“A Battle of Books”: The Westminster Conference of 1559 and the Rise of Disputative Literature

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They say it takes a village to raise a child but, given the number of people I need to thank, I am sure the same applies to writing a dissertation. Much of a graduate student's experience is dictated by their dissertation committee. In that regard, I count myself most fortunate and would like to express sincere gratitude to each of my committee members. Paul Lim provided superb academic guidance for a study of this nature. He consistently pointed me to important resources I was unaware of and helped me think beyond the arcane subject matter contained in these pages to the larger theater of Reformation Europe and the *longue durée* of early modern England. He also generously provided personal counsel, professional opportunity, and hospitality throughout my time at Vanderbilt. Peter Lake's encyclopedic knowledge of religion and politics in early modern England, often imparted over a cup of earl grey tea, is rivaled only by his generosity and good humor. He constantly helped me think through the sources, context, and arguments, and his influence is likely evident in this work (at least in the good parts). Joel Harrington always helped me to think through arguments thoroughly and was particularly helpful with questions I had about late medieval thought or the Continental Reformation. Emily Nacol never failed to be both kind and helpful in her guidance, even when she took another academic post, and tirelessly answered my incessant and often ill-formed political questions. Karl Gunther deserves much thanks not just for agreeing to serve as an external reader, but also selflessly giving of time, historical knowledge, and personal insight. Each of them has helped me tremendously and in their own way. Much—if not all—of anything good in this work is the direct result of these individuals' tutelage and friendship.

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ABSTRACT

This dissertation revitalizes and revisits the historical category of polemic by arguing for the existence of a distinct subgenre within polemic that was constructed as oral university-style disputation. It does by first analyzing the Westminster conference of 1559, the intellectual climate of late Renaissance England, and John Jewel's subsequent 'challenge sermon,' which was the catalyst for the printed controversial works examined here. It then analyzes several of the print exchanges between Protestants and Catholics that were direct outgrowths of the Westminster conference and elucidates two distinct facets of disputative literature within them. The first of these is disputative methodology, or the use of sixteenth-century intellectual methods that accorded with oral disputation to construct their works. This is the primary defining characteristic of disputative literature, but it also reveals that late Renaissance authors were much more idiosyncratic and eclectic in their methods than previous scholarship has allowed for. The second is portrayals of moderation and, relatedly, denunciations of immoderation in the opponent. This is reflective of burgeoning social conventions in Elizabethan England that linked the social virtues of moderation and civility with intellectual credibility. In addition, this study highlights the rhetoric of abuse, or authors' use of ad hominem, sarcasm, ridicule, and the like in these works. Elucidating vitriol in works expected to be academic and moderate reveals both the authors' mindset that such language was justified in the name of religious truth, but also reveals that such rhetoric was neither new nor the sole property of early modern libel.

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LITERATURE REVIEW

The study of polemic has long suffered neglect, due especially to the ideological and cultural shifts that led to the disappearance of religious polemic as a genre in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth-century. Jesse Lander has convincingly argued that the genre of print polemic, pervasive from the reign of Henry VIII up through the Civil War, was edged out by Restoration Englishmen and their preoccupation with "polite learning." As more distinctly 'modern' (by which I primarily mean familiar) and 'scientific' modes of writing began to dominate in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth-century, dogmatic literature was displaced, and thus hidden from posterity.

Despite the fact that works of religious controversy are among the most plentiful resources we have to investigate the sixteenth and seventeenth-centuries, the modern historian cannot help but agree with James Kearney's assessment that "polemic seems to lack all that we have been taught to appreciate about literature" and as a result ends up "in the dustbin of history."[1] As a case in point, the *ODNB* entry on the prominent Elizabethan clergyman Protestant Alexander Nowell, dean of St. Paul's and author of extraordinarily popular catechisms,[2] doesn't even mention his exchange with Thomas Dorman, which lasted three years and contained five publications. Living in the wake of such a massive literary coup, however, should not blind us to the fact controversial literature was an immensely important genre for over a century.

[1] James Kearney, Review of *Inventing Polemic: Religion, Print, and Literary Culture in Early Modern England* by Jesse Lander, *Shakespeare Quarterly*, Vol. 58, No. 4 (2007): 550.
[2] Nowell produced a number of catechisms of varying lengths in English, Latin, and Greek and Latin. Taken together, Nowell's catechisms went through a remarkable fifty-six editions between 1570 and 1645. Ian Green, *The Christian's ABC: Catechisms and Catechizing in England c. 1530-1740* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), 66. For the differing versions see Ibid., 690-693.

There was a brief (re)discovery of printed polemic in the mid nineteenth-century, though it too was tied up in confessional events in the Church of England, thus adding another layer for the historian to peel back. Beginning in 1841, the Parker Society was established to combat the growing Tractarian movement in England by returning back to the Church of England's 'true' source, the writings of sixteenth-century Protestant reformers. Nearly every one of the Parker Society volumes is a meticulously edited version of some Protestant polemical work, drawing upon Protestants from all four Tudor monarchs. However, a large portion were editions of writings from prominent Elizabethans polemicists such as Calfhill, Fulke, Pilkington, Nowell, Whitgift, Sandys, and not least of all, Jewel. It is no coincidence that the environment of Victorian and Edwardian England rapidly accelerated the self-conscious notion of 'Anglicanism' as a *tertium quid* of the Protestant Reformation in response to the new Anglo-Catholicism, embodied in Cardinal John Henry Newman, whose Tract 90 had appeared in February 1841.[3]

The question, therefore, is not whether polemic is a justifiable category of study, but what precisely polemic *is*. Given the paucity of scholarship on the genre in general, it is not surprising that a systematic definition not been elucidated. Establishing any sort of firm definition of Elizabethan polemic is further complicated by two facts. First, the earliest recorded usage of the word "polemic" does not appear until the seventeenth century and, when it is used, is not used in ways consistent with modern understandings.[4] Second, modern understandings of polemic tend to be overly general. Most use the word to denote anything confrontational. As a result, a wide variety of literature is incorporated under the rubric of "polemic" that is not necessarily of the

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[3] John Wolffe, *The Protestant Crusade in Great Britain, 1829-1860* (Oxford: Clarendon Press; New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), 112-113. For an overview of *Tract 90* in relationship to these contemporary debates see Frank Turner, *John Henry Newman: The Challenge to Evangelical Religion* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2002), 357-364.
[4] See Ch. 1.

same character and, more importantly, was not received as such by contemporaries. There are numerous scholarly works that fruitfully use polemic, yet it is often incidentally and few excavate the underlying intellectual foundations of the literature that stemmed from 'secular' sources (i.e. not primarily religious or ecclesiastical in orientation). Most are concerned with different sorts of questions altogether.

Jesse Lander's study *Inventing Polemic* is valuable in that it draws attention to polemic as an important genre of literature in early modern England, and is especially important for its *longue durèe* argument that polemic as a genre was exiled by Restoration Englishmen obsessed with "polite learning."[5] However, Lander's book incorporates works that do not at all look alike, such as Foxe's *Actes and Monuments*, Shakespeare's *Hamlet*, the Marprelate tracts, and Milton's *Areopagitica*. While each of these works was polemical in some respect, categorizing them all in the same genre presents difficulties.[6] Peter Lake's recent *Bad Queen Bess?* is a thorough investigation into the polemic and libels of Elizabethan England, and while it emphasizes the dialogic nature of these often-monotonous texts, its primary orientation is political and concerned with many works, such as Stubbs' alarmist *Gaping Gulf* and the salacious *Leicester's Commonwealth*, that fall outside the parameters of this particular study.[7]

Rainer Pineas' *Thomas More and Tudor Polemics* undertakes a relatively similar analysis as mine for select Henrician controversialists, even exploring the roles of rhetoric and logic in certain polemical works. However, the individual who receives the most sustained treatment of

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[5] Jesse Lander, Epilogue to *Inventing Polemic: Religion, Print, and Literary Culture in Early Modern England* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 222-231.
[6] Robert Hamm raised a similar point in his review of Lander's book. See Hamm, Review of *Inventing Polemic: Religion, Print, and Literary Culture in Early Modern England*, *Textual Cultures* Vol. 2, No. 1 (2007): 161.
[7] Peter Lake, *Bad Queen Bess? Libels, Secret Histories, and the Politics of Publicity in the Reign of Queen Elizabeth I* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016).

this kind is John Frith, and Pineas noted that Frith's use of these disciplines distinguishes him "from his coreligionists' professed dislike of 'worldly' learning."[8] Ellen Macek's book, *The Loyal Opposition* is valuable for its insights concerning mid-Tudor Catholic polemics, but there is much about the intellectual influence of humanism that goes unsaid.[9] Dewey Wallace, Jr.'s chapter "Puritan polemical divinity and doctrinal controversy" is also helpful, but it is exclusively related to puritan practical divinity and spread out over a lengthy period of time.[10]

Peter White's *Predestination, policy and polemic* is exclusively concerned with the question of predestination and a 'Calvinist consensus' in Elizabethan and early Stuart England.[11] Alexandra Walsham's *Church Papists* uses polemic as a means to shed light on the "ideological anxieties" on both sides of the confessional divide surrounding the nebulous identity of conforming Catholics in Elizabethan and Jacobean England and their "intense moral and religious predicament," but the intrinsic intellectual and social elements of polemic are not part of her focus.[12] Peter Lake's invaluable *Anglicans and Puritans?* contains a chapter on the literature of the Admonition controversy and touches on the importance of logic in the debates, but is ultimately about the religious and political flash points of the affair.[13] Donald McGinn's

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[8] Rainer Pineas, *Thomas More and Tudor Polemics* (Bloomington, IN: University of Indiana Press, 1968), 174-187 (quote at 174; see also 180).
[9] Ellen Macek, *The Loyal Opposition* (New York: Peter Lang, 1995), ch. 5, especially.
[10] Dewey Wallace, Jr., "Puritan polemical divinity and doctrinal controversy," in *The Cambridge Companion to Puritanism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), eds. John Coffey and Paul C.H. Lim, 206-222.
[11] According to White, the role of polemic (especially William Prynne's *Anti-Arminianisme*) has been to beguile historians into believing there was indeed such a consensus. See Peter White, *Predestination, policy and polemic: Conflict and consensus in the English Church from the Reformation to the Civil War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), xi and 1-12, especially.
[12] Alexandra Walsham, *Church Papists: Catholicism, Conformity and Confessional Polemic in Early Modern England* (Royal Historical Society: The Boydell Press, 1993), 2.
[13] Peter Lake, *Anglicans and Puritans?: Presbyterianism and English Conformist Thought from Whitgift to Hooker* (London: Unwin Hyman, 1988), 13-70 (see 14-15 for logic).

The Admonition Controversy is quite dated (using the anachronistic “Episcopalian” and “Anglican” interchangeably) and is essentially a close reading of Cartwright and Whitgift’s writings from the exchange.[14]

Karl Gunther’s *Reformation Unbound* makes excellent use of polemical material throughout to persuasively argue for a significant “radical” strain in the English Reformation but has a different orientation and goal (which is accomplished admirably) than the present study.[15] Pearson’s classic *Thomas Cartwright and Elizabethan Puritanism* devotes a substantial portion to the Admonition controversy but little is said of intellectual underpinnings of the literature.[16] Christopher Highley’s *Catholics Writing the Nation in Early Modern Britain and Ireland* contains an enlightening chapter on Catholic polemics but it is more concerned with political ideas and religious representation, particularly of Islam, as it pertains to nationhood (and a later date).[17] Richard Bauckham’s Cambridge dissertation on William Fulke has very insightful material on Fulke as a controversialist and does explore some of Fulke’s Aristotelian interests, though in limited fashion.[18]

John Craig’s *Reformation, Politics and Polemics* is a series of local studies on four different market towns, and his chapter on Thetford (a small town in the southwest corner of Norfolk) between 1560 and 1590 problematizes definitions common in English Reformation

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[14] Donald J. McGinn, *The Admonition Controversy* (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1949).
[15] Karl Gunther, *Reformation Unbound: Protestant Visions of Reform in England, 1525-1590* (Cambridge, 2014), chs. 5 and 6, especially.
[16] A.F. Scott Pearson, *Thomas Cartwright and Elizabethan Puritanism* (Gloucester, MA: Peter Smith, 1966), chs. 2 and 3.
[17] Christopher Highley, *Catholics Writing the Nation in Early Modern Britain and Ireland* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), ch. 3.
[18] Richard Bauckham, “The Career and Thought of Dr. William Fulke (1537-1589),” Ph.D. dissertation, Cambridge University (1972), chs. 4 and 2, respectively.

historiography. It is an interesting study of a little-known town and a cautionary tale against the uncritical acceptance of labels used by contemporaries on account of the personal motives of those using them.[19] However, Craig essentially uses "polemic" to refer to local disputes that were as much personal as they were religious. Furthermore, Craig's sources are archival records, not printed works, once again revealing the fluid usage of the term as well as the underlying assumption that polemic simply refers to conflict.

Felicity Heal's essay "Appropriating History: Catholic and Protestant Polemics and the National Past" deftly analyzes the critical role that history played among Elizabethan and early Jacobean controversialists in establishing religious truth, as well as the contradictions that this approach entailed, especially by citing authoritative sources (most notably Bede). She also acknowledges the critical role that Jewel's challenge sermon played in setting off the controversy and briefly posits that these print exchanges were meant to continue oral disputation—a central argument of this study—though does not elaborate on the suggestion.[20]

The same limitations apply to the study of polemical material from the seventeenth-century. Anthony Milton's study of Peter Heylyn emphasizes polemical writing, but with the intent of offering a more nuanced understanding of a highly polarizing individual in the volatile context of the 1630s through the Restoration. Milton did remark, "[p]olemical writing was one of the dominant features of the intellectual culture of the age, but its practitioners have received very little study."[21] What Milton said about Jacobean and Caroline polemicists holds true, albeit

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[19] John Craig, *Reformation, Politics and Polemics: The Growth of Protestantism in East Anglian Market Towns, 1500-1610* (Aldershot; Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2001), ch. 5.
[20] Felicity Heal, "Appropriating History: Catholic and Protestant Polemics and the National Past," in *The Uses of History in Early Modern England*, ed. Paulina Kewes (San Marino, CA: Huntington Library, 2006), 105-128.
[21] Anthony Milton, *Laudian and royalist polemic in seventeenth-century England: The career and writings of Peter Heylyn* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2007), 3.

in a different way, for Elizabethan controversialists. It is also true that most of the Catholic and even some of the Protestant authors have received little biographical attention, though the same cannot be said of Jewel. Milton's previous tome, *Catholic and Reformed*, is an invaluable study of the intellectual landscape of post-Reformation English authors, yet is once again primarily oriented towards contextual theological and political contours.[22]

David Loewenstein's two-part study *Representing Revolution in Milton and His Contemporaries: Religion, Politics, and Polemics in Radical Puritanism* does something similar to my exploration of intellectual fault lines for the Civil War and the Protectorate. Through close analysis of writings from radical sectarians such as John Lilburne and Gerard Winstanley alongside Milton, he "explore[s] the ways in which these writings represented the Revolution's intense ideological and religious conflicts and the ways in which their authors struggled with its contradictions and inconsistencies." However, whereas Loewenstein's work elucidates how Revolutionary English authors "fomented revolution, escalated political and religious tensions, and probed the ambiguities of the period's regimes,"[23] I emphasize the painstaking efforts of Elizabethan authors to legitimize themselves in relationship to the established monarchy, largely in part through connection to the past and with their decidedly non-revolutionary tendencies.

Ann Hughes' essay "The Meanings of Religious Polemic" correctly observes that the spoken, written, and printed word were "inevitably intertwined" by analyzing printed controversial literature in relation to religious disputations, though the essay exclusively focuses on select puritan publications from the 1640s and 50s. And though Hughes's essay is similarly

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[22] Anthony Milton, *Catholic and Reformed: The Roman and Protestant Churches in English Protestant Thought, 1600-1640* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).
[23] David Loewenstein, *Representing Revolution in Milton and His Contemporaries: Religion, Politics, and Polemics in Radical Puritanism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 2, 3.

concerned with the internal contours of controversial literature and how these reflect print culture, she is bringing to bear "insights developed by cultural historians and literary theorists influenced by post-structuralism or new historicism" on these texts in order to argue that "language is constitutive of meaning, it does not merely reflect it."[24] This study—perhaps to its disadvantage—is less theoretical.

Recent treatments of Jewel's challenge sermon tend to be general and do not connect it back to the Westminster disputation. Angela Ranson's essay "The Challenge of Catholicity" is an interesting analysis and provides helpful insights, but it also gives cursory treatment to some of the important themes in the sermon and, I think, overemphasizes aspects of Jewel's sermon that were simply part and parcel of sixteenth-century religious controversy, such as a bifurcated worldview (i.e. "us *v.* them"), arguments over apostolicity, and Biblical self-fashioning. Furthermore, her discussion of rhetoric tends to be very general.[25]

Torrance Kirby's essay "Political Hermeneutics: John Jewel's 'Challenge Sermon' at Paul's Cross, 1559" uses the challenge sermon as an entry point into contemporary debates about the public sphere, the disenchantment thesis, and modernity. Kirby also helpfully situates Jewel's challenge sermon in long line of Tudor divines fixated on the mass and transubstantiation. Although Jewel's sermon is certainly a fruitful lens for examining these questions, Kirby's focus

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[24] Ann Hughes, "The Meanings of Religious Polemic," in *Puritanism: Transatlantic Perspectives on a Seventeenth-Century Anglo-American Faith*, ed. Francis J. Bremer (Boston: Massachusetts Historical Society, 1993), 201-229 (quotes at 201 and 203).

[25] Angela Ranson, "The Challenge of Catholicity: John Jewel at Paul's Cross," in *Paul's Cross and the Culture of Persuasion*, eds. Torrance Kirby and P.G. Stanwood (Leiden, Boston: Brill, 2014), 203-221.

on theoretical questions—many of them distinctly modern—leads him to emphasize sacramental presence at the expense of important contextual factors.[26]

The best treatments of Jewel's challenge sermon come from Mary Morrissey. In her *Politics and the Paul's Cross Sermons, 1558-1642*, Morrissey astutely observes some of the same elements that are explored more fully in this study, namely the connection to formal disputation, the closeness between orality and print, and the role of classical rhetoric. Given the nature of her study, however, the treatment of Jewel's challenge sermon is abbreviated and focused primarily on orality, simply because it is one of many stops in her interesting and ably done tour of sermons given at St. Paul's Cross. In a recent chapter, she expertly highlights many of the contextual elements of the sermon as well as the resulting expansion of literature while situating Jewel's use of the fathers alongside some of his Continental predecessors and contemporaries as a commentary on deabtes about Jewel and 'Anglican' method.[27]

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[26] For instance, Kirby only mentions in passing that the sermon was preached more than once and there is no reference to the Westminster conference. Torrance Kirby, "Political Hermeneutics: John Jewel's 'Challenge Sermon' at Paul's Cross, 1559," in Idem, *Persuasion and Conversion: Essays on Religion, Politics, and the Public Sphere in Early Modern England* (Leiden, Boston: Brill, 2013), 114-143.

[27] Mary Morrissey, *Politics and the Paul's Cross Sermons, 1558-1642* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 162-175 (and elsewhere); Idem, "The 'Challenge Controversy' and the Question of Authority in the Elizabethan Church," in *The Search for Authority in Reformation Europe*, eds. Helen Parish, Elaine Fulton, and Peter Webster (Farnham, Surrey; Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2014), 147-169. In a chapter on Edmund Campion, Gerard Kilroy also notes the connection between disputation, oral sermon, and print controversy, especially as it was centered around Paul's Cross, though again the theme is not substantially explored. Gerard Kilroy, "Edmund Campion in the Shadow of Paul's Cross," in *Paul's Cross and the Culture of Persuasion*, eds. Torrance Kirby and P.G. Stanwood (Leiden, Boston: Brill, 2014), 273-275.

A WORD ON DEFINITIONS

Cesare Cuttica has helpfully highlighted many of the obstacles faced by intellectual historians and the use of –isms. More often than not, they are pejorative and laden with value, often determined by the user, and therefore polarizing. Examples include eighteenth-century French "dilettantism," the twentieth-century alarm over "communism," or the prevalence of "atheism" in the early modern period as a catchall to describe perceived impiety and irreligiousness. In addition, –isms are employed in nearly every sphere of human conduct imaginable, thereby making consistent and precise usage of any –ism as a historically meaningful category very difficult. Furthermore, the overuse of –isms tends to relegate them to the realm of cliché. Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, –isms seem overly prone to anachronistic usage. Two ready examples from the sixteenth-century are East Germany's declaration of Thomas Müntzer as a communist hero (even placing him on the currency) or the debates in early modern English historiography over the origins of "Anglicanism." However, as Cuttica pointed out, if we jettison –isms then we have nothing to replace them with.[1]

This study employs three –isms that are strongly contested by historians: humanist/humanism, scholastic/scholasticism, and puritan/puritanism. Besides the quibbles over definitional specifities, both historical and theoretical, these terms brim with facile stereotypes and simplistic connotations—the most acerbic being H.L. Mencken's definition of puritanism as "[t]he haunting fear that someone, somewhere, may be happy"[2]—that could provoke objections

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[1] Cesare Cuttica, "*To Use or Not to Use…*The Intellectual Historian and *the Isms*: A Survey and Proposal," *Études Épistémè* 23 [English] DOI: <http://episteme.revues.org/268>.
[2] H.L. Mencken, "The Citizen and the State," in *A Mencken Chrestomathy* (New York: Vintage, 1967), ed. H.L.M[encken]., 624. Though the pejorative nature of this statement is obvious, it is worth pointing out that Mencken harbored a deep animosity towards puritanism as a force in American religious life and literary culture, as well as its theological engine, Calvinism. See his

against their usages. Therefore, I have given very brief explanation of how each of these terms is understood in this study.

Conceptually, humanism has proven to be a scholarly Cheshire cat with the result that its meaning is most often found in the eye of the beholder. The intellectual reforms that began in fifteenth-century Italy, most famously with Petrarch, soon swept through Europe and radically altered the intellectual landscape. Furthermore, humanism—however defined—had drastic implications on the genesis and growth of Protestantism. There is a certain amount of truth to the sixteenth-century adage, "Erasmus laid the egg that Luther hatched."[3] Humanism is a moving target, however, and there is a myriad of elements that could be incorporated into its definition.

Defining humanism has proven especially problematic on a number of fronts that are important to this study. First, scholars have long distinguished, though without much accord, between humanism as found in the Italian Renaissance and that which was practiced farther North, exemplified by Erasmus, even going so far as to discern an "Erasmian humanism" as distinct from its Southern counterpart. Second, Englishmen borrowed heavily from the ideas emanating from the Continent, but the reception of humanist ideas in England was incredibly mixed. Ever since Gordon Zeeveld shined a light on the significant role of Italian humanism on Tudor political policy in the mid-twentieth century, scholars have worked and reworked the

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"Puritanism as a Literary Force" in *A Book of Prefaces* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1918), 197-283.

[3] Erasmus mentioned the quip in a 1524 letter to John Caesarius: *Ego peperi ouum, Lutherus exclusit* ("I laid the egg, Luther hatched [it]"). He protested though that Luther had, in fact, had hatched an entirely different chick (*Lutherus exclusit pullum longe dissimillimum*). Erasmus, Epistle 1528 in *Opus Epistolarum Des. Erasmi Roterodami*, eds. P.S. Allen and H.M. Allen, Tom. 5 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1924), 609 (lines 11-14). See also Erika Rummel, *The Confessionalization of Humanism in Reformation Germany* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 9.

dynamic relationship between England and Europe.[4] Third, scholars have had great difficulty defining humanism in relation to the confessional debates.[5] Humanism, on the one hand, supposedly injected an unprecedented anthropological optimism into the bleak outlook of the late medieval period. On the other hand, humanist ideas and methods were readily picked up and employed by Protestants who also affirmed an Augustinian pessimism concerning humanity that set them apart from figures like Pico della Mirandola. Philipp Melanchthon and John Calvin, whose influence on English Protestantism cannot be understated, are quintessential examples. Fourth, humanism was far more than an intellectual program, and it exercised special influence on pedagogy, social perspectives, and civil thought. It was, as Margo Todd described it, a "social ideology."[6] Zwingli, with his strong emphasis on education and vocal criticisms of the use of Swiss mercenaries or Sir Thomas More's discussion of England's penal system in book I of *Utopia* are two such examples.

Suffice it to say, humanism as a category is extremely nebulous, yet it had an undeniable impact on Europe that was nothing short of cataclysmic, and any reference to humanism must be descriptive. Rather than defining what precisely English humanism was—which is well beyond my present scope, and also done much more ably by others already[7]—this study treats humanism

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[4] Perhaps the best example of this is Quentin Skinner's analysis in *The Foundations of Early Modern Political Thought*, vol. 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), chs. 7-9. See also Jonathan Woolfson, *Padua and the Tudors: English Students in Italy, 1485-1603* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1998), Anne Overell, *Italian Reform and English Reformations* (Aldershot, Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2008).

[5] Ian Green, *Humanism and Protestantism in Early Modern English Education* (Aldershot, Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2009), 9-15.

[6] Margo Todd, *Christian Humanism and the Puritan Social Order* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), ch. 2.

[7] Alistair Fox's incisive essay "Facts and Fallacies: Interpreting English Humanism" was a watershed moment in the study of English humanism. In it, Fox highlighted three distinct problems in studying humanism (defining humanism based on extrinsic approaches, presuming humanism was a unified and continuous movement, and carelessness in assessing the

as an intellectual posture that was processual and tentative, rather than dogmatic and definitive. As Alistair Fox rightly pointed out over thirty years ago, "[h]umanism was not a dye with which men were indelibly stained for life; it was a practice and set of assumptions that could be repudiated or neglected at will."[8] Thus, humanism is best identified using a 'smell test' that includes a strong emphasis on the classics, original languages, intellectual simplicity, and a strong affinity for dialectic and rhetoric.

For those who study the sixteenth-century, especially if they have their own Protestant convictions, the term "scholasticism" conjures up a number of images, few of them positive. The popular perception of late medieval scholastics, especially from Aquinas on, and their labyrinthine methods was widely protested beginning in the Renaissance, first by humanists who wished to simplify matters and, later, by Protestants who accused them of unnecessarily muddling up theology, with much of the blame placed on the pagan Aristotle, often with impious and even heretical conclusions. Modern scholarship, however, has labored to nuance this understanding. For instance, Richard Muller has done much to highlight the continuing importance of scholasticism as it was used by Protestants to explain their own theology, beginning with Calvin and continuing on through the seventeenth-century. This is important because it reminds the modern reader that scholasticism was a *method*—and not a specific

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relationship between humanism and reform) and issued a clarion call for a total revision (but not rejection) of the terms "humanist" and "humanism." Alistair Fox, "Facts and Fallacies: Interpreting English Humanism," in *Reassessing the Henrician Age*, eds. Idem and John Guy (Oxford; New York: Basil Blackwell, 1986), 9-33. For more recent overviews of the state of scholarship on English humanism see Green, *Humanism and Protestantism in Early Modern English Education*, 9-25; Geoffrey Elton, "Humanism in England," in *The Impact of Humanism on Western Europe*, eds. Anthony Goodman and Angus MacKay (London; New York: Longman, 1990), 259-278.

[8] Fox, "Facts and Fallacies: Interpreting English Humanism," 27-28.

content—that was adapted over time to suit its user's needs.[9] Furthermore, the term "scholasticism" has so many complexities associated with it that we may be better off referring to it (as E.J. Ashworth does) as "traditional logic."[10] This contextualized understanding of scholasticism is retained in this study, and scholasticism is understood to be the dominant mode of scholarship that relied heavily on the Aristotelian syllogism up until the Renaissance when it was, quite successfully, challenged by a humanist method that prioritized language over logic (the subject of chapter 2). And, much like "humanism," a large part of this term's meaning is derived from its adversarial stance against its rival methodology.

Like "humanist" and "scholastic," the term "puritan" is fraught with difficulty in its application in the Elizabethan period. For the most part, the labels "Protestant" and "Catholic" possess relatively stable intrinsic characteristics, such as belief in justification by faith (Protestant) or transubstantiation and the propitiatory nature of the mass (Catholic). The same, however, is not true for Elizabethan puritans.

Satisfactorily defining "puritanism" has proved nearly impossible.[11] This is especially true because a primary tool for defining puritans—opposition to the Church of England's

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[9] See Richard Muller, *After Calvin: Studies in the Development of a Theological Tradition* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), ch. 2, especially.
[10] E.J. Ashworth, "Traditional Logic," in *The Cambridge History of Renaissance Philosophy*, eds. Charles Schmitt and Quentin Skinner (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 143-172.
[11] For a sampling see Patrick Collinson, "A Comment: Concerning the Name Puritan," *The Journal of Ecclesiastical History*, Vol. 31, No. 4 (1980): 483-488; Idem, "Antipuritanism," in *The Cambridge Companion to Puritanism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 19-33. See also Peter Lake's multibook review, "Puritan Identities," *The Journal of Ecclesiastical History*, Vol. 35, No. 1 (1984): 112-123; Idem, "Defining Puritanism—again?," in *Puritanism: Trans-Atlantic Perspectives on a Seventeenth-Century Anglo-American Faith*, ed. Francis J. Bremer (Boston: Massachusetts Historical Society, 1993), 3-29. For analyses of the study of puritanism see Lake, "The historiography of Puritanism," in *The Cambridge Companion to Puritanism*, 346-371; Todd, *Christian Humanism and the Puritan Social Order*, ch. 1.

ceremonies—cannot be consistently applied in early Elizabethan England. Despite the early rumblings of such opposition in the Vestiarian and Admonition controversies, too many important figures—such as Laurence Chaderton, Edmund Grindal, or John Rainoldes—do not allow for this kind of definition. Furthermore, other important figures, not least John Whitgift, displayed puritan sympathies at one point in their career but then became more aligned with the conformist wing.[12]

Following Peter Lake and Patrick Collinson, I prefer to see puritanism in this period as a "spiritual dynamic" that characterized a disparate and loosely affiliated group of conspicuously zealous Protestants.[13] Elizabethan puritanism was Protestantism of degree and not kind (and therefore I retain the lowercase spelling of the word). As Michael Winship aptly put it in his article on defining puritanism in the North American tradition, "Puritanism…is unavoidably a contextual, imprecise term, not an objective one, a term to use carefully but not take too seriously in itself."[14]

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[12] Patrick Collinson, "The 'nott conformytye' of the young John Whitgift," *The Journal of Ecclesiastical History*, Vol. 15, No. 2 (1964): 192-200.
[13] Two of the best studies advancing this understanding are Peter Lake's *Moderate Puritans and the Elizabethan Church* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982) and Patrick Collinson's *Elizabethan Puritan Movement* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991).
[14] Michael Winship, "Were There Any Puritans in New England?," *The New England Quarterly*, Vol. 74, No. 1 (2001): 137.

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Scraping the Bottom: The Importance of Polemic

As Norman Jones pointed out thirty years ago, contemporary understandings of the Elizabethan settlement—at least since the work of J.E. Neale—"are separated by point of view, not by factual evidence." This paucity of new evidence has generated continual re-interpretation of the religious settlement of 1559/60 and the aftershock that reverberated through post-Reformation England up to the Civil War. The *longue durée* historiography of England from "reformation to revolution" has fueled what Jones termed an "intellectual myopia" of the Elizabethan settlement in particular, and English Protestantism more generally.[1] One might think that this intense historiographical focus would deter new attempts to evaluate such a complex period. However, scholarship has a compounding interest rate as historians evaluate and re-evaluate the work of others and, occasionally, themselves.

This study adds another point of view to the plethora of perspectives on the early years of Elizabeth's reign and the Protestant settlement of religion. I do not claim to offer any previously unknown material or turn existing interpretations on their head. Instead, I wish to draw attention to an element of these contentious years that has gone largely ignored in a field that is filled to the brim with scholarship: that of printed religious controversial literature, traditionally referred to as polemic. Specifically, I argue for more nuance in how historians and literary scholars talk about polemic by demonstrating the existence of a distinct genre within religious polemic that

[1] Norman Jones, *Faith by Statute: Parliament and the Settlement of Religion 1559* (London: Royal Historical Society; Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1982), 3, 5.

was acknowledged as such by contemporaries: that of disputative literature. Thus, this study is not a revisiting of *what* Elizabethan controversialists argued. That topic has been covered extensively. Rather, it is an explanation of *how* they argued. Many of the topics these controversialists addressed were already well-worn tropes in the explosion of religious controversy on the Continent.[2] The royal supremacy, of course, is a glaring exception, but even that is not the hot button topic in the pieces examined here that it was during Henry's reign, or would become after the publication of *Regnans in excelsis* in 1570 and the Catholic 'political' tracts that followed, in the exchanges between puritans and conformists or, later, conformists and Jesuits.

Before defining disputative literature, two points should be made. First, "polemic" is such a nebulous term primarily because there is no shared understanding of what polemic *is*. Rather, the word is used indiscriminately to refer to anything that is *polemical*, what has sometimes been understood as literature of "encounter." In fact, Jewel used this exact language in his exchange with Cole (the subject of chapter four).[3] However, the word "polemic" does not appear in English to denote works of religious controversy until the early seventeenth-century, thus making it a technically anachronistic term to describe sixteenth-century literature.[4] Furthermore, when the word is used, it's not always in line with modern understandings. For instance, in 1658 both Christopher Cartwright and Thomas Hall published works titled *A Practical and Polemical*

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[2] For a helpful analysis of some of these topics from the Protestant perspective on the Continent see Euan Cameron, *Enchanted Europe: Superstition, Reason, and Religion, 1250-1750* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), ch. 13.
[3] John Jewel, *Works*, ed. John Ayre, vol. 1 (Cambridge: The University Press, 1845), 61.
[4] Jesse Lander, *Inventing Polemic: Religion, Print, and Literary Culture in Early Modern England* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 11. *Pace* Lander, the earliest usage of "polemic" as controversial literature that I have been able to find is Patrick Forbes' 1614 *A Defence of the Lawful Calling of the Ministers of the Reformed Churches, against the Cavillations of Romanists* (Middleburgh, 1614; STC 2nd ed. 11146), 2.

Commentary. Cartwright's *Commentary* was a publication of sermons on Ps. 15 which featured an extensive treatment on usury. True to its polemical advertisement though, it also identified the pope as antichrist and took passing shots at Jesuits,[5] both favorite pastimes of English Protestants from the Elizabethan period to the Restoration.

Second, polemical literature was not new in Elizabethan England. For example, the lengthy exchanges between the Henricians Tyndale and More or Joye and Gardiner during Edward's reign, and the fervent literature that emerged from Englishmen on the Continent during Mary's reign (which came back to haunt them when another female took the throne) are all polemical, and thus "polemic" in a broad sense. Indeed, polemic wasn't even new in the sixteenth-century. Much of the material that Elizabethan controversialists pulled from was polemical literature from the early church,[6] with special attention given to figures such as Irenaeus, Chrysostom, Basil, Augustine, etc. Some, however, are more startling, such as John Martiall's appropriation of Socrates of Constantinople's heresiographical account of the fate of Arius, who purportedly died after expelling his blood, intestines and organs into a latrine as definitive proof of God's righteous judgment on the heretic.[7]

Disputative literature, however, was a very distinct genre of controversial writing that functioned as both an extension *of* and substitute *for* the university disputation, and was generated by specific historical events (in this case, the 1559 Westminster disputation). The

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[5] Christopher Cartwright, *A Practical and Polemical Commentary* (London, 1658; Wing / C693). On usury see 232-265 (Sermons 24-27); on the pope as antichrist see 221 and 254; for comments on Jesuits see 67, 174 and 222. Interestingly, both Cartwright and Hall mention "controversies" and "cases of conscience" in the titles of their works.

[6] For an insightful discussion of the use of patristic sources in English Reformation authors, see J.L. Quantin, *The Church of England and Christian Antiquity: The Construction of a Confessional Identity in the 17th Century* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), ch. 1.

[7] John Martiall, *Treatyse of the Crosse* (Antwerp, 1564; STC 2nd ed. 17496), fol. 164r.

writings examined here exhibit very specific intrinsic characteristics that distinguish it from other works that were far more likely to be considered libelous by contemporaries, though they may be considered polemic by modern historians. It is precisely because works like *An admonition to the Parliament* (1572), *The life of the 70. Archbishopp of Canterbury* (1574), Stubbe's *Gaping Gvlf* (1579), *Leicester's Commonwealth* (1584, but in circulation well before then) and the Marprelate tracts (1588-1589) lack the shared emphases common to disputative literature that some kind of distinction should be made.

Defining Disputative Literature: The Intellectual Element

Disputative literature is defined by two distinct characteristics, one intellectual and one social. The intellectual element of early Elizabethan disputative literature is a strict adherence to the standards of oral academic disputation. These works were intentionally constructed as print versions of oral disputations.[8] Oral disputation had been significantly influenced by academic reforms beginning in the late fifteenth-century and continuing throughout the sixteenth-century, specifically in logic and rhetoric, that are manifest in the works that form the subject of this study. The emergence of a humanist logic that was grammatically-oriented and privileged dialectic in order to strip away extraneous arguments and conclusions challenged the dominant scholastic Aristotelianism of the late medieval period (often successfully), and much of the intellectual landscape of the sixteenth-century was an attempt to work this out. In addition, humanist emphases on rhetoric, particularly via the recovery of Roman theorists such as Cicero and Quintilian, profoundly shaped sixteenth-century debate. These intellectual methodologies

[8] This point that has been suggested or observed incidentally by multiple scholars (e.g. Felicity Heal, Ann Hughes, and Mary Morrissey), but never explored directly. See the Literature Review.

exercised significant sway in the shaping of universities and academic disputation in particular, which the majority of printed controversial literature was structured in accordance with. This study, however, argues that late Renaissance English controversialists are not identifiable by adherence to a particular academic 'tribe.' Rather, their work is remarkably eclectic and, at times, surprisingly indiscriminate about sources.

This is important to note because the fact that both sides were using the same arguments and the same sources made intellectual stalemate inevitable. Both Protestants and Catholics insisted on using reason, logic, grammatical arguments, history, and the like in religious disputation to 'prove' demonstrable truths of religion, yet could just as quickly resort to theological categories like "faith" and "mystery" to justify their doctrines. This created argumentative cul-de-sacs that expose how each side was departing from variant first principles that made coming to mutual agreement fundamentally impossible.[9] These are referred to throughout as "intellectual fault lines" (or simply "fault lines").[10] Though both sides put forth herculean efforts to prove their opponent wrong, one could only say so much before the argument reached a core disagreement, such "The pope is head of the church" *v.* "The pope is not head of the church," or "The number of communicants at the Lord's Supper is a matter indifferent" *v.* "The number of communicants at the Lord's Supper is not indifferent." While there were an infinite variety of shades within these dichotomous statements, they do illustrate how many of these arguments, when reduced to their most fundamental tenets, came down to

[9] The same might be said concerning puritans and conformists, particularly regarding the regulative principle of interpreting scripture, but these debates are beyond the present scope.
[10] This term is not original to me. It is a metaphor for matters indifferent used repeatedly by Gunther in *Reformation Unbound* and also used by Patrick Collinson for the same. Karl Gunther, *Reformation Unbound: Protestant Visions of Reform in England, 1525-1590* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 253 n. 1 and *passim.*

irreconcilable points of departure and therefore ended in a disputative cul-de-sac from which the only exit was concession—a possibility neither side was willing to entertain.

That said, intellectual fault lines weren't always a matter of antithetical first principles. They also appear in modes of argumentation (like the proper use of historical examples and authorities) and theological arguments (such as transubstantiation and the 'true' church). This latter example, discovering the 'true church,' is an excellent example. How was a sixteenth-century Christian, wholeheartedly committed to the existence of an all-powerful God who was closely involved in the affairs of human history, and especially his church (which was representative of God as well as obligated to fulfilling his will on earth) to interpret the violent and unceasing regime changes of the late sixteenth-century? Sometimes it was explained as God's favor of the 'true' religion is manifested in glorious success on earth. Other times the 'true' church was identified as that which was oppressed by the forces of antichrist. It is not hard to see why both explanations were appealing and used widely in such a chaotic time.

This question was particularly thorny in England as the quick succession of Edward, Mary, and Elizabeth saw both sides appealing to both explanations. The theoretical confusion was exacerbated by the confessional violence in England's neighbors across the channel, France and the Netherlands, which appreciably shaped contemporary English perspectives.[11] Occasionally, some authors (such as John Rastell) identified the contradictions created by appealing to such explanations, but most often they were simply met with an intellectual re-entrenchment. The same question also appeared in the theological pronouncements and historical practice of the Church in history. Catholics frequently cited a dictum of Augustine's to the effect

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[11] Peter Lake, *Bad Queen Bess? Libels, Secret Histories, and the Politics of Publicity in the Reign of Queen Elizabeth I* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), ch. 10.

that the individual Christian need not doubt what the whole church has always believed *semper ubique*.[12] On the other hand, Protestants often pointed out that the Church was entirely capable of erring (and often had). Indeed, when it strayed from God's word, it was inevitable. In addition, God's 'true' messengers—most conspicuously the Hebrew prophets and Christ himself—were always persecuted by the religious majority when they attempted to reform God's church according to God's original plan.[13] Because both English Protestants and Catholics both experienced success and persecution in a relatively short amount of time, arguing from examples (both historical and contemporary) could and often did result in self-contradictions.

Defining Disputative Literature: The Social Element

These texts were also written by men who were eminently of their time. This is conspicuously evident in the defining social aspect of these texts, namely the authors' obsession with presenting themselves as learned and moderate, which was always contrasted to the unbridled and malicious zeal of their opponent. Social historians have long observed the shifting intellectual landscape of Tudor England that made men of the 'new learning' highly sought after for important positions, especially in government. This altered the cultural landscape by displacing learned clerics and theologians in the upper echelon of society,[14] which profoundly

[12] "What (sayeth [Augustine]) the vniuersall churche kepeth, neither hath ben ordeined in councelles, buth hath alwaies ben obserued: of good right we beleeue it hath ben delyuered (to the church) as a Tradition by the auctoritie of the Apostles." Thomas Harding, *An Answere to Maister Iuelles Chalenge* (Louvain, 1564; STC 2nd ed. 12758), fol. 129^{r}. See also John Rastell, *A Replie against an answer (falslie intitled) in Defence of the truth* (Antwerp, 1565; STC 2nd ed. 20728), sig. A[1]^{r}, fol. 8^{v}.
[13] E.g. Thomas Cooper, *An Apologie of priuate Masse…with an answer to the same Apologie set foorth for the maintenance and defence of the trueth* (London, 1562; STC 2nd ed. 14615), fols. 94^{r}-95^{r}.
[14] Lawrence Stone, *The Crisis of the Aristocracy, 1558-1641* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1965), ch. 12; M.H. Curtis, *Oxford and Cambridge in Transition* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1959), ch.

altered who was perceived as learned, and therefore authoritative. Constructing this perception relied heavily on presenting oneself as moderate and civil.

Moderation has recently been analyzed in two important ways. The first is in Ethan Shagan's *The Rule of Moderation*, where Shagan argues that the concept of moderation functioned as a means of social, religious, and political control throughout early modern England. In a nigh-Foucaultian analysis of moderation in early modern England,[15] Shagan argues that the developments of an Anglican *via media*, political liberty, empire, and even toleration were defined and defended as "coercive moderation" producing a middle way between dangerous excesses. In the Tudor period, this manifested itself in events such as Henry's simultaneous execution of three Protestants and three Catholics in July 1540. The English Reformation was understood to be moderate not because it was limited, compromised or reasonable, but because the Church was "so very governmental."[16] Moderation was at the heart of an ideology of dominance.

The second comes from Steven Shapin's *A Social History of Truth*, where Shapin argues for a close link between moderation, civility, and truth-telling in early seventeenth-century England that was largely driven by an honor culture. Because a gentleman was socially bound to

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3; Victor Morgan, "The Social Composition of the University: The 'Aristocratic' Curriculum," "The University and the Country" and "University Alumni in Country Society;" Christopher Brooke, "Aristocratic Regard" in Idem and Idem, *A History of the University of Cambridge, Volume II: 1546-1750*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 131-147, 221-240, 316-320. For the connection between 'new learning' and political service see Quentin Skinner, *Reason and Rhetoric in the Philosophy of Thomas Hobbes* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), chs. 1 and 2.

[15]Conal Condren, Review of Ethan Shagan, *The Rule of Moderation: Violence, Religion and the Politics of Restraint in Early Modern England*, *Renaissance Quarterly*, Vol. 66, No. 2 (2013): 693.

[16] Ethan Shagan, *The Rule of Moderation: Violence, Religion and the Politics of Restraint in Early Modern England* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 9.

be truthful (as lying was evidence of one's depravity), he was perceived to be a source of credibility. With the rise of the scientific mindset in the early seventeenth-century, it was a natural step for the gentleman to become the scientist. Thus, a moderate and civil gentleman was a cultural guarantor of being truthful, and thus authoritative in matters of fact and truth.[17]

This study qualifies these interpretations in two ways. First, it modifies Shagan's thesis by arguing that while moderation may have certainly been an ideological tool for control, it was also much more than that. These works reveal something much closer to Shapin's understanding of moderation, namely that it was a form of social currency cashed in for credibility. This is most obvious in the fact that moderation was equally as important to Elizabethan Catholics who were *not* in political control. Even when bound to recognizance (Cole) or in self-imposed exiled on the Continent (Harding), moderation remained a central part of their arguments against Elizabethan Protestants who, in turn, replied that Catholics were in no position to pontificate on moderation given their ardent persecution of Protestants under Mary. The extent to which moderation functioned as an ideology of control reflects how moderation was already deeply embedded in English culture as a social virtue.

Second, these works of disputative literature largely bear out Shapin's thesis that moderation was intimately linked to one's status as a truth-telling gentleman, and thus a source of credibility and authority. However, this can be observed roughly a half century earlier than Shapin's scientific men and—somewhat counterintuitively—in works of religious dogma. These authors believed themselves to be eminently moderate, and privileged status is routinely invoked (especially against Jewel) as a form of cultural credibility. In addition, the overzealous and

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[17] Steven Shapin, *A Social History of Truth: Civility and Science in Seventeenth-Century England* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1994), ch. 3.

intemperate language of one's opponent invalidated their arguments on both a moral and an intellectual level.[18] Thus, what Shapin argued regarding probabilistic knowledge and practical epistemology is found earlier and in fierce contests concerning matters of theology and faith.[19]

Furthermore, Shapin predicated his discussion on a dynamic between belief and honor. He begins this discussion with a quotation from Hobbes' *Leviathan*: "To believe, to trust, to rely on another, is to Honour him; signe of opinion of his vertue and power. To distrust, or not believe, is to Dishonour."[20] This reads strikingly close to Luther's "second function" of faith in *The Freedom of a Christian* (1520), one of the earliest articulations of Luther's newfound evangelical faith that was translated into English by James Bell in 1579 and republished 1636. Bell's 1579 translation describes the second "duty" of faith in the following terms:

> …for this also is the duty of faith, that it reuerence him on whom it beleeueth, with a most godly and earnest bent affection, to wit, that it accompt him true, & worthy to be beléeued, for there is no honor like vnto the opinio[n] conceiued of truth and rightesounes, wherewith we do most highly estéeme of him whom we doe beléeue, for what are we able to ascribe to any person, more tha[n] truth, righteousnes, & goodnesse, of all parts perfect and absolute? Contrariwise, it is a detestable reproach, to conceiue a secret opinion of a man to be false, faithlesse, and wicked.[21]

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[18] Peter Lake made the same point about Elizabethan and Stuart puritans in several publications. See, for example, "Joseph Hall, Robert Skinner and the rhetoric of moderation at the early Stuart Court," in *The English sermon revised: Religion, Literature and History, 1600-1750*, eds. Lori Anne Ferrell and Peter McCullough (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2001), 167-185 and his *Moderate Puritans and the Elizabethan Church* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982).

[19] This, incidentally, affirms Mordechai Feingold's critique of Shapin that scholars and authors were almost universally perceived as having gentle status. Feingold, "When Facts Matter": Review of *A Social History of Truth: Civility and Science in Seventeenth-Century England* by Steven Shapin, *Isis*, Vol. 87, No. 1 (1996): 133. Gentle status is an especially important topic to Jewel's Catholic interlocutors, who repeatedly invoke his status as a bishop against him. See chs. 4 and 9.

[20] Shapin, *Social History of Truth*, 65. The quote comes from Hobbes, *Leviathan*, ed. Edwin Curley (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1994), X.27.

[21] Martin Luther, *A Treatise, Touching the Libertie of a Christian. Written in Latin by Doctor Martin Luther. And Translated into English by Iames Bell* (London, 1579; STC 2nd ed. 16996), 18.

In the margin, Bell wrote, “The greatest honor” and “The greatest reproach” next to their respective explanations so that the reader would not miss the point. An understanding of faith that emphasized trust and honor, however, was not limited to Protestants. Catholics routinely claimed that Protestants, because of their vanity, didn’t believe God was able to work above and outside the confines of natural law—a retort to Protestant criticisms of transubstantiation. This argument is prominent in Harding’s *Answere* (1564), where he repeatedly accused Jewel, who holds the noble office of bishop, of taking honor to himself that belongs to God alone.[22]
What Shapin’s scientific gentleman performed as an essential aspect of social cohesion was already deeply embedded in the Protestant mindset, of which Luther’s *sola fide* was a cornerstone. Furthermore, Catholics exhibited the same fixation on honor and belief, though in different ways. Thus, what Shapin saw as a social concept was also a theological one. Of course, it would be much too ambitious to argue that Luther was the source of the English honor culture that prized truthfulness so deeply, or that Luther and Hobbes were saying the same thing. They were not. But in a world where one’s vertical relationship with God and one’s horizontal relationship with neighbor were dynamically and inextricably intertwined, this does raise the possibility that the associations of honor and truthfulness among Shapin’s scientific gentlemen were an outgrowth of the Protestantization of England that imbibed widely-held cultural assumptions about truth and honor.

[22] See ch. 9.

Defining Disputative Literature, Negatively

Though disputative literature is defined by its intellectual and social components, there are two other aspects of these works that merit examination. The first is the abusive and vitriolic rhetoric they sometimes employ. The modern reader may find this odd in works fashioned to be eminently scholastic and moderate, but abusive language, ranging from disdainful asides about an opponent's intellectual abilities to vitriolic ad hominem attacks, were part and parcel not just for Elizabethan polemic, but early modern religious controversy in general. Such abusive rhetoric also tended to grow dialogically, as participants' frustration with their interlocutor grew with each new publication.[23]

In disputative literature, abusive language was always justified in terms of religious zeal—it was the overflow of passion in defending 'true' religion as well as efforts to help one's opponent see the error of their ways. Zeal for God could never be too great, though it certainly could towards one's fellow man.[24] This created another "fault line" of sorts as many of the controversialists examined here deployed that which they condemned in their opponent, predicated on the assumption that one was defending 'orthodoxy' against 'heresy.' In modern ethical terms, what was justified consequentially for the user was condemned categorically in the opponent. Thus, it created another cycle in which each party reinforced what the other already believed.

Such rhetoric is noteworthy because a litany of works was just over the horizon that are polemical, but not in the same way as disputative literature. The abusive rhetoric in works like *An admonition to Parliament* (1572), *The life off the 70. Archbishopp off Canterbury* (1574),

[23] This is especially conspicuous in the exchange between Martiall and Calfhill. See ch. 7.
[24] Shagan, *Rule of Moderation*, 42.

Stubbe's *Gaping Gvlf* (1579), *Leicester's Commonwealth* (1584, but circulating well before then), and the Marprelate tracts (1588-89) was not 'new.' Rather, what made such works libelous was not the presence of abusive language but the blatant flouting of the conventions of academic method and civility. Though Marprelate employed syllogistic reasoning and other academic forms of argument, especially in *Hay Any Work for Cooper*, the overall thrust of mockery and insolence remains unaffected. This put such works on the fringe as socially and politically subversive, well beyond the circumscribed bounds of learnedness and moderation.

This is important because "libel," like "polemic," suffers from promiscuous usage. However, unlike "polemic," the word "libel" is not at all anachronistic for the Elizabethan period. The word was frequently used in royal proclamations against works that the crown deemed seditious for a variety of reasons. As Debora Shuger noted in her study of Tudor-Stuart print censorship, such works were outlawed and their authors punished for containing lies and untruths, thus threatening to spread false and potentially destabilizing information. She also develops the idea that early modern press censorship was meant to protect norms of civility by making speech an "ethical activity" and the enforcement of transgressions based on Roman conceptions of *iniuria* (i.e. defamation harms another's reputation and therefore infringes upon their rights).[25] This analysis adds another dimension to Shuger's argument by affirming the important place of the social norms of civility and moderation in early modern England (discussed above) while demonstrating the cultural expectations that print disputations were carried on in the same form as oral disputations, and thus formed an acceptable venue in which to carry out public debate.

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[25] Debora Shuger, *Censorship and Cultural Sensibility: The Regulation of Language in Tudor-Stuart England* (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2006), 14-20, ch. 5, *passim*.

The second aspect of the works forming the subject of study that should be observed is that each of them was published in the vernacular. It should be stressed that Elizabeth's last second decision to hold the Westminster conference in English rather than Latin so that the MP's in attendance could understand was vitally important for two reasons. First, it reflects a significant shift in the cultural understanding of who was fit to judge matters of religion. These decisions were no longer the monopoly of Latinate clerics and scholars, but were now put before the literate (but not necessarily Latinate) men of civil service. Second, it set the tone for the ensuing print controversy. The works were published in English because the author was more concerned about their reader, who they frequently and deferentially dialogued with as the "judge" of the ongoing dispute, than their opponent. Both of these observations—the relationship between disputative literature and libel and the discriminatory function of language—will be revisited in the Conclusion.

The Structure

The first chapter revisits the 1559 Westminster conference, the genesis for all the works examined here. The Westminster conference was a public disputation between leading Protestants and Catholics held shortly after Elizabeth's accession, purporting to be a fair means of settling the pressing religious question and the future direction of the English Church. The conference was a fiasco and broke down after two days due to disagreements over the proper mode of disputation. Two of the Catholic participants were imprisoned in the Tower, and all the others except one were bound to recognizance. In this chapter, I argue that the Westminster conference was a much more significant event than most historians have granted, not least because of the long afterlife of the conference in the minds of controversialists. I also suggest a

new timeline for the breakdown of the conference, which has been a subject of disagreement among historians.

The second chapter analyzes the intellectual culture of late Elizabethan England. It traces Renaissance reforms to rhetoric and logic beginning in the late-fifteenth century and their reception in England, the introduction and influence of Ramism, the continuance of an Aristotelian/scholastic tradition, and the role of each (as far as can be ascertained) in Tudor universities, where the authors examined in this study all received their training. In doing so, I argue that early Elizabethan authors were far more eclectic and idiosyncratic—a reflection of their university education—than historians have tended to allow for.

The third chapter analyzes John Jewel's challenge sermon. Preached in the wake of the Westminster conference, it was a public attack on Catholics in which Jewel promised that if any Catholic could produce proof that any of several doctrines and practices—such as transubstantiation, sole receiving by the priest, prohibition of vernacular service and scripture, and the like—were universally practiced in the first 600 years of the Church's existence, then he would convert. Though Jewel's sermon, which was in reality preached three times and slightly altered at least once, provoked several responses, I argue that it is especially significant as the bridge between the Westminster conference and the several publications analyzed in the remaining chapters. The Westminster conference left behind a volatile situation, and Jewel's challenge sermon was the spark that ignited the powder.

The fourth chapter examines the epistolary exchange between Dr. Henry Cole, the first to respond to Jewel's challenge, and Jewel. It began with a very short and mild letter from Cole, the Dean of St. Paul's and a participant at Westminster. Cole's letter was almost wholly concerned with Jewel's argument from the negative, which he claimed was a violation of the rules of

disputation, as well as Jewel's own rashness and lack of moderation. Cole's brief letter generated a substantial epistolary exchange between the two, although Jewel certainly held the upper hand due to his political privilege, something Cole sorely lacked after the dissolution of the conference. I argue that their letters were a conscious extension of the conference and that their exchange, published in 1560 as *The True Copies of the Letters betwene the reuerend father in God Iohn Bisshop of Sarum and D. Cole*, was profoundly shaped by the rules of disputation as well as moderation, though it also contained limited abusive rhetoric (the majority of which came from Jewel).

The fifth chapter investigates the second Catholic response to Jewel, the anonymous *An Apologie of priuate Masse* (1560-1562) and the reply by Thomas Cooper, bishop of Winchester, *An Answere in defence of the truth. Againste the Apologie of priuate Masse* (1562). It examines the background of each author and their works, tracing how the anonymous *Apologie* was a direct response to Jewel's challenge sermon and the Westminster conference. Cooper's response, the first reply by a Protestant author other than Jewel to the controversy, was the first step towards the mushrooming of the controversy that grew to entail several authors and many more printed works. In it, I detail the disputative method and portrayals of moderation that characterize the works as disputative, as well as the rhetoric of abuse in each publication.

The sixth chapter is a detailed examination of the Catholic John Rastell's *A Replie against an answere (falslie intitled) in Defence of the truth* (1565), which was a reply to Cooper's *Answere*. Rastell is a lesser-known figure among Elizabethan controversialists, and he received scant attention from Protestants. However, his *Replie* is important for a number of reasons. First, it illustrates the compounding nature of the controversy, as more and more authors began to contribute and felt compelled to answer their opponent's every point. In addition,

Rastell is a superb example of the close connection between moderation and truth to Elizabethan polemicists. Perhaps most importantly, Rastell demonstrated a keen ability to cut to the heart of the arguments by naming the underlying fault lines running between Protestants and Catholics.

The seventh chapter is an exploration of three works: the Catholic John Martiall's *Treatyse of the Crosse* (1564), James Calfhill's *Aunswere to the Treatise of the Crosse* (1565), and Martiall's *A Replie to M. Calfhills Blasphemous Answer* (1566). These three works evidence the dynamic and dialogic character of the controversy, as authors' frustrations grew with one another. They also offer an interesting window into the broadening nature of religious controversy in the Elizabethan period, due primarily to the unusual character of Martiall and his work. Martiall was a lawyer and had no degree in divinity (something Calfhill mocked him for repeatedly) and, in his *Treatyse of the Crosse*, he did not take a direct approach in replying to Jewel. Rather, he outlined ten articles in defense of the crucifix. He did this because Elizabeth, much to the consternation of zealous Protestants such as Alexander Nowell, retained a silver crucifix in her private chapter. Martiall seized upon this a point of entry to prove to the Queen that Catholics were both religiously sound and politically loyal. Furthermore, Martiall liberally employed miracle stories (sometimes Christians, sometimes not) in his *Treatyse*, for which Calfhill ridiculed him. This, in turn, prompted Martiall to become more resolute in his academic and moderate posturing in the *Replie*. Calfhill's *Aunswere* is notable because it was his only vernacular work, again underscoring the targeted audience for these works (i.e. literate but not necessarily Latinate gentlemen). Lastly, both men were far more abusive in their works towards each other than the majority of other authors, yet also decried the same in each other.

The eighth and ninth chapters examine two sides of the same coin—Thomas Harding's *An Answere to Maister Iuelles Chalenge* (1564) and John Jewel's *A Replie vnto M. Hardinges*

Answeare (1565). Both works are paragons of disputative literature, and each chapter elucidates the disputative method, portrayals of moderation, and abusive rhetoric in them. The eighth chapter demonstrates how Harding's *Answere*, a point-by-point refutation of Jewel's challenge sermon, is emblematic of late Renaissance authors' dependence on formal logic as well as the English prioritization of moderation. The ninth chapter does the same for Jewel's *Replie*, giving special attention to Jewel's use of an incredibly wide range of sources and argumentative methods, thereby exemplifying the intellectual eclecticism of late Renaissance authors.

The Conclusion sums up the argument for classifying disputative literature as a distinct genre within early modern English polemic by surveying how printed literature that represented oral disputation remained integral to the confessional debates in the Elizabethan and early Stuart periods. I argue that contemporaries viewed disputative literature as something entirely different from other publications that were condemned as libelous. I argue that libel cannot simply be defined by the presence of vitriol, sarcasm, ad hominem, and the like, for those existed in these very academic and (ostensibly) moderate works. Rather, libel must be understood as contemporaries understood it—by the absence of scholarly methods and moderate posturing.

Statement on Method

I take for granted that the Christian scriptures and ecclesiastical history are authoritative sources for these writers. References to the church fathers (Augustine, Jerome, Chrysostom, Irenaeus, Cyril, and the likes) and scripture are abundant. One could open to virtually any page and point their finger at random to find a reference in either category. Furthermore, matters such as the Eucharist, ecclesiastical polity, papal supremacy, salvation, etc., that were of self-evident importance to sixteenth-century Christians are relegated to the background as far as possible.

That Christians would use Christian sources when arguing about their Christianity is not particularly novel, but what *is* interesting is that these English polemicists were shaped by intellectual reforms in rhetoric and logic and saw their efforts as formal disputation, fully expecting that their work, and that of their opponents, adhered to the rules of engagement. Following Peter Mack's method in *Elizabethan Rhetoric*, my goal is to work at the intersection of literary and social history. Rather than searching out and pronouncing judgment on the author's motives and endeavors, my goal is to explore "shared forms of expression and ethical assumptions."[26] I believe that these works can and should be read as works of sixteenth-century scholarship which were expected and intended to live up to the high standards of formal university disputation. This does not negate their theological significance to contemporaries, which should be blindingly obvious in their obsession with such topics.

Lastly, what is examined here is a sampling of the literature. Even when just considering the publications of the 1560s, there are several notable absences from this study, including the three-year exchange between Alexander Nowell and Thomas Dorman, Edward Dering's *Sparing Restraint* (1568), the extended controversy over Jewel's *Apology of the Church of England*, and the literature of the Vestiarian controversy. In addition, only one of John Rastell's several publications is examined. This is mostly for internal coherence, as all the works here are direct responses to John Jewel's challenge sermon and the 1559 Westminster conference. They all form a polemical ecosystem, so to speak. The selectivity, however, also owes the sheer scope of these works. In the first decade of Elizabeth's reign alone, literally thousands of folios and pages of

[26] Peter Mack, *Elizabethan Rhetoric: Theory and Practice* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 7.

polemic were put into print, almost always in response to particular controversies. To give each of these works the same care and attention would require many more years.

I have retained original spelling throughout with the exception of shortening long "s's" and modernizing "vv" as "w." I have also frequently put words like 'right' and 'wrong,' 'true' and 'false,' or 'orthodoxy' and 'heresy' within single quotations. This is to remind the reader that terms like this were both widely accepted and fiercely contested in the sixteenth-century; it is not because of any sort of personal skepticism or intended as a normative statement.

The title "A Battle of Books" comes from James Calfhill's *Aunswere* to John Martiall's *Treatyse of the Crosse*. Calfhill, in explaining to his reader that unjustified violence is simply the Catholic way, asserted that because God has not allowed them to succeed, "they have thought it best to make open war against God, and all honesty." After providing a litany of violent and treasonous episodes instigated by Catholics, which Calfhill compared to "that reign of Romulus, first gotten by murder," he stated,

> they have thought it most gainful for them to come in with a new battle; a battle of books: whereof some already be come into our sight; and they say that more do lie in ambush. Thanks be to God, they shed no blood; though they breathe nothing else but sedition and lies.[27]

Ironically, the great satirist Jonathan Swift used the same title for an addendum to his anonymously published *Tale of the Tub* (1704), where Swift identified works of print religious controversy as something new while simultaneously mocking them.[28] Thus, we can find the same pithy phrase used to describe the same phenomenon—voluminous printed religious controversial literature—though with diametrically opposed interpretations of the importance of

[27] James Calfhill, *An Answer to John Martiall's Treatise of the Cross*, ed. Richard Gibbings (Cambridge: The University Press, 1846), 49-50.
[28] Lander, *Inventing Polemic*, 1-3.

those works. This, I think, is a fitting way to capture the incredible distance between the modern reader's understanding of and proximity to Tudor religious controversy and the alarming urgency which contemporaries assigned to the same.

CHAPTER 2

AN ELIZABETHAN 'WITTGENSTEIN'S POKER': THE WESTMINSTER CONFERENCE OF 1559

It is contrarye to the order in disputations that we should begyn.[1]

Bishop Ralph Bayne to Lord Keeper Bacon, Westminster conference, 3 April 1559

Introduction

In 2001, David Edmonds and John Eidinow published *Wittgenstein's Poker*, an account of the infamous clash between the philosophical giants Karl Popper and Ludwig Wittgenstein at the Cambridge Moral Science Club in 1946 over the question of whether there really are philosophical problems. Popper said yes, Wittgenstein, no. The book's title references the fact that Wittgenstein picked up a fireplace poker and used it for emphasis when he 'corrected' Popper. Soon after, he stormed out in a rage. But despite the fact that the event was witnessed firsthand by a number of intellectuals of contemporary and future importance, what caused Wittgenstein's abrupt departure is a matter of dispute.

In his autobiographical account of the confrontation, published over thirty years later, Popper claimed that Wittgenstein angrily asked him to provide an example of a moral universal, to which Popper jokingly responded, "Not to threaten visiting lecturers with fireplace pokers." At this, Wittgenstein slammed down the poker and stormed out. Popper's narrative, however, resulted in a flurry of letters accusing him of lying, mostly from Wittgenstein's defenders. Popper's detractors cited a heated exchange between Wittgenstein and Bertrand Russell, who was defending Popper, as the catalyst for Wittgenstein's hasty departure.

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[1] John Foxe, *Actes and Monuments* (London, 1563; STC 2nd ed. 11222), 1725.

What precisely triggered Wittgenstein's unceremonious exit is important, for Popper believed his own retort caused Wittgenstein to leave in defeat, thus granting him 'victory' over his philosophical opponent (and senior). Others, however, disputed Popper's claim and pointed to an entirely different reason for the fiasco. Furthermore, there is disagreement as to whether Wittgenstein was just being animated or actually became agitated and potentially threatening with the poker (as Popper believed).[2]

Such a dilemma is not unusual for the historian: a significant event occurs with eyewitness accounts and firsthand documents offering a rich and fascinating record. However, the animosity between the parties involved (perhaps what makes the event so interesting in the first place), predicated on mutually exclusive convictions, produces competing narratives about precisely *what* happened and, more importantly, *why* things turned out the way they did. Tantalizing details that furbish historical events with meaning, such as motive and intent, often prove frustratingly elusive. No one doubts that Wittgenstein and Popper clashed at the Cambridge MSC, that they argued about philosophy, or that Wittgenstein had a fireplace poker in his hand, but they do disagree on what it all *meant*.

The Westminster conference of 31 March and 3 April 1559 is an Elizabethan 'Wittgenstein's poker.' There are a plethora of eyewitness accounts and official records that testify to a religious disputation between Protestants and Catholics in the choir of Westminster Abbey on these dates with unanimity on the topics (one mistaken report notwithstanding). Sources are nearly uniform on all the participants, as well as on the fact that it dissolved on Monday, 3 April, because of disagreement over the rules of debate. It is difficult, however, to

[2] David Edmonds and John Eidinow, *Wittgenstein's Poker: The story of a ten-minute argument between two great philosophers* (London: Faber and Faber, 2001). Summary taken from 1-5, 206-228.

pronounce anything with much certainty beyond these general points, primarily because the accounts of the disputation (most of which are Protestant) are tainted by personal religious bias and the need to paint a particular picture of events, namely that their opponents were devious, contumely, and obstinate. Arriving at a clear picture of the Westminster conference is further complicated because modern historians have tended either to take the reports at face value or simply dismiss the event as a perfunctory exercise without giving due attention to important details. Even if the conference was token in nature, however, this does not render it historically trivial, nor does it nullify the very real significance contemporaries ascribed to it, for all involved knew that they were fighting to set the sails of the English Church.

This chapter briefly reconstructs the events of the Westminster conference of 1559 and highlights that its dissolution owed to the fact that Catholics objected to the ground rules of the disputation, which they insisted were not only unfair but also in violation of standard academic method. Other historians have put forth interpretations that shed light on the disputation and highlight Catholic objections to procedure but curiously none (to my knowledge) have emphasized the formal academic nature of the conference. Rather, it has been overwhelmingly interpreted as nothing more than a political victory lap for the Elizabethan Protestant regime.[3] No doubt this is true, but in order to fully understand the event, we must appreciate it for what contemporaries saw it as: an exercise that was at once meant to be academic and moderate.

This chapter begins with a brief overview of the conference propositions, the participants of the debate, and summaries of each side's explanation for the conference's dissolution. It then explores the difficulties with both Protestant and Catholic accounts of the conference and the

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[3] These are primarily the interpretations of Neale, Haugaard, Collinson, and Jones (discussed below).

ramifications of Henry Cole's written speech for establishing both the debate's timeline and the motivation behind participants' behavior at the conference, which suggests a revised timeline as well as a new plausible cause for the conference's dissolution. It concludes by arguing that modern interpretations of Westminster, which emphasize the conference in relation to Parliament and the passing of the religious settlement are historically accurate but overlook the importance that contemporaries invested in the event as an academic disputation that was meant to be dialectical in nature (according to the "schoole maner") and moderate in tone, which is reflective of emerging social conventions that tied moderation and civility to intellectual credibility.

The Conference

There were three propositions for debate at the Westminster conference:

1) It is contrary to scripture and the custom of the ancient church to use a language unknown to the people in common prayer and administration of the sacraments.
2) Every church has the right to alter and abrogate ceremonies and ritual for the sake of edification.
3) It cannot be proved by scripture that a propitiatory sacrifice is offered for the living and the dead in the mass.

While most of the participants are known for certain, there are a few lingering questions of identity. Below is a list of each person reported to be at the debate (participants for whom there are still questions are marked with an asterisk [*]), followed an overview of the sources and analysis of the gaps in the narrative:

Catholic:	Protestant:
Bishop of Winchester [John White]	Richard Scory (Bishop of Chichester)
Bishop of Lichfield and Coventry [Ralph Bayne]	Dr. Richard Cox
Bishop of Chester [Cuthbert Scot]	David Whitehead
Bishop of Carlisle [Owen Oglethorpe]*	Edmund Grindal
Bishop of Lincoln [Thomas Watson]	Robert Horne

Dr. Henry Cole	Edwin Sandys*
Dr. Harpsfield*	Edmund Guest [Gheast]
Dr. Alban Langdale	John Aylmer
Dr. William Chedsey	John Jewel

Moderator:

Sir Nicholas Bacon, Lord Keeper of the Seal

There were two other notable Catholics involved in the debate: John Feckenham, Abbott of Westminster, and Dr. Nicholas Heath, Archbishop of York. Though not a disputant, Feckenham attempted to join the debate on the second day when other Catholics refused to continue but was not allowed (though reasons for this vary). Heath reportedly collaborated with Bacon to organize the conference and, during a heated exchange between the participants, purportedly chastised his fellow Catholics for their refusal to continue in the debate (a point only recorded by Protestants). In addition, both Strype and Dixon noted that James Turberville, bishop of Exeter, was at least present on the second day.[4]

It was determined that the Catholics, ostensibly in esteem for their position (they were, after all, still bishops and archdeacons) would go first. It began with Henry Cole's oration defending the use of Latin in the service. Afterwards, a Protestant offered a public prayer and then Robert Horne read the Protestant argument in defense of the vernacular. Bacon then stated

[4] Nicholas Sander, "Report to Cardinal Moroni [1561]," ed. and trans. J.H. Pollen, *Catholic Record Society Miscellanea*, I (London: Privately Printed, 1905), 27; John Strype, *Annals of the Reformation and Establishment of Religion, And Other Various Occurrences in the Church of England, during Queen Elizabeth's Happy Reign*, vol. 1 (London: Tho. Edlin, 1725), 88; R.W. Dixon, *History of the Church of England from the Abolition of Roman Jurisdiction*, vol. V (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1902), 77. There has also been some uncertainty surrounding the Harspfield at the debate, whether it was Nicholas or John. It appears that this confusion can be traced to Strype, who named the Harpsfield as the archdeacon of Canterbury (i.e. Nicholas), when in reality it was John, who is named in the official records and confirmed by Nicholas Sander. Strype, *Annals*, 1:87; *Acts of the Privy Council of England*, ed. John Roche Dasent, vol. 7 (London: Public Records Office, 1893), 79; Sander, "Report to Cardinal Moroni," 29.

that the conference would resume on Monday. The Catholics protested, insisting they had more to say, but were rebuffed by Bacon. When Monday came, dispute broke out almost immediately over the proceedings, namely whether the Catholics should go first again and what the proper format of the debate should be. As a result of their vocal protest, the bishops of Winchester and Lincoln were imprisoned in the Tower and the remainder of the Catholic party bound to recognizance. This, unfortunately, is about as much consensus as we can draw from the sources, for there is disagreement over historically important details.

The Catholic account is one of Protestant duplicity in a deliberate effort to avoid public debate and to publicly portray their opponents in as bad a light as possible. First, the Catholics complained that they were initially told the disputation would be conducted in writing and in Latin, then orally in English, then written in English, thus preventing them sufficient time to prepare for the disputation. Second, they contended during the actual disputation that the rules of debate were incorrect. On that Friday, the Catholics claimed they had not been given enough time to prepare a written piece to read from, so they elected Cole to speak extemporaneously for them with the impression that once both sides had offered prefatory remarks, debate would commence. However, after Horne read the Protestant paper, they were denied to chance to offer further commentary as Bacon moved to collect both sides' writings, but were led to believe they would revisit the question on Monday. When Monday came, though, this opportunity was denied, and Bacon insisted that they only speak to the second question. At this point, the Protestant conniving became all too clear and the Catholics responded by digging in their heels and declining to participate at all. Feckenham did offer to speak for the Catholics but was denied.

The Protestants then used this as justification to dissolve the disputation, castigate their opponents as obstreperous, and claim victory.[5]

Unsurprisingly, the Protestant account differs substantially. They claimed both parties were given the same amount of time to prepare and the rules were established and well communicated ahead of time: each side was to bring written statements that they would read in order to prevent the debate from descending into impassioned argument. The Catholics, however, wiled their way out of it. Jewel even reported to Vermigli that the Catholics had been boasting of victory in the days leading up to the debate.[6] On the first day, the Catholics feigned misunderstanding and claimed that they had not had enough time to prepare a written piece, so they elected Henry Cole to step forward and speak on their behalf. When Cole finished, they were asked if they had any more to say, to which they responded they were finished. After this, Horne read the Protestants' paper. When he concluded, the Catholics then began insisting that they had more to say but were denied by Bacon. It was agreed upon by both parties that they would come Monday with written statements to the second proposition. When Monday came,

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[5] The contemporary Catholic sources (in chronological order) are two letters from the Spanish ambassador, Count de Feria, to Philip, dated 30 March and 4 April, in *Calendar of Letters, Despatches and State Papers Relating to the Negotiations between England and Spain, Elizabeth I: Vol. 1: 1558-1567*, ed. Martin A.S. Hume (Burlington, Ont.: TannerRitchie Publishing & The University of St. Andrews, 2007), 45-48 (*CSP Span. Eliz.*); a letter dated 11 April from the Venetian ambassador Il Schifanoya in *Calendar of State Papers and Manuscripts Relating to English Affairs Existing in the Archives and Collections of Venice and Other Libraries of Northern Italy, Volume 7: 1558-1580*, eds. Rawdon Brown and G. Cavendish Bentinck (Burlington, Ont.: TannerRitchie Publishing & The University of St Andrews, 2006), 64-66 (*CSP Ven.*); Nicholas Sander's 1561 "Report to Cardinal Moroni" (24-31 [English translation]). In addition, Henry Cole's speech is recorded in C.C.C.C. MS 121 (183-191) and reproduced in Gilbert Burnet, *The History of the Reformation of the Church of England. The Second Part* (London, 1681; Wing 2nd ed. B5798A), 338-344 ("Collection") (*History*); Edward Cardwell, *A History of Conferences and Other Proceedings Connected with the Revision of the Book of Common Prayer*, 3rd edition (Oxford: The University Press, 1849), 63-72.

[6] John Jewel, *Works*, ed. John Ayre, vol. 4 (Cambridge, 1850), 1200.

however, the Catholics tried to go back to Friday's debate topic, which was not to be revisited until Wednesday (the day scheduled for responses). A heated exchange broke out between Bacon and the bishops of Winchester and Lincoln (White and Watson) regarding the rules. Feckenham offered to step in for the Catholic cause but was not allowed. White and Watson were committed to the Tower for their defiance, and the rest were bound by recognizance and ordered to appear daily before the Council (excepting Feckenham). The summation of it all was that the Catholics manipulated events to avoid public debate because they could not intellectually defend their beliefs.[7]

Because historians have tended to concentrate on Westminster in the context of Parliament and Protestant efforts to push the religious settlement through, the question that has garnered the most attention regarding the disputation is whether the Catholics were obstructive in the proceedings. If they were, it is the Catholics who are responsible for the conference dissolving, thereby granting 'victory' to the Protestants. If, on the other hand, the Protestants were deceptive about the rules in the days leading up to the disputation, and thus provoked the

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[7] The contemporary Protestant sources (in chronological order) are C.C.C.C. MS 121 ("Synodalia"), which contains a handwritten account of the Protestant paper from day one of the debate on the vernacular (163-182) and what the Protestants planned to deliver on day two on the abrogation of ceremonies before the conference dissolved (197-232; both, per Strype, are in Parker's hand); recordings of the punishments meted out to Catholic participants in *Acts of the Privy Council*, 7:77-8; *Calendar of State of Papers, Domestic Series, of the reigns of Edward VI., Mary, Elizabeth: 1547-1580*, ed. Robert Lemon (London: Longman, Brown, Green, Longmans, & Roberts, 1856), 127 (§51-54 merely enter the request for writing on both sides, the Privy Council's report, and Cecil's correction of said report) (*CSP Dom. Eliz.*); John Jewel's 20 March and 6 April letters to Vermigli (Jewel, *Works*, 4:1200-1201 and 1203-1204 [English translation]), Richard Cox's 20 May letter to Wolfgang Wiedner in *Zurich Letters, First Series*, trans. and ed. Hastings Robinson (Cambridge: The University Press, 1842), 26-28; the crown's official response that appeared in 1560 as *The declaracyon of the procedynge of a conference, begon at Westminster the laste of Marche. 1559* (London, 1560; STC 2nd ed. 25286), which was based on the Privy Council's report, included in MS 121 and reproduced in Raphael Holinshed's *Chronicles* (London, 1577; STC 2nd ed. 13568b), 1778-1801; and John Foxe's 1563 *Actes and Monuments* (London, 1563), which relied on both MS 121 and the *Declaracyon* (1717-1728).

Catholics' refusal to continue because of the unfair treatment, this gives the Catholics the moral high ground.

While this is an important question, asserting either absolutely is tenuous because all the sources are prejudiced—not just one side or the other. What can be known, however, is that the Westminster conference was an exercise intended to be both academic and moderate. In this respect, it is worth briefly examining the problem posed not by whose 'fault' the failure of the conference was, but by the existence of Henry Cole's speech, specifically whether it was truly extemporaneous or prepared ahead of time. Knowing this would help greatly in understanding motives and intent. Though both parties reported that Cole spoke (in contrast to Horne reading), Catholics claimed that, because they had been duped, Cole was forced to speak with no preparation. Protestants, on the other hand, argued that Catholics did prepare ahead of time and feigned confusion to avoid debate.

Cole's speech is not just a contested point but also an excellent example of the ambiguity of evidence. The speech recorded in MS 121 (and transcribed by Burnet and Cardwell) potentially reveals familiarity with the Protestant arguments regarding the first proposition. This is most evident in Cole's special aim at the Protestant interpretation of 1 Cor. 14 as a directive that nothing ought to be done in an unknown tongue.[8] If this is true, then it indicates Catholic familiarity with the debate topics (possibly obtained via the exchange of papers beforehand) and thus their obstruction at the conference. However, this raises another interpretative dilemma: was Cole's speech a reply to specific Protestant arguments from Friday or was it simply responding to widely-known stock Protestant arguments for the vernacular?

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[8] Burnet, *History*, 389-390; Cardwell, *A History of Conferences and Other Proceedings*, 63.

Both positions have been argued.[9] The latter aligns with Cole reading not from a written discourse but some kind of reference sheet, a common practice in sixteenth-century academic debate. The *Declaracyon* recorded that the Catholics "sayde their booke was not ready then write[n], but thei were ready to argue and dispute, and therefore they would for that tyme repeate in speache that which they had to say to the first proposicion." Foxe wrote that the Catholics claimed their book wasn't ready to be read and so selected Cole "to be y[e] vtterer of their mindes, who partly be spech only, and partly by reading of authorities written, and at certayne times beinge enformed of his colleagues what to say made a declaration of their meaninges and their reasons to their first proposition." This accords with Jewel's (surely exaggerated account) of the event to Vermigli where he stated that the Catholics didn't produce "a single line in writing" and described Cole's performance as "harangue" against Protestants, as well as the following sarcastic aside to Cole in their later exchange of letters: "Ye could not lightly have gotten so many untruths together [at Westminster] without some study."[10]

However, Sander's report to Moroni contains a summary version of the same speech as MS 121, which Sander explained in rather ambiguous terms: "Cole observed that he had come not so much to speak as to refute what might be put forward on the opposite side."[11] Thus, if Sander can be trusted here, then Cole's speech was likely prepared for Friday and his awareness of the Protestant arguments owed more to their commonplace nature than actually seeing

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[9] For the former see Norman Jones, *Faith by Statute: Parliament and the Settlement of Religion 1559* (London: Royal Historical Society; Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1982), 124-125; for the latter Gary Jenkins, "Whoresome Knaves and Illustrious Subjects at the 1559 Westminster Disputation: the Intent and End of an Ecclesio-political Exercise," *Anglican and Episcopal History*, Vol. 75, No. 3 (2006): 328-330.

[10] Anon., *Declaracyon*, n.p.; Foxe, *Actes and Monuments*, 1718 (see also 1724); Jewel, *Works*, 4:1203; Idem, *Works*, 1:59-60. This revises Jenkins's claim that Foxe "contradicts" the official record. Jenkins, "Whoresome Knaves," 330. See further Burnet, *History*, 389.

[11] Sander, "Report to Cardinal Moroni," 27-28.

anything before the conference convened. That Cole saw a Protestant paper beforehand is rendered even more unlikely because the sources indicate the exchange of papers was to take place after day one's debate in preparation for day two—not before.[12]

The existence of Cole's speech, however, also complicates Catholic accounts. The Spanish ambassador Feria claimed that the Catholics brought something for Monday that was so good the Protestants resorted to underhanded tactics to prevent it from being read. Sander reported that the Catholics spent the two intervening days collecting arguments and came Monday prepared to answer both the first and second proposition. The Venetian ambassador Il Schifanoya, however, said the Catholics did not have enough time to put something in writing for Monday and only composed "what little they could be Divine inspiration."[13]

It is tempting to assume that Il Schifanoya was speaking of a Catholic response to the second proposition while Feria had in mind a response to Friday's argument regarding the first proposition. This is unlikely though, for both Feria and Sander reported that the Catholics came with the expectation that they would reply to Friday's arguments while Il Schifanoya is silent on this aspect.[14] In fact, it does not appear that the Venetian ambassador was even present at the debate, relying instead on secondhand information, for he apologized to his addressee for his delayed reply (dated 11 April), explaining that he had "been absent in country, 20 miles hence, at the obsequies of my Lord St. John." Il Schifanoya's lack of detail (such as the content of Cole's speech, only recounting the first proposition "on ceremonies," and what Catholics believed Monday would look like) strengthen this likelihood. It is also important to note that Sander stated

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[12] Anon., *Declaracyon*, n.p.; Sander, "Report to Cardinal Moroni," 29; Burnet, *History*, 388.
[13] *CSP Span. Eliz.*, 1:47; Sander, "Report to Cardinal Moroni," 29; *CSP Ven.*, 7:65.
[14] That Sander and Feria are in accord here plus Feria's mistaken report that all the Catholics would be imprisoned, something Sander erroneously claimed happened, raise the possibility of Sander relying on Feria for his report to Cardinal Moroni.

that the Catholics had selected John Harpsfield, not Cole, to be the spokesperson on Monday. If this is true, then Cole's speech would have been prepared for Friday, not Monday, thus indicating foreknowledge of the rules and implying Catholic duplicity.[15]

Given the difficulty of reconciling the disparate information, another plausible explanation lies in a distinction between what happened on the first day and what happened on the second. There is evidence that the Catholics, who first suggested the format for the debate be written and in Latin,[16] were obstructive on Friday by pretending they had misunderstood the rules and attempting to change the format to oral disputation. However, there is also evidence that the Protestants (or perhaps just Bacon) ambushed the Catholics on Monday by refusing to revisit the first proposition, possibly as retribution for Friday's events.

Modern Interpretations of Westminster

The conference remained a point of interest for centuries, most frequently as a polemical trope. The zealous Stuart Protestants George Abbot and Daniel Featley (in 1601 and 1638, respectively) both used the conference as evidence of Catholics' character and inability to argue, while Parsons cited it in 1604 as proof of Protestants' malicious character.[17] In the anti-Catholic excitement of post-Restoration England, Gilbert Burnet gave the conference extended treatment

[15] *CSP Ven.*, 7:64, Sander, "Report to Cardinal Moroni," 29.

[16] When the *Declaracyon*'s account comes to the moment when Catholics feigned ignorance of the debate rules and petitioned to debate orally the author recorded, "This varyacion from the former order and specyally from that which them selfes had by the sayde archebyshop in writing before required…" Anon., *Declaracyon*, n.p.

[17] George Abbot, *The Reasons which Doctour Hill hath Brought, for the Upholding of Papistry* (Oxford, 1604; STC 2nd ed. 37), 104; Daniel Featley, *Transubstantiation Exploded* (London, 1638; STC 2nd ed. 10740), 19-20; N.D. [Robert Parsons], *A Review of Ten Pvblike Dispvtations*, ([St. Omer], 1604; STC 2nd ed. 19414, A&R 638), 81-87. See also Joshua Rodda, *Public Religious Disputation in England, 1558-1626* (Aldershot; Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2014), 76-77.

in his *History of the Reformation of the Church of England* (1681), drawing heavily on parliamentary journals to contextualize the affair. Strype also analyzed the event in his influential, though imperfect, *Annals of Reformation and the Establishment of Religion* (1725).[18]

In the 1830s and 40s, as the Church of England was engulfed in internal conflict and the emergence of Tractarianism prompted a reactive union between evangelical and high church Anglicans (seen most clearly in the Parker Society publications) the conference once again became a topic of interest. Edward Cardwell, as part of the anti-Tractarian reaction, published his *A History of Conferences and Other Proceedings Connected with the Revision of the Book of Common Prayer* in 1840.[19] (It is also noteworthy that Sander's polemical *De origine ac progressu schismatic anglicani* was translated into English in 1877.[20]) In 1907, the Benedictine Henry Norbert Birt analyzed the conference (and Protestant duplicity in it) in his *The Elizabethan Settlement*.

Many prominent modern historians of the English Reformation have paid scant attention to the Westminster conference, simply noting it as an explanatory signpost along the road to religious settlement.[21] Others, most notably Profs. J.E. Neale and William Haugaard, gave the

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[18] On Strype as a historian, see ch. 2.
[19] Cardwell was a prolific church historian and published several works of great historical importance to the Church of England between 1839 and 1850. See "Cardwell, Edward (1787-1861), ecclesiastical historian," C.W. Sutton, rev. H.C.G. Matthew, *ODNB*.
[20] Nicholas Sander, *Rise and Growth of the Anglican Schism*, trans. David Lewis (London, 1877).
[21] A.G. Dickens gave it a mere four paragraphs in his *English Reformation* (one of which is a quote), though he did make the important observation that the second proposition, the authority of national churches to abrogate ceremonies, was designed to force Catholics either to deny papal supremacy or royal supremacy, effectually choosing between heresy or treason. Winthrop Hudson described Westminster as part of a broader "charade" put on by the Elizabethan regime to give the appearance of a futile parliament coming quickly to a close, and then use the long-planned recess (instead of dissolving, a point on which he disagreed with Neale) to hold the conference and publicly discredit the Catholics. Hudson, however, takes the finer historical points on Jewel's word. Patrick Collinson only referred to the conference in an early article as a

conference a more sustained examination, though to limited agreement.[22] The fullest and most balanced account of the Westminster conference is found in Norman Jones' *Faith by Statute.*

"public signal that the English Church was to be once more reformed according to the Protestant model," and even in his magisterial *Elizabethan Puritan Movement* does not give the conference much analysis, simply observing it was manipulated to discredit Catholics. A.G. Dickens, *The English Reformation*, 2nd ed. (London: BT Batsford Ltd., 1989), 356-357; Winthrop Hudson, *The Cambridge Connection and the Elizabethan Settlement of 1559* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1980), 121-123; "Sir Nicholas Bacon and the Elizabethan Via Media," *The Historical Journal*, Vol. 23, No. 2 (1980): 255; Idem, *Elizabethan Puritan Movement* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991), 33.

[22] Neale interpreted the conference in relation to the debate over religious settlement in Parliament, particularly Elizabeth's uncomfortable position between Catholic bishops who voted against any reform and overly zealous Protestants who pushed for too much reform (especially in the Commons). Neale believed the Protestant divines, the majority of whom were Marian exiles, exerted enormous influence on the lower house, and agitation for religious reform more aligned with Edwardian reforms (a point affirmed by Il Schifanoya [*CSP Ven.*, 7:52]) was significant. Though the conference had been scheduled as early as 20 March, parliamentary gridlock led Elizabeth to conclude on either 23 or 24 March that Parliament should be dissolved, but she then changed her mind at the last minute. Neale believed that this unusual timing was the result of the peculiarities of a personal monarchy as Elizabeth needed to pacify a vocal and influential bloc of subordinates—the Protestant divines—which turned out to be pivotal, as it ensured that the Prayer Book would be passed rather than punted until the next Parliament. Thus, the goal of the Westminster conference was "propaganda on which to launch the religious settlement," namely by taking away the Catholics' opportunity to object (as Jewel wrote to Vermigli). That the conference dissolved due to disagreement over procedure was of minor concern to Neale, for the resulting propaganda was at least as good as outright victory. He also attached great significance the achievement of peace with the French at Câteau-Cambrésis, which he argued made Elizabeth "feel secure enough on her throne to take the second step in her religious settlement." (Feria thought this to be the case too, writing on 18 March, "I am sure that the news of peace [of Calais] made the Parliament come to the decision I have mentioned." *CSP Span.*, 1:43). Haugaard, on the other hand, believed that Neale overestimated the importance of peace with the French and also assumed too quickly that the conference, as a tool for religious reform, was necessarily dependent on the extension of Parliament, for Elizabeth could have selected ministers to write up reforms, have them ratified by Convocation, then submitted to Parliament. He also argued that Elizabeth had misjudged the polarizing effect of Mary's reign on religious convictions, and it was especially important to him to highlight the practical nature of the reforms being debated in Parliament. He did, however, agree with Neale that the Catholic Catholic bishops' refusal to allow Protestants to speak last (and thus depart *cum applause populi*) on the second day was a smokescreen: the real reason for their recalcitrance was avoiding the religio-political dilemma that the second proposition (the right of every provincial church to determine its own rites) put them in, namely the rock of royal supremacy and the hard place of allegiance to Rome. J.E. Neale, *Elizabeth I and Her Parliaments, 1559-1581* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1953), 64-

Jones performs a detailed excavation of the mad dash that was Parliament in the weeks leading up to Easter as it attempted to pass bills not only regarding the royal supremacy and uniformity in worship but also repeal Marian heresy laws, return revenue from ecclesiastical lands back to the crown, and even regulate the importation of sweet wines. Rather than see Elizabeth's last second decision to extend Parliament into Holy Week instead of dismissing before the holiday as the natural course of a personal monarchy (Neale), Jones attributes it to two more concrete factors: first, the myriad of undecided bills would have left many MP's disgruntled, as well as hindered crown revenue; second, the bill of supremacy as it stood—lacking clear backing from Parliament—did not give Elizabeth enough legal purview to maintain religious order.

Jones also discredits Neale's emphasis on peace with France, though for different reasons than Haugaard, by pointing out that the bill for supremacy made its first appearance back in February, more than a month before news of peace reached London. This makes it unlikely that Elizabeth feared what Philip might do if England broke from Rome without first making peace with France. Furthermore, the news that reached London 19 March was not final peace but a draft of articles for Elizabeth to look over. The talks nearly broke off shortly after, and peace was not officially brokered until 2 April.[23] The most definitive proof is a letter from Henry II of France, dated 20 January (well before prorogation), offering to broker a separate peace between England and France (and Scotland), without Spain if necessary.

72; William Haugaard, *Elizabeth and the English Reformation: The Struggle for a Stable Settlement of Religion* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968), 96-104.

[23] He also finds Grindal's comment to Conrad Hubert, an important point to Neale, to be too ambiguous for definitive conclusions.

Concerning religious matters, Jones—like most other historians—saw the disputation as an important tool for the Protestantization of England. He observes that legislation permitting communion in both kinds was not passed, even though the edict had already been printed. Elizabeth's personal chapel, he wrote, was "as reformed as it would ever be," and the disputation was the tool she would use to extend this to the rest of England. The disputation itself was "deliberately rigged to ensure a Protestant victory," for the Queen wanted to give the Catholics at least the appearance of a public hearing so that people could see for themselves the heretical ways of Rome and it was Elizabeth who ultimately was responsible for the procedural changes. However, as already noted, he also cites evidence that the Catholics were deliberately obstructive. Jones concludes that though Westminster was certainly engineered by Protestants in order to clear the upper house so that the settlement could be pushed through, neither party could claim total innocence for the breakdown of the proceedings.[24]

Westminster as a Moderate Academic Exercise

The moral of this story is that historians have paid much attention to Westminster in relation to Parliament and the Elizabethan settlement. And rightly so. However, contemporary perceptions of the conference on both sides reveal a profound concern with academic integrity and moderation, which were intimately linked in their eyes. Though it may have been a political charade built to ensure Protestant victory, its participants did not treat it in this way, for Westminster was a university-style disputation, at once academic and moderate. As Sanders

[24] Jones, *Faith by Statute*, 114-125 (quote at 123).

reported, "When [Horne] had finished, the Bishops, thinking that all these things were merely introductory, expected that he would have put these arguments into a syllogistic form."[25]

All the sources agree that writing was the chosen medium in order to prevent the debate from spiraling into a shouting match and preserve the integrity of the exchanges (which ultimately failed). According to the *Declaracyon*, Heath determined the disputation would be in writing "for auoydyng of much altercation in words." Such a formatting was justified as biblical: "the reason of the apostle, that to contende wyth wordes is profitable to nothing, but to subuersio[n] of the hearer." Cox reported to Weidner that a written format was adopted to avoid a "war of words."[26] Sander reported that the Catholics assumed the debate proceedings would be recorded by notaries to avoid "misrepresentation." Jewel declared to Vermigli that a written format was chosen "to remove all ground of contention and idle debate." Strype linked the choice of writing back to imprisoned Marian Protestants who requested to debate their Catholic opponents in writing and quoted from the seventeenth-century Archbishop of Armagh John Bramhall, who mandated the same when "disputing with some Papists": "Conferences, saith he, in Words do often engender Heat, or produce Extravagancies and Mistakes. Writing is a way more calm, more and such as a Man cannot depart from." Dixon likewise stated writing was chosen to avoid "the animated scene of a verbal disputation" such as had happened at Oxford.[27]

Of course, things were not actually so civil, and each side blamed the other's immoderation for the unraveling the conference. Feria painted a picture of Protestant self-

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[25] Sander, "Report to Cardinal Moroni," 29.
[26] Anon., *Declaracyon*, n.p. (repeated by Foxe, *Actes and Monuments*, 1717); "Richard Cox to Wolfgang Weidner," *Zurich Letters*, 1:27.
[27] Anon., *Declaracyon*, n.p. (repeated by Foxe, *Actes and Monuments*, 1717); Sander, "Report to Cardinal Moroni," 27; Jewel, *Works*, 4:1203; Strype, *Annals*, 1:88; Dixon, *History of the Church of England*, 5:78. The relationship between the Westminster conference and the Oxford disputation was repeatedly mentioned by Jewel. See ch. 3.

righteousness, particularly when Horne turned his back on the altar (a symbolic attack on the Catholic priesthood) and "prayed that God would inspire and enlighten those present to understand the truth." Sander called the same "sanctimonious." Il Schifanoya went even further, complaining not just of Protestant deception but also of Horne's unhinged behavior on the first day, who he claimed read the Protestant paper "with great vehemence" and "deafening the audience with false doctrines." Jewel told Vermigli that Cole stood up only to "harangue" and "assail." Cox's picture of Cole as smug and self-congratulatory sharply contrasts to his description of Horne, who replied "relying on the truth, and not upon high-flown language; in the fear of the Lord, and not with the boasted affectation of learning."[28]

Conversely, when pointed language was used, it was justified in terms of spiritual zeal. In this particular instance, it was up to Catholics to justify such behavior as two of their own were imprisoned for vocal protestation. Sander claimed that when confusion broke out on day two, the bishops "respectfully asked" they be allowed to read their paper like the "Lutherans" and that the bishop of Lichfield's very pointed question inquiring what 'kind' of Protestant they were ostensibly debating was uttered by "the learned father…with holy warmth." Il Schifanoya recounted that, following the "stormy debate" on the second day (a prelude to the conference's dissolution), the bishops of Winchester and Lincoln "inflamed with ardent zeal for God, said most boldly that they would not consent…nor ever change their opinion from any fear."[29]

It is also critical that all the sources agree that the conference broke down because of disagreement over the rules of debate. Scholars have noted this as a key element in the

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[28] *CSP Span. Eliz.*, 1:46; Sander, "Report to Cardinal Moroni," 28; *CSP Ven.*, 7:64; Jewel, *Works*, 4:1203; *Zurich Letters*, 1:27. Similarly, Henry Birt remarked in his account of the event that Horne's paper was "full of sophistries." H.N. Birt, *The Elizabethan Religious Settlement: A Study of Contemporary Documents* (London: George Bell and Sons, 1907), 107.
[29] Sander, "Report to Cardinal Moroni," 30-31; *CSP Ven.*, 7:65.

breakdown of proceedings but have not connected it to university standards of disputation; it is noted in passing as a practical obstacle rather than an academic transgression.[30] To the participants though, this was more than mere procedure.

From the very outset, there was a fault line running between the two sides: a disagreement over who possessed the "negative" in the debate, and therefore only needed to assume a defensive posture, thereby encumbering their opponent with the burden of proof. Catholics insisted that history was on their side and therefore the burden of proof lay with their Protestant opponents. They were relentless in their contention that they were the defendants, not the plaintiffs; by trying to reverse those roles the Protestants had violated the rules of academic disputation. An exchange between Lord Keeper Bacon and some of the Catholic bishops as recorded in Foxe underscores this important point:

> *L. Keper.* Go to now, begyn my Lordes.
>
> *Linc. Couen.* It is contrarye to the order in disputations that we should begyn.
>
> *Chester.* We haue the negatiue: the affirmatiue therefore they must begyn.
>
> *Lich. Couen.* They must first speake, what they can bryng in agaynst vs, sythe that wee are the defending part.
>
> *Chester.* So is the schoole maner, and lykewise the maner in Westminster hall is, that the plaintifes part should speak firste, and then the accused partye to answer.
>
> *Lich. Couen.* I pray you let the proposition be red, & then let vs see who hath the negatiue part, and so let the other begyn.
>
> *L. Keper.* The order was taken y^{t} ye shoulde begynne.

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[30] John E. Booty, *John Jewel as Apologist for the Church of England* (London: SPCK, 1963), 17; W.M. Southgate, *John Jewel and the Problem of Doctrinal Authority* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1962), 53. Dixon attributed it to the Catholics' intractable insistence that their opponents were heretics. This may be true, but they wisely couched it in academic parlance. Dixon, *History of the Church of England*, 5:75-76, 86.

Lich. Couen. But the[n] we should do agaynst the schoole order.

L. Keper. My maisters, ye inforce much the schoole orders. I wonder much at it, sythe diuers of those orders are oft tymes taken for the exercise of youth, and ought to mayntain a fashion and many prescriptions, which we neede not here to recite, much lesse obserue. Wee are come hyther to keepe the order of God, and to set forth his truth, and hereunto we haue taken as good order as we mygthe, which lyeth not in me to chaunge.

Carlile. We are of the catholicke church, and abyde therein, and stand in the possessions of the truth, and therefore must they saye what they haue to answere against vs, and so we to mayntayne and defend our cause.

Lich. Couen. Yea, euen so muste the matter be ordered.

Chester. When they bringe anye thynge agaynste vs, it is sufficient for vs to denye it. Therefore must they begyn.

Lich. And when they affirme any thing, and we say nay, the proofe belo[n]geth to them, and so it behoueth them to shewe first what they affirme, and for what cause and purpose.

L. Keper. Here resteth our purpose, & whole matter, whether you wyll begynne, if they do not, sythe that it was determined ye should begynne.[31]

Afterwards, the bishop of Lichfield denied ever hearing such an order, an assertion Bacon found unconvincing given that the Catholics had abided by it the first day. However, what is most important here is the explicit connection between what was happening at Westminster, the rules of disputation, and the question of who bore the burden of proof. Though Foxe's narrative must be treated with caution, Bacon's assessment that the question of who should go first as "our purpose, & whole matter" was not an overstatement, as evidenced in the printed literature that followed in the years to come. Catholics never gave up on the idea that their opponents bore the burden of proof. In rebuttal, Protestants argued that Catholics had altered the church so much over the centuries that it was no longer recognizable as the true apostolic church. By returning to the source, they were the true defendants of the church. This was arguably the most significant

[31] Foxe, *Actes and Monuments*, 1725.

intellectual fault line that runs throughout the material examined here, and it certainly contributed to the unceasing argument by making any sort of agreement impossible.

It is interesting that Foxe recounted that the dispute over who possessed the negative descended into a back-and-forth between the Protestants and Catholics regarding who was the rightful possessor of the title "catholic"—roughly forty years before Perkins would cause such controversy over the same assertion.[32] Each side staked their claim to being "catholic" and in possession of the "negative," terms which were regarded almost synonymously. Add to this already combustible recipe the Catholic protest that whoever would go last would depart *cum applausu populi* (what the Protestants had benefited from on Friday) and it is not hard to see why they refused to go any further in the debate, thus dissolving the conference.

The fierce disagreement over this is evident in the first salvo launched following Westminster—Jewel's challenge sermon. In it, Jewel defied Catholics to prove any number of doctrinal points as being prevalent in the first 600 years of the Christian church's history. His point was simple: because Catholics could not show evidence of their church as it stood now being in continuity with the primitive church, it was *they* who were the innovators, and thus the Protestants were the defendants and rightful possessors of the negative in the debate.

Bacon's description of the "schoole orders" as the "exercise of youth," which pale in comparison to "the order of God" is one example of the idiosyncratic and selective approaches of Elizabethan Christians in religious controversy. Though Bacon did not write any lengthy polemical work, his dismissal of academic disputation as puerile stands in stark relief to the way Elizabethan controversialists—Protestant and Catholic—viewed their task. The works of

[32] William Perkins' *A Reformed Catholike* (London, 1597) generated print controversy on an international scale well after his death in 1602 and was republished as late as 1634.

disputative literature printed in the early Elizabethan years (and well beyond) are mammoth undertakings: hundreds of folios of printed arguments, often running multiple layers deep, overflowing with biblical, historical, logical, theological, philosophical, and political arguments. Polemicists debated the meanings of words in ancient languages, checked their opponent's references in obscure works, battled over the proper use of rhetoric, and quarreled over how to interpret not just the Bible and the church fathers, but also Aristotle, Cicero, and many others. In short, disputative literature was quintessentially scholarly.

In order to best understand the nature and function of academic disputation in Elizabethan England, it is worthwhile to examine the reception of Renaissance reforms in logic and rhetoric, and how these reforms made their way into the universities and printed literature, as these were the disciplinary underpinnings of disputation. This is the subject of the next chapter.

CHAPTER 3

ESTABLISHING THE FOUNDATIONS: LOGIC AND RHETORIC IN ELIZABETHAN ENGLAND

> This kynde, Syr, of Rhetoryke and Logike we learn of you, which if you do greatly myslyke, when you heare it of an other besides your selfe, looke then vpon your selfe better…[1]
>
> John Rastell, *A Replie against an answer (falslie intitled) in Defence of the truth* (1565)

Introduction

The previous chapter analyzed the Westminster conference of 1559, arguing that although the disputation was a political mechanism for pushing through the Elizabethan settlement, this is not how contemporaries viewed or treated the event. Rather, both sides ardently insisted that the conference was a university-style disputation that fell apart because the academic rules of procedure had been violated as well as the social expectation that each side be moderate in their language. Of course, these interpretations are not mutually exclusive, but to write off the disputation as a token performance misses much of its historical significance.

Before analyzing the polemical works that were published in response to the Westminster conference, it stands to examine the intellectual climate in which Elizabethan polemicists learned and wrote. This chapter first traces the significant reforms to logic and rhetoric brought about during the Renaissance and then surveys the intellectual culture of Elizabethan England, particularly that of the university, where all the controversialists examined here received their training. In doing so, it underscores how controversialists participating in the controversy surrounding Jewel's challenge were immersed in an eclectic intellectual environment, which

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[1] John Rastell, *A Replie against an answer (falslie intitled) in Defence of the truth* (Antwerp, 1565; STC 2nd ed. 20728), fols. 99^{v}-100^{r}.

fostered the varied and inconsistent approaches of polemicists that furthered the divide between Protestants and Catholics. Thus, academic method—presumably a means of achieving certain knowledge, and thus unity—only further polarized each side.

Renaissance Theory

The resurgence of classical learning during the Renaissance repeatedly proved to be a matter of controversy among Europeans as it was feared that the taint of 'heathen' learning would corrupt theology and thus endanger souls. Because of this, humanists often felt the need to justify the study of ancient pagans as a benefit to Christian society. Thomas More did just that in his famous 1518 letter to Oxford: "Now then, as for secular learning, no one denies that a person can be saved without it, and indeed without learning of any sort. But even secular learning, as he calls it, prepares the soul for virtue."[2]

This anxiety did not fade with the coming of Reformation; instead, it intensified in many ways and reverberated throughout the sixteenth-century. Elizabethan Christians, whether conformist, Catholic, or puritan, were all deeply influenced by the humanist educational revolution that created a swirl of classical authors and traditions that profoundly shaped the intellectual landscape of the sixteenth-century. The fact that pre-revolutionary England bought up more copies of Cicero and Ovid than Calvin and Perkins reveals that the theological giants did not have a monopoly on English readers.[3]

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[2] Thomas More, "Letter to the University of Oxford," in *The Complete Works of St. Thomas More*, vol. 15, ed. Daniel Kinney (New Haven, CT; London: Yale University Press, 1986), 139. See also Margo Todd, *Christian Humanism and the Puritan Social Order* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), ch. 2

[3] Markku Peltonen, *Rhetoric, Politics and Popularity in Pre-Revolutionary England* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 2.

The Elizabethan Lewis Evans captured this intellectual dilemma well in the introduction to his 1568 *The Abridgement of Logique*, dedicated to Edmund Grindal, then Bishop of London, thereby underscoring the connection between classical education and true religion.[4] In it, Evans vividly described the contradictory feelings of joy and sorrow he experienced when reading the ancients. He was ecstatic that "through their most excellent labors, it hath pleased almightie God, such is his goodnesse, so to open vnto vs the secrete workings of nature, and knowledge of sundrie things, which fro[m] many, were of a long time before secret and hidden."[5] But he also lamented the pagan ways and ignorance of God "of such singular instrumentes prouided for our welth and benefites."[6] After admonishing the ancients directly with Calvinistic warnings against vain speculation, Evans declared that "worldly wisdom" and "ouer curious knowledge...hath blinded, beguiled, deceyued thee." However, despite their heathenism, Evans still heaped praise on "the incomparable Cicero" (whom he later declared "I fauour most") as the most persuasive of all orators, and lauded "the great wisedom of Socrates" as well as Plato, the Catos, Pythagoras, Sophocles, Demosthenes, and "many more."[7] He conceded that their works contain much that is "vntrue, supersticious and lewde," but it was through them that "we haue attained the ryght entrie into Artes, the readye way how to vnderstand liberall sciences, and the playne path into the pleasaunt park of al laudable studies."[8]

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[4] There is some confusion over the precise identity of this Lewis Evans. He was likely either the religious controversialist who converted from Roman Catholicism to Protestantism (publishing as both) or a Protestant divine, and there is a decent chance they were the same person. See Lock, "Lewis Evans (fl. 1565-1571), religious controversialist," *ODNB*.
[5] Lewis Evans, *The Abridgement of Logique* (London, 1568; STC 2nd ed. 10588), sig. A2^{r}. It's possible that this is the Catholic polemicist referenced by James Calfhill. See ch. 7.
[6] Evans, *The Abridgement of Logique*, sig. A2^{v}.
[7] Evans, *The Abridgement of Logique*, sig. A3^{v}.
[8] Evans, *The Abridgement of Logique*, sig. A6^{v}.

The influence of ancient philosophy was especially marked on the disciplines of rhetoric and logic. This is epitomized by Roland MacIlmaine's 1574 English translation of Ramus' influential *Dialecticae libri duo* into English. Sitting between the title page (an image of Ramus) and the introductory epistle is a short poem extolling Ramus' logic as an encapsulation of the best of the ancient philosophers:

> The lyuelie pithe of Platoes witte and Aristots ingeine,
> The pleasaunte vayne of Cicero, and of Quintiliane
> The iudgement highe, here thou maiest see: therefor if thou be wise,
> No farther seeke but in this booke thy self doe exercise.[9]

The two disciplines of logic and rhetoric, both as old as western philosophy itself, were the twin pillars upon which public discourse and debate rested, and the Renaissance's recovery and privileging of Roman philosophy resurrected and expanded ancient philosophical debates concerning the relationship between the two. This relationship became fiercely disputed in the late fifteenth and sixteenth-century, and questions about method, priority, and proper usage were subjects of intense interest. Logic and rhetoric were the subjects of an untold number of early modern works, curricular cornerstones in Elizabethan universities, and ultimately the framework in which disputative literature was written.

Analyzing the reception of logic and rhetoric in Elizabethan England requires tracing, as far as possible, the various strands of ancient ideas that circulated in Tudor intellectual culture with special attention given to the relationship between 'Greece' and 'Rome.' Greek thought, characterized by Platonic privileging of the contemplative life and suspicion of "sophistry," and an Aristotelian emphasis on syllogistic reasoning, deeply embedded in late medieval scholasticism, found a worthy opponent in the revival of Roman philosophy that advocated the

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[9] Petrus Ramus, *The Logike of the Moste Excellent Philosopher P. Ramus Martyr*, trans. Roland MacIlmaine (London, 1574; STC 2nd ed. 15246), sig. Ai^{v}.

vita activa, the political value of rhetoric, and topical logic by drawing from Cicero, Quintilian, and others.[10] This dynamic was further complicated by Renaissance reforms in logic that pitted humanism, and later Ramism, against scholastic Aristotelianism.

This emphasis on antagonism between Greek and Roman thought, as David Norbrook suggests, perhaps owes to living in the wake of post-structuralism, which has caused scholars to pay more attention the subversive nature of rhetoric—typically associated with Roman political thought—on 'artificial' political structures. (It should be noted that the notion that political structures, or at least hierarchies, are not natural would have been incomprehensible to most early modern thinkers.) Though different in content, such an argument has the same net effect as Hobbes blaming the English civil wars on "Seditious *Presbyterian* ministers" and "ambitious ignorant Orators" who helped Parliament as it "reduced the Government into Anarchy."[11] Both underscore the politically destabilizing potential of speech.

A more tangible reason for this bifurcation is that sixteenth-century thinkers often described, and even sometimes perceived, Greece and Rome in adversarial terms. This was the case not only in politics, but also in their attitudes towards rhetoric and logic, albeit frequently in exaggerated terms. For example, medieval scholasticism and Aristotle's philosophy were synonymous to many sixteenth-century humanists and theologians, and Aristotle-bashing became a Protestant hobbyhorse after Luther launched the opening salvoes in his 1517 *Disputation Against Scholastic Theology*.

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[10] For a helpful overview see Quentin Skinner, *Reason and Rhetoric in the Philosophy of Thomas Hobbes* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), ch. 2.

[11] David Norbrook, "Rhetoric, Ideology, and the Elizabethan World Picture," in *Renaissance Rhetoric*, ed. Peter Mack (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1994), 140-141; Thomas Hobbes, *Behemoth or the Long Parliament*, ed. Paul Seaward (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2010), 252 [fol. 52[v]].

Thus, it is not surprising that historians tend to describe the sixteenth-century as dichotomous Protestant-Catholic, each confession with its own intellectual center of gravity. Protestantism is most often associated with humanism, Ramism, and topical logic as taught by ancient Roman philosophers such as Cicero and resurrected by humanists like Agricola and Erasmus, with its hub in Cambridge University. Catholicism is usually associated with scholasticism, Aristotelianism, and formal logic, with its intellectual anchor in Oxford.

Modern historians often make much of the adversarial relationship between these two ancient cultures in Renaissance thought, both in religious and political thought. Regarding religious history, scholars have become hyper-attuned to the influence that confessional polemics exercised upon Reformation and post-Reformation historiography for centuries, yet this awareness has yet to fully penetrate the relationship of intellectual to religious history. In other words, there is still work to be done to disentangle the 'losers' of intellectual (and not just religious) history.[12] This is especially true of the relationship between Aristotelianism and Ramism and the vitality of Aristotelianism in Renaissance England. While the pitfalls of confessional history have long been noted in the historiography of the English Reformation, the same has rarely been noted in intellectual history. An excellent example is the assessment of the humanist reforms in logic, beginning with Agricola's *Dialecticae libri tres*. The late Father Ong

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[12] 'Revisionism' (a la Haigh, Scarisbrick, Duffy, etc.) deconstructed Foxeian notions of Protestant triumphalism and, later, 'Anglicanism,' that had been perpetuated for centuries, particularly through works of writers like the Restoration historian Gilbert Burnet and the early eighteenth-century antiquarian John Strype. For a helpful introduction to the historiographical debates see Ethan Shagan, *Popular Politics and the English Reformation* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 1-25. See also Cargill Thompson, "John Strype as a Source for the Study of Sixteenth-Century English Church History," in *Studies in the Reformation: Luther to Hooker*, ed. C.W. Dugmore (London: Athlone Press, 1980), 192-201. Concerning the effect of confessional scholarship on intellectual history, see the "Statement on Method" in the Introduction.

described the work as “scientifically irresponsible” for its treatment of logic, while Peter Mack calls the same text “an original and under-rated work.”[13]

Though it is certainly true that Protestants and Catholics repeatedly failed to achieve any kind of concord, the intellectual stereotypes that often follow these confessional divides are much less firm. “Greek” and “Roman” ideas were not always mutually exclusive and were often synthesized, both in the minds of the ancients and Renaissance authors,[14] and a close reading of the sources actually reveals a much more heterogeneous approach among controversialists on both sides. The multifaceted approach among polemicists resulted in inconsistent method, which only further entrenched the intellectual fault lines that doomed confessional debates from the beginning. Much of this owes to the fact that the disciplines of logic and rhetoric were at once incontrovertibly central to public discourse yet, by the time Elizabethan polemicists began printing their works of disputative literature, their proper use had been a matter of controversy for over a century.

Humanism and the Reform of Logic

Throughout the medieval period, philosophers and theologians used Aristotelian philosophy to construct an all-encompassing vision for the sciences with Theology as the “queen,” which prioritized developing universal rules of judgment that could be applied to statements. The advent of Renaissance humanism first and then Reformation theology rigorously contested this vision and the crucial place of scholastic logic within it.

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[13] Walter Ong, *Ramus: Method, and the Decay of Dialogue* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1958), 100; Peter Mack, *Renaissance Argument: Valla and Agricola in the Traditions of Rhetoric and Dialectic* (Leiden, New York, Köln: Brill, 1993), 120.
[14] Cicero’s avowed indebtedness to Greeks like Plato, Aristotle, and Panaetius and Quintilian’s recounting of Greek rhetorical textbooks in book III of his *Institutions* are two ready examples.

At the heart of Renaissance debates about logic was the relationship between invention (*inventio*) and judgment (*iudicium*). "Invention" was the discovery of a meaningful topic to debate; "judgment" was the application of rules of logic to statements in order to avoid fallacious reasoning.[15] The former emphasized reasoning that has practical ramifications and is averse to speculation; the latter emphasized proper judgment, insisting that correct reasoning can exist in a vacuum and is not contingent upon real world actions. Neither invention nor judgment existed independently apart from the other; indeed, they were inextricably intertwined. What led to intellectual disagreement was emphasizing one at the expense of other.[16] The tension of this relationship does much to explain certain historical stereotypes such as the Roman sympathies of Renaissance humanists (or Ramist puritans), in contrast to Aristotelian scholastics.

A significant catalyst for the growth of Renaissance humanism was Petrarch's discovery of the ancient Roman statesman Cicero in the fourteenth-century. Roughly a century after the recovery and infusion of Aristotle into the medieval intellectual mainstream,[17] Petrarch gave Cicero (back) to the world "in his own words,"[18] and the embers of nascent humanism were

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[15] E.g. Cicero, *Topica*, ed. and trans. Tobias Reinhardt (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 119 [§6-§8, English translation].

[16] For an interesting study of various historical interpretations of Aristotle on the relationship between rhetoric and dialectic see Lawrence Green, "Aristotelian Rhetoric, Dialectic, and the Traditions of Ἀντίστροφος," *Rhetorica*, Vol. 8, No. 1 (1990): 5-27.

[17] The European reception of Aristotle occurred over an extended period that can be divided into three stages. The first began in the sixth-century with Boethius' translations of Aristotle's logical works and adaptations of Aristotle's rhetorical works, the second in the twelfth-century with the slow translation of the entire Aristotelian corpus into Latin (mainly from Jewish and Muslim sources), and the third in the late fifteenth-century, which focused on close study of the texts rather than attempts to unify the sciences. This last period was the peak of Aristotelian scholarship. C.H. Lohr, "The medieval interpretation of Aristotle," in *The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy*, ed. Norman Kretzmann, et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 81.

[18] Martin McLaughlin, "Petrarch and Cicero: Adulation and Critical Distance," in *The Brill Companion to the Reception of Cicero*, ed. Walter Altman (Boston, Leiden: Brill, 2015), 19-20.

fanned into a flame.[19] Intellectual and political historians such as Quentin Skinner and Richard Tuck have emphasized the influence that Roman notions of patriotism and republicanism exercised upon Renaissance civic humanism in northern Europe, arguing that Aristotle was dethroned and practice surpassed theory as the foundation for a virtuous life.[20] However, Petrarch also railed against scholasticism for perverting language with its complex systems. (Ironically, it was chiefly works coming into Italy from England that so vexed him.)[21] Though this picture strongly correlates to how sixteenth-century Christian thinkers approached logic, it was not an unqualified victory, for traditional logic did not disappear altogether.[22]

Robust reforms of logic began in the fifteenth-century when Valla and Agricola initiated a sweeping transformation of the discipline, primarily as a reaction against scholasticism. Their intent was to simplify matters by privileging dialectic and cutting away excessive philosophical

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[19] Historians have often emphasized the singular nature of Petrarch in the genesis of Renaissance humanism. While this is mostly true, it is worth pointing out that scholastic logic and humanist dialectic co-existed in Italian universities in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries and humanist intellectual emphases (such as reading and imitating classical prose and poetry) predated Petrarch. Mack, *Renaissance Argument*, 12-14.

[20] Quentin Skinner, *The Foundations of Modern Political Thought*, vol. 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), 86-89; Richard Tuck, "Humanism and Political Thought," in *The Impact of Humanism on Western Europe*, eds. Anthony Goodman and Angus MacKay (London; New York: Longman, 1990), 52, 55-56. David Marsh observes that the humanists' embodiment of Cicero's skepticism towards traditional authorities was a direct cause for an intellectual turn against "the Philosopher." David Marsh, "Cicero in the Renaissance," in *The Cambridge Companion to Cicero*, ed. Catherine Steel (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 306-309.

[21] E.J. Ashworth, *Language and Logic in the Post-Medieval Period* (Dordrecht, Boston: D. Reidel, 1974), 9.

[22] E.J. Ashworth pointed out that scholastic logic largely disappeared in the sixteenth-century. Instead, logical writings tend to fall into one of four categories: humanist, Ramist, Aristotelian textbooks, or commentaries on the Greek Aristotle. However, other scholars have traced the survival of scholasticism into the sixteenth-century, though largely changed. E.J. Ashworth, "The Eclipse of Medieval Logic," in *The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy*, ed. Norman Kretzmann, et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 791; cf. J.H. Burns, "Scholasticism: survival and revival," in *The Cambridge History of Political Thought, 1450-1700*, eds. Idem and Mark Goldie (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 132-155.

complications and speculations that grew up during the medieval period while also expanding the range of permissible arguments beyond just the Aristotelian syllogism.[23] The purpose was to construct persuasive arguments ("eloquence") in neo-classical Latin while focusing on *inventio*, the structure of a work, and the use of dialectic as a way to analyze texts.[24]

Agricola's work was particularly influential in northern Europe. His famous (though unfinished) *De inventione dialectica libri tres* had circulated in manuscript for a several decades before going to print in 1515. This date partly explains its sudden success in the 1520s and 30s, as universities like Cambridge and Tübingen officially replaced scholastic logic in their curriculum with Agricola's logic.[25] A simultaneous development was occurring in theology, evidenced in Luther's attack on the contemporary truism that a theologian must be a logician.[26]

Early sixteenth-century humanists then used these intellectual reforms to protest against theology wrapped in labyrinthine philosophy. Erasmus' *Praise of Folly* (1511) is an excellent—and quite entertaining—example of humanists' desire for intellectual simplicity. This satirical

[23] Charles Lohr described many of the developments as rising out of clashes between Aristotelian philosophy and Christian theology (e.g., disputes about the resurrection of the body, the immortality of the soul, the eternality of the world, or Averroism). C.H. Lohr, "The medieval interpretation of Aristotle," 87-96. More generally, see Mack, *Renaissance Argument*, 10-12.
[24] The fullest explanation of this is found in Mack, *Renaissance Argument*, 37-256. See also Lisa Jardine, "Lorenzo Valla and the Origins of Humanist Dialectic," *Journal of the History of Philosophy*, Vol. 15, No. 2 (1977): 143-164; Debora Shuger, *Sacred Rhetoric: The Christian Grand Style in the English Renaissance* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988), 61; Ashworth, *Language and Logic in the Post-Medieval Period*, 8-14.
[25] The most detailed analysis of Agricola's *De inventione dialectica* and its reception among sixteenth-century humanists (including Ramus) is found in Mack, *Renaissance Argument*, 257-374. See also Ashworth, "The Eclipse of Medieval Logic," 791; Jardine, "Lorenzo Valla and the Intellectual Origins of Humanist Dialectic," 147; Todd, *Christian Humanism and the Puritan Social Order*, 63; Ong, *Ramus*, 94-96. Ong also provided a short title catalogue of these manuscripts with a brief introduction. Walter Ong, *Ramus and Talon Inventory* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1958), 534-558.
[26] Martin Luther, *Disputation Against Scholastic Theology*, in *Luther's Works (American Edition)*, Vol. 31, trans. H.J. Grimm (Philadelphia, PA: Fortress Press, 1957), 9-16 [theses 45-49].

work, which lampooned theologians and monks as self-important ninnies and clueless dunderheads, earned the ire of the Theology faculty at Louvain. The celebrated English humanist Thomas More defended his friend in a letter to Martin Dorp,[27] professor of theology at Louvain, primarily by repeating similar charges:

> But there have sprung up of late certain monstrous absurdities, the bane of sound learning in general, which have muddled up subjects which were clearly distinguished by the ancients and have corrupted all subjects by sullying the oldest and purest traditions with their foul accretions. In grammar, for instance, to say nothing of Alexander and others like him (for they did teach grammar somehow, no matter how crudely), a certain Albert, professing to expound grammar, has presented us instead with some sort of logic or metaphysics, or rather with out-and-out drivel and nonsense; yet this unsurpassed trifling is not only accepted in the universities but is even admired so much by some that according to them no one who has not earned the title of Albertist is worth anything as a grammarian.

More continued by recounting an encounter he had with "a certain dialectician who passes for very learned." More reported,

> he claimed...that "how Aristotle wrote was real vulgar," and "these days," he said, "schoolboys get so wonderfully grounded in their *Little Logic* that I am pretty well certain that if Aristotle rose again out of his grave and picked an argument with them they would shut him up good, not only in sophistry but in his logic, too." I was sorry as I could be to take leave of the fellow, but as things stood just then I was rather too busy for play.

More decided that the *Little Logic* (Paul of Venice's *Parva Logica*)—one of the most popular medieval works on dialectic—earned its title from the fact that "it contains little logic."[28] More's satire comically underscores multiple aspects of the humanist agenda: the scorn for the bewildering logic of medieval scholasticism (as More sarcastically suggests the man had to be

[27] Interestingly, Dorp produced an *editio princeps* of Agricola's *De inventione*. Kinney, Introduction to "In Defense of Humanism," *The Complete Works of Sir Thomas More*, 15:xxi.
[28] Thomas More, "Letter to Dorp," in *The Complete Works of St. Thomas More*, 15:27, 29. On the sixteenth-century demand for Paul of Venice's *Logica Parva* see Ashworth, *Language and Logic in the Post-Medieval Period*, 3.

joking), the connection between grammar and 'true' learning (Albert Magnus' grammar as "out-and-out drivel and nonsense"), and the necessary distinctions between disciplines (the muddling of subjects "clearly distinguished by the ancients"). More also reflected the conservative protest against humanism and its emphasis on grammar, namely that it was not possible to be both a grammarian and a theologian.[29] This was, of course, because one could not do theology proper without the syllogism.

After Luther's evangelical theology irrupted into the intellectual landscape, Protestants—much to the chagrin of Catholic humanists like Erasmus and More—used humanist linguistic tools for biblical exegesis as a means to combat Catholics (and fellow Protestants) as well as continuing the strong preoccupation with applying the practical ramifications of the faith. There is truth to the adage, "Erasmus laid the egg that Luther hatched."[30] These emphases did not fade in the Elizabethan period. In fact, they intensified in many ways, and it is important to note that no one could have predicted that the intimate connection that would arise between humanist educational reforms in rhetoric and logic would become fuel for religious controversy.[31]

When reading disputative literature, the adversarial nature between exclusive approaches (i.e. Catholic-Aristotelian-scholastic *v.* Protestant-humanist-Ramist) is not the dominant motif one might expect it to be, although hints of the mutual suspicion between Catholic Aristotelians and humanists are observable among select Elizabethan controversialists. For example, Thomas

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[29] Macek makes this same observation regarding mid-Tudor polemics. Ellen Macek, *The Loyal Opposition: Tudor Traditionalist Polemics, 1535-1558* (New York: Peter Lang, 1996), 137. Ong recounted a similar conflict at the University of Paris in the 1530s. Ong, *Ramus*, 95.
[30] Thomas Stapleton reported that More and Erasmus had a falling out over this, as More blamed Erasmus for not denouncing Protestantism in strong enough terms. Thomas Stapleton, *The Life and Illustrious Martyrdom of Sir Thomas More*, trans. P.E. Hallett, ed. E.E. Reynolds (New York: Burnes & Oates, 1966), 36. For the origin of this statement, see "A Word on Definitions."
[31] Peter Mack, *Elizabethan Rhetoric: Theory and Practice* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 8, 254.

Harding chastised Jewel for bragging about his studies in divinity when, in reality, "your tyme hath ben most bestowed in the studie of humanitie and of the latine tonge, and concerning diuinitie, your most labour hath ben imployed to fynde matter against the churche, rather then about seriouse and exacte discussing of the truthe."[32]

A more substantial example is found in the Catholic John Martiall's *Replie to M. Calfhills Blasphemovs Answer Made Against the Treatise of the Crosse* (1566), where Martiall criticized Calfhill for confusing two authors with the same first name. Calfhill (following the English Prayer Book), mistakenly attributed *De Honesta Disciplina* (1504) to Petrus Erinilus instead of Petrus Crinitus, an Italian humanist. Martiall declared that the author of the Prayer Book and Calfhill were both "grossely deceaued;" Martiall for trusting Crinitus who "liued but of late yeres, and was of no fame, nor profounde lerning, but skilled in poyntes of humanitie, like a peda[n]te of Italie," and the author of the Prayer Book for attributing the work to "an authour whose name is a well know[n]e as the ma[n] in the mone."[33] Martiall then confirmed the Protestant habit of appealing to 'new' authors as proof of their duplicity: "We may perceaue what narrow shiftes you seeke, when for a proufe of so auncient a lawe, you repaire to him that

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[32] Thomas Harding, *An Answere to Maister Iuelles Chalenge* (Louvain, 1564; STC 2nd ed. 12758), fol. 7^{r}.

[33] The Prayer Book does erroneously cite the work as Erinilus'. See Jewel (attr.), *The second Tome of Homilees, of such matters as were promised, and intituled in the former part of Homilees* (London, 1571; STC 2nd ed. 13669), 61. This mistake was repeatedly cited by Catholics, and then met by Protestant responses. See, for example, John Bridges, *The Supremacie of Christian Princes* (London, 1573; STC 2nd ed. 3737), sig. ciij^{r}, 694-695 and William Fulke, *D. Heskins, D. Sanders, and M. Rastel…ouerthrowne, and detected of their seuerall blasphemous heresies* (London, 1579; STC 2nd ed. 11433), 161.

lyued in a maner, but yesterday...Good authours scant, where an humanitian, a scholemaster, and a late writer is alleaged, for a receaued authour."[34]

Martiall's hostility towards the humanist 'new learning' as a threat to the received tradition of the Catholic Church, as well as the distinction between "profounde lerning" and humanism (the "pedants of Italy"), are illustrative of the intellectual dichotomies that could influence sixteenth-century authors. Elsewhere, however, Martiall cited from Cicero's *De officiis* (which he remarked that Calfhill had read "being but a boy") in order to make an argument for the sevenfold grace of the Holy Spirit.[35] That a very traditional Catholic would both disparage Italian humanists and cite Cicero—perhaps the most significant ancient authority in Italian humanism—to make a theological argument illustrates the remarkable intellectual flexibility of Elizabethan polemicists it came to sources.

John Jewel provides an excellent example of this eclecticism among Protestants. In a span of two pages written against an argument by Thomas Harding distinguishing between the people hearing mass and receiving communion as decreed in councils, Jewel cited multiple councils, attacked the historical veracity of a Latin phrase, referenced several fathers and a pope, quoted scripture and medieval doctors, and appealed to Aristotle, Cicero, the emperor Justinian, the Italian humanist jurist Andreas Alciatus, and the ancient Greek philosopher and playwright Epicharmus.[36] This kind of wide-ranging argumentation reveals that, for early Elizabethan polemicists, the sources and methods were used for their aid in defending a position, not

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[34] John Martiall, *A Replie to M. Calfhills Blasphemovs Answer Made Against the Treatise of the Crosse* (Louvain, 1566; STC 2nd ed. 17497), fol. 99^{v}. See also 115^{v}-116^{r} where he makes a similar argument concerning Eusebius and Dionysius' *Ecclesiastical Hierarchies*.
[35] Martiall, *Replie*, fol. 122^{v}.
[36] Jewel, *A Replie vnto M. Hardinges Answeare* (London, 1565; STC 2nd ed. 14606), 69-70.

according to a predetermined framework, intellectual or otherwise. Various methodologies and sources were merely a means to an end.

Rhetoric and its Discontents

Ancient philosophers debated the proper usage of rhetoric, with responses ranging from Socrates' denouncements of rhetoric in the *Gorgias* to the standard handbooks of rhetoric written by Aristotle, Quintilian, Cicero, and the pseudo-Ciceronian *Ad Herennium*, all of which became exceedingly popular again during the Renaissance.[37] The resurrection of classical oratory and rhetoricians during the Renaissance created a rich and complex tradition of teaching rhetoric.[38] Humanists sometimes expressed the relationship between rhetoric and logic by borrowing Zeno's analogy comparing human eloquence to an open hand but logic to a closed fist.[39] Church of England clergyman Richard Rainolde did just that in his 1563 *Foundacion of Rhetorike*:

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[37] One can find traces of this tension in the earliest stages of Greek thought. In Aeschylus' tragedy *The Eumenides* (c. mid-fifth century BCE), Athena transforms the Furies from havoc-wreaking avengers into peaceful guardians of Athens through "Persuasion." In the *Gorgias*, Socrates is dismissive of rhetoric, but seems to have softened his stance in the *Phaedrus*. In Plato's *Apology*, Socrates credits his death sentence to his own refusal to elicit sympathy from the jury. Aeschylus, *The Eumenides*, in *The Oresteia*, trans. Robert Fagles, ed. W.B. Stanford (New York: Penguin, 1984), lines 893-896 and 981-984; *Apology*, in *Plato, Five Dialogues: Euthyphro, Apology, Crito, Meno, Phaedo*, trans. G.M.A. Grube, rev. John M. Cooper (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 2002), 39d-e; *Gorgias*, in *Plato III: Lysis, Symposium, Gorgias*, trans. W.R.M. Lamb (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1925; LCL 166), 465a-467a; Idem, *Phaedrus*, in *Plato I: Euthyphro, Apology, Crito, Phaedo, Phaedrus*, trans. Harold North Fowler (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1914; LCL 36), 258d. See also George Kennedy, *A New History of Classical Rhetoric* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2011), 11-12 and Charles Griswold, "Plato on Rhetoric and Poetry," *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, ed. Edward N. Zalta (2014), §5.1 (electronic resource).

[38] Agricola's work on dialectic divorced dialectic from rhetoric by associating it with teaching; see Shuger, *Sacred Rhetoric*, 61-62; Mack, *Renaissance Argument*, 120-121; Ong, *Ramus*, 101-104. John Rainolds also mentions this in his Oxford lectures on Aristotle (see below).

[39] "After all, not the least of the philosophers had reason to think dialectic and rhetoric as closely akin as a fist and a palm, since dialectic infers more concisely what rhetoric sets out more elaborately, and where dialectic strikes home with its daggerlike point rhetoric throws down and

> *Zeno* the Philosopher comparing *Rhetorike* and *Logike*, deoth assimilate and liken them to the hand of man. *Logike* is like saith he to the fiste, for euen as the fist closeth and shutteth into one, the iointes and partes of the hande, & with mightie force and strength, wrapped in thynges apprehended...*Rhetorike* is like to the hand set at large, wherein euery part and ioint is manifeste, and euery vaine as braunches of trées sette at scope and libertée.[40]

The art of rhetoric was traditionally held to be composed of three categories, each with an ascending number of components: the three types of orations, the four elements of an oration, and the five skills of rhetoric.

Aristotle first divided orations into three types, which was then repeated by Roman philosophers: deliberative, judicial (or forensic), and epideictic. Deliberative orations were given before a popular assembly, with the aim to persuade popular opinion. A judicial speech was delivered before a judge or jury. Epideictic (also known as demonstrative) was the rhetoric of praise or blame.[41] In addition to the three categories of oration, there were four components of an oration (though speakers might add or drop elements depending on the circumstances): the exordium (introduction), narration (describing the circumstances of the case), the argument, and conclusion.[42]

Lastly, there were five skills of an oration. Any rhetorical exercise began with invention (*inventio*), which the *Ad Herennium* described as "the devising of matter, true or plausible, that

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overwhelms the opponent with its very weight." Thomas More, "Letter to Dorp," in *The Complete Works of St. Thomas More*, 15:17.

[40] Richard Rainolde, *A booke called The Foundacion of rhetorike* (London, 1563; STC 2nd ed. 20925a.5), fol. 1^r. Rainolde's textbook was a reworking of the fourth-century sophist Apthonius' *Progymnasmata* ("preliminary exercises"), a popular text in the sixteenth-century. Brian Vickers, "Some Reflections on the Rhetoric Textbook," in *Renaissance Rhetoric*, ed. Peter Mack (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1994), 88-89; Mack, *Renaissance Argument*, 129; Ong, *Ramus*, 96.

[41] Aristotle, *The Art of Rhetoric*, trans. by J.H. Freese (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1926; LCL 193), I.3; Cicero (?), *Rhetorica ad Herennnium*, trans. by Harry Caplan (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1954; LCL 403), I.2; Kennedy, *A New History of Classical Rhetoric*, 11.

[42] Kennedy, *A New History of Classical Rhetoric*, 10-11; Mack, *Elizabethan Rhetoric*, 9.

would make the case convincing." It was, in a literal sense, the finding out of a topic to speak on. The second skill was disposition (*dispositio*), or the arrangement of the materials for maximum impact on the audience. Third was elocution (*elocutio*), or style, which was the presentation of the material. The fourth skill was memory (*memoria*), enabling the orator to deliver the speech from memory. The final skill was delivery or, more literally, pronunciation (*pronuntiatio*), the use of one's voice and physical gestures.[43]

Quentin Skinner observed that the last two skills (memory and delivery) received less attention from Roman oratory theorists, and were therefore less likely to be emphasized by Renaissance humanists.[44] But even if the last two don't seem overtly relevant to written material, they are still present in these controversial works but adapted for literary forms. In the post-classical period, authors broadened the categories of rhetoric to adapt for writing, but still stayed close to these main elements.[45] Writing and speaking were not dichotomized exercises to sixteenth-century authors; in fact, they viewed the two as closely related.[46]

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[43] Cicero (?), *Rhetorica ad Herennium* I.3; Quintilian, *The Orator's Education*, ed. and trans. Donald A. Russell (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001; LCL 124), 3.3; Kennedy, *A New History of Classical Rhetoric*, 1-11; Mack, *Elizabethan Rhetoric*, 9; Skinner, *Reason and Rhetoric in the Philosophy of Thomas Hobbes*, 45-46.

[44] Skinner cites three reasons why that may have been the case: first, Aristotle did not consider memory and delivery an art; second, memory and delivery are more difficult to make general observations about; and third, they only apply to spoken rhetoric and not written, whereas the first three apply to both. Skinner, *Reason and Rhetoric in the Philosophy of Thomas Hobbes*, 46.

[45] Peter Mack, "Ramus and Ramism: Dialectic and Rhetoric," in *Ramus, Pedagogy and the Liberal Arts: Ramism in Britain and the Wider World*, eds. Steven J. Reid and Emma Annette Wilson (Aldershot; Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2011), 28; Idem, *Elizabethan Rhetoric*, 10.

[46] Skinner (following Ong) suggests that Ramism focused on written rather than spoken eloquence as an unconscious adjustment to living in a printed age. Cathy Curtis highlighted Richard Pace's self-conscious use of letters as one half of a dialogue. Skinner, *Reason and Rhetoric in the Philosophy of Thomas Hobbes*, 110; Curtis, "Richard Pace's *De fructu* and Early Tudor Pedagogy," in *Reassessing Tudor Humanism*, ed. Jonathan Woolfson (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 49-50, 50 n. 57. See also Vickers, "Some Reflections on the Renaissance Textbook," 83-84.

Elizabethan England saw no shortage of texts on rhetoric, and they came from varying perspectives. Richard Rainolde's *Foundacion of Rhetorike* (1563) has already been mentioned. Another successful rhetorical handbook was Thomas Wilson's *The Arte of Rhetoríque*. Originally published in 1554, it proved remarkably popular and was republished in 1560, 1562, 1563, 1567, 1580, 1584, and 1585. Wilson also produced a translation of Demonsthenes' *Orations* (comprised of the *Olynthiacs* and *Philippics*), published in 1570 and dedicated to Cecil. Henry Peacham's *The Garden of Eloquence* was printed twice (1577 and 1593), and the poet and lawyer Abraham Fraunce's *The Arcadian Rhetorike*, an English adaptation of the Ramist Omer Talon's *Rhetorica*, appeared in 1588.[47] Puritans offered their own distinct contributions: Dudley Fenner's *The Artes of Logike and Rhethorike* ran through five editions between 1584 and 1588 and William Perkins' highly influential *The Arte of Prophecying* became a puritan preaching handbook.[48]

These works contain interesting and sometimes marked differences. Fraunce's *Arcadian rhetorike* is intellectually elite; it advertises itself as quintessentially humanist, alerting the reader in the title that it contains different languages, both ancient and modern (Greek, Latin, English, Italian, French, Spanish), and employs examples from literary greatness, again both classical and contemporary (Homer, Virgil, and Philip Sydney). Thomas Wilson's translation of Demosthenes' *Orations*, a typically humanist undertaking, was in reality a print Trojan horse of anti-Spanish propaganda and political critique, calling for intervention on behalf of besieged

[47] Walter Ong, "Hobbes and Talon's Ramist Rhetoric in English," *Studies in Philology*, Vol. 51, No. 2 (1954): 260.
[48] Perkins' work first appeared in Latin as *Prophetica* in 1592 but not translated into English until 1606 by Thomas Tuke. McKim, *Ramism in William Perkins' Theology* (New York: Peter Lang, 1987), 80-81.

Protestants in the Netherlands. Interestingly, Wilson likely took his cue from humanist John Cheke's lectures on Demosthenes in the mid-1550s, which were of a similar political flavor.[49]

Dudley Fenner's *The Artes of Logike and Rhethorike* (1584), on the other hand, is exactly what one might expect from one of the godly undertaking a humanist endeavor. The work cites the ancients only once, and that is to defend the use of the vernacular.[50] The book brims with biblical citations, but the subtitle is perhaps most telling of all: *togither with examples for the practise of the same for Methode, in the gouernement of the familie, prescribed in the word of God: And for the whole in the resolution or opening of certayne partes of Scripture, according to the same.* In other words, logic and rhetoric are ultimately about ruling a godly household and proper interpretation of the Bible. Likewise, Perkins' *Arte of Prophecying* was unambiguous about its priorities:

> Wherefore if it be demaunded which is the most excellent gift of all, doubtlesse the praise must be giuen to Prophecying. Now by how much the more excellent euery thing is, by so much the more diligently it ought to be adorned with varietie and plentie of precepts.[51]

As logic was malleable to a variety of uses and arguments, so too rhetoric was an intellectual tool to advance a more dignified end. However, despite the wide range of uses for logic and rhetoric that often defy precise categorization, there still were very real

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[49] The Spanish campaign against Dutch Protestants, led by the Duke of Alva, was alarming both because of its religious implications and the geographical proximity of the Netherlands; if the already strained relations between England and Spain worsened, then the Netherlands could be used as a strategic location from which to launch an offensive against England. Blanshard and Sowerby, "Thomas Wilson's Demosthenes and the Politics of Tudor Translation," *International Journal of the Classical Tradition*, Vol. 12, No. 1 (2005), 46-80. For the relationship to Cheke's lectures on Demosthenes, see Jonathan Woolfson, *Padua and the Tudors: English Students in Italy, 1485-1603* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1998), 118.
[50] Dudley Fenner, *The Artes of Logike and Rhethorike* ([Middelburg], 1584; STC 2nd ed. 10765.5], sigs. A2^{r-v}.
[51] William Perkins, *The Arte of Prophecying*, trans. Thomas Tuke (London, 1607; STC 2nd ed. 19735.4), sigs. A4^{v}-A5^{r}.

intellectual tensions in the sixteenth-century that frequently fell along confessional boundaries. This is particularly true in the impact of Petrus Ramus and the continued importance of Aristotle.

In Search of English Ramism

Before beginning an analysis of Ramism in England, it must be acknowledged that the controversialists analyzed in the following chapters, especially the Protestant ones, exhibit no distinct 'Ramist' characteristics. Although Ramus' famous *Animadversions on Aristotle* appeared in 1543 and his *Rhetoricae distinctiones in Quintilianum* in 1549, and select Protestants such as Gabriel Harvey and Roger Ascham (tutor to Elizabeth) exhibited some awareness of Ramus in the 1560s,[52] the Frenchman's work did not become widely influential in England until the 1570s and 80s (as seen in the 1574 translation of his *Logike* into English).

However, an analysis of Ramus in England is still worthwhile for two reasons. First, analyses of English Ramism tend to be imprecise and overly dichotomous, thus committing the same fallacy as analyses of sixteenth-century humanism that take antagonistic rhetoric about humanism and Aristotelianism at face value. Second, and more importantly for this study, it throws into sharp relief the pronounced eclecticism of those authors writing during the so-called

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[52] Lisa Jardine, "Gabriel Harvey: Exemplary Ramist and Pragmatic Humanist," *Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques*, Vol. 70 (1986): 36-48. Though Harvey was reading Quintilian and Cicero in the late 1560s and early 1570s, and was likely using them for his lectures on rhetoric in the early 1570s, he apparently did not do critical comparative work with Ramus (and Talon) until 1579. Roger Ascham named Ramus and Talon (Talaeus) in his *Scholemaster*, a pedagogical handbook on teaching Latin, which was published posthumously in 1570, though begun as early as 1563. Interestingly, it was not a favorable mention: Ascham rebuked the two French humanists for their hubris in judging Aristotle, Cicero, and Quintilian. Roger Ascham, *The Scholemaster* (London, 1570; STC 2nd ed. 835.5), 34.

"Great Controversy" of the 1560s.[53] Because the polarizing Ramus was not yet established on England's intellectual landscape (and puritanism was still a nascent and nebulous movement), these authors exhibit a stage of Elizabethan intellectualism that was especially ecumenical.

Ramism became quite popular among Protestants in the mid and late Elizabethan period. Not only did Ramus provide suitable intellectual tools for Protestants to teach with, but he was also a Protestant convert from Catholicism and murdered in the St. Bartholomew's Day Massacre (1572), making him a bona fide martyr and *cause célèbre*.[54] John Foxe included Ramus in his recounting of the "bloody massacre in France" in the *Actes and Monuments* and Roland MacIlmaine advertised the same when he translated Ramus' *Dialecticae libri duo* into English in 1574 as *The Logike of the Moste Excellent Philosopher P. Ramus Martyr*.[55]

Ramism has attracted considerable scholarly attention, particularly in its relationship to Protestantism. However, defining Ramism is not easy, not least because scholars are divided on whether Ramus did anything innovative or merely presented a simplified version of Aristotle.[56] Furthermore, as Mordechai Feingold pointed out, scholars tend to identify Ramists using either circumstantial evidence (such as owning Ramist works, employing charts and dichotomies in

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[53] A term coined by A.C. Southern, who counted over sixty works as making up this controversy. See A.C. Southern, *Elizabethan Recusant Prose, 1559-1582* (London, Glasgow: Sands & Co., 1950), 60-67.
[54] Mack, *Renaissance Argument*, 358-359.
[55] John Foxe, *Acts and Monuments*, ed. George Townsend (New York: AMS Press, 1965), 8:750.
[56] See Ong, *Ramus*, 1-7; Emma Wilson, Introduction to *Ramus, Pedagogy and the Liberal Arts: Ramism in Britain and the Wider World*, eds. Steven J. Reid and Idem, 17-18; Mack, "Ramus and Ramism: Dialectic and Rhetoric," in Ibid., 22, 29-33. The general consensus is that Ramus significantly influenced pedagogy, but offered little that was original. Anthony Grafton and Lisa Jardine, *From Humanism to the Humanities: Education and the Liberal Arts in Fifteenth- and Sixteenth-Century Europe* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1986), 161-162.

their work, or just anti-Aristotelianism) or by association, rather than according to an agreed-upon definition for Ramism.[57]

While anti-Aristotelianism has traditionally been taken to be a sign of Ramism, Ramus was inconsistent in his criticisms of Aristotle and even mentioned the Philosopher favorably on occasion. Despite all his hostility towards Aristotle (which extend beyond just his *Remarks on Aristotle*), Ramus did write in the preface to his *Arguments in Rhetoric against Quintilian*, "I admit that that philosopher [i.e. Aristotle] had an amazing fecundity of talent."[58] He also penned attacks against Cicero (*Brutinae quaestiones*, 1547) and Quintilian (*Rhetoricae distinctions in Quintilianum*, 1549) in rhetoric, thus making his relationship to both Greek and Roman sources complicated, at best. And for all his anti-Aristotelianism, Ramus was ultimately indebted to the Greek philosopher.[59]

Ramus was most profoundly (and quite self-consciously) influenced by the humanist logician Rudolph Agricola, who had followed the lead of Cicero and Quintilian in emphasizing topics (*inventio*) that could be discussed rather than following syllogisms *ad infinitum*.[60] Roland

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[57] Mordecai Feingold, "English Ramism: A Reinterpretation," in *The Influence of Petrus Ramus (Studies in Sixteenth and Seventeenth Century Philosophy and Sciences)*, eds. Idem, Joseph S. Freedman and Wolfgang Rother (Verlag; Basel: Schwabe & Co. AG., 2001), 128-129.
[58] Petrus Ramus, *Rhetoricae Distinctiones in Quintilianum*, ed. James J. Murphy, trans. Carole Newlands (Dekalb, IL: Northern Illinois University Press, 1986), 81. Ong wrote that Ramus' *Remarks on Aristotle* "has as its objection not explanation but annihilation of the text to which it is addressed." Ong, *Ramus*, 172. For a contemporary's critique of Ramus for waffling, see Ibid., 39-40. For a listing of Ramus' controversies with his contemporaries, many of which were spats over Aristotle, see Ong, *Ramus and Talon Inventory*, 492-533. For an exposition of critical responses to Ramus see Neal Gilbert, *Renaissance Concepts of Method* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1960), 145-163. For more favorable references to Aristotle see Ramus, *Logike*, 10, 12, 68, 94.
[59] James V. Skalnik, *Ramus and Reform: University and Church at the End of the Renaissance* (Kirksville, MO: Truman State University Press, 2002), 43-46.
[60] Ashworth, *Language and Logic in the Post-Medieval Period*, 11; Todd, *Christian Humanism and the Puritan Social Order*, 63.

MacIlmaine made this prioritization of simplicity abundantly clear in to readers in the preface of his 1574 English translation of Ramus' *Logike*:

> But least thou thynke that thy labour and payne shoulde be lost in reading of the same, seyng so many bookes goyng abrode vnder glorious names, hauing in deade lytle or no vtilitie, but wrapped al together with innumerable difficulties: I shall in a fewe wordes shewe the, the matter contayned in this in this booke, the methode and forme of the same, howe easye it is aboue all others to be apprehended, howe thou shalt applye it to all artes and sciences, and shortlie that no arte or science maye eyther be taught or learned perfectlie without the knowledge of the same.[61]

Abraham Fraunce's 1588 *The Lawiers Logike* expressed similar motivations. In his dedicatory epistle, Fraunce declared that he had originally set out seven years ago to write a comparative work of Aristotle's and Ramus' logical methods but then grew attracted to Ramism because of its simplicity:

> I first began, (when I first came in presence of that right noble and most renowmed knight sir Philip Sydney) with a generall discourse concerning the right vse of Logike, and a contracted comparison betweene this of Ramus and that of Aristotle. These small and trifling beginnings drewe both him to a greater liking of, and my selfe to a further trauayling in, the easie explication of Ramus his Logike.[62]

Following the lead of Valla and Agricola, Ramist logic was minimalist by its prioritization of language.[63] Aristotelian, and thus to a greater degree scholastic logic, emphasized judgment—it was highly taxonomical and ontological. Ramist logic, on the other

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[61] Ramus, *Logike*, 7.
[62] Abraham Fraunce, *The Lawiers Logike* (London, 1588; STC 2nd ed. 11344), sig. ¶[1]^{r}.
[63] It is also worth noting that Luther made similar linguistic criticisms of scholastic theology, primarily by pitting Aristotle and Augustine in an adversarial relationship and arguing that scholastics were imposing stiff modes of logic on top of the biblical way of speaking, especially that of St. Paul (*modus loquendi Apostoli*). See Erik Herrmann, "Luther's absorption of Medieval Biblical Interpretation and His Use of the Church Fathers," in *The Oxford Handbook of Martin Luther's Theology*, eds. Robert Kolb, Irene Dingel, and L'ubomír Batka (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 79-80; Johannes Von Lüpke, "Luther's Use of Language," Ibid., 143-144; Heiko Oberman, *Luther: Man Between God and the Devil*, trans. Eileen Walliser-Schwarzbart (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1989), 159-161.

hand, privileged *inventio*.[64] Aristotelian scholasticism was ontological before it was linguistic; Ramism was linguistic before it was ontological, summarized in Ramus' famous criticism of scholasticism: "ordinary people don't talk like that."[65]

Ramus also borrowed Aristotle's three laws of logic and applied them to the arts.[66] After promising the reader that they will find nothing in the book of dialectic which does not pertain to the nine arguments artificial or inartificial, or of disposition that does not pertain to judgment, syllogism or method—something which he claimed Aristotle, Cicero, and Quintilian could not accomplish in all their major writings—the reader (who is surely wondering how such a feat is possible) is informed that this is done by adhering to three simple rules, borrowed from Aristotle:

> For in this booke there is thre documents or rules kept, whiche in deede ought to be obserued in all artes and sciences. The first is, that in setting forthe of an arte we gather only togeather that which dothe appartayne to the Arte whiche we intreate of, leauing to all other Artes that which is proper to them, this rule (which maye be called the rule of Iustice) though shalt see here well obserued….The seconde document (which diligently is obserued in this booke) is that all the rules and preceptes of thine arte be of necessitie tru, whiche Aristotle requireth in the seconde booke of his Analitikes and in diuerse chapiters in his former booke….The third documente which thou shalt note herein obserued, is, that thou intreate of thy rules which be generall genreallye, and those whiche be speciall

[64] Ashworth described it as "formal logic" versus "the art of thinking clearly," Ong described it as "humanists' pupil-oriented teaching" vs. "universities' teacher-oriented teaching" and Mack as "dialectic as the gateway to further study and humanist notions of speaking freely on whatever subject is proposed." Ashworth, *Language and Logic in the Post-Medieval Period*, 9; Ong, *Ramus*, 97; Mack, *Elizabethan Rhetoric*, 57.
[65] Quoted in Ong, *Ramus*, 54.
[66] The laws are 1) Things are identical with themselves; something can't be itself *and* something else (i.e. the law of identity); 2) A logical statement cannot both affirm and deny the same thing (i.e. law of non-contradiction); 3) A logical statement must be either true or false; it cannot be neither or both (i.e. the law of the excluded middle). This, however, is a modern formulation of the laws of thought; they can be found in Aristotle but are not necessarily articulated as such. The laws of non-contradiction and excluded middle do appear in the *Posterior Analytics*, 1.11. See "laws of thought" in *The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy,* 3rd ed., ed. Robert Audi (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 489 and Robin Smith, "Aristotle's Theory of Demonstration," in *A Companion to Aristotle*, ed. Georgios Anagnostopoulos (Chichester, UK; Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009) (electronic resource).

> speciallie, and at one tyme, without any vaine repetitions, which dothe nothing but fyll vp the paper.[67]

The three laws of justice, nature, and wisdom[68] allowed Ramus to push back against the unified vision of the sciences that had so preoccupied medieval scholastics (similar to More's critique that scholastic developments had "muddled up subjects which were clearly distinguished by the ancients") which, once again, is traceable to Valla and Agricola.[69]

In addition to railing against Aristotle for mucking up logic and rhetoric, Ramus also criticized Cicero and Quintilian for regurgitating Aristotelian obscurity in their rhetorical schemes. Ramus, once again following humanists like Agricola, took his pruning shears to rhetoric and reduced it down to elocution and pronunciation. He insisted that *inventio* pertained strictly to logic and not rhetoric, for which *topica*, or "commonplaces," was appropriate.[70] This, however, did not mean that Ramus intended rhetoric and logic to be completely separate. The rhetorical texts of Ramus' lieutenant Omer Talon (*Rhetorica*) and fellow French Ramist Antoine Fouquelin (*La Rhetorique francoise*) were originally published as complementary pieces to Ramus' logic.[71]

Many Elizabethan thinkers followed Ramus' lead in fencing off *inventio* from rhetoric. In *The Arcadian Rhetorike* Abraham Fraunce defined rhetoric as "an Art of speaking" that

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[67] Ramus, *Logike*, 8-10. See also Skalnik, *Ramus and Reform*, 43-46; Perry Miller, *The New England Mind: The Seventeenth Century*, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1983), 141.
[68] They are named as such later in the work where the order of the first and second laws is exchanged. Ramus, *Logike*, 74.
[69] Jardine, "Lorenzo Valla and the Origins of Humanist Dialectic," 147.
[70] Ramus, *Logike*, 55. Ashworth, *Language and Logic in the Post-Medieval Period*, 12-13; Skalnik, *Ramus and Reform*, 46.
[71] Ong, "Fouquelin's French Rhetoric and the Ramist Vernacular Tradition," *Studies in Philology*, Vol. 51, No. 2 (1954): 127-142. For a more nuanced view of Fouquelin's intellectual relationship to Talon see Roy Leake, Jr., "The Relationship of Two Ramist Rhetorics: Omer Talon's *Rhetorica* and Antoine Fouquelin's *Rhetorique Francoise*," *Bibliothèque d'Humanisme et Renaissance*, T. 30, No. 1 (1968): 85-108.

consisted of only two parts: "Eloqution" and "Pronuntiation."[72] In *The Lawiers Logike*, he insisted that invention and judgment "bée the parts of Logike, not of Rhetorike, as they are widely taken."[73] He later forcefully reiterated the point:

> What precepts soeuer the common Rhetoricians put downe for ordering of *Exordiums* and framing and disposing of the whole course of their spéeche fitly and according to cause, auditors, time, place, and such like circumstances; all those I say, are altogether Logicall, not in any respect perteining to Rhetoricke, but as a Rhetor may bée directed by Logicall precepts of iudgement and disposition.[74]

Since Perry Miller's landmark study decades ago that noted "the passing of [Ramism] from Cambridge, England, to Cambridge, New England," it has become a historical truism that Ramism was most attractive to those of the puritanical persuasion, typified by Elizabethans such as Laurence Chaderton, Dudley Fenner, and William Perkins.[75] The puritan affinity for Ramism is intuitive given that the godly were frequently concerned with how to present Christian truths in their most teachable form, much in the same way that Ramus was dedicated to educating students in the most effective and simplest manner possible.[76] Peter Lake (following Lisa

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[72] Abraham Fraunce, *The Arcadian Rhetorike* (London, 1588; STC 2nd ed. 11338), sig. A2ʳ.
[73] Faunce, *The Lawiers Logike*, fol. 37ʳ. Though later Fraunce will join together "Logicall gradation" with "Rhetoricall *climax*" he still seemed to understand that logic and rhetoric were to be kept separate, as when he described the intermingling of their methods "discrepant and disagréeable." See fols. 78ʳ and 89ᵛ, respectively.
[74] Fraunce, *The Lawiers Logike*, fol. 115ʳ.
[75] Miller, *The New England Mind*, 116-153 (on Ramist logic) and 312-330 (on Ramist rhetoric), quote at 118; Mack, *Renaissance Argument*, 334; Ong, *Ramus*, 4; McKim, *Ramism in William Perkins' Theology*; Joan Simon, *Education and Society in Tudor England* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1966), 319-220, Keith Sprunger, "John Yates of Norfolk: The Radical Puritan Preacher as Ramist Philosopher," *Journal of the History of Ideas*, Vol. 37, No. 4 (1976): 697-706; Emma A. Wilson, "The Art of Reasoning Well: Ramist Logic at Work in *Paradise Lost*," *The Review of English Studies*, Vol. 61, No. 248 (2010): 55-71. Sprunger wrote, "The sixteenth- and early seventeenth-century Puritan preacher, in many cases, was an amateur Ramist philosopher." (697)
[76] Wallace, Jr., "Puritan polemical divinity and doctrinal controversy," in *The Cambridge Companion to Puritanism*, eds. John Coffey and Paul C.H. Lim (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 211.

Jardine) suggested that Ramism was widely accepted by puritans on the assumption that it reflected the natural workings of the human mind, as opposed to awkwardly imposing stiff logic on the fluid movements of human cogitation,[77] which echoes both humanist and Protestant objections against the scholastic mind as unnaturally academic.

Dudley Fenner, noted for his Ramism,[78] is perhaps the best example of puritan affinity for Ramus. In his *Artes of Logike and Rethorike* (1584), he described invention as that which "concerneth the distribution of an argument."[79] After dividing logic into invention and judgment, Fenner elaborated: "[t]he spring of reasons is the firste parte of Logike, whiche giueth rules of the sortes of reasons, which because it doth helpe much to the finding out of reasons, is commonly called Inuention."[80] Rhetoric, which Fenner defined as "an Arte of speaking finelie," is made up of two parts: "Eloqution and Pronunciation." "Eloqution" is either the "finer maner of wordes, called a Trope" or "the fine shape or frame of speache, called a Figure." The "abuse" of a trope is "Katachresis" and the "excess" is "Hyperbole." Tropes are subdivided into a trope of one, or of many.[81] Feingold's "Ramist by association" warning notwithstanding, the dialectical arrangement of Fenner's work is certainly striking. Indeed, scholars have gone so far as to say that works from Englishmen like Fenner and Fraunce were essentially reproductions of Omer Talon's *Rhetorica*.[82]

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[77] Peter Lake, *Moderate Puritans and the Elizabethan Church* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 101.
[78] John Morgan, *Godly Learning: Puritan Attitudes towards Reason, Learning and Education, 1560-1640* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 109.
[79] Fenner, *The Artes of Logike and Rethorike*, sig. A2^{v}.
[80] Fenner, *The Artes of Logike and Rethorike*, sig. B[1]^{r}.
[81] Fenner, *The Artes of Logike and Rethorike*, fol. D1^{v}.
[82] Ong, "Fouquelin's French Rhetoric and the Ramist Vernacular Tradition," 127-128.

Some historians have seen the humanist/Ramist trimming of rhetoric as potentially reducing its political impact. While there are certainly examples to support this,[83] Roland MacIlmaine did not see it this way. In the dedicatory epistle of the English translation of Ramus' *Logike*, MacIlmaine immediately informed the reader that he undertook his translation of Ramus because it was his "dewtyie." It is the responsibility of all Christians "to labour by all meanes, that they maye profytte and ayde their bretherne, and to hyde or kepe secrete nothing, whiche they knowe may bringe vtilitie to the co[m]mo[n]wealthe."[84] Indeed, if rhetoric was now widely accepted as important, primarily as a 'neo-Roman civic humanist' position, then it should not be surprising that any English Christian who believed rhetoric important, regardless of methodology, would not be willing to put it to political use. This is especially true for Tudor England, where the *telos* of humanist education was religious and/or political service.[85] When Sir John Harington began his studies at Cambridge, William Cecil advised him to read Cicero for Latin, Livy and Caesar for Roman history ("exceeding fitt for a gentleman to understande"), and Aristotle and Plato for logic, all to the end of being "a fytte servaunte for the Queene and your countrey for which you weare born, and to which, next God, you are moste bounde."[86] Abraham

[83] Peltonen, *Rhetoric, Politics, and Popularity in Pre-Revolutionary England*, 20. Peltonen also points out that though Ramus did attack Cicero, early modern Englishmen did not always perceive Ciceronian and Ramist rhetoric as mutually exclusive.
[84] Ramus, *Logike*, 7.
[85] Peltonen, *Rhetoric, Politics, and Popularity in Pre-Revolutionary England*; Idem, "Virtue in Elizabethan and Early Stuart Grammar Schools," *Journal of Medieval and Early Modern Studies*, Vol. 42, No. 1 (2012): 157-179; Skinner, *Reason and Rhetoric in the Philosophy of Thomas Hobbes*, 66-110; Todd, *Christian Humanism and the Puritan Social Order*, ch. 2. Skinner hints that preaching owed more to Hellenistic sources, whereas civic humanism owed more to Roman rhetoric (67). For a more general overview of the relationship between humanism, education, and politics see Skinner, *The Foundations of Modern Political Thought*, 1:122-123, 213-243.
[86] Quoted in Stone, *The Crisis of the Aristocracy, 1558-1641* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1965), 679.

Fraunce made a similar point regarding the relationship between logic and law: "Which then I prooued, I then perceaued, the practise of Law to bee the vse of Logike, and the methode of Logike to lighten the lawe."[87]

Fenner described his own treatise on logic and rhetoric in such pragmatic terms. In responding to critics who might say that such learning is not for everyone, Fenner wrote,

> Neither let them obiect against vs: A sword in a fooles hand: for besides that weapon[n]s are not restrained & tyed only to masters of fence, not singing to musitions only: the simple playnes of these treatises, which drawe men to no curiouse or doubtful discourses, but onely put them in minde of that which they may easilie seeke and knowe in most familiar examples with great fruit and delight, shall sufficientlie aunswere for them selues in this behalfe: praying all men to vse them with some studie as their callings may suffer, to strengthen their iudgement, to discerne of the sayinges and writinges of other men, to keepe better that whiche they learne, and not beyond their gifte and callinge, to aduenture to a further vse then they can reache vnto.[88]

The adversarial relationship of Ramism to Aristotelianism, or grammatical and propositional logic, was sometimes traced back to ancient Stoicism (as seen in Rainolde's use of Zeno's analogy of the open palm and closed fist).[89] While this genealogy is not a very neat one, it does help contextualize the Renaissance debates over logic as they were influenced by classical sources and perceived by contemporaries.[90] In response to critics who quibble about the words "invention" and "judgment," Fraunce wrote,

> The Stoicall diuision of Logike into Inuention and Iudgement, although both *Aristotle* himself séeme to commend it in some places, as in 8. *Topi.* 3: *Rhet:* and *Tully* and *Quintilian* doo altogether obserue it, is yet reprehended of some, who

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[87] Fraunce, *The Lawiers Logike*, sig. ¶[1]^{r}.
[88] Fenner, *The Artes of Logike and Rhethorike*, sig. A2^{v}. In an odd historical twist, an English adaptation of Omer Talon's *Rhetorica* was spuriously attributed to Thomas Hobbes when it was originally credited to Dudley Fenner. Ong, "Hobbes and Talon's Ramist Rhetoric in English," 260.
[89] Ong, *Ramus*, 93.
[90] See Michael Frede, "Stoic vs. Aristotelian Syllogistic," *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie*, Vol. 56, Iss. 1 (1974): 1-32; John Nolt, "Free Logic," in *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, ed. Edward N. Zalta (2014), §1.2 (electronic resource).

> thinke that Iudgement is not any seuerall parte of Logike, but rather an adiunct or propertie generally incident to the whole Art: because, say they, there is use of iudgement euen in inuention. But in my fancie they might better haue founde some fault with these wordes, Iudgement, and Inuention, then reprehended the distribution, which is most true, if they consider what the Stoikes did understand by these wordes.[91]

As mentioned, Protestants found Ramus attractive because of his anti-Aristotelian ways, which had been a characteristic of Protestantism since Luther.[92] This antipathy towards "the Philosopher" primarily stemmed from the perceived corruption of Catholic theology by Aristotelian philosophy (in particular logic and metaphysics) that was used to justify doctrines Protestants found abhorrent. This was especially true of transubstantiation, which rested on making Aristotelian distinctions between "accident" and "substance" and integrating it with the Christian doctrine of the two types of flesh in Christ to prove that the people were indeed worshipping Christ in the sacrament and not just bread and wine.[93]

Protestants commonly charged Catholics with idolatry when they worshipped the bread and the wine in the Mass, thinking it to be the body of Christ. In his challenge sermon, Jewel anticipated the Catholic objection that since the bread was indeed Christ himself, idolatry was impossible by lambasting such metaphysical niceties: "Undoubtedly, I could never yet perceive by any reading, either of the scriptures or else of other profane writings, but that the people of all ages hath evermore been readier to receive idolatry than to learn the distinctions and quiddities of logic or philosophy."[94]

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[91] Fraunce, *The Lawiers Logike*, fol. 5v.
[92] On Luther's relationship to Aristotle see Brian Gerrish, *Grace and Reason: A Study in the Theology of Luther* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962), 32-42. Gerrish also observed that Luther held a special affinity for Cicero (40-41).
[93] For example Harding, *An Answere to Maister Iuelles Chalenge*, fol. 98v.
[94] Jewel, *Works*, 1:12.

With all the attention given to Ramism and its dramatic influence upon sixteenth-century Protestantism, it would be easy to think that Aristotelianism was vanquished, if not eradicated altogether. But this is a misleading picture, for the reception of Aristotle in the sixteenth-century was much more complex than the polemic of Protestants like Luther and Ramus would lead one to believe.

The Many Faces of Aristotle

The presumed 'defeat' of Aristotle owes primarily to two factors: modern historians accepting anti-Aristotelian polemics at face value and notions of a traditionalist and conservative Aristotelianism in early modern England that was stubbornly opposed to scientific progress. It was not without reason that James McConica referred to academic Aristotelianism as the "darkest region" of intellectual history in Renaissance England.[95] Yet, despite Hans Holbein's depiction in *Hercules Germanicus*, Luther didn't actually 'kill' the Philosopher and his scholastic cronies. Aristotelian logic survived into the sixteenth-century, though it was now quite fragmented, divided (broadly speaking) between the received heritage of scholastic logic and a humanist-informed "movement back to unsupplemented Aristotle."[96]

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[95] See Charles B. Schmitt, *John Case and Aristotelianism in Renaissance England* (Kingston, Ont.: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1983), 1-12; Mordecai Feingold, *The Mathematicians' Apprenticeship: Science, Universities and Society in England, 1560-1640* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 1-22, *passim*; James McConica, "Humanism and Aristotle in Tudor Oxford," *English Historical Review*, Vol. 94, No. 371 (1979): 291. Schmitt repeats the argument that Feingold later challenges, namely that scientific literature "declined disastrously" in late sixteenth and early seventeenth-century England. Schmitt, *John Case and Aristotelianism in Renaissance England*, 22-26 (quote at 22).

[96] Mack, *Renaissance Argument*, 356-358 (quote at 357), Idem, *Elizabethan Rhetoric*, 55. See also Schmitt, *John Case and Aristotelianism in Renaissance England*, 23; Ashworth, *Language and Logic in the Post-Medieval Period*, 8, 10; Richard Bauckham, "The Career and Thought of Dr. William Fulke (1537-1589)," Ph.D. dissertation, Cambridge University (1972), 28. For a more general overview of the state of sixteenth-century scholasticism see Burns, "Scholasticism:

Though the growth of medieval scholasticism is well beyond the present scope, it is worth mentioning that historians have noted two different 'Aristotles' used by medievals. The *Topics* prioritizes the invention (or discovery) of topics, while the remainder of the *Organon* (the *Analytics* in particular) stresses judgment. The former 'Aristotle' was the one to whom the largely non-syllogistic logic of Cicero, Quintilian, and Boethius is indebted, while the latter 'Aristotle' was the impetus for the growth of scholasticism. Elizabethan divine John Rainolds made a similar distinction in his Oxford lectures on Aristotle's *Rhetoric*:

> Next, Aristotle divides proofs into modes of argumentation, that is, he separates the materials of proving into forms of proving, separates a part of invention into a part of judgment. But, in so doing, he confuses two branches of dialectic with one another, both of which he subjects even to the faculty of oratory. For the proofs which he divides are those which demonstrate or to seem to demonstrate. But in fact the two parts into which they are divided, the enthymeme and example, in Aristotle's opinion are *modes of argumentation*. And for that reason, although they are mentioned in the *Topics*, that is, in the "art of invention," nevertheless they are openly investigated in the *Analytics*, that is, in the "art of judgment."[97]

A significant source of Aristotelianism in Tudor intellectual culture was the many English humanists who studied at the Greek-oriented University of Padua in the early sixteenth-century. Padua was particularly Aristotelian, especially through the private but important teaching of Niccoló Leonico Tomeo, and English humanists brought a passion for Greek learning

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survival and revival," 132-155. Charles Lohr described these two Aristotelianisms as scholastic and secular, primarily located in the fields of philosophy and medicine, respectively. See C.H. Lohr, "The Sixteenth-Century Division of the Aristotelian Division of the Speculative Sciences," in *The Shapes of Knowledge from the Renaissance to the Enlightenment*, eds. Donald R. Kelley and Richard H. Popkin (Dordrecht, Boston: Kluwer Academic, 1991), 51.

[97] John Rainoldes, *Lectures on Aristotle's Rhetoric*, ed. and trans. Lawrence Green (Newark: University of Delaware Press; London, Toronto: Associated University Press, 1986), 179. Ong wrote that Agricola "exploits" the Aristotle of the *Topics*, not of the *Categories* or *Analytics*. Ong, *Ramus*, 92-130 (quote at 116); Jardine, "Lorenzo Valla and the Intellectual Origins of Humanist Dialectic," 143-164 (145, especially); Todd, *Christian Humanism and the Puritan Social Order*, 68.

back with them.[98] One of the earliest was the physician and humanist Thomas Linacre, who left a substantial sum of money to Oxford upon his death to endow a Greek lectureship.[99] The noted humanist Richard Pace and the evangelical Richard Morison (both of whom had direct contact with Henry VIII[100]) also studied at Padua, as did Catholic clergymen such Reginald Pole (Cardinal and Archbishop of Canterbury under Mary) and Cuthbert Tunstall (bishop of London and then Durham under Henry).

Though English interest in Greek owed much to foreign influence, it carried important domestic implications. Any discussion of Greek studies in England would be remiss to not mention Thomas More's famous defense of Greek learning against the Oxford "Trojans" (mentioned above) and the controversies over Greek pronunciation at Cambridge in the 1530s.[101] This emphasis on Greek could be both religious, as a means to better understand the scriptures, as well as humanistic in its orientation,[102] and Greek learnedness and an awareness of the state of

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[98] See Woolfson, *Padua and the Tudors*, 103-118 and 136-137, especially; Curtis, "Richard Pace's *De fructu* and Early Tudor Pedagogy," 43-77 (45-48, especially); Tracey Sowerby, *Renaissance and Reform in Tudor England: The Careers of Sir Richard Morison c. 1513-1556* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 20-27.

[99] Rainoldes, *Lectures on Aristotle's Rhetoric*, ed. Green, 17; Woolfson, *Padua and the Tudors*, 84.

[100] Pace served as Henry's secretary for a time in addition to delivering an oration to the king and Morison worked as a propagandist in the Cromwellian regime.

[101] More, "Letter to the University of Oxford," in *The Complete Works of St. Thomas More* 15:130-149. On the pronunciation controversies at Cambridge see J.B. Mullinger, *The University of Cambridge: From the Royal Injunctions of 1535 to the Accession of Charles the First* (Cambridge: The University Press, 1884), 54-63; H.C. Porter, *Reformation and Reaction in Tudor Cambridge* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1958), 83-84.

[102] This, however, is broadly true for the study of any of the classical languages. For Greek specifically, see Wallace, Jr., "Puritans and polemical divinity," 209; Curtis, "Richard Pace's *De fructu* and Early Tudor Pedagogy," 47 n. 31.

affairs on the Continent could be advantageous for political advancement, as was the case with Cromwellian propagandist Richard Morison.[103]

Though Aristotle remained more popular with religious conservatives, the study of Aristotle was not just confined to Catholics. Puritanical protestant clergy of the late sixteenth- and early seventeenth-centuries (including Arthur Hildersham and John Rogers) read Peter Martyr not just for his biblical commentaries but also his works on Aristotle.[104] This is particularly interesting for Martyr, who had studied at Padua and taught himself Greek so he could read Aristotle in his original language, lectured on Aristotle between 1554 and 1556 in Strasbourg, when Marian exiles were there in large numbers. Giulio Santerenziano, the editor of Vermigli's posthumously published *Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics*, dedicated the work to Edwin Sandys.[105] John Seton (whose logic book was written specifically to be taught at Cambridge), Melanchthon, and Ramus all took their cue from Agricola while simultaneously claiming to use a purer form of Aristotle.[106] And though Aristotelianism was not well received in England for most of the sixteenth-century, the Philosopher's reputation was marginally revitalized during the Elizabethan period, even if Aristotelianism did not fully recover as a general philosophy.[107]

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[103] Sowerby, *Renaissance and Reform in Tudor England*, 54-55; William G. Zeeveld, *Foundations of Tudor Policy* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1948), 39-81.
[104] Todd, *Christian Humanism and the Puritan Social Order*, 59.
[105] Luca Baschera, "Aristotle and Scholasticism," in *A Companion to Peter Martyr Vermigli*, eds. Torrance Kirby, Emidio Campi, and Frank A. James III (Leiden, Boston: Brill, 2009), 144.
[106] Todd, *Christian Humanism and the Puritan Social Order*, 61; Mack, *Elizabethan Rhetoric*, 55-6; Idem, *Renaissance Argument*, 335.
[107] Schmitt, *John Case and Aristotelianism in Renaissance England*, 6-8; Cargill Thompson, "The Philosopher of the 'Politic Society'," in *Studies in the Reformation: Luther to Hooker*, ed. C.W. Dugmore (London: Athlone Press, 1980), 148-149.

William Fulke, the zealous Protestant polemicist of the 1570s and 80s who is best known for his engagement with the Jesuit Edmund Campion, wrote neo-Aristotelian scientific texts attacking the pervasiveness of myth and superstition in astrology (*Antiprognostication* [1560]) and meteorology (*A Goodly Gallerye* [1563]).[108] John Case, perhaps the most prolific Tudor Aristotelian, wrote a commentary on Aristotle's *Politics* titled *Sphaera civitatis* (1588) that went through five editions, but in Germany—not England.[109]

Jonathan Woolfson has documented the pervasiveness of Aristotle's *Politics* in Tudor England while acknowledging that it lagged well behind Cicero's *De officiis* in popularity.[110] The divine Richard Hooker favorably employed Aristotle in many of his works—especially in regard to human reason—often to the alarm of his presbyterian critics who believed he was resurrecting medieval scholasticism.[111] In addition, the pseudo-Aristotelian *Secretum Secretorum* was printed (as a genuine work of Aristotle) in London in 1572.

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[108] Bauckham, "The Career and Thought of Dr. William Fulke," 20, 26-28.

[109] Schmitt, *John Case and Aristotelianism in Renaissance England*, 87, 262 (for the bibliographic references). For an interesting exposition of Case's *Sphaera civitatis* in its Tudor context, see Jonathan Woolfson, "Between Bruni and Hobbes: Aristotle's *Politics* in Tudor Intellectual Culture," in *Reassessing Tudor Humanism*, ed. Idem (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 208-211.

[110] Woolfson, "Between Bruni and Hobbes: Aristotle's *Politics* in Tudor Intellectual Culture," 197-222 (Cicero remark at 201).

[111] Comments from Hooker, such as referring to Aristotle the "the mirror of humaine wisedome" and "Arch-Philosopher," and Aquinas as "the greatest amongst the Schoole divines," quickly aroused suspicion from contemporaries. See Richard Hooker, *Of the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity* in *The Folger Library Edition of the Works of Richard Hooker*, Vols. I-IV, eds. Georges Edelen, et al. (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1977-1982), 1.4.1, 1.10.4, and 3.9.2 (respectively). For perspectives on Hooker's complex relationship to Aristotle see Torrance Kirby, *Richard Hooker, Reformer and Platonist: A Reassessment of His Thought* (Aldershot; Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2005), 3-4, 32, 62-78 (62 n. 23), 98; Peter Lake, *Anglicans and Puritans?: Presbyterianism and English Conformist Thought from Whitgift to Hooker* (London: Unwin Hyman, 1988), 207, 225; Thompson, "The Philosopher of the 'Politic Society'," 131-191; Robert Faulkner, *Richard Hooker and the Politics of a Christian England* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1981), 61-117, especially; Nigel Voak, *Richard Hooker and Reformed Theology: A Study of Reason, Will, and Grace* (Oxford: Oxford University Press,

Thomas Blundeville's *The Art of Logike*, published in 1599, though likely written around 1575,[112] is a highly Aristotelian work. (Considering part of the full title is "aswell according to the doctrine of Aristotle," this is not surprising.) The subtitle belies Blundeville's suspicion of sophistry: *A very necessarie Booke for all young students in any profession to find out thereby the truth in any doubtfull speech, but specially for such zealous Ministers as haue not beene brought vp in any Vniuersity, and yet are desirous to know how to defend by sound argumentes the true Christian doctrine, against all substill Sophisters, and cauelling Schismatikes, & how to confute their false Sillogismes, & captious arguments.* In the introduction Blundeville explained that the book was intended for the uneducated who desire to learn but are unable to undertake formal study. His logical text was intended as an intellectual defense for the less learned who still needed to guard against arguments that were persuasive but false.[113] It employs many scholastic concerns such as delineating intention, taxonomizing particulars ("Indiuidua") and Aristotelian predicaments, such as the substance, quality, and quantity of a proposition. Chapters 18 and 19 of book five deal with the Aristotle's rules of knowledge and demonstration and how the "Scholemen" divide them.[114]

In the *The Arte of Reason, rightly termed, Witcraft, teaching a perfect way to argue and dispute* (1573) Ralph Lever, one of the Cambridge Marian exiles returned from the Continent, was quite clear about his admiration for Aristotle:

2003), 26, 40-42, 63, 104, 125-28, 137. Hooker's use of classical and medieval sources (especially Aristotle and Aquinas) is one of the bugbears at the heart of the debate over his relationship to the contemporary Church of England and, by extension, the historical 'Anglican' problem.

[112] W.S. Howell, *Logic and Rhetoric in England, 1500-1700* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1956), 285.

[113] Thomas Blundeville, *The Arte of Logike* (London, 1599; STC 2nd ed. 3142).

[114] These selections are taken from the table of contents, sigs. A*[1]^r-[A*4^v].

> Now to let euerie writer haue his deserued praise, I confesse (to them that desire to knowe whom I folow) that in my thrée firste bookes, I [onely] folow Aristotle: both for matter, & also for order: who is in my iudgement, an author, [y^t] farre passeth all prophane writers: not onely for that he writeth more true, and profitable things then others do: but also, for that his manner, and trade of writing, is more perfect and playner, then any others y^t I haue red.[115]

Though the precise location of Lever's travels is unknown, one cannot help but wonder if he spent time in Strasbourg listening to Vermigli lecture on Aristotle.[116]

Perhaps the best-known example of Protestant Aristotelianism in Elizabethan England is the divine and teacher of Richard Hooker John Rainolds (or Reynolds), who lectured on Aristotle's *Rhetoric* at Oxford in the 1570s. These lectures were open to the public, and apparently well attended by both students and townsfolk.[117] Rainolds' intellectual talents were widely acknowledged: he earned a reputation as a walking library, Patrick Collinson described him as the Laurence Chaderton of Oxford, and Robert Bellarmine acknowledged Rainolds as one of his greatest intellectual foes. Though Rainolds was of puritanical persuasion (albeit moderate), his insights were sought in a variety of theological disagreements. In 1584, he weighed in on a conference at Oxford on church discipline and in 1585 he debated his own brother Edmund, a Catholic, upon the occasion of Robert Dudley's visitation to Oxford. He was also the leading puritan spokesman at Hampton Court in 1604 (even if he was ineffectual).[118]

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[115] Ralph Lever, *The Arte of Reason, righty termed, Witcraft teaching a perfect way to argue and dispute* (London, 1573; STC 2nd ed. 15541), sig. i^{r-v}.
[116] Garrett assumed that he remained "a wandering scholar." Porter mentioned Ralph along with his brothers John and Thomas in his study, but also that very little can be known about his travels. Christina H. Garrett, *The Marian Exiles: A Study in the Origins of Elizabethan Puritanism* (Cambridge: The University Press, 1928), 218; Porter, *Reformation and Reaction in Tudor Cambridge*, 75-77, 85, 90.
[117] Feingold, "Rainolds [Reynolds], John (1549-1607), theologian and college head," *ODNB*.
[118] Rainolds, *Lectures on Aristotle's Rhetoric*, ed. Green, 24, 32-34; Collinson, *The Elizabethan Puritan Movement* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991), 129, 320, 413, 456-462.

Rainolds' Oxford lectures are another excellent example of the close connection between sound learning and true religion among Elizabethan Christians, though in this case it pertains to the proper uses of rhetoric. As the modern editor of Rainolds' *Lectures* remarked, "rhetoric was a vital discipline for achieving the humanist vision of the Christian life through the power of language."[119] The lectures are a paragon of intellectual eclecticism, brimming with references to classical, medieval, and humanist sources (including Cicero, Boethius, Averroës, and Agricola) and giving close attention to language: a substantial portion of the opening lecture is dedicated to the interpretive possibilities of what it means for dialectic and rhetoric to be the ἀντίστροφη (*antistrophe*) of one other.[120]

Rainolds also commented on more contemporary debates. For instance, he affirmed that invention pertains more to dialectic than rhetoric, for which "commonplaces" are more fitting,[121] and that those who group invention, disposition, and memory under rhetoric do some from "ignorance."[122] Rainolds also was not uncritical of Aristotle and at one point offers qualified praise of Ramus, "an excellent man of piety and erudition" who "assail[ed] Aristotle perhaps a little too sharply." Rainolds defended Ramus in typical Protestant language, claiming that Ramus' vitriol towards Aristotle stemmed not from "calumny" but "righteous grief of the soul

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[119] Rainolds, *Lectures on Aristotle's Rhetoric*, ed. Green, 13

[120] Rainolds, *Lectures on Aristotle's Rhetoric*, ed. Green, 103-109, which is followed by exposition of other important Greek terms (109-113).

[121] Rainolds, *Lectures on Aristotle's Rhetoric*, ed. Green, 209, 221.

[122] Rainolds, *Lectures on Aristotle's Rhetoric*, ed. Green, 175. Though there are places where Rainolds seems to place invention within rhetoric (cf. 167, 199), it is likely because he believed the word "rhetoric" could be used in two ways: "a restricted way when it includes only the rules of eloquence, and in an unrestricted way when it indicates wisdom speaking copiously." (97)

that the Sorbonnists still believed in Aristotle even when Aristotle was wrong, while other writers who spoke the truth were suspected of heresy."[123]

Despite the continuation of Aristotelianism, English intellectuals did not reappropriate the Philosopher in the same way as Continental writers, particularly Melanchthon or the Italians.[124] I have hinted as much with John Case (one of the few English Aristotelians who has been studied in any depth), whose work was reprinted on the Continent more frequently than in England. In fact, Case's printer grew so frustrated with the number of pirated editions that he refused to print any of Case's works for a nearly eight-year period.[125]

Intellectual Culture and Tudor Universities

A glance at Tudor universities is important for two reasons. The first and most important reason is that the controversialists who wrote disputative literature were all formally trained at either Oxford or Cambridge. In many cases, such as with Jewel and Harding, they knew each other personally from their university days. Second, there was tremendous growth in university attendance by non-clerics, and this laicizing of university education drastically altered the political and cultural dynamics of England as men of the 'new learning' began to dominate society, particularly in government.[126] Though Cambridge is frequently considered to have been friendlier to humanism and Protestantism while Oxford is widely believed to have been more

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[123] Rainolds, *Lectures on Aristotle's Rhetoric*, ed. Green, 181. For Rainolds' criticism of Aristotle, see e.g., 221; see also Mack, *Elizabethan Rhetoric*, 52-53.
[124] Schmitt, *John Case and Aristotelianism in Renaissance England*, 19-20. On Melanchthon's intellectual development, see John R. Schneider, "The hermeneutics of commentaries: origins of Melanchthon's integration of dialectic into rhetoric," in *Philip Melanchthon (1497-1560) and the Commentary*, eds. Timothy Wengert and M. Patrick Graham (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1997), 20-47. See also Ashworth, *Language and Logic in the Post-Medieval Period*, 16.
[125] Malone, "Case, John (1540/41?-1600), philosopher and physician," *ODNB*.
[126] See the Introduction.

conservative in its pedagogy, the extent to which each followed similar trajectories of educational conservatism or differed in their reaction to and embrace of the ‘new learning’ is still an open question. For instance, Lisa Jardine suggested that there was little to indicate variation between the two universities’ curriculums, while James McConica highlighted distinctive differences.[127]

University book inventories provide us with a window (albeit a limited one) into the prioritization of Elizabethan education, and they reveal a remarkably diverse body of literature. Margo Todd has documented the supremacy of Erasmus at both Oxford and Cambridge between 1558 and 1603, followed secondly by Cicero at Cambridge; much farther behind were Aquinas and Ramus. Peter Mack has found that eleven undergraduate book lists from Oxford have Cicero at the top of the list, followed closely by Erasmus,[128] thus indicating that Aristotle was not the sole intellectual force at the university.

Regarding rhetorical works specifically, Mack concludes that Aristotle’s works were most prevalent, but that Agricola, Melanchthon, and Ramus all held significant places. He also suggests that Melanchthon’s works—which owed much to Aristotle—were influential in the mid-century but then gave way to Ramus in the 1570s at both Oxford and Cambridge.[129] While such inventories are extremely valuable, the historical picture is further muddled by the fact that syllabi do not always reflect the actual nature of pedagogy in Renaissance English universities,

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[127] Lisa Jardine, “The Place of Dialectic Teaching in Sixteenth-Century Cambridge,” *Studies in the Renaissance*, Vol. 21 (1974): 32; McConica, “Humanism and Aristotle in Tudor Oxford,” 292-293.
[128] Mack, *Elizabethan Rhetoric*, 50 n. 10.
[129] Todd, *Christian Humanism and the Puritan Social Order*, 67 (see 53-95 for a more general evaluation of the influence of humanism on Elizabethan and early Stuart education); Mack, *Elizabethan Rhetoric*, 48-75.

which at times could be highly individualistic, tied more to tradition and the tutor's preferences than any universally recognized curriculum.[130]

Religious historians have tended to see more of a difference between the two universities, likely because Cambridge was more receptive to the new evangelicalism and eventually became a puritan incubator, especially Emmanuel College.[131] Not surprisingly Oxford, as the more conservative of the two, retained scholastic logic throughout the sixteenth-century, but at a diminishing rate. The precise impact of Ramism on the university is uncertain, but we cannot discount humanist influences at Oxford: Brasenose and Corpus Christi were founded in the sixteenth-century as centers of the 'new learning,' and both John Jewel and John Rainolds were Oxford men.[132] Similarly, the Marian exile and fervent admirer of Aristotle Ralph Lever (mentioned above), spent his entire academic career at Cambridge. Regardless of whether Aristotelianism or humanism (in their variant forms) reigned supreme, or they simply co-existed, we must concede that the Tudor university had an intellectually "eclectic culture."[133]

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[130] Morgan, *A History of the University of Cambridge*, vol. 2, 131-135, 511; Feingold, "English Ramism: A Reinterpretation," 134; Mack, *Elizabethan Rhetoric*, 50.
[131] See Porter, *Reformation and Reaction in Tudor Cambridge*, 41-73, 146-273, especially; Lake, *Moderate Puritans and the Elizabethan Church*, 40-46; Collinson, *The Elizabethan Puritan Movement*, 125-128.
[132] Todd, *Christian Humanism and the Puritan Social Order*, 49, 58; on Corpus Christi specifically see Rainolds, *Lectures on Aristotle's Rhetoric*, ed. Green, 13-18.
[133] McConica, "Humanism and Aristotle in Tudor Oxford," (quote used throughout); Feingold, "The Humanities," 289-295; Marco Sgarbi, *The Aristotelian Tradition and the Rise of British Empiricism: Logic and Epistemology in the British Isles (1570-1689)* (Dordrecht: Springer, 2013), 40-41; Woolfson, "Between Bruni and Hobbes: Aristotle's *Politics* in Tudor Intellectual Culture," 198-200. (Woolfson also highlights the humanistic approach to the *Politics* at Cambridge, 200-201.) Christopher Dent has enriched the historical picture of Protestantism at Oxford but ultimately concludes that it differed from Cambridge in that it lacked the consistent patterns of puritan behavior exemplified at Cambridge, instead tending towards a more moderate and academic form of Protestantism. This was largely due to the fact that Oxford did not experience the same level of intra-Protestant quarreling (such as the Vestiarian and Admonition controversies in the 1560s and 70s, or the fierce Calvinist debates of the late 80s and 90s) characteristic of Elizabethan Cambridge, which in turn accelerated the development of

Ramism versus Aristotelianism?

Though the reception of Greek and Roman philosophy in Tudor intellectual culture may have been far more of a "both-and" rather than an "either-or," we must note that contemporaries frequently described the intellectual landscape in adversarial terms (which, in turn, has shaped current scholarly opinions about the sixteenth-century's bifurcated intellectual character). Abraham Fraunce, for instance, groused about the rivalry between Aristotelians and Ramists in *The Lawiers Logike*. While commenting on the differences between civil and common law in England, Fraunce recounted a scenario that he apparently encountered all too often:

> But loe, I see on the sodayne this extrauagant discourse abruptly cut off by the importunate exclamations of a raging and fireyfaced Aristotelian; who seeing Ramus his Logike in some estimation, maketh small accompt of his owne credite in vttering such impatient speaches. / Good God, what a world is this? VVhat an age doo wee lyue in now? A Sopister in tymes past was a tytle of credite, and a woord of commendation; nowe what more odious? Aristotle then the father of Philosophy; now who lesse fauoured? Ramus ruled abroade, Ramus at home, and who but Ramus?

Fraunce continued on to complain how impertinent young men ("[n]ewfangled, youngheaded, harebrayne boyes") believe themselves to be masters when they have only just begun in study and "rayle against Aristotle as they are crept out of the shell." In this way, "euery Cobler can cogge a Syllogisme, euery Carter crake of Propositions." Fraunce lamented that logic is "prophaned" and "lyeth prostitute…made common to all, which before was proper to Schoolemen." But, Fraunce asserted, such an antagonistic approach owes to ignorance, not least of Ramus:

> Touching the gryefe you conceaue for the contempt of Aristotle, it is needles and vnnecessary: for, where Aristotle deserueth prayse, who more commendeth him

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theoretical underpinnings for radicalism there. Dent, *Protestant Reformers in Elizabethan Oxford* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983), 243-244.

> then Ramus? Where he hath too much, Ramus cutteth off, where too little, addeth, where any thing is inuerted, hee bringeth it to his owne proper place, and that according to the direction of Aristotle his rules.

Fraunce summed up his position by stating that what Aristotle invented, Ramus perfected.[134]

Ralph Lever, however, took a slightly harder tack towards his civic-minded counterparts:

> As for Ciceronians & suger tongued fellowes, which labour more for fineness of speech, then for knowledge of good matter, they oft speake much to small purpose, and shaking foorth a number of choise words, and picked sentences, they hinder good learning, wyth their fond chatte.[135]

The intellectual forces of Renaissance humanism and Aristotelianism profoundly shaped English university life and theology for a long time. As late as 1660, the Quaker apologist Samuel Fisher bemoaned the "*doting disputers*" who have made Scripture the "*causa sine qua non* of all the *confusion*, *darkness*, *uncertainty*" and "endless *enmities* and *hatreds*, and *envyings* one of another about their own *sottish senses*." He described the pedagogical and logical tools that made this "*hellish life* of disputing out their giddy guessings" as dominated by the Stagirite and French humanist: "So that as *Aristotle* and *Ramus* the two received and respective *Standards* for the *junior Sophisters* of our two *Nurseries*, *Oxford*, and *Cambridge*, to fight under in their *Logical scoldings*."[136]

The tensions between Aristotelianism and Ramism in Elizabethan England are captured well in a remarkable (and likely embellished) story about the zealous Elizabethan Protestant clergyman William Gouge, as told by his equally fervent son, Thomas.[137] After observing that

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[134] Fraunce, *The Lawiers Logike*, sigs. ¶¶2r-3r.
[135] Lever, *The Arte of Reason,* sig. iv.
[136] Samuel Fisher, *Rusticus Ad Academicos in Exercitationibus Expostulatoriis, Apologeticis Quatuor. The rustick's alarm to the rabbies, or, The country correcting the university and clergy* (London, 1660; Wing / F1056), 44.
[137] For a brief note on Gouge's influence as Protestant divine see Todd, *Christian Humanism and the Puritan Social Order*, 92.

his father was the nephew of Laurence Chaderton (thus creating both a familial and intellectual genealogy of Ramism), Thomas recounts his father's academic journey:

> From *Eaton* he was chosen to *Kings College* in *Cambridge*, whether he went *Anno* 1595. Where he first addicted himself to *Ramus* his Logick, and therein grew so expert, as in the Schooles he publickly maintained him: Insomuch as on a time diverse Sophisters setting themselves to vilifie *Ramus*, to which end the Respondent put up this Question, *Nunquam erit magnus, cui Ramus est magnus*;[138] which some of the Sophisters then hearing, and knowing the said *William Gouge* to be an acute disputant, and a stiff defender of *Ramus*, came to the Divinity Schooles, where he was hearing an act, and told him, how they were abusing *Ramus*. He thereupon went into the Sophisters Schools, and upon the Moderators calling for another Opponent, he stepped up, and brought such an argument as stumbled the Respondent; whereupon the Moderator took upon him to answer, but could not satisfie the doubt. A Sophister standing by, said with a loud voice, *Do ye come to vilifie* Ramus*, and cannot answer a Ramists argument?* Whereupon the Moderator rose up and gave him a box on the ear, then the School was all in an uprore, but the said *William Gouge* was safely conveighed out from among them.

There are two noteworthy elements of this story. First is the repeated use of "sophister" as a technical term, and not one of abuse—similar to Fraunce's observation that a Sophister used to be a "tytle of credite" but now nothing is more "odious." Second is the fact that Gouge was not just a Ramist, but a pious Ramist. Indeed, he had to be fetched from the "Divinity Schooles," and a printed marginal note seems to link Gouge's Protestant piety, Cambridge, and Ramus together.[139]

More importantly though, the story's afterlife illustrates how the uncritical repetition of adversarial rhetoric has entrenched the historiographical narrative that the early modern

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[138] Literally, "Nothing will be great, of which Ramus is great." The thesis supposedly originated with Lipsius. Howard Hotson, *Commonplace Learning: Ramism and Its German Ramifications, 1543-1630* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 64. Ong provided another Lipsius quote on the title page of his *Ramus*: "Young man, listen to me: You will never be great if you think Ramus was a great man."

[139] Though speculative, this story may intentionally parallel St. Paul's dramatic rescue by Roman soldiers from a riotous mob of angry Jews (Acts 21:26-35).

intellectual landscape was more bifurcated than malleable. The narrative originally appeared as a preface to Gouge's posthumously published *A Learned and Very Useful Commentary on the Whole Epistle to the Hebrews* in 1655, was repeated in Clarke's *Lives of Ten Eminent Divines* (1662), then by Mullinger in his *The University of Cambridge* (1888), which repeated a later edition of Clarke's *Eminent Divines* nearly verbatim, and finally in Curtis' *Oxford and Cambridge in Transition* (1959), which cites Mullinger. Regardless of how historically accurate the story is, the description of a chaotic scene in what was supposed to be a staid academic environment—comically pictured in a moderator losing his temper and cuffing the ear of one of his own—is a reminder that the intellectual climate of the Elizabethan universities was often fractious, contentious, and dynamic—not static and monolithic.[140]

Again though, it must be stressed that intellectual rivalries do not necessarily prove bifurcation. Rather, as will be shown, when Elizabethan polemicists sprung (or sat, more likely) into action, they were not identifying their methodologies as "Ramist" or "Aristotelian," though they were using formal logic, grammatical arguments, historical precedent, intellectual authorities, and whatever else they get their hands on to argue down their opponents.

[140] The work in which this story is first found is a posthumous publication of decades of Gouge's sermons on Hebrews. William died with the work nearly complete and his son, Thomas, finished the work and wrote the Epistle to the Reader. See "A Narrative of the Life and Death of Doctor Gouge" in Thomas Gouge, *A Learned and Very Useful Commentary on the Whole Epistle to the Hebrews…By that Holy and Learned Divine William Gouge* (London, 1655; Wing 1059:01), sig. a[r-v]; Samuel Clarke, *A Collection of the Lives of Ten Eminent Divines* (London, 1662; Wing C4506), 96-97; Mullinger, *The University of Cambridge*, 2:413; Curtis, *Oxford and Cambridge in Transition, 1558-1642*, 118-119.

Conclusion

It would be misleading to characterize the Renaissance humanist emphasis on the intimate relationship between rhetoric and logic as historically novel. We have already noted that the relationship between the two is as old as western philosophy itself. Thinkers such as Alcuin were noted for pairing together dialectic and rhetoric as far back as the eighth century, and dialectic was a pressing theological matter during the Averroist controversies of the thirteenth century.[141]

Furthermore, the act of disputation as an academic exercise is not peculiarly Renaissance; rather, it was decidedly medieval,[142] and tied directly to logic. Blundeville defined logic as "an Art which teacheth vs to dispute probably on both sides of any matter that is propounded."[143] However, the quality and scope of what happened in the late fifteenth and through the sixteenth-century *is* remarkable, as humanism contested and deconstructed (with varying degrees of success) centuries of development in scholastic logic. Furthermore, Renaissance humanists and sixteenth-century reformers (especially) did not see themselves as a continuation with the Carolingian Renaissance; rather, they perceived their recovery of the ancients precisely as a reaction against corrupted medieval philosophy.

Elizabethan Christians were no exception, and they saw an intimate and necessary connection between precise thought and true religion—the dominant motif of piety and learning

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[141] Martin Irvine, *The Making of Textual Culture: 'Grammatica' and Literary Theory, 350-1100* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 322-323; Alister McGrath, *The Intellectual Origins of European Reformation* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1987), 77.
[142] See Alex Novikoff's thorough survey, *The Medieval Culture of Disputation: Pedagogy, Practice, and Performance* (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013).
[143] Blundeville, *The Art of Logike*, 1.

in early modern England.[144] In his translation of Ramus' logic, Roland MacIlmaine made the importance of this relationship quite clear. In discussing Aristotle's second rule of logic—that "all the rules and preceptes of thine art be of necessitie tru"—he made an exact parallel between fallacious logic and scriptural interpretation:

> Thou shalt violate this document, whensoeuer amongest thy precepts in writing or teaching, thou shalt myngle any false, ambiguous, or vncertaine thing: as if in theaching me my logicke, which consistethe in rules to inuente argumentes, and to dispone and iudge the same, thou shouldest begyn to tell me some tryckes of poysonable sophistrie: and when thou shouldest teache me the worde of God truly, thou goest aboute to deceaue me by tellyng me mans inuentions.[145]

Logic and rhetoric went hand-in-hand; neither was to be employed without the other. Undecorated speech was considered stultifying, inappropriate, and ineffective, whereas sophistry was untruthful and deceptive. But both were needed to deploy a convincing argument.

These intellectual tenets were carried over into religious controversy, where precise reasoning was of the utmost importance. However, methodology was not a well-defined endeavor for Elizabethan polemicists. Rather than falling along the neatly defined categorical lines such as Aristotelian or Ramist, they pulled from any and every source that was helpful to their argument. Though certain patterns, such as an emphasis on syllogistic reasoning amongst Catholics or emphasis on dialectic and grammatical arguments amongst Protestants, have long been entrenched in the historiography, there are so many counter-examples that the potential for misclassification is great enough to question their helpfulness at all, especially for authors writing in the 1560s.

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[144] See, for example, Keith Wrightson, *English Society, 1580-1680* (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1982), ch. 7.
[145] Ramus, *Logike*, 9-10.

The argumentative complexity in disputative literature also owes to the fact that controversialists often reacted to *how* their opponent was arguing and, by imitating their polemical sparring partner or borrowing their sources, they attempted to beat their opponent at their own game. This gives the majority of the works examined here (John Rastell's *Replie* being an exception) a dialogic character, as authors responded with increasing ardor against their opponent, which also exponentially increased both the length and number of polemical works.

The import of all this is that Elizabethan polemicists were not only using the same *sources*, such as scripture, the fathers, councils, and medieval theologians, but they were also using the same *methods*. Reading these polemical debates with this in mind exposes the antithetical first principles underlying each side's conclusions—the intellectual fault lines—in addition to the fiercely held conclusions that neither side was willing to give up. They were not authors of intellectual tribalism. Rather, they used anything and everything considered authoritative to advance their points, which only reinforced that mutually exclusive mindset each had of their religious opinions.

The intellectual fault lines that emerge in these debates include (but are not limited to) matters indifferent, papal power, what constituted an article of faith, and how to define the 'true' church. Likewise, each side had matters it would not budge on. For Catholics, these included transubstantiation, tradition as a source of revelation, papal power, and the propriety of sole receiving by the priest. For Protestants, these included the sacrament as a sign and the necessity of multiple persons present to partake, the idolatry of images, and scripture as the sole and self-sufficient source of doctrine. Ultimately though, the fact that both sides believed they were fundamentally right and their opponents were categorically wrong meant that these debates were bound to end in a stalemate. Furthermore, the dialogic nature of the texts in which authors

attacked one another directly only further polarized the atmosphere. Put simply (perhaps too simply), in a debate carried out in such a hostile environment where both sides were fighting with the same weapons to defend fundamentally opposed positions, epistemic gridlock was unavoidable.

CHAPTER 4

BEGINNING THE DEBATE: JOHN JEWEL'S CHALLENGE SERMON

> Now, good people, judge ye in your conscience indifferently us both, whether of us bringeth you the better and sounder arguments.[1]
>
> John Jewel, challenge sermon

Context

The first chapter analyzed the content and context of the 1559 Westminster conference, which ended in the silencing of the Catholic bishops and clearing the way in the House of Lords for the necessary votes to push through the religious settlement. However, the end of Westminster was not the end of the controversy. Rather, Westminster left behind a highly combustible situation that would fuel English polemic for decades to come.

The most significant event following Westminster was John Jewel's challenge sermon. In the sermon, Jewel defied Catholics to prove that any number of their 'key' beliefs—that he determined—were considered orthodox or widely practiced within the first 600 years of the Christian church's existence. If they could, Jewel promised, he would convert. Jewel's promise provoked a large volume of polemic from Catholics—so much so that Torrance Kirby labeled it "virtually unprecedented."[2] Catholic responses then prompted ripostes by Protestants, thus swelling the amount of print polemic that flooded Elizabethan England. In this way, the challenge sermon was both the bridge between the Westminster conference and the print polemic

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[1] John Jewel, *Works*, ed. John Ayre, vol. 1 (Cambridge: The University Press, 1845), 16.

[2] Torrance Kirby, "Political Hermeneutics: John Jewel's 'Challenge Sermon' at Paul's Cross, 1559," in Idem, *Persuasion and Conversion: Essays on Religion, Politics, and the Public Sphere in Early Modern England* (Leiden, Boston: Brill, 2013), 126. For an overview of these publications, see A.C. Southern, *Elizabethan Recusant Prose, 1559-1582* (London, Glasgow: Sands & Co., 1950), 60-66.

that poured into England in the 1560s, but also the spark that ignited an already combustible situation.

This chapter revisits Jewel's controversial sermon by contextualizing the event(s) and demonstrating how it must be read in continuity with the Westminster conference, while also elucidating some rather unusual elements of its content. It analyzes how Jewel's sermon set the terms for the Great Controversy of the 1560s while opening the door for disputative literature, and then elucidates the importance of moderation in Jewel's sermon, as well as his abusive rhetoric (or, in this case, lack thereof), which mainly consisted of accusations of spiritual pride.

Low-hanging fruit? The content of Jewel's challenge sermon

Analyzing the content of Jewel's challenge sermon is important for three primary reasons. First, the challenge sermon has largely been ignored in favor of Jewel's *Apologia pro Ecclesiae Anglicanae*, the first doctrinal articulation of post-Reformation English Protestantism.[3] Second, the challenge sermon set the terms for religious debate between English Protestants and Catholics for years, if not decades, to come. Third, that the sermon was almost immediately put into print again demonstrates the close connection between oral and print culture, and how they were used in tandem as polemical strategies in Elizabethan England.

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[3] Because of this, the *Apology* is often taken to be a major source for the ostensible origins of early modern 'Anglicanism.' However, as Quantin pointed out, Jewel's *Apology* gives no reason to think that Jewel saw the English church as different from Continental reformed churches, especially considering his close relationship with Vermigli. Jean-Louis Quantin, *The Church of England and Christian Antiquity: The Construction of a Confessional Identity in the 17th Century* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 31. See also Mary Morrissey, "The 'Challenge Controversy' and the Question of Authority in the Elizabethan Church," in *The Search for Authority in Reformation Europe*, eds. Helen Parish, Elaine Fulton, and Peter Webster (Farnham, Surrey; Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2014), 147-148.

Jewel's sermon was actually preached three times: twice at Paul's Cross, once 26 November 1559 and again 31 March 1560, and once in-between then at court on 17 March 1560 (which is referenced in the exchange with Cole). Given the prominence and institutional nature of Paul's Cross, this location is not surprising. The importance of Jewel's sermon at Paul's Cross was recorded by Henry Machyn, who wrote in his diary that the mayor, aldermen, and many other courtiers were present, along with "[a] grett audyense as [has ever] bene at Powlles crosse."[4]

The location of court, however, invites some interesting questions. Jewel had been invited to deliver the sermon, which he preached at the "Preaching Place," not the Chapel Royal. This venue was both open-air and much larger. This enabled a larger popular audience, which had an interesting effect on the sermons preached there in Elizabeth's reign. It could be a blessing and curse for the monarch. It was a blessing insofar as it was a very effective way to be seen publicly as a pious monarch, something Elizabeth (like monarchs both before and after her) wanted. In this regard, attending sermons during Lent—when Jewel preached his challenge sermon—was especially common. However, it could also be a curse because opening up the audience created a potentially tricky situation if the preacher ventured too far into state matters. Elizabeth was quite proactive in heading off sermons she found too meddlesome: she chastised Alexander Nowell in the middle of his 1564 Lenten sermon for using harsh language about Catholic images and saints. Nowell was humiliated and could barely finish his sermon. In 1579,

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[4] *The Diary of Henry Machyn, Citizen and Merchant-Taylor of London, from A.D. 1550 to A.D. 1563*, ed. J.G. Nichols (London: Camden Society, 1848), 218.

Elizabeth walked out of another sermon (preacher unknown) harping on the dangers of her potential marriage to the Duke of Anjou, the subject of Stubb's *A Gaping Gvlf*.[5]

We do know though that Jewel, like many of his fellow Protestants, felt that Elizabeth needed some encouragement when it came to reform. He complained in a letter to Vermigli dated 20 March 1559 of the Queen's slowness in reform, which he at least partly blamed on the influence of the Spanish ambassador, the Count de Feria. He reported to his Italian friend that "though she openly favours our cause, yet is wonderfull afraid of allowing any innovations…She is, however, prudently, and firmly and piously following up her purpose, though somewhat more slowly than we could wish."[6] Jewel's court sermon also may have been—like the Westminster conference—a signal of the shifting winds, this time to the many Catholics still at court. Or, put in stronger terms, it was part of the 1560 Lent Series that was a "calculated assault on Roman Catholicism," meant to drum up support for the religious legislation.[7] Of course, these explanations are not mutually exclusive, either.

The printed version edited and recorded in the Parker Society[8] is the second sermon at Paul's Cross, as stated in the title and validated by Jewel's mention of "certain things that I

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[5] Peter McCullough, *Sermons at Court: Politics and religion in Elizabethan and Jacobean Preaching* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 42-49. Nowell's words were in response to John Martiall's *Treatyse of the Crosse* (1564). See ch. 7.
[6] Jewel, *Works*, ed. John Ayre, vol. 4 (Cambridge: The University Press, 1850), 1200. It is worth noting that Jewel was much more circumspect in his sermons before the Queen than was Dering. McCullough, *Sermons at Court*, 90-91.
[7] McCullough, *Sermons at Court*, 94.
[8] The editor John Ayre relied primarily on John Norton's 1611 folio of Jewel's *Works* and consulted the 1609 edition. While Ayre did also consult contemporary printings of Jewel's writings reproduced in the volume, it is unclear whether he used one or both editions of *The True Copies of Letters* from 1560. See Ayre's "Advertisement" in Jewel, *Works*, vol. 1. This may be significant as I have been unable to locate any research on whether Norton's editions of Jewel's works are accurate reproductions of the original. It is also interesting given that Norton's 1611 edition of Jewel's *Works* was likely a compulsory purchase for Jacobean churches. Natalie Mears, "Brought to Book: Purchases of Special Forms of Prayers in English Parishes, 1558-

uttered unto you to the same purpose at my last being in this place." In it, Jewel also confessed that some may have found him too bold in his previous sermon, but "these reports were only made in corners, and therefore ought less to trouble me. But if my sayings had been so weak, and might so easily have been reproved, I marvel that the parties never yet came to the light, to take the advantage."[9] In making such a statement, Jewel was continuing to antagonize Catholics through taunts intended to provoke public dispute.

That this particular printed version is actually of the third oration and not the first is important because a close reading actually reveals some changes between the two, thus making the singular "challenge sermon" somewhat of a misnomer.[10] After referencing his first sermon at Paul's Cross, Jewel recited the points of the same, which are as follows:

1. "that it was then lawful for the priest to pronounce the words of consecration closely and in silence to himself"
2. "that the priest had then authority to offer up Christ unto his Father"
3. "[that the priest had authority] to communicate and receive the sacrament for another"
4. "[that the priest had authority] to apply the virtue of Christ's death and passion to any man by the mean of the mass"
5. "that the mass, *ex opere operato*…is able to remove any part of our sin"
6. "that then any christian [*sic*] man called the sacrament his Lord and God"

1640," in *Negotiating the Jacobean Printed Book*, ed. Pete Langman (Aldershot; Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2011), 29 n. 2.

[9] Jewel, *Works*, 1:20.

[10] Morrissey noted that because Cole's first letter was a reply to the first iteration of the challenge, we can gather a sense of the difference from reading Cole's letter. Morrissey, "The 'Challenge Controversy' and the Question of Authority in the Elizabethan Church," 152-153.

7. “that the people was then taught to believe, that the body of Christ remaineth in the sacrament as long as the accidents of the bread remain there without corruption”
8. “that a mouse, or any other worm or beast, may eat the body of Christ”
9. “that when Christ said, *Hoc est corpus meum*, this word *hoc* pointeth not the bread, but *individuum vagum*”
10. “that the accidents, or forms or shews of bread and wine, be the sacraments of Christ’s body and blood, and not rather the very bread and wine itself”
11. “that the sacrament is a sign or token of the body of Christ that lieth hidden underneath it”
12. “that ignorance is the mother and cause of true devotion and obedience”[11]

Some have observed that this kind of structuring is an example of the “confutational sermon,” an intermediary form of controversy that stands somewhere between oral disputation and print controversial literature. Such sermons were crafted for a lay audience that lacked formal theological training.[12] Though I do not dispute that Jewel’s sermon may be categorized as such, it is worth pointing out that the setting out of topics for debate was a fundamental practice for academic disputation. In this way, Jewel was likely catering to both his lay audience and more learned listeners.

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[11] Jewel, *Works*, 1:20. Jewel gives another list in his first response to Cole (“The Bishop of Sarisburie’s Answer to the Letter Afore Written”) and lists private mass, communion in one kind, prayers in a strange tongue, that the bishop of Rome was called the universal bishop, transubstantiation, multiple masses in one day, that the people were forbidden to read the scriptures or pray in the vernacular, and “other more articles a great number I reckoned up then at Paul’s Cross, which it were long now to rehearse.” Ibid., 27-28.
[12] Mary Morrissey, *Politics and the Paul’s Cross Sermons, 1558-1642* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 165.

Most of Jewel's twelve points were very clearly aimed at the Roman mass and its doctrine of transubstantiation.[13] His targets ranged from the academic and theoretical, such as the Tridentine reaffirmation of *ex opere operato* (i.e. that the sacrament is efficacious in itself) and logical nuances of particulars and universals in Christ's institution of the sacrament (the *individuum vagum*),[14] to *reductio ad absurdums* that drew out impious logical consequences from transubstantiation—such as a worm eating a consecrated host—and accused Catholics of making "ignorance the mother of devotion." The goal was, in Mary Morrissey's memorable phrase, "weaning ordinary Londoners from the Mass."[15]

In his *Answere*, Thomas Harding printed a copy of the sermon as prefatory for the reader that actually lists twenty-seven articles. Though more in number, they are not that different in substance and all are still aimed at the Roman mass. For instance, Harding lists the specific practices of the priest lifting the consecrated host over his head, the people falling down and worshipping the host (i.e. adoration), and placing the host in a pix (Articles 7-9). He also mentioned the priest dividing the sacrament into three portions before receiving himself (Article 11), that whoever believes the sacrament to be a token or pledge—the standard Reformed interpretation—is a heretic (Article 12), and images (Article 14).[16]

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[13] Ranson counts fourteen, Morrissey fifteen, and McCullough seven. Angela Ranson, "The Challenge of Catholicity: John Jewel at Paul's Cross," in *Paul's Cross and the Culture of Persuasion*, eds. Torrance Kirby and P.G. Stanwood (Leiden, Boston: Brill, 2014), 203; Morrissey, *Politics and the Paul's Cross Sermons, 1558-1642*, 164; McCullough, *Sermons at Court*, 94.

[14] The term *individuum vagum* referenced an indefinite particular. E.J. Ashworth, "Singular Terms and Singular Concepts: From Buridian to the Early Sixteenth Century," in *John Buridian and Beyond: Topics in the Language Science, 1300-1700*, eds. Russell L. Friedman and Sten Ebbesen (Royal Danish Academy of Sciences and Letters, 2011), 127-128.

[15] Morrissey, "The 'Challenge Controversy' and the Question of Authority in the Elizabethan Church," 150.

[16] Thomas Harding, *An Answere to Maister Iuelles Chalenge* (Louvain, 1564; STC 2nd ed. 12758), sigs. A^{r-v}.

Interestingly, Harding also listed “that, [Christ’s] body is, or may be in a thousand places or mo, at one tyme.” This was an attack by Jewel on the doctrine of ubiquity, the theoretical underpinning for Luther’s sacramentology (as well as transubstantiation). It was a matter of fierce debate on the Continent between Reformed and Lutheran theologians throughout the sixteenth-century, and English divines were at pains to tell their Reformed Continental counterparts where they stood on the issue. Jewel repeatedly and fervently denied that ubiquitarianism was held among the English church to Vermigli. Bishop Parkhurst did the same in a letter to the Swiss theologian Josiah Simler.[17] In a sentence that frustrates a historian of the Reformation, Jewel relayed to Bullinger that he had written a vernacular book against the ubiquitarians and hoped to send him a portion of it; unfortunately this work has not (to my knowledge) been discovered and is likely lost.[18]

A close reading of the printed copy of the second sermon, however, reveals that Jewel slightly adjusted his agenda, mainly by dropping some of the more specific theological attacks against the mass and adding more practical and political talking points. Jewel claimed that he would “disadvantage” himself by passing over certain doctrines such as “transubstantiation” and “superstitious ceremonies of the mass” and instead “briefly” treat only “two or three points.” These were the use of Latin in the mass, communion in one kind, the canon, adoration of the sacrament, and the private mass (so five points, really).

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[17] See Jewel’s letters to Vermigli dated 6 Nov. 1560 and 7 Feb. 1562 as well as Parkhurst’s letter to Simler dated 7 Feb. 1574 in *Zurich Letters, First Series*, trans. and ed. Hastings Robinson (Cambridge: The University Press, 1842), 92-93, 100, 302.

[18] “Among other things, the ubiquitarian question is pressed upon me, which, for the sake of our old Tubingen friend, I have purposely treated of very copiously, to the best of my power, and as the subject required; but in our own language, as being intended for our own people.” Jewel to Bullinger, [1] March 1565, Jewel, *Works*, 4:1264. I would like to thank Karl Gunther for pointing me to this reference.

What is unusual about both sermons is the striking absence of the weighty theological issues that divided Roman Catholics and Protestants, especially justification by faith. This was noted by more than one of Jewel's opponents. Though ascertaining Jewel's precise thoughts behind this is impossible, it *does* reveal how the challenge sermon was preoccupied with immediate contextual concerns as much as larger Protestant-Catholic debates, if not more so. The sermon was self-consciously polemical, as Jewel attacked a variety of Catholic arguments, nearly all of which were anchored in practice. This, as Angela Ranson put it, "made difficult theological concepts real and relevant for his audience."[19]

Harding said as much in his *Answere* when he insisted that Jewel picked less important matters so that people would not see how weak Protestant arguments are in chief points of religion. He accused Jewel of a "shifte" and declared Jewel's articles, as put forth in the challenge sermon, were meant to be a distraction ("a bone to gnaw vpo[n]") from the major disagreements. Furthermore, that Jewel picked articles ostensibly of 'less' importance meant that he set the debate according to topics that the fathers spent less time thinking about. Harding declared that the articles

> be partly concerning order, rather then doctrine, and partly sequeles for former and co[n]fessed truthes, rather the[n] principall pointes of faith, in th'exact treatie of which, the auncie[n]t doctours of the churche haue not imployed their studie and trauaile of writing. For many of the[m] being sequeles depending of a confessed truth, they thought it needelesse to treate of them. For as much as a

[19] Ranson, "The Challenge of Catholicity: John Jewel at Paul's Cross," 219. See further Morrissey, "The 'Challenge Controversy' and the Question of Authority in the Elizabethan Church," 153-154. This should nuance Gary Jenkins' claim that "Many of the arguments Jewel used in treating the Mass apply to seeming minutiae, matters probably too arcane for the vast majority of the faithful in England to have contemplated, let alone considered at any length." Gary Jenkins, *John Jewel and the English National Church: The Dilemmas of an Erastian Reformer* (Aldershot; Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2006), 71.

principall point of truth graunted, the graunting of all the necessarie sequeles is implyed.[20]

Harding's critique also reveals an underlying intellectual fault line concerning tradition and authority that ran between Protestants and Catholics. For Harding and other Catholic controversialists, the received teaching of the Church provided enough epistemic authority to believe a doctrine, which was not the case for Protestants.[21] This point was buttressed with theological arguments such as the promise of the Holy Spirit keeping the true church from error and apostolic succession. However, that Harding reiterated what the earliest respondents to Jewel said—that the burden of proof was incumbent upon Protestants as the innovators—reveals that the conservative mindset of Catholics played out in the realm of academic disputation (in declaration of the inappropriateness of "negative" arguments by Protestants) as much as in theology.[22]

This point, unsurprisingly, was vigorously disputed by Protestants. The title page of Jewel's challenge sermon contains quotes from Tertullian and the Council of Nicaea regarding the superiority of ancient doctrines, and he opened the sermon with a forceful appeal to apostolicity, citing Jesus and St. Paul as the quintessential examples of returning to the original source of religion: the scriptures.[23] Jewel also repeatedly appealed directly to historical authorities that ran chronologically from Jesus and St. Paul to Gregory the Great. He did so giving the rhetorical impression that he was crying out to these authorities out of desperation and anguish over how far the church had strayed from its original state. It is possible Jewel is

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[20] Harding, *Answere*, fol. 3r. Henry Cole made similar criticisms, which are noted in the next chapter.
[21] Morrissey, *Politics and the Paul's Cross Sermons, 1558-1642*, 168-169.
[22] This is an especially prominent theme in John Rastell's *Replie* (1565) to Thomas Cooper's *Answere* (1562). See ch. 6.
[23] Jewel, *Works*, 1:3-4.

following Calvin here, who, in an extended treatment of why all communicants should receive both elements, called Gregory "the last bishop of Rome."[24] It is also possible that Jewel chose these parameters because Protestants determined sole receiving and papal supremacy—two of the most hated aspects of "popish" religion—as seventh-century developments.[25]

In another example, illustrative of the common humanist training these authors received (particularly in classical history), Jewel cited the example of the Roman consul Lucullus coming to save the Roman-allied city of Cyzicus from Mithridates. When the Roman forces arrived, Mithridates attempted to convince the citizens of Cyzicus that Lucullus' army was actually his. This, Jewel asserted, was precisely what Catholics did with tradition,[26] but he was confident that true Christians, like the citizens of Cycizus, will choose rightly: "But keep your hold: the doctors

[24] John Calvin, *Institutes of the Christian Religion*, trans. Henry Beveridge (Peabody, MA: Hendrickson Publishers, Inc., 2008), 4.17.49.
[25] Morrissey, "The 'Challenge Controversy' and the Question of Authority in the Elizabethan Church," 156-158.
[26] The siege of Cyzicus took place in 73 BCE and was part of the Third Mithridatic War. I have not, however, been able to locate this precise reference. Though Appian, Sallust, and Plutarch all discuss the skirmishes between Lucullus and Mithridates at Cyzicus, including Lucllus' crucial decision to cut off Mithridates' food lines, none mention the city inhabitants throwing bread over the wall. It's possible that Jewel confused two passages from Julius Frontinus' *Strategems*, the first a remarkable story of how Lucullus got a message to the Cyzicenes during the siege (also told by Sallust) and the second a mention of Romans, under siege by the Gauls, throwing bread over the wall to give the appearance of abundance, despite being in famine. The editor of the Loeb edition of the fragments of Sallust's *Histories* points out the similarities in language between Sallust's account of the siege of Cyzicus and Livy's language describing the siege of Rome by Gauls, which may also help explain Jewel's apparent conflation of the events. See Frontinus, *Stratagems. Aqueducts of Rome*, trans. C. E. Bennett, Mary B. McElwain (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1925; LCL 174), 3.13.6 and 3.15.1. See also Appian, *The Mithriadatic Wars*, in *Roman History, Volume II*, trans. Helen White (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1912; LCL 3), 10.71-11.77, Sallust, *Fragments of the Histories. Letters to Caesar*, ed. and trans. John T. Ramsey (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2015; LCL 522), 3.21-27, Plutarch, *Lucllus*, in *Lives, Volume II*, trans. Bernadotte Perrin (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1914; LCL 47), 8-11 (Plutarch wonders at Sallust's comment that the Romans had never seen camels before this), and Livy, *History of Rome, Volume III*, trans. B. O. Foster (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1924; LCL 172), 5.48 .

and old catholic fathers, in the points that I have spoken of, are yours: ye shall see the siege raised, ye shall see your adversaries discomfited and put to flight." The Pelagians tried to claim Augustine, Helvidius tried to claim Tertullian, Eutyches tried to claim Athanasius and Cyprian, Nestorius tried to claim the Council of Nicaea, Jewel asserted, but in the end they all stood against their alleged allies.[27]

Jewel self-consciously used a large number of Catholic historical sources in his arguments as a way to prove that the Catholic church had indeed become severely corrupted. However, he also carefully crafted his arguments for maximum rhetorical effect on his hearers. In the printed version of Jewel's second sermon from Paul's Cross, the discussion of transubstantiation is short and the topic is approached sideways, treated as a subpoint of adoration rather than attacking it head on. (In this way, Jewel technically didn't address the topic as he had promised, but still shrewdly chipped away at the doctrine's credibility in his audience's eyes.) Jewel, citing Scotus and William Durand, claimed that transubstantiation had been invented at Lateran IV (1215) to preclude the possibility that the people might commit idolatry by worshipping the bread instead of Christ *in* the bread, for if it really is Christ by way of transubstantiation, then idolatry is impossible.

Jewel continued his point about transubstantiation being invented as a preemptive measure against idolatry by lambasting the idea that such philosophical niceties could ever be taught to, or comprehended by, the average mass attendee:

> For, alas, how many of them understand these distinctions, or care for them? How many of them understand after what sort *accidentia* may be *sine subjecto*?...or what is the difference between *substantia* and *accidens*? Or what priest, when he went to mass, ever taught the people to know these things, and to avoid the danger? Undoubtedly, I could never yet perceive by any reading, either of the scriptures or else of other profane writings, but that the people of all ages hath

[27] Jewel, *Works*, 1:22.

> evermore been readier to receive idolatry than to learn the distinctions and quiddities of logic or philosophy.[28]

Jewel's approach in critiquing transubstantiation is an excellent example of how Jewel catered his sermon to a decidedly lay audience. It also illustrates how Elizabethan polemicists on both sides were forced to reckon with the relationship between 'worldly' learning and spiritual truths. This dynamic proved thorny for both Protestants and Catholics for each had to confess that certain spiritual realities were beyond comprehension while, at the same time, holding firm that their arguments could be demonstrably proven using the academic methods of the day. In this particular instance, Jewel, reflecting humanist critiques of scholastic theology, painted Catholic technicalities about subjects and accidents as overly obscure, pastorally unhelpful, and spiritually dangerous.

What was true about transubstantiation as a subpoint approached sideways is even truer for papal supremacy, which might barely even be called a subpoint in the challenge sermon. Jewel did not mention papal supremacy in his recitation of the points from the first challenge sermon, and he doesn't include it in the list of topics for this one, either. Instead, it comes up after Jewel has continued to recite Catholic explanations of how the sacrament may be worshipped without committing idolatry—as proof that in the "highest and heavenliest point of religion, that is, in the worshipping of God, they themselves know not what they do"—which he used to transition into a litany of other Catholic arguments so that the listeners (and readers) may have a taste of both Protestant and Catholic opinions and decide for themselves: a hallmark of sixteenth-century academic disputation.

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[28] Jewel, *Works*, 1:11-12. See above.

He then cited no less than two dozen Catholic arguments, all arranged syllogistically (excepting one mathematical argument), which include multiple arguments for the pope's supremacy over the temporal ruler: the 'two lights' theory, a mathematical equation calculating the how many times greater the pope's dignity is than the emperor's, a teleological argument from singular origin (i.e. there was one beginning, therefore there is one ruler), and the 'two swords' theory. The entire section, however, contains many other Catholic arguments, including (but not limited to) a defense of Latin, purple sandals for priests, and holy water. Jewel, who meticulously cited his sources, ranging from Boniface VIII to John Fisher, apparently thought these were self-evidently absurd, for he didn't bother explaining them.

Though this brief analysis may feel tangential, Jewel's approach was strategic. By putting Catholic arguments into syllogistic form again, he set himself up for a comprehensive assault on the mass planned for maximum rhetorical effectiveness. It's not hard to imagine the impression of such an approach on the hearers: if the more than twenty syllogisms just given aren't true, then how could these other ones be? Jewel's approach of piling up 'false' evidence was, as will be seen, a common strategy among polemicists in both camps: reducing your opponent's arguments down into refutable syllogisms, if not absurdities, makes the task of disproving your enemy much simpler as it created an "impression of unreliability."[29] And while papal supremacy may not have been a conspicuous element of the challenge sermon, Jewel made sure to paint Henry Cole as a thoroughgoing "papist" in their epistolary exchange (discussed in the next chapter), again illustrating that polemical works addressed broad overarching debates, but were

[29] Morrissey, *Politics and the Paul's Cross Sermons, 1558-1642*, 169. Although Morrissey's immediate point was about misquoting and mistranslating the fathers, the same applied to any form of argumentation and was used universally by controversialists.

also profoundly influenced by immediate contextual concerns that could change at a moment's notice.

Portraying Moderation in Jewel's challenge sermon

Not only did Jewel intentionally structure his challenge sermon in academic format, he was also insistent throughout that he was restrained and moderate in his approach. Like so many other polemicists, this rhetorical strategy was cast both as consideration of the reader, usually through claims to brevity, and a moral quality. For instance, Jewel demonstrated an awareness of and sensitivity to the reader's (or listener's) attention span. Early on when discussing all the purported "abuses of the mass" Jewel informed his audience, "Of these errors I have intended somewhat to entreat at this time; not of all, for that would be an infinite labour, but of so many, and so far forth, as the time shall suffer me." This came with the added bonus of being able to flatter the audience's intelligence; not many words were needed since the falsities of Catholicism were so obvious:

> Of these things I am content to disadvantage myself at this time, and briefly to touch two or three points…And of these things I intend to speak, although not so largely, and with so many words as the cause would require; yet, by God's grace, so simply and so truly, that whoso will be moved with truth or reason shall soon perceive there have been abuses in it, yet were it worthy to be spoken of, and to be amended. But if we shall plainly see with our eyes that all the errors and disorders, besides a great number else, which I willingly pass by, have been in the mass, O good brethren, let us not think that so many godly men in these our days have spoken against it without cause.[30]

Later, Jewel cited a number of ancient authorities as proof that there was no private mass in the first 600 years of the church's life including Clemens, Dionysius the Areopagite, Justin Martyr, Ambrose, Jerome, Augustine, the *Ecclesiastical History*, and Pope Leo. These, Jewel

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[30] Jewel, *Works*, 1:8.

proclaimed, are only a sampling of the many others who make against the Catholic "private mass": "I leave out other authorities for shortness sake; for it would be too long to say as much herein as might be said."[31]

Moderation, however, was not just a matter of catering to the audience; it was, more importantly, a matter of moral credibility. For instance, when Jewel highlighted numerous arguments for papal supremacy for his audience, he did so with supposed reticence from fear of appearing immoderate: "Loth I am here to rip up and open unto you the high mysteries and secrets of their learning, and the force and strength of their reasons." However, such sharp honesty was necessary, for "the importunity of them forceth me so to do, that, after ye have once taken as well some taste of their arguments, as ye have of ours, ye may the better and more indifferently judge of both."[32] Though it is highly unlikely that Jewel actually felt remorse about 'exposing' Catholic falsehoods for his audience, the connection between his projection of moderation and the 'indifferent' presentation of argument for the audience highlights the intimate relationship between moderation and intellectual credibility among Elizabethan polemicists.

Later in the sermon Jewel declared to his audience that he was naming so many authorities against Catholics so that "ye may the more marvel at the wilfulness of such men" who stubbornly ignore that the fathers, doctors, the primitive church, and the "plain words of the holy scriptures" all make against them. Such an act, Jewel insisted, was not tainted by malicious motives or rhetorical embellishment: "And when I say, no one, I speak not this in vehemency of spirit, or heat of talk, but even as before God, by the way of simplicity and truth; lest any of you

[31] Jewel, *Works*, 1:18
[32] Jewel, *Works*, 1:13-14.

should happily be deceived, and think there is more weight in the other side, than in conclusion there shall be found." Later, Jewel asserted that though the Catholics claim doctors, councils and history as on their side, when they are called to provide their proofs "they shall open their hands and find nothing." Jewel defended such accusatory rhetoric as a matter of Christian charity and obligation before God: "I speak this not of arrogancy (thou, Lord, knowest it best, that knowest all things); but, forsasmuch as it is God's cause and the truth of God, I should do God great injury if I should conceal it."[33]

Another critical element of moderation was ensuring that unbridled zeal did not allow the reader (or listener) to be carried away into heterodoxy or heresy. As noted in the Introduction, the virtue of self-restraint emerged in early modern England as proof of epistemic authority, though most often in connection with burgeoning notions of science in the early seventeenth-century. However, this was an integral part of the religious debates in Elizabethan England, evidenced in Jewel's final appeal to his audience. Jewel implored his audience not "wilfully to be led away" and "run not blindly to your own confusion." Instead, consider "that so many of your brethren rather suffered themselves to die, and to abide all manner extremity and cruelty" rather than partake in the mass. He then adjusted to a more rational appeal: "Be not ruled by your wilful affections. Ye have a good zeal and mind towards God: have it according to unto the knowledge of God. The Jews had a zeal of God, and yet they crucified the Son of God. Search the scriptures: there shall ye find everlasting life. There shall ye learn to judge yourselves and your own doings, that ye be not judged of the Lord."[34] Jewel's appeal to the audience served two purposes. First, it created an intentional juxtaposition that clearly demarcated the two parties participating in

[33] Jewel, *Works*, 1:20 and 22.
[34] Jewel, *Works*, 1:25.

religious debate and the inherent truthfulness of their arguments—the impassioned and irrational Catholics, who cruelly burned innocent Protestants, and the moderate and learned Protestants, who presented both sides indifferently so that the hearer (or reader) may decide for him- or herself. Second, in the spirit of disputation, Jewel was appealing to a third party to adjudicate based on rational argument, once again underscoring the disputative mentality that permeated early Elizabethan controversial writings.[35]

The Rhetoric of Abuse in Jewel's challenge sermon

Abusive language in Jewel's challenge sermon is virtually non-existent, though for very strategic reasons. It should be remembered that this was first a public oration, and Jewel likely would not have done himself any favors by viciously attacking his Catholic opponents who were already in a precarious position and likely had a substantial amount of public sympathy. Furthermore, this is the beginning of the exchange. In both Jewel and other polemicists, the level of acrimony seems directly related to how thin their patience had worn with their 'obstinate' opponent. Because this is the first volley, moderation is plentiful and vitriol is scarce.

The common trope of abuse in the challenge sermon was spiritual pride. A classic vice in the Christian tradition,[36] pride was perceived to having a blinding effect that prevented the

[35] See also Ranson, "The Challenge of Catholicity: John Jewel at Paul's Cross," 213-214.
[36] Pride and its antithesis, humility, are common themes of the Hebrew Bible, especially the wisdom literature, and remained an important theme in the writings of the New Testament. Human pride was sometimes connected to 'worldly' learning and frequently described in opposition to divine wisdom, which was considered to operate in ways beyond human comprehension. (See, for example, Ps. 138:6; Prov. 3:34, 29:23; Is. 55:8-9; Matt. 23:12; 1 Cor. 8:1; Col. 2:8; Js. 4:6.) Pride remained a much-discussed vice in the Christian tradition. Augustine gave it special attention in *On Nature and Grace*, which formed a portion of Aquinas' discussion of it in his *Summa*. Augustine, *On Nature and Grace*, in *A Select Library of the Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, First Series, Vol. V: Saint Augustin's Anti-Pelagian Writings*, trans. Peter Holmes and Robert Ernest Wallis, rev. Benjamin B. Warfield (Edinburgh: T&T Clark; Grand

prideful opponent from seeing their own errors. Interestingly, sixteenth-century Jewish authors also saw the confessional violence that resulted from the Reformation as a stemming from Christian pride, evidenced in their treatment of the Jews.[37]

Jewel advertised this immediately in the carefully crafted opening of his sermon. He began with a citation of 1 Cor. 16:23, where St. Paul told the Corinthian church that he delivered them to them what he had received directly from Jesus. But after Paul was forced to leave the Corinthian church, "false prophets, men full of pride and vain glory" took advantage of Paul's absence "to mislike the gospel of Christ that they had received at St Paul's hand" and "missense the sacraments."[38] Jewel then elucidated the apostolic plan for reform: "For a redress hereof he calleth them back to the first original, and to the institution of Christ, from whence they were fallen…Thus, whensoever any order given by God is broken or abused, the best redress thereof is to restore it again into the state that it first was in at the beginning."[39]

The parallel between Paul's instructions to return to institutions of Christ and what Protestants were attempting to do through reform directly implicated the Catholics as "false prophets, men full of pride and vain glory." This pride was most clearly manifested in creating 'manmade' traditions and elevating them above biblical doctrines. For instance, after citing the plural language in the mass book as proof that communion is not meant to be received by the priest alone, Jewel turned on arguments that interpret this plural language in other ways without shying away from castigating such opinions as nonsense:

Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 1887; repr. 1987), 121-151 (chs. 32-36); Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologica. First Complete American Edition. In Three Volumes*, trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province (New York: Benziger Brothers, 1947), II-II, Q. 62, Art. 1-8.

[37] Jerome Friedman, "The Reformation in Alien Eyes: Jewish Perceptions of Christian Troubles." *The Sixteenth Century Journal*, Vol. 14, No. 1 (1983): 30.

[38] Jewel, *Works*, 1:3.

[39] Jewel, *Works*, 1:3-4.

> And thereof have idle heads of late time fancied out many mystical follies; as though one part thereof were offered from them that be in heaven, the other for them that, they say, be in purgatory, the third for them that be alive. These be phantasies and very follies, without any ground either of the holy scriptures, or of the doctors, or of the old catholic church.[40]

Relatedly, this pride also manifested itself in stubborn and conscious resistance to 'true' religion, as found in scriptures and throughout Christian history, per Protestant interpretations. Jewel (in a passage noted above) went to great lengths to communicate this to his audience:

> And that ye may more marvel at the wilfulness of such men, they stand this day against so many old fathers, so many doctors, so many examples of the primitive church, so manifest and so plain words of the holy scriptures; and yet they have herein not one father, not one doctor, not one allowed example of the primitive church to make for them.[41]

Though the absence of abusive rhetoric in Jewel's challenge sermon may seem trivial, it's actually quite important to note, for it underscores two points. The first (as mentioned) is that Jewel's challenge sermon was the initial salvo—the spark that ignited an already combustible situation created by the fiasco of the Westminster conference—and thus it was critical for Jewel to present himself as moderate and civil as 'proof' of his position. Second, the lack of abusive rhetoric illustrates the dialogic nature of these texts, as this was the starting point. The mushrooming effect created by the print exchanges naturally increased the amount of polemic put into print, but it also added to the authors' acerbity. There was a perceived growth to the need to discredit their opponents as thoroughly as possible, which created the theoretical justification for such language, which was not generally not permissive in academic discourse. In other words, when rational and academic discourse did not work, then sharper language was called for in order to 'awaken' the opponent to the error of their ways.

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[40] Jewel, *Works*, 1:18.
[41] Jewel, *Works*, 1:20.

Conclusion

Jewel's challenge sermon—in reality preached three different times—was the spark that ignited an already combustible situation and fueled the print exchanges that followed Westminster, and the content of Jewel's sermon reveals that the substance was tailored to his audience. In the sermon(s), Jewel concentrated on attacking Catholic practices that would've been readily known by his hearers rather than more abstract doctrines, which he dismissed as self-evidently false. He primarily did this by assembling large numbers of Catholic arguments and then framing them as obviously untruthful and deceitful, which he did in order to create a cumulative rhetorical effect on his hearers. Jewel's sermon, however, was also structured as an academic exercise, as he methodically responded to potential objections regarding well-known topics, such as whether or not the mass can be abused.

After Jewel iterated his challenge to Catholics to prove that any number of their 'key' beliefs existed within the first 600 years of the church's existence, Catholics responded with gusto. The first, however, came in a slightly different form. This was the very short and restrained letter from Henry Cole asking Jewel precisely how he justified arguing from the negative when he was the innovator. A lengthy exchange grew from this letter, though the vast majority of the material—disputative and otherwise—is from Jewel, who was in a much safer position than his Catholic debate partner. Their exchange, as recorded in *The True Copie of Letters* (1560) is the subject of the next chapter.

CHAPTER 5

HUMBLE BEGINNINGS: *THE TRUE COPIES OF THE LETTERS*

> If happily it shall like you to write any more than the places, which ye account will thoroughly prove your opinion, I pray you do it rather *dialectice* than otherwise. For the weight of these matters more requireth learning than words.[1]
>
> Cole's first letter to John Jewel

Context

In response to Jewel's third iteration of the challenge sermon, Henry Cole penned a response that generated a substantial epistolary exchange between the two, although Jewel held a distinct advantage over his opponent due to their very different political positions. This is evident in both the length and nature of their arguments. The exchange took place between late March and May 1560, mostly between late March and early April, and it ended rather unceremoniously. Cole sent his first letter, which was quite short, to Jewel on 18 March (untitled in the printed versions). Jewel responded with his "The Bishop of Sarisburies's Answer unto the Letter Afore Written" on 20 March, which was also brief. This was followed by "Doctor Cole's Second Letter to the Bishop of Sarum" on 24 March, then "The Answer of John Bishop of Sarum unto Doctor Cole's Second Letter" on 29 March. Next came Cole's final letter, "Doctor Cole's Answer to Certain Parcels of the Second Letters of the Bishop of Sarum" on 8 April.

The final two pieces published, both by Jewel, indicate that Protestant attempts to manipulate Catholic public image were far from over. The first is the short "A Letter Sent from the Bishop of Sarum to Doctor Cole; where he requireth of him a true and a full copy of the former answer," dated 22 July from Shirburne. The second is the lengthy "The Reply of the

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[1] John Jewel, *Works*, ed. John Ayre, vol. 1 (Cambridge: The University Press, 1845), 26

Bishop of Sarum to the Letter Above Written; which D. Cole, contrary to even dealing, had given out and sent abroad, not to the said bishop to whom he wrote it, but privily and secretly unto certain of his own friends," dated 18 May.

That the latter work predates the former indicates that Jewel was working on the "Reply" well before he sent his 'request' to Cole for a response and back-dated it (reinforced by the amount of time it would have taken to write something as lengthy as the "Reply"). This is likely because Jewel anticipated Cole would not respond and had his "Reply" ready to print as soon as he felt he had given the appearance of waiting a fair amount of time for Cole to respond. However, in a grim turn of events, Cole was committed to the Tower on 20 May.[2] One cannot help but speculate that Jewel knew what was coming for Cole and intentionally timed the publication of his "Reply" so that it would go unanswered, thus granting unqualified 'victory' to the Protestant cause.[3] Furthermore, Jewel's "Reply" took a decidedly disputative turn in the epistolary exchange by adopting the format so common to controversial works of quoting

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[2] John Strype, *Annals of the Reformation and Establishment of Religion, And Other Various Occurrences in the Church of England, during Queen Elizabeth's Happy Reign*, vol. 1 (London: Tho. Edlin, 1725), 148. Privy Council records note that Cole appeared 12 May 1559 to fulfil his recognizance. His name does not appear again until 28 July 1562, when is noted as a prisoner in the Fleet (along with several others). The records in-between 12 May 1559 and 28 May 1562 these dates have been lost. *Acts of the Privy Council* (London: Public Records Office, 1893-1894), vol. 7, 103, 119.

[3] It was often assumed that whoever had the last word in public print exchanges was the victor, as happened with puritans in the Cartwright-Whitgift exchange in the Admonition controversy. Martin Marprelate taunted in *The Epistle*, "It is a shame for your grace John of Cant. that Cartwright's books have been now a dozen years almost unanswered: you first provoked him to write, and you first have received the foil. If you can answer those books, why do you suffer the puritans to insult and rejoice at your silence? If you cannot, why are you an archbishop?" *The Martin Marprelate Tracts: A Modernized and Annotated Edition*, ed. Joseph L. Black (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 8.

arguments verbatim (both his own earlier writings and Cole's response) in order to fulfill the academic meticulousness expected of such literature.

There are a few aspects of this exchange that are important to note. First, Cole's approach was incredibly measured. He never went beyond pushing against Jewel's (and Protestant's) claims to the "negative" position in the debate as forcefully articulated in the challenge sermon. Some have argued that Jewel's "negative" arguments in the challenge sermon, which set the terms for the debate for years to come, actually put Jewel on the offensive, not the defensive in these debates.[4] This is only partially true, though: Jewel was actually doing *both*, which is why Cole (and others) incessantly complained that Jewel was effectually cheating by trying to assume both the positive and negative positions in the debate. Cole claimed that because Protestants were not actually in possession of the negative, then Jewel's arguments were academically invalid.[5] (This is explored more fully below.) He also repeatedly appealed to his recognizance as reason why he could not say more. In the first letter (which was remarkably short, barely a page long in the Parker Society volume), Cole didn't say any more than that Protestants had not, despite their boasts, satisfactorily answered Catholic arguments. As the exchange wore on, however, the rhetorical heat increased, particularly on Jewel's part (which is not surprising given his protected status)

Cole's cautious approach is connected to the second notable element of the exchange, namely that both Cole and Jewel were both highly preoccupied with establishing the apostolic

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[4] Angela Ranson, "The Challenge of Catholicity: John Jewel at Paul's Cross," in *Paul's Cross and the Culture of Persuasion*, eds. Torrance Kirby and P.G. Stanwood (Leiden, Boston: Brill, 2014), 210-211.
[5] See also Mary Morrissey, "The 'Challenge Controversy' and the Question of Authority in the Elizabethan Church," in *The Search for Authority in Reformation Europe*, eds. Helen Parish, Elaine Fulton, and Peter Webster (Farnham, Surrey; Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2014), 153.

continuity of their respective churches. In the case of Cole, when the church didn't mirror the apostolic church exactly, it was either because the Catholic church wasn't bound to the example of the primitive church or had the authority to alter ritual. This is worth highlighting because, as has already been noted, the argument over which side was in continuance with history was the side possessing the "negative" and was therefore the defendant in the debate, thus making their task much easier than the plaintiff's (i.e. the religious innovator), who bore the burden of proof. After Westminster, this is the second appearance of this particular intellectual fault line running through these debates that doomed them from the start.

Finally, both men perceived their epistolary exchange in direct continuity with the disputation at Westminster. Despite the fact that the conference dissolved almost exactly a year ago by this point, the controversy over what happened had not gone away. Catholics were still fuming at how they had been treated and, understandably, felt compelled to vindicate themselves by proving that their Protestant opponents were intellectually inferior, evidenced in their manipulation of the conference towards appearance of political victory. Protestants, on the other hand, still pointed to Catholic behavior at the conference as proof of both their unsavory character and inability to intellectually substantiate their arguments.

Below, the letters between Cole and Jewel are analyzed thematically by examining the academic structuring and tone, the authors' insistence on moderation, and the language of abuse. Because these letters were some of the earliest printed works following Westminster, *The True Copies of the Letters* has much more material in the academic vein than that of abuse, though Jewel was secure enough in his political position to make a fair number of sarcastic comments towards Cole, mostly regarding the substance of Catholic arguments. Furthermore, because of Cole's precarious status and Jewel's political privilege, Jewel produced much more literature and

also had much more latitude in what he could say, thus the disproportionate degree of focus on Jewel in this chapter.

That their exchange was in response to the Westminster conference and Jewel's challenge sermon is evident immediately. In his first letter, Cole asked Jewel why his sermon at court ("and at all other times in at Paul's Cross") had not addressed weightier theological matters that divided Protestants and Catholics: "Yet one thing more I long much to be answered in, why ye rather offer both in your sermon yesterday in the court, and at all other times at Paul's Cross, to dispute in these four points, than in the chief matters that lie in question betwixt the church of Rome and the protestants." It would be more sensible, Cole continued, to start with more contentious issues than with matters "which we deny not but a general council might take order that they should be practised as ye would have it." The real questions that divide Protestants and Catholics, Cole stated, are the presence of Christ's body and blood in the sacrament, justification, good works, the mass, prayer of the saints, adoration of saints, etc. Cole then proffered his own summary of Jewel's main points from the sermon as they had been reported to him: transubstantiation, communion under one kind, the use of Latin in ecclesiastical offices, and sole receiving of the priest. In response, Jewel stated that it was evident Cole had not actually been present at his sermon for the intermediary had "altered the whole form of my speaking."[6]

Both men, but Jewel especially, also made frequent connections back to the challenge sermon and the Westminster conference, again illustrating the porous divide between oral and print disputation. For instance, Jewel wrote in the *Reply*, "For at Paul's cross I required of you, or any of you, to shew the grounds of your religion, if you had any, that by indifferent

[6] Jewel, *Works*, 1: 27.

conference the truth might better appear."[7] In his first letter, Jewel reminded Cole on multiple occasions that he had "stood only upon the negative," which Cole himself had said was impossible to prove at the conference.[8]

Cole's binding recognizance was another recurring theme, as Cole claimed it prevented him from entering into a full and open debate with Jewel. Jewel smugly remarked to Cole that he wished Elizabeth would release him from his recognizance so that he would provide proofs and then asked, "But when ye were at liberty, and a free disputation was offered you at Westminster before the queen's most honourable council and the whole estate of the realm, I pray you, whether part was it that then gave over? And yet then you know ye were not bound."[9] He declared to Cole that his recognizance had nothing to do with his ability to dispute but was rather punishment "for your disobedience and contempt."[10] Elsewhere Jewel caustically commented, "Belike you have forgotten wherefore you with all your company not long since openly refused to enter disputation with us at Westminster."[11] Jewel also complained of Cole's (apparent) patronizing tone at the conference as an effort to make Protestants appear intellectually inferior to their Catholic counterparts: "But this is your old wont, to make the people think that we read nothing else but two-penny doctors, as you call them. As, in the disputation at Westminster, ye would seem to stand in doubt whether we were able to understand you or no, when ye speak a little Latin." Jewel also claimed that Cole argued out of Justinian at Westminster that ignorance was the true mother of devotion, which happened to be one of Protestants' favorite attacks on

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[7] Jewel, *Works*, 1:41.
[8] Jewel, *Works*, 1:27; see also 71.
[9] Jewel, *Works*, 1:34.
[10] Jewel, *Works*, 1:71.
[11] Jewel, *Works*, 1:35.

Catholics.[12] Lastly, Jewel disputed Cole's claim that Catholics didn't have time to prepare for the disputation, sarcastically observing, "Ye could not lightly have gotten so many untruths together without some study." He insisted that the failure of the conference lay with the Catholics who didn't abide by the rules, which they clearly knew: even "your own friend" the Archbishop of York had rebuked the Catholic party for obstructing the proceedings.[13]

Furthering the connection between disputative literature and oral disputations, Jewel also harkened back to the Oxford disputations as an attack on Catholics for both academic disingenuity and resorting to force. In reference to the fate of Archbishop Cranmer Jewel wrote,

> I remember what a clapping of hands and stamping of feet ye made at Oxon against that notable godly learned man, the archbishop of Canterbury, for that he, alleging a place out of St Hilary, had changed but one letter, and written *vero* instead of *vere*. Ye triumphed over him, and pointed him to the people, and called him a falsary, a wrester, a corrupter of the doctors. And yet afterward it was found, and will yet appear, that two of your own doctors, Stephen Gardiner and Smith, in their own printed books had changed the same letter, and written *vero*, as well as he.[14]

References to the Marian martyrs, and the Oxford martyrs in particular, were not uncommon in Jewel (discussed below). They were a direct response to Catholic complaints of Elizabethan Protestants' *politique* as evidence that Catholics would do (and did) the same and worse when they had the upper hand. Furthermore, the debate over the changing of one letter in one Latin word evidences the earnestness that polemicists invested in their literary duels.

Though Jewel leveraged much more out of the Westminster conference than Cole, the Catholic still pointed back to it a few times. He recounted to Jewel that at the conference, "We brought more than ye were able to answer, all were it no scriptures, nor councils, nor doctors."

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[12] Jewel, *Works*, 1:52-53, 57.
[13] Jewel, *Works*, 1:59-60.
[14] Jewel, *Works*, 1:53.

Shortly after he complained that Catholics were not allowed to read their book "indifferently" as Protestants had been, and did not refuse to dispute but rather balked at the obvious favor shown Protestants at the dispute. He also reminded Jewel of a reference he read to him at the conference out of Ambrose proving that the church was not bound by example.[15]

Disputative Method in *The True Copies of the Letters*

Logic

The letters between Jewel and Cole are an interesting case of the complex relationship between print and oral disputation, for they begin with an ostensibly meek inquiry into the nature of debate by Cole—especially negative proofs—but quickly expand into more detailed arguments, culminating in Jewel's "Reply," which is thoroughly disputative in tone and structure. In his first letter, Cole immediately appealed to Jewel to make sure that he followed the method of dialectic in their debate: "If happily it shall like you to write any more than the places, which ye account will thoroughly prove your opinion, I pray you do it rather *dialectice* than otherwise. For the weight of these matters more requireth learning than words."[16]

Jewel's immediate response was to once again fall back on the negative: "For I stood only upon the negative, which, as you said, when time was, in the disputation that should have been at Westminster, is not possible to be proved." The fact was, Jewel insisted, that Catholics could not bring forth a single authority to prove a number of points both doctrinal and practical (such as private mass, communion in one kind, common prayers in a strange tongue, papal supremacy, transubstantiation, and multiple masses in one day).[17]

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[15] Jewel, *Works*, 1:36, 38, 39.
[16] Jewel, *Works*, 1:26.
[17] Jewel, *Works*, 1:27-28.

Jewel also replied to Cole's query about why he didn't begin with more substantial issues. The reason, Jewel declared, was "not for that I doubted in any of the premises" but rather to select issues that "might have at least some colour or shadow of the doctors." (Though, as I argued in the last chapter, the reasons were surely more complex than that.) Jewel imagined that after proving Catholics demonstrate the points of contention from the fathers, then "afterward I am well content to travail with you farther in the rest." He then came back to the negative again: "But to conclude as I began, I answer that in these articles I hold only the negative, and therefore I look how you will be able to affirm the contrary, and that, as I said afore, by sufficient authority. Which if ye do not, you shall cause me the more to be resolved, and others to stand the more in doubt of the rest of your learning."[18]

In his second letter, Cole once again tried to reclaim the presumption that Catholics were in possession of the negative and it was therefore incumbent upon Protestants to prove their arguments. Because Jewel would "not to give any account thereof, or to satisfy any that doubteth," Cole appealed to their academic training as proof that his opponent had run afoul of procedure:

> And there you bid me allege to the contrary and disprove your saying; which neither reason nor law can drive me to. Reason, because, the doctrine being yet doubtful, and standing upon proof, the teacher should first approve it unto such as doubt. Which the custom of learning in all universities proveth true; where the opponent, when the matter is denied, as your doctrine is by us, allegeth for that part which he would have seem true. And you take on you to disprove that doctrine, which long time hath been received. Evermore, when any man professed a reformation of doctrine, as you do, the reformer hath ever alleged causes why they so did, and so take in hand to prove that they taught, against such as did and would think otherwise.[19]

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[18] Jewel, *Works*, 1:28.
[19] Jewel, *Works*, 1:29.

In addition to their university training that dictated the rules of disputation, Cole appealed Jewel's standing as a bishop (discussed below). Just because you are a bishop, Cole insisted, it does not mean you can only speak "by protestation." The person or place "maketh no difference who should prove or disprove."

> You have not, I ween, all forgot the trade in Oxford, which you and I were brought up in. In schools of philosophy a master of art is the highest degree; where the master is rather put to oppose than to answer. And likewise in divinity, in ordinary disputation, the doctor opposeth, the meaner man answereth.

Why, Cole asked, should a bishop be any different? St. Paul said that a bishop must be able to teach, and it is a rule that bishops "be ready to give an account of their belief."[20] Cole's weaving together of their shared education at Oxford with Pauline injunctions relevant to ecclesiastical office is illustrative of the overlapping academic and theological languages of polemicists.

Jewel responded to Cole's recurring appeals to procedure by chastising his opponent, both for his understanding of how disputation worked as well as his own 'illogical' thinking. For instance, in his rejoinder to Cole's second letter, he first countered Cole's accusation that he "fly answering because I am a bishop," by declaring a flaw in Cole's thinking: "This in logic is called *Paralogismus, a non causa ut causa*."[21] He then took a rather creative (but no doubt efficient) tack by arguing that Jesus himself used the negative when debating the Pharisees, while also pointing them back to the original sources of their religion—Abraham [John 8:40] and creation [Matt. 19:8]. Furthermore, Jewel argued, when the bishop of Constantinople took upon himself the title "universal bishop of the whole church," Gregory "reasoned then as we do now, only upon [the] negative."[22] Cole, however, denied this to be the case: Gregory used the negative

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[20] Jewel, *Works*, 1:29. Cole likely had Titus 1:9 in mind.
[21] Jewel, *Works*, 1:31; see also 43.
[22] Jewel, *Works*, 1:33.

"because none of his forefathers ever used the title;" therefore, "[t]his part of Gregory serveth no whit to disprove the sovereignty; as Driedo will teach you, if you vouchsafe to read him."[23]

Their shared experience as Oxford men likely explains the propensity evident in both to cite Aristotle, but it also made their exchanges quite personal. In response to Cole questioning both his skills and motivation in using logic, Jewel retorted,

> Ye call me a smatterer in logic, as if yourself were as perfect in logic as Aristotle. And yet I remember well, I understood as much logic as this cometh to, and some deal more, for twenty years ago, ye wis when you, by your own report, were but a simple smatterer in divinity. Neither did I bring it in for a shew of skill, as you say, but to declare your oversight and lack of skill, which appeareth now not only in divinity, but also in logic.

Shortly after, Jewel pounced on Cole's request from his first letter (which had been repeated multiple times by now) that they dispute dialectically. Jewel 'reminded' Cole that Aristotle "giveth order to the opponent in many cases to require an instant of the respondent, as I do now at your hands. And what is that else but in denial to defend the negative, and to drive the adversary to avouch the affirmative?"[24] After reprinting Cole's encouragement that Jewel "read again" the passage from the *Topics*, for Aristotle was speaking of when men disputing *dialectice* ("in such sort as we do not"), Jewel acidly remarked:

> I never thought it had been so high a mystery to understand the nature of an instant. Children were wont to have it in their common disputations in the parvise schools in Oxford. If it serve only for them that dispute *dialectice*, and ye (as ye pretend) bear the person only of a learner, and come not to dispute; why then did ye allege against me the custom of the schools, and the disputations of masters of art in the universities? Ye know they use there to dispute only *dialectice*, and none otherwise. And that I speak herein, I speak only upon occasion of your own words. How shall I think ye remember your Aristotle, if ye so soon forget your own letters?[25]

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[23] Jewel, *Works*, 1:37.
[24] Jewel, *Works*, 1:47-48.
[25] Jewel, *Works*, 1:48.

This passage is interesting for another reason, though, namely that Jewel took a wholly different line than Bacon did as the Westminster conference was falling apart. In response to White and Watson's insistence that they keep the "schoole order," Bacon remarked, "I wonder much at it, sythe diuers of those orders are oft tymes taken for the exercise of youth," which was not the purpose of the conference; rather, they were there "to keepe the order of God."[26] Jewel turned this on its head, declaring to his opponent that the proper disputation allowed for requiring evidence of defendant, a point taught to children in "the parvise schools in Oxford." And, if you are so insistent on being a "learner," Jewel asked Cole, "why then did ye allege against me the custom of the schools, and the disputations of masters of art in the universities?" Bacon's minimization of the importance of procedure in university disputation as childish in comparison to the business of religious truth and Jewel's declaration that proper disputation was so important (and simple) that it's taught to children are not wholly contradictory, but are illustrative of the idiosyncratic ways in which polemicists went about their work.

Elsewhere, Cole appealed to law (his own specialty) as further academic proof that Jewel was debating improperly. Legally, Cole argued, no one is ever required to prove what has long been accepted. He compared Jewel to one who taunts a man to strike him when he is "bound hand and foot." Catholics are the learners, and Jewel bears the burden of teaching: "[w]e are defendants, and ye the plantiffs." Catholics, he continued, are simply maintaining what has always been passed down, the faith which they were baptized in. As the innovator, Jewel is responsible for providing proof—not Catholics. "We make no innovation; for, *in rebus novis*

[26] John Foxe, *Actes and Monuments* (London, 1563; STC 2nd ed. 11222), 1725.

constitudendís, saith the law, *evidens debet esse utilitas*; and all new attempts are to be suspected."[27]

Cole's argument here is again illustrative of the deep and diverse intellectual pool from which controversialists drew. In this case, Cole's quotation of the Roman jurist Ulpian was part of an attack on Jewel that essentially accused him of trying to have his cake and eat it too: it's not right, Cole insisted, to attack Catholics and tradition while also claiming the privilege of being the defendant.[28]

> We are in possession: ye come to put us from it. Ye mean to draw us to you: we desire to know cause why. What reason leadeth you to put a negative in question thereby to grieve your adversary (yet have you none of me, for I seek on you to be taught)? where in law a person assaulted can be put to no more but to defend. Where a negative implieth in it a yea, or affirmation, there the plantiff is put to his proof.[29]

Another common disputative element of these exchanges was the use of an opponents' sources against them. Here, the Protestants were at a distinct advantage, as they had over a millennium of material to pull from. In an exchange over transubstantiation, Cole had accused Jewel of not being well-read. Jewel did not take this kindly, retorting to Cole, "How are ye so privy to my reading. Wise men avouch no more than they know: ye lacked a shift when ye were driven to write thus." He then continued on, assuring Cole "that I have not been so slack a student these twenty years," reading not only various ancient authors but also authors "of your

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[27] Jewel, *Works*, 1:29-30.
[28] "In the establishing of new things, usefulness ought to be apparent." *The Digest of Justinian*, ed. Alan Watson, 4 vols. (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2009), 1.4.2. Ulpian's dictum was also cited by Aquinas. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologica. First Complete American Edition. In Three Volumes*, trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province (New York: Benziger Brothers, 1947), I-II Q. 97 Art. 2.
[29] Jewel, *Works*, 1:30.

side," naming Roffensis,[30] Albert Pighius, Johann Hofmeister, Johann Eck, and Stanislaus Hosius.[31] In another dispute over the authority of Pighius (in relation to whether or not the second council of Ephesus should be considered general), Jewel brought up Cole's responses to an inquiry at Lambeth:[32]

> And yet, when you were before the queen's majesty's commissioners at Lambeth, ye said openly there that Pighius is full of errors. But forasmuch as ye yourself have begun to find fault with your own doctors, I trust hereafter ye will the better bear with us, if we sometimes shall do the same. Here ye drive me to use the more words, partly to defend Pighius in his right, and partly to make you see how wilfully ye withstand an open truth, having so little to the contrary.[33]

The debate over sources becomes especially interesting in a detailed back-and-forth over the authority of general councils. As noted earlier, Cole had appealed to a general council to decide the most divisive theological matters separating Protestants and Catholics. Due to his fragile status as a Catholic in Elizabethan England, this was a brilliant move, for Protestants had often done the same in attempts to settle religious quarrels but were repeatedly stymied over the issue of papal authority. There had hardly been time for the smoke to clear from the Marian burnings, so asking for a general council was both safe and smart for a Catholic still in England, as it put forth a plausible attempt at reconciliation while circumventing an appeal to papal authority. Jewel certainly understood this, which is why he was determined to prove that papal

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[30] This is a reference to a twelfth-century legal manuscript, the *Textus Roffensis*, or the *Annals of Rochester*.
[31] Jewel, *Works*, 1:52. See also 55 for an exchange over the interpretation of a gloss by Gratian on Gelasius regarding transubstantiation.
[32] It's likely that Jewel is referencing the inquiries at Lambeth in the summer of 1560 where noted Catholic were asked to assent to the royal supremacy or pay a fine. John Strype, *Annals of the Reformation and Establishment of Religion, And Other Various Occurrences in the Church of England, during Queen Elizabeth's Happy Reign*, vol. 1 (London, 1725), 208-209.
[33] Jewel, *Works*, 1:65.

authority was a matter of central importance in Catholic theology, despite of Cole's attempts to minimize it.

It began with Jewel asserting that Albert Pighius had declared the Councils of Constance and Basle to be in error for deposing a pope, yet they are still considered general. Cole shrewdly responded that if Jewel wished to follow Pighius on this point, "than ye are a greater papist than I: for I hold herein rather with Gerson." Jewel replied that he had used Pighius in the same manner that St. Paul "used the authority of them that baptized for the dead; not for that he thought such baptism well ministered, but only for that it serveth to his purpose." Jewel then turned to logic, asking Cole that "[i]f the pope be head of the church, as ye say" and the council "'be a resemblance of the church,' as your canonists and schoolmen say," then how can it be otherwise but that the pope is head of the council?" For, "he that is head of the whole must also be head of the part; unless perhaps ye will say, the part is greater than the whole," a conclusion that results in "great inconvenience against yourself."[34] Jewel then recited a litany of Catholic sources on the matter of papal supremacy, conspicuously placing the Tridentine canons first, before informing Cole that "if ye take part with Gerson, a great many of your own friends will fall out with you, and ye will be in hazard to be called a heretic."[35] The tactic of arguing from an opponent's sources was not relegated to the past, though. For instance, Jewel cited Stephen Gardiner as proof that communion in one kind was not a divine ordinance, "but only crept in…by a superstitious negligence of the people."[36] As will be shown below, Gardiner played a significant role in another aspect of these literary debates.

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[34] Jewel, *Works*, 1:67.
[35] Jewel, *Works*, 1:69.
[36] Jewel, *Works*, 1:65.

Rhetoric

The antithesis of proper debate was sophistry. And because sophistry was in direct opposition to sound logic, it was perceived to the bedfellow of bad logic, such as when Jewel called Cole's paralogism a "sophistication."[37] Most often, sophistry was simply referred to as "rhetoric," although this term did not always have negative connotations to it. For example, Jewel accused Cole of stirring up emotions at the outset of his argument (by indiscriminately accusing Jewel of lying), an inappropriate tactic according to proper academic disputation: "Contrary to the rules of rhetoric, I see you begin to chafe and to inflame all your affections even at the first. Soberness were much fitter for a doctor. But your heats be such, that your friends have shewed me you must be borne withal."[38] This passage is particularly striking because of Jewel's use of "rhetoric" in a positive sense here, namely the discipline of oration.

More often, however, "rhetoric" was synonymous with sophistry. In the "Reply," Jewel responded to Cole's assertion that he was more confirmed in his faith now than in years past (which, he claimed, Jewel gave him "good cause" for) by insisting, "This is a fair shift of rhetoric, when other help faileth you."[39] Later, in response to Jewel's claim that if Cole could conquer his "affection" then he would agree with Protestants soon enough, Cole replied that such an argument "may serve you well in rhetoric, but no where else, I ween."[40] Jewel's response is indicative of the perceived opposition between sophistry and sound learning as well as the complex Renaissance attitudes towards rhetoric. He began by accusing Cole of trying to mislead the reader with such a charge: "Thus ye write to make your reader believe (as ye have reported in

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[37] Jewel, *Works*, 1:44.
[38] Jewel, *Works*, 1:41.
[39] Jewel, *Works*, 1:59.
[40] Jewel, *Works*, 1:39.

places) that the ground of my sermons is rhetoric, and not divinity." He then inverted the attack into a self-compliment, associating himself with church fathers who were both theological authorities and renown orators: "If I were skillful in rhetoric, as ye would have me appear, only to discredit me with the people; yet can I not understand wherefore that thing should be so faulty in me, that was sometimes commendable in St Augustine, in St Chrysostom, in St Hierome, in Arnobius, in Lactantius, in Cyprian, in Tertullian, and in many other old godly fathers; for all these, as ye know, were great rhetoricians." He then compared Cole to the Assyrian kings in 1 Kings 20 who blame their downfall on the pagan gods rather than the God of Israel: "even so, ye at this time, after ye see yourselves scattered and put to flight, cry out, It is rhetoric and eloquence that hath overthrown you, and not the force of the gospel of Jesus Christ."[41]

Jewel's response to Cole's accusations of rhetorical manipulation encapsulates the multifaceted attitude of Elizabethan polemicists. Dialectical argument was the modus operandi of disputative literature, which meant that sophistry had no place. However, rhetoric *could* be a good thing, as long as one was teaching 'true' religion. By alluding to a biblical story to explain this point, Jewel reveals what was true of all the authors examined here: varying intellectual methods were all available in argumentation for, ultimately, they were all subordinate to one's own convictions. This pragmatic approach used by two confessionally opposed groups meant that the intellectual fault lines that made stalemate inevitable would be exposed.

Portraying Moderation in *The True Copies of the Letters*

As an academic exercise, the proceedings were expected to be moderate in nature. Moderation, however, could be manifested in many ways beyond simple adherence to

[41] Jewel, *Works*, 1:73.

disputative method. For instance, brevity was often considered a virtue in theory (though hardly accepted in practice, by any standard). Cole opened his first letter to Jewel with the assurance, "I trust I shall not need many words to make my entry with you."[42] In an exchange over whether or not the church is bound by the example of the primitive church, Cole gave a simple no, which delighted Jewel, who said that he "cannot but commend your plainness therein" and then asked, "But wherein then is your antiquity become?"[43]

Elsewhere, Jewel and Cole accused one another of excessive passion and verbiage in the debate. In the *Reply*, Jewel told Cole that instead of bringing the requisite sources for academic debate (i.e. scriptures, doctors, and councils), "ye brought such extremity as the world hath not seen the like, and as you are now loth to hear of; and yet it pleased God that the same should be answered sufficiently, with patience and sufferance." Later, Jewel told Cole that in his conclusion "ye take great advantage to answer many things in one, wherein your words, because they come flowing down in abundance like a stream, they carry away a great deal of slime and baggage."[44]

Moderation was also expressed as moral inculpability. In his second letter, Cole defended his own untainted motives by asking Jewel to remember why he wrote to him: not as an attack, but because he genuinely desired to know why Jewel counted him obstinate. Cole claimed that many others had reported to him that his adversary "openly wished that one man thinking otherwise than you do would charitably talk with you, whom you would with like charity

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[42] Jewel, *Works*, 1:26.
[43] Jewel, *Works*, 1:75.
[44] Jewel, *Works*, 1:44-45, 75.

answer, and endeavour to satisfy." Such an expression, Cole claimed, was the entire motivation of his writing.[45] Jewel, however, was suspicious of this claim:

> Where ye say ye are in place of a learner, and gladly come to be taught, you must pardon me, it seemeth very hard to believe. For if you were desirous to learn, as you would seem, ye would come to the church, ye would resort to the lessons, ye would abide to hear a sermon; for these are the schools, if a man list to learn: it is a token the scholar passeth little for his book, that will never be brought to school.[46]

Of course, it wasn't as simple as "going to church" for Cole and other Elizabethan Catholics, and Jewel's multiple provocations might appear unfair and malevolent (Cole referred to the question as "captious"[47]). It is, however, difficult to fault Jewel for his skepticism of the ostensibly mild-mannered Cole. Such a cynical outlook among Elizabethan Protestants was profoundly shaped by the fresh memories of the Marian persecutions. Jewel repeatedly pointed to the deaths of his fellow Protestants by burning as proof that his Catholic opponents were not only immoderate themselves but now playing the hypocrite by calling for temperance from their Protestant adversaries. Jewel guffawed that Cole wanted to Protestants to quit their "unmerciful dealing" towards Catholics from the pulpits, yet "when you were in authority, ye never could call us other than traitors and heretics; and yet, besides all that, used our bodies as you know." Jewel also blasted Cole's claim that Protestant doctrine was still "in doubt;" Protestants were well assured in their beliefs, Jewel assured him. In reply to Cole's requests for charity in matters uncertain, Jewel retorted that the behavior of the Marian regime indicated no lack of certainty by Catholics: "But if you for your part be yet in doubt, reason and charity would ye had been quite resolved and out of doubt before ye had dealt so unmercifully for it with your brethren." Later, Jewel

[45] Jewel, *Works*, 1:26, 29, 30-31.
[46] Jewel, *Works*, 1:32-33.
[47] Jewel, *Works*, 1:37.

turned particularly acid on this point: “If ye love your friends, notwithstanding their religion, ye are more charitable than some of your brethren. For ye remember how unfriendly some of you have used their friends, only for dissent in religion, unless perhaps ye will say ye imprisoned them, and burnt them, even for very love.”[48] To Cole’s argument that an intellectual impasse meant each side should leave the other alone, Jewel once more reminded him that no such option was offered to Protestants under Mary, telling Cole, “If you of your part would have done so when time was, many a godly man had now been alive.”[49] Jewel continued to harp on this theme. He rebutted Cole’s claim that Protestants cannot answer Catholic arguments by reminding how Catholics ‘answered’ Protestants during Mary’s reign:

> The arguments, that you say we shall never be able to answer, are sword and fire, such as of late days ye used so plenteously, for lack of others. And yet, as strong and as forcible as they were (God be thanked!), they have been fully answered, to the great and unspeakable comfort of God’s people, and to your shame and confusion for ever.[50]

The importance of moderation was not just about how one side treated the other when in political power, however; it also included the tone of one’s writing, which was expected to be civil in nature. Near the end of his second letter, Cole reported to Jewel that he had actually written a different letter but decided against sending it for it “was some deal sour, and would have been as bitter as a medicine, or in time of Lent penance.”[51] Jewel responded with a mixture of indifference and sarcasm:

> You suppressed, ye say, your first letters, for that you saw they were too sour. That had been all one to me; for sour words are not enough to quail the truth. Howbeit, to my knowledge, I gave you no evil word to increase that humour. But

[48] Jewel, *Works*, 1:73.
[49] Jewel, *Works*, 1:33-34.
[50] Jewel, *Works*, 1:42.
[51] Jewel, *Works*, 1:31.

> if ye will strive against nature, as ye say ye have done now, and conquer the rest of your affections too, I doubt not but we shall soon agree.[52]

Jewel's confidence that he had given Cole no reason to respond acerbically is interesting (and dubious), but what is especially noteworthy is Jewel's claim that Cole's heretical opinions stemmed from his inability to overcome "nature" and "affections," once again underscoring the importance of restraining one's emotion in academic discourse, as inflamed passions were both unnatural and an impediment to accurate reasoning. The same is evident when Jewel told Cole that his own "importunity" had caused him to utter things "contrary to mine own nature."[53]

In a particularly illuminating example, Jewel told Cole that it was not his fault that the Catholic could not restrain his rhetoric: "By likelihood some other man had moved your choler; for my words be as far from railing as yours as from modesty."[54] Elsewhere, Jewel responded to Cole's rebuke of his harsh language towards the council of Constance—intensely symbolic to Protestants of Catholic duplicity for the burning of Hus—by replying, "I speak more favourably of that council than I might have done."[55] In the opening of the "Reply," Jewel relayed how he received from others fragmented letters answering "the second letters that I had sent unto you before" that looked like Cole's, but they were "heaped up with taunts and scorns" and "too much stained with choler" to have come from such a "sober grave man, as I ever took you to be."

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[52] Jewel, *Works*, 1:36.
[53] Jewel, *Works*, 1:53.
[54] Jewel, *Works*, 1:42.
[55] Jewel, *Works*, 1:35. Foxe, for instance, included Hus in the earliest edition of his *Actes and Monuments* along with a sizeable illustration depicting Hus wearing the heretic's hat, bound to the stake, and surrounded by bundled faggots as the fire is being lit. This symbolism is amplified in that Hus was one of a select number of non-English martyrs included in the first edition (as indicated on the title page), the other being the fellow Bohemian Jerome of Prague. Foxe, *Actes and Monuments*, 238-241. For a fascinating discussion of Foxe's use of Continental sources in his depicitions of Hus and Jerome as well as the Protestant connection via Luther, see Margaret Aston and Elizabeth Ingram, "The Iconography of the *Actes and Monuments*," in *John Foxe and the English Reformation*, ed. David Loades (Aldershot: Scolar Press), 90-98.

Jewel claimed he delayed responding out of uncertainty as to whether the letters really were Cole's, but because he never heard back, "Therefore I have joined my sayings and yours simply and plainly both together, without colour or shadow, that the indifferent reader may have all before his eyes, and so be the better able to judge aright."[56] The claim to indifference, which appeared in the challenge sermon as well, was the link between moderation and academic credibility, as it 'proved' that the disputant made no attempt to mislead the audience, but rather laid out all the pertinent arguments in a neutral manner so they could decide for themselves.

The positive and negative connotations of rhetoric have already been mentioned in connection to disputation. However, excessive vitriol was not just academic problem, but also a moral one. Jewel responded to Cole's repeated claims that he came to the debate as a "learner" by pointing the finger at Cole's rhetoric and then assuming his own pious posture: "But by your scoffs and scorns it may appear you come to control, sooner than to learn. God send us both humbleness of heart, that we may content ourselves to be taught!"[57] Humility, an accepted virtue on both sides, was most clearly expressed in the subjugation of one's own opinions to a higher authority. At a fundamental level, this was scripture for Protestants, and the Church for Catholics. Jewel reflected this mentality when he wrote to Cole,

> O master doctor, let us lay aside all self-will and contention, and have recourse only unto the truth that God hath revealed to us in his holy word. For thereby shall ye be able to know whether the church do right or no: and thereby shall ye be able to reform her, if she happen to do amiss. For it is possible the church may err; but it is not possible the scriptures may err. And the scriptures of God have authority to reform the church; but I never heard that the church hath authority to reform the scriptures.[58]

[56] Jewel, *Works*, 1:41.
[57] Jewel, *Works*, 1:41.
[58] Jewel, *Works*, 1:79.

As a social concept, moderation played a particularly important role in relation to the estate of those involved. This is clearly seen in Cole and Jewel's argument over whether Jewel was fulfilling his standing as a bishop. In his second letter, Cole told Jewel, "because you are a bishop, and spake in such an audience, ye doubt whether you ought to show cause of that you teach or no, and therefore ye spake by protestation." This, Cole claimed, caused him to "marvel," for "the person or place maketh no difference who should prove or disprove. The greater personage you bear, the less cause have ye to be put to answer." After gently 'reminding' Jewel of their shared academic training, Cole argued that the procedures are one and the same, whether in philosophy or divinity. "And what reason should lead you to think that a bishop should not rather shew cause that he teacheth, than any other? St Paul requireth in a bishop that he be διδακτικὸς, a man before all other meet and able to teach. And it is a rule in bishops, that they be ready to give an account of their belief. And many reasons are there why it should be so."[59]

Jewel responded with multifaceted defense. He first asked Cole what "privilege" he had to require proof but be relieved of the burden of producing "one poor sentence" in "confirmation" of his own beliefs. He then declared a logical flaw in Cole's thinking (a paralogism, noted above), then maintained his own actions: "I alleged the place and audience where I spake, and not only mine office, for that I thought it might appear some want of discretion to call that doctrine into question which I knew was grounded upon God's word, and authorised and set forth by the queen's majesty, and by the assent of the whole realm." He then reaffirmed his promise from the challenge sermon to recant if convinced: "But as touching my

[59] Jewel, *Works*, 1:29.

calling, I am not only ready to answer any man in any thing that I profess, but also upon sufficient allegation, as I have promised, very well content to yield unto you."[60]

Another common trope in the portrayals of moderation very much related to the office of an ecclesiastical leader was concern that one's opponent was misleading the uneducated with their heretical opinions. For instance, in his second letter to Cole, Jewel replied to Cole's claim that theological responses to Catholic arguments by Calvin and Bucer are "weak" and unconvincing to anyone except "young folk and unlearned people" by claiming that this argument cuts both ways. For years, Jewel countered, Protestants have read Coclæus, Eck, Pighius, Bunderius, and the like, "and have found such reasons and answers in them, as I believe you yourself are not much moved withal."[61] Jewel later continued the argument that Catholics have falsely claimed Christian history as on their side by directly accusing Cole and Catholics of leading the ignorant astray by their arrogance:

> You would have your private mass, the bishop of Rome's supremacy, the common prayer in an unknown tongue; and for the defence of the same ye have made no small ado. Methinketh it reasonable ye bring some one authority beside your own, to avouch the same withal. Ye have made the unlearned people believe ye had all the doctors, all the councils, and fifteen hundred years on your side. For your credit's sake let not all these great vaunts come to nought.[62]

As mentioned in the Introduction, such a concern reflects an awareness of the growing 'gap' between the learned and unlearned. This is not to say that this is the first time one can observe a recognition of difference between an educated elite and 'common' folk, but the nature of this divide is different in Elizabethan England due to the influence of the 'new learning' and its long-term effect on England's political landscape.[63] By portraying themselves as protecting the

[60] Jewel, *Works*, 1:31.
[61] Jewel, *Works*, 1:28.
[62] Jewel, *Works*, 1:32.
[63] See the Introduction.

ignorant from the wiles of their adversaries, religious polemicists attempted to occupy the moral high ground over their opponents while simultaneously defending 'orthodoxy' as unadulterated truth. Jewel insisted that "it was ever your grace to bear the people in hand that all we are altogether unlearned, and know nothing" and that "[i]f the people had understanding of the truth, they would not suffer you thus to lead them into error as ye do, and have done." He then borrowed from Pliny's *Natural History* to make a parallel, saying that even though "the lion be a marvellous fierce and courageous beast, yet, if ye may once hoodwink him, or make him blind, ye may lead him whither ye list."[64]

One particular exchange is highly illustrative of the varying approaches that polemicists took towards the 'wisdom of the crowds.' After Jewel had remarked to Cole that the "people must needs think somewhat of your silence," Cole retorted, "God wot, I pass little in these matters what the poor silly souls deem of my doings, wherein ye have no cause to complain, sith they be edified towards you. Wise men, I doubt not, see what just cause I have to do as I do." Jewel responded by casting the Catholic church as historically oppressive and painting Cole to be a hypocrite: "Now God wot, then are the poor silly souls little beholden to you, that have been so long and so worshipfully maintained by the sweat of their brows; and now, seeing them, as ye say, deceived, and perish before your eyes, ye can hold your peace and let all alone."[65] This statement reflects the inconsistencies in how either side pointed to the majority as an indicator of rightness; sometimes having the majority indicated orthodoxy, but at other times being in the

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[64] Jewel, *Works*, 1:43, 57. It seems that Jewel has in mind Pliny's discussion of how lions were captured and tamed. Pliny recounts that a shepherd discovered by accident that throwing a cloak over a lion's eyes subdued the animal as it could not see, and this technique was transferred to the arena and used to harness lions. Pliny [the Elder], *Natural History, Volume III: Books 8-11*, trans. H. Rackham (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1940; LCL 353), 8:21.
[65] Jewel, *Works*, 1:72 (see also 39).

minority demonstrated orthodoxy, paralleling when prosperity and power might prove the 'true' church or if experiencing persecution by the established church demonstrated the same.

The Rhetoric of Abuse in *The True Copies of the Letters*

As mentioned at the outset, *The True Copies of the Letters* has much more material from Jewel than Cole, primarily because Jewel's status was protected, whereas Cole was bound to recognizance as a result of the Westminster debacle. Furthermore, Cole was still in England. Unlike Dorman, Harding, Rastell, Allen and others, Cole did not have the security of writing from the Continent, so he had to exercise extreme caution regarding what he put into print. Thus, it is not surprising that there is much more abusive rhetoric from Jewel than Cole in the letters.

Cole could, however, be rather patronizing towards Jewel. For example, in his first appeal, Cole asked Jewel to supply him with some new arguments, as most Protestant arguments were either "already answered by learned men on our side" or simply recycled from men like Calvin and Bucer, who "I repute them percase somewhat able to do with young folk, or the simple and learned people." In his "Answer to Certain Parcels of the Second Letter," Cole sarcastically remarked to Jewel that he had misunderstood a legal concept but "I pardon you for mistaking the law: it is not your faculty." He also told Jewel, "I see well ye write much and read little" and "Ye have better stuff than this, I trow. For this is somewhat weak."[66]

Jewel, in contrast, was relentless in his critiques of Cole's arguments and character. In his second letter Jewel responded to Cole's argument that Calvin and Bucer's arguments are "weak" and unconvincing to anyone except "young folk and unlearned people" by declaring that this accusation cuts both ways. For years, Jewel retorted, Protestants have read Coclæus, Eck,

[66] Jewel, *Works*, 1:26, 37-38.

Pighius, Bunderius, and the like, "and have found such reasons and answers in them, as I believe you yourself are not much moved withal." Jewel was also not persuaded that Calvin and Bucer had indeed been 'answered' by Catholics: "I grant indeed they have been answered, but not so much by learning, as by other means, as you know. But your reasons have been answered by reason sufficiently; as now, God be thanked, the whole world knoweth."[67]

Elsewhere Jewel sarcastically quipped, "I would have marvelled [*sic*] that you brought nothing all this while, saving that I knew you had nothing to bring." He followed this by answering Cole's query as to why he was counted obstinate by informing his Catholic counterpart that he was obstinate because he continued to "withstand an open truth"—the classic definition for a heretic. In comparing each side for his reader Jewel asked, "And what better ground can we have on our side, than that doctor Cole, the chiefest man on the other side, can find no ground to stand against us?" Returning to his insistence that Catholics didn't actually have any substantial arguments, Jewel taunted his legally muzzled opponent: "I require you to no great pain: one good sentence shall be sufficient."[68]

Another point of contention that routinely spilled over into abusive rhetoric was the political machinations of both sides. Protestants and Catholics routinely accused the other of resorting to force when they could not intellectually defend their arguments. Jewel's citations of the Marian martyrs as quintessential proof of Catholics' immoderation has been observed already, but Jewel also leveraged Cole's legal muzzling to argue that his 'silence' on the sources indicates he doesn't actually have any and concluded,[69] "[t]herefore the ground of your

[67] Jewel, *Works*, 1:28.
[68] Jewel, *Works*, 1:31 (see also 42).
[69] As noted above, Jewel also used this argument to criticize Cole's attitude towards the 'common' folk.

persuasion must then needs be, *Nos habemus legem, et secundum legem*, &c."[70] This phrase comes from the gospel of John, where the Jewish leaders accuse Jesus before Pilate: "we have a law, and according to the law he must die" [19:7].[71] Elsewhere, Jewel asserted to Cole that if Catholics knew they actually had scriptures, ancient doctors or councils on their side as they claimed, then they would not have restored the papal supremacy after it was abolished.[72]

Associating one's opponent with the religious leaders who condemned Jesus was a convenient yet powerful way to place them on the 'wrong' side of religious truth. It also reveals the determination of each side to put themselves in continuity with God's 'true' church, which was often identified as the persecuted minority. However, attempts to identify the 'true' church in relation to the current political landscape was tricky for Tudor Englishmen, and whether the 'true' church was identified as the oppressed or the oppressor depended on who you asked and which monarch was on the throne. In the exchanges between Jewel and Cole, Jewel frequently brought up the Marian persecutions as indisputable proof that Catholics would resort to force rather than argue.

Elsewhere, in response to Jewel citing John 19:7 again, Cole wrote, "This argument I would fain see proved." Jewel immediately pointed back to the reign of Mary, citing an anonymous Catholic who determined that Protestants could not be reasoned with—only punished:

> Your whole practice, and the order of your doings for six years together, have proved it sufficiently. And besides that, a bishop of yours even in that time sitting

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[70] Jewel, *Works*, 1:31.
[71] Thomas Becon used the same passage to make the identical point in *The Acts of Christ and Antichrist* (1563), i.e. because Catholics can't defend their doctrine, they kill those who speak out against it. Thomas Becon, "The Acts of Christ and Antichrist," in *Prayers and Other Pieces of Thomas Becon, S.T.P. Chaplain to Archbishop Cranmer, Prebendary of Canterbury, &c.*, ed. John Ayre (Cambridge: The University Press, 1844), 528.
[72] Jewel, *Works*, 1:31.

> in judgment upon a poor man in a case of religion, and hearing him allege the scriptures and other authorities for himself, rounded a gentleman in the ear that sat next to him with these words, "Nay, if we strive with them in scriptures and reasoning, we shall never have done. We must proceed against them with the law."[73]

Jewel's image of a Catholic bishop refusing to dialogue with a "poor man" underscores not only the malicious picture of a tyrannical Catholic church that Jewel wished to impress on the reader, but also the nature of piety, as a single "poor man" stands up to a prelate (and thus the Catholic hierarchy), relying only on the word of God and 'authentic' Christian sources.

Due to the overlapping nature of confessional alignment and political loyalty in Tudor England, one of the more contested aspects of these debates was ascertaining when religion became treason. And, much like the debate over the 'true' church, both sides had arguments to make as well as defend from. In an exchange over whether Protestants were dealing "unmercifully" with Catholics from the pulpit (referenced above), Cole had disputed Jewel's claim that he (Cole) had said Protestants were traitors to Mary; what he had actually said was *if* Protestant acted traitorously to Mary. Jewel then asked the inevitable question: "If they were traitors, why did ye burn them as heretics?"

Jewel continued by turning the charge of treason back on Catholics, which Jewel apparently believed to be inherent in Catholicism, for "[t]he matter would be too odious to shew what hath been wrought by men of your side against their princes." He then, predictably, defended his own political views on such men: "But as I then never liked them that drew their against their sovereign, even so now I pray God confound them, whosoever they be, that shall first begin the same."

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[73] Jewel, *Works*, 1:45.

Jewel then acerbically told his opponent, “What law ye ministered to us in those days, I remit it unto you that are a lawyer. But I am well assured ye shewed us neither divinity nor humanity.” He continued on, citing numerous injustices inflicted upon Protestants by Catholics during Mary’s reign (“with all extremity and cruelty”), describing Catholics using Cyril’s words about the Jewish leaders who tried Jesus: “‘First, they bind him fast,’ saith Cyril ‘and then they devise matter against him: they lay hands upon him before any man accuse him.’” Jewel asked Cole what law he would use to justify a number of excessive punishments levied against Protestants, such as “burn[ing] the queen’s subjects’ hands with candles or torches, before they were condemned to die by any law,” ordering someone to appear in Rome within fourscore days but then “keep him still in prison in Oxford; and afterward for not appearing at his day at Rome to condemn him there as obstinate,” and afterwards execute the same man “against the express words of your own law, after he had subscribed unto you, and was found in no relapse?” Jewel caustically concluded, “I trust ye can say somewhat herein, for that you, being then a lawyer, and in commission, had the execution of the law. But I believe when ye have searched your books through, ye shall find ye had not so much law as they that said: *Nos habemus legem, at secundum legem debet mori*.”[74] The subject of Jewel’s argument was once again Thomas Cranmer,[75] and the purpose of such an argument was to definitively ‘prove’ that Catholics were neither truly loyal nor concerned with obedience—unless it was in their own interest.

The importance of obedience factored in these debates in another way. Due to the violent and tumultuous nature of Tudor England’s religious changes, both Catholics and Protestants often subscribed to the religious law under the reigning monarch, only to recant when the

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[74] Jewel, *Works*, 1:58-59.
[75] See Diarmaid MacCulloch, *Thomas Cranmer* (New Haven, CT; London: Yale University Press, 1996), 574.

opportunity presented itself. The number of important Marian Catholics who subscribed under Henry, Harding's very Protestant-sounding sermons under Edward, and the Marian 'Nicodemites' all found themselves parrying charges of hypocrisy. However, because both sides used this argument, both sides were also vulnerable to it, thus creating a theoretical impasse: if no one is unsullied by dissembling for the sake of political expediency, then who can hold the moral high ground? And though somewhat of a morose point, Jewel rightly observed that if such dissembling had not taken place, then he would not be alive to debate with Cole. The same is true for many high-profile religious leaders of these volatile years.

Jewel was quick to point out the many Catholics who had subscribed to Henry's royal supremacy by citing perhaps the most glaring example of this, Stephen Gardiner's *De Vera Obedientia* (1535). In a response to Cole's claim that he was defending his original faith, Jewel wrote:

> Ye say ye remain in the faith ye were baptized in. O good master doctor, stand not too much in that point. You know ye have already forsaken a great number of such things as were thought necessary when ye were baptized; and yet, besides that, how many times some of you altered your faith within the space of twenty years? Remember yourself, who wrote the book *De Vera Obedientia*, against the supremacy of Rome? Who commended it with his preface? Who set it forth with solemn sermons? Who confirmed it with open oath?[76]

Gardiner's *De Vera Obedientia*, one of the most interesting works of Tudor political theory, was a radical reworking of Marsilius of Padua's *Defensor Pacis* (1324) as a vindication of the royal supremacy. And, shortly before *De Vera Obedientia* was published, Gardiner had written another piece justifying the execution of John Fisher, one of the most ardent opponents of Henry's campaign to divorce Katherine of Aragon, in response to a condemnation of the same from Rome. The work was republished in Strasbourg with a commendatory preface by Bucer and,

[76] Jewel, *Works*, 1:34.

during the reign of Mary, Protestants published an unlicensed English translation of the work in order to embarrass the Marian regime. Jewel opportunistically latched on to the work as proof of Catholic hypocrisy: not only was it authored by Gardiner, who had been a high-ranking Marian official, but the preface was written by 'Bloody' Bishop Bonner, a chief architect of the Marian persecutions, commended in sermon by Cuthbert Tunstall, and subscribed to by Cole himself.[77]

Gardiner proved to be somewhat of a lightning rod when it came to attacking one another's religious hypocrisy. Cole responded to Jewel's accusations by minimizing both his own religious change and Gardiner's actions as well as drudging up Jewel's own subscription under Mary:

> What one thing am [I] gone from? You say much, and prove little. You mean the old bishop of Winchester, who repented at the hour of his death. And where you mean I condescended to the primacy of king Henry at my first coming home, or I had laboured the matter, you did the like yourself: for in queen Mary's time you subscribed to the articles, some of them we are entered to talk in, to your no less blame than mine. There be in the town that both saw you subscribe, and can bring forth your hand.[78]

Jewel's response to this is in the "Reply" is revealing of the dual approach common among polemicists: morally discredit your opponent as thoroughly as possible while justifying your own moral and religious inconsistencies. Jewel upped the ante by pointing to the exhumations and burnings of the corpses of Protestant figures long dead (including Peter Martyr's wife) and added a bilious remark about Cole's 'constancy':

> Yes, I think ye are gone from one thing at the least, besides pardons and pilgrimages. I meant not doctor Gardiner to pull him out of his grave, and to torment him, being dead, as ye did master Bucer, master Fagius in Cambridge, doctor Peter Martyr's wife in Oxford, and others more; but only that I would not

[77] Shelley Lockwood, "Marsilius of Padua and the Case for Royal Supremacy," *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, Sixth Series, Vol. 1 (1991): 89-119.
[78] Jewel, *Works*, 1:38.

> have you build too much upon your constancy, which hitherto hath been found to be even as the pleasure of the prince.[79]

Jewel then questioned the legitimacy of Gardiner's own repentance. He believed that Gardiner did repent, "for he had good cause so to do," but if he repented of the book he had written "so stoutly against the pope," then why did he never recant of it in his lifetime? "[W]hy dissembled he so deeply for the space of twenty years together?"[80] Jewel then turned his sights on Cole, pushing back on Cole's own justification of his acquiescence to the royal supremacy. Jewel conceded that he may have only subscribed after returning home from Italy, but he felt compelled to remind Cole, "that ye continued therein still all king Henry's time out, even until the death of king Edward and the coming in of queen Mary." And if Mary had continued with the title "supreme head" of the church, "as she did a great while after her first entry, and that (as it is to be thought) without burden of her conscience, I doubt not then but ye would have talked better with yourself and continued to do so still." During all of this time, Jewel pointed out, you came to church, heard common prayers, ministered, received communion, "and in all your doings bare yourself as any other subject of this realm." Because you did this for twenty years, Jewel sarcastically observed, "I may say to you, this was a good long coming home." Jewel concluded that, any way Cole tried to cut it, he was still a liar:

> Therefore I may well thus conclude, and ye must needs confess the same, that either ye deceived the people then by your example, and conformity of all your doings, allowing that religion for good which in your conscience ye knew to be naught; or else that ye be a dissembler, and deceive the people now, making them, as much as in you lieth, by your example, to think this religion is to be naught, which in your conscience and knowledge, ye find to be godly and good. So that, whatsoever judgment ye have now, or heretofore have had of this religion, it must needs appear that either ye be now, or else have been, a deceiver of the people.[81]

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[79] Jewel, *Works*, 1:60.
[80] Jewel, *Works*, 1:60-61.
[81] Jewel, *Works*, 1:61.

And while Jewel would not let Cole escape his own past (and that of his co-religionists'), he defended himself by pointing out that he had already publicly confessed and repented of his actions, thus atoning for his sin and restoring his integrity (in a way):

> But I have subscribed, ye say, as well as ye, and my hand is to be seen, and there be some that saw me when I did it. These proofs were needful, if I had denied the fact. But I have confessed it openly, and unrequired, in the midst of the congregation. The arguments that ye made were so terrible; ye concluded altogether with fire and fagot.

This, however, was not the only way to think about the matter. Jewel observed that his own subscription, as well as that of his religious enemies, was ultimately what brought them to where they are now: "I confess I should have done otherwise; but, if I had not done as I did, I had not been here now to encounter with you: if ye should now be apposed with the like conclusions, I doubt not but ye would be glad to do as both ye yourself and your fellows have done heretofore."[82]

Abusive rhetoric was not limited to attacking an opponent's argumentative abilities or moral credibility. It often came in the form of dripping sarcasm and insulting parallels. In the "Reply," Jewel had apparently grown tired of circling around the same point with his opponent, so he simply parroted back slightly edited phrases to Cole. For instance, Cole responded to Jewel's charge of "innovation" by telling him, "In the end of my writing ye shall find mine answer to that ye say here. The last answer." Jewel mockingly answered, "And there shall you find the reply."[83] When Cole, yet again, insisted that he was both unable to dispute (because of his recognizance) and was not required to (because Catholics possessed the negative), he told Jewel, "I wis ye know I may not, nor the case I stand in requireth it not." Jewel retorted, "I wis

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[82] Jewel, *Works*, 1:61.
[83] Jewel, *Works*, 1:48.

ye know ye cannot, and therefore ye do best to say ye may not."[84] In another instance, Jewel used a rather unusual example to comment on the supposed weakness of Catholic arguments:

> But because I came near the matter, and with my negative declared the weakness of your side more than some others did, therefore ye break out first upon me, and laid in a claim without evidence, and, having nothing to say, ye would seem to have somewhat; as women that would seem to be with child sometimes rear up their bellies with a cushion.[85]

Cole's numerous objections for requests to provide "positive" proof, which he correctly saw as efforts to bait him into forfeiting his recognizance, could turn Jewel particularly acerbic. When Cole told Jewel that what he asked was "dangerous," Jewel suggested that Cole pass the responsibility "to some other of your side that is not bound" before sarcastically remarking, "forasmuch as you have used this excuse so often, and so few wise men will believe it, I would think it good that now ye would devise some other." Upon another request for proof of Catholic doctrine, which Cole declared an attempt to "guilefully allure" him into violating his recognizance, Jewel responded with a laughble image from the animal kingdom: "Ye hide yourself under your recognisance, and think ye walk invisible, as the ostrich, when he hath couched his head under a little bough, though the rest of the body, which is great and large, stand open and uncovered, yet he thinketh no man can espy him."[86]

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[84] Jewel, *Works*, 1:58.
[85] Jewel, *Works*, 1:51. Though not exactly the same as a "phantom pregnancy" (pseudocyesis), pregnancy was of paramount importance for women in Tudor England (not least royalty), and false pregnancies were the subject of numerous early modern English medical works. For a discussion of false pregnancies in Tudor England see Carole Levine, "Pregnancy, False Pregnancy, and Questionable Heirs: Mary I," in *The Birth of a Queen: Essays on the Quincentenary of Mary I*, eds. Sarah Duncan and Valerie Schutte (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 179-193.
[86] Jewel, *Works*, 1:42, 71. Just above, Jewel also compared Cole's appeals to recognizance as "but fig-leaves" that "cover not your shame."

One of the primary arguments of this study is that polemicists were highly eclectic and frequently inconsistent in their approaches. They pulled on a wide variety of sources and quickly shifted between types of argument, often pooling several together in order to create a cumulative effect upon the reader. Paring up these works according to various themes can lend to a much neater appearance of these books than is actual. Because of this, it's fitting to end with an interesting example that ties together disputative method, moderation, and abusive rhetoric. Jewel, in a lengthy diatribe against Cole, specifically his constant appeals to recognizance, asked, "were ye thus bound in queen Mary's time? Or, if ye were not bound, how happened it that ye never durst allege one ancient doctor in these matters all that while?" He then parroted back to Cole his words that the Catholics had "brought more than we [Protestants] were able to answer" before caustically asking if "the rest of the doctors of your side" (Pighius, Eck, etc.) were bound as well. If not, then "why were they so dainty of their doctors, that in these matters they could never vouchsafe to allege one?"

He then transitioned from the academic element to the social: "Look better upon your recognisance: I cannot believe ye should be so free to scoff and to scorn, more than either divinity or good humanity would bear withal, and only be forbidden to do that thing which of all good reason ye ought most to do" (i.e. engage in disputation). Jewel wondered further, how is it "that ye should be restrained from the alleging of St Augustine, St Hierome, St Ambrose, St Chrysostom, St Basil, &c.," and only have the ability "to allege Aristotle, Horace, the decrees, the decretals, the gloss, Gerson, Driedo, Royard, and Tapper, such men as I never could have thought had been canonized and allowed for doctors of the church"? Jewel then pulled a rather comical classical example to sarcastically drive the point home: "Augustus Caesar on a time, as he was passing through Rome, and saw certain strange women lulling apes and whelps in their

arms, 'What,' said he, 'have the women of these countries none other children?'"[87] The obvious implication, as Jewel explained, is that Cole used odd sources in disputation instead of the most authoritative ones (i.e., the fathers).

Conclusion

The True Copies of Letters was the earliest print exchange to follow the Westminster conference, and Cole and Jewel clearly saw their writings as an extension of the abortive conference, and thus disputative in nature. These works were expected to adhere to the academic conventions of university disputation, including the range of permissible sources. However, because of his tenuous position (which ended with him committed to the Tower), Cole was confined to merely questioning Jewel's method of arguing from the "negative" and occasional comments about his opponent's understanding of canonical sources. Conversely, because of his privileged political status, Jewel was free to put much more into print, both in terms of quantity and the scope of argument.

The True Copies of Letters also illustrates the dynamic relationship between oral and print culture, as the authors routinely connected their writings back to not only the oral disputation at Westminster but also Jewel's challenge sermon. Similarly, just as Cole could not forfeit his recognizance by what he said, he was also in danger of doing so by virtue of what he put into print, despite Jewel's repeated efforts to entrap him by baiting some form of "positive" proof out of him.

The nature of the exchange between Jewel and Cole differs somewhat from the other print pieces examined here though because of their organic growth into full-blown disputative

[87] Jewel, *Works*, 1:71-72.

literature. The exchange began with Cole inquiring into Jewel's methods—not the content of his argument. However, as the exchanges grew in number and Jewel's patience wore thin, it culminated with the lengthy "Reply," in which original arguments, responses, and counter-arguments were all printed together for the reader's reference.

These writings also reflect the reality that Elizabethan Englishmen believed the virtue of moderation to be inextricably linked to credibility and veracity of argument. Excessive verbiage, sophistry, and impassioned arguments were unacceptable, both academically and morally. An immoderate opponent could not be correct, for their excessive emotion indicated they were unable construct an argument based upon reason and spiraled into emotional manipulation.

Lastly, these works contain abusive rhetoric. The overwhelming majority is from Jewel because of his status, though Cole did occasionally make caustic asides. Pinpointing the exact extent and character of abusive rhetoric is certainly more art than science and, as this study will show, it could vary greatly between authors—and often revealed their own personalities—but it is more important to point out that abusive language is there at all. In works expected to be academic and moderate, this is a paradoxical character of these writings. However, it demonstrates that abusive rhetoric was not unprecedented in works that were considered libelous by contemporaries. Rather, it illustrates that works printed for semi-public consumption were expected to adhere to certain standards of academic rigor and moderation. Each of these characteristics becomes more pronounced as the controversy wore one, as seen in the first systematic Catholic reply, the anonymous *Apologie of priuate massei* (1560-2), which was met by Thomas Cooper's *Answere* (1562). These works are the subject of the next chapter.

CHAPTER 6

THE QUESTION OF PRIVATE MASS: THE ANONYMOUS *AN APOLOGIE OF PRIUATE MASSE* (1560-1562) AND THOMAS COOPER'S *ANSWERE* (1562)

> May not children in this sort deuise negatiues conteinyng false doctrine, and when they are called vpon to proue it, say they are not bounde to proue their assercions, because they are negatiues?[1]
>
> *An Apologie of priuate Masse* (1560-1562)

Context

After Cole's epistolary exchange with Jewel, the anonymous *An Apologie of priuate Masse* was the next response to Jewel's challenge. It appeared in manuscript form soon after the publication of Jewel's challenge sermon and *The True Copies of the Letters*, both in 1560. The *Apologie* circulated among English Catholics before Thomas Cooper took note and wrote a refutation of it in 1562 titled, *An Answere in defence of the truth. Againste the Apologie of priuate Masse*. The two works were printed together as *An Apologie of priuate Masse [sediciously] spred abroade in writing without name of the authour: as it seemeth, against the offer and protestacion made in certayne sermons by the reuerent father Bisshop of Salsburie*. The work ran through three editions, each slightly altering the title of the *Apologie* (not all with "sediciously" in the title). Subsequent printings, however, dropped the *Apologie* and just printed

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[1] *An Apologie of priuate Masse…with an answer to the same Apologie set foorth for the maintenance and defence of the trueth* (London, 1562; STC 2nd ed. 14615), fols. 4^{v}-5^{r}. Because the two works were initially printed together, all references to both the anonymous *Apologie* and Cooper's *Answere* come from this edition except for when the pages are missing. In those instances, the edition is noted by the STC number.

Cooper's refutation, prompting complaints from Catholics.[2] For instance, John Rastell protested in his *Replie*:

> Yet, this I am bold to saye, that thei might (if thei would) haue done by this boke, as thei dyd by the Apologie (as thei termed it) of priuate masse, and haue set it furth in print with their answer vnto it, for the glorie of their religion, and much liberalitie towardes poor Catholikes, whose writinges without the author his labors and charges, full diligentlie thei haue printed.[3]

The author of the *Apologie* was never discovered. It was imputed to Harding, who denied writing it in the preface to his *An Answere to Maister Iuelles Chalenge* (1564). The author does, however, offer a few clues. At the outset, he deferentially described himself as "nothyng comparable to the learned of the clergie, yet beyng brought vp in learning alwaies beyond the seas." He mentioned that at one point he had been a Protestant but had converted back to the Catholic faith "by the godly instruction of the learned."[4] The author also described himself as "nothyng in comparison of the learned Doctours of this realme, beyng a man of no greate reading, but in stories"[5] and claimed some familiarity with Jewel's letters.[6] Given that the exchange between Jewel and Cole appeared in 1560 (printed by John Day), this is certainly plausible. The author's borrowing of imagery that Jewel also used in his exchange with Cole (comparing himself to besieged persons who toss bread over the wall to their enemy) makes it seem very likely that he had read the exchange between Jewel and Cole.[7]

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[2] Peter Milward, *Religious Controversies of the Elizabethan Age* (Lincoln, NE; London: University of Nebraska Press, 1977), 2.
[3] John Rastell, *A Replie against an answer (falslie intitled) in Defence of the truth* (Antwerp, 1565; STC 2nd ed. 20728), fols. 9^{v}-10^{r}.
[4] Cooper, *Answere*, fol. 2^{v}.
[5] Anon., *Apologie*, fol. 25^{v}.
[6] Anon., *Apologie*, fols. 2^{r} and 4^{v}, respectively.
[7] Jewel, *Works*, ed. John Ayre, vol. 1 (Cambridge: The University Press, 1845), 35.

Cooper, on the other hand, was an established Elizabethan churchman who rose rapidly through the ecclesiastical ranks. He published his *Thesaurus* in 1565, delivered a Latin oration as well as a theological disputation before Elizabeth in 1566, proceeded BTh and DTh in March 1567, and received appointment as dean of Christ Church, Oxford, and became tutor to Sir Philip Sydney the same year.[8] Cooper diligently defended the Protestant settlement in print for nearly thirty years before he became the butt of Martin Marprelate's ridicule, particularly in *Hay any Work for Cooper* (1589).

Cooper also articulated to his reader that his piece was a continuation of the ongoing debates: "I will make my entrie there, where he first beginneth to confute the reasons, that were alleged, why accompte should not bee made to Doctor Cole of that religion that now is taught." He announced his intention to be brief "because those thinges bee sufficiently answered in the conference already published."[9] This is almost certainly a reference to *The declaracyon of the procedynge of a conference, begon at Westminster the laste of Marche. 1559*, published anonymously in 1560, though the publication of the Jewel-Cole exchange is possible too.

As the title indicates, much of the debate centered on private mass. The author of the *Apologie* insisted there was, in fact, no such thing.[10] Rather, it was a term invented by "Luthers schoole,"[11] a notion used repeatedly to accuse English Protestants of being at odds with their co-

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[8] Bowker, "Cooper, Thomas (c. 1517-1594, theologian and bishop of Winchester)," *ODNB*.
[9] Cooper, *Answere*, sigs. $E3^{v}$-$E4^{r}$.
[10] This argument rested upon three principal points: first, a priest may celebrate the mass even "when none other is disposed to receiue with him;" second, the necessity of persons to communicate with the priests is a matter indifferent because it's not stated positively in scripture; third, the benefits are still communicated to Christians, even if they do not physically participate, because all Christians are part of Christ's mystical body. Anon., *Apologie*, fols. 6^{r}-7^{v} and 10^{r}-11^{r}, 13^{v}, 15^{r}-17^{r} (respectively). Cooper responded by denying the distinction between "private mass" and "sole receiving." Cooper, *Answere*, fol. 7^{r}.
[11] Anon., *Apologie*, fol. 6^{r}.

religionists on the sacraments. For instance, he pointed to disagreement with Luther and Melanchthon on the necessity of communion in one kind, which "they acknowledge that a general counsell may take order in it, as a thynge indifferent."[12] More telling are statements on Eucharistic theology. The author equated the conventional Reformed denial of Christ's real presence in the Eucharist with English Protestant theology and then attacked it using Lutherans:

> I will sende you to your great god Luther, in a littell booke that he wrote against the Swinglians, of the sence of the woordes of the supper of Christe. They yet remayne vndefaced. There he answereth you at the ful: Or els Brentius that great Cane, in the exposition of the article of thassention in the first of the Actes: where he enterpreteth thereof at the full: thoughe very farre in diuers poinctes from the sence of the church. Yet may he not suffer that blinde reason of yours to haue his force in no case.[13]

Both the *Apologie* and Cooper's response are also far shorter than the majority of controversial tracts published as part of the challenge sermon controversy. For the *Apologie*, this is almost certainly because the piece was likely not intended for publication. Cooper's response is proportionally much longer—roughly 120 folios to thirty—yet it still falls well short of the majority of other polemical pieces published during the challenge sermon controversy. Regardless, both are exemplary models of Elizabethan disputative literature: zealous and

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[12] Anon., *Apologie*, fol. 27^{v}.

[13] Anon., *Apologie*, fol. 29^{r-v}. Though Luther published three pieces defending his view on the Sacrament between 1526 and 1528 (primarily against Karlstadt and Zwingli), the author of the *Apologie* seems to have in mind his *That These Words of Christ, "This is My Body," etc., Still Stand Firm Against the Fanatics* (1527). In 1529, in an attempt to forge a unified Protestant front against the Catholic Hapsburgs, Phillip of Hesse brought the two together at the Colloquy of Marburg, though to no avail. Any hope of unity was dashed with Zwingli's death at the Second Battle of Kappel in 1531. It is possible that the author of the *Apologie* is referencing Johannes Brenz's exposition of Acts 7 where he ridiculed Reformed interpretations of the "right hand of God" as a physical location. On Luther and Zwingli see Heiko Oberman, *Luther: Man Between God and the Devil*, trans. Eileen Walliser-Schwarzbart (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1989), 232-238; James M. Kittleson and Hans H. Wiersma, *Luther the Reformer: The Story of the Man and His Career*, 2nd ed. (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 2016), 155-171. On Brenz, see Joar Haga, *Was There a Lutheran Metaphysics?: The interpretation of communicatio idiomatum in Early Modern Lutheranism* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2012), 142.

dogmatic, yet strongly preoccupied with proper reasoning and projecting moderation, frequently contrasting themselves to their impassioned opponent.

Disputative Method in the *Apologie*

The author of the *Apologie*, very similar to Cole, made much of the fact that arguing from the negative was poor logic, and therefore an impermissible method of disputation. He wondered how Jewel could hope to build a case upon the claim that certain doctrines "as you pretende, cannot be proued." The author asked how a man "whiche studdie so maruelous refomacion of all doctrine to the touch stone of scripture" will make such bold claims "all because it standeth in negatiues?" Such reasoning, the author insisted, was puerile:

> May not children in this sort deuise negatiues conteinyng false doctrine, and when they are called vpon to proue it, say they are not bounde to proue their assercions, because they are negatiues? It were either great folly to kéepe that secret, the whiche without any damage may doo good to many, or meruelous enuie to enclose that without gaine, which law and reason would haue to be commen.[14]

The author did grant that negatives may have been permissible in certain contexts, yet they ought not to be taken for a general rule:

> The lawes may in diuers speciall factes, not restrained to time and place, teach perhappes, that a negatiue can not be proved. But to say that a negatiue in doctrine, as yours is, can not be proued vpon only consideration that it is a negatiue, as your shifte is, that I am well assured no learned man hitherto euer taught: either in law; or in any other science besides. Yet the contrarie rather appereth in Logicke: the whiche teacheth the generall groundes of all disputacions.[15]

Though scripture does frequently "ioygne issue in the negatiue" in order to prove certain truths (e.g., humanity is "not iustified by Moses law, and so the like"), Jewel must admit that when

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[14] Anon., *Apologie*, fols. 4^{v}-5^{r}.
[15] Anon., *Apologie*, fol. 5^{r-v}.

"there is an affirmatiue imploied in the negatiue, as there is here" that the "order of schooles will driue you to proue the other: though it were in factes, muche more in doctrine."[16]

Jewel's negative, the author pointed out, was that there was no private mass in the early church; "thus you say, and shewe no cause why." He then moved on to argue that the term "private mass" was not historical, but rather an invention of "Luthers schoole." The way that Protestants use it ("contrarie to common, to many") is not at all how Catholics mean it: "For the catholike church euer taught, that the Masse is a common or publique sacrifice, restrained to none so" and it has never been withheld "from any that disposed them selues godly." The other signification, however, that of "soole receiuynge" is taught as permissible by the Catholic church, when none are "so wel disposed to receiue" with the priest. Then he shifted the burden back on to Jewel: "Now if you be able, wee require you to proue thaffirmatiue included in your negatiue. Which is this. That euery priest or any other ought, when he receiueth the sacrament, to haue companie to receiue with him in the same time and place, upon payne of Gods high indignation."[17]

Logic

Despite the author's insistence on following the methods of disputation and logic, he occasionally used logic in ways that his opponent found less than convincing. For instance, he asserted that in the primitive church the sacrament was delivered into peoples' hands, and because wine cannot be held in the hand, it therefore must have been given in one kind. Elsewhere he made a similar argument about Ambrose's praise of his brother Satyrus for keeping the sacrament in a stole at sea: "And I trow vnder one kinde, vnlesse your brayne will serue you

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[16] Anon., *Apologie*, fols. 5[v]-6[r].
[17] Anon., *Apologie*, fol. 6[r]-7[r].

to enclose wine in a stole, as mine will not."[18] Shortly after, the author lectured Jewel on the implications of Christ saying the sacrament was his body: "…or if you had marked, but the very rule of nature, how of an antecedent grau[n]ted, all necessarie consequence doo by force of reason issew there hence…"[19] Thus, that the bread was Christ's body was more than just taking the words of Jesus at face value: it was logical.

Elsewhere the author relied on inference to make points about Catholic practice and doctrine, such as the real presence of Christ. This, he argued, is one of those points of the Catholic church "not mencioned in scripture expresly, but bulted out by drifte of argument, as these are, that offend you so sore." Reasoning from what he saw as a parallel metaphor, he asked Jewel, What happens when the master tells his servant to prepare so that he may dine? Does he instruct him to scrub the pots, fetch clean water, chop the herbs, prepare the capons, chop the wood, lay out the cloth, or do any other necessary task? No, but if the servant does not carry out these duties because they are implied, "I wéene no man would alow his wit or honestie. Because in his maisters first commaundement all suche necessaries are imploied."[20]

The author also relied on the concept of logical necessity to argue against the Protestant insistence that only what was expressly commanded in scripture was permissible.[21] This was the

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[18] Anon., *Apologie*, fols. 17^{v}-18^{r}, 21^{v}; see also 23^{v}-24^{r}. Ambrose praised his brother Satyrus at his funeral for refusing to reach for a plank as the ship was breaking up, rather having the sacrament bound in a napkin around his neck as a testimony of faith. Ambrose, *On the Decease of Satyrus. Book I*, in *A Select Library of the Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, Second Series, Volume X: St. Ambrose: Select Works and Letters*, eds. Philip Schaff and Henry Wace (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 1955), I.43.
[19] Anon., *Apologie*, fol. 28^{r}.
[20] Anon., *Apologie*, fols. 29^{v}-30^{r}.
[21] Thomas Harding used this exact argument and for the same doctrine (see ch. 8). This concept (often referred to as the "regulative principle") was the earliest source of intra-Protestant tension and one of the chief causes for the split between puritans and conformist Protestants. This issue comes to the surface in the Vestiarian and Admonition controversies, in particular.

principle underlying Protestant arguments that communion was necessarily a communal act, and therefore it is invalid for the priest to celebrate by himself. He took this strict reading of *sola scriptura* and made a *reductio ad absurdum* to conclude that whether or not there are others to commune with the priest is in reality a matter indifferent. If Protestants "sucke out a bonde of necessitie" from scripture that demands Christians only do what is expressly written, "Then must wée aske you how dare you minister the sacramente in Englande, séeynge that Christe onely ministred it in Jurie?"[22] The author then asked a number of such questions (Why administer to women when Christ only gave the sacrament to men? Why do it openly in a church, when Christ did it secretly in a parlor?) to argue that Protestants are taking things to be the

> substance of the sacrament, the whiche are nothing eels but very accidentes: the alteration whereof doo lie in the discrecion of spirituall gouernours… and are to be compted amongest suche thinges, as saincte Paule speaketh of, when he wrote, *Cetera cum venero disponam*. I will set the other thynges in order, when I come.[23]

This reasoning is both unusual and noteworthy, for two reasons. First, the author used the Aristotelian distinction of "accident" and "substance" (used to explain transubstantiation) to argue in matters of practice, namely that certain things are indifferent. This is the second notable characteristic, for arguments from adiaphora are usually treated as a Protestant matter, not Catholic.[24] The question over what was and was not a matter indifferent proved to be another

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[22] i.e., Jewry, the land of the Jews.
[23] Anon. *Apologie*, fols. 14^{v}-15^{r}.
[24] Though it has since come under substantial critique and revision, one of the earliest and most influential studies of edification and matters indifferent in English Protestantism is John S. Coolidge, *The Pauline-Renaissance in England: Puritanism and the Bible* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1970), ch. 2, an analysis of the subject in Elizabethan puritans and conformists. In *The Indifferent Mean: Adiaphorism in the English Reformation to 1554* (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press; Detroit, MI: Wayne State University Press, 1977), Bernard Verkamp argued that adiaphorism was a dominant and binding principle in the first half of the English Reformation. However, Karl Gunther has recently shown that debates over adiaphora in the English Reformation were present from the beginning and "were neither constant nor

fault line running through these debates. As much as the author of the *Apologie* and other Elizabethan Catholics argued that the number of persons present to partake the sacrament was adiaphora, Cooper and Protestants responded by arguing that a plurality of persons at communion was in fact *not* a matter indifferent simply because it is not positively stated in scripture. Furthermore, the question was answered in Christ's institution. If spiritual counsel could alter it, Cooper claimed, then they could also alter the commands to take, eat and drink.[25]

The disputative mentality of the author of the *Apologie* is also evident in his attacks on Protestant rhetorical trickery, such as his dismissal of Protestant grammatical arguments over the Eucharist (used to deny transubstantiation) as nothing more than disingenuous word play: "I will not say vse no such daliance vpon the worde, eate in the Cannon as you vse in take eate and drinke al of this in the vse of the sacrament very sophistically."[26]

Historical and Grammatical Arguments

The *Apologie*'s author also used the common tactic of pressing on Protestant appeals to the primitive church. Appeals to apostolicity were pervasive in the religious controversies of the sixteenth-century (and not just England), but this approach proved tricky for, the tables could quickly be turned (against either side). For instance, the anonymous author insisted that if Jewel would argue that there was no private mass in the apostles' time, then he must also concede that neither was there a Christian king or private possessions. There was also no doctrine taught, but

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unchanging." Gunther, *Reformation Unbound: Protestant Visions of Reform in England, 1525-1590* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 254 and *passim.*
[25] Cooper, *Answere*, fols. 41^{v}-42^{r}, 57^{r}.
[26] Anon., *Apologie*, fol. 24^{r}.

only confirmed by miracles, no women coming to church with their faces uncovered, no bishops with temporalities (a personal swipe at Jewel), no distinction of parishes, nothing eaten mingled with blood, no entire realms turned to the faith, no receiving of the sacrament except after supper, nor infant that was not housled. "And will you I beséeche ye reforme al thynges to the very state of the primatiue churche now?" He then used an argument also employed by Cole about the 'ages' of the Church: "To call suche thynges to the state of the Apostels time, and of the primatiue church againe, is nothyng els, but to enforce a taule [tall] man to come to his swadlynge clothes, and to crie alarme in his cradel again."[27]

Portraying Moderation in the *Apologie*

There is little about the rhetorical self-styling of the *Apologie* to set it apart from other polemical works. This is partly due to the fact that it was so early on in the lifespan of Elizabethan polemic, and partly because of its brevity. The author primarily cast himself as responding to Jewel's excessive pride in denying the received doctrine of the Catholic church. While this in itself is not unusual, it is telling of just how provocative Jewel's sermon was to conservatives.

An early autobiographical paragraph offers a glimpse into the author's self-understanding. He claimed to have been Protestant at one point but "god of his infinit goodnes hath called me backe againe from all suche lewde fansies, by the godly instruction of the learned." He had once been "so fully perswaded by euil bookes, that all that time I neither regarded God, nor good religion, nor any good conscience besides." This provided his motivation: "And therefor trustynge to doo some good with suche as simplicitie without malice

[27] Anon., *Apologie*, fol. $8^{r\text{-}v}$.

hath perswaded to stay, consciens pricked me to giue the aduenture: nothyng doubting but that God will bring that to a good ende, the beginnynge whereof had no euill meanyng."[28] This connection between reason, conscience, and persuasion is illustrative of the Elizabethan polemicist's mindset. The means by which God had saved him from "lewd fansies" was "the godly instruction of the learned," an intuitive remedy for someone for someone who was once "fully perswaded by euil bookes." The author claimed to have been converted from not just ungodliness, but also ignorance.

The author announced to Jewel (and the reader) that he had written the treatise "to discouer certeine vanities of yours," and then appealed directly to Jewel's learning and vocation as a Christian minister in order to persuade him that his challenge sermon was unfitting for someone in his position:

> And to make mine entrie with you (maister Iewell) whiche are counted the greatest clarke on your side, I meruell not a litle why you, beyng reputed a man of such learnyng, vtterly refuse to proue the doctrine you teache. Allegyng very slender causes of your refusal: that serue the contrarie side, rather then yours. Your vocation to so highe a rome,[29] the place where you taught, the honorable estate of the audience, which hard you, the doctrine you taught auctorised by the realme, as you alledge doo not vnburden you from the proufe of your doctrin, but rather bourden you more to proue the same: because your estate is now suche, that is bounde to rendre accompte of that you teach.[30]

The author's appeals to Jewel's "rome" and "estate" are indicative of the social positioning attached to participants in these debates; they were expected to be learned and occupying a 'high' estate that came with education. As will be seen, the relationship between Jewel's position as a bishop and the burden to prove his assertions was a recurring theme among controversialists.

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[28] Anon., *Apologie*, fol. 2^{v}.
[29] I.e., room, meaning estate or office.
[30] Anon., *Apologie*, fols. 2^{v}-3^{r}.

The author concluded the work by using the most effective method of contrast between himself and his opponent, that of Christian charity for the belligerent heretic. He insisted (with God as his judge), "I wrote not this for any malice to suche as are otherwise ente. I pittie them rather, and dayly pray for them, that they may embrace the catholike faieth." However, when he saw this 'Goliath' (i.e. Jewel) "hauynge truste in his bigge bones and stronge weapons, braggyng many times" he assumed the role of David, "not to hurte him in the forhead, as Dauid did Golias, but to crushe in péeces certeine vntruethes that he taught." Indeed, the author was

> Wyshyng him as wel to doo as I woulde my self: And all my countrey men of Englande to be ware, least they fal into the snares and trappes that our ghostly enemie laieth abrode euery where: not onely to hurte their bodies, but to hurle downe bothe body and soule into the déepe dongeon of hell. The whiche I beséeche God moste hartely géeue all men grace to auoyde.[31]

The Rhetoric of Abuse in the *Apologie*

Likewise, much of the vitriolic rhetoric in the *Apologie* is standard fare, primarily consisting of accusations of pride, heresy, and politicizing religion. For instance, he declared that Protestant use of adiaphora and their "vaine principles" would force them to confess sole receiving by the priest as a thing indifferent.[32] Though not necessarily a personal attack, the author of the *Apologie* took aim at the argument from Jewel and other English Protestants that the settlement *de jure* ought to settle the question of religion.

> And if the chief proufe of your doctrine be the assente of this realme, shall not other christian realmes, that teache quite contrarie vnto you, rest in doctrine auctorised by them, and al christian realmes besides? Here you ar driuen, if you rest so stoutly vpon thassent of realmes, to confesse that the doctrine taught here is trew, because this realme hath auctorised it: and the doctrine in straunge realmes is trew, beyng quite contrarie to yours, because by like reason the realmes

[31] Anon., *Apologie*, fol. 31^{r-v}.
[32] Anon., *Apologie*, fol. 13^{v}.

> ther hath auctorised it. You haue no refuge in this case, but to say, that this realme folowed the scripture in suche doctrine, as they auctorised, and that other realmes folowed not the scripture in auctorising the contrarie.[33]

Arguments from authority, employed regularly by both Protestants and Catholic, were a theoretical two-edged sword. On the one hand, when in power, Protestants and Catholics routinely cited biblical passages about the need for order and submission to the civil authorities from passages such as Rom. 13. On the other hand, when each found themselves the persecuted minority, they regularly argued that the 'true' church has *always* been the persecuted minority, opposed by the forces of antichrist. The author of the *Apologie* was making the case that, all things even (i.e., the use of scripture, fathers, and councils), political authorization cannot serve as proof that one form of Christianity is right and another wrong. Taking a glance around Europe, the author insisted, is proof enough as various realms are authorizing competing versions of Christianity. Though this was not a point belabored in the *Apologie*, it is another example of an author identifying a theoretical impasse running between Protestants and Catholics, and one that Rastell would pick up on in his *Replie* to Cooper.

The author used a brief rhyme to disparage Jewel's argument ("You driue men to these trifels that the worlde may know you hang in nifels"[34]) and also observed the "meruelous arrogancie" necessary for someone to discredit all the fathers, particularly someone not as learned as they:

> Haue you no other meanes to get honor, but to dishonour so many auncient fathers, as haue written this latter .ix. hundred yeres?…And I pray you, if they were so many yeres disceiued, and yet giuen all the while to spiritual exercises, more then you, as it appereth by their workes, or any now a daies, what assurance can you make vs, that you do now know the truth? Beynge a man far vnderneath them in all poinctes?[35]

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[33] Anon., *Apologie*, fols. 3^v-4^r.
[34] Anon., *Apologie*, fol. 17^v.
[35] Anon., *Apologie*, fol. 27^r.

As observed above, the *Apologie of Priuate Masse* was not particularly unusual for its method or rhetoric, which partially owes to its early place on the conveyor belt of Elizabethan polemic, and also because of its brevity. However, the fact that the work is wholly concerned with vindicating private mass, and not justification by faith or some other central doctrinal division, underscores the unusual nature of Jewel's challenge. It was an attack on Catholicism shaped by contextual and political concerns that chose certain practices and beliefs that were easy to publicly discredit rather than focusing on the most significant issues dividing Protestants and Catholics.

Disputative Method in Cooper's *Answere*

Logic

Cooper, like most Elizabethan polemicists, responded to his opponent with the utmost thoroughness, and the disputative mindset is revealed in that Cooper immediately responded to the *Apologie*'s dwelling on Jewel's negatives. He insisted that the author had missed the point, and not even Dr. Cole had found such fault with Jewel for denying that a negative might be proved. Rather, Cooper argued, Jewel rested upon his negatives to better "gréeue his aduersarie" since you have "vntruly borne the world in hande…these .xv. hundred yeres." Jewel "both wisely and learnedly did sée, that there was no way so fitte either to driue you from this auaunte, or to declare it euidently to be false, as to rest vpon this true negatiue, that you haue no sufficiente proufe out of the aucthoritées before rehearsed."

After reviewing for his opponent what Jewel's negatives really were, Cooper declared "Surely the profe of this negatiue can bée none other, but to holde open the bookes of the bible and doctours to you, and wyll you to reade them ouer, and sée that there is no suche profe for

your parte." Cooper then waved off the logical niceties of negatives, for such a topic paled in comparison the gravitas of theological controversy: "When a negatiue or what kinde of negatiues may bée proved, I leaue to bée discussed in some other place, as a question more mete for Sophisters in the paruise schoole at Oxforde, then for dyuines in matters of weight and importance."[36] Cooper's statement is illustrative of the paradoxical approach to learning so many Elizabethan polemicists both embraced and struggled with: academic standards are of the utmost importance (especially when analyzing an opponent's argument), yet matters of theological controversy were not to be hindered by sophistical niceties that could be used to obscure the truth.

Cooper's resemblance (intentional or not) of early humanist protests against scholastic logic in theology is reinforced by his use of Cicero to further critique his opponent.[37] Cooper criticized the *Apologie*'s author for claiming that Protestants abused the meaning of "private mass" (as opposed to "sole receiving") without actually defining what that meant: "In this place ye shall geue me leaue to finde that faute in you, that *Tully* in the beginning of his offices layeth to *Panetius*: who, intending to write of dutie in behauiour, omitteth the definition of the same: where as euery reasonable discourse ought to procede of a [briefe] declaracion of that, whiche is in controuersée."[38]

Cooper also drew from St. Cyprian (his words not "gaily garnished with colours and amplifications…but plainly and nakedly…that euen the meanest may see what force and strength they haue") and crafted a syllogism as irrefutable proof that the Eucharist can only be received

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[36] Cooper, *Answere*, fol. 5^{r-v} (STC 424:06).
[37] For the influence of Cicero in sixteenth-century intellectual debates, see ch. 2.
[38] Cooper, *Answere*, fol. 7^{r-v}. See Cicero, *On Duties*, eds. M.T Griffin and E.M Atkins (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), I.7.

when multiple people are present: “Our proufe is this. In the celebration of this Sacramente of the: Lordes Supper wee ought to doo that only and nothing els, that Christ the aucthour of it did in his institution. But in Christes institution appeareth neither sole receuinge, nor ministring vnder one kinde: Therfore in celebration of this Sacrament neither sole [receiuinge] nor minystringe vnder one kinde ought to bee vsed.” The major, he declared, is from St. Cyprian, and the minor is proven in the Evangelists and St. Paul. Cooper even portrayed St. Paul as thinking syllogistically about communion in scripture. He cited two passages (1 Cor. 10:16-17 and 11:21, both significant in sixteenth-century Eucharistic debates) and argued from the latter that St. Paul instructed the Corinthian church “to tary vntill the congregation came together, that they might receiue according to Christ[’s] institution. That this was S. Paules minde, it appeareth by his first proposition and reason, and by the conclusion that he addeth in the ende.”[39]

Elsewhere, Cooper challenged the *Apologie*’s logic undergirding the argument that the priest may celebrate the mass by himself, a disagreement partially stemming from subtle distinctions in precisely what they were arguing for (again predicated on the *Apologie*’s distinction between “private mass” and “sole receiving”). Cooper insisted that the Protestant “contention is for priuate masse” while the Catholic argument “is to proue your vse of priuate masse to be good: of which sole receuinge is but one parte,” though even this has not been sufficiently proven. “For it foloweth not to say, the prieste in case of necessitie, when none wil receiue, may take the Sacrament alone: Therefore he may doo it without necessitie, when hee may haue other to communicate with him.” (Cooper later made explicit this point about reasoning from particular instances to universal practices: “But the particular cases of a few,

[39] Cooper, *Answere*, fols. 20^{v}-23^{v} (quotes at 20^{v} and 23^{v}).

ought not to be taken for a general rule of the holy churche."[40]) He did concede that circumstantial necessity may alter the ordinary means of grace, such as martyrs who died before receiving baptism, but this did not pertain to the Eucharist: "yet is this sentence alway true: The supper of the Lorde in the ordinary vse of it ought of necessitie to haue communicants to be partakers of it."[41]

Cooper also disputed the *Apologie*'s use of analogous reasoning by attacking the author's use of Chrysostom to argue that the expectation for Christians to be in a 'fit' state to receive the sacrament with the priest daily is unrealistic; just as we might hope "that al folkes were so wel agréed that al suites in the law might surseasse [surcease]," yet this "doth not inhibit but y^{t} men may sew [sue] for their right." In the same way, despite that "all good men may wishe that al christian people were alwaies so deuoute and wel disposed" to receive the sacrament daily, the fact that this is not reality ought not to prevent those who are fit from receiving or "imbarre the priest that is bounde to offer vp the daily sacrifice for him self & the people."[42]

Cooper found this comparison absurd: "In recityng the aucthoritie of Chrisostome you brynge in a similitude or comparison, which of how small force they be in prouyng, your learnyng can not be so little, but that ye must néedes know." The comparison, Cooper argued, was between what was possible and impossible, law and unlawful. Though we cannot look for perfect charity in "this fraile life," this doesn't mean it can't be sought after and achieved partially in the church. In addition, "to sue for ones right is not only a thing suffered, but of it selfe lawful and good: and wée haue therof example and aucthoritée in gods worde." For the priest to minister the sacrament by himself, however, "is a thyng neither tollerable nor lawfull."

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[40] Cooper, *Answere*, fol. 62^{r}.
[41] Cooper, *Answere*, fols. 19^{v}-20^{r}; see also 75^{r-v}.
[42] Anon., *Apologie*, fols. 10^{v}-11^{r}.

Therefore the comparison is “fautie on both partes.” Cooper was quick to point out the dire consequences of letting faulty comparisons go unchecked: “If such similtudes be alowed, a man might breake all gods commaundementes, and yet proue him selfe not to do amisse.”[43]

Historical and Grammatical Arguments

Cooper also attacked his interlocutor’s use of reasoning from historical examples. In response to the *Apologie*’s use of the story of Sirapion’s servant boy administering him the sacrament in one kind *in extremis*, Cooper retorted that one might as well argue “to haue boyes and chyldren to minister the sacramente commonly.”[44] Cooper’s conclusion about his opponent’s arguments was predictably disparaging. He insisted that his reasoning was groundless, for all of the proofs are either abuses of the early church or cases of necessity turned into generalizations,[45] and he took strong exception to the author’s arguments that certain Catholic doctrines are reached by “drift of reason”: “Euen so sir those thynges, that you say foloweth by force of reason and argument vpon the first sentence, do folow indéede only vpon that sence, that your selfe doth imagine mistakyng your maisters wil and pleasure, and not vpon that meanyng that Christe himself would haue his wordes to be taken in.”[46]

Cooper, like many of his fellow controversialists, paid especial attention to his opponent’s use of sources (both contemporary and ancient). Throughout his *Answere*, Cooper

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[43] Cooper, *Answere*, fols. 26v-28r.
[44] Cooper, *Answere*, fol. 74v (STC 424:06). See Anon., *Apologie*, fols. 21v-22r. This story is originally recounted in third-century a letter from Dionysius of Alexandria to Fabius, fragments of which are recorded in Eusebius, *Church History*, in *A Select Library of Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers of the Christian Church. A New Series, Vol. I: Eusebius: Church, History, Life of Constantine the Great, and Oration in Praise of Constantine*, trans. Henry Wace, Philip Schaff, et al. (Oxford: Parker and Company; New York: The Christian Literature Company, 1890), 6.44.
[45] Cooper, *Answere*, fol. 130v.
[46] Cooper, *Answere*, fol. 118r.

was eager to turn a critical eye towards traditional and even revered sources, for the simple reason that so many polemical arguments, particularly from history, could be as obstructive as they were useful. A perfect example of this is the use of Erasmus. From his earliest days, Erasmus was both criticized and claimed by both sides. Protestants found much to love in his biblical translations, which exposed grave errors in the Catholic church's Latin Bible, and his critiques of both scholastic theology and clerical corruption. For these same reasons, Catholics sometimes found him equally problematic.[47] On the other hand, Erasmus deeply lamented the strife within the church and clearly rejected Protestant theology, most evidently in his battle with Luther over the bondage of the will in the 1520s. For this reason, many Catholics claimed Erasmus as one of their own while Protestants were forced to be quite selective in their approach towards the prince of humanists.

Cooper claimed Erasmus as a viable authority, albeit one that must be read carefully. He faulted the author of the *Apologie* for claiming Erasmus "as ye haue often chased him out of grammer schools, and dryuen him into the fire." Protestants, Cooper argued, do regard Erasmus, but treat him in the same manner as the fathers:

> Truly wée doo now esteme Erasmus, as wee haue alwayes, for a man of excellent learning, and a singular instrument prouided of god to begin the reformacion of his church in this latter time: and yet thinke wee not all his opinions to be true. For you, I thinke doo esteme Tertullian and Origen and that right worthely. And yet if ye wyl graunt all, that they write, to be true: I wyl proue you an heritke.[48]

Augustine himself, Cooper insisted, counseled reading with caution. "Therefore who doth not muche honour them, & (when trueth constreineth) with reuerence go from their opinion, is

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[47] Certain works of Erasmus were periodically banned in France throughout the 1520s and 30s, and the 1559 *Index librorum prohibitorum* condemned the entirety of his oeuvre. Paul Grendler, "The conditions of enquiry: Print and Censorship," in *The Cambridge History of Renaissance Philosophy*, eds. C.B. Schmitt, et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 44-45.
[48] Cooper, *Answere*, fol. 53^{r}.

scantly worthie the name of a christian ma[n].” Even Augustine himself, Cooper observed, seems to have written one way about free will before the Pelagian heresy, and then another afterwards, for “vpon occasion of that Heresie, he writeth more perfitly of that [i.e. free will] and of predestination.”[49]

Cooper’s critical approach towards sources sometimes resulted in all-out attacks on their veracity. For instance, he argued that the *Apologie* and other Catholic authors have cited from a work of the Greek father Cyril that is not extant; therefore, “I haue good cause to suspecte it.” He similarly accused Catholics of citing a passage from Cyril’s *Thesaurus* about the supremacy of the bishop of Rome that is not there.[50]

Cooper also attacked the *Apologie*’s use of an extraordinary story recounted from Cyprian’s *De lapsis* (also used by Harding and Martiall) about a child who was administered wine that had been offered to idols and vomited it up.[51] Cooper claimed to be at a loss as to why the author used that example from Cyprian; perhaps you haven’t seen it yourself, Cooper mused, or you thought Protestants would be negligent in looking it up? “Or lastly, that of purpose you dyd abuse the simplicitie and ignorance of them, that you conueighed your wrytinge vnto: which commonly beleue all that you say without examination.” After quoting Cyprian at length, Cooper pointed out that he had used this passage to argue for sole receiving and communion one kind, when in reality there was a plurality of persons and the child received wine, not bread (as was the practice with communion in one kind). Indeed, Cooper argued, it is more likely that the child’s

[49] Cooper, *Answere*, fol. 70^{r-v}.
[50] Cooper, *Answere*, fols. 70^{v}-71^{r}.
[51] Thomas Harding, *An Answere to Maister Iuelles Chalenge* (Louvain, 1564; STC 2nd ed. 12758), fol. 46^{r}. See Cyprian, *On the Lapsed*, in *Ante-Nicene Fathers: The Writings of the Fathers Down to A.D. 325, Vol. 5: Hippolytus, Cyprian, Caius, Novatian, Appendix*, eds. Alexander Roberts and James Donaldson (Peabody, MA: Hendrickson Publishers, 1999), §25.

physiological response was due to her age or stress (because she was "so yonge…or so troubled"), not for any spiritual or miraculous reasons. Such a reading, Cooper declared, is evidence enough of the author's interpretive skills: "Your handlyng of this place of Cyprian, may be sufficient proufe to all men, how soundly and truly you interprete other mens writinges, and how sincerely you iudge of them, that is, by violence as it were to streine them to say that whiche they neuer ment." The same is true for alleging that Luther and Melanchthon believed communion under one kind to be a matter indifferent (which, Cooper insisted, anyone who reads them knows is not true): "But I perceiue this is your co[m]mon fashion, to make Doctours & writers to speake whatsoeuer you woulde haue them to speake."[52]

Cooper, like many Protestants, also enjoyed the fruits of the humanist Lorenzo Valla when he ripped into the anonymous author of the *Apologie* for corrupting much of church history and for forgeries, specifically the Donation of Constantine and fabricated epistles attributed to early bishops of Rome. Cooper repudiated the "barbarousnes of the stile" and the "unfitte wresting of places of holy scripture" that were so obvious "as a childe almoste may perceiue them to be forged." He then asked, "Be not your selues ashamed of y^{r} counterfaite Donation of Constantine, wherwith the sée of Rome a longe time blinded the princes of the earth and made them almoste slaues vnto it?"[53]

Cooper—in good Protestant fashion—also employed grammatical arguments to dispute Catholic claims about the Lord's Supper. For example, he attacked the anonymous author's patristic citations in proof of one kind for failing to see the figure at work: "But a reasonable man wyll easely conceiue that in speakinge of one parte, both is vnderstanded." In fact, in these

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[52] Cooper, *Answere*, fols. 81^{v}-84^{r} (STC 424:06).
[53] Cooper, *Answere*, fol. 87^{r} (STC 424:06).

arguments his Catholic opponent is forced to resort to long-windedness in place of substantial arguments: "In déede it standeth you vpon, seinge your proufes are of them selfe so sclender, somewhat to helpe them with stoute wordes: that men may bee almost afrayde to doubte of them."[54] Catholics, Cooper declared, are in no place to accuse Protestants of manipulating words when they so grossly distort the fathers:

> You obiecte to vs that we dalley, when wee presse you with the wordes of Christes institution: *Accipite*, *manducate*, *bibite*, *diuidite*: and yet you wyl vrge the wordes of the fathers, as though euery sillable in them were in like maner to be scanned as the wordes of the bible, written wholly by the inspiration of the holy ghost. But in déede you declare of what aucthoritie you coumpt Christes wordes, that estéeme it a dalleinge to repete often his commaundementes.[55]

Portraying Moderation in Cooper's *Answere*

From the outset, Cooper labored to point out that the *Apologie*'s author had attacked Jewel not for matters of doctrine, but his own depravity: "So he, to discredite the doctrine that he reuolted from, geueth such testimonie of his owne naughtie life and conscience, as he would be lothe to heare at any mans mouth but his owne." After pointing out that sinfulness is never a discredit to the gospel (after all, Judas was a disciple), Cooper struck his own self-assured posture:

> I will iudge and hope better of this wryter, to whom with all my harte I wishe much more good: trustinge that god shall once agayne open his hearte to receiue the trueth, which I cannot but thinke God hathe taken from him in punishment of that naughtie conscience, that hee witnesseth hath ben in him selfe. But, what so euer he be, let him stande or fall to his lorde god, I will not take vppon me to iudge him, neither would I haue spoken this much of him, but that he doeth odiously excuse his own euill mynde by the good doctrine of Christes gospel. My purpose is to confute his doctrine, I will not meddle with his person.[56]

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[54] Cooper, *Answere*, fols. 78^{v}-79^{r}.
[55] Cooper, *Answere*, fols. 78^{v}-79^{v}.
[56] Cooper, *Answere*, sigs. E2^{v}-E3^{r}.

After attacking the author's character, Cooper adopted the deferential posture so common among Elizabethan polemicists. He acknowledged that there were others better equipped to respond to the *Apologie* than himself, which might lead some to deem him arrogant. Cooper offered three reasons justifying his piece: first, the controversy was a "common quarell, touchinge not only him, that is named, but all other that either teacheth or beleueth as he doth;" second, the individual attacked by the *Apologie* (i.e., Jewel) either didn't know about the piece or was unable to answer it at the present moment; third, he had learned through private conversations "how muche this treatise is estemed amonge many," perhaps more than many realize.[57] Thus, he reluctantly decided to enter the controversy, although he did not necessarily make good on his promise to "not meddle with his person."

Cooper took it upon himself to defend Jewel from the *Apologie*, a task which he connected with political stability. He immediately took exception with the author for saying that Jewel claimed his position as a bishop exempted him from proving his assertions and that the religious settlement *de jure* was proof enough for the Protestant cause; rather, Jewel had said he would do "vnaduisedly" to "make accompte therof to a subiecte" (particularly one he misliked) who challenged him "vnder pretence of learnyng, but in déede quarelyng." If every person who demanded proof of a law were answered, Cooper asked, where would that leave the magistrate?

> If that should be so, a gappe might be opened to euerie busie person to picke a quarell against the law. If that should be so, beside other inconueniences, he might séeme to submit the iudgement of the prince and realme to the mislikynge of one waywarde subiecte. Which coulde not be doone without greate impeachement to the princes aucthoritée, and wisedome of the whole state of the co[m]mon weale.[58]

[57] Cooper, *Answere*, sig. E3^{r-v}.
[58] Cooper, *Answere*, fols. [1]^{v}-2^{r}.

If a government were to accommodate every single critic, Cooper argued, then its credibility would be compromised. (This point would be revisited by Rastell, Martiall, Calfhill, Harding, and Jewel himself.)

Cooper again defended Jewel later in the *Answere*, this time in a lengthy contrast between the learned, grave, and godly Jewel with the incompetent author of the *Apologie* and other malicious Catholic polemicists. After attacking the author for arguing from Chrysostom that the Holy Spirit always guides the church and is therefore infallible (a common Catholic argument)—rather than saying that the Holy Spirit "confirmeth that Christe spake before"—Cooper took aim at his opponent:

> …you haue at your pleasure in sundry partes of your treatise charged him that you write against with folly, rashnes, arrogancie, and impudency, euen in those pointes that the same crimes may bee more iustly retourned to your selfe and yours: in this place also you indeuour to debase and imminishe his estimation, extenuatinge his age, continuance in study of holy scripture and maner of life, in comparison of your late holy fathers, which you doo greatly extolle. Such is your shiftes, when the matter will not healpe it selfe, to transferre your talke to the persons, & by scorneful disdeining of other to procure your selfe aucthoritie.

Despite the author's moral attacks on Jewel, Cooper declared that those who "haue bene of longer and better acquaintance with him then you are, doo right well know, and in his behalfe doo protest, that .xx. yeres sence he was able fully to haue answered stronger arguments for these matters, then any that you haue brought at this time." Jewel's conduct is such, Cooper contended, "as the most malicious of your parte cannot iustly blame him" and his learning is such "as, when the matter shalbe tried, I doubt not but it wil fal out, that he w^{t} his .xl. yeres age, and such other, whom in like maner you disdaine, shal shewe more true diuinitie, then a many of your hoare heades and great reading clerkes."[59]

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[59] Cooper, *Answere*, fol. 101^{v}-102^{r}.

Cooper’s concern with perception remained was constant throughout the work. He, like many Protestants, labored to demonstrate that Protestants, in rejecting transubstantiation, were not denying God’s omnipotence. Rather, it was Catholics who were prideful for demanding miracles from God that God did not will: “Wherefore wée are not so muche to be blamed for mistrustynge the almightie power of God, which wée confesse to be in all thynges, that his pleasure is to haue it shewen, as you are for presuming vpo[n] the same to haue miracles wrought beside his will and without necessitie.”[60]

The same defense was necessary in relation to the use of the fathers. In a section concerning examples and authority, Cooper cited from a letter Augustine wrote to Jerome stating that only the scriptures deserve the “reuere[n]ce and honour” of uncritical acceptance, for the fathers—“be they neuer so excellent in great holynes and learnyng”—were still vulnerable to error.[61] However, Cooper wished to tread carefully lest some think him guilty of impudence towards the fathers. After naming multiple fathers who had erred, most notably Origen (“in whom be founde so many perilous doctrines, as both I, in this place, am loth to rehearse them, and in the primatiue churche diuers greate learned men woulde haue had his bookes burned for the same”) Cooper wrote,

> I coulde say the like of diuers others, but that I feare some will maliciously gather, that I rehearse these thynges of purpose, so muche as in men lieth, to deface the

[60] Cooper, *Answere*, fol. 118^{r-v}.

[61] “For I confess to your Charity that I have learned to yield this respect and honour only to the canonical books of Scripture: of these alone do I most firmly believe that the authors were completely free from error….As to all other writings, in reading them, however great the superiority of the authors to myself in sanctity and learning, I do not accept their teaching as true on the mere ground of the opinion being held by them; but only because they have succeeded in convincing my judgment of its truth either by means of these canonical writings themselves, or by arguments addressed to my reason.” Augustine, “To Jerome.” Epistle 82 in *A Select Library of the Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, First Series, Vol. I: St. Augustine: The Confessions and Letters of St. Augustin, With a Sketch of His Life and Work* (Edinburgh: T&T Clark; Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1955), ed. Philip Schaff, I.3.

> aucthoritie of the holy fathers. Whiche, God is my witnesse, I meane not: but onely to signifie, that, when wee measure their doctrine by Goddes wordes, or teache not in all poinctes as they did, wée be not so muche to be blamed as that men should counte vs, as you doo, to controlle the doctours, and as it were set them to schoole.[62]

Like other Elizabethan polemicists, Cooper also demonstrated awareness of the reader, which comes through in a couple of different ways. First, Cooper is concerned with readers being deceived, and he accused the *Apologie*'s author of aiming to do just that. He asked, "Were it not almoste desperate stubburnesse to perswade the contrarie to ignorant people, and by libelles priuily spred to deteine the vnlearned in errour? But it stoode you vpon to say somewhat, least you shoulde séeme to haue nothynge to say."[63] Later, after alleging that the *Apologie*'s arguments "be nothinge but wrythed coniectures vpon cases extraordinary, and shiftes of extremitie, to proue a continual or general rule to bée obserued in the church of Christe, contarary to the example and order by hym selfe apointed," Cooper asked,

> Thinke you not but the meanest of a great number in this realme (although they séeme but babes and children to you) haue knowen a greate deale more, then you haue heare alledged: and could haue spoken better for you, then you haue yet for your selfe. And yet, when they had all said, it had ben nothinge in comparison of the very trueth.[64]

After accusing the author of the *Apologie* of grossly misinterpreting the fathers on private mass, he declared, "These are the mystes, which you haue alway cast before the eies of the simple and ignorant, as it were to blinde and amase them: to the ende, that either they may not sée the trueth, when it is brought to them: or, if they sée it, to make them suspecte it, when they heare that .xv.C. yeares the more parte of the worlde haue bene of contrary opinion."[65]

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[62] Cooper, *Answere*, fols. 68^{r}-69^{r}.
[63] Cooper, *Answere*, fol. 67^{r}.
[64] Cooper, *Answere*, fol. 84$^{r\text{-}v}$ (STC 424:06).
[65] Cooper, *Answere*, fol. 86r.

In addition, Cooper was also aware of his reader's patience. After arguing that the Catholic belief in the sacrifice of the mass meant the Eucharist was a "testimony of separacion" Cooper declared "This haue I spoken more largely of this mattier, then either I purposed, or you gaue me occasion by any proofe brought for the confirmation of your sacrifice."[66] Elsewhere, in drawing from patristic sources for arguments about the Antichrist, Cooper declared "If I should recite out of authours, and Histories as serueth to this purpose, I shoulde be a greate deale longer then this place requireth."[67]

Cooper had little sympathy for the *Apologie*'s arguments, which he deemed completely unfit for such topics: "Woulde a man thinke that any, hauyng the feare of God, woulde in so weightie mattiers, either grounde his owne conscience, or séeke to confirme others by such féeble proofes and argumentes?"[68] Yet at the same time, he too portrayed himself on the moral high ground, at once castigating his opponent while 'hoping' for his salvation, which could be achieved if he would simply consider the matter honestly:

> …as for shame you should haue runne out of the place, or at the least submitted your self & yelded to the truth, y[t] you protest your self to haue forsaken. Wherfore as you haue the feare of God, as you haue care of your soules health, I most earnestly exhorte you, to leaue studie of contencio[n]: and w[t] a single harte diligently to ponder the reasons on both partes as the weight of the mattier requireth.[69]

Near the end of the work, Cooper tied all these themes together:

> The true church therfore will not go rangynge what way she lusteth, she will not learne of hir own braine, she will not folowe hir owne phantasie…The true shéepe of Christe therfore, the diligent scholars, the obedient spouse, that is, the right and true church will harken onely to hir good shepardes voyce, wil folow hir maisters preceptes, wil obey hir housbandes commaundementes. How then can you excuse your selfe by your holy mother the churche, if you teache otherwise then Christe

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[66] Cooper, *Answere*, fol. 35[v].
[67] Cooper, *Answere*, fol. 98[r-v].
[68] Cooper, *Answere*, fol. 60[r].
[69] Cooper, *Answere*, fol. 119[r-v].

> hath taught? and make such interpretacions of your owne head as haue no grounde in his holy woorde.[70]

Cooper's words are revealing of the polemicist's mindset: true religion cannot be private or consist of extrabiblical interpretations; rather, the "true shéepe of Christe" are both "diligent scholars" and an "obedient spouse." There is no escape for those "make such interpretacions of your owne head as haue no grounde in his holy woorde."

Cooper's conclusion is a striking example of the moderate posture so valued by Elizabethan polemicists:

> For if I should haue scanned euery sillable, worde or sentence, that in this writing hath passed you, and indeuoured capciously to haue taken aduantage at euery trifle, (as your sorte is wonte to deale with vs for faute of better mattier) bothe I shoulde haue fallen into that faute, that I proteste my selfe to mislyke in you, and my answere would haue growen to suche a length, as it might iustly haue weried the reader.

Cooper concluded that he had "medled onely with the principall poinctes of this your Apologie" (again, not necessarily the case) and "let passe many small trifles" that others might "thinke meete and worthy to be answered." Cooper ended the work by adopting the highest form of moderation: pity for his opponent's soul:

> I wyll now ende, and cease any further to exhorte you to a more diligent examinyng and discussyng of the residue of your doctrines: trustynge that your owne conscience, hauynge now more feare of God, then you say you had before, wyll driue you to the same. Whiche I pray God may be, if not by this occasion, yet by some other, when his holy wyll shall be.[71]

The Rhetoric of Abuse in Cooper's *Answere*

Much of Cooper's frustration was aimed at the *Apologie*'s perceived abuses and distortions of scripture and the fathers, which was regularly interpreted as an attempt to mislead

[70] Cooper, *Answere*, fols. 121^{v}-123^{v}.
[71] Cooper, *Answere*, fol. 121^{r-v}.

the ignorant (noted above). In this way, much of the abusive language found in Cooper is simply an extension of his insistence upon academic standards and portrayals of moderation.

He concluded about a reading from the fathers in the *Apologie*, "Wherfore it must néedes bee that ye sucked this erroure oute of the phrases and fashions of speakynge, that the old fathers vsed, peruertinge the same to a farre worse sence, then euer they ment it."[72] After arguing that offerings for the dead in the ancient church were of "the sacrifice of prayse and thankes geuynge to God" and "not a practise to pull soules out of Purgatorie for merchandise and money, as ye haue vsed in your priuate Masses a great number of yeres, to the great defasing of the death and passion of Christe" that "your Masse can not iustly be called the Lord['s] supper, but a peruertyng of the institution and ordina[n]ce, cleane to an other purpose and ende, then he willed to be kepte amonge his people."[73]

Many of Cooper's attacks, however, were more targeted insults of intellect. He insisted that the author's declaration that spiritual governors can alter this aspect of the sacrament (i.e. the necessity of multiple persons) nothing but "exceding arroganice."[74] There are certain parts of the sacrament that may be altered by spiritual governors (such as the kind of bread or wine, the place, time, the number of participants), but making a universal rule concerning the place, time, or a certain number "that may serue for all churches, times, and ages, is far aboue our reache." Such concepts, Cooper sarcastically commented,

> I leaue it to be deuised of suche profound and curious braines, as you and yours haue. Which, beside the word of god, and contrary to his workynge in his creatures, can compryse accidences without subiectes,[75] and bodies withoute

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[72] Cooper, *Answere*, fol. 30^{r}.
[73] Cooper, *Answere*, fols. 33^{v}-34^{v}.
[74] Cooper, *Answere*, fol. 46^{r}.
[75] Cooper argued earlier that scripture records no miracle that changed the substance of something while leaving the accidents intact, the basic theoretical justification for the miracle of transubstantiation. See Cooper, *Answere*, fol. 103^{v}.

> fashion, qua[n]tity or measure, with other suche highe misteries, whiche neither scripture, nor any necessitie of reason doth teache. For in déede our wittes are so simple as, in gods misteries, we can sée no more, then his holy word leadeth vs vnto.[76]

Cooper derided the author's reasoning skills throughout. Responding to the Catholic doctrine of concomitance Cooper mockingly called out, "O profounde and déepe sette reason, wherin you séeme to make your selfe wiser than Christ him selfe, that ordeined the sacrament." Under the pretense of glorifying Christ's blood, Cooper asserted, the author used his "gay gloses" to destroy the sacrament; therefore "God iustly doeth punish you for your rashenesse in leauyng his worde and folowyng ye phantasies of your owne braine."[77] When he came to the *Apologie*'s argument for communion in one kind based upon the priest who carried the sacrament to sea in a stole (which couldn't hold wine) Cooper scornfully asked, "And shall we thinke by a vayne coniecture of the history of *Satirus*, that the custome of that time was otherwise, because your mocking head could not deuise how to cary wyne in a stole?"[78]

Cooper likewise dismissed the *Apologie*'s claims that other Catholic authors' "bondes of recognisance and possession of the trueth" were why they remained silent; rather, Cooper asserted, the reality is "they haue in these poinctes or litle or nothing to say for them selfe."[79] And he found little time for the anonymous author's claims that certain doctrines of the Catholic church are drawn out by "drift of reason." This, Cooper claimed, was "the vanitie of mans reason

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[76] Cooper, *Answere*, fol. 52^{r-v}.
[77] Cooper, *Answere*, fol. 58^{v}.
[78] Cooper, *Answere*, fol. 64^{v}.
[79] Cooper, *Answere*, fol. 85^{v} (STC 424:06).

in gods holy misteries" that departs from true sense of scripture and "draweth in, as it were by linkes, a number of other absurdities."[80]

Cooper stated to the author that he handled his similitude about the servant and his master's orders to prepare dinner "with more sluttish eloquence, then is méete for suche a mattier as this" and the terms used "more méete for the kitchinne, then for the Diuinitie schoole." You would not have done so, Cooper accused, had not your "mockyng spirite…so rauished you." If Protestants had done likewise, Cooper asserted, you would have "sayd that wée had rayled, and done otherwise then it became vs."[81] In concluding his *Answere*, Cooper drew on classical imagery to disparage the anonymous author's own projections of writing humbly and dutifully, instead declaring it analogous to sexual transgression and cowardice:

> For neither is it Goliath that you fight against in his brauerie, as you say, braggynge agaynst the people of God, but rather Achilles manfully reuengynge the inceste committed with the spouse of Christe, which with your amorous cupps you haue allured from him: nor yet doo you come stoutely as Dauid did in the name of the liuynge God, before the face of both the armies to hurle your stones, but priuely out of a corner shoote your arrowes agaynst him as Paris against Achilles.[82]

Cooper's abusive rhetoric also stands out for his frequent employment of apocalyptic rhetoric.[83] The *Apologie* had used several common arguments as evidence that the Catholic faith

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[80] Cooper, *Answere*, fol. 104^{v}.
[81] Cooper, *Answere*, fol. 117^{r-v}.
[82] Cooper, *Answere*, fol. 119^{r}.
[83] The importance of apocalypticism in early modern English Protestant thought is well-documented. Starting places for the dramatic influence of apocalypticism in early modern English thought are Richard Bauckham, *Tudor Apocalypse: Sixteenth century apocalypticism, millenarianism and the English Reformation* (Oxford: The Sutton Courtenay Press, 1978), Katherine Firth, *The Apocalyptic Tradition in Reformation Britain, 1530-1645* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979), and Christopher Hill, *The World Turned Upside Down: Radical Ideas During the English Revolution* (New York: Viking Press, 1972). For more focused studies on Elizabethan Protestants and their apocalyptic worldviews, see Peter Lake, "Anti-Popery: the

was true while Protestantism was not. These included arguments from history and tradition, as well as prosperity and piety. In response to such arguments, Cooper laid out in detail why the Catholic church was the church of the Antichrist. He drew on the prevalent distinction between the "visible" and "invisible" church,[84] arguing that the invisible church (the "piller of truth") cannot err, yet the visible church can.[85] Drawing heavily on the Old Testament prophets, Cooper pointed out that God's visible church could and had gone astray. Furthermore, when the visible church was confronted with its own waywardness by a minority or even a single individual, it frequently reacted with persecution. Though the visible church possessed the law of God, and even the sacraments and ceremonies, it was still corrupted. The same happened when Jesus confronted the Jewish leaders and the apostles preached: so who, Cooper asked, is the true church? The Jews possessed God's truth, the succession of bishops and priests, holiness, austerity, and great learning of God's law, "[a]nd yet is it moste euident that they erred: that they refused the trueth, that vnder the name and gay shewe of the church, in very déede they persecuted the church." The parallel was too obvious to Cooper: "Why shal we not thinke that the like maybee in this time? Yea why should wee not surely perswade our selues, by the course of gods beinges, and by the testimonies of holy scripture, that the like is now in this our time?" This is especially considering that "Our sauiour Christ and hys Apostles haue left warning abundantly, that it would bee so in his churche, and especially towarde the ende of the worlde."

Structure of a Prejudice," in *Conflict in Early Stuart England: Studies in Religion and Politics, 1603-1642*, eds. Richard Cust and Ann Hughes (London; New York: Longman, 1989), 72-106; Idem, *Moderate Puritans and the Elizabethan Church* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), chs. 4 and 6; Richard Bauckham, "The Career and Thought of Dr. William Fulke (1537-1589)," Ph.D. dissertation, Cambridge University (1972), ch. 6.

[84] This distinction was agreed upon almost universally among both Protestants and Catholics, with many Anabaptists being the exception (who collapsed the distinction altogether).

[85] Cooper, *Answere*, fols. 90^{v}-91^{v}.

Paul wrote that the Antichrist must sit in his temple, and Peter stated they must be teachers of lies. Most importantly, "These thinges were prophecied to come, not amonge Turkes and Sarasens, not amonge Infidels and Paganes, but in the temple of god, in the church of god, in the societie of them that did professe Christ."[86] Thus, just as Christ and his disciples were rejected by the religious establishment, 'true' Christians were now suffering the same fate. Because, Cooper argued, the visible church shall "departe from the trueth of Gods worde, & right ministration of his sacraments" in the last days, "cleauinge to theyr owne interpretacions" and "beinge deuided in sundry sectes of religion," the Catholic church's rejection of Protestantism is proof of its veracity.

> Wherfore it ought to comfort and confirme vs, and cause vs to thinke, that wée be in déede in the churche, rather then to feare vs: seinge they, that in the pompe and glorious face of the world séeme to haue the gouernmente of the churche, doth refuse vs and take vs to bee none of the church. For suche they were alwaies, that from the beginnynge refused and oppressed the trueth.

Cooper then paused to address the skeptical reader who might doubt that God would not allow such large-scale apostasy. He sought to assuage their doubts with a Calvinistic warning against searching into the unknowable providence of God:

> Here perhappes some curious conscience wil be pricked, and thinke it is not likely, that god of his great mercy would suffer his churche and so great a number of people to erre so many hundred yeares. But wée must beware how by oure reason of likelihodde, wée enter into gods iudgement and vnscrutable prouidence. We must thinke of him, as the courte of his doinge sheweth vs, Wée must thinke of him, as his holy worde teacheth vs. Wée must not thinke of him, as oure [sonde?] reason wyll leade vs.[87]

After drawing from the fathers to buttress his point, Cooper spelled out the 'inevitable' conclusion: "Seyng therfore it doeth euidently appere; that in the latter time they shall beare the

[86] Cooper, *Answere*, fols. 94^{r}-95^{r}.
[87] Cooper, *Answere*, fol. 96^{r-v}.

name of the churche, which in déede be not the right churche?" And, according to Cooper, the method for discerning the 'true' church from the 'false' one was simple enough: "Therfore it is easie to iudge what is to be thought of them that leaue ye worde of God, and worship him well nere altogether with their owne deuised pha[n]tasies."[88]

Conclusion

The anonymous *Apologie for priuate Masse* and Cooper's *Answere* to the work may be considered minor episodes in the controversy surrounding the abortive Westminster conference and Jewel's challenge sermon, but they are no less illustrative of the traits that defined early modern disputative literature. The *Apologie*, like many Catholic pieces responding to Jewel, was insistent that Jewel had gone about the whole thing from the wrong end by arguing from the negative, for he didn't have that privilege. The role of defendant belonged to the Catholic church. Cooper, predictably, responded by arguing that the Catholic church had gone so far astray it was no longer recognizable.

Their arguments illustrate stock points belonging to both Protestants and Catholics, but also the intellectual fault lines running underneath these debates that inevitably contributed to intellectual stalemate. The primary example of this is the debate over 'private' mass. The author of the *Apologie* claimed there was no such thing; it was a term invented by Protestants. Cooper did not agree. As the controversial literature of the 1560s increased, so did the number of fault lines in the arguments and though most authors continued debating these key issues, some took the unusual step of naming them. One such person was John Rastell, whose *Replie* to Cooper's *Answer* appeared in 1565 and is the subject of the next chapter.

[88] Cooper, *Answere*, fols. 98^v-99^r.

CHAPTER 7

WHO BORE IT BEST? JOHN RASTELL'S *REPLIE* (1565)

> No Syr, you must not rule vs in the maner of our reasoning, and appoint vs to proue that, which we take not vpon vs.[1]
>
> John Rastell, *A Replie against an answer (falslie intitled) in Defence of the the truth* (1565)

Context

A few years after Cooper's *Answere* appeared, the Catholic John Rastell published *A Replie against an answere (falslie intitled) in Defence of the truth* (Antwerp, 1565). Rastell's *Replie* was a direct response to Cooper's attack of the anonymous *Apologie*. Curiously, however, Rastell never refers to Cooper by name, but simply as the author or "master" of the *Defence*.

Rastell was a prolific author, publishing several polemical works—almost all of which were against Jewel—yet he was largely ignored by Protestants.[2] He is named in passing by Edward Dering in his *Sparing Restraint* (1568), a reply to Harding's *Reioinder*, and Calfhill cites his Rastell's *Confutation* in his *Answere* to Martiall's *Treatyse of the Crosse* (the subject of the next chapter).[3] He did not receive a direct reply until William Fulke's *D. Heskins, D. Sanders,*

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[1] John Rastell, *A Replie against an answer (falslie intitled) in Defence of the truth* (Antwerp, 1565; STC 2nd ed. 20728), fol. 126^{r}.

[2] Besides the *Replie*, Rastell published five pieces: *A confutation of a sermon, pronou[n]ced by M. Iuell, at Paules Crosse* (1564), *A Copie of a challenge, taken owt of the confutation of M. Iuells sermon* (1565), *A Treatise Intitled, Beware of M. Iewel* (1566), *The Third Booke, Declaring by Examples out of Auncient Councels, Fathers, and Later writers, that it is time to Beware of M. Iewel* (1566), and *A Briefe Shew Of the false Wares packt together in the named, Apology of the Churche of England* (1567).

[3] Edward Dering, *A Sparing Restraint, of many lauishe Vntruthes, which M. Doctor Harding dothe chalenge, in the first Article of my Lorde of Sarisburies Replie* (London, 1568; STC 2nd ed. 6725), 19, 122; James Calfhill, *An Answer to John Martiall's Treatise of the Cross*, ed. Richard Gibbings (Cambridge: The University Press, 1846), 3, 52.

and M. Rastel, accounted (among their faction) three pillers and Archpatriarches of the Popish Synaogogue (1579), some fifteen years after Rastell's first publication.

Interestingly, Rastell seems to be one of the earliest allusions to puritans.[4] Though he didn't use the word specifically, a suggestive reference shows up in his *Confutation* (1564). In a discussion about the holding of the bread in administration of the sacrament, he told Jewel that there are "thousandes…of your inferior ministers whose death it ys, to be bound vnto any such externall fashion."[5] In the preface, Rastell claimed to have written the work four years prior for a private friend, which could make this a very early reference to puritans. However, the work's timing, suspiciously close to Parker's mass deprivation of ministers for refusing vestments, makes it more likely that Rastell wrote this bit closer to the publication date.

There are two characteristics about Rastell's *Replie* that set it apart from most of the other works examined here. First, Rastell exhibited unusual perceptiveness in cutting to the heart of an argument and exposing the argumentative fault lines by pinpointing the mutually exclusive first principles that frequently put Protestants and Catholics at loggerheads. Second, Rastell's arguments are often more convoluted than the others, not least because he is the fourth layer to this dispute, and sometimes they are just downright odd. This may help explain why Rastell went largely unanswered through his polemical career.

Rastell's *Replie* is aimed at both Jewel's challenge sermon and Cooper's *Answere*, something made explicit in the preface. Rastell declared that, "A preacher at paules crosse, (in an euill houre) prouoked all the Catholikes in the world, vpon manifold articles," and a treatise was

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[4] For other references from the 1560s see Patrick Collinson, "Antipuritanism," in *The Cambridge Companion to Puritanism*, eds. Paul C.H. Lim and John Coffey (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 19-20.
[5] Rastell, *Replie*, fol. 25r.

put into writing against him that was agreeable to Catholics because it was short, easy to copy out, as well as true and sound.[6] However, “through much goeing abrode in to manie places, and free communicating of it vnto diuers persons, it cummeth at length vnto a protesta[n]ts handes, which before that, was desirous of it.” Rastell described the Protestant who responded (i.e. Cooper) as commendable for his “zeale” though “not of his science.”

Rastell then complained that “simple and familiar letters of Catholikes, not framed to such purposes” were taken up and answered in print by Protestants, as well as many other treatises “which went abrode without name from frind to frind.” However, Rastell contended, Protestants were unable to meet the challenge. It seems that Rastell was moved to write after a friend with Protestant sympathies sent him Cooper’s *Answere* in hopes he would convert:

> But concerning that called *Defence of the truth*, being sent vnto me by a great fauorer of the proceedinges, and sent of verye good will and friendshipp, that I shoulde be reformed (after his desire) by it, considering how the Papistes are allwayes repelled, I taried not long, but made a reply againste it, the veritie of our cause was so euident, and the false demeanure of the aduersarie, that I might well defend the Catholike, and turn the glorie of crakers in to confusion.

Rastell also used this as an opportunity to comment on Protestants’ duplicitous printing practices:

> Yet, this I am bold to saye, that thei might (if thei would) haue done by this boke, as thei dyd by the Apologie (as thei termed it) of priuate masse, and haue set it furth in print with their answer vnto it, for the glorie of their religion, and much liberalitie towardes poor Catholikes, whose writinges without the author his labors and charges, full diligentlie thei haue printed.[7]

Here, Rastell complained of what was noted in the previous chapter: Protestants had begun printing the *Apologie* and Cooper’s response together but soon dropped the *Apologie*, only

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[6] This contrasts with Harding, who fervently denied writing the *Apologie of priuate Masse* when it was attributed to him because of the work’s tone. See ch. 8.
[7] Rastell, *Replie*, sig. †j^{r-v}.

printing Cooper's *Answere*. While this is an interesting historical note, it is also revealing of the pervading disputative mindset that expected both arguments be made available in their entirety.

Disputative Method in Rastell's *Replie*

Rastell made explicit connection between this particular print debate and the Westminster conference. He first disputed Cooper's defense of Jewel as exempt from providing a defense because of his standing as a bishop. Rastell did this by comparing Jewel's current status to that of the Catholic bishops at the Westminster conference, who were not afforded the same advantage:

> Well Syr yet agayne, if the order which any one Realme taketh, be able to settle men in the possession of the truth, and if for the tyme of that order standyng, no Bishope is to be required to shew his euidence: how chaunseth it, that in the disputatio[n] which was prepared at Westminster, the catholike Bishopes, which then were in possessio[n], were not yet permitted to enjoy their priuilege?[8]

Rastell also reprimanded Jewel for overreaching in the debate: "yet you were not content with the licence grau[n]ted vnto you, of disputyng with them, but you would allso apoint vnto them, what order thei should take in the matter. And for all their possession, yet you would dryue them to shew their euidencies." Rastell argued that since Protestants were now in power, they had changed the rules of the game in their favor and, in doing so, violating the norms of disputation:

> you are content that the plaintyfe shoulde first and formost shew his euidence. And now it ys against reason, that the possessor should take the person of a plaintyfe, which, before this tyme, would not be grau[n]ted, whiles your selfes were out of all possession....But no reason shall preuaile except it make for you, and therefor you passe not vpon the possession, which the Catholikes hold and keepe in the world, but you wyll dryue them to the prouyng of such articles as doe offend you, and for your owne part, you will stand vpon the negatiue.[9]

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[8] Rastell, *Replie*, fol. 6^{v}.
[9] Rastell, *Replie*, fol. $7^{r\text{-}v}$.

While couching his *Replie* as a continuation of the Westminster disputation, Rastell also leveraged the advantages that came with putting disputation into print. He printed reference tables in the preface so that the reader could see for themselves where Cooper went amiss. The entries are categorized for the reader's convenience: places where Cooper wrote slanderously, went off topic, added terms, made arguments "such as the knowen Logike or Diuinitie neuer alowed," lied, and abused St. Cyprian.[10]

Rastell intended his piece to be a continuation of the Westminster disputation, but the work is rather unusual in regard to its internal content (though not to the extent of Martiall's *Treatyse*). On one hand, it exhibits many conventional characteristics of disputative literature. Rastell was highly concerned with disproving his opponent's arguments by using logic and preoccupied with projecting himself as moderate in the work while demonstrating the immoderate character of Protestants. However, Rastell exhibited noticeably less concern with formal logic as did many of his fellow Catholic controversialists and Protestant opponents. Instead, Rastell spent considerably more time arguing about the sense and meaning of words. Most interesting though is that Rastell was far more likely than other controversialists to identify the mutually exclusive principles that fueled print debate.

Logic

Rastell repeatedly insisted that arguing from the negative (as Jewel had done) was not permissible. He stressed that Protestants' blustering assertions mean nothing, for the burden of proof is not on those who wish to keep religion the same but those who wish to change it. He insisted to Jewel that even Augustine thought it madness to dispute what the universal church has

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[10] Rastell, *Replie*, sig. †iij^{r}-iv^{v}.

always practiced and that it is unfair for Protestants to gloat that Catholics have nothing to say simply because they can't disprove negatives.[11]

Nevertheless, Rastell decided to accommodate his opponent(s), precisely because it was an academic exercise: "I will yet goe further with you, and graunt for disputation sake, that which for truth sake is to be denyed."[12] Rastell told Jewel that he would hypothetically grant the negative "if you can and will proue the whole world to haue ben deceaued" (which, of course, he could not do). "Wherefor M. Iuells inuention of his negatiue, hath neither so greate wyte nor lernyng, as you suppose, because it would neuer serue hym, if the Catholike should tell hym plainely, either that he would not, either that he could not answer him."[13]

As part of the disagreement over the burden of proof, Rastell reprimanded Cooper time and again for arguing negatively or from silence (fallacies often connected in Rastell's mind), especially out of the fathers. In a lengthy debate over Chrysostom, Rastell remonstrated, "And neuer fill your papers in writinges or your audience eares in preaching, with such argumentes, as are taken of authoritie of holie fathers negatiuelie, or with such commendacio[n] of one truth, as craftelie shall disgrace an other, as true."[14] Concerning a passage from Aquinas which was sourced from Cyril's *Thesaurus*, Protestants objected that the passage was not to be found in the editions of Cyril in possession. This, Rastell objected, did not mean Cyril never wrote it, simply because it was impossible for Protestants to know everything that had been written. Rastell meant this quite literally:

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[11] Rastell, *Replie*, fols. 8^{r}-9^{r}; see also 150^{r} for the Augustine reference again.
[12] Rastell, *Replie*, fol. $9^{r\text{-}v}$.
[13] Rastell, *Replie*, fols. 10^{v}-11^{r}. See 77^{r} for similar example, where Rastell hypothetically grants an interpretation of Chrysostom by Wolfgang Musculus against the sacrament as a sacrifice.
[14] Rastell, *Replie*, fol. $76^{r\text{-}v}$.

> which testimony if it be not in the Latyn now extant, yet it maye be in the Greeke, and what Greeke copyes are beyond the sea you can not tell, and if it be not in print, yet it may be in wryten bookes, whereas many yeares, before any printing was in the world, this testimonie is alleaged by approued men and excellent, both for learning and lyuing.[15]

In response to Cooper's claim that Catholics must prove sole receiving by the priest (even though early Christians received alone in their homes sometimes), Rastell vehemently refused the burden of proof. "No Syr," Rastell replied,

> you must not rule vs in the maner of our reasoning, and appoint vs to proue that, which we take not vpon vs. This is it, which I haue wysshed before to be well remembered, that our question is not, whether any priest then did receiue alone, but whether he might do it laufullie, or no, that is our questions.[16]

Elsewhere, in a back-and-forth about concomitance,[17] Rastell insisted that Protestants must prove that receiving the body necessarily meant the blood was not received as well, in addition to proving that the body in the sacrament was Christ the human, not Christ the divine Son of God, both of which are traditional teachings of the Catholic church.[18]

Such arguments reveal how Catholics rarely felt the need to defend tradition, castigating Protestant arguments *ex silencio* as feeble attempts to overturn sacred history. This question about the burden of proof was one of the fundamental fault lines running through these debates that led to theoretical impasses. Rastell, however, was somewhat unusual in his habit of actually *naming* these intellectual stalemates. This is noteworthy, as it reveals that even if polemicists did not always point out the epistemic gridlock, they were at least aware of it. Perhaps the most pronounced example of this is Rastell's

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[15] Rastell, *Replie*, fols. 151^{v}-152^{r}.
[16] Rastell, *Replie*, fol. 126^{r}.
[17] I.e. that receiving the bread imparted the same spiritual benefit as receiving both elements, a justification for communion in one kind.
[18] Rastell, *Replie*, fols. 137^{r}-138^{r}.

continual insistence that Cooper had missed the entire point of the *Apologie*: Catholics do not advocate for sole receiving by the priest as a matter of necessity, but permissibility.[19] The theological concept of indifference was the hinge of the whole argument.

Rastell opened the third chapter by observing that the author of the *Apologie*, "for the better opening of their weake kynd of reasoning," had hypothetically conceded to Jewel that there was no private mass in the early church, even though he "had good authorities to confute that bold conclusion." He then chided Cooper for shifting the argument away from the matter at hand: "You be verie suspitiouse Syr, or verie iniurious. For no other thing was gone aboute in this third chapiter, but that all thinges should not be required to be done, as thei were vsed in the primitiue church." Both Protestants and Catholics agree that the church need not be made to resemble the apostolic church in *every* respect, Rastell observed, so why fault a Catholic for saying so?

He then quoted the other half of Cooper's statement, which specified that the church must be apostolic in regards to doctrine and the sacraments. Rastell remarked that if he knew what sense Cooper was using to talk about the sacraments, "I could sone answer you, how farfuth we agree with you in this part of your distinction." It is necessary to know whether Cooper means elements of the sacrament such as time and place, fasting beforehand or eating, or to receive "with cumpanie or alone." Rastell used this to return back to the point made in the *Apologie* and which he heartily assented to, namely that the number of communicants is a matter indifferent and the church has the authority to change it as she deems appropriate:

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[19] Rastell made the same point about receiving communion in both kinds. See Rastell, *Replie*, fol. 147^{r-v}.

> Wherefore the vse of the sacramentes being with vs a thing indiffere[n]t in it selfe…you speake very absurdly vnto our iudgementes, first in not bynding vs vnto the obseruations of ceremonies and thinges indifferent, and then againe requiring of vs to keepe the ceremonies of the primitiue church.

As ceremonies are a matter indifferent, Rastell continued, we then must (as Cyprian exhorted) return to the head, the pope, to settle the matter.[20] Likewise, the recurring story of Sirapion receiving the sacrament from the priest's boy proves nothing, for the question is not one of "necessity" but "permissibility."[21]

As mentioned in the previous chapter, the concept of indifference is almost always associated with Protestant argumentation, particularly in the debates between puritans and conformists.[22] However, as we have seen from the *Apologie* and Rastell's defense, Catholics routinely employed *adiaphora* as well.[23] Rastell turned indifference against his Protestant opponent by insisting that it is contradictory to say, on the one hand, that only what is commanded in scripture is a matter of necessity and, on the other, that a company of persons to celebrate the sacrament is a matter of necessity. This is because scripture nowhere commands that there be multiple persons present at the sacrament.[24] As shown below, Rastell's arguments for adiaphora relied heavily on the use of history.

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[20] "Because the vse of them is a thing indifferent, and it neither maketh neither marreth to receiue alone orwith cumpanie, and to receiue in one or in both kyndes, or at night or in the morning, or thrise in the yere, or ones in all our liffe, so that the church be obeied." Rastell, *Replie*, fols. 21^{v}-23^{r} (quote at 23^{r}); see also 33^{r}-38^{r}.
[21] Rastell, *Replie*, fol. 158^{r-v}.
[22] See the discussion of matters indifferent in ch. 5.
[23] For a discussion of adiaphora in Erasmus see Gary Remer, *Humanism and the Rhetoric of Toleration* (University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1996), 50-54.
[24] Rastell, *Replie*, fols. 97^{v}-98^{r}.

Throughout the *Replie*, Rastell repeatedly chided Cooper for poor reasoning, both generally (i.e. not being "reasonable") and syllogistically. Rastell dismissed the Protestant definition of private mass as something so faulty "that not only the scholes of the Catholikes would neuer haue made it, but not so much as a reasonable scholars head would euer haue permitted," and derided an argument out of Tertullian by Cooper as so poor that any man can see by "common reason" that Tertullian did not say what his opponent made him to say.[25]

Rastell's use of formal logic was primarily restricted to criticizing Cooper's own syllogisms. He attacked Cooper's argument against sole receiving and communion in one kind[26] by refuting the major and minor premises: "Syr, I deny your maior vnto you, because you affirme, that generally, which ys true only in certen pointes of Christ his mau[n]dy." If it were true that we must only do what Christ did, Rastell claimed, then we must only administer the sacrament to twelve persons, before dinner, without cope or surplice, or with organs. Rastell suggested to Cooper that he replace the word "institution" with "tradition" and then his major premise would become acceptable to Catholics, for anything that Christ did that night could be considered an institution, but not all of it is tradition. Rastell judged Cooper's major premise, taken from Cyprian, to be a travesty of reason: "You may be for euer ashamed, that you alleage Saint Cypriane for the proufe of your proposition, which nothing at all maketh for you."[27]

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[25] Rastell, *Replie*, fols. 7^{r}-8^{r}, 14^{r-v}, 139^{r}.

[26] A) We ought to only do what the Lord did at the institution of the sacrament; B) There was no sole receiving or communion of one kind; C) Therefore, we ought not to do it either. See below, n. 73.

[27] Rastell, *Replie*, fols. 40^{v}-42^{r}.

Rastell began the sixth chapter by repeating a syllogistic argument for the number of persons to receive as a matter in different: "*That which is not euidentlye determined in scripture* (saieth the Catholike vpon his aduersaries graunting, of this vayne principle) *ought to stand indifferent. / But the necessitie of cumpanye to receyue with the priest, ys no where determined: / Ergo it ought to remain indifferent.*" Rastell then pointed out that Cooper denied the second proposition, and for the first brought in "so many new deuises and conclusions, that we haue to abhorr them, which are not of the auncient religion."[28]

Rastell also broke down the logic of Cooper's denial that multiple persons might receive the same communion in separate places because they do not celebrate according to Christ's institution. It was, Rastell asserted, part and parcel of his opponent's scattered approach:

> You be allwaies lyke your selfe, in forgetting your selfe. For here you denye the argument, and the cause of your denyall is the faulte which you fynde with the maior and minor propositions of it. But if the faulte be only in the propositions; why denye you the argument? And if the argument be faultie, how vncunnynglie do you proue that, by the denying of the propositions?

Rastell then used the distinction between and particular and universal to validate sole receiving: if the universal sacrament is celebrated correctly, Rastell concluded, then the particular sacrament celebrated by an individual priest is too. Because you affirm the universal and deny the particular, "you speake so farr out of all forme and fasshion, that no reason or probabilitie, may be perceiued in your saying."[29]

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[28] Rastell, *Replie*, fol. 94^{r-v}. See also fol. 111^{v}.
[29] Rastell, *Replie*, fols. 118^{v}-119^{v}.

Historical and Grammatical Arguments

Though syllogistic reasoning is less pronounced in Rastell than other Catholic controversialists, he was very preoccupied with arguments from history (because of the critical role tradition played in his thinking) and the senses and meanings of words. Rastell's use of history is particularly pronounced in his use of adiaphora to defend tradition. However, Rastell's use of historical sources, both ancient and contemporary, illustrate well the inconsistent methods employed by controversialists.

For instance, Rastell argued that Cooper was hypocritical to make communion in both kinds a matter of necessity while using patristic sources: "you do against right dealing, to call vs to the primitiue churche for ceremonies, which you said before were in themselues were indifferen[n]t." Moreover, Cooper contradicted himself for arguing for both kinds out of Chrysostom, and was intellectually disingenuous for suspecting the credibility of Cyprian's *De coena* while simultaneously citing it against Catholics.[30]

However, Rastell also argued that to make communion in both kinds a matter of necessity is "directly against your father Luther, which [*sic*] in more the[n] one place declareth the precept of receuying both kindes to be in it selfe indiffere[n]t, and such as he, at his owne pleasure, in some cases would either vse or refuse."[31] A similar issue

[30] Rastell, *Replie*, fols. 22^{r}, 92^{r-v}, and 154^{v}-155^{r} (respectively).
[31] Rastell, *Replie*, fol. 168^{v}. In the margin, Rastell cited Luther's 1523 *Formula Missae*, his first order for the evangelical service in Wittenberg. However, in the *Formula Missae*, Luther did not say exactly what Rastell claimed he did. Luther wrote there that receiving in both kinds was clearly instituted by Christ and the apostles, and therefore it is better, but also not to contend with those who wish for one. However, those who refuse both kinds were "ignorant" and therefore not to be given one kind, but neither. Ironically, Luther also railed against the necessity of a council to determine this matter (something Catholics repeatedly argued for) and denounced sole receiving of the priest in this work (and many other places) as "absurd" and impermissible "except as a temporary concession for the sake of necessity or for the weak in faith." Martin Luther, *An Order of Mass and Communion for the Church at Wittenberg*, in *Luther's Works*

arose over the usage of Erasmus (which also appears in the exchange between Martiall and Calfhill). After quoting Cooper's incredulity that the author of the *Apologie* would cite Erasmus whom they have "so much hated," Rastell turned the tables by punting Erasmus back to Protestants:

> Syr, our store is so great, that we neede not Erasmus authoritie, but our behauior is so reasonable, that we doe condescend to you, in alleaging your owne doctors. And it seemeth very strainge vnto me, that Erasmus, whom you call a singular instrume[n]t prouided of God to beginne the reformatio[n] of his church, shold yet be proued to haue written by name against the false ghospellers and beginners of this new reformation of Christianitie.[32]

From these passages, we can see how Rastell, like many controversialists, did not use sources along neat categorical lines. This often landed him in the awkward position treating a historical figure as both an authority and not an authority. This is precisely what Rastell accused Cooper of doing in his appeals to the early church yet, at the same time, he cited Luther against Protestants. Erasmus too was at once one of "your owne doctors" and someone who wrote against Protestants.

One of the most pronounced elements of Rastell's *Replie* is his repeated use tradition to justify the Catholic position as the defendant. Early in the work, Rastell asked Cooper, "But, Syr, how can your wysedome serue you to think, that because you will haue vs to proue our doctrine, therefor we must do it?" Rastell explained that Catholics do not lightly abandon the received articles of faith, precisely because of the high regard

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(American Edition), Vol. 53, trans. Paul Zeller Strodach, rev. Ulrich S. Leupold (Philadelphia, PA: Fortress Press, 1965), 34-35 (on communion in one kind) and 32 (on sole receiving). In the 1520 and 30s, Luther wrote two tracts specifically against private mass (*The Misuse of the Mass* [1521] and *The Private Mass and the Consecration of Priests* [1533]), as well as mentioning it in several other works. Thus, Rastell either felt justified in misrepresenting Luther or was very confused.

[32] Rastell, *Replie*, fol. 124^{v}.

for tradition: "so when the churche of Christ doth generallie receaue and folow a custome, I ought to iudge the best of it, allthough I were not able to proue it."[33]

Rastell admitted that this position would never be accepted by Protestants. They would demand scripture, council, or doctor to prove the argument—communion in one kind, in this instance—and when Catholics resort to tradition, both parties enter into a disputative cul-de-sac from which there is no escape:

> either you must declare, that reason of myne be nothing worth the staying vpon: or els you must hold your peace, as hauing no more to saye vnto me: or els you must repete your begynning againe, and harpe madly vpon one string, in telling me that I can shew no sufficient sentence, exa[m]ple, or authoritie, why co[m]munion should be geauen vnder one kynd only.

From there, the only place to go was particular historical examples, which inevitably will take the argument into other questions which "apperteine to an other tyme."[34]

Rastell bookended his *Replie* with arguments from tradition. Near the end of the work, he undertook an extended discourse on the historical unity of the Catholic church as definitive evidence that he was not wrong. He concluded to Cooper that it is now clear that the 600 years since Christ's ascension are not for Protestants (per Jewel's challenge), but why refuse the same standard for these previous 900 years?

> Is this (thinke you) a small and weeke argument to confirme and staye our consciences vpon, that for .ix. hundred yeares space, you, our aduersaries, can not deny vnto vs, but that all Bishops, Vniuersities, Realmes, and states of Christendome, haue quyetlie continued in one kynde of true Apostolike fayth, vntyll within these few dayes, that all the old catholike religion hath in some places ben abolyshed by publike authoritie?

He then turned this argument into a moral matter. If Luther—"a rennegat and dissolute fryar"—is esteemed because he has many (irreligious) followers, how much more ought those to be

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[33] Rastell, *Replie*, fol. 8$^{r\text{-}v}$.
[34] Rastell, *Replie*, fol. 10$^{r\text{-}v}$.

regarded "which continued in great numbre and with much praise in ther orders"? Rastell pointed out the obvious (to him) contradictions between this time being one of "grace and light" as Protestants claimed and widespread destruction and degeneracy: "vowes broken, monasteryes ouerturned, the landes of Christ and his church alyenated, virginitie, fasting, praying, and all rules of good and perfect lyfe co[n]temned." Thus, "The continuance onlye, of a religion .900. yeares without interruption, is a very probable argument not lightlie to passe away from it."[35]

While this argument underscores the role of tradition as a source of authority for Catholics that was co-equal with the scriptures, it is also a strange take on history. For sixteenth-century Christians, the closer one could get to the time of Jesus and the first Christians, the better. Apostolicity was self-evidently important even if what, precisely, apostolic practice should be applied to was never agreed upon. Here, Rastell turned that notion on its head and argued that the centuries following Jewel's 'pure' age could be just as authoritative for their (ostensible) unity.

Rastell ended on a mark of supreme confidence by appealing to the 'majority rule' of the Catholic church. He did not deny Cooper's accusation that there may have been forgers and flatterers throughout history who corrupted texts, but he replied that it was incumbent upon Cooper to prove who these persons were. Surprisingly, Rastell even defended the Donation of Constantine (if somewhat cautiously). Though the Donation of Constantine may be in question, Rastell argued, it has no bearing upon any article of faith. Further, Protestants need to explain how Sylvester came into possession of Rome, or what Constantine did with the old Rome when he built Constantinople if they wished to explain it away. Rastell also dismissed any corruptions in the Decrees as "no matter of my faith." In response to Cooper's charge that the Eastern church

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[35] Rastell, *Replie*, fol. 169^{r-v}.

has not allowed the errors that flood the Catholic church, Rastell simply observed that their enslavement to the Turks was evidence enough of the soundness of their doctrine. He concluded that "continuance of tyme in one doctrine with multitude of folowers" is much more persuasive than the simple who chase Christ to Geneva, Wittenberg, or the woods of Bohemia.[36]

Following his engaging, if somewhat romantic, discourse on the unity of the Catholic church, Rastell perceptively pointed out another significant fault line between Protestants and Catholics: How to determine the true church. Rastell asked his opponent, if it's possible for the church and magistrates to be deceived (a critique applicable to both Protestants and Catholics), then how do we decide between the churches?

> If the churche of Rome, which hath ben and is so well receyued, hath ben and may be vntrulye perswaded, maye not that church, which you perchanse, shall point out vnto vs with your lytle fynger, be also with good lykelyhood very fowlie deceyued? And maye not one thirde person, commend vnto vs an other church? which agreeth with none of our two, and yet is nothing the better? In this doubt, which doth so necessarilye aryse, what is your ghostly counsell vnto such as are fearefull of conscience?[37]

He then compared Cooper's stock Protestant definition of the church (the Word rightly preached and sacraments rightly administered) to "symple idiotes of the countrey" who ask a stranger for guidance and are given generic landmark directions that can easily be confused. In the same way, "so yet euery mysbegotten congregatio[n], will chalendge them vnto herselfe." Luther and Zwingli, Rastell pointed out, are quintessential examples of the inability to agree on such a definition.[38] Though Rastell appealed, once again, to tradition as the epistemic validator of Catholic belief, he was not a typical Catholic in this regard. Rather, his unusual arguments reveal

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[36] Rastell, *Replie*, fol. 175^{r}-176^{r}.
[37] Rastell, *Replie*, fol. 185^{v}.
[38] Rastell, *Replie*, fol. 186^{r-v}.

his ability to dig into the heart of an issue and highlight the insurmountable theoretical obstacles between them.

History was at the forefront of Rastell's *Replie*, but he was also very preoccupied with the senses and meanings of words. This is clear from the outset, beginning with his criticism of Cooper for distorting and embellishing the *Apologie*'s objections to Jewel:

> Wherefor, Sir, you make the matter worse by your telling, then it was in the authour his writyng: and yow find fault with others for misreporting and misco[n]struing, prouiding not in the meane while for your selfe, to vse and shew true dealing. The Catholike doth not take M. Iuell to be so folishe, as to thinke that because he is a Bishope, he should make no rekonyng of his doctrine: but he marueleth rather (his lerning co[n]sidered) that he would alleage such causes as he dyd, for the refusal of prouing his doctrine. And so he may yet still maruell at it.[39]

Rastell defended the *Apologie* by repeating its argument that the Church permits sole receiving by the priest but does not believe in such a thing as "private" mass; rather, the term had been invented by Protestants. Catholics, Rastell continued, require that Jewel and Protestants are bound to prove the affirmative (i.e. that a priest must have communicants in order to celebrate). To Protestant accusations of a "shift" and demand to know whether there is a difference between private mass and sole receiving, Rastell sarcastically retorted, "Aske not this question of Catholikes, but of Luthera[n]s." He then turned on Cooper's use of Cicero to critique the *Apologie* for a lack of clarity: "Wherefor you haue done verie vnskillfullie to tell us of Tully & Panetius, and to require that we should define *priuate masse* vnto you, which haue not ben the inuentors of that terme." Rastell asserted that his opponents may have seen "scholme[n]" mention "priuate and

[39] Rastell, *Replie*, fol. $2^{r\text{-}v}$.

solempne [*sic*] masse" but these are not two different kinds of mass, just two different circumstances, and thus are "accidents" of mass.[40]

After reprimanding Cooper for jumbling together a select number of disparate and non-essential elements in order to define the mass, Rastell insisted he prove that such an understanding of the mass was ever taught by theologians: "Yf you haue any face at all of à true man, shew in what place of any scholeman, any such priuate masse is spoke[n] of as you define." After repeating again that the term had been invented by Lutherans, Rastell accused his opponent of intentionally conflating the two senses of private mass "to haue some libertie to hyde your selfe vnder ambiguities, and thereby to troble your aduersarie, when he shold not know where to find you."[41] Rastell clearly read the debate carefully, as his repetition of the *Apologie*'s arguments and direct rebuttals to both Jewel and Cooper testify.

Rastell returned to the sense and meaning of words several times. In a back-and-forth over the apostolic church and the sacraments, Rastell remarked that if he knew what sense Cooper was using to talk about the sacraments, "I could sone answer you, how farfuth we agree with you in this part of your distinction."[42] Similarly, he criticized Cooper for misunderstanding the two senses of the word "sacrifice" (one internal of thanksgiving, the other external and propitiatory) and equivocating "matter" and "form" in his discussion of the sacraments,[43] and for using the phrase "communion of Christ his

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[40] Rastell, *Replie*, fols. 11^{v}-14^{v}.
[41] Rastell, *Replie*, fols. 16^{v}-17^{v}.
[42] Rastell, *Replie*, fol. 20^{v}.
[43] Rastell, *Replie*, fols. 108^{v}-109^{r}.

bodye and bloud" to describe "concomitance" without definition.[44] He also repeatedly faulted Cooper for misunderstanding the sense of the fathers' writings.[45]

For Rastell, the importance of clear definitions was explicitly tied up in the exercise of disputation. He sardonically commented to his opponent that his vagaries will be the ultimate defeat of Catholics in debate: "Syr, I confesse playnely, we shall be ouercummed, if we stryue long with you, or if we can not be ouercummed, because fayth doth not referr herself, vnto the euent of disputations, yet we shall be (I trow) confowded, because we can not tell where to haue you."[46]

Rastell's mode of argument shifted continuously in the *Replie*, and he frequently wove together different kinds of argument, whether logical, historical, or grammatical. Though his arguments could be more unusual than his contemporaries', he still exhibited the widespread assumption that religious debates in print were connected to and extensions of disputation, and he also displayed an acute awareness of the importance of moderation in argument.

Portraying Moderation in Rastell's *Replie*

Rastell's portrayals of moderation are particularly evident in three ways. The first two, as we have routinely seen, are his own self-portrayal as a restrained author, coupled with reprimands of his opponent for overzealousness. Rastell also shows a pronounced concern for the

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[44] Rastell, *Replie*, fol. 135^{v}.
[45] For instance, he attacked Cooper at length over his interpretation of Chrysostom on the daily sacrifice. He also claimed that Cooper neglected to consider Augustine's distinction between the kinds of deceased for whom the living make sacrifices. Rastell, *Replie*, fols. 73^{v}-94^{r} (on Chrysostom) and 76^{r-v} (on Augustine).
[46] Rastell, *Replie*, fol. 93^{r-v}.

intellectual divide that existed between the controversialists and the English 'everyman,' which he used in two ways that are somewhat at tension with one another. On the one hand, he attacked Protestantism as a religion for the uneducated and unreputable, but also exhibited concern that Protestants are intentionally misleading the uneducated. From the outset, Rastell described his opponent's unrestrained behavior as part of the reason why he could not grasp the truth that was right in front of him. This was set right alongside Rastell's presumptions about the divide between the learned who engaged in such debates, and the unlearned whose faith hinged upon the outcomes. This rhetorical styling shapes almost the entirety of his preface, and continues throughout the work.

Rastell began by lamenting the general state of spiritual apathy. If people are outraged when a beautiful young virgin is ravaged, Rastell asked, how much more ought people to care about the desolation of truth? Adam's fall was so great that people are more upset by an opprobrious word spoken of a friend or an earthly prince than the torture and crucifixion of Jesus. Having set a tone of *gravitas*, Rastell then explained the manner in which such matters are to be conducted:

> And in deede, allthough the thinges them selues are but simple, yet the truthe in them allso, moderatelie to be folowed, and in right iudgement it were not to be suffered, that either officers, either orders, should be freelie disgraced: how much more iustlie then are the sacrame[n]tes & the auncient maners of the Catholike faith, to be considered of all sober heades, and maintayned in all humilitie, and if truth in wordlie [*sic*] and common matters be embraced of euery honest man, whi is the euerlasting veritie, and cause of owr soule, which should be chiefest, either not sought for, when it is easelie to be fownd, either els not cared for, when it is euidentlie perceaued.

Rastell's "if-then" comparison between moderation in worldly matters and serious contemplation of religious matters was followed by two rhetorical questions intended to help his reader understand precisely what kind of person ought to be considered credible in such debates:

Hath he (trow you) a good iudgement or a noble hart, which either affecteth ignorance, and wil not turne ouer the lesse, least he should haue a conscience of the truthe once knowen, either being conuinced by euident reason, that his forfathers beleiued well and trulie, doth thinke that diuines onlie haue to thinke of such matters, and foloweth outwardlie the fond and newfound brothers? Or thei, which read the bokes of both sides, and either through lightnes and vanitie doe beare awaye no more then the phrase and maner of writing of the authors, either for malice and enemitie, consider onlie how to find faultes with the writer, doe thei shew therein, anye point of great witt and grauitie?[47]

Rastell cited the biblical story of King Solomon judging between the two women and the disputed child [1 Kings 3:16-28] as an example of how "in all controuersies we goe strayt to the quicke of the question, and not rest vpon the by matters" and reproved the standard mode of conversation with its vitriol as an inappropriate way to arrive at truth, singling out the debate over private mass as the issue at hand:

For, in disputing the Sacrament of the aultar, and the necessitie whether some allwaies should communicate, thou lyest saieth one, this is sluttisshe eloquence saith the other, you playe apishe partes saieth one, you be like S. George on horseback saieth the other, and this is no litle sport vnto manie to see, how contrarie sides can cutt one the other. But this vndoubtedlye is nothing to the question, how euen one is with the other.

Rastell claimed he did not know where "such odd wordes" originated from and exhorted fellow controversialists to "take heede" so "that thei co[n]sent and agree with the matter." He also encouraged the reader "not to gape after such glauncies, which happ now and then in sadd writing, but to mark aduisedlye what truth is in question, and neither by acclamation to the wordlie [*sic*] proceedinges, neither indignation against the old faith and Catholike, to shrinke in any parte from it."

Rastell insisted that his pleas were not just for the reader but "our ease allso in this fight with Protestantes, that we might come to some peace and conclusion." Rastell complained that

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[47] Rastell, *Replie*, sigs. ¶ iij^{v}-iiij^{v}.

Protestants find great fault with Catholic writers for trivial matters, ranging from inappropriate titles to poor Latin to ad hominem rhetoric ("*skoffes and tauntes*"), which he found to be a mere diversion from the actual arguments:

> As who should thinke, the argument were dissolued, if the maker of it were reproued, for lisping in his vtterance, or making a wrie mouth vpon his aduersarie. For, if these were heighnous faultes, and might in deede be so proued against the Catholikes, or if there were not a perfect hatred, which the holye Prophete boldlye confesseth, in louing the persons of his enemies, with detesting to the vttermost, and defying all their iniquities, yet a wise preacher, would not speake at all of them, or lightlie passe away from such matters, and go exactlie to the point of the question, and proue that it toucheth not the state of his religion.[48]

Rastell's exhortations to the reader are meant to be a paragon of moderation, and they illustrate the intimate relationship between academic argument and expectations of moderation. First, as shown above, Rastell insisted that the moderation and temperance which ought to characterize political debate is even more important in questions of religion. Second, there is a particular *kind* of person who ought to engage in such debates, namely one who humbly gives serious thought to both sides (a hallmark of academic disputation) and does not maliciously seek out trivial faults in their opponent.

Interestingly, it seems that Rastell did not expect critical thinking from academics alone. Rather, all persons should seriously weigh the matter. Rastell implicitly reprimanded those who "thinke that diuines onlie haue to thinke of such matters, and foloweth outwardlie the fond and newfound brothers." This is indicative of the paradoxical form that religious debate was forced to take in the sixteenth-century, as matters of theological controversy from the outset were no longer confined to the Latinate university, but spilled out into the wider vernacular populace.

[48] Rastell, *Replie*, n.p.

Rastell continued on in this fashion, asking the reader to consider what happens when "extraordinarie inuectiues are not intended." He mentioned that Protestants make the same complaints about Catholics, but sarcastically commented,

> As who should thinke, that thei (like gentle doues) had no manner of gall in their writinges, or as though that a wiseman might not dissemble an iniurie, and answer to the matter directlye. But, be it so, you be patient, quiet, fairespoken, innocent, harmelesse, you thinke euill of no man, you praie for the Pope and the Cardinals, you reuerence the name of religious folkes, you know not how to nickname the Papistes, no bitternes, no skoffing, no vncurteousnes, is in your preachinges and writinges espied, and the contrarie vices are in Catholikes. Forgeaue vs then, I praie you, these our singular faultes, considering yourselues, that you allso maye be tempted.

Rastell, like other polemicists, justified any unfit language that might be found in his work as inevitable and not a fatal flaw: "And if a sharpe word or sentence, allthough it be medicinable, must not be spoken vnto you, take awaye all such wordes in this boke, as may troble your patience, and let the truthe by itselfe be considered, and briefelye answer iust obiections."[49]

Moderation in Rastell is connected to two related yet distinct intellectual arguments. First, Rastell insisted that his opponent's unchecked passion continually led him to distort what others were saying. In the midst of his extended preface on the importance of moderation and decorum in these literary controversies Rastell declared that some

> which busie themselues about wordes and titles, and passe ouer, without consideration, the sense of thinges and the matter, are lyke them which loke a man in the faces, whiles he telleth them a sadd tale for their profite, & thinke all that while vpon nothing els in a maner, but what tailer it shold be, which made his cote and apparell.[50]

Rastell recited Cooper's own vow to be moderate back to him as a reminder of the expected decorum for the exchanges: "Syr, I beseche you to pacifie yourselfe, and to vse the matter so

[49] Rastell, *Replie*, sig. † ij$^{r\text{-}v}$.
[50] Rastell, *Replie*, sig. ¶ v^{r}.

calmelie and quietly, as you promised to do in the end of the .ij. chapiter." He later informed Cooper that he had misunderstood a similitude because "you ful manly reason against hym, and proue your selfe to lacke discrecion."[51] In one of his more memorable passages, Rastell described Cooper's work as this "extraordinarie eruption of yours."[52] He called Cooper's estimation of Catholic priests and private mass as done for their own glory "a shamefull lie, yea rather it is a slaunder" and reprimanded Cooper's attempts to disprove the propitiatory sacrifice of the mass "to haue gone so farr besides the purpose" as owing to his "malice."[53] In an argument about the sacraments, Rastell reprimanded Cooper for becoming so zealous he attacked imaginary arguments of his Catholic opponent: "if you had ben a reasonable man, you would neuer haue made such an earnest battaill against your owne fancye."[54]

Rastell also seized on the recent religious legislation as further proof that Protestants could not achieve their goals without that most immoderate mean: political coercion. He rebuked Cooper for using "vehement sentences" to argue that the priest ought to bring the people to receive communion more frequently, which (for Protestants) depended more on "the princes law, then…your vehement exhortations." The hypocrisy of Protestants is manifest because of their dependence on the law to establish their religion:

> And when you shall perceaue by experience (which allreadie in part doth trie it) that except you co[n]straine men by act of parleame[n]t, you shall neuer bring them, by the strength and dailynes of your preaching, vnto the frequentyng of the co[m]munion, then lo you shall be more mercifull towardes others in your owne exact iudgement, and thinke, that with good cause, that may be vnspoken, in which you shold haue no hope of redresse to be made by your speakyng.[55]

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[51] Rastell, *Replie*, fols. 23^{v}-24^{r}.
[52] Rastell, *Replie*, fol. 53^{r}.
[53] Rastell, *Replie*, fols. 55^{r}, 72^{r-v}.
[54] Rastell, *Replie*, fol. 115^{r}.
[55] Rastell, *Replie*, fols. 28^{v}-29^{r}.

Rastell, like his fellow polemicists, also repeatedly appealed to the "indifferent" reader as judge. Besides his extended preface to the reader (essentially one long discourse on moderation), Rastell asked the "gentle reader" to see "the folissh hardines of this M. of defence" for his denial of the daily sacrifice in Chrysostom. Regarding arguments concerning communion in both kinds, Rastell urged the reader to use "his owne sense and disctetio[n] [*sic*]" to decide who had the more convincing argument.[56]

Rastell also put himself on the spiritual and moral high ground. Near the close of the work, Rastell wished that God may send his opponent grace so that he might not fight for a 'Helena,' "mainteyning the lustes and appetytes of your carnall reason, striuing for your owne inuentions, and following your owne prayses." This was the way of "Luther and his folowers, which as though they had nothing els to study vpo[n], but only how thei might inuent sectes and diuisyons," took all that the Church gave them, and corrupted it.[57]

Besides arguing that his opponent's immoderation caused him to distort and misunderstand key arguments, Rastell also linked moderation and the possession of truth to the cultural expectations for figures of their social standing. In the first chapter, Rastell made much of both Jewel and Cole's vocations, particularly in contrast to the less learned. In his opening argument—a striking example of the lengths to which these polemicists were willing to go to prove even the minutest point—Rastell defended the author of the *Apologie* for questioning why Jewel appealed to his high vocation, the "honorable estate" of the audience, and the authorization of doctrine by the realm. Rastell decided that there are two ways such a denial might be interpreted: one is an outright refusal, the other is a descriptive statement. The first is an unwise

[56] Rastell, *Replie*, fols. 84^{r}, 147^{v}-148^{r}.
[57] Rastell, *Replie*, fols. 204^{v}-205^{r}.

and arrogant brag that alleges position as a cause, but the second is an appeal to duty that can accord with their calling. Rastell then chided Cooper for confusing the senses:

> Wherefor, Sir, you make the matter worse by your telling, then it was in the authour his writyng: and yow find fault with others for misreporting and misco[n]struing, prouiding not in the meane while for your selfe, to vse and shew true dealing. The Catholike doth not take M. Iuell to be so folishe, as to thinke that because he is a Bishope, he should make no rekonyng of his doctrine: but he marueleth rather (his lerning co[n]sidered) that he would alleage such causes as he dyd, for the refusal of prouing his doctrine. And so he may yet still maruell at it.[58]

Rastell then insisted that Cole (in contrast to Jewel) had shown himself to be nothing but moderate in his letters:

> M.D. Cole in hys first letter to the Bishope, promiseth by the faith he beareth to God, that he will yeld so farr as M. Iuel shall geaue him cause. And he againe in the second letter to M. Iuell, in most hartie and humble wyse, desyreth hym to geaue eare vnto his sute, and he speaketh so loulie and baselie, that it may be wel marueiled, why such a Catholike would submit hym selfe vnto a protestant.

Rastell then reprimanded Cooper for assigning disingenuous motives to Cole which he could not have known and for misrepresenting Cole in his exchange with Jewel. The conclusion was simple for Rastell:

> Yf therefor D. Cole was not in such sense taken by M. Iuell, as you suppose hym to haue ben receiued, it is euident that as you vnderstode not the meanyng of the author of the Apologie, so lykewyse, you haue mistaken the mynd and saying of your Lord of Salisburie. Which maketh me iustly to doubt, whether you vnderstande your selfe in such matters, as you haue enterprysed.

Rastell argued further that Jewel's standing as a bishop was completely irrelevant to the debate: "For allthough palace, parkes, reuenues, seruantes, horses, and such lyke, do make hym in the sight of the world more worthyer, yet all the ryches and glorie of the world, should not make

[58] Rastell, *Replie*, fol. 2^{r-v}.

hym, by one iote, the truer." Rastell concluded that if the consent of the realm determined truth, then the rulers would not only be in possession of the truth, but actually *be* the truth.[59]

Tucked within Rastell's reply to Cooper is an argument illustrative of the tensions caused by cultural norms about the social divide between educated and uneducated and the self-obvious nature of 'true' Christian doctrine. Rastell, for instance, found Cooper's defense of Jewel odd, observing "truly you do take very much from a Bishope his libertie, if he can not safely co[n]ferr with such as D. Cole is, withowt obteinyng of licence." This will trouble the magistrates "with more matters then needfull" if this is the case. Furthermore, if all imprisoned Catholic "were such greuouse offendars against the state, that it might be suspected they would practise all treason," then such a sweeping restraint would make sense "for suertie that none of their religion might come vnto them." Rastell correctly pointed out that Cooper's objection amounted to an issue of credibility and expedience: it was not beneficial for the magistrate answer every subject who objects to a law. He agreed, even going so far as to say "God forbed, that either cardmaker, or tapster, or fyddler, or peddler, should be permitted emo[n]g their pottes and packes, to sitt iudges vpo[n] great Doctours, or reuerend Canons of general Councells." It ought not be allowed that any man "captiouslie and proudlie appose the priest or curate of his parishe." However, Rastell continued, Dr. Cole is not an 'everyman,' and neither are the "good and lerned Catholikes" who continue in "indurance."[60]

Rastell's agreement with Cooper that it would not be appropriate to indulge every tradesman who wished to lodge an objection against policy exemplifies the social divide created by formal education. Rastell took what was an argument about political expediency from Cooper

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[59] Rastell, *Replie*, fols. 2^{v}-5^{r}.
[60] Rastell, *Replie*, fol. 4^{r}.

and augmented it to fence off disputations such as they were having; it would not be fitting for every Tom, Dick, and Harry "to sitt iudges vpo[n] great Doctours, or reuerend Canons of general Councells." This illustrates well the "zones of exclusion" observed by Peter Mack, where people who had not mastered the requisite skills could not participate in debate.[61]

Rastell repeatedly articulated his concern that Cooper was misleading the uneducated. In an argument over Cyprian on the mass, he insisted that Cooper, "may be for euer ashamed" for alleging a passage from Cyprian that "nothing at all maketh for you, and that you do so wickedly, in so ernest a matter, abuse the simplicitie of your countrymen, such as can vnderstand no Laten."[62] He charged Cooper with malicious motives, declaring he mistranslated *traditio* as "institution" and not "tradition" because "you abhorr the name of tradition, and because you would seeme to the ignorant Reader, to be a great fauorer of Christ his institution." And why, Rastell asked further, do you render *in calice offerendo* "in offering the sacrament of the Lord's bloud" and not "in offering the chalice"? Because, "You had no litle craft in mynd, when you sett vpon the translating of this plaine sentence…it was a deceitfull enterprise."[63]

Rastell later insisted that Cooper has misconstrued Christ's words "take this and diuide it emong you" to mean that there must be multiple persons to receive, yet Christ spoke only to the apostles (and thus priests), and therefore nothing about people to receive with them. Rastell told him that in doing so "you could perswade the rude" that Christ's words apply to the laity as well, with the obvious implication being that the more learned would not be convinced.[64] He also

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[61] Peter Mack, *Elizabethan Rhetoric: Theory and Practice* (Cambridge, 2002), 3.
[62] Rastell, *Replie*, fols. 41^{v}-42^{r}.
[63] Rastell, *Replie*, fol. 44^{v}. See also fol. $52^{r\text{-}v}$, where he makes similar charges over Cooper's handling of Lateran IV.
[64] Rastell, *Replie*, fol. 95^{v}. See also 107^{v}.

attacked Cooper's citation of Jerome against Jovinian, in which Cooper claimed Jerome "inueigheth against" sole receiving. "But (alas)," Rastell asked,

> how shall he, which knoweth none other tongue then his English, trye the truth of his sayinges, which speaketh vnto hym out of Latyne authors? But if the simple can not, or should not rather, examyne these matters, let the indiffere[n]tlie learned take an example by this one place, with what co[n]science and honestie you alleage and abuse the doctors.[65]

Rastell drove the point home by contrasting charitable and honest Catholics with malicious and deceitful Protestants:

> For if the Catholikes could haue founde in their hartes, to haue mysused the simplicitie of others, and to attribute vnto holie fathers, such sentences as were neuer thers, it had ben an easie matter for the Bisshoppes of Christendome, in that great consent and peace of faith, which hath ben in the church for eight or nine hundred yeares togeather (vntill the dyuell raised vpp Luther) to haue agreed vpo[n] such a booke, which should make expressely against new vpstart heretikes, and haue the name of S. Augustine, S. Ambrose, S. Hierome, or some other. And againe, it had ben an easye matter for some one Bisshop, Abbot, or Doctor, to fayne that he had fou[n]de such or such a booke of S. Augustine, S. Ambrose, S. Hierome, or other, if there had ben no more conscience in Catholikes, then is proued to be now in heretikes.[66]

Rastell's approach exemplifies the tension latent within these debates about the necessity of education. On the one hand, only those educated for such an exercise should participate, which gave rise to the charge of intentionally misleading the uneducated. Both, however, sit uneasily next to Rastell's earlier statements that seem to presume that *all* people ought to read these matters and consider them closely. Yet, at the same time, each side felt their theological position was so self-evident that anyone, no matter how intelligent, could perceive it to be true. These inconsistent understandings that continually shifted often led to the related charge that

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[65] Rastell, *Replie*, fol. 129^{r-v}.
[66] Rastell, *Replie*, fol. 151^{r-v}.

only the uneducated and lowbrow would adhere to the opponent's religion. This one of the many types of vitriolic rhetoric in these debates.

The Rhetoric of Abuse in Rastell's *Replie*

Though Rastell was remarkably temperate and restrained in the *Replie*, he was not above using a variety of insults, and he routinely employed humorous absurdities in order to demonstrate the gross fallacies of his opponent. Rastell strategically reserved his more biting language for his opponent's arguments, a common strategy among controversialists that allowed one to let loose a variety of insults and barbs while ostensibly remaining moderate by not insulting the opponent as a person. It was, in effect, to have the cake of moderation and it eat, too.

Rastell described one of Cooper's argument as an "vnsensible and pernitiouse folissh opinion" and elsewhere declared Cooper was so ignorant of Catholic teaching that it was evident he had never read "any other then his owne doctours." Shortly after, in a section concerning private mass, Rastell declared to the reader that Cooper had attacked a minor argument (rather than "a principal argument") so that "he might shew his florishes."[67] He described some of Cooper's assertions as nothing "but shiftes of yours, and starting holes, in whiche you may couche, before the ignorant, and seeme to haue some hart left vnto you."[68]

Rastell could be quite sarcastic. At one point, he commented that, given Cooper's poor argumentats in theology, it's not surprising he can't reason in natural matters either: "I wyll not greatly wonder, if you haue strainge opinions as concernyng diuinitie, whereas in naturall

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[67] Rastell, *Replie*, fols. 32^{v}, 48$^{r\text{-}v}$. This was a common rebuttal from Catholics. Cole and Harding stated the same against Jewel repeatedly. See chs. 4 and 8.
[68] Rastell, *Replie*, fol. 49^{v}.

matters and reasonable, yow make new conclusions besides all truth and consequence."[69] In defending the anonymous Catholic author of the *Apologie*, Rastell declared that he might have made the poor argument Cooper accused him of "if he would folow your example in co[m]menting vpon a text, he might haue doone right well inough."[70]

Some of Rastell's abusive language could be quite humorous. In the debate about Cyprian and private mass, Rastell lectured Cooper for misinterpreting Cyprian's Latin,[71] which was so grossly rendered that Cooper's schoolteacher should discipline him with a hearty spanking: "I beleeue verely, if the Scholemaster were not very much a sleepe, he would beare softly at your backe doore, and make you to remember yourselfe better."[72] He then rearranged Cooper's syllogism[73] with Cyprian's proper meaning and an absurd conclusion to portray Cooper's argument as ridiculous for using such a specific premise to draw a general conclusion:

> *We ought to do that only, which Christ did, and nothing els, as concerning the ordering and tempering of the chalice:*
>
> *But in Christ his institution appeareth, neither sole receiuing, nor ministering vnder one kynd:*
>
> *Therfor* (you may inferre whe[n] you will) *that, if all abbeis were destroied, we should haue fortie egges for a penie.*

"The *maior* of this argument," Rastell boldly pronounced, "is S. Cyprian, and much staied vpo[n] in his epistle ad Cecilium. The *minor* is your owne. The conclusion ys lawfull and currant. For to suche agreeable and proper premisses, euerie conclusion will serue inwogh."[74]

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[69] Rastell, *Replie*, fol. 50^{r}.
[70] Rastell, *Replie*, fol. 162^{v}.
[71] Rastell was chiding Cooper for rendering *traditio* as "institution" and not "tradition."
[72] Rastell, *Replie*, fol. 44$^{r\text{-}v}$.
[73] A) we ought to only do what the Lord did at the institution of the sacrament; B) there was no sole receiving or communion of one kind; C) therefore, we ought not to do it either. See above, n. 26.
[74] Rastell, *Replie*, fol. 46^{r}.

Shortly after, Rastell used the same technique in a rather strange argument that ended as an attack on Protestant clerical marriage. He criticized Cooper's critique that pure harmony among humanity is impossible (an analogous argument against private mass[75]) by pointing out that many Protestants say the same about virginity, yet chastity still exists. Rastell then drew his own ridiculous comparison between types of apples and marriage in order to demonstrate to Cooper how he missed the point of the *Apologie*'s original similitude. Cooper's arguments that prohibitions of clerical marriage is analogous to an ape wearing a reasonable man's coat:

> Also your mery folowing of the catholikes similitude, and you co[n]cluding (as it were by the like argument) that bisshopes must not forbydd priestes to haue such cussons with whom *Si non castè tamen cautè:*[76] ys much lyke as when Iacke an Ape, doth besides the right waye and maner, put a reasonable man his cote vpon hymselfe.[77]

Rastell then applied the same to Protestant clerical marriage by claiming that Protestants 'settle' since they believe the ideal unattainable:

> Yea truly, not in sport but in sadd ernest, you make a worse kind of reason, fauling from the not obtayning of the best, to concluding of that, which is worse then naught. As, when you can not haue ministers to lyue chast, to geaue them from licence to take open harlottes. whom allthough you couer, with the name of wiues or sisters, yet are they in very deed, no better, then I haue termed them.[78]

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[75] This was Cooper's response to the *Apologie*'s theoretical defense of the priest celebrating mass by himself when no lay person is fit or prepared to do so. See Thomas Cooper, *An Apologie of priuate Masse…with an answer to the same Apologie set foorth for the maintenance and defence of the trueth* (London, 1562; STC 2nd ed. 14615), fols. 26^{v}-28^{r}.
[76] "If not chastely, at least cautiously." This was a common phrase in the medieval period but its meaning was malleable. See P.P.A. Biller, "Birth-Control in the West in the Thirteenth and Early Fourteenth Centuries," *Past & Present*, Vol. 94, No. 1 (1982): 17.
[77] "Jackanape" was a common term for either a tamed monkey, or just a monkey more generally. "Jackanapes," *OED*.
[78] Rastell, *Replie*, fols. 50^{r}-51^{v}.

Rastell's imagery of a pet monkey ("Iacke an Ape") may seem odd to the modern reader, but Tudor England was no stranger to monkeys as exotic pets.[79] It is therefore not surprising that Rastell again used the image of a primate against his opponents. This time, however, it was borrowed from Cyprian's description of Novatian heretics who 'aped' the true Catholic church. Rastell defended the *Apologie*'s analogy between the communal spiritual effects of prayer and the sacrament against Cooper by arguing that analogies are not always meant to be one-to-one correlations, and he did so by drawing St. Cyprian's insult and adding his own commentary to it:

> As who should saye, when a similitude or proportion is made betwyxt two thinges, that they must in all partes answer one an other, or els the comparison is nothing worth. Yet we reade in wyse mens workes this similitude: *Lyke a munkey doth counterfait and folow a mann, so doe the heretykes couet to appeare lyke vnto the trew Catholykes*:[80] in which so saying, no man (I trow) doth meane that all heretikes haue tayles, but only that in the acte of imitating perfect and good Christians, they playe verye munkyshe partes. which comparison, yf you shall despyse, because it is made of twoe thinges of nature very diuers, and tell vs that a munkey hath an other maner of heare and coat then a ma[n], or make sporte, against the author of that similitude, as though he would haue co[n]cluded, that a reasonable man is no better then a beast, I would not geaue ouer so, but further continew in the similitude, and saye, that lyke as munkeys, when thei haue spent all their other knackes, doe make moppes and mowes[81] cunninglie, to delight thereby the lookers on: so some men in the world, when they haue no more to

[79] A dynastic portrait of Henry VIII by an unknown artist depicts Henry's favorite jester William Sommers in the background with a pet monkey on his shoulder. Portraits of Catherine of Aragon and Edward VI (by Lucas Horenbout and Hans Holbein, respectively) show them both holding monkeys. A portrait of Thomas More's family (also by Holbein, though it only exists in copy form) shows the family monkey in the bottom corner by Lady Alice. However, it is quite likely that monkeys had been in Britain for centuries both as performers and pets. Performing monkeys were common in Tudor England and monkeys were a popular literary motif, making appearances (often as insults) in both Chaucer and Shakespeare. Caroline Grigson, *Menagerie: The History of Exotic Animals in England, 1100-1837* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), ch. 1 (2-3, 7-9, 12-13, and 15, especially).

[80] Cyprian, "To Jubaianus, Concerning the Baptism of Heretics." Epistle 72 In *Ante-Nicene Fathers: The Writings of the Fathers Down to A.D. 325., Vol. 5: Hippolytus, Cyprian, Caius, Novatian, Appendix*, eds. Alexander Roberts and James Donaldson (Peabody, MA: Hendrickson Publishers, 1999), 379-386, §2.

[81] "A grotesque grimace or grin, as made by a monkey." "Mops and mows," *OED*.

> saye or do, least they should seeme to be ydle, resorte vnto making of newe constructions, as it were distorted and madd faces.[82]

This excerpt is a rich example of the confluence of scholarly arguments, the use of historical authorities, and ridicule. In order to teach his opponent how similitudes work in argument, Rastell borrowed from a third-century hero of orthodoxy so that he could not only label Protestants as heretics but also compare them to monkeys who, when they run out of tricks, resort to making faces to entertain those watching.

Returning to the fault line created by formal education, Rastell frequently associated Protestantism with the 'common' and uneducated folk. In an early riposte to Cooper's assertion that the Catholic church 'sold' salvation, Rastell sarcastically suggested that Cooper might be rewarded with a bishopric for his poor arguments (which Rastell compared to someone singing a ditty that was no better than a dog's barking). He then drew the link between Cooper's reasoning, the lower rungs of society, and Protestantism:

> Do you not thinke, that as many poyntes might be fott vpon tapsters, fiddlers, peddlers, baggpypers allso and sowgelders (Syr reuerence) whiche for idlenes sake do come vnto your ministrie, and for lacke of better, are receiued by and by: as you can make vpo[n] such wretched men, which make merchandyse of their masses?[83]

Rastell also bitterly accused Protestants of Machiavellian tactics.[84] The events of the Westminster conference portended what would become a matter of habit for the regime: just as

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[82] Rastell, *Replie*, fol. 116^{r-v}.
[83] Rastell, *Replie*, fol. 12^{r-v}.
[84] For instance, accusations of Machiavellianism are common in Anon., *A Treatise of Treasons Against Q. Elizabeth, and the Croune of England* ([Louvain], 1572; STC 2nd ed. 7601). See sig. a4^{r}, sig. [a5^{r-v}], fols. 42^{v}-43^{r}, 83^{r} ("Machiauel Catilines"), 85^{r}, 86^{v}, 93^{v}, 103^{v}, 117^{v}, 119^{r}, 129^{r}, 161^{r}, 144^{r}, 162^{r}, 169^{v}. For an analysis of the *Treatise of Treasons* see Peter Lake, *Bad Queen Bess? Libels, Secret Histories, and the Politics of Publicity in the Reign of Queen Elizabeth I* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), ch. 3. The pervasiveness of Machiavellianism as a political attack is a common theme of Lake's study.

they had changed the rules of debate upon Elizabeth's accession, so likewise they did with the question of political coercion:

> But this is your practise, to denye all thinges, which make presentlye against you, and to allow the same againe, when hereafter they may serue for you, and so long as you be in danger of law, *No man must be violentlye constrayned to receyue the religion which his conscience can not allow.* And when the Prince and power is with you, then saye you, *Hanging is to good for hym, which wyll not beleiue as you doe.* And so, in the Apologye of your Englysh church, the argument was sound, and comfortable, that because many Kynges had abandoned the sea [*sic*] of Rome, therefore they might seeme not to be madd, which did folow them: and now in this your defence of the truth, (as you call it) when we alleage contynuance, and authoritie of .ix. hundred yeares, you saye, that multitude maketh not to the purpose, and you thinke your selfe not a lytle wise in reprouing of our argument.[85]

Rastell's reference of Jewel's *Apology* again illustrates the dynamic and dialogic nature of these texts as well as the fact that polemical exchanges grew to include new arguments (which were being printed on a regular basis). Disputative literature was rarely contained in the scope of a single controversy. More importantly, however, this passage is a perfect example of how the construct of moderation was not perceived by contemporaries as a tool of social and political control. Rather, the moderate—and therefore 'right'—party, was the one who did not need to use force precisely because their arguments were persuasive enough. For early Elizabethan polemicists, the use of force was in direct contrast to moderate argument, a last resort for the one who could not be vindicated by truth.

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[85] Rastell, *Replie*, fols. 170[v]-171[r]. The marginal note reads, "As the world cha[n]geth, so doe the conclusions of heretikes." He had a marginal note nearly verbatim on fol. 7[r]: "The heretikes cha[n]ge their argumentes, togeather with the changes of tyme."

Conclusion

Rastell's *Replie* is one of the more unusual pieces to appear in the "Great Controversy" of the 1560s. It was uninvited and unprovoked (insofar as Rastell was not specifically attacked) and an attempt to intervene in a growing debate, which led him to address both Jewel and Cooper throughout. Though he made much of Jewel's "negative," his arguments and emphases do not look like some of his contemporaries (especially Cole and Harding). He was far more concerned with establishing the precise meanings of words and the unassailable character of tradition.

The *Replie*, however, is notable for Rastell's ability to name the fault lines running through the arguments between Protestants and Catholics. Many of these have been noted above, but it's worth briefly observing one more in concluding: The recourse to faith in matters of intellect. To fall back on matters of faith as above or beyond reason, especially that which is used in formal argument, was common in Rastell, perhaps nowhere clearer than when he informed Cooper that "fayth doth not referr herself, vnto the euent of disputations."[86]

This tension, however, is especially pronounced in Rastell's defense of transubstantiation, the one miracle upon which "all the rest of our beleif therein, doeth follow by necessitie of consequence." To buttress his point, Rastell quoted Augustine's letter to Volusianus: "Yf you aske for a reason, the thing shal not be wonderfull, and if you requyre an example, the thing shall not be singular."[87] In matters beyond human comprehension we do not "apoint...but we belieue" and contended that God not bound by necessity. Contrary to your

[86] Rastell, *Replie*, fol. 93^{r-v}.

[87] "Here, if the reason of the event is sought out, it will no longer be a miracle; if an example of a precisely similar event is demanded, it will no longer be unique." Augustine, "To Volusianus." Epistle 137 in *A Select Library of the Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, First Series, Vol. I: St. Augustine: The Confessions and Letters of St. Augustin, With a Sketch of His Life and Work*, ed. Philip Schaff (Edinburgh: T&T Clark; Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1955), 473-481, II.8.

"diuine logike," Rastell retorted to his opponent, "It is wysedome for vs to, rather to beleiue the church, then to allow such argumentes by which we maye destroye all true religion."[88]

The inconsistent ways in which controversialists handled the relationship between 'worldly' and 'spiritual' learning did not facilitate progress in these heated debates. Rather, it only widened the chasm further. The uses of formal academic methods as proof of learnedness and faith as proof of piety only aggravated the already polarized situation (much like moderation). Often, what one side insisted was contrary to reason was justified as a matter of faith by the other. Such arguments were inevitably bound to futility. Rastell, however, is not an isolated incident, as both Protestants and Catholics moved fluidly between modes of argument. These inconsistencies and tensions are conspicuous in the debate between John Martiall and James Calfhill, the subject of the next chapter.

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[88] Rastell, *Replie*, fols. 191^{v}-194^{r}.

CHAPTER 8

DEFINING IDOLATRY: JOHN MARTIALL AND JAMES CALFHILL (1564-1566)

> …yet, if ye had joined more logic with your law, your reasons should not have run so lawless (as they do:) or, if you had remembered your old humanity, you would not have stained your new divinity with such slanders and lies, such vain supposals and idle tales…[1]
>
> James Calfhill, *An Answer to John Martiall's Treatise of the Crosse*

Context

John Martiall's *A Treatyse of the Crosse Gathered Ovt of Scriptures, Councelles, and auncient Fathers of the primitiue churche* (1564) was one of the earliest responses to Jewel's challenge. Though Cole's letters and the anonymous *Apologie of Priuate Masse* predate it, they are noticeably different. Because of his recognizance, Cole did little to no direct contradiction of Jewel's claims, instead gingerly navigating the debate by appealing to Jewel's sensibility as a fellow Oxford trainee who was also taught that disputation simply did not work in the way that Jewel was using it (i.e. by arguing from the negative). It is also unlikely that Cole intended his letters to be published. The *Defense* was concerned almost exclusively with defending the Catholic practice of sole receiving by the priest. It was also anonymous and likely only intended for circulation in manuscript form.[2]

It is arguable that Martiall did not intend his *Treatyse* as a response to Jewel. Milward believed the book to have been written solely because Elizabeth retained a crucifix in her private

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[1] James Calfhill, *An Answer to John Martiall's Treatise of the Cross*, ed. Richard Gibbings (Cambridge: The University Press, 1846), 1.

[2] As noted in ch. 5, Protestants took the anonymous *Apologie* and began printing it with Thomas Cooper's refutation of it before dropping the *Apologie* altogether so that only Cooper's response could be read Peter See Peter Milward, *Religious Controversies of the Elizabethan Age* (Lincoln, NE; London: University of Nebraska Press, 1977), 2.

chapel (a fair guess since Martiall dedicated the *Treatyse* to the Queen).[3] While this certainly was a motivating factor, especially considering that the image of the cross was a significant part of the Prayer Book debates leading up to the Westminster conference,[4] the structure of the work and mentions of Jewel—who Martiall refers to as "their raging Rhetour"[5] (among other things)—indicate that Martiall was consciously weighing in on the ongoing controversy over Jewel's challenge sermon. Even if Martiall originally had no intention of joining the controversy over Jewel's challenge, Calfhill certainly brought him into the fray when he lumped Martiall's *Treatyse* in with several other Catholic works aimed at Jewel in his *Answer* to Martiall.[6] This, in turn, spurred Martiall to mold his *Replie* to Calfhill to fit more within the parameters of the debate as well as directly address other Protestant polemical works in circulation.[7]

This chapter analyzes Martiall's *Treatyse* (1564), Calfhill's *Answer* (1565), and Martiall's *Replie* (1566) as disputative literature. It first briefly contextualizes Martiall and Calfhill and gives an overview of their works. It then examines how the *Treatyse*, *Answer*, and *Replie* functioned as continuations of the Westminster conference that adhered to academic norms in addition to exhibiting the norms of moderation. It also draws out their abusive rhetoric,

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[3] See Milward, *Religious Controversies of the Elizabethan Age*, 17.
[4] John Strype, *Annals of the Reformation and Establishment of Religion, And Other Various Occurrences in the Church of England, during Queen Elizabeth's Happy Reign*, vol. 1 (London, 1725), 82.
[5] John Martiall, *A Treatyse of the Crosse Gathred Ovt of the Scriptures, Councells, and auncient Fathers of the primitiue church* (Antwerp, 1564; STC 2nd ed. 17496), fol. 162^{r}.
[6] Calfhill, *Answer*, 2-3.
[7] For example, Martiall cited Jewel's 600-year timeframe of the purity of the church as an example of internal Protestant discord (as others, such as Luther and Foxe, placed the corruption of the Catholic church either earlier or later). He also referenced Jewel's *Apology* and the ongoing debate between Alexander Nowell and Thomas Dorman. John Martiall, *A Replie to M. Calfhills Blasphemovs Answer Made Against the Treatise of the Crosse* (Louvain, 1566; STC 2nd ed. 17497), fol. 101^{v} (for Jewel viz. Luther and Foxe), sig. Aiiij^{r} and fol. 35^{r} (Jewel's *Apology*), and sig. *ij^{r-v} and fol. 13^{r} (Dorman).

which is more pronounced here than in other exchanges. The debate between Martiall and Calfhill is one of the better illustrations of the dialogic nature of the texts, as authors responded to their opponents and temperatures flared in response to attacks in print.

Little is known about John Martiall. As a boy, he studied at Winchester College before going on to New College, Oxford. He received his BCL in 1556 and returned the same year to Winchester to take the position of usher (or second master). When Elizabeth succeeded the throne, he went into exile at Louvain and earned a BA at Douai in 1567. The next year he helped William Allen found the English College.[8] In his *Replie*, Martiall made mention of plans for another volume containing of all Calfhill's errors and corruptions ("which will make a pretie volume") but "becuase I could not conueniently set them foorth together with this replie, I haue reserued them to another tyme."[9] I have found no evidence indicating he ever wrote it.

Martiall received little attention from contemporaries. The editor of the Parker Society edition of Calfhill's *Answer* erroneously interpreted a quote from Jewel ("I write nothing about Marshal, for fear of defiling my paper"[10]) as about John Martiall, when it is almost certainly in reference to Richard Martial, the Catholic priest who nearly caught Jewel when he fled for the Continent and gained infamy after reportedly digging up the corpse of Peter Martyr's wife and reburying it in a dunghill.[11] (This is especially important given that the above quote comes from a letter to Vermigli.) In *Epistle of the persecution of Catholickes in England*, Persons named Martiall in a litany of Catholic polemicists who "shew what reason, authoritie and truthe we haue

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[8] L.E.C. Wooding, "Martiall, John (1534-1597)," *ODNB*.
[9] Martiall, *Replie*, sig. **^{v}.
[10] Jewel, *Works*, ed. John Ayre, vol. 1 (Cambridge: The University Press, 1845), 12; see Calfhill, *Answer*, ix.
[11] Christopher Haigh, "Marshall [Martial], Richard (b. 1517, d. in or after 1575)," *ODNB*. Jewel referenced this event along with similar actions taken against the corpses of Bucer, Fagius, and others. Jewel, *Works*, 1:60.

on our syde" and "laye wydeopen the greate fraude, falsehoode, lapse, fall and error, on oure aduersaries syde."[12] Martiall's *Replie* to Calfhill did not receive a Protestant response until Fulke's two-part *T. Stapleton and Martiall (two Popish Heretikes) confuted* (1580).[13]

It has apparently gone unnoticed that a second edition of Harding's *Answere* (Antwerp, 1565) has a preface from the printer with "John Martiall" printed in the signatory, though William [Willem] Silvius, who also printed Thomas Heskyns' *The Parliament of Chryste* (Antwerp, 1566), is given as the printer on the title page.[14] Perhaps Martiall was working alongside Silvius in Antwerp, though there is no record (I am aware of) to substantiate this.

More is known about Calfhill. He supplicated for his BA in 1549 and his MA in 1552. There is no indication that he fled during Mary's reign, and he held a clandestine meeting with princess Elizabeth sometime in the summer of 1554 after she was released from the Tower, where he pledged his loyalty to her. He was ordained deacon and then bishop in close succession by Grindal in January 1560. In 1561, he likely initiated the solemn reburial of Peter Martyr's wife at Oxford and composed a Latin poem for the occasion. He proceeded BD at Oxford in December 1561 and rapidly gained appointments in the diocese of London. At Oxford, Calfhill was linked with the more radical group of Protestants (including Thomas Sampson and Laurence Humphrey), a point reinforced by Martiall's references to puritans in the *Replie*. In February 1564, he was appointed Lady Margaret Professor of Divinity, and in March the following year

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[12] Robert Parsons, *An Epistle of the Persecution of Catholickes in England* (Douay in Artois [Rouen: Fr. Parsons' Press], 1582; STC 2nd ed. 19406), 105-106.
[13] This timing is perhaps best understood in relation to the Jesuit mission, begun in 1580, particularly the capture and trial of Campion. These events spawned an enormous amount of anti-Catholic literature, of which Fulke was a significant contributor. See Richard Bauckham, "The Career and Thought of Dr. William Fulke (1537-1589)," Ph.D. dissertation, Cambridge University (1972), ch. 4.
[14] Thomas Harding, *An Answere to Maister Iuelles Chalenge* (Louvain, 1564; STC 2nd ed. 12758), sig. A3^{v}.

was one of the leading ministers who petitioned Parker not to enforce the wearing of vestments. The same year he published his *Answer to the Treatise of the Crosse*, his only work in English.[15]

Two points are worth noting. First, Martiall and Calfhill were both at Oxford at the same time, though at different colleges. There is no indication that they knew each other personally (like Cole, Jewel, and Harding did) but Calfhill was certainly aware of Martiall's background.[16] Second, the *Answer* was Calfhill's only vernacular work. So, despite Calfhill's contempt for Martiall's reasoning abilities, that he responded at all is revealing of the anxiety of Elizabethan Protestants that Catholic treatises be answered fully. That he responded in the vernacular demonstrates the same concern that drove Elizabeth to change the rules of the 1559 Westminster conference permeated these controversial works: accessibility for a literate but not necessarily Latinate audience, which necessarily included MPs and others with political clout.

Martiall's *Treatyse* stands out among Elizabethan Catholic polemics for a few reasons. First, the work took a different tack by choosing one specific issue—the crucifix—and then outlined ten articles in defense of it. Martiall's decision to dedicate the *Treatyse* to Elizabeth was likely because he saw her private crucifix as a direct point of contact that circumvented her hostile Protestant clergy. After praising Elizabeth's "princely prowes and giftes of nature" as equal to the greatest yet inferior to none, Martiall stated that she was

> so wel affectioned to the crosse (which is the matter that I haue taken in hand to treate) that youre Maiestie haue always kept it reuerently in youre chappel, notwithstanding many meanes haue bene made to the contrary, by the priuy suggestio[n]s, and open sermons of such...[17]

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[15] Brett Usher, "Calfhill, James (1529/30-1570, Church of England clergyman," *ODNB*.
[16] He repeatedly referred to Martiall as the usher of Winchester in his *Answer*. Calfhill, *Answer*, 70, 72.
[17] Martiall, *Treatyse*, sig. A2^{v}.

It was, in effect, Martiall's attempt to persuade the Queen back to Rome, or at least that Catholics were loyal subjects. Martiall insisted that he had faithfully quoted the fathers throughout his work and even provided references so that the Queen might see "whether their meaning (who haue blasphemously railed ageinst it, and bereathed youre faithful subiectes of the swete sight of it) be syncere and correspondent to the fathers of the primitiue church (as they pretend)."[18] This again illustrates the academic and moderate mindset that so highly valued indifference in argument as well as the adjustment made in print disputation that turned the reader into the judge.

The "open sermons" against Elizabeth's personal crucifix is almost certainly a reference Alexander Nowell's famous 1564 Lenten court sermon, where Nowell used abusive language about Martiall and was publicly silenced by Elizabeth, to his great humiliation (and, according to Spanish ambassador, to the consternation of Protestants and rejoicing of Catholics).[19] This incident is illustrative of just how mercurial Elizabeth could be regarding her own religious convictions. Thus, what may seem like overly optimistic hopes on the part of Catholics was entirely realistic to the Elizabethan Christian, whether Protestant or Catholic.

The second unusual factor about Martiall is that he was not, by his own admittance, a learned theologian; he was a layman, trained in law. Martiall was aware that this, along with his youthful age (he was approximately thirty when his *Treatyse* was published), might be cause for

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[18] Martiall, *Treatyse*, sig. A3^{v}.

[19] *Calendar of Letters, Despatches and State Papers Relating to the Negotiations between England and Spain, Elizabeth I: Vol. 1: 1558-1567*, ed. Martin A.S. Hume (Burlington, Ont.: TannerRitchie Publishing & The University of St. Andrews, 2007), 405. Strype referred to the incident as a "great Check…both from the Queen and some of the Popishly affected Courtiers." John Strype, *The Life and Acts of Matthew Parker, The First Archbishop of Canterbury in the Reign of Queen Elizabeth* (London, 1711), 202.

dismissal. He asked the reader not to judge the work by its author's age, but rather its message. More interesting, however, is his justification for writing:

> …wherefore if taylers coming from the shopp: smithes from the forge, tapsters from the tauerne, ostlers from the stable, botemen from the whirry, cokes fro[m] the kitchen, weuers from the lome, protestantes from Geneua, and lepping streit to the pulpet, deserue credit, although they speake nothing but the imaginations of their owne heades, and leane to their owne wisdom…I trust although I come from humanitie to lawe, and from lawe to diuinitie, yet I shall deserue credit amongest youe, seing I auouche nothing of the imagination of my owne head, but alleage scripture, auncient doctour, or councell, for al pointes of doctrine vttered in this treatise, and so cite the chapiter and cote the place: that eche ma[n] may confer, and see from what [fountaine] I set this swete water, that I offer yowe to drinke.[20]

Martiall's appeal to the reader is interesting for two reasons. First, he pointed to unlearned Protestants, apparently nascent puritans in particular ("protestantes from Geneua…lepping streit to the pulpet"), as examples of those lacking academic credentials who still get to proffer religious opinions and, more importantly, receive an audience. Second, Martiall believed that his learning in law qualified him to speak to the subject of divinity as well. He conceived of himself to be somewhere in-between the unlearned laity, not qualified to speak (if they were Protestants, at least) and the academic theologians, who were qualified to speak, but not the only ones equipped to do so. Thus, we once again see the social divisions along education that was employed by both sides and ultimately proved to be an intellectual fault line in the debates.

The third and most unusual characteristic about Martiall's *Treatyse* is his habit of employing quite extraordinary, and sometimes pagan, stories as proof. Though appeals to the miraculous were not unusual among Catholic controversialists, Martiall's range of sources is. Other polemicists primarily cited from the fathers, whose spiritual authority lent credibility to miracle stories. This was a clever tactic, for it forced Protestants into an uncomfortable position,

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[20] Martiall, *Treatyse*, fol. 9^{v}.

as denying a miraculous story recounted by a church father (such as the possessed child who vomited up the sacrament, or the woman who was scorched by fire when she tried to unworthily receive the sacrament in private) opened up the critic to charges of disparaging the ancient heroes of the faith. In response to Calfhill's relentless criticism of such arguments, Martiall redoubled both academic posture and language of moderation in his 1566 *Replie* with much less recourse to hagiographical stories.

Calfhill responded to Martiall's plethora of arguments from miracles with principled cessationism. For instance, Calfhill argued against the Catholic practice of laying on of hands—couched within broader arguments against Catholic sacramentology—by claiming that this apostolic practice as seen in Acts [7:14-17] served the particular purpose of conferring the Holy Ghost, and thus the ability to speak in tongues, perform miracles, and other "particular graces." Though they had received the "common grace of adoption and regeneration through Baptism" they did not possess these others "which in the beginning of the Church were granted, and now be denied." Therefore, Calfhill argued, the laying on of hands was orchestrated by God towards a certain end that is no longer applicable.

> So that laying on of hands served to good use then, when it pleased God at instance of the Apostles' prayers to confer the visible graces of His Spirit: but now that there is no such ministry in the Church; now that miracles be ceased; to what end should we have this imposition of hands; the sign without the thing? If a man should now-a-days prostrate himself upon the bodies of the dead, because Helias [Elisha] and Paul used this ceremony in raising of their dead, should he not be thought preposterously to do? So that it might well be a kind of Sacrament in the Apostles' time; but, the cause ceasing, what should the sign continue?[21]

Though Martiall's *Treatyse* is the most pronounced work examined here in terms of arguments from the miraculous out of history, Calfhill's cessationist stance and Catholic

[21] Calfhill, *Answer*, 217-218; see also 245 where he applies the same argument to anointing by oil.

responses reveal two fault lines running through these debates. The first is arguing from historical examples, specifically miracles. Though both sides fought furiously over the appropriate ways to argue from historical precedence, miracles proved especially tricky. Catholic controversialists exhibit a greater propensity to arguments from miracles as they were deeply tied to historical tradition and frequently cited from the fathers.

The second fault line is arguments from history, broadly construed. Protestants, in their efforts not to be seen as dismissive of the fathers, typically responded in one of three ways: naturalistic explanations (such as Cooper did with the vomiting child), challenging the interpretation, or, as Calfhill does here, rigid cessationism. This is notable because though the arguments were typically about the sacrament, that was ultimately the conclusion; the starting place of proper argumentation out of history, of which miracles were one form, was where the division ultimately lay.

Disputative Method in Martiall's *Treatyse*

Martiall's *Treatyse*, like most of these works, was designed to be referential. The preface and dedicatory epistle to Elizabeth is followed by an alphabetical table of the authors cited.[22] He also sectioned his work into ten articles, each one an argument for why the material cross ought to be preserved in the English Church. The topics indicate the line of argument that Martiall wanted to follow (and set the tone for Calfhill's response).[23] Once these have been proved,

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[22] Martiall, *Treatyse*, fols. 10^{r}-12^{r}.
[23] They were 1) the "significations" of the word "cross;" 2) the sign of the cross as historically revealed in the law of nature, the law of Moses, announced by the prophets, and now revealed "in the tyme of grace;" 3) that the sign of the cross should be in "euery church, chapel, and oratorie erected to the honour and seruice of god;" 4) that the sign of the cross is essential to the sacraments; 5) that the apostles and fathers signed themselves with the cross, exhorted all Christians to do so, and erected a cross "in euery place mete and conuenient for it;" 6) that holy

Martiall asserted, then the reader can judge whether the taking away of the cross under pretense of idolatry "tendeth not to bring vs to paganisme, and vtter forgetting of Christe his passion."[24]

Martiall cited classical pagan philosophers, though most often as passing references to buttress a point he had already made. For example, Martiall decided that listing many examples of precedent for the sign of the cross in churches was unduly burdensome; every man can be judge for himself, unless he be biased to his own sect and insensible. Just as Aristotle "willed all that douted [*sic*] whether fier be hotte or no, to put their fingers in to it and trie," so any man who doubts the historical prevalence of crosses in churches may "take his eies in his handes, and looke in all churches, chappells, and oratories through out al countries where Christes religion is, and was in dewe reuerence before thes shismes [*sic*], whether ther were or be any crosses or no."[25]

Martiall later compared those who doubt the miracles wrought by the sign of the cross to those whom Augustine chastised for denying that Romulus had killed his brother Remus despite "euident prouffes by histories."[26] In response to the Protestant objection that reading scripture and listening to preaching is more effective than images, Martiall conceded that though this may be true, not everyone can read or understand the scriptures nor hear a good preacher as often as they conveniently see a cross. He then quoted Horace to prove that "Thinges let downe by the

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men and women took little pieces of the cross, encased them in precious metals, and placed them in churches "to be worshipped" or hung them about their necks "therby to be the better warded;" 7) the cross was born in litany in the early church; 8) that the sign of the cross has effected "many straunge and wonderful miracles;" 9) that the sign of the cross brings the Christian every "commoditie;" 10) that the church fathers had allowed "the adoration and worshipping of the crosse."

[24] Martiall, *Treatyse*, sig. B^{v}.

[25] Martiall, *Treatyse*, fol. 46^{r}. See Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, trans. Hugh Tredennick, 2 vols. (Harvard University Press, 1997; LCL 271 and 287), Θ.5.

[26] Martiall, *Treatyse*, fols. 110^{v}-111^{r}.

eares do more slowely styrre vp mens minds, then such as are subiect and leyed præsent, before the faithful eies." For "furder prouffe" he cited three historical examples, two heathen and one religious: Julius Caesar being stirred upon the sight of depictions of Alexander the Great's conquests, and Scipio Africanus stating that the examples of his forefathers motivated him to virtue and greatness. The third example was Gregory of Nyssa's assertion that he could not pass by an image of Abraham offering up his son Isaac without coming to tears.[27]

Martiall did employ logical reasoning in his *Treatyse*, though not to a great extent. In the second article (that the sign of the cross was prefigured in every age), Martiall, quoting Augustine, cited the upholding of Moses's hands during the Israelites' battle with the Amalekites [Exod. 17:12] as a sign of the cross that was to come, but then reasoned syllogistically that this meant material crosses were necessary spiritual defense for the Christian's life: "But by Moyses handes the signe off the crosse was praefigured *ergo* by the signe off the crosse deuils are overcomed."[28] He made a similar logical leap to prove that it was the latter days and, therefore, Protestants were liars.[29] He likewise argued that tradition either comes from the apostles and the Holy Spirit or the devil, and since we know it's the former and Protestants reject tradition, then "it must nedes follo, that they them selues be *cæci & duces cæcorum*, blinde and guides off the blinde, and so faull bothe in to the deeke."[30]

Martiall, however, was also willing to acknowledge that reason could be deceptive in the search for spiritual truth, particularly when used by heretics. He argued that Protestants are

[27] Martiall, *Treatyse*, fols. 117^{r}-118^{v} (quote at 117^{v}).
[28] Martiall, *Treatyse*, fol. 28^{v}.
[29] Martiall, *Treatyse*, fols. 81^{r}-82^{v}.
[30] Martiall, *Treatyse*, fol. 83^{r}.

deceitful, lead debased lives, and deny the resurrection, not in their words, but in their works. And, as heretics, they counterfeit academic rhetoric and logic:

> They haue no profou[n]de lerning. For as S. Hierome saieth, *In hæreticis nihil aliud est quàm fulgor eloquentiæ, & sensus dialectica arte co[n]structus, & sermo mortuus.* In heretickes there is nothing but a glittering glimpse of eloquence, and a sense builded by the arte of logick, and dead talke.[31]

Martiall also regularly employed his legal training to argue his case. For instance, after citing two laws from Justinian commanding the erection of crosses, Martiall wrote,

> Ageinst which the aduersaries of of treuth and enemies of Christes crosse, haue nothing to reply, vnlesse they will absolutely say that nether crosse nether churche is necessary amongest Christen men, or flately deny the authoritie of the emperour: and that were greate arrogancy and pryde: and not lauful for them nether. For reason willeth and the law saieth, that: *Qui admittit testem pro se non potest eundem repellere contra se:* He that admitteth a man to be witnesse for him, can not repel the same man, if he be witnesse ageinst him.[32]

In sum, if Protestants use Justinian for service in a barbarous tongue, they must use him here too. Martiall's denunciation of Protestants for the inconsistent use of sources reflects the shifting methods of arguments among controversialists that created argumentative impasses. However, as will be noted from below, Martiall was not immune from such charges, either.

In a debate over whether or not marriage was a sacrament (and thus the sign of the cross should be used in it), Martiall weighed in on the ongoing debate sparked by Erasmus over the meaning of marriage as a *mysterion* in Eph. 5:32. He cited the legal principle *simul et semel* (literally "at once and together") and coupled it with some discourteous implications about Protestant ministers:

> Nor here can the ghospellers haue any aduantage or euasion, because S. Paule writing in greke saieth it is *Misterium magnum*, a greate mystery: for mystery and sacrament do not so far differ, but that, that which is caulled a mystery may also be a sacrament: as for example, baptisme, and the sacrifice off the body and bloud

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[31] Martiall, *Treatyse*, fol. 136^{r-v}.
[32] Martiall, *Treatyse*, fol. 45^{v}.

> Christ are caulled by diuerse auncient fathers a mystery, *ergo* be they not sacramentes: a goodly reason by S. Mary, not much vnlieke to an old mother Maukyns talk:[33] who hearing her neighbour saye that their S. Edmonde was a mynstrel, saied nay by S. Mary gosship he is a minister, as though in these later dayes in the holy co[n]gregatio[n], he that is a mynstrel can not be a minister to, and *simul & semel* serue both turnes for a nede. Wel how so euer it pleaseth them to dally with the signification of the woode, yf they wil loke but to the definition of a sacrament, and consider what is required in a sacrament, they shall finde nothing lacke in matrymonie that is, or ought to be in any sacrament: here is a visible signe of inuisible grace.[34]

In response to the Protestant argument that worshipping the cross was idolatry, Martiall borrowed the language of courts to argue his case. He insisted that Christians are "expressely forbed to iudg of other mens co[n]sciences, or to be curious or suspicious of other mens doinges." These "cross-crucifiers"[35] cannot judge a man's heart; only God can do that. If they presumptuously say it is evident, Martiall continued, then it must be evident by confession, proof, or evidence of the fact, none of which Protestants can do.[36]

Martiall routinely cited hagiographical stories as evidence for the power of the sign of the cross. The eighth article of his *Treatyse* is entirely about signs and wonders wrought by the sign of the cross. Bishops who put out raging fires when prayers didn't avail, women who prevented rape (even when they had been sentenced to the brothel as punishment for their Christian faith), and a woman healed (apparently of breast cancer), all by the sign of the cross, were some of the tamer anecdotes. Martiall also recounted the story of Donatus and the dragon (from Sozomenus), in which the bishop Donatus killed a dragon that had tormented nearby inhabitants by making the sign of the cross over it and spitting into its mouth. St. Martin (from Suplitius Severus)

[33] "Old mother Maukyn" was an unfavorable colloquial reference to a woman who might be lower-class, unkempt, a rube, or whorish. "Malkin," *OED*.
[34] Martiall, *Treatyse*, fol. 67^{r-v}.
[35] Martiall, *Treatyse*, fol. 129^{v}.
[36] Martiall, *Treatyse*, fols. 130^{r}-133^{v}.

stopped pagan funeral processors in their tracks with the sign of the cross and was also able to move a tree that had been cut down to kill him in mid-fall "and put the gentilles in danger."[37] The sign of the cross also prevailed in wartime: soldiers of Constantine who fled despite having the sign of the cross were killed, while those who bravely stayed were saved. Perhaps Martiall's most incredible story was how Theodosius was saved from the hands of the enemy following an ambush: after the enemy captain took him to safety, God sent a great wind that took the enemies' weapons out of their hand and kept them suspended in the air until they were slaughtered; those who "caste any darte or shote" had it turned back upon themselves.[38]

All in all, Martiall's *Treatyse of the Cross* is an unusual work, and certainly an outlier in the corpus of works making up the "Great Controversy" of the 1560s. Though Martiall still used some conventional forms of argumentation, such as logical reasoning, his *Treatyse* relies heavily on miracle stories. The logic he did use (as Calfhill happily pointed out) was not always airtight. Martiall's *Treatyse* is especially notable for its attempt to use Elizabeth's personal crucifix as leverage in public debate, but its value in analyzing disputative literature owes more the response it elicited from James Calfhill which, in turn, radically altered Martiall's *Replie*. Martiall's *Treatyse*, however, is much more conventional in its use of moderation.

Portraying Moderation in Martiall's *Treatyse*

Moderation is prominent throughout Martiall's *Treatyse*. In his preface to the readers, Martiall adopted a common motif by casting God's 'true' church as perennially embattled and oppressed and then self-deferentially cast himself as a noble soldier fighting on its behalf. He

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[37] Martiall, *Treatyse*, fol. 105^{v}.
[38] Martiall, *Treatyse*, fol. 106^{v}-107^{r}.

recounted the historical beginning with the apostles and early church, the Great Schism, and then advent of the Reformation as persecutory. Christ, however, had always raised up “diuerse faithful capitaines” to defend his church:

> Amo[n]gest whome albeit I am not woorthy to be adnumbred for a pore, base, and common souldier, nether for harte, courage, wit, policie, learning, ne strength, yet because I am apointed by the grace of my sauiour Christ, to follo his campe, and beare his armes and recognisaunce in my forhead, I thought it my dewtie to fight vnder his banner, and for the defense of his dere spouse the churche to labour to the vtter most of my pouer.[39]

Martiall also appealed to the indifferent readers to judge for themselves whether or not the taking away of the cross under the pretense of idolatry (as Protestants argued) “tendeth not to bring vs to paganisme, and vtter forgetting of Christe his passion.” His aim, Martiall insisted, was only to profit. However,

> Yf any thinke my wordes in many places bitter, and taunting rype, let them vnderstande, I founde them, or such lieke in the scriptures and holy fathers applied to such persons: and that I vse them as the surgeon doth his launce, Kniff in the festered sores, and the phisition his sharpe byting medicines, in olde growen deseases: hoping that the lieke effect wil follow in the one as in the other, if the malady be not by long continuance incurable and past recouery.[40]

Simply put, though sharp words may be unsavory to the reader, they are always appropriate for heretics. Protestant heretics, however, were not just known by their doctrine; they are also known by their dissolute lifestyle, such as the violation of Catholic dietary practices: “Now in these oure dayes, thes newe men feede the bely with fleash, moste parte of al the lent, to the great offense of their Christen brothers, and that contrary to the doctrine of S. Paule.”

Martiall also complained of the abuse heaped upon chaste Catholics by Protestants:

> [They] caul those that wil not beare them co[m]pany in their fleashly feastes, papistes and superstitious hipocrites, and besides make lent but a mans tradition,

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[39] Martiall, *Treatyse*, fol. $7^{r\text{-}v}$.
[40] Martiall, *Treatyse*, fols. 8^{v}-9^{r}.

> some popes deuise, and human policie. Howe agreeth this with, the doctrine of Christ, and the Apostles, and fathers of the primitiue churche?[41]

In fact, Martiall argued, Protestant marriage was indisputable proof of their immorality. He lamented the absence of chastity among Protestants and then described Protestant justifications of marriage in very vivid terms. Protestants "holde this as a certe[n] sure position, that a man can no more lyue without the company of a woman, then he can abstayne from spetting," and "if the wiffe be sicke and impotent for the acte of matrymonie, *Veniat ancilla*,[42] the husbond may ioyne issue with the mayde." Furthermore, "euery ma[n] may haue as many wiffes as he liste." Evidence for this debauchery is readily available in any book written since "frier Luther begane his ghospel: who to geue al his schollers example ranne out of his cloyster, brooke his vowe of chastetie, maried a nonne, after she had bene two yeares at [suesa queue] with the schollers of Wytte[n]berg." Luther's example "made almost euery monke, frier, chanone, and priest that came to that newe Christianitie, to get hym a paramour, and amarouse or doxie, and for a fayerer name caul her wife." The conclusion was straightforward to Martiall: "And to be shorte yow shal fynde no gift nor grace of the holy ghoste amongest the[m]."[43]

Martiall appealed directly to Protestants not to let desire for worldly gain prevent them from returning to the true church: "And neuer be ashamed to returne to the vnitie off the churche,

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[41] Martiall, *Treatyse*, fol. 159^{r-v}.
[42] "He goes to a handmaid." The idea was that if the wife was unable or unwilling to have sex with her husband, then he had permission to find sexual gratification elsewhere (*Si nolit vxor, aut non possit, veniat ancilla*). The phrase was used repeatedly by Catholic polemicists against Protestants, though this appears to be one of the earliest. For another example see Edmund Campion, *Rationes decem* ([Henley-on-Thames], 1581; STC 2nd ed. 4536.5), fol. 27^{r}.
[43] Martiall, *Treatyse*, fols. 138^{v}-139^{r}; see also 158^{r-v} where he makes reference to "newe bishoppes wiffes."

from which yowe haue separated, and diuided youre selues. Let not worldely policie, nor desire of riches, and vaine estimation amongest menstaye yowe from reentringe into fauor with god."[44]

The varied language of moderation in Martiall's *Treatyse*, whether it was portraying himself as a humble servant of the Catholic Church or denouncing Protestant immorality, is reflective of the importance of presenting oneself as moderate and civil in these debates. Though Martiall's take on moderation in his *Treatyse* was very traditional (such as denouncing Protestants for violating Lent dietary restrictions and clerical celibacy), it still evidences the close link between morality and intellectual credibility in Elizabethan controversialists. In the same way, abusive rhetoric in Martiall's *Treatyse* is fairly convention, although this is to be expected as it was the first piece of the exchange; it would take Calfhill's blistering riposte to get Martiall's abusive rhetoric in full swing.

The Rhetoric of Abuse in Martiall's *Treatyse*

Much of what does appear in the *Treatyse* is standard polemical tropes such as spiritual pride as the root of heresy, dissolute living, and charges of political sedition. In keeping with his consistent use of historical examples, Martiall repeatedly pointed to early church heretics as mirror images of Protestants. For example, Martiall insisted that Protestants have the same spirit that Cyprian spoke of in the heretic Novatus:

> A forsaker of the churche, an enemie off mercye, a destroyer of pænaunce, a teacher of pride, a corrupter of trewth, a betrayer of charitie, desirous of newes, in auarice insatiable, in spoylinge other mens goodes raginge madde, pufte vp with pryde, alwayes curiouse to learne, that he might betray, alwayes flattringe that he might deceaue, neuer faithful that he might loue, a fyer brande to enkendle the flame of dissension, an hurle winde and te[m]pestuous storme to drowne faith, and aduersarie of quietnesse, and enemie of peace...where they præsume to saye that they teache the trewe ghospel of Christe, doctrine of the Apostells, and

[44] Martiall, *Treatyse*, fol. 167ᵛ.

> fathers of the primatiue churche, examine them wel and yowe shal find them starke liers.[45]

A lack of accord with the fathers was Martiall's primary attack on Protestants. He even referred to Jewel as that "raging Rhetour" who "arrogantly abused" the names of fathers, apostles, and Christ by appealing to them in vain against Catholics.[46] After citing from various patristic sources (Ignatius, Cyprian, Ambrose and Leo), Martiall asked, "And these newe men caulle [Rome] the hoore of Babilon, the seate of the Antichrist, the sincke of sinne, the corruption of the worlde, the mother of al abomination. Howe wel agreeth this with the holy fathers?"[47]

Martiall later asked his reader to remember "Core, Datha[n], and Abyron" as well as the Montanists who, according to Eusebius, "[e]nded their liffes, euen as *Iudas* the traytor did. And the sodayne death of *Arrius*, who for diuiding him self from the churche, and raysing a blasphæmous heresie ageinst Christ, lost all his entralles in a iakes."[48] Martiall's reference to the three Hebrew men led a rebellion against Moses and subsequently swallowed up by the earth [Num. 16], was a clear statement about the fate of those who presume to challenge God's established authority. Likewise, the comparison with Arius who (according to the early church historian Socrates) died after violently expelling large quantities of blood, most of his smaller intestines, and some of his vital organs in a latrine is a particularly poignant and graphic parallel. Elsewhere Martiall asked his reader,

> who deserueth more credit, Leo or Luther, Cyprian or Caluin, Basile or *Brentius*, Austine or *Swnglius*, Ambrose or Amsdorf, Chrisostome or Cranmer, *Paulinus* or Parkar, Hierome or Iuel, trewe Apostels, or false Apostates, auncient fathers, or newe brothers, vertuous prælates, or vitious preachers, sounde catholickes, or fonde heretickes.

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[45] Martiall, *Treatyse*, fols. 139^{v}-140^{r}.
[46] Martiall, *Treatyse*, fol. 162^{r}.
[47] Martiall, *Treatyse*, fol. 143^{v}.
[48] Martiall, *Treatyse*, fol. 164^{r}.

The reader can see "in al that they preach, of only faith, lack of free wil, Mariadge of priestes, and such mostrous [*sic*] opinions...howe grossely they haue bene taught, and lurdely deceaued, vnder pretence, and colour of the worde of the lorde." Martiall announced his intention to pass it over (a moderate gesture), but warned his reader "yowe must (as S. Ciprian saieth) flee far from the contagion of such men, and be as ware of their talke, as yowe wold be of a venemous cancker, or infectious plague."[49]

Martiall also used the common tactic of portraying Protestants as politically seditious in contrast to loyal Catholics. In the dedication to Elizabeth, Martiall insisted that his citations of the fathers were word for word and properly referenced. In this way, she might see "whether their meaning (who haue blasphemously railed ageinst it, and bereathed youre faithful subiectes of the swete sight of it) be syncere and correspondent to the fathers of the primitiue church (as they pretend)."[50] This connection between accurately citing patristic sources and political loyalty highlights the intimate relationship between doctrinal truth and fidelity to the Queen in the mind of Martiall, something he insisted Protestants did not have, as evidenced by the violent conflicts on the Continent and to the north:

> They haue no fidelitie towardes the prince. And therefore Constantine the greate would neuer admit those that had forsake[n] their religion into his præsence, most certe[n]ly assuring him self, that they woulde neuer be faithful aboute their prince, who had forsaken and betrayed their lord and god. And the rebellions stirred vp by frier Luther and his companions in Germany ageinst the emperour, in Fraunce ageinst the Kinge, in Scottland ageinst the Queene, and in England as yowe knowe, be euident prouffes off this.

Martiall made a political assertion about Protestants by inverting *sola fide* into an attack: "They obserue no iustice: for where there is no sounde faith, there ca[n] be no trew iustice, for the iust

[49] Martiall, *Treatyse*, fols. 160^{v}-161^{r}.
[50] Martiall, *Treatyse*, sig. A3^{v}.

man liueth off faith."[51] Martiall lamented that "al lawe taken awaye in Germanie" and asked about his own England, "Be not...Macheauelianes policies holden and folloed for lawes?"[52]

Martiall's abusive rhetoric in the *Treatyse* is fairly conventional. The trope of pride and heresy, intimately connected in the sixteenth-century, were directly connected back to early church heretics. Protestants were seditious insurrectionists, whereas Catholics were as loyal their monarch as they were to God, and the intellectual credibility of Protestantism is laughable in light of its historical novelty. As mentioned though, Martiall's *Treatyse* had no direct interlocutor and, as the initial piece in the exchange, there was no gadfly yet to sting him toward more heated vitriol. Both of these changed with the appearance of Calfhill's *Answere* in 1565.

Disputative Method in Calfhill's *Answere*

Calfhill's *Answere* was thoroughly modeled in the form of academic disputation. In keeping with conventions of disputative literature, Calfhill quoted Martiall verbatim and cited the folios where Martiall's arguments could be found. After making an unfavorable comparison between Martiall and Virgil's Sinon (the character in Virgil's *Aeneid* who stayed behind at Troy to convince the Trojans to bring in the wooden horse, thus sealing the fate of the city), Calfhill stated "he telleth undoubted trothes; to the end that the falsehoods…may have the more credit."[53]

Calfhill's primary attack was against Martiall's learning (chiefly through ridicule) and he wasted no time in questioning Martiall's reasoning abilities:

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[51] Martiall, *Treatyse*, fol. 137^{r}. Martiall cited the *Apology* of Friedrich Staphylus (a former counselor to Charles V who had converted to Lutheranism then converted back to Catholicism and wrote a polemical tract against Protestantism) as his source. Stapleton's translation of Staphylus's *Apology* appeared in 1565 from Antwerp, indicating its circulation amongst Catholic exiles before then.
[52] Martiall, *Treatyse*, fol. 137^{v}.
[53] Calfhill, *Answer*, 48-49.

> ...yet, if ye had joined more logic with your law, your reasons should not have run so lawless (as they do:) or, if you had remembered your old humanity, you would not have stained your new divinity with such slanders and lies, such vain supposals and idle tales, as I am ashamed to hear of any that challengeth to himself the name of learning. But man's law striketh so great a stroke with you, that God's rule and conscience excluded from you: and, being so deep in your popish divinity, you have forgotten all christian humanity.[54]

Calfhill then quickly categorized what he perceived as Martiall's gravest errors:

> For this must I needs say; that either ye have not well learned your sophistry, or else you think you have to do with fools. For three kinds of paralogisms of false arguments, or fond cavils, are most familiar with you. First, by inserting oft into your writing *Non causam pro causa:* taking that for a buttress and defence of your cause, which maketh nought to purpose. Then, by arguing *Ab eo quod est secundum quid, ad simpliciter:* making a general consequent of that which in part is true; an absolute rule of that which was done or spoken only in some respect: and most of all, *A consequenti:* when ye rashly gather that doth not truly follow.

Martiall's arguments belied his willfulness and ignorance, especially by blaming plagues and other ills on Protestants, when it is widely known that "there was never age so free from miseries, specially in England, as, since the preaching of the Gospel, this of ours hath been."[55] At another point Calfhill quipped,

> He beginneth, then, with a long process; and hath couched all his eloquence together, to tell a good tale of his master the Devil. He labours busily about that, which no man contends with him of. There he forgat the rule of logic, *de Reciprocatione*. That is an ill argument which serveth both parts.[56]

The two arguments, Calfhill observed, are that Catholics claim to be the persecuted minority, and thus validated as God's true church, while at the same time hoping for ecclesial success, and thus be validated as God's true church (another instance of an author identifying a fault line running through the arguments, as Calfhill claimed these two positions were mutually exclusive).

[54] Calfhill, *Answer*, 1.
[55] Calfhill, *Answer*, 5.
[56] Calfhill, *Answer*, 49.

Logic

Calfhill relished dismantling Martiall's syllogisms. In a response to Martiall's arguments for the sign of the cross in the sacraments, Calfhill insisted that for three of them (matrimony, penance, and unction) Martiall had failed to provide proofs that they were sacraments, instead simply asserting that Augustine says sacraments are not to be done without the sign of the cross, therefore the sign of the cross is to be used in them: "For answer whereof, neither is the first Proposition, (as you understand it,) to be admitted; nor in the second in any wise true. Therefore the Conclusion doth follow ill-favouredly." After dissecting the difference between a sign (i.e. the sacrament) and the thing signified (i.e. spiritual benefit) Calfhill argued that a sacrament is perfect without the sign of the cross, which is nowhere mentioned in scripture: "Wherefore the Major is falsely set. But the Minor is farther out of square."[57]

Calfhill kept his word in highlighting the three most common fallacies in Martiall's *Treatyse*, the first being *non causa[m] pro causa* (i.e. substituting a false cause). He leveled this charge repeatedly. For instance, Calfhill said that Martiall misunderstood Chrysostom's words on the venerability of the cross, as Chrysostom was trying to prove to heathens that Christ was God, not defend the sign of the cross: "though you, taking still *Non causam pro causa*, that which is impertinent for proof of your matter, confound the same." He did the same, Calfhill argued, by mistaking an outward sign for Christ's merit: "Still you do reason *A non causa pro causa*; attributing that unto the outward sign, which is indeed the virtue of Christ, and belief in His passion." The same was true for Martiall's reasoning about why Constantine was granted

[57] Calfhill, *Answer*, 234.

victory; it was because of his obedience, Calfhill, insisted, not the sign of the cross, "[b]ut still ye put *Non causam pro causa*."[58]

The second fallacy he accused Martiall of was reasoning from a particular to a universal (a favor which Martiall returned repeatedly in his *Replie*). This was not only specious reasoning, but impious:

> Wherefore, as God miraculously did work, and used this sign to contrary effects; sometime for comfort, sometime to despair; sometime for the godly, sometime to the wicked; so we must not, contrary to reason, gather an universal only of the one side; and, contrary to His will, abuse it at our pleasure.[59]

Calfhill likewise reprimanded Martiall for deducing from consequences (the third common fallacy). Following an accusation that Martiall drew a conclusion completely irrelevant to the premises, Calfhill lectured his opponent, "Ye were taught once, out of the Topics, that it is an ill argument *A consequenti*, when, in two propositions things utterly unlike shall be compared together; and the one, by no mean, can infer the other."[60] Elsewhere, he accused Martiall (again) of confusing the sign with the thing signified (this time cross and crucified) and failing to prove that material benefits followed: "Sure, if they were causes of any good that came, they were *Causæ stolidæ*,[61] as Tully calleth them, mean and instrumental causes; as the axe is cause of the wood cleaving, and not efficient."[62] In a lengthy response to several of Martiall's own counterarguments against Protestant objections to the sign of the cross, Calfhill applied the

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[58] Calfhill, *Answer*, 65, 92, 115.
[59] Calfhill, *Answer*, 121.
[60] Calfhill, *Answer*, 73.
[61] Probably best translated as "inert causes." The passage Calfhill likely had in mind is Cicero's *Topics*, §59 where Cicero described some causes that are necessary for an effect yet not efficient causes; of these causes, "some are dormant, of no active efficacy, somehow inert [*stolida quodam modo*], like place, time, matter, tools, and other things like that." Cicero, *Topica*, ed. and trans. Tobias Reinhardt (Oxford, 2003), 147 [Latin text facing opposite].
[62] Calfhill, *Answer*, 116.

framework of effects and causes to argue against Martiall's defense of images as evangelistic. For though "[t]he world itself is a certain spectacle of things invisible…that no excuse, no cloke of ignorance, can be pretended" but conversion of the heart "is the work of another instrument, and effect of another cause."[63]

On two other occasions he accused Martiall of the similar *Ab ignoratione Elenchi*,[64] thus making an argument "which made nothing at all to purpose."[65] In the same segment he also accused Catholics of the rhetorical fallacy "*Acyrologiam*, which you may call 'Abusion,' 'improper speeches.'" This is because "the Papists have, to make the Scriptures to serve their fancies" read any kind of "bowing, saluting, [or] blessing" in scripture as "worshipping." For example, Calfhill said, they say that Jacob received Joseph's garment and laid it on his eyes, weeping; therefore, images ought to be worshipped. His disdain for the conclusion was clear: "And is this not a reason, that might have been fette [fetched] out of a Christmas pie?"[66]

Historical and Grammatical Arguments

As shown above, Martiall's use of history in the *Treatyse* was somewhat unusual. Calfhill picked up on this and ridiculed Martiall mercilessly for it, either for citing spurious sources or misapplying arguments from history. For instance, he chastised Martiall for making Martialis one of the 72 disciples sent out by Jesus despite the fact that Eusebius tells us there is no record of them and Jerome, Gennadius, Isidorus "never do remember this author of yours." If he were

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[63] Calfhill, *Answer*, 355.
[64] Literally, "from ignorance of a refutation."
[65] Calfhill, *Answer*, 156, 160 (quote at 156).
[66] Calfhill, *Answer*, 158. Gibbing suggested in a note that "reason" is a pun off of "raisin," a reference to the Christmas pie (158 n. 2).

so ancient, Calfhill observed, "it had been a great oversight of them to have so forgotten him."[67] Elsewhere he argued that a tale of Probianus from Sozomen's Tripartite History was likely not true ("Wherefore, either the collector of this tale was a liar, or you a fond applier"[68]) and that he had cited from a spurious work of Augustine that had been condemned at Paris.[69]

Regarding Martiall's other tales, Calfhill declared that whether St. Anthony, St. Martin, Donatus, and Paula all signed themselves with the cross does not matter, for they were not a binding precedent. The authenticity of these stories is in question, Calfhill continued, as Erasmus reckoned that Jerome wrote the life of Paul the Hermite "only for his exercise." The story of the dragon is ambiguous as to whether the devil counterfeited the monster to Antony or there really was a monster in the wilderness, "[s]o that we may doubt the truth of the history."[70] Calfhill also pointed to discrepancies in dating when Helena purportedly found the cross of Christ. Nicephorus reports that she was converted by Pope Sylvester and the invention of the cross came about during Constantius the Great, but Martiall's "Pope holy-law" records it during the time of Pope Eusebius: "Wherefore you must either say, that your popish law doth teach you lies; or else that your author in this behalf is a liar. It is always to be observed, how uncertain tales be delivered of Papists as truths unto us."[71] He also ridiculed the decrees of Pope Sylvester as full of "idle tales and impudent lies of Constantine's Donation, Peter and Paul's apparition, with such other like," and sarcastically quips how incredible it is the Sylvester remembered to record things that even Eusebius and Sozomen forgot.[72]

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[67] Calfhill, *Answer*, 69.
[68] Calfhill, *Answer*, 199.
[69] Calfhill, *Answer*, 361.
[70] Calfhill, *Answer*, 252.
[71] Calfhill, *Answer*, 323.
[72] Calfhill, *Answer*, 193.

Calfhill also took exception to Martiall's application of historical stories. For instance, Martiall recounted (from Theodoret and Gregory of Nazianzus) how the pagan emperor Julian drove away demons by the sign of the cross. Calfhill scoffed, "For the truth of the history I contend not with you: but what I judge of the experiment I will tell you" before systematically objecting to Martiall, not least that he contradicted his own ninth thesis (the benefits of the cross for Christians).[73] Martiall had also compared Protestants to the Italian Andrew Lampugnam who, in conspiring to kill a duke, had his image painted on a table and stabbed it repeatedly until he had the courage to carry out the deed.[74] Calfhill found this ridiculous; Andrew Lampugnan[o] and his co-conspirators were stirred by God to kill the Duke of Milan for he was a wicked tyrant: "Wherefore your history is ill applied."[75] In a debate about the practice of godparents, Calfhill accused Martiall of foisting a "bastard book" upon Dionysius the Areopagite and attacked his claims about godfathers as grossly anachronistic; even if they were in place, Calfhill argued, there's no way Dionysius could have known about the practice as he was dead by then.[76]

Calfhill also demonstrated more 'humanist' flair by attacking Martiall's linguistic arguments. He compared Martiall's interpretation of the Latin *benedixit*, which he used to argue that Christ had used the sign of the cross at the Last Supper (sourced from Albert Magnus) with the Greek passages found in the gospels of Matthew and Mark (which Calfhill quoted) to prove that *benedixit* cannot be taken read in this way while also taking a parenthetical passing shot at Martiall ("if ye understand any Greek").[77]

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[73] Calfhill, *Answer*, 87.
[74] Martiall, *Treatyse*, fol. 109^{r-v}. The reference is to Giovanni Andrea Lampugnani, one of three Milanese officials who assassinated the duke Galeazzo Maria Sforza on 26 Dec. 1476.
[75] Calfhill, *Answer*, 339.
[76] Calfhill, *Answer*, 211-212.
[77] Calfhill, *Answer*, 231.

Calfhill's *Answere* to Martiall's *Treatyse* relied extensively on formal logic, exhibited in his relentless attacks on Martiall's own reasoning, as well as more 'humanistic' enterprises, such as historical and linguistic arguments. Calfhill also apparently took great joy in mocking his opponent's arguments which, as will be shown below, had a profound effect on Martiall's *Replie*. Before examining it, however, Calfhill's portrayals of moderation should be studied, as they were central to his *Answer*.

Portraying Moderation in Calfhill's *Answere*

One of Calfhill's primary means of portraying moderation was to repeatedly comment on the unfitness of someone like Martiall—a person with no training in divinity—weighing in on religious controversy, which was interpreted as immodest on Martiall's part. For instance, Calfhill used the story of the interaction between the ancient painter Apelles and an opinionated cobbler to declare that although Martiall may have training in law, he was not fit to participate in 'higher' debates such as divinity.[78] Calfhill made it a point to connect Martiall's immodesty in joining theological debates he was not qualified for with truthfulness. In the prefatory letter to Martiall, he wrote, "But, that your impudence may be the more apparent" it is necessary to highlight that he ascribed to the fathers "such falsehoods and absurdities as they never thought [and] good man [*sic*] never gathered."[79]

Calfhill also responded to Martiall's connection between immorality and Protestantism by volleying back the charge. In his prefatory letter to the reader, Calfhill insisted that Catholicism was a counterfeit religion, constructed by the devil and his priests to deceive the

[78] Calfhill, *Answer*, 263.
[79] Calfhill, *Answer*, 9.

people. While true Christians are known for characteristics such as faith, fear and love of God, repentance, true preaching, prayer, thanksgiving, praise, perseverance, justice, charity, "and such other like," servants of the devil are known by the devil's ordinances: "strange attire, difference of meats, refusal of marriage, rising at midnight, shutting up in a cloister, erecting of Images, worshipping of Saints, service in Latin, gadding on pilgrimage, making of vows, most wilful beggary, most vile hypocrisy." Therefore, the honor due to God is now given to the Devil. For proof, Calfhill asked the reader to consider that a solitary life is not commanded by God, but is by the Devil; God condemns adultery, "the Devil in his ministers makes a trifle of it," evidenced in decrees issued by Popes Alexander and Pelagius. These decrees and decretals, "Papists have in as sovereign a price as the Bible," even allowing a "whoremaster" to receive holy orders.[80]

Later, and likely in response to Martiall's narrative of persecution, Calfhill commented that God has always raised up "notable instruments" to defend the church such as Luther, Zwingli, Calvin, Knox, Latimer, and Cranmer, most of whom paid "with their blood, to bear witness to the truth." Yet these great men are "with all words of beastliness and reproach, slandered. But now they [Catholics] have uttered themselves so far; their malice and impudence is so apparent; that their tongue indeed is no slander at all." He then continued to recite a historical narrative about the triumph of true religion recently accomplished (though begun by the Wycliffites) and insisted that Martiall's speech proved him to be a child of the devil. Imitating the Johannine greeting, Calfhill wrote "Wherefore, dearly beloved, although this ape[81] come forth with ten Articles, in imitation of ten Commandments; yet, God be thanked, they

[80] Calfhill, *Answer*, 17-19.
[81] This imagery is likely drawn from Cyprian's language of the Novatian heretics, also used by Rastell in his *Replie* to Cooper's *Defence*. See ch. 6.

neither be the Commandments, therefore to be followed; nor Articles of our faith, therefore to be believed." Afterwards, Calfhill apologized and justified his zealousness to the reader:

> I confess that I am more aspre in my writing, than otherwise I would, or modesty requireth: but no such bitterness is tasted in me, as the beastliness of them, (with whom I have to do,) deserveth. Bear with me, therefore, (I beseech you;) bear with a truth, in plain speech uttered. Bayard hath forgot that he is a horse; and therefore, if I make the stumbling jade's sides to bleed, blame me not. Impute not to malice and impatience that which is grounded of hatred to the crime, but love to the persons which be touched. I hope, by this means, that, seeing their own shame, they will come to more honesty; or, hearing their own evil doings, surcease, (at least wise,) their evil speaking.[82]

Later Calfhill (again aware of his reader) appealed to modesty as the reason for not answering his opponent as he deserved:

> I should here pass the bounds of modesty, and justly offend the good reader's ears, if I should answer according to your professed impudency, and shameless deserving. Thought you that your writing should never come to scanning? Was it not enough for you to belie them that be most unlike you, the Ministers of the Church of Christ now living; but that you would falsify the Scriptures, and make lies of the Fathers?[83]

Calfhill later returned to contrasting Protestants with immoral papists. He recounted how Catholics charge Protestants with all kinds of egregious sins, yet if he were to expose "the lives of your popish Doctors, and your own selves; O Lord, what perjury, what impiety, what incontinency, what sodomitry, would burst out together!"[84] He also specifically compared himself to the Catholic controversialist Lewis Evans,[85] stating "Wherein if I had Lewis Evans his vein, I could with truths make those ears to glow, which now do glory in his shameless lies."[86] These two statements are interesting examples of the rhetorical ploy of *praeoccupatio*, which (as

[82] Calfhill, *Answer*, 50-51.
[83] Calfhill, *Answer*, 272.
[84] Calfhill, *Answer*, 276. See also 52-53.
[85] As noted in ch. 2, the exact identity of Lewis Evans is uncertain. See Julian Lock, "Evans, Lewis (fl. 1565-1571)," *ODNB*.
[86] Calfhill, *Answer*, 276, 331 (respectively).

will be shown) Martiall repeatedly charged Calfhill with. In concluding his *Answer*, Calfhill reiterated his own restraint in responding to his opponent:

> And thus have I answered your ten articles; using moe words in disproof of them than the cause requireth…Only I would not be said to conceal any piece of proof that you bring for maintenance of your error. Wherefore I have turned over leaf by leaf, as in the margent every where appeareth; perused each line and word that had any reason in it; annexing a sufficient and the same abundant confutation of it. Your Conclusion indeed I deal not withal: for it containeth more than was in the Premisses; more than you be able or go about to prove. It is but an heap of lies and slanders, which, impudently spoken, may be best answered with silence.[87]

Part of this in-depth argumentation required Protestants to constantly parry charges of extreme hubris from Catholics for rejecting the fathers. Calfhill met this critique head-on by insisting that he revered the fathers, but only so far as they deserved. Ultimately, it would be immodest to take the honor due God—obedience in all things—and give it to the fathers, for "They themselves refused that honour." If we develop our own tradition and reject theirs, Calfhill postulated, we are to be blamed, but if we reject a tradition because it is not in accordance with God's word, "we are not to be burdened with pride or singularity." Calfhill lobbed back the charge against Martiall, asking how Catholics are not guilty of the same for developing rituals from their own "fancies" and "follies."[88]

He then argued the inverse: that Protestants are truly the humble ones for their naked faith in God, as opposed to Catholic self-reliance. Calfhill's testy response to Martiall's argument that the sign of the cross can teach humility illustrates this well. He began with utter sarcasm: "Indeed, Sir, humility may well one way be learned of a Cross; for when it is stricken, it strikes not again: when it is reviled, it gives no ill language: will it to stand, and it will not stir." If Catholics had really learned this lesson, then they would put no trust in works or "idle

[87] Calfhill, *Answer*, 388.
[88] Calfhill, *Answer*, 260.

ceremonies and will-worship." But if they retain works-righteousness or seek satisfaction for sins outside of Christ's death "then is your humility but hypocrisy."

> When the Papists behold the work of their own hands, the Cross itself, fair mustering in the church; which might peradventure have been a log for the chimney, or else…no other thought can come into their head, but that they themselves be better than their handy work, the maker more to be esteemed than the metal: and so for humility a pride is engendered, that they be causes of such wonderful effects; and if God be honoured, they must be thanked.[89]

The connection between spiritual pride and counterfeit (and thus demonic) religion runs throughout Calfhill's *Answer*, but it is especially pronounced in his discussion of Augustine of Canterbury for, according to Calfhill, Catholic ambition had been present in England from the very beginning. Augustine was painted as a prideful Romish prelate who tried to extinguish true religion that was already practiced in Britain: "For ever since the time of Eleutherius of Rome, and Lucius of England, Christianity hath been received, and never failed among us." Though some parts that were subject to invasion "were blinded with pagan superstitions," the "faithful Christians fled into the mountains." When Augustine arrived, he found seven bishoprics and an archbishop, "beside divers and sundry Monasteries: which all had faithful and learned Prelates, keeping their flocks in most godly order."[90]

Although where Augustine landed was not totally corrupted, he "in place of Idolatry planted superstition: and where Religion was sincerely taught, he laboured what he could, of a certain ambitious proud heart, to pervert it." When Augustine tried to force seven thousand pious monks ("not idle bellies, as of late years they have been, but learned, and living of the sweat of their brow") to serve in preaching the gospel "to their mortal enemies, the Saxons," the monks refused. King Ethelbert, "partly in Austin's quarrel, partly of an old grudge of his own, stirred up

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[89] Calfhill, *Answer*, 352-352.
[90] Calfhill, *Answer*, 305-306.

the rest of the Saxon kings to make war upon them." The result was over 10,000 deaths, "[w]hich great murder cannot be imputed to any thing so much as to the ambition of the Monk." Although Bede "reciteth the story somewhat otherwise," Calfhill conceded, it is clear that the tragedy was the result of Augustine's pride.[91] (It is worth noting that Bede's version is markedly different; it absolves Augustine of any role in the slaughter.[92])

Given Calfhill's penchant for arguing the counterfeit (and thus demonic) nature of Catholics, the tropes of spiritual pride and humility were efforts to convince the reader that his opponent, for all his humble posturing, was simply one more example of a Catholic Church that had been guilty of the sin of spiritual pride for centuries. In sharp contrast, Protestants depended solely on the word of God to understand God, and in faith for salvation—not works (itself another manifestation of spiritual pride). Calfhill's own depictions of Protestant moderation and Catholic immoderation, however, sits alongside a healthy amount of abusive rhetoric, which he doled out generously.

The Rhetoric of Abuse in Calfhill's *Answere*

Martiall wasn't the only target of Calfhill's derision; he named most of the major Catholic polemicists and mocked each in turn. The first was Harding, "a gay disguised gest" and "sudden convert" who "must need be thought to say something" simply because he is a doctor "and hath otherwise some opinion of learning." Jewel "abundantly" proved how he, in reality, had nothing to say. Next came Dorman: "the master came the worthy scholar: and yet, worthy

[91] Calfhill, *Answer*, 306-307.
[92] Calfhill, *Answer*, 306 n. 6.

Man, he gave but a *Dor*."[93] Neither "for all their heat of railing, hath any warmth of religion… Only I am sorry M. Nowell had not a more learned adversary." Then came Rastell (a "proud peacock") with his *Rejoinder*: "I pity the poor soul; he maketh his match so far amiss. *Dares Entellum*. Nay, *Hinnulus Leonem*."[94] Lastly, "[t]o make up the mess, steps out M. Stapleton." Calfhill sardonically commented on the fact that Stapleton didn't actually write his own piece, but rather translated one (Friedrich Staphylus' *Apology*[95]) by comparing it to a sword borrowed from a "ruffian" and polished it up, but the "blade itself is all to behacked." Therefore, he must fight with the scabbard, but "if a man give him a dry blow or two, (as, for his wilfulness, he well deserveth,) we shall see hereafter what fence he hath for it."[96]

Catholic authors, Calfhill continued, burden the printers of Antwerp far more than they answer sound doctrine, but Protestants are "too well acquainted with [their works] to be now abused by a dog's eloquence." The Catholics are at a distinct advantage for while Protestants are busy caring for Christ's church, "ye have nothing else to do but commit to writing your peevish fancies, and send them into England to set us a work withal." Protestants, however, continue to respond "for charity's sake." Calfhill told Martiall that he would have had some respect for him

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[93] This word can be applied both to buzzing insects (e.g., bees, flies, hornets) and, as a verb, to make a mockery of. Calfhill seems to have the former in mine, as he refers to Dorman as a "bug" later in the paragraph, though this could also be short for "bugbear." However, the earliest usage of "bug" to refer to an insect in the *OED* is 1622.

[94] The former is a reference to Dares challenging Entellus in Virgil's *Aeneid* (Calfhill shortened it from "Dares Entellum provocas"); both men were renown for their fighting skills. "Hinnulus Leonem" means a fawn (or young mule) against a lion. They were likely sourced from Erasmus' *Adages*. See *The Collected Works of Erasmus*, vol. 34, trans. R.A.B. Mynors (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1992), 208-209 and *The Collected Works of Erasmus*, vol. 31, trans. Margaret Mann Phillips, annot. R.A.B. Mynors (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1982), 276-277.

[95] On Staphylus' *Apology* see above, n. 54.

[96] Calfhill, *Anwer*, 2-3.

if he kept quiet, for even a fool is thought wise when silent.[97] But, alas, he didn't. "For learning have ye little, discretion less, good manners least of all." And, "Wherein I marvel not if the doctrine be higher than your skill can reach unto."[98]

Calfhill routinely ridiculed Martiall's logic, often by making unfavorable comparisons to unlearned persons. One of Martiall's more allegorical arguments,[99] he declared, "moveth me to laughter with an indignation. For it savours nothing of the school, save that it hath *Ergo* before the conclusion; which every alewife can do as well as you. It hath neither mode nor figure, wit nor common sense." He then lectured Martiall on the proper use of minor premises in syllogisms and faultily ascribing the "effect" of the passion to "the instrument and sign."[100]

In another lengthy passage, Calfhill picked up Martiall's ridicule of Protestant ministers in the debate over *mysterium* and *sacramentum* and turned it back on him:

> Your wisdom supposeth, that because a mystery and a Sacrament do not so far differ, but that that which is called a mystery may also be a Sacrament, therefore your ground is good enough, that Matrimony is a Sacrament. This do ye prove by a sad tale of old mother Maukin, that 'thought her Saint Edmund to be no minstrel because he was a Minister; whereas in these latter days a minstrel,' (as you say,) 'may be a Minister, and serve both turns for a need.' But if mother Maukin had been such a daukin, as to think every Minister to be a minstrel, as you do every mystery to be a Sacrament; then Martiall and Maukin, a dolt with a daukin, might marry together; and the Vicar of Saint Fool's be both minstrel and Minister, *simul et semel*, to solemnize your Sacrament.[101]

This passage illustrates well the dialogic nature of these exchanges, for it was a direct response to Martiall's use maukin as an insult (as well as his use of the legal principle

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[97] See Prov. 17:28.
[98] Calfhill, *Answer*, 3-4.
[99] The uplifting of Moses's hands prefigured the cross, therefore the sign of the cross overcomes devils. Martiall, *Treatyse*, fol. 28^{v}.
[100] Calfhill, *Answer*, 106.
[101] Calfhill, *Answer*, 236; see also 251, 284; comp. Martiall, Treatyse, fols. 67^{r-v}.

simul et semel to 'prove' sacrament and mystery to be the same), but Calfhill escalated the rhetoric by adding the rhyming "daukin"[102] (which would provoke Martiall further).

Calfhill declared about one of Martiall's arguments how "This fellow began in good divinity but ended in foolish sophistry: for in the Conclusion he put more than was in the Premisses."[103] He then drew on ancient philosophy to ridicule his opponent:

> If I might crave so much of your Mastership, I would be a suitor, once to have you prove that which so often you confidently affirm. I acknowledge you not for any such Pythagoras, that it shall suffice me for mine own discharge to say, αὑτος ἔφα,[104] M. Martiall hath said the word: but I rather think you to be some scholar of Anaxagoras, which have learned to make *quidlibet ex quolibet;* an apple of an oyster. Pardon me, therefore, if I trust you no further than I have trial of you.[105]

Calfhill's language here was quite intentional. The disciples of Pythagoras were notorious for asserting something to be true simply because their teacher had said it was.[106] The reference to Anaxagoras and *quidlibet ex quolibet* seems to be a conflation of the pre-Socratic's perplexing "Everything-in-Everything" principle and the "anything out of anything" fallacy.[107] How accurately Calfhill understood Anaxagoras is immaterial though, for his polemical point is clear: His Catholic opponent drew any conclusion he wished from any reason he found.

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[102] "Dawkin" was the diminutive form of "daw," a term for a fool or a slattern. "Dawkin," *OED*.
[103] Calfhill, *Answer*, 159.
[104] Greek for "he said it" (Lt. *ipse dixit*), the logical fallacy of an appeal to authority.
[105] Calfhill, *Answer*, 99.
[106] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Eminent Philosophers, Volume II: Books 6-10*, trans. R.D. Hicks (Harvard University Press, 1925; LCL 185), 8.46-47.
[107] The question of drawing conclusions from false premises has a long history in logic and has often been tied specifically to the simultaneous validity of two contradictory premises (i.e. if contradiction can exist, anything can be true). It's no clear what, precisely, Calfhill had in mind, though he was possibly considering *ex contradictione quodlibet*, sometimes known as the "Liars Paradox." Today it is categorized under paraconsistent logic. The phrase *ex falso quodlibet* appears in several early modern publications. See Priest, Tanaka, and Webster, "Paraconsistent Logic," *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, ed. Edward N. Zalta (Fall 2017), §1.2; William Kneale and Martha Kneale, *The Development of Logic* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962), 227-228; C.A.M. Fennell, *Stanford Dictionary of Anglicised Words and Phrases* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1892), 670.

Calfhill also cited the Roman poet and satirist Martial ("a merry man, a poet of your name, a man of more learning and wit than you") about a man whose lawyer babbled on and on about great Roman wars when he had been hired to help the poor fellow get back his three stolen goats. In the same way, Calfhill asserted, his opponent prattled on and on about will and custom when he had been asked for Scripture.[108]

Disputative Method in Martiall's *Replie*

Calfhill's scorn in the *Answer* prompted Martiall to radically alter his 1566 *Replie*. His eighth article, in particular (signs and wonders effected by the sign of the cross) was significantly revised and references to classical learning noticeably increased. Cicero, Pythagoras, Aesop, and Aristotle all are named, even if as passing insults to Calfhill. For example, Martiall appealed to Aristotle to prove that humans learn first by sensory intake in order to justify pictorial depictions of the passion.[109] He also appealed to Aristotle to argue against Calfhill's claim that "naked faith" could teach a deaf man about the existence of God and Cicero's *De officiis* to make a parallel argument about the sevenfold grace of the Holy Spirit.[110] Martiall's revamped academic posturing is evident first in his assumptions about the intellectual standards that they, as religious controversialists, were expected to live up to. For instance, he kept up the practice of quoting his opponent verbatim so that the reader could see both arguments.[111] Martiall, however, places special emphasis upon reason in this work.

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[108] Calfhill, *Answer*, 264. See Martial, *Epigrams, Volume II: Books 6-10*, ed. and trans. D. R. Shackleton Bailey (Harvard University Press, 1993; LCL 95), 6.19.
[109] Martiall, *Replie*, fol. 209^{r}.
[110] Martiall, *Replie*, fols. 51^{r}, 122^{v}.
[111] Martiall, *Replie*, sig. ** iij^{r}.

Logic

In response to common Protestant arguments from Romans, Corinthians, and Galatians against idolatry, Martiall declared them fallacious (either by equivocation or reasoning from a particular to a universal) and informed the reader, "We will send hym to schole to learne Logicke agayne: For this is starke naughte, as euery you[n]ge puine that hath read his first principles may see."[112] After listing Calfhill's three objections to why the sign of Tau in Ezekiel was not a prefiguring of the sign of the cross, Martiall quipped, "Yow may see (good readers) that Logique was hard with him, and euell to be gotten, when he aduised to make such consequentes."[113] In a debate over what Chrysostom meant when he wrote that Christ shall appear with marks of the passion on his body, Martiall insisted that this did not exclude the sign of the cross too ("the signe of the sonne [of] man"). He asked a number of questions as a *reductio ad absurdum* on Calfhill's arguments, even punning on Calfhill's name ("It is truer that an old oxe hath longer hornes than a younge Calf. of xij. moneths old, ergo a younge Calfe of twel moneths hath no hornes at all?"), and informed his opponent that if he found all this "but vaine sophistrie" then he ought to "loke al Aristotell, and your Raphe ploweman if ye list, yow shal neuer be able to make that consequent good."[114]

Martiall was particularly touchy in his ripostes to Calfhill's accusations of fallacious reasoning. In response to Calfhill's claim that the sign of the cross has caused great inconvenience by causing the inward faith to be untaught, Martiall wrote "You tell me that, *I do putt causam pro non causa*, Where I wisse, You haue litle cause, but howe well you haue kepte your shipp frome that rocke and putte, *non causam pro causa* lett the world iudge." So, Martiall

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[112] Martiall, *Replie*, sig. ** ij^{r}.
[113] Martiall, *Replie*, fol. 20^{r}.
[114] Martiall, *Replie*, fol. 18^{v}-19^{r}.

asked, the inward faith was not taught in the time of Tertullian or Jerome, both of whom spoke of the prevalence and importance of the sign of the cross? "O fyne logitioner and profou[n]de diuine. O cu[n]minge [*sic*] argume[n]t worthie that all the schollers may hisse out of the scholes? Would a ma[n] haue thought that a Bachiler of Diuinitie and woorshipful reader in Paules, could haue made so woorshipful a reason?"[115]

Later, Martiall complained that many of Calfhill's arguments against papal authority failed to understand that the one who gives the law (i.e. the pope) is greater than the one who receives it (i.e. the king), a basic principle of learning: "Lorde what ouersighte was this of those that had the ouersighte and viewe of his booke before it came to printe with out priuiledge? Must all syphre, and none disiphre, nor by rhetorique resolue euery letter of this, and by logike proue, that it would make against him? Lorde what a scape was that?"[116]

Martiall repeatedly accused Calfhill of the fallacy of begging the question. He insisted that Calfhill slandered Catholics by calling them heretics and quoted Tertullian to the effect that Catholics were the ones faithful to apostolic doctrine, before identifying the fallacy: "This patrologisme *petitito Principij*, taking that to be graunted which remayneth to be proued ys ofte yn your booke: before you had sclaundered vs as aduersaries to truth, you shuld haue proued it: that you your selues are such in deede you may see by these places of Tertullian."[117]

Martiall also charged Calfhill with specific rhetorical fallacies (besides the generic accusation of "sophistry"). For example, he used the rhetorical fallacy of *praeoccupatio* to defend Catholics from charges of sedition:

> And whereby a figure called *praeoccupatio*, you chardge vs that our bokes are seditious, yf it may please you to examine them indifferently, it will easely be

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[115] Martiall, *Replie*, fol. 28^{v}.
[116] Martiall, *Replie*, sig. ******^{v}.
[117] Martiall, *Replie*, fol. 8^{v}. See also fol. 225^{v}.

> espied whether your diuines bokes breathe sedition, or ours. Let the lerned iudge: praysed be God, There is no blast blowen against the monstrous regime[n]t of wome[n]. There is no libel set foorth for order of successio[n]: there is no word vttred agai[n]st dewe obedie[n]ce to the soueraine.[118]

Eliot's *Dictionary*—a source frequently cited by Martiall[119]—defined *praeoccupatio* as "a fygure in Rhetorike, whan we will saye that we will not tell a thinge, and yet therby couertly we wil declare the matter, or make it suspected."[120] Ironically, by hinting at but not naming infamous Marian Protestant works of resistance (Knox's *Trumpet Blast* and Goodman's *How Superior Powers Ought to be Obeyed*), Martiall was doing the same.[121]

In a back-and-forth about what Origen meant by saying that Christ should be kept for before the eyes and the mind (Did "eyes" mean that we should have a visual reminder of Christ crucified?), Martiall exclaimed, "Yf yow saye that Origen by the eies and minde which he speaketh of, meant but one thing, howe will you excuse him from that foule figure *Tautologia*[122]

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[118] Martiall, *Replie*, sig. **^{v}.
[119] Often with Cooper's enlargement of it. See Martiall, *Replie*, fols. 81^{r}, 86^{v}-87^{r}, 156^{r}, 166^{r}, 167^{v}.
[120] Thomas Elyot, *The Dictionary of syr Thomas Eliot knyght* (London, 1538 STC 2nd ed. 7659), n.p. (entry "*Praeoccupatio*"). Quintilian grouped the term under "Figures of Thought," which were emotive figures of speech meant to rouse the hearers. Quintilian, *The Orator's Education*, ed. and trans. Donald A. Russell (Harvard University Press, 2001; LCL 124), 9.2.16-17.
[121] He did this more than once. Elsewhere, he agreed with Calfhill that preaching "in deede is an excellent way to set foorth the praise of God," but then proceeds to list all the blasphemous Protestant doctrines taught, most specifically making God the author of evil. Martiall, *Replie*, fol. 16^{v}; see also 23^{r-v}.
[122] Eliot defined it as "a fygure where oone thynge is twyse spoken." Sherry categorized it as a part of "vngarnished" speech and defined it as "an vnprofitable rehearsall of all oue woorde, or construccion when with great yrcksomnes we double the matter, whiche commonly they are wont to doe that bee not exercised, but therefore sing all one song." Thomas Elyot, *Bibliotheca Eliotae Eliotis Librarie* (London, 1542; STC 2nd ed. 7659.5), fol. Lli^{r}; Richard Sherry, *A Treatise of the Figures of Grammer and Rhetorike* (London, 1555; STC 2nd ed. 22429), fol. ix^{r-v}.

in so fewe wordes in one sentence?" Or would you make Origen so "ignorant in matters of diuinitye" and "rude in logicke that he knewe not your rule *frustra fit per plura*?"[123]

Elsewhere, he attacked Calfhill for arguments *ex silencio*. In a debate about the authenticity of a work by Lactantius, Calfhill argued that Jerome did not mention it in his inventory of Lactantius' works, therefore it was not genuine. Martiall found this absurd, retorting that just because Jerome didn't mention a book by Lactantius doesn't mean Lactantius didn't write it.[124] Besides, no one thinks that Jerome saw and read all that had been written. Martiall replied with a blistering retort: "S. Hierome *maketh no mention of that booke, ergo it was none of Lactantius writing.* No more than yf one would say, Iohn Fox maketh no mention in his Martyrloge that Cranmer was pardoned for traison, and burned for heresie, ergo it is not true that he was a traitour and an hereticke."[125] He made the same argument against Calfhill's denigrations of Dionysius' *Ecclesiastical Hierarchy*, which are not mentioned by Eusebius.[126]

In replying to the objection that images of Christ are idolatry for they portray only his humanity (and therefore heretical for dividing the hypostatic union) Martiall wrote, "Thus for that obiection, wherin yf I haue bene somewhat longe, pardon me (gentle reader). It is all to make the matter playne to thy capacitie. Yf I had to doe with M. Calf. alone in the schooles, I would haue denied his argument, and required his ministershippe to haue made these conseque[n]ts good." If, Martiall continued, he had been able to do so from scriptures, the councils, the fathers, "or any good reason, I would haue geuen him the victorie."[127] (Of course,

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[123] Martiall, *Replie*, fol. 43^{v}. This was a shortened version of "Occam's razor": *Frustra fit per plura, quod potest fieri per pauciora.*
[124] John Rastell made the same argument against Thomas Cooper concerning a passage from Cyril. See the previous chapter.
[125] Martiall, *Replie*, fol. 90^{v}.
[126] Martiall, *Replie*, fols. 115^{v}-116^{r}.
[127] Martiall, *Replie*, sig. **** ij^{r}.

he didn't.) Calfhill's other two reasons—that Christ, upon his ascension, took his flesh with him and therefore is not to be known by his flesh, and what Christ actually looked like is unknown, therefore an image of him is a lie—are "witless." Martiall scoffed, "I assure you no simple logisoner [logicianer], muche lesse a solemne reader of Poules owght to vse suche baggae for very shame. It is but paultry."[128]

Besides vehemently attacking Calfhill's logic, Martiall substantially increased his own use of syllogisms and formal reasoning in the *Replie*. In an argument about whether images by themselves make religion any better or worse Martiall confidently declared that learned men say that religion, the worship owed to God, "contynueth alwayes one, and as the logisioners say, *non suscipit magis & magis* [does not support the greater or the lesser], is no more a worship this day, then it was yesterday, no more purer this day, than it was yesterday. And whether we haue images, or no images, religion shalbe most pure alwayes."[129]

Martiall also repeatedly attacked Calfhill for reasoning from a particular to a universal, such as when he concluded, "I must so bold as tell M. Calf. that he must haue a bell rung at his eares, to wake him out of his drowsie dreame, that he may learne, that we vse not to allowe argume[n]tes, from particulars to generalls, nor him self neither when he is fullie awaked."[130] Martiall also employed syllogistic reasoning to prove that no man ought to be judged an idolater (as Protestants were wont to do, in his opinion) for kneeling before a cross and removing his cap:

> The *Maior* dependeth on the lawe of God. *Nolite iudicare. Iudg not, and yow shall not be iudged.* The *Minor* is euident by the practisse of the Catholique church, and proued by authorities out of the old fathers, Grekes and Latins. The argument is good: ergo the co[n]clusion, that you may not iudg men idolaters by

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[128] Martiall, *Replie*, sig. **** iij^{r}.
[129] Martiall, *Replie*, n.p.-*****^{r}.
[130] Martiall, *Replie*, fol. 21v; see also ******^{r}, 8^{r}, and 117$^{r\text{-}v}$.

> curious surmises, or suspicious fansies vntil the contrary be most euidently proued, must needes be true.[131]

Though Martiall's *Replie* came six years after Jewel's challenge, Martiall apparently still felt the need to respond to Jewel's "negative" arguments. In fact, Martiall asserted negative reasoning was a distinctive mark of Protestant logic. After accusing Calfhill of falsifying Tertullian and Eusebius for his argument that Christians never used processions before the Montanists and Arians, Martiall wrote, "Wherfore vnlesse, he had better prouf for this negatiue, we will enrroll him amongest the negatiue doctours of whom the common rule, *Plus potest asinus negare etc.* may be truly verified."[132]

In response to Calfhill's claim that Augustine did not send Christians to tradition, but rather scripture, Martiall wondered, "was your witt so barren, and your skill so simple that you knewe not this to be an euill argument[?]...Forgot you that it is no sounde nor substantial reasoning vppon the authoritie of any man negatiuely? Yf you did, to schole like a sir Iames, to schole, for shame, and lerne your logique and diuinitie better, this will not serue your turne." After accusing Calfhill of fabricating a passage from Augustine's *De Doctrina Christiana*, Martiall conceded that Catholics agreed that all things in the early church were examined according to the apostles' teaching before the New Testament was written, but it does not necessarily follow that the same must be done today: "we will denie the conseque[n]t, and auouche the reason to be starke naught, and desire your woorship to proue a necesitie in it, and make euident declaration that all the woordes and sermons of the Apostles are written and come into our handes."[133] In reply to Calfhill's arguments that St. Paul wrote all scripture is profitable

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[131] Martiall, *Replie*, fol. 220^{r}.
[132] Martiall, *Replie*, fol. 165^{r}. Elsewhere Martiall spoke of "your negatiue diuinitie, and ablatiue doctrine" (fol. 116^{r}). See above, n. 6.
[133] Martiall, *Replie*, fol. 6^{v}-7^{r}.

for teaching, and not images, Martiall dryly stated that he doesn't even think the objection worth responding to: "I leaue, with a great many more, to the logisioners and determiners in the scholes. The meanest and symplest of the[m] al knoweth, that nothing can be truly concluded of negatiues."[134]

In one particularly intriguing instance, Martiall connected Protestant negatives with the coming of Antichrist. Hippolytus and Ambrose claimed that the mark of Antichrist spoken of in Revelation 13 will be juxtaposed to the sign of the cross. Martiall explained to his reader why he recited the fathers (particularly Hipolytus) on this point:

> which wordes I repeate here for this purpose, that you (good readers) may consider, whether Sathan by the doinges of heretikes and practises of protestantes, in these latter dayes, and declination of the worlde, beginne not to prepare a waye for Antichriste. Doe yow not see how they stand vpon the negatiue and cry all day, *Nego*, I deny... Doe you not see M. Calf. as though he had Antichristes counter and marke in his hande, and foreheade alredy, denyi[n]g all that is me[n]tioned befor [*sic*]?[135]

Historical and Grammatical Arguments

Besides the significantly increased attention given to logic, Martiall's *Replie* also gave much greater scrutiny to sources. A substantial portion of this was linguistic, often simply pointing to the original texts to buttress an argument. However, it was also frequently more technical than that. For instance, a lengthy debate about what precisely Christ did with the bread at the Last Supper ("blessing" vs. "thanksgiving") included dissecting the tenses of Greek verbs, and a dispute over what it meant to "resist the devil" [1 Pet. 5:9] involved Latin case endings.[136]

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[134] Martiall, *Replie*, 201r; see also 223^{r-v}.
[135] Martiall, *Replie*, fol. 38^{r}.
[136] Martiall, *Replie*, fols. 123^{v}-128^{v} and *Replie*, fol. 37^{r-v} (respectively). See also 137^{v}-139^{r}, 160^{r}, and 193^{v}-194^{r} for similar passages.

Elsewhere, Martiall used linguistic arguments to prove that the words "idol" and "image" are used differently in the scriptures in order to undercut Calfhill's arguments from biblical prohibitions against idolatry: "The word idol is deryued of the Greke nowne *ἐίδως species*, because it sheweth and pretendeth a bare shape and voyde figure of a thinge, wheras in dede there is no suche thinge at all. Whereupon that whiche the Greekes called ἐίδωλομ[137] idol, the Latins called, *Spectrum*, and it is taken for this pillers, counterfeicts and images, which were erected to represent that which is falsely beleaued to be a God." (Interestingly, this distinction was sourced from Cicero.[138]) No Christians give *Latriam*, or honor and worship to any created thing, Martiall continued; rather, they offer *dulia*, or service. Abraham adored the people of Heth [Hittites], Moses his father-in-law Jethro, Areuna[139] adored David with his face to the ground, Jacob adored the top of Joseph's rod.[140]

Martiall repeatedly accused Calfhill of falsifying, corrupting, and twisting words of church fathers and councils, as well as mistranslating from original texts. In response to Calfhill's accusation that he had falsified a quote from Tertullian, Martiall quoted the Latin then meticulously detailed precisely where he sourced the quote from as a defense:

> These wordes finde I in Tertullian printed of *Frobenius* at Basile in the yere of our lorde 1521. in the moneth of Iuly. The very same wordes finde I in Tertullian printed of *Frobenius* at Basile in the yere of our lorde 1528. In Marche… Wherfore seing I followed my printed booke viewed by learned men before it came to the printe, and receaued of learned men in the same sense, in whiche it is

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[137] It seems likely this is a misprint and that Martiall intended εἴδωλον.
[138] "Cicero to Cassius," in Cicero, *Letters to Friends, Volume II: Letters 114-280*, ed. and trans. D. R. Shackleton Bailey (Harvard University Press, 2001; LCL 216), 283.
[139] This story is recounted twice, once in 2 Sam. 24:18-25 and again in 1 Chron. 21:18-30. In order to halt a plague sent from God for his disobedience, David buys a field and builds an altar to make sacrifices. In Samuel, the man who sells David the land is named Araunah, but in Chrnicles is Ornan. The man paying homage to David is only recorded in Chronicles; thus, Martiall conflated the passages.
[140] Martiall, *Replie*, sig. *** iii^{r}; see also 219^{r-v}. See Gen. 23:7, Exod. 18:7, 1 Chron. 21:21, and Heb. 11:21, respectively.

> alleaged, after it came from the printe, especially out of Basile where your religion raygneth, I am not to be cou[n]ted a falsifier of the authour, for alleagi[n]g him as I finde hi[m] in print, but you an infamous scla[n]derer, for so reporti[n]g of me before you had consulted diuerse printes, and impressions, and seene vpon what grounde I builded.[141]

Martiall made the same accusation concerning an edition of Athanasius and Calfhill tacking a piece of his “owne fansie” to an edition of Isaiah from a Protestant printer (in contrast to his own citation from Jerome’s commentary).[142] In response to Calfhill calling him a liar for crediting a story about Helena (mother of Constantine) to Eusebius that was actually from Rufinus, Martiall conceded an error in the print, which he deemed an honest mistake and not deserving of the vitriolic response Calfhill gave it: “In deede I must confesse an ouersighte in the printer for setting *Eusebius* for *Ruffinus*: But is this a shamefull lye with you M. Calf? and worthie so bitter a note in the margent?”[143]

Portraying Moderation in Martiall’s *Replie*

In addition to his academic self-portrayal, Martiall also augmented his moderate posturing. Whereas the *Treatyse* was dedicated to Elizabeth, Martiall dedicated the *Replie* to Grindal, thus taking another opportunity to cast himself (and Catholics) and learned and moderate in contrast to his overzealous and ignorant opponent. Martiall stated he was aware that Grindal had read and approved Calfhill’s work and wished to know if it “be the doctrine of all your church of Engla[n]d, or the fansie only of one idle brayne.” For although Calfhill’s work had been allowed, printed, and sold, as well as “the authour to triumphe of it at the Crosse,” the English church did not provide any warning of the work, and have long been silent to Thomas

141 Martiall, *Replie*, fol. 149^{v}-150^{r}.
142 Martiall, *Replie*, fols. 155^{r}-156^{r} and fols. 14^{v}-15^{r} (respectively).
143 Martiall, *Replie*, fol. 187^{r}.

Dorman's request.[144] Because of this, Martiall claimed, he has restrained from assuming the entire Church of England believes it without "some furder notice and certificate from you." If the request is refused, however, "we shall iudge of your silence accordingly."[145] Martiall actually referenced Grindal repeatedly throughout the work in this posture of deference, even writing hypothetical dialogues where Grindal reprimanded Calfhill for his ignorance of doctrine (possibly retribution for Calfhill's own insulting hypothetical as Martiall's schoolteacher).[146]

Martiall repeatedly complained of Calfhill's vituperative rhetoric: he used "sclaunderous and spiteful wordes,"[147] was guilty of "much arroganice,"[148] displayed a "vehement spirite" and "hote interrogatio[n]," which revealed that his "patience is some what broke[n]" and "charitie chafed."[149] He was guilty of "not omly [*sic*] arrogancie, and singularitie, but *insolentißimam insaniam, moste proude mandes.*"[150] Martiall complained that a mocking comment comparing adoration of the cross and adoration of God as two horses in one stable "was not Christian like, nor ministerlike. No bedlem in his furie could haue spoken more unreuerently."[151]

This uncharitable rhetoric was characteristic of all Protestants: He informed Calfhill you "rayle impudently, as your euangelicall ma[n]ner is."[152] Martiall also lamented,

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[144] In the margin, Martiall simply referenced Dorman's preface without naming the work. In the preface to his *Provfe*, Dorman did not issue any specific call, although he repeatedly claimed to have answered Jewel's challenge throughout and, in the Conclusion, told Jewel, "so now by me yow be put in remembrance once againe, according to your promise to returne fro[m] your heresies, to your mother the Catholike church." Thomas Dorman, *A Provfe of Certeyne Articles of Religion, Denied by M. Iuell, sett furth in defence of the Catholyke beleef therein* (Antwerp, 1564; STC 2nd ed. 7062), fol. 110^{v}. Dorman's *Request to M. Iewell* was not printed until 1567.
[145] Martiall, *Replie*, sig. *ij^{r-v}.
[146] Martiall, *Replie*, fols. 112^{v}-114^{v}; see also 6^{r}, 19^{v}, 27^{v}-28^{r}, 104^{v}, 108^{v}.
[147] Martiall, *Replie*, fol. 83^{v}.
[148] Martiall, *Replie*, fol. 105^{r}.
[149] Martiall, *Replie*, fol. 107^{v}.
[150] Martiall, *Replie*, fol. 153^{v}.
[151] Martiall, *Replie*, fol. 219^{r}.
[152] Martiall, *Replie*, fol. 115^{v}.

> but you see what modestie is in protestants tongues, and reuerence in their heartes to antiquities. Euer sythens frier Luther gaue example to contemne the scriptures, and especially the Epistle of S. Iames, because it made against his position of only faith, his disciples haue not stickt to conte[m]ne doctours, councells, yea and the scripture it selfe, where it maketh against them.[153]

Sometimes his language was so awful, Martiall determined, that it could not be repeated. After complaining of "the bitter blast that malice blewe from your blessed mouth" Martiall declared that "you haue disgorged your stomacke of a foule deale of fylth: which I dare not repete, for feare of offedning good Christian eares." The "vilanous termes" and "blasphemous wordes" used against the Catholic Church's sacraments "are to horrible to be repeted, and more meeter to be written of a *Celsus*, Porphirie, or Lucian, that dispited the faith of Christe, and mysteries of the Christians, than of a bachiler of diuinitie, that shoulde reuere[n]ce them, and more worthie to be heard of heathens, Turkes and painimes, than of such as reuerence the name of Christe."[154]

Putting such language into print, Martiall warned, had dire consequences. This was the case concerning some of Calfhill's arguments against Constantine:

> Such imaginations are to grosse, and heathenishe, vnfitte, either to be vttered in mouth, or conceaued in hearte of one Christia[n] against an other. And certes M. Calf. if there were any such euangelicall charitie in yow as Christe requireth, such a surmise should neuer haue entred into yower hearte, much lesse haue bene spoken with to[n]gue and vttered in printe to yower perpetuall infamye. Take heede: *Qui amat periculum, peribit in eo.* He that loueth danger shall perish in it.

Such arguments "maye welbe compared to an angrye and cholericke ruffians fighte."[155]

Martiall also leveraged moderation to put himself and Catholics on the moral high ground. Early in the work he declared the "only remedy" for this "desease passing with the

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153 Martiall, *Replie*, fol. 79^{v}; see also 56^{v}-57^{r}, 158^{r}, 206^{v}-207^{r}.
154 Martiall, *Replie*, fol. 117^{v}.
155 Martiall, *Replie*, fol. 63^{r}.

inheritance [i.e. heresy]" is "to pray vnto allmightie God to geue the[m] the spirite of humilitie and grace to knowe the[m] selues."[156]

> Where you labour M. Calf. to proue by force of my argume[n]t that all protestants be good Christians, I wishe with all my heart that you would proue it true in deede, by some fruictes of penaunce worthy of Christians. But as longe as you continewe in your Apostasie, like obstinate heretikes out of the vnitie of the church, you will neuer be able to proue your selues good Christians.[157]

In a spat about an interpretation from Isaiah (about whether the cross can be a sign, or just preaching[158]), Martiall wrote, "a[n]d because you thought I would take *skorne to lerne of you, you willed me to lerne of God*. It is ge[n]tly done of you (sire) you haue preferred me to a good scholemaster. I thanke you for it. I will dayly pray, that I may haue grace to lerne, and faith to beleaue al that he teacheth." Though you have falsified the scriptures "we must pardon your ouersigth [*sic*]," and though you untruly accuse me of the same, "yet will I note deale cruelly with yow here, nor note your errous, so despite fullye to the world, as you would do myne if yow had like occasion. But let me frendly aske you this one question." He queried whether Calfhill had read Jerome on this passage; if he had, "then can you not be excused of gret singularitie and pride," but if not "then were you not well aduised when vppon so slipper a grounde, you would build, and proue that S. Hierome did not speake of the signe of the crosse."[159]

In good moderate fashion, Martiall repeatedly appealed to his "gentle" and "indifferent" reader to play the role of judge. After calling Calfhill an "euill gloser" for coming up with a sense plain contrary to the gospel, he did just that: "Wherefore iudge of him (good readers) accordinglye, and thincke whether he be worthy to be a preacher amongest the people of God,

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[156] Martiall, *Replie*, sig. ******ij^{r}.
[157] Martiall, *Replie*, fol. 200^{v}.
[158] Isaiah 49:2.
[159] Martiall, *Replie*, fols. 15^{v}-16^{v}.

who is so good a proctour for the deuil. My selfe will say nothing, but wishe him grace to repent for his fondness, in tyme."[160] Martiall concluded the work with such an appeal: "Wherfore I desire the gentle reader to doe no more but reade and regarde, and iudge indifferently, and beware of these deceitfull workemen, and lying lippes."[161]

The Rhetoric of Abuse in Martiall's *Replie*

Though moderation is prominent in Martiall's *Replie*, he still routinely employed the abuse that he also decried as un-Christian in his opponent. Much of it was standard polemical fare, primarily that of heresy and political sedition (even "Machiavellian"[162]), but Martiall used plenty of colorful language. He referred to Calfhill as a "prati[n]g Parrot, more woorthy to be condemned than answered,"[163] a "wittelesse head" and "idle brayne,"[164] "pieuish puine Iulianiste,"[165] his work a "dounghill of blasphemies,"[166] his rhetoric "like a venemous serpent spetteth out his poyson" and his reasoning "like a blind harper vpon one string."[167]

This kind of abuse, however, was justified in Martiall's eyes: "Yf any willfull protestant, or hotte hereticke myslyke my writing, for that I dippe my penne sometymes ing [*sic*] all, and vse certayne termes, inflamed (as it may seme) with choler, I desire them to consider charitably whose woordes these are." Martiall then listed dozens of the insults used by Calfhill against him, his writings, other Catholic polemicists, and Catholics in general. If this kind of language can

[160] Martiall, *Replie*, fol. 32^{r}. This is another instance of *praeoccupatio*.
[161] Martiall, *Replie*, fol. 227^{r}; see also fol. 41^{r}.
[162] Martiall, *Replie*, fols. 73^{v}-74^{r}, 172^{r}. As noted in ch. 6, this was not an unusual attack and was especially pronounced in *A Treatise of Treasons* (1572).
[163] Martiall, *Replie*, sig. ** iij^{r}.
[164] Martiall, *Replie*, fol. 28^{v}, 29^{r}.
[165] Martiall, *Replie*, fol. 108^{r}.
[166] Martiall, *Replie*, fol. 122^{v}.
[167] Martiall, *Replie*, fol. 122^{v}, 128^{v}.

flow from the "plenifull spo[n]ge, and scolding spring" of Calfhill's spirit, then he ought to be allowed the same "in imitation of his owne Rhetorique." Indeed, it is only reasonable, Martiall insisted, "that they allowe that in another, which they commend in them selues."[168]

Martiall's insults were frequently associated with a lack of learning or understanding. Martiall declared one of Calfhill's reasons "so fonde, that I thincke your brayne had some convulsion, and witte distraction, when you deuised to vtter it."[169] More than once he mocked Calfhill as being unable to "stomach" learned arguments, such as when he declared that Jerome could've taught Calfhill that the sign of the cross appears in the gospel of Matthew, "[b]ut you would not vouchsafe to reade him. His graue authoritie was to hard meate for your quesie stomake. It liketh nothing but woodcocks and capons."[170]

In a historical debate about Martialis and Eusebius' register of the 72 disciples, Martiall found Calfhill's reasoning to be defective (to say the least): "Certes if yower diuinitie should chaunce to faile, and you fortune to become a portpannier, or pedler, and fell Sophistrie, the veriest idiote in the cuntrey that knoweth a B fro[m] a beetle, will not geue twoe lepps of an olde dogg, for x. ounces of the best that you carye in al your panniers."[171] This ignorance was part and parcel for Protestants. In citing from Aquinas, Martiall declared that the medieval theologian was one "whome all good men reuerence, whome all learned men wonder at, to whome yf all the protestantes in the worlde were compared and laied in a balance, for profounde diuinitie they would apeare lighter then a feather."[172]

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168 Martiall, *Replie*, sig. ******ij^{r-v}.
169 Martiall, *Replie*, fol. 51^{r}.
170 Martiall, *Replie*, fol. 19^{r}; see also 227^{r}.
171 Martiall, *Replie*, fol. 30^{r}.
172 Martiall, *Replie*, fol. 23^{r}.

Other times, the insult was leveled with academic panache: “you do men greate wrong to troble them, with so many woordes without substance of matter. *Parturiunt montes*: The hills trauaill, as though they laye in child bedde, but after long expectation of a fayre baby, out cometh a foule and foolish mouse from the hills syde, that geueth all that see it occasion of laughter.”[173] Though the proverb was quite ancient (made popular by Horace), it was likely sourced from Erasmus’s *Adages* by Martiall,[174] which was also used by Calfhill (and for the same purpose).

Martiall also frequently associated Calfhill’s learning with lower or dubious social standing. In response to Calfhill’s denial that God uses the sign of the cross to convert unbelievers, Martiall wrote, “Suerly (sire) whatsoeuer opinion of lerning, the Alebastards, ta[n]kerdberers, porters, coblers, and other your auditours haue conceaued of you, I will not acknowledge you for a master, more worthy of credit than S. Hierome.”[175] Elsewhere Martiall declared to Calfhill “yow vaunte yower selfe as peart as a pere munger” in denying scripture and contemning the holy fathers. What should the reader make of all these distortions of scripture and falsifying of the fathers, Martiall mused. “Are yow worthie to be taken for a cunni[n]ge M. *Carpenter*, or a vile botcher, an experte free mason, or a durtie morter maker? My selfe will geue no sentence, let wise men iudge, to them I appeale, to them I call, to their censure I submit my cause.”[176]

Many of Martiall’s insults were more vitriolic in tone. In a riposte over Chrysostom, Martiall repeated Calfhill’s insult of the father, that his “golden mouth” had “ledden words” for

[173] Martiall, *Replie*, fol. 201^{v}.
[174] The Latin phrase here is a shortened version of *Parturiunt montes, nascetur ridiculus mus* (“The mountains labor, and give birth to a ridiculous mouse”). It was a commentary on a boastful person who promised much but delivered little. See *The Collected Works of Erasmus*, vol. 34, trans. R.A.B. Mynors (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1992), 188.
[175] Martiall, *Replie*, fol. 15^{v}.
[176] Martiall, *Replie*, fol. 23$^{r\text{-}v}$. See also fols. 27^{v}-28^{r} and 44^{r}.

"speaking honorably of the crosse to ge[n]tils" by using extreme language to counteract the gentiles' abuse of it. Martiall felt justified in returning the insult: "But howe vnmete a goldsmith you are to iudge of Chrisostomes golden mouth, your coper teath and ledden tongue declare."[177] In response to Calfhill's stock Protestant stance that it was Christ and not the cross that saved us, Martiall asked,

> I pray you what waltams caulfe euer did denye that, or thincke the contrary?...Yf you haue any mathematicall imagination in youer idle brayne, or melancholie fansie in yower wauering head, consult with some astronomers, that may resolue the one, and drincke some *Elleborum* that may expel the other. For I thincke there was neuer a man that had more nede.[178]

Martiall's combination of an insulting proverb and scatological humor ("that may expel the other"[179]) illustrates well Marprelate-like abuse before the appearance of the tracts.

Martiall especially seemed to enjoy punning off of Calfhill's name. Regarding an argument of Calfhill's on the naming of churches to be worse than the naming of temples Martiall wrote "This note is so fyne that all men may not him for a very Calf. that noted it."[180] Comparing Jerome to Calfhill Martiall wrote "that an old oxe is to be preferred and better estemed then a younge calf."[181] After mocking another of Calfhill's arguments (regarding

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[177] Martiall, *Replie*, fol. 23^{v}.

[178] Martiall, *Replie*, fol. 29^{r}. The phrase "waltams caulfe" is the shortened version of the proverb "As wise as Waltham's calf, who went nine miles to suck a bull, and come home as dry (or thirsty) as he went," which was an early modern English proverb indicating the stupidity and futility of a venture. John Heywood, *A dialogue conteinying the number in effect of all the prouerbes in the englishe tongue* (London, 1546; STC 2nd ed. 13291), fol. Gii^{r}. Martiall later cited the full proverb to mock both Calfhill and Robert Horne. Martiall, *Replie*, fol. 78^{v}-79^{r};

[179] Hellebore was a plant known in the early modern period for its expurgatory properties and also believed to be a remedy for mental illness. William Turner, *The first and seconde partes of the herbal of William Turner Doctor in Phisick* (Collen, 1568; STC 2nd ed. 24367), fol. 160^{r-v}.

[180] Martiall, *Replie*, fol. 200^{r}.

[181] Martiall, *Replie*, fol. 17^{v}.

Eusebius) Martiall wrote, “But we must pardon him. A rollinge eye in a Calfes head, dothe not narrowlye marke al that lyeth before him.”[182]

Much of Martiall’s abuse was contextual. In addition to the references to Knox and Goodman’s controversial political works and the burning of Cranmer, Martiall pointed to Wyatt’s Rebellion as more indisputable proof that Protestants were traitors.[183] Besides Luther and Bale, Martiall also repeatedly targeted Calvin. In exchange about the relics of the cross, Martiall declared, “The disprouing of Caluine I referre to learned in Frau[n]ce, where his adulteries, his sacriledges, his murder, leyed to his charge by *Seruetus*, his treasons, his extorsions, and tyrannie, and lowsie euill are better knowen.”[184] Elsewhere he punned off Geneva and Gehenna, then referred to Calvin as “their Brutish Bassa”[185] and also declared that some of Calfhill’s arguments as “fine absurdities” which he “hath sucked, this dragges out of Caluins drugges.”[186]

Perhaps Martiall’s most interesting form of abuse is his repeated reference to puritans. In response to Calfhill’s argument that Christians cannot worship metal or wood and therefore cannot worship the cross, Rastell shot back “The catholqiues, when the figure is blurred out, or the image broken, passe as litle for the wood and the cold canckred corrupte metall, as the most spiritish puritane and pieuish protestant that lyueth.”[187] When replying Calfhill’s argument that the cross cannot be worshipped unless all items by which miracles are wrought are adored Martiall asked, May not a captain be rewarded by his prince without every one of his soldiers

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[182] Martiall, *Replie*, fol. 49^{r}.
[183] Martiall, *Replie*, fol. 188^{v}.
[184] Martiall, *Replie*, fol. 189^{r}. See also sigs. *****ij^{v}-*****iij^{r}
[185] Martiall, *Replie*, fol. 131^{v}. “Bassa” was the Turkish “pasha,” a high-ranking military official, so in effect Martiall is declaring him a heretical leader of heretics.
[186] Martiall, *Replie*, fols. 133^{v}-134^{r}.
[187] Martiall, *Replie*, fol. 205^{v}.

being recognized, or cannot the mayor of London be distinguished from every citizen? Or, "May not some whote puritanes of the newe clergie be dispensed with for wearing of a longe gowne, square cap, and satte[n] tippet, vnlesse al be dispe[n]sed with all?"[188] Martiall declared that Calfhill's distinction between three kinds of tradition (necessary, erroneous, and adiaphora) "so fauoreth of ignorance that it is like to disgrace the estimation of our lerning amongest the whottest puritanes in all London."[189] After reciting Calfhill's rejection of the binding authority of conciliar pronouncements, Martiall declared "Here is a plaine puritaine, and notorious protestant."[190]

Martiall's exasperation appears when he recycled—for the third time—the insulting colloquialism of "Maukin" and "Daukin." After quoting Calfhill's ridicule of himself (that the vicar of St. Fool's might marry Maukin and Daukin) and citing the folio, Martiall wrote

> But yf Sir Iames, Calfhil, wilbe such a calf still, as to followe Caluin, then Calfhil, and Caluin, A Calf with a carrin, may daunce before Satin and like a dolt, and a dawkin, meete with Luther and his katrin, and *simul & semel* by the vicar of sainct Folly, be married to a furie, without sacrament or mysterie.[191]

Conclusion

The above passage from Martiall, complete with an insult of Luther and his wife Katharina von Bora, illustrates well how the rhetoric of abuse was incrementally increased as each side responded to the other. Though considered justified by the author, it reveals that the bawdy content of the future Marprelate tracts was not unprecedented. Though Martiall and Calfhill's exchange was more like an offshoot from Jewel's challenge sermon and the *Apology*

[188] Martiall, *Replie*, fol. 185^{r}.
[189] Martiall, *Replie*, fol. 152^{r}.
[190] Martiall, *Replie*, fol. 80^{r}.
[191] Martiall, *Replie*, fol. 133^{v}.

rather than direct engagement with it, their works are illustrative of the expectations that accompanied Elizabethan controversial literature: academic, moderate, and zealous in defense of 'true' Christian doctrine, employing abuse when necessary.

However, both Martiall and Calfhill exemplify the inconsistent and eclectic modes of argument employed by polemicists. Martiall's *Treatyse*, an extended work on the sign of cross and relying heavily on miracle stories both pagan and Christian, was met by Calfhill's biting *Answer*, in turn motivating Martiall to drastically reshape his *Replie* to fit the mold of academic dispute. However, the wide-ranging argumentations that fought fiercely over logic, historical sources, and interpreting ancient languages also included more specious and unusual arguments—such as Calfhill's use of Bede and Anaxagoras or Martiall citing Aristotle's treatise on animals to prove his differentiation between signs and sacraments[192]—furthered the divide between Protestants and Catholics as each side constantly found reason to disprove or discredit their opponents, their arguments, and their sources. The most thorough example of this comes from Thomas Harding's *Answere* (1564) to Jewel's challenge and Jewel's riposte, the *Replie* (1565). These works are the subject of the next two chapters.

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[192] "Euery sacrament is a signe of an holy thinge: but euery signe of an holy thing, is not a sacrament. Your forgett your rules of reciprocation. Albeit, Aristotle saied, euery horned beast lakceth teethe in the vpper iawe, yet you knowe right well, that whosoeuer lacketh teethe in the vpper iawe is not an horned beast. And so you may thinke of signes and sacraments." Martiall, *Replie*, fol. 130r. Aristotle, *Parts of Animals. Movement of Animals. Progression of Animals*, trans. A. L. Peck, E. S. Forster (Harvard University Press, 1937; LCL 23), 3.2.

CHAPTER 9

THE BEGINNING OF THE END, PT. I: HARDING'S *ANSWERE* (1564)

For truth as it is playne and simple, so it needeth not to be set forth with bragge of high words.[1]

Thomas Harding, *An Answere to Maister Iuelles Chalenge* (1564)

Context

The most significant print exchange stemming from the failed 1559 Westminster conference occurred between Thomas Harding and John Jewel, two of the most influential religious authors in early Elizabethan England. Though the print history between the two is voluminous, this chapter will focus only on Thomas Harding's 1564 *An Answere to Maister Iuelles Chalenge*. (Jewel's 1565 *Replie* is the subject of the next chapter.) The reasons for this are partially practical (space constraints) and that subsequent publications are very similar,[2] but also because it was not long after that the focused exchanges over the Westminster conference and Jewel's challenge sermon were absorbed into other contemporary controversies. The most notable of these is the equally fervent ongoing print battle over Jewel's *Apology of the Church of England*, which had appeared in 1562. In fact, it is entirely likely that Harding's *Answere* was in reaction to the appearance of the English version of Jewel's *Apology*.[3] Numerous publications were printed in the early and mid-1560s responding to Jewel's *Apologia*, and sometimes these debates bled over into one another.[4] In addition, a series of contemporary sermonic exchanges

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[1] Thomas Harding, *An Answere to Maister Iuelles Chalenge* (Louvain, 1564; STC 2nd ed. 12758), fol. 1^{v}.

[2] Jewel responded with his *Replie unto M. Hardinges Answeare* (1566), after which Harding published his *Reioindre to M. Iewels Replie* (1567).

[3] Mary Morrissey, *Politics and the Paul's Cross Sermons, 1558-1642* (Oxford, 2011), 166.

[4] This is especially true of Thomas Dorman's *A Provfe of Certeyne Articles of Religion, Denied by M. Iuell, sett furth in defence of the Catholyke beleef therein* (Antwerp, 1564; STC 2nd ed.

contributed to the print wars, as evidenced by works like Rastell's *A confutation of a sermon, pronou[n]ced by M. Iuell, at Paules crosse, the seconde Sondaie before Easter* (1564) and Harding's *A Briefe Answere of Thomas Harding Doctor of Diuintie touching certaine vntruthes with which Maister Iuell charged him in his late sermon at Paules Crosse the VIII of Iuly* (1565).[5] Lastly, the Vestiarian controversy of the mi-1560s, the earliest exposure of the fissures between puritans and conformists in the Church of England, was drawing extended attention from both Protestants and Catholics.[6] Each of these factors indicates that the print controversies of early Elizabethan England were not necessarily confined to any one event, nor were abstract theological works produced sui generis. Rather, they were dynamic reflections of ongoing Protestant-Catholic debates that bear the particular characteristics of their context and authors.

Both Harding's *Answere* and Jewel's *Replie* are quintessential examples of disputative literature. Both authors gave extraordinary attention in responding to one another's arguments, giving the works the continued dialogic feel, and the virtue of moderation is of paramount importance. In addition, both works are excellent examples of the fault line running between 'worldly' and 'spiritual' knowledge that forced authors to sometimes rely on intellectual proofs for their arguments, and other times to categorize a doctrine as an article of faith. Such inconsistency contributed to the intellectual stalemate between Elizabethan controversialists.

7062), which repeatedly referenced Jewel's *Apology* and letters with Cole, as well as Harding's works (e.g. fols. 7^r-8^r, 10^r-11^v, 35^v, 37^r, 44^r, 54^r,116r, 118v, 121v, 124v, 134v, 135r).

[5] Peter Milward, *Religious Controversies of the Elizabethan Age* (Lincoln, NE; London: University of Nebraska Press, 1977), 3-4; see also Thomas Harding, *A Reioindre to M. Iewels Replie Against the Sacrifice of the Masse* (Louvain, 1567; STC 2nd ed. 12761), fol. 223^v.

[6] For an excellent analysis of the Vestiarian controversy see Karl Gunther, *Reformation Unbound: Protestant Visions of Reform in England, 1525-1590* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), ch. 6.

Though the *Answere* was printed in 1564, Harding was at work on it well before then. The printer's stamp on the back side of the cover page is dated Sept. 1563, and Harding dated his epistle to the reader June the same year (also the year he arrived in Louvain). In it, Harding claimed that he had written out a response to Jewel's challenge for a friend who "required it for his priuate instruction," but upon arriving in Louvain decided "by putting it in print, to make it common to many" (although this owed more to the "zelouse persuasions of others" than his "myne owne lyking").[7] Harding also referenced the controversy that ensued after the *Apologie of Priuate Masse* was erroneously attributed to him as a factor in authoring the *Answere*. He wrote,

> a certaine exercise of a learned man of fiue or sixe sheetes of paper spredde abroade in the Realme in defence of some of these Articles by M. Iuell denyed, was fathered vpon me, which in dede I neuer made a sentence of, and therefore as storme imminent was mystrusted: that by chaunging the hew, which many know me by, that know me familiarly, in case it shuld comes to the handes of many, as it was likely, I myght escape the danger of being charged with it, and neuer the lesse satisfye my frendes request, and in some parte also my conscience, and doo good.[8]

Harding's strong denials of authorship of the *Apologue of priuate Masse*, as shown below, had nothing to do with the contents of the work. Rather, it owed to the book's overly strident tone, another example of the importance of moderation to religious controversialists.

Harding's reasoning in the *Answere* could vary widely, again underscoring the eclectic method of late Renaissance authors. For instance, he frequently employed syllogistic reasoning, but also routinely cited historical precedent. This is especially true of the ancient church as evidence for sole receiving of the sacrament. Sometimes, though, Harding offered surprising explanations for certain Catholic practices. For instance, when justifying the practice of communion in one kind for the laity, he explained that this was necessary sometimes because of

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[7] Harding, *Answere*, sig. *ij^{r}.
[8] Harding, *Answere*, fols. 5^{v}-6^{r}.

the “vnreuerence” of certain people or for those who “can not brooke the taste of wine.” Other times, however, it is necessary because of more practical constraints, such as in certain geographic regions where it is difficult to get and keep wine, like “countries situated neare to the north Pole, in that clime, where is knowen to be great extremitie of colde.”[9]

Harding also argued from miracles, though he was more circumspect with his sources than was Martiall, whose *Treatyse of the Crosse* cited a hodgepodge of stories and works, both pagan and Christian (thereby giving James Calfhill plenty of opportunity to criticize him).[10] For example, Harding recounted the story from Cyprian of a woman who was going to consume the sacrament at home in an unworthy manner but was burned when fire burst out from the chest she had hidden the host in. Harding's point, however, was less about the dangers poised to a Christian by irreverent consumption of the host (though he was concerned about that too) and more about historical precedent for sole receiving of the sacrament.[11] Later, again citing Cyprian, Harding narrated the story of the child who “through defaulte of the nource, has tasted of the sacrifices that had ben offered to deuilles.” Initially, the child turned away and closed her lips “by the instincte of the diuine maiestie,” but the deacon forced the child to drink. Once this happened, “the yeax and vomite folowed, so that sanctified drinke in the bloude of our lorde, gowshed foorth of the polluted boilles.”[12] Once more, Harding was not as interested in the extraordinary events demonstrating the spiritual power of the sacrament. Rather, this example was proof that the ancient church offered the sacrament to children—something Protestants did not do. In this way, Harding was more cautious in arguing from miracles, which Protestants

[9] Harding, *Answere*, fol. 37r.
[10] See ch. 7.
[11] Harding, *Answere*, 18v.
[12] Harding, *Answere*, fol. 46r.

tended to either deny outright or turn back against Catholics as demonic charades that led Christians astray from the 'true' gospel.

Another notable element of Harding's *Answere* is his repeated linking of Jewel's doctrine with Continental Reformed Protestantism.[13] For instance, in a passage responding to Jewel's arguments against the Latin service out of 1 Cor. 14, Harding referred to Calvin as "your own patriarke" and cited the *Institutes* against English Protestants.[14] Elsewhere, he goes after standard Reformed sacramentology, which argued that Christ's resurrected body is seated in heaven, and therefore cannot be physically present in the sacrament, only spiritually. Properly understood, Harding argued, Christ is both corporally and visibly in heaven, seated at the Father's right hand, *and* invisibly and substantially in the Sacrament. When looked at rightly, there is "no co[n]tradiction fownde in these beinges, but onely a distinction in the waye and maner of being."[15] Harding insisted that the fathers and all of Christian history "co[n]fesse as it were with

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[13] This has bearing on the question of whether or not the Elizabethan and Jacobean churches were operating under a 'Calvinist consensus' that was subsequently upended in the reign of Charles, which has proven to be a minor controversy within the study of religion and politics in pre-Civil War England. Most of the literature, however, deals with the Stuart period (for obvious reasons). This course of events is tied up with a debate over the shifting identities of "Calvinist," "Arminian" and "puritan" in pre-Civil War England, with many scholars arguing that English anti-Calvinists were able to successfully convince James and Charles that "Puritans" and "Calvinists" were the same thing, and thus of significant political danger. As Peter White summed up the result of such arguments, "The Civil War was not a Puritan Revolution but a counter-revolution against that Arminian takeover." White, *Predestination, policy and polemic*, xi and 1-3. For individual contributions to the debate see Nicholas Tyacke, "Puritanism, Arminianism, and Counter-Revolution," in *The Origins of the English Civil War*, ed. Conrad Russell (New York: Barnes & Noble Books, 1973), 119-143; Peter White, "The Rise of Arminianism Reconsidered," *Past & Present*, 101 (1983): 34-54; William Lamont, "Comment: The Rise of Arminianism Reconsidered." *Past & Present*, 107 (1985): 227-231; Tyacke, "The Rise of Arminianism Reconsidered," *Past & Present*, 115 (1987): 201-216; White, "The Rise of Arminianism Reconsidered: A Rejoinder," *Past & Present*, 115 (1987): 217-229; Peter Lake, "Calvinism and the English Church, 1570-1635," *Past & Present*, 114 (1987): 32-76.
[14] Harding, *Answere*, fol. 68^{r-v}.
[15] Harding, *Answere*, fol. 105^{r}.

one mowth" that Christ is both in heaven and in the sacrament, wherever it is offered." He then turned his sights squarely on Reformed sacramentology:

> And this article is by them so clearely and plainely vttered, that figures, significations, tropes, and metaphors can fynde no appearaunce nor colour at all. Whereby the new Maisters reasons seem very peeuishe: Christ is ascended, ergo he is not in the sacrame[n]t. Christ is in heauen sitting at the right hande of the father, ergo he is not in earth. Christes body is of nature finite, ergo it is conteined in a place circu[m]scriptiuely, ergo it is not in many places.[16]

Later, Harding pitted the Zwinglians, "whom M. Iuell foloweth," against the Lutherans on the article of adoration, which Harding claimed as proof of the falsity of Protestantism, as they could not reach concord on important doctrines.[17]

It is also important to note Harding's moderate approach in his *Answere*, which is both doctrinal and rhetorical. For instance, he frequently cited conciliar authority, though not at the expense of papal authority. Interestingly, in his defense of papal authority (the fourth article), Harding did not deny critiques from both Protestants and Catholics that the papal see had become corrupted. This corruption though, he argued, was moral—not doctrinal. Although the Holy See "hath failed sometymes in charitie…yet it neuer failed in faith." This was Rome's "speciall grace and singular priuiledge," obtained by Jesus "for Peter and his successours." For Harding, the conclusion was inescapable: "Therefore the euill lyfe of the bishops of Rome ought not to withdrawe vs from beleuing and folowing the doctrine preached and taughte in the holy churche of Rome."[18]

Harding also frequently argued that some of the matters under dispute, such as communion in one kind, were adiaphora (i.e. matters indifferent). As noted previously,

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[16] Harding, *Answere*, fol. 107^{r}.
[17] Harding, *Answere*, fol. 116^{r}.
[18] Harding, *Answere*, fol. 85^{v}.

arguments of adiaphora—and, relatedly, edification—are most frequently associated with Protestants, but Elizabethan Catholics often employed the idea too. For instance, Harding wrote that the Church has always taught the necessity of both the bread and the wine for the daily sacrifice, but the use of only one for administration. This was a matter of the Church's "libertie" and done "for the behoufe and commoditie of the receiuers…as it hath ben thought most expedie[n]t, in regard of tyme, place, and persons."[19] That distribution of one kind was a matter indifferent, Harding continued, was affirmed by Luther, Melanchthon, and Bucer.[20] Likewise, the manner of baptizing is a mutable practice, as is the manner of keeping the sacrament, a practice which "no catholike man will maineteine strife" for.[21]

Disputative Method in Harding's *Answere*

That Harding conceived of his writing as an extension of the controversy resulting from Jewel's challenge sermon is evident immediately. Material from Jewel's sermon and his letters with Cole are prefatory to the work, as is a letter addressed directly to Jewel. Select points from Jewel's challenge are printed before the article addressing them, and there is a table of "affirmatives" responding to Jewel's "negatives" appended to the end of the work.

Harding made numerous specific references to Jewel's challenge sermon and arguments from the "negative" throughout his *Answere*. In the opening of his section on the elevating of the sacrament, Harding wrote, "For as you haue ouer rashely, yea I may saye wickedly, affirmed the negatiue of sundry other articles, and stowtely craked of your assurance thereof, so you haue

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[19] Harding, *Answere*, fol. 32$^{r\text{-}v}$. See also 47$^{r\text{-}v}$.
[20] Harding, *Answere*, fol. 35$^{r\text{-}v}$.
[21] Harding, *Answere*, fols. 37^{v}-38^{r} and 123^{r}.

likewise of this."[22] Harding informed the reader that he would pass over certain articles "which M. Iuell hath not as yet manifestly touched in his sermon."[23] In the defense of administering the sacrament in one kind, Harding spoke of Jewel's "vaunt," which was "that we haue not one sentence or clause for proufe of these articles, which he so defaceth with his negatiue."[24] He also wrote that the fathers have affirmed that Christ is both in heaven and in the sacrament, "contrarie to M. Iuelles negatiue," as did Bucer, who "vseth the similitude of the sunne for his prupose, contrary to M. Iuelles negatiue, to proue Christes body present, and that really and substa[n]tially, in what places so euer the sacrament is rightly ministered."[25] He began his Conclusion with the declaration, "Thus your Chalenge M. Iuell is answered. Thus your negatiues be auouched."[26]

Harding also situated his *Answere* alongside the Westminster conference and the growing controversial literature surrounding it. In response to Jewel's claim that Catholics believed "ignorance to be the mother of devotion," Harding wrote, "Verely this is none of the highest mysteries, nor none of the greatest keyes of our Religion, as he sayeth it is, but vntruly, and knoweth that for an vntruth. For him selfe imputeth it to D. Cole, in his replyes to him, as a straunge saying by him vttered in the disputation at Westminster, to the wondering of the most parte of the honorable and worshipfull of this realme."[27]

Transposing oral disputation into print offered some benefits as well as necessary adjustments. For example, Harding's *Answere* (like many disputative works) contains tables and

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[22] Harding, *Answere*, fol. 109^{v}.
[23] Harding, *Answere*, fol. 32^{r}.
[24] Harding, *Answere*, fol. 43^{r}.
[25] Harding, *Answere*, fols. 105^{r}, 107^{v}.
[26] Harding, *Answere*, fol. 188^{r}.
[27] Harding, *Answere*, fol. 187^{v}.

an index. In this way, these works were both intended to be read by an educated audience, but could also serve as reference works.[28] Putting disputation into print also required an adjustment for the audience, which was no longer just those present at the conference, but was now the reader, who was to decide for himself which of the two parties presented the more persuasive argument. For example, in responding to Jewel's claim that communion in both kinds was the accepted practice in the first 600 years of the church's existence, Harding offered numerous quotes from the fathers as proof that communion in one kind was a prescriptive practice and then asked the reader to make a decision:

> Now I referre to the iugeme[n]t of the reader, of what opinion so euer he bee, whether for proufe of the communion vnder one kynde, we haue any word, sentence, or clause at all, or no: and whether these words of M. Iuell in his sermon, be true or no, where he sayeth thus: *it was vsed through out the whole catholike churche six hundred yeres after Christes ascension, vnder both kyndes, with out exception.* That it was so vsed, yea six hundred yeres, and long after, we denye not: but that it was so alwayes, and in euery place vsed, and with out exception, that we denye. and vpon what growndes we doo it, let M. Iuell him selfe be iudge.[29]

Such a posture reflected the widespread assumption that religious truth, once presented clearly, was readily discernible. However, religious controversialists were also forced to reckon with the fact that many others either could not or would not accept 'truth,' regardless of how obvious it might be.

Throughout the *Answere*, Harding repeatedly challenged Jewel on not just *what* he argued, but also *how* he argued. Early on, he (like Cole) accused Jewel of pretending that points

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[28] The same is true of early Tudor polemical works, such as in Thomas More's exchanges with William Tyndale. William Rogers, "Thomas More's Polemical Poetics," *English Literary Renaissance*, Vol. 38, Iss. 3 (2008): 399-400.
[29] Harding, *Answere*, fol. 47^{r}.

of secondary concern to Catholics were "keys" of their religion, thereby giving himself an easy yet disingenuous way to publicly discredit Catholics:

> Thus craftely you shifte your handes of those greater pointes, wherin you know scriptures, councells, doctours, and examples of the primitiue churche to be of our syde, and cast vnto vs, as a bone to gnaw upo[n], this number of Articles of lesse weight, a fewe excepted, to occupie vs withall. Which be partly concerning order, rather then doctrine, and partly sequeles of former and co[n]fessed truthes, rather the[n] principall pointes of faith.[30]

Elsewhere, in a reply to Jewel's criticism over the number of masses performed in a day, Harding questioned if Jewel was denying multiple masses in a day, or the mass in general. Harding pointed out that by equivocating between the two, Jewel was able to pronounce judgment on the matter before actually considering it:

> Albe it here it is to be marueiled, that he appointeth vs to proue a number of Masses in one churche in one daie, that vtterly denyeth the Masse, and would haue no Masse in any church any daie at all. And standing in the denyall of the whole so peremptorely as he doth, it may seme straunge, that he shuld thus frame this Article. For what reason is it to chalenge vs for proufe of so great a nu[m]ber, sith he taketh awaie all together? It appeareth that being not vnwitting how good proufes we haue for the Masse it selfe, he thinketh to blanke vs by putting vs to the proufe of his number of xxx.xx.xv.x. or .v.[31]

Besides accusing Jewel of "shiftes" and practicing "Lidford law," Harding also employed many of the same intellectual tacks common to sixteenth-century disputation, not least syllogistic logic.

Logic

The primary tool of sound argumentation, and thus disputation, was logic, and Harding's *Answere* is brimming with it. For example, Harding pressed Jewel on whether he denied private

[30] Harding, *Answere*, fol. 3^{r}.
[31] Harding, *Answere*, fols. 138^{v}-139^{r}.

communion (i.e. sole receiving by the priest) or the mass in general. Though similar to his questioning whether Jewel denied multiple masses in a day or the mass in general, In this instance, his means for doing so was the role of particulars and generals, a topic of primary importance in logic:

> Vpon this resolution, that the Masse, as it is taken in generall, is to be allowed: I enter further in reason with you, and make you this argument. If priuate Masse in respecte only of that it is priuate after your meaning, be reproueable, it is for the single communion, that is to saye, for that the priest receiueth the Sacrament. But the single communion is laufull, yea good and godly: ergo the priuate Masse in this respecte that it is priuate, is not reprouable, but to be allowed, holden for good and holy, and to be freque[n]ted. If you denye the first proposition, or maior, then must youe shew for what elles you doo reproue priuate Masse in respecte only that it is priuate, then for single communion. If you shew any thing elles, then doo you digresse from our purpose, and declare, that you reproue the Masse.[32]

Harding used the same syllogistic reasoning to prove that ancient churches held their services in a tongue unknown to the parishioners. He asserted that churches in lesser Asia, which were "a principall parte of the greke churche," held services in Greek. However, people in various parts of lesser Asia did not understand Greek: "Ergo the people of sundry regions and countries had then their Seruice in an vnknowen tonge. The first proposition or *maior*, is confessed as manifest, no learned man will denye it, and if any would, it may easely be proued. The second proposition or *minor*, maye thus be proued." He then cited the ancient historians Strabo, Ephorus, and Pliny to prove that there were significant number of nations hearing the service in Greek that didn't actually speak Greek, as well as the Pentecost narrative from Acts 2, which "reporteth a diuersitie of language." This syllogism, Harding concluded, "maketh a good argument, that all Asia the lesser had not one onely the greke to[n]ge. and therefore so many of them as were of other language, hauing the Seruice in greke, had it in a tonge they vnderstode not."[33]

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[32] Harding, *Answere*, fol. 22^{v}.
[33] Harding, *Answere*, fol. 54^{r}.

Later, in an argument about transubstantiation, Harding employed logical necessity, another intellectual tool routinely employed by controversialists.[34] He argued the outward appearance of bread and wine remain although they have been transformed into Christ's body and blood, which "foloweth by sequell of reason, or consequent of vnderstanding, deduced out of the first truth." Citing the church father Basil of Caesarea, Harding claimed that such reasoning is appropriate where scripture is silent: "Of which sequel of reason in the matter of the Sacrament, many conclusions may be deduced in case of wante of expresse scriptures. Which waye of reasoning Basile vsed against heretikes, as also sundry other fathers where manifest scripture might not be alleaged."[35]

Harding also used arguments about generality and particularity in a legal sense when arguing for the permissiveness of celebrating multiple masses in a day. He cited canon 10 of the council of Antisiodorum, which forbade the celebration of multiple masses upon one altar in a day and argued that, rather than making *against* multiple masses in a day, it's proof *for* multiple masses in a day.[36] This is because the council would not have forbidden multiple masses upon

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[34] The anonymous author of the *Apologie of priuate Masse* frequently did the same. See ch. 5.
[35] Harding, *Answere*, fol. 186^{r}.
[36] This was the provincial Synod of Auxerre (561 x 605), referred to alternatively as Antisiodorum and Altisiodorum (Lt. Autissiodorensis). Its canons addressed a wide variety of topics, including 'incestual' relationships between regulars, clerical celibacy, ecclesiastical authority, the reception of pagan practices in the church, the eucharist, suicide, and more. The tenth canon did forbid the celebration of multiple masses upon the same altar in one day: "Non licet super uno altario in una die duas missas dicere; nec in altario, ubi episcopus missas dixerat, presbyter in illa die missas non dicat." *Corpus Christianorum Series Latina*, vol. 148a, ed. Caroli de Clercq (Turnholt: Brepols, 1963), 266. For a brief overview of the synod see *Les Canons des Conciles Mérovingiens (VIe-VIIe Siècles)*, trans. Jean Gaudemet and Brigitte Basdevant (Paris: Les Éditions du Cerf, 1989), 2:486-487. For the synod's pronunciations on pagan practices see Bernadette Filotas, *Pagan Survivals, Superstitions and Popular Cultures in Early Medieval Pastoral Literature* (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 2005), 146, 243, and 325. Interestingly, Jewel cited the synod against Harding as proof that the Catholic Church had become corrupt within its first 600 years (both believed the council met in 613). John Jewel, *A Replie vnto M. Hardinges Answeare* (London, 1565; STC 2nd ed. 14606), 487-488.

one altar if the practice were not already pervasive ("elles prohibition[n] had ben superfluouse").

Furthermore, this is a particular prohibition, not a general one, which grants license to perform the act in places *not* prohibited:

> So that we may not argue by reason in this sorte, it is forbidden to saye mo Masses at one aulter in one daye, ergo it is forbydden to saye many Masses at all in one churche in one daye vppon diuerse aulters: but the co[n]trary reason foloweth, ergo ye may saye many Masses vpon diuerse aulters in one daye. And likewise ye maye not saye Masse that daye on th'aulter, where the bishop hath sayde, ergo ye may lawfully saye that daye at an other aulter. For other wise the lawe would haue forbydden generally, ye shall not saye Masse in the church where the bishop hath sayde that daye: and then ye had ben forbydde[n] that aulter and all aulters there at one worde. but in forbidding the one aulter, the lawe grawnteth you the vse of the reste there.

Such reasoning, "that forbyddeth one case specially, to affirme the reste," Harding asserted, would be defended by lawyers against Jewel, "who I thinke will not wade farre, to stande against them in this matche."[37]

Rhetoric

Harding, like other polemicists, drew a line between pure logical arguments and the illegitimate use of rhetoric, though it was not a major point of concern in the *Answere*. (Jewel, however, made much more out of it in the *Replie*, again illustrating the dialogic nature of the works.) For instance, in his prefatory letter to Jewel, Harding described Protestant arguments as mere saber-rattling:

> Among cowardes perhappes it serueth the tourne some tymes, to looke fiercely, to speake terribly, to shake the weapon furiously, to threaten bloudily, no lesse than cutting, hewing and killing but amo[n]g such we see many tymes sore frayes foughten, and neuer a blowe geuen.[38]

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[37] Harding, *Answere*, fol. 142^{r}.
[38] Harding, *Answere*, fol. 1$^{r\text{-}v}$.

Elsewhere, after lengthy argument for distribution of sacrament in one kind, Harding warned the reader that "perhappes oure aduersaries will caste some myste ouer these allegations, to darken the truth with theire clowdy gloses, which be cleare ynough to quiet and sobre wittes," but he promised "bring forth such witnesses and proufes for this purpose out of auncient fathers, as by no reason or Sophisticall shifte, they shall be hable to auoyde."[39] He again later disparagingly referred to Protestants as as "hote talkers of godes worde," as well as "Rhetoricians" and "Sophisters" who deceive the simple with "sophisticall arguments."[40]

Historical and Grammatical Arguments

In addition to the reliance on formal logic and suspicion of rhetoric, Harding also devoted substantial attention to the proper interpretation of texts in their original language and context. For instance, he accused Jewel of purposefully misconstruing Gelasius in the Latin to argue for the necessity of communion in both kinds. Harding claimed that Jewel "alleageth Gelasius vntruly, making him to sownde in English otherwise, than he doth in latine." His distorting of the doctor was "no syncere handeling of the matter" and he misrepresented his words in Latin without directly translating them into English "because he knewe, the wordes of that father imported not so much." Gelasius' point, Harding continued, was not that the bread and wine can't be divided, but that "high mysterie" that is the sacrament cannot be divided. He then pressed the argument on a historical front, musing that he could ask Jewel to produce the letter so

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[39] Harding, *Answere*, fol. 42^{r}.
[40] Harding, *Answere*, fols. 160^{v}, 191^{v}-192^{r}.

they might consider it in its context, but “it is not extant. and therefore your argument in that respecte, is of lesse force.”[41]

Elsewhere, Harding made important distinctions concerning language in context. For instance, the twelfth article of Harding’s *Answere* is entirely concerned with “the termes figure, signe, token, etc. by the father applyed to the sacrament” (a response to Jewel’s claim that Catholics condemn any who interpret the sacrament in these ways as a heretic).[42] One of the fathers whose words were contested by Protestants and Catholics was Tertullian, who had written that Christ’s words “This is my body” were to be understood as “this is the figure of my body,”[43] a point which Jewel made much of. What Tertullian really meant, Harding countered, was what Catholics have always believed, namely that the sacrament comprehends two things: “the visible forme of the outward eleme[n]tes, and the inuisible fleshe and bloud of Christ, that is to saye, of the Sacrament, and of the thing of the sacrament.”[44] Harding cited Augustine and Pope Hilary on Tertullian as proof that this was what he meant, but then hedged a bit to explain that Tertullian’s words were adapted for disputation, and thus were not as accurate as sixteenth-century controversialists might like:

> And the cause why Tertullian so expownded these wordes of Christ, was, that thereby he might take aduantage against Marcion the heretike, as many tymes the fathers in heate of disputatio[n] doo ha[n]dle some places, not after the exacte signification of the wordes, but rather folowe such waye, as serueth the[m] best to confute their aduersarie.

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[41] Harding, *Answere*, fol. 47^{v}-48^{r}.
[42] Harding, *Answere*, fol. 129^{r}.
[43] Tertullian, *Against Marcion*, in *Ante-Nicene Fathers: The Writings of the Fathers Down to A.D. 325, Volume 3: Latin Christianity: Its Founder, Tertullian*, eds. Alexander Roberts and James Donaldson (Peabody, MA: Hendrickson Publishers, 1999), IV.40.
[44] Harding, *Answere*, fols. 131^{v}-132^{r}.

Indeed, Harding continued, understanding the difference between modes of speaking is of paramount importance when interpreting the fathers, especially because they too engaged in disputation:

> Which maner not reporting any vntruth, S. Basile doth excuse in the setting forth of a disputation, not in prescribing of a doctrine. As he defendeth *Gregorius Neocæsariensis* against the Sabellianes, for that in a co[n]tentio[n] he had with Ælianus an Ethnike, to declare the mysteries of the trinitie, he vsed the word ὑπόςασις, instede of ᾿υσΐ́α. And the learned men that be well sene in the fathers, knowe they must vse a discretion and a sundry iudgement betwen the thinges they write agonisticῶs, that is to saye, by waye of contention or disputation, and the thinges they vtter dogmaticῶs, that is by waie of setting forth a doctrine or matter of faith.[45]

Harding's argument here reveals not just the importance of historical authority to Elizabethan controversialists, but also the role of historical interpretation that became such a contentious topic with the advent of Renaissance critical methods.

Harding, like so many other polemicists, also took the disputative tack of using his opponents' sources against them. Harding's citations of Luther, Melanchthon, Hus, and Bucer to argue for communion in one kind as a matter indifferent has already been noted.[46] Elsewhere, Harding again cited Bucer against English Protestants. The use of Bucer by Catholics was especially poignant for the Swiss theologian was much beloved by English Protestants from his days as Regius Professor in Edwardian Cambridge and his close working relationship with both Thomas Cranmer and Matthew Parker. Bucer's memory took on a new sanctity after the Marian

[45] Harding, *Answere*, fol. 133^{v}. Harding erroneously cited Epistle 64 in the margin, which makes no mention of such a dispute. This reference comes from Epistle 210, which is now lost. We know of Basil's dispute with Aelianus (or Gelianus) from a later letter. Stephen Mitchell, "The Life and *Lives* of Gregory Thaumaturgus," in *Portraits of Spiritual Authority: Religious Power in Early Christianity, Byzantium and the Christian Orient*, eds. Jan Willem Drijvers and John W. Watt (Leiden, Boston, Köln: Brill, 1999), 109 n. 44. See also fol. 134^{v}, where Harding made the same point regarding Augustine's writings against the Manichees.
[46] Harding, *Answere*, fol. 36^{v} (see above).

regime exhumed his bones and burned them.[47] In this instance, he used Bucer's words to argue for the real presence of Christ in the sacrament.

Harding wrote that because "M. Iuell and they of that secte, seme to set litle by these fathers…I will bring forth the auctoritie of Martin Bucer, a late doctour of their owne syde, though not canonizate for a sainte as yet, for that I knowe." He then quoted Bucer's affirmation of the real presence of Christ, who "vseth the similitude of the sunne for his purpose, contrary to M. Iuelles negatiue, to proue Christes body present, and that really and substa[n]tially, in what places so euer the sacrament is righly ministered." After quoting Bucer in the Latin and translating his words into English, Harding concluded: "Thus we see, how Bucer in sundry other pointes of faith bothe deceiued and also a deceiuour, confirmeth the truth of this article pyththely and playnely. Such is the force of truth, that oftentymes it is confessed by the very enemies of truth."[48]

Harding's words here are highly illustrative, for they reveal the high premium that controversialists placed on the self-evident nature of religious truth. That Bucer, an "enemy" of truth, was compelled to confess truth himself, was proof to Harding that truth is obvious to those who bother to look for it. However, the perspicuity of truth could be drastically affected by something else—the moderate presentation of it.

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[47] The same was done to Paul Fagius. Elizabeth rehabilitated both reformers in 1560. For a helpful overview of Bucer and English Protestantism see Basil Hall, "Martin Bucer in England," in *Martin Bucer: Reforming Church and Community*, ed. D.F. Wright (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 144-160. MacCulloch's exhaustive biography *Thomas Cranmer* (New Haven; London: Yale University Press, 1996) also has much helpful information; see especially chs. 9-11. For contemporary reference see Jewel, *Works*, ed. John Ayre, vol 1. (Cambridge: The Univesity Press, 1845), 60. See also ch. 8, which mentions similar actions taken against the corpse of Peter Martyr's wife.

[48] Harding, *Answere*, fols. 107^{v}-108^{r}.

Portraying Moderation in Harding's *Answere*

Harding is another excellent example of the close connection between religious truth and moderation that was so central to Elizabethan controversialists. There's a paradoxical sense among these authors that that truth is obvious and cannot be suppressed, yet it can be obscured through rhetorical ploys and overzealousness, which (as Jewel put it in the challenge sermon) allowed people to be carried away by their "affections."[49] In short, there was an intimate link between being moderate and being right.

In his prefatory letter to Jewel—an extended treatment of the relationship between moderation and truth—Harding chastised Jewel for his rashness and arrogance. He declared that Jewel must be extraordinarily confident in his position; otherwise, he would not have put such a large "heape of Articles" into print, for "the more groweth your number, the more enlarged is the libertie of the answerer." What else, Harding asked, could move you in both your printed sermon and letters with Cole "to shew such courage, to vse such amplification of wordes, so often and with such vehemencie, to prouoke vs to encounter, and as it were at the blast of a trumpet, to make your chalenge"?[50]

Instead, Harding continued, "wise and graue men…would haue lyked you better, if you had meekely and soberly reported the truth," rather than bragging that the victory was a foregone conclusion. The reasoning behind this had less to do with Jewel's argumentative abilities as it did with the self-sufficient and self-evident nature of truth: "For truth as it is playne and simple, so it

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[49] Jewel, *Works*, 1:25.
[50] This is likely an intentional echo of John Knox's *The First Blast of the Trumpet Against the Monstrous Regiment of Women* (1558). Knox's ill-timed piece was cited by Catholics (such as Rastell and Martiall) as proof of Protestants' politically seditious intentions.

needeth not to be set forth with bragge of high words. You remember that old saying of the wise, *Simplex veritatis oratio.* the vtterance of truth ought to be simple."[51]

Harding also accused Jewel of defacing the church—the Catholic trope of Protestants' hubristic attitudes towards authority—and leading souls of the 'common' people astray. As noted throughout, concern that one's opponent was misleading the uneducated was pervasive on both sides and a powerful indicator of the 'charitable' approach each side conceived of themselves to be taking. Harding told Jewel that in the following "the new and straunge doctrine" of Beza, Martyr, and the French Calvinists ("whose scolar a long tyme you haue ben"), "you diuerte farre from that prudencie, sobrietie, and modestie" exhibited by them at the Colloquy of Poissy. The same is true of the letters with Cole, where "you withdraw your self from plainenesse, so much as you doo in your presumptuouse chalenge, from modestie."[52]

Harding asserted that because Jewel was "more desyrouse to deface the catholike churche, then to set forth the truth," he recited a long list of articles "which for the most part be of less importance." The more significant points, Harding insisted, were addressed in the preachings and writings of your "scoolemaisters of Germanie, Suityerland and Geneua," but "you will not aduenture the triall of them with making your matche with learned men, and in the meane tyme set them forth by sermo[n]s busyly among the vnlearned and simple people, vntill such tyme, as you haue wonne your purpose in these smaller matters."[53]

He then compared Jewel to Alexander the Great, who presented himself in one manner to the ignorant "barbarians" and another to learned Greeks. In your sermons, Harding claimed, your pretend "to haue singular skill in diuinitie" and denounce Catholic doctrines (as distorted by

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[51] Harding, *Answere*, fol. 1v.
[52] Harding, *Answere*, fol. 2r-v.
[53] Harding, *Answere*, fol. 3v.

Protestants) “with vehement affirmations, with misconstrewed and falsefied allegations, and with pitifull exclamations,” thereby leading “seely soules in to dangerouse errours.” But in your writings, “which you knew should passe the the iudgement of learned men, the pointes of greater importaunce you coouer with silence, and vtter a number of Articles of lesse weight for the more part in respect of the chiefe…you shew your self not to feare controlment of the ignorant, but to mistrust the triall of the learned.”[54]

Because Jewel had connived by selecting articles of less importance, he attacked topics “such as the old doctours haue passed ouer with silence, and for that can not of our part by auncient authorities be so amply affirmed.” In this way, Harding declared, “you laye on lode of blame, contumelies and sclaunders vpon the churche, for mainteining of them.” Every learned man can see what Jewel was doing: bringing contempt on the Catholic church and deceiving the people so that “you may set vp a new Religion of your own forging; a new church of your own framing, and new gospell of your own deuise.”[55]

Harding then explained his own moderate motives in writing, which sharply contrasted with the given portrait of Jewel as arrogant and obstinate. Because “your stoute and bolde bragges” mar the church and truth, and mislead the people, and he had been “[i]mbarred of libertie to preache by Recognisance,” he decided to write his treatise to save the church, defend truth, and stem the tide of error, “which by order of charitie we are bownde vnto.”[56] Harding then explained his motives at a more personal level, asserting “myne intent was not to hurt you, but to profite you, by declaring vnto you that truth, which you seme hytherto not to haue knowen.” This way, no Protestants “shall haue iust cause to complaine.” The entire work, Harding declared, “is

[54] Harding, *Answere*, fols. 3^v-4^r.
[55] Harding, *Answere*, fol. 4^v.
[56] Harding, *Answere*, fols. 4^v-5^r.

written with out choler, with out gaull, with out spite. What I mislike in you, and in them of your syde, I could not allow in my self." Harding's reasoning is illustrative of the antithesis Elizabethan polemicists saw between reason and emotion: "Where truthes cause is treated, humaine affections, where by the cleare light is dymmed, ought to be layd a parte." Yet, Harding continued, "if I shall perhappes sometymes seme to scarre or lawnce a festered bunche, that deserueth to be cut of, you will remember I doubte not, how the meekest and the holyest of the auncient fathers in reprouing heretikes, [oftentimes] haue shewed them selues zelouse, earnest, eager, [seuere],[57] sharpe and bitter."[58] Harding distinguished between his own rhetoric and that of the Protestants, declaring that he could not do what he found objectionable in his religious adversaries, thereby delineating between the moderate and immoderate.

Harding's charity towards his opponent not only necessitated rebuke, but was also expressed in an ostensibly compassionate exhortation to repent. In his conclusion, Harding offered Jewel an escape, one that was nobler than his obstinate resistance (and inevitable intellectual and spiritual vanquishing). He reminded Jewel that it is not "shamefull, to forsake errour for loue of truth, but rather willfully to dwell in errour, after that it is plainely detected." It shall not be judged "inconstancie, where is no chaunge of will, but onely in vnderstanding."[59] Harding concluded the work by expressing a hope that Jewel, after "mature deliberation" and in "sadder yeres" change his opinions that were the result of youthful impulsivity: "Thus shall your errour seme to procede of ignorance, not of malice."[60]

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[57] Words in brackets are indiscernible in this edition; they are taken from Thomas Harding, *An Answere to Maister Iuelles chalenge, by Doctor Harding. augmented with certaine quotations and additions* (Antwerp, 1565; STC 2nd ed. 12759).
[58] Harding, *Answere*, fol. 5^{r-v}.
[59] Harding, *Answere*, fol. 190^{r-v}.
[60] Harding, *Answere*, fol. 193^{r}.

Though a detailed recounting of the prefatory letter may feel unduly laborious, it provides a valuable window into the mindset of Elizabethan polemicists, among whom Harding was widely regarded on both sides. In disputative literature, it was assumed that temperance in writing and emotional restraint indicated the possession of 'truth.' Truth was plain, simple, and self-evident, and did not require rhetorical garnishing, evidenced in Harding's chastisement of Jewel for straying both from modesty and plainness. Furthermore, overzealousness was impermissible, as Harding claimed that he could not allow in himself what he detested in Protestants.

Harding also exhibits moderation in his sensitivity to the reader's temperament. In the prefatory letter, Harding explained that some may not like the work because it is not sensational and vitriolic. However, this was a necessary adjustment before sending the work into print (and thus making it widely available):

> If any man that shall reade this, be of that humour, as shall mislike it, as being colde, lowe, flatte and dull, and requrye rather such verder of writing, as is hote, lofty, sharpe and quycke, which pleaseth best the tast of our tyme: vnderstand he, that before I inteneded to put this forth in printe, I thus tempered my stile for these considerations.

The "considerations" were the false attribution of the *Apologie of Priuate Masse* to him, that the style of writing suited the work better, and that he saw no other option for how to deal with "myne old acquainted, felow and countreyman other wise then swetly, gentilly and courteouslye." Harding again cited his own moderation and Christian charity as the reason for correcting his opponent: "And in dede here I protest, that I loue M. Iuell, and detest his heresies. And now Syr, as I loue you, right so I am desyrouse of your soule helth, which you seme either to forgete, or to [pro]cure by a wrong waye." He then, in a passage reminiscent of epideictic rhetoric, told Jewel that "when deceite is by plaine truth detected, then to dwell and continewe in

errour, that procedeth not of humaine weaknes, but of deuilish obstinacie. But you M. Iuell as many men thinke, and I trust, are not yet swallowed vp of that gulfe."[61]

In addition to his heightened awareness of how his work might be perceived by readers, Harding repeatedly professed consideration for the reader's attention span by not unnecessarily belaboring a point. One such reason was the avoiding of "tediousnesse."[62] Elsewhere, Harding wrote that because private mass is "private" only according to Protestants and there are already plenty of treatises in print defending the practice, "at this present, I will saye nothing, thinking hereof, as Salust dyd of Carthago that great citie, that it were better to kepe silence, then to speake fewe."[63] He also expressed a wish "to auoide prolixitie" because the matter at hand (papal supremacy) was "allready largely and learnedly handled of others."[64] Similarly, in an interpretation of Cyprian, Harding wrote, "Because his workes be common, to be shorter, I will rehearse his wordes in English."[65] Similarly, some issues demanded so much attention that to give it the full weight it deserved "will amount to a sufficie[n]t bignes, and that matter thoroughly handeled, will fill a right great volume."[66] At other times though, Harding's stance towards verbiage had an ostensibly more virtuous reasoning behind it: "Many mo auctorities might be alleaged for the opening of this matter, but these for this present are ynough, if they be not too many, as I feare me they will so appeare to the vnlearned reader, and to such as be not geuen to earnest studie and diligent searche of the truth."[67] Conciseness was not a virtue not only

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[61] Harding, *Answere*, fols. 5^{v}-6^{r}.
[62] Harding, *Answere*, fols. 77^{v}, 90^{r}, 134^{r} (where Harding wishes to avoid being "tedious").
[63] Harding, *Answere*, fol. 11^{v}. Sallust, *The War with Jugurtha* in Sallust, *The War with Catiline. The War with Jugurtha*, ed. John T. Ramsey, trans. J.C. Rolfe (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2013; LCL 116), 19.2.
[64] Harding, *Answere*, fol. 75^{v}; see also 176^{v}.
[65] Harding, *Answere*, fol. 169^{r}.
[66] Harding, *Answere*, fol. 77^{v}; see also 79^{v}.
[67] Harding, *Answere*, fol. 138^{r}.

for the reader's attention span, but because simplicity was an aid in the search for 'truth,' especially to the less educated.

The converse of presenting yourself as moderate was, of course, to convince the reader that your opponent was immoderate. Early in his *Answere*, Harding expressed "fear" that Jewel's

> sore is so putrifyed so farre, as oyle and lenitiues will not serue now, but rather vinegre and corosiues. You remember I doubte not, what Cicero sayth. that medicine to profite the most, which causeth the greatest smarte, And what Salomon also, The woondes of à freende, to be better then the kisses of an enemie.[68]

Harding then offered his own prescription, based on the diagnosis of spiritual pride: "The best salue any man can minister vnto you, verely I thinke, is, to exhorte you to humilitie, and to denying of your selfe." Harding, echoing biblical language, repeatedly exhorted Jewel to "deny himself,"[69] as this was the only way for him to see his own error:

> Againe denye your selfe to be so great a man, but that you may take aduertisement of a man of meaner calling, denye your selfe to be so honorable, but that it may stand with your honestie, to abyde by your promise in a most honest matter by your owne prepensed offer made: you maye easely learne how to redresse, that hath ben done amisse, you maye see your owne infirmities, defectes, ouersightes and ignorances plainely, as it were in a glasse, all selfe loue and blinde estimation of your self set a parte: you maye with the fauour of all good men, with the wynning of your owne soule and many others, whom you haue perelously deceiued, and to the glory of God, be induced to yelde to the truth, to subscribe to the same, and to recant your errours.[70]

Harding not only insisted that Jewel's own hubris and high self-opinion ("self loue and blinde estimation of your self") blinded him from seeing the truth, but also that Jewel had malicious motives behind his antics. In an argument about private mass, Harding wrote that

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[68] Harding, *Answere*, fol. 6ᵛ.
[69] For instance, Jesus' words to his disciples that anyone who wishes to be his disciple must "deny themselves, take up their cross and follow me." (Matt. 16:24; see also Mark 8:34 and Luke 9:23).
[70] Harding, *Answere*, fol. 7ʳ.

Jewel “inueigheth sore in his pri[n]ted Sermo[n]” against it, but any reader can readily perceive what Jewel was really aiming to do: “And though he pretende enemitie against priuate Masse in word, yet in dede who so euer readeth his Sermon, and discerneth his sprite, shall easily perceiue, that he exte[n]deth his whole witte and cunning, vtterly to abolishe the vnbloudy and daily Sacrifice of the Churche, commonly called the Masse.”[71] Harding then described Protestant railing against the practice more generally as done “with grat vilanie of wordes.” Harding defended the practice with the standard Catholic line (i.e. the priest receives alone when there is no one spiritually fit to communicate), which effectively nullified Protestant criticisms: “So the right of their cause depe[n]deth of the misdooing of the people, which if they would amende, these folke shuld be dryuen either to recant, or to holde their peace.”[72]

Lastly, it is worth noting how Harding, like Cole, had gone after Jewel’s social position as a gentleman and a bishop. In the prefatory letter, Harding asserted that Jewel had, in his challenge sermon, provoked all learned Catholic men to fight with him by insulting them:

> But you Maister Iuell in this quarrell, aske not the combate of one catholike man only, but as one suer [*sic*] of the victory before proufe of fight, cast your gloue as it were, and with straunge defyaunce, prouoke all learned me[n] that be a lyue to campe with you.[73]

Harding’s analogy of “casting the glove” is a fascinating example of the dueling culture, deeply embedded in early modern England and intimately connected to notions of civility,[74] that shaped controversialists’ perceptions of their work. To cast the glove was a frequent metaphor used in

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[71] Harding, *Answere*, fol. 10r.
[72] Harding, *Answere*, fols. 11v-12r.
[73] Harding, *Answere*, fol. 1v. I would like to thank Karl Gunther for drawing my attention to this reference.
[74] See Markku Peltonen, *The Duel in Early Modern England: Civility, Politeness and Honour* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), ch. 1 for an analysis of the duel in Elizabethan culture.

polemical literature during the Civil War, but to find it this early illustrates how early Elizabethan controversialist conceived of themselves and their writing, namely as masculine "aristocratic violence" in print.[75] As a gentleman, Harding believed he was obligated to respond to the insult and defend the honor of the aggrieved party—although it was not a person, but God.

Shortly after, Harding insisted that Jewel be responsible to "geue a rekening of the doctrine which you preache openly before the high estates,"[76] reinforcing that the target audience of these works were the same individuals who were originally in attendance at the Westminster conference, namely educated and literate, though not necessarily Latinate, MPs and other influential upper-class gentlemen who were responsible for and could influence policy decisions concerning religion. However, as vernacular works that were conscientious replications of oral disputation, disputative literature aimed to reach as wide an audience as possible without sacrificing the academic integrity befitting such debates.

Later, Harding strategically targeted Jewel's as a bishop. For instance, he wondered to the reader how Jewel could criticize the canopy for the sacrament when men have no qualms with the same treatment for princes and cathedral deans:

> With what face speaketh he against the Canopie vsed to the honour of Christ in the Sacrament, that sytting in the bishoppes seate at Salesburie, can abyde the sight of a solene canopie made of paineted bourdes spredde ouer his head? If he had ben of counsell with Moses, Dauid and Salomon, it is lyke he would haue reproued their iudgementes for the great honour they vsed and caused so to be continewed towards the Arke, wherein was conteined nothing but the tables of the lawe, Aarons rodde, and a pottefull of Manna.[77]

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[75] E.g. Thomas Edwards, *Antapologia* (London, 1644; Wing / E223), 53; John Goodwin, *Cretensis* (London, 1646; Wing 2nd ed. G1161), 3. The quote is taken from Marcus Nevitt, *Women and the Pamphlet Culture of Revolutionary England, 1640-1660* (Aldershot; Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2006), 31-32.
[76] Harding, *Answere*, fol. 6v.
[77] Harding, *Answere*, fol. 121v.

The implications of Harding's wonderment, namely that Jewel would privilege treatment to himself that he won't to the very body of Christ (a point with which Jewel, of course, fundamentally disagreed), was spelled out more clearly when the Catholic exile diagnosed the reasons for his former friend's obstinacy: "Shame, welth of your estate, your worldly acquaintance, besyde many others." Harding continued,

> As for the welth of your estate, which some assure you of, so long as you maineteine that parte: I can not iudge so euill of you, but that you thinke, how fickle and fraile these worldly thinges bee, and how litle to be estemed, in respecte of the heauenly estate, which remaineth to the obedient children of the church, as the contrarie to the rebelles, Apostates, and renegates."[78]

Shortly after, Harding again posited that Jewel's bishopric, a reward received for his Protestant faith, could be a hindrance to Jewel's refusal to convert, perhaps, "thinking great skorne, to be remoued fro[m] the same"[79]

Though moderation was an important element in the work of many Elizabethan controversialists, it was especially important to Harding, who made a concerted effort to present himself and his arguments in a tempered manner. True to his promise, Harding was remarkably restrained in his writing (much more than some of the other controversialists, especially Martiall and Calfhill). He did, however, take great pains to make the reader aware of his opponent's immoderate writing. For Harding, his remarks about Jewel's own posture were intimately tied to moderation, for it was nearly all about Jewel's own vanity. Thus, rebuke was in order—he was duty-bound "by order of charitie" to correct his former friend.[80] With Harding, as other controversialists, such sharp rhetoric was justified as the overflow of religious zeal. It was

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[78] Harding, *Answere*, fol. 190^{r}.
[79] Harding, *Answere*, fol. 191^{r}.
[80] Harding, *Answere*, fols. 4^{v}.

accepted collateral damage (to the giver, not the receiver, of course) of the Christian love and charity for one's opponent.

The Rhetoric of Abuse in Harding's *Answere*

Though Harding was remarkably tempered in his writing (especially compared to Martiall and Calfhill), he occasionally felt confident enough to make some rude observations about Jewel's argumentative abilities. Regarding Jewel's contention that the word "communion necessarily implies a plurality of persons present, Harding described the reasoning as "weake and vtterly vnlearned, as that which procedeth of ignorance."[81] He categorized another of Jewel's arguments as "peeuish"[82] He was particularly annoyed by Jewel's interpretation of 1 Cor. 14 as prohibitive of service in another language. He declared that the text was "put out of tune by your noyse of straunge wordes" and the interpretation "violently applied by your new fangled exposition."[83] Jewel, however, was not the only person to come under Harding's sharp criticisms. Like many other Catholics (and some Protestants), Harding thought that Luther's vitriol was excessive:

> Who so euer readeth his bookes with indifferent iudgement, shall fynde, that sythens the Apostles, tyme neuer wrote [a] man so arroga[n]tly ne so dispitefully against the churche, nor so contrayly to him selfe…Here I doubte not, but wise men will regarde more that Luther wrote, when his minde was quiet and calme, then when it was enraged with blustering stormes of naughty affections.[84]

The uneven amount of material here on Harding's moderation and his abusive rhetoric exemplified once again that these works, though they bear common characteristics that mark

[81] Harding, *Answere*, fol. 13^{v}.
[82] Harding, *Answere*, fol. 16^{v}.
[83] Harding, *Answere*, fol. 68^{v}.
[84] Harding, *Answere*, fol. 35^{r}.

them as disputative, were also reflective of the individual author's personality. Harding, like Jewel, occupied a prominent space among early Elizabethan controversialists, and he felt the need to meet the high expectations placed upon someone in the public eye. As shown in the next chapter, Jewel's approach shifted to answer the moderate and thorough nature of Harding's *Answere*. However, despite (or perhaps because of) Harding's meticulousness, his *Answere* is a rich example of the characteristic eclecticism and fault lines running through Elizabethan controversialists' works.

Conclusion

It bears repeating that delineating the themes of disputative method, moderation, and abusive rhetoric can create a misleading picture that these were discrete elements in the writings of Elizabethan controversialists. They were not. Polemicists frequently moved between these themes and also wove them together.

Harding did precisely this in the Conclusion of his *Answere*. He asserted that though some of Jewel's argument "may happely persuade some of the worldly wise, who be fooles in Gods iudgement." He caustically remarked that such people have praised "the feuer quartane…dro[n]kennes…baldness…[and] vnrighteousness." In our own time, Harding continued, they laud "ignorance" and "foolishness." If only these (Protestant) authors had written "for an exercise of wittes, and rather to the wondering, then corrupting of the Readers," which is not only "besyde reason and truth" but also dangerous. "[T]hese Rhetoricians haue not brought good and true reasons, but onely a probabilitie of talke: right so for confirmation of your negatiue diuinitie, and of many newe straunge and false doctrines, you haue no suer proufes, but shadowes, colours, and shewes onely, that perhappes may dasell bleare eyes, and deceiue the

vnlearned." However, the "learned wise" and "godly wise" will not be deceived, for "the church allwayes assisted and prompted by the holy Ghoste, the spirite of truth, in pointes of faith erreth not."

Harding clearly saw the Catholic church as inextricably linked to religious 'truth,' which was being assailed by those who may have earthly knowledge but are spiritually foolish. These people—the "Rhetoricians"—use language to distort and deceive. This was at the tragic cost of the souls who were too unlearned to defend themselves. Harding wrote that anyone who through Protestant teaching "fall from the catholike Church into the errours of our tyme" is like the simpleton who, "being borne in hande by a Sophister, and driuen by force of sophisticall arguments to graunt, that he hath hornes, thinketh so in dede, and therefore putteth his hande to his forehed."[85]

Then, echoing another common trope used by both sides—that of doctrinal error and moral licentiousness—Harding drew a straight line from heresy to vice:

> So who so euer through your teaching fall from the catholike Church into the errours of our tyme, from the streightnes of Christian lyfe, into the carnall libertie of this newe gospell, from deuotion into the insensibilitie which we see the people to lyue in, from the feare of God, to the desperat contempte of all vertue and goodnes: hereby they shewe them selues to be such, as haue vnstable hartes, which be geuen ouer to the lustes of their fleshe, which haue no delite ne feeling of God, which like Turkes and Epicures seeking onely for the co[m]modities and pleasures of this world, haue no regard of the lyfe to come.

However, "the godly sorte, whose hartes be established with grace," will continue on the straight and narrow path, and "though they geue you their hearing, and that of constraint not of wil, yet wil not they geue you their lyking not consenting."[86]

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[85] Elsewhere, Harding wrote that "our aduersaries doo much abuse the simplicitie of the vnlearned, bearing the[m] in hand." Harding, *Answere*, fols. 130^{v}-131^{r}.
[86] Harding, *Answere*, fols. 191^{v}-192^{v}.

Harding's attacks on Jewel (and Protestants more generally) illustrate the dominant themes that were common to both sides. Religious 'truth' is objective, discernible, and defensible using the standard intellectual methods of the day, such as logic, history, and grammar. However, there was a paradox, for though religious 'truth' was all of these things, it could also be disguised, manipulated, and perverted by the use of rhetoric.

This was not just an intellectual matter, though, for the party in possession of truth did not need to employ rhetorical trickery to persuade. Rather, the defender of truth was moderate and civil, employing only rational arguments and rebuking immoderation. The debate over truth necessitated not only intellectual proofs, but also social ones. Highlighting each of these elements in Harding and other religious controversialists reveals the shared language and assumptions that each side operated with that inevitably contributed to polemical stalemate.

Harding's moderate approach sometimes resulted in paradoxical stances, especially concerning matters indifferent. For instance, in defending sole receiving of the elements by the priest, he judged the number of persons necessary for a communion to be valid as a matter indifferent, just like other accidental elements of the ritual:

> Now for the number of communicantes, how many shuld receiue together in one place, and in what place, what tyme, sitting at table (as some would haue it) standing or kneeling, fasting, or after other meates: and whether they shuld receiue it in their handes, or with their mowthes, and other the like orders, maners and circu[m]stances: all these thinges perteine to the ceremonie of eating. the obseruation whereof dependeth of the churches ordinance, and not of Christes Insitution.

Because, Harding concluded, this depends on the "Churches disposition" and not the institution of Christ, "for that respecte the ministration of the priest is not made vnlaufull."[87]

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[87] Harding, *Answere*, fols. 12^{v}-13^{r}.

Similarly, Harding claimed that images are permissible, despite their potential for abuse. Harding argued that images serve three causes in the Christian's life: 1) "the benefite of knowledge;" 2) "the styrring of our myndes to all godlynes;" 3) "the keping of thinges in memorie necessary to our saluation." They may be worshipped "without offence" because of the distinction between adoration and worship. Worship "co[n]sisteht in spirite and truth inwardly, and is declared by signes outwardy [*sic*] in recognizing the supreme dominion, which properly of th diuines is called *Latria:* is deferred onely to the blessed Trinitie." Adoration, on the other hand, is "nothing elles, but a recognizing of some vertue or excellencie protested by outwarde signe, as reuerent kissing, bowing downe, kneeling, and such the like honour." Such actions, Harding continued, "we fynde in the scriptures oftentymes geuen to creatures."[88]

The vernacular scriptures, however, were a different matter. Even though he admitted that vernacular scriptures were not expressly prohibited and, in theory, could be beneifical, neither were they commanded. Therefore, once again, the authority of the Church was the deciding factor. Harding delineated a variety of opinions on the matter before concluding, "the setting forth of the whole Bible, and of euery parte of the scripture in the vulgare tonge, for all sortes of persons to reade without exception or limitation, to be a thing not necessary to saluation, nor otherwise conuenient, nor profitable, but contrarywise dangerous and hurtefull."[89]

However, the most obvious fault line in Harding is the same one that plagued most sixteenth-century Christians, that of reason and understanding versus matters of faith. Catholics like Harding were often put on the defensive by Protestant's insistence on the place of comprehension in matters of religion. This is especially evident in attacks on the Latin service,

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[88] Harding, *Answere*, fols. 150^{r}-152^{v}.
[89] Harding, *Answere*, fol. 159^{r}.

one of the three topics in the original Westminster conference and a point that Jewel belabored in a variety of ways in the challenge sermon.

Harding mounted a lengthy defense of the Latin service, mainly by making faith without understanding a virtue. (This was particularly urgent given Jewel's diatribe that Catholics make "ignorance the mother of devotion.") For instance, Harding argued that the people give their consent to the Latin prayer by saying "Amen" even if they don't fully understand.[90] More importantly, Harding argued that comprehension has little or no bearing on faith and charity. After quoting Augustine that "it is not the quiknesse of vnderstanding, but the simplicitie of beleuing, that maketh them safest of all" and then spelled out his precise understanding of the relationship between understanding, faith, and charity:

> If Christ (sayeth [Augustine]), dyed onely for them which can with certaine or suer vnderstanding discerne these thinges (concerning God) then is the labour we take in the church, in maner in vayne. God requyreth not so much of vs, how much we vndersta[n]d, as how much we beleue, and through belefe, how much we loue. And when we shall all appeare before Christ in that dredfull daye of iudgement, whe shall not be requryed to geue an accompte of our vnderstanding, but faith presupposed, of our charitie.

Harding argued further that even if the people can't understand the scripture being read to them, both the hearers and the reader benefit. He did this by quoting from Origen (whom he used to criticize Calvin) as to why this is the case, culminating with the example that we eat and drink things good for our health [eyes] though we don't know how it works. Anticipating Protestant objections that this will lead to spiritual laxity, Harding cited Origen that the point of this argument is not that Christians may be lazy in their study of the scriptures, but that they understand the spiritual power they possess.[91] Harding's argument that the reading of scripture

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[90] Harding, *Answere*, fol. 69^{v}.
[91] Harding, *Answere*, fols. 71^{r}-72^{r}.

and prayer are efficacious in themselves is remarkably parallel to Catholic understandings of how the sacraments work. Therefore, it is not surprising that the same emphasis on faith over reason appears in defending transubstantiation.

As has been observed throughout, attacking transubstantiation was a Protestant hobbyhorse. A favorite Catholic riposte to this critique was that Protestants denied transubstantiation not because of a lack of understanding, but a lack of faith. More specifically, a faith that was stunted because of an unhealthy obsession with rational explanations. Harding argued from Chrysostom that the real body of Christ in the sacrament is not "outwardly sensible or perceptible."[92] Elsewhere, he reprimanded Jewel by reminding him that God is able to vse nature finite and that "the thinges that be done by the power of God aboue nature, are not to be tryed by rules of nature."[93] Elsewhere, Harding described it as "in sorte and maner to our weake reason incomprehensible."[94]

The subtle adjustments concerning multiple matters of thought and worship, which made allowances for certain practices but disallowed others (despite the similar rationale behind the practice itself), coupled with the default demurral to the Catholic church's tradition, created an intellectual ecosystem that was paradoxical and at times contrary. And though Protestants gleefully exploited these fault lines, they were by no means immune to them (as will be shown in the next chapter). Because Catholics argued that images were justified and beneficial for they edified, though vernacular scriptures were not, because they were dangerous and fodder for heretics, was inverted by Protestants: images were dangerous, because they tended to idolatry, while the vernacular scriptures was necessary and edifying for God's people. It is easy to see

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[92] Harding, *Answere*, fol. 99^{v}.
[93] Harding, *Answere*, fol. 109^{r}.
[94] Harding, *Answere*, fol. 132^{v}.

how such arguments, made using the same sources and according to a shared language, created an intellectual impasse.

CHAPTER 10

THE BEGINNING OF THE END, PT. II: JEWEL'S *REPLIE* (1565)

> It had been more modestie, to haue leafte the Commendation, and iudgement thereof vnto your Reader: who comparing your Proufes with the Answeares, and layeinge the one on the other, might be hable to iudge indifferently bitweene bothe.[1]
>
> John Jewel, *Replie vnto M. Hardinges Answeare*

Context

Jewel's *A Replie vnto M. Hardinges Answeare* appeared in August 1565. Given that Harding's *Answere* was only printed the year before, this is a relatively quick turnaround when one considers the sheer size and painstaking detail of Jewel's tome—650 pages of point-by-point refutation. The relationship of Jewel's *Replie* to the Westminster conference is interesting, and it illustrates the dynamic nature of early modern print controversy.[2] On the one hand, it is a painstaking rebuttal of Harding's *Answere*, itself an exacting refutation of the challenge sermon that also interacts with Jewel's published letters to Cole. On the other hand, Jewel rarely references his "negative" argument, and though he does not add new points for the debate, the amount of material necessary to address each argument either for or against the original topics necessarily expanded the scope of the debate immensely. In this way, the work can still be directly linked to the Westminster conference and the challenge sermon, but is also indicative of the fluid nature of print polemic, which was, by default, shaped by the opponent's publication

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[1] John Jewel, *A Replie vnto M. Hardinges Answeare* (London, 1565; STC 2nd ed. 14606), "An Answeare to M. Hardinges Conclusion," n.p.

[2] Ann Hughes made similar observations about disputation and print in puritan literature from the 1640s and 50s. See Hughes, "The Meanings of Religious Polemic," in *Puritanism: Transatlantic Perspectives on a Seventeenth-Century Anglo-American Faith*, ed. Francis J. Bremer (Boston: Massachusetts Historical Society, 1993), 201-229.

while it simultaneously absorbed other ongoing controversies into it (much like Harding's *Answere* referenced another sermon Jewel had given at Paul's Cross).[3]

The *Replie* is similar to Harding's *Answere* in both scholarly effort and moderate tone. However, Jewel's mode of argument also took on new elements that distinguish it from the challenge sermon and his letters with Cole. For instance, historical argumentation is a significant element of the *Replie*, perhaps even overshadowing the syllogistic reasoning. It would therefore be tempting to assume that the *Replie* is more 'humanistic' in orientation. However, this owed more to Jewel's intellectual eclecticism and the need for ad hoc responses to his opponent's arguments (which relied heavily on ecclesiastical history) rather than Jewel exhibiting any sort of intellectual tribalism common to Protestants.

In the *Replie*, Jewel provided far less background information than Harding did in the *Answere*. For instance, Harding explained that the work was originally intended for a friend and his initial hesitation in responding to Jewel. Though this is painfully obvious, Jewel's silence on motives indicates the expectation that there would be a response. No other reason was necessary apart from the existence of an antagonizing publication. As the party in power, no public attack could go unanswered, again illustrating the mindset of an intellectual duel discussed in the

[3] John Jewel has traditionally been placed at the head of the formation of a distinct 'Anglicanism' as a tertium quid of the Protestant Reformation that found its identity in navigating a *via media* between Geneva and Rome. This assumption has come under severe scrutiny over the past several decades with several scholars rejecting the label as woefully anachronistic and reductionistic. For a recent overview of the debates see Peter Lake, "'Puritans' and 'Anglicans' in the History of the Post-Reformation English Church," in *The Oxford History of Anglicanism, Vol I: Reformation and Identity, c. 1520-1662*, ed. Anthony Milton (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 352-379. See further Idem, *Anglicans and Puritans?: Presbyterianism and English Conformist Thought from Whitgift to Hooker* (London: Unwin Hyman, 1988); Mary Morrissey, "The 'Challenge Controversy' and the Question of Authority in the Elizabethan Church," in *The Search for Authority in Reformation Europe*, eds. Helen Parish, Elaine Fulton, and Peter Webster (Farnham, Surrey; Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2014), 147-148.

previous chapter. This is further exhibited in the preface of the *Replie*, where Jewel expressed his anticipation that Harding would answer again. After referencing Harding's promises to reply and the flood of Catholic pamphlets coming into England "with the Turkish Newes of Malta," Jewel announced to the reader, "before [Harding] addresse him selfe to his second Booke, I would counsel him, first, to consider better the ouersightes, and scapes of his former Booke."[4]

Jewel's exhortation here made explicit what has been observed throughout, namely that controversialists did not write with the expectation that their opponent would actually change his mind. Rather, they wrote these works for the literate and educated, but not necessarily Latinate: the MPs, nobility, and other upper-class men who exercised political power and influence, whether local or national. Works of disputative literature functioned in the same way as public disputation—to communicate as widely and convincingly as possible to the people who made decisions which side was 'right' and which side was 'wrong' with little expectation that the parties on either side would actually change their position.

This chapter examines Jewel's *Replie* to Harding's *Answere* in detail. It first outlines Jewel's disputative methods, which drew on a variety of sixteenth-century scholarly techniques such as Aristotelian logic, criticisms of his opponent's 'sophistry,' and historical and grammatical arguments. It then examines his portrayals of moderation, which relied heavily on painting Harding as immoderate and overzealous while contrasting himself as sober-minded and civil. Finally, it elucidates Jewel's rhetoric of abuse, which primarily consisted of sarcastically mocking his opponent's arguments. This approach allowed Jewel to retain a semblance of moderation while publicly deriding his Catholic opponent. It concludes by highlighting how

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[4] Jewel, *Replie*, sig. ¶3^{v}. This seems to be a reference to the Great Siege of Malta. Though the siege took place in 1565, the conflict had been brewing for months, and it's unclear if Jewel is referencing rumors of the impending attack or the siege itself.

these elements of disputative literature contributed to the stalemate that was print polemic in early Elizabethan England.

Disputative Method in Jewel's *Replie*

There are certain shared characteristics that lend scholarly character to Jewel's *Replie*, such as margins filled with detailed academic references or the alphabetized index affixed between the preface and the beginning of the work. And, like the other publications examined here, Jewel's *Replie* exhibits an astounding level of detail to particular arguments, which contributed to the dialogic character of these works. The preciseness could literally come down to syllables. For instance, in response to Jewel's original argument in the challenge sermon that priests communicate for others, Harding pounced and pointed out that he had never written that the priest can receive the sacrament for others. Furthermore, the Catholic church had never taught this. Rather, the oblation of the mass, performed by the priest, is communicated to others.

Jewel dismissed the "for an other" that Harding seized on as a nothing more than a typo due to "the Printers negligence" and turned it around to attack on Harding, claiming that such words were unbecoming for "a Doctour professinge suche a countenance of grauitie, as doo fewe others." Furthermore, Harding might have granted his opponents "some simple habilitie of speakinge Englishe." Jewel then highlighted mistakes in Harding's *Answere*, citing the precise folio and line of his opponent's work that contained an error:

> M. Hardinge, that is so learned, so circumspecte, so curious, & maketh him selfe so mery with the errour of one poor Syllable co[m]mitted onely by the Printer in my booke, in the selfe same place, and in the nexte side folowinge hath erred fiue Syllables togeather in his owne Booke: as it may easily appeare by that, his frende, for shame, hath restoared, and amended the same with his penne.[5]

[5] Jewel, *Replie*, 584. (Jewel cited fol. 172b, lin. 19.)

Likewise, great care was given to arguments that are quite foreign to the modern reader but were of great importance to sixteenth-century controversialists (although less for the particular subject and more the implications that could be drawn from it). For example, in the challenge sermon, Jewel raised the point that, because of transubstantiation, a mouse or worm may eat the body of Christ. Harding dismissed this as a "vile asseueration," but Jewel spent four pages detailing how the question had been addressed by Thomas Aquinas and many other Catholic authorities, thus refusing Harding's attempts to wave off the morose conundrum.[6] Similarly, when Harding cited the example of Egyptian monks in the wilderness who couldn't keep wine in the extreme heat as an example of communion in one kind, Jewel pointed out that this was not a universal practice *and* that Egyptian wine was essentially colder than typical wine, and thus kept longer, as proven by Macrobius' *Saturnalia*.[7]

Logic

However, what primarily defines Jewel's *Replie* as emblematic of academic disputation is the use of formal Aristotelian logic, again illustrating the scholarly expectations of these controversial works. One of Jewel's favorite tactics was to reformulate Harding's arguments into a syllogism, then exploit the (purportedly) fallacious reasoning, and he relished pitting Harding's logic against him. He did this literally dozens of times.

Jewel's reliance on Aristotelian logic is evident throughout the work, and made explicit in an attack on one of Harding's justifications for adoration of the sacrament. Jewel pointed out

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[6] Jewel, *Replie*, 624-628. See Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologica. First Complete American Edition. In Three Volumes*, trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province (New York: Benziger Brothers, 1947), III, Q. 80, Art. 3.

[7] Jewel, *Replie*, 138. Macrobius, *Saturnalia, Volume III: Books 6-7*, ed. and trans. Robert A. Kaster (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011; LCL 512), 7.8.9.

that the “argument is made up of four Termes: and therefore in the Schooles would be counted childishe.”[8] (Jewel frequently made reference to what was taught in the “schooles,” a jab at Harding for they were both Oxford men.) Jewel also picked apart several of Harding’s arguments and classified them according to their formal fallacy. He charged Harding with *petitio principii* (i.e. begging the question),[9] equivocation,[10] arguing from false causes,[11] reasoning from effects instead of causes,[12] arguing from the negative,[13] arguing from the possible to the actual (*ad posse*, *ad esse*),[14] and drawing conclusions from invalid premises.[15]

Others were more technical in nature. For instance, Jewel criticized the Catholic justification for sole receiving (i.e. that it is impossible, for partaking of the sacrament necessitates communion with all Christians) by claiming this rendered excommunication pointless. Harding dismissed the argument as “peevish,” but Jewel reaffirmed his stance by insisting that you can’t excommunicate someone who isn’t receiving the sacrament anyway. This he did by charging Harding with a formal fallacy: “But for better declaration of this mater, it is commonly taught in Schooles, that *Priuatio praesupponit habitum*, that is, that the loosinge of a thinge firste presupposeth the hauing of the same: for no man can loose that thinge, that he hath not.” The possibility that someone could be excommunicate without communicating in the first

[8] Jewel, *Replie*, 384. Aristotle deemed the “perfect” syllogism to be made up of three terms. See Aristotle, *Prior Analytics* in *Categories. On Interpretation. Prior Analytics*, trans. H. P. Cooke, Hugh Tredennick (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1938; LCL 325), 1.4.
[9] Jewel, *Replie*, 17, 494.
[10] Jewel, *Replie*, 29, 439.
[11] Jewel, *Replie*, 485.
[12] Jewel, *Replie*, 37.
[13] Jewel, *Replie*, 68, 105, 126, 187, 349.
[14] Jewel, *Replie*, 367.
[15] Jewel, *Replie*, 20, 92-93, 569.

place is absurd: “Uerely this kinde of learning in the Primitiue Churche woulde haue séemed not onely péeusih, but also fantastical and méere Frantike.”[16]

In a back-and-forth over whether or not Greek-speaking churches of Asia minor are examples of having service in the vernacular, Jewel framed Harding’s argument thus: “The lesse Asia beinge a principal parte of ye Greeke Churche, had then the Seruice in the Greeke tongue: But sundrie Countries of the same Asia vnderstoode not the Gréeke tongue: *Ergo,* they had their Seruice in an vnknowen tongue.” Jewel derided this as a “fayre glosse” that commits the fallacy “named in the Schooles, *Ex meris particularibus:* or, *A non distributo ad distributum.* Onlesse he amende the Maior, and make it vniuersal, and say thus, Al Asia the Lesse had the Seruice in the Greeke tongue, it can in no wise holde.”[17] Jewel’s criticism relied on a development in medieval logic that declared the middle term (i.e. the minor premise) in a syllogism cannot be distributed because it is not universal. Therefore, because Harding treated a particular (“sundrie Countries”) as a universal, the syllogism did not hold.[18]

Likewise, Jewel accused Harding of committing the *secundum quid* fallacy, or arguing from the qualified statement to the unqualified. The place in question was Harding’s defense of the Latin scripture. This partially owed to the fact that there were “dark” (i.e. obscure) places of scripture, which could be harmful to the untrained lay person if put in the vernacular. Jewel would have none of it.

> Hereof M. Harding seemeth to conclude thus: There be certaine darke places in Scripture: Ergo, The Scriptures are ful of Darknesse. This is a guileful kinde of reasoninge, knowen vnto children, called Fallacia a secundum quid ad simpliciter.

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[16] Jewel, *Replie*, 39. See Abraham Fraunce, *The Lawiers Logike* (London, 1588; STC 2nd ed. 11344), fol. 49v.
[17] Jewel, *Replie*, 160.
[18] See William Kneale and Martha Kneale, *The Development of Logic* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962), 273; E.J. Ashworth, *Language and Logic in the Post-Medieval Period* (Dordrecht, Boston: D. Reidel, 1974), 210.

> In like fourme of argumente he might haue said, Albertus Pigghius graunteth, there be certaine errours in the Masse: Ergo, The Masse is ful of errours.[19]

Rhetoric

Jewel's fixation with proper logic in their print dispute was matched by his insistence that Harding had abandoned formal disputation for sophistry. It is worth noting that Jewel, like other polemicists, used terms like "rhetoric" and "eloquence" both positively and negatively. For instance, Jewel spoke of rhetoric as a formal exercise when he wrote that Harding "contrary to the order of Rhetorique, woulde confute our side, before he confirme his owne."[20] Likewise, Jewel declared that in answering Harding, "I wil not answeare heate with heate, but suche kinde of eloquence wil rather geue place." Elsewhere, he described Basil, Chrysostom, and the ancient Catholic fathers in general as notable for their "eloquence."[21]

Generally speaking, though, "eloquence" was one of Jewel's favorite term to disparage Harding's arguments. From start to finish, Jewel repeatedly charged Harding with using "eloquence" and rhetorical ploys to distract from his poor arguments.[22] Similarly, he described one of Harding's syllogisms as a "sophism" and another argument as "enlarg[ed] Rhetorically."[23]

One of the more interesting examples of this comes from the first few pages, where Jewel claimed that Harding wrote so "handsomely" and "smoothely" that he had almost been convinced by his Catholic opponent. He then cited Socrates and Aristotle on the dangers of sophistry, which dresses up falsehood so that truth, many times brought in "simple, and naked, in

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[19] Jewel, *Replie*, 532; see also 58-59.
[20] Jewel, *Replie*, 156.
[21] Jewel, *Replie*, 6, 87, 89, 318, 421.
[22] Jewel, *Replie*, sigs. [¶2]^{v}-¶3^{r}, ¶6^{v}; 112, 143, 347, 417, 510, 536, 559, etc. Jewel also sarcastically said the same about medieval canonists; see 326.
[23] Jewel, *Replie*, 564, 566. See also 155, 564, where Jewel accused Harding of "sophistication."

poore araye," is overlooked.[24] The use of Socrates here served a twofold purpose. First, as noted earlier,[25] Socrates was the quintessential example of 'pure' philosophy that was deeply suspicious of rhetoric. Second, Jewel cited from Socrates' trial, thereby associating himself with an ancient martyr for 'truth,' albeit not a Christian one. By opening his work with a citation of two of the greatest ancient philosophers, Jewel making explicit the close connection between Protestantism and pure philosophical truth that could be obtained by learning.

The nature of debate entailed not only sound logic and suspicion of sophistry, but also an understanding of how language worked. This is especially evident in debates over authorial intention and context in the early fathers. As noted in the previous chapter, Harding made a distinction between the fathers writing *agonisticos* and *dogmaticos*, or polemically and systematically. This distinction resurfaces in Jewel's *Replie*.

In a debate over what Chrysostom meant when he wrote that "nobody" came to communicate (which Harding had taken as proof of sole receiving by Chrysostom), Jewel argued that Chrysostom's can't be taken literally, for then even he didn't communicate. The meaning, Jewel argued, is contextual, for "his purpose was, to rebuke the negligence of ye people," who were coming in small numbers in such a large city. The same hyperbolic use of "nobody" is found in scripture [Jn. 3:32] and elsewhere in Chrysostom: "In theese wordes M. Hardinge must néedes confesse, that Chrysostom in stéede of a *fewe*, by heate of speeche, and by way of comparison, saide *No body*." This is obvious, Jewel continued, when Chrysostom's eloquence, "whiche commonly is hoate and feruent," is compared to the universal practice of the church.[26]

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[24] Jewel, *Replie*, sig. ¶2[r].
[25] See ch. 2.
[26] Jewel, *Replie*, 88-89.

This argument, however, could also be used the other way. When Harding excused some of Tertullian's words as said "in heate of disputation" against Marcion the heretic, Jewel commented, "How be it, Tertullian not onely spake these woordes vpon the suddaine, but also leasurely, and with studie wrote them: and yet afterwarde quietly perusinge, and consideringe the same, was neuer hable to espie this faulte."[27] In other words, Tertullian may have spoken in excess, but he had the opportunity to temper his words when they were put in print, which he chose not to do.

Historical and Grammatical Arguments

Jewel's use of formal logic and suspicion of rhetoric was complemented by typically 'humanist' historical and grammatical arguments. Again, much of it was standard disagreement, such as charges of falsifying and forging historical writings.[28] Jewel also seized on Harding's use of sources as they had been filtered through later authors. For instance, he criticized Harding for citing a canon from the council of Nicaea that is not in the Greek, decrees, or original canons, but only found in Rufinus (as well as his translation of the text).[29] Similarly, he censured Harding for using an old translation of Justinian's *Constitutions* that is missing a leaf found in the original Greek.[30] Jewel also rebuked Harding for attributing words to Ambrose and Basil that had been corrupted by Gratian and Pope Adrian (respectively).[31]

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[27] Jewel, *Replie*, 461.
[28] Jewel, *Replie*, 45, 69, 218, 238, 246, 250, 264-265, 284, 316, 335-336, 370, 383, 436, 513.
[29] Jewel, *Replie*, 130.
[30] Jewel, *Replie*, 173.
[31] Jewel, *Replie*, 427, 507.

Several of Harding's other arguments were blasted for coming from sources that were historically dubious. Jewel disputed the authenticity of a letter Harding had cited from Soter,[32] argued that another work Harding had referenced mentioned the spread of Islam and therefore did not met the 600-year parameter,[33] and castigated a work of Amphilochius because it cited Thomas Becket (who lived centuries later).[34]

Jewel made good use of 'humanist' intellectual tools by attacking several of Harding's sources using linguistic arguments. For example, Harding had cited a book purportedly written by Hippolytus that Jewel described as "a very litle booke, of smal price, and as smal credite, lately sett abroade in printe, about seuen yéeres paste: before neuer acquainted in the worlde." Not only does the author have quite an imagination, Jewel continued, but his Greek throws his learning into question: "It appeareth it were some simple man that wrote the booke, bothe for the Phrases of speache in the Gréeke tongue, whiche commonly are very childishe, and also for the truthe and weight of the mater. He beginneth the firste sentence of his booke with, *enim*, whiche a very childe woulde scarsely doo."[35] He made similar criticisms of a work supposedly written by Pope Anacletus in support of papal supremacy, both for being historically impossible and because the Latin lacked the "congruitie, and natural sounde of the Latine tongue" and spurious letters of Athanasius found in Latin, in which "[t]he manner of vtterance is childishe, and bablinge, emptie of mater, and ful of woordes without measure. The substance of the whole is

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[32] Jewel, *Replie*, 66-67.
[33] Jewel, *Replie*, 76.
[34] Jewel, *Replie*, 80-82.
[35] Jewel, *Replie*, 12; see also 224 and 233, where Jewel makes similar critiques of Harding's use of Pope Anacletus and Athanasius.

nothinge els but flatteringe, and auancing of the Sée of Rome, farced vp, and set out with lies without shame."[36]

With its wide-ranging arguments that draw on formal logic and rhetoric as well as historical and grammatical arguments, Jewel's *Replie* is a paragon of Renaissance eclecticism. Even though he clearly relied heavily on formal Aristotelian logic, he cited Cicero numerous times,[37] as well several other ancient figures, and even insinuated that Harding—because of his scurrilous language—might be mistaken for a writer of "Vetus Comoedia" (i.e. Old Comedy).[38] In the introduction, Jewel compared himself to the Spartan king Agesilaus who inflated his political enemies to his troops, then after defeating them stripped their naked bodies in the field to show his soldiers they were unnecessarily fearful.[39] (The comparison, of course, was intellectual—not literal.) He also cited Pythagoras to admonish Harding that no man ought to speak of God without "premeditation, and good aduisement," Aristotle, Cicero, and Epicharmus on the senses to argue why people who don't understand the language being spoken can't comprehend what's happening, and Cato to mock Catholic priests.[40] Jewel even went out of his way to explain why Harding's use of Plato is not an applicable critique to Protestant attacks on transubstantiation.[41]

Such a broad use of academic methods and sources reinforces that early Elizabethan polemicists, despite being trained in Oxbridge colleges with various intellectual persuasions,

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[36] Jewel, *Replie*, 224, 233.
[37] Jewel, *Replie*, 165, 175, 178, 406.
[38] Jewel, *Replie*, sig. ¶6v.
[39] Jewel, *Replie*, sig. ¶3r.
[40] Jewel, *Replie*, 15, 69-70, 178. The quote from Cato, however, was almost certainly sourced from Cicero's *On Diviniation*. See Cicero, *On Divination* in *On Old Age. On Friendship. On Divination*, trans. W.A. Falconer (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1923; LCL 154), 2.24.51.
[41] Jewel, *Replie*, 367.

rarely (if ever) saw themselves as operating within a determined intellectual framework. The sixteenth-century was a time of remarkable intellectual transformation, and these transformations were appropriated and wielded as far as they were useful to one's argument, not in line with a preset intellectual matrix.

Portraying Moderation in Jewel's *Replie*

As has been argued throughout this study, portrayals of moderation were intimately connected to the presentation and possession of the truth, which was proved both through purely rational arguments as well as the civility expected of a gentleman. Jewel's ceaseless accusations against Harding of sophistry were, of course, connected to what was fitting for a formal and academic debate. However, he also criticized Harding by connecting his ostensible rhetorical embellishment to immoderate character. Jewel complained frequently of Harding's "choler" and "intemperate humour."[42] Elsewhere, he wrote that Harding borrowed "Ruffians termes" and wrote in "a bitternesse of talke inflamed with malice."[43]

Jewel went out of his way to paint Harding as impetuous and overzealous. For example, he relayed to the reader how Harding demanded answers from Protestants "in the impatience of his heate."[44] Elsewhere, Jewel warned his reader how "handsomely" Harding had twisted Tertullian's words, who "enlargeth nothing, nor vseth any suche contentious, or fiery speache ouer, and aboue the Trueth." Tertullian, in contrast, wrote "grauely, and soberly, and without any token of impatient heate, and that not lightly, or sclenderly, touchinge the mater with one hoate woorde, or two, as it is here supposed, but clearely proouinge the same by a Substantial, and ful

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[42] Jewel, *Replie*, n.p. [sig. 5v], 4, 5, 375, 417, 439, 489, 629.
[43] Jewel, *Replie*, 173-174 (see also 211).
[44] Jewel, *Replie*, 418

Conclusion."[45] Shortly after, Jewel complained that Harding acted out of order by comparing Protestants to Muslims and other non-Christians: "But here once againe in his impatient heates he vttereth his inordinate, and vnaduised Choler, & thinketh to prooue himselfe a good Catholike man, onely by comparinge others with Turkes, and Infidelles."[46]

Jewel's repeated use of "heat" to describe Harding's temperament is quite interesting. It is likely that this was not entirely metaphorical (in the modern understanding of "hot temperaments") but was an actual commentary on Harding's physical health. When the medical humanists of the late-fifteenth and early-sixteenth century recovered Galen's Greek writings from Byzantine and Muslim scholars (especially Avicenna), medical Galenism experienced a revival in Europe. Galen had accepted the widespread ancient theory that a human being was composed of four elements that corresponded to four temperaments, or humors that, in turn, corresponded to the four Aristotelian primary qualities: blood (hot), bile (cold), phlegm (wet), and black bile (dry). Health was a balance of these four elements and qualities.[47]

Medical Galenism was particularly influential in England, owing especially to Thomas Linacre (1460-1524) and John Caius (1510-1573). Both Linacre and Caius studied medicine at Padua, the leading medical university in Europe, where they learned Galen, Hippocrates, and

[45] Jewel, *Replie*, 462.
[46] Jewel, *Replie*, 489.
[47] Though most ancient medical authors believed the body was composed of elements and these elements affected the health of the body, this precise articulation of the four elements was not universally accepted. The most notable exposition of the four elements is *The Nature of Man*, which is part of the Hippocratic corpus but is of unknown authorship and not something Hippocrates himself believed. Aristotle attributed it to Polybus, believed to be Hippocates' student and son-in-law. It was widely believed in the ancient world and the sixteenth-century that Hippocrates had written it, partly because Galen wrote *Concerning the Elements According to Hippocrates* and a commentary on *The Nature of Man* believing it to be written by Hippocrates. Vivian Nutton, *Ancient Medicine*, 2nd ed. (London, New York: Routledge, 2013), chs. 5 and 16.

Avicenna.[48] Both produced Latin translations of Galen's works (that were published abroad). Linacre was a major contributing figure to the regulation of Tudor medicine, particularly through his support of the Medical Act of 1512 and influence on Henry to establish the College of Physicians in London in 1518. Furthermore, he used lectureships at Oxford and Cambridge to teach Galen's texts that he had translated.[49] Though Jewel was no medical student at Oxford, his intellectual eclecticism and long career as both a student and lecturer at Merton College (1535-1553) make it entirely likely that he was at least knowledgeable about current medical theories. Thus, Jewel's comments about Harding's "hoate" language likely reflect that he believed (or at least wanted to imply) that something was seriously wrong with his opponent.

This is reinforced by Jewel's descriptions of Harding as a man enslaved to his passions. In a debate concerning the elevation of the sacrament, Harding had accused Jewel of Lucianic mockery. Jewel responded by denying the charge and declaring Harding the immoderate party:

> Neither did I scoffe hereat, as a Lucian, as it pleaseth M. Hardinge in his Choler to reporte, but reuerently, and soberly spake the Truethe, euen as in the presence of God. It pitied mee to sée [Goddes] people so deceiued, and that euen by suche, as had taken vpon them, to be the Fathers, and Guiders of the people.

Harding's insult (that Jewel may be "ashamed to shewe [his] face emong learned menne") was spoken "as a man somewhat ouermuche subiecte to his Passions."[50]

Shortly after, Jewel again described Harding as "a mane ouer muche obedient vnto his affections." Then, in one of the more unusual examples of Renaissance reception of ancient

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[48] Jerome Bylebyl, "The School of Padua: humanistic education in the sixteenth century," in *Health, medicine and mortality in the sixteenth century*, ed. Charles Webster (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 335-370.
[49] Elizabeth Lane Furdell, *Publishing and Medicine in Early Modern England* (Rochester, NY: University of Rochester Press, 2002), 4; Andrew Wear, *Knowledge & Practice in English Medicine, 1550-1680* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), ch. 1.
[50] Jewel, *Replie*, 375.

physiology, Jewel drew from the colorful world of ancient cockfighting. By calling Protestants "Sacramentaries" (by which he meant "Schismatiques, Heretiques, & the enimies of God"), Harding "breaketh vp his way into this treatise with vnsauerie, and bitter talke: and as a Cocke, that is wel pampered with Garlike before the fighte, he séeketh to ouermatche his felowe, rather with rankenes of breathe, then with might of Bodie."[51] The practice of rubbing garlic on a cock before a fight was a common practice in the ancient world, believed to increase the 'hot' qualities in the bird due to the 'hot' nature of the food. Jewel adapted this and added that Harding's argument depended more on putrid and overpowering smell than substance.

Jewel, like so many other Elizabethan controversialists, repeatedly claimed that Harding's immoderation was also driven by sinister motive, namely to deceive the uneducated. Jewel warned his reader in the introduction that there is no easier way to deceive the simple than to use the names of the fathers.[52] He accused Harding of using Latin so frequently "to astonne the simple" rather than "to make any good sufficient proufe."[53] Elsewhere, he asserted that Harding "thinketh he may leade alonge his simple Reader, and easily carrie away the mater" and "misreporteth the Scriptures" so that he "muche abuseth the simple credulitie of the people."[54] Jewel also insisted that Harding had "witingely, and willingely misreported, and falsified S. Augustines meaninge."[55] His recounting of the fathers teaching adoration, "is to bolde abusinge of the simple Reader, to beare him in hande" and he employs "manifest forgeries" and fabricated

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[51] Jewel, *Replie*, 379. For a reference to this practice see Xenophon, *Symposium*, in *Memorabilia. Oeconomicus. Symposium. Apology*, trans. E.C. Marchant, O. J. Todd, rev. Jeffrey Henderson (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2013; LCL 168), 4.9.
[52] Jewel, *Replie*, sig. ¶2^{v}.
[53] Jewel, *Replie*, 200; see also 595.
[54] Jewel, *Replie*, 327, 386-387.
[55] Jewel, *Replie*, 370.

miracles to deceive the simple.[56] Jewel asserted further that this behavior was part of a pattern of abuse demonstrated by the Roman church.

> I cannot imagine, wherefore M. Hardinge should so often telle vs, that the people in the Primitiue Churche was taught plainely. For, as nowe, in his Churche of Rome, al thinges of purpose are drowned in darknesse, & the simple people suffered to knowe nothinge.[57]

In contrast, Jewel made every effort to define himself as serious-minded, thoughtful, and charitable. (This was an intentional effort by Jewel to meet Harding's extended treatment of the topic, especially in his introduction.). In response to Harding's calls for his opponent to humble himself before the Catholic church and history, Jewel painted himself as the humbler of the two by associating himself with Jerome and Socrates:

> Touchinge your exhortation to humilitie, and the denieal of my learninge, whiche, I trust, of your parte proceedeth from a meeke, and humble spirite. I maie safely denie that thinge, that I neuer auouched. It cannot shame mee to saie, that S. Hierome saide, 'Dicam illud Socraticum, Hoc tantùm scio, quòd nihil scio: *I wil saie, as Socrates sometime saide, This thinge onely I knowe, that I knowe nothinge.*[58]

Jewel was forced to answer Harding's repeated charges of hubris. This was a common for Catholics, who saw Protestants as rising up in prideful rebellion against God's instituted authority, justified by their own private opinions culled from scripture. For instance, Jewel attacked Harding for his assumption that because Christ never commanded to give both kinds to the laity, it was therefore left to the Church to decide: "What so euer ordinary lighte the Churche hath, she hathe it not of hir selfe, but of Goddes holy Woorde, that is a lanterne vnto hir feete.

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[56] Jewel, *Replie*, 403 (see also 552); 513, 515.
[57] Jewel, *Replie*, 620.
[58] Jewel, *Replie*, sig. *1^{v}.

And it is no Christian modestie, to make suche boastes of the gyftes of God." Elsewhere, he wrote simply, "It is no vaunte to say the truthe."[59]

This also required demonstrating a certain level of piety and humility in matters of religion. As with other controversialists, Jewel justified his writing in terms of Christian responsibility and love:

> In this case Christian dewtie, and Charitie required, that the trueth, and certaintie of your tales shoulde be opened, that the simple might vnderstande, ye had deceiued them, and that of al that your so large talke, and countenance of Antiquitie you were, as you wel knowe, vtterly hable to auouche nothinge.[60]

Jewel also expressed his own charitable desire that divine intervention would save his supercilious opponent who, "[f]or his entrie, in mirth and game," called Protestants "Gospellers." Such arrogance necessitated spiritual, not human, mediation: "God open the eies of his harte, that he may sée the brightnesse of Goddes Gospel, and consider, what it is, y^t he hath refused. Surely, it is an horrible thing, for a Christian man, thus to make mockerie of the Gospel of Christe."[61]

In another instance, Harding had accused Protestants of refusing to believe anything could be done above nature (a common line when defending transubstantiation). In response, Jewel observed that Harding was spreading lies: "For, with what Trueth, or Modestie can he say, That we measure al thinges by the Lawes of Nature, and beléeue nothinge aboue the iudgement of our senses?"[62] In the conclusion (another discourse on moderation), Jewel turned Harding's accusations of egotism against him: "That ye charge mee with ambition, and selfelooue, and seeking of praise, although it be the weakest of al other your shiftes, yet it is an affection incident vnto the children of Adam: and some men suspecte, that M. Hardinge is not fully emptie of the

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[59] Jewel, *Replie*, 118, 132.
[60] Jewel, *Replie*, sig. ¶4^v.
[61] Jewel, *Replie*, 256.
[62] Jewel, *Replie*, 356-357.

same."[63] The insinuation that Harding was still a child of Adam was, of course, a commentary on the state of Harding's unregenerate soul.

Achieving an image of moderation was of paramount importance because it was intimately connected to possession of the truth and was evidence of an opponent's immoderation, and thus erroneous beliefs. This shows through in Jewel's *Replie* in connection with the "plainness" of truth. Because religious truth was self-evident and did not need rhetorical garnishing, it could be seen by anyone, even a child.

This was a particularly important aspect of their debates over scripture and the fathers. Jewel twice declared St. Paul's words "plaine" and in direct opposition to Harding's interpretation of them.[64] In a debate about Christ's words of institution, Jewel quoted Augustine's observation that they were "so cleare, so open, and so plaine, that noman, be he neuer so heauie, or dulle of harte, can iustly say, I vnderstoode him not."[65] Jewel later stated that Harding had "taken greate paines, to wreast, and to falsifie the plaine woordes of that holy Father Ireneus."[66] He spoke similarly of Theodoretus, Ephrem, Tertullian, and Leo.[67]

Plainness was cast as characteristic of Protestants and juxtaposed to Catholic obscurantism. In the introduction, Jewel asserted that Protestants utter the words of the fathers "plainely" and "simply."[68] He later declared that Protestants "deale plainely, and séeke nothinge but the truthe."[69] In a not-so-subtle insult to Harding, Jewel remarked, "It were farre better, for a man, that meante truthe, to leaue these vnsauerie, and vnsensible Gloses, and simply, and

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[63] Jewel, *Replie*, "An Answeare to M. Hardinges Conclusion," n.p.
[64] Jewel, *Replie*, 152, 194.
[65] Jewel, *Replie*, 362.
[66] Jewel, *Replie*, 383.
[67] Jewel, *Replie*, 429, 453, 455, 484.
[68] Jewel, *Replie*, 452-453.
[69] Jewel, *Replie*, 155.

plainely to expounde the Woordes of Christe."[70] In their back-and-forth over the vernacular scriptures, Harding had argued that only certain lay persons should be allowed to read the scriptures. Jewel attacked him for this, saying that Harding should have told us "plainely, owt of al the whole people, what personnes he thinketh meete" to read the scriptures in the vernacular.[71] In a debate about the effects of consecration on the elements, Jewel sarcastically wrote, "This is the simplicitie, and plainnesse of M. Hardinges Churche. It is an easier mater, for the simple people to goe to Heauen, then for him and his felowes to agrée wel, and thorowly of the waie."[72]

As with other controversial works, moderation shined forth in deference to the reader. Despite the work's length of 650 pages, Jewel referenced his efforts to avoid undue pedantry for the effect that it could have on the reader. For instance, Jewel explained in three different places that it would be "tedious" to answer each and every argument brought forth by Harding.[73] Elsewhere, he remarked that Harding, by equivocating in his arguments (showing "one thinge for an other") "hath somewhat abused the patience of his Reader."[74]

This awareness of the reader's engagement is connected to the critical role that the reader played in the minds of the authors. Jewel directly addressed the reader using a variety of respectful terms literally dozens of times. More importantly though, as extensions of oral disputation, these works presumed a judge. In this case though, rather than a table of predetermined authorities listening to an oral debate in real time, it was the "indifferent" reader

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[70] Jewel, *Replie*, 465.
[71] Jewel, *Replie*, 526.
[72] Jewel, *Replie*, 621.
[73] Jewel, *Replie*, 223, 381, 400.
[74] Jewel, *Replie*, 589. See also "An Answeare to M. Hardinges Conclusion," n.p., where Jewel made the same statement nearly verbatim.

comparing arguments side-by-side who was to adjudicate, and Jewel's *Replie* demonstrates a heightened sensitivity to this role of the reader.

For instance, in the introduction, Jewel promised that any "indifferent reader" will be able to see Harding's weak and deceptive arguments.[75] Responding to Harding's claim that typically binding laws can be broken for exceptional reasons, Jewel offered some contextual information about the early church so that the reader "maist the better perceiue the fraude."[76] He also repeatedly described his efforts to expose Harding's deceptive arguments for the assuaging of the reader's conscience.[77] Elsewhere, Jewel asserted that because Harding's doctrine "standeth vpon so simple groundes" and "serueth onely to mainteine ignorance, and the kingdom of darkenesse, it is now thy part, gentle Reader, to iudge indifferently betwéene vs."[78] After repackaging Harding's argument into a fallacious syllogism, Jewel wrote "These, and suche like arguementes be brought by them: I leaue it vnto the discréete reader, to iudge their force."[79] In another place, Jewel reminded the "good Christian Reader" of the parameters of the debate as they were originally articulated in the challenge sermon so that they could decide whether or not Harding had fulfilled his obligation.[80]

Jewel went out of his way to communicate his confidence in the reader's ability to decide the outcome of the debate. In an extended argument over Augustine and Justinian concerning services in the vernacular Jewel wrote, "Good Christian Reader, if it shal please thee, onely to peruse these woordes of the Emperour Iustinian, and of S. Augustine by vs alleged, I will make

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[75] Jewel, *Replie*, sig. 3^r.
[76] Jewel, *Replie*, 115.
[77] Jewel, *Replie*, 126, 175, 238, 432, 484, 613.
[78] Jewel, *Replie*, 219; see also 142.
[79] Jewel, *Replie*, 158.
[80] Jewel, *Replie*, 111.

thee Iudge, and Arbitour of the whole."[81] The best example of this comes from the conclusion, where Jewel chastised Harding for prematurely declaring victory:

> It had been more modestie, to haue leafte the Commendation, and iudgement thereof vnto your Reader: who comparing your Proufes with the Answeares, and layeinge the one on the other, might be hable to iudge indifferently bitweene bothe.[82]

The importance of laying claim to moderation, modesty, and civility in these works cannot be overstated. It served as both a validator of one's own side for being in possession of the truth as well as an attack on an opponent, who in their overzealousness was forced to resort to rhetorical embellishment in argumentation. This revealed itself in both the nature of debate and peculiar aspects of print literature, where the author could engage with the reader in numerous ways—as a fellow Christian, as a person struggling to choose sides, but most importantly, as the judge.

In his *Replie*, Jewel was at great pains to present himself as moderate in all these regards. He did this by painting a picture of Harding as irrational and impassioned and himself as civil and charitable, but also by dialoging with his reader. Jewel's *Replie* shows greater attention to this than other controversialists examined here as well as his previous publications. This is likely explained by the fact that the print controversy had now been going on for five years and grown to include a number of other parties. With Catholics publishing from the Continent, it was literally an international affair. However, despite all the rhetoric of moderation and promises not to touch Harding's "personne,"[83] Jewel was quite comfortable using abusive language towards his opponent.

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[81] Jewel, *Replie*, 171.
[82] Jewel, *Replie*, "An Answeare to M. Hardinges Conclusion," n.p.
[83] Jewel, *Replie*, "An Answeare to M. Hardinges Conclusion," n.p.

The Rhetoric of Abuse in Jewel's *Replie*

Jewel's abusive rhetoric can be broken down into a few different categories. Some of it was stock Protestant arguments against Catholics, such as the immorality of Catholic hierarchs and refusal to translate the scriptures into the vernacular as a desperate attempt to hold on to power by the Roman church. For instance, Harding had argued that the laity (or at least most of them) ought to be kept from reading the scriptures because of their immoral lives. Jewel found this ironic given that "it is commonly thought, that the Cardinalles, and Priestes in Rome liue as loosely as any others."[84] Elsewhere, Jewel insisted that people in the Church of Rome know nothing, and are taught nothing: "It is thought to be the surest fence, & strongest warde for that Religion, that they should be keapte stil in ignorance, and know nothinge."[85]

Jewel also levied attacks against historical Catholic sources. For instance, when arguing that the proceedings of certain church councils had been forged, he referred to Gratian as "a man of great diligence, as may appeare by his geathering: but of no great iudgement, as wée may sée by his choise."[86] He attacked Augustine of Canterbury as "so rude, that a man may wel doubte, whether Augustine were ruder, or the people" and the pope as a man "whose greatest practise these many yéeres hath beene to inflame, and mainteine discorde emong Princes."[87]

Some of it was insulting language about Harding's reasoning skills. Jewel frequently used a number of disparaging terms to refer to Harding's arguments, including (but not limited

[84] Jewel, *Replie*, 538; see also 554, where Jewel wrote, "it is thought lawful for Usurers, Théeues, Hoores, Murderers, Traitours, and al other like, to be presente, and to heare Masse, without exception."
[85] Jewel, *Replie*, 550; see also 539, 640.
[86] Jewel, *Replie*, 69.
[87] Jewel, *Replie*, 187, 259.

to) “gheasses,” “conjectures,” “fantasies,” and “childish.”[88] Others were “vain” and he repeatedly accused Harding of bringing in “fables” or “fantastical” (sometimes “peeuish” or “fond”) stories as proof.[89] Jewel accused Harding using arguments that were worse than puerile: “Uery Children doo not…reason in so childishe sorte.”[90] Elsewhere, he charged Harding with “open dissimulation, & a childish plaieing with woordes, & an open mocking of the worlde.”[91] In response to Harding calling Protestant arguments “peevish” Jewel retorted, “Uerily it appeareth by the whole Substance, and Course of M. Hardings Booke, that he hath somme good pretie skil in peeuishe Argumentes: otherwise he coulde not haue them, and vse them in suche plentie.”[92]

Of course, no work of theological controversy would be complete without insinuations and accusations of heresy. Jewel warned that Harding’s Christology came dangerously close to the ancient heresy of Eutychianism to prove transubstantiation.[93] Later, Jewel was bolder in his accusation. After asserting that the fathers did not hold to Harding’s interpretation of the sacrament, Jewel wrote, “But M. Hardinge with his new deuised Fantasie, is a Patrone, and mainteiner of the Manichees, of the Apollinaristes, of the Eutychians, and other moe horrible, and olde condemned heresies.”[94]

Jewel also homed in on Catholic persecution and Harding’s confessional waffling as a means to discredit his arguments. (As repeatedly noted, Jewel was not immune from these

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[88] Jewel, *Replie*, 55, 79, 92, 95, 112, 128-129, 135, 166, 187, 296, 354, 560, 572, 602, 604, (“guesses”); 67, 71, 79, 88, 91, 95, 131, 133, 143, 147, 154, 184, 337, 484, 542 (“conjectures”); 24, 39, 82, 324, 441, 447, 496, 561, 632, 639, (“fantasies,” “fantastical”).
[89] For “vain” arguments, see 22, 58, 113, 207, 634; for “fables” [¶3^{v}], 3, 8-9, 42, 79, 82-83, 132-133, 135, 149, 162, 200, 232, 337, 414, 419, 481, 502-503, etc.
[90] Jewel, *Replie*, 204; see also 223.
[91] Jewel, *Replie*, 297.
[92] Jewel, *Replie*, 361.
[93] Jewel, *Replie*, 331.
[94] Jewel, *Replie*, 372.

charges, either.)[95] In his preface—a direct response to Harding's preface—Jewel told Harding that he shouldn't complain when Protestants call Catholics by such a civil name as "Aduersaries" when you have "filled your handes with the bloude of your Brethren."[96] In response to Harding's complaints of persecution of Catholics, Jewel caustically observed, "verily it seemeth a delicate kind of Persecution. They of his side did not so persecute others." As for Harding's own claims to "constancy" in religion, "I wil say nothinge. How be it his frendes thinke, So many, so light, and so suddaine changes, can scarcely stand wel with the title of Constancie. Certainely the maintenance of open, & knowen errour, should rather haue other name."[97]

Jewel's forte in the *Replie*, however, was sarcasm. This approach allowed Jewel to ostensibly keep his promise to not attack Harding's character, and thus retain his claim to moderation and civility, while publicly ridiculing his opponent's arguments in such a way that the insulting implications were obvious. This is evident in the introduction where Jewel responded to Harding's charge that Jewel had "scoffed" at the Henrician Catholic martyr John Fisher. Jewel replied, "Touchinge D. Fisher, I scoffed neither at him, nor at any others. Onely I laide out the imperfection of certaine their Argumentes: whiche if they were weake, & manie waies faultie, the faulte was not mine: I made them not."[98]

In the introduction, Jewel replied to Harding's attempts to minimalize Jewel's point of disputation in the challenge sermon by highlighting the inconsistency. Now, Jewel asked, you

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[95] Constancy and a willingness to die for one's beliefs was widely-accepted by both Protestants and Catholics as the ultimate form of devotion and the definitive proof of the religion that one died for. Conversely, confessional fence-jumping led to charges of dissembling, hypocrisy, and invalidation of one's confession. See Brad Gregory, *Salvation at Stake: Christian Martyrdom in Early Modern Europe* (Cambridge, MA; London: Harvard University Press, 1999).
[96] Jewel, *Replie*, sig. ¶4^{r}.
[97] Jewel, *Replie*, 387. See also 573-574, where Jewel viciously attacked Harding for his role in the prosecution and execution of Protestants and his confessional equivocating.
[98] Jewel, *Replie*, sig. *2^{r}.

want the Mass, transubstantiation, real presence, adoration, sacrificing the son of God, and the supremacy of Rome to be small matters, whereas before they were great matters? "And may we thinke, that your Religion is nowe greatter, nowe smaller: and increaseth, and vadeth: and waxeth, and waneth, as doothe the Moone?"[99]

Jewel become particularly testy in response to a story purporting that St. Basil was miraculously administered the sacrament, found in a work by Amphilochius that Jewel had repeatedly attacked as spurious. I suppose now, Jewel mused, we can also believe Homer that Jupiter came down to banquet in Ethiopia, or that an angel administered the sacrament to the holy monk Marcus, or any other number of supposed miracles. He then accused Jewel of intentionally falsifying the Latin by translating multiple different Latin phrases as "mass," despite that this was not their meaning: "For as *Midas* what so euer he touched had power to turne the same into golde: so M. Hardinge what so euer he toucheth hath a special power to turne the same into his Masse."[100]

As Jewel continued, the insinuations became more direct. For example, after rattling off a list of 'proofs' Harding employed for the service in Latin, which "serue him more for shew of learninge, then for substance of proufe," Jewel asked, "How be it, greate vessels be not always ful: and the emptier they be, the more they sounde."[101] Regarding another of Harding's arguments (concerning the Latin service in England), Jewel wrote, "Here is a great bulke, and no Corne. If emptie woordes might make proufe, then had we here proufe sufficient."[102]

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[99] Jewel, *Replie*, sig. ¶5^{r}.
[100] Jewel, *Replie*, 84.
[101] Jewel, *Replie*, 151.
[102] Jewel, *Replie*, 185.

Jewel seemed quite fond of using mundane metaphors, such as his comparison of Harding's argument to a scarecrow stuffed with straw, which "may séeme a farre of to be a man."[103] On two other occasions, Jewel used hunting imagery, which would have resonated with English gentlemen,[104] again giving an indication of Jewel's intended audience as well as his own self-perception as gentleman engaged in conflict with another gentleman.

In response to Harding's claim that there was no substantial difference between "universal bishop" and "bishop of the universal church," Jewel retorted, "O what ranginge, and huntinge here is, to beate vp that thinge, that wil not be founde."[105] Elsewhere, after accusing Harding of misinterpreting a Greek word to support transubstantiation, Jewel made an amusing comparison between Harding's reasoning skills and an inept hunting companion: "And thus, although he hunte like a wanton Spaniel, and range at riot, and beate vp Butterflies, yet at the laste he thinketh he hathe founde somewhat."[106] Jewel also compared Harding to a man running amok or wandering directionless.[107]

Jewel was particularly sharp when it came to dealing with historical sources in their exchange. In a debate about papal supremacy, Harding had quoted from Gregory the Great to prove that the Bishop of Rome had been called "universal bishop." Jewel conceded that this would indeed have been Gregory's meaning if he had only said what Harding quoted, but his opponent abruptly cut Gregory's words. Jewel caustically asked, "And why no farther? was he

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[103] Jewel, *Replie*, 232.
[104] For an interesting overview of hunting in Tudor life, see Emma Griffin, *Blood Sport: Hunting in England Since 1066* (New Haven, London: Yale University Press, 2007), ch. 5. Though at a later date, B.W. Quintrell gave a fascinating picture of the intrusion of religion and politics into King James' habitual hunts in "The Royal Hunt and the Puritans, 1604-1605," *The Journal of Ecclesiastical History*, Vol. 31, Iss. 1 (1980): 41-58.
[105] Jewel, *Replie*, 299-300.
[106] Jewel, *Replie*, 337.
[107] Jewel, *Replie*, 153, 324, 477.

staied with Choynecough,[108] and forced to breake of his tale in the middest?"[109] Elsewhere, Harding had cited the fourth council of Carthage, which stated that the sacrament could be poured into a man's mouth if he became sick or went mad or mute. Since bread cannot be poured, Harding reasoned, this proved the Church administered communion in one kind to the sick. Jewel retorted, "For proufe hereof here are brought in Lunatiques, and Madde men. It were a strange sight, to sée a Churche ful of suche people."[110] In reply to Harding's argument for the Latin service, Jewel posed a rhetorical question to his reader: "Yet thinke these men, that Goddes eares be so curious, or so deintie, that he can abide no praier, but onely in a *Learned language?*"[111]

There are numerous other examples of Jewel's sarcasm woven throughout the lengthy work. It was a default approach for him, as it gave him the chance to publicly mock his opponent while keeping his promise to restrain his language, as moderation dictated. Of course, the line between scorning an opponent's argument, argumentative abilities, and the opponent himself was not at all well-defined, and one man's rational argument was another man's insult. This again exposes the fault lines running through these print debates that made reaching any sort of agreement impossible.

Conclusion

Because Jewel operated with the same shared intellectual methodology, language, and social expectations as his opponent, one can find the same fault lines running through the *Replie*

[108] Chincough, i.e. whooping cough.
[109] Jewel, *Replie*, 225.
[110] Jewel, *Replie*, 140.
[111] Jewel, *Replie*, 200.

that are evident in the other works that led to confessional gridlock. One of the more obvious examples is the expectation of moderation. Bitter rhetoric that was proof of ungodliness in Harding was the mark of pious zeal in Jewel, who made this explicit in his prefatory letter to Harding, where he wrote, "O, M. Hardinge, in these cases a meane waie is no waie. Accursed is that Modestie, that drowneth the Truethe of God."[112] When moderation is subordinated to religious truth, yet both sides fundamentally disagree on what 'truth' is, one man's moderation is another man's mockery.

Another glaring fault line was the role of the church in determining 'orthodoxy.' Harding frequently admonished Jewel for his presumptuously elevating his 'private' opinion over the received opinion of the Catholic church. Jewel responded in a few different ways. First, he paralleled Protestants with heroic figures from the Bible who indicted established religion for hypocrisy and 'heresy.' Stephen, Paul, and Jesus were all accused of slander, Jewel argued, and the Jews cried out against the prophet Jeremiah exactly what Catholics claim against Protestants: "The Temple of God: the Temple of God." Thus, Jewel concluded, "he defaceth not the Churche, that defaceth the defacers [of] the Churche: and wipeth the soile of your Errours, that her face maie shine, and appeare more glorios."[113]

Second, Jewel (like all Protestants) argued that the Church was capable of error, and therefore orthodoxy must be judged according to another standard (i.e. scripture). In response to Harding's argument that there was no need to debate matters which the Church had already pronounced sentence on, Jewel wrote, "As for the Determinations of the Churche, they are sundrie, and variable, and vncertaine, and therefore sometimes vntrue: and for that cause may not

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[112] Jewel, *Replie*, sig. ¶5r.
[113] Jewel, *Replie*, sig. ¶6r.

alwaies stande of necessitie, as mater of iudgement."[114] A similar tack was taken against Harding's arguments for papal supremacy, where Jewel pointed out that just because a particular person or party was in power doesn't mean that it was *right*:

> The Pope, said he, is auanced vnto a Monarchie, or Emperial state of a Kingedome: But he could neuer be so aduanced without Goddes wil: *Ergo,* it was Goddes wil, it should be so. Argumentes, that be taken of Goddes permission, or of the tokens of his wil, make no necessary proufe, either that the thinges in them selues be good, or that God is pleased with them. For God suffred Nabucodonozor, Sennacherib, Pharao, and others: and their very estates, & procéedinges were euident tokens of Goddes wil. For if his wil had béene otherwise, they coulde not haue reigned.[115]

Jewel found a similar problem when citing authoritative figures from church history. Jewel noted that there have been dissensions in the church since the beginning, as evidenced by the conflict between Peter and Paul.[116] Jerome charged Augustine with heresy; Augustine willed Jerome to recant; Jerome despised Ambrose and found fault with Basil; Cyprian believed differently than Cornelius, and Pope Sabinianus would have burned all of Gregory's books: "Hereby it appeareth, That Sainctes haue beene againste Sainctes: and Martyrs, against Martyrs, euen in maters, and cases of Religion."[117] Thus, Jewel found a way to qualify arguments from historical precedence and authority that Harding used to substantiate his claims by arguing that there has *always* been fierce disagreement in the Church.

Of course, this also worked the other way around, especially now that Protestants were in power. Thomas Dorman gleefully seized on Protestant inconsistency regarding female headship after Elizabeth came to the throne:

> When it serued youre turne yow defended stoutelie with toothe and naile, that a woman might now gouerne a realme laufullie descended vnto her, no not in ciuile

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[114] Jewel, *Replie*, 489-490.
[115] Jewel, *Replie*, 313.
[116] See Gal. 2:11-14.
[117] Jewel, *Replie*, 395.

> and politike matters. Within how fewe yeares, yea monthes after, taught ye (the time so seruing for youre purpose) and yet doe, that a woman maie rule, not a realme in temporall thinges, but the churche in spirituall? I am not ignorant of your excuse in this behalfe, which is to couer youre malice with the cloke of a straunger and so to conuey the faulte from youre selues to an other. But the truthe is well knowen to be far otherwise, bothe by him who for that that he was a principall doer therein lurcketh presentlie in Scotland, and also by that other who so euer he wer that made the booke entituled the harborough for faithefull subiectes.[118]

Even more problematic for Protestants though was the fact that the entire debate hinged on the practice of the Christian church in the first 600 years of its existence—this was the parameter that Jewel laid out in the challenge sermon. Because historical precedent and authority was only binding when it was 'right' (i.e. in accord with Protestant reading of scripture), how to argue from either of these points was a moving target, and thus used inconsistently.

Jewel, as all the authors examined here, displayed a nebulous approach to the relationship between 'worldly' and 'spiritual' learning. Academic and rational arguments were employed *ad nauseam* and other points were determined so self-evident that a child could see it, yet these assertions were quickly discarded when it came to *articuli fidei*. For instance, Jewel judged one of Harding's arguments as "very comfortable vnto the simple minde, that deliteth in Gods Woorde, although oftentimes not vnderstandinge the déepe sense of it."[119] Much later, Jewel wrote that in cases where Scripture "may séeme darke" that "the Spirite of God is bounde, neither to sharpnesse of wit, nor to abundance of learninge. Oftentimes the Unlearned seeth that thinge, that the learned cannot see."[120]

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118 Thomas Dorman, *A Provfe of Certeyne Articles of Religion, Denied by M. Iuell, sett furth in defence of the Catholyke beleef therein* (Antwerp, 1564; STC 2nd ed. 7062), fol. 119^{r-v}.
119 Jewel, *Replie*, 201.
120 Jewel, *Replie*, 532.

These paradoxical and inconsistent approaches to argumentation that subordinated literally everything to one's own arguments meant that this controversial literature was bound to end in an argumentative cul-de-sac. Either one side gave in, or the publications continued coming. Interestingly, Jewel seems to have acknowledged as much in the introduction to his *Replie*. He reminded Harding (as he did Cole) that arguing from the negative was entirely justifiable, primarily because St. Gregory did so against John of Constantinople to deny universal jurisdiction, as did Augustine to deny that there had ever been a Donatist bishop. Even Catholics do it when they deny that Protestants cannot show a service in a language other than Latin or Greek in the first 600 years of the Church. Jewel complained that his opponent accused him of presumptuously claiming to have read everything, but this was no different than Harding's claim to the universal consensus of the fathers: "The difference of these saieinges standeth, onely in this, that the one is true, the other vntrue: That your Affirmatiue cannot be prooued: My Negatiue cannot bee reprooued."[121]

In other words, Jewel saw that, at the heart of the issue, was a fundamental disagreement about who was telling the truth. Both sides could (and did) use every intellectual resource available to them—formal logical and rhetorical arguments, the fathers, church history, scripture, medieval doctors, philosophy, grammatical arguments, and even miracles—but none of those were authoritative enough. Ultimately, this was because works of disputative literature were never really about convincing the opponent—they were about convincing the reader.

Because works of disputative literature were aimed at the reader as much, if not more, than the opponent, they were written to defend a position, not search out common ground in the name of 'truth'—the *raison d'être* of university disputation. This resulted in a paradoxical

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[121] Jewel, *Replie*, sig. ¶4v.

approach among Elizabethan controversialists, who insisted on academic method and moderation in their print exchanges, sometimes to extreme degrees, while dismissing arguments that did not accord with their religious outlook and feeling entirely justified in maligning their opponent. As a result, two mores of Elizabethan life that were intended to unify—one intellectual and one social—only fueled polarization by giving controversialists the means and reason to confirm their theological position while categorically condemning their opponent.

CHAPTER 11

CONCLUSION

> Harding, and Iewell, were our Eschines, and Demosthenes: and scarsely any language in the Christian world, hath affoorded a payre of aduersaries, equiualent to Harding, and Iewell; two thundring and lightning Oratours in diuinity.[1]

Gabriel Harvey, *Pierces Supererogation* (1593)

The Character of a Genre

This study does not have a tidy end point. The controversy resulting from the 1559 Westminster conference and Jewel's challenge sermon continued on with more publications from Rastell, Dorman, Harding, and Jewel before being absorbed into other contemporary controversies, especially over Jewel's *Apology*. These were then absorbed in the mushrooming of print controversial literature that continued *ad infinitum* throughout the Elizabethan period and beyond. However, the works examined in this study do form a coherent constellation, as they all can be traced back to the same event and, for the most part, address the same questions. They form, as it were, a polemical ecosystem.

Disputative literature, at its most basic, was a replacement for oral disputation. Given the inability to carry out formal debate in person, taking to print was the logical substitute. Of course, putting university-style disputation into print came with some benefits. Besides the obvious boons of time to study and think a bit more deeply before writing as opposed to the urgency of an open-air public disputation, authors were able to structure their works in an orderly

[1] Gabriel Harvey, *Pierces Supererogation, or a New Prayse of the Old Asse* (London, 1593; STC 2nd ed. 12903), 13.

manner and add other elements such as scholarly marginalia and indices.[2] Their formal character, however, should not obscure the organic and dialogic nature of the works. Each was a response to a specific event, like Jewel's challenge sermon, or another publication. When considered in context, two prominent qualities of disputative literature emerge: its intellectual character and the authors' preoccupation with moderation and civility.

Intellectual Character

The concerted scholarly nature of disputative literature is its most prominent feature. This character was deeply influenced by reforms to logic and rhetoric that began in the fifteenth-century that influenced Tudor universities by varying degrees and in inconsistent ways. These reforms rendered universities a dynamic mix of old and new learning and were then imbibed by the Elizabethan controversialists who were trained in this environment. It was, as Alex Novikoff observed about the medieval period, a "culture of disputation," but one that was now far more eclectic, which owed to a much wider range of available sources.[3]

The remarkably mixed intellectual landscape of Tudor England, especially in the university, calls into question the helpfulness of dichotomies that intellectual historians frequently rely on, such as scholastic-humanist or Aristotelian-Ramist, especially for authors writing in the 1560s.[4] The result was highly diverse and idiosyncratic intellectual methods in the disputative literature of the 1560s. Each of the controversialists examined in this study hardly

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[2] Reference tools like these were a development of late sixteenth-century print. Paul Grendler, "The conditions of enquiry: Print and Censorship," in *The Cambridge History of Renaissance Philosophy*, eds. C.B. Schmitt, et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 27.
[3] Alex Novikoff, *The Medieval Culture of Disputation: Pedagogy, Practice, and Performance* (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvnia Press, 2013).
[4] See ch. 2.

anywhere exhibited dislike for a source simply because it was 'Aristotelian,' 'humanist,' 'scholastic,' etc. Rather, authors took the sources at hand and either used or rejected them based on the immediate argument. In fact, they often joined them together, such as when James Calfhill rebuked John Martiall for stumbling in both "logic" and "humanity" in the same sentence.[5] Early Elizabethan controversialists were not at all consistent because everything—literally, everything—was a means to an end: the defense of their 'orthodoxy.' Multiple scholars have noted how humanism was "parroted," "co-opted," and "exploited" by Protestant reformers for various ends.[6] The Elizabethan controversialists that constitute this study are a pronounced example of this.

Harding accused Jewel of such co-optation nearly verbatim when he condemned Jewel for selective study with the primary aim of attacking the Catholic Church rather than any noble search for truth: "your tyme hath ben most bestowed in the studie of humanitie and of the latine tonge, and concerning diuinitie, your most labour hath ben imployed to fynde matter against the churche, rather then about seriouse and exacte discussing of the truthe."[7] Unsurprisingly, Jewel also saw his opponent as intellectually disingenuous. When Harding justified restricting scripture reading among the laity by expressing concern over the effect that graphic stories from holy writ might have on the minds of young people, Jewel charged him with duplicity, precisely because of the resurrection of classical learning in pedagogy:

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[5] James Calfhill, *An Answer to John Martiall's Treatise of the Cross*, ed. Richard Gibbings (Cambridge: The University Press, 1846), 1.
[6] For the "parroting" of humanism, see Alistair Fox, "Facts and Fallacies: Interpreting English Humanism," in *Reassessing the Henrician Age*, eds. Idem and John Guy (Oxford; New York: Basil Blackwell, 1986), 9-33; for the "co-opting" and "exploitation" of humanism see Rummel, *The Confessionalization of Humanism in Reformation Germany* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).
[7] Thomas Harding, *An Answere to Maister Iuelles Chalenge* (Louvain, 1564; STC 2nd ed. 12758), fol. 7^{r}.

> And may we thinke, that M. Hardinge meaneth any good Faithe, that to the intent, as he saith, to pul yonnge men from euil thoughtes, thus withdraweth them from the readinge of Goddes Woorde, whiche euerywhere reproou eth Sinne: and neuerthelesse geueth them leaue to reade Ouide, Terence, Propertius, and suche others, whiche, for the most parte, are nothing els but examples, and Schooles of Sinne?[8]

Despite the fact that both men drew liberally from classical sources, the knowledge of ancient works was not considered inherently valuable, as a more conventional humanist might argue. Rather, these works were ransacked and manipulated to defend one's own position and discarded when unhelpful. This eclecticism is also evident in the scope of sources, for it wasn't just philosophy that these controversialists pulled from: the Roman jurist Ulpian, Pliny's descriptions of lions in the *Natural History*, Martial's epigrams, commentary from Sallust's histories, and classical theories of physiology were only some of the other arguments employed.

Disputative literature lacks other typically 'humanist' characteristics, such as sharp criticism of medieval scholasticism, a "civic" outlook, or a "moral imperative." Because of the way in which Jewel threw down the gauntlet in his challenge sermon, the medieval doctors were important allies in these debates—not enemy combatants. In addition, disputative literature lacks the characteristic politically "applied" outlook so often attributed to English humanists. This is intuitive given the volatile religio-political pendulum swings of the previous monarchs, which forced controversialists to argue for the veracity of their religion apart from political power. Because each side had been on both the giving and receiving end of political persecution for religious confession, any appeal to political hegemony as proof of God's favoring the 'true' religion rang hollow and opened one up to charges of duplicity. This is especially pertinent

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[8] Jewel, *A Replie vnto M. Hardinges Answeare* (London, 1565; STC 2nd ed. 14606), 523. Jewel continued the attack by pointing out the moral depravity of the "many Unmaried Priestes in the Churche of Rome, [who] are as muche inclined to the same, as any Woman, Maiden, or Yonge man."

considering that many of these authors—most notably Cole, Jewel, and Harding—had previously subscribed to religious policies they claimed to no longer hold.[9]

The common 'language' shared by religious controversialists with such different presuppositions exposed the intellectual fault lines that made stalemate inevitable. Two of the most obvious fault lines are the disagreements over whether Protestants could argue from the "negative," which Cole and Rastell protested repeatedly, and whether "private mass" was really private at all (and, by extension, whether the number of communicants was a matter indifferent). Others include whether images were edifying or idolatrous (something Martiall and Calfhill argued over extensively), identifying and using the 'true' church in argument (a point made by Rastell), and the imitation of apostolic church.

Occasionally, authors identified these fault lines. As observed in chapter six, John Rastell was unusually adept at this. James Calfhill ridiculed Martiall for simultaneously claiming that Catholics were validated as God's 'true' church for suffering persecution at the hands of Protestants while laying claim to desert of ecclesial dominance. It was, as Calfhill mused, an "ill argument which serveth both parts."[10]

Another example appears in Jewel's *Replie* to Harding, where Jewel insisted that the debate over Christ's presence in the sacrament was a matter of divergent interpretations of the same sources: "In deede the question bitweene vs this daie, is not of the Letters, or Syllables of Christes Woordes: for they are knowen, and confessed of either partie: but onely of the Sense, and Meaninge of his woordes."[11]

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[9] Thomas Dorman is another example. Ironically, they all still accused each other of hypocrisy, despite the fact that none were immune from the charge.
[10] Calfhill, *Answer*, 49.
[11] Jewel, *Replie*, 317.

Papal authority was another such fault line. Catholics argued the pope was divinely instituted to be head of the church, but also that such a role was necessary because there had to be a single authority to resolve disputes.[12] This, Protestants countered, did not work because popes were fallible human beings, as evidenced by the successors of Peter who were heretics, doubtful, or just plain ignorant. Again, Jewel labored to exploit this:

> But they say, The Scriptures be darke: therfore we must séeke the meaning of them in the Doctours. The Doctours agrée not: Then we must weigh & trie them by the Master of the Sentences. The Maister of the Sentences him selfe sometimes is not holden: then muste we seeke further to the Schoole Doctours. The Schoole Doctours canne in no wise agrée: there is Scotus against Thomas: and Occam against Scotus: and Alliacensis against Occam: the Nominales against the Reales: the Scholasticalles against the Canonistes: the contention is greater, & the doubtes darker, then euer they were before. Neither is there any resolution to be hoped for, but onely of the Bishop of Rome.[13]

In rebuttal, Catholics spotlighted internal division among Protestants. How could scripture be the final authority, Catholics demanded, if Protestants could not agree among themselves as to what scripture said regarding even the most fundamental issues? Harding informed Jewel, “the vniuersall churche doth better vnderstand, which are the co[m]maundeme[n]tes of Christ, and how they ought to be kepte, then Berengarius, Wiclef, Hus, Luther, Zuinglius, Caluine, Cranmare, Peter Martyr, or any of their scolers, and folowers, which now be sundry sectes.”[14] Though not a leading character in this study, Thomas Dorman was particularly keen on leveraging Protestant factionalism in his *A Provfe of Certeyne Articles in Religion*, a 1564 riposte to Jewel that strongly emphasized the question of papal supremacy (what Dorman called “the

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[12] E.g. John Rastell, *A Replie against an answer (falslie intitled) in Defence of the truth* (Antwerp, 1565; STC 2nd ed. 20728), fols. 21^{v}-23^{r}; see also 33^{r}-38^{r}.
[13] Jewel, *Replie*, 258-259.
[14] Harding, *Answere*, fol. 39^{r}.

principall poinct that lieth in question betwene vs"[15]). Dorman spent pages stressing the difference between Lutherans and Calvinists on the Lord's Supper, and Anabaptists and all other Protestants on infant baptism. Yet all of these 'heresies,' Dorman insisted, could be traced back to one source: "creaping all out the filty neast of one Martin Luther."[16] Each criticism was a manifestation of the intellectual impasse Protestants and Catholics faced against each other: both sides used the same sources and intellectual methods but held fundamentally different presuppositions that resulted in unceasing arguments with no consensus in sight.

Moderation and Civility

Besides an intellectual diversity that strongly resists classification by genre or –ism and guaranteed that no compromise would ever be reached, disputative literature displays another pronounced theme: laying claim to moderation and civility. The controversialists examined here all insisted that they were the moderate party while their opponent was overzealous, impassioned, and therefore distinctly un-Christian. In this way, a social virtue also functioned as intellectual proof. The underlying rationale for this was ancient, stemming as far back as Plato's dialogues: passion and reason are antithetical, and the party that is wrong tries to convince through rhetorical ploys and emotional appeals.

Controversialists did sometimes admit that they could become too heated and used sharp language. This, however, was always justified in spiritual terms: it was the overflow of zeal for 'true' religion that (ostensibly) desired to open their opponent's eyes to their grievous error,

[15] Thomas Dorman, *A Provfe of Certeyne Articles of Religion, Denied by M. Iuell, sett furth in defence of the Catholyke beleef therein* (Antwerp, 1564; STC 2nd ed. 7062), fol. 4^{r}.
[16] Dorman, *Provfe*, fols. 12^{v}-14^{r} (quote at 14^{r}). See also 54^{r} and 133^{r}.

which is why cutting language was frequently defended as a matter of charity.[17] Each side was thoroughly persuaded that it was in the right and its opponent was in the wrong, and this created an unending cycle in which both Protestants and Catholics further convinced themselves of their already mutually exclusive positions. Rather than helping find common ground, moderation only served to further polarize polemicists. Because the intellectual was shaped and informed by the social, yet the intellectual presuppositions were believed (by both sides) to be mutually exclusive, the valuing of moderation created a feedback loop in which each party reinforced their belief that they were behaving in a more 'Christian' manner than their opponent, thus validating their arguments.

This fixation with moderation underscores the social quality of religious controversy: disputative literature was the monopoly of gentlemen. Jewel, for instance, was repeatedly criticized by Catholics for failing to live up to his standing as a bishop. Harding used language of the duel—an eminently civil way to settle disputes in early modern England—to describe Jewel's challenge. Such language is all the more striking considering that many of these controversialists knew each other personally. Cole, Jewel, and Harding had intimate knowledge of one another, and Calfhill and Martiall at least knew of each other. Accusations of dissembling, intellectual inferiority, or spiritual pride were not directed at anonymous persons, but former friends and colleagues. In this way, moderation was both a cultural expectation and construct, intimately related to the truthfulness of one's side. It was not just a social virtue, but also a position from which to attack one's opponent for failing to live up to the conventions surrounding academic debate.

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[17] E.g. *An Apologie of priuate Masse…with an answer to the same Apologie set foorth for the maintenance and defence of the trueth* (London: T. Powell, 1562; STC 2nd ed. 14615), fol. 31^{r-v}; Harding, *Answere*, fol. 5^{r-v}.

Moderation was on the side of the party whose arguments were demonstrable and reasonable (often self-evidently), while coercion was the last resort of the side that could not prevail by rational debate. This is evident in Protestants' repeated citations of the Marian persecutions as the quintessential proof of Catholic immoderation, and also likely why the Elizabethan regime made such concerted efforts to justify the imprisonment and executions of Catholics as political and not religious—a point disputed vehemently by Catholics.[18]

In this way, moderation was *not* a tool of political control (*pace* Shagan). Rather, it was the exact opposite, a rational appeal to the audience—the adversary, the reader(s), and England as a whole—to quietly and calmly consider the arguments before deciding. This aligns with Steven Shapin's argument that moderation was part and parcel of truthfulness in early modern England, one's standing as a gentleman, and epistemic credibility. However, this shared understanding of moderation among Elizabethan controversialists reveals that the link between moderation and truthfulness was an important quality of religious dogma roughly fifty years before Shapin noted the same in the rise of the 'scientific' mind.

While this is certainly not the only way to think about moderation, it is an important one, and it shows up repeatedly. For instance, the audience of the Campion disputations drew a close connection between moderation and a fair and open disputation.[19] The role of moderation remained an important aspect of English social understandings of religion and truth for a very

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[18] One of the more notable examples of this is Burghley's *The Execution of Justice in England* (1583) and William Allen's response, *A Trve, Sincere, and Modest Defence of English Catholiques that svffer for Their Faith* (1584).
[19] Peter Lake and Michael Questier, "Puritans, Papists, and the 'Public Sphere': The Edmund Campion Affair in Context," *Journal of Modern History*, Vol. 72, No. 3 (2000): 621-622; Gerard Kilroy, "Edmund Campion in the Shadow of Paul's Cross," in *Paul's Cross and the Culture of Persuasion*, eds. Torrance Kirby and P.G. Stanwood (Leiden, Boston: Brill, 2014), 276 (quoting Paolo Bambino's 1618 biography of Campion).

long time. In 1669 Robert Mascall, a Puritan divine with a bent towards toleration and cousin of John Leverett (governor of the Massachusetts Bay colony from 1673 to 1679), wrote from England in defense of allowing Baptist churches worship freely in the colonies. In England, Mascall wrote, many "Anabaptists" are admitted freely into churches, and that "[t]his is love in England; this is moderation; this is the right New Testament spirit."[20]

Performative

Weighing these two elements together—the intellectual eclecticism and preoccupation with moderation—reveals an important aspect of disputative literature: its performative function. These works were public debate written primarily for the audience (i.e. the reader), not the opponent. Given that they served as extensions of and replacements for oral disputation, this should not be surprising. The performative nature of disputative literature is especially conspicuous in the authors' continuous deferential appeals to the reader as judge and arbiter between the two disputing parties. And, because these were all written in English, the audience was not primarily learned divines and theologians, but lay politicians. (Of course, the fact that divines such as Jewel and Harding contributed means that Latinate divines were not excluded.) The wide scope of the intended audience is affirmed by the function of the ancient languages in these works. To print a quote in Latin or Greek and *not* translate it into English was exceptionally rare and, when it did happen, it was noticed. When Jewel left a passage from Gelasius in the Latin, Harding accused him of "no syncere handeling of the matter." Jewel

[20] Robert Mascall to Capt. Oliver, March 25, 1669. Quoted in Backus, *An Abridgement of the Church History of New-England, from 1602 to 1804* (Boston: E. Lincoln, 1804), 103. On Mascall as Leverett's cousin see Francis Bremer, *The Puritan Experiment: New England Society from Bradford to Edwards. Revised Edition* (Hanover and London: University Press of New England, 1995), 160.

replied that he had simply forgot and turned the charge of "guile" back on Harding for making so much of the matter but failing to specify how it was an intentionally deceptive act.[21]

Disputative literature need not be in the vernacular, as exhibited by the Campion affair. In this particular instance, the Jesuit Campion was disputed publicly and privately by Protestant divines (something he specifically requested), which in turn spawned another swirl of publications responding to the event, again exhibiting the close connection between formal disputation, print, and public debate.[22] However, the language of a publication was the easiest and most effective way to determine audience. That most Elizabethan works of religious controversy were only one edition further underscores the contextual urgency and rapidly changing character of religious controversy, as the eclipsing of one controversy by another demanded the printing of new works and rendering what was in print irrelevant.[23] Such urgency is amplified when one considers that such practice made little economic sense and is better interpreted through the lens of the cultural expectation that every public attack be met in kind.[24]

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[21] Harding, *Answere*, fols. 47^{v}-48^{r}; Jewel, *Replie*, 145. See also Harding fol. 62^{v}, where he accused Jewel of the same for a passage from Augustine.

[22] For the Campion affair, see Kilroy, "Edmund Campion in the Shadow of Paul's Cross," 275-287 and Lake, Questier, "Puritans, Papists, and the 'Public Sphere'," 587-627 (esp. 600-627).

[23] Felicity Heal, "Appropriating History: Catholic and Protestant Polemics and the National Past," in *The Uses of History in Early Modern England*, ed. Paulina Kewes (San Marino, CA: Huntington Library, 2006), 126.

[24] For a discussion of the book economy (primarily focused on the Continent) see Andrew Pettegree, *Reformation and the Culture of Persuasion* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), chs. 6 and 7. Pettegree does mention "pamphlet moments" (149, 163-170), though it's difficult to imagine that disputative literature occupied the attention of the public, and was therefore economically viable, as much as it did that of the government, and thus posed a political problem. For a more in-depth analysis of the early modern English book trade that highlights the dynamics between religious conflict and print see James Raven, *The Business of Books: Booksellers and the English Book Trade, 1450-1850* (New Haven, CT; London: Yale University Press), ch. 3.

The discriminatory function of language in religious controversy, both oral and print, is captured well in Robert Parsons' *Memorial for the Reformation of England*. Written in 1596 as a blueprint for England's return to Rome (which was never realized), the *Memorial* lay unpublished until after the Restoration. It had been presented to James II by Jesuits, but was not printed until 1690 by the anti-Catholic Edward Gee, who saw an opportunity to publicly discredit Catholics. Gee dedicated the copy to William Lloyd, then bishop of St. Asaph, claiming that Lloyd's anti-Catholic sermon to the Lords on 5 November—the anniversary of the Gunpowder Plot—motivated him to find and print a copy of the *Memorial* as proof of Catholic seditiousness.[25] In it, Parsons laid out the ground rules that would accompany a Catholic monarch. Crucially, he saw formal disputation as the key to exterminating Protestant heresy:

> I am of Opinion that it would break wholly the credit of all Heresies in *England*, and that afterwards few Books would be needful on our part, as in truth it were to be wished, that few or none were written in the Vulgar Tongue, against Hereticks; but rather that Books of Devotion, and vertuous Life should enter in their place, and the memory dye of other Wranglings. And the like course also may be taken by Preachers in their Sermons, which by little and little were to be freed from all mention of Heresies, to the end the People of God might come again to their old peace of Mind, and attention only of good Works, and Christian Vertues.[26]

Jewel and Harding, who had both been dead approximately twenty-five years by this point, can be discussed in London, "for they wrote in the Vulgar Tongue," and Whitaker and Stapleton can be debated in Oxford or Cambridge, "for that they writ in Latin."[27] They will be read aloud, and a learned Protestant and Catholic will be appointed to both sides to check their references, in order to ensure that truth is found.

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[25] Robert Parsons, *The Jesuit's Memorial, For the Intended Reformation of England, Under their First Popish Prince* (London, 1690; Wing / P569), sigs. A3^{r}-A4^{v} and i-iv. I am indebted to Peter Lake for drawing my attention to this important passage.
[26] Parsons, *The Jesuit's Memorial*, 40.
[27] Parsons, *The Jesuit's Memorial*, 41-42.

> I perswade my self this Examination would do exceeding much good to all such of undertanding as should be present, as indeed I suppose that all principal Protestants likely would be, for that the Exercise would be both pleasant and profitable; and I dare avouch that *Juell* will be discovered to make so many shifts, and to slide out at so many narrow holes and creeks to save himself, and to deny, falsifie, and pervert so many Authors, Doctors, and Fathers, as his own side, within few days, would be ashamed of him, and give him over; which would be no small blow, to overthrow Heresie even by the root in England, he having been their chiefest Pillar, to maintain the same in that Kingdom.[28]

Abusive Rhetoric, Disputative Literature, and Libel

Given the scholarly character and preoccupation with moderation in works that functioned as public academic debate, one might be surprised to find large amounts of abusive language in them. Though it varied widely, ranging from sardonic asides about an opponent's intellectual abilities and opprobrious eponymous puns to accusations of malicious deceit, sedition, and the like, it is still there, and in substantial amounts. The extent of abusive language varied too, thus giving a glimpse into the authors' personalities. Harding, for instance, largely made good on his promises to be restrained towards Jewel, but John Martiall's animosity in the *Replie* towards his opponent Calfhill, who had gleefully and liberally mocked Martiall's *Treatyse of the Crosse* in his *Answere*, is impossible to miss.

Here, it was worth pausing to examine a point raised at the outset: What does the pervasiveness of abusive language in disputative literature reveal about early modern libel? More specifically, why were some works condemned as libel but much disputative literature, especially in the 1560s, was not? For, unlike "polemic," the word "libel" is not anachronistic. In fact, it was used routinely. However, like polemic, libel lacks historical precision.

[28] Parsons, *The Jesuit's Memorial*, 42-43.

Libel has a long history in the Anglo world. In medieval England, a distinction was made between two kinds of defamation: slander, which was spoken, and libel, which was written. The starting point for most scholarly discussions of libel is the 1275 Statute of Westminster (3 Edw. 1 c. 34), which prohibited any "false news or tales," spoken or written, "whereby discord, or occasion of discord or slander may grow between the King and his people, or the great men of the realm." In the late fourteenth-century, additional statutes increased the scope of *scandalum magnatum* to include other nobility and, beginning in the late-fifteenth century, defamation trials expanded from ecclesiastical courts into the Star Chamber. By the early sixteenth-century, defamation had become a tort in the Court of the King's Bench. At this point, defamation—whether written or spoken—had to be made known to a third party in order to be actionable. Throughout the sixteenth-century, defamation and libel became more legally complex on two counts: the exponential increase of libel cases and the qualifier that anything judged libelous had to be proven false. Therefore, if the accused could prove that what he had written or said was true, he was judged innocent.[29]

Libels exploded in popularity in the early modern period, reaching "near-epidemic proportions."[30] They are, however, notoriously difficult to analyze. The popularity of libels is not hard to understand. First, they were intended for a popular audience. Libels were often posted under cover of darkness in public places where crowds would see them come daytime. Such was the case with a 1571 libel bill that had been "affixed against a post in the city"[31] or the 1575 Colchester libels (discussed below), which were scattered throughout the city. Second, people

[29] Steven W. May and Alan Bryson, *Verse Libel in Renaissance England and Scotland* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 5-6.
[30] David Cressy, *Dangerous Talk: Scandalous, Seditious, and Treasonable Speech in Pre-Modern England* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 35.
[31] *CSP Dom. Eliz.*, 417.

tended to believe libels and official attempts to suppress them only made matters worse.[32] This is perhaps best observed in the cat-and-mouse game that Martin Marprelate played successfully for several months against the crown's efforts to track him down, which he impishly mocked.[33] The Marprelate tracts were so successful, in fact, that the crown took the highly unusual step of moving beyond standard responses to libel (i.e. printed refutations, sermons, and royal proclamations) and attempted to meet Martin on his own terms with anti-Martinist literature imitating Marprelate's style.[34] Third, and perhaps most critical to libels' success, was that libels were funny.[35] A Star Chamber judge dryly observed in 1634 that "some have been punished in this court for laughing when they have heard a libel read."[36] And, with libels, the bawdier the better. During debates on the naturalization of the Scots in Parliament on 4 March 1607, Henry Ludlow audibly flatulated when Sir John Croke came to read his piece. MP Robrt Bowyer noted in his diary that upon Ludlow's breaking wind, "whereat the Company laughing the Messenger was almost out of countenance." The famous incident resulted in a libel titled "The Parliament Fart" that remained popular throughout the seventeenth-century.[37]

Libel is so challenging to analyze, however, for two primary reasons. First, it was almost always either circulated in manuscript. If it was published, it was done so anonymously or from

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[32] Cressy, *Dangerous Talk*, 34.
[33] In the opening address of *Hay Any Work for Cooper*, Martin wrote, "I thought you to be very kind when you sent your pursuivants about the country to seek for me." *The Martin Marprelate Tracts: A Modernized and Annotated Edition*, ed. Joseph L. Black (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 101.
[34] Black, Introduction to *The Martin Marprelate Tracts*, lvi-lxxiv.
[35] The same is true for medieval flytings. May, Bryson, *Verse Libel in Renaissance England and Scotland*, 2.
[36] TNA PRO C 115/196, no. 8438. Quoted in Cressy, *Dangerous Talk*, 34-35.
[37] *The Parliamentary Diary of Robert Bowyer, 1606-1607*, ed. David H. Willson (New York: Octagon Books; Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1931; repr. 1971), 213 n. 1; Bellany, "The Parliament Fart (1607-)," "Early Stuart Libels" (electronic resource).

the safety of the Continent. Such was the case with *An Admonition to Parliament* (1572), *An Abstract, of Certaine Acts of Parlement* (1583), *Leicester's Commonwealth* (1584, but circulating before then), and the Marprelate tracts (1588-1589). Second, there are exceptions to nearly every generalization used to define libel. Stubbs' *A Gaping Gvlf*, a work vehemently denounced by the crown as libel, is illustrative. First, Stubbs very willingly put his name to it. Second, Stubbs did not at all conceive of his pamphlet as libel—he genuinely believed it to be urgently needed counsel for a Queen on the verge of ruining her country and herself by marrying a French Catholic. Hence Stubbs' shock at having his hand chopped off with a meat cleaver on the scaffold (and why he put his name to it in the first place).[38] And while verse libel was rarely printed, there are instances of libels being printed with official sanctioning, such as John Skelton's *The Ballade of the Scottysshe kynge* (1513), which ridiculed the recently-deceased James IV, who had died at the Battle of Flodden earlier that year. During Elizabeth's reign, anti-Catholic verse libels were frequently printed with permission so as to make the papists look less threatening.[39]

Libel is further complicated by the fact that contemporaries did not restrict their understanding of libel to what was written, though historians tend to analyze libel almost exclusively through this medium. Libels, however, could be spoken, sung, and even made from mundane symbols. We find one such example of spoken libel in 1580, when a deposition was taken regarding "certain libellous speeches" reportedly uttered by a servant of one Mr. Drewe.

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[38] Mears, "Counsel, Public Debate, and Queenship: John Stubbs's *THE DISCOVERIE OF A GAPING GULF*, 1579," *Historical Journal*, Vol. 44, No. 3 (2001): 629. The punishment prescribing chopping off the hand of a libeler comes from a 1554 statute. David Ibbetson, "Edward Coke, Roman Law, and the Law of Libel," in *The Oxford Handbook of English Law and Literature, 1500-1700*, ed. Lorna Hutson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 491.
[39] Alan Bryson, "Elizabethan Verse Libel," in *The Oxford Handbook of the Age of Shakespeare*, ed. Malcolm Smuts (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 478-479.

(It's possible that this Drewe was Richard Drewe, who worked in the office of the Queen's Barges, which would explain how the careless words of a servant found their way into the state papers.)[40] Calves' heads, turnips, and cuckolds' horns were common unwritten and unspoken libels in the seventeenth-century.[41] In 1637, Thomas Wentworth offered consolation to Archbishop Laud, who was distraught over a number of libels about him that had been posted around London after the corporal punishment of three puritans, by relaying his own experience being libeled. These included being hung in effigy and images of him painted on gibbets.[42]

Despite libel's long history, scholarly analysis of libel is relatively new, and what does exist is primarily concentrated on the early Stuart period.[43] Within this (relatively) nascent field, discussions of libel usually focus on one of two spheres: verse libel as a genre or libel in the context of legal history.[44] Concerning the latter, scholars tend to emphasize one of two strands of influence on the development of libel law: either Roman law, specifically the concept of *iniuria*, or an early modern honor culture that saw libel as a personal affront and, by extension, a potential threat to peace and good order.[45]

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[40] *Calendar of State of Papers, Domestic Series, of the reigns of Edward VI., Mary, Elizabeth: 1547-1580*, ed. Robert Lemon (London: Longman, Brown, Green, Longmans, & Roberts, 1856), 700 (for the deposition), 107 (for entry on Richard Drewe). *CSP Dom. Eliz.*
[41] Bryson, "Elizabethan Verse Libel," 478; Cressy, *Dangerous Talk*, 33-34. See also Ibbetson, "Coke, Roman Law, and the Law of Libel," 490.
[42] Alastair Bellany, "Libels in Action: Ritual Subversion and the English Literary Underground, 1603-42," in *The Politics of the Excluded,* c. *1500-1800*, ed. Tim Harris (New York; Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001), 99.
[43] For an assessment of this scholarship see Bellany, "Railing Rhymes Revisited: Libels, Scandals, and Early Stuart Politics," *History Compass*, Vol. 5, No. 4 (2007): 1136-1142. For a substantial listing of works on early Jacobean libel see Idem, "Libels in Action," 100 n. 3 and Gary Schneider, "Libelous Letters in Elizabethan and Early Stuart England," *Modern Philology*, Vol. 105, No. 3 (2008): 475 n. 1.
[44] Although Schneider's "Libelous Letters in Elizabethan and Early Stuart England" is a concerted effort to expand the scope of study for libelous literature beyond verse libel.
[45] For instance, Alistair Bellany and David Cressy emphasize the former, whereas the latter is a prominent theme in Shuger's *Censorship and Cultural Sensibility: The Regulation of Language*

The crystallization of libel law can be traced to a specific event in the early days of James I's reign: the 1605 Star Chamber trial of the puritan Lewis Pickering. Pickering was accused of penning a defamatory libel about the deceased Archbishop John Whitgift titled, "The Lamentation of Dickie for the Death of His Brother Jockie" ("Dicke" being Bancroft and "Jockie" Whitgift) and pinning it on Whitgift's coffin during the funeral procession in Croydon in March 1604. Pickering's case prompted Sir Edward Coke to clarify the criteria for libel in his famous report on the trial, "De Libellis Famosis," the starting point for historical analyses of libel law.[46]

Pickering's case, however, is a testimony the fluidity of the term in early modern England. Using Pickering's trial as a case study, Alastair Bellany has expertly highlighted how, prior to Coke's "De Libellis Famosis," definitions of libel were "loose and sometimes contradictory" and were shaped more by immediate political concerns than anything else.[47] There were, however, certain criteria that had to be addressed in libel cases: anonymity,[48] the factual nature of the libel, whether the libeled party was still alive, whether the libel was politically seditious, and whether the accused party bore legal responsibility for the libel.[49]

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in Tudor-Stuart England (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2006). In the most recent treatment of the topic, Ibbetson qualifies the role of Roman law in defining libel. Ibbetson, "Edward Coke, Roman Law, and the Law of Libel," 487-506.

[46] Coke, "De Libellis Famosis" in *The Reports of Sir Edward Coke, Knt. In Thirteen Parts*, eds. John Henry Thomas and John Farquhar Fraser (London: Joseph Butterworth and Son, 1826), 255. David Ibbetson has recently cautioned that the constructive nature of Coke's text must be accounted for when used as a historical source. Ibbetson, "Coke, Roman Law, and the Law of Libel," 487, 495-496.

[47] Alastair Bellany, "A Poem on the Archbishop's Hearse: Puritanism, Libel, and Sedition after the Hampton Court Conference," *Journal of British Studies*, Vol. 34, No. 2 (1995): 151.

[48] Cartwright and Whitgift argued about this specific point in the Admonition controversy. Bellany, "A Poem on the Archbishop's Hearse," 151.

[49] Bellany, "A Poem on the Archbishop's Hearse," *passim.* Coke addressed some of these themes, namely the status of the libeled (i.e. private or public), whether the libeled is dead or alive, and the veracity of the libel. Coke deemed all of them immaterial in a libel case. Coke, "De

Charges of libel in official documents reflect the extent to which "libel" was thick with meaning but lacking in definitional precision. It was most frequently associated with the potential for political unrest through anything deemed seditious, traitorous, defamatory, blasphemous, and the like. Though the qualifier of untruth was routinely included in denunciations of libel, it was not the distinguishing factor. Rather, the false nature of a libel was merely one ingredient in the recipe for sedition.

A 1573 proclamation aimed at Catholic works coming from Continent, especially the anonymous Catholic *Treatise of Treasons* (1572), called for the destruction of "infamous libels, not only in the English, but also in Latin and other strange languages" that were spawning more "seditious books and libel." It blamed the libels on "certain obstinate and irrepentant traitors" who, "after their notorious rebellions made against this their natural country, have fled out of the same" and landed in foreign parts, where they hope to "impeach and subvert the universal quietness and peace of this realm." The push to destroy the books was intended to preserve the "amity…reciprocally embraced by her majesty to the honor and benefit both of her majesty and her allies and confederates and their countries and subjects." The seditious nature of these works owed to the "malicious untruths and slanders contained in them." Here, libels threatened the delicate state of Elizabethan international relations, especially by poisoning the minds of English subjects against foreign allies by spreading false information.[50]

Similarly, a 1576 proclamation offered a £40 reward for anyone who brought information regarding "certain infamous libels full of malice and falsehood spread abroad and set up in

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Libellis Famosis," 254-256. For an overview of the historical development of some of these criteria, see Ibbetson, "Coke, Roman Law, and the Law of Libel," 488-492.

[50] *Tudor Royal Proclamations, Volume II: The Later Tudors, 1553-1587*, eds. Paul L. Hughes and James F. Larkin (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1969), 376-379 (§598).

sundry places about the city and court tending to sedition and dishonorable intentions of her majesty's godly actions and purposes."[51] A 1582 proclamation declaring Jesuits and seminarians traitors condemned them as engaging in "wicked traitorous practices, tending not only to the moving and stirring up of rebellion within their natural countries…but also the endangering of her majesty's most royal person." After naming Edmund Campion, Ralph Sherwin, and John Bryant as such seditious persons captured and punished, it denounced the spread of "letters, libels, pamphlets, and books both written and printed falsely, seditiously, and traitorously given out that the said most horrible traitors were without just cause condemned and executed."[52]

As mentioned, another pressing question surrounding libel was whether the libeled party was still alive. A fascinating example of how defamation of a dead person could still be libel and, by extension, slander of an unnamed person (especially the monarch) appears in a 1584 proclamation condemning "diverse false, slanderous, wicked, seditious, and traitorous books and libels" that were spread secretly by "seditious and traitorous persons." These works tended to the "defacing of true religion" and "slander" the "execution of justice" in England. They also served to "most detestably and slanderously to reproach her most renowned and dear father; the dishonor or note whereof doth and cannot but touch herself as near as her highness' own life, and so she taketh it." Thus, libels against England's current government were necessarily libels against the monarch considered responsible for instituting it—Henry VIII—who had been dead for nearly forty years by this time.[53]

Other records problematize the role of anonymity in determining a writing to be libel. This has already been noted for Stubbs' *A Gaping Gvlf.* In 1573, Henry Neville wrote a letter to

[51] *Tudor Royal Proclamations*, eds. Hughes and Larkin, 2:400-401 (§612).
[52] *Tudor Royal Proclamations*, eds. Hughes and Larkin, 2:488-491 (§660).
[53] *Tudor Royal Proclamations*, eds. Hughes and Larkin, 2:506-508 (§672).

Burghley relaying what he knew regarding libels written against him by the late Duke of Norfolk (who was briefly in Neville's custody in 1569). Seeing as Thomas Howard's only known writings were ciphered letters to Mary Queen of Scots, it's an unusual use of the descriptor of libel and one that can only pertain to political sedition and treason.[54] Similarly, a 1577 entry mentions questions for the examination of one Charles Ratclif "touching certain libels against the Earl of Leicester and Burghley."[55]

The intermingling of all these elements—sedition, honor, and false reports—are on prominent display in the lengthy proclamation responding to Stubbs' *A Gaping Gvlf*. The 1579 proclamation repeatedly denounced the book as untruthful, seditious, disparaging, and promoting popular unrest, particularly among puritans (the "zealous sort"). It was,

> a lewd, seditious book…a heap of reproaches and slanders of the [Duke of Anjou] bolstered up with manifest lies and despiteful speeches of him, and therewith also seditiously and rebelliously stirring up all estates of her majesty's subjects to fear their own ruin and change of government, but specially to imprint a present fear in the zealous sort of the alteration of Christian religion by her majesty's marriage, with many other false suggestions to move a general murmuring and misliking in her loving people concerning her majesty's actions in this behalf.

The reports of the "seditious libeler" (i.e. Stubbs) could be repudiated by Elizabeth herself who "doth of her own knowledge declare the said reports to be false and maliciously forged against manifest truth." This was sharply contrasted to the "honor" of the Queen in being visited by the Duke, who bore "faithful and honorable good will" towards her and traveled to visit her "not without his own peril by seas and otherwise." The Queen could not help "but greatly mislike, yes, and marvel" at the work considering the continual reminders that she should marry so as to

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[54] *CSP Dom. Eliz.*, 467.
[55] *CSP Dom. Eliz.*, 547.

"avoid all such or greater civil wars and bloodsheds as betwixt the House of York and Lancaster."[56]

A 1589 proclamation ordering the destruction of the Marprelate tracts again exhibits the all-encompassing and fluid nature of libel, sedition, and slander:

> The Queen's most excellent majesty considering how within these few years past, and now of late, certain seditious and evil-disposed persons towards her majesty and the government established for causes ecclesiastical within her majesty's dominions have devised, written, printed, or caused to be seditiously and secretly published and dispersed sundry schismatical and seditious books, defamatory libels, and other fantastical writings among her majesty's subjects, containing in them doctrine very erroneous, and other matters notoriously untrue and slanderous to the state, and against the godly reformation of religion and government ecclesiastical established by law and so quietly of long time continued, and also against the persons of bishops and others placed in authority ecclesiastical under her highness by her authority, in railing sort and beyond the bounds of all good humanity.[57]

It is worth underscoring how condemnation went beyond the false and seditious nature of author and works: because the Queen appointed the bishops being slandered, the libel necessarily touched her too.

Though libels are most often interpreted in a national context, they could also be intensely local affairs. In February 1575 a call was issued "in making searche for certein writinges and libels secretly spred abrode within the countie of Sussex, the same tendinge to the sclaunder of certein persons of good creditt and to brede grete unquietnes amongst sundry her Majesties subjects." The libels were against the Bishop of Chichester.[58] Near the end of

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[56] Hughes and Larkin, *Tudor Royal Proclamations*, 2:445-453 (§642). The succession question was a pressing one, particularly around this time, and was commented on repeatedly in various mediums, especially by 'reminding' Elizabeth of how the War of the Roses had begun. One of the more notable examples is Norton and Sackville's *The Tragedie of Gorboduc*, which was performed for Elizabeth.
[57] *Tudor Royal Proclamations*, Hughes and Larkin, 2:34-35 (§709).
[58] *Acts of the Privy Council of England*, ed. John Roche Dasent, vol. 9 (London: Public Records Office, 1894), 85, 87.

December 1576, the Privy Council recorded "certaine infamous libells" in Norwich written against the Dean, naming eight suspected authors and three who appeared at Westminster in April 1577.[59]

One of the better-preserved local conflicts over libel occurred in Colchester in 1575. On 20 September 1575, the Privy Council received letters from the Bailiffs and JP's of Colchester regarding the "casting abrode of libels." On 25 September, George Dibney was examined on suspicion of being a "favorer" of these "sedicious libells" and then committed to the Knight Marshal. Approximately a month later, a letter arrived from the Colchester town clerk alerting the Council that they had indicted unnamed persons in the town for the libels. Another letter appears 8 November from the town clerk regarding proceedings and on 20 November, a letter from two chief justices regarding the Colchester libels is noted and that it should be passed along to the Privy Council so that, if they agreed, proceedings might begin in the Star Chamber. On 20 December, George Dibney's name appears again. He had been imprisoned at Woodstock "upon suspicion of making and casting abrode of sedicious libells in the towne of Colchester," but had been released upon bond to appear in the Star Chamber. However, sometime between 15 Dec. 1575 and 19 April 1576, Dibney drops out of the picture and Chapman, Tymdott, and Mathew Stephin [Stephens] are ordered to appear in the Star Chamber at the beginning of Easter Term. (This entry also notes a letter from the end of March regarding the libels, though this section of the records is lost.)[60]

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[59] *Acts of the Privy Council*, 9:258, 332.

[60] *Acts of the Privy Council*, 9:24, 25, 61, 105. See also *CSP Dom. Eliz.*, 520. The controversy surrounding the Colchester libels lasted over a year. An entry on 5 Sept. 1576 notes a letter to the bailiffs of Colchester to send Benjamine Clere to London to "for thaunsweringe of his misdemeanure towardes the Lord Darcie, appointed Commissioner for thexaminacion of the matter of the imposicion set on the inhabitauntes there for the mainetenance of a sute againste certaine libellors." *Acts of the Privy Council*, 9:199. For a fuller analysis of the context of the

Reading Elizabethan proclamations, one is hard pressed to say that libel was a formal category as much as a political tool used against sedition and popular unrest, and often synonymous with slander and defamation. However, studying libel exclusively through official documents ignores the wider usage of the word which, in turn, problematizes the definition of libel in the Elizabethan period. Was "libel" simply whatever the crown condemned as such?

The semantic flexibility of the word is evident among the religious controversialists writing approximately fifty years before Coke, whose charges of libel have a slightly different hue. To cite just a few examples, Thomas Dorman used the word frequently and in two senses: the first for historical works (as in the traditional sense of the Latin *liber* or *libellus*) and the second as a pejorative term for Protestant polemics.[61] John Martiall described Calfhill's *Answer* as a "famous libel" and also referenced Protestant anti-Marian tracts as "libel."[62] Thomas Cooper, referring to Catholic tracts circulated privately, wrote of "libelles priuily spred to deteine the vnlearned in errour."[63] Both John Whitgift and Richard Cosin referred to the anonymous puritan publications *An Admonition to Parliament* (1572) and *An Abstract, of Certaine Acts of Parlement* (1583), respectively, as libels in the title of their responses (and throughout).[64]

Colchester libels, see Laquita M. Higgs, *Godliness and Governance in Tudor Colchester* (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1998), 227-230.

[61] For the former see Dorman, *A Provfe of Certeyne Articles of Religion*, fol. 21^{v} and *A Disprovfe of M. Nowelles Reproufe* (Antwerp, 1564; STC 2nd ed. 7061), fols. 25^{v}, 36^{v}-37^{v}; for the latter see *Disprovfe*, sig. *2^{v}, fol. 29^{v}.

[62] John Martiall, *A Replie to M. Calfhills Blasphemovs Answer Made Against the Treatise of the Crosse* (Louvain, 1566; STC 2nd ed. 17497), fol. 158^{v} (see also sig. **iij^{r}) and sig. **^{v}, respectively.

[63] Thomas Cooper, *An Apologie of priuate Masse…with an answer to the same Apologie set foorth for the maintenance and defence of the trueth* (London, 1562; STC 2nd ed. 14615), fol. 67^{r}.

[64] John Whitgift, *An answere to a certen Libel intituled, An admonition to the Parliament* (London, 1572; STC 2nd ed. 25427); Richard Cosin, *An Answer To the two fyrst and principall Treatises of a certaine factious Libell…vnder the title of An Abstract of certeine acts of Parlement* (London, 1584; STC 2nd ed. 5819.7).

William Fulke published *An answere to a popishe and slaunderous libell in forme of an apologie* in 1572, a response to a Catholic manuscript circulating at the time.[65]

The same is true for Cardinal Allen's *Defence*, a response to Burghley's justification of the execution of Catholics in England for treason, which bore the subtitle *against a false, seditious and slaunderous Libel intituled; THE EXECUTION OF JUSTICE IN ENGLAND* (1584). Allen's charge of libel against a work written by one of Elizabeth's most trusted officials (justifying governmental policy, no less) certainly struck a nerve.[66]

When Elizabethan controversialists writing in the 1560s accused one another of libel, they weren't considering the scandalous verse libels or poems that circulated in manuscript. Nor were they concentrating on the threatening Catholic political polemics that became such a priority from the 1570s on. Rather, they were focused primarily on a work that they deemed to be intellectually inferior, unacceptably immoderate, and, to a lesser extent, politically seditious. The word retained a certain elasticity in the Elizabethan period as a way to disparage an opponent's work. Of course, just because an Englishman described his opponent's work as a libel didn't necessarily make it one, but it does reflect the very real expectations surrounding public print debate. Attaching the word "libel" to an opponent's work was an effort to eject it from the arena of public debate by reducing it to a condemnable single word. Looked at from this angle, libel was not confined to royal proclamations, the courts (especially the Star Chamber[67]), or press censorship. It was a part of the wider cultural milieu.

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[65] Richard Bauckham, "The Career and Thought of Dr. William Fulke (1537-1589)," Ph.D. dissertation, Cambridge University (1972), 154.

[66] For a summary of Allen's *Defence*, see Peter Lake, *Bad Queen Bess? Libels, Secret Histories, and the Politics of Publicity in the Reign of Queen Elizabeth I* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 136-149.

[67] While the vast majority of libel cases landed in the Star Chamber, this was not always the case. A note from 1 July 1575 records that the next Assize court to be held in Northampton was to be

Disputative Literature and a "Real" Libel

This definition of disputative literature as printed public debate that was expected to adhere to conventions for intellectual argument, moderation and civility, and limited (but ultimately justifiable) invective can be better understood by considering the Marprelate tracts. These scandalous presbyterian pamphlets created an uproar in Elizabethan England that changed much about the way print debate was conducted and had a lasting impact on English literature. They also attest to evolving understandings of libel in Elizabethan England. Written pseudonymously,[68] the Marprelate tracts are highly illustrative because they were not contradictions of disputative literature, but a total inversion of the norms surrounding it.

Though condemned as libelous and seditious, Marprelate routinely employed syllogistic reasoning in his arguments and his constant mocking of the decorum expected for Elizabethan public debates reflects a keen understanding of the importance of moderation and civility. This, as Joseph Black noted, gives the Marprelate tracts a "[d]oubleness and fluidity."[69] The Marprelate tracts are most often studied for their prose style or galvanizing effect on the polity debates of Elizabethan England, but it is important to stress just how well Martin understood the importance of academic disputation and its methods.

"betwene Henry Norwiche and Anthonye Palmer, havinge made certein sclanderous libells against the said Norwiche, to examine the matter and to procede to sume ende therein acording to lawe, &c." *Acts of the Privy Council*, 9:3. It seems that during the final years of Elizabeth's reign libel cases were increasingly funneled from local courts to the Star Chamber, which, due to its wide latitude of power, helped shape libel law. Ibbetson, "Coke, Roman Law, and the Law of Libel," 494-495.

[68] The authorship of the Marprelate tracts has long been a source of debate. The most recent discussion of it can be found in Joseph Black's Introduction to the modern critical edition of the Marprelate tracts (xxxiv-xlvi). Black concludes that Job Throckmorton was primarily responsible with assistance from John Penry.

[69] Black, Introduction to *The Martin Marprelate Tracts*, xxvi.

In his first salvo, *The Epistle* (October 1588), Martin referred to himself as "a reverend and learned brother" and a "shrewd fellow," before laying out a syllogism for why no "petty popes and petty antichrists" (i.e. bishops) ought to be maintained. He then asked the English bishops, "Can you deny any part of your learned brother his syllogism?"[70] In *The Epitome* (November 1588), Martin accused John Bridges of paralogisms and inverted syllogisms to use against Whitgift.[71] *Hay Any Work for Cooper* (March 1589) is rife with syllogistic reasoning.

Marprelate's approach was also shaped by a conscious understanding of the importance of disputation in religious argument. His *Certain Metaphysical and Mineral Schoolpoints* (late January or early February 1589) was printed as a broadsheet listing points for disputation, likely to encourage readers to associate it with Luther's 95 Theses.[72] The *Theses Martinianae* (July 1589), purportedly written by "Martin Junior" though almost certainly the same author as "Martin Senior,"[73] are 110 theses (described as "unanswerable conclusions") 'proving' the presbyterian platform—all of which aggressively attack English episcopacy and its bishops as unchristian and "popish." In *The Protestation* (September 1589), Martin justified his enterprise, which now had put others in very real danger, by arguing against syllogisms that move from effect to cause: "*Reason not from the success of things to the goodness of the cause.*"[74] Even in his irreverence, Martin reflected the cultural prevalence of disputation. He mocked Thomas Cooper's age by claiming that Cooper "disputed a Master of Art 45 years ago" and expressing his hope that the disputation "was very cholericly performed."[75]

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[70] *The Martin Marprelate Tracts*, ed. Black, 9.
[71] *The Martin Marprelate Tracts*, ed. Black, 69, 79.
[72] *The Martin Marprelate Tracts*, ed. Black, 89.
[73] *The Martin Marprelate Tracts*, ed. Black, 143-144.
[74] *The Martin Marprelate Tracts*, ed. Black, 193.
[75] *The Martin Marprelate Tracts*, ed. Black, 138.

The Marprelate tracts also adopted other characteristics of disputative literature. The most obvious is the plentiful specific citations to the work, page, and line of an opponent's work: John Aylmer's *Harborowe of Faithfull Subjects* (1559) and John Bridges' *Defence of the Government Established in the Church of Englande* (1587) are cited repeatedly in *The Epistle* and *The Epitome*.[76] Arguments from Thomas Cooper's anti-Martinist *An Admonition to the People of England* (1589) are frequently printed out in *Hay Any Work for Cooper*, and John Whitgift is named again and again throughout several of the tracts. Similarly, Marprelate printed Errata at the end of some of his tracts, though they were in reality more sarcastic assault on the church, such as the swipes at English bishops in the Errata of the *The Epitome*.[77]

Most striking, though, is Marprelate's appeals to disputation as the definitive means for settling the presbyterian-episcopal debate.[78] Almost immediately in *The Epistle*, he issued a challenge to English prelates for an open and fair disputation. Like Jewel, Marprelate promised to 'convert' if bested: "Now may it please your grace with the rest of your worships, to procure that the puritans may one day have a free disputation with you about the controversies of the church, and if you be not set at a flat *non plus*, and quite overthrown, I'll be a lord bishop myself."[79] Likewise, in *The Protestation* (the final Marprelate tract), Martin declared his willingness to appear personally for a disputation in the "*scholastical manner*" with the word of God as the sole basis of authority.[80] There was, of course, an intentional irony to this since Martin Marprelate was not a real person, but it again underscores the centrality of disputation and its close connection to print.

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[76] For example, see 8, 63, 79 (for Aylmer's *Harborowe*), 20, 61, 83 (for Bridges' *Defence*).
[77] *The Martin Marprelate Tracts*, ed. Black, 85-86.
[78] Lake and Questier briefly note this. "Puritans, Papists, and the 'Public Sphere'," 615.
[79] *The Martin Marprelate Tracts*, ed. Black, 9.
[80] *The Martin Marprelate Tracts*, ed. Black, 199.

Academic argument, however, was not Martin's true *modus operandi*. Rather, his primary tactic was to heap unrelenting derision on the bishops and episcopacy in general in his efforts to prove why episcopacy ought to be abolished. In this way, Martin showed total contempt for the conventions of decorum surrounding public debate *and* threatened England's established polity, which helps explain why his tracts were denounced as libel while the disputative literature of the 1560s (and beyond) was not.

In the vein of early modern libel, Marprelate crafted his works to be both biting and entertaining. The quickest way to do this fit within Marprelate's overall agenda: ridicule the established polity and its leaders. (Though, like the *Admonition to Parliament*, this tactic sharply divided the Elizabethan puritan movement.) Early in *The Epistle*, which opens with an appeal to the "right puissant and terrible Priests," Marprelate beseeched the bishops,

> may it please your worthy worships to receive this courteously to favour at my hand, without choler or laughing. For my Lord of Winchester is very choleric and peevish, so are his betters at Lambeth, and Doctor Cosin hath a very good grace in jesting, and I would he had a little more grace, and a handful or two more of learning.[81]

In addition to calling Cooper "choleric and peevish," Martin ridiculed the bishop's age and referred to Whitgift as "Caiaphas of Canterbury."[82] In one of his funniest moments, Martin described Bridges' *Defence*—a 1,400 page work—as "very briefly comprehended in a portable book, if your horse be not too weak."[83]

It is worth noting that while sedition often went hand-in-hand with charges of libel, Catholic works attacking Elizabeth's legitimacy and defending papal supremacy (and Mary

[81] *The Martin Marprelate Tracts*, ed. Black, 7, 8.
[82] *The Martin Marprelate Tracts*, ed. Black, 102 (for Cooper's age), 135 and 157 (for Whitgift as Caiaphas).
[83] *The Martin Marprelate Tracts*, ed. Black, 56.

Stuart) were equally as threatening to the monarchy.[84] The difference is that presbyterianism was sedition from *within*, a point that conformists such as Whitgift, Bridges, Cosin, and Bancroft belabored. In response, Marprelate took the unprecedented step of leaning into this suspicion and even fanning the flames.

For instance, he pointed out in *The Epitome* that English translations of Beza's *Confession* conveniently left out the part declaring that "church government that cannot stand with the civil government of women." This was an attempt to aggravate the already tense relations between Elizabeth and Continental reformers whose Calvinist doctrine was widely embraced by her bishops, although their presbyterian polity was not.[85] He also volleyed back charges of sedition leveled against presbyterians, such as when he baldly called Richard Bancroft a traitor for his famous anti-Martinist sermon at Paul's Cross.[86]

Marprelate was acutely aware that his tracts would be taken as libel. In *The Epistle*, Martin taunted that his works were not, in fact, libel because they are true and his identity is known: "You will go about, I know, to prove my book to be a libel, but I have prevented you of that advantage in law, both in bringing in nothing but matters of fact, which may easily be proved, if you dare deny them: and also in setting my name to my book."[87] He also

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[84] Works such as Martiall's *Treatyse* (1564), which labored to prove that Catholics were loyal subjects, and Dorman's *Provfe of Certeyne Articles* (1564), which gave sustained attention to the question of papal supremacy, were different from tracts such as *A Treatise of Treasons* (1572), which named specific persons (Burghley and Bacon). This was likely a major factor in the *Treatise* being denounced as libel while the others were not.
[85] This, again, pertains to the scholarly debate over a 'Calvinist consensus' in the early modern English Church. See above, 279 n. 13.
[86] *The Martin Marprelate Tracts*, ed. Black, 71, 157.
[87] *The Martin Marprelate Tracts*, ed. Black, 35.

acknowledged that charges of *scandalum magnatum* would likely be brought against him, and suggested the same for praemunire in *Hay Any Work for Cooper*.[88]

An example demonstrating the confluence of syllogistic reasoning, presbyterian 'sedition,' and Marprelate's disproportionate emphasis on ridicule and mockery of figures in authority can be found in *Hay Any Work for Cooper* where he banters about the validity of his syllogism while mocking both Archbishop Whitgift and Thomas Cooper:

> But the offices of archbishops and bishops may be lawfully abolished out of the church by her Majesty and the state. As I hope one day they shall be. Therefore (mark now, T.C., and carry me this conclusion to John o' Lambeth for his breakfast) out church government by archbishops and bishops is an unlawful church government. You see, brother Cooper, that I am very courteous in my minor, for I desire therein no more offices to be thrust out of the church at one time, but archbishops and bishops. As for deans, archdeacons and chancellors, I hope they will be so kind unto my lord's grace as not to stay, if his worship and the rest of the noble clergy lords were turned out to grass. I will presently prove both major and minor of this syllogism. And hold my cloak there somebody, that I may go roundly to work. For I'se so bumfeg the Cooper, as he had been better to have hooped half the tubs in Winchester than write against my worship's pistles.[89]

Thus, the distinction between disputative literature and works like the Marprelate tracts is less about content and more about delivery. The controversial works published in the 1560s adhered to strict conventions surrounding argument and moderation. Marprelate flouted these conventions while still employing formal argument, which earned him charges of libel, a demolished press, Star Chamber interrogations, and a legacy of notoriety.

[88] *The Martin Marprelate Tracts*, ed. Black, 23, 131. See also 203 where Martin mentions the *scandalum magnatum* as a weapon wielded against puritans in the Star Chamber.
[89] *The Martin Marprelate Tracts*, ed. Black, 109.

Disputative Literature and Its Afterlife

It would be misleading to imply that the controversy that erupted from the Westminster conference and Jewel's challenge sermon is historically unique. John Strype mentioned imprisoned Marian Protestants who wished to debate their Catholic persecutors in writing, and Robert Parsons recounted impromptu disputations held in Elizabethan prisons.[90] However, what emerged following the Westminster conference set the stage for the innumerable bouts of disputative literature that were such a prominent aspect of Elizabethan religious controversy. Ready examples include the aforementioned exchange between archpuritan Thomas Cartwright and John Whitgift in the Admonition controversy of the 1570s, the flurry of publications following the disputation with the Jesuit Edmund Campion in the 1580s, the exchange between William Fulke and Gregory Martin, and many others.

An example from the decade following the "Great Controversy" is John Bridges' *The Supremacie of Christian Princes* (1573). The origin of Bridges' *Supremacie* can be traced to the publication of a justification of refusal to conform sometime in the mid-1560s by the Catholic priest and Westminster disputant John Feckenham. (It apparently did not survive.) The bishop of Winchester Robert Horne responded with *An Answeare…to a Booke entituled, The Declaration of Suche Scruples, and staies of Conscience, touching the Othe of the Supremacy* (1566), prompting Thomas Stapleton's *A Counterblast to M. Hornes Vayne Blaste against M. Fekenham* (1567). Bridges's *Supremacie* was a direct reply to Stapleton's *Counterblast* (1567) as well as Nicholas Sander's *De Visibili monarchia Ecclesiae* (1571), which also printed *Regnans in*

[90] John Strype, *Annals of the Reformation and Establishment of Religion, And Other Various Occurrences in the Church of England, during Queen Elizabeth's Happy Reign*, vol. 1 (London, 1725) 88; Robert Parsons, *An Epistle of the Persecution of Catholickes in England* (Douay in Artois [Rouen: Fr. Parsons' Press], 1582; STC 2nd ed. 19406), 119-125.

exclesis (the bull excommunicating Elizabeth). In it, Bridges repeatedly attacked the logic of his Catholic adversaries. In one especially notable example, he drew a sharp distinction between logic and rhetoric and made sure the reader was aware that Sanders' arguments were insufficient and misleading, not least because of his extraneous verbiage (certainly an ironic claim in a book over 1,000 pages long):

> If Maister Saunders woulde goe plainely to woorke, and make his argumentes shorte and formall, and woulde rather shewe his Logike than his Rethorike: the truthe or falsehoode woulde appéere the sooner, the reader perhappes mighte be the lesse delyghted, but withoute perhappes, hee shoulde be lesse beguyled, and the aunswere mighte bée the clearer and the shorter.[91]

The centrality of disputations and the literature they routinely spawned in early modern England as an important mechanism for determining religious truth is again observable in Parsons, whose *Review of Ten Pvblike Dispvtations* (1604) argued that disputations were manipulated to change England's religion under the guise of academic debate. Disputations are so convincing, Parsons claimed, that "Foxian Martyrs" blindly offered themselves to the fire because of their authority. This abuse of disputations, however, did not negate their significance. The preface of Parsons' *Review* defends the use of disputations to combat heresy: "That disputation is a good meanes and profitable instrument, to examine and try out truth, euen in matters of faith, yf yt be rightly vsed, & with due circumstances, no man can deny."[92]

Almost thirty years after the "Great Controversy" of the 1560s, Gabriel Harvey (embroiled in his own literary fray) described Jewel and Harding as "our Eschines, and Demosthenes: and scarsely any language in the Christian world, hath affoorded a payre of

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[91] John Bridges, *The Supremacie of Christian Princes* (London, 1573; STC 2nd ed. 3737), 962. For other references to logic see 35, 55, 103 (where he mocks Stapleton's attacks on Horne's logic), 155, 159, 279, 568, and 618.
[92] Parsons, *Review of Ten Pvblike Dispvtations*, 3.

aduersaries, equiualent to Harding, and Iewell; two thundring and lightning Oratours in diuinity."[93] Harvey's comparison to Harding and Jewel to Aeschines and Demonesthenes, two of the greatest political rhetoricians of classical Greece who were also adversaries, indicates that polemical works, for all their abstruseness, were assumed to be of great importance in the Elizabethan era. Modern scholars have yet to fully plumb the depths of these works, and I think for understandable reasons. We tend to view a "a battle of books" through the eyes of Swift, not Calfhill. However, for all that is distinctly unattractive about them, they are important windows into the intellectual, social, and religious world of Elizabethan England and beyond. As such, they deserve much closer examination than they have received to date.

[93] Harvey, *Pierces Supererogation*, 13. See Southern, *Elizabethan Recusant Prose* (London, Glasgow: Sands & Co., 1950), 67.

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