one would have a parley of his own. A common tactic of *indios amigos* was to agree to live on a *reducción* near the Spanish long enough to organize a raid on them and flee to the mountains. The offending *indios amigos* knew the mountains could sustain them only as long as it took for a new governor to arrive, to whom they would make an offer of peace. The governor would

⁴³⁶ Ibid., 1338.

⁴³⁷ Gascón, “La frontera sur del virreinato del Perú,” 14.

⁴³⁸ Gascón, “Frontier Societies,” 28.

demand they come out of the mountains, and the process would begin all over again.⁴³⁹

Indios rebeldes gained power and material benefits through their participation in parleys. These meetings were occasions not only for discussions of peace, but also for trade. The Indians would not only receive gifts in exchange for their offers of peace,⁴⁴⁰ but would sometimes sell their desperately needed ponchos and blankets to Spanish soldiers who were constantly complaining that they were “shoeless and naked.”⁴⁴¹ This trend had mixed benefits for the Spanish. While this exchange motivated *indios rebeldes* to participate in the parleys, it also created wider *indio rebelde* alliances through the gifting cycle.⁴⁴²

A description of a 1646 parley called by incoming Governor Martín de Mujica reveals a great deal about the mixed benefits of these meetings and how they merely served to reinforce the balance of power on the frontier. First of all, it was the Spanish who approached the Araucanians about a peace deal, but it was the Araucanians who accepted Spanish terms. The “principal chiefs” (*caciques principales*) who attended the parley agreed that their subjects would be catechized,

⁴³⁹ A.G.I. Chile,129. Expediente relativo al Ejército de Chile y su situado. 1680-1699. Memoria de los ynstrumentos que el lco D. Pablo Vazquez de Velasco Cavo del orden de Santiago y fiscal de la R. Audiencia de Chile remite a su Magd. en comprobazion de lo que en carta de 25 de Septte de 1690 escribe en orden a lo obrado en la distibuzion del situado del exercito de chile y de los fraudes y malas administraciones que reconosco y experimto en el dispendio del caudal de dicho situado y lo demas que en dha carta se contiene. N. 12 is a letter from Maestre de Campo Geronimo de Quiroga to Licenciado Don Pablo Vazquez de Velasco...Fiscal de la Real Audiencia ... de Chile, Concepción, February 28, 1690.

⁴⁴⁰ Several breakdowns of the *situado* list how much is to be dedicated to *agasajos* (gifts) for Indians seeking peace. A.G.I. Chile 126, Expediente de la actuación del Gobernador de Chile. 1663-1665. A.G.I. Chile, 4. Consultas de la Junta de Guerra: 1602-1699. Letter from don Juan de Urrutia, Concepción, 15 July, 1690.

⁴⁴¹ Silva Galdames, “Guerra y trueque,” 87. This purchase of peace was so common that *agasajos* or gifts were part of the army’s *situado*. A.G.I. Chile,4. Consultas de la Junta de Guerra. 1602-1699. Letter from Don Juan de Urrutia dated Concepcion, 15 July, 1690.

⁴⁴² Silva Galdames, “Guerra y trueque,” 93.

that the enemies of the Spanish would be their enemies, and that they would immediately notify the Spanish if another cacique tried to initiate a rebellion by “passing the arrow.” Not notifying the Spanish of such a call to arms would be punishable by death.

However, the principal chiefs were allowed celebrate the ceremony in their own manner, making sure of course that the process enhanced their power. First of all, the chiefs literally buried the hatchet, breaking a *toqui* in half, giving half to the governor and interring the other half. Next, the chiefs planted a *canelo* branch on top of the buried *toqui*.⁴⁴³ The chiefs had buried their war-making capability but had replaced it with a powerful symbol of peace. We see that although the Spanish may have declared victory when their conditions were accepted, for Araucanian leaders recognition by the Spanish whether through war or diplomacy was usually beneficial.

While some Araucanians and many colonists may have been content with this cycle of parleys, the viceroy spoke out against them as he recognized that they were a veiled protest against a lack of resources from Lima. He argued that while the Spanish were involved in peace negotiations they should have been capturing territory and Indians and dividing them into *encomiendas*. The viceroy added that Indians who had not been *encomendados* would always have peace on their own terms, and would be able to conserve their territory and some autonomy. He also explained that without Indian or African laborers and without gold or silver, Chile could not attract new colonists.⁴⁴⁴

⁴⁴³ Aguirre, *Población de Valdivia*, 84-87.

⁴⁴⁴ A.G.I. Lima 50. N.8 Lib. II. V a S.M. informe sobre el tratado de paz con indios rebeldes de Chile, según aviso el Marqués de Vaides. Callao, 8 June 1641. Foja 131 v.

The Governor of Chile and the Viceroy of Peru had been at odds before, but this new impasse was more serious as Lima could refuse (at least until the crown heard about it) to send Chile's *situado*. Without the *situado*, the Chile of the 1630s and 40s would have still been in the post 1598 doldrums. The *situado* was supposed to be a temporary measure to help Chile end the War of Arauco, but instead had extended the war by supporting other commercial and illicit activities.⁴⁴⁵ The king thought about suspending the *situado* on a number of occasions as the war drew on but "the incessant complaints of the Governors of Chile" and the re-appearance of pirates assured that it kept coming.⁴⁴⁶

Despite Dutch past designs on Chile's port of Valdivia, and intelligence that indicated they were still interested in it, a lack of resources made Chilean Governor Luis Merlo de la Fuente resist reconstructing the town.⁴⁴⁷ Merlo de la Fuente was concerned about the Dutch threat, but pointed out that there were "a thousand good ports" between Chiloé and Panama from which the Dutch could continue their East Indies trade. He added that if they were to gain a foothold in the Pacific, they could attack anywhere from New Spain to Chile without warning.⁴⁴⁸

In 1640 the outgoing viceroy explained his reluctance to carry out the long overdue repopulation of Valdivia. The viceroy did argue that Valdivia could be an

⁴⁴⁵ Gascón, "La frontera sur del virreinato del Perú," 16.

⁴⁴⁶ Barros Arana, *Historia general: Tomo IV*, 167.

⁴⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 279-83. In 1621 the Príncipe de Esquilache wrote of the "grave damage" European enemies would do if they were to fortify the abandoned port of Valdivia. He called for his successor to try and repopulate the port. Ricardo Beltrán y Rózpide, ed. *Relación que el Príncipe de Esquilache hace al Señor Marqués de Guadalcázar*, 264. Another 1635 letter from the viceroy mentioned that Father Bernardino de Morales y Alboroz, a Dominican who had been a Dutch prisoner, warned of the "designs (the Dutch) had to fortify the port of Valdivia." A.G.I. Lima 46. N. 4, lib. II. V. a S.M. 26 May, 1635. Foja 242

⁴⁴⁸ Lima 46. N. 4, lib. II "Memorial y parecer que el Oidor Luis Merlo de la Fuente, gobernador de Chile, dio al V. sobre los medios para la pacificación del reino de Chile. Dated Lima, 1 May, 1635. Foja 249.

important supply point in the War of Arauco, but added that if European enemies wanted a fortification in the South Sea, they would have attempted to establish one already. The viceroy theorized that European enemies would be more interested in ports like Buenos Aires (also under his jurisdiction) that would be easier for them to re-supply.⁴⁴⁹ Plans were even made to prevent a land invasion from Buenos Aires, and the Governor of Chile was warned to be on the lookout for the western prong of the attack that would leave the Dutch in control of Potosí's silver.⁴⁵⁰ In an embarrassing twist for the viceroy, at the very time he was dismissing European intentions to establish themselves in a Pacific port, the Dutch were planning their takeover and settlement of Valdivia.

The Dutch West India Company had expanded its influence in Brazil to conduct raids on Spanish ships and territory in the Caribbean, but occupation was expensive. A takeover of Peruvian silver at its source would have been more cost effective. Thus, a streamlined version of previous South Sea expeditions was sent to Chile in 1642. The viceroy was half-right, as “the Dutch governor of Brazil, Prince Maurits, hoped to establish a foothold (on the coast of Chile not in Buenos Aires) and launch attacks on the mineral-rich interior.”⁴⁵¹ The Dutch also hoped that allying with the Araucanians could offset their lack of manpower. It was precisely the stiff Araucanian resistance to Spanish rule that made the “Chileans the best hope for an American ally.” The leader of the Nassau fleet had also played up the possibility of a

⁴⁴⁹ Relación del estado en que el Conde de Chinchón deja el Gobierno del Perú al Señor Virrey Marqués de Mancera, Los Reyes, 26 January, 1640, *Colección de las memorias o relaciones que escribieron los Virreyes del Perú acerca del estado en que dejaban las cosas generales del reino: Tomo II*, ed. by Angel de Altolaquirre (Madrid: Imprenta Mujeres Españolas, 1930), 109.

⁴⁵⁰ A.G.I. Lima, 50. Num. 8, Lib. II. El V. a S.M., prevenciones para evitar la entrada de enemigos desde el Brasil por el puerto de Buenos Aires. Callao. 8 June, 1641. Fojas 169-171.

⁴⁵¹ Lane, *Pillaging the Empire*, 87-88.

Dutch-indigenous alliance, claiming that la Mocha residents were excited to see that Dutch guns would be used against the Spanish. The Dutch went so far as to identify Araucanians as fellow freedom fighters. The leader of the 1642 expedition, Hendrick Brouwer detailed that he wanted to ally with the “freedom-loving and Spanish-loathing warriors” depicted in *La Araucana*.⁴⁵²

Brouwer’s expedition took on supplies at Recife and landed just north of Chiloé in May of 1643. There two hundred Dutch musketeers defeated Spanish resistance and took on some provisions, but lost their element of surprise.⁴⁵³ The desperate and outnumbered Spanish called local Indians to their aid, but the Dutch soon advanced on Castro, sacking it and partially destroying a Jesuit church. There they left a message in Latin that accused the Spanish of being cowards for fleeing and signed it, “*Victor (olandii), cola España.*”⁴⁵⁴

After receiving word from Chiloé, the governor scrambled to defend Concepción, digging miles of trenches and erecting a small fort.⁴⁵⁵ Concepción was spared however, as the Dutch would only go as far north as Valdivia where they met no Spanish resistance. Brouwer died of natural causes during the voyage, but the expedition’s new leader Elias Herckmans “landed (in Valdivia) with two companies of troops and delivered ‘an excellent harangue and oration’ to a crowd of about three hundred Araucanians. Herckmans explained the Dutch purpose in the South Pacific, presented ‘Letters of Credentials’ from the Prince of Orange, and distributed gifts in his name. In another speech to an audience of 1,200 Herckmans reminded the

⁴⁵² Schmidt, *Innocence Abroad*, 205-06.

⁴⁵³ Rosales, *Historia general:II*, 1163. Lane, *Pillaging the Empire*, 87-90.

⁴⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 1164.

⁴⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 1166.

Araucanians that the Dutch had also fought the Spanish for 80 years, and trade agreements were made.⁴⁵⁶ The Araucanian Manqueante in turn agreed to ally with the Europeans against the Spanish and offered the Dutch “his lands, people, arms, rich gold mines and women.” He even sent his son to live among the Dutch as proof of his trustworthiness.⁴⁵⁷

The Dutch takeover of an abandoned port may not have seemed like much, but in the context of the state of the American colonies it was disastrous. The recent Portuguese War of Independence had already weakened the Spanish position in America, as the Spanish no longer had an ally in Brazil. The Viceroy of Peru expressed his concerns about Dutch power in the Americas to his contemporary, the Viceroy of New Spain. The letter sent from Lima again raised the possibility that the Dutch and Portuguese could push inward from the River Plate and the Dutch from Chile. Of interest to the Viceroy of New Spain was the possibility that once the Dutch became established in Valdivia or another port in Chile, Acapulco would be threatened, as it was an ideal port for a return voyage from China.⁴⁵⁸

The situation was even graver from Chile’s perspective. The possibility of an alliance between *indios rebeldes* and European enemies had kept Chilean officials on edge for decades, and now that it had occurred, the colony’s position was painted as all the more precarious and requiring additional resources. In a 1643 letter, the governor claimed that the presence of the Dutch was a watershed moment for Indians in the region, whether they were at peace or *enemigos*. The “*aucaes*” or *indios*

⁴⁵⁶ Schmidt, *Innocence Abroad*, 208-09.

⁴⁵⁷ Rosales, *Historia general:II*, 1168-69.

⁴⁵⁸ A.G.I. Lima 51. No. 12-B. El V. al V. de Nueva España, Conde de Salvatierra, sobre la entrada de holandeses en el Mar del Sur. 10 October, 1643.

rebeldes had become “extremely bold” while those on *reducciones* were “insolent” and *encomendados* were “content.” The governor added that without His Majesty’s help, things could get very dangerous in Chile. He argued that if the Dutch were only intent on using Chile as a stopover for their journey to the Philippines, they would not have pillaged Chiloé.⁴⁵⁹ The governor added that the Chiloé landing was more evidence that the Dutch wanted to “infest” Chile and asked the king for 1,000 men.⁴⁶⁰

A little more than a week later, the governor sent another letter to the viceroy detailing how quickly Spain’s “sea and land” enemies had formed an alliance. The Indians of Villarrica, Valdivia, Osorno, Mariquina and Toltén had all “befriended” the Dutch who had announced that they would help them drive the Spanish out of Chile. The Dutch were even winning over *indios reducidos*, making the governor fear that the Dutch were providing just the spark these groups needed to try and free themselves of “Spanish oppression.”⁴⁶¹ To prevent this alliance from spreading any further, the governor sent Spanish and Indian messengers to warn that the Dutch were there for gold, and that local Indians would soon be forced to work in Dutch mines.⁴⁶²

⁴⁵⁹ The second Dutch attack on their island (the first was in 1600) had made residents of Chiloé especially nervous, prompting them to ask the Viceroy to give them enough resources to defend themselves against such attacks or move them to Coquimbo. Rosales, *Historia General:II*, 1175.

⁴⁶⁰ The governor went on to describe Chile as the “key” to Spain’s retaining power in all of the Americas. From Valdivia, the Dutch could begin to take over Spanish trade in the Pacific. Valdivia’s proximity to the Strait of Magellan would facilitate communication and cooperation with their forces in Brazil to cut off Spain’s Atlantic trade as well. The marquis claimed that with this increasing Dutch control, no American silver would reach Spain. Also, Valdivia’s distance from Spanish forces, its fertile soil, and cooperative local Indians, made a permanent Dutch presence there seem all the more possible. The governor challenged those who “had tried to say that (the loss of Chile) would be of little import.” If Chile were to fall, “(God forbid),” they would know the “true affliction” that would befall so many Spanish “provinces and kingdoms.” A.G.I. Lima 52. Cartas y expedientes de virreyes de Perú. Pedro de Toledo, Marqués de Mancera. 1644-45. N. 4-A. El Marqués de Vaidés, gobernador de Chile, a V. sobre los navíos holandeses que habían llegado a Chiloé. Concepción. 16 November, 1643. Foja 3.

⁴⁶¹ A.G.I. Lima 52. N. 4-E. El Marqués de Vaidés, gobernador de Chile, al V., sobre el enemigo holandés. Concepción. 3 December, 1643.

⁴⁶² This message did have some truth to it, as the Dutch believed that gold in Valdivia would bring more settlers. A.G.I. Lima 52. 4-D Declaración de un prisionero... Concepción, 23 November, 1643.

These messengers were sent with instructions to give the Indians whatever they wanted to keep them in “obedience to His Majesty.”⁴⁶³ Ironically then, these groups were being asked to trust the Spanish, who had already forced them to work rather than the Dutch, who might do so.

The viceroy, who had proved reluctant to fortify Valdivia, was now obligated to send troops to root out the Dutch there. Since scouts from Concepción had reported that the Dutch were nowhere to be seen, the viceroy could confidently send his twenty-two ship fleet to take the port.⁴⁶⁴ The fleet arrived off the coast of Valdivia in 1645, with much fanfare and of course found nothing. Herckmans had wished to stay in Valdivia and had even sent to Brazil for reinforcements, but the Dutch colony had suffered the same fate of Nombre de Jesus and Rei Don Felipe. A breakdown in dialogue with the Araucanians meant that without the same frontier exchange that allowed Spanish survival, hunger forced a Dutch departure.⁴⁶⁵ The only task for the huge Spanish force was the capture of a handful of Dutch deserters.⁴⁶⁶

In fact, by 1645 Dutch “pretensions in the Spanish South Sea” had ended almost as quickly as they had begun. The Spanish had no way of knowing this however, and seven hundred of the viceroy’s reinforcements stayed behind in Valdivia. The expedition of reconquest had cost 348,000 pesos, with maintenance of a Valdivia garrison projected to cost 20,000 annually. Added to other expenses such as the fortification of Callao, soldier pay, and ship building we see that “the Dutch pirates

Fojas 10-10v.

⁴⁶³ A.G.I. Lima 52. 4-E. ...sobre el enemigo holandés... Concepción. 3, December, 1643.

⁴⁶⁴ Barros Arana, *Historia general: Tomo IV*, 290-91.

⁴⁶⁵ Herckmans returned to Recife to find that Prince Maurits had already outfitted the “relief force.” Lane, *Pillaging the Empire*, 87-90.

⁴⁶⁶ A.G.I. Lima 52. N. 4-B. Copia de carta que el General Olandes Elias Harquemans escribió a Manqueante caçique de Mariquina en 14 de octubre de 1643. Valdivia.

and privateers had thus cost their enemies much more than they themselves realized.”⁴⁶⁷ Despite the costs however, the viceroy announced that Valdivia now protected Chile from both European and Indian enemies.⁴⁶⁸

This was especially important after the testimony of Dutch stragglers. One such deserter, Antonio Juan, confirmed the worst Spanish fears by testifying that the Dutch had brought carpenters, ironsmiths, and a multitude of tools useful in construction and farming. They also brought a number of small arms, which Antonio Juan believed were “to arm the Indians that befriended (us) to fight against the Spanish and drive them out of the Kingdom (of Chile.)”⁴⁶⁹

Other witnesses claimed that the Dutch had told *caciques* in Valdivia that they would soon return with twelve to fourteen ships, “two thousand soldiers and a thousand African slaves, to relieve the Indians (of any forced labor.)”⁴⁷⁰ The Dutch had also expressed that next time they would not only settle Valdivia, but would try to take Concepción as well.⁴⁷¹

With Valdivia fortified, the viceroy believed that the main remaining obstacle in the protection of the Pacific coast was a lack of cooperation from the same Chilean colonists who so often appealed to him for help. The viceroy was especially frustrated when the Governor Marqués de Baides was unable to rendezvous his

⁴⁶⁷ Lane, *Pillaging the Empire*, 87-90.

⁴⁶⁸ Relación del Estado del Gobierno del Perú que hace el Marqués de Mancera al Señor Virrey Conde de Salvatierra, Lima, 8 October, 1648, *Colección de las memorias o relaciones que escribieron los Virreyes del Perú*, ed. by Angel de Altolaquirre, 198.

⁴⁶⁹ A.G.I. Lima 52. Num. 4-D. Declaración de un prisionero holandés que hizo traer de Chiloé el Marqués de Vaides. Concepción, 23 November, 1643. Fojas 3-3v.

⁴⁷⁰ Lima, 52. Cartas y expedientes de virreyes de Perú. Pedro de Toledo, Marqués de Mancera. 1644-45. N. 43, lib. III. El V. a S.M., noticia de holandeses en Valdivia. Fortificación del puerto. 24 May, 1645.

⁴⁷¹ Lima 52. Num. 52. El V. a S.M, noticias de una armada que se prevenía en Holanda para Pernambuco y pasar al Mar del Sur. Propone medios para la defensa de las provincias del Puerú y Nueva España. 25 November 1645.

overland forces with the seven hundred soldiers who had come by sea.⁴⁷² The viceroy was also upset by the governor's claim that the fortification of Valdivia would require another *situado* when officials were wasteful and even "pernicious" with the first one. The viceroy even added that the Army of Chile didn't want the war to end! To this end he argued, army officials had persuaded the governor that a land-based fortification of Valdivia would have been impossible even with two armies; one leading the attack, and another defending the frontier. At the very least, the viceroy wanted the governor to inform him of any sightings of the Dutch as he determined to sit on his silver shipment until the coast was clear. Chile was becoming central to the viceroyalty's economic livelihood. As he sent more resources sent to Chile, the viceroy moved to exert more authority over his colony, becoming increasingly critical of the prodigal colony's spending.⁴⁷³

The viceroy hoped that the new governor, Martín de Mujica would be able to "walk the eight of ten leagues (to Valdivia from the interior) ... that so many Spaniards with fewer troops" had walked, and would show that such a trek "was not impossible."⁴⁷⁴ The viceroy claimed that he wanted the new governor to have sufficient resources and sent him three hundred troops, even though Mujica had requested 1,000. In the same breath that he mentioned reinforcements for Chile the

⁴⁷² Before sending the rescue fleet, the viceroy had ordered the Governor of Chile to gather all his troops and march on Valdivia, driving the Dutch out to sea. This order merely revealed "the viceroy's imperfect knowledge of Chile's situation" and was impossible to carry out. Gathering the Army of Arauco together as one force would have meant abandoning Spanish forts and exposing the column to a series of ambushes as they marched the hundreds of kilometers to Valdivia where they would meet an unknown number of Dutch and Indian enemies. Barros Arana, *Historia general: Tomo IV*, 289-90.

⁴⁷³ A.G.I. Lima 52. El V. a S.M., noticia de holandeses en Valdivia, fojas 178-178v.

⁴⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, fojas 185-186v.

viceroy proposed other ways to protect silver, such as bringing it overland to Callao instead of through Arica.⁴⁷⁵

Chile would have to wait almost thirty years for the appearance of its next European enemy.⁴⁷⁶ In Chile's first 150 years the colony saw fewer than ten significant landings of European enemies on its coast, and only of handful of these could be called attacks. Drake and others found very few objects of value on Chile's under-populated coast, and potential settlers found the climate and the lack of supplies prohibitive. These factors only encouraged the English and Dutch to keep sailing northward and westward toward their real reward; Peru's silver and the Orient's spices.

Despite this, we have seen that officials in Chile were convinced for most of the 17th century that a larger scale European invasion of their distant colony was imminent. While officials in Chile were not averse to manipulating the viceroy, there was very real counter-reformation hatred between the Dutch and Spanish colonists. When the Spanish retook Valdivia they exhumed the "heretic" Brouwer's body and burned it.⁴⁷⁷ Whether fears in Chile were genuine or were the equivalent of crying wolf, they did prompt the viceroy to act. The very real threat from Chile's War of Arauco, combined with the potential threat from European enemies kept attention and resources directed toward this peripheral colony, even at the expense of other parts of

⁴⁷⁵ Lima 52. Num. 52. El V. a S.M, noticias de una armada que se prevenía en Holanda para Pernambuco y pasar al Mar del Sur. Propone medios para la defensa de las provincias del Puerú y Nueva España. 25 November, 1645.

⁴⁷⁶ The Spanish had technically been at peace with the English since 1667, but rampant English pirate activity in the Caribbean prompted Queen Mariana to declare that the peace did not apply in the Americas. Barros Arana, *Historia general: Tomo V*, 100-101.

⁴⁷⁷ Barros Arana, *Historia general: Tomo IV*, 291.

the viceroyalty.⁴⁷⁸ Therefore, even though Chile had kept its *situado*, Santiago and Lima were back to square one, with Chile calling the viceroy stingy and the viceroy pointing to Chile's wastefulness.

Unfortunately for the viceroy, Chile's wastefulness actually spiked after, and to some extent as a result of the scare of Dutch colonization efforts. Not only were officials being wasteful with the *situado* but the viceroy had begun investigating embezzlement of its funds and goods only a decade after it began to arrive. This skimming from the *situado* and other forms of corruption continued in the 1640s when governors and soldiers behaved as though the reinforcement of Valdivia was a victory for Chile and a license to continue to profit, often illicitly from the War of Arauco. Some soldiers sold clothes destined for the army in local markets and others doubled as horse thieves.⁴⁷⁹ Governor Mujica (1646-48) was forced to found fort Nacimiento on the other side of the Bío-Bío to keep soldiers away from the equine inhabitants of haciendas outside of Concepción.⁴⁸⁰

Despite some advances through parleys, Spanish soldiers continued to participate in illegal raids and were increasingly aided by governors. By the time Antonio de Acuña y Cabrera was named governor in 1650, illegal slave taking was significantly affecting Chile's fragile peace, angering both *indios rebeldes* and more importantly

⁴⁷⁸ While they Dutch had not invaded Buenos Aires, the port was affected by their presence in Chile. In 1645 the viceroy requested 100 men from Valdivia to defend Buenos Aires from the newly antagonistic Portuguese in Brazil. Jose Torre Revello, "Los gobernadores de Buenos Aires (1617-1777)," in *Historia de la nacion argentina: desde los origenes hasta la organizacion definitiva en 1862. 2d ed. Vol. III*, Ricardo Levene, ed. (Buenos Aires: Libreria y Editorial "El Ateneo," 1939), 342. A year later however, the viceroy decided to put off that project until Valdivia was repopulated to his satisfaction. Lima, 53. *Cartas y expedientes de virreyes de Perú. 1646-1649. Pedro de Toledo, Marqués de Mancera. N. 1, lib. iv. El V. a S.M., noticias del puerto de Buenos Aires del estado de sus defensas y fortificaciones. Callao, 5 July 1646. Foja 249.*

⁴⁷⁹ Gascón, "Frontier Societies," 10.

⁴⁸⁰ Góngora, "Vagabundaje y sociedad fronteriza en Chile," 7.

indios amigos, the army's foot soldiers.⁴⁸¹ Bishop Dionysio of Concepción noticed that the Spanish used offensive war as a *carte blanche* to commit abuses, selling free Indians "with little fear of God." Many Indian slaves had appealed to the bishop for help, arguing that they had never been "rebels" and didn't understand why the Spanish had deprived them of their freedom.⁴⁸²

Acuña would have been hard-pressed to turn this illegal activity around. The *veedor* Francisco de la Fuente Villalobos warned that illegal slave raids were spreading to cordillera Indians who once captured were shipped out from Valdivia. The *veedor* warned that such practices threatened to turn back the conquest, provoke an Indian rebellion, and render meaningless the deaths of 26,000 Spaniards in the War of Arauco's 100 years.⁴⁸³

Villalobos praised the new governor for cracking down on rampant slave export in 1651.⁴⁸⁴ Diego de Rosales was also an early supporter of Acuña when the governor returned forty-four illegally taken Puelches to their lands.⁴⁸⁵ Despite early attempts to restrict it however, Acuña's nepotistic impulses seem to have compelled him to expand the illegal slave trade, with disastrous results.⁴⁸⁶

⁴⁸¹ See footnotes in Chapter three for a discussion of the military role of *indios amigos*.

⁴⁸² A.G.I. Chile 57: Expediente de la libertad de los indios esclavos de guerra. 1674-1683. Letter from Bishop of Concepción, Fray Dionysio. Concepción, August 1659.

⁴⁸³ A.N. Fondo Morla Vicuña. Vol. 20 Pieza 5. Carta (a S.M.) de Francisco Fuentes Villalobos a S.M., de 20 de Abril de 1651, Concepción. Fojas 25v.-26. The marquis had also been accused by Father Rosales of taking "some benefit" from the sale of *piezas* but was never formally charged of illegal slave taking. Barros Arana, *Historia general: Tomo IV*, 298.

⁴⁸⁴ BN. Manuscritos Medina. Tomo 142, Pieza 2654. Antonio de Acuña y Cabrera and others. Carta de la Real Audiencia de Chile a S.M. el Rey. Santiago, 22 Mayo 1651. Foja 29.

⁴⁸⁵ Rosales, *Historia general: Tomo II*, 1335-36.

⁴⁸⁶ Eugene Korth blames Acuña's change on his inability to resist the influence of his young and "comely" wife. Korth, *Spanish Policy*, 180-81. A number of witnesses agree that his wife did have significant influence on Acuña's decisions, but whether this was due to her beauty, youth, intelligence, or malevolent charm is something we probably can't know.

Acuña first found himself in hot water after he appointed his inexperienced relatives to important army posts. Juan de Salazar, Acuña's brother-in-law and newly appointed Maestro de Campo General, angered a group of *indios amigos* in the first months of his command by leading them into an obvious *indio de guerra* ambush, threatening those who balked with the gallows.⁴⁸⁷ Both Juan and brother José obligated *indios amigos* to transport the wine and other items that they sold in their *pulperías*, providing no compensation or even any food for jobs that often lasted over a month.⁴⁸⁸ The Salazars soon expanded their malfeasance to include illegal slave taking. One witness claimed that slaves were given to José and Juan in exchange for promotions.⁴⁸⁹ Another testified that Juan beat a Spanish soldier to death when the latter refused to falsely testify that he had taken an Indian girl in war. In fact, Salazar had ordered the soldier to steal her from a group of *indios amigos*.⁴⁹⁰

Especially critical of this family racket was Diego de Rosales, who had inherited the Defensive War from Luis de Valdivia, and continued his missionary work in the Araucanía even after the project ended. His efforts against the enslavement of *indios amigos* developed into a very personal feud with the Acuña-Salazar family. One witness to the conflict said that Acuña became furious when his raids were interfered with and that José de Salazar referred to Rosales as a “cuckold.” Rosales in turn was upset because this abuse would not only erode his work, like it had Luis de

⁴⁸⁷ A.G.I. Escribanía 932 C. Pieza 22. Testimony of Don Francisco de Pineda Bascuñán. Concepción. 29 June, 1656. Fojas 385-387.

⁴⁸⁸ B.N. Manuscritos Medina. Tomo 143, Pieza 2706. Información sumaria que está mandada haver sobre la pérdida y alzamiento general del Reino de Chile, en la causa que sigue el genreal Martín Ruíz de Gamboa al gobernador de Chile, don Antonio de Acuña y Cabrera y el Maestre de Campo don Juan de Salazar y Solís Henríquez, tomada al padre Diego de Rosales, Rector de la Compañía de Jesús, en la ciudad de la Concepción en 3 de Jun(1?)io de 1656. Foja 281.

⁴⁸⁹ A.G.I. Escribanía 932 C. Pieza 22. Testimony of Don Francisco de Pineda Bascuñán. Concepción. 29 June, 1656. Fojas 380-380v.

⁴⁹⁰ Ibid., foja 384v.

Valdivia's, but would drive more and more groups into alliances against the Spanish as word spread of this deception on the part of army officers.⁴⁹¹

Even without the help of his relatives however, Acuña would have managed to get himself into hot water. He was accused of permitting abuse and illegal enslavement of *indios de paz*, and in one case of personally inflicting a beating on an important *cacique*.⁴⁹² Acuña was at best slow to respond to accusations of abuse by his soldiers, and ignored altogether complaints about the actions of his relatives. The governor was in fact reprimanded in a 1656 royal *cédula* for permitting illegal slave taking.⁴⁹³ Often Acuña would order officers to conduct illegal raids, even leaving written instructions for their sale.⁴⁹⁴ In one such case, Acuña ordered Captain Luis Ponce de León to raid a group of *indios de paz*. The survivors of this raid went to the governor directly to try and reach an agreement for the sake of “peace throughout the land.” Governor Acuña had the emissaries followed back to their settlements and ordered them raided again. Acuña's involvement in these events did not go un-rewarded.

⁴⁹¹ A.G.I. Escribanía 932 C. Pieza 22. Sargento Mayor Ignacio de Carrera. Información sumaria... Concepción, 27 June, 1656. Fojas 315-316. Rosales also claimed that on one occasion near Osorno, an un-named *cacique* came to Lieutenant Manuel Méndez with twenty-five of his people offering peace and agreeing to live next to the Spanish. The *cacique* wanted assurances that his people would be fairly treated and Méndez replied that the “royal word” was sufficient. Méndez eventually broke this word and the *cacique* and his people were imprisoned and enslaved. When Méndez's superior got wind of this, instead of denouncing the lieutenant, he took the slaves himself, giving twelve to Governor Acuña and six to Juan de Salazar. Some of the slaves were sold to Lima while others were given to the governor's wife, María de Salazar. A.G.I. Escribanía 932 C. Pieza 22. Testimony of Padre Diego de Rosales... given to General Martín Ruíz de Gamboa. 3 July, 1656. Concepción. Fojas 536-538.

⁴⁹² A.G.I. Escribanía, 932 B. Pieza 8. Ratification of testimony from Juana de Sotomayor. Ciudad de los Reyes. 23 November, 1655. Fojas 141-141v. This witness had heard that Acuña had assaulted Antonio de Chicaguala, “beating (him) with a cane and grabbing and shaking (him) by the hair.”

⁴⁹³ A.G.I. Chile 57. Referred to in letter from Governor of Chile, Juan Henríquez de las Casas and others. Santiago. 19 October, 1671.

⁴⁹⁴ A.G.I. Escribanía 932 C. Pieza 22. Testimony of Don Francisco de Pineda Bascuñán. Concepción. 29 June, 1656. Fojas 383v.-384.

Juan de la Roa sent the governor 100 slaves who were later freed when the Audiencia de Chile put de la Roa on trail.⁴⁹⁵

Acuña also took advantage of indigenous desperation in famine and wartime and greatly expanded the relatively new practice of *uzanza*.⁴⁹⁶ Most common during times of scarcity, Indians had begun to take the extreme step of “renting” a son or daughter to feed the rest of the family.⁴⁹⁷ *Uzanza* was declared illegal on several occasions and even made punishable by death, but these bans did not stop the practice.⁴⁹⁸

An *uzanza* agreement was only supposed to last for “a given time” but Juan de Salazar and other officials could and did issue false certificates stating that soldiers had taken *uzanza* Indians in war. These certificates allowed the Indians to be taken to Concepción and shipped to “other places.”⁴⁹⁹ Governor Acuña had little to say about this fraud, as he too falsified these certificates.⁵⁰⁰ He also relaxed the restrictions on settlement of “reduced” Indians, allowing them to live closer to Santiago so that his

⁴⁹⁵ A.G.I. Escribanía 932 C. Pieza 22. Sargento Mayor Ignacio de Carrera. Información sumaria... Concepción, 27 June, 1656. Fojas 294-297v.

⁴⁹⁶ In his 1651 exit interview, the viceroy explained *uzanza* to his successor. He added that he had only recently learned of it and that the Audiencia of Chile had already requested that it be banned. Relación de Estado en que deja el Gobierno de estos reinos el Conde de Salvateirra al Sr. Virrey Conde de Alba de Sesta, Los Reyes, 22 March, 1651. *Colección de las memorias o relaciones que escribieron los Virreyes del Perú: Tomo II*, 300.

⁴⁹⁷ BN. Manuscritos Medina. Tomo 143, Pieza 2705. Información sumaria que está mandada hacer sobre la pérdida y alzamiento general del Reino de Chile, en la causa que sigue el general Martín Ruíz de Gamboa al Gobernador de Chile, don Antonio de Acuña y Cabrera y al Maestre de Campo, don Juan Salazar y Solís Henríquez, tomada al testigo don Ignacio de Carrera, Sargento Mayor del Reino, en la ciudad de la Concepción en 27 de Junio de 1656. Foja 242 v.

⁴⁹⁸ A.G.I. Chile 57. Letter from Viceroy Conde de Alba. Lima, 14 March, 1659. In 1652 Isabel de Villagra was accused of selling twenty Indians, many of whom she had garnered through *uzanza*. A.G.I. Escribanía 932 A. Comisiones Audiencia de Chile. 1660-1685. Pieza 1a. Comisión a Pedro de Azaña Solís y Palacio, oidor de la Audiencia de Chile, para proceder en la continuación de la causa que de oficio comenzó Martín de Mújica, Presidente de la Audiencia de Chile, contra Antonio Ramírez de Laguna, fiscal y protector general de indios, sobre el mal uso de su oficio en tratos y contratos y los azotes que mandó ejetutar en Gonzalo de Aculco, cacique principal del pueblo de Aculco. Testimonio de la causa que segui sobre que los Indios de servidumbre no se vendesen en conformidad de la cedula de su Magd. Antonio Ramírez de Laguna. 2 December, 1659. Foja 359.

⁴⁹⁹ A.G.I. Escribanía, 932 B. Pieza 19. Testimonio en Relación de la Culpa ... Fojas 4v.-5

⁵⁰⁰ A.G.I. Escribanía 932 C. Pieza 22. Testimony of Don Francisco de Pineda Bascuñán. Concepción. 29 June, 1656. Fojas 383v.-384.

wife could carry out more *uzanza* trades.⁵⁰¹ Francisco de Pineda y Bascuñán said he personally expressed his doubts to the governor about removing these Indians from “under (the control of) our arms,” but that Acuña responded by angrily ordering that he leave the room.⁵⁰² Other critics claimed that this relaxation of settlement rules had made Chile vulnerable to an indigenous assault.⁵⁰³

Acuña’s worst offense and most foolhardy strategy was the enslavement of *indios amigos*. We have already discussed the overall military value of *indios amigos*, but these troops were also very important in slave-taking raids. *Indios amigos* had taken hundreds of Indian captives in the 1640s alone, and as mentioned were very willing to sell them to the Spanish at a low rate or even better turn them over to the Spanish directly. Acuña’s strategy to enslave *indios amigos* would in essence involve killing the goose that laid golden eggs.

Despite evidence to the contrary then, Acuña persisted in his belief that *indios amigos* were useless as allies but as enemies they would help he and his cohorts “make themselves very rich.”⁵⁰⁴ His strategy was to pocket the salaries of *indios amigos*, and when they tired of mistreatment and rebelled he could collect again when they were captured and sold as slaves. To get them to turn against the Spanish,

⁵⁰¹ A.G.I. Escribanía 932 C. Pieza 22. Testimony of Don Francisco de Pineda Bascuñán. Concepción. 29 June, 1656. Fojas 382v.-383.

⁵⁰² A.G.I. Escribanía 932 C. Pieza 22. Testimony of Don Francisco de Pineda Bascuñán. Concepción. 29 June, 1656. Fojas 382v.-383.

⁵⁰³ A.G.I. Escribanía 932 C. Pieza 22. Martín Ruíz de Gamboa. Querellas against Antonio de Acuña y Cabrera and Juan de Salazar. Concepción. 26 June, 1656. Foja 138v.

⁵⁰⁴ A.G.I. Escribanía 932 C. Pieza 22. Martín Ruíz de Gamboa. Querellas against Antonio de Acuña y Cabrera and Juan de Salazar. Concepción. 26 June, 1656. Foja 140. A.G.I. Escribanía 932 C. Pieza 22. Testimony of Don Francisco de Pineda Bascuñán. Concepción. 29 June, 1656. Foja 375. Another witness heard Acuña say he wished to force the Indians to rebel in order to justify a counterattack and to “quemarlos a todos.” (Burn them all.) A.G.I. Escribanía 932 C. Pieza 22. Sargento Mayor Ignacio de Carrera. Información sumaria... Concepción, 27 June, 1656. Foja 306.

Acuña left a number of companies of *indios amigos* without supplies or payment for their service.⁵⁰⁵

The violations of Acuña's family were even more excessive than those of previous governors in that their intent was to enslave the very *indios amigos* who allied with the Spanish, had brought some order to the frontier. The results of this excess were catastrophic for the entire colony.⁵⁰⁶ Acuña's critics like Diego de Rosales and Francisco Núñez de Pineda would not have denied that they had benefited from the *vida fronteriza* themselves. Rosales's conversion efforts were aided by his understanding and use of fluid alliances between frontier indigenous groups. Núñez de Pineda converted his captivity narrative and service on the frontier into fame and a high ranking position within the army. However, both warned that Acuña's attempt to benefit from the *vida fronteriza* by purposefully interrupting the colonial pact would have only disastrous consequences, much like Loyola's expansion efforts did in 1598. Núñez de Pineda even informed the governor of a warning from various groups of *indios amigos*. The aborigines communicated to Núñez de Pineda that if the poor treatment under Acuña's government continued, they would have no choice but to revolt.⁵⁰⁷

One *indio amigo* leader bent over backwards to try and keep a rebellion from happening. Antonio de Chicaguala headed a contingent of *indios amigos* near Boroa

⁵⁰⁵ A.G.I. Escribanía 932 C. Pieza 22. Sargento Mayor Ignacio de Carrera. Información sumaria... Concepción, 27 June, 1656. Fojas 306-306v.

⁵⁰⁶ James F. Brooks argues that Spanish slave taking also had a role in Pueblo Revolt of 1680 or as he calls it the "Great Southwest Rebellion." The Pueblo army asked for head of Maese de Campo Francisco Javier as their "first demand." He had recently "been at Pecos, where, after extending his guarantee of safe conduct to a visiting band of Plains Apaches, he had disarmed and distributed them among his friends as captives, retaining some to sell south in Parral." Brooks, *Captives and Cousins*, 52.

⁵⁰⁷ A.G.I. Escribanía 932 C. Pieza 22. Testimony of Don Francisco de Pineda Bascañán. Concepción. 29 June, 1656. Fojas 372-373.

and had close contact with the Salazar brothers who often sought, but usually ignored his counsel. Chicaguala had warned Juan de Salazar that *indios amigos* were angered by his abuse, and even scolded other groups of *indios amigos* for supporting an armed rebellion.⁵⁰⁸ Despite the constant warnings from the most reputable of sources, greed prompted Acuña and his family to keep the colony on the road to disaster.

The disaster came in the form of the largest Indian uprising in Chile's 17th century. Unlike the assaults of columns of *indios de guerra* led by Lautaro or Pelantaro in years past, this 1655 attack was a coordinated uprising of *indios de servicio* that stretched from the Maule to Toltén Rivers with involvement from *toquis* only coming in the planning stages.⁵⁰⁹ The pattern of Spanish abuse and climate of mistrust had become so universal and was ignored so long by Acuña that thirty thousand "subjected" Indians rebelled against the Spanish, with 8,000 of them taking up arms.⁵¹⁰ The assault forced the evacuation of the governor's estancia, its more than 2,000 residents forced to flee dozens of miles under the cover of darkness to Concepción. The rebellion reached as far north as Huasco and Copiapó,⁵¹¹ cost the Spanish fourteen of their forts and presidios, the governor's ranch, an important

⁵⁰⁸ A.G.I. Chile 53. Expediente de la destitución del Gobernador de Chile. Confesión del Capitan Jerónimo de Molina Basconcelos, Concepción, 17 March, 1654. Foja 38v. A.G.I. Escribanía 932 B. Pieza 9. Dated Ciudad de los Reyes, 10 April 1656. Letter (series of protests) "en nombre de" Juan de Salazar by Antonio Perez de Villaroel. [Reyes, 10 April 1656.] Foja 28.

⁵⁰⁹ Barros Arana, *Historia general: IV*, 347-48. Juan de Salazar named Catinaguel of Boroa as one of the revolt's intellectual authors, a fact that makes its scale all the more impressive since Boroa was located deep in the Araucanía just north of the Toltén River. (See Map 4) A.G.I. Escribanía 932 B. Comisiones Audiencia de Chile. 1661. Comisión de Fernando de Velasco y Gamboa, ... Pieza 9. Dated Ciudad de los Reyes, 10 April 1656. Letter (series of protests) "en nombre de" Juan de Salazar by Antonio Perez de Villaroel. [Reyes, 10 April 1656.] Foja 28.

⁵¹⁰ A.G.I. Escribanía 932 C. Pieza 22. Martín Ruíz de Gamboa. Querellas against Antonio de Acuña y Cabrera and Juan de Salazar. Concepción. 26 June, 1656. Foja 155. José, who was killed in the aftermath of the 1655 uprising, was also named in documents as "Joseph."

⁵¹¹ B.N. Manuscritos Medina. Tomo 142, Pieza 2679. Información sobre todo lo sucedido en Chile después del alzamiento general de indios y sedición de los españoles. (May, 1655) Foja 213v.

stable, 200,000 head of cattle,⁵¹² and 8,000 horses. Hundreds of Spanish women and children were captured.⁵¹³

Acuña did little to put down the rebellion that he had caused. In fact, witnesses claimed that Acuña was in such a hurry to abandon his estancia that the Jesuits in the adjacent mission were left defenseless and could take nothing with them when they evacuated.⁵¹⁴ Witnesses recounted that the stress of the exodus from the estancia caused a number of stillbirths, as well as the deaths of adults due to heat exhaustion or fatigue.⁵¹⁵ By the time they reached Concepción the refugees' anger with Acuña had reached a boiling point, so much so that the authors of this account preferred not to record the "offensive language" being used toward the governor. The refugees joined 4,000 other residents of Concepción, and together hunkered down in the city center to fend off the assault.⁵¹⁶ It was under the stress of this siege that a revolt by colonists against Acuña emerged.

On Feb 20, 1655 angry residents and members of Concepción's *cabildo* overpowered an army company, took their weapons and shouting, "long live the King, death to the bad governor" and entered Governor Acuña's residence with swords drawn. Governor Acuña got wind of this mob in the nick of time, narrowly escaping through a back door and into the nearby Jesuit monastery. One observer noted that there was so much anger directed at Acuña by this multitude that it was "a

⁵¹² A.G.I. Escribanía 932 B. Pieza 19. Testimonio en Relación de la Culpa que resulta contra el Maese de Campo General Don Juan de Salazar, en razón del Alçamiento General que subçedio en el Reyno de Chile a los 14 de febrero de 1655. Reyes, 14 August 1656. Foja 5v.

⁵¹³ A.G.I. Escribanía 932 C. Pieza 22. Martín Ruíz de Gamboa. Querellas against Antonio de Acuña y Cabrera and Juan de Salazar. Concepción. 26 June, 1656. Foja 154v.

⁵¹⁴ A.G.I. Chile 53. Expediente de la destitución del Gobernador de Chile. Letter from El Provincial de la Compañía de Jesus, Vicente Modelle(?). Santiago, June 13, 16[55].

⁵¹⁵ A.G.I. Escribanía, 932 B. Pieza 8. Testimony of Juana de Sotomayor. Ciudad de los Reyes. 18 November, 1655. Foja 81v.

⁵¹⁶ A.G.I. Escribanía 932 B. Pieza 19. Testimonio en Relación de la Culpa...Fojas 5v.-6.

wonder he wasn't killed" and described how Acuña sought refuge among the Jesuits until another governor was named.⁵¹⁷ Acuña's cleric brother-in-law, and an unpopular *oidor* were also sought by the mob, and they too found refuge in Concepción churches. The mob was quieted when Acuña complied with the Jesuit demand that he submit his resignation. Acuña was then placed in irons and verbally abused by the conspirators. The Concepción *cabildo* elected its own Governor, the army's *Veedor* General Francisco de la Fuente Villalobos, and triumphantly paraded him about on their shoulders.⁵¹⁸

This was the first time in Chile's one hundred year existence that a governor had ever been deposed, "an act that under the regimen of laws and ideas of that era, almost equivalent to sacrilege," and one which was immediately condemned by the Audiencia de Chile. However, the viceroy ultimately sided with the mob, and stripped Acuña of his post and replaced him with Pedro Porter Cassanate. The viceroy based his decision on the "dire events with His Majesty's arms" that took place during his government and the "damages caused by the little experience and abundant greed of his brothers-in-law in that army's most important posts."⁵¹⁹

There were a number of causes for this massive uprising, but most agreed that the Indians rebelled "in hatred of Antonio de Acuña, his wife and brothers-in-law

⁵¹⁷ A.G.I. Chile 53. Expediente de la destitución del Gobernador de Chile. Letter from El Provincial de la Compañía de Jesus, Vicente Modele(?). Santiago, June 13, 16[55].

⁵¹⁸ A.G.I. Escribanía 932 B. Comisiones Audiencia de Chile. 1661. Comisión de Fernando de Velasco y Gamboa, alcalde del crimen de la Audiencia de Lima, para la averiguación de los procedimientos de Antonio de Acuña y Cabrera, gobernador y capitán general del reino de Chile, y Juan de Salazar, maestre de campo, su cómplice principal, en la causa de levantamiento y tumulto de la ciudad de la Concepción de Chile. Pieza 6a. Charges against Sargento Mayor Don Martín Cerdan. Bartolome Maldonado y Madrigal. Santiago. 25 July, 1655. Fojas 1-2v.

⁵¹⁹ BN. Manuscritos Medina. Tomo 143, Pieza 2692. Carta del Virrey del Perú, Conde de Alba a S.M. el Rey. Lima. 31 August, 1656. Foja 26.

because of the mistreatment that they received from them in word and deed.”⁵²⁰ The very strategy that was designed to make Acuña rich then instead led to his ouster and proved a financial disaster for him and the rest of the colony. Slaves were actually lost to the Spanish during this uprising when many of their owners were killed or enslaved themselves.⁵²¹

The 1655 rebellion was merely the latest reminder of the fact that while the enslavement of prisoners of war was permitted as a means to end the interminable “War of Arauco,” it provoked abuse by governors and soldiers alike. These colonists sought to keep the war under control but very much alive so that they could continue to profit from the sales of legitimately and illegally taken slaves alike.

This rebellion, combined with a devastating earthquake in 1647, left the Chilean economy in a dire state. The viceroy of course did not blame colonists for the earthquake, but after spending so much on Valdivia only a decade earlier, Lima was in no mood to hear more bad news from Chile. The financial and territorial losses from the rebellion were bad enough, but further details about the events leading up to the uprising surely infuriated the viceroy.⁵²² The illegal slave trade had been brisk enough for the Salazars to share the profits with a handful of others, principally their sister, María de Salazar. According to Father Rosales, María bought slaves and sent

⁵²⁰ A.G.I. Escribanía 932 C. Pieza 22. Sargento Mayor Ignacio de Carrera. Información sumaria... Concepción, 27 June, 1656. Acuña y Cabrera blamed the revolt on the “natural malevolence and unpredictability” of the Indians who had infested the “tamer” *indios amigos* and *yanaconas* who were born among and or lived with the Spanish and claims that up to the eve of the rebellion he had made some of the greatest strides in terms of achieving peace and colonizing to the south that had been seen in years. BN. Manuscritos Medina. Tomo 142, Pieza 2679. Información sobre todo lo sucedido en Chile después del alzamiento general de indios y sedición de los españoles. Foja 213v.

⁵²¹ A.G.I. Escribanía 932 C. Pieza 22. Martín Ruiz de Gamboa. Querellas against Antonio de Acuña y Cabrera and Juan de Salazar. Concepción. 26 June, 1656. Foja 140

⁵²² Since Chile was again in a post-1598 position, the viceroy Conde de Alba counted as lost to the rebellion, all of the money sent from Lima since the beginning of the “re-conquest” in 1600. Over 58 years, 16,109,663 pesos “of eight and three Reales and a half” had been spent. A.G.I. Chile 53. Certification from Viceroy Conde de Alba, Lima, 8 August, 1658.

them to be sold in Lima.⁵²³ María paid for the slaves with goods from her personal fortune, goods that were undoubtedly meant for the army.⁵²⁴

This was an especially unfortunate time for the viceroy because Spain's European enemies were making more difficulties for them in the Caribbean, which of course endangered Peru's silver shipment. What had been a "Spanish lake" was becoming a European one as the Dutch took Curaçao and Tortuga islands, the French Martinique and Guadalupe and the English claimed Barbados, St. Christopher, Antigua, and capped off the period by capturing Jamaica in 1655.⁵²⁵ These events were added to the unnerving news that the English had even bigger plans in the Spanish Americas. A plan by Simón de Casseres, presented to Oliver Cromwell in 1655 called for a double front attack on Panama from the Pacific and Caribbean, a plan that included details on how and where the Pacific leg would be re-supplied in Chile.⁵²⁶ Therefore, the 1655 rebellion became another excuse for officials in Chile to ask for resources, especially those who could claim they had no hand in provoking it.

After 1655, threats from pirates and Araucanians were now assumed. Officials in Chile needed to do very little try and convince the viceroy that funds were needed, and the number of colonists who skimmed from the *situado* and committed excesses under the guise of "just war" only increased. The War of Arauco, which had began as

⁵²³ Considering the amount of money the viceroy sent in the yearly *situado*, it is surprising that no viceroy took an active role in prohibiting the sales of Chilean slaves in Lima, sales that were so obviously prolonging the War of Arauco.

⁵²⁴ BN. Manuscritos Medina. Tomo 143, Pieza 2706. Información sumaria que está mandada haver sobre la pérdida y alzamiento general del Reino de Chile, en la causa que sigue el genreal Martín Ruíz de Gamboa al gobernador de Chile, don Antonio de Acuña y Cabrera y el Maestre de Campo don Juan de Salazar y Solís Henríquez, tomada al padre Diego de Rosales, Rector de la Compañía de Jesús, en la ciudad de la Concepción en 3 de Jul(?)io de 1656. Fojas 293v.-294.

⁵²⁵ J.H. Elliot, "Spain and America in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries," in *The Cambridge History of Latin America: Volume I*, Leslie Bethell, ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 333-34.

⁵²⁶ Gabriel Guarda, O.S.B. *Flandes Indiano: Las Fortificaciones del Reino de Chile 1541-1826* (Santiago: Ediciones Universidad Católica de Chile, 1990), 9.

a tale of sacrifice and shortage, was now making a number of unscrupulous colonists rich.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION: AN EARTHQUAKE RATTLES PERU AND SENDS RIPPLES THROUGH CHILE'S FRONTIER ECONOMY

The revolt of 1655 was clearly shocking enough to bring major changes to Chile, especially when it came to indigenous slavery. However, the most shocking outgrowth of 1655 remains how little in fact changed. The Bishop of Concepción, Fray Dionysio wrote in 1659 that while he agreed that the fear of being enslaved and taken out of Chile made many “rebel” Indians seek peace, he also saw that the raids were taking a toll on the Spanish. Just as Governor Fernández de Córdova had warned thirty years before, the raids had begun to tire Spanish horses and soldiers and consumed tremendous amounts of scarce resources, especially when governors went along.⁵²⁷ The viceroy reminded the king in 1662 that these raids were a distraction to the overall war effort and that soldiers’ greed had even caused the Spanish to lose battles.⁵²⁸

The revolt of 1655 was caused by rampant slave taking raids but produced an acute labor shortage in Chile. In 1659 the *audiencia* asked the king for African slaves, claiming that the devastating earthquake of 1647 coupled with the 1655 revolt had made feeding soldiers increasingly difficult.⁵²⁹ Fray Dioniso also noticed that so many women and children were being sold out of Chile that the colony was “being

⁵²⁷ A.G.I. Chile 57. Letter from Bishop of Concepción, Fray Dionysio. Concepción, August 1659

⁵²⁸ A.G.I. Chile 57. Letter from Conde de Santisteban Diego de Benavidas a S.M. Lima, 20 November, 1662

⁵²⁹ BN. Manuscritos Medina. Tomo 145, Pieza 2752. Carta de la Real Audiencia de Chile a S.M. El Rey, fecha en Santiago, a...de Junio de 1659. Fojas 110-111.

depopulated.” He argued that without the raids, more *yanacunas* would remain in Chile and feel safe enough to stay on their haciendas and Chile would return to the days when it had enough wine, bread, meat and legumes to “sustain this and six other armies.”⁵³⁰

Although it was widely recognized that abuse of the local indigenous population had led to the revolt of 1655, there was not an accompanying shift in sympathy to their cause. If anything, it became more difficult for officials in Chile to curb abuse by soldiers and *encomenderos*. If military tactics and labor needs did not change after 1655, neither did the political attacks on critics of Indian abuse. In one case, Chile’s Protector General de Indios, Antonio Ramírez de Laguna was subjected to a defamation campaign and actually brought to trial on spurious charges by vindictive and powerful *encomenderos* who thought he was doing his job too well.⁵³¹ Ramírez de Laguna had previously rebuked at least three of his accusers for having their Indians work “as slaves.” This of course infuriated the *encomenderos* one of whom stopped by to “provoke” Ramírez de Laguna while he was under house arrest, and to inform him that he would be testifying against him.⁵³² Ramírez de Laguna was called a womanizer, was accused of bribery and of running an illegal *pulpería*, the profits from which he supposedly added to an imagined and vast hidden fortune.⁵³³

If little change came within Chile, the events of 1655 did at least prompt the crown to restrict, if not ban this indigenous slave trade. Letters from Fray Dionysio

⁵³⁰ A.G.I. Chile 57. Letter from Bishop of Concepción, Fray Dionysio. Concepción, August 1659.

⁵³¹ Ibid. One of the accusers was Maestre de Campo Domingo Sánchez Chaparo.

⁵³² A.G.I. Escribanía 932 A. Response to charges against him. Antonio Ramírez de Laguna. [Santiago, 1659]. Fojas 324v.-325.

⁵³³ A.G.I. Escribanía 932 A. Verdict of the Audiencia de Chile. Santiago. 26 June, 1660. fojas 578-580.

and other Chilean ecclesiastics and government officials influenced the king's 1662 order that all Chilean Indians sold to Peru be returned to Chile. In his *cédula* he shared Bishop Dionysio's belief that these Indians could be divided among *encomenderos* in Chile and return abundance to the colony.⁵³⁴

As was to be expected, this extraordinary decision by the king brought no shortage of responses by those affected in Chile and Peru. The Viceroy of Peru, Diego de Benavides asked that the order be delayed until the king could hear more from Chile and Peru. The viceroy provided the king with a summary of the wide range of arguments he had gathered. Some were against freeing the slaves because they were too valuable in prisoner exchanges and as laborers. Many argued that the Indians killed and captured colonists and that without punishment and as they were "*sin fe ni ley ni palabra*" (without faith, law or the word of God) were sure to attack again. Others argued that Chile's aborigines outnumbered Spanish colonists and therefore selling Indian slaves to other colonies would mitigate the population discrepancy. Some pointed out that a number of Araucanians had behaved badly in Peru, and if returned among their own people this would continue or get worse. Finally there were those who argued that enslavement was justified because those captured were evangelized.⁵³⁵

Other voices supported the king's decision to free the slaves, arguing that sending slaves to Lima and slavery in general was an excessive punishment which none of the Spanish subjects of the "rebel provinces of Europe" had endured. Still others felt the king didn't go far enough and should have banned slave taking in Chile altogether.

⁵³⁴ A.G.I. Chile 57. Real Cédula of 9 April, 1662.

⁵³⁵ Ibid.

They pointed out that the Spanish had unjustly conducted multiple raids against *indios amigos* and had led to an Indian “conspiracy.”⁵³⁶ Ultimately however the viceroy suspended the 1662 decree, because he needed the slaves in Peru. Historian Eugene Korth argued that a reversal or even an interruption in slave supply from Chile would have caused a “serious economic crisis” in Peru.⁵³⁷

The decision of the viceroy protected and emboldened Chilean slavers, who needed little motivation to engage in the trade in the first place. Governors also must have known that the crown would not take the viceroy’s insubordination lying down and would soon issue more restrictions if not a complete ban. Therefore, despite the lessons of 1655, and still suffering its effects, governors took advantage of the potential rewards to be had from slave raids while they were still legal. In fact, the extent of Antonio de Acuña’s slave taking and corruption was surpassed less than a decade later by another governor, Francisco de Meneses.

One of the most serious accusations leveled by the *audiencia* against governor Meneses in their intense 1660s feud was that he ordered slave-taking raids against groups of *indios amigos*, selling many of them himself for at least 400 pesos each. The *oidores* feared that this practice would provoke “a second general uprising,” which they would have considered “not unjustified.” In the same letter, the authors claimed that the governor’s right hand man had suddenly become quite wealthy, acquiring riches that included a number of illegally taken Indian slaves.⁵³⁸ In another letter, the *audiencia* members wrote that the peace parleys that Governor Meneses

⁵³⁶ A.G.I. Chile 57. Letter from Conde de Santisteban Diego de Benavidas a S.M. Lima, 20 November, 1662.

⁵³⁷ Korth, *Spanish Policy*, 190.

⁵³⁸ A.G.I. Chile 55. Expediente de los excesos del Gobernador Francisco Meneses. (1664-1668). Letter from Audiencia de Chile, Santiago, August 9, 1665. Fojas 10-11.

boasted of setting up were actually designed to bring potential slaves to him. The judges also claimed that many Indians that made war on the Spanish at this time did so because the Spanish had enslaved their family members, and that Meneses had cut off any possibility of a peaceful resolution by denying them access to the politically persecuted Protector General de Indios.⁵³⁹

The Bishop of Santiago added that Meneses committed abuses of, and within the *encomienda* system. According to the bishop, Meneses asked for the titles of all the *encomenderos* in Chile, declared the *encomiendas* “vacant” and then reissued the titles for a fee. In six months Meneses made 40,000 pesos through this scheme, and the bishop estimated that when the transactions were finished the governor would pocket close to 100,000.⁵⁴⁰

The bishop was also concerned about the plight of *encomienda* Indians themselves. He said that the *encomenderos* continued to “enslave” their Indians, despite his constant admonitions that even included the reading of a royal *cédula* banning “personal service” from the pulpit. The bishop added that no religious or secular authority had been able to stop Meneses and the *encomenderos*, and he feared that they would die “excommunicated,” a prediction that came true in Meneses’s case.⁵⁴¹

Through embezzlement, corruption and slave sales Meneses greatly contributed to what one author calls the “passion for luxury” among the creole elite of the late 17th century. One of the main beneficiaries of this wealth was the Flores-Lisperguer

⁵³⁹ A.G.I. Chile 55. Letter to V.M. from Audiencia de Chile. Santiago, Feb. 10, 1666. foja 2v.-3

⁵⁴⁰ A.G.I. Chile,126. Expediente de la actuación del Gobernador de Chile. 1663-1665. Fr. D(iego?), Obispo de Santiago de Chile. Letter to S.M. Santiago. 9 August, 1664.

⁵⁴¹ Ibid. Diego Barros Arana, *Historia general de Chile*: Tomo V. (Santiago: Editorial Universitaria, 1999), 56-58.

family of the central valley. Descendants of a member of Pedro de Valdivia's original expedition, the Flores-Lisperguers expanded their considerable fortune through abuse of indigenous servants and were suspected in the murders of a number of their political rivals. Meneses' intervened on behalf of Catalina Flores when the *audiencia* accused her of the murder of a number of her indigenous and African slaves, allowing the family to continue the business of expanding its fortune. However, Meneses showed his true colors when he tried to take over the family estate upon Flores's death citing the fact that she was under investigation.⁵⁴² Thanks largely to governors like Meneses, while other colonies started with a boom and fizzled, Chile began with a whimper but turned its frontier conflict into gain at the expense of its indigenous inhabitants and the royal treasury.

Another wrinkle in Meneses's seemingly endless tale of malfeasance was an accusation that he was in fact a spy for the English. The captured officer of an otherwise uneventful English expedition, Carlos Henríquez Clerque, claimed that he had met Meneses in Flanders and that the King of England was fond of him.⁵⁴³ Another captive testified that Henríquez had not made plans to meet up with anyone in Chile, but that he had heard him say during the voyage that he had a powerful brother-in-law in Peru and that with all his connections he and his men would be showered with gifts upon his arrival in Chile.⁵⁴⁴ Henríquez later declared that he

⁵⁴² Chile 55A. Expediente de los excesos del Gobernador Francisco Meneses. (1664-1668). Expediente relativo a los excesos cometidos por el Gobernador y Capitán de Chile, Don ..., durante su mandato. —Letter from Audiencia (leveling their accusations against him.) August 9, 1665. Fojas 3, 7v.

⁵⁴³ Kris Lane writes that "Clerque" may have been his last name or his occupation (clerk). Lane, *Pillaging the Empire*, 132-33. A.G.I. Lima 73. Copy of testimony dated 12 March, 1671 in Balparaiso from Dn. Carlos Enríquez Clerque. Foja 6.

⁵⁴⁴ A.G.I. Lima 73. Declaration of Don Juan Fortiscue, (sic) dated Valdivia, 14 March, 1671. Lane has the correct spelling is Fortescue.

didn't know whether Meneses was a spy or even if he had corresponded with the King of England. However, Henríquez did confirm the presence of English spies in the viceroyalty.⁵⁴⁵ Meneses's long and embarrassing administration came to an end in 1670, but he was simply replaced by an equally unscrupulous slave taking governor, Juan de Henríquez.⁵⁴⁶ Diego de Rosales, who witnessed Governor Acuña's abuses twenty years earlier, continued to write the king about illegal slave taking still occurring in 1672 and asked the king to put a stop to it. Rosales detailed that under Henríquez the Spanish continued to call "peace parleys" whose purpose was actually to take more slaves. Rosales also claimed that Spanish officers continued to enslave *indios de paz*. In one of the more dramatic of these cases, the Spanish enslaved the *indio amigo* Mtumpillán had three hundred of his people. When Mtumpillán threatened to go to the governor about this, "that very night four masked men entered his house and killed him as he slept in his bed."⁵⁴⁷

The crown did respond to Rosales's complaints, but a 1674 royal ban on slavery and personal service in both Chile and Tucumán was just as ineffective as previous prohibitions.⁵⁴⁸ Even after the ban, Henríquez was accused of calling impromptu war councils in Concepción and declaring raids as part of a "just war" against the Indians, despite the fact that they had no authority to do so. The viceroy added that no governor had ever consulted him or the Audiencia of Chile before calling such meetings, and that *uzanza* was also still regularly practiced.⁵⁴⁹ Henríquez took his

⁵⁴⁵ A.G.I. Lima 73. Declaration of Don Carlos Enríquez (sic), Reyes, 28 April 1671. Fojas 47-49.

⁵⁴⁶ Villalobos, "Tres siglos y medio de vida fronteriza," 39.

⁵⁴⁷ A.G.I. Chile 57: Expediente de la libertad de los indios esclavos de guerra. 1674-1683. Letter from Jesuit Rosales which he titles, "Memoria de los caciques de paz, que degollo el Capan Pedro de Ripete y de las piezas de paz, que cautivo en esta campeada del año de 1672..." 25 July, 1672.

⁵⁴⁸ A.G.I. Chile 57. Consejo de Indios, 6 November, 1674. Madrid.

⁵⁴⁹ A.G.I. Chile, 85. Cartas y expedientes de los Virreyes de Lima (sobre asuntos de Chile). Letter

noncompliance to such an extreme that his participation in slave taking raids actually led to his impeachment.⁵⁵⁰

While levels of corruption and abuse of viceregal resources had reached new heights, the return of European enemies in the Pacific once again made it impossible for Peru to rid itself of the Chilean lamprey by discontinuing or restricting the *situado*. The Spanish had reestablished themselves in Valdivia after the events of the 1640s, but viceroy Diego de Benavides noted that the soldiers there were mostly involved in fighting Indians and rarely saw the pirates who were “the principal reason for the (re)population of Valdivia.”⁵⁵¹ This attitude could probably be described as nervous rather than disappointed, as the viceroy did expect pirates to come. His state of alert was increased in 1669 when the English crown’s failure to control Caribbean piracy led the Spanish crown to warn its colonies that the peace with England “was not understood in the Indies” and that they should be wary of attacks.⁵⁵² The viceroy wrote that Chilean ports from Concepción to Valparaiso were ready for an attack but mentioned no specifics. Most his preparations centered around defending Callao. Chile was again reduced to a lookout role, where their poor intelligence and skittishness resulted in multiple false alarms.⁵⁵³

In 1671 reports reached the viceroy that twelve ships had been spotted off the coast of Valdivia and Lima moved to warn Quito, Panama, Guatemala and the

from Virrey Conde de la Monclova. Lima. 15 July, 1696.

⁵⁵⁰ Barros Arana, *Historia general: Tomo V*, 135.

⁵⁵¹ A.G.I. Lima 63. Cartas y expedientes de virreyes de Perú, (vistos o resueltos en el Consejo: Diego de Benavides, conde de Santisteban) 1662. N. 96. Lima, 5 February, 1662.

⁵⁵² A.G.I. Lima,71. Cartas... 1669-1670. Pedro Fernández de Castro, conde de Lemos. V. a S.M. La paz con Inglaterra, no le toca a los puertos de Indias. Lima, 1 February, 1670.

⁵⁵³ A.G.I. Lima,72. Cartas y ... 1671-1672. Pedro Fernández de Castro, Conde de Lemos. V. to S.M. in which is included a copy of letter from Gov. Henriquez regarding English in Valdivia. Lima, 27 January, 1671.

Viceroy of New Spain.⁵⁵⁴ The viceroy was right to be alarmed, as in the same year Henry Morgan sacked Panama. A month after the warning went out however, the viceroy updated that there was only in fact one ship, which turned out to be piloted by the Englishman John Narborough.⁵⁵⁵ Narborough landed peacefully in Valdivia in 1671 after exploring the Magellan Strait for a month.⁵⁵⁶ Just to be on the safe side however, the viceroy sent his own scouts to Chile, who found little evidence of more threats.⁵⁵⁷ While the perturbed viceroy tried to figure out how one ship became twelve, officials interrogated the aforementioned Henríquez Clerque and his four fellow crewmen, left behind in Valdivia after English-Spanish talks went sour and Narborough sailed off.⁵⁵⁸

Therefore, even though the Narborough expedition's activity in "the Spanish Pacific was minimal" after these declarations "the whole viceroyalty was in fact put into a panic over possible spying connections among internationally mobile Spanish officials."⁵⁵⁹ By this point it was not only Spanish officials but Araucanians and other indigenous groups in Chile who were perpetuating the permanent war to play up the pirate threat. *Indios de guerra* could spread rumors inventing or exaggerating pirate landings quite readily, as the Spanish often did not have access to certain coastal areas. The *indios de guerra* did so to increase their reward for seeking peace, to keep the Spanish off guard, or to exact a measure of revenge on the Spanish as seemed to be the case in a 1670 report. The aforementioned erroneous twelve-ship

⁵⁵⁴ A.G.I. Lima 72. V. to S.M., Lima, 24 January, 1671.

⁵⁵⁵ A.G.I. Lima 72. V. to S.M., Lima, 14 February, 1671.

⁵⁵⁶ Barclay, *The Lure of Peru*, 104.

⁵⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, 115-16.

⁵⁵⁸ The *audiencia* of Lima also investigated after the king expressed concern at the "damage and expense that resulted from such an inaccurate report." A.G.I. Lima 73. Real Audiencia de Lima a S.M., Lima, 8 April 1673.

⁵⁵⁹ Lane, *Pillaging the Empire*, 133-34.

report was eventually traced to an eight-month-old rumor spread by enslaved *indios de guerra*. Those who testified about the twelve ships added that the fictitious landing in Chiloé had provoked much excitement as these “*moros huincas* (white Moors) would liberate them from the slavery the Spanish pretended to impose upon them.”⁵⁶⁰

Paid indigenous informants, while technically allied with the Spanish, were not above exaggerating or inventing indigenous-pirate alliances to keep themselves employed. Cristobal Talgui Pillán was one such informant who reported that the English had populated two islands 160 leagues from Chiloé, “toward the Magellan Strait.” Talgui Pillán added that the English had two forts, artillery, sheep and goats, had planted wheat, and were building “a large ship whose wood was brought by Indians loyal to them.”⁵⁶¹ On one island the English were said to have built a stone wall and on the other a mill. In a final embellishment, Talgui Pillán described the settlers as “blond-haired and blue eyed.”⁵⁶²

Somewhat distrustful of the information but at the same time intrigued, the viceroy sent an expedition to try and find these supposed settlements. Talgui Pillán was to guide the group of forty Spanish soldiers and thirty Indians in seven canoes, and was given instructions not to return until he had found the settlements he had testified to viewing. The expedition proved unsuccessful, prompting the viceroy to express his doubts about Talgui Pillán’s story. The viceroy argued that had the

⁵⁶⁰ A.G.I. Lima 73. Declaration of Loncón, aquel caçique principal del ahillo de coipue en los llanos uno de los Prisioneros de la maloca que se hiço por las armas de Valdivia en dhos llanos habra dos meses. Taken en el castillo de San Pedro de Marzera isla de costantino,” 31 December, 1670. Foja 110v.

⁵⁶¹ AN Morla Vicuña. Vol. 20 Pieza 11a Fojas 91-101. Carta del virrey del Perú a S.M., de 28 de abril de 1675. (Posible colonización inglesa en el Estrecho; diligencias relaizadas para saber efectivamente; medios que utilizará para desalojar a los ingleses.), foja 93.

⁵⁶² Ibid.

English managed to bring over two hundred settlers to these outposts as Talgui Pillán had claimed, the news would have been all over Europe and confirmed by the English court. Having received no such confirmation, the viceroy began to refer to Talgui Pillán's claims as "fictions and falsehoods." The viceroy later received information from captured English sailors who claimed that no such settlements ever existed.⁵⁶³

The fact remained that the viceroy, albeit suspicious of the information he was getting from informants in Chile, was still very detached from his southern colony and had to relay these less than reliable reports to the crown. If the viceroy's best information was based on rumors and hearsay, his task of enforcing the crown's wishes was not becoming any easier.

Ironically, it was only after one of the few real pirate attacks on Chile that the fear of these invaders abated. In 1680 and 1686, near the end of the heyday of pirates in the Americas, English buccaneers attacked La Serena after sailing southward from Panama. In the first attack the town was pillaged and burned, as the residents were caught off guard thinking that the South Sea Armada had chased off the buccaneers.⁵⁶⁴ The second attack, the last significant pirate activity in Chile was repelled by the Spanish infantry, a rather insignificant battle that nonetheless was "celebrated throughout (Chile) as a great (and rare at that time) victory for the Spanish army."⁵⁶⁵ Colonists would not soon have another chance to repeat this victory however, as the upcoming War of Spanish Succession would occupy most European mariners and vessels.

⁵⁶³ Ibid., 95- 96.

⁵⁶⁴ Barros Arana, *Historia general: Tomo V*, 155.

⁵⁶⁵ Ibid., 179.

As conditions in Lima had much to do with Chilean attempts to prolong the War of Arauco, it is appropriate that events in the viceregal capital interrupted this trend. A massive earthquake in October of 1687 heavily damaged Lima and left Peru unable to feed itself. A wheat blight that followed the earthquake rendered the Peruvian harvest insignificant for several years.⁵⁶⁶ As a result, wheat prices in Chile almost immediately tripled in response to the new demand. Although the colony struggled to retool its agriculture, Chile eventually would become “Peru’s Sicily,” providing the viceregal capital with its wheat for much of the 18th century.⁵⁶⁷

Economic viability of course brought changes to Chile’s southern frontier where much of the wheat was grown. Chile’s “tallow century” would soon come to an end.⁵⁶⁸ In the 17th century Chile’s main exports were fat, beef and hides to the mines of Potosí, while in the 18th exports shifted to wheat and cereals to Lima. The economy became centered on the more sedentary *haciendas* instead of the more mobile grazing patterns of *estancias*. Decreasing mobility meant a decrease in all kinds of raiding from both sides of the Bío-Bío. The profitability of wheat export also put a dent in raids as the illegal export of slaves was no longer such an attractive activity.⁵⁶⁹

⁵⁶⁶ Most historians agree that this blight was caused by the *ustilago segetum* or “black powder” fungus, although it is not clear whether the fungus was caused by the earthquake or whether its appearance was a terrible coincidence. At the time of course, all manner of explanations were offered including the argument that the earthquake released nitrates and sulfates in the soil, and the belief that this was a punishment from God. Barros Arana, *Historia general: 2d ed, Tomo V*, 220(n).

⁵⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, 219(n).

⁵⁶⁸ Simon Collier and William F. Sater, *A History of Chile, 1808-1994* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 9.

⁵⁶⁹ In Chile an *arroba* of wheat was around five times more valuable than a cow in 1700. Barros Arana, *Historia general: 2d ed. Tomo V*, 218-220.

Also, for the first time since a permanent army was established in Chile in 1604, significant military cutbacks were made to fund mission activity and to provide wheat to Lima.⁵⁷⁰ The War of Arauco was no longer Chile's first priority.

Missionary activity had been scant in Chile since the end of the Defensive War. Franciscans and Jesuits worked mostly with *indios reducidos* and stayed close to or within Spanish settlements or forts. The missionaries lacked the funds and support required to establish new and independent missions, and secular and religious authorities alike were hesitant to send missionaries far into Araucanian territory after the murder of three Jesuits in 1612.⁵⁷¹ After decades of failed military attempts to end the conquest the king was ready to make another attempt at a "spiritual conquest" of Chile. In 1692, new governor Tomás Marín de Poveda was given instructions to establish new missions in Araucanian territory.⁵⁷² In the next twenty years the Jesuits alone founded six new missions. Before Marín de Poveda's government it had taken more than fifty years to establish as many.

Finally, this new landscape brought changes to frontier political relationships. While the 17th century was one of raids, the 18th was dominated by parleys.⁵⁷³ This is not to say that conflict was eliminated.⁵⁷⁴ Some colonists took advantage of the new relative calm to take more slaves, while some indigenous groups used it to gather

⁵⁷⁰ Ibid.

⁵⁷¹ Foerster, *Jesuitas y Mapuches*, 140.

⁵⁷² Barros Arana, *Historia general: 2d ed. Tomo V*, 194.

⁵⁷³ The authoritative work on 18th century parleys is León Solís, *Maloqueros y conchavadores*.

⁵⁷⁴ Kristine Jones points out that much of this raiding simply moved to the more volatile Argentine pampa. She adds that this raiding economy persisted into the 19th century and had an important role in the formation of the "modern nation states" of Chile and Argentina. Kristine Jones, "La Cautiva: An Argentine Solution to Labor Shortage in the Pampas, in *Brazil and Río de la Plata: Challenge and Response*, Luis Felipe Clay Mendez and Lawrence W. Bates, eds. (Charleston, IL: Eastern Illinois University, 1983), 91-94.

strength for attacks.⁵⁷⁵ Demand for indigenous labor did not disappear, and populations continued to decline through abuse and disease.⁵⁷⁶ Overall however, a more sedentary frontier meant that new energy could be dedicated to cultivating stable relationships, cultivating wheat, and cultivating local labor pools to harvest it. Wheat export's profit margin even decreased the need for tribute through personal service. In the 17th century Chile's indigenous laborers were lucrative exports, while in the 18th they produced them.

While acculturation on the frontier became less and less violent during the 18th and 19th centuries, Valdivia's concept of the poverty and sacrifice of the frontier still is a useful one in Chile. Today the idea not only applies to the Araucanía and its unique history, but has become important as a tool for establishing Chile's sense of nationhood. In a 2002 article, one of Chile's most eminent historians Cristián Gazmuri, summarized what he believed to be the most important historical antecedents of the modern "Chilean mentality." The second antecedent he mentioned was Chile's poverty. He claimed that Chile was the poorest Iberian-American colony and that the crown maintained an interest in the colony only because it was "wealthy

⁵⁷⁵ Future governors continued to permit and even order slave taking raids. In response to a 1696 "attempted uprising" by a group of mountain Indians, Governor Thomas Marín de Poveda decided to permit raids to "take *piezas*" belonging to this group. More specifically, the Governor asked for volunteer soldiers to conduct these raids. Those who captured slaves could determine what to do with them. The Audiencia of Chile quickly ordered Marín de Poveda to retract this decision as it was contrary to the orders of His Majesty and infringed upon "the liberty of the Indians." A.G.I. Chile, 85. *Cartas y expedientes de los Virreyes de Lima (sobre asuntos de Chile)*. Letter from Virrey Conde de la Monclova. Lima. 15 July, 1696. Just war doctrines provided a number of exceptions to the ban in New Mexico as well. Padre Juan Amondo Niel claimed in 1694 that "Carlos II himself condoned the use of royal funds to ransom Pawnee and Jumano boys and girls held captive by Navajo raiders" who were often destined for beheading if not purchased. Brooks, *Captives and Cousins*, 123.

⁵⁷⁶ The Spanish could do little about the epidemics that continued to decimate Indian populations. In a 1692 letter, a number of officials in the town of Mendoza complained of their shortage of Indian laborers, brought to a head by a smallpox epidemic. The authors claimed that the labor pool had been reduced to 175 Indians. They also requested that the crown lift the prohibition on moving African slaves from Buenos Aires to Peru and "the other side of the cordillera" so that Mendoza might survive this crisis.

Peru's southern door, which had to be defended against corsairs and against the ambition of European powers." Gazmuri added that this poverty not only contributed to Chile's mentality, but continues to be reflected in a national architecture that maintains a "rustic" quality from cities to farmhouses.⁵⁷⁷

What began as a failed conquest by a group of experienced soldiers evolved into a frontier pact that affected not only Chile's south and central valley, but the entire Viceroyalty of Peru. Throughout the late 16th century the residents of both sides of the frontier honed their ability to take advantage of this balance of power, until in 1598 when the rules of the colonial pact became crystallized when they were dramatically broken. The war could not be left only simmering if there were attempts to take territory like there were in the 1590s. In the 17th century this simmering conflict attracted even more resources from the viceroy with the sporadic appearance of European pirates near the frontier. By the early 1600s the Araucanians and Spanish had solidified a formula that could maintain the focus of the viceroy on this otherwise forgotten colony. This formula involved was keeping the War of Arauco alive and exaggerating its threat to the viceroy. By the late 17th century, this formula had become so successful that abuse of the *situado* actually was getting in the way of the war effort, especially in the aftermath of the 1655 revolt. This cycle of profiteering eroded when after the Lima earthquake of 1687, stability became more profitable than the ebb and flow of raids, trading and peace treaties that had defined the War of Arauco.

⁵⁷⁷ Cristián Gazmuri, "Rasgos de nuestra mentalidad: Perspectiva pretérita. Nuestra historia y geografía," *El Mercurio*, September 15, 2002. Available at <http://www.uc.cl/historia/cinfo/Articulos/gazmuri29.html> >.

This project would have been impossible without the scores of enlightening studies by historians and anthropologists alike that have helped us understand the events and relationships that created Chile's frontier. Scholars have exhaustively evaluated the role of the multitudes of both local and global actors that determined the frontier's development. In that regard, the contribution of this study is a better understanding of how these factors interacted, and how residents of Chile acted not only as participants in the cross cultural exchange that was the *vida fronteriza*, but how this exchange had an important function in the Viceroyalty of Peru.

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