

Redemptive Geographies:  
The Turn to Local Heimat in West Germany, 1945-1965

By

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## INTRODUCTION

In 1945, the city of Cologne, like so many other German cities, lay in total ruins. The air wars leveled the metropolis of 770,000 inhabitants by 90%, with fewer than 40,000 residents remaining. As Nazi forces withdrew across the Rhine, they ceased referring to it as a city, reporting only that they were abandoning the “rubble pile Cologne.” All twelve of the city’s famous Romanesque churches lay in ruins, with corpses strewn through the streets. The Cologne Cathedral, having suffered only minor damage, was amazingly left towering above the silent ruins. Citizens who emerged from their places of refuge to survey the destroyed landscape described not a constituent part of a destroyed nation, but rather a shattered place of past personal life and the threatened extinction of their locality. As one resident recounted, wandering from destroyed personal sites, he felt in the ruins that his earlier life had been irrevocably lost. Further finding no one from his old communities, he feared that “Heimat,” (home) was no more.<sup>1</sup> Yet, within months, a deluge of citizens flooded back into the city in overwhelming numbers. Experts were flabbergasted at the extent of such materially-irrational and premature return. Incoming citizens and local newspapers recounted how it was informed by strong desires for local Heimat.

Heimat, the subject of this study, is sometimes translated as “home,” but is perhaps better conveyed by the idea of “being at home” in a local or regional place. It refers not only to the domestic abode, but also a harmonic relationship between an individual and their local world. Helpful terms used to describe it include “near space,” “experienced space,” “satisfaction space,” “personal geography,” or a local “symbolic relationship to place,” in which social networks and communities are situated.<sup>2</sup> It represents a deep emotional attachment to such places as sites of community, belonging, orientation, life memory, and identity.

In early postwar Cologne, as in other rubble cities, the loss of Heimat and its desired

recreation bore heavily on the minds of beleaguered citizens. By 1946, a profusion of observers in the Rhenish metropole noted the pervasive “wild-growing Heimat culture” of the rubble world, the surprising renaissance of local culture amidst starvation diets, the rapid rise of their local worlds in sentiment, and how such a turn to local Heimat resulted from a search for new “sources of life.” Each month, thousands of dislocated citizens continued to pour back into the city on foot. They often reporting singing on these voyages not *Deutschland über Alles*, but rather a local Colognean song, *Heimweh noh Kölle*, which recounted a local overcome by homesickness and wanting to walk home.

Such preoccupation with local Heimat continued for nearly two decades. Examining the profusion of discussions on Heimat during this period, we find two developments. The first is prolific reference to Heimat feeling reaching unprecedented heights. The second is significant re-formulation of local and regional identities. In Cologne, early postwar locals claimed “life-affirmation,” “democracy,” “world-openness,” and “tolerance” as tenets of local identity. They further replaced nationalist definition of their region as a border fortress, defining it instead as a “world-open bridge” that could facilitate western *rapprochement*. These terms of local identity were largely uncontested and discussed not in terms of guiltlessness for the past, but rather in terms of an uncertain future and the role of Heimat in de-centering and democratizing the nation.

What is most surprising is not that these developments happened in Cologne, but that they happened in regions and localities throughout the Federal Republic. This study traces a strong cultural and emotive turn to local and regional places in the aftermath of World War II. It does so through case studies on Cologne, the Hanseatic cities, the German Southwest, federalist attempts to create regional “Heimat states,” and a study of the expellee tradition “*Tag der Heimat*” (Day of the Heimat). These five case studies offer both a thematic and geographical



cross-section. After 1945, I argue, local and regional places of Heimat emerged as new redemptive geographies that rapidly displaced notions of expansive nation as the guarantor of future personal lives. This geographic-emotional turn stands in contrast to the years after World War I. Facing the partial defeat of 1918, as Peter Fritzsche points out, “the most authoritative means by which individuals made sense of their losses was by identifying their own fate with that of the nation.”<sup>3</sup> In turn, a grandiose vision of nation, for many, became a redemptive geography.<sup>4</sup> After World War II, circumstances proved quite different, with a storm of factors converging that effected a strong emotional turn to local geographies of home.

Amidst defeat, tainted national identities, and destroyed landscapes of past lives, citizens rapidly turned away from the idea of expansionary nation as a redemptive force. Four factors proved decisive. First was absolute defeat and discredited nationalism. The nation was eliminated as a sovereign actor, while many citizens sought out positive and flexible sources of identity. Localities and regions provided them and simultaneously offered federalist de-centralization. The second factor was loss and feared loss of locality and community; preoccupation with local Heimat has notably often been connected to its loss. Unlike in World War I, the home front after 1945 was a site of utter devastation. The third factor that informed the local turn was the protection, orientation, and community solidarity that local Heimat offered. Citizens actively discussed the role of Heimat and local community in confronting trauma and postwar struggles. Fourthly, and finally, localities offered a sought after space of private life that had been diminished through ideological appropriation and almost entirely extinguished by war. Local Heimat offered a place of restored civilian life that would no longer be smothered under the weight of destructive geo-political struggle and ideology. Such insistence on a sacrosanct space of private life was often articulated as a political act that harmonized with democracy.

Observers in a host of localities and regions after 1945 repeatedly argued that local sentiment reached unprecedented heights. Whether it be a Rhenish city administration reporting on “wild-growing Heimat culture,” a Hanseatic mayor recounting how attachment to Heimat proliferated in the ruins like never before, or a Lake Constance archivist noting that Heimat had become a greater value than in times of peace, we find that lay citizens were quite conscious that local geographies had gained a more prominent place in the popular imagination. This study traces a collection of indices that demonstrates this psychic turn, including the rapid proliferation of new Heimat publications and societies, precipitous return to local places of home and resulting discourses, and the early and emotionally-charged re-awakening of local traditions and culture.

Reformulation of local and regional identities proved crucial to this story. While national identity proved stubbornly immovable, local and regional identities were more flexible and capable of facilitating conceptual identification with a new democratic system. In a host of localities, citizens re-invented traditions and reformulated local historical memories to posit “democracy,” “world-openness,” “republicanism,” and “tolerance” as tenets of local identity. In border and maritime areas, regionalists tossed aside notions of themselves as defensive national walls, emphasizing instead the role of their Heimat in international mediation. This forged crucial identifications that disarmed the notion that democracy and European unification were foreign bodies. Progressive groups also picked up language of localist world-openness and tolerance to argue for embracing new outsider groups as a practice of local tradition.

This project engages with and contributes to two broad fields of research. The first of these is on the Heimat concept. Through an empirical excavation of how Heimat deeply informed early postwar culture, this study reveals the complex developments that informed its rise and probes its heretofore unexplored decline and cultural devaluation in the 1960s. This study pushes

beyond discussions of Heimat as a generic trope, focusing instead on analysis of Heimat as specific places—particularly in the shattered cities. This study further breaks new ground in comparing expellee and West German understandings of Heimat and illustrates how this relationship proved crucial to the cultural vicissitudes of the concept. While expanding our understanding of how Heimat was used after 1945 to imagine a de-centered, federalist, and democratic nation, this study further moves beyond consideration of Heimat’s role in imagining nation. Heimat was also about the relationship between individuals and their place of home and community—a relationship that underwent tremendous rupture during the war. On a broad scale, we must consider how the relationship between individual and place embodied in Heimat could be shaped in ways that may encourage more permeable and democratic notions of community. This study is very much concerned with such shapings of Heimat, and, in aggregate, intervenes in an ongoing debate on whether Heimat is a concept with progressive possibilities, or as many continue to maintain, an inherently regressive, undemocratic, and exclusionary principle.

The second field of research to which this study contributes is democratization in West Germany. Current work often focuses on imposed democratic institutions that seemingly concealed a non-committal population, followed by conservative stabilization in the 1950s, and the *actual* breakthrough of democracy in the 1960s. Few studies have explored conceptual identifications or popular discourses on democracy in the earliest postwar years, looking instead at yardsticks of what democracy is supposed to look like. This study underscores conceptual identification with democracy and the alternative cultural routes—in this case localities and regions—that could facilitate them. We should not underestimate the cataclysmic force of defeat, death, and destruction in rapidly re-shaping conceptual identifications, even if it did not do away with many underlying mind-sets and practices.

## **Heimat: Between Trope and Experienced Spaces**

Over the past several decades, research on Heimat has crossed the spectrum from examining Heimat as a cultural trope in which it is an idyllic, rural, and generic space and contrasting empirical examination of Heimat as actual places. Most research on the concept has focused on questions of the concept's modernity and its role in imagining nation. The modern Heimat concept itself derives from an early-modern term for right of settlement. Infused with new meaning in the early nineteenth century, it quickly came to refer to an emotive feeling of home. Throughout the nineteenth century, amidst growing mobility, industrialization, urbanization, and national unification, the rapidly changing world increased the concept's prominence. Much work has focused on this period to assess Heimat's modernity and role in imagining nation. Celia Applegate illustrates how Heimat was a mediating force in imagining a de-centered nation, often used to refer to locality, region, and nation, bridging the chasm between local experience and the abstract nation. She argues for Heimat as a modern concept and shows its ideological flexibility and appeal to democratic groups.<sup>5</sup> Subsequent studies, looking at a range of nineteenth-century localities and regions have illustrated how Heimat could become part of liberal politics, environmentalism, and locally-rooted visions of a "vernacular modernism."<sup>6</sup>

Another study on Heimat and nation by Alon Confino goes beyond arguing for local Heimat as a mediating point, reducing it to a mere strategy of imagining nation. Looking past the myriad of sources of Heimat as a specific place, Confino frequently isolates generic depictions of locality in propaganda where they were evoked simply to represent the nation. He elevates these sources as representative of the Heimat phenomenon in its totality. In order to make strategies of national self-depiction into the singular function of Heimat, Confino truncates the concept's history, blocks out a host of factors beyond national unification that led to its rise, and slights

anthropological works on Heimat as about relationships between individuals and local place. Though he shows harmonizing processes between local and national memories after national unification, he goes further, arguing it created a single “local-national memory.”<sup>7</sup> Seemingly, local historical memory after 1870 could serve no purpose without reference to the nation. Yet, if we look beyond narrow evidence where a generic church tower or wood-work house stood for the locality and nation and look at the bulk of discourses on Heimat, we find that it was anything but a generic place or empty signifier. The question of nation in such sources is also frequently peripheral or absent entirely.

Nevertheless, Confino’s study provides evidence reaffirming Heimat as a modern phenomenon used by different political groups. This contrasts with other works such as Werner Hartung’s study of nineteenth-century Lower Saxony which argues that Heimat was irredeemably anti-modern, racist, undemocratic, pre-industrial, conservative, and used by elites to dominate society. Martina Steber has made a similar argument in a work on the rural interior region of Bavarian Swabia, pointing to regionalists’ use of *Stamm* (tribe) as a proto-racist search for “ethnic certainties.” She does not, however, examine the complexities and diverse uses of *Stamm* and other terms. Heimat enthusiasts, she concludes, were largely conservative, regressive, and anti-democratic.<sup>8</sup> *Stamm*, as we shall see, was not always so straightforwardly about ethnicity, and was evoked by some postwar citizens to promote regional democratic identifications.

Much research on the nineteenth century Heimat movement ends in World War I, when the concept was used to link the war effort to the home front. Some have pushed further to consider the Weimar Republic and the Nazi period. While Steber argues that Weimar Heimat enthusiasts were largely undemocratic, Applegate illustrates how the concept held appeal to conservative and democratic groups. Turning to the Nazi era, Applegate shows how the regime

often drained Heimat of its localness and did away with associational independence. This did not mean that many Heimat enthusiasts had not been “willing victims” of the regime.<sup>9</sup> Nazi abuse of the concept has been a continued point of debate. Some work, placing regional administrative and party structures as stand-ins for “Heimat” have argued for its prominence under the regime. It often ignores contradictory evidence, such as how Nazi eagerness to uproot millions of Germans to expand national territory represented a tremendous disregard for local Heimat.<sup>10</sup> We know that the Nazis turned away from Heimat as a subjective and local term, reducing it to the single objective nation.<sup>11</sup> Focus on *Heimatkunde* decreased, as did publication of Heimat books.<sup>12</sup> As one Nazi pedagogue insisted, they should only teach children history rooted in spaces of “national destiny.” Historical views based on “Heimat,” he argued, were products of a “liberal” world-view that must be scrapped.<sup>13</sup> The Nazis shuttered many Heimat societies and took control of others, though the extent of such *Gleichschaltung* remains a matter of debate.<sup>14</sup> While many Heimat enthusiasts after 1945 emphasized local spheres as sacrosanct spaces that should not be appropriated for ideology or outward expansion, Nazism required precisely the opposite. Like other dictatorships, the regime sought to funnel all local resources and sentiments into the national war effort.<sup>15</sup>

After 1945, a series of factors came together effecting a tremendous cognitive and emotional turn to local worlds of Heimat. The paucity of empirical research on Heimat in the early postwar period is itself reflected in the tenacious myth of Heimat as tainted after 1945. Scores of works, without offering examples or evidence, continue to describe Heimat immediately after 1945 as a “*verbum non gratum*,” a “taboo word,” and “unusable term.”<sup>16</sup> Yet, in pouring over tens of thousands of pages of early postwar discourses on Heimat from a large range of genres, authors, and places, we find not only numerous references to Heimat sentiment

reaching unprecedented heights, we also find virtually no reference to it as tainted. Nor can we find defense against the idea of a taint—an idea that seemingly no one was perpetuating. Even in the GDR, it was not stigmatized. Though none have looked at desires for Heimat amidst crucial dislocation and shattering of Eastern cities, Jan Palmowski has illustrated how the regime used Heimat to promote identification with the artificially-created state, while pushing a socialist definition of Heimat—often inhibiting Heimat societies’ independence in the process.<sup>17</sup> The state did remain skeptical of Heimat enthusiasts, smothering what would likely have been a more popular local turn.<sup>18</sup> Unlike with West Germans, East Germans found themselves subject to forced politicization of private spaces and could not freely form Heimat societies, push a Heimat-infused federalism, or independently re-fashion local identities.

In contrast to the GDR, for West Germany, we have little empirical research. Applegate provides a useful chapter on the Pfalz that shows how Heimat was one of the few ideas not tainted, used not against nation but as a check on excessive Germanness. She also points to how occupation and fragmentation left Germans to rebuild in localities and regions.<sup>19</sup> Some work has also been done on dislocation, POWs, urban evacuees, and “returning home” as a shared experience and literary theme.<sup>20</sup> Heimat also appears in fragmented histories on education, environmentalism, radio, and processing the past.<sup>21</sup> Heimat-infused environmental protection, for example, continued after 1945, even if citizens in shattered cities were often not preoccupied with the state of the trees in the countryside. In one study, Willi Oberkrome plugs in the ruralist environmental activities of one of the most conservative Heimat societies as representative of “German Heimat” and concludes that Heimat is anti-modern, ethno-centric, and conservative.<sup>22</sup>

For those who have not fallen into the Heimat-as-tainted myth, the assumption has often been that it was simply about repressing the past.<sup>23</sup> Of course, localities and regions were equally

as lacking as the nation in confronting guilt.<sup>24</sup> Yet relying on repressing the past as the key explanatory factor for early postwar actions proves problematic. Behind such explanations is an assumption that early postwar citizens anticipated that peace, stability, and successful democracy were just around the corner. They could sweep Nazi crimes under the rug by simply “turning to the ‘carefree’ rebuilding of a country in ruins.”<sup>25</sup> But the rubble world was not a place for carefree rebuilding, and those in the ruins saw themselves as living anywhere but in the “prehistory of better times.”<sup>26</sup> They feared renewed war, potential failure of democracy, and again plunging into dictatorship, with the infant republic in many ways, the “catastrophe that never happened.”<sup>27</sup> Uncertainty and fear of disaster proved a great engine of action.

Following the trend of *Heimat* as primarily about forgetting, Confino, looking at early postwar tourist pamphlets, argues that *Heimat* was about repression and a turn to tourism as a strategy of national self-portrayal. Promotional tourist literature, he points out, depicted the nation as “an innocent victim of war and occupation.” As *Heimat*, for Confino, is primarily an empty-signifier as a strategy of national self-depiction, his account largely ignores violent postwar dislocation, shattering of personal geographies, jarring ruptures between individuals and place, and the postwar need for local home as a site of protection and restored civilian life. Instead, *Heimat* remains a generic image that represented the nation.<sup>28</sup> However, as Christian Graf von Krockow argued, tourism often erases *Heimat* as a “concrete” experience of space, transforming it into kitsch and clichés.<sup>29</sup> *Heimat* was anything but a generic space for those in the postwar rubble. It was a concrete place that was lost with actual communities that had been displaced. The need for *Heimat* as a source of real social solidarity had never been greater.

Finally, much work in film studies has looked at *Heimat* as a trope in early postwar cinema, often concluding that *Heimat* was escapist, regressive, and about repressing the past.<sup>30</sup> In



a helpful work revising many of these positions, Johannes von Moltke finds in Heimat films negotiation between modernity, mobility, and rootedness. He argues that they reflected conservative modernization and rejects the notion that Heimat was inherently about excluding the foreign.<sup>31</sup> Certainly, as we shall see in this study, popular Heimat enthusiasts also used Heimat to imagine rooted visions of modernity and promoted permeable notions of Heimat. Through film, however, it is difficult to get at citizens' relationship to ravaged places of home and their dreams of its future restoration. As Ina-Maria Greverus notes in a study of Heimat in literature, one should not take Heimat as a literary trope as representative of notions in society.<sup>32</sup> Film, requiring even larger amounts of capital, expertise, and state support represented the least accessible genre for lay people. They viewed such films in large numbers, but it does not follow that they did so because the films reflected their own Heimat sentiment. If we look at discourses on Heimat as actual places or imagined rebuilt home towns, we find that film was almost never mentioned. When it was, Heimat enthusiasts often highlighted its lack of representativeness.<sup>33</sup> Cinematic depictions of the city as anti-Heimat certainly conflicted with those for whom such cities represented a deeply cherished Heimat.<sup>34</sup> Divergences between Heimat as cinematic trope and popular experience, in short, calls for empirical observation of Heimat as specific places and reconstructed sites of home that were seldom imagined to be in a generic stretch of countryside.

An empirical approach illustrates how the ravaged cities and shattered landscapes of the early postwar world represented focal points of the local turn.<sup>35</sup> While few studies have examined Heimat in cities, the existence of urban Heimat feeling has had its defenders.<sup>36</sup> Sociologists, psychologists, and anthropologists have been the clearest in pointing to the reality of urban Heimat feeling, which has also appeared as a theme in literature.<sup>37</sup> Only through empirical consideration of Heimat as actual places do we discover how it deeply informed early postwar

culture, federalist visions, and attempts to bridge torn life narratives, gather energies for reconstructions, and imagine new postwar civilian lives. Such an examination also provides the means to confront the outstanding question of what happens to local and regional identities when nations fail.<sup>38</sup> In the case of West Germany, the answer was: a great deal.

Probing these developments necessitates looking at sources from a broad array of provenances and genres, including source from non-societal Heimat enthusiasts and multiple societies that engaged in different activities. The sources used in this study include Heimat journals, Heimat society papers, Heimat chronicles, Heimat books,<sup>39</sup> Heimat poetry, Heimat songs, city government reports, amateur historical writings, extensive local newspapers, autobiographies, and pamphlets and programs from local Heimat festivals. What we find through these sources is the popular roots of desires for local Heimat in a precarious and uncertain world.

### **Geographies of Life After Death: Local Heimat as a Site of Postwar Cathexis**

“Hamburg,” Wolfgang Borchert wrote, was for him and his fellow early postwar locals, “more than a pile of stones;” it was their “will to exist.”<sup>40</sup> Early postwar scholars have asked how Germans after 1945 sought “life after death.”<sup>41</sup> However, none have considered what geographies became the containers for visions of life after death—a question with significant ramifications for politics and culture. In rubble cities, locals often described Heimat as a site of “life affirmation” and conflated their future personal lives with that of their locality. Rather than looking to expansionary nation to redress their plight, they sought to begin anew by “holding together on the small bit of earth left...from the earth of the Heimat” in the “small circle” of their regional community.<sup>42</sup> The Nazi regime had promoted the nation as the singular redemptive force, and it resulted in total destruction, occupation, and defeat. The collapse between home front and war

front brought tremendous disillusionment as home towns became the center of warfare.<sup>43</sup> The rubble world was filled with rupture and latency in which the past was cut off from them and the future seemed anything but certain.<sup>44</sup> Heimat emerged as a means of bridging across this rupture. An inherent binary of the Heimat concept proved crucial: on the one hand it was a past experienced space—a place of personal biography, memory, and community; on the other, it was an imagined ideal relationship between individual, place and the “possibilities of community.”<sup>45</sup> Heimat proved capable of unifying a lost past with an imagined future, while offering a much desired site of civilian normality. Such desires reflected hunger for private spheres and domestic places of home that can be found throughout war-torn Europe.<sup>46</sup> Though early postwar “normality” has been challenged as a misnomer since pre-war socio-economic circumstances were never restored, the point was not restoring earlier social conditions.<sup>47</sup> Rather, it was about restoring a local world where private life would not be sacrificed on the altar of ideology, geopolitics, and warfare.

Finally, the turn to local Heimat as a site of life after death, I argue, resulted from strong desire for community solidarity amidst trauma and insecurity. Desire for protection and security are not only associated with early postwar culture, they are also associated with Heimat and local community. Such communities were integrative forces in a world fraught with challenges that threatened to tear apart inter-human bonds.<sup>48</sup> Citizens re-awoke local culture, often noting how it provided glue for community feeling and compensated for the lost built environment. Local cultural renaissance brought citizens together in both real and imagined ways. This phenomenon helps answer the recently posed question of how the social fabric of such “post-catastrophic cities” have historically been reconstructed. In early postwar West Germany, the Heimat concept proved crucial.<sup>49</sup> Moreover, it was not just in the destroyed cities that Heimat had great attraction.

The countryside too had been flooded with millions of evacuees and expellees, and faced torn communities from death and dislocation.<sup>50</sup> They too looked to Heimat as a site of life after death.

Looking to normal localized civilian lives meant that, unlike after 1918, citizens were no longer looking to an assertive nation as redeemer. This study therefore strongly disagrees with the assessment that desires for normality hindered democratization.<sup>51</sup> The shift to focusing on normalized local civilian life ultimately proved crucial to cultural demobilization, which required the dismantling of the values and mind sets of war.<sup>52</sup> Turning to Heimat and politics in the early postwar period, we further find that many saw turning to local worlds as anything but sticking one's head into parochial sands.

### **Federalism and the Local Turn**

Far from retreating into private life, many Heimat enthusiasts articulated the turn to local Heimat as a part of an essential democratic realignment between the private and ideological spheres. They described how focus on local worlds was crucial to federalism and rejecting Nazi “Nibelungen-like large spatial thinking.” As one Badenese regionalist held the “germ of dictatorship,” could be found in the “herd that has the ambition to be ever more numerous, ever more unitary, ever more powerful.” Within the “visual range of the Heimat-like church tower” or the “reach of the Heimat-like parliament,” he argued, citizens had a comprehensible realm in which they could realize popular democratic participation.<sup>53</sup> In articulating the role of the local in democracy, Heimat enthusiasts revived historical memories of German federalisms and evoked federalist theories from beyond their region. Through Heimat-infused federalism, citizens emphasized a de-centralized vision of nation. Historically, Heimat could be used either to promote the national idea or contain or “modify” its breadth.<sup>54</sup> After 1945, the modifying role

became crucial, with Heimat enthusiasts addressing how they could serve the nation by moderating disproportionate focus on broad national geographies.

This study rejects the notion that desires for cultural federalism and local geographies of private life represented either cultural pessimism or “fearful efforts at containment of modernity.”<sup>55</sup> By contrast, it represented a search for a “vernacular modernity”(Umbach and Hüppauf) that balanced local rootedness with modern changes. Heimat enthusiasts often argued for harmonizing tradition, development, progress, and local rootedness. Their concern with “massification,” moreover, made them neither anti-modern nor anti-democratic, as current historiography would maintain.<sup>56</sup> Rather, Heimat enthusiasts often discussed massification as a danger *to* democracy, that was reflected in how Nazism and Soviet Communism treated individuals as part of a fungible mass. Heimat enthusiasts described localities as “comprehensible spaces” and “elementary schools of democracy.” Vast bureaucratic structures, they believed, resulted in a realm controlled by elites, mass state machinery, and powered interests.

Creating structures for a Heimat-infused federalism, however, proved a challenge. Several advocated a federalism made up of regional “Heimat states.” Attempts to redraw the map according to regional Heimat, however, was unprecedented. Geographers, historians, research institutes, politicians, and Heimat societies which sought to discover such geographies found pervasive disagreement. No factors, including confession, *Stamm*, dialect, ritual traditions, urban centers, or past states forged universally shared cognitive maps. Heimat permitted tremendously subjective and diverse constructions of belonging, both in geographic and qualitative terms. This allowed for more individualistic definitions of Heimat, while at the same time making it problematic as the basis of new structures. Though visions of Heimat-infused federalisms were

abandoned by the mid to late 1950s with the ascendance of a more functionalist federalism, Heimat enthusiasts proved more effective in transforming local and regional identities.

### **Localities, Regions and Forging Identity with Postwar Democracy**

While national identity in the early postwar period proved stubbornly inflexible, local and regional identities, I argue, proved malleable and capable of being reformulated to facilitate identification with a new system. Heimat enthusiasts almost immediately after 1945 rapidly forged notions like “Hanseatic republicanism,” “Colognian democracy,” “Badenese democracy,” or “Swabian-Alemannic democracy,” as explicit local values. Reconfiguring historical memories and re-inventing local traditions proved key to their construction. Such notions of local and regional identities, rather than the product of a clear advocating group, was advanced interchangeably by a range of actors, including Heimat societies, amateur authors, local historians, and local politicians. Such claimed tenets of local identities quickly became dominant.

Collective historical memory, as Maurice Halbwachs argued, is shaped by the circumstances and social pressures of a given period.<sup>57</sup> Studies of postwar Germany, however, have not looked at how popular memory of the long haul of German history was used to reformulate identification at a time when many feared a second Weimar.<sup>58</sup> Useful historical memories varied by place, making the similarity of results all the more striking. Hanseatic localists drew on their histories as republics, discussing their use in the “gradual overcoming of their great German distress!”<sup>59</sup> Colognian Heimat enthusiasts looked to their history as a free city, “guild democracy,” and hotbed of nineteenth-century democratic activities. Badenese regionalists looked to their region’s prominence in the revolutions of 1848 and the Weimar Republic. Swabians pulled on similar histories and historic federalist fragmentation of their

region. Negative historical memories proved equally useful. Across West Elbian Germany, localists pulled upon and magnified anti-Prussian sentiments, arguing for hostility to Prussian militarism, authoritarianism, centralization, rigid class structure, and submission to authority as the foil to their own identities. The allies often praised such reformulations, sharing hostility to the Prussian tradition.<sup>60</sup> Beyond historical memory, re-inventing local traditions played a prominent role. In Cologne, locals promoted Cologne Carnival as an embodiment of democratic participation, freedom of speech, anti-Prussianism, rejection of authority, and mockery of militarism. In places like Lübeck, citizens could re-awaken their *Volks- und Erinnerungsfest*, created by the 1848ers, strip it of nationalist interpretations, remove sharp-shooter events, and observe it as a celebration of local democratic histories. Whether or not such histories and traditions “truly” contained such meanings, they facilitated new identities and provided a medium for dis-identifying with centralization, nationalism, and National Socialism.

In uncovering the growth of such local identities in the early postwar years, this study contributes to research on West German democratization in several important ways. Historians continue to debate the overarching narratives, years of caesura, and key factors in the “democracy wonder” in West Germany.<sup>61</sup> Grand narratives have ranged from Americanization and Modernization to Liberalization and Westernization.<sup>62</sup> Current work, however, has not looked in depth at either early popular identifications or lay discourses on democracy. It emphasizes the 1960s as the actual breakthrough in democratization, with the early Federal Republic often viewed as an institutional democratic shell that concealed an unreceptive population.<sup>63</sup> Some have noted a “modernization under conservative auspices” in the earlier years, with conservative integration, economic growth, and stabilization redounding to the benefit of democracy.<sup>64</sup> On the whole, however, scholars have downplayed the importance of the period to democratization. This

study does not seek to diminish the role of pluralization in the 1960s in West German democratization. Rather, it expands discussion to consider how West Germans used alternative media in the earlier years to forge new identifications.

For the period of the late 1940s and 1950s, a number of historians, often attacking the thesis of a zero hour, have rightly highlighted persisting racist attitudes, lack of a critical press, undemocratic views of authority, backward gender norms, and failure to prosecute former Nazis.<sup>65</sup> We are quite justified in being skeptical of absolute ruptures, whether in West Germany after 1945 or in any other historical time and place. Nevertheless, the grand narrative of these years as a time of undemocratic “continuity” proves problematic. Such continuity is often created by isolating strands from their broader context, obscuring interactions with a range of other forces that could ultimately contribute to the habituary phase of democratization.<sup>66</sup> “Continuity,” rather than referencing persistence of Nazi beliefs, is often evoked without demonstrating its significance or deeper meaning, used to describe continuities such as scarcity and destruction or the strength of the social state.<sup>67</sup> For these reason, this study eschews vague categories of continuity and rupture in favor of focusing on the interaction of different strands and how old traditions could be reformulated within a complex system. Taking the example of *Heimat*, one could say that there were “continuities” such as environmental protection, local dialects, or festivals. Yet this is hardly significant and obfuscates more than it enlightens. It conceals reformulations and re-inventions beneath the surface that resulted in very different trajectories.

In looking at *Heimat* enthusiasts’ discussions of democracy, this study moves beyond elite actors and intellectuals to consider the importance of realms of everyday life in the story of developing identification with democracy. As one recent volume notes, much work remains to be done on how private and personal realms figured into democratization in postwar Germany.<sup>68</sup>



While historians have measured West German democratization through contemporary benchmarks of practice—whether it be embrace of American Rock and Roll youth culture or developing a critical press—democracy is a constantly changing idea that must be historicized.<sup>69</sup> Beyond imposing current definitions of what democratic practice should look like, we must ask how lay people talked about and forged identification with the “search for democracy.”<sup>70</sup> In pointing to the earliest postwar years, I would argue that we must not underestimate the force of the Nazi “battle until self-destruction” and the subsequent calamity in rapidly shifting identifications. Defeat and catastrophe can be strong legitimizing forces, and were impossible to interpret as anything but the result of Nazism.<sup>71</sup> Even if a host of continuous mentalities and practices remained, dis-identification with Nazism was often swift.

Finally, this study contributes to recent debates on the role of interior versus external impulses in West German democratization. One recent volume has argued that it combined both outside impulses with re-framed German traditions.<sup>72</sup> This project expands this research into the realm of identifications in which reformulated historical memories and traditions played an important role. Democracy could not simply be imposed by the outside, and the allies would have had an infinitely more difficult task if they did not have a receptive audience that felt they could draw on their own traditions.<sup>73</sup> Nothing could have been worse for the prospects of German democracy than the notion that it was utterly foreign. Through local identities, democracy could be seen as in harmony with tradition. At the same time identification did not equate to adept practice, and the “search for democracy as a life form” was long and arduous.<sup>74</sup>

### **Attenuating National Borders: Heimat and a Unified Europe**

In addition to the search for democracy, early postwar citizens faced the task of imagining

a new Europe, tearing down borders, and scrapping enemy images vis-a-vis the West. Some scholars have described democratization itself as a “long path” to and “arrival” in the West.<sup>75</sup> Though some have stereotyped Heimat as “anti-western” and hostile to the outside, this study argues that, in the early postwar world, it often proved anything but.<sup>76</sup> Heimat enthusiasts were frequently among the most strident advocates of European unification. Border areas from the Southwest to the Rhineland to the coastal Hanseatic cities rapidly inverted nationalist definitions of themselves as the most deeply German guardians of the border. For the years before 1945, several scholars have demonstrated the prominence of such nationalist and Nazi definition of border regions—whether it be the Pfalz, Schleswig-Holstein, or the German Southwest. Such ideas were well reflected in the idea of the Rhineland as a Watch on the Rhine.<sup>77</sup> After 1945, border regions tossed these narratives of place overboard, and underscored the mediating role of their region, including historic influences on their regions from beyond Germany and the function of their Heimat in re-creating fluid borderlands. Many also argued for a parallelism between inner-German federalism and a unified Europe.

As early as the mid 1940s, we find strong evidence of these developments. Rheinländer drove the nails into the coffin of the Watch on the Rhine and emphasized notions of their region as a “world-open bridge” to the West. Hanseatic citizens reformulated notions of themselves as “gates to the world” to emphasize mediation and giving and receiving, rather than being exit points of German power onto the global stage. Heimat enthusiasts of the Southwest emphasized world-openness as a regional value and their role in mediation and creating porous borderlands vis-a-vis France and Switzerland. These definitions of place went largely unchallenged, in spite of these regions having recently undergone harsh allied occupation.<sup>78</sup> Such identifications deconstructed enemy images, whose removal proved crucial to cultural demobilization.<sup>79</sup> In forging

such identities, reformulation of historical memory and re-invention of traditions again proved instrumental. Histories of foreign influence, international trade and movement, and pre-national eras with fluid borderlands all proved useful. Hanseatic citizens emphasized their sea-faring and commercial traditions, and Hamburger revived and reformulated the “Over Seas Day” tradition. Colognians emphasized Roman influences and medieval histories of the Christian *Abendland*, while showcasing these notions of regionalness at special events. Many in the Southwest emphasized French influence on their culture and their historical connections to the Swiss. Competing regionalists arguing for different federal states in the Southwest argued back and forth on which vision of region would facilitate a better “world-open bridge” to their neighbors.

Creating world-open bridges to the West through Heimat contrasted with the “burned bridge” vis-a-vis the Eastern bloc.<sup>80</sup> Pre-existing enemy image vis-a-vis the East were only slightly altered after the war.<sup>81</sup> Heimat enthusiasts often lumped together the Soviet Union, Nazism and Prussia, as anti-Heimat forces that uprooted individuals at will for purposes of state. Many also argued that lack of personal freedoms created an anti-Heimat, pointing to the Soviet Union’s mistreatment of non-Russian minorities, the “prison” of the GDR, and Soviet expulsion of the expellees. Encoding the Eastern bloc as anti-Heimat paralleled bloc propaganda which depicted the West as imperialist abusers of the Heimat concept.

### **Local “World-Openness,” “Tolerance,” and the Arrival of Outsiders**

Beyond using ideas of local world-openness to encourage identification with Europe, progressive localists used such claims to confront the influx of outsiders—in particular millions of expellees. Tensions and hostilities vis-a-vis such newcomers have been well documented. Some Heimat groups did little to include outsiders or sought to explicitly exclude them, while others

became vocal advocates of integration, using claims to local world-openness to promote embracing outsiders as a practice of local traditions. Historical memories of outsider integration proved valuable in this project. Another strategy for inclusion entailed emphasizing the universality of Heimat; progressive Heimat enthusiasts argued that by looking to their own Heimat and imagining its searing loss, natives could develop sympathy with expellees. Several further argued for using ritual local traditions to integrate and teach newcomers about local cultures. Expectations that expellees would shed former regional cultures in the process varied.

By the mid 1950s and 1960's, many promoted Hanseatic tolerance and Cologneian tolerance as local values. In the more rural Southwest, claims to tolerance as a regional value, while occasionally appearing, never gained popularity. Many Heimat enthusiasts drew on the same historical memories and traditions to anchor ideas of local tolerance that they used in articulating notions of local “world-openness.” In Cologne localists drew on histories of outsider integration, trade, and Cologne Carnival as a performance of tolerance. Local tolerance further proved to be a sliding signifier, used over time to reference to new outsiders groups. Though early postwar Germany was more ethnically homogenous than ever before, foreign immigrants later arrived in large numbers. Some progressive localists used claims of local tolerance to encourage integration. They further appealed to Heimat as a human metaphor, arguing that all people are capable of understanding those, including foreign immigrants, who lost their Heimat. Illustrating further sliding signification, in contemporary Cologne and Hamburg, ideas of local tolerance have been claimed by and applied to sexual minorities.

These remained proscriptive tenets of identities rather than descriptive realities. The challenge of fashioning close-knit, yet tolerant communities was an on-going project. We should not underestimate continued exclusion in practice. Reprimands for failure to live up to claimed

values could result. At the same time, identification with local tolerance contradicts notions of Heimat as conceptually regressive, exclusionary, and hostile to outsiders. Though exclusionary strains of Heimat have been propagated, tolerance was not incompatible with the core tenets of Heimat: belonging, local rootedness, spaces of familiarity, and valuing personal memories inscribed in local places. Many Heimat enthusiasts sought to demonstrate this compatibility, even if their practices of such principles could prove clumsy and bound by the restraints of their time.

### **Between the West and Lost East: Divergences in Understandings of Heimat**

Finally, in considering how Heimat deeply shaped early postwar society, it is essential to consider the scores of expellees forced to leave their homes in the East. While historiography on the expellees has become quite large, none have considered how their use of the Heimat concept fits within the concept's broader history, nor have they considered divergences between West German and expellee societies in their understandings of Heimat. Few sources offer us more insight into this question than a surprisingly unresearched tradition, the expellee "*Tag der Heimat*"—a tradition that combined personal reunion and aggressive national politics. While failing as a national tradition, it commanded vast expellee attendance and became a discursive site on Heimat. Major clefs emerged between expellee societies and West Germans. The most prominent was on the relationship between Heimat and nation. While Western Heimat enthusiasts emphasized Heimat as a decentralizing agent that moderated nation, vocal expellees maintained visions of assertive nation as the sole redemptive geography capable of either regaining their lost Heimat or recognizing injustice by maintaining theoretical territorial claims.

The *Tag der Heimat* tradition illustrated the funneling of expellees' lost personal world of Heimat into aggressive national politics. Facilitating temporary reconstruction of lost

communities, the tradition was simultaneously used to emphasize national self-assertion, with expellee societies lecturing West Germans on their insufficient national sentiment and excessive local orientations. Expellee discourses were filled with vocabulary that was absent from West German Heimat discourses, including notions of national *Lebensraum* and “complete-German duties.” Beyond the historic strength of nationalism in the East, these bifurcations can be traced to diverging experiential profiles. While West Germans could return home and look to localities as sites of reconstruction, repaired community, and reformulated identities, this was impossible for expellees. Expulsion based on nationality also made the national category more prominent in confronting their circumstances.<sup>82</sup> Both groups also differed on how expellees should regain Heimat. West German speakers often encouraged emotive integration into a new Heimat, while expellee speakers encouraged only functional integration as the first step to return. There were, however, points of agreement. Expellees and West Germans both held Heimat to be against massification and communism, while being harmonious with European unification.

The expellee societies’ wielding of the Heimat concept in the Cold War politics played an instrumental role in the concept’s cultural devaluation in the 1960s. Through expellee politics, the Heimat concept entered into a discursive realm quite different from the intralocal discourses that took place in rubble cities. Expellee claims to a right to the Heimat destabilized international politics and could be heard in London, Washington, and Moscow. *Tag der Heimat* alone evoked massive denunciation from the Eastern bloc press. The tradition was subjected to Neo-Nazi invasions and students protests that demanded expellee stop telling “Heimat lies.” To achieve *rapprochement*, the political left sought to discredit Heimat by appropriating histories of Nazi misuse of the concept.<sup>83</sup> Subsequently, the concept would be ever more associated with Nazi propaganda—an association fundamentally absent for nearly two decades after 1945.

Such a cultural devaluation would not have occurred without the convergence of other factors. Generational shifts played a decisive role, with the youth not having experienced dislocation, torn life narratives, and destroyed places of home. This generation associated the word closely with its misuse in Cold War politics. The long-term effects of the Economic Miracle also played a role, though in its earliest stages, economic boom facilitated Heimat through reconstruction, domestic nesting, and the end of forced dislocation. The relationship between Heimat and economy was not as black and white as they appear in theories of Heimat as either a capitalist tool or as inherently anti-industrialist and anti-consumerist. By the 1960s, however, long-term material stabilization meant less need for compensatory local solidarities.<sup>84</sup>

Tracing the turn to local Heimat and its later decline, this study begins in Chapters I and II with early postwar Cologne. Chapter I examines the proliferation of Heimat activities and association of Heimat with “life-affirmation,” while Chapter II illustrates the emergence of Colognian democracy, world-openness, and tolerance. A similar turn in the Hanseatic cities is examined in Chapter III, which shows the development of ideas of Hanseatic democracy, world-openness, and tolerance. Chapter IV probes regional identities and the popular spatial imaginary during debates over the Southwest state, followed in Chapter V with an examination of Heimat enthusiasts’ failed advocacy of new Heimat states and the radical divisions in geographic imaginings of Heimat that it laid bare. Heimat-infused federalist activities declined by the late 1950s, though the episode revealed the plasticity of the Heimat concept and its ability to facilitate individualized understandings. Finally, Chapter VI, through the lense of *Tag der Heimat*, traces West German vs. expellee-society understandings of Heimat and the expellee societies’ role in the cultural devaluation of the concept. A brief Coda examines the concept’s tabooization and tepid re-valuations in subsequent years. In the late 1970s and the 1980s, the Heimat concept saw

a lukewarm revival resulting from several factors including technocratic administration, environmental exploitation, and lack of space for private life in the abstract thought of the 68ers.

Though subsequent revivals have seen precipitous claims that the taboo on Heimat has been cast aside, stereotypes of the concept as inherently regressive have persisted. One recent work, for example, disavowing empirical observation and looking at philosophical principles, has concluded Heimat to be a “disturbing part of the German-speaking people’s attempt to make sense of the world” that is inherently exclusionary, classist, “pre-modern,” “anti-enlightenment,” patriarchal, “xenophobic,” anti-urban, “*völkisch*,” “autistic,” and part of a “narcissistic personality structure,” that must be abandoned to develop “the ability to think.”<sup>85</sup> Far from an isolated positions, such preconceptions have colored ongoing attitudes toward the concept.

Whether or not one prefer the word Heimat be struck from the popular lexicon, one can hardly cast overboard so easily individual needs for comprehensible spaces, community, and sites of private life memory—all so intrinsic to Heimat. This brings us to a question that studies of Heimat have invariably confronted: whether it is a broader anthropological need or simply a German concept.<sup>86</sup> Rather than taking either of these positions, I argue that the question itself presents us with a false binary. Instead, this study conceives of Heimat as combining individual needs for locality, belonging, and orientation on the one hand, and on the other cultural views through which they are refracted. The question is therefore not whether we should do away with Heimat, but rather how such needs can be managed and culturally encoded in ways that make it more tolerant, inclusive, and democratic. Investigating this question, I argue, represents a crucial way to heed the challenge of making Heimat “think big.”<sup>87</sup> An analysis of Heimat in the early postwar period, moreover, helps us answer questions about how citizens in this war-torn era re-constructed communities, rebuilt, reformulated identities, and imagined a life after death.



“Because only desire drove me to you,  
to you my Heimat Cologne on the Rhine.”  
-Karl Jahn, “Ming Heimat”(Carnival, 1946)<sup>1</sup>

## Chapter I

### **“*Colonia Deleta*:” Heimat Revival and Redemptive Locality in Postwar Cologne**

As Colognian citizens fled the bombing raids in the final war years, many recalled the increasingly foreign nature of the local landscape. Streets, squares, and historic structures that marked the city and served as sites of personal memories were destroyed beyond recognition. Over 90% of Cologne was laid to waste, and few inhabitable domiciles remained. Looking across the destroyed landscape, Heinrich Böll recalled that the city’s rubble had something that prewar Cologne never had: a look of “seriousness.”<sup>2</sup> Indeed, Cologne’s exuberant Carnival tradition defined the city’s claims to local natures of “Colognian jollity” for nearly two centuries. The postwar city felt worlds away from the one that they had known. Thoroughfares that bustled with civilian sounds and trolley cars were replaced by deafening air raids. For the 40,000 of the 770,000 inhabitants who stayed in the city, by the end of the war these explosions quickly transformed into an odd silence. Heinrich Schroder, an amateur artist, reported on the peculiar “soundlessness of the rubble world,” as he sketched the surreal landscape. (Figure 1-1) He recorded a city littered with charcoaled bodies and deformed street cars. Cologne, he believed, ceased to exist, describing it as “*Colonia Deleta*” – deleted Cologne.<sup>3</sup>

Though many citizens expressed fears that the city had been irrevocably destroyed, within months, it witnessed an overwhelming deluge of returning citizens who, rather than trumpeting national slogans, insisted that desire for their local Heimat motivated their return. Experts and returnees both noted how desires for Heimat overpowered the materially irrational aspect of return. Within a matter of a year or two, returning citizens ushered in a vibrant local cultural

renaissance. In 1947, the city administration noted the “wild-growing Heimat cultural activities” that thrived in the ruins. Cologne’s rubble citizens, often living on diets of around 1000 calories, produced a profusion of dialect songs, poems, and works of prose on the city’s remembered form, its current ruins, and its imagined future. They established Heimat societies and publications in droves, held numerous Heimat evenings, and re-awoke a host of local traditions. Everyone was talking of their locality, their determination that it not “fall asunder,” and, how strong local sentiment would fuel reconstruction.

The aftermath of wars, particularly in German history, frequently involved cultural and structural re-negotiations between local worlds and the nation. After 1945, with the nation in the ruins of defeat, national identity tainted, and feelings of anxiety and loss greater than ever, a grandiose vision of nation rapidly ceased to function as the imagined vehicle of securing a future utopia; instead, local worlds of Heimat as sites of future civilian life emerged as redemptive geographies. Locals cognitively and emotionally fused their personal plight with that of their local Heimat to a significant degree.

This case study traces these developments in the rubble of Cologne and examines the forces that informed their development. A sense of lost Heimat and traumatic rupture of personal lives played a significant role— fueling desires for local places of home: “Foreign, very foreign, appeared that most familiar” one Cologne citizen wrote in 1949 regarding his city quarter. He consequently insisted that love of Heimat would not break during these “apocalyptic times.”<sup>4</sup> Scholars have noted how turn to Heimat is frequently linked to its loss, though none have heretofore applied this to the ruptures of the postwar world.. Citizens in the rubble processed these destroyed landscapes not as constituent parts of a destroyed nation, but rather as shattered private lives that had taken place in lost spaces of Heimat.

Richard Bessel and other historians have raised the question of how postwar Germans created a sense of “life after death.”<sup>5</sup> Visions of restored local places of home, I argue, became a site of pre-occupation in imagining life after an era of mass death and destruction. While rubble-filled home towns were barometers of personal loss, ideas of restored local Heimat concurrently acted as a bridge to an imagined future. Tellingly, Cologneans used the word “Heimat” in conjunction with “life-affirmation” to a stunning degree. They strongly evoked Heimat to rally energies for rebuilding and to bridge across torn life narratives. Images of normalization, in turn, focused less on reconstructed nation as such, than on a reconstructed local stage.<sup>6</sup>

In illustrating these thematic developments, this chapter follows a series of indices that demonstrate the emergence of a local turn. The first index can be found in the immense evacuee influx back to the city beginning in 1945/46 and the discourses that ensued. Karl Jahn, an evacuee, reflected popular sentiments in his 1946 Cologne Carnival song “*Ming Heimat:*” desire for Heimat drove them back. The second index of the local turn can be found in the proliferation of Heimat societies and publications that followed. Only the foliage growing over Cologne’s rubble mounds seemed to match the pace of local Heimat groups popping up in the city. This popular network of societies pushed local culture and community feeling, describing their activities as collecting “energies” for rebuilding and rallying against fears of lost Heimat. This institutional flowering partially informed the third index of the local turn: the local cultural renaissance that gripped the rubble city. Locals ushered in a vibrant revival of local traditions, dialect, customs, history, *Heimatkunde* (education on the local world), along with extensive creation of Heimat songs and poetry. Cologne Carnival re-emerged as a center piece of the revival—a tradition which locals interpreted as embodying Colognean “life-affirmation.” The compensatory function of this local cultural renaissance did not escape Cologneans, many of

whom noted that it could make up in part for the physical destruction of their city. The revival further functioned as the glue of deeply desired community feeling, a point of common engagement, and a means to bridge the chasm between a lost local past and an imagined future.

In uncovering a turn to local Heimat in a metropolis—and a rubble city at that—this chapter rejects stereotypes of Heimat as simply idyllic, generic, and rural places. Such images, I argue, reflect a priori stereotypes which do not correspond to empirically observed relationships of individuals to their local places of home. Rubble Cologne was quite a different place from the bucolic world of Heimat film that dominates our conception of Heimat in the postwar period. Its landscape was anything but scenic. As a Swiss journalist reported upon visiting Cologne, it was a site of ubiquitous destruction, peopled by citizens with poor diets, who lived among the smell of bodies rotting underneath the rubble.<sup>7</sup> “Heimat,” as the early postwar Colognian localist, Joseph Klersch argued, does not corresponded to preconceived tropes. Rather it is an individual “inner-experience” of place, which, in the ruins of Cologne, he believed, did not require fitting aesthetic stereotypes.<sup>8</sup> In the end, one need not rely on the historian’s narrative to establish that there was a turn to Heimat in the rubble city; those in Cologne and other destroyed urban centers noted themselves that the word “Heimat” was everywhere and that a major awakening of local culture and community feeling was taking place.

### **“It must be Cologne:” Local Heimat and Evacuee Return**

From 1942 to 1945, bombing campaigns over Cologne prompted near complete evacuation. By 1945, around 95% of its population had abandoned the city. In 1945/46, precipitous return in overwhelming numbers provides one of the first measures of local Heimat’s emergence as a site of postwar cathexis. Evacuees themselves reached a similar conclusion. Their

preoccupation with their local world began even before return—with the experience of leaving. Early accounts reveal how bombing and evacuation triggered a shift from preoccupation with the national effort to focus on the locality. In processing the bombings, evacuating locals described Cologne's destruction not in national terms, but rather as obliteration of personal lives. This can be clearly seen in the scores of amateur dialect poetry written by evacuees. In one poem, a local doctor wrote of the surrealism of the bombed places where he spent his entire life. The Cologne native expressed his desire to see prior to his death, not a rebuilt Germany, but the rebuilt city of Cologne.<sup>9</sup> His relation reflected broader sentiments. Willy Klett, a Colognean songwriter, similarly reflected on the pulverized city in a dialect lyric. Instead of reflecting on the defeated nation, Klett was overwhelmed by disintegrated personal memories of lost locally-situated friendships, family life, and familiar places of home. Klett's dialect lyrics ended not by declaring that "Germany" must be rebuilt, but rather that "Colonia" could not be allowed to disappear.<sup>10</sup> Such emphatic statements that Cologne and local Heimat must not cease to exist became an ever-reappearing theme in local discourses. A dialect poem entitled "*Kölle ming Heimat*," (Cologne, my Heimat), for instance, wrote in the same vein that, in spite of being a rubble pile, the local world must not fall asunder. After relating the wrenching feeling of evacuation, the unknown author insisted that he would hold tightly to his local Heimat.<sup>11</sup>

Many accounts from everyday citizens demonstrate how destruction and dislocation drew away from psychic emphasis on grandiose national visions, and toward local places of home. Pervasive violence, insecurity, and scarcity generated a need for protection, community, and orientation— all values traditionally associated with Heimat. As a result, signifiers of Heimat acquired tremendous valuation amidst war-driven dislocation. Observers noted, for example, how nearly all Colognean evacuees had a picture of the Cologne Cathedral somewhere in their

make-shift residences, used to display emotive attachment to Heimat. Years later, Cologne carnivalists parodied the trope with a float of a Colognian evacuee, sleeping in a barrel, with the inevitable picture of the cathedral nailed to his barrel wall.<sup>12</sup> (Figure 1-4) Evacuees drew on yet other signifiers of Heimat. One citizen even recounted taking a bottle of *Eau de Cologne* (4711) from his bombed house. The smell of “Heimat air,” as he termed it, represented for him a panacea in a situation of disorientation.<sup>13</sup>

Undeterred by the ruined state of their home town, a cascade of returnees filled the city from 1945 to 1947, an act described by locals as a barometer of local Heimat sentiment. In the first eight months alone, a whopping 400,000 poured into a city that had been over 90% destroyed.<sup>14</sup> As Heinrich Böll pointed out, many Colognians viewed returning to their home city as the “only opportunity to have hope.”<sup>15</sup> Citizens recounted traveling hundreds of kilometers to reach Cologne, often setting out on foot, by bicycle, or other means, for treks that lasted several weeks. Accounts of citizens like that of Maria Harff were fairly common. The former secretary from Cologne recounted walking two weeks from Bamberg, being filled with homesickness, ultimately finding a hole where her house formerly stood.<sup>16</sup> The renewed feeling of lost Heimat upon seeing their destroyed city only generated more desires for its reacquisition.

Local administrators confessed themselves flabbergasted at the irrational behavior of returning evacuees; they would have been materially better off staying in rural places. The local press similarly explained it as indicative of a turn to local Heimat. In the first newspaper published in the rubble, one article insisted that, in spite of the destruction of 58,000 houses, streets filled with rubble, burnt out street cars, and strewn electric wires, the citizens of Cologne were “loyal to Heimat” and would rather live in basement ruins in their home town than in a perfect house outside the city.<sup>17</sup> In 1946, another newly founded local newspaper reported that the

dominant attitude could be described by the phrase: “No, it must be Cologne!”—a relation from a determined recently-returned evacuee.<sup>18</sup> An article in the *Westdeutsche Zeitung* in 1949 echoed these sentiments, asking the question in reference to Cologne: “Are these large cities of our time, in particular the large rubble settlements, Heimat in a deeper sense to those people who reside within them?” The question was rhetorical. The article continued that the droves of 500,000 who returned provided a clear answer. Colognians did not see the city as a material or national commodity. Rather, they saw it as “Heimat.”<sup>19</sup> Illustrating how strongly this idea reverberated throughout the rubble world, one 1948 poem, “*Kölle-uns Heimat,*” recounted how, in spite of the disappearance of all personal local landscapes, Cologne would remain their “*Heimat.*”<sup>20</sup>

Many Colognians, often for reasons beyond their control, stayed in evacuation for years. Their home city suffered from a housing shortage for nearly two decades, meaning that many simply had to remain elsewhere for prolonged periods.<sup>21</sup> Millions of West Germans still in evacuation often insisted on their continued membership in distant local communities through overt displays of Heimat sentiment.<sup>22</sup> Those Colognians forced to remain in evacuation frequently expressed a preoccupation with Heimat that proved more melancholic. They often wrote on the subject of Heimat and their strong desires to return.<sup>23</sup> Fellow localists in Cologne aided them by pressuring authorities to prioritize the evacuee question and to give them equal settlement rights as the expellees. The city administration itself established an evacuee caritative agency.<sup>24</sup> Dislocated Colognians particularly used local traditions to express desires for home. Carnival provided a case in point. In 1949, the first postwar Carnival Prince received stacks of mail from dislocated citizens, some of whom recounted listening to “Heimat sounds” of Cologne Carnival on the radio.<sup>25</sup> As far away as Chicago, former Colognians came together to celebrate Carnival, sending a dialect telegram to Cologne expressing their wishes that they could help

rebuild their old “Heimat.” In subsequent years, Carnival Princes continued to receive evacuee letters which expressed “homesickness” and desire for “Heimat.”<sup>26</sup> The city administration even arranged for special trains to bring evacuees to celebrate Cologne Carnival, with a flood of evacuees pouring into the city for celebrations, reportedly singing of their “homesickness for Cologne.” Evacuees appeared in the parade with signs reading “dearest Heimat, best greetings,” and local papers reported that events conveyed the feeling of old Cologne and the solidarity between “Mother Colonia” and her dislocated “children.”<sup>27</sup> In spite of such sentiment, not all evacuees returned. Many felt a torn sense of Heimat after years in evacuation, hesitating to return to a now unfamiliar city. By the mid 1950's, the evacuee issue ebbed, with isolated incidents of return taking on mostly symbolic importance for the local community.<sup>28</sup>

Yet another critical dislocated group pined for local Heimat, and their return would be couched even more in terms of transformation from war to peace: German soldiers and POWs. As Frank Biess has shown in a study of returning POWs, they often held strongly to mythical images of Heimat that resulted in renewed feelings of loss when they returned to destroyed and changed places of home. He also notes that they saw returning home not as return to the nation, but rather as return to a “distinct locality.”<sup>29</sup> In Cologne, both of these phenomenon are clearly visible. Colognian soldiers, having left localities long before civilians, often pined for home long before becoming POWs. In the closing years of the war, the Nazis officially forbade Colognian soldiers from singing the localist song “*Heimweh noh Kölle*,” as it implied a desire to return home and abandon the war effort.<sup>30</sup> After the war, the song could be heard, among other places, in trains of POWs returning to Cologne over the Hohenzollern bridge.<sup>31</sup> For returning soldiers, Heimat offered the same vision of a restored civilian life. It also offered them a path from soldier to re-localized civilian without confronting their possible war crimes. Similar to their civilian



counterparts, POWs expressed desire for Heimat through localist media like dialect poetry. POWs like Heinz Weber recalled in one poem his desire to be in Cologne, see the cathedral, go to the Händeschen Theater, cook Rhenish foods, and shop on the *Aldemaa*—trappings of a restored civilian life.<sup>32</sup> The civilian population encouraged this transition from soldier to a civilian of one's Heimat. Cologne's Lord Mayor, Ernst Schwering, for example, positively recounted how Heimat could transform POWs into local civilians and called for POW "Heimatkehrer" to feel a connection to their "Heimat city."<sup>33</sup> While seeking to make peaceful civilians out of soldiers, this process ignored the need to work through the crimes in which "Heimatkehrer" were often implicated.

In considering those Colognians who lost Heimat, it would be wrong to forget (as many postwar locals themselves did) a group of former localists who lost Heimat in a far more vicious and violent manner, and who, unlike the postwar civilian population, were unambiguously victims: Cologne's former Jewish population. Many postwar locals were complicit in Cologne's Jews' violent loss of local places of home. The sense of loss of home for former Cologne Jews should not be underestimated. Barbara Becker-Jákli, in interviews with former Colognian Jews and Kirsten Serup-Bilfeldt, in her history of Jews in Cologne, have both noted the striking local Heimat sentiment of Colognian Jews prior to 1933. Local patriotism and Judaism, Serup-Bilfeldt argues, were quite compatible and could be seen in all social classes of Colognian Jews before 1933.<sup>34</sup> Holocaust survivors and Colognian Jews in exile often expressed tremendous feelings of lost Heimat. Wilhelm Unger, one of the few Jews who returned to Cologne after the war, wrote of the anguish of lost former lives, community, and the wrenching feeling of lost "Heimat." Long before Colognian evacuees sang *Heimweh nach Köln*, Unger recalled how, feeling a sense of lost Heimat, he and a group of Colognian Jews sang the song in an Australian refugee camp. Unger

recalled thinking of the Cathedral as a symbol of a lost “Heimat” that had accompanied him through his former life.<sup>35</sup> With Jews in postwar Germany viewed as an unwelcome reminder of German crimes, those like the pre- and postwar Jewish Colognean, Günther Ginzel, were the clear minority in attempting to retain local Heimat sentiment. Ginzel recounted, among other things, the “attractive power of the Carnival festival” on him and other prewar Colognean Jews and how it gave him “a rooted feeling of Heimat,” which he recounted for him “could not even be fully extinguished by Auschwitz.” Ginzel praised how postwar Cologne Jews invited localist Carnival singers into their Synagogue in 1946.<sup>36</sup> Ginzel, however, was far from representative. As Jean Améry, a former Auschwitz internee, Jewish-Austrian author, and commentator on the Holocaust wrote on Jewish loss of Heimat, German Jews, unlike groups like the expellees, were denied the collective sense of “we” that was impossible to restore.<sup>37</sup>

Few former Colognean Jews would ever have dreamed of returning. Those survivors, living mostly abroad, recounted a searing, irreparable loss of home that could not be mended. One Colognean Jew, Artur Joseph recorded such emotional wounds after being forced to leave the city. In exile, he recounted every year during Carnival being filled with his “desires for his old Heimat” and being overcome with a desire to sing *Heimweh nach Köln*. Once encountering a group of Rheinländer celebrating Carnival in Los Angeles, he again conveyed his sense of loss. Looking through the “clouds of smoke,” that surrounded his memories of “Heimat,” he reported taking mental walks through the streets of his old “father city.”<sup>38</sup> Many Jews who survived had a tortured sense of lost Heimat and permanently disconnected life narratives.<sup>39</sup> Cologneans in the rubble failed to reflect and remember their plight, in part to avoid facing their own complicity in crimes of the Third Reich, and in part due to preoccupation with their own trauma. Those like Heinrich Böll, who pushed against repression of such memories, were, sadly, in the minority.<sup>40</sup>

## Heimat as a Site of “Life affirmation:” Repairing Torn Life Narratives

While lost past lives triggered preoccupation with local worlds, strong desires for future private lives on the restored stage of Heimat sustained it. Few sources better convey desires for the civilian life of Heimat so vividly as one article published in the *Kölnier Kurier* in August 1945. The article by a Cologne citizen conveyed a relation that would never reach the pages of a contemporary paper. Entitled “*Heimatliche Melodie*” (Heimat-like melody), the article recounted how one morning, the writer woke up to hear a “platsch-platsch-platsch” from next-door—the sound of a neighbor cleaning a carpet by banging it out of an open window. The writer confessed being baffled at the sound—taken aback, he confessed, that such an act existed. What would normally be a perturbing sound, he wrote, struck his ears with the most melodious sounds. Such sounds, he wrote, had not been heard for years—since before the war! The sound was for him a “*heimatnachbarlichen Haushaltmelodie*” (Heimat-neighborly household melody). It brought him an “unusual feeling of newly won, no, more, a newly gifted sense of home (*Beheimatung*).”<sup>41</sup>

Why publish an article of this nature when there was much to report, and when paper scarcity meant that they could publish only one short newspaper each week? The relation clearly resonated with the editors, who would have understood prospective return of localized civilian lives as captivating. It represented the possibility of recreating personal lives in neighborly spheres that would no longer be controlled and determined by expansive ideology, geo-political imperatives, disruptive destruction, the constant threat of death, and broad developments that superseded the intimacy of local worlds. It was a desire for “normality” where personal lives could again be pursued on the local stage of Heimat. The same sentiment came through in one local picture book of the city ruins produced for evacuated Colognians, in which the author juxtaposed pervasive death and loss with local life-affirmation. He wrote first of how Cologne

appeared as a “corpse” in the shadow of the cathedral—a site of “desert-like absence of Heimat” where the living and the dead wandered. But, the locality, he continued, was not fully dead: within Cologne’s “motherly depths slumber the seeds for new life.”<sup>42</sup> Notably, they highlighted not the nation, but their home town as containing such seeds. Visions of an expansive nation as the guarantor of future life was suddenly gone.

Throughout local discourses in the ravaged city, it is striking the extent to which locals conflated their personal fates with that of their home town. In such discourses, the promise of future life was to be found not in national action and the reconstruction of “Germany” as such, but in local reconstruction of city and community as a stage of private life. While some have collapsed local Heimat and imagining nation into a single phenomenon, it was the local and not the national that was saturated with sites of personal life memory.<sup>43</sup> An illustration cover of a work of Heimat poetry from the rubble well illustrates how local Heimat acted as a vessel for entire individual life narratives (Figure 1-5). The image depicts the life cycle from birth to childhood, courtship, marriage, to decline, and ultimate death, as a localized process. The local situatedness of private life is symbolized here by the Cologne Carnivalist, the Rhine *Schiffahrt*, the Colognian *Heinzelmännchen*, the crib (a historic topos of Heimat), and the figure of death juxtaposed against the Cologne Cathedral. The final of these, the relationship of Heimat to death, is a much neglected topic. Indeed, the grave and cemetery frequently appear as topoi of Heimat.<sup>44</sup> Given the surfeit of personal sites of memory in local worlds, citizens most felt a sense of torn life narratives when seeing their home town’s ruined state. While one local song recounted how “memories” drove them home,<sup>45</sup> finding a pulverized landscape upon return generated feelings that they belonged to a lost world. The homey/uncanny (*heimlich/unheimlich*), a Freudian binary central to Heimat, permeated the urban rubble. The uncanny, Freud noted, is not complete

foreignness, but—much like the rubble of one’s Heimat— the familiar in a disturbed form.<sup>46</sup> The tension within this binary acted as a driving force behind the local turn. Heimat was where citizens sensed ruptured personal lives and emerged as the only place where it could be repaired.

The driving force of this binary can be seen in a thematic matrix that suffused discourses on the locality in early postwar Cologne. These three, ever interwoven topoi included: i. description of lost individual pasts in terms of lost Heimat, ii. equation of the rubble city with individual plight, and iii. restoration of future life through an imagined reconstructed local Heimat. In this thematic matrix, Heimat ever functions as a bridge between lost past and an imagined future. While research on reconstruction has focused on modern vs. traditional building styles, scholars have neglected how lay people processed rubble worlds more in terms of disappeared personal worlds of Heimat than architectural style.<sup>47</sup> As one former citizen recounted upon seeing the vanished sites of his former local life, he was overwhelmed with the feeling that his “youth had withered away.” He felt perplexed that no one from his former community was there to greet him and say “there are you again.” “Heimat,” he concluded, appeared to be no more.<sup>48</sup> The Heimat society *Alt-Köln* in 1948 reported that many presented dialect poems at their events that recounted a lost world of Heimat.<sup>49</sup> As one local wrote in a 1947 dialect poem, underneath the rubble was a buried world of former neighbors, streets filled with local dialect, gabled houses, and all elements of a former personal world.<sup>50</sup> One avid Cologne carnivalist similarly recalled in verse his lost life and personal relationships buried in the ruins. “Youth and beauty are gone,”...“that on which my heart hung,” he continued, “has all been destroyed.” To counteract this, he insisted that Colognians must reanimate the rubble, and maintain their local natures so that no one would ever say: “Cologne—once upon a time.”<sup>51</sup>

Local dialect lyrics, a historically popular genre in Cologne that everyday locals produced

in droves, drew on the same thematic Heimat matrix. Almost in formulaic fashion, dialect lyrics recounted lost local-personal worlds, followed instantly by rebuilding and securing a life-affirming future through restored Heimat.<sup>52</sup> In such pieces, accounts of lost Heimat and personal lives are followed with insistence on reconstruction and reacquisition of Heimat as a route to securing a life-affirming future. Colognian lyrics that elucidate these patterns include titles such as: “*Köln du kannst niemals untergehn*,” (Joachim Henning, 1945), “*Ming Heimat*,” (Karl Jahn, 1946), “*Köln, mein Köln, du wirst wiedererstehn*,” (Rudolf Roonthal) “*Ming herrlich Kölle*” (Jupp Schmitz, 1947), and “*Kölle, domols un jetzt*” (Wilhelm Stumpf). Such pieces typically begin by recounting disappeared local childhoods and erased personal sites of memory and the rubble world’s surrealism. They evoked the cyclical markers of a past local life including celebrating Carnival with their communities, taking family walks through the city, or regular meetings with friends. As Henning emphasized in the opening of his 1945 lyrics, “Heimat” churned up memories of a world that was gone, a former world that now appeared to him “as a dream.” Jahn’s lyrics “Ming Heimat” recounted a lost private past, symbolized by evaporated childhood places and other physical sites of Heimat. Schmitz’s lyrics recounted how, amidst the rubble, no one hung onto “Heimat” like Colognians, but he subsequently asked “where are your streets? Where is my house?”<sup>53</sup> Rather than seeking to memorialize their own “victimhood,” all of these lyrics juxtapose lost Heimat with determination to overcome loss. The word “victim” itself seldom appeared in Western Heimat discourses. These lyrics almost inevitably turned to rebuilding, recreating Heimat, and healing. Roonthal’s lyrics transitioned from lost private lives to emphasis on reconstructing the city in spirit, even if it would be physically foreign. Local sentiment remained strong, he insisted, in spite of the city’s destroyed state. Karl Jahn’s 1945 lyric, “Ming Heimat,” after recounting disappeared local lives, maintained that Cologne

nonetheless remained “Heimat.” Defying the city’s obliteration Jahn’s repeated: “that is my Heimat, Cologne here on the Rhine.” “Desire,” drove him back, he wrote; Cologne could not “fall asunder,” and all would help rebuild “until our Heimat Cologne is again standing.” In the, by now, predictable discursive pattern, Hening’s localist lyrics turned from reflection on his lost local past to insistence that Cologne would remain Heimat and “never disappear.”<sup>54</sup> The same can be said of Colognian poet Waldemar Cosson’s rubble verse, which followed his reflections on the city’s destruction with a magniloquent “vow of fidelity” to the city and repetition of the ubiquitous phrase that their locality “could not fall asunder.” The piece leads to a “life-affirming” conclusion, insisting that local citizens would turn away from preoccupations with their afflictions to look toward a future when “new life” would “bloom” from the ruins. Thus, “Colognian life,” Cosson concluded, would never fade.<sup>55</sup>

If we look to the host of popular local poetry produced in the rubble, we find the same discursive trends, with yet again the same salient three-pronged matrix of lost personal past described as lost Heimat, conflation of the rubble city with personal plight, and restoration of local worlds as the route to life after death. Amateur dialect poetry proliferated, offering lay people a medium to emotionally process destruction through a language steeped in an intimate familiarity. The rubble dialect poetry of local Lis Böhle offers one example. Between 1945 and 1947, her writings conveyed personal disjuncture by recounting the places she no longer recognized, lost memories, vanished people, and the need to shape the future in a “human” way. After such motives, her verses turn rapidly to local Heimat as a site of what she called “affirmation of life” that could unify a new city with the memory of the lost one. When reconstruction of Cologne was well underway, Böhle wrote that the city, which many declared dead, was returning to life. Bringing all Colognians back to their “Heimat,” she wrote, was the

final goal before they could declare “Cologne is there again!” Attempting to overcome disjuncture, Böhle later wrote a series of poems taking leave of memories attached to disappeared local places.<sup>56</sup> The national valence as a vehicle of securing restored private lives was completely absent in her writings, as it was in that of so many others.

Such localist sentiments were harnessed to encourage public involvement in rebuilding. Projects like “*Kölle Blied Kölle*” (Cologne will remain Cologne) attracted volunteers to clear rubble through emotive dialect posters (Figure 1-6). Other locals encouraged reconstruction volunteerism by appealing to their local Carnival tradition. One 1946 Carnival song insisted that Colognians would keep up their good spirits through localist humor and that Cologne carnivalists would spit on their hands and rebuild. A Carnival society enshrined the call on their membership cards inscribed with an image of rebuilding carnivalists.<sup>57</sup> (Figure 1-7) Reinhold Louis, in a collection of Colognian songs, has noted how Carnival particularly became a site of awakening energies for rebuilding. Citizens could scarcely resist the call, with the phrase “*Kölle darf nit ungergonn*” (Cologne cannot perish) echoing throughout the chambers of local discourse.<sup>58</sup>

Of course, not all locals were of the age that they could anticipate a long personal future in a new city. Still, elderly locals exhibited similar preoccupations with local reconstruction and the desire to see the rebuilt city before their death. Laurenz Kiesgen, a Cologne native, in his late 70's, wrote his own dialect poetry recounting his Cologne childhood and his inner-conflict in the postwar world. He hoped for a local rebirth to refute the power of death. Reference to any national rebirth in his poetry, by contrast, is entirely absent.<sup>59</sup> Peter Felten, a Cologne doctor nearing his eighties, similarly wrote in dialect during evacuation, recounting his early Cologne childhood, memories of a familial past inscribed on different local places, and lost people he once knew. “Heimat no longer exists,” Felten wrote. He expressed the desire to see the rebuilt



city before he died, and to be interred in Cologne's *Melaten* cemetery with his wife and children.<sup>60</sup> Similarly, the Cologne ophthalmologist Paul Boskamp, also of advanced age, expressed in dialect his disillusion and disbelief at lost sites of a personal past. Addressing pre-war Cologne as a personified figure, he wrote: "What for Muslims is Mecca, what for Hindus is Benares, what for the Christian is Rome, and what for the world is Jerusalem"—"so were you to me."<sup>61</sup>

Those younger Colognians who could anticipate future lives in a new city, however, evoked the term *Heimat* in conjunction with words like "life-affirmation," "affirmation of life," or "life-affirming optimism" to a stunning degree. The carnivalist Hans Jonen conveyed this in his carnivalist writings, proclaiming: "we still exist! Let the word be noted!" He wrote that, in spite of losing old Cologne, defiance would help them confront postwar challenges and not buckle under destruction and loss. The *Heimat* enthusiasts Joseph Klersch reported on how Colognians in the rubble maintained "Heimat love," "Heimat pride," and a "life-affirming optimism" that left no doubt that the city would be reconstructed. "Local *Heimat* sentiment" (*engere Heimatgefühl*), he wrote was a strong source of moral and material support, and created strong community feeling. He described this not as national resurrection, but as "Cologne saying yes to life."<sup>62</sup> This affiliation persisted and even grew as reconstruction was well underway. Some, like Adam Wrede, the author of his own dialect dictionary, even wrote in the mid 1950s on "affirmation of life" as a specifically Colognian characteristic.<sup>63</sup> Around the same time, the new Cologne Almanach reported that, though many formerly feared that Cologne had ceased to exist, they had proven that "Cologne lives!"<sup>64</sup> Konrad Adenauer similarly insisted that Colognians demonstrated a "will to live, bravery, and love of *Heimat*." He praised the city for maintaining local culture, and welcomed a future localism where tradition and a "progressive spirit" would be kept in harmony.<sup>65</sup>

But why was Heimat so able to unify and bridge over a lost personal past and imagined future? Throughout these sources, we find the answer in a crucial binary intrinsic to the Heimat concept that proved tremendously useful in the rubble world. While many have emphasized the Heimat concept's ability to contain ideal visions, as the expellee author and historian Christian Graf von Krockow argues: "Heimat is either concrete or nothing at all."<sup>66</sup> Heimat clearly referred to actual experience of lost local places. At the same time, it also contained, on the other hand, an imagined ideal relationship between the individual and their local environment. Chasms between ideal and reality resulted in mobilization of the Heimat idea to take action to improve this relationship. It allowed a simultaneous recognition of personal past, while providing an imagined path into reconstructed localized civilian life. As a 1948 article in *Unser Köln* recounted, out of feelings of lost Heimat grew a sense of "life-affirming desire for the future."<sup>67</sup> Amidst this process, messianic nation as the guarantor of personal future was displaced; visions of restored local Heimat took its place.

### **Renaissance of Local Culture and Compensatory Spaces of Heimat**

The question remains how locals would recreate Heimat in the ruins and later in a slowly-rising city that would be utterly foreign. Of course locals and Heimat societies urged reconstruction of key identity-laden structures, such as the exteriors of Cologne's twelve Romanesque churches and the medieval Gürzenich. They would often battle technocratic city planners, who were giddy at the thought of being able to create a new city from scratch.<sup>68</sup> Nevertheless, most lay citizens knew that the new city would be largely unrecognizable. The historical and cultural loss from the bombings was indeed staggering. In an indexed list of destroyed historical sites in the North Rhineland, the entry for Cologne spanned over fifty pages,

reporting that virtually all of the old city was gone.<sup>69</sup> Early photographic compilations of Cologne's "crater landscape" conveyed a clear message to evacuated locals: the built environment of Heimat could not be salvaged.<sup>70</sup> This left Colognians with non-material anchors of Heimat feeling that gained tremendous prominence in the rubble, leading to the local cultural renaissance that gripped the rubble world already in 1945 and 1946.

Scholars have often noted the flourishing of high culture in the rubble, including a turn to the humanism of the Weimar classics, but have overlooked the parallel awakening of local cultures. This oversight is in part due to its unexpectedness. In a population without stable dwellings, living on daily diets around 1000 calories, we would not at first expect a wave of interest in dialect poetry, local traditions, Heimat societies, teaching local history, founding Heimat publications, and so forth. Nevertheless, all of these activities surged immediately after 1945 in rubble cities. Such a local cultural renaissance can be clearly seen in Cologne, and provides the second index of the early postwar turn to local Heimat. Beginning in 1945, rubble Cologne saw an explosion of new Heimat societies, localist publications, Carnival societies, dialect works, revived ritual traditions, and emphasis on *Heimatkunde* (localist youth education). Local officials from 1945-1947 noted the local hunger for culture and Heimat triggered by the city's physical destruction and a search for sources from which "new life" could bloom from the ruins.<sup>71</sup> The local cultural flourishing would be sustained for nearly two decades.

The local cultural renaissance served four functions in the rubble world. Firstly, it served as a *compensatory space* of Heimat amidst physical destruction. Citizens candidly discussed how local cultural practices could compensate for physical loss. Like the lost built environment, these cultural practices served as sites of personal memory. The second function can be found in how local culture facilitated a much pined after local community feeling; it offered a medium to repair

torn communities, bringing citizens together in real and imagined ways. Colognean citizens frequently discussed such local community feeling as crucial in overcoming trauma from war. The third function can be found in the role that local culture played in bridging across a generational cleft. Fearing that their children were growing up in a local landscape foreign from the one that they knew, the parent generation emphasized teaching children local culture and traditions to repair the intergenerational Heimat chasm. As we shall see in the next chapter, the fourth role of the local cultural turn was how it permitted shaping new notions of local values.

The local cultural awakening can be witnessed in several media in the immediate postwar years, including revivals of dialect, Heimat poetry, local historical writing, traditional Carnival and Kirmes celebrations, local St. Martin's processions, localist Old market theater pieces, dialect theater, and so forth. One useful yard stick, however, can be found in a profusion of new Heimat societies and publications from 1945 to 1949. Such Heimat societies included, among others, the recreated *Heimatverein Alt-Köln*, the *Rheinischer Verein für Denkmalpflege und Heimatschutz*, the *Arbeitsgemeinschaft der Rheinischen Geschichtsvereine*, the *Kölner Arbeitsgemeinschaft für Heimatpflege*, a Rhenish *Vereinigung für Volkskunde*, and new Heimat magazines which included *Alt-Köln*, *Unser Köln*, and the youth Heimat publication *Jung-Köln*. This proliferation of Heimat works reflected recorded publication trends in localities throughout West Germany.<sup>72</sup> They were read prolifically by locals in the rubble and scores of evacuees pining for home.<sup>73</sup> The first edition of *Alt-Köln* in 1947 elucidated why locals created such new publication. The editors held that their publication was centered on a mental re-orientation (*Rückbesinnung*) to local Heimat as a place to collect energies for future challenges. They wanted to reach the entire local populace, rather than catering to a narrow group. In the first edition, the Lord Mayor Hermann Pünder and Konrad Adenauer both praised the new publication. Pünder

urged the spread of “Heimat thoughts” and teaching children “sincere love of Heimat” to give them a bold trust in the future. Adenauer, whose house in Rhöndorf was decorated with historic images of Cologne, similarly praised Heimat sentiment as one of the few things that Colognians had left at their disposal.<sup>74</sup>

Cologne also had its own unique form of Heimat institution: Carnival societies, which Colognians founded or re-founded in droves from 1945 to 1947. Members of one prominent Carnival society, the locally-patriotic *Rote Funken*, saw its re-establishment as so pressing that they fled to Walporzheim in the French zone to circumvent a temporary British ban on society establishments in 1945. Many other Carnival societies still active in Cologne trace their original founding to the early rubble years. As in prewar Cologne, Carnival societies formed crucial hubs of local community and cultural practice. Deeply active in the rubble, they held numerous events year-round, described in terms of community togetherness and helping overcome trauma.<sup>75</sup>

These grassroots cultural activities found subsequent support from prominent local figures and institutions. Local newspapers, for example, traditionally known as forces of cultural leveling, made significant efforts to make room for localist Heimat articles and works. The editor of the *Kölnische Rundschau* insisted on the obligation of journalism to promote local community, the local past, and Heimat. In view of these goals, he wrote, his newspaper decided to frequently publish dialect works; they also published regular Heimat newsletters.<sup>76</sup> The level of demand for such works must have figured into such decisions. A representative of one local paper, the *Kölnische Rundschau*, noted the growth of local sentiment in the rubble, and the resulting interest in literature on Heimat. He argued that the city’s physical destruction triggered the massive interest in local tradition, though he maintained that their paper’s focus on local tradition and dialect since before 1948 was not a business venture, pursued at great material

expense. The paper insisted that it took up such activities to fulfill their self-appointed role as a “guardian of Heimat.”<sup>77</sup>

As the local cultural turn grew “wildly” from 1945 to 1946, the city administration, viewing the grassroots turn positively, offered its own support, opening a new city office in 1947 called the *Amt für Kölnisches Volkstum*. The office’s proponents held that these “wild-growing Heimat cultural activities” should have a center point that tied their forces together and gave the local turn endurance. From the outset, the office’s existence was justified in terms of maintaining local culture as an “essential part of spiritual rebuilding of the city.” The goal of the office, as a follower and not a leader of the popular turn, included promoting Heimat sentiment, local culture, history, dialect, traditions, and to support re-establishing local cultural institutions. The office’s creators stressed that it would have no “policing control” over popular Heimat activities, though it could provide moral guidance when necessary. Despite its extensive activities, it followed this principle and played only a supporting role. The office assiduously promoted dialect poetry, localist music, theater, and marionette productions—all traditional media of localist discourses in Cologne. It also supported revivals of local traditions, including Carnival, the Cologne Kirmes, a new “children’s Carnival,” the Old Market *Festspiele*, *Krippenspiele*, the Rhenish “Heimat days,” and celebration of the 1900-year Cologne anniversary in 1950, which included a series of localist exhibitions. The office also tended to Cognian evacuees by holding “Heimat evenings” outside of Cologne and sending them localist publications. It further established itself as an information source for Heimat enthusiasts on local history and traditional practice, and actively promoted local historical research, archival activities, and publication. Locals’ reception of the organization was overwhelmingly positive.<sup>78</sup>

Illustrating consciousness of why they were turning to Cognian cultural practices, locals

discussed openly how the turn to local culture offered a compensatory space of Heimat. In 1946, the localist Hans Jonen and the Cathedral Capitular of Cologne both wrote in a new Heimat publication how Cologne would never physically be what it once was. They argued that Colognians needed to bring the old city into the new one by maintaining local spirit in language, memories, and cultural uniqueness. Konrad Adenauer wrote to the same effect. After praising the creation of the new Heimat journal, he insisted that, beyond the questions of what could be rebuilt, Colognians needed local culture to restore traditions. This included dialect, a hobby horse of the former mayor.<sup>79</sup> Upon receiving honorary Colognian citizenship, Adenauer renewed his support for local cultural revival. Citizens must, he proclaimed teach their children “what a Heimat is, what a Heimat means, and what Cologne is.”<sup>80</sup> In a similar tone, the Heimat enthusiast Joseph Klersch wrote in 1947 on the vanished “exterior image of Cologne” that formerly anchored a “strong support of Heimat sentiment and love of Heimat.” In a postwar world, he argued, Colognians must maintain Heimat feeling to make up for the city’s physical loss; the goal was to prevent “yesterday and tomorrow” from being “ripped apart in today.” Here, Heimat appears yet again as the means of repairing rupture. Years later, Klersch reaffirmed that the loss of Cologne’s “architectural-cultural substance” meant that citizens felt a pressing need to secure Heimat in *sentiment*.<sup>81</sup> Dialect poetry conveyed similar desires for compensatory non-material anchors of Heimat. One dialect verse by a lay citizen recounted how the destroyed physical city contrasted with the “spirit of the city,” the latter of which would remain a steadfast site of local tradition. Yet another dialect poem made the same distinction between the city’s “dead” physicality vs. vibrant cultural spirit; despite physical destruction, subsequent generations, it held, would spiritually be instilled with “Heimat-like character.” (*heimatlichen Art*).<sup>82</sup>

The use of dialect to convey such sentiment was no coincidence. While citizens could not

reconstruct for their eyes the familiar built environment of Heimat, they could bring the familiar sounds of Heimat to their ears. Dialect, dialect poetry, and dialect theater, were among the most easily recreated symbols of Heimat and therefore one of the earliest that appeared. Locals after 1945 often feared that dialect could be lost amidst postwar dislocation.<sup>83</sup> Such speech represented both an expression of local community and a site of personal memory. To hear and speak local dialect evoked memories of former lives viscerally connected to its sounds. As one local wrote in a postwar poem, dialect represented “mother language, father language, Heimat language, and childhood language,” and reminded one of local childhood memories and past lives. Dialect in speech, poetry, and theater was one of many dishes that palliated hunger for sites of familiarity and community-generating tradition. Explosion of dialect theater and poetry had already begun by 1945/46. This included the restoration of the tradition *Hänneschen Theater*, which received material support for nearly a decade from the *Amt für Kölnisches Volkstum*. The local puppet theater, founded in the early nineteenth century, historically performed dialect pieces, making it a central discursive site on the localism. Cognians for generations had adopted its stock characters as embodiments of their own local natures. Performing again in make-shift establishments since 1946, by 1948 reports held that it gained tremendous popularity. The *Milowitsch-Bühne*, another localist theater, garnered equal popularity after petitioning the American occupiers in May 1945 to re-establish their institution. With the added support of Konrad Adenauer, the localist theater rebuilt in remarkable time, re-opening its doors in 1946.<sup>84</sup>

Dialect plays performed in the ruins contained themes on how community solidarity was instrumental in overcoming their struggles and highlighted local tradition as a source of energy for the future. One theatrical dialect piece from 1948 “*Et Gespens om Schötzeßeß*” thematized lost local history and the urgent need to tend to local historical legacies. The piece particularly



looked back to dark local histories, such as Cologne during the black plague. The play ended by drawing a parallel between such morose local histories and their present-day circumstances. The piece insisted that life after periods of bleakness and mass death could be achieved through local community.<sup>85</sup> Locals could look to Cologne's worst historical moments, rather than an idyllic past, to transform reconstruction and overcoming trauma into a local tradition. Similar use of dismal local histories for such purposes can be found throughout other postwar German cities.

Dialect poetry, as it did not require institutional support, became a prominent, accessible, and personal compensatory space of Heimat. Colognians privately turned to the genre both to process trauma and emphasize local cultural uniqueness. While some dialect poets suggested founding an academy of Heimat poets, a congress of Rhenish dialect poets in March 1948 decided against the move, arguing that it would barricade off everyday citizens from an important realm of Heimat activities; dialect poetry was to retain its popular roots. The congress did resolve to promote dialect programs in radio and education. The group of amateur poets fully acknowledged that they were promoting dialect as a compensatory space of Heimat. As Klersch asserted during the 1948 meeting: "The more Heimat is exteriorly destroyed, all the more must we reconstruct it indestructibly in the heart of the old and the young." Klersch concluded by arguing that their "Heimat" is no longer beautiful, but that dialect poetry could act as a way to make up for this, and should therefore be made part of local youth and humanist education.<sup>86</sup>

Klersch's evocation of the youth hit on a point that concerned many local parents regarding their lost Heimat. They not only felt rupture between their own pre- and postwar lives, they equally feared an intergenerational Heimat chasm between themselves and their children. They often discussed how children were growing up in a physically foreign place to which they had no connection. Parents in the early postwar period also felt a deep desire to give their

children what they themselves had lacked.<sup>87</sup> For many, this was an intact sense of Heimat, local community, and rootedness. One medium for addressing this concern was *Heimatkunde* (education on the local world). Heimat enthusiasts used *Heimatkunde* both to bridge over this intergenerational gap and to integrate displaced children into a new city. *Heimatkunde*, was itself both a subject and a teaching theory. It taught about local worlds, its history, culture, and traditions, while also acting as a method of teaching other subjects through a local prism. *Heimatkunde* quickly achieved prominence in Cologne schools, which incorporated dialect and Heimat poetry into the curriculum. Given the lack of resources, schools petitioned for materials to instruct in *Heimatkunde*. The *Kölnische Rundschau*, among others, responded by producing collections of Heimat pamphlets and dialect publications.<sup>88</sup> The school subject enjoyed reciprocal support from above and below. At the top, one could find supporters as high up as the state minister president, Karl Arnold. As a speaker at the “Rhenish Heimat Days” in the early 1950's, Arnold underscored the subject's importance. The youth, he argued, must be won over for the “Heimat concept” as they had been uprooted by war and needed feelings of belonging. Arnold did not intend for *Heimatkunde* to create myopic, self-satisfied localists, arguing that the youth should have a parallel sense of “world-openness.”<sup>89</sup> Lay Heimat enthusiasts agreed on the subject's importance in giving children a sense of rootedness; as the *Rheinischer Verein für Denkmalpflege und Heimatschutz* argued, they must lead the youth “to the concept of Heimat.”<sup>90</sup>

The youth Heimat magazine created by the *Amt für Kölnische Volkstum* offers us a glimpse into the content of *Heimatkunde* in the early postwar city. The periodical *Jung Köln*, founded in 1949, was based on an earlier youth Heimat publication of the same name shut down by the Nazis in 1933. The publication took up a self-proclaimed goal of strengthening Heimat feeling and the youth's connection to Cologne's past and present. It was to emphasize local

tradition, history, uniqueness, and dialect. In its first edition, editors noted that a massive cultural revival of “Heimat traditions and Heimat dialects” was already underway in rubble Cologne—belying fears that dislocation extinguished Heimat. The editors proclaimed that their magazine would be part of the broader renaissance of “Heimat traditions.”<sup>91</sup> The *Heimatkunde* magazine later received praise for realizing this goal and their success in instilling the youth with Heimat sentiment.<sup>92</sup> Ultimately, the publication did not present a perfectly rosy picture of local history. It included articles that taught children about the *Kristallnacht* in Cologne, Cognian Jews in the Holocaust, and discrimination against Jews in medieval Cologne.<sup>93</sup> Such articles, nonetheless, did not appear with adequate frequency. The Heimat magazine’s engagement with history primarily sought to mobilize local history for the present, arguing that histories such as that of industrious Cognian Renaissance burgher, for example, encouraged “love of Heimat” and inspiration for the rebuilding of Cologne.<sup>94</sup>

Nevertheless, by approaching Heimat as coming from knowledge and experience of space, rather than ethnicity and race, postwar Heimat enthusiasts demonstrated the limits of Nazi definitions of Heimat. Nazi propaganda treated Heimat not as local places of subjective and personal life experiences, but exclusively as race and ethnicity. As a member of the *Rheinischer Verein* held, Heimat was “acquired” by the individual gradually over the course of their life.<sup>95</sup> These notions of Heimat paralleled the Weimar ideas of Eduard Spranger.<sup>96</sup> In seeking to ameliorate a rupture in Heimat between parents and children, Cognians drew on notions of *Heimat* as knowledge, experience, and culture. As we shall see in chapter six, a similar, though more pronounced intergenerational Heimat cleft can be seen among eastern expellees. Expellees similarly attempted to repair this rupture through local culture, but were ultimately unsuccessful, as their children had no personal experience of the East or contact with former local

communities.<sup>97</sup> Westerner's advantage in having a center point for rebuilding, recollecting community, and reviving local culture proved crucial to their contrasting success.

The community-strengthening element in local culture was perhaps the most critical in sustaining the local cultural awakening. As scholars of trauma have argued, the ability to cope is often directly linked to community solidarity. Moreover, the forces of the rubble world threatened to further tear people yet further apart. Many Cologne citizens discussed this need for community solidarity explicitly in terms of overcoming trauma. A 1949 piece in the *Kölnischer Rundschau* entitled "On Heimat," for example, expounded on the intense "warmth" of Heimat which brought the individual from loneliness and gave them a source of comfort for sorrows.<sup>98</sup> It offered a panacea against trauma and isolation. In turn, everyday citizens, like the Cologne Günther Hochgürtel, referenced how local community feeling and cooperation pervaded the early postwar city.<sup>99</sup> Heimat enthusiasts like Adam Wrede insisted that the greatest duty of the hour was to meld together all the citizens of the city through keeping local tradition alive.<sup>100</sup> Revival of local culture, as such assertions demonstrate, was not only about culture for culture's sake; it was the mortar of local community feeling implicit in the word "Heimat." The use of local community feeling to process trauma, in turn, re-enforced the connection made between Heimat with and "life affirmation." As a Carnival song from 1946 recounted, Cologneans would help one another to overcome difficult times, bringing them "fresh courage to face life."<sup>101</sup> Expression of this fusion between local Heimat and life-affirmation through Carnival, as we shall see, was not coincidental. Cologne Carnival, as we shall see, was not only their primary Heimat tradition; it was an ecstatic performance of local community, a founding corner stone of the local cultural renaissance and the center of claims to local uniqueness. It was a major forum where citizens proclaimed their local world to be a place of "life-affirmation." Its celebration reflected nearly all

of the strands of Heimat enthusiasm in early postwar city, providing a useful aggregating lense into the local turn.

### **Performing Heimat: Cologne Carnival and Making “Life affirmation” a Local Value**

In mid February 1946, many Colognians, looking out at the snowfall, or standing in line at the black market, saw to their astonishment spontaneous Carnival processions winding through the rubble.<sup>102</sup> The frequent re-tellings of these sighting in later years attest to its emotional resonance. Cologne Carnival, among the largest in Northern Europe, was the high season of expressing Heimat sentiment in Cologne. For at least two centuries, it was the central tradition through which Colognians articulated their local natures. After years of non-observance during war and dearth, it re-emerged in a truly organic fashion from 1945 to 1948. Many celebrated spontaneously in private groups, while Carnival societies emerged in droves. Members of one new society recounted at their 1946 celebrations that trauma, while keeping some away, had mostly driven massive crowds to the local tradition.<sup>103</sup> The next year in 1947, in spite of the city council forbidding public parades, masked balls, or costumed events, spontaneous processions again made their way through the snow-covered ruins (Figure 1-8). Carnival societies also began holding regular year-round social events couched as “Colognian events.” As one carnivalist insisted, they held these year-round events to get through “grey daily life” for a few hours together. Again in 1947, reports noted that attendance at Cologne Carnival events was bursting at the seams.<sup>104</sup> The British occupiers held no objection, having removed all restrictions so long as carnivalists observed curfews. A pre-war Colognian Jewish carnivalist, in particular, helped convince the British that the tradition was not a military demonstration.<sup>105</sup>

Carnival’s dramatic re-emergence offers a unique prism into the local turn in Cologne—

vividly bringing together all the strands that informed the appeal of local Heimat. Citizens discussed Carnival as compensating for the city's physical loss, as a bridge across torn life narratives that restored feelings of "old Cologne," and as a site of personal memory. They further described how it conveyed strong local community feeling and how, like Heimat, it offered a means to heal from postwar trauma. All of these elements combined in the association of Cologne Carnival with a "Colognian" spirit of "life-affirmation." The degree to which Cologne Carnival functioned as a forum of local Heimat sentiment after 1945 can hardly be overstated. As the early postwar carnivalist Hans Jonen argued, their local tradition "embraces the entire Heimat complex." He described how his own Carnival society reflected "Heimat thought," and refused to concede the Heimat concept to a "fanatic-brutal dictatorial statist idea." Jonen's statement is among the rare early postwar references to Nazi propagandistic manipulation of the Heimat concept. Instead of relinquishing the definition of the Heimat concept to Nazi racial and national propaganda, Jonen held his Carnival society to be an expression of a "loyal Rhenish sense of Heimat"—insistence that Heimat referenced an intimate regional space and not an expansive national one. This notion shines through in his description of how Carnival conveyed a feeling of belonging to a local "family."<sup>106</sup> As another local argued, "love of Heimat" was the first and foremost element in the celebration's arrangement.<sup>107</sup>

Compared to other media of local culture, Cologne Carnival proved far more potent as a compensatory space of Heimat, as it offered a recurring sensual, participatory, ecstatic, and unified performance of local community. Descriptions of the tradition as protecting a sense of Heimat threatened by physical destruction and dislocation proliferated in postwar Carnival speeches, songs, poems, and private accounts. Jonen again conveyed this in his 1948 Carnival song "*Kölsche sin nit klein zo krigge*" (Colognians cannot be kept down). The song proclaimed

that, amidst the ruins and starvation conditions, local carnivalists stood “shoulder to shoulder” with their local community in order to keep from “losing themselves.” “Colognians cannot be kept down” the refrain insisted, pushing against fears that physical destruction dissolved local bonds. The next year, Jonen composed another Carnival song that insisted that, though their houses were destroyed, with the last shirts on their body they would proclaim “We are still here—so long live Cologne!” A proliferation of other Carnival songs from the late 1940s echoed these sentiments. The song “*Fruhsenn trotz aller Nut*,” (Joyousness in spite of all adversity) proclaimed that “When Colognian carnivalists stand, Cologne can never fall asunder.” Another entitled “*Kölle bliev Kölle*” (Cologne remains Cologne) held that, in spite of much suffering and lack of physical homes, the “Colognian heart,” still remained. Another 1948 Carnival song, “*Hundert-fünfundzwanzig Johr Fastelovend*,” (One-hundred and fifty years of Carnival) took a similarly defiant tone against fears that their Carnival tradition would disappear after years of interruption; the refrain proclaimed that their tradition will never fall asunder. The next year, a Cologne Carnival song entitled “*Wat uns blevv vum ale Kölle*,” (dialect: “What remains for us of Old Cologne”) similarly recounted that, while little was left of their former city, they would hold strongly to that which remained and that their tradition and local natures “cannot fall asunder.” The same year, yet another Carnival song defiantly insisted: “As long as we live in Cologne, Carnival will exist.” Colognians continued in later years to use Carnival as a defiant and compensatory space of Heimat. As the Cologne government president asserted, Cologne Carnival was the “high festivals of Colognian custom, father-city tradition, and love of Heimat,” and, as the Cologne Carnival song “We are the Sons of the Rhine,” maintained two years later, Rhinelanders refused to forget “Heimat.”<sup>108</sup>

This element of community cohesion in performed communal traditions like Carnival

made them quite useful in processing trauma. While all such traditions facilitated performance of local community, Carnival excelled above all others in this function, as it tore down formal interpersonal distance. As the Russian philosopher Mikhail Bakhtin notes, Carnival is “without footlights”—that is, it is an inherently participatory festival with no stable boundary between performers and spectators.<sup>109</sup> Early postwar Cognians combined Carnival’s emphasis on indulging positive human emotions with the tradition’s community-forming principle to articulate “life affirmation,” as a specifically *Cognian* value rooted in their local tradition. To promote such an interpretation of Cologne Carnival, many locals re-channeled a tradition of Cognian humor, bringing it into discourse with the war’s “erasure” of positive emotion. Locals further described its celebration as a harbinger of future times of peace. Description of Cologne Carnival as life-affirming appeared in the very first *ad hoc* postwar celebrations. The Heimat enthusiast Joseph Klersch described spontaneous events in 1946 and 1947 as displaying a “bravery to live,” noting, among other things, a celebration attended by bearers of prosthetic limbs. Cologne Carnival, he held, mirrored all “Cognian life” and represented a Cognian desire for life. His contemporaries echoed these views. His fellow carnivalist, and head of his own Carnival organization, Albrecht Bodde, wrote of the Cognian bravery to live displayed in Carnival. This informed his view that supporting the tradition was a crucial task of rebuilding.<sup>110</sup> A few years later, Bodde re-enforced these sentiments, describing their tradition as a “health fountain of Cognian happiness” that provided “healing water for wounded souls.”<sup>111</sup> This intentional juxtaposition of Cologne Carnival and its life-affirming powers with trauma can be seen throughout postwar celebrations. One image from the *Rheinische Zeitung* from the 1950 Carnival presents us a visual illustration of this juxtaposition that appeared throughout discourse. (Figure 1-9) The theme of this year’s Carnival, scrawled in local dialect at the top of the image,



memorialized the 1900 year anniversary of the city. Below, we see the figure of the Cologne carnivalist shaking his stick at the ruins of Cologne around the Cathedral. Here the jarring contrast of the rubble world to the Cologne carnivalist is underscored. It succinctly depicted local views of their tradition as a means of pushing back against trauma. They saw this process of processing trauma as occurring in a decidedly local framework. The juxtaposition itself required little artifice; it reflected a clashing duality that could be physically seen in the visual landscape of early postwar Carnival celebrations. (Figures 1-10, 1-11, 1-12).

Illustrating the breadth of views of Carnival as a site of Colognian life-affirmation, several local newspapers were filled with articles that contrasted their local tradition's "life affirming" powers with stimuli of trauma. They reported, for example, on special Cologne Carnival events which gathered together those who suffered war damage, brain injuries, or lost limbs. Reports described Carnival and its localist humor as providing brief opportunities to take leave from their downtrodden circumstances and effect a temporary return of positive human emotion.<sup>112</sup>

Ascription of healing powers to their local tradition appeared in yet other media. Cologne's Theodor Milles publishing house, for example, iterated similar views in a collection of Carnival speeches by Karl Küpper—a speaker banned during the Third Reich for his Nazi jokes. The publisher presented Cologne Carnival as "soul medicine" that would help them confront the challenges of the time.<sup>113</sup> Other carnivalist performers and poets shared this view. The carnivalist singer and speaker, Gebhard Ebeler, in an early postwar Carnival speech, described the local celebrant as the optimist who says "yes to life." Similarly, Johannes Leptien's 1948 Carnival poem, "*Alaaf die Köllsche Gecke*" described Cologne Carnival as an aide in emotionally coping with the city's destruction.<sup>114</sup> Adding to the profusion of such expression, Hans Mollitor, a member of the Carnival Honor Guard declared that, in times of crisis, the "life-affirming

Colognian” emerges to confront it.<sup>115</sup>

In asserting Cologne Carnival as a pillar of localist “life-affirmation,” Colognians re-appropriated their local tradition of carnivalistic humor with particular ease, bringing it directly into dialog with postwar trauma. For generations, Cologne’s citizens identified with their unique style of local humor. According to the early postwar carnivalist Hans Jonen, re-shaping this tradition to cope with postwar circumstances resulted in a Colognian “tragi-comic” gallows humor, which he argued was about creating a sense for the “life-affirming.”<sup>116</sup> Ironic localist humor blurbs written in chalk could be found throughout bombed out buildings in Cologne, seemingly blunting the ruin’s traumatic force.<sup>117</sup> Illustrative of the power of such localist humor, one citizen reportedly played a symbolic localist song on a piano that had been freshly dragged out of a burning building: The local song was entitled “*Et hät noch immer immer got gegange*” (Things have always always gone great).<sup>118</sup> Heinrich Lützeler, an early postwar Rhineländer, emphasized the importance of such localist gallows humor as a means of coping and remaining “human.” He held that Colognian humor was used to deal with threatening situations and create a space of security.<sup>119</sup> Konrad Adenauer certainly recognized this as he encouraged a reawakening of localist humor in the ruins, calling a group of local dialect humorists to “go onto the rubble and bring humor again to the Colognians.”<sup>120</sup> Descriptions of Cologne Carnival humor as restoring positive human emotions appeared quite frequently. The *Rheinische Zeitung*, in the lead up to the first official Carnival celebrations, recounted that, in their world, humor was itself impossible—destroyed by war. The inverse of this world, it insisted, could be found in Cologne Carnival. Re-establishing “true Colognian humor,” would help restore the city and a sense of protection. The article concluded by arguing that the Carnival call “*Kölle Alaaf*” (long live Cologne), included not only a sense of joy, but also responsibility, and “admonition.”<sup>121</sup> The point was not to suppress

past trauma through Carnival gaiety, but rather to enter into dialog with it.

Following the unofficial Carnival celebrations from 1946 to 1948, the official celebrations after 1949 continued to be pervaded by the same notion of their tradition as a site of “Colognian life affirmation.” The theme of the first official observances in 1949 made this clear, entitled: “*Mer sin widder do und dun wat mer künne*” (dialect: we are here again and will do what we can). The *Westdeutsche Zeitung* reported that the theme was not a haughty expression of pride, but rather of their “right to exist.” “Life wisdom” the author held, could be found in Carnival and their local humor.<sup>122</sup> The Lord Mayor Robert Görlinger similarly commented on the theme while handing the city keys to the Prince at the opening festivities. Görlinger held that the theme demonstrated that Cologne was not dead and that citizens would do what they could to confront their circumstances and rebuild. The Prince receiving the keys reaffirmed this views, proclaiming: “the mentality of our Colognian hearts will give us the power to overcome all that is repugnant, and it will give us the bravery to look into the future, because we know today, with joy, everything can be overcome.” Those who lived in joy, lived in peace, the Prince argued as he declared “joy and peace ” the official theme of his Carnival government.<sup>123</sup>

Their Heimat tradition provided a medium through which to confront the trauma of the rubble in a decidedly local framework. A grandiose national idea would not be the peoples’ redeemer, rather restored local communities and their spheres of private life took its place. Their Heimat tradition, as a report that year recorded, provided a few hours in which to see only the “optimism of the Rhenish people” that cleared their hearts of the rubble that surrounded them. Their eyes, used to greyness and squalor now “bathed joyfully in the variegated play of colors” that thrived in their local tradition.<sup>124</sup> And, indeed, as the first postwar Rose Monday parade proceeded through the streets in 1949, the color of make-shift costumes contrasted sharply with

the drab tones of the ruins. The rubble mounds themselves served as bleachers. City officials continually warned against celebrating on rubble piles— a warning they annually re-issue into the late 1950s. In the early years, however, few other places were available. With few large standing structures, outdoor neighborhood celebrations proved quite successful and reportedly conveyed a particularly strong community feeling.<sup>125</sup> Locals, including the Prince himself, recorded the strong community sentiment in these early celebrations, including its sense of “life affirmation,” and Heimat sentiment. The 1949 Prince described the tradition as representing the “unbroken bravery for life of the citizens of this destroyed city.” He declared himself proud to be Colognean given “their will to live and their bravery for life.” The carnivalist Hans Jonen, who composed the report for the 1949 celebrations, reported how the large crowds had delivered a positive referendum on its revival and symbolized a triumph of the “mentality of the Rhineländer,” which relieved political and economic pressures. They had seemingly been drawn in by the tradition’s “life affirming doctrine.” As if repeating a broken record, Jonen described that year’s Rose Monday parade as conveying an “unbroken bravery to live” with Cologneans feeling like “a single large family.”<sup>126</sup> In all of these accounts, local tradition, Heimat, community, and desire for Carnival’s “life affirming forces” proved inseparable topoi.

Beyond the earliest rubble years, the connection of Carnival, local Heimat, and Colognean life-affirmation continued. This can be seen in public discourses and official Carnival themes such as “Cologne in Minor and Major Keys.” Prince Edmund I, in 1951, pointed to the theme as expressing an optimistic “Rhenish mentality,” and ordered his Carnival empire to proceed with the “mobilization of life-affirming forces.” Their theme, Edmund argued, referenced looking back on sorrows while looking ahead to joy. Cologneans, he claimed, were a peaceful people who maintained a laughing eye next to a sobbing one. Their tradition, he repeated, was about moving

from “depression” to “life affirmation.”<sup>127</sup> While an era of past warfare meant refraining from both their Heimat festivals and everyday civilian life, the tradition’s return seemed to harbingers a different time. As yet another Prince argued, the tradition seemingly re-emerged as “the first representative of a beginning time of peace.”<sup>128</sup>

After 1945, all types of performed communal traditions throughout West Germany gained tremendous prominence as sites of local community feeling used to compensate for the lost built environment of Heimat. Such traditions proved one of the main channels through which the energies of the Heimat movement flowed. One Rhenish Heimat enthusiasts made precisely this point at the “Rhenish Heimat day,” noting how festivals and local culture shaped feelings of “community” and “Heimat.”<sup>129</sup> Performed traditions were particularly powerful in that they subsumed public spaces, facilitated simultaneous sensual performance of local community, and could easily be recreated. The calendrical rhythms of such these traditions also often meant that they functioned as recurring sites of personal memory, representing a lost personal past, and helping to repair disjuncture in personal life narratives.

In Cologne itself, Carnival was far from the only performed local tradition, and given the many reasons for the attraction of such traditions, it is little surprise that Colognians sought out yet other localist festivals and public events. The *Kirmes*, a summer fun fair festival, was among those localist festivals revived. The Cologne dialectician, Adam Wrede, described how *Kirmes*, like Carnival, possessed “community-forming powers.”<sup>130</sup> Cologne further revived annual *Altermarktspiele*, which featured localist plays on the public square by city hall. Hungering for yet other communal gatherings, postwar Colognians arranged special events in which they could celebrate local Heimat. Three far-reaching events were held from 1946 to 1950, including the “Cologne culture days” (1946), the “Cathedral Jubilee” (1948), and the 1900-year Cologne

anniversary (1950). The Cologne Culture Days (*Kölner Kulturtage*), organized by the city administration, situated their local culture within a European culture of the “Occident,” rather than a narrowly national context, while also seeking to demonstrate that physical destruction had not destroyed their local “cultural will.”<sup>131</sup> Two years later, Colognians held the Cathedral Jubilee, which celebrated the 700 year anniversary of the Cathedral’s cornerstone laying. Many recounted the event as embodying localism and local community. A 1948 dialect song about the jubilee stylized it as a symbol of Colognian “determination to live” (*Levensmot*) and the city returning to life.<sup>132</sup> The similarity of this discourse to Carnival is unmistakable. Citizens noted that the jubilee marked a major upswing in the city, attracting thousands of attendees who crammed into the Cathedral square for the events (Figure 1-13).<sup>133</sup> Wrede recounted that it strengthened local traditional consciousness, while a Cologne professor reflected on how it helped make the Cathedral identical with “Heimat feeling,” irrespective of a person’s religion. As long as the Cologne Cathedral remained standing, he wrote, Cologne remained “Heimat.”<sup>134</sup> Finally, organizers presented the event and the cathedral bells as symbols of a new time of “peace” and collection of forces for the future.<sup>135</sup>

Only two years later, Colognians held a slew of events to observe the 1900-year city anniversary. As early as 1945, the upcoming anniversary was propagated as an opportunity to emphasize local community, history, and tradition. The anniversary, as Jeffrey Diefendorf has argued, was used to teach returnees about local history, and eased their return to everyday life.<sup>136</sup> Konrad Adenauer first promoted the upcoming anniversary in the *Kölnischer Kurier* in the Summer of 1945, insisting that it should be used to awaken the spirit of the old city, and its inheritance as a city of Rome, Europe, Germany, Christianity, and Humanism. After encouraging anniversary observances, Adenauer concluded his article by discussing German guilt and

perpetration of war crimes.<sup>137</sup> Years later, citizens celebrated the anniversary with a string of events, theater pieces and dialect songs, which presented Cologne's 1900-year history as an inspiration for rebuilding.<sup>138</sup> Numerous exhibitions, special events, publications, and Carnival celebrations contributed to the anniversary. Locals yet again acknowledged how such events compensated for a destroyed built environment. As one citizen wrote in a special newspaper printed for the 1900-year anniversary: after the bombings, what remained of Cologne could, in their time, be found only in the immaterial realm: those things that could not be destroyed by "explosives and phosphorous."<sup>139</sup>

## **Conclusion**

The turn to local Heimat in the rubble of Cologne tells us much about the postwar turn to Heimat. The Freudian binary of the homey (*heimlich*) and the uncanny (*unheimlich*) that pervaded the rubble of German cities did much to jump-start the turn. The experience of evacuation and return, insecurity, disorientation, and obliteration of past individual worlds triggered an inward reorientation toward the local stage and away from an expansive idea of nation as the guarantor of future life. This effected a crucial psycho-geographical cognitive and emotional transference. Rather than projecting anxieties and future hopes onto the surface screen of national ambition, the intimate world of local Heimat came to the fore as the place where anxieties and torn life narratives registered. Local Heimat simultaneously offered a place where locals could bridge over rupture and imagine new personal future. As the case of Cologne demonstrates, loss and fear of loss ultimately fueled the movement. Nothing pushed emphasis on Heimat more than the specter of "*Colonia Deleta*," and feelings that past personal lives had been irrevocably buried underneath the rubble.

Several indices in Cologne evinced the strong turn to local geographies of home after 1945. Locals demonstrated clear awareness that local culture and Heimat activities had reached unprecedented heights. Amidst desires for family and friends, community, and places of restored civilian life, local evacuees discussing their own premature return held that desire for local Heimat drove them back—a sentiment expressed in the phrase “it must be Cologne.” The explosion of new Heimat societies, Heimat publications, discourses on the local world, dialect poetry, *Heimatkunde*, emphasis of performed local tradition, and so forth, all displayed the turn to Heimat. Extraordinary events like the Cologne Culture Days, Cathedral Jubilee, and city anniversary offered yet more channels for the movement to unfold. In attempting to overcome a sense of a lost former local world, Colognians used these and other “non-material” aspects of the local as compensatory spaces through which locals could convince themselves of the continued existence of Heimat.

Early postwar Cologne witnessed a revival of the three primary pillars of the Heimat concept: desire for comprehensible territory, emphasis on community, and tending to cultural uniqueness.<sup>140</sup> The local turn began with emphasis on physical return, followed by emotive revival of local community and an explosion of local cultural activities in the rubble. This chapter has examined many of the factors that motivated these developments. Nevertheless, a consideration of the ideological framings of the local turn remains outstanding. The following chapter addresses this question by looking at how locals reformulated local identities through re-invention of local traditions and historical memories. Also left unanswered is how many Heimat enthusiasts saw the local turn as fitting within a new federalist democratic system. This question too is worthy of further examination.



“Cologne is in all things of life a tolerant city.”<sup>1</sup>  
-Peter Sabel, *Kölner Stadtanzeiger* (1963)

## Chapter II

### **Democratic, World-Open, and Tolerant: Cognian Tradition and Re-shaping Heimat Values**

After 1945, locals in rubble Cologne confronted more than just the challenges of piecing together ravaged communities, rebuilding lost Heimat, repairing torn private lives, and finding a space of “life after death.” Like other West Germans, they also faced the daunting task of forging identification with a new democracy, scrapping entrenched enemy images vis-a-vis the West, dis-identifying with Nazism, and realizing the nascent goals of European unification. They also had to grapple with leaving behind a centralized dictatorship and rebuilding a German federalism. Finally, after an era that witnessed promotion of fundamentally exclusionary notions of community, postwar locals confronted an unprecedented influx of outsiders into the city. The arrival of Eastern German expellee in the early years would be followed a decade and a half later by the arrival of yet other outsider groups of different nationalities.

In coming to grips with these many challenges, nothing could have been more lethal than the idea that democracy, European unification, and more open forms of community were utterly foreign bodies. At the same time, national identity proved problematic in facilitating new identifications. Local identities, by contrast, proved tremendously malleable, and the veritable torrent of discourses on local Heimat in early postwar Cologne reveals tremendous reformulations of local identities. Most importantly, we see the emergence of new claimed tenets of local identity: Cognian “democracy,” “world-openness,” and “tolerance.”

These dynamic identity claims pervaded localist discourses in the city, but citizens did not need to read proliferating Heimat journals, attend any of the many Heimat evenings, or read local

newspapers to encounter them or participate in their construction. Such reformulation of local identity could just as easily be seen on the stage of the city's disheveled streets during public events, festivals, and anniversaries. From the Cologne Culture Days in 1945 to the Cathedral Jubilee in 1948, Colognian citizens, through processions, speeches, and public events, heralded their region as a "world-open bridge" vis-a-vis the West. Similarly, during the 550-year anniversary of the Cologne constitution and during the 1900-year city anniversary, one could hear speeches, watch theater pieces, or visit historical exhibitions that underscored their city's "democratic" histories. Perhaps one of the most telling scenes appeared in the second official postwar Carnival where celebrants cheered a float of the personification of Cologne being injected with syringes of "demokratin;" it was itself a succinct microcosm of what was happening with local identity. Following such displays, carnivalists, as seemingly permissive, democratic, and anti-militarist Colognians, often dressed up in Prussian uniforms and mocked authoritarian Prussian traditions.

Local identity, in short, came to the fore as a highly effective resource at a moment of crisis, offering a medium to dis-identify with Nazism and forge conceptual identification with a new system and new goals. The flood of writings about Heimat and the locality in early postwar Cologne reveals the strongly popular roots of ideas of Colognian democracy, world-openness, and tolerance. Soon after 1945, they became dominant and went largely unchallenged. Two mechanisms proved most essential to their construction: reformulation of local historical memory and re-invention of local traditions. Colognians had a large body of historical matter at their disposal, including the city's Roman origins, pre-national "Christian occidental" history, their medieval guild democracy, status as a border region, history of international trade, status as hotbed of nineteenth-century radical democratic politics, and their historic anti-Prussianism. Re-

invention of tradition, particularly of Cologne Carnival, also proved a prominent tool in reformulating identifications. The tradition had defined local identities for generations, and it shaped local social life year-round. The tradition's meaning, moreover, was historically flexible and underwent radical re-invention from its medieval origins to the nineteenth century.<sup>2</sup> After 1945, its perceived meaning continued to evolve in tandem with local identities, with its antagonism to authority, class leveling, anti-Prussianism, popular inclusion, free speech, and facilitation of anti-militarist displays all decisive assets.

Shifts in local identities were nowhere more apparent than in early articulation of "world-openness" as a local value. Its emergence was accompanied by the swift death of the notorious trope of the "Watch on the Rhine." Since the nineteenth century, the figure flourished in local discourses, symbolizing the Rhineland as a national fortress.<sup>3</sup> Tossing the figure overboard, postwar Colognians instead described their city and region as an international bridge, emphasizing historical memories from their city's pre-national past, Roman influences, international connections and trade, and position at the center of Christian Europe. Identification with medieval Christian Europe as a denationalized idea did, admittedly, bring its own regressive baggage. However, conceiving of their local Heimat as "world-open," aided in turning away from nationalism and toward European unity. These developments ultimately proved essential to cultural demobilization. While war culture relied on the type of absolute enemy images that the Nazis had carefully tended, cultural demobilization, by contrast, required their removal—something never fully realized after World War I.<sup>4</sup> After 1945, on the level of the locality and region, we see contrasting developments vis-a-vis the West.

Early postwar Colognians linked local Heimat and democracy in two ways: through the specificity of their local identities and through articulation of how local orientation itself was

crucial to a decentralized democratic system. Many Heimat enthusiasts emphasized how, in a federalist democracy, local worlds must be sacrosanct sites not subjected to grandiose national spatial visions. Local spaces, many argued, also offered accessible sites of democratic political participation, while geographically expansive polities were often the realm of political machines, privileged elite interest groups, and aspiring dictators. Such advocacy for a Heimat-infused federalist democracy went hand-in-hand with articulation of democracy as a specifically Colognian value. In promoting ideas of Colognian democracy, many locals emphasized the history of their “guild democracy,” Free Imperial city, and their hostility to Prussian authoritarianism and militarism. Many further interpreted Cologne Carnival as a democratic tradition, emphasizing its permissiveness of speech, anti-hierarchical veins, participatory nature, its anti-militarism, and its hostility to the Prussian tradition. Of course, ideas of Colognian democracy did not suddenly make citizens adept practitioners of democracy; in democratic practice, West Germans fell short on multiple fronts. Such identities also did little to help coming to grips with German crimes of the recent past, even if locals seldom argued that they absolved them of guilt. Still, through such ideas, many citizens found a medium through which to identify with the postwar search for democracy and defuse the notion that it was a foreign entity.

Ideas of Colognian world-openness and democracy dovetailed with the later emergence of the idea of “Colognian tolerance.” In the immediate postwar years, some Heimat enthusiasts did evoke local “world-openness” to reference embrace of outsiders. But it was not until the mid 1950s that the idea of Colognian tolerance came into its own—used to reference tolerance toward outsiders and toward their own fellow citizens who had different political or life views. The idea emerged at a time when the city saw a notable influx of non-natives and expellees, and it gradually displaced older, more rigid categories of local citizenship. Reformulated historical

memory and re-invention of tradition—particularly Cologne Carnival— again provided the idea with historical roots. With the arrival of a growing immigrant population into the 1960s, progressive Heimat enthusiasts again used the idea to argue for their acceptance as a practice of local tradition. Cologne tolerance, moreover, proved a sliding signifier that persists in the present day city and has been claimed by and used in reference to new groups.

In addition to articulating tolerance as a specifically Cologne value, many Heimat enthusiasts also promoted a tolerant Heimat idea by arguing for Heimat as a *human* metaphor. They argued that by reflecting on one's relationship to their own Heimat, they could understand newcomers to the city who lost their own—whether those newcomers be expellees or foreign immigrants. Several wrote on how this made Heimat and cosmopolitanism compatible principles. Of course, both Cologne tolerance and theories of tolerant Heimat, like ideas of Cologne democracy and world-openness, remained proscriptive concepts rather than descriptive realities. Creating more permeable and open forms of community proved an ever ongoing challenge.

While the previous chapter demonstrated the turn to local Heimat in the rubble of Cologne, this chapter concludes by outlining the factors that informed the concept's cultural devaluation during the 1960's. The *long-term* effects of the Economic Miracle played a role in its decline, though in its earliest stages, economic boom facilitated rebuilding and a domestic nesting that harmonized with desires for Heimat. The relationship between Heimat and economy, in short, was not as black and white as they appear in theories of the concept as either anti-materialist or about capitalist exploitation. Generational and intellectual shifts also contributed to the decline of the Heimat movement in the 1960s. The youth had very different memory profiles, not having experienced the same ruptures, dislocation, and lost Heimat as their parent generation. Around the same time, the expellee societies used the Heimat idea ever more provocatively in

Cold War conflicts, which increasingly shaped a new generation's attitude toward the concept. While Heimat sentiment after these years persisted, later staggered revivals paled in comparison to the strong local turn of the early postwar years.

### **The Death of the Watch on the Rhine: Local Heimat as a World-Open Bridge**

In 1945, as Colognians feared the loss of their local history from the physical destruction of its many edifices, they quickly discovered much older ones that had long been buried. Sorting through stone mounds overgrown with weeds, and digging out old foundations, locals found a host of Roman ruins from a pre-national past; the volume of discoveries ultimately required a new scheme to house the finds. The unearthings came at a convenient moment, presenting citizens with one of the first usable pasts that they would appropriate to articulate ideas of their region not as the most German of places and bulwark of the nation, but as a historic “world-open” bridge to the West that had historic influences from beyond Germany. As the finds were still being made, a local event in 1946, the “Colognian Culture days,” promoted a denationalized democratic localism with much fanfare. The events included a series of speeches, a local history exhibition, theatrical and operatic performances, and the unveiling of a local theater and a new museum building which would house Cologne's newly-found Roman relicts. The event's theme underscored its purpose. Entitled “the Rhine and Europe,” it sought to awaken memories of the city's Europeanness. The mayor, Hermann Pünder, opened the Cologne Culture Days proclaiming emphatically: “Cologne lives!” His speech drew on Cologne's pre-national history as a center of “Christian occidental culture,” a tradition which he argued persisted despite the city's ruined state. He pointed to the Roman Dionysus mosaic, the Cologne Cathedral, the city's cultural traditions, and medieval histories to anchor Cologne's self-understanding as a *European*

city. Their mission in rebuilding, Pünder announced, would be to recreate the city as a historical site of the “European Occident.” Their local European tradition, he continued, had become their “duty of the present,” with the European idea containing “Christian love and human tolerance.” Identification with the European idea, he insisted, should be held not out of calculation, but of conviction. Rather than throwing the national idea completely overboard, he insisted that the European and national ideas were compatible and that Cologne, with its German, Roman, and Christian histories, was an ideal site from which to recognize this compatibility.<sup>5</sup>

The Cologne Culture Days were a harbinger of popular changes in local self-understandings after 1945, with Colognian and Rhenish Heimat enthusiasts rapidly shifting from seeing their city and region as a national fortress to understanding themselves as an international bridge. The Culture Day events strongly hit home how their local history made their city a democratic bridge between national peoples. The Cologne culture secretary couched the events as building a bridge across hate, mistrust, and divides between Germany and Europe. Cologne, he continued, was a city of the “European middle”— at the “heart of Europe.”<sup>6</sup> In a different event speech, another local used the opening of the new city history exhibition to address the historic duty of their local Heimat in a postwar democracy. He proclaimed that “the Heimat-enthusiast and Heimat-proud Colognian people” had the obligation to remember their local history, which for him meant maintaining their local-historical “push toward freedom.” Citizens who listened to his speech later entered the exhibition to see the medieval “democratic” city constitution, the *Verbundbrief* (1396).<sup>7</sup> City reports held that the events demonstrated the dedication of their “Rhenish cultural metropole to international understanding on a cultural basis.”<sup>8</sup>

These new narratives of place evinced a decisive break from those promoted by nationalists and later National Socialism. Of course, it has become fashionable to construct

narratives of continuity across the 1944/45 divide, often by isolating strands from their broader context, and privileging the 1960s as the actual period of democratization. While not seeking to challenge the importance of the 1960s in democratization, I would argue that we must examine early postwar discourses on the democratic and European project to consider how many postwar citizens came to identify with the search for democracy and western *rapprochement* much earlier. Local identities provided but one media through which such conceptual identifications could be forged.

In Cologne, the earliest caesura of the early postwar years can be most clearly seen in the death of the *Wacht am Rhein*. After 1945, the symbol of their regionalness as a defensive German wall was nowhere to be found, and would never reappear as a significant figure of local self-understanding. Tossing overboard such nationalist tropes, Colognians in the wake of the war continually emphasized the connection of their localness to international reconciliation and European Unification. Only two years after the Cologne Culture Days, locals used the Cologne Cathedral Jubilee in 1948 for yet another dramatic demonstration of local history as inspiring a bridging across nationalized borders. While the church used the events for its own propaganda, others argued that the event represented the victory of a different European German tradition over an exclusionary tradition that prevented international reconciliation.<sup>9</sup> In the lead up to the 1948 jubilee, interpretations of Colognian history, tradition, and geography, as fashioning a “world-open” and “European” identity, reverberated throughout popular local discourses. The Heimat publication, *Unser Köln*, for example, published articles that defined being a Rhineländer as balancing Germanness with being world-open, and European. The Rhine, such articles insisted, did not separate people, it joined them. They encouraged fellow Rhineländer to turn away from nationalism and toward a regional tradition of freedom.<sup>10</sup> Such narratives of world-



open Colognian natures continued beyond these years, evoked continually throughout the 1950s and 1960s. The local Joseph Haubrich, for example, later argued for Cologne as an “entrance gate” of the western world to Germany, while others like local professor Hans Peters described their locality as bearing the “soul of contemporary European culture.”<sup>11</sup> Societal Heimat enthusiasts, like those in the society *Alt-Köln* took up the same idea of Colognianness as balancing local rootedness and “world-open” Colognian tradition.<sup>12</sup> In propagating such identifications, postwar Colognians appealed to a notion of local Heimat as serving the nation by de-centering it and rendering its boundaries porous. In the process, pre-national histories went from representing what nationalists saw as abhorrent divisions of national unity, to becoming positive histories to be revived in a new federalist, unified Europe.

Heimat enthusiast also sought to convey to their children through *Heimatkunde* the notion that local-rootedness and world-openness were compatible values. Instead of promoting a myopic view of localness, the youth Heimat publication *Jung-Köln* used local teaching to foster awareness of the outside world and broad concepts. Articles on the history of local innovators, industries, flora and fauna, architecture, history, theater, travel, transportation networks, practiced traditions, and so forth, all served to teach children about both the local world and the broader one outside of it. The Heimat publication’s regular sections on Colognians’ global travels particularly sought to harmonize local Heimat sentiment with a broader global purview, encouraging local children with a strong sense of Heimat, to become interested in and to respect other world cultures and practices by reflecting on other peoples’ relationship to the places that they too saw as Heimat.<sup>13</sup> Heimat appeared here not as a metaphor of Germanness, but as an anthropological metaphor for the local situatedness of the human condition.

Promotion of world-openness as a local value had parallels throughout West Germany. It

also reverberated in Rhenish areas beyond Cologne. Karl Arnold, the North-Rhine Westphalia state president, for instance, at the 1954 “Rhenish Heimat day” discussed “world-openness” and “Heimat” vis-a-vis the youth. Rhenish children, he declared, should be brought up to be “world-open.” This world-openness he believed, was not achieved by hectic running about the globe photographing tourist attractions. Rather, he believed Heimat itself could facilitate world-openness; by understanding their relationship to their own regional Heimat, they could understand others’ relationship to their own places of home. By others, he did not mean only fellow nationals; he believed that Heimat, when understood as an inherent human experience, contained a spirit of world-openness.<sup>14</sup>

The rapid increase in localist identification with Europe and the proliferation of more permeable concepts of Heimat represented crucial breaks with earlier notions of region.<sup>15</sup> These development were significant, even if they came with their own substantial pitfalls. To provide but one example, identification with Colognian world-openness through historical memory of the Christian occident, while facilitating dis-identification with national egoism, also proved laden with resurgent conservative Christian tropes that informed an era of sexual repression. Strains of the Christian Occident idea were also used to buttress divisions with the Eastern block. The aggressive postwar ambition of the Catholic Church to re-Christianize Germany through the Occident idea could be seen, among other places, at the Cologne Cathedral Jubilee in 1948.<sup>16</sup> Ultimately, however, emphasis on world-openness as a local value represented an early, if at times clumsy, attempt to conceptually harmonize Heimat with cosmopolitanism.

### **Affiliating Local Heimat with Postwar Democracy**

Like the affiliation of Heimat with world-openness, postwar Colognian localists linked

Heimat with democracy through two means: firstly by articulating notions of local-rootedness and Heimat as essential to democracy, and secondly through the idea of democracy as a specifically Colognian value. Locals often articulated such ideas with a sense of urgency about an uncertain future. Before considering the emergence of “democracy” as a specific tenet of Colognian identity, it is necessary to examine Heimat enthusiasts’ arguments that Heimat and local orientation were themselves essential to the establishment of a new decentralized democracy. Such notions were rooted in recent experience of totalitarianism, and reacted against the subjugation of local worlds to mass geo-political goals. Heimat enthusiasts frequently argued that local Heimat was to be the center of a restored vibrant private sphere that must be sacrosanct and above being harnessed for grandiose ambitions. Psychic emphasis on local and regional spaces, many argued, would have a structural and cultural decentralizing effect, described not as anti-national, but as fostering a healthier vision of nation. Learning perhaps the wrong lesson from the rise of Nazism, many local enthusiasts further argued that mass political parties, creatures of the national stage, were harmful to democracy; decision-making instead should be invested in local communities. Local Heimat, they often argued, would act as a “comprehensible forum” for increased public political participation that would achieve the opposite of complex mass political systems which they described as shutting out normal citizens. Some localist charges against the dictatorship were quite legitimate. Nazi use of the Heimat concept itself rejected valuation of local worlds for their own sake, insisting that they must look toward outward expansion and militarist struggle.<sup>17</sup> Postwar Heimat enthusiasts made the same charges against the Soviet Union, skewering the Soviet dictatorship as an anti-Heimat state given the regime’s willingness to uproot people from their localities for mass geopolitical ends. In charging the Soviet Union with a disregard and undemocratic contempt for Heimat they often cited not only uprooting of the

expellees, but also Soviet treatment of non-Russian cultures (in such evocations, Heimat again was not simply a German feeling, but about individual relation to place). Democracy, they often argued, must respect individuals' roots in their local worlds; expansive visions, in contrast denigrated individuals by forcing them into a depersonalized utilitarian mass. In some areas, these were legitimate critiques of the dark face of modernity implicit in totalitarianism. Historians of the early postwar period, however, have often precipitously labeled such concerns— often articulated through the language of “massification”— as itself inherently anti-modern and anti-democratic.<sup>18</sup> As we shall see, Heimat enthusiasts typically discussed the dangers of massification in terms of its threat to *democracy*, illustrating at the very least their identification with the postwar search for a democratic system.

The idea that a democratic re-orientation could be bolstered by elevating the status of local worlds had popular appeal throughout West Germany. It proved equally prominent in Cologne. While many examples can be found, the early postwar writings of the Colognean Heimat enthusiast Joseph Klersch provide a salient example. The amateur historian, carnivalist, and localist, though not a man of any significant political influence, wrote frequently on Heimat as crucial to a postwar democracy. Klersch argued that rootedness in local space fostered a “feeling of responsibility,” and was an “elementary school of politics” that contrasted to mass political systems and their barriers to grassroots participation. For Klersch and other local enthusiasts, everyday citizens needed local venues of democratic governance to avoid becoming *Untertanen*—subservient subjects.<sup>19</sup> “Metaphysical rootedness” in a place, he argued, instilled one with democratic responsibility toward their locality; “atomization of society,” by contrast, was the death knell of democracy by breeding “helplessness and passivity.” It allowed political speculators to prey on their “libidinal urges” and “forgetfulness,” and then “ruthlessly” misuse

them.<sup>20</sup> Intimate communities and face-to-face relationships, Klersch argued, meant that one did not become the “robotic” “mass man,” of totalitarianism. In comprehensible space of local Heimat, the individual acquired the “capability of judgement.” Heimat preserved individuality and prevented uprooted individuals from falling for demagogic “rat catcher melodies.” What Klersch did not advocate, however, was backward ruralism. They must, he argued, expiate the notion of a fountain of health in the German village which supposedly contrasted to the “ill cities.”<sup>21</sup>

In Klersch’s writings, he further described local worlds as a means of pushing against an expansionary national idea. “Real Heimat feeling” he saw not as outward national sentiment, but rather, “daily experiences of a trusted environment.” This did not mean that Heimat was without dangers; Klersch argued that Heimat enthusiasts must avoid falling for “romanticism” or “false ideology.”<sup>22</sup> Other localists throughout West Germany similarly referenced the need of Heimat enthusiasts to avoid romantic or utopian visions of Heimat. Their “Heimat movement,” as Klersch termed it, was about giving people a new sense of humanity by protecting local spaces from dehumanizing “massification.” Heimat, moreover, was not to be anti-modern in spirit; local culture and traditions should, according to Klersch, be reconciled with modern circumstances and a technological world. It should not be exclusionary, but encourage understanding between native localists and outside groups like the expellees.<sup>23</sup>

Other Cologne locals echoed Klersch’s views of local Heimat as a site of democratic potential. Max-Leo Schwering, who took over at the city office for the promotion of local culture at the end of the 1950s, argued that “Heimat” offered a means of avoiding the creation of “robotic masses” who did not think for themselves and who took no responsibility. Leveling individuals into malleable masses, he believed risked creating a political passivity that provided rich soil for dictatorship. “He who has no Heimat,” Schwering argued, risks losing public spirit and not caring

for their fellow man.<sup>24</sup> Concurring voices could be found throughout the Rhineland. At the Rhenish Heimat Day in 1953, Karl Arnold, a figure once hounded by the Nazis, held that “Heimat” was neither backwards nor reactionary; it was the foundation of a state that would be the “anti-thesis of modern nationalism”—the key to a “constructive future.” He affiliated absence of Heimat with dictatorship, pointing to how non-Russian nationalities in the Soviet Union were uprooted in a utilitarian spirit. Soviet massification, he argued, created a society without Heimat; economic utility, he insisted, should never trump Heimat.<sup>25</sup> Through such examples we see that, while Heimat could be used to tear down enemy images in the West, it helped to sustain them via the East, which West Germans encoded as a space of “anti-Heimat.”

Other Rhenish localists underscored how, in a postwar democracy, they needed a modern notion of Heimat, open to change, that harmonized traditional consciousness with modern impulses. Heimat enthusiasts like Adolf Flecken and his *Rheinischer Verein für Denkmalpflege und Heimatschutz* were among those who voiced such views. Heimat sentiment, Flecken wrote, should avoid false romanticism and be geared toward the “duties of the present.” The society was to make the rich heritage of their “Rhenish Heimat” useful for the present and the future. Modernity, he continued, required change, but this did not mean dispensing with Heimat and regional tradition; it meant finding a harmonic balance between “traditional and modern forces.”<sup>26</sup> The Heimat society held to this view, re-iterating again at their yearly meeting the need to support Heimat while rejecting “false romanticism” and “sentimentalism.”<sup>27</sup> Those in another Heimat society, the *Rheinischer Heimatbund*, felt the same, insisting that Heimat should not be a relict of the past or an element of museum work. Rather, it must be modern and “close to the times.”<sup>28</sup> The point was not regressive backwardness, but to make local intimacy compatible with modernity and a new democratic system.

## Colognian Democracy as a Local Value

While articulating theories of local rootedness as beneficial to modern democracy, many Heimat enthusiasts simultaneously pushed the idea of democracy as a specific tenet of local identity. Their tools in this project were reformulation of local historical memory and re-invention of tradition. Colognians had a panoply of unique traditions and histories to draw from. Moreover, affiliation of Colognian identity with democratic colorings was not *entirely* new. Inchoate ideas of Colognian democratic and anti-militarist natures fluctuated throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. James Brophy, for example, demonstrates how nineteenth-century Rhenish Carnival acted as one of the earliest forums of a democratic public sphere, with nineteenth-century regionalists positing a certain connections between Rhenish identity and “constitutional rights and participatory politics.”<sup>29</sup> Interpretation of Cologne’s primary Heimat festival as a democratic, anti-Prussian, and anti-militarist tradition oscillated throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.<sup>30</sup> Reinhold Billstein, and a host of other historians have further demonstrated the existence of a host of prewar democratic traditions in Cologne, while Jonathan Sperber has shown how radical democratic groups flourished in the nineteenth-century Rhineland, fomenting an otherwise successful revolution in 1848-1849 until it was crushed by the Prussian military.<sup>31</sup> Historically, there was more than stereotype to the Rhineland having more democratic leanings than East Elbian Germany. Nevertheless, articulation of democratic Colognian identity in earlier periods was ever inchoate, incomplete, and contested.<sup>32</sup>

In the early postwar years, this affiliation went from inchoate to hegemonically articulated. In 1950, at the peak of Carnival, we see perhaps the most theatrical glimpse into these developments. The Rose Monday parade that year memorialized the city’s 1900 year anniversary with scenes from local history. Floats could be seen with Konrad Adenauer being crowned a local

democratic hero, while others blasted Prussian militarism and rigidity. At the end of the parade, the final section, entitled: “the 1000 year empire,” mocked Nazi visions of grandeur. Here, a float appeared that presents us with a succinct microcosm of how local identity was developing. The float, entitled “Tünnies is being denazified,” depicts Tünnies, the personification of Cologne and its local natures, receiving medical treatment after Nazi efforts to inculcate him with negative values. (Figure 2-1) A team of physicians surround him with medicines titled anti-Nazin cream, anti-Nazi powder and doses of demokratin. One doctor’s resemblance to Adenauer, is unmistakable—his second appearance in the parade. Locals continued memorializing him as a local democratic hero in later years.<sup>33</sup> The 1950 Tünnies float presented a stunning visual summary of the project of infusing local identity with democratic affiliations.

Local historical memory would prove crucial to the construction of ideas of Colognean democracy. As Maurice Halbwachs argued, historical memory is inherently shaped by the needs, circumstances and social pressures of a given historical period. Scores of scholars have confirmed the validity of this observation in different historical contexts.<sup>34</sup> Much work on memory for early postwar Germany, however, has focused almost exclusively on questions of guilt suppression, often neglecting the many ways in which postwar society simultaneously sought to shape historical memory of the more distant past as they faced an unstable future. Facing a new Cold War, economic disaster, and the influx of expellees whose loyalty to the new state seemed uncertain, postwar Cologneans and other West Germans palpably feared a second Weimar.<sup>35</sup> The early Federal Republic itself has been usefully described as the “catastrophe that never happened.”<sup>36</sup> In turn, many local Heimat enthusiasts often discussed memory of the distant past in terms of its use in confronting a turbulent future for which they needed to solidify identification with new values. While national memory proved a difficult medium for forging such



identifications, localities proved a more fruitful avenue. In propagation of “local” democratic values, locals seldom argued or even hinted that it reduced their responsibility for Nazi crimes—though the idea of Colognian democracy did nothing to help come to grips with local culpability for the past. As the historian Celia Applegate convincingly argues, *Heimat* after 1945 was often perceived as a medium of rehabilitation.<sup>37</sup> Notably, local histories that would have been more effective in suppressing local culpability for the Nazi past seldom appeared in discourses on local identity. Such histories included the status of Cologne-Aachen as the district with the lowest voting levels for the Nazis. Reference to this history was surprisingly low, though the Nobel prize recipient Heinrich Böll pointed to the low level of Nazi voters in Cologne-Aachen as one of the reasons that made him feel comfortable living in the Rhineland. Böll was otherwise known for emphasizing local processing of their complicity in Nazi crimes.<sup>38</sup>

But what local historical memories proved useful in establishing democracy as a perceived Colognian value? As elsewhere in rubble Germany, histories of eras prior to national unification and centralized territorial states were re-valued *en masse*. While nationalists and National Socialists had viewed histories of German fragmentation as abhorrent, after 1945, *Heimat* enthusiasts frequently appropriated them to advance a federalist and more de-centered image of nation. Cologne was no exception, and already in 1946, a convenient memorial arrived. In this year, the city celebrated the 550 year anniversary of the Cologne city constitution written in 1396. The constitution had overthrown an oligarchy of ruling families and established the city as a “guild democracy.” If not for their postwar circumstances, it is questionable whether the anniversary would have been observed. But in 1946, it provided the perfect opportunity to link the city’s old “guild democracy” and history as a Free Imperial City to a local value of “democracy.” Postwar Colognians held several events to memorialize their “democratic constitution,” including

theatrical performances where locals saw enactments of the 1396 revolution where “subjects” became “free citizens.”<sup>39</sup> While the Englishman could look to the Magna Charta to posit democracy as part of his national identity, the Cologne citizen could do the same in reformulating notions of local identity. In forging such identifications, it was aside from the point that historical matter seldom aligns neatly with popular memory.

The Heimat enthusiast and amateur historian Joseph Klersch avidly promoted the guild democracy as giving Colognean democracy historical roots. In 1947, in a new *Heimatblatt*, Klersch wrote that the 1396 constitution was the origin of a “democratic tenor” that Cologneans had in their local natures. He underscored a Colognean feeling of equality, proclaiming that a spirit of democracy still lived in the city. Klersch later took this message to the youth, insisting that their medieval guild democracy, while not a true democracy in the modern sense, contained an “old transmitted Colognean democratic mind set” that citizens should identify with.<sup>40</sup> Klersch was explicit about the function that such historical memory should play in present-day Cologne: it taught Cologneans that people who think differently should have equal rights.<sup>41</sup>

Klersch was not alone in promoting historical memory of the guild democracy as a pillar of Colognean democratic identity; Max-Leo Schwering, the Cologne museum director, did much the same. Schwering did not aim to exculpate locals through narratives of Colognean democracy; rather, as head of the city museum, he pushed confrontation with local complicity for the Nazi past more than many locals would have desired.<sup>42</sup> Others like Cologne architectural conservationist, Hans Vogts, also pushed memory of the guild democracy, with similar goals in mind. Known for his sensual verbal tours through images of the prewar city, Vogts described Cologne and its guild democracy as a “democratic local community” which left behind no elaborate Duchal palaces. He described buildings like the old city hall as representing Cologne’s

status as a city of humanism and occidental spirit.<sup>43</sup> Emphasis on democratic traditions in local architecture could also be found in discussions about rebuilding historical structures described as containing democratic symbolism. Localists underscored reconstructing the old city hall, whose history extended back to the Free Imperial City days, describing it as a historical marker of “Colognian city democracy.” The city hall’s *Hansasaal* and the *Platzjabbeck*, a figure on the tower, were both particularly interpreted as democratic symbols. Heimat enthusiasts also emphasized rebuilding the *Gürzenich*— a medieval social meeting hall that they some described as having democratic symbolism; the first days of its reconstruction itself became a localist Carnival event.<sup>44</sup> As a youth Heimat journal argued in 1949, the *Gürzenich* was a symbol of “freedom.”<sup>45</sup> Some locals clearly recognized that the guild democracy was anachronistic and only a vague point of inspiration. For localists like Werner Holbeck, they were not to be mimicked, representing but pre-modern “beginning realization of basic rights” with which Colognians should identify.<sup>46</sup>

Even more than Cologne’s medieval guild democracy, the city’s nineteenth and twentieth-century conflicts with Prussian rigidity and militarism offered a prime foil against which postwar notions of “Colognian democracy” developed. Prussia stood in the minds of many as the spiritual ancestor of Nazism, rooted in submission to authority, strident militarism, authoritarianism, territorial expansion, and rigid class structure. These affiliations were not purely postwar inventions, with many in the prewar years also viewing the Nazis, for better or for worse, as the spiritual inheritors of Prussian tradition.<sup>47</sup> Nor was anti-Prussianism in Cologne something new, having existed to varying degrees since the early nineteenth century. In the immediate postwar period, however, anti-Prussian sentiment in Cologne reached unprecedented levels and served new purposes. By rallying against the “Prussian tradition,” Colognians and *Rheinländer* posited anti-militarism, anti-hierarchy, challenging of authority figures, and democracy as overtly local values.

Heimat enthusiasts were not alone in viewing cultural “de-Prussianization” as akin to denazification. The British, Americans, and French allies all explicitly emphasized abandoning Prussian tradition as a postwar imperative. These attitudes circulated at all levels of allied administration—including the likes of Charles de Gaulle and Winston Churchill. After 1945, the occupiers looked positively on the popular anti-Prussian sentiment that exploded in postwar Cologne. As the British Lieutenant J.M. White wrote while stationed in Cologne in 1946, their Rhenish tradition should be emphasized in order to turn away from the dark traditions of Prussia. Germany needed to learn democracy, White continued, by encouraging individual personality, community, and abandoning soulless Prussian state machinery.<sup>48</sup> Cologne’s citizens themselves similarly associated Prussian tradition with depersonalizing mass state structures and an atomized “massified society.” Hans Schmitt-Rost, a Cologne Heimat enthusiast with a knack for anti-Prussianism, for example, argued that Colognian nature included a penchant for “human scales” in which they mistrusted the “apparatus,” “the masses,” and the “machine.”<sup>49</sup> By turning to face-to-face personal relationships of Colognian Heimat, and respecting individuality, he believed, they could turn away from a system of mass political manipulation that was spiritually linked to the Prussian tradition. Joseph Klersch similarly reflected this view in his writings on the “duties of Heimat” in their time. “Heimat,” he wrote, was about “tending to personality” in an era of “massification.” The point was not to indulge in a solipsistic anti-modernism—rather, as Klersch made clear, Heimat was about seeing the “smallest entity in its largest context.”<sup>50</sup>

Whatever Prussian tradition truly contained, its imagined substance functioned as a screen against which locals articulated ideas of political participation, decentralization, greater social equality, and democracy as local values. In so doing, they increasingly stigmatized submission to authority, rigid social structure, and centralized state machinery. Locals sought out several media

for expressing hostility to such seemingly Prussian values, including attempts to rename the traditional Hohenzollern bridge, or instilling their children with opposition to Prussian tradition through *Heimatkunde*.<sup>51</sup> Beyond re-configuring local historical memory to forge notions of Cologneian “democracy,” locals had yet other tools for reformulating local identities. Re-invention of performed traditions served a similar purpose, and, in Cologne, no tradition was more important to local identity than their traditional Carnival. Often referred to as their “father-city festival,” the tradition was saturated with expression of “commitment to Heimat,” with the refrains of its songs triumphantly declaring “Cologne is our Heimat.”<sup>52</sup>

### **Re-invention of a Heimat Tradition and Cologneian Democracy**

Cologne Carnival, a tradition with medieval origins, underwent tremendous re-invention over the course of its history, keeping many continuous forms that later took on radically different meanings. While medieval Carnival symbolized the Kingdom of Hell as the counterpoint to Lent—the evil of human natures to be rejected—by the nineteenth century, the tradition had fused with local and regional identities and became a performance of positive Rhenish jollity, and a “healthful” break from forces of rigidity—values to be promoted and embraced beyond Carnival. Many factors informed the Heimat tradition’s historical malleability, including its inherently participatory nature, and its lack of boundaries between performers and spectators, making it difficult for a single group to control the tradition.<sup>53</sup> After 1945, the tradition’s perceived meaning continued to evolve in tandem with local identity, and its re-invention offered yet another route to affiliate democracy with their localness.

The idea of Cologne Carnival as a democratic tradition was not completely new. Over the centuries, absolutist rulers distrusted the tradition given its disorder, mockery of authority, social

leveling, and free speech. Early nineteenth-century Cologne Carnival reformers were strident democrats who filled Carnival with politically encoded symbolism, including tropes of the city's freedoms prior to Prussian annexation. The Carnival form itself acted as a re-occurring discursive space on societal orders.<sup>54</sup> Throughout the nineteenth century, Cologne's citizens projected different politicized meanings onto the tradition, including inchoate interpretations of Carnival as a democratic, anti-Prussian, and/or nationalist tradition. After 1945, however, inchoate notions of Cologne Carnival as democratic and anti-Prussian surged, and formerly contested symbolism interpreted as democratic were magnified; this included interpretation of the Carnival number "11," as an equality symbol and Carnival uniforms as mocking militarism.<sup>55</sup> Other democratic symbolisms created by early-nineteenth century Carnival reformers also proved of value, including the "*Kölsche Boor*" and "*Kölner Jungfrau*," personages in the Carnival triumvirate who represented Colognian free citizens. Postwar citizens emphasized the figures as symbols of their democratic civic spirit, and praised nineteenth-century reformers for pushing their tradition into "true democratic channels." Others believed that "the democratic and the permissive" elements of Cologne Carnival had even longer historical roots.<sup>56</sup>

The earliest postwar celebrations saw theatrical expressions of their Heimat traditions as being a bastion of local democracy. In February 1951, as the grey rubble world bathed in a sea of colorful costumed citizens, the Carnival Prince, in addition to elaborating on the tradition as a site of Rhenish optimism and mobilizing "life-affirming forces," asserted that his Carnival Kingdom was the "most tolerant democracy on earth."<sup>57</sup> As the first postwar Prince similarly proclaimed, his Carnival Empire was a monarchy in name only, and his subjects had a true "democratic (jesters-) freedom."<sup>58</sup> The locally-patriotic carnivalist Hans Jonen echoed this in posing the question "What does Carnival have to do with politics?" His answer was "very much!," as he

touted its satire's democratic function.<sup>59</sup> Other prominent carnivalists loudly proclaimed the tradition's contrareity vis-a-vis Prussian bureaucratic natures, while playing up Carnival symbolism as representing a Colognean "democratic disposition."<sup>60</sup> Locals often used celebrations to advance a politics of democratic unity, while denouncing dictatorship and Nazism in new Carnival songs like "D'r Molli," which insisted that in future, they would be wary of dictators.<sup>61</sup>

Theatric carnivalistic expression of hostility to Prussian militarism was particularly salient in early postwar celebrations. Locals easily pulled on anti-militarist and anti-Prussian tropes that were already latent in their tradition. For over a century, for example, societal carnivalists donned eighteenth-century military uniforms, carried fake wooden rifles, and often appeared as a rag-tag disordered force that engaged in the *Stippeföttche*—a dance consisting mostly of posterior rubbing. Throughout the nineteenth century, the idea circulated that the uniformed figures and their theatrical non-sense mocked Prussian militarism, though this was a contested interpretation. In the postwar period, however, many locals re-appropriated and magnified such anti-militarist interpretations, using both discourse and visual persiflage to skewer militarists.<sup>62</sup> Postwar parades offered a prime venue for such expressions. Floats mocked Prussia and the need to dismember its traditions. One float depicted the Prussian bureaucrat as the heathen with Viking horns, while yet another mocked the figure of the cantankerous Prussian policemen. Another float roasted military re-armament, depicting it as a wing-man with a propelling cone sticking out of his anus, while another attacked re-armament with the image a distressed angel of peace, riding on a tank with Prussian spiked helmets, with the inscription "who is to pay for this?"<sup>63</sup>

Promotion of anti-militarism as a tenet of local tradition appeared elsewhere in Carnival, including in the first postwar Carnival constitution issued by Prince Theo I in 1949. In the most important article of his constitution, "§11," the Prince made a demilitarization declaration; his

dutiful scribe further referred in song to their local tradition as a “festival of peace.”<sup>64</sup> Such anti-militarism, however, was not entirely uncontested. The next year, anonymous individuals put up posters denouncing celebrating Carnival when they should be thinking of the German POWs. Celebrants tore down the posters and proceeded with events.<sup>65</sup> Anti-militarist sentiment in their Heimat tradition continued throughout the 1950's and 1960s. Local writers such as Partykiewicz (pseudonym), Hans Jonen, and Eva Stünke, continued to write about how their tradition mocked Prussian militarism.<sup>66</sup> Others used Carnival to make jokes about the Federal Army, while some present-day locals continue to see anti-Prussianism and anti-militarism in the tradition.<sup>67</sup>

This magnified layer of anti-Prussian/anti-militarist meaning in their local tradition fed directly into ideas of democracy as a local value. Heinrich Lützeler, a local professor in the early 1950's, spoke on the democratic nature of Cologne Carnival humor at the “Wednesday discussions,” a forum of democratic discussion held weekly in the Cologne train station.<sup>68</sup> Lützeler recorded his thoughts in two booklets on the philosophy of Cologne humor and how it informed Cologne democracy. Their local value of democracy, he argued, was not a “theory of state,” but rather a “life feeling.” Rhenish tradition, he argued, was, as reflected in carnivalistic and humorist traditions, rooted in the West and against Prussian military traditions. Lützeler also believed that Cologne hostility to rigid class boundaries was inscribed in their local humor and Carnival tradition, and informed the life-feeling of “Rhenish democracy.”<sup>69</sup>

Adding to their assets in identifying their Heimat tradition with democracy, Carnival historically contained class-leveling elements, which fit neatly with early postwar notions of democracy requiring a strong *Bürgertum* and the doing away with rigid Prussian class structures.<sup>70</sup> Carnival's class-leveling aspects included renouncing the formal *Sie* (thou-speech) regardless of class or authority, and the mocking of authority figures. Contested equality symbolism, like the



Carnival number “11,” similarly gained prominence. The number, which contrary to legend did not originate as a symbol of equality, represented in the medieval period the wicked overstepping of the ten commandments, re-interpreted by some of their nineteenth-century ancestors as symbolizing equality between the classes (1 to 1), inscribed onto Jacobin-like Carnival caps.<sup>71</sup>

Postwar Colognian citizens magnified these perceived meanings in claiming opposition to rigid class structure as a local tradition.<sup>72</sup> Heinrich Böll reflected these interpretation by insisting on class leveling as a value of Cologne Carnival and an intrinsic part of Colognianness and Rhenishness. The difference between Cologne Carnival, and, say Bavarian “*Fasching*” he insisted, was that the former was “classless, like an infection, that does not know the difference between classes.” Böll used this interpretation of the tradition to answer the question: “What is Colognian?”<sup>73</sup> Böll was not alone in emphasizing a socially progressive democratic local identity. Others, like the museum director Max-Leo Schwering did the same by teaching Colognian children socially-progressive local histories to promote identification with Cologne as a city of “trail-blazing social progress,” which helped the poor and challenged authority.<sup>74</sup>

Finally one of the less obvious ways in which locals viewed their tradition as democratic was its strengthening of local community bonds. This notion was founded upon the idea that atomization and massification threatened democracy, while forces that tended to local community redound to the benefit of democracy. The notion of community participation as key to democracy was quite prominent amongst Heimat enthusiasts. Localists like Joseph Klersch, viewed local solidarity as a means of overcoming ideological fervor by putting face-to-face relationships above geopolitics. In 1947, he wrote how “love of Heimat” and values of local community helped overcome the “spiritual and moral collapse” of their people.<sup>75</sup> Their local Carnival tradition and other performed ritual traditions, in turn, offered a medium to perform the primacy of local

solidarity over ideology and geopolitical struggle. Community-promoting traditions seemingly protected against the isolation and massification that provided tinder for aspiring dictators. For this reason, Klersch believed they should emphasize passing on Cologne Carnival to their children as part of an “upraising to democracy,” given how it encouraged community participation.<sup>76</sup>

The theme of placing local unity over dangerous ideological division can be seen throughout early postwar celebrations. Eberhard Hamacher, the head of a prominent Cologne Carnival society wrote in 1948 that their society symbolized a “peaceable spirit” and “love of Heimat” that respected all citizens regardless of their politics.<sup>77</sup> The following year, Carnival Prince Theo I transformed this philosophy of local unity over ideological allegiance into practice. At a prominent Carnival event, the Prince called representatives of the Liberal, Socialist, Christian Conservative, and Communist parties to appear on the stage arm in arm. He proclaimed Carnival as the space where all of their hostilities against each other could be reconciled in a realm above partisanship.<sup>78</sup> Other Carnival Princes propagated this same localist notion, with one declaring their tradition to be a “true connecting link” that brought together locals from “different types and different classes...as only a truly democratic people could wish.”<sup>79</sup> Local unity through Heimat, they believed, placed loyalty to fellow man over loyalty to ideology. With the Weimar years fresh in their memories, heated party rivalry seemed to be one of the greatest dangers to democracy. Heimat, by contrast, seemed to offer a space of consensus.

### **The Birth of Cognian Tolerance as a Local Value**

While postwar ideas of Cognian democracy had some earlier precedents, the emergence of “Cognian tolerance” as an explicitly claimed local value was without precedence. This is all the more surprising given the prominence of the idea in the contemporary city. One need not dig

deeply in present-day localist discourses to find references to the term. Peppered throughout dialect rock songs, the notion has been appealed to for different purposes, including use by progressives to fight hostility toward foreigners. Cognian tolerance has also been used to reference contemporary embrace of the city's large gay and lesbian population. Cognians, unsurprisingly, posit "*Kölner Toleranz*" as timeless. Even scholars have failed to question such assumptions. Helene Klauser, in a book on Cologne Carnival, for example, argues that the spirit of "Cognian tolerance" originated with the *Ubier*, the tribal people that the Romans invited to settle the city.<sup>80</sup> However, in sifting through discourses on Heimat and local identity in prewar sources, "Cognian tolerance" is nowhere to be found. It can first be found in the early postwar period. As with other early postwar developments in local identity, Cognian tolerance derived from re-formulations of historical memory and local tradition. It emerged at a time of significant outsider influx, including expellees, and later, immigrants. Cognian tolerance, like democracy, was a prescriptive ideal, and was understood within the limited framework of the time. A local utopia of acceptance of sexual, cultural, racial, or ethnic otherness their city was not. It was, moreover, like the rest of the West, a time of regressive sex and gender norms.

Nevertheless, defining localness through tolerance belies interpretations of Heimat as conceptually backward and exclusionary. While exclusionary strains of Heimat have been propagated, tolerance was by no means conceptually incompatible with the core tenets of Heimat, namely: local rootedness, belonging, need for familiarity, and valuing private life memories inscribed in local spaces. Many West German Heimat enthusiasts sought to demonstrate this compatibility in re-shaping local identities. Cologne reflects this pattern. As an edited postwar volume by Heinrich Böll held, Cologne was neither exclusively a world city nor a provincial city—it hovered above one-or-the-other dualities. Heimat and cosmopolitanism could seemingly be

harmonized, and Cologne, the article continued, could be “Heimat” *and* have aspects of a world city. Other early postwar localists similarly described Cologne as a city that was large and cosmopolitan but not “depersonalized.”<sup>81</sup> In such references, Heimat does not appear as the essence of Germanness. As one Colognean wrote in 1950, it would be “arrogant” to claim Heimat as simply a German phenomenon. Heimat, he argued, was something that described peoples’ relationship to their places of home across the globe.<sup>82</sup>

Many of the same historical memories used in claiming Colognean world-openness proved equally useful in articulating tolerance as a local value. While evocations of local world-openness appeared almost immediately after 1945, references to local tolerance first surfaced in the 1950's and early 1960's.<sup>83</sup> Useful histories included past outsider and refugee integrations and Cologne’s historic interaction with foreigners in its role as a trade hub. By emphasizing how outsiders historically found refuge in Cologne, progressive localists portrayed integration of new outsiders as a performance of local tradition rather than a challenge to it. Adam Wrede, a pre- and postwar Heimat enthusiast and local dialect expert promoted such a conception of local tradition in 1948. In a new *Heimatblatt*, he wrote on the “maintenance of Colognean uniqueness” and argued that Cologne was historically adept at maintaining tradition amidst massive change. Turning to the expellee issue, he argued that Cologne historically succeeded in “melting together and Colognifying natives and immigrants.” He pointed, among other things, to the twelfth-century integration and extension of citizenship to artisans from diverse geographic backgrounds and Dutch refugees who integrated into Cologne in the 1500's. After 1945, the Colognean “duty of the hour,” he wrote, was to meld together old Cologneans with new citizens.<sup>84</sup> Wrede’s statements preceded the emergence of Colognean tolerance as a concrete idea, but demonstrate early antecedents. The same historical memories used to affiliate Colognean identity with European

unity also proved effective in shaping ideas of Colognean tolerance. This included Cologne's history as a Roman and "occidental" city, which seemingly made the city a "world-open bridge" that hovered between nationalizing spaces. Joseph Klersch, like Wrede, held that Cologneans had a historical "world-openness" and "tolerance," (*Duldsamkeit*) that helped Cologneans make outsiders into insiders. To demonstrate this local value, he cited a Colognean poem which recounted the outsider being invited in Colognean fashion to sit down at their local table. For Klersch, local history cemented these values, including their Roman history and historic geography on the Rhine, which gave Cologne "farsightedness and world-openness." Klersch believed that the city, rather than being rigidly nationalized, had a western, European culture, which attracted outsiders, for whom the city quickly became "Heimat."<sup>85</sup> He was not alone in advancing a more tolerant vision of Heimat through local historical appeals. Adenauer advanced a similar view, as did the Lord Mayor, Theo Burauen, who held that Cologne's history as a trade and transport center instilled citizens with a "tolerant, world-open spirit."<sup>86</sup>

Cologne Carnival also became a site of articulating tolerance as a local value. In many ways, the tradition was uniquely suited to such an appropriation. Carnival was a topsy-turvy space that permitted greater deviance and subjective indulgence expressed in ostentatious performance. As early as 1949, locals used their tradition to express notions of Heimat as balancing local rootedness with openness toward otherness, describing how, through Carnival, Cologneans hang "onto their Heimat with love" while having a "world-open sense."<sup>87</sup> In 1951, one of the first overt descriptions of Cologne Carnival as embodying tolerance appeared in Edmund I's reference to his empire as the "most tolerant democracy of the world."<sup>88</sup> Cologne carnivalists used some older historical mortar to cement an interpretation of their tradition as being explicitly about Colognean tolerance. One useful historic concept was the "*Jeck*"—a Colognean Carnival term going back to at

least the sixteenth century, referencing an individual and their unique proclivities.<sup>89</sup> In Cologne, it also became a playful way to refer to one's fellow man in everyday life—often implying that the person had a unique character. By the nineteenth century, Carnival dialect aphorisms used the *Jeck* concept to enumerate the tradition's values. These aphorisms included “*Jeck sin mer all, ävver jeder Jeck es anders*” (We are all *Jecks* but all *Jecks* are different) and “*Jeck los, Jeck elans*” (*Jeck*, let the *Jeck* pass). These remain well-known tropes of local self-understanding, first interpreted in the 1950's as explicitly making tolerance a local value. The phrases have occasionally been called the Colognean “tolerance edicts” and continue to appear as laws in the mock Cologne constitution. A local newspaper article during Carnival in 1954 demonstrates early descriptions of the *Jeck* concept as embodying Colognean tolerance. Written to teach non-Cologneans dialect, the article held that to be a *Jeck*, was not derogatory; it was about building bridges between people, developing understanding for different views and individual peculiarities. The localist concept, it continued, represented a “right to individuality” imbued with “tolerance” and “benevolence.” The concept, the writer continued, brought no judgement, no offense, and no exclusion.<sup>90</sup> Equivalent interpretations of the *Jeck* concept and *Jeck* aphorisms persist in contemporary Cologne.<sup>91</sup>

The lack of boundary between performer and spectator in Carnival also bolstered its function as a site of localist tolerance. Few mechanisms, barring state intervention, permitted control over who could celebrate. Its inherently participatory nature is precisely what made the modern tradition an ecstatic, recurring performance of local community. Given the role of Carnival in shaping local community, enlightened postwar Heimat enthusiasts encouraged its use to integrate newcomers. In a non-nativist spirit, Carnival Princes declared that one must not be native, and can “learn” local uniqueness through participation in Carnival, therein becoming

Colognian.<sup>92</sup> Progressive localists seeking to marshal Carnival for integration also underscored teaching the tradition to outsiders who did not speak dialect.<sup>93</sup> One Carnival Prince hit home how their local tradition embraced all citizens, old and new and possessed a “power of assimilation.” Carnival and the “spirit of Colognian tolerance,” he declared, were enviable. Carnival organizers themselves bragged about how the number of Carnival Princes not native to Cologne affirmed “Colognian tolerance.” By 1960, Colognian tolerance, crystalized into a fully enshrined local value, bolstered through affiliation with their Heimat tradition.<sup>94</sup> In 1963, locals like Peter Sabel declared: “Cologne is in all things of life a tolerant city.” A lecturer on Colognian humor whose presentation Sabel attended the evening prior agreed with such sentiments.<sup>95</sup> Such affiliation of Carnival with tolerance, moreover, proved infectious, popping up in other Rhenish cities.<sup>96</sup>

As locals increasingly adopted notions of tolerance as a local value, more rigid categories of local citizenship began to lose currency. While designations of belonging based on duration of a family’s residence in Cologne held sway during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, such as *Alt-Kölner*, *Eingesessenen*, or *Alteingesessenen*, they receded in the early postwar period. By the mid 1950’s, Hans Schmitt-Rost described how such older categories had fallen apart. The question of “who is Colognian,” he wrote, could no longer be described with these rigid designation, even if there was lingering arrogance of older Cologne families who saw themselves as “patent Colognians” in contrast to the “*Imis*” (imitation Colognians). Schmitt-Rost held that: “in regards to Cologne: here everyone becomes Colognian!”<sup>97</sup> The concept of the “*Imi*,” moreover, was a tricky localist term that vacillated between being exclusionary, neutral, and in some circumstances, a positive designation of local belonging for non-natives. It implied not outsider, but one who had learned local culture after relocation. Some individuals self-identified as *Imis*, with one Carnival song proclaiming that the *Imi* had Colognian tradition deep within them.<sup>98</sup> In

other circumstances, the *Imi* concept was used in playful jest, but could have a potential for exclusion, which turned some against it. By 1960, the Lord Mayor and the president of the Standing Committee of Cologne Carnival stated that the word *Imi* was obsolete and should be done away with. Cologne, they argued, was a city of Europe.<sup>99</sup>

To witness the clear shift in local identity effected by ideas of Colognian tolerance, one only need look at tropes of localism from a few decades earlier when the songwriter Willi Ostermann complained in song about how the “foreign stuff” in the city is regrettable, and that, in adopting the “dance of the day” people rejected “Heimat.”<sup>100</sup> Several decades later, a different tune could be heard. Member of the *Kölnische Karnevals-Gesellschaft, e.V. 1945*, for example, insisted that their local Heimat festival was about bringing “good tradition” and “the newly formed” into harmony.<sup>101</sup> One member rhapsodized about how he was not from Cologne or the Rhineland, but had found his “second Heimat” there through their “great Heimat festival,” which instilled natives and non-natives with a sense of belonging.<sup>102</sup> Early postwar progress in inclusion, of course, should not be overstated. Colognian tolerance was by no means a descriptive reality. Exclusion through localism continued to be a problem. One local woman even took to the pages of the *Kölnische Rundschau* to insist that only “real Colognian girls” should celebrate *Weiberfastnacht*, the Carnival Thursday when women turn male authority upside-down.<sup>103</sup> Nevertheless, Colognian tolerance remained as a crucial ideal in localist discourse. Decades later figures like the president of the Society of Friends and Promoters of Colognian Folk Culture, still underscored the importance of inclusion through venues like Carnival, and insisted that locals must remain vigilant against turning their Heimat tradition into either an exclusionary event.<sup>104</sup> Transforming ideals into performance, however, remained an ever ongoing project.



## The Challenge of Performing Local Tolerance and Heimat as a *Human Metaphor*

These shifts raise the question of how Cologneian tolerance played out in relation to two major outsider groups: expellees and immigrants. It is no coincidence that the idea emerged amidst outsider influx. While expellees resided primarily in rural areas immediately after 1945, a second phase of inner-German movement later increased their urban presence. The myriad of factors that challenged expellee and immigrant integration cannot be recited here. The primary question is how Heimat enthusiasts responded to outsider arrival through localist activities. What did expellee influx mean for the city's self-understanding and notions of Heimat? In the late 1950's and 1960's, a narrative of successful expellee integration held sway throughout West Germany. Historians have recently challenged this as myth, some replacing it with an inverse myth of failed integration.<sup>105</sup> This question will be examined in greater detail in Chapter VI. Needless to say, expellee integration in Cologne saw a clear mixture of tensions, rejections, and pro-active attempts by Heimat enthusiasts to integrate the expellees. Localists also differed on whether expellees should conform to local culture or be allowed to maintain cultural difference.

Cultural differences proved a point of tension. Anti-Prussianism, rife throughout the Rhineland, proved a case in point. Ideas of Cologneian western orientations, used to promote *rapprochement* with Western neighbors, in some circumstances led to an arrogance vis-a-vis East-Elbian expellees. The avid anti-Prussianist Hans Schmitt-Rost, for example, wrote in 1955 that the 40,000 expellees who lived in Cologne had, after some conflict, given up the role of being an "*Untertan*" by having "dissolved themselves into the free West."<sup>106</sup> Other locals expressed irritation when expellees chaffed at the Cologneian culture. Many locals also expressed frustration that expellees had legal privilege over evacuees in housing, which prevented many evacuated Cologneians from returning home.<sup>107</sup> Paul Wagner, an expellee and former Mayor of Neidenburg,

pushed back against Colognian anger at expellee settlement privileges, arguing that the expellees would gladly return home on foot if they could—a jabbing reference to the Colognian song, often sung by local evacuees, which recounted how locals’ homesickness drove them home. Wagner insisted that West Germans should support the expellee “battle for their rights.”<sup>108</sup> Local-expellee conflicts, however, were more mild in Cologne as it did not witness the same expellee influx as cities like Lübeck, which saw its population double with expellee arrival. In 1950, around 26,000 expellees lived in Cologne, with 60,600 East Elbian Germans in total when including those from the GDR; 13,900 foreigners also resided in Cologne. The city population further consisted of 363,800 native Colognians and 99,500 from other North Rhenish cities.<sup>109</sup> Numerical dominance likely made Colognians feel less threatened and therefore more willing to adopt slogans of tolerance. By 1956, an article in the *Kölnische Rundschau*, for example, pointed out that from 1880 to 1956, the percentage of native Colognians in the city remained nearly unchanged. It emphasized that Colognians should respect non-natives, while also expressing the view that natives should remain the majority.<sup>110</sup> The preparedness for tolerance, in short, clearly had limits.

Beyond cultural differences, expellees confronted numerous other challenges that inhibited integration, including lost social networks and clear economic disadvantages. Integration anxiety also surfaced, with much expellees harboring fears that full emotional integration would result in the loss of native cultures and relinquishing landscapes of past personal lives. This included distress over their children integrating into places disconnected from the landscapes of their parents’ former lives. Ultimately, the threat of dissolving into the new population hovered as many expellees’ greatest fear. While West Germans generally accepted the permanence of expellee settlement much earlier, many expellees entertained illusions of return for years.

In Cologne, amidst mixed solidarity and conflict, Heimat enthusiasts could be found

among the most strident voices calling for greater integration and giving expellees a feeling of Heimat. They used the idea of *Heimat* as a metaphor of personal experience to rally sympathy for the expellees. By looking to their own relationship to local Heimat, many argued, they could develop compassion for expellees who had lost theirs. This argument proved a *leitmotif* in West German Heimat discourses vis-a-vis the expellees. As a Cologne school inspector argued in a youth Heimat publication, understanding and appreciating one's Heimat is a means of understanding others' relationship to their Heimat.<sup>111</sup> Joseph Klersch was among such vocal proponents of a tolerant Heimat idea, arguing in 1948 that while Colognians lost the built environment of Heimat, the expellees lost Heimat in the most absolute terms. He accepted their permanent settlement in the West and insisted that a Cologne goal would be to give them a "new Heimat." He later wrote on the particular need to give expellee children a sense of Heimat; while one could reconstruct a physically destroyed Heimat, Klersch concluded that when a "young tree is transplanted" it had to be tended all the more carefully so that it could grow new roots.<sup>112</sup> For Klersch, Heimat did not divide locals and expellees; it could forge common understanding.<sup>113</sup> The city office for local culture subsequently adopted as an official duty tending to expellees and helping them "find a new Heimat" in Cologne.<sup>114</sup> City administrators supported such integrationist impulses. Lord Mayor and avid localist, Theo Burauen, recalled how city policy makers sought to unify locals and expellees by pursuing reconstruction models that prevented segregation.<sup>115</sup> In Rhenish Heimat publications, one could also find articles emphasizing rebuilding in a way that promoted acquisition of a second Heimat for both natives and newcomers.<sup>116</sup>

Propagation of a more tolerant Heimat idea can be found in other mainstream localist media. This included popular dialect poetry. One early postwar dialect poem, published in a new *Heimatblatt*, wrote that "those who come from the outside to the Rhine, burdened with sorrows,"

should be “surrounded with love,” and “given Heimat,” with a stretched out “hand of brotherhood.”<sup>117</sup> Here, the uniqueness of dialect was not used to articulate exclusion; it sought to rally those who understood it to embrace outsiders. Inclusive attitudes could also be found in *Heimatkunde*. The youth Heimat publication, *Jung Köln* encouraged tolerance toward expellees, insisting on the Colognean duty to help them find a new “Heimat” in Cologne.<sup>118</sup> These notions reverberated throughout the Rhineland more broadly. Peter Altmeier at the Rhenish Heimat Day urged solidarity with expellee’s “right to Heimat” which for him meant not return to the east, but finding a second Heimat in the West.<sup>119</sup> Expellee Heimat conventions also offered opportunities for Cologneans and Rheinländer to express solidarity with the expellee plight. The local administration used the 1950 Silesian meeting in Cologne to announce a cultural sponsorship for the city of Breslau, even if they hesitated to divert sparse financial resources to it.<sup>120</sup>

Most interesting in Colognean arguments for a tolerant Heimat concept vis-a-vis expellees is the sparsity of appeals to Heimat as a *national* commonality. Rather than appealing to nation as a “local metaphor,” Heimat appeared primarily as a *human* metaphor. That is, one could reflect on their own personal relationship to their local place of home to sympathize with and embrace those who had lost theirs. Embeddedness in local places of home became the common metaphor that Heimat enthusiasts used to encourage solidarity with the expellee plight. Understandings of Heimat as a human rather than a national metaphor also allowed it to be later transposed to promote local integration of foreign immigrants. By the early 1960s, just as foreigner influx was about to begin, Cologneans increasingly believed that expellee integration was complete. Joseph Klersch argued by mid-decade that expellee children had found “Heimat” in Cologne, while G. Wilczek, writing on Cologne’s Breslau sponsorship, held that Breslauer in Cologne had already become full citizens of their new home.<sup>121</sup> Claimed successful integration was not necessarily

positive, often overlooking continuing tensions. Derogatory terms for expellees still circulated in Cologne as they did throughout West Germany, and, after two decades in the West, many West Germans balked at expellee leaders' trumpeting of their losses and demands for return of Eastern territories. Expellee financial benefits also caused tension. In one derogatory song from the 1960's, the expellee appeared as he who gets "everything" except for "homesickness."<sup>122</sup>

Nevertheless, progressive Heimat enthusiasts continued to promote tolerance as a tenet of Colongian identity, appealing to Heimat as a means to accept outsiders by conceiving it as an inherent human experience regardless of its particular geography. The Rhenish Heimat enthusiasts, Adolf Flecken, in his 1965 speech at the Rhenish Heimat day, declared that in having a Heimat, people of all countries and landscapes were similar: it was about personal experiences of space. Heimat was not an ethnic category, rather, it was "acquired" and in a spirit of love of fellow man, it could be "created."<sup>123</sup> Such a view of Heimat as a universal experience can also be found at the grass-roots Heimat poetry. As Albrecht Bodde, an amateur poet wrote in a Carnival poem entitled "De Heimat," it was irrelevant whether one's Heimat was a small rural village or urban metropolis, or whether or not it had a large cathedral and ornate palaces. The value of Heimat, the poem held, came from being a place of individual human experience.<sup>124</sup> Heimat in such understandings was, in short, first and foremost about individual human experience of space as anthropologically analogous.

In Cologne, as expellee integration matured in the wake of the Economic Miracle, foreign groups, largely of Italian and Greek origins, arrived in the city—often displacing expellee-West German tensions.<sup>125</sup> Cologne's immigrant population, which stood at a modest 20,035 in 1961, expanded greatly throughout the decade.<sup>126</sup> The challenges and exclusions that immigrants faced in West Germany have been well documented, and Cologne was no exception. Racism circulated

in the Rhineland as it did elsewhere in the West. Progressive Heimat enthusiasts, however, can again be found among those arguing for greater acceptance. They used once more historical memories of Cologne's historical ability to draw people from the outside and make the city "Heimat" for them— an argument appropriated in the 1958 Cologne Almanac, whose editors promoted a pro-European, anti-Prussian, anti-totalitarian vision of local identity.<sup>127</sup> Nor were Colognians the only ones to evoke local historical memory to argue for embrace of new Greek and Italian immigrants. At the Rhenish Heimat day, their fellow regionalist Adolf Flecken did the same. In the nineteenth century, he argued, immigrants came to the Rhineland from France, the Netherlands, Poland, Italy, and Belgium. Two generations later, he held, they became natives, rather than segregated appendages. Flecken continued that his Heimat society aimed not only to integrate the expellees; they also sought to help immigrants find a second Heimat in the Rhineland. Given the origin of most immigrants from the Mediterranean, Flecken drew on the Rhineland's Roman histories, noting how influx from Mediterranean historically enriched their culture. It was typical for their "Heimat," he insisted, to have immigrant influx while maintaining a basic Rhenish component. By portraying the two as compatible, he sought to disarm immigration as a threat to Heimat.<sup>128</sup>

Notions of Colognian-world openness and tolerance vis-a-vis immigrant newcomers were again iterations of ideals and not descriptive realities. Discrimination against foreigners remained rife. Reprimands for failure to live up to claimed local values vis-a-vis foreigners could result. Wolfgang Schulze-Olden, a University of Cologne student, and student association president (AstA) addressed their city's self-understanding as "world-open," calling attention to where it was lacking. Foreign students in Cologne, he argued, still experienced exclusion, subjection to highly offensive stereotypes, and housing discrimination. Criticizing gaps between value claims and

performance, Schulze-Olden issued a renewed call to embrace foreign students.<sup>129</sup> Outsiders could also call out locals when they did not adequately perform local values. One foreign exchange student, in a letter to the *Kölnische Rundschau* demonstrated this, pointing to how Cologneans jokingly referred to non-natives with phrases such as “*Pimock*,” and “*Imi*,” which he held were often used in jest, but could still inhibit a feeling of belonging.<sup>130</sup>

Nevertheless, the seriousness with which many took tolerant ideals of Heimat was reflected in attempts to convey them to local children. Emphasis on Colognean tolerance, world-openness, and the idea of Heimat as a human metaphor could also all be found in *Heimatkunde*. The youth Heimat magazine, *Jung-Köln* particularly propagated this view. Next to articles on local history and culture, publishers included regular columns on immigrant experiences in Cologne. They further used accounts of locals’ world travel to promote a cosmopolitan localism, in which their relationship to Cologne was analogous to peoples’ relationship to their local places of home throughout the globe. The youth Heimat journal often recounted stories of immigrants to Cologne from areas including Greece, Afghanistan, Turkey, and Indonesia, demonstrating their struggles leaving behind social networks, adjusting to a new culture, and confronting treatment as second-class citizens. The articles encouraged tolerance and acceptance. Recounting the story of a Greek girl who arrived in their Rhenish metropolis, for example, the journal invited young readers to speculate whether, having left friends and familiar places behind, if she would find a sense of “Heimat” in her new place of residence.<sup>131</sup> Here, Heimat appears not as a national trope, but rather as a human metaphor that described a harmonious relationship between individual and place that could be experienced by all people in different global localities.<sup>132</sup> This and other examples clearly illustrate how more tolerant notions of Heimat had clearly gained a foothold in local discourses. They remained but small tools that could be appropriated to help tackle a mammoth problem for

which there would be few easy solutions.

### **Dwindling Enthusiasm: Cultural De-Valuations of the Heimat Concept**

In spite of attempts to articulate more tolerant notions of Heimat, Cologne, like the rest of West Germany saw a mounting cultural devaluation of the Heimat concept throughout the 1960s, reaching a peak during battles over *Ostpolitik* at the end of the decade. This cultural devaluation was preceded by the political victory of a purely structural federalism in the mid to late 1950s, which brushed aside many Heimat enthusiasts' visions of a more culturally-rooted federalism. Diverse factors informed the cultural devaluation of the Heimat concept during the 1960s. As we shall see later, the expellee movement wielded the idea of their "right to the Heimat" against *rapprochement*, with *Ostpolitik* supporters responding by dredging up Nazi misuse of the concept and fashioning it into a political weapon against the expellees. Prior to the 1960s, affiliation of Heimat with Nazi propaganda was fundamentally absent, and almost never referenced or even hinted at in Heimat discourses, whether for apologist purposes or otherwise. Only in subsequent generations would a myth of the Heimat concept as tainted after 1945 take hold. The political philosophy of the 68ers further emphasized a singularly global geographic purview, in which the specificity of private life and intimate realms of personal experience held little significance.

Yet other factors influenced the decline of the Heimat concept, such as long-term stabilization and completed reconstruction. In Cologne, 1958 saw many of the last rubble structures disappear; the city opera which stood for over a decades its ruined form came crashing down, as did the pot-marked neo-Romanesque masts of the Hohenzollern bridge towering above the Rhine. Coincidentally, 1958 also saw the opening of a new city museum. The Lord Mayor declared that it would "deepen love of Heimat" and increase local historical consciousness.<sup>133</sup> By



1961, a writer in *Jung-Köln* declared that Cologne's war wounds had healed, even if scars remained.<sup>134</sup> As a sense of instability, vulnerability and lost Heimat subsided, feverish preoccupation slowly with it leveled off.

The long-term effects of the Economic Miracle certainly played a role in the decline of local Heimat enthusiasm. Material stabilization meant that protective spaces of local solidarity were less needed. Employment-driven movement also, over time, rendered local community bonds more soluble. We should not, however, posit a black-and-white relationship between Heimat on the one hand, and industry, capitalism, and consumerism on the other. Positions on Heimat and economy have fallen into such extremes, either viewing Heimat as a source of sublimating class interest (the Marxist charge against the Heimat concept), or as an inherently anti-consumerist and anti-materialist concept. Kurt Stavenhagen argued that "capitalist work machinery" is incompatible with Heimat because it made people into an economic commodity and forced them to be an uprootable working force.<sup>135</sup> Willi Oberkrome in a study of postwar Westfalen-Lippe repeats this stereotype of Heimat as a rejection of modern industry and economic consumption.<sup>136</sup> Heimat, however, for centuries had a material element. Its early-modern meaning referred to a community's *material* responsibility to those with *Heimatrecht*.<sup>137</sup> In the modern context, the sense of protection associated with Heimat necessitated a level of material security. The Economic Miracle laid bare a more ambiguous relationship between Heimat and economy. In the short term, as locals transitioned out of extreme scarcity, material consumption fueled domestic nesting, and was therefore harmonious with Heimat.<sup>138</sup> One advertisement in an early postwar Heimat publication succinctly illustrates this harmony. (Figure 2-2) The ad, selling appliances for new domestic nests demonstrates how material acquisitions facilitated Heimat's reconstruction. The individuals ecstatically dance in their re-furnished home. Above them is the

restored landscape of Cologne topped by a Colognian crest (this image did not reflect the heavily rubble-covered landscape of 1951). Consumerism here did not challenge Heimat, it promoted it.

As the eminent German sociologist and member of the “Cologne School,” René König argued, Heimat is not inherently in conflict with a modern industrial and urban society. König argued that, when industry and urbanity become part of the local experience, they often become part of individuals’ relationship to Heimat.<sup>139</sup> The assumed incompatibility of Heimat with industry, in short, is too rigid, and, in the short term, the Economic Miracle facilitated Heimat enthusiasm. Stimuli connected to local industry and consumption, as constituent parts of local experience, could inform a sense of Heimat in some circumstances, while harming it in others. One need look no further than Heinrich Böll’s reference of how Heimat was evoked for him by the smell of cocoa puffing out of Cologne’s Stollwerck plant, and seeing their vending machines when he was away from the city. Memories of playing cowboys and Indians as a child behind Kotthof’s paint factory, likewise evoked Heimat associations for Böll.<sup>140</sup> In the 1950’s economic growth also fueled local cultural activities. It permitted the creation of new works, publications, exhibitions, societies, and more complete restoration of old traditions. In 1961, localists displayed awareness of how economic revival assisted revival of tradition, as displayed in a Carnival float entitled “tradition’s wonder children,” with “the economic miracle” inscribed in dialect (Figure 2-3). The meager 1945 Carnivalist, “under-developed” figure is juxtaposed to the “well-developed” tradition’s wonder child of 1961. Here we see evidence supporting the argument that folk culture is compatible with a modern technological world and economic growth.<sup>141</sup>

On the other hand, when consumerism and industrialization conflicted with cultural ideas of what Heimat should look like, or when it hampered local rootedness, it could and did concern Heimat enthusiasts. One early postwar Rhenish Heimat society, for example, went on a crusade to

ban oversized advertizing, which they believed was taking over the local landscape.<sup>142</sup> At the Rhenish Heimat day, to present another example, Karl Arnold warned against dislocating forces of unrestrained industrialization that could lead to people becoming “industry nomads” with no connection to “Heimat.”<sup>143</sup> Heimat enthusiasts for generations had criticized the industrial economy’s compulsion of individuals to uproot themselves for purely materialist reasons. It is no coincidence that Heimat songs and poetry often historically juxtaposed Heimat and acquisition of wealth as contrasting binaries. As Fritz Hönig wrote in a late nineteenth-century Cologne Carnival song, entitled “Kölle Alaaf:” “What would a pile of money bring” if it meant he could not participate in their local tradition?<sup>144</sup> Postwar citizens continued to sing the song. As the postwar local enthusiast Albrecht Bodde wrote in his dialect poem *De Heimat*: “You can offer me whatever you want, a large mountain of money. My answer will be: keep your rubbish. My Heimat is my world!”<sup>145</sup> His fellow localist Augusten Schnorrenberg similarly wrote in local Carnival song, reflecting on incentives to be uprootable: “Here we want to stay, here we are at home, no devil, no devil, will get us out.”<sup>146</sup> Such critiques of economic compulsion to be uprootable made Heimat enthusiasts neither cultural pessimists, nor anti-modern. Indeed, they touched on an issue of enduring significance. In any case, the Economic Miracle reflected the ambivalent relationship of Heimat to industry, materiality, and economic growth. While facilitating domestic nesting, reconstruction, and stabilization in the short-term, in the long-term, it also brought challenges. While the economic boom took longer to effect culture and popular mentalities than previous assumed, by the mid-1960's, amidst greater stability, reconstructed cities, and material security, need for protective spaces declined.<sup>147</sup>

Different generational memory profiles also had an influence on cultural devaluation of Heimat. New generations of youth did not share their parents experiences of lost local worlds. For

them “old Cologne,” was only an abstract concept. Hilde Domin, a notable Jewish-German author, and native of Cologne, provides us with an example of this split in her poem “Cologne.” The piece recounts how, while others walk through the streets, she “swims” through the “sunken city.” Old Cologne and new Cologne were like two celluloid strips on top of one another, she argued, with the same outline but different lights—identical, but not identical.<sup>148</sup> For the younger generation, a sense of torn and lost Heimat was absent, and they increasingly associated the concept with nationally-strident career expellees using the concept in political battles. As Heinrich Böll noted, while many in the West lost Heimat through the war’s destruction and death, this did not figure into expellee leaders’ “political-propaganda vocabulary.”<sup>149</sup> For the progressive youth generation of the 1960's who grew up in more intact places of home, internationalism was seemingly the call of the day. “Heimat” many believed contradicted this goal.

Whatever the precise mixture of these factors that ultimately caused the decline in Heimat enthusiasm, such a downturn can be seen in local cultural life in Cologne. In 1958, the city folded the office for promotion of local culture into the new city museum, which into the 1960s failed to tend to local Heimat sentiment with the same vigor. By the latter half of the 1960's, the youth Heimat publication *Jung-Köln* ceased to publish much on Heimat or local culture at all, and was discontinued in 1969. This paralleled rejection of *Heimatkunde* as a primary school subject throughout West Germany. Formerly localist publications like the Cologne Almanach also ceased to publish on local history, culture, tradition, and Heimat sentiment. By their 1969/1970 edition, articles on industry, commerce, economics, and construction projects fully replaced Heimat-oriented articles.<sup>150</sup> Rhenish citizens demonstrated clear awareness of the turn against the Heimat concept. The 1965 Rhenish Day of Heimat saw two speeches which addressed the developments. The first noted that the geographical purview of their time was expanding—not a negative

development the speaker argued, but it proceeded in a way that led people to abandon the idea of Heimat. A broad global purview, he insisted, was not incompatible with Heimat, and he encouraged parallel geographic orientations. The final speaker closed the festivities by noting how the youth of their time were coming to view the Heimat concept with disinterest. He continued by pressing the importance of Heimat as facilitating respect of different peoples. To respects one's Heimat, he believed, was a prerequisite to respecting other peoples' relationship to their local places of home.<sup>151</sup> In advocating a harmony between inwardness and outwardness, however, these figures brushed against an emerging *Zeitgeist* that favored theories of global purview in which local rootedness was viewed as a regressive barrier.

While traditions like Carnival, according to one Colognean, remained a "haven" of local culture and "Heimat," changing attitudes toward local rootedness even made their primary Heimat festival an area of concern.<sup>152</sup> Localist increasingly noted the need to tend to Carnival's localness and "save it for coming times as a symbol of old Cologne" and as a "Heimat festival."<sup>153</sup> Max-Leo Schwing, later raised awareness of delocalization in Carnival celebrations, based on "misunderstood cosmopolitanism" which incorrectly saw "Heimat" as the "most beautiful word for backwardness."<sup>154</sup>

Into the 1970s and 1980s, with *Ostpolitik* settled, gradual and tepid re-appearances of the Heimat concept surfaced in new circles, including amongst the Greens. The ensuing Heimat "boom," "renaissance," or "discussion," as it has been variously called, was, however, different from the turn to Heimat in both the late nineteenth century and the early postwar period. After the 1960's, Germans never again embraced the term so universally. Staggered revivals in different political, ecological, literary, cinematic, and scholarly milieus have resulted in precipitous declarations of a Heimat revival. Despite the allure of claiming to overcome a taboo, however,

such revivals have had only fragmented appeal. The late 1970's and 1980's did see modest improvement in cultural valuation of Heimat. One historian briefly postulated that this resulted from the public's inability to situate the specificity of their private lives into the broad, abstract, and dogmatic theories of earlier protest cultures—making Heimat itself a new concept of protest.<sup>155</sup> Hermann Bausinger similarly pointed to reappearance of Heimat as a reaction to technocratic administration of the 1970s, its shutting out of the grass-roots, and industrial exploitation of the landscape.<sup>156</sup> In Cologne and throughout West Germany, however, throughout the 1970s and 1980s, one still finds frequent reference to Heimat as outmoded. In 1977, for example, while the concept was again being used in some progressive circles, Peter Hasenberg of the *Heimatverein Alt-Köln* noted how, in their day, the Heimat concept was being pushed back in school and among everyday people. His Heimat society, he insisted, would work all the harder. Around the same time, Cologne witnessed significant decline of dialect and an architectural overhaul of the city that focused on mechanical function over individual relationship to the built environment.<sup>157</sup> Heinrich Böll noted how, after feeling alienation between prewar, rubble, and reconstructed Cologne, the architectural high-modernist overhaul of the city in the 1970's created yet another alienating landscape, destroying the social life of the street. The new “auto-Cologne,” he argued, sequestered individuals into fragmented isolating spaces.<sup>158</sup>

Amidst fluctuating cultural attitudes toward the Heimat concept, however, ideas of Colognian tolerance and world-openness persisted and acted as sliding signifiers that subsequent generations reformulated. In present-day Cologne, “Colognian tolerance” is frequently evoked in reference to the city's gay and lesbian population. This was certainly not the intended reference group of the 1950's and 1960's. In those years, one could find articles in Heimat publications which proscribed rigid gender norms, where women were to be creatures of the domestic sphere,

men the breadwinners, and children the obedient followers.<sup>159</sup> Cologne's gay subculture in the 1950s and 1960s encountered the same pervasive rejection that homosexuals did on a near global scale. Carnival offered only a temporary vacuum that permitted open homosexual activity, though this was due to its appearance as play rather than substance.<sup>160</sup> Nor was this carnivalistic tolerance free of opponents. Regressive moralists, who sought to contain Carnival's sexual permissiveness for over a century, continued to exist.<sup>161</sup> Whether Cologne in the early postwar period was more tolerant than other cities vis-a-vis homosexuals is a question that requires more research.<sup>162</sup> Certainly, localists of earlier periods, like Peter Fröhlich, in his dialect postwar history of Cologne denigrated homosexuals, for example, by affiliating homosexuality with Nazism.<sup>163</sup>

New generations, however, demonstrated the performative potential of Colognian tolerance by expanding who it encompassed. Not only has Cologne become one of Germany's most vibrant gay centers, the city boasts the largest Christopher Street Day in Germany, and the only one with a locally-patriotic Carnival call (*Kölle Aloha!*) which organizers teach celebrants to say with a demonstrably limp wrist. Cologne has witnessed the emergence of its own gay Carnival societies, including the *Rosa Funken*, who wear the eighteenth-century uniforms of Cologne's old imperial city soldiers—only in pink instead of red. They were both embraced by the umbrella organization of Carnival societies and received official visits from the royal triumvirate as a sign of acceptance.<sup>164</sup> Localist songs celebrate Colognian tolerance vis-a-vis non-normative sexualities, including the unofficial local anthem *Viva Colonia* and Tommy Engel's *Do bes Kölle*, which declares: “you are Cologne, you are super tolerant, you take each on the arm and by the hand.”<sup>165</sup>

Progressive localists have continued to appeal to Colognian tolerance to advance immigrant integration. This has been an ongoing, bumpy process. In 1976, for example, two controversial floats appeared in the *Rosenmontag* parade, one depicting Turkish immigrants

rhapsodizing on the beauty of the Rhine while pushing a pram of children holding child-money vouchers. The other poked fun at the “lazy” unemployed. Progressive locals attacked the floats with eggs and paint, while Böll fumed with indignation, insisting that this violated their local spirit. Their local tradition, he insisted, was about challenging secure authorities; vulnerable groups were off limits.<sup>166</sup> More tolerant voices won out in 1992, when Cologne Carnival musicians and dialect bands held a concert in response to right-wing attacks on immigrants in Solingen. The concert entitled “*Arsch huh, Zäng Ussenander*” (dialect: Stand up and open your mouth!), attended by 100,000 participants, denounced intolerance toward foreigners.<sup>167</sup> Some foreign residents have noted progress, such as Raissa Orlowa and Lew Kopelew, exiled from the Soviet Union, who declared Cologne to be a “very world-open city,” for which they developed an unusual affection.<sup>168</sup> Much room for progress remains, however, particularly vis-a-vis Turkish immigrants, who often develop a sense of Heimat for city quarters, which can, contrarily lead to ghettoization. One study has found that Heimat sentiment for Cologne is shared by both Germans and Turkish citizens, though percentages of such sentiment is lower among Turkish citizens.<sup>169</sup> Cologne Carnival has remained a tool to push integration used, for example, to teach immigrant children local Carnival songs and instill them with a sense of community.<sup>170</sup> It has recently become a forum of the anti-racism campaign “No one is illegal,” entitled in local dialect, “*Kein jeck ist illejal*.” Just as dialect was marshaled to reject anti-foreign attacks in the 1992, counter-protests against the anti-Islamic Pro-NRW group in 2012 have likewise used dialect to assert inclusion as a local value.<sup>171</sup>

## **Conclusion**

The attempt of Cognian localists after 1945 to propagate a notion of local Heimat as



defined by world-openness, democracy, and tolerance belie arguments that Heimat is, by definition, an inherently regressive, exclusionary, and backward concept. Through re-formulations in historical memory and re-invention of tradition, many localists fused progressive value claims to local identity. While the national idea remained more inflexible, the local permitted identification with a postwar democratic project and European unification, and a shift from perceiving their Heimat as a national fortress, to a bridge between Germany and the Western democratic world. Cologne, however, was not alone in witnessing such developments. In the next chapters we shall see the same trends in Hamburg, Lübeck, Bremen, and the Southwest, which drew on quite different traditions and histories to fashion similar notions of local values.

Of course, such claimed local values remained proscriptive and performative rather than descriptive. Rarely have Heimat enthusiasts understood this distinction, with some exceptions. In an excerpt in a little-known pamphlet from the ninety-year celebration of the Heimat society, *Alt-Köln*, for example, one localist perceived this dynamic. After listing Cologne values, including “extensive tolerance,” he concluded: “some of it is more ideal than reality. But ideals obligate those that have them. It is good this way.”<sup>172</sup> The point is not that identification with Cologne democracy suddenly made citizens adept at democratic practices and instilled with reformed mind sets. Nor did Cologne tolerance suddenly lead to embrace of outsiders. What they did was provide a useful rhetorical tool box for arguing for more progressive notions of community and help promote identification with goals of greater inclusion. In the conservative 1950s and 1960s, one need not look far to find lack of performance of such values. Amidst regressive gender norms, when citizens were not adequately confronting their dark past, and still working through barriers to forging a democratic culture, one of the first and most important steps, whose achievement should not be underestimated, can be found in the realm of identification itself.

“Heimat is not simply about the dying past, it is simultaneously the mother earth of the future”<sup>1</sup>  
Quoted by R. Burke *Lübeckische Blätter* (1951)

“...Hamburg knows no boundaries, it stands at the gate of infinity, open to all five continents and the seven seas.”<sup>2</sup>  
B. Meyer-Marwitz. *Hamburg Heimat am Strom*. (1947)

### Chapter III

#### Looking Out by Looking In: The Local Turn in Hamburg, Lübeck and Bremen, 1945-1965

In 1945, Arthur Dickens, a Yorkshireman in the British Royal Artillery, took up a post as press supervisor in the coastal city of Lübeck. For a British soldier in early postwar Germany, Dickens developed an odd predilection for the city. He took regular nightly walks through the town and its ruins, meandering through the *Altstadt* on the Trave river, passing through the *Burgtor*, over the city canals, and finally to the nearby Wakenitz Lake. Dickens often recorded his nocturnal ruminations on local architectural styles and the local landscape. In July 1945, after such a stroll, he wrote in his diary of his affection for Lübeck. He admired other cities, of course, such as Florence, Paris, and Oxford—but they commanded “reverence rather than friendship.”<sup>3</sup> Dickens, oddly enough, had been caught up in the local Heimat enthusiasm that surged in Lübeck, as it did in other rubble cities. His position as press supervisor exposed him to the profuse localist writings that gripped the rubble world. Dickens recounted reading Heimat magazines like the *Niederdeutsche Welt*, which focused on local culture and dialect. He reacted positively to revival of localist enthusiasm, writing that it reminded him of Yorkshire regionalists that he knew during his youth. For Dickens, localist sentiment was not narrow, close-minded, or Naziesque; he viewed it as representing a different vision of nation, recording in his diary:

“No man whose heart lies truly in his local history can, I like to hope, be utterly lost, and whatever one thinks of political

regionalism in Germany, these local cults must at all cost be encouraged; apart from their intrinsic mental worth, they are the basis of a truer and better patriotism, as opposed to a state-engineered Chauvinism...”<sup>4</sup>

Dicken reflected Hanseatic Heimat enthusiasts’ mentalities to a stunning degree. They turned against what they described as centralized mass-state engineering, and a totalitarian “massified society.” Massification, Hanseatic Heimat enthusiasts often argued, dehumanized individuals by viewing them as commodities; Heimat, in contrast, was about individual face-to-face relationships. In many ways, these concerns reflected desires for a vernacular modernity.<sup>5</sup> Many Heimat enthusiasts explicitly rejected rigid traditionalism and excessive romanticism. Heimat, they often argued, must be forward looking. It was not, one Lübecker wrote, just about the “dying past” – it was also about the future.

Cologne and the Hanseatic cities were very different places, with quite different regional cultures. While Cologne was inland, Catholic, and a central-western city, the Hanseatic cities were coastal ports, Protestant, and situated within a northern German culture. While Colognians were famous for their exuberant, humorous, and sociable natures, *Hanseaten* were known for the opposite – reservedness, laconicness, and interpersonal distance. At the same time, the cities faced many of the same early postwar circumstances: shattered landscapes of former personal lives, a tainted national idea, tremendously dislocated communities, defeat, and loss of a unified nation. While nationalists and later National Socialists promoted the idea of the *Wacht am Rhein* in the Rhineland, they had similarly defined the Hanseatic cities as anodes of expansionary Germanness. Both Colognians, and Hanseatic citizens, like other Germans, not only faced overcoming such narratives of place, they further shared the daunting task of imagining a life after death and in finding new sources of flexible identity in rapidly changing times.

Despite significant differences in the profile of the Hanseatic cities vis-a-vis Cologne, the strong similarities of developments in ideas of Heimat and local identities are revealing. While the last two chapters have offered thick description of developments in Cologne, this chapter shuttles between the three Hanseatic cities to illustrate remarkably similar trends in a different cultural and geographic context. Hanseatic locals not only turned to Heimat as a site of federalism, they also, like Colognians, described local Heimat as a site of “life affirmation.” By 1945, as expansionary nationalism became ever more associated with mass death, Hanseatic citizens, like their Colognian counterparts, increasingly turned inward toward local spaces of home as sites of peaceful civilian existence and community solidarity. Few expressed this better than the rubble author, Wolfgang Borchert, who wrote that for locals, Hamburg was “more than a pile of stones...”; it was their “will to exist.”<sup>6</sup> They too abandoned notions of expansionary nation as guarantor of future lives, looking instead to local Heimat as a new redemptive geography. As in Cologne, this would redound greatly to the benefit of cultural demobilization.

The Hanseatic cities, like other West German localities, also witnessed droves of returning evacuees recounting their strong desire for Heimat. On the Elbe as on the Rhine, a sense of lost Heimat drove preoccupation with their local worlds. The Hanseatic cities witnessed a similar renaissance of local culture—offering compensation for physical destruction. Most important among the parallels, the years after 1945 saw the propagation of Hanseatic “world-openness,” “democracy” and “tolerance” as local values. A range of Hanseatic citizens turned to localities to identify with a new postwar system amidst challenging times. Those promoting such values included local Heimat societies, politicians, authors, and historians. Adding to the similarities with Cologne, Hanseatic localists rejected nationalist narratives of their cities as nodes of expansionary German power. They instead propagated a self-understanding as

internationalist, peaceful intermediaries between Germany and the world.

But how did Hanseatic citizens construct such notions of local values? Like in Cologne or in the German Southwest, reformulating local historical memories proved crucial. They focused on their cities' histories as sea-faring city republics, Free Imperial cities, and cities of trade— all histories that gave the three cities a common kinship in their local identities. As Hans Röthel wrote: “Hamburg, Lübeck, Bremen: it sounds like an unmistakable unity, like a matter of course that needs no justification.”<sup>7</sup> While republicanism had long been a trope of Hanseatic localism, after 1945, many Heimat enthusiasts re-shaped ideas of Hanseatic Republicanism to facilitate identification with a new decentralized democracy.<sup>8</sup> Hanseatic world-openness and tolerance, perceived today as timeless values, were also first popularized after 1945. They portrayed outside penetration as defining local rootedness, rather than undermining it. As Bernhard Meyer-Marwitz, the head of a Hamburg Heimat society wrote in 1947, their city knew “no borders”— embracing “infinity,” and “all five continents and the seven seas.” After 1945, the very mention of “Heimat” in the cities seldom appeared without referencing “world-openness” in the same breath. Progressive localists used these narratives of place to promote identification with international reconciliation, European unification, and local expellee integration.

These local values, however, remained prescriptive rather than descriptive. As Matthias Wegner argues in his study on the *Hanseat* concept, it is a “behavioral codex” that has varied historically, attached at different times to being reasonable, fair, honest, distanced, pragmatic, open, and/or transparent. Ironically, Wegner describes the *Hanseat* as “tolerant” and “world-open” throughout his text without viewing them as historically recent notions.<sup>9</sup> As prescriptive value claims, we should again not underestimate the gap between utterance and performance. In many cases, local identities retained exclusionary, classist, and sexist elements. Expellees and

foreign immigrants did not find utopias of acceptance in the cities, even if these notions of local values of world-openness and tolerance were used to encourage more inclusion.

Not all trends in the early postwar Hanseatic cities were identical to those in Cologne. Reserved Hanseatic citizens, while describing their localities as places of life-affirmation, did not further describe it as a specifically Hanseatic value, as Colognians did. Nor did Hanseatic citizens turn to the kind of explosive, ecstatic performance of community like Carnival—an act that would be at odds with their local traditions. There were also slight differences in their postwar circumstances: the Hanseatic cities faced a somewhat smaller level of physical destruction, while facing a much greater influx of expellees and outsiders. But what shines through most are the similarities, in particularly the new dominant tenets of local identities that sought to give democracy, European unification, softened national divisions, and more permeable notions of community roots in local tradition. Such notions of place offered tools for progressive localists arguing for outsider integration. Defining local-rootedness by outside penetration and embracing otherness again contravenes stereotypes of *Heimat* as conceptually exclusionary. Much has been made of the supposedly rigid binary between *Heimat* and *Fremde*, and local rootedness in one's "home town" has often been viewed as inherently exclusionary and anti-democratic.<sup>10</sup> Many postwar *Hanseaten*, however, saw cosmopolitanism and local rootedness, and *Heimat* and modernity as reconcilable. Rather than the local turn representing a sticking of their heads in parochial sands, it represented a "looking out, by looking in." Turning inward to the local world represented a means to face the challenging task of imagining postwar lives and reconstructing identities within a new ideological framework.

### **Recovering Heimat: Evacuee Return and Heimat Enthusiasm in the Ashes**

While dislocation and destruction in the Hanseatic cities was less extensive than in Cologne, the devastation should not be underestimated. Hamburg was the hardest hit. Bombings in 1943 led 900,000 of its 1.7 million inhabitants to flee, with 41,000 locals perishing in the raids, and 44,000 Hamburg soldiers dying on the front.<sup>11</sup> Bremen, nestled on the Weser river, fared somewhat better. The city of around 350,000, by 1945 lost 36% of its population and 50 to 60% of its inhabitable structures, with the city buried in 8.7 million cubic meters of rubble.<sup>12</sup> Finally, Lübeck, after a large bombing raid in 1942, had been 20% destroyed, with 16% of abodes completely destroyed, and 41.4% lightly damaged, leaving 10% of the city homeless. Lübeck was spared from later bombings by becoming a Red Cross hub.<sup>13</sup> Its position near the Soviet zone, however, brought its own challenges. East German expellees, driven from their native regions, often sought to push just beyond the Soviet zone. In the early years, 90,000 expellees flooded Lübeck, nearly doubling its population.<sup>14</sup> Despite the bombings, Lübeck's population mushroomed from 154,000 to 250,000 by 1945.<sup>15</sup> In 1948, a Cologne citizen evacuated in Lübeck, writing of his own desire for Heimat, drew a comparison between the two cities. Cologne's challenge, he argued, was to create a new city for its old citizens. Lübeck faced the inverse problem: creating Heimat for new citizens in an old city.<sup>16</sup> All the Hanseatic cities, however, faced wide-spread death, dislocation, and straining circumstances, with citizens living on daily diet of around 1000 calories.

Evacuated Hanseatic locals quickly flooded back home in precipitously large numbers, often citing desire for local Heimat as their motivation. This sparked a crisis in Hamburg. Of the 900,000 Hamburger who evacuated in 1943, 615,000 returned within only a few years to a city still covered in 43 million square meters of rubble. The British therefore blocked further relocation to the city.<sup>17</sup> In April 1946, the *Hamburger Echo* reported on how the “storm to the

Heimat” crashed into allied relocation restrictions. The article cited a representative letter from female evacuee who wrote: “I must, as a Hamburger, be allowed to again live in Hamburg...I have spent my entire life there until 1943... I want to, and must go back to my Heimat.” The newspaper reported that thousands of Hamburger felt the same.<sup>18</sup> Precipitous return to destroyed cities was in many ways materially irrational. Nevertheless, the newspapers reported that evacuees continually wrote to them of their desires to return home. When locals did return, they faced the daunting task of finding a place to live and found their sense of lost Heimat all the more heightened.<sup>19</sup>

As they returned to purvey the rubble of their home towns, Hanseatic citizens often had to convince themselves that their “Heimat” was not on its deathbed. Experiencing rubble landscapes, disappeared sites of past lives, and dislocated communities, they turned to local Heimat feeling in response to perceived loss. The patterns are strikingly similar to Cologne, even if rates of dislocation and destruction were lower. In 1946, one citizen who lived in the rubble for years recounted how a Hamburg soldier returned home after six years. Landscapes of his former life were gone, and the “city of ruins” left returnees grasping for familiar places.<sup>20</sup> Another local wrote how, prior to seeing the rubble, he was not aware that such landscapes held such personal significance for him.<sup>21</sup> Like in Cologne, locals continually processed these rubble fields not as destroyed national treasures, but in terms of disappeared individual past lives. Such descriptions clearly evince the shifts in the geographies that, by that time, came to preoccupy the emotional lives of lay citizens amidst destruction.

In Lübeck and Bremen, the same specter of lost Heimat is apparent. Lübecker, whose city suffered less destruction, noted a turn to local Heimat sentiment in response to its feared loss. In 1948, the head of the Lübeck Society for Heimatschutz wrote that widespread belief that Lübeck



was on its death bed triggered a surge of interest in Heimat and reconstruction.<sup>22</sup> The city witnessed a wave of foundings and re-foundings of Heimat societies and publications. These included the *Verein für Heimatschutz, Natur und Heimat*, the very Heimat-engaged *Gesellschaft zur Beförderung Gemeinnütziger Tätigkeit*, the *Plattdütsche Volksgill to Lübeck*, and the *Vaterstädtische Vereinigung* founded in 1949, whose members included Thomas and Heinrich Mann.<sup>23</sup> New or re-established Heimat periodicals included the *Lübeckische Blätter*, *Vaterstädtische Blätter*, *Zeitschrift des Vereins für Lübeckische Geschichte*, and *Der Wagen*. This societal flourishing in the early rubble world reflected trends elsewhere. Heimat associations, of course, did not hold a monopoly on local culture, but they did much to jump-start a local cultural renaissance that helped compensate for destroyed local landscapes. Lübecker noted how the war's destruction of "Heimatgut" (material anchors of Heimat) informed the subsequent local cultural revival. Re-awakening traditions like the Lübeck city festival, they argued, would help make up for destruction.<sup>24</sup>

Heimat societies and publications proliferated in Hamburg and Bremen to an equal degree. Societies like the *Hamburg-Gesellschaft* (1945), the *Verein geborener Hamburger*, the *Vereinigung Niederdeutsches Hamburg*, or the *Historischen Gesellschaft* in Bremen (1946), responded to loss of physical landscapes of Heimat by feverishly pushing local culture, history, language, and art.<sup>25</sup> Locals in Hamburg and Bremen also recounted how loss, destruction, and dislocation resulted in an unprecedented turn to Heimat sentiment. In 1946, the Hamburg mayor, Max Brauer, addressed the sad state of their "Heimat," and held, their "glowing love" of Hamburg he held had reached greater heights than in times of the city's "blossoming." Hamburg, he believed, "bleeding from a thousand wounds," needed this local sentiment to rebuild, strengthen community, and fight for their local independence. Brauer, who lived in French and

American exile from 1933 to 1945, did not aim to repress the recent past through Heimat enthusiasm; his speech addressed and denounced Nazi crimes against the Jews and those who did not ideologically fall in line.<sup>26</sup> Eighty miles to the West, Brauer's fellow mayor in Bremen similarly recounted a growing localist spirit amidst the rubble, where Bremen's "Polis spirit" fueled rebuilding.<sup>27</sup> City quarters also emerged as strong sites of Heimat sentiment— achieving a prominence that surpassed that prior to the bombings.<sup>28</sup> On an even more intimate level, small groups of localists regularly met in "Heimat evenings" to foster community and face the challenges of the rubble world together. Such Heimat evenings often adopted themes that clearly framed the evenings in terms of overcoming the trauma of a destroyed world through Heimat.<sup>29</sup> These same type of Heimat evenings proliferated in Cologne.

#### **"It is our will to exist:" Local Heimat as a Site of Life-affirmation**

In 1945, Hamburger evacuees returning home and purveying the rubble would find near the city's *Außenalster* Lake a fully-intact infantry monument from the mid 1930s. Ironically spared from bombings, it consisted of a *bas relief* with soldiers marching in rigid, depersonalized rows; individual faces were indistinguishable behind the austere formations. Beneath the relief, citizens could still read: "Germany must live, even if we must die." Nazi Germany notoriously valorized sacrifice of individual life for national glory, and by the end of the war, expansionary visions of nation were associated with mass death like never before. Remaining were shattered places of home and a desire for anything but the anonymity of the soldiers in the *Bas Relief* and sacrifice of their lives for redemptive visions of nation. Instead, they pined for the personal closeness of face-to-face communities and hungered for restored local Heimat as a site of future civilian lives. *Hanseaten*, as a result, increasingly described their local Heimat as life-affirming.

In Hamburg, Bremen, or Lübeck, as much as in Cologne, local Heimat was one of the primary geographies in which life after death was pursued. Abandoning visions of messianic nationhood as the guarantor of a better future, citizens imagined reconstructed local worlds as the site of future private lives. Reconstructing the local world was, to use the words of Hamburg mayor Paul Nevermann, doing away with “mountains of death!”<sup>30</sup> Kaisen recalled Bremen’s reconstruction in the same vein. After a speech reflecting on *Kristallnacht*, he asserted that local rebuilding represented the “triumph of life over destruction.”<sup>31</sup> As Borchert’s 1948 prose asserted, for him and Hamburg citizens, their rubble city was their “will to exist;” not just their desire to live, “anywhere or somehow,” –“but to live here.” Borchert’s prose recounts tableaux of civilian life in Hamburg that may strike the contemporary ear as mundane: screeching street cars, dance music, ship sirens, and seeing factory chimneys, the Alster Lake, green-hooded towers, and gray-red roof-tops, and feeling sea winds.<sup>32</sup> The every-day nature of these local tableaux was precisely the point. Just as a Colognian wrote in 1945 about hearing the “Heimat melodies” of a carpet being banged-out of a window by his neighbor, the prospect of everyday life on a local stage resonated deeply with the early postwar psyche. Lines like Borchert’s, in turn, found public resonance. Mayor Brauer repeated them, insisting that Hamburg was more than a harbor, economy, or place of work. It was a “life community” and a “humanitarian community.” By clearing the rubble and maintaining local community, Brauer believed Hamburger demonstrated their “will to live.”<sup>33</sup> These sentiments appeared in yet other rubble cities beyond those considered here. On the Spree, in the fractured city of Berlin, we find similar notions of locality. One 1948 Berlin poster targeted at returnees tellingly called upon them to help rebuild the city, declaring: “your Heimat city can show you the way to a new livelihood (*Lebensgrundlage*).”<sup>34</sup>

POWs and returning soldiers also looked to local Heimat as a redemptive “life affirming”

geography, just as much as civilians. While the Nazi regime attempted to connect expansionary goals to local places of home by arguing that soldiers were fighting for Heimat, by the end of the war, this link was fully broken. No longer dedicated to fighting for nationalist redemption, numerous soldiers were overcome with a desire for local places of home. In expressing this desire, they often conflated the fate of their home city with their own future life. This is reflected, among other places, in a dialect poem by a returning Bremer soldier entitled “Bremen: March 1945.” Writing in dialect, he recounted scenes of his local home, and his desire to leave the violence of war for the peace (*Fräen*) of Heimat. Bremen, he wrote, held both his father's grave, and the landscape of all “which he ever experienced in life.” The desire for the intimacy of family, private life, and familiar landscape is overt. Addressing the city as a personified individual, Böhme's poem turns Bremen's fate into a metaphor for his own. The city is the vessel of a peaceful future where he will begin life anew “without moroseness.” The thought of his home town, made “his heart soar,” and he desired to help reconstruct it.<sup>35</sup> Nowhere in this account do we see plans to confront the violent past or his complicity in them. Indeed, Heimat was not a space that forced coming to grips with the past.

Like in Cologne, locals eagerly embraced POWs in their Heimat enthusiasm and thematized their challenges in finding Heimat. In Hamburg, locals listened to radio broadcasts of Borchert's *Draußen vor der Tür*, which depicted a former soldier returning home to find, as one Hamburger wrote, no house, no wife, no job, and, therefore, no “Heimat.”<sup>36</sup> In Hamburg, Brauer called for consideration of POWs in the spirit of Heimat, and recounted how their Heimat needed them. In Bremen, Kaisen sent his “Heimat greetings” to POWs, enthusiastically validating their desires for “Heimat.” Even if much of their Heimat was gone, he encouraged them to “hold fast” to it, as even the “smallest remainder” promised a “new beginning.” The new beginning, again,

did not entail coming to grips with whatever moral crimes they had perpetrated. Kaisen instead set up a binary of weapons and war on the one hand, and restored Heimat on the other. Now that the weapons of war had been laid down, he argued, it was time to give POWs Heimat again.<sup>37</sup> Return to local worlds was thus a liminal act between national war and local peace which transformed the soldier into the citizen. Not a grandiose vision of nation, but restored local Heimat offered future life. The move changed the public spatial imaginary, and oriented it away from nationalist militarist fervor.

Given the focus on local Heimat as a place of “life-affirmation,” Heimat enthusiasm fueled popular reconstruction fervor in the Hanseatic cities just as it had in Cologne. The Bremer citizen Hans Kasten, in a poem on Bremen’s reconstruction, recounted with intensity how a “life stream” still flowed through Bremen— a city, which he argued, demonstrated throughout its history the ability to pull itself out of the ashes. He ardently called on their local community to rebuild through the inspiration of their local tradition.<sup>38</sup> By evoking historical memories of their city rising from past disasters, Kasten reflected broader trends in historical memory in the rubble world. Indeed, convincing themselves that Heimat was a place of life after death required not idealistic memories of better times or a flight into the perfect world of *Heimat* films; it entailed dredging up memories of cities’ worst historical moments. In Hamburg, locals emphasized historic destructions, plagues, and disasters, including the 1842 Hamburg fire, and how their “Hanseatic spirit” rescued them. Through such historical memories, localists assuaged fears that Heimat had been irrevocably destroyed, and transfigured reconstruction into a local tradition.<sup>39</sup> The same can be seen in Lübeck. An article in the *Vaterstädtische Blätter*, for example, emphasized “the six historic destructions of Lübeck” from 1149 to 1945. After 1945, they undertook the “sixth rebuilding.”<sup>40</sup>

Notable throughout such ubiquitous references to Heimat in the rubble was that it was used almost exclusively to refer to their locality. Of course, much work has emphasized the relationship of local Heimat and nation; imagining a de-centered vision of nation had become quite important after 1945. At the same time, Heimat was also about the disruption between individuals and their destroyed places of home—an issue that went beyond strategies of imagining nation. As one Lübecker wrote, Heimat referred to their personal connection to familiar city streets, alleys, and squares. The landscape of Heimat was the city and the surrounding countryside, to which “fellow citizens stood closely.” It could be found, in “homey dialect” and was about a “familiarity” from immediate experience. The journal proclaimed that their Heimat society promoted “Heimat-city connectedness.” Rather than focusing on Heimat and nation, the journal proclaimed that they served the “feeling of nearness” so crucial to the Heimat concept and closely attached to notions of Heimat as “life-affirming.”<sup>41</sup> This did not mean that their movement was irrelevant to nation. Heimat enthusiasts, as we shall see, often posited an affinity between local orientations and establishing a federalist German democracy. Emphasizing Heimat also became a route of imagining a different type of modernity that balanced change with rootedness in local worlds.

### **Heimat, Vernacular Modernity, and Postwar Democracy in the Rubble Imagination**

Studies of the Heimat concept have taken conflicting positions on the concept’s modernity, with historian Werner Hartung, the American-German literary scholar Peter Blickle, and others viewing it as inherently backwards and anti-modern. Armin Flender has argued that early postwar orientation toward values such as community, Heimat, and tradition represented a “protective mechanism” to battle against change.<sup>42</sup> On the other side, scholars including Celia

Applegate, Alon Confino, Meike Werner, Jennifer Jenkins, and William Rollins have argued for its modernity.<sup>43</sup> More recently, Maiken Umbach and Bernd Hüppauf, looking through the lense of the built environment, argue that Heimat has been used to articulate a “vernacular modernism” which balances modernity with the local.<sup>44</sup> Though they do not consider the post-1945 period, I argue that the term is uniquely applicable to the theories and principles of much of postwar Heimat enthusiasm. Localists in the Hanseatic cities, I argue, rather than promoting an anti-modern focus on intact local worlds, often articulated visions of a harmony between modernity and local rootedness. They frequently insisted that emphasis on Heimat was crucial to both decentralization and modern democratization.

Many postwar Hanseatic localists candidly stated that they believed Heimat sentiment to be neither backwards nor anti-modern. The Lübeck Senator Hans Ewer, for example, declared that Heimat feeling went beyond medieval buildings and romantic retrospect; it should be open to change and in tune with the present. Locals, he concluded, should link “old spirit” with “new life.”<sup>45</sup> Similarly, the Hamburg Senator a.D. Plate reflected at a *Hamburg Gesellschaft* anniversary, that their Hanseatic tradition contained the path-blazing of the pioneer; Hamburger should thus all work for a “future-oriented tradition.” In pursuing this goal, the *Hamburg Gesellschaft* was to focus on both their local world and the broader one outside of it.<sup>46</sup> Another Hamburger localists, Hans Leip, fused modernity with Heimat by arguing that two of Hamburg’s prominent values were “progress and perseverance.”<sup>47</sup> Such sentiments, as we have seen, had appeal in other localities in the West. In fusing local tradition with “future-orientedness,” localists sought to answer the question posed by one Lübecker Heimat enthusiast of how “progress can be served, without letting tradition suffer.”<sup>48</sup> Harmonizing Heimat and modernity, moreover, was not simply a phenomenon of urban Heimat enthusiasts. If we look just outside the

Hanseatic cities to the surrounding rural areas of Lower Saxony, for example, we find voices like that of Herbert Röhrig who underscored that Heimat must not be afraid of change, development, and modernization, which could be harmonized with historical preservation.<sup>49</sup>

Within the Hanseatic cities, attempts to harmonize local rootedness and modernity can be seen in several realms after 1945. The first was in physical reconstruction. Heimat enthusiasts certainly emphasized restoring local historic building styles. According to one early postwar Hamburg historian, this meant shunning a standard cliché model for all of Germany. Local distinctiveness remained important, and for Hamburg, this meant keeping its “amphibian nature.”<sup>50</sup> Bremen’s building commissioner similarly sought to preserve local architecture and rejected a unified national model; technical questions, he believed, should be secondary to “form of life.”<sup>51</sup> Many Bremer urban planners argued that they should rebuild in a way that would encourage a feeling of local community and avoid “massification and anonymity.”<sup>52</sup> Local distinctiveness was equally important in Lübeck, where the building commissioner emphasized reconstruction in a spirit of Heimat. He praised the “true love of Heimat” which protected the city’s architectural heritage and prevented construction of soulless “boxes” in the place of historic structures. Nevertheless, these desires did not mean narrow historicism and many localists sought to harmonize restorative projects with a modern spirit. As Lübeck’s building commissioner argued, rebuilding must not turn back time to some historic ideal; it had to be flexible, critical and adaptable, and maintain the dignity of the city.<sup>53</sup> Heimat enthusiasts themselves argued for balancing vernacular styles with modern architecture. The *Verein für Heimatschutz* in Lübeck maintained in 1948 that they must avoid “false romanticism” in rebuilding. The society reiterated this argument in 1956, asserting that *Heimatschutz* should not fall into a romanticism and unhelpful worship of dead relicts.<sup>54</sup> Locals at the *Vaterstädtische*



*Vereinigung* shared these sentiments, and discouraged extremes of dogmatic “modern functionalism” and “ingratiating Historicism.”<sup>55</sup> The Circle of Lübecker Architects even more ingeniously harmonized localism with modern building by arguing for progressiveness as a local value: the Lübecker was ever the “progressive citizen” who experimented with the Gothic when conservative groups were stuck in the Romanesque. Lübecker, they argued, never stuck to rigid traditionalism and false piety toward tradition; they harmoniously unified the old and the new.<sup>56</sup>

Beyond the question of physical reconstruction, Heimat enthusiasts, even more importantly, articulated a vernacular, locally-rooted vision of modernity in the realm of politics. They frequently argued that a locally-rooted modernity was essential to a viable postwar democracy. Reacting to Nazism, and facing the Soviet Union, Heimat enthusiasts warned of the dangers of an unwieldy strain of modernity that could result in a “massified society” which they often described as leading to totalitarianism. Contemporary historians have often labeled early postwar concerns about “massification” as anti-modern and anti-democratic, while overlooking how Nazism and totalitarianism could be seen as containing dark sides of modernity.<sup>57</sup> Many early postwar West Germans referred to massification as a danger *to* democracy—indicating their identification with establishing a democratic system. Hanseatic Heimat enthusiasts frequently wrote about massification as dehumanizing individuals by treating them as commodities, rather than discrete individuals situated within intimate communities. Critiques of massification, informed by recent experiences under the Nazi regime, were used to critique nationalism and militarism. Heimat enthusiasts often saw expansive geographies as hostile grounds for democracy, believing that mass polities generated impenetrable political machines, mass organizations, and intimidating power interests. “Comprehensible” spaces of Heimat, in contrast, seemed to them to offer a forum where everyday citizens could participate politically.

Articulations of a vernacular democratic modernism can be found in all three early postwar Hanseatic cities, but let us consider in closer detail the example of Lübeck, and its largest Heimat society, the *Vaterstädtische Vereinigung* (1949). Its society publication, the *Vaterstädtische Blätter* was filled with elaborations on the importance of local community to democracy.<sup>58</sup> The society itself emphasized devotion to Heimat and their locality's role in promoting democratic governance.<sup>59</sup> The first edition of their publication outlined their goals as promoting Heimat sentiment for old and new citizens, supporting rebuilding, and breathing new life into the phrase on Lübeck's Holsten Gate: "harmony within, peace without."<sup>60</sup> The phrase became the society motto, and reflected how members perceived their localist activities in broader contexts.<sup>61</sup> By tending to local traditions, forging local unity, and strengthening neighborly connections, they believed they could promote a "new understanding of the world." This meant fighting forces that threatened democracy: "massification," "technocracy," and "nihilism"—presumable byproducts of a dark strain of modernity. Admittedly, wistful romances of past comprehensible worlds, and negative comments about secularization did, in limited cases, creep into their publications.<sup>62</sup>

Members of the *Vaterstädtische Vereinigung* continually re-iterated that "comprehensible community" was a *Sine qua non* for successful democracy. Localities, they often argued, acted as schools of democratic participation that gave everyday citizens political responsibilities.<sup>63</sup> Massification, in contrast, made them susceptible to demagogic propaganda. Local communities, as an article from the society publication insisted, made individuals more oriented to public welfare, reigned in the dangers of mass politics, would lead citizens to become involved in decision-making, and ultimately prevent political lethargy.<sup>64</sup> Love of Heimat, as their society president argued, was the opposite of "bureaucratic machinery," operated by "unfeeling

functionaries.” The municipality offered face-to-face relationships where politics would not be the monopoly of demagogues, “egotistical” interest groups, and those with mega-phones. Intimate communities, in short, would promote democracy by preventing citizens from becoming “subjects of administration.”<sup>65</sup> The critique was not leveled against modernity and democracy; it advocated an alternative vernacular democratic modernity.

Locals in the *Vaterstädtische Vereinigung* in the late 1940's and 1950's also wrote how emphasis on their local world contributed to federalized, de-centered ideas of nationhood. Their society president drew on Hanseatic history, for example, to argue for a federalized “German future from a Hanseatic spirit” instead of a Prussian-Nazi tradition that they viewed as subverting individualism. “Connection to Heimat” in a “Hanseatic-Lübeck disposition” seemingly provided the antidote.<sup>66</sup> Another article in the *Vaterstädtische Blätter* from the mid 1950's similarly emphasized a national idea more strongly mediated by local rootedness. The author drew on the ideas of the Swiss Federalist Ernst von Schenk in denouncing Nazism’s “large scale re-organization plans.” The *Heimatvertriebene*, the article argued, had been uprooted from their local communities precisely because of such grandiose nationalist schemes. In turn, the article continued, the expellees had been forcibly made into “only Germans”—massification at its very worst. Being “only German,” the article continued, “sounds uncanny..in our ears”—like an existence that no longer belonged to one’s self. The author, returning to von Schenk’s federalist theories, argued that unitary national identity should be abandoned and replaced with a notion of nation that emphasized smaller worlds that were both “concrete” and “human.” The article concluded that “love of Heimat” should triumph over a “mentality of utility.” Lübecker, he believed, were determined not to become “*Einheitsdeutsche*” (unitary Germans).<sup>67</sup>

Illustrating that they were not merely blocking themselves off into local worlds, Heimat

enthusiasts frequently drew on federalist theories that originated beyond their region. The Swabian scholar Waldemar Kurtz was among those thinkers whom Hanseatic Heimat enthusiasts found inspiring. His writings emphasized small intimate spaces in establishing a “true democracy,” with concrete local places acting as a “contrary force against massification and bureaucratic centralism.” Connection to local Heimat, Kurtz believed, was among the only ways to respect the individual and facilitate their political participation. Making massified statecraft more humane, the Swabian federalist believed, was among the primary goals of their generation, and this entailed giving individuals a place that they felt to be “Heimat” amidst the “mass homelessness” (*Massenheimatlosigkeit*) and “uprootedness” of their times.<sup>68</sup> Hanseatic Heimat enthusiasts similarly welcomed the ideas of the Swiss historian and federalist advocate, Adolf Gasser, who spoke in Hamburg and Lübeck. Gasser, who lectured throughout West Germany, emphasized the importance of local municipalities in promoting federalism, democracy, “militant tolerance” and respect for constitutions. “Progressive municipal freedom,” he believed, must be a counterweight to centralization, totalitarianism, and submission to authority. A response article to his speech in Lübeck’s *Vaterstädtische Blätter* praised Gasser and Swiss democracy’s decentralization. Indeed, the freedom of local communities, one *Vaterstädtische Blätter* article concluded, was the “key to true democracy” that was threatened by the “craze for the masses.”<sup>69</sup>

Other outside theorists of federalism, including the Swiss theorist Carl Jacob Burckhardt, enjoyed a positive Hanseatic reception. Coincidentally, Burckhardt played a key role in sparing Lübeck from bombings by making it a Red Cross hub during the war. Lübeck, in turn, made him an honorary citizen. *Hanseaten* also valued him for his federalist theories. The Bremer senator Theodor Spitta responded enthusiastically to Burckhardt’s ideas.<sup>70</sup> He kept among his papers a Burckhardt speech on the republican histories of German localities. In it, Burckhardt argued that

connection to one's "place of Heimat," was intrinsic to the republican principle and contained a power of integration. Without preserving local Heimat and republican principles, Burckhardt held, the individual becomes a cog in the machine and a "means to an ends."<sup>71</sup> Hanseatic localists received the federalist theorists of the Swabian scholar Waldemar Besson with equal enthusiasm. The president of Lübeck's *Vaterstädtische Vereinigung* heaped Besson with praise for his argument that the individual's sinking into the masses threatened democracy.<sup>72</sup>

Localists, in short, were not simply emphasizing local worlds and blocking out larger societal questions. Rather, inward reflection on their local world often involved a looking outward. But, beyond abstract theories of a locally-rooted democracy, the question remains how localists moved from theories to action. In many cases they proved lacking here. Heimat enthusiasts had some venues for pushing a Heimat-infused federalism beyond simply placing cultural emphasis on local worlds. In Bremen and Hamburg, one route was defending their local independence as city-states, and for Lübecker restoring theirs after the Nazis had done away with it. Lübecker certainly valued their historic independence. Only two decades earlier, in 1926, they took to the streets to bombastically celebrate 700 years of Lübecker independence.<sup>73</sup> After 1945, localists in societies like the *Vaterstädtische Vereinigung* argued that they desired restored independence— not simply to bring back tradition, but rather due to principles of federalism and decentralization.<sup>74</sup> Lobbying for independence began with the Lübeck *Bürgerschaft's* unanimous 1946 vote for a referendum. Some histrionic voices compared Nazi dissolution of the city's independence to "rape" and criticized the Nazi craze for structural uniformity.<sup>75</sup> Lübeck's Heimat societies themselves pushed legal challenges in the courts, with the *Vaterstädtische Vereinigung* leading the fight for Lübeck's "*Bundesunmittelbarkeit*" (federal independence). The Heimat society quickly collected the requisite signatures from 10% of the voting population to hold a

referendum that ultimately never took place due to intransigence in Bonn.<sup>76</sup> Opponents of Lübecker independence privileged structural administrative questions, and charged Lübecker localists with “petty statism.”<sup>77</sup> Heimat enthusiasts responded by arguing that the issue went beyond their seven-towered city on the Baltic: local independence provided the “seeds of a healthy democratic order” that would be deeply federalist and de-centralized. The “power of comprehensible space,” they argued, benefitted the new democracy, and pushed against the Nazi “largeness craze.” The battle continued until the courts ruled in 1956 that Lübecker had no legal standing. Over time, desire to carry on the legal battle wavered.<sup>78</sup> Following the defeat, the *Vaterstädtische Vereinigung* called for memorialization of their former independence in lieu of its restoration.<sup>79</sup>

Other minor routes were also available to give dreams of a Heimat-infused federalism structural manifestations. The Hanseatic cities, for example, like other West German cities, witnessed the emergence of neighborhood cooperatives. These small groups, typically consisting of double- or low triple-digit membership, brought together neighbors in common collaborative organizations. Such face-to-face, grass-roots forums, so the theory went, would guard against “fanaticism and radicalism,” act as a site of community problem solving, and provide a medium of political participation for everyday citizens. Lübeck saw its own neighborhood cooperatives, where, as the *Vaterstädtische Blätter* reported, one need not worry of “massifying buzzword propaganda” and demagogues. In place of exploitive mass politics, neighborhood cooperatives offered “comprehensible municipalities,” and a “pre-parliamentary space” for political discussion.<sup>80</sup> The fad, however, would not last beyond the early postwar period. Ultimately, the power of Heimat enthusiasts to realize their visions of a vernacular modernity in administrative systems was quite limited, and they were anything but politically adept. Postwar localists in the

Hanseatic cities and elsewhere nevertheless made valid criticisms of the dehumanizing processes that could result under systems that relegate individuals to mass state commodities. Early postwar concerns about massification cannot be dismissed willy-nilly as anti-democratic, anti-modern, or self-serving without closer analysis, nor can we lump all who used the term massification into a single ideological category. As the local Bremer historian, Friedrich Prüser argued, they saw local Heimat as a sphere for protecting individual freedom from “massification and collectivism” within “small comprehensible communities.” For localists like Prüser, this did not mean retreat from the outside world or broader issues; their “Polis” unified citizens, both outsiders and natives, and they believed that their “feeling of the community” had a salubrious effect on broader problems.<sup>81</sup> Reacting against Nazism, of course, did not mean that Heimat enthusiasts learned correct lessons from their experiences. A case in point was their frequent aversion to party politics after 1945, with recent memories of a mass political party toppling a democracy. Lübeck’s *Vaterstädtische Vereinigung* argued against mass political parties and sought to make their Heimat society a replacements political conduit and promoter of a “true democratic form of life.”<sup>82</sup> Ultimately, such visions turned out to be pipe dream. The *Vaterstädtische Vereinigung* noted being closed out of local politics, becoming a purely cultural institution.<sup>83</sup> Though not realizing structural political goals, Heimat enthusiasts proved more effective in the cultural realm, where they fashioned more democratically-colored local identities.

### ***Hanseatic Democracy and Usable Local Pasts***

In the first edition of a new early postwar Heimat publication, the *Hamburger Journal*, the editor unveiled the periodical by writing on Hamburg’s history. He held that it gave their locality a “breadth, open-mindedness,” and “receptiveness to giving and receiving.” Most

importantly, their history gave them constitutional freedom, he held, pointing to the historic inscription above the *Rathaus*, which read: “The freedom which the old have arduously achieved, may posterity maintain!”<sup>84</sup> While reference to the Hanseatic cities as sites of “freedom” extended back to the Middle Ages, after 1945, such notions would take on a new meaning as a number of localists sought to solidify identities rooted in a Hanseatic penchant for democracy.

The Nazis had certainly tried to shape local historical memory for their own ends. They particularly appropriated the cities’ sea-faring tradition to affiliate Hanseatic localness with expansionary German naval power. The Nazis later drew on Hanseatic histories to encourage locals to fight against the advancing allies. While scholars have interrogated Hanseatic identities and local historical memory prior to 1945, little attention has been paid to the postwar period. Thomas Hill, in a short essay, argues that the Hanseatic idea was de-politicized in the postwar period.<sup>85</sup> A close examination, however, suggests instead that, after 1945, Hanseatic historical memories offered a “usable past” and were reformulated to affiliate their localness with democracy and decentralized federalism. But what of the local historical matter that postwar *Hanseaten* had to draw from in constructing new postwar identities? What did their histories “truly” contain and what were the local values with which previous generations identified? How much difference was there between pre- and postwar local identities?

A cursory view at local discourses in earlier periods does reveal description of freedom and republicanism as local traits, even if they did not refer to freedom in a modern sense. Localist songs since the eighteenth century included tropes of the free citizen, his rights, the “high altar of freedom,” the “mildness” of city laws, their laudable representative institutions, and resulting domestic happiness. In previous generations, the tyrant, magnate, and bondage appeared as foils to local freedom.<sup>86</sup> In 1803, Johann Curio wrote that Hamburg had “no aristocracy, no patricians,



no slaves, and not even subjects.”<sup>87</sup> In the song “Hansa,” (1830) Lübeck, Hamburg, and Bremen appear as “a league of freedom,” where a “brisk sense of freedom” resided.<sup>88</sup> There were also precedents to postwar claims that the Hanseatic cities were products of a federalist, de-centered national configuration. As Garlieb Merkel reflected in 1801, the Hanseatic cities were rooted in a “fragmented form of Germany.”<sup>89</sup> Even after national unification in 1870, Hanseatic localists emphasized local autonomy, with folk songs praising their cities as places where “Bismarck should have no say.”<sup>90</sup> In a similar spirit, the *Heimatkundler* Heinrich Helmers wrote in 1905 how the words “*Ick bin ’n Bremer Borger!*” were suffused with Bremer freedom.<sup>91</sup> While Bismarck did actually have quite a say, affiliation of Hanseatic identity with federalism and decentralization had antecedents.

But despite these antecedents, notions of Hanseatic freedom from previous centuries did not mean much by contemporary standards, signifying only local independence and freedom from feudal lords. The cities were ruled by oligarchies for much of their history. Free Imperial cities were also often repressive places for outsiders, Jews, and those without citizenship. As Johann Smidt ‘s 1813 song “*Kriegslied der Bremischen Hanseaten*” insisted, their freedom only applied to German men of notable stature.<sup>92</sup> Around the same time, Johann Rambach wrote that Hamburger were not enthusiastic about their constitution or its “principles of freedom.”<sup>93</sup> His contemporary, Garlieb Merkel also wrote of his disappointment at not finding Romans or Greeks in Hamburg. Having indulged in romantic raptures, Merkel imagined that monarchies were like regimented Dutch gardens, while the Hanseatic cities must be diverse and un-regimented forests. He was sorely disappointed, finding a citizenry primarily focused on the acquisition of goods.<sup>94</sup>

In short, the local historical matter was a mixed bag, and historians continue to debate the “democratic” natures of the cities’ histories.<sup>95</sup> As a recent edited volume illustrates, Hanseatic

histories have continually been used by different groups for different political, cultural, and social purposes. While the volume explores the internalization and use of Hanseatic histories in the modern period, it does not give full consideration to the years after 1945, which witnessed significant developments.<sup>96</sup> Here, I do not seek to engage in historical debates on pre-war Hanseatic histories; rather, I aim to illustrate how many *Hanseaten* used such historical memories after 1945 to facilitate identification with postwar democracy.

Rather than finding de-politicized Hanseatic histories, a glance at the rubble world quickly illustrates how many evoked local histories to link a modern democracy with local identity. Like the *Hamburger Journal* editor, local enthusiasts after 1945 argued they should look to such histories to bolster German democracy through “Hanseatic freedom.” As early as 1947, during an assembly of the *Hansischer Geschichtsverein* and the *Verein für Niederdeutsche Sprachforschung*, a newspaper reported that locals in the Hanseatic cities were talking incessantly about the “Hanseatic spirit” and its force in reconstruction. The article author encouraged these developments, as did the speakers at the conference.<sup>97</sup> Subsequent society meetings continued to emphasize historic memory of the Hansa as “connecting people” of different nations in peace. The application of such ideas for European integration was clear.<sup>98</sup> In local serial publications, we see similar uses of local historical memory. Fritz Rörig, an aging Hanseatic historian, wrote in the first postwar publication of the *Hansische Geschichtsblätter* how their histories related to the present. After the German disaster, he argued, Hanseatic history would be different, as all works are influenced by the “spiritual and political mores” and “duties” of a given time. He clarified that he did not mean using history for political propaganda—they had seen too much of this in the recent past. What “present impulses” would inform their history, Rörig argued, must be left unsaid, though he hoped to make these histories useful for the

“gradual overcoming of their great German distress!”<sup>99</sup> His fellow local historian, Karl Pagel, in the preface to his work on the Hanseatic League, similarly wrote that he hoped his book would help build a historical consciousness that would contribute to finding a “future path” for a “downtrodden people.”<sup>100</sup> Locals, consuming such works at a pace that demanded frequent re-printings, supported using local histories to inspire a new modern democratic future. As one Lübecker emphasized—drawing on Hans Konrad Röthel’s history of Hamburg, Lübeck, and Bremen—to be Hanseatic was, a “German form of a cosmopolitan-oriented world citizenship” (Röthel). In turn, their Hanseatic history, the Lübecker argued, must not be forgotten in the school books. *Hanseaten*, he held, could be both conservative in maintaining their republican tradition, while having a progressive sense of “thundering toward the new, the forward-looking” when it was prudent. Lübeck localists also marshaled such histories to argue for the restoration of the city’s independence and remembrance of Lübeck as “Germany’s oldest republic.”<sup>101</sup> The Lübeck Heimat enthusiast Hans Wittmack was among such advocates. He argued that their historic local independence would prop up a German and European federalism. By respecting republican traditions and giving democracy traditional roots, he held, national democracy would have fewer instabilities. On the use of local history for the present, he declared:

“It is the Hanseatic spirit which once encompassed all of Europe that must be reawakened. Hanseatic spirit is more than simply the spirit of a single city, whether it be as large and world-open and bold as Hamburg. Hanseatic spirit was a federalist spirit that filled an entire league of cities. It could, today, act as a model...”<sup>102</sup>

Localist historians and Heimat societies were not the only ones wielding the Hanseatic past to facilitate identification with democracy. Local politicians of all major political parties re-enforced these local narratives from the pulpit of their office. In Hamburg, we see this with Max

Brauer, the newly-elected mayor after 1946. Born in Hamburg, and active in Weimar politics, Brauer came with impeccable democratic credentials. The SPD politician fled Germany in 1933, finding refuge in Paris and the United States. While in exile, he made frequent presentations at the American Jewish Congress, where he insisted in 1936 that anti-Semitism was at the core of Nazism. After the war, he pushed against amnesty for Nazi perpetrators.<sup>103</sup> Long before the end of the war, Brauer saw Hanseatic federalist and democratic traditions as the inverse of a negative Prussian militarist tradition. During his exile, Brauer argued that Germany must reject Prussian militarism. In a 1943 speech in the United States, Brauer connected the Prussian militarist tradition with Nazism, and argued that this must be done away with to establish a postwar democracy.<sup>104</sup> When he returned to Hamburg in 1946 as the city mayor, Brauer appealed to ideas of Hanseatic democracy to promote rejection of Prussian militarism. In 1948, amidst the drafting of the Hamburg constitution, Brauer addressed the Hamburger *Bürgerschaft* calling for the creation of a federalist nation amidst the Prussian downfall. In Hamburg, he believed they could contribute to democratization by “interweaving” their local traditions into German federalism. Hamburger, he insisted, needed to seize the moment and profess their allegiance to their city’s “healthful republican and democratic traditions.”<sup>105</sup> In a later speech, Brauer touted that Hamburg and Bremen were historically among the “few true city republics” with long histories.<sup>106</sup> Brauer’s promotion of such notions of localness was not aimed at repressing memory of German crimes. Indeed, Brauer emphasized the horror of the Holocaust in such speeches while seeking to integrate historical memory of Jewish contributions to local culture, trade, and arts.<sup>107</sup>

Brauer’s colleague on the Weser, Bremen mayor Wilhelm Kaisen also marshaled local history to bolster a local identity rooted in Hanseatic republicanism, democracy, and federalism. During his twenty-year tenure, the SPD mayor argued for local democratic decentralization, and

associated centralization with a “dehumanized schematism”—one of the reasons he supported retaining Bremer independence.<sup>108</sup> Bremen, he believed, must remain a Free Hanseatic city for the sake of its old republican principles, its position in world trade, and its importance to having a federalist nation and a “federalist Europe.”<sup>109</sup> Kaisen emphasized that local orientations and independence were not about petty statism; rather, they served national democratic goals.

Admittedly, Kaisen’s depiction of the Nazis as interrupting a twelve year “Bremer democratic history,” did little to help Bremer to come to grips with their complicity in Nazi crimes—brushing over the question altogether.<sup>110</sup> With Bremer and Hamburger politicians seeing eye to eye on Hanseatic republicanism, they issued a joint declaration in 1946 insisting that they retain their historic independence, which gave them particular historic “duties” of international significance, particularly given their connections with the outside world.<sup>111</sup>

Looking to the liberal end of the political spectrum, we see the same emphasis on democratic Hanseatic histories. The Bremer FDP Senator Theodor Spitta denounced a “centralized uniform state;” he held that a “federalist state with significant decentralization” was needed where Hamburg and Bremen could fulfill their unique historic duty.<sup>112</sup> His assistant on the statehood issue, Herbert Lampe, elaborated further on how “the spirit of republicanism and democracy” had deep roots in Bremen. He emphasized the history of their city’s freedom against feudalism and overlords and their membership in the Hanseatic League. Bremen, he continued, had historic connections with the outside world which it wanted to maintain and nurture in a spirit of international friendship. While the Nazis had abolished Bremen’s status as a Free and Hanseatic city in 1937 (restored in 1945 by the American allies), twelve years of Nazism had not, Lampe argued, fully extinguished centuries of local tradition.<sup>113</sup> The Bremen Senate pushed the same ideas of federalist decentralization, rooted in local historical tradition, which would

strengthen national democracy and guard against “bureaucratic centralism.”<sup>114</sup> The Hamburg Senate contained similarly strident federalist voices. The Senator Renatus Weber (CDU) argued that in their new democracy, Hamburg would never hover in the shadow of the national capital; they would maintain a “federalist foundation” and loyalty to the republic where they could bring their historic “Hanseatic experience” to the table.<sup>115</sup>

The union of Heimat enthusiasts, localist historians, and politicians in supporting democracy as a local value contributed to its vitality beyond reconstruction. Trends in developments in local identity remained fairly stable and consistent from the immediate postwar years into the 1960s. Throughout the mid and late 1950's, we see the same strength in notions of a local democratic identity. Kurt Sieveking (CDU), at the beginning of his four years as Hamburg mayor illustrated this in a speech on “Hanseatic Duties.” Beginning by asking what being “Hanseatic” means, he concluded that it was something that made them unique among other Germans, bestowing them with a distinct form of local political community with unique duties. To be Hanseatic, he continued was to be a member of a *free* city. While they were previously “*reichsunmittelbar*,” Sieveking argued, they were now “*bundesunmittelbar*”— an assertion that refashioned a past as a republican and Free Imperial City into a modern democratic future within a federalist state. Continuing in his definition of what it meant to be “Hanseatic,” Sieveking argued that it meant to be a city-state, deeply democratic, and conscious of tradition.<sup>116</sup>

While re-fashioning local historical memory offered one tool in reformulating local value sets, re-inventing ritual tradition also offered a site of action. The Hanseatic cities were not as rich in public festivals as Cologne, nor did they have a single major ritual tradition like Carnival. Nevertheless, postwar Hanseatic localists reformulated local ritual traditions to shape local identities. Even smaller scale events like the Northern German holiday, “Sunday of the Dead”

could be made to serve anti-militarist, democratic purposes. One Lübeck dialect poet used the holiday, created in 1816 to honor the fallen soldiers of the national wars of liberation, not to praise the heroism of national struggle, but to denounce war as a crime against humanity, arguing in dialect: “*Krieg is för de Dummen!*” (War is for the stupid!) The dialect poet’s piece further referenced the scourge of the concentration camps.<sup>117</sup> One Heimat society demonstrated its approval of the piece by including it in their well-circulated publication. As we shall see, the Overseas Day tradition in Hamburg underwent its own reformulation to make it a celebration of Hanseatic world-openness. Other local ritual traditions, however, retained clearly backwards and regressive elements. The Bremen *Schaffermahlzeit*, for example, brought together—as it had for centuries—the city’s economic elite in a resplendent banquet that excluded women. The tradition emphasized a view of the truest *Hanseat* as a kingly businessman— buttressing classist colorings of local belonging that held sway in the Hanseatic for over a century.<sup>118</sup> In the late 1940’s and 1950’s, this patriarchal system was largely taken for granted. While Bremer did not reform the tradition, other traditions proved more effective in promoting local democratic identifications. While one could probe several ritual traditions, close observation of one in particular proves revealing: Lübeck’s *Volks- und Erinnerungsfest*, celebrated on the Trave since 1848. The festival would be observed by Lübecker after 1945 as a local democratic tradition.

The *Volks- und Erinnerungsfest*, first celebrated in Lübeck by the 1848 revolutionaries, was intended as a one-time sharp-shooter event, which Lübecker in 1849 decided to adopt as a local tradition. As Gisela Jaacks has illustrated in a study of the festival, its meaning was rooted in three principles from 1848 to 1870: I. desire for German unity, II. equality between the estates, and III. enthusiasm for a local democratic constitution. From 1870-1914, the tradition morphed into a primarily nationalist and militarist celebration, shedding many of its former democratic

undertones. Chauvinist speeches came to pervade the festival during the Kaiserreich, leading non-nationalist groups to reject the tradition altogether.<sup>119</sup> Overtime, remembrance of 1848 in the festival was restricted to its national elements, further supplemented with other nationalist historical memories. As one Lübecker wrote of the tradition in 1901: “It is and remains a patriotic festival in the sense of the Fatherland, a memorial festival of the freedom year 1848, a memorial festival moreover of the great national act of 1870/71, and the re-establishment of a powerful German Empire.”<sup>120</sup> By the Third Reich, the Nazis sought to obliterate the memory of 1848 altogether, insisting that the festival had “ancient Germanic” and pagan roots.<sup>121</sup>

Amidst the local cultural renaissance in the rubble of the postwar city, Lübecker began holding small observances of the old tradition. Its nationalist elements disappeared, and remembrance of 1848 and constitutional democracy was revived. The year 1948, the tradition’s 100 anniversary offered an opportune moment to reformulate the tradition, though observances suffered due to lack of resources. During the early 1950s, the *Vaterstädtische Vereinigung* sought a more extensive revitalization of the tradition, which reached full bloom by the mid 1950’s. Perhaps due to fears that traditional sharp-shooting events, (held since 1848) would counter the message of localist democracy and rejection of militarism, they were not revived.<sup>122</sup> It is also notable that, given the long history of the festival as a rallying point for national unification, this was not a focus of the postwar tradition. At the peak of the *Volks- und Erinnerungsfest*’s revival, its organizing committee distributed a pamphlet on the tradition. In the introduction, the Lübecker Senator Martin Strack wrote that a true Lübecker tradition had been fully re-instated. Supporting the Heimat feeling in the festival, he hoped that Lübecker would feel the tradition’s “community forming concept.” In a gesture to the city’s outsiders, Strack invited the expelled organizations to participate in arrangements in order to build solidarity between Lübeck’s old and



new citizens.<sup>123</sup> The pamphlet went on to emphasize that the tradition memorialized the democratic revolutions of the “stormy year of 1848” and the constitution of their free city; founded as an “enduring memorial” to the achievements of 1848.<sup>124</sup> In the ensuing years, locals continued to have diverse understandings of their tradition’s intended memorializations. The majority of them had democratic overtones, including the freedom seeking of 1848, revolutionaries’ attempts to establish a liberal nation at Frankfurt, or the issuance of the Lübeck city constitution.<sup>125</sup> Re-invention of local tradition, in short, had become a clear toolbox in the reconstruction of new postwar local identities.

Hanseatic locals were the primary agents behind such shifts in local identity. However, they enjoyed overt outside approval of their efforts—both from co-nationals and the allied occupiers. Just as British occupiers looked positively on Cognians turning away from “Prussian” militarism and toward “democratic” Rhenish traditions, the American occupiers in Bremen, to take but one example, firmly endorsed a Bremer identity rooted in democratic histories. The American occupiers issued a statement in 1946 arguing that Bremen was a free city, and center of liberal thought in Germany. It described Bremen as a fruitful site for international reconciliation, praising their long democratic history that allegedly had longer historical roots than the United States.<sup>126</sup> Prominent German figures gave the same endorsement. Theodor Heuss, the Federal President proclaimed that Hamburg had a national duty rooted in its local republican history. In a speech in the city, he declared that Hamburg represented a model of German Republicanism that contained a vision of new German possibilities.<sup>127</sup>

In aggregate, emphasis on local identities rooted in “Hanseatic democracy” strengthened identification with postwar democratic project. These developments, however, were not without substantial pitfalls. For one, Heimat societies, by emphasizing local unity over exclusion, made

little effort to exclude former Nazi party members from their ranks. One egregious example included the acceptance of the Lübecker librettist and historian, Johannes Klöcking, in his mid 60's, who was a member of multiple Heimat societies and published in their journals until his death in 1952. He did not write on localist ideas of democracy, world-openness or tolerance and was anything but unburdened from the Nazi regime, having worked at the *Reichsstelle für Musikbearbeitung* where he was charged with re-writing Handel's Oratorios with non-Jewish themes.<sup>128</sup> Moreover, while focusing on their own torn sense of Heimat, they failed to memorialize others loss of Heimat in which many of them were complicit: the cities' prewar Jewish population. For over a century prior to 1933, many Jews in the Hanseatic cities had strong localist sentiment for their home city, and expressed the wrenching feeling of losing former places of home. Those who returned after 1945, felt largely "foreign in their own city."<sup>129</sup>

Though locals, at least in print, rarely discussed Hanseatic democracy and republicanism as absolving them of Nazi crimes, such narratives of place largely ignored the need to confront local complicity in the Nazi past. In Hamburg and Lübeck, citizens would, on certain occasion, trumpet their having surrendered their cities to the allies without a fight. In Lübeck, some localists even argued that Hitler had a vendetta and anger vis-a-vis Lübeck, purportedly informing his decision to abolish their local independence. Some argued that it was a response to the city banning Hitler from speaking there until 1932 and interfering with planned Nazi rallies. Senator Hans Ewers raised this unsubstantiated point in court arguments in the 1950's, in efforts to restore Lübecker independence.<sup>130</sup> Nevertheless, historical memories that would have proven more potent in forming a false narrative of Lübecker absolution from Nazi crimes remained largely untouched. The Lübeck martyrs offers an example of this. The martyrs—four clerics from Lübeck, were executed for opposing the regime, one of whom had insinuated that the bombings

of Lübeck was God's judgement against the regime. Memory of this resistance did not hold any particular prominence in local historical memory after 1945. Locals instead focused on how prewar local histories could play a role in finding a way out of the "urgency" of the period and assist in turning away from Nazism. As we shall see, this not only included propagation of Hanseatic democracy and republicanism, but also Hanseatic world-openness and tolerance. Such notions were likewise discussed in terms of shaping future conditions, and in terms of overcoming hyper-nationalist division and exclusionary notions of community.

### **Hanseatic Tolerance and World-Openness: Reformulating the Local Spatial Imaginary**

On May 16, 1945, Rudolf Petersen, a Hamburg tradesman, became the first postwar mayor of his home city. Petersen came from a strongly democratic and mayoral family. His grandfather had been mayor in the nineteenth century, and his brother Carl Petersen had been mayor from 1932 to 1933, during which time he denounced the Nazis in the strongest of terms.<sup>131</sup> As Rudolf addressed war-torn Hamburg citizens, he drew on their Hanseatic history of trade, maritime activities, and international contact. While the Nazis defined the city as a hub of expansionary German power, Petersen defined it as one of *Völkerverbindung* (connection of international peoples) and as a door of reconciliation between Germany and the outside world. Their history, he further argued, made them a "mediator" between Germany and the Anglo-Saxon world, its way of life, and notions of freedom.<sup>132</sup> These principles would be enshrined in the city constitution, which cited Hamburg's duty to be "in the spirit of peace, a mediator between all people and lands of the globe."<sup>133</sup> Petersen's speech was a harbinger of further changes in local identity that began after 1945, encapsulated in the prescription of world-openness and tolerance as local values.

Such perceived local values overwrote nationalist spatial narratives of the Hanseatic cities as exit points of expansionary German power. Overwriting these narratives entailed emphasis on an identity rooted in international reconciliation and European unity—topoi that frequently appeared in discussions of Hanseatic world-openness. Such value claims also became prominent in attempts to conceptually grapple with outsider influx. Early postwar *Hanseaten* faced a massive influx of outsiders—particularly the expellees. Progressive localists appropriated ideas of local world-openness and tolerance to disarm its threatening power, portraying outsider inclusion as itself a local tradition. Of course, significant gaps remained between identification and performance. Establishing tolerant communities is an ever ongoing process. One cannot descriptively speak of tolerant communities but only degrees of tolerance bound to unique temporal contexts. In the early postwar period, “tolerance” did not apply to the woman who flouted gender norms, or homosexuals, viewed almost globally as aberrant threats to moral order. National, ethnic, and racial difference still brought clear discrimination in postwar Germany and Europe. The value of these new identity claims, however, came in their prescriptivism and conceptual reconciling of tradition with outsider inclusion. They further opened up a space for outsiders to challenge identity claims when their performance fell short.

In demonstrating how local identities shifted after 1945, it is again helpful to take a brief side glance at prewar ideas of localness. The Hanseatic cities for centuries were trade hubs with high outsider contact. Previous generations, in limited cases, did see this as giving their cities a sort of “world-openness,” even if they did not use the term. In 1801, Garlieb Merkel recorded how Hamburg citizens’ foreign contact gave them an “uninhibited view of things,” that informed their local psychology and gave them a “healthy stomach” that “digested” those from the outside.<sup>134</sup> In the same year, Johann Rambach described the city as having an unusual “love for

the foreign.”<sup>135</sup> Not all shared this assessment; their contemporary, Jonas Ludwig von Heß wrote that the “true old Hamburger” had no interest in anything but their locality; when they encountered a “foreign element,” he wrote, they stuck out their horns.<sup>136</sup> During the heyday of nineteenth-century Heimat enthusiasm, *Hanseaten* seldom prattled on about their cosmopolitan world-connections as their postwar progeny did. If we look, for example, to Carl Wefing’s 1903 *Bremische Heimatkunde*, we see almost no reference to the city’s connection to the outside world or its inclusion of foreign elements, themes which fifty-two years later figured prominently in Friedrich Prüser’s *Bremer Heimatchronik*.<sup>137</sup> Weimar brought little change. One of the few locals who pushed world-openness and democracy as Hanseatic values was Thomas Mann., who failed to popularize such ideas.<sup>138</sup> After 1933, the Nazis appropriated and magnified pre-existing nationalist narratives of Hanseatic localness.<sup>139</sup> The Nazis also sought to infuse Hanseatic localism with a scientific racism, radically different from anything that appeared before 1933. Nazi publications, like one in 1940, delineated the “racial character of the Bremer”—presenting image charts which show the Bremer’s racial traits.<sup>140</sup>

After 1945, localists frequently asserted that to be a Hamburger, Lübecker, or Bremer meant to be world-open and tolerant— notions that continue into the present. Ideas of localness as rooted in international reconciliation and Europeanism were promoted interchangeably by a host of groups, including local politicians, local historians and writers, and grass-roots Heimat enthusiasts. A *continuous* trope of local identity, rather than a new one, perhaps best illustrates postwar changes: the idea of a Hanseatic city being a “gate to the world.” The term existed since at least the nineteenth century. Yet, being a “gate to the world” bore different meanings in different times. Was the gate for exit, entrance, or both? In Nazi propaganda, it was the gate through which national power exited onto a global stage.<sup>141</sup> After 1945, the concept, as used in

popular Heimat publications like the *Hamburger Journal*, was a gate of “openness,” and “breadth” rooted in international mutuality, cooperation, and a “willingness to give and to receive.”<sup>142</sup> Hamburg’s first postwar mayor similarly argued that their city was a “gate” that would reconnect the world’s peoples. His successor, Max Brauer did the same, declaring that Hamburg being a “gate to the world” meant that they were a bridge between Germany and the broader world.<sup>143</sup> Local historians like Hans Röthel wrote that the Hanseatic cities being a “gate to the world” was not just about exiting: it was also for receiving from the outside. Pointing particularly to Hamburg, he praised the city’s acceptance of the “foreign,” and its “power of assimilation.”<sup>144</sup> After 1945, the Hanseatic “gates to the world” remained standing; their meaning was inverted to attach Hanseatic localness to international *rapprochement*.

Appealing to Hanseatic world-openness to identify with international reconciliation was largely a cognitive task. Applying such local values to expellees flooding into their local worlds, however, took practicing tolerance and openness to an entirely different level. The first shock of expellee arrival was great, with the Hanseatic cities seeing larger influx than Cologne. Hamburg became home to 327,000 expellees, making up 18.8% of the population. The percentage in Bremen was lower at 8.6%.<sup>145</sup> Neither witnessed the expellee tidal wave that hit Lübeck. The Baltic city directly bordered the Soviet zone, making it a hub of expellees pushing their way to the West. In the first two years after 1945, expellee influx doubled the population and put a tremendous strain on social structures. In 1945 alone, 100,000 expellees settled in Lübeck in a matter of weeks, creating extreme housing shortages and high unemployment. Once populations stabilized, Lübeck was a city of 240,000 people, 90,000 of whom were expellees.<sup>146</sup> The city also became a political nerve center of expellee politics, housing fifteen expellee societies. Lübecker very much feared that the outsider influx would extinguish local culture. A Heimat society, which

later became a strident voice of expellee inclusion, the *Vaterstädtische Vereinigung*, cited both lost physical spaces of Heimat and expellee influx as motivating their founding. Years later an expellee himself would sit at the head of the society. In the whirlwind of the immediate postwar years, however, expellee influx stoked fears, even if local Heimat societies claimed that they were not founded in direct opposition to the newcomers.<sup>147</sup>

So what of “Hanseatic tolerance” vis-a-vis the expellees? Research for Hamburg and Bremen has illustrated the many challenges that expellees faced during the early years when competition for resources was most pervasive. Ingeborg Esenwein-Rothe, in her study on Hamburg and Bremen emphasizes the numerous foreign elements that expellees had to become accustomed to, including new built environments, modes of communication, and everyday practices. This often resulted, she argues, in an “inferiority complex” that inhibited their integration, in addition to significant discrimination from locals. The city administrations, Esenwein-Rothe argues, was also focused primarily on economic integration rather than caritative action.<sup>148</sup> In early years of cut-throat competition over housing and resources, expellee and native relations were tense. In 1948, the American occupiers in Bremen were still quite unsatisfied with the pace of integration and native attitudes toward the outsiders.<sup>149</sup> Expellees met with a host of other disadvantages and discrimination that inhibited their integration. Anti-eastern sentiment, negative stereotypes, and anti-expellee invectives circulated throughout West Germany. Economic disadvantages lasted for decades. As Franz Bauer points out, when expellee residence in the West appeared to be more permanent, Westerners felt that their local and regional ways of life were threatened. At the same time, as Klaus Bade points out, expellee belonging to the same national group was a counterweight and tremendous boon to integration.<sup>150</sup> In current historical debate, scholars have focused on whether expellee integration in the West

was a success or failure. Narratives of a failed integration have been used to shape memory politics and underscore the importance of memorialization. Though expellee hardship and hostility toward them from natives should not be underestimated, Chapter VI will discuss the deeply problematic aspects of a failed integration thesis that posits pervasive Western German hatred and even racial animus vis-a-vis the expellees.<sup>151</sup>

After the shock of expellee influx subsided and competition for scant resources relented, rather than finding a universally hostile West German populace, we find that many native Heimat enthusiasts actively encouraged expellee embrace and integration. In the Hanseatic cities, many locals used ideas of Hanseatic tolerance and world-openness to argue explicitly for expellee inclusion as a performance of local tradition. Such impulses came from both above and below, but let us first consider efforts by prominent locals, who often used events like the annual expellee *Tag der Heimat* to promote more inclusive local identities. *Tag der Heimat* events revealed frequent connective moments between natives and expellees, mixed with tensions over expellee leaders' nationally strident tones. At the Hamburg events, organizers emphasized that the tradition should bring together natives and expellees in joint commemoration of their Heimat.<sup>152</sup> The keynote speaker, Senator Edgar Engelhard underscored that Hamburger Heimat feeling should forge sympathy with the expellee plight. To disarm the perceived threat of expellee arrival, Engelhard drew on the same local historical memories of outsider influx that Hamburger used to fashion ideas of Hanseatic world-openness. In spite of such overtures, Engelhard came close to boycotting the event over the nationalist symbolism permitted by expellee organizers.<sup>153</sup> The Hamburg mayor, Max Brauer, while also encouraging localist tolerance and embrace of the expellees, also had trepidations about the strident national sentiment of the expellee leadership, and used his speech at the *Ostdeutsche Heimatwoche* in



Hamburg to both support the expellees while decrying an “antiquated nation-state principle.”<sup>154</sup>

In later years, *Tag der Heimat* continued to reveal mixed connective moments. The CDU

Hamburg mayor Kurt Sieveking made similarly positive overtures to the expellees at *Tag der*

*Heimat*, though he was careful not to equate a right to Heimat with national territorial claims.<sup>155</sup>

In Bremen, mayor Wilhelm Kaisen acted as a staunch expellee ally at his city’s yearly events.

After the early 1950's, Kaisen removed from his speeches earlier references to expellee-Bremer

tensions, and by 1960, he declared that the expellees had become Bremer.<sup>156</sup> At parallel events in

Hamburg, expellees sang localist Hamburger songs at *Tag der Heimat*, and a Hamburg senator

declared that the city belonged to both expellees and natives, who rebuilt it together.<sup>157</sup>

Though a full examination of native-expellee relationships in the Hanseatic cities cannot

be included here, let us consider in closer detail the case of Lübeck, where, given the sheer size

of the expellee influx, we should expect to find the highest levels of tension and most pervasive

rejection. Certainly much tension did emerge in housing, access to goods, and cultural mores.

Nevertheless, as Sigfried Schier’s analysis of expellee integration in Lübeck illustrates, many

strides were made fairly quickly, with native locals often playing a pro-active role. *Tag der*

*Heimat* revealed integrationist developments. One Lübecker noted that the events illustrated how

expellees were developing a “presentiment” of Heimat for Lübeck. To illustrate solidarity with

the expellees, the city of Lübeck also took up sponsorships for the regional Pomeranians, who

made up a large block of Lübeck’s expellees and regularly held Heimat meetings in the city. The

city administration further set up a *Heimatskartei* for Pomerania, an index of regionalist strewn

throughout the Federal Republic. Into the mid to late 1950's, numerous prominent local figures

asserted that the *Heimatvertriebene* had become Lübecker, and that native Lübecker increasingly

shed resentments toward the expellees.<sup>158</sup>

At the top, local West German politicians did have at least some electoral incentive to make such overtures to the expellees.<sup>159</sup> Thus, it is important to look at grass-roots Heimat enthusiasts, with no electoral concerns, who also shaped notions of local tradition to expressly encourage outsider inclusion. The new Lübeck Heimat society, the *Vaterstädtische Vereinigung*, for example, after brief fears over expellee influx, quickly turned toward integration, emphasizing expellee inclusion in local traditions and practices, and instilling them with a new sense of Heimat. Throughout the early 1950s, the society re-iterated how they aimed to tend to the Heimat sentiment of both old and new residents. Whether native or newcomer, all were invited to become members.<sup>160</sup> Some Heimat society members even bragged about the viability of their city by pointing to expellee influx and their continued welcomed presence in Lübeck.<sup>161</sup> Good will toward the expellees also came from other Heimat societies, such as Wilhelm Stier's *Verein für Heimatschutz in Lübeck*. The expellees, Stier argued in 1946, "will bear their loss much easier when they have a feeling of belonging in Lübeck." He continued that a primary goal of his society would be to promote attachment to Heimat for both natives and those for whom Lübeck was a "new Heimat."<sup>162</sup> Stier's declaration reflected how many West Germans came to grips with the permanence of expellee relocation earlier than the expellees themselves. Lübeck politicians again seconded popular integrationist interpretations of local tradition. The Lübeck Senator Hans Ewers held up as a Lübecker tradition the capability to make outsiders feel as "eager Lübecker" shortly after they set foot into the city. Lübeck, he believed, had a secret "power of attraction."<sup>163</sup>

Many Lübeck Heimat enthusiasts also emphasized expellee inclusion in their revived local traditions. This was quite apparent in the *Volks- und Erinnerungsfest*. Festival organizers from the *Vaterstädtische Vereinigung* insisted that it should tie the expellees to the community

and give them “connection to their new Heimat.” They invited expellees to take part in reviving the festival, which they suggested could also be used to pay tribute to the expellees’ lost Heimat. The overarching goal of the festival, the organizers argued, would be to create “solidarity of the entire population”<sup>164</sup> Paul Brockhaus, a prominent Lübeck Heimat enthusiasts since the Weimar period, also insisted in 1952 that at the festival, natives and expellees would form a “celebratory community.” Heimat, he wrote, unified *Heimatgebliebene* and *Heimatvertriebene*. Brockhaus specifically drew inspiration from the union of natives and *Heimatvertriebene* in the Heimat film *Grün ist die Heide*—one of the rare instances where we find a Heimatfilm evoked in lay Heimat enthusiast discourses. He urged a similar celebratory joining of natives and outsiders through cultural events and argued that the regional cultures of the expellees should be included in the festival. Through such connections, he concluded, Lübeck would fulfil its historical role as a “bridge” between the East and the West.<sup>165</sup> Such examples should not be misconstrued to fashion an image of a “rosy” and smooth path to integration, nor should they lead us to overlook strong Western hostilities vis-a-vis the expellees. Nevertheless, they reveal proactive attempts by native Heimat enthusiasts to encourage embrace of the expellees that muddles argument of a near unified West German rejection of them.

The examples that we see in Lübeck paralleled developments in Hamburg and Bremen, where many grass-roots Heimat enthusiasts pushed more inclusive and permeable narratives of local tradition. In Hamburg, Rudolf Petersen’s 1945 definition of localness by referencing world-openness proved to be equally prevalent among grass-roots locals, Heimat society members, dialect poets and writers, *Heimatkundler*, and local historians. Among the Heimat societies, the *Hamburg Gesellschaft* officially aimed to promote “the language, art and culture of Hamburg and Lower Germany” and balance this with their duty of world-openness. Like other Heimat

organizations, they also drew on a long Hanseatic past to facilitate postwar change, underscoring the Hanseatic's "pioneering activities" as useful for the present. The society held up as one of their most critical duties the creation of "a future-oriented tradition."<sup>166</sup> Forging conceptions of Heimat as "world-open" and "tolerant" fit neatly with this vision.

The popular appeal of these local self-definitions is further attested to by the emphasis on Hanseatic world-openness throughout the deluge of early postwar Heimat publications. In Bernard Meyer-Marwitz *Hamburg, Heimat am Strom* from 1947, for example, he wrote that the city knew "no boundaries" and stood "at the gate of infinity, open to all five continents and the seven seas."<sup>167</sup> Its "openness" to the outside world was central. The local author Ernst Schnabel similarly described Hamburg as the world contained within a local nutshell; his fellow Heimat enthusiast in Bremen, Hermann Tardel did the same, citing two components of the Bremer—the first revolving around house, family, city and state, and the second looking into the distance of foreign countries.<sup>168</sup> The Hamburg philosopher, Hans Driesch similarly wrote that being a Hamburger was to be exposed to people from all over the world while also having pride in their city. He wrote, that "particularism and world citizenship" went hand in hand.<sup>169</sup>

Heimat enthusiasts, in short, did not see local rootedness, embracing outsiders, and internationalist orientations as incompatible. In Lübeck, few reflected more concisely on this compatibility than the local writer Gustav Hillard. In tracing the "foundational elements" of their local community, he argued there were two "great components of the Lübeck form of existence:" familiarity and universality. Lübeck contained an "immanent family-like structure." It was no coincidence, he wrote, that it was a family—the Buddenbrooks—who symbolized the city. The solidarity of their family was ever stalwart, even in the face of "collapses and downfalls, overthrows and shifts, migration and in-migration." This local Heimat sentiment was embodied

for him in the word “*Übereinanderbescheidwissen*”—to know one another intimately. Yet, Lübeck, he noted, was a historic city of trade and commerce, bound up in the “charm of distant lands and the foreign.” It was a city that had both a “feeling of landscape” and an enchantment with the “borderlessness of the sea.” Hillard used telling dualities to describe their localness: “family spirit and a sense for the world,” “intimateness of the city and world breadth,” and “nearness and distance.” He depicted the dualities as complimentary parts of local natures.<sup>170</sup>

Unsurprisingly, quite regressive ideas of *Heimat* also continued to circulate. World-openness and tolerance were not evoked by all localists. One highly exclusionary group, the *Verein geborener Hamburger*, a *Heimat* society of 4000 members provides us with a case in point.<sup>171</sup> Unlike the *Vaterstädtische Vereinigung* or the *Hamburg Gesellschaft*, which encouraged expellee integration, the *Verein geborener Hamburg* excluded both native women and those men not born in Hamburg.<sup>172</sup> Women’s exclusion reflected a misogynist and classist strain of local Hanseatic identities which viewed the successful businessman as the truest of *Hanseaten*. The woman, proscribed a domestic role, did not fit the bill.<sup>173</sup> The society lexicon was filled not with words like world-openness and tolerance, but rather with those like “*Quidjes*”—local dialect for “the non-Hamburger.” The society had as its founding principle the protection of local culture from “*Quidjes*.” The very word represented a strain of exclusionary *Heimat* enthusiasm.<sup>174</sup> Joining the group entailed going through an aberrant process to ensure their nativeness.<sup>175</sup> The society drew a clear line between natives and those for whom Hamburg was “*Heimat* by choice.”<sup>176</sup> Society leaders argued that a pre-requisite for “*Heimat* life” (*Heimot leev*) to thrive was not letting their local culture be “pushed against the wall by newcomers.”<sup>177</sup> They were certainly unhappy with expellee influx. On the society’s sixtieth anniversary, a reporter held that their society founding (1897) and re-founding (1945) were parallel years: they saw newcomer

invasion which the society believed required a defensive posture.<sup>178</sup> As one of their society members wrote, those who came from the outside live well alongside native Hamburger, as long as “they knew to conform.”<sup>179</sup> Notably, the society did propagate Hanseatic democracy and republicanism as local values. Their society president underscored the usefulness of their republican tradition for Germany, and drew on Hamburg’s “liberal spirit” and historical memories of republican forefathers, including the 1848ers. The society also declared that they sought to bring up their children “in a democratic mind set to love of Heimat.” Their president even claimed that their society, while being loyal to Heimat, respected those from the outside who came to Hamburg due to its liberal spirit. Such families, within a few generations, he believed, “became good Hamburger.”<sup>180</sup> Pressure from without and within eventually forced it to be more open. Their own members kept sponsoring non-natives for membership, resulting in reprimands from above.<sup>181</sup> Under public scrutiny, their president eventually conceded that “one can also be a good Hamburger, without being native,” though he re-iterated the need for conformism to Hamburger customs.<sup>182</sup> Only by the 1970s did public pressure lead the society to drop their exclusion of women; it took twenty more years for the society to remove birth restriction and rename themselves the *Verein der Hamburger*.<sup>183</sup>

Such exclusionary societies, however, were largely outgunned by those promoting Hanseatic tolerance and world-openness. Local historians were particularly prominent advocates of more permeable ideas of Heimat. They were also uniquely able to give them roots in local historical memory. Two exemplary historical works from the early 1950's were Friedrich Prüser's *Bremer Heimatchronik* and Hans Röthel's *Die Hansestädte*. Prüser's work contained historical theories of Bremen embodying both familiarity and openness toward otherness. He argued that Bremen's history forged a city with local-regional rootedness and the spirit of a “world-open

harbor city.” Bremen, according to Prüser, maintained a “strong feeling of belonging” balanced with “the breadth of the sea,” which exposed them to the outside world.<sup>184</sup> The thrust of this history, he argued, was toward embrace of newcomers. His *Heimatchronik* argued vigorously for integrating outsiders into their culture and “Polis spirit,” while not requiring them to leave their native cultures at the city gates, writing:

“It is a an essential criteria of all true living communities with promising futures that they attract into their orbit those people who have come from the outside and impress and instill in them their natures without completely divesting them of the unique characteristics that they bring with them.”

The most convinced of Bremer, he continued were “Bremer by choice” who contributed significantly to the city’s richness and power of integration.<sup>185</sup> Prüser appealed to local histories of outsider integration to advance the idea that outsider inclusion was a local tradition.<sup>186</sup>

Hans Röthel’s history of the Hanseatic cities promoted similar historical memories. His work was infused with localist sentiment and ideas of Hanseatic “world-openness and connection to the sea.” The cities’ histories and republican ethos, he argued, should be made useful in their postwar distress, which Röthel’s work did by advocating “world-open” localism, and depicting the *Hanseat* as the inverse of the burgher “who hides trivially behind narrow walls.” He depicted their localness as about not projecting national power overseas, but rather maintaining their historic internationalist connection and meditation. Their neighbors, he argued, were not simply German villages, but London, Scandinavia, and the global community. Their historic interaction with foreigners, he held, expanded the *Hanseat*’s purview and brought them the fruits of “tolerance.” Lacking the feeling of being servile subjects, he wrote, the *Hanseat* had a “cosmopolitan world-feeling and freedom” and “cosmopolitan world citizenship.”<sup>187</sup> Just as Rhinelanders shaped historical memories to identify their regions as a world-open bridges,

Hanseatic historians like Röthel did something similar. Rather than insisting on their Germanness, Hanseatic citizens continually emphasized connections to foreign cultures. Gone was an era when the cities declared themselves “the most German of all cities.” Localness was now supposed to be a bridge across national divisions, not a buttress that reinforced them.<sup>188</sup>

Grass-roots localists positively received such historical works. One member of Lübeck’s *Vaterstädtische Vereinigung* wrote an enthusiastic review of Röthel, praising his writing on world-openness in particular.<sup>189</sup> Heimat enthusiasts also acclaimed local historians like Ahasver von Brandt, whom the president of the *Vaterstädtische Vereinigung* quoted as inspiring a Hanseatic-Lübecker sense of “world-wide open mindedness and simultaneous close connectedness to Heimat,” which they should teach their children.<sup>190</sup> These ideas harmonized with the society’s advocacy of “political tolerance.” Indeed, their three stated goals were promoting: openness with one another, respect of different ways of thinking, and reconciliation within conflict.<sup>191</sup> Tolerance, world-openness, and Heimat seemingly all went hand in hand; as their society president argued, Lübecker and *Hanseaten* were never true particularists, and “closer Heimat was never in hostile opposition to the broader world.”<sup>192</sup>

While Heimat enthusiasts, local authors, and historians frequently encouraged identification with local tolerance and world-openness, few had the same megaphone as Hanseatic politicians who adopted these popular ideas and promoted them with alacrity. At least two decades of politicians appealed to these local value claims since the Hamburg mayor Rudolf Petersen first evoked them in 1945. After Petersen’s one-year tenure, his successor, Max Brauer, a convinced democrat, promoted many of the same ideas of localness. Beyond speeches in which Brauer appealed to Hanseatic tolerance and world-openness, he further sought to enshrine these ideas in performed local tradition—specifically in the “Overseas day” (*Überseetag*). Begun as a



small affair of elite tradesmen in 1920, the city resurrected the tradition in 1952. The day memorialized Friedrich Barbarossa permitting Hamburg to become a harbor. The revived postwar tradition was no longer an elitist affair and was declared a matter for all locals. An article in the *Hamburger Journal* insisted that the tradition had deeper meanings that could be found within the harbor itself, namely “reconciliation between peoples of the world, ”world peace“ and the fight against “ethnic hatreds.”<sup>193</sup> Brauer delivered annual keynote speeches at celebration, where he discussed their local republican tradition and the role of their “world-open Hamburg” in encouraging European unification.<sup>194</sup> Brauer used the tradition to promote both local community and cosmopolitanism. He insisted that his call for local sentiment was not a call for “narrow limiting,” or rejection of national identity. Like the love of Goethe for Frankfurt, Brauer argued, Heimat sentiment did not exclude “being a world citizen.”<sup>195</sup>

On the Weser, we see the same trends from Bremen’s SPD mayor, Wilhelm Kaisen, who wrote of “the world-open Hanseatic city Bremen,” rooted in the “immeasurable breadth of the sea” and the charitable nature of its citizens who valued local culture and freedom.<sup>196</sup> As the city looked inward during rebuilding, Kaisen argued they must also look outward to the major issues of their time—a goal which harmonized, he believed, with their maritime histories.<sup>197</sup> Like Kaisen, the FDP Bremen Senator, Theodor Spitta discussed Heimat and world-openness as a unified duality. He evoked them, among other places, in lobbying for a new Bremen university, boasting of the city’s simultaneous “world breadth and connection to Heimat.”<sup>198</sup> Back in Hamburg, with the ascendance of mayor Kurt Sieveking (CDU), the Elbian metropole saw the non-partisan consensus on promotion of such local values. Sieveking defined Hamburger as sober, tolerant, embracing compromise, and having international orientations.<sup>199</sup> A decade later, such narratives still dominated. In the late 1960's, SPD mayor and Jewish Hamburger, Herbert Weichmann,

promoted Hamburger tolerance, freedom, republicanism and liberalism. By drawing on these traditions, he argued, Hamburger could look forward to a more promising future.<sup>200</sup>

At the end of the period in question, as reconstruction came to an end and expellee integration matured, foreign guest workers increasingly appeared—a new group of outsiders with more stark cultural differences than the expellees who were often subject to discrimination and isolation to a greater degree. In Hamburg, the foreign population eventually rose to 10%.<sup>201</sup> Ideas of Hanseatic tolerance and world-openness were little match for the pervasive challenges faced by these groups, though they could offer rhetorical tools for progressive localists arguing for inclusion. The Hamburg philosopher Rolf Italiaander emphasized Hamburg’s localness as defined by its embrace of foreigners. The city archivist, Hans-Dieter Loose, who shared this goal, simultaneously recognized that local historical legends of past outsider integrations were frequently evoked in Hamburg as inspiration for integrating foreigners. Loose himself believed that, in reality, this past did not offer any concrete models.<sup>202</sup> Other outsider groups have been able to insist that certain local values meant acceptance of their minority group. Hamburg’s gay population beginning in the earliest years of gay liberation held that Hamburg’s “world-openness” applies to them—even if notions of localist tolerance applying to the gay community did not find the same wide circulation in Hamburg that it would in Cologne.<sup>203</sup> In the contemporary cities, ideas of Hanseatic tolerance and world-openness remain useful proscriptive tools in the progressive arsenal, worthy of promotion to insist on inclusion of outsiders and marginal groups as a practice of and not challenge to local tradition.

### **Conclusion: Waning Hanseatic Heimat Enthusiasm**

As elsewhere in the Federal Republic, emphasis on local rootedness waned in the

Hanseatic cities throughout the 1960's. This was preceded by the decline of Heimat-infused federalist visions in the mid 1950s. Heimat societies that sought to take on political functions soon found themselves shut out by mass political parties. Lübeck's *Verein für Heimatschutz* recorded in 1958/59 that the society was officially renouncing all political activity and sticking to cultural issues, as they had been denied a voice in a system that privileged large political organizations.<sup>204</sup> By the 1960s a broader cultural turn against the Heimat concept began, informed by multiple factors, including long-term stabilization, generational divides, and expellee use of the Heimat concept in Cold War politics. Decline in cultural valuation of Heimat is apparent in discourses, but can also be seen quantitatively in Heimat society activities and membership. In Lübeck, the *Verein für Heimatschutz* dwindled to a mere 100 members by 1965, consisting mostly of older citizens. By the next decade, the society dissolved.<sup>205</sup> The *Vaterstädtische Vereinigung*, which grew strongly in the 1950's, declined into the 1960's, with a much reduced 850 members by 1965, losing 5.5% of their membership in one year. They noted little interest from the youth.<sup>206</sup> Economic stabilization meant that Heimat was, over time, less sought-after as a compensatory site of protection. In some sense, Hanseatic localism, by staking out trade and industry as a pillar of local identity, was more immune to beliefs that industrial growth invariably threatened Heimat. Nevertheless, generational differences led to a cultural decline of Heimat with a younger generation growing up in more intact local worlds. Expellee-society wieldings of Heimat in international politics was more likely to form their ideas of the concept. Of course, the appeal of Heimat did not disappear completely; Heimat societies persisted, as did notions of Hanseatic democracy, world-openness, tolerance, and affiliation of their localness with European unity.<sup>207</sup>

On a broader level, the history of early postwar Hanseatic Heimat enthusiasm

demonstrates the geographic breadth of the local turn after 1945 and reveals similar patterns as in Cologne. This includes cognitive and emotional turn to the local world in order to encourage physical reconstruction, establish positive sources of identity, and find a stage on which to imagine a life after death. The Hanseatic cities all witnessed the same local cultural renaissance and turn to Heimat based on a sense of its loss. Cultural practices similarly offered a means to compensate for lost landscapes of Heimat. A profusion of Heimat societies emerged in the Hanseatic cities during the rubble years, as it had in Cologne and other postwar cities. Locals further demonstrated awareness that emphasis on local worlds had reached a higher point than in earlier years when their “Heimat” had been intact. Like their other West German counterparts, many Hanseatic localists similarly viewed cultural and structural emphasis on local places of Heimat as salubrious to creating a decentralized, democratic order. Rather than advocating an anti-modernist worship of the past, Heimat enthusiasts often articulated visions of a vernacular modernism and argued that mass administrative structures shut out the individual from democratic participation. For them, local Heimat provided a comprehensible forum that would facilitate democratic political participation.

Adding to the parallels between Cologne and Hamburg, Lübeck, and Bremen, Hanseatic localists, as we have seen, reformulated the content of their specific local identities to facilitate identification with postwar democracy. While drawing on traditions and historical memories quite different from those in Cologne, they arrived at comparable notions of Hanseatic democracy. A broad range of locals promoted such identifications, including local historians, writers, politicians, Heimat societies, and grass-roots Heimat enthusiasts. Such groups sought already in 1945 to reformulate the local spatial imaginary to affiliate their localness with international reconciliation and attenuating national division. Rather than propagating a local

vision of themselves as a bulwark of radiating German national power, they increasingly defined Hanseatic localness by its mediating international connections.

Concomitant with these developments, progressive Hanseatic localists cemented understandings of Heimat and cosmopolitanism as harmonic, grounded in local world-openness and tolerance. Such conceptions contradict stereotypes of Heimat as, by definition, closed to the outside world and excluding outsiders. Rather than sticking their heads into local sands, the local turn represented a “looking out, by looking in.” This not only applies to ideas of local tolerance and world-openness, but also the manner in which many Heimat enthusiasts looked inward to the local world to reflect on postwar orders, identify with a new decentralized democratic system, and imagine the centrality of restored civilian life in such an order.

Beyond Cologne or the Hanseatic cities, such efforts to make Heimat more “world-open” had much breadth, appearing in yet other West German regions and even in places beyond Germany’s borders. As the Swiss scholar and honorary Lübecker, Carl Burckhardt, declared to a crowd in early postwar Frankfurt, “Heimat” is only made narrow through fear and distrust, but otherwise can be a creative and constructive force that transforms foreignness into familiarity and extinguishes hostility. The speech harmonized with Lübecker to such a degree that they reprinted it in the local press.<sup>208</sup> Moving to the German Southwest, we see related developments in conceptions of Heimat in a very different regional cultural landscape. It is to an examination of Heimat sentiment in the lands between the Black Forest and the River Lech that we now turn.

“The imagined forces that engagement with the Heimat gives us are today, amidst the collapse of so many other basic principles, all the more valuable than they ever were in peaceful times.”

-Otto Feger, *Konstanz: Aus der Vergangenheit einer alten Stadt*, 1947.<sup>1</sup>

## Chapter IV

### Redemptive Heimat and the Regional Spatial Imaginary in the German Southwest

“It is...possible that the individual in Germany can find themselves when they take themselves out of the vague grandiose state and bring themselves into the concreteness of the small state.”<sup>2</sup> So wrote the Badenese author Max Picard in his 1946 work *Hitler in Ourselves*. Picard, who later received the regionalist Hebel Prize, captured a broad desire for Heimat as a culturally and politically redemptive space. While the Third Reich underscored an abstract grandiose nation as a redemptive geography, by the end of the war, in the areas between Lake Constance and the Odenwald, just as much as on the Lower Rhine or the North Sea shores, regionalists jump-started an inverse turn to local places of home in response to massive dislocation, destruction of Heimat, and the need for new flexible sources of identity.

This chapter excavates crucial shifts in the popular spatial imaginary and regional identities in the early postwar Southwest. It argues that, similar to Cologne or the Hanseatic cities, Southwesterners reformulated notions of region to posit democracy and permeable borderlands as tenets of regional identities. Secondly, this chapter argues that many Heimat enthusiasts affiliated emphasis on grandiose abstract spatial visions with Nazism, and saw mental and emotional orientation to local spaces of home as a democratic, demilitarizing force that facilitated democratic participation and redounded to the benefit of postwar European unity.

This chapter traces these developments by looking at debates that raged from 1945 to 1952 over federalism and re-thinking the regional political map. The *Tabula Rasa* years

immediately after the war represented an unusual moment in their territorial history. As the mayor of Ulm trenchantly argued: “For the first time in German history, the people themselves have the opportunity to decide the borders of their states...”<sup>3</sup> Many advocated creating states based on regional Heimat feeling in order to establish a firmly decentralized and viable federalist democracy. Yet regionalists quickly found extensive disagreement on where such spaces existed. For over a decade, they argued over regional culture, histories, and values of their regional Heimat, whose “acoustic color,” they argued, must be maintained for the nation.

One of the first interlocutors in the debate was the Konstanz archivist Otto Feger, who issued his own regional vision in his 1946 work *Schwäbische-Alemannische Demokratie*. Published in the same year as Picard’s description of small spaces as a denazifying force, Feger’s program offers a unique lens into trends in the popular spatial imaginary and regional identities. His best-seller work proposed the creation of an autonomous Swabian-Alemannic state— unifying a region, he argued, with a democratic tradition that must determine their future. He argued for abandoning a Prussian vision of Germanness, its militarism, large state machinery, and obsession with expansive spaces. In a “smaller house” he argued, they could create a peace-time state, without a military, and with no desires to conquer geographies beyond their Heimat. Their state would be decentralized and *Heimatkunde* would have a place in the democratic upbringing. Feger further articulated notions of their region as a bridge to their international neighbors, overwriting nationalist and Nazi narratives of borderlands as bastions of German power and points of expansion. Though Feger and his followers ultimately failed in their efforts and deviated from other Heimat enthusiasts in seeking regional autonomy, their view of space and regional identities proved highly representative.

From 1949 to 1952, public discussion on the importance of Heimat in a democracy

continued as citizens faced a referendum on what states to create. Political imperatives by these years narrowed options to recreating Baden and Württemberg or creating a unified Southwest state. While Württemberger identified with a pan-Swabian idea in greater numbers and, as the larger group did not fear losing their identity in a new state, visceral debates emerged in the former state of Baden. Baden supporters were unified in viewing the old state as their regional Heimat. The pro-Southwest state camp consisted of those who saw a unified state as roughly corresponding to regional Heimat and others who believed that Heimat should be protected from political exploitation, rather than infused into political structures. State boundaries, this second group argued, should be based on financial and administrative imperatives, which were more crucial to reconstructing local Heimat and aiding the expellees.

Those seeking a federalism of Heimat states proved the larger group, and they believed that such states were needed to prevent power from floating to the center. Heimat states would secure orientations to local and regional spaces, which contrasted, they believed, with a Nazi obsession with “grand statism,” or what one Badenese Heimat enthusiast called a “Nibelungen-like large spatial thinking.” Heimat, they argued, also offered a comprehensible space for popular democratic participation: Within view of the “Heimat-like church tower” and the “Heimat-like parliament” everyday citizens could exercise political responsibility, rather than being shut out by mass administrative structures. Contrarily, a fraction of Southwest staters that opposed making Heimat a principle of political structures often saw desire for too much fragmentation as “petty statism” that threatened West German territorial integrity. Instead, they focused on the need to defend against the “true” threat to Heimat from the communist East.

In spite of these divisions, all groups converged in jointly articulating ideas of democracy, world-openness, and bridging across national borders as tenets of regional identities. Like in



Cologne or the Hanseatic cities, reformulated regional historical memories proved crucial. Many emphasized early liberal constitutions, the prominence of the Southwest in the revolutions of 1848 and in the Weimar Republic, and the region's history of anti-Prussianism. They did not need to purely invent such traditions: as several scholars of the region have illustrated, it did have a stronger liberal tradition than many other parts of Germany. Nevertheless, the systematic appropriation of such histories to identify with democracy as a regional value was unprecedented. They also pulled on pre-national histories of an open borderland and historical moments of foreign influence, cultural exchange, and cultural similarities across national borders to construct notions of international reconciliation on a regional basis.

Such identifications did not suddenly make Southwesterners adept practitioners of democracy anymore than in Cologne or Hamburg. The debates over Heimat states itself revealed weaknesses in democratic practice, including undemocratic referendum procedures, violation of the rules of civil debate, and use of political propaganda for campaigns of annihilation. These only scratched the surface of the pitfalls of democratic practice in early West Germany. The debates also revealed problems with exclusion of the expelled. The rural and conservative inflection of the Southwest further meant that, unlike in Hamburg or Cologne, ideas of regional values of tolerance made little headway in the region. Nevertheless, such rapid identification with democracy, decentralization, establishing permeable borderlands, and forging a unified Europe all represented astonishing development. Even if different sides disagreed on the role of Heimat in federal state structures, all agreed on the importance of Heimat to postwar democracy. Many maintained that in turning to Heimat, they could achieve popular democratic participation, federalist decentralization, identification with a new democratic system, and re-orientation away from war and toward local civilian lives.

## **Histories of Fragmentation and the Postwar Turn to Local Worlds**

Given that discussions of these regional values came in the form of debates over different geographical imaginings of Heimat, a cursory glance at the region's territorial history is useful. The Southwest, like many German regions, had a fragmented and complex territorial history that even confused natives. The early region had been settled by the Swabian-Alemannic tribe, which deeply influenced a host of regional cultural practices, dialects, architecture, settlement patterns, and ritual traditions into the modern period. They bordered on the Franconians in the north, the Bavarian in the east, and encompassed the German areas of present day Switzerland, Alsace, and the Austrian Vorarlberg. (Figure 4-1) While the tribe was unified in a common duchy, after its medieval break up and the shattering of the region into a score of small states, notions of a Swabian-Alemannic region slowly receded throughout the early modern period, co-existing with other notions of region. The seventeenth-century cartographer Matthäus Merian, for example, provided a picture of such lost memory. In his work of Swabian topography, he provided an extensive list of Swabian cities that "because of their hearts" felt they belonged to other lands.<sup>4</sup> By the early nineteenth-century, Napoleon significantly reduced territorial fragmentation in the region, creating the new dynastic states Baden and Württemberg, drawn entirely according to power politics. The states, which pushed new regional identities, persisted through national unification in 1870 and the Weimar Republic, later being converted into Gaus after the Nazi seizure of power.<sup>5</sup> Throughout this long history, their regional map had never been drawn based on a common feeling of regional Heimat. For the first time in 1945, it seemed that the region would have this possibility.

Rethinking the map of the Southwest after 1945, far from taking place in a vacuum, came at a time when war-torn citizens were weaving visions of new federalist democratic systems.

They were already living in a fragmented nation and looking to local and regional worlds as a place to rebuild civilian existences. Like in other German regions, citizen of the Southwest turned to local and regional community to confront postwar challenges. As the South Baden state president, Leo Wohleb argued in 1946, after the disaster of war, they could begin anew by “holding together on the small bit of earth that is left to us, from the earth of the Heimat, in a small circle of the Badenese land and people.” He continued that, though, they also thought about all of Germany, they wanted to be clear in their federalist convictions.<sup>6</sup>

Southwesters hardly saw orientation to local Heimat as tainted by Nazi abuse of the concept. Its positive cultural valuation was so broadly assumed that it is impossible to find writings that even sought to defend against the a suggestion of Nazi taint. Reference to Nazi propagandistic abuse, when mentioned at all, can be found only in cursory references. Wohleb once mentioned briefly the importance of giving the youth a genuine sense of Heimat that was not the engineered Heimat feeling of Nazism.<sup>7</sup> In another case, one citizen wrote to Wohleb on the importance of bringing Heimat sentiment to the children, given how Heimat feeling had been neglected during the years of the regime. Expressing her love for her Badenese Heimat, a place where she felt like “a child in its mother’s lap,” she wrote that she feared that Heimat feeling would be lost on the youth given how it was ignored under the Nazis, who instead of focusing on Heimat emphasized “battle, singing marching songs and similar slogans.”<sup>8</sup> Like the Badenese author of the letter to Wohleb, many Southwesterners desired a restored sense of Heimat not only for themselves, but also for vulnerable uprooted children. Another Badenese woman similarly wrote to Wohleb about the need to give children a feeling of Heimat, recounting her own attachment to her Heimat in Karlsruhe and her elation amidst reconstruction as she saw the Stefan’s church re-ascending over the skyline.<sup>9</sup> The South Baden state constitution itself held that

the youth were to be raised with respect for God and love of people and Heimat.<sup>10</sup>

Heimat, in short, had become the object of desire from the Neckar to Lake Constance, just as much as it had elsewhere in other war-torn German lands. The Archbishop of Freiburg, in a 1946 pastoral letter, gives us insight into this turn. “Heimat!” he wrote, “it sounds like a song to our ears.” Their “badische Heimat” even if it was “chopped up, in disarray, and destroyed” would “bloom” after they cleared the rubble. The archbishop, it should be noted, presented a definition of Heimat with a more ruralist and conservative inflection than what could often be found in destroyed urban centers like Cologne or Hamburg. He held that Heimat was felt more strongly by Germans and rural people. He also defined Heimat as connection to ancestry, rather than just a place where one felt at home. But he did not appeal to Heimat to call for exclusion. Instead, the point of his letter was to urge congregants to sympathize with the expellees.<sup>11</sup> The Archbishop was certainly not the only one calling on the healing force of Heimat. If we leave Freiburg and cross the Black Forest to the litoral city of Konstanz, we find the city archivist busily preparing his own programmatic work on the redemptive role of Heimat after the disaster of the Third Reich. Southwesterners would read his work in droves.

### **“Swabian-Alemannic Democracy” and the Redemptive Force of Regional Heimat**

“Swabian-Alemannic democracy” the archivist of Konstanz argued in 1946, was a value rooted in centuries of regional history; if postwar citizens were to build a new democracy, he insisted, they must draw on this value and their region’s historic “striving toward freedom.” The Konstanz archivist, Otto Feger, like many others, did not see regionalism and Heimat as tainted by sporadic evocation in Nazi propaganda. He recounted only in passing that the Nazis had little interest in Heimat and held Heimat enthusiast to be uninteresting, unthreatening book worms.<sup>12</sup>

Feger believed that Heimat proved key to postwar democratization. Feverishly composing a work that proposed a regional democratic state, Feger published his *Schwäbisch-Alemannische Demokratie* in a left-leaning press in Konstanz, and it sold over 50,000 copies.<sup>13</sup> In it, Feger sought more than a decentralized nation; he wanted full autonomy within a new democratic Swabian-Alemannic Heimat state based on the old *Stamm* borders. Those of the Southwest, he argued, must turn toward a smaller world and away from the large machinery of the German state. Their new autonomous Swabian-Alemannic state would not be a “formidable palace,” but a “weather-proofed, home-like abode for a family that has become smaller.” They could not wait for the allies to bring them democracy, he argued—they must seize the moment by turning to their regional democratic traditions.<sup>14</sup> Of course, Feger’s separatism deviated from most Heimat-enthusiast visions, though he proved strikingly representative of views of Heimat as a redeeming force in politics, culture, and private life. His emphasis on a democratic regional identity, decentralization, and the idea of their region as a bridge to international neighbors also strongly paralleled that of other Heimat enthusiasts, including those who vehemently opposed his vision based on identification with a different map of regional Heimat. At least in the early years after the war, Feger proved one of the most central figure in debates over the Southwest.

From an unassuming background, Feger was born to a middle-class family in Mülhausen in Alsace in 1905. Having studied in Switzerland, Freiburg, Berlin, and in the United States, he became a Doctor of Law in 1928. Active in the Center party in the Weimar years, the Nazis banned him from practicing law after 1935 and removed him from a city job in Bad Mergentheim. Throughout the latter half of the 1930s, he ran a cinema to finance his avid study of history. From 1939 to 1945, he was drafted into the *Wehrmacht*, stationed briefly in North Africa and spending most of the war as a translator in Italy.<sup>15</sup> As a prisoner of war in Northern

Italy for a short period in Summer 1945, he recalled how inactivity led his mind to “the democratic traditions” of his “Alemannic Heimat.”<sup>16</sup> Quickly released, Feger was given the position of Konstanz city archivist, where he hastily composed his book, published with approval of the French occupiers who supported German decentralization in order to prevent military threats from across the Rhine. Like Feger, the French also saw “de-Prussianization” as crucial to denazification and cheered regionalists along their border in turning to their regional traditions.<sup>17</sup>

Feger’s work drew on a host of historical memories to push regional identification with democracy. One was the Southwest’s historic fragmentation, which he held made their tradition uniquely suited to democratic decentralization. He pointed to an era when 240 states bespotted the Southwest—small states which he argued were not imperialist by nature, but “supranational” and influenced by France and the West. Their historic resistance to central powers, he argued, gave the Southwest a European outlook. He traced a history of democratic liberalism from medieval decentralization and city constitutions to the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Beyond emphasizing Southwest German involvement in the 1848 revolutions, he pointed to their strong representation amongst the democratic leaders of the Weimar Republic, including Max von Baden, Matthias Erzberger, Friedrich Ebert, Constantin Fehrenbach, and Joseph Wirth.<sup>18</sup> Feger did not need to completely invent such democratic histories; the region did, as Hans Fenske and Dieter Langewiesche have illustrated, have a liberal democratic tradition stronger than many other regions.<sup>19</sup> Nevertheless, Feger’s systematic marshaling of these histories to firmly establish democracy as a tenet of regional identity was unprecedented.

Negative historical memories proved equally as instrumental. The foil to a democratic Alemannic identity was for Feger a Prussian-Nazi tradition. Fiercely anti-Prussian, Feger drew a direct line from Friedrich the Great to Bismarck and Hitler. The Prussian tradition, he argued,

contained the seed of territorial expansion from Great Brandenburg, to Great Prussia, to Small Germany, to Great Germany, to a greater German *Lebensraum*. Prussia, he argued, was the traitor of the true Imperial idea embodied in the Holy Roman Empire's decentralization and European-orientation. He denounced Prussia as a bastion of "militarism," violation of human rights, glorification of the state over the people, and hostility to democracy. Wielding statistics that demonstrated lower voting levels for the Nazis and nationalist parties (when combined) in the South and West of Germany, he railed against the autocratic tradition of the Prussian North and the East. Rather than using such histories to focus primarily on re-shifting guilt for the recent past, he was obsessed with his fears that the East and North would again lead to failed democracy and plunge Europe again into World War. No more Swabian blood should be spilt, Feger argued, simply because the East of Germany wants to conquer Poland.<sup>20</sup> For Feger, expansionary national vision was death and erasure of private civilian life, while focus on region and locality represented exactly the opposite.

Rather than advocating vague principles, Feger outlined detailed structures for his Heimat state. They must, he argued, overcome the failure of Weimar, with its vast state machinery that blocked democratic participation. A Swabian-Alemannic democracy would be radically decentralized, facilitating grass roots participation, and everyday citizens would be integrated into administration and the legislative process. The state would have a two-chamber parliament elected directly. There would be frequent popular votes, but to protect against past abuses of direct democracy, non-voters would count as no-votes. The capitol was to be in a small city, like Rottweil or Sigmaringen, to avoid the centralist tendencies of a large city like Stuttgart. State law was to be simple so that normal people could understand it. There was to be no ministry of war, and the economy would be oriented toward peace-time goods. In schools, *Heimatkunde* would be

a part of democratic education, and their state would tend to local and regional cultural practices. Through the nearness of local administration, democratization would emerge from the bottom up.<sup>21</sup> Feger left open the question of what territories would join the state. (Figure 4-3) The Swabians and the Alemannen, he noted, were the same cultural group, and the dynastic states had to be done away with. He would have preferred his native Alsace be included, though he depicted it as a cultural “transition area” in order not to antagonize the French. The border in the northern Franconian areas would need to be considered carefully, as regional belonging there proved vague. Swabian groups to the East in Bavarian Swabia and the Austria Vorarlberg would be welcome to join, but they needed to make this decision themselves.<sup>22</sup>

Feger’s separatism did not mean tossing out German identity; Swabians would remain German, he wrote, and might feel even more so once they are not “terrorized in the name of Germandom.” Germany would remain a cultural idea, but not a political union. The Swabian example, he held, could pave the way for other German regions: though a Swabian democracy could not be exported, other regions could turn to their regional traditions for similar purposes.<sup>23</sup> Feger further argued that their region would serve as a bridge vis-a-vis Germany’s neighbors. A Swabian-Alemannic state guided by its tradition, he argued, welcomed French cultural influence. He expounded on their historical relationship to France, pointing to Badenese democrats’ French connection. Despite a difficult occupation, he argued, their region would never hate the French.<sup>24</sup>

Feger further articulated their crucial relationship with Switzerland, which he argued could advise them in rebuilding, as they too had an Alemannic constitutional tradition. The Southwest certainly had a historical connection with the Swiss, memory of which was emphasized in early postwar discussions of federalism. Many parts of Switzerland had been part of the Swabian-Alemannic *Stamm*, though notions of belonging to a common region faded



throughout the early modern period. Feger, however, appealed to an early-modern Southwestern history of turning Swiss—breaking away from territorial states and forming “democratic” communal leagues. By doing this themselves, Feger argued, they would tend to their fraternal relationship to the Swiss, while having small Heimat states would further European unification more generally. Small states, he held, would not antagonize their neighbors, as they only wanted to preserve their own existence; “Small statism,” he concluded, could secure peace, individualism and quality of life.<sup>25</sup>

Reactions to Feger’s work—both positive and negative—illustrated the resonance of his ideas. He inspired other Heimat enthusiasts to write in the same spirit, including one Münsingen lecturer who completed a 1947 work on Alemannic history and culture that also argued for regionalist bridging across national borders.<sup>26</sup> Feger’s former law teacher, Franz Beyerle, supported many of his goals, while suggesting instead a loosely-bound federalist state with a capitol in Frankfurt that would be true to a decentralized Imperial idea.<sup>27</sup> Full throated opponents, like the Badenese patriot, Karl Bader, at least held that the “slightly eccentric” book had interesting ideas; he particularly shared Feger’s hostility to Prussian traditions.<sup>28</sup> More than any other figure, Feger found resonance with the mayor of the town of Singen, Bernhard Dietrich. Dietrich promoted a similar regionalist state as part of a decentralized confederation of southern German Alpine states, with a capitol in Salzburg. He worked briefly with Feger in a new Swabian-Alemannic Heimat society, and proved an even more wild political dreamer.<sup>29</sup>

Bernhard Dietrich organized his own group of “autonomist federalists” who issued a manifesto in the late 1940s, addressed to the “Heimat-conscious people of the countries of Europe.” They argued that they must protect their Heimat from Prussian-German militarism, nationalism, and centralism. Rejecting national political unity, they held that individual freedom

in Heimat could only be achieved in an autonomous, democratic, deprussianized state. These autonomous states would be based on *Stamm* and common culture, and work toward a European confederation.<sup>30</sup> To further this vision, Dietrich created the *Schwäbisch-Alemannischer Heimatbund*, which Feger also joined, though the new society was only authorized to operate in the French zone. The society platform held that forcing the German *Stämme* together led to the disaster of 1918 and 1945, and that continuation of a national union threatened renewed catastrophe. The “South and West” had their hands forced by the “reactionary mass voices of the north and the East.” Their platform emphasized Southwestern democratic traditions that could no longer be subjected to Prussian desires for conquest, colonies, and *Lebensraum*. National unity had been the “nightmare of the Heimat,” and they sought a “small, but free state” where Germany was only a cultural space. An autonomous state would be founded on small communes, facilitate tremendous citizen involvement, and promote a critical valence of Heimat— the “warmth of the family home.” Their Heimat society, with branches across the French zone, was to be led by uncompromising Nazis resisters, but they would not ask lower-level members about their political past, as they needed everyone for rebuilding.<sup>31</sup> Such was to be the integrative force of Heimat. To create a successful democracy, they believed they could not exclude a group with a compromised past that would work against the state.

Despite the ultimate failure to create a “Swabian-Alemannic democracy,” and despite separatism setting Feger and Dietrich apart from many other Heimat enthusiasts, both figures broadly reflected early postwar re-orientation away from visions of national “*Lebensraum*” and toward regional and local worlds as redemptive geographies. As Feger rhetorically asked: “Should we (in a Swabian-Alemannic state) somehow conquer a part of Bavaria or a canton of Switzerland as *Lebensraum*?” In a small Heimat state, Feger believed, war would be eliminated

as an instrument of politics. Other non-separatist Heimat enthusiasts expressed similar arguments about the democratizing and demilitarizing force of Heimat, its role in weakening national borders and creating a federalist European system.<sup>32</sup> Heimat enthusiasts in the Southwest state debates later underscored how Heimat promoted individualism and democratic participation.<sup>33</sup>

Dietrich and Feger also, unfortunately, reflected a chasm between identification and practice. The underdeveloped nature of democratic practice in early postwar Germany is not surprising, and proponents of a “Swabian Alemannic democracy ” were hardly different. Feger’s discussion of creating a new democracy, for example, often drew on unhelpful biological metaphors of the human body, such as cutting away tumors.<sup>34</sup> Both Dietrich and Feger also proved exclusionary vis-a-vis the expellees, arguing that outsiders culturally unconnected to the region should not be enfranchised in their new state. The expellees, they feared, could destroy democracy by bringing Prussian influences. Both expressed sympathy with the expellees and held that they could resettle in the Southwest, but without citizenship. Dietrich additionally added that expellees needed to conform to their Southwestern culture, and pointed to Switzerland to justify not allowing outsiders to influence their politics. Citizenship was to be linked to culture, and was in no way to be a racial qualification, and, at least for Feger, was not based on location of birth.<sup>35</sup>

The lack of democratic attitudes was further reflected in evasion of guilt for the recent past. Even if it was not the central point of their works, Feger and Dietrich held that their region to possess less guilt for the Nazi past. This was quite different from non-separatist Heimat enthusiasts, who rarely made such arguments, at least in writing. Of course, both Feger and Dietrich had been disadvantaged by the Nazi seizure of power and remained politically unburdened from the Nazi years, but their ideas offered a route for collective suppression of

guilt. Feger even briefly referenced a notion of Germanic freedom that he believed was lacking in Slavic culture that had a greater influence on the German East. The Southwest had been “raped” by the North and East, Feger argued. Dietrich felt that in their new state, they would have a new beginning in breaking free from “collective guilt.”<sup>36</sup> Rather than representing a center point of their works, such evasions appeared as supporting arguments for why they should create an autonomous state and identify with a new democracy. Far more prominent in their writings was a feared repeat of the recent past. Feger was not interested in forgetting, and expressed concern that forgetting the crimes of the recent past was harmful to democracy. “*Today*” everyone was against war and for democracy, he argued, but he feared that in the future, they would forget “Dachau” and “Bergen-Belsen,” and only remember Nazi parades and victory marches.<sup>37</sup>

By 1947, their fantastical visions fell apart, with their proposals not fitting with allied plans. The Heimatbund also made little progress in their attempts to purge the word “separatist” of its negative connotation. Feger and Dietrich further disagreed on federalist theories. The French finally forbade them from establishing newspapers or a political party, and the disorganized Heimat society soon disbanded. Its supporters came mostly from the highly educated, and failed to gain a foothold in the working-class, much of which identified with the former dynastic states.<sup>38</sup> As the Tübinger parliamentarian Carlo Schmid argued in the early 1950s, regional folk culture could no longer be used in fashioning state craft.<sup>39</sup> Feger himself soon tired of personal attacks resulting from his political involvement. But even if he gave up on his state vision, he could still push cultural emphasis on Heimat.<sup>40</sup> In his 1947 work on the history of Konstanz, he encouraged readers to recognize the role of local history in creating a new world view after Nazism. Recognition of that which was “near” he argued, would lead to recognition of broader spheres. In earlier years, he wrote, one could hear “flowery” statements

about Heimat as a source of protection and energy. After the disaster of the Third Reich, he continued, such flowery speech had gained concrete reality. The “imagined forces” of Heimat was “amidst collapse, all the more among the valuable basic principles than they ever were in peaceful times,” and local Heimat was a crucial source of “spiritual rebuilding.”<sup>41</sup>

### **Heimat, Federalism, and Redemptive Regional Spaces**

While many identified with a pan Swabian-Alemannic region, the dynastic states, along with other territorial configurations, commanded significant identification. Identification with the state of Baden, in particular, conflicted geographically with a pan Swabian-Alemannic region. The dynastic states, which owed their creation to Napoleon, had been randomly fashioned by adding territories to the smaller core states. In the early nineteenth century, Baden increased five to six times in population, while Württemberg more than doubled.<sup>42</sup> These states had been drawn entirely according to politics, with no reference to culture or regional belonging, leading Wilhelm Heinrich Riehl to denounce them as “accidental states.” Common identities had been forged throughout the nineteenth century, aided by the introduction of notably liberal constitutions in Baden and Württemberg.<sup>43</sup> By the twentieth century, many in the Southwest had lost all historical memory of belonging to a common Swabian-Alemannic *Stamm*. The terms *alemannisch* and *schwäbisch* also referred to different sub-dialect groups in the Swabian-Alemannic region. Many Badenese regional patriots proclaimed that they belonged to an “Alemannic” *Stamm* that was not the same as a Swabian *Stamm*. Correcting such views, the president of Württemberg-Hohenzollern in the early 1950s, recounted in vain how the two words referred to the same historical regional group—quoting a ninth-century Abbot who noted that *alemannisch* was the term used by Latin peoples, while the term *schwäbisch* was used by non-Latin groups.<sup>44</sup> While

Württemberg identities proved more compatible with a pan Swabian-Alemannic idea, many Badenese continually opposed such notions of region.

By 1949, with the free-wheeling imaginings of the late 1940s behind them, politically feasible options were limited to creating a single federal Southwest state or restoring Baden and Württemberg. Feger, for his part, supported a Southwest state as a partial unification of common parts of the Swabian-Alemannic region. The three interim states of the Southwest created by the allies were untenable, meaning that a decision on territorial restructuring had to be made. The Americans had earlier redrawn the regional map by cutting a border based on the Karlsruhe-Ulm freeway, taking all counties to the north and giving those to the south to France.<sup>45</sup> (Figure 4-2) The north of Baden and Württemberg became the state of Württemberg-Baden. The French zone consisted of South Baden which took on the name “Baden” while South Württemberg and Hohenzollern became Württemberg-Hohenzollern. The allies fully understood them as interim states and planned for the Germans to redraw them after occupation. After 1949, to deal with the particularly problematic configuration in the Southwest, Bonn approved a new constitutional article that would allow the three state presidents to agree to unify into one single state without a popular vote. The staunch Badenese patriot and South Baden state president, Leo Wohleb, however, refused, meaning a referendum had to be held and would be regulated by federal law.<sup>46</sup>

The Bundestag settled on a voting model in four districts: South Baden, North Baden, North Württemberg, and South Württemberg, with approval in three districts required to create a unified state. The referendum forced citizens to intensify discussions about regional values and their cognitive maps of Heimat, particularly in the smaller state of Baden. As one pro-Badener argued, Württemberger supported the state, as they did not fear losing their identity.<sup>47</sup> The referendum made Baden a lightning rod in debates over federalism and the role of local and

regional worlds in the infant republic. An informational referendum would be held in 1950, followed by a binding referendum in 1951. Both pro-Badener and pro-Southwest staters formed working committees that created propaganda, including posters, leaflets, mailers, and public discussion forums. The inner-working of these groups proved opaque, and it is impossible to divine the “true” motivations of politicians involved.<sup>48</sup> Wohleb certainly would have been interested in being minister president of a new unified Baden. Some argued that state politicians were interested more in “personal advantage” than they were in “Heimat,” while others have taken their rhetoric more sincerely.<sup>49</sup> Whatever their ultimate motives, discussions of federalism, Heimat, and local values had a deep popular resonance and generated significant popular discussion. The referendums were anything but simply politicians’ debates.

So what was the role of Heimat in a postwar federalist democracy? Several interlocutors in the Southwest state debate provided answers to this question, but few as directly as Badenese author Max Picard. He wrote a telling letter to state president Leo Wohleb in which he elaborated on the redemptive role of small spaces in postwar Germany. Recounting ideas advanced in his book, Picard argued that “small states” and “concrete” places were crucial to denazification. The most horrible thing of their time, he wrote, was “grand-statism” rooted in the “abstract.” His reference to “grand-statism” (*Großstaaterie*) was itself a neologism that evoked its precise opposite, “small” or “petty statism” (*Kleinstaaterei*). Nationalists since the nineteenth century wielded the term to harangue those they saw as its practitioners. But for Picard, expansive geographical visions and emphasis on what he called “abstract space” were cornerstones of an “abstract Hitler dictatorship.” He encouraged Wohleb to continue his federalist struggle to make smaller “concrete” spaces the cornerstones of a new democracy.<sup>50</sup> Though expressing these ideas through philosophical language, Picard reflected broader associations of emotive emphasis on

large geographies as fascist and emphasis on small geographies as potentially democratic. This notion could easily be found among lay citizens. In 1948, a former soldier from Heidelberg wrote to Wohleb expressing a similar mind set. Returning from three year as a POW, he wrote damning German nationalism, “large state bureaucracy,” and emotional investment in an expansive national geography. Not only would a smaller state have a more personal bureaucracy, he argued, they would also block nationalists from gaining power. He feared a renaissance of “Nazi-dom” and a third plunge into world war, and felt that this could result from movement to a unitary state: “Out of small federal states will become large federal states, and out of these the even bigger brother “unitary state.” This would bring Germany back to where the nationalists wanted them; from the grandiose state would emerge a “big snout” dictator that would bring back “one empire-one Führer-one war-one mass grave!” Focus on expansionary nation, he argued, was not love of “people and Heimat,” and the urban rubble proved it.<sup>51</sup>

There was a broad consensus in West Germany on the positive effects of *cultural* orientation to local and regional Heimat. Structural politics, however, proved a point of contention. The Southwest state debates revealed two dominant, conflicting positions regarding the proper relationship between Heimat and political structures in a postwar democracy. The first held that the decentralizing power of Heimat must be infused into political structure. Redrawn Heimat states based on feelings of regional community would form the backbone of a stronger decentralization that would ensure power did not float to the center. Those who held this position included nearly all pro-Badener and those who supported the Southwest state based on the view that it represented a common cultural region. The second view, held by the remainder of Southwest state supporters, maintained that Heimat must be protected from over-politicization. They emphasized Heimat as exclusively a local and personal experience, and not an appropriate



foundation for structural politics. “Heimat will remain Heimat” many of them argued, irrespective of state borders.

Pro-Badener articulated at length why preventing fascist relapse and embracing democracy required stronger orientation toward smaller spaces—and many lay citizens shared this view. In a 1949 survey on the Southwest state issue, many expressed an aversion to large territorial entities. One teacher, age 49 recounted that she supported Baden because of her “animosity toward large entities.” A Freiburger book binder, age 33, argued that he supported Baden because of Heimat feeling and for “defense against centralism.”<sup>52</sup> One woman in Konstanz with “deep-seated Heimat feeling” felt so passionately about the issue that she created a local “Federation of Badener.” Writing about her new society, she recounted how she believed that Southwest state supporters were taken in by “large spatial politics.” She asked: “Doesn’t that evoke unconsciously the unholy legacy of an unholy time? The notion inculcated by dictatorship that you can only feel strong in the illusion of an imaged great power?” They should, she argued, look to the Swiss who were reaping the fruits of federalist division. She defined freedom by directly evoking Heimat, arguing that the most beautiful feeling of freedom is consciousness of “self-supporting responsibility in a more narrow place of Heimat.”<sup>53</sup>

Few pro-Badener offered as concise a description of this spatial vision of “Heimat-like” democracy than Walter von Cube. In a 1951 pro-Baden speech, after denouncing a “Prussian” militarist idea of Germanness, he attacked those who saw focus on region as “post-coach romanticism or treason.” He ascribed to such people a Naziesque view of space, in which ever greater spaces were most German: they believed “that the Southwest state is more German than Baden, that Bonn is more German than the Southwest state, an empire more German than the federation, and a *Führer* more German than the Empire.” He argued that radicals on both ends of

the political spectrum pushed centralism, while the federalist held the democratic middle. For von Cube, regional Heimat was the antidote to fascism. The “germ of dictatorship,” he argued, could be found within the “herd that has the ambition to be ever more numerous, ever more unitary, ever more powerful.” Heimat, by contrast, facilitated democratic participation: within the “visual range of the Heimat-like church tower” or the “reach of the Heimat-like parliament,” he argued, citizens possessed a realm of political responsibility. Those who denounced localist “church-tower politics,” he continued, were those that wanted to transform church towers into “observation stations for the officers of their unitary-German artillery.” Europe had been turned into a grave field by those who “thought in big spaces;” they “loved the colossal, the gigantic” and labeled people who valued the “particular” as enemies of the fatherland. In the future, he concluded, they must not view opposition to unitarism as the un-German romanticism of regionalists who wanted their own stamps. It was a demand for federalist democracy.<sup>54</sup>

This link between democracy and rootedness in Heimat left a clear imprint on pro-Baden rhetoric throughout the referendums. As one Badener argued in a radio address, in an age of the automobile and airplane, they could not let themselves be “bedazzled” by ridiculous visions of “size” which he argued had led the German people to misfortune. The Badenese people loved freedom, he continued, but the larger the state, the more the common people are left at the mercy of legal clauses and bureaucracy.<sup>55</sup> Another pro-Badener advanced similar ideas in a 1951 radio address, arguing that large states and bureaucratic apparatuses threaten democracy, pointing to Nazi *Gleichschaltung*. He further attacked the notion that orientation to smaller spaces was incompatible with European unification. A unified Europe, he held, could not be realized by “raping” individual states into a “coordinated monstrosity” (*gleichgeschalteten Monstrum*).<sup>56</sup>

Those who argued against obsession with “grand spaces” usually advocated a democracy

built on regional Heimat states. Wohleb was among this group. In a 1948 article, he attacked Bonn technocrats whom he argued only had an eye for technical function and viewed historical states as unmodern and antiquated. A federalism rooted in Heimat, he held, could prevent something like a Nazi seizure of power. He insisted that the rebuilding Germany was not simply an economic question, it was about creating a patriotism infused with rootedness in regional Heimat. In another piece, Wohleb argued that Southwest staters only cared about economics and politics, and “wanted ‘bigger’ spaces.” He expressed these same sentiments in private letters to Badenese citizens, who often wrote to him expressing their dedication to Heimat and federalism, in some cases attaching their own Heimat songs and poetry. Wohleb responded by encouraging their sentiments, and underscoring the importance of passing on Heimat sentiment to the youth. The purpose of such sentiment, he wrote in one letter, was not only for the betterment of Baden, but also for fighting against a “lethal centralism” in their new democracy.<sup>57</sup> Grassroots supporters echoed the same views of federalism and essentialness of Heimat. One doctor in Freiburg wrote to Wohleb praising his support of federalism, arguing that the pro-Badener were forcing the nation to decide whether it was serious about federalism or using it as a facade to hide “awakening centralist and totalitarian tendencies.”<sup>58</sup> Yet another pro-Badener, in a poem, underscored the essential mediating force of Heimat. He wrote that Bavarians, Hessians, Pfälzer, Badener, and Swabians alike must have their own federal states. Without them, one would have to simply call them “Germans.”<sup>59</sup> This sentiment strongly parallels the words we saw earlier from a Lübeck Heimat enthusiasts who wrote of the tragedy of the expellees losing their Heimat and becoming “just Germans”—the fulfillment of a “Prussian” idea of nationhood.<sup>60</sup>

Baden supporters therefore saw regional Heimat and state as entities that must overlap.<sup>61</sup> As the pro-Baden author Reinhold Schneider held, “home” (*Heim*) must be surrounded by

“Heimat”—“a state with a made-up name” he argued “will not become Heimat.”<sup>62</sup> Pro-Baden leaflets and posters asserted that the state referendum would prove if regionalists stood by their Heimat, and depicted regional scenes with phrases like “Loyalty to the Heimat, your voice to Baden.”<sup>63</sup> (Figure 4-4) Not only was decentralization at stake, local sovereignty, so they argued, also required Baden, a state of “inner- decentralization,” that contrasted with the “centralist phantom” of the Southwest state. Baden was, as Wohleb argued, the champion of “real federalism and true democracy.”<sup>64</sup> The South Baden parliament advanced the same point, issuing a statement in 1949 that declared Baden a state of inner cultural decentralization.<sup>65</sup>

Rather than indulging in solipsistic inwardness, pro-Badener drew on broader federalist theories to elucidate their points. Wohleb often drew on Swiss federalism and non-Badenese theorists. Among others, he evoked the recently deceased federalist thinker Albert Kramer, and his argument that federalism relied on a rooted feeling that a place is one’s “Heimat.” Kramer, looking to the Switzerland, posited a federalist architecture based on the family, ascending upward to the *Gemeinde* and Canton. Wohleb advanced this idea as the basis for a future interior Badenese decentralization.<sup>66</sup> Federalists outside of the Southwest also used debates in the regions to advance their ideas. At a 1951 “Federalism Day” meeting in Karlsruhe, a federalist congress denounced a unitary state as the essence of “totalitarian machinations” and held up federalism as the foundation for respect of other peoples and a unified Europe.<sup>67</sup> The head of the Bavaria party also used the Southwest state debates to argue that federalism was needed to fight centralism, collectivism, and militarism.<sup>68</sup> Pro-Baden federalists received equal approval from lay Heimat enthusiasts in other regions who wrote to Wohleb expressing their support. This included one self-described “unknown” and “Heimat-devoted” Bavarian, and another “state conscious Bavarian” who held that all “true federalists” were behind Wohleb.<sup>69</sup>

The pro-Badener, however, were not the sole champions of federalism within the Southwest state debates, as they so often maintained. Many Southwest state supporters were advocates of a Heimat-infused federalism, as were others who proposed alternative geographic visions of region. The Augsburgener Ernst Vollert, for example, drafted a plan for two southwestern states of Upper and Lower Swabia that extended to the Lech; he argued that they must learn from the recent past and create a federalism rooted in organic regional states.<sup>70</sup> Many early postwar Germans, whatever geographic spaces they saw as corresponding to regional Heimat, viewed central structures, distant centers of power, and technocratic spatial planning as politically suspect. As one citizen wrote to Wohleb, many wanted to show their disapproval of the center in Bonn. In turn, he wrote, the Badenese must depict a future Southwest state as a vassal of the center.<sup>71</sup> Badenese propaganda, drawing on these hostilities, underscored the idea of technocrats coming to steal their Heimat— an act that could only be stopped by the down-to-earth common man defending it.<sup>72</sup> (Figure 4-5)

### **Southwest State Supporters and Emphasis of Heimat as Private and Local**

A fraction of Southwest state supporters, however, did not believe they needed states rooted in regional Heimat sentiment. Heimat, this group argued, should not be entangled in political structures, as this would subject it to political abuse. It was to be protected as a private concept. This attitude was nothing new; as Hermann Hesse declared in a letter to his mayor in Calw in the late 1940s, “for me, Heimat was never a political concept, but rather a purely human one.”<sup>73</sup> In the Southwest state debates, this fraction reacted hostilely to Badenese claims that losing their state meant loss of Heimat, and countered with the slogan: “Heimat will remain Heimat” (*Heimat bleibt Heimat*). In a pro-Southwest state pamphlet based on an alphabetized list

of debate keywords, we find a concise explanation of Heimat as a primarily personal space. Under the entry “Heimat,” the pamphlet described it as an inviolable private landscape: “Heimat is the valley, the place where the crib stood, it is the village and the city, where ancestors rest in the cemetery.” It was a “community of fate” where people shared a common language, cultural monuments, and historical memories. It downplayed the regional valence of Heimat, emphasizing instead local experience—recounting an extensive list of localities throughout the Southwest that were sites of Heimat. The entry further outlined what Heimat was not: “Heimat is not the state, the county, the district of some secular or religious agency.” Administrative districts, it argued, could be changed, but Heimat endured as it came from “God’s grace” and not from “Napoleon’s grace.” It could be the place where one was born and spent their youth, or it could be a “Heimat of choice,” the pamphlet argued, gesturing to the expellee plight.<sup>74</sup>

This faction of Southwest state supporters emphasized that this local and personal world of Heimat would not disappear simply by being embedded in a different state. Reinhold Maier, the Württemberg-Baden president asked rhetorically of locals in the interim state of Württemberg-Baden: “Did Heidenheimer, Ludwigsburger or Heilbronner lose their Heimat because North Württemberg was placed in a state community with North Baden?” Expellees could claim to have lost Heimat, he argued, but not the Badenese. He further rallied against over-politicization of Heimat, arguing: “He who loves his Heimat does not permit its political misuse.” The only political valence of Heimat, he finally argued, was the nation.<sup>75</sup> The Lord Mayor of Pforzheim advanced the same arguments, arguing that the Southwest state supporters were the true promoters of Heimat.<sup>76</sup> Gebhard Müller, the Württemberg-Hohenzollern state president echoed such sentiments, pointing to his own “upper Swabian Heimat” which would remain his Heimat despite state borders. The Southwest state, he added, would also preserve

independence of local Heimat through administrative districts.<sup>77</sup> In harmony with such positions—Southwest state posters declared the Southwest state a “demand of reason and love of Heimat.” For those who did not get the message, they draped street cars with the words: “Heimat will remain Heimat: More than ever in the Southwest state.”<sup>78</sup>

This group of Southwest state supporters thus sought to dis-embed a private and local world of Heimat from a regional state container. The pro-Badener, by contrast, clung strongly to the regional state as a conceptual vessel of local and personal experiences. As one pro-Badener wrote in a *Volklied* in 1950, Heimat was Baden—the place of his childhood crib, father’s house, and natural landscape.<sup>79</sup> Yet another Badener from Ebersteinburg composed a Badenese Heimat lyric that pulled on the personal familial language of the childhood crib and being a son of his local Heimat valley, placing such local personal memories squarely within a regional state container.<sup>80</sup> Proponents of the Southwest state, such as Gebhard Müller, rejected such coupling, arguing, for example, that Wohleb himself had a Heimat in Freiburg, and not in the whole state of Baden. In a piece entitled “What is Heimat,” Wohleb responded by insisting that Freiburg was his “Heimat city” and his “Heimat” was Baden.<sup>81</sup> Southwest state supporters often argued that local worlds of Heimat would be best served by the efficiency and economic strength of a larger state. Posters like one in Mannheim conveyed this principle. Depicting Hermes leading the way into a reconstructed Mannheim, the poster, calling out the name of Mannheim in local dialect, declared: “Mannheim forward, more than ever in the Southwest state.” The poster background appeared in the locally patriotic Mannheim colors of blue, white, and red.<sup>82</sup> The pro-Badener responded with a poster contrasting the dilapidated Mannheim train station with that of Stuttgart, arguing that the Southwest state would only care about the center, with the words “Stuttgart forward, Mannheim behind!”<sup>83</sup> Pro- Baden posters like one in Heidelberg similarly sought to re-

enforce the coupling between local Heimat and the Badenese state in places where it proved weak. (Figure 4-6)

Those who emphasized Heimat as a primarily personal and local space found a prime opportunity to vent their anger when the South Baden government invented a Heimat festival to push the state issue. In 1950 and 1951, South Baden ordered localities to observe the so-called “Day of the Heimat” in mid July. The state oddly took the name of the new expellee tradition, though the Badenese tradition was entirely unrelated. South Baden funded events, sought support from Catholic churches, and slated performance of groups in regional costume. Cultural performers from Switzerland, France, and Austria were also invited. One event poster displayed a woman in Black Forest costume in a regional landscape, scrolled with the words “your heart to the Heimat”— an image unmistakably reminiscent of posters supporting a Badenese state. Several Badenese mayors, however, refused to hold a politicized government-funded Heimat festival based on top-down orders, and Southwest state supporters went on the attack. Gebhard Müller argued in a speech entitled “the Southwest state as a psychological problem” that it is dangerous to politicize Heimat festivals and make them forums of political struggle.<sup>84</sup> In the South Baden parliament, FDP representative Willy Stahl led a tirade against politicization of Heimat and praised cities like Lörrach, Villingen, Singen, and Neustadt that refused to observe the tradition. States cannot force people to celebrate festivals and sell state emblems, he argued. His fellow FDP parliamentarian, Friedrich Vortisch, shouted in support that this evoked “fatal memories” of totalitarian states. They did not need top-down Heimat festivals, Stahl continued: from the *Tag des Schwarzwälder Pferdes* in St. Märgen, to the *Hans-Thoma-Fest* in Bernau, or the *Bühler Zwetschgenfest*, localities throughout the Southwest had their own grass-roots Heimat festivals. Stahl provided a contrary example of the type of positive Heimat event that they should promote,



highlighting the new “Heimat evenings” held by the mayor of Titisee, where outsiders were invited to learn about local traditions of their new places of home. Heimat, Stahl concluded, could get by without politicians. Following his speech, Vortisch took to the microphone to note that his home town refused to celebrate the tradition, not because they did not love their Heimat, but because they were against the “abuse of the Heimat idea for political purposes.” That had been done for twelve years under the Nazis, he argued, and he held that he had sought to prevent such exploitation through his activities in the Heimat movement during those years.<sup>85</sup>

Few points of contention illustrated more vividly the two dueling positions on the role of Heimat in a democracy than debates over “petty statism” and “particularism.” If we look to the pro-Southwest alphabetized pamphlet, we find under the term “particularism,” the claim that it was a “lethal” phenomenon furthered by those who sought excessive independence under the guise of federalism.<sup>86</sup> But what appeared to one side as excessive regional statism, for another was serving the nation by de-centering it. Denunciations of “petty statism” therefore became a heated point of debates. A significant minority of voters objected to “petty statism.” In a 1949 poll in South Baden, 36% of Southwest state supporters justified their support for the unified state for reasons interpreted by poll-takers as being against petty statism. One female apothecary, age 28, held that “petty-statism is Germany’s misfortune,” while a housewife fourteen years her elder held that: “the bigger, the better.” In a similar sentiment, one undecided female doctor, age 38, responded that she thought only for Germany and not for particular regions. Some Badenese men expressed comparable views. A North Badenese doctor, age 42 argued that they needed to “overcome local patriotism,” while an Offenburger businessman, age 41 opined “I find petty statism disagreeable.” Similarly, a 62 year-old Bühler employee argued “We must think German, and not Badense.”<sup>87</sup> Hostility to petty statism seemed stronger higher up in the intellectual and

economic ranks. As one professor in Heidelberg asked: What do state borders have to do with Heimat?— He had only Heimat feeling for Germany, and held a Badenese identity to be a sham.<sup>88</sup>

Nevertheless, it was only a minority who reacted negatively to “small-statism.” Even ten years later, when enthusiasm for cultural federalism had already waned, opposition to “*Kleinstaaerei*” in the Southwest stood in two polls at only 28% and 40%. Southwest state proponents were aware that they had to also appeal to those who desired a federalism based on regional Heimat states. In the end, variations in local vote returns most strongly correlated with factors that influenced imaginings of regional Heimat, such as dialect, confession, and geography— indicating that desires to create something akin to a “Heimat state” proved the most influential force in voting.<sup>89</sup> Southwest state propaganda therefore combined arguments of “Heimat remaining Heimat” with insistence that the new state would also unify a common cultural region. Several advocates of the Southwest state continually argued that it would unify a common Stamm and get rid of artificial Napoleonic borders.<sup>90</sup> To balance conflicting positions of Heimat as independent from state and the new state as corresponding to regional culture, Southwest state propaganda permitted diverging readings. Several of their posters, for example, depicted the Württemberg black and yellow flag merging with the yellow-red-yellow flag of Baden to form the German flag.<sup>91</sup> (Figure 4-7) It was intentionally silent on whether creating a unified state served the nation because it created a Heimat state rooted in a common regional culture or because it overcame petty statism.

The pro-Badener, for their part, delivered a full-throated rebuttal against charges of petty statism and defended a strong federalism. As early as 1948, pro-Badener responded to charges that their leader, Leo Wohleb, was a “petty separatist,” insisting that he was a “Badenese democrat” fighting centralization.<sup>92</sup> They continually attacked a grandiose unitary national vision,

insisting on federalism as the optimal route for serving the nation. One pamphlet issued by the Badenese working committee made this point through visual imagery. Alongside pictures that touted the threat of centralization, including one of the sea-monster Southwest state gobbling up localities, they also used patriotic images of a re-unified Germany.<sup>93</sup> (Figure 4-8) Pro-Badener deflected attacks of petty statism by targeting for criticism key Southwest state supporters who had a history of investment in grandiose spatial politics. They particularly attacked the spatial planner, geographer, and former Nazi, Friedrich Metz, who supported the Southwest state, and was notorious for his argument that a Badenese “people” did not exist. Pro-Badener dug up a 1934 address from the geographer on the “Alps in German Space,” in which he argued against overly regionalist orientations as damaging the nation. There was not an Austrian or Prussian Stamm, Metz argued in the 1934 piece, but only “a German people and a German nation.” Metz’s 1934 speech warned Alpine Germans against their tendency of excessive inwardness, remaining crouched in the “narrowness of their valleys.” The Badenese held this as evidence of his Naziesque focus on expansive geographies. They labeled Metz a criminal, and denounced his “Nibelungen-like large spatial thinking” that allegedly informed his support for the Southwest state.<sup>94</sup> Metz was certainly not the greatest fan of federalism. He believed that “Badenese particularists” hid their particularism behind the name of “federalism.”<sup>95</sup>

These debates over space, Heimat, and democracy further spilled into Bundestag. A January 1951 debate proved particularly revealing, with explosive exchanges between the South Badener CDU representative Anton Hilbert, and Ernst Mayer and August Euler from the FDP. After Hilbert praised Württemberger and Badener state consciousness as basis of a federalist Germany, Euler responded that the Badenese people did not exist; there was only a German people, he argued and they invented the Badenese people. Hilbert shot back that Euler was an

“unteachable unequivocal centralist,” and outlined how the Southwest state could create a new trend in which smaller states would be swallowed up into a unitary state. Subsequently, representative Mayer from Stuttgart took to the floor to denounce petty statism, arguing that the majority wanted a unified Southwest state and thus, for the first time, were considering national interests before regional ones. Hilbert angrily interjected, asking whether this meant that being a Badener meant not being a good German. He received assists from other parliamentarians who supported a Heimat-infused federalism. Representative Seelos from the Bavaria Party insisted that a German federalism needed organic states with their own traditions. Wilhelm Hamacher, a Rhinelander from the Center party, argued that, while he knew little about Southwestern regional culture, they must avoid centralism at all costs and encourage culturally-founded federal divisions. Yet others supported these sentiments, while not agreeing that this meant there should not be a Southwest state. Kurt Kiesinger stood up to counter the argument that Southwest state supporters were against such a culturally-rooted federalism. He asserted that he was both a Southwest state supporter and a “convinced federalism,” and he wished that Badener would see that a Southwest state had historical and cultural justifications.<sup>96</sup>

In discussions over whether Heimat-infused federalist fragmentation served or harmed the nation, consideration of Cold War imperatives surfaced. Some argued that the true danger to Heimat came from the East—indeed, many Heimat enthusiasts in the West identified Soviet communism as the absence of Heimat. The Soviet Union was, they often argued, a technocratic society that treated its population not as private individuals rooted in places of home, but as a fungible labor force that the state managed and uprooted according to state imperatives. We see the same attitudes in the Southwest. The specter of Soviet communism could be used both to argue for federalism and against too much decentralization. In 1947, the head of FDP in Baden

argued for federalism by arguing that their party rejected both separatism on one hand and on the other end a “Prussian centralism under the banner of the hammer and sickle.”<sup>97</sup> Such lumping of the Prussian tradition, Soviet Communism, and Nazism into one anti-Heimat pot was common in early postwar Heimat discourses. They all seemingly violated rootedness of individuals in local places of home by focusing on grandiose global ambitions in which local peoples could be moved around like pieces on a chess board. On the other hand, many Southwest state supporters argued that the Badenese should realize that Heimat was not threatened by a Southwest state, but by the Soviets, and that maintaining a solid national structure should be the deciding factor. One Southwest state pamphlet noted that the true threat to Heimat came from the Soviets and not the Swabians: “The raping of our Heimat derives from somewhere completely different: From the East! To thwart this, we need to create a tight, solid order in a healthy, strong federal state, the Southwest state! True loyalty to Heimat means energetic help for people in our city who have been hit hard by the war.”<sup>98</sup>

Some lay people in the 1949 poll directly cited Cold War imperatives as their reason for supporting the Southwest state. A housewife, age 42, responded, that the state would allow for a “strengthening vis-a-vis Russia,” while a young locksmith, age 25 responded that it would assist in the fight against Bolshevism.<sup>99</sup> To the dismay of the pro-Badener, the Communist party endorsed recreating Baden, leading Southwest stater to draw cartoons of a smiling Soviet star above Badener and Swabians sitting at a border fence.<sup>100</sup> Some even scrawled on pro-Baden posters “paid for by Moscow.”<sup>101</sup> Southwest state propaganda emphasized unity in strength, while pro-Badener bemoaned invoking geo-political imperatives to trump local democracy.<sup>102</sup> In the end, the Cold War proved one of the most significant factors that sabotaged dreams of a more extensive decentralization, not only in the Southwest, but throughout the Federal Republic.

Different groups clearly disagreed on the place of Heimat feeling in political structures. However, as we shall see, there was much convergence on identification of democracy and world-openness with regional identities—wherever in geographic space those imagined regions happened to be.

### **Democratic, European, and World-Open: The Politics of Regional Identities**

“The Swabians,” a visitor to the Southwest once wrote, are famous for their hard-working nature; they excel at trade and science and don the clothes of war and peace equally well. The description, from a 1512 work by Johannes Cochlaeus, unsurprisingly says nothing of their *democratic, European, and world-open* natures.<sup>103</sup> Notions of regional values evolved according to the needs of the time. After 1945, these three regional identity tropes surged in popular consciousness. This was already clear with Otto Feger and his supporters who later supported the Southwest state. Pro-Badener advanced similar ideas about regional identities. They drew on many of the same historical memories, and, like the Konstanz archivist, did so with the support of the French occupiers. In 1949, the French endorsed recreating Baden, with the occupation official, Francois Poncet, citing the state’s democratic traditions and federalist history.<sup>104</sup>

Pro-Badener articulated ideas of Badenese democracy by highlighting their state’s early democratic constitution of 1818, as well the prominence of Badenese democrats in the 1848 Revolution and the Weimar Republic. In the Bundestag, the Freiburg representative Hermann Kopf elaborated on Baden as a “sanctuary of democratic tradition,” illustrated by its historic constitution and democratic heros, including Struwe, Welcker, Fehrenbach, and Ebert. This democratic line, he argued, was the common property of the Badenese people, and they must protect their state as a “place of Heimat for our democratic freedom.”<sup>105</sup> Common citizens forged

similar connections on a local and personal level. One Freiburger priest wrote in 1952 that he supported Baden, as his own ancestors fought in 1848 to advance their “true democracy of Baden.”<sup>106</sup> A few years earlier, regionalists observed the centennial anniversary of 1848 with works like that of Jean Sigmann, who noted in a work on the Badenese revolutions that this history of “Badenese liberalism” could be used to reflect on the present and the recent past.<sup>107</sup>

Wohleb promoted ideas of Badenese democracy with many of the same local historical memories. He recounted Max von Baden leading Germany toward a parliamentary democracy after 1918, informed by “moderate Badenese thinking,” and recounted prominent Badenese of Weimar, from Ebert, Wirth, and Fehrenbach. Pro-Badener who advanced such historical memories rarely rallied them to deny regional culpability for Nazi crimes, but in one case, Wohleb could not help but opine in passing that Badenese presence in Nazi leadership had been small. He argued that Baden balanced tradition with an “open-minded progressiveness” and revolutionary change, and, as one journalist later recalled, Wohleb believed they must keep their state and its liberalness as a voice in the “acoustic color” of the nation.<sup>108</sup>

Like other Heimat enthusiasts, pro-Badener drew on anti-Prussianism as a buttress of democratic regional identity. They had an assist here from the occupying powers. In 1945, De Gaulle delivered a speech in Baden-Baden where he insisted that if regions along the Rhine wanted to belong to the West, they must abandon the idea of a “Prussian-oriented Germany” and turn their hopes and orientations to the West and to France.<sup>109</sup> Three years later, Wohleb took to the radio to denounce how “Prussiandom” led to the misfortune of Germany through “glorification of the principle of power,” “idealization of war,” and “deification of the state.”<sup>110</sup> Badenese citizens also wrote letters to Wohleb denouncing Prussian values of submission to authority and centralism that contrasted with those of Baden. Illustrating genuine belief in such

ideas, Badenese and Bavarian politicians in private letters corroborated in opposing what they called “Prussianization” of the armed forces.<sup>111</sup>

Southwest state supporters similarly posited democracy as a tenet of regional identity. Gebhard Müller, who often reminded South Badener that they shared a common Stamm with many Württemberger, argued that they should conduct debates with less demagoguery as their corner of the country possessed a “true democratic tradition” that knew how to balance interests objectively.<sup>112</sup> Citizens in Württemberg, where Southwest state supporters dominated, also looked to their own histories to identify with democracy as a local tradition. In Ulm, the Lord Mayor argued during the Southwest state debate that Ulmer were proud of their democratic history that went back to their city’s constitution of 1397 which made every citizen part of the political system.<sup>113</sup> This paralleled trends in Cologne, where citizens looked to their city’s own 1396 constitution to identify with Colognean democracy. Both groups also shared anti-Prussian sentiment as the inverse to their regional democracy.<sup>114</sup>

Assertion of democracy as a tenet of regional identity went hand-in-hand with ideas of world-openness and reformulations of their self-understanding as a border region. Before 1945, the Nazis propped up definitions of the Southwest as a fortresses of national power, useful for national expansion. As a contributor to a 1937 work on Alemannic culture wrote, those who belonged to their Stamm were not only in Germany but also across the Southwestern national borders. He wrote, among other things, that they must force the Swiss to their knees and back into Alemannendom where they belonged.<sup>115</sup> After 1945, however, all in the Southwest state debate elaborated on their region’s bridging function vis-a-vis their western neighbors. Pro-Badener argued that an independent Baden would be a better agent for European unification and bridge to Switzerland and France. One pro-Baden pamphlet conveyed this function through



imagery. One image depicted the old borderland before 1945, with two enemies sitting across a fortified line, while the other depicted Baden as a permeable borderland, replete with multiple train crossings and bustling activity. (Figure 4-9) As if to defend against charges that they were weakening the nation, they included on the pamphlet cover a full map of Germany including the areas East of the Oder-Neiße line, with the words “it must be all of Germany.” The iconography sent a clear message: they were patriots who were serving the nation and Europe by weakening the divisions of the national border, but without threatening the nation’s territorial integrity.<sup>116</sup>

Such iconography paralleled popular discussion of world-openness and Europeanness as tenets of Badenese identity. As Reinhold Schneider, the Freiburg author and Baden supporter argued in 1950, their state was one of “transitions” and “bridges.” The “heritage of the Heimat,” he held, sat at the “foundation of the occidental world.”<sup>117</sup> The Heimatbund Badenerland scrolled on the back cover of one of their pamphlets a similar quotation from Schneider that described Baden as a “hall on the Rhine.” All of its windows, the quotation continued, were opened to the terraces of the Strasbourg tower and the Vosges mountains; Baden was a place of coming and going that gave and received as a point of meeting. Inside the pamphlet, the Heimatbund defined their region as a “natural gate to the West.”<sup>118</sup> Similar tenets of Badenese regional identity could be heard in the halls of the Bundestag, where Hermann Kopf argued against the suggestion that they needed a unified Southwest state to form a “block” against Bavaria. They did not need a block, Kopf argued, they needed a “bridge” to the West with France and Switzerland.<sup>119</sup>

Pro-Badener also articulated a parallelism between a Heimat-infused German federalism and a unified federalist Europe. The Baden supporter Walter von Cube succinctly outlined this principle in a referendum speech. Through European unification, he argued, the duties of federal “Heimat-like” states would increase, as the decision-making structures of Europe would be

distant. Close-knit states would form a harmonic counterpoint, bringing the fruits of European unification into a comprehensible space.<sup>120</sup> Wohleb was an equally vocal advocate of this principle. Having been a member of the pan-European movement in the Weimar Republic, the French occupiers praised him for his simultaneous local patriotism and European-orientedness. Wohleb argued as early as the late 1940s for a parallelism between European federalism and an inner-German Heimat-infused federalism, and he frequently underscored Baden's role in European unification. He articulated these ideas, among other places, at the *Hebeltag*, an event of Alemannic authors from Switzerland, Alsace, and Germany where he argued that Baden was crucial to maintaining positive relations with their brothers across the Rhine.<sup>121</sup>

Southwest state supporters also articulated a notion of the Southwest state as a border that would serve a bridge function. A minority added some qualifications to this argument, accurately pointing out that the French encouraged inner-German division for their own political purposes. Reinhold Maier even argued that they needed less an international bridge to France than states that were solidly part of the new German state. Some regular citizens also reported supporting the Southwest state over fears that Baden could go the way of Saar—a German border region and French protectorate that France was openly attempting to peel away from the nation.<sup>122</sup> Nevertheless, most Southwest state supporters went toe-to-toe with pro-Badener on the Europe question, depicting their state vision as serving a better bridging function to the West. Posters for the Southwest state declared that their state would be the first step in unifying Europe. Pro-Southwest state speakers not only talked about their region as a pioneer in bringing “democratic foundational principles” to Germany, but also their “mediating and reconciling” function in international politics.<sup>123</sup> Southwest staters openly challenged Baden's function as a viable bridge, arguing that they could not even reconcile themselves with the Swabians, much less the French

and the Swiss.<sup>124</sup> As the Southwest state guide pamphlet to the debates maintained, since the Southwest state would be securely party of the new Federal Republic, they would form a better “bridge” to France as they would not be French puppets; true reconciliation and mediation, it argued, could only occur when France and Germany were mutual partners.<sup>125</sup> Southwest stater also argued for the need for fewer borders rather than more. As one Württemberg professor held, the Southwest state reduced the number of borders along a common western cultural space that stretched from Vienna to Paris.<sup>126</sup> The Southwest stater’s regionally-based national reconciliation narrative received overt approval from beyond Germany. One Alsatian professor and Southwest state supporter, for example, reported attending a presentation from a French professor from Nancy who spoke on the Alemannic spirit as a “connective force of middle European space and therein Europe.” The Alsatian professor recounted how such western cultural unity was crucial to opposing Bolshevism.<sup>127</sup>

While ideas of their region as a world-open bridge achieved wide circulation, notions of regional tolerance never gained wide-spread traction like in Cologne or Hamburg, though it was not entirely absent. Wohleb referenced the Badenese as a people of “acceptance,” “tolerance,” and “balance,” while the Heimatbund Badenerland argued for a Badenese tradition of “tolerance” and “liberalism.”<sup>128</sup> The region’s rural landscape and the absence of a large tradition of trade and immigration perhaps informed the weakness of these ideas. Still, the strength of a regional identity rooted democracy and world-openness vis-a-vis a former national enemies was a major turn-around—especially after harsh French occupation. Identification was a crucial first step in democratization, even if identification did not equate to adept practice.

## **But what is Democracy?: Chasms between Identity and Practice**

So what of democratic practice? As early as 1946, commentators noted both strong popular democratic identification and an uncertainty of what this meant. As Feger himself wrote: “lovely...so we are all democrats; with or without intellectual reservations. But what is democracy?”<sup>129</sup> Identification did not suddenly make citizens adept practitioners of democracy, even if it laid crucial groundwork for future development. The referendum campaigns illustrated the underdeveloped nature of German democratic culture and problems of outsider exclusion. With questionably undemocratic referendum procedures, overwhelming propaganda campaigns, participants in the debate further demonstrated a lack of civil debate and lack of willingness to disagree. Instead, there was much heated slander and campaigns of annihilation.<sup>130</sup>

The democratic nature of referendum voting procedures was certainly suspect. After the informational referendum in 1950, Southwest state supporters ascertained that they could gain massive majorities in North and South Württemberg, a slight majority in North Baden, and a significant loss in South Baden. They also knew that votes in Baden as a whole would reject the Southwest state. They therefore convinced the Bundestag to approve the law which established four voting districts of North and South Baden and North and South Württemberg, with approval from three needed to create the Southwest state. Pro-Badener argued that this machination was a gross violation of democratic principles and regional sovereignty. Common citizens shared this view and wrote to their state presidents about how such actions endangered German democracy—often comparing these electoral tactics to the political style of Hitler.<sup>131</sup> One Heidelberger, age 28, wrote to Wohleb on defending their “Badenese Heimat” against the Southwest state cabal and held that if they lost the election, he would see the republic as a dictatorship.<sup>132</sup> Pro-Badener continually insisted that local democracy was a weighty matter that was being ignored.<sup>133</sup>

Pro-Badener, however, proved equally egregious in going beyond the boundaries of civil debate. Their propaganda unleashed a campaign of annihilation that depicted Württemberger as imperialist Naziesque dictators. Pro-Baden political cartoons depicted their Eastern neighbors as abusive house-wives or tyrants who locked the young girl Baden in the attic with a long list of house rules.<sup>134</sup> One Badener made a parallel between Swabian expansionary desires and both the Prussian tradition and the Soviet establishment of satellite states.<sup>135</sup> Their propaganda ceaselessly evoked the metaphor of their Heimat being “raped.” While Southwest state supporters argued that pro-Badener should abandon the rape metaphor, the pro-Baden camp firmly rejected the call, insisting that Baden was being raped in a way that threatened German democracy.<sup>136</sup> Southwest state supporters like Eduard retorted that use of such metaphors was an example of undemocratic behavior.<sup>137</sup> Pro-Badener took little heed and continued to refer to the rape of their state through a “sham democracy.”<sup>138</sup> Wohleb himself made the melodramatic assertion that the question of “Württemberg-Baden” had replaced the option of “Hindenburg-Hitler.”<sup>139</sup> The Badenese working committee simultaneously argued that the flood of propaganda from Southwest state supporters reminded them of the “methods of the Hitler party of 1933.”<sup>140</sup>

The referendums also revealed exclusion of outsiders, particularly the expellees, who were a sizable minority in the Southwest. By 1947, Württemberg-Baden took in 560,000, and, by 1952, 1,000,000 expellees lived in the Southwest state.<sup>141</sup> In debates about Heimat, the expellee issue was difficult to avoid. Some argued for sympathy based on analogous experience of Heimat. The Archbishop of Freiburg had done so in his 1946 pastoral letter.<sup>142</sup> Others encouraged sympathy with expellees at the Badenese Day of Heimat in July, where organizers included readings of Badenese dialect poetry that expressed solidarity with the expellee plight.<sup>143</sup> In spite of such efforts, one did not need to look far to find strong hostilities. As one Offenburger citizen

wrote to Wohleb regarding the troubles of attracting expellee voters, expellees had to deal with the hostility from natives, which made it difficult for them to find a sense of Heimat in a new region.<sup>144</sup> Wohleb certainly knew of such hostilities and saw them, among other places, in letters from citizens like one former Badenese bureaucrat, Julius Glatz. In his 1951 letter to Wohleb, the former Nazi wrote of his dismissal from the Baden Statistical Office for joining the party before 1933. Playing the regional patriot who supported recreating Baden, Glatz appealed to get his job back, noting with anger how expellees were preferred over regional natives in such jobs. Their Stamm, he opined, was being tainted by the expellee “infestation.” While mentioning nothing of Badenese democracy or world-openness, Glatz illustrated his lingering racial world-view by denouncing the “oriental” expellees as “questionable *Polaken*” or “disguised eastern spies” who received state government positions. He argued that Baden was driving native Badener into the arms of the Southwest state through their actions.<sup>145</sup>

Though this example was an outlier in its extremity, referendum voting procedures suggested by the pro-Badener revealed ongoing hostilities to such outsiders. It was well known that expellees overwhelmingly supported the Southwest state based on beliefs that a larger state would deal with expellee issues more efficiently and not fragment the national strength needed to assert their right to the Heimat. As a Sudeten German argued in a radio address, for “Heimat-political reasons” the expellees supported the Southwest state and rejected “petty statism;” the Southwest state issue was a “complete German” issue, and the expellees were for “stronger state formations.”<sup>146</sup> In a regional newspaper, another expellee repeated the frequent argument that a larger state would be administratively and economically more efficient on expellee issues.<sup>147</sup> In view of such high expellee support for the Southwest state, pro-Badener promoted voting procedures that would ban newcomers from the referendum. As one North Badener wrote to

Wohleb, their state was full of expellees who should not be allowed to water-down native voices. One South Badener expressed anger that the expellees with no knowledge of Badenese culture and history were the feather that tipped the scales in erasing their state from the map.<sup>148</sup> Given, it was not clear to all that the expellees were more than long-term guests, though these efforts at keeping them out of the referendum still proved both exclusionary and undemocratic.

Federal law ultimately guaranteed expellee voting rights, leaving pro-Badener to find ways to compete for their votes. One pro-Baden poster depicted an expellee family over a Badenese village arriving to find a new place of home.<sup>149</sup> (Figure 4-10) Another depicted a Badener and expellee eating at the same table, declaring “we eat from the same bowl.”<sup>150</sup> The message had a double-meaning: they offered solidarity, while arguing that they too had their Heimat threatened.<sup>151</sup> Expellees, however, reacted hostilely to Badenese claims that Badener would lose Heimat without their own state. As the expellee politician Karl Mocker argued, by advancing this argument, the pro-Badener illustrated that they did not understand the expellee plight.<sup>152</sup> Southwest state supporters, by contrast, adroitly mobilized expellee votes.

The undemocratic and exclusionary practices revealed by the referendums of 1950 and 1951 only scratched the surface of the undeveloped nature of democratic practice in early postwar West Germany. Deficiencies extended from patriarchal views of authority, lack of a critical press, enduring racism, and inability to confront culpability for crimes of the recent past, among others. At the same time, the referendums illustrated an astonishing regionally-based identification with the goal of postwar democracy, the deconstruction of enemy images vis-a-vis the West, and enthusiastic emphasis on forging European unification. Such rapid shifts in identification, overlooked by many historians of the early postwar period, laid an important part of the ground work upon which further processes of democratization would build.

## Referendum Results and Disparate Regional Geographies of Heimat

Referendum results turned out much as expected given the 1950 informational referendum that preceded them: over 90% in Württemberg supported the Southwest state, with 57.1% support in North Baden, and 37.8% support in South Baden, and only 47.8% in Baden as a whole. The earlier informational referendum similarly yielded 93% support in Württemberg, 57.0% in North Baden, and 40.5% in South Baden, with a total in all of Baden at 49.1%.<sup>153</sup> The required majorities in three of the four voting districts needed to create the Southwest state were achieved. The local breakdowns proved quite telling and indicated that factors influencing geographical imagining of Heimat proved most decisive. (Figure 4-11) Differences in voting based on political party or urban vs. rural differences proved marginal. Factors like dialect, Stamm borders, old state borders, confessional divisions, and geography stood out prominently. Party proved a poor voting predictor. The Lake Constance town of Überlingen (city proper), for example, voted 77% for the Southwest state (Lake Constance was a hot-bed for the Pan Swabian-Alemannic idea and had differently colored dialect than Southwest Baden). Überlingen was also a CDU stronghold, having voted 57% for the party in the last election. However, the returns there proved little different than places where the CDU had much less influence. The city of Sinsheim in the northern Franconian area of Baden that voted only 30% for the CDU. Sinsheimer, however, like citizens of Überlingen, similarly voted in the high 70's for the Southwest state. Other city comparisons bear out this phenomenon. In terms of rural versus urban, there were some areas in which rural places more strongly supported Baden, but the trend was minimal. In Freiburg (city proper) support for Baden was only 5% lower than in the surrounding countryside, while in Karlsruhe, city dwellers, whose urban identity rested on being the state capitol, voted 71% for Baden, fifteen points higher than the surrounding villages.<sup>154</sup>



By contrast, differences strongly cut along regional cultural borders, including the line of Franconian vs. Alemannic areas and the geographic barrier of the Black forest in the South. Dialect borders could also be clearly deciphered in voting returns. This was apparent in the major outlier on the old map of Baden—the city of Pforzheim, the only area of Baden that belonged to the Swabian branch of the Swabian-Alemannic dialect group that was most dominant in Württemberg. Pforzheimer supported the Southwest state by around 90%. (Figure 4-12). The boundary between the Franconian and Swabian dialect areas can equally be deciphered, as could the sub-group dialect boundaries that ran through the Black Forest. The dialect subgroup west of the Black Forest voted significantly higher for Baden than those to the East. Otto Feger observed in a letter to a reporter visiting Konstanz that those around Lake Constance are, in contrast to the Southwest Badenese, strong supporter of the Southwest state. Perhaps, he continued, “the Black Forest is a border after all”—a reference to his own work which insisted that it did not represent a border between two separate regional cultures.<sup>155</sup>

Regionalists also noted confessional variations, with confession historically influencing notions of regional belonging. Baden was majority Catholic, while a Southwest state would be evenly balanced. A table of Protestant versus Catholic villages in Emmendingen county clearly showed that Catholic villages supported Baden to a greater extent.<sup>156</sup> Southwest state supporters were aware of this trend and targeted Catholics with leaflets that held it was not their religious obligation to support Baden.<sup>157</sup> What ultimately sunk the pro-Baden movement, however, was a conglomeration of factors in North Baden that influenced regional imaginings of Heimat. The North, of course, had a greater number of expellees—but they also belonged to the Franconian Stamm, meaning they had different types of traditions and dialects. The Kurpfalz around Mannheim and Heidelberg in many ways shared a common regional culture with the Pfälzer

across the Rhine. A movement began to unify Baden and Württemberg with the intention to later include the left-Rhenish Pfalz.<sup>158</sup>

In aggregate, debates revealed more than bifurcated imaginings of regional Heimat between the dynastic states or a unified state. It illustrated prolific disparateness in cognitive maps of regional Heimat. After unification, these diverse imaginings of Heimat shone through again as the new Southwest state grappled with finding a state name and symbols that would not injure regional Heimat sentiments. What name or symbols could encompass everyone's feelings of regional Heimat? What histories, geographical landscapes, or cultural legacies could be evoked? Would they call the new state? Names officially suggested included Rheinschwaben, Altschwaben, Großschwaben, Schwaben, Alemannien, Neu-Alemannien, Baden-Württemberg-Hohenzollern, Zollern, Neckarland, Donau-Rhein, Südwestdeutschland, and "Wühoba." Regional archives were ordered to collect petitions from experts and citizens on the question, while panels of historical and cultural experts assembled to mull over the issue. Two large congresses of cultural experts, historians, Heimat researchers, experts in folklore, and geographers met in 1952 and 1953, and both decided overwhelmingly in favor of the historic name of "Schwaben."<sup>159</sup> Throughout the debates, those most educated on regional culture and history had generally seen Stamm as the strongest factor in regional Heimat.

Lay citizens, however, some of whom supported "Schwaben," also had other ideas. In the Black Forest, one local newspaper reported that most wrote to them supporting the name of Alemannien or Rheinschwaben, followed by names based on rivers.<sup>160</sup> Some citizens wrote arguing for names like Donau-Rhein or Südrhein-Neckar, arguing that consciousness of a Swabian Stamm extending to the Rhine had been lost.<sup>161</sup> Many petitioners justified names by insisting that they facilitated "connection to Heimat." One teacher from the Black Forest wrote

that they should call the state “Zollern” or “Zollernland” after the highest mountain at the state’s center—a name, he argued, with connection to Heimat. He attached an appropriate Heimat hymn for the state of Zollern along with his letter.<sup>162</sup> Others wrote proposing a variation of the name Schwaben, arguing that in the word Schwaben, they found a sense of “Heimat.”<sup>163</sup> Heimat enthusiasts of all shades, however, reacted with horror upon hearing suggestions such as “Wühoba,” “Bawü,” or “Bademberg”—neologisms that reflected a technocratic view of space. One Baden-Badener decried such atrocious names, and argued that “Baden-Württemberg” would not be much of an improvement. The name Schwaben or Alemannen, he asserted, would be a thousand-times better, as it would not be “artificial.”<sup>164</sup> The proposal of the name “Baden-Württemberg” itself offended the Heimat feelings of those from the old tiny state of Hohenzollern. Not only did the noble family of Hohenzollern protest the name, lay citizens like one Hohenzollern woman wrote expressing the injury to her Heimat sentiment. She expressed the hope that the choice of this name did not mean that in the new state they would follow the principle of privileging larger spaces simply because of their size.<sup>165</sup>

The question of a state crest as a symbol of Heimat proved no less contentious. Scores of drafters submitted drawings that mixed and matched preferred insignia and colors from a smattering of historical states, from the Staufer lions, former crests of Baden, Württemberg, the Kurpfalz, Franconia, and Anterior Austria, while others took regional landscape scenes. Some argued for deliberate exclusion of some symbols, such as those of the nineteenth-century “accidental states” which conveyed “misunderstandings” about regional culture. When particular drafts were released, many expressed anger that their area was not represented. State archivists in Stuttgart, charged with collecting proposals, found the lack of consensus so amusing that they drafted their own mock crests, including one with Badenese Griffins, Staufer lions, and

Württemberg bucks devouring one another.<sup>166</sup> The final adopted state crest solved these problems by simply including nearly every proposed symbol, including the Staufer lions, and symbols from Baden, Württemberg, the Kurpfalz, Franconia, Hohenzollern, and Anterior Austria. The name Baden-Württemberg was chosen as the name least offensive to Badener who were already mobilizing in the Heimatbund Badenerland to legally challenge the state's creation.

The discourses that the referendum triggered had further revealed a plethora of different geographic visions of regional Heimat. Some simply held that they did not need a regional state to maintain their different imagining. As the Freiburg librarian argued during debates, his Heimat encompassed a Southwest German-Swiss area from the northern Black forest to Zurich, Lake Constance, and the Vosges mountains, which stretched across several administrative borders that he never felt to be natural.<sup>167</sup> Hermann Hesse, from Calw on the Württemberger side of the Black forest, asserted that, for him, Heimat was on both shores of the upper Rhine.<sup>168</sup> For one Bavarian-Swabian man, regional belonging corresponded to separate Upper Swabian and Lower Swabian spaces, which he believed should become states.<sup>169</sup> Geographers imagined up different state formulations, generating a host of variations, with different capitols and borders, based on Stamm or other histories and geographies.<sup>170</sup> Metz analyzed what he called the four S's: settlement, customs, language, and Stamm to arrive at a solution. Determining that a Badenese people did not exist, he used these categories, combined with geography and water flow patterns, to draft a Southwest state that included the Pfalz.<sup>171</sup> The committee in the Bundestag on border redrawing themselves presented a picture of a Southwest state unified by a forgotten Stamm and the geographies of the Rhine, the Bodensee, and the Swabian core.<sup>172</sup> But whatever methods experts used to discipline spaces, below the surface was ever a profusion of diverse imaginings.

## **The End of Debates over Federalism and Heimat**

No sooner was the new state created than it was challenged in the Constitutional Court. Pro-Badener howled that local democracy had been violated, while Wohleb spoke of a “Morbus Badensis” or Badenese sickness spreading through the nation that consisted of systematic violation of regional democracy.<sup>173</sup> The court decided in 1956 that Badenese rights had been violated and mandated a re-vote in all of Baden as a single district. The Bundestag was to draft a law initiating a new vote. To the chagrin of the pro-Badener, the Bundestag refused to do so for over a decade. One Badener noted six years into parliamentary inaction that their regional “crib of democracy” was threatened with becoming a democratic graveyard as they fought for Heimat against the “political party and state machine.” He argued that they must oppose arguments that global political issues should trump local ones.<sup>174</sup> In the meantime, Baden-Württemberg conducted secret polls through which they watched support for Baden decline each year. A 1959 poll determined that only 29% supported recreating Baden, with die-hard pro-Badener coming from groups with a lower level of education, and from citizens over the age of 45. Rural areas of South Baden were hot beds of the movement, with hardly any support from rural Northern areas. Catholics still provided more support for restoring Baden than Protestants. The polling institute told state leaders they could decrease support for recreating Baden even further if they accommodated Badenese Heimat feeling more in state symbols, trappings, and language.<sup>175</sup>

After the SPD came to power in Bonn in 1969, the Bundestag passed the law for the referendum, which took place in 1970. As one former Badenese bureaucrat noted, by that time, there was no taking down the state which had proven its viability.<sup>176</sup> Voting returns in North Baden for recreating the old state hovered in the low teens, with votes scarcely breaking 20% in South Baden. In all of Baden, 81.9% voted for the Southwest state.<sup>177</sup> Pro-Baden propaganda had

abandoned the Heimat concept wholesale. Throughout the 1960s, as in other regions, the concept underwent an extensive cultural devaluation. Pro-Baden slogans in 1970, instead of drawing on Heimat, called for “a modern new Federal state on the Upper Rhine.” One referendum pamphlet drew on Willy Brandt’s slogan “dare more democracy,” emphasizing progressive newness over tradition, while still attacking centralization, and rejecting “large spatial politic.” Their propaganda did illustrate continuity in a Badenese identity rooted in European unification and hostility to an impersonal administrative machine.<sup>178</sup> The idea of the region’s Europeanness and role in softening rigid national borders had also been maintained for over two decades. Only four years earlier, at a regional Heimat Day in 1966 in the border city of Kehl, regionalist celebrated with French visitors under the theme “Heimat in Europe.” Speeches at the event underscored the harmony between Heimat and European unification.<sup>179</sup> During the 1970 referendum, pro-Badener still referenced the role of their region in improving relationships with France and Switzerland, and citizens continued to describe their region as “world-open.”<sup>180</sup> The Southwest state camp equally depicted their state as open to all of Europe.<sup>181</sup>

The 1970 referendum also revealed the persistence of democratic regional identities. One pro-Baden leaflet evoked regional democratic histories in attacking a Southwest state leaflet that attacked pro-Badener for wanting to turn the clock back to the nineteenth-century. The pro-Baden response leaflet depicted the Badenese revolutionaries of 1848, declaring their tradition to be one of progressive democratic radicalism.<sup>182</sup> Upon loss of the referendum, one pro-Badener lamented that Baden, the place where democratic thought went throughout Germany in 1848, had been defeated.<sup>183</sup> Nevertheless, by 1970 times had changed, and nothing illustrated this better than a bizarre leaflet of unknown origin that circulated around Heidelberg and Mannheim. Composed by the so-called “*Pfälzischen Befreiungsfront*” it urged Pfälzer to break away from

their historic domination by Prussia, Baden, and Swabia. Noting that school children were being forced to speak High German and that Swabian policemen were knocking down Pfälzer students, it called on Pfälzer to throw off their yokes. It compared fighting for Pfälzer independence with struggles in Vietnam and Kurdistan, and opined that the solution could be found in Leninism and anti-colonialism. It urged referendum voters to vote “invalid” by defacing ballots.<sup>184</sup> The inventive author, if in earnest, was dissimilar from his fellow 68ers, who largely saw regional orientations as regressive and the Heimat concept as a reactionary concept.

## **Conclusion**

Though cultural valuation of the Heimat concept in the Southwest went into sharp decline throughout the 1960s, the debates over Heimat states in the late 1940s and early 1950s provide us with a unique lens into the popular spatial imaginary of the early postwar period and the multifaceted redemptive roles ascribed to local and regional Heimat. It revealed popular association of emphasis on broad geographical spaces with fascism and affiliation of localist and regionalist orientations with relinquishing militarism, establishing a federalist state, Europeanization, and fashioning comprehensible spaces where individual’s political voicelessness in vast political structures could be replaced by the “Heimat-like parliament.” A minority, as we have seen, did prove weary of infusing Heimat into structural politics, fearing its over-politicization. Instead, they articulated a vision of Heimat as a sacrosanct private space that must be protected in a true postwar democracy. This group also tended to emphasize creating a solid national state structure that could protect against the true threat to Heimat: Soviet Communism. In both cases, neither side even remotely perceived the Heimat concept to be tainted by Nazi misuse of the concept, nor did Heimat enthusiasts feel the need to defend against

such an argument, which few to none were advancing.

Groups with all different types of territorial imaginings of regional Heimat reformulated historical memories to posit democracy and world-openness as explicit values of Heimat. In doing so, they proved similar to Heimat enthusiasts throughout the Federal Republic. Identification of their region as a “window” to the West and a cornerstone of European unification illustrated the rapid inversion of former enemy images, the dismantling of which proved crucial to cultural demobilization. It inverted nationalist and Naziesque notions of border regions as bastions of expansionary national power. Voices against being a “bridge” to the West were tepid at best, as openness vis-a-vis their western neighbors became the dominant trope of regional self-understanding. Of course, strong regionalist identification with “democracy” did not suddenly make citizens adept practitioners of democracy, nor did ideas of world-openness wipe away continuing exclusionary impulses. Moreover, unlike cities such as Cologne or Hamburg, the idea of tolerance as a regional value never gained prominence. Nevertheless, other new identifications created a receptive regional audience for western democratization.

Bound up in this moment when citizens believed that they could, for the first time, redraw state borders based on regional Heimat feeling, we find an intriguing dynamic that requires further explanation: why were imaginings of the regional map of Heimat so pervasively disparate? One could hardly even outline common agreed-upon cores and contested peripheries. What are we to make of such diverse imaginings of Heimat and what permitted them to exist in such harmonic suspension for so many years? What can this tell us about the dynamics of the Heimat concept more broadly? What can it tell us about why building a federalism of Heimat states proved so problematic? As we shall see in the next chapter, this phenomenon was not limited to the Southwest, nor was its significance linked purely to geography.



“Beware, everywhere one steps on federalist  
corns—injures particularist feeling.”<sup>1</sup>  
-Heinrich Böll, “Nordrhein-Westfalen”

## Chapter V

### Diverse Imaginings: The Search for Regional Heimat

In 1954, a new *Bundestag* committee led by Hans Luther set out on an investigatory trip of the regions of the Federal Republic. Crossing over plains and mountain chains, moving from state to state, committee members recalled in some places seeing regional patriots waving flags as their train passed. The so-called “Luther Committee” undertook such excursions to gather information for their assigned task of drafting an entirely new interior map of the republic. They were one in a line of groups that sought to find new states whose borders would correspond, in accordance with the new 1949 constitution, to “*landsmannschaftliche Verbundenheit*,” cultural and historical connections, and economic and social viability.<sup>2</sup> The term “*landsmannschaftliche Verbundenheit*,” as experts, constitutional drafters, and commentators noted, was a peculiar legalese term that referred to “*heimatliche Verbundenheit*”—a common feeling of regional Heimat. In terms of regional territorial history, the period was quite unique. Never before in German history had there been such an opportunity to conceive of the inner map as a blank slate that could be drawn according to regional Heimat sentiment. Of course, Weimar reformers had tried and failed to re-conceive of the map, confronting entrenched state interests. After 1945, it was also primarily West Germany under consideration.<sup>3</sup> But as one *Kurpfälzer* Heimat enthusiast declared in a presentation to the Luther committee, democratically redrawing inner-German borders was unprecedented.<sup>4</sup> Such borders had always been determined by raw power politics, with random states subsequently inventing new regional identities. In the early postwar years, the plausibility of such a redrawing led to unprecedented public discussion of where people imagined

regional Heimat. The constitutional provision to redraw state borders further triggered the emergence of a massive scholarly-bureaucratic apparatus including geographers, politicians, historians, political scientists, *Volkskundler*, linguists, and dialect experts who sought to find the boundaries of “*heimatliche Verbundenheit*.” What they stumbled upon was radical and prolific divergences of territorial imaginings across the map.

Examining both Heimat enthusiast proposals of Heimat states and the discourses, studies, map drafts, and proposals of this scholarly-bureaucratic apparatus, this chapter argues that the answer to the question of how to find the borders in regional Heimat was clear: No set of factors forged universally shared cognitive maps of regional Heimat, whether based on geographic traits, confession, vaguely conceived dialect spaces, regional ritual traditions, old territorial entities, orientation to local centers, common histories, regional artistic styles, or disparate conceptions of *Stamm*. They were not able to “discover” universally accepted borders of *heimatliche Verbundenheit* not because of their own failings, but because such borders did not exist. Citizens had radically contradicting cognitive maps of regional Heimat. The question went beyond centers and peripheries, with conflicting geographic imaginings crisscrossing the core points of other’s cognitive maps. While all the factors that experts considered could all influence geographic imaginings, it was ultimately at the prerogative of individual groups which of these principles outlined the spaces that they identified as their regional Heimat. In short, the disparities in territorial imaginings of Heimat that we witnessed in the Southwest state debates were not peculiarities of the region.

The Gordian knot discovered upon opening the question of creating new Heimat states was one of the reasons for the ultimate failure of the project. This failure has meant that this history has received little attention from historians.<sup>5</sup> Despite the failure of attempts to redraw the

federal map, I argue that they are worth closer examination as they illuminate unique properties of the Heimat concept. As the anthropologist, Ina-Maria Greverus, has argued, “Heimat” is, in its essence, an identification with territorial space. But what are the dynamics according to which such belonging is projected onto geography? How do the dynamics of cognitively mapping regional belonging differ from national belonging? What does this history tell us about the failure to realize a federalism of “Heimat states” in the mid 1950s? Finally, and most importantly, what does it tell us about the nature of imagining Heimat more broadly?

Given that part of the attraction to Heimat after 1945 was that it offered flexible identities, in contrast to the inflexibility of national ones, a comparison between territorial imaginings of nation and Heimat is helpful. While Heimat was used to imagine de-centered and more regionally diverse ideas of nation, the modern ideal of nation, in contrast to Heimat, was inherently bound up in the notion that the state must constitute a comprehensive decision-making space that mirrors national-identity space. This geographic overlap, in turn, became the foundation of modern legitimate exercise of power.<sup>6</sup> When national identity borders and decision-making borders did not overlap, the primary goal of politics became its achievement. Decision-making in the modern nation-state, moreover, was not only about policy, but also the symbolism of national self-definition. The unending imperative of decision-making and insistence on overlap of decision-making and identity spaces became tightly bound to definition and canonization of the defining principles of community. Such processes often resulted in long, violent, and historical struggles to define the geographic and qualitative contours of national communities.<sup>7</sup> Struggles to define the “who” and “where” of national community often tore apart fluid border regions with mixtures of different ethnic and lingual groups.<sup>8</sup>

Of course, many regional states pushed identity-forming politics. This left a strong

imprint on notions of regional Heimat, in spite of such regional states often having random borders that did not correspond to cultural practice.<sup>9</sup> Local and regional spaces, however, had never undergone the same pervasive and rigid processes of definition as modern nations. Considering Heimat as a “symbolic relation to place” helps to elucidate how the concept enabled subjective imaginings.<sup>10</sup> Symbolic territorial elements such as dialect, practiced regional traditions, architectural styles, memories of historical states, geography, confession, or *Stamm* (including subjective and diverse understandings of *Stamm*), all were elements that could be drawn upon to imagine regional and local community. In imagining Heimat, individuals had a greater ability to subjectively privilege varying elements in fashioning subjective cognitive maps. The result was the persistence of diverse and disparate cognitive maps and more subjective understandings of what factors defined Heimat.<sup>11</sup> Moving from geography to the Heimat concept more broadly, I argue that Heimat’s geographic polysemy paralleled the concept’s crucial diachronic plasticity. Just as the concept allowed diverse geographic imaginings, it also permitted rapid diachronic changes in its ideological framework and the interpretations of its traditions, historical memories, and perceived values. This trait made it particularly useful in an era of rapid change and re-orientation like the early postwar period.

Rather than viewing the facilitation of subjective definition as illustrating the “disturbing” nature of the Heimat concept, as the American-German literary scholar, Peter Blickle asserts, I argue that facilitation of different imaginings without historically forcing rigid definition was a decidedly positive aspect of the concept.<sup>12</sup> Ironically, however, creating “Heimat states” would have required more disciplining to define the who and what of community. Such notions of federalism had gained popularity among those who argued for more than technocratic division of power. Ultimately, a technocratic vision of federalism won out, with the largely random interim

states created by the occupiers remaining up until the present. (Figure 5-1) That is not to say that all Heimat-infused federalisms required regional Heimat states. For many, it was about bringing governance and democratic participation down to a more tangible and local level.

Tracing cultural federalist enthusiasm in the early postwar period, this chapter further probes the work of experts, scientists, and spatial planners tasked with outlining regional borders that reflected feelings of “*heimatliche Verbundenheit*.” Not all of these experts believed that such border should ultimately determine state borders, with many believing that, in the end, economics and convenience of administration should be determinative. As the federal government, state governments, and research institutions sought out scientific geographic experts, they inevitably ran across many with burdened Nazi pasts, including scholars who had worked in *Ost-* and *Westforschung*—scholarly projects to make national claims on more expansive territories. Unfortunately such individual pasts typically did not disqualify them from being contracted to offer expert opinions. Hermann Aubin, who had been involved in such research under the regime, was appointed by politicians as an expert in geographic analysis in the Luther committee. Aubin himself personally objected to redrawing the map based on *landsmannschaftliche Verbundenheit*, preferring instead Stamm. He recognized that the odd bureaucratic phrase was mostly about Heimat feeling, and accurately summarized the issue of finding “*landsmannschaftliche Verbundenheit*” as answering the question: “What borders ‘Heimats’ from one another?”<sup>13</sup> Two parliamentary committees undertook the task of answering this question, with reports contracted from two geographic institutes and a parade of experts.

Immediately after the submission of the *Bundestag* committee report in 1955, a constitutional provision took effect that opened a brief legal window where citizens of states whose borders changed after May 1945 could collect signatures to hold referendums on new state

proposals. Moving from technocrats' analyses of geographies of Heimat, this chapter turns to the proposals of Heimat enthusiasts themselves. Over a dozen Heimat societies emerged that fervidly pushed the creation of different, albeit conflicting state visions. Even within common societies, diverse territorial visions of regional Heimat circulated. This study focuses on the emergence of five such movements in the state of Rheinland-Pfalz and how all manifested such the diversity of cognitive maps of Heimat. While many succeeded in signature collections, the Federal government blocked votes for over a decade. The diverse imaginings of regional Heimat had proven *landsmannschaftliche Verbundenheit* to be a problematic concept for redrawing state borders. With the decline of cultural federalism in the ensuing years, the question of creating Heimat states went into decline. In the end, the influence of the early postwar turn can be found in culture and identification and less in structural realization of Heimat-infused federalist dreams. The history of such efforts, however, laid bare a unique story of diverse imaginings that had long lurked underneath the surface of regional landscapes.

### **A Nation of Regional “Heimat States?”**

The German people, an Oldenburg Heimat society wrote in the early 1950's, were meant to live in “Heimat states” (*Heimatländern*). Different geographic visions of Heimat, they argued, could not be foisted on people by pushing them into random territorial constructions. Thrusting citizens into a new state without their consent—like Oldenburg becoming part of Niedersachsen—they argued, would leave them only with national feeling but deprive them of the crucial feeling of Heimat.<sup>14</sup> Hans Ehard, the Bavarian minister president, made a similar argument in pushing for federalism in which “*Heimatlandschaften*” would play a role in reigning a spirit of collectivism that he believed left society susceptible to dictators.<sup>15</sup>

A federal system based on “Heimat states,” many regionalists insisted, was key to postwar decentralization. In advancing this project, cultural federalist simultaneously emphasized longer tradition of German federalism, while proposing a federalism that was historically unprecedented. While all types of federalism were imaginable in the rubble years, some based on localist federalism or even autonomous regions, by 1949, it was clear that there would be a system of federal regional states. The random states created by the occupiers were generally viewed as provisional, and most agreed that the inner-map needed to be redrawn.

If, as Thomas Nipperdey suggests, we view federalism simply as a system of fragmented power irrespective of ideological context, postwar Germans could very much claim that their imaginings drew on a long German history of federalism.<sup>16</sup> Past systems of power defragmentation in Germany, however, had been rooted in dynastic divisions rather than representing a deliberate democratic distribution of power. Weimar represented a possible exception, if not in the forms of federalism, than at least in those that many sought to establish. As Celia Applegate has pointed out, Weimar saw astonishingly strong debates about federalism, which she argues centered around the fundamental question of the spaces in which the “citizen was to be made, to live, to act, (and) to flourish.” The answer for many Weimar federalists, she argues, was “Heimat.”<sup>17</sup> Heimat enthusiasts after 1945 appropriated long histories of German federalist fragmentation to imagine a system of democratic decentralization in which Heimat states would form crucial pillars. However, while shrouded in history, the idea of regionalist coming together to form regionally sovereign self-manifest polities was unprecedented.

A slew of private citizens after 1945 enthusiastically imagined their own different territorial and political visions for a future German federalist democracy. While postwar historians have often focused on high politics where serious political decisions were made, a

plethora of privately-created drafts for a new German democratic state offers an important window into the popular imaginary that has been largely ignored. Federalist plans from private citizens or low-level politicians varied in arguing for a federalist system rooted in the local, the regional, or both. Robert Scholl, the Lord Mayor of Ulm, and father of Hans and Sophie Scholl, to present but one example, drafted his own elaborate sketches for a new decentralized democratic Germany. The key to the new system, he argued, was rejecting Prussian militarism and centralization by turning to the local and regional traditions of West Elbian Germany. His draft separated the country into five regional states that would consist of a series of cantons with substantial powers.<sup>18</sup> Somewhat more prominent figures such as Waldemar Kurtz and Adolf Gasser advocated the *Gemeinde* as the breadbasket of a new democracy that would replace the dark legacy of territorial states. Such a system of communalism, they argued, would also form a bulwark against the vast bureaucracies of totalitarian systems.<sup>19</sup> The frequent denunciations of Prussian centralization pulled on and magnified prewar anti-Prussian sentiments in the West. It also reflected strong allied statements that Germans must abandon “Prussian” traditions.<sup>20</sup>

After the late 1940s, it quickly became apparent that visions of communal federalism in West Germany were pipe dreams. The public became increasingly aware of what decision-makers knew earlier—that a new federalist democracy would be based on regional states. A highly decentralized federalism of unwieldy local communes could hardly have confronted postwar challenges and emerging Cold War threats. Not that such threats resulted in unitary convictions. The Luther Committee argued, for example, that a strong federalism and the resulting increase of popular democracy would win over the sentiments of Germans on the other side of the iron curtain. Such a factor, they held, should be considered in recreating the interior map.<sup>21</sup>

In early postwar federalist discourses in West Germany, two primary strains of thought



emerged. Adherents of what could aptly be called “technocratic federalism,” made up largely of elite policy makers, viewed the question in a purely functional light. The point of federalism, they believed, was solely about structural division of power, and should be determined by economic and administrative efficiency. The second strain of federalist thought, embraced by Heimat enthusiasts, argued for a vision best described as “cultural federalism.”<sup>22</sup> Federalism, for them, went beyond structural concerns; they sought a federalism based on regional and local communities that would facilitate cultural rejection of the spiritual legacy of centralization and militarism. These two competing federalist visions surfaced among the constitutional drafters themselves. While some argued for a federalism with states created only according to size and function, other drafters pushed through the requirement in Article 29 that required that the new federal system have states drawn according to *landsmannschaftliche Verbundenheit*.<sup>23</sup> Nearly all noted the peculiarity of the phrase.<sup>24</sup> Constitutional drafters, legal experts, and academics, however, confirmed that the term referred to a common sense of regional Heimat. Hermann von Mangoldt, who helped draft Article 29, held that the council chose *landsmannschaftliche Verbundenheit* to replace *Stamm*, which they believed was not modern enough, too narrow, and could convey undesirable connotations. The replacement, he argued, referred to “*heimatliche Verbundenheit*,” a term that Kurt Georg Wernicke, a jurist and assistant to the Parliamentary Council, also used to translate the constitutional legalese into the vernacular.<sup>25</sup> Hans Evers entry in the Bonn Constitutional Commentary on Article 29 likewise referred to the term as reflecting connection to Heimat.<sup>26</sup>

Werner Münchheimer, a scholar deeply involved in border redrawing, concurred with these broader opinions, arguing that *landsmannschaftliche Verbundenheit* was an emotional principle informed by subjective factors and lived experience, including childhood memories,

domestic warmth, and consciousness of the past. It was, he argued, a “superordinate term” for all “feeling of belonging in Heimat.” Such entities, he argued, had the right to be states.<sup>27</sup> The *Akademie für Raumforschung und Landesplanung* reached the same conclusion in their interpretation of the term as regional “Heimat.” *Landsmannschaftliche Verbundenheit*, they insisted, was shaped by the “forces of Heimat,” tradition, and a “feeling of belonging,” that contained “familiarity” and “security.”<sup>28</sup> Beyond the experts working inside the committees, outside experts similarly translated the term into the vernacular as “Heimat.” Heinz Beckmann, in his 1954 dissertation, argued that the concept, in its historical development was a feeling of belonging of certain peoples based on their unique folk traditions and the forces of “Heimat.”<sup>29</sup> Such an interpretation has persisted into the present, reflected in contemporary constitutional commentaries which continue to describe the term along these lines. Roman Herzog, Ruper Scholz, and Theodor Maunz, for example, refer to it as an “important inner feeling of belonging,”— a common belonging informed by “Heimat,” residence, and dialect.<sup>30</sup>

The constitutional obligation therefore to consider “*heimatliche Verbundenheit*” in drafting a new inner-map set into motion a large scientific apparatus whose task was to find the geographic borders of such spaces, in addition to analyzing technical and economic considerations of drafting new state borders. This apparatus produced numerous studies, map drafts, and expert opinions from historians, geographers, spatial researchers, linguists, *Volkskundler*, and art historians. Such works were undertaken both independently and under contract from the federal or state governments. This project began with a series of failed state-minister conferences assembled to address the question. Werner Münchheimer, a geographer, used the opportunity to collect a slew of Weimar proposals on redrawing the national map. Laying them onto one another, he sought to discover “core landscapes” that could act as puzzle

pieces for putting together a new map through processes of elimination.<sup>31</sup> The conferences, however, failed to reach any semblance of consensus, while two subsequent *Bundestag* committees were called to address the issue. The first, the Euler Committee (1949-1950), also failed to present a map proposal. The committee merely outsourced its work, contracting reports from two geographic institutes, the *Institut für Raumforschung Bonn*, and the Hannover *Akademie für Raumforschung und Landesplanung*. After a year, no closer to a solution, the committee ended its work by presenting a list of the fourteen most prominent problem areas that proved tremendously difficult to assign to any particular state.<sup>32</sup>

The Euler Committee was replaced by a standing committee, the Luther Committee, which was given until 1955 to create and submit a final map draft to the *Bundestag* for a vote. The committee consisted of an army of forty members and associated experts. Sifting through a widely tainted pool of academic experts in geography and geographic history, the committee ignored the dark past of two commissioned experts, Hermann Aubin and Erwin Scheu, who under the Nazi regime had been involved in *Ostforschung*. Both were again professors at German universities and were contracted to do studies for the committee. Aubin, an expellee from the Sudetenland, sought to pre-empt notions that his work would reflect any “blood and earth” propaganda, though traces of his racially tinged view of historical geography peeked through in some reports. His colleague Scheu held that “Heimat feelings” should be spared by border redrawing, but only in those cases when preponderant practical considerations did not indicate otherwise.<sup>33</sup> Among Luther Committee members, there were differing attitudes on Article 29, with many technocratic federalists arguing that economic considerations and administrative function should be decisive. Nevertheless, from 1952 to 1955, the committee would produce numerous studies of regional culture, traditions, and histories, to discover where regional citizens

felt a common feeling of regional Heimat.

The committee assembled and examined a massive lists of past scholarly literature of regional histories, politics, dialects, and traditions, followed by expert reports, none of which brought clear answers on redrawing the Federal map.<sup>34</sup> The difficulty of the question would ultimately lead the Luther Committee to abdicate their responsibility to present a map draft, instead arguing that border redrawing was a political decision that the committee should leave to the *Bundestag* as a whole. They would add to the Euler committee's laundry list of territorial Gordian knots, with a list of twenty prominent problem areas, and concluded that the map contained numerous "overcuttings and combination possibilities of the most different types."<sup>35</sup> Their report, which they rushed to submit by the deadline, produced a slew of different contradictory suggestions, and allowed the *Bundestag* to punt on their constitutional obligations of border redrawing by officially rubber-stamping that, legally, the current states fulfilled all the requirements of Article 29.<sup>36</sup> However, as we shall see, the report and commissioned expert analyses fundamentally belied such proclamations.

In examining the failed attempt of this scholarly-bureaucratic apparatus to discipline and delineate the principles that should border regional Heimat in geographic space, we get an image of the fluidity, subjectivity, and polysemic nature of the Heimat concept. In attempting to canonize the principles that defined such territories, the committee could not simply rely on pre-existing studies. As the *Institut für Raumforschung* reported, no single "usable map" existed that reflected borders of *landsmannschaftliche Verbundenheit*. Instead, the institute produced a massive list of 226 historical and cultural regional maps and atlases, drawn according to different principles. A new map, they insisted, had to be created.<sup>37</sup> As experts set about analyzing local and regional spaces, their descriptive geographic language itself revealed the very fluidity and

indeterminate nature of the cognitive maps of regional Heimat that they confronted. In their work, certain cities and “core spaces”, were frequently described as “radiating” a common feeling of regional belonging into zones of influence. Certain localities “tended” or “were turned” to given regional territorial constructions, while other localities and sub-regions were described as “transitional spaces,” “overlayed,” “overlapping,” or as “in tension” between different regional constructs.<sup>38</sup> *Stamm*, dialect, confession, radiating urban influences, natural geography, and past dynastic state borders could all shape notions of regional Heimat, but none yielded clear and hegemonic cognitive maps.

### **Regional Heimat and the Concept of “*Stamm*”**

If the drafters of a new interior map had anything to look back on, it was reformers efforts to redraw the Federal map in the Weimar years. In this first German experience with democracy, the constitution declared Germans to be united in its “*Stämme*.” While the 1949 constitution drafters rejected *Stamm* as the principle for redrawing borders, the concept influenced cultural geographies. But how did it influence *landsmannschaftliche Verbundenheit*? In contemporary historiographies, *Stamm* is often used to refer to geographically stable places that offered “ethnic certainties.” Some have even suggested that it could act as a point of narrativizing German history. Early postwar analysis of *Stamm*, however, revealed the concept’s fundamental instability and inability to clarify imaginings of regional Heimat. Major clefs also existed between academic and popular usage of the term. Translated as “tribe,” *Stamm* was often used in historical sciences, cultural works, and linguistic analysis to refer to the ancient Germanic tribes and the influence of their historical settlement patterns on regional spaces. The tribes’ historic influence deeply shaped many aspects of regional culture and dialect in modern Germany. The

translation of the term *Stamm* as “tribe,” however, does not properly render the fluid connotations of the German term. It could refer to the ancient Germanic tribes but also simultaneously to a sense of present-day regional belonging that may or may not be tied to cultural uniqueness originating from “tribe.”<sup>39</sup> The term *Stamm* was often used in popular contexts to describe a general sense of regional commonality projected into a vague past. What was and was not a *Stamm*, and to what degree different groups identified with certain notions of *Stamm* were tremendously inconsistent. As Kurt Stavenhagen wrote years earlier, the Weimar constitution referred to Germany as unified in its *Stämme*, “but no one can list them.” Are the Prussians a *Stamm*?, he asked. What about so-called “sub-*stämme*”? In defining what was a *Stamm* he asked rhetorically: “to what principles should one even hold?” He pointed out that tribal settlement patterns in many areas no longer reflected notions of community, such as that of the Franconian *Stamm* that stretched from the Rhineland to the Oberpfalz. In such areas, he argued, citizens had no notions of *Stamm* as referring to the ancient tribes. *Stämme* he concluded, quoting M.H. Boehm, did not lay side by side with one another, rather, it was a structure of “entangled touching, overlapping, and penetrating.”<sup>40</sup> Conflicting territorial histories, vagueness of early histories, and divergences between cultural commonality and ideas of belonging all made *Stamm* impossibly fluid. Its influence on regional Heimat was therefore not to bring more agreement. It made such imaginings all the more complicated and divergent.

The team of postwar historians, politicians, and experts who sought to come to grips with how *Stamm* influenced imaginings of regional Heimat came to a similar conclusion. Aubin recollected that in Weimar no one seemed to have any idea “who these *Stämme* were.”<sup>41</sup> The ideological bent of the *Stamm* idea seemed equally variant. While Werner Hartung and Martina Steber hold that the concept was “anti-modern” with racial overtones, its Weimar history

illustrated how it was viewed at different times by different people, as a wholly unpolitical concept, a federalist democratic concept, or— among the nationalist right and the National Socialists—a racial term.<sup>42</sup> Prior to the Nazi seizure of power, it should be noted, racial interpretations of Stamm encountered substantial scholarly denunciations.<sup>43</sup>

Among those who interacted with the Stamm idea in Weimar was Hugo Preuß, who reflected its potential to be integrated into democratic federalism. Germany, Preuß argued, consisted of a diversity of regional *Stammesarten*, that the nation should recognize by not pushing “reckless centralization.” By disrespecting the rights of the *Stämme*, he argued, they would in the end hurt national unity, best preserved in regional diversity. But where could the *Stämme* be found in geographic space? Preuß offers no answer, though he is clear that they are not the dynastic accidents of birth which he insisted had no place in a decentralized democratic state.<sup>44</sup> This was in spite of the fact that many old dynasties also deeply informed cognitive maps of regional belonging.

While democratic federalist notions of *Stamm* placed more importance on consciousness of regional belonging, nationalist scholars were more likely to take an ancient view of *Stamm* as based on the original Germanic tribes that was often more ethnic and even racial in nature. Joseph Nadler, a nationalist Weimar literary scholar, presented a particularly primordial interpretation of Stamm. Nadler argued for two groups of *Stämme*, one being a “German-Roman” group (Thüringen, Bayern, Alemannen, and Franken); the other being a German-Slavic group (Sachsen, East-Middle Germans, and East-Lower Germans). While some forces, he noted, may appear to have broken up these *Stämme*, such as the geography of the Rhine, carving *Rheinländer* out of the Franconian *Stamm*, *Rheinländer* remained, he concluded, part of the original *Stamm*. The Swiss, moreover, remained Alemannen, and Austria, he argued, belonged to

the Bavarian *Stamm*. While many in modern Germany continued to identify with some of these old *Stamm* designations, his schema deviated from popular notions of regional belonging in numerous respects. But consciousness of belonging was, for Nadler, unimportant.<sup>45</sup> Other Weimar experts, like H. Schrepfer noted these same inconsistencies of identification with “*Stamm* feeling.” He believed, in contrast to Nadler, that it should only be a force in redrawing state boundaries when it remained in popular consciousness.<sup>46</sup> The Weimar scholar Friedrich Hertz similarly argued that the concept proved flexible and immensely difficult to delineate.<sup>47</sup>

Experts after 1945 continually found the same inconsistency, slipperiness, clefts in usage, and uneven identification of *Stamm* as experts in Weimar.<sup>48</sup> Furthermore, as the postwar scholar Wolfgang Bolten pointed out, in the face of nationalist and racial usage of the term in the Third Reich, after 1945, they had turned from *Stamm* to “*landsmannschaftliche Verbundenheit*” to avoid evoking any ethnic overtones—appealing instead to “connection to Heimat.”<sup>49</sup> Reports to the Luther committee reflected maddeningly diverse visions of *Stamm*. In Ahasver von Brant’s Luther Committee report on Lübeck, for example, he reported that the city culturally belonged to the same *Stamm* as the surrounding region, but that they did not identify it.<sup>50</sup> This deviated from yet another committee report which held that the areas around Schleswig-Holstein did not even belong to a common *Stamm*, but rather were shaped by different *Stämme* whose vague borders could be seen in fuzzy zones of regional culture, dialects, place names, and building styles.<sup>51</sup> Curiously, one report noted that an area around Lippe was part of the Westphalian *Stamm* (an ancient “Westphalian” tribe never existed). The report concluded, however, that Lippe did not identify with this *Stamm*, having developed a separate “Heimat feeling.”<sup>52</sup> The situation in the German Southwest reflected the same indeterminacy. While the committee determined that the region was unified by a *schwäbisch-alemannischen Stamm*, they noted how consciousness of this



had been blurred. The identification with Baden with a separate Alemannic Stamm particularly illustrated disparities between scientific designations and popular identification.<sup>53</sup>

In the end, the vocabulary that postwar experts used to talk about Stamm conveyed its imprecision, indeterminacy, and fluidity. They invented new terms such as “partial *Stämme*,” “young *Stämme*,” “new *Stämme*” and “intermediate *Stämme*.” Through these categories, they sought to include fragmented and historically recent regional creations to deal with frequent inconsistencies.<sup>54</sup> Throughout Aubin’s reports, we see this imprecision. Regional *Stämme*, he argued, are formed and reshaped continually throughout history. They had unclear borders, often overlapped, and did not correspond to old borders of the Germanic tribes.<sup>55</sup> Given the conflicts and disparities revealed in such studies, the Luther Committee’s final report referred to the term inconsistently when describing *landsmannschaftliche Verbundenheit*. Regarding the state of Rheinland-Pfalz, for example, a state that a host of Heimat enthusiasts were desperate to tear apart, the committee signed off that the state fulfilled the constitutional requirement of *landsmannschaftliche Verbundenheit* by all its territories being within the boundaries of the old Franconian *Stamm*.<sup>56</sup> In Hessen, they argued that the state was unified by the closeness of two separate *Stämme*, the southern Franconians and the northern Chatti.<sup>57</sup> Despite such inventive rubber-stamping of existing artificial states, Stamm brought little clarity to attempts to “discover” the peoples’ cognitive maps of regional Heimat.

### **Dialect, Geography, Confession, and the “City-Gedanke”**

If Stamm proved little help, a broad tool-box of other categories could be used, such as dialect, natural geographic borders, confessional borders, maps of regional architectural and artistic styles, and influences of urban centers. All of these factors influenced how Heimat could

be sensually experienced. Dialects, natural landscapes, and regional architecture acted as personal and communal sites of memory that influenced local and regional “symbolic relation to place.” In turning to such concepts to discover borders of regional Heimat, however, they proved equally slippery and imprecise. The example of dialect provided an excellent example. As Luther Committee reports held, dialects did not have clear borders, separated by broad segue areas. Linguistic analysis merely bundled together diverse but related variations to establish simplified categories.<sup>58</sup> For linguists, literally thousands of dialect borders of different gradations could be found, many but not all of which were recognizable by citizens of varying degrees of education. Moreover, appropriation of dialect spaces as a territorial marker of regional Heimat proved inconsistent.

As the Luther Committee set out to determine the role of dialects in belonging, they drew on Wilhelm Heinrich Riehl’s partition of Germany into three broad cultural and dialect groups: Lower, Middle, and Upper German. (Figure 5-2) At the same time, they noted tensions of such a model in public conception. The nineteenth-century Prussian influence throughout the North, and historical memory of Southern resistance had, in some areas, they argued, shaped a binary notion of Southern and Northern German cultures.<sup>59</sup> The relationship between *Stamm* and dialect families also proved a controversial issue. A study commissioned by the state of Hessen, for example, claimed that Hessian dialect borders corresponded with *Stamm* borders that came close to state borders. However, a committee expert, Heinrich Landahl, in his study of Hessen, rejected the general notion that *Stamm* borders follow dialect borders. The southern half of the Hessian state, he pointed out, spoke a west Franconian dialect that was shared with areas around Aschaffenburg, that, for over a century, shared dynastic histories with Bavaria. Did this difference of dialect tear the areas of Frankfurt away from a notion of regional belonging with

Hessen? Did the same apply to Aschaffenburg? The areas around Aschaffenburg did not speak the same East Franconian dialect that could be found in other Franconian parts of the Bavarian state. The Spessart mountain chain directly east of the city formed a significant dialect border within the Franconian dialect family, separating *Rheinfränkisch* and *Moselfränkisch* from the *Ostfränkisch* dialect spoken in the areas of the Bavarian state around Nuremberg. Such a border, however, did not register consistently in notions of regional belonging. Common dialect was not enough to pull Aschaffenburg solidly toward a common feeling of belonging with areas around Frankfurt. Bavarian state identity, the report ultimately noted, made tremendous inroads in Aschaffenburg over the course of a century.<sup>60</sup>

Other disparate relationships between dialect borders and notions of regional Heimat emerged throughout the Federal Republic. Franz Steinbach, for example, presented a study on dialect spaces in the Middle and Lower Rhine, in which he demonstrated that the Vinxtbach river represented a relatively sharp dialect border within the Rhineland that separated the Lower Rhine from the Middle Rhine. This difference was noticeable to all speakers of the dialects. Steinbach also pointed out that Trier, in the Middle Rhine, was very much connected to the Saarland to the west.<sup>61</sup> However, in attempts to re-establish a unified Rhineland, we shall see the ambiguous effect that such a dialect border had on notions of regional belonging. The area around the city of Ahrweiler, north of the Vinxtbach border showed a stronger desire to unify politically with the Lower Rheinland with which they shared a more similar dialect. This contrasted with those areas immediately south. Nevertheless, the city of Trier, one of the cities geographically and dialectic-wise most far apart from the Lower Rhine showed an astonishingly strong desire to unify with it based on a concept of common regional belonging—far outstripping votes to do so in areas closer to the Lower Rhine in both geography and dialect. In short, no clear rule could be established on

dialect and notions of regional Heimat. It at once played a role while proving unstable in how it shaped and interacted with other factors that informed cognitive maps of regional Heimat.

Beyond fuzzy dialect spaces, another tool that attracted several adherent was natural geographic borders. Geographic features informed not only the experienced landscape of Heimat, it also contained physical features that shaped historical, cultural, and linguistic development.<sup>62</sup> Physical geography seemingly provided a means around which many different factors that shaped understandings of regional Heimat could be aggregated. Wolfgang Bolten's study thus argued that natural geographies could be a way of finding the borders of "*heimatliche Verbundenheit*." Bolten outlined the importance of geographic influences by arguing that rivers and drainage divides did not constitute geographic borders but rather "axles of collection basins." In plain areas, he argued, forests and lowly populated agrarian spaces acted as natural borders.<sup>63</sup> The *Institut für Raumforschung* similarly emphasized natural borders in shaping "core landscapes."<sup>64</sup> Scheu shared this position, arguing that geographic core landscapes represented central points of influence that radiated out to "border fringes." Scheu similarly insisted that rivers were inappropriate borders, with water drainage divides only being appropriate when accompanied by large mountains. Valleys, he argued, generally made good borders.<sup>65</sup>

Others were more critical of the power of geography in shaping regional culture and belonging. Werner Münchheimer argued that drawing regional boundaries according to common geography was a "Sisyphean task." Nevertheless, when geography is taken into account, he advised long mountain chains as useful borders. The flow of water, Münchheimer argued, never determined "organic political borders" in Central Europe—though tributary systems, he held, could be collective points of common regional cultures. He pointed to the Neckarland as representing such an example.<sup>66</sup> One wonders that Münchheimer did not mention the Rhine as

shaping regional culture, though proponents could be found who argued that, even if modern states shaped common identities along the Rhine, cultural similarities developed across the river and not along its length. Ultimately, the final Luther Committee report held that states should not be drawn along natural borders. Instead, they emphasized cities as natural crystalized points of influence that tied together different geographic landscapes. The committee report concluded that the idea of “natural borders” was itself a culturally constructed notion and that the influence of a sea, mountain chain, moor, heath or forest landscape on developments of regional culture was always situational. They agreed, however, that rivers were not proper borders, as they disrupt organic state foundations and regional orientation toward urban centers. Instead, they advised, borders should be placed in lowly populated areas.<sup>67</sup>

Scientific analyses of geographic features’ impact on regional culture often contradicted empirical observations of regional Heimat sentiment. In the Luther Committee report on Baden-Württemberg, for example, they argued that the Black Forest did not represent a boundary between a Swabian and Alemannic regional culture—categorizing both sides as belonging to a single cultural space.<sup>68</sup> Nevertheless, as we witnessed in the previous chapter, the Black Forest indeed represented a border in the minds of many regionalists. The dynastic state border that it represented, for many regional Heimat enthusiasts, fused with a weak dialect border, becoming the basis for imagining a new *Stamm*. In the Southwest, we find yet other contradictions between outlined effects of geography and feelings of regional Heimat. While rivers were touted as “collection points” of common regional cultures, for example, this did not always leave a clear imprint on notions of regional belonging. The river Lech, for example, constituted a particularly strong dialect border between the Bavarian and Swabian dialect families. Areas on both sides of the river divide, however, belonged to the Bavarian dynastic state. Nevertheless, feelings of

belonging in the area were decidedly split. Other geographic features brought the same ambiguity. Peter Schöller, a scholar conducting research on border redrawing two decades later, would find a similar problem in his detailed study of the Westerwald. He found it to be a tremendously fluid geographic area. While it would not be conceivable to rip the Westerwald into multiple spaces, the forest seemed in tension between *Rheinfränkisch* and *Moselfränkisch* dialect spaces, with Colognian influences in the north in tension with the influences of Trier and Mainz in the south. The Luther Committee had referred to the area as one whose “*landsmannschaftliche Verbundenheit*” were strong enough in any direction to permit unification with any state.<sup>69</sup>

Some geographic features forged more cultural diversity than unity. In Olaf Klose’s Luther Committee report on Schleswig-Holstein, for example, he pointed to how the isthmus state acted as a “bridge land” bordered by both the North and Baltic seas. It historically acted as a thoroughfare of different peoples, giving it a diverse cultural history. The resulting diversity, he argued, could be found in an array of indicators including different building styles and place names. But despite these regional cultural differences, the geography gave the people a common sense of belonging as the people “between the seas.”<sup>70</sup> Indeed, an early-nineteenth century song proclaimed pride of the state as being one surrounded by the sea (*Schleswig-Holstein meerumschlungen*).<sup>71</sup> Geography, like dialect, in short, seemed to both register in notions of regional belonging, without forming cohesive and commonly agreed regional Heimat borders.

A separate approach to discovering the spaces of *heimatliche Verbundenheit*, was the so-called “*City-Gedanke*,” which conceived of regional belonging as revolving around “radiating” urban influences. Such an approach not only revealed the fluidity and variance of regional identifications, but local ones as well. Cognitive maps of local Heimat were often rendered fuzzy

by spasmodic orientation of surrounding areas to a center. What did it mean for local identity, for example, to reside within the city, or to be within its zone of cultural influence? For those drawn in by the influence of the a city, such centers would themselves represent a familiar and sensually-experienced space. But did this imply belonging? Did it collectively shape clearer contours of regional Heimat? Different individuals having different personal radii of movement, based on different occupations and lifestyles, complicated this question. An inherent fuzziness in local orientations resulted from unpredictable exchange of population between urban centers and its *Umland*, and the conflict of different urban influences in certain areas. The influx of expellees into the cities, displacement of urban evacuees to the countryside, and varying level of postwar destruction of the cities also problematized this approach. While geographies of regional and not local Heimat were at the center of the discussions, the same problems and fluid imaginings of local Heimat came through during the 1970s *Gemeindereform*.<sup>72</sup>

The Luther Committee supported the *City-Gedanke* as a useful point of departure in finding approximate borders. Their report held that cultural spaces were not “isolated, full spaces” but rather “radiating areas” that emerged from primary points.<sup>73</sup> This argument confirmed that zones of belonging were fluid, even if they used the *City-Gedanke* to delineate clear territorial structures, such as the state of Hessen, which they posited as embodying the radiating influence of Frankfurt, Kassel, Wiesbaden, and Darmstadt.<sup>74</sup> In measuring the radiating influence of cities, a number of tools could be used. Scheu suggested looking at the subscription of city newspapers.<sup>75</sup> In some areas, one could have drawn upon local food and drink. Rural identification of North Rhenish towns with Cologne or Düsseldorf has been long been affiliated with patterns of local beer consumption. Nevertheless, the “*City-Gedanke*” was deeply problematic. Peter Schöller’s study of the Middle Rhine demonstrates many of these problems.

The area, he pointed out, had no true center point. In the Westerwald in particular, we see the crisscrossing and overlapping of orientation toward different valences of local influence. (Figure 5-3) Other areas, such as the German Southwest, proved equally difficult to conceive in terms of the *City-Gedanke*. Here the Luther Committee, determined that the Southwest was not oriented to radiating urban influences, but toward three geographic radiating zones that were centered at Lake Constance, the Upper Rhenish lowlands, and the “Swabian core area” (they left undefined precisely where this core area can be found).<sup>76</sup> The *City Gedanke* was also unable to explain cognitive maps of regional Heimat that stretched across large territories, unconnected to common urban centers. Other large urban conglomerates, moreover, contained interior clefts in regional belongings. The population conglomeration of the Ruhr and Northern Rhine, including Essen, Dortmund, Duisburg, Bochum, Düsseldorf, Cologne and Bonn provided a prime example of such a phenomenon, straddling divisions between Rhenish and Westphalian regional identities. The need to define a border between the two was obviated by a consensus that they could share a common state while maintaining separate identities. In spite of such a consensus, the idea of what constituted the “Rhineland” and “Westphalia” remained tremendously unstable.

Beyond looking to *Stamm*, geographic borders, or urban orientations, other factors could be used to tease out geographic maps of *heimatliche Verbundenheit*. Confession, for example, had fundamentally shaped the German map for much of its history. Regional enthusiasts of Bavaria, the Rhineland, Oberschwaben, and Baden often affiliated regional natures with Catholicism, while many northern German territories identified regional culture with Protestantism. Nevertheless, Confession proved of limited usefulness, given that nineteenth-century regional states mixed confessional populations, while population movements and arrival of the expellees variegated confessional geographies.<sup>77</sup> Yet other cultural tools for border



drawing included regional food and drink, regional dress, flora and fauna, or regional art styles.<sup>78</sup> The geographic borders of private societies, institutions, and publications could also influence cognitive maps of regional Heimat. The Luther Committee recognized such possibilities, drawing up a forty-page list of private organizations and their institutional borders.<sup>79</sup> Others found more creative ways of analyzing space. Peter Schöller later fashioned regional maps of how butter is processed (at home/in dairies, using modern technology or traditional methods) and maps of the spread of the American holiday Mothers' day. The theory held that both provided lenses into what areas embraced technological development and international influences.

### **Dynastic States and Regional Decision-making Spaces**

One factor proved quite influential in shaping cognitive maps of regional Heimat: modern regional states and historically recent regional decision-making spaces. Such spaces, including dynastic states, provinces, and independent city-states all proved capable of shifting territorial imaginings of Heimat. At the same time, such entities failed to create hegemonic cognitive maps. The inconsistent identifications left by such states quickly became apparent to postwar experts. At Luther Committee meetings, experts bickered on the historical influence of states. While some equated state belonging with Heimat, others posited them as parallel, or as only partially overlapping. Debates extended to how the "psychological facts" of identification could be observed. Were identifications openly and consciously expressed, or were they, as one suggested, hidden within "layers of consciousness" that could emerge spontaneously?<sup>80</sup> The committee posited six periods of territorial history that influenced regional belonging: the period of tribal states, a period of splintering 1250-1648, a period of confessional statehood, an era of territorial consolidation under Napoleon and the Congress of Vienna, a period of dynastic state building

(1815-1918/1945), and finally, the postwar period. But what historical periods were most influential? Constitutional drafters recognized that territorial histories conflicted, leading some to argue that the constitution should stipulate that new states be drawn according to “living” historical connections.<sup>81</sup> To simplify the “monstrous” territorial history of Germany, the Luther Committee created a six-page fold out chart giving a rough, convoluted, sketch of which territories went to which state in respective periods. They ultimately privileged two periods as the most influential on regional community: the period of tribal duchies, and the nineteenth-century history of regional dynastic states. (Figures 5-6) They did note that conflicting identifications with different historical states could exist simultaneously in the same regional communities.<sup>82</sup>

The early nineteenth-century creation of sprawling territorial states had historically reduced the tremendous fragmentation of German territories. Such states, however, were drawn with no regard for historical tradition or culture. As Werner Münchheimer argued, the years from 1789-1949 was the period of German territorial history when “*landsmannschaftliche Verbundenheit*” was shaped in “historically coincidental relationships.”<sup>83</sup> Such states have often been labeled as “brackets” by bringing together diverse populations. Dynastic states used their political prerogatives to solidify their legitimacy by pushing regional state identities via propaganda, education, and the invention of new traditions. These actions forged some new regional cultural similarities. In other cases, local cultural particularities were simply projected onto the cognitive map of the state itself.

Given the randomness of such states, many postwar experts argued that dynastic borders should be rejected in favor of ones based on rational cultural principles. The *Akademie für Raumforschung und Landesplanung* held that such dynastic territories must be ignored when considering *landsmannschaftliche Verbundenheit*, as they were based on random principles, such

as marriage politics, inheritance, seizure, annexation, and military dictates. The inner-German map, they argued, should not be “burdened” with such state legacies.<sup>84</sup> Yet, in spite of such random histories, postwar mental maps of regional Heimat often drew on dynastic state traditions, without forging a consensus on regional Heimat. A closer examination of the territories of the former dynastic states of Bavaria, Baden, and Hannover all display such territorial disparities in identification. The same can be said of the territorial legacies of former Prussian provinces.

While few suggested tearing apart the Bavarian state, the territorial ambiguities of belonging in the former dynastic state was quite apparent to the committee. When the subject of regional Heimat sentiment in Bavaria arose, there was little consensus. Jakob Kratzer, a Bavarian jurist, presented the state as a place that developed a common “feeling of belonging” that crossed different lines of *Stamm*—bringing together *Franken*, *Schwaben*, and *Altbayern*. He argued that the *Stämme* did not have their own sense of “*landsmannschaftliche Verbundenheit*.” Hans Luther rejected this view, arguing that there could be a “double feeling of belonging.” Such “double feelings” he held, could also be seen in places like Osnabrück. Hermann Heimerich, who had been Lord Mayor of Mannheim until 1933, subsequently pointed to the limits of dynastic state feeling in determining regional Heimat. The city of Mannheim, he opined, felt no feeling for the dynastic state of Baden to which it belonged, and only felt connection with the neighboring Pfalz across the border. The current inhabitants of this area, he insisted, simply wanted unity with one another, whatever state construction they ended up in.<sup>85</sup> Such conflicting statements revealed the diverse imaginings of regional Heimat that could coexist. Of all of them, Luther’s assessment of overlapping proved most insightful. The state of Bavaria certainly represented an important map of upon which regional belonging was projected. Such sentiment was demonstrated in Lindau on

Lake Constance. After belonging to Bavaria since the nineteenth-century, the city was placed in Baden-Württemberg after 1945, linking them with a larger groups who shared a common Swabian dialect. Nevertheless, the residents of the city pushed strongly for reunification with Bavaria, which the committee endorsed, and which was achieved shortly thereafter.<sup>86</sup> At the same time, postwar separatist movements in the Bavarian state existed based on *Stamm*.<sup>87</sup> A new postwar institution, the *Fränkische Arbeitsgemeinschaft*, brought together those with a regional Franconian identity. They denounced hypocritical Bavarian advocacy of national federalism that contrasted with the “crass centralism” exercised within their own state, resulting in inequality between the *Stämme*. The group called for greater cultural autonomy and expressed anger over *Altbayer* conflation of their *Stamm* with the entire Bavarian state.<sup>88</sup> For them, the state did not represent the region that they viewed as Heimat.

The influence of over a century of dynastic state borders, in short, had not created consensus; they added more ambiguity. This was not only true in places like Baden, but also in Lower Saxony, based on the dynastic state Hannover which pressed identification with the state and their dynastic house, even as territorial imaginings of Heimat failed to fully coalesce around the state map. A broad sweep of territories in the west of the state stood in fluid tension between the idea of being Lower Saxons or being Westphalians. (Figure 5-7) Karl Alfred Hall, in his work analyzing the Lower Saxon-Westphalian border, argued that the idea of “Westphalia” had, throughout its history, corresponded to five different regional maps whose borders fluctuated tremendously. Those redrawing regional borders, he insisted, needed to “redefine” where Westphalia was in geographic space—particularly vis-a-vis Lower Saxony.<sup>89</sup> The city of Osnabrück, proved a perfect example of the conflicting notions of regional belonging. As the Luther Committee reported, there was a long identification in the town with Westphalia in terms

of *Stamm*.<sup>90</sup> They speculated that this was perhaps better kept alive in the state of Hannover, which had frequently referred to the areas around Osnabrück as the “Westphalian part of the Kingdom.” The committee described the ambiguity of regional sentiments in Osnabrück as “over-laid.”<sup>91</sup> Georg Schnath, a native of Lower Saxony argued that in many areas, the state was too big to represent “Heimat.” Frisian, Harzer, Hadler, and Eichsfelder, he argued, seldom identified with the state as their regional Heimat. However, such areas could maintain their own sense of Heimat while belonging to a different state. The good citizen of the state, he concluded, was always a good friend of Heimat, even when state and Heimat did not overlap.<sup>92</sup>

Historical memory of nineteenth-century Prussian provinces, which had historically less power and had not utilized propaganda to the same extent, similarly proved highly influential on mental maps of Heimat. The Luther Committee noted how both the Rhenish and Westphalian Prussian provinces supported private societies, institutions, publications, and social events that informed *landsmannschaftliche Verbundenheit*.<sup>93</sup> Adolf Süsterhenn, a committee member from Cologne, asserted that throughout the Rhineland, a common feeling of regional belonging emerged after 1815 that corresponded to the borders of the old Rhine province. He compared the phenomenon to the influence of dynastic states. Süsterhenn certainly noted separating histories and dialect borders between the North and South of the Rhineland.<sup>94</sup> The state of Rheinland-Pfalz, by contrast, argued that the unity of the Rhineland was a historical fiction, insisting that the South had always suffered under the hegemony of the North. The area of the Mosel, which included cities such as Trier, belonged, they opined, to a separate regional culture.<sup>95</sup> Many Heimat enthusiasts, however, often held opposite opinions, as the 1956 referendum movements demonstrate. Even if politically separated after 1945, a prominent institution, the newly-formed *Rheinische Heimatbund*, argued for the cultural unity of the North and South Rhineland. As

Adolf Flecken, the president of the institution argued in a speech in Trier, their society fought for a vision of the Rhineland that stretched from Cologne to Mainz and Trier. He insisted that they would vigorously fight the notion that the Rhineland included only the cities of the Northern Rhine. Nevertheless, he noted that the borders of their Heimat society did not entirely overlap with the old Rhine province, leaving out certain areas and adding others. Mainz and Worms, for example, belonged to their Heimat society though they had not belonged to the Rhine province.<sup>96</sup>

While the committee privileged nineteenth-century states, they also found ambiguities in cognitive maps of regional Heimat that resulted from states in other historical periods. This was well illustrated in Schleswig-Holstein. The state on the far northern national border existed in a similar territorial form since the Middle Ages. As Deyn reported to the committee, regional identity in this area was founded upon the medieval unity of the two states, with the phrase “forever unified” (*up ewig ungedeelt*) being key to regional self-understanding. Klose’s report to the committee agreed, and argued that this unity was strengthened during the nineteenth-century Danish struggles to annex Schleswig. Klose argued against dissolving Schleswig-Holstein into a larger state, as it would loosen the sense of regional bonding between the states which maintained the integrity of the national border. In spite of the long history of statehood, however, cognitive maps of regional Heimat turned out to be anything but stable. A great source of ambiguity arose from the role and influence of the Hanseatic cities Lübeck and Hamburg. The former had just become a part of Schleswig-Holstein, while the latter represented a crucial urban center point. Deyn and Klose’s reports to the Luther Committee differed strongly on how this influences regional belonging.<sup>97</sup> The Hanseatic cities and the surrounding territories certainly shared common dialects and cultural practices with the surrounding territorial states. At the same time, they differed in their long histories as independent decision-making spaces, that were

additionally oriented toward maritime trade networks. Ahasver von Brandt, in a Luther Committee report on the Hanseatic cities, wrote the high degree of trans-territorial identification with one another was “baffling.” It contrasted, he argued, with a weaker notion of common regional feeling with areas immediately surrounding their individual cities. He traced the cities’ diverging regional identification to the cities’ histories as separate decision-making spaces. The lack of Lübecker Heimat sentiment for Schleswig-Holstein, Brandt, argued, was manifested by the attempts of the *Schleswig-Holsteinische Heimatbund* to establish themselves in the city—to no avail. While not advocating a return to independence, Brandt argued that *landsmannschaftliche Verbundenheit* required giving the Hanseatic cities a special status.<sup>98</sup>

The Luther Committee also recognized such ambiguities in regards to Heimat sentiment in Hamburg. They reported that most living in Hamburg came from surrounding areas that were similar in terms of culture and *Stamm*. The city’s history of political independence, however, had often given them a separate sense of local belonging that could repress regional belonging. The same phenomenon, they held, could be seen in other Hanseatic cities. They classified it as a “special form of city-state feeling of belonging.”<sup>99</sup> The Hamburg Senate, in turn, insisted that Hamburger had a common feeling of belonging based on “Heimat and tradition.” All three of the “emotional principles” according to which border redrawing was to take place, they argued, required maintaining their statehood.<sup>100</sup> Similar sentiments could be found in Oldenburg which had a long history of independence. The new Heimat society, the *Oldenburgischer Landesbund*, protested the British decision to dissolve the city into Lower Saxony.<sup>101</sup>

In short, historical regional decision-making spaces—weak as opposed to comprehensive decision-making spaces—proved their ability to shape geographical imaginings of regional Heimat. They could create a sense of regional belonging in areas with different landscapes,

regional cultures and dialects, without fully being able to extinguish identifications with common cultural areas outside state borders. As the debates on border redrawing drew to a close, Schnath reflected on this abstract relationship between Heimat and state. The definition of state, he argued, was defined by its great clarity, while Heimat seemed to have a lack of clarity. It could be any type of space that was experienceable. No general rule, he argued, could be found on whether Heimat or state converged or diverged, though states could influence notions of Heimat through cultural sponsorship.<sup>102</sup> Just as dialect, natural geographies, *Stamm*, and other factors proved inconclusive, recent histories of statehood proved equally incapable of “revealing” the boundaries of where people collectively imagined their regional “Heimat.”

### **Rebellion of the Heimat Societies**

The public release of the Luther report in 1955 generally confused and befuddled the public.<sup>103</sup> It increasingly became clear that a government-led re-bordering was unlikely to occur. But shortly after the release of the report, a time-regulated constitutional clause was triggered that allowed citizens a one-time opportunity to petition for referendums to change federal borders in states whose borders were changed after May 1945. This sparked the creation or expansion of an array of Heimat societies whose primary goal was to push for different visions of new states based on regional Heimat feeling. These societies included, among others, the *Vereinigung Rheinland*, *Verein Kurpfalz*, *Heimatbund Hessen-Nassau*, *Heimatbund Badenerland*, *Oldenburgische Landesbund*, *Bayern und Pfalz*, the *Bund Rheinland-Pfalz* and the *Rheinhessen-Bund*. Strategic considerations influenced the type of states that Heimat enthusiasts advocated. Constitutionally, such referendums, if successful, were not legally binding, and merely required that the *Bundestag* examine the proposal.<sup>104</sup> Such societies thus sought to achieve at least semi-



practical states that would either reflect regional Heimat sentiment, or simply do away with borders that separated co-regionalists. (Figure 5-1)

The subsequent flurry of Heimat-society proposals demonstrates that the Luther Committee's inability to discover the borders of "*heimatliche Verbundenheit*" was not a result of its own failures. Heimat enthusiast state proposals conflicted, overlapped, and diverged from one another. Even within societies seeking common borders, a closer examination reveals interior diversity and fluidity in territorial imaginings. In February 1956, thirteen Heimat societies submitted petitions for referendums, only seven of which were approved. The Interior Ministry turned down petitions from the Southwest based on the justification that Article 118 of the *Grundgesetz* had already regulated borders there. The ministry rejected three further petitions, including one to unify Geesthacht with Hamburg, one to restore Lübeck's independence, and another submitted by sixty-two villages of the Bergstraße to leave Hessen and join the culturally related Franconian areas of northern Baden-Württemberg. The ministry rejected these on the grounds that their state membership had not been altered after May 1945. A further petition to make the small town of Lindau on Lake Constance into an independent state was withdrawn by its applicants.<sup>105</sup> Such a petition was perhaps tied to the city's status as a Free Imperial City prior to becoming part of the state of Bavaria in 1806. Simultaneous movements in Lindau also sought reunion with Bavaria. Yet other documented movements to redraw regional borders did not submit official petitions by the deadline.<sup>106</sup>

Given the stringent rules on referendums and the wide-held view that Bavaria and North-Rhine Westphalia were functionally stable states that the *Bundestag* would never eliminate, referendums were centered in Rheinland-Pfalz and Lower Saxony. Two petitions were approved to restore the statehood of Oldenburg and Schaumburg-Lippe. In spite of regional cultural and

dialect similarities with surrounding areas, long histories of independence forged a strong sense of local belonging in these areas that suppressed a regional valence of Heimat. Five petitions emerged from Rheinland-Pfalz, including two separate petitions to reunify the Pfalz enclave with Bavaria, drawing on its historical union with the state after 1815. Contrarily, another petition sought to unify the Pfalz with Baden-Württemberg, in order to unify the Pfalz with the Kurpfalz around Mannheim and Heidelberg. These areas, in addition to being adjacent to one another, shared a common history stretching to the Middle Ages and similar regional dialects. Subsequent Heimat societies, moreover, emerged that promoted continued unity of the Pfalz and Middle Rhine. In short, the Pfalz became the scene of at least three competing imaginings of region.

A separate petition, pushed for a unification of the Middle Rhine with the state of North-Rhine Westphalia. Though sharing little or no sense of regional belonging with Westphalia to the far north, such petitions drew on a notion of common regional belonging based on the history of the Rhine Province from 1822 to 1945. Another petition drawing on the historical Province of Nassau also came from the areas surrounding Montabaur which sought to unify with Hessen in order to reunite the former Prussian province of Hessen-Nassau. The seventh and final petition called for the unification of the former Hessian province of “Rheinhessen” (the areas of Mainz, Bingen, Worms, and Alzey) with Hessen. For all of these petitions, a so-called *Volksbegehren* was initiated in which Heimat societies had two weeks to collect signatures from 10% of the voting population—a daunting task made worse by the requirement that signatures be made in person at city halls during limited hours.<sup>107</sup>

### *The Pfalz Question*

Looking at each of the regionalist movements, we see consistent diversity of imaginings

of regional Heimat. Nowhere was this more apparent than in the Pfalz. As the Luther Committee entered the Pfalz in 1954, they recorded seeing from their train windows citizens waving Bavarian flags. Their report on their Pfalz travels surmised that it was likely the older generations who regionally identified with Bavaria—as they would be the only people who could remember past unity with the state.<sup>108</sup> Winding their way through the Pfälzer landscape, the committee arrived at the city of Neustadt, a town on the famous “Wine street.” In Neustadt, the committee granted an audience to two conflicting Heimat societies. The first, the *Kurpfalz Verein*, sought unity with the adjacent Kurpfalz, a part of Baden-Württemberg. The grassroots society existed since 1949.<sup>109</sup> The second society, the *Bund Bayern und Pfalz*, pushed unity with Bavaria based on a “common history” and state loyalty. As Ludwig Reichert, the representative of the *Kurpfalz* society addressed the committee, he insisted that the Left and Right-Rhenish Pfalz had been ripped apart by Napoleon based on politics and the desire not to have a strong state on the Upper Rhine. With this separation, he argued, their region had lost their “Middle point”—Mannheim and Heidelberg. This unity, which stretched from 1329 to 1797, he argued, must to be restored. As the hearing went on, heated debates over regional belonging emerged, with Reichert strongly denouncing the notion of common regional belonging with Bavaria. Their Bavarian overlords, Reichert held, had been hated by Pfälzer, as displayed at the Hambacher Fest and in the 1848 Revolutions. To speak of *landsmannschaftliche Verbundenheit* between the two groups, he insisted, would be equally absurd as to speak of such a connection between Pfälzer and Rheinländer. Inventing a new *Stamm* concept, Reichert insisted that the Pfälzer were uniquely “Oberrheinfranken.”<sup>110</sup>

The *Bund Bayern und Pfalz*, however, held that the Pfalz was “at the Heart of Bavaria.”<sup>111</sup> Their Bavarian sister society, the *Landesverband der Pfälzer im Rechtsrheinischen*

*Bayern* supported this notion—lobbying Konrad Adenauer to support Bavarian union with exaggerated claims of medieval historical connections with the Pfalz.<sup>112</sup> The argument that nineteenth-century dynastic belonging had shaped regional Heimat sentiment was more believable. As Anton Keim, a Mainz professor, intervened in the debates, he drew on the writings of Wilhelm Heinrich Riehl, who had dubbed the dynastic states “accidental states,” but had argued as early as 1853 that areas of Franken and the Pfalz were increasingly feeling regional connection with Bavaria.<sup>113</sup> Certain members of the Luther Committee were persuaded by such arguments. The Hamburg Senator and committee member, Heinrich Landahl pointed to the 9000 members of the *Bund Bayern und Pfalz* and estimated that as many as half of *Pfälzer* wanted union with Bavaria. Attachment to the Kurpfalz idea, he argued, was primarily a phenomenon in the Southeast of the Pfalz that immediately bordered the Kurpfalz.<sup>114</sup>

The magazine of the *Kurpfalz* society made clear what the entire debate was about. It was, it argued, a question of Heimat: whether their Heimat would be politically unified or politically fragmented.<sup>115</sup> *Pfälzer* on the right and left of the Rhine, they pointed out, spoke the same dialect and had the same regional natures. For this reason, the Pfalz must join Baden-Württemberg so that all *Pfälzer* are unified.<sup>116</sup> Geographic experts such as Adolf Scharpff backed up their state vision, arguing that rivers are not cultural borders and that a common regional *Pfälzer* culture existed on both sides of the Rhine. Identities based on later political entities, he argued, forged “border errors.”<sup>117</sup> However, pro-Bavarian *Pfäzlers* argued that the *Kurpfalz* society claims were bogus and called on them to cease their efforts. *Kurpfalz* Heimat enthusiasts responded with a virulent refusal, denouncing the Bavarian dynastic tradition, and calling all *Pfälzer* to consciousness of this belonging by proclaiming: “PFÄLZER: IHR SEID EIN VOLK.” The emphasis of such an assertion underlined, however, that not all were conscious of such a

notion of regional Heimat and needed to be taught to recognize what enthusiasts believed was present beneath the level of consciousness.<sup>118</sup>

While *Kurpfälzer* Heimat enthusiasts could point to common cultural practices and dialects, the *Bund Bayern und Pfalz* had Bavarian state support to press its propaganda and advance its cause. This state-supported propaganda represented precisely the type of identity promotion that had historically forged common identification in dynastic states. Bavarian financial support facilitated several projects, including the formation of a *Bayern und Pfalz* youth group.<sup>119</sup> The moles of the president of Rhineland-Pfalz reported that Bavaria was pushing considerable propaganda and using aggressive politics to support reunification with the Pfalz.<sup>120</sup> The Bavarians also formed their own society, the *Bund der Pfalzfreunde in Bayern*, an umbrella organization which sought to unify all groups fighting for the reunification of the Pfalz and Bavaria.<sup>121</sup> The Bavarians further created a Pfalz committee in their state *Landtag*, outraging the Rhineland-Pfalz government as the committee began touring the Pfalz. During their tours, they even held Heimat evenings with Pfälzer, such as one in Bergzabern supported by the city's mayor, who supported reunification.<sup>122</sup>

A close examination of the arguments of both sides, however, reveal even further disparities in imaginings of regional Heimat. It went beyond two straight-forward maps. Divergences coexisted within the same societies. If we examine a poster of the *Kurpfalz* society, for example, it depicted a map of the Pfalz and the Kurpfalz in unity. By not including the rest of the Southwest state, the image was clear in proclaiming common regional identification *only* with the Kurpfalz, even though joining Baden-Württemberg would unify them with other territories.<sup>123</sup> Another society member, however, went beyond arguing that there was a common *Pfälzer* regional culture. He additionally argued that they were part of a *Rheinfränkisch* Stamm that was

shaped under Alemannic influence, orienting them toward the Southwest.<sup>124</sup> Other statements from the *Kurpfalz* society proved equally ambiguous. One article in their magazine held that the Pfalz shared a common regional culture not just with the *Kurpfalz* but with all the Upper Rhine. It was a land of wine with confessional tolerance, the article held, and not a Bavarian beer land of centralism, Catholicism, and conservatism.<sup>125</sup> In yet another article, published before the existence of Baden-Württemberg, an article in the society publication argued that the artificial imaginings of pro-Bavarians stood in contrast to the “ethnographic reality” of the Rheinschwaben idea.<sup>126</sup> This idea held that Württemberg, Baden, and the Pfalz should form a common region.<sup>127</sup>

The Bavarian side demonstrated equal ambiguity and fluidity in ideas of regional Heimat. In 1954, for example, in the *Stimme der Pfalz*, a publication pushing for unity with Bavaria, an article appeared arguing that a unified *Pfalz* and *Kurpfalz* was a fiction that no one identified with. The citizens of the *Kurpfalz*, it continued, looked jealously on the Left-Rhenish Pfälzer who had a strong sense of “*Staatsheimat*” in Bavaria.<sup>128</sup> The assertion that Bavaria was their “*Staatsheimat*,” however, reveals the geographic instability of cognitive Heimat maps. It asserted, on the one hand, that the aspect of Heimat informed by state feeling unified the Left-Rhenish Pfalz with Bavaria. At the same time, the qualification of “*Staatsheimat*” implied that other valences of Heimat existed which geographically corresponded only to the Left-Rhenish Pfalz. Indeed, the non-adjacent Bavarian state, with its substantially different dialect spaces, natural landscapes, and regional practices, could hardly have evoked the same feelings for native Left-Rhenish *Pfälzer* as those seen, felt, practiced, and spoken in their immediate surroundings.

Making things even more complicated, the question arose whether Rheinland-Pfalz, drawn according to random principles, could come to represent regional “Heimat.” Its borders were no more random than states such as Baden which later came to represent regional Heimat for many.

While the Luther report, in order to avoid a legal crisis, officially certified that Rheinland-Pfalz fulfilled the constitutional requirement of “*landsmannschaftliche Verbundenheit*,” a prominent committee member insisted that the state had no center points, that its parts were historically more oriented to other states, and that committee findings were anything but an “enthusiastic hymn of praise” of the state.<sup>129</sup> However, a new organization created in 1956, the *Bund Rheinland-Pfalz*, argued that the state represented a common Middle Rhine area and that other visions promoted inorganic solutions based on ducal histories. Supporters argued that the state represented “Heimat,” while arguing for further union with the Saarland. Had such a suggestion reached a more serious stage, it would, no doubt, have sparked debates over the Saarland’s regional attachment to the old Rhine Province. Whether the idea of Rheinland-Pfalz as regional Heimat had popular appeal, however, remains questionable, with the institution becoming embroiled in debates over whether it was simply a state-funded puppet organization.<sup>130</sup>

In the brief two-week window for signature collections, both sides on the *Pfalz* question narrowly failed to acquire the required signatures from 10% of the voting population. Those supporting unity with Bavaria were hindered by their inability to collect signatures from Pfälzer living in Bavaria. They pointed to the number of former *Pfälzer* bureaucrats who still lived in Bavaria, who they insisted viewed the Pfalz as “Heimat” (perhaps beyond the mere valence of *Staatsheimat*?).<sup>131</sup> The official rules, however, held that all over 21 who resided in the area for over six months could sign referendum petitions and vote.<sup>132</sup> The pro-Bavarian side acquired 58,144 signatures, reaching 7.6% of the voting population, compared to the 71,447 signatures for unity with the Kurpfalz, which reached 9.3%. Signature collection proved mostly stable across the counties of the Left-Rhenish Pfalz, with some disproportionately large numbers for the Kurpfalz along the Rhine. Germersheim, in the Southwest corner, collected four times more signatures for

union with the *Kurpfalz* than with Bavaria.<sup>133</sup> Geographic proximity certainly played an important role in cognitive maps of Heimat. For those living closest to the *Kurpfalz*, no doubt a sense of common regional Heimat was less an imagined connection, corresponding to regular movement across both sides of the Rhine.

### *Koblenz and Trier*

A different result emerged in the districts of Trier and Koblenz, which fulfilled the 10% requirement for a referendum to become part of North-Rhine Westphalia. Unlike Bavaria, North-Rhine Westphalia had not offered material support to the Rhenish regional movement. Yet, the concept of what belonged to the “Rheinland” proved equally fuzzy. As Beate Dorfey points out, the use of the plural term “Rheinlande” often demonstrated the very fuzziness of the regional concept.<sup>134</sup> Heimat enthusiasts who drew on the memory of the Rhine Province were quite aware of ideas of the Rhineland as consisting only of the Northern Rhine around Düsseldorf, Cologne, Bonn, and Aachen. As a former mayor of Trier, Heinrich Weitz argued after 1945, there should be “no Rhineland without Wineland,” asserting that the “Rhineland” concept must always include the wine-growing areas of Koblenz and Trier.<sup>135</sup> Earlier attempts at reunifying the Rhine province immediately after 1945 had failed, in spite of having received support from the French occupiers, and prominent politicians such as Hans Fuchs and Konrad Adenauer, who saw the Rhine as an important region that formed a bridge between Germany and the West.<sup>136</sup>

Before the Rhenish referendum movement, the Luther Committee failed to reach a consensus on how the borders of the old Rhine Province corresponded to Rhenish identity. Committee reports noted differences both in dialect and regional culture between the north and the south. Moreover, as Lutz Röhrich insisted, clear borders of regional folklore did not exist in the



region. Borders were only traceable for specific individual practices. Röhrlich held attempts to create political borders according to regional cultural practices to be absurd, as such connections went in every which direction. At the same time, the Luther Committee noted in their travel reports a strong sense of regional Rhenish affiliation with the former province stretching into the Saarland.<sup>137</sup> There were a number of cultural and regional societies whose private borders crossed the Nordrhein-Westfalen and Rheinland-Pfalz border including the *Eifelverein*, the *Rheinischer Verein für Denkmalpflege und Heimatschutz* and the *Gesellschaft für Rheinische Geschichte*.<sup>138</sup> Franz Steinbach, a historian of the Rhineland, insisted to the committee that in spite of historical diversity and fuzziness of its borders, the areas of the North and South Rhine from Düsseldorf/Uerdingen to Speyer represented a common cultural area.<sup>139</sup> In a contrary opinion, Heinrich Landahl, a member of the committee, argued that common feeling of regional belonging did not so much follow the flow of the Rhine as cut across it.<sup>140</sup>

A new Heimat society, the *Vereinigung Rheinland*, emerged in 1956 and presented a map of regional Heimat that defied Landahl and others' assessments, pushing unification of the Koblenz and Trier districts with the North Rhine. As one of their leaflets rhetorically asked, asserting a geographic basis for regional belonging: "Where does all the water of the Saar and Mosel flow? To Cologne and Düsseldorf." The southern areas of Koblenz and Trier, they insisted, shared a common cultural tradition, dialect, social networks, and economic systems with the North Rhine.<sup>141</sup> Their arguments found public resonance, acquiring signatures from 14.2% of eligible voters. Yet, geographic distributions of signature collection reveals disparities regarding such a cognitive map of regional Heimat. The first related to the so-called "Vinxtbach border"—a noticeable inner-Rhenish dialect border that separated the north and south ends of the old Rhine province. The cities of Altenkirchen and Ahrweiler, both in Rheinland-Pfalz, were, unlike the rest

of the Rhenish areas of the state, north of this dialect border. Ahrweiler was also oriented to the urban center Cologne-Bonn. Signature collection in these two areas reached nearly 26%—more than five times that of counties immediately to the south of the dialect border, such as Cochem which reached only 5.3%. In several villages around Ahrweiler and Altenkirchen, in contrast, collection exceeded 75% of the voting population.<sup>142</sup>

Yet dialect was not the only factor that influenced imaginings of regional Heimat, with unusually strong support for a unified Rhineland in certain areas far to the south of the dialect border. Geographic proximity to the North Rhine seemed to be an imperfect standard against which to measure imaginings of regional Heimat. In the district of Trier, signatures were collected from 17.7% of the population, while the government district of Koblenz, geographically much closer to the North Rhine, reached only 12.7%. This reflected anecdotal accounts from several quarters on the unusual enthusiasm for the old Rhine province among Trierer. Confession proved an equally poor predictor of signature collection patterns—a surprising result given the historical association of the Rhenish regional idea with Catholicism.<sup>143</sup>

### *Montabaur and Rheinhessen*

Movements in Montabaur and Rheinhessen equally displayed disparities in geographic imaginings of regional Heimat. Like many other areas, the landscape had been subject to massive territorial fluctuations and possessed fluid dialect spaces. In the areas around Montabaur, the *Heimatbund Hessen-Nassau* emerged to push unification with Hessen. The areas near Montabaur and territories directly across the Hessian border had been unified under the Nassau Duchy, from 1806 to 1866, when it became the Prussian province of the larger Hessen-Nassau. This resulted in internal vacillations within the new Heimat society in territorial imaginings of regional Heimat.

Did it correspond to a greater Hessen, to a smaller idea of Nassau, or to both simultaneously? Their official goal was to unify the people of Nassau as a people with a unique culture and geography. At the founding meeting, however, one attendee, a local postman, raised the question of the larger state of Hessen itself. Was the modern state of Hessen not just as artificial as Rheinland-Pfalz?<sup>144</sup> As Heimat society poster printed in local dialect, held “We are and remain NASSAUER!” (Mer senn und bleiwe NASSAUER!).<sup>145</sup> Here reference to being Hessian was absent. In a letter seeking support from local teachers in their movement, however, the opposite was true. Rather than focusing on the idea of being Nassauer, Helmut Pohl of the Heimat society wrote that the regional idea of Hessen had within it the “spirit of progress and tolerance” (certainly this was not the first time that postwar ideas of Heimat had facilitated such value claims).<sup>146</sup> Disparities of identifying as Hessian, Nassauer, or both, pulsed throughout the movement. The *Nassauer Land* argued that it was Heimat sentiment for old Nassau territories that separated them from the Rhine.<sup>147</sup> A forester who belonged to the Heimat society, however, argued that he was a “Hessen-Nassauer” as opposed to merely a Nassauer. Another supporter of the movement, a housewife, argued that she was oriented to the city of Wiesbaden and therefore wanted to become part of Hessen. Yet another local citizen, who decried Rheinland-Pfalz’s artificial nature argued: “As a Nassauer I am Hessian and will remain Hessian.”<sup>148</sup> Ambiguities in the belonging of these areas, moreover, were further obscured by being in dialect zones of fluid transition, as reflected in a study contracted by the state of Rheinland-Pfalz.<sup>149</sup>

While the state of Hessen expressed its support for the movement and promised full cultural support in a unified state, it declared official neutrality.<sup>150</sup> Signature collection around Montabaur proved tremendously successful, reaching 25.3%. In Mainz, Alzey, Bingen and Worms, the areas of the former Rheinhessen province, signature collection had equal success,

securing signatures from 20.2% to join Hessen.<sup>151</sup> However, the geographic spaces where citizens of Rheinhessen felt a sense of regional Heimat proved equally ambiguous. Experts debated over whether Rheinhessen, which unlike the rest of Hessen, lied on the left side of the Rhine, were oriented more toward Hessen or other left-Rhenish areas. In committee presentations, travel notes, and in their final report, the Luther Committee noted an orientation of many Rheinhessener, historically and culturally, toward territories on the left of the Rhine.<sup>152</sup>

The newly founded Heimat society, the *Rheinhessen-Bund*, however argued that the territories of Rheinhessen felt a sense of regional Heimat with Hessen. The society strongly denounced Rheinland-Pfalz as an “accidental state” of French creation.<sup>153</sup> Such a statement was not without irony, given that the province of Rheinhessen itself had been drawn randomly by the Congress of Vienna. A Luther Committee expert, Hermann Brill, who embraced the Heimat society position, put his weight behind the notion that Rheinhessen and Hessen shared a common feeling of belonging.<sup>154</sup> As an advertisement of the Heimat society asserted, they believed: “We are Rhenish Hessians”...“Our name tells us to which state we belong. For us there is no question that we must again return to our *Heimatland* Hessen.”<sup>155</sup> Others, however, questioned what was meant by the idea of “returning” to their true regional Heimat—pointing out that the greater unified Hessian state for which they were arguing, had historically never existed.<sup>156</sup> Moreover, regional notions of belonging in Hessen were in a constant state of flux both in the north as well as the south of the state. The north of Hessen around Kassel also showed ambiguity toward such imaginings of regional belonging.<sup>157</sup>

### *Federal Intransigence*

The success of *Volksbegehren* in Rheinhessen, Koblenz and Trier, and Montabaur, were

joined by tremendously successful signature collections in Oldenburg and Schaumburg-Lippe, which reached 30.9% and 39.6% respectively.<sup>158</sup> This success, however, was for naught, as the Federal government refused to pass legislation facilitating referendums. Court action to force their hand proved fruitless. After vituperative debates about territorial imaginings of Heimat, much enthusiasm for such border redrawing projects declined over years of waiting. Some Heimat societies continued to push their own visions of region. As Adolf Flecken argued at the *Rheinischer Heimattag* in Trier, his society, the *Rheinische Heimatbund*, sought to maintain the idea that the words “rhenish” and “Rhineland” did not shrink to refer only to the North Rhine.<sup>159</sup> Two decades later, the votes would finally be permitted in many of the areas that had petitioned for them. With desires for Heimat states long deflated, the areas of the South Rhine voted only 13.1% for union with North-Rhine Westphalia.<sup>160</sup> Oldenburg became somewhat of an anomaly, with the referendum becoming a proxy vote for anger with Lower Saxony over recent district reforms that had done away with historic counties. All agreed that it was a mere protest vote and would not result in the reconstitution of the city-state. Thus, while the entire episode of these debates tells us volumes about territorial imaginings of Heimat, it proved, ultimately to be a failed vision.

In subsequent decades, federal considerations of redrawing state borders illustrated the abandonment of the idea of Heimat states as the structural basis of German federalism. In the 1970s the “Ernst Commission,” would take up the question of state borders again, jettisoning the principle of “*landsmannschaftliche Verbundenheit*” from serious consideration.<sup>161</sup> Peter Schöller, during his work for the commission, pointed out that there had still been no cartographic map created that displayed the borders of regional belonging. *Landsmannschaftliche Verbundenheit* he held, was free to be formulated in different ways and was imprecise.<sup>162</sup> The 1970's, even if a

decade where Heimat found niches of restored popularity, still suffered under negative stereotypes. Had there been a push to discover spaces of regional Heimat in these years, it would no doubt have been further problematized by growing mobility, modern communication, and solidification of the new postwar “accidental states.” However, as Helmut Quaritsch held in a 1968 presentation on the “unfulfilled constitutional mandate” of border redrawing, regional states were no longer “entities of feeling” but rather, “entities of utility.” He insisted it was a positive development, viewing those seeking states based on Heimat as people fearful of modernity who wanted to climb into a post coach and return to the Biedermeier.<sup>163</sup> He reflected common derisive attitudes of the period toward a cultural federalism that emphasized comprehensible spaces in the face of anonymity, alienation, mass bureaucracy, and instability.<sup>164</sup>

## **Conclusion**

In spite of its failure, the attempt to redraw the federal map based on *heimatliche Verbundenheit* demonstrated crucial dynamics of the Heimat concept, its plasticities, and its ability to hold diverse imaginings in suspension. Rather than positing stable territorialities of regional Heimat, we must consider how subjective imaginings in both spatial and qualitative terms could be held in harmonically within Heimat without forging rigid principles according to which the matrices of communities are canonized. Rather than viewing the ability of Heimat to permit subjective definitions as “disturbing,” I would argue that it allowed for greater diversity and greater sovereignty of individuals to construe their own notions of belonging. This was apparent in how different symbols of place–dialect spaces, confessional identities, historical memories of past territorial states, diverse notions of *Stamm*, practiced traditions, and so forth, could be drawn upon freely in shaping individual cognitive maps. Though Heimat had historically

been involved in imagining a more interiorly diverse idea of nation, at the same time, imagining regional and local Heimat differed from imagining nation. The modern demand for an overlap of national-identity spaces and comprehensive decision-making spaces made processes of rigid national definition unavoidable, often becoming entangled in long, violent processes of national self-definition. In contrast, after 1945, as a scientific-bureaucratic apparatus of geographers, politicians, linguists, parliamentary committee members, state president conferences, geographic institutes, historians, and art historians sought to “discover” spaces of *heimatliche Verbundenheit*, it became increasingly clear that such commonly agreed upon borders did not exist. Notions overlapped or conflicted, while in other cases dual notions of regional Heimat emerged. The core of certain cognitive maps, represented, for others, the border of their imagined regional Heimat. The question arose, moreover, whether certain identifications lurked below the level of consciousness—dormant identities that could rise at given moments under different circumstances. As Ahasver Brandt representively concluded in his analysis of Lübeck, feelings of regional belonging were too complicated to enshrine in any single regional map, while Stickrodt concluded that *landsmannschaftliche Verbundenheit* was a “non-ascertainable fact in a positive sense.”<sup>165</sup> Meanwhile, contemporary constitutional commentaries of the concept have determined it to be a “subjective feeling of belonging” that does not have to be founded upon “rational criteria.”<sup>166</sup>

The monochronic flexibilities in territorial imaginings of Heimat, I argue, reflected similar flexible diachronic properties of the concept that made it tremendously useful in re-fashioning postwar local and regional identities. This contrasted with the stubbornly inflexible idea of nation after 1945. Not only did Heimat allow diverse notions of where local or regional Heimat lied in geographic space, it also permitted rapid and significant reformulation of its traditions, historical memories, perceived local values, and the conceptual relationship between locality, nation and

foreign neighbors. While many Heimat enthusiasts' goal of establishing a federalism rooted in Heimat states was never realized, they could use Heimat's plasticities in other arenas to more successfully reformulate local and regional identities.

By the middle to end of the 1950s, the prospect of redrawing the federal map according to Heimat feeling increasingly receded into the background. The stabilization of the existing technocratic federalist system, emerging Cold War realities, and the end of the *Tabula Rasa* spirit of the rubble years, all rallied toward the decline of free-wheeling political imaginings. Certainly the disparate imaginings of Heimat made it difficult to create a federalism of Heimat states, though this did not impede other forms of Heimat-infused federalism. By the end of the 1950s, however, it became increasingly apparent that a more technocratic and functionalist federalist system had won out. Perhaps, as Theodor Heuss, argued "*landsmannschaftliche Heimatseligkeit*" and lofty early postwar ideas of federalism were impractical as the basis for a modern state.<sup>167</sup> Still, the positive cultural valuation of Heimat would continue through the end of the decade. The later cultural turn against the concept that grew over the course of the 1960s proved more complex. It involved, among other factors, shifts in generational memory profiles, the long-term effects of economic growth, growing mobility, the 68er movement's emphasis on thinking exclusively within broad cognitive spaces, and the growing notion that the private *must* be political. As the next chapter will illustrate, these factors combined with the increasing aggressive political use of the concept by the expellee movement in a way that could potentially threaten global politics. No studies, however, have looked at the convergences and divergences of the expellee movement and western Germans on the concept of Heimat. It is to this question that we now turn.



“What we don’t understand here is why you are all so divided? Hold yourselves together! Why all of these state parliaments? Be German and not Bavarian or Hessian, or God knows what else...”<sup>1</sup>

Letter from a Silesian to the Union of Silesians in Bavaria. (1949)

## Chapter VI

### **Strident Nation as a Redemptive Geography: The Expellee “*Tag der Heimat*,” 1949-1970**

Not everyone in early postwar West Germany had home towns where they could return, rebuild, and reawaken local cultures. For millions of expellees, there was no “local geography” to turn to. Nor could they transplant old communities to new places, with the allies intentionally dispersing local communities to convey to them the permanence of expulsion.<sup>2</sup> For both expellees and West Germans, *Heimat* was a personal experienced space, a site of lost community and past life narratives, and a location of intimate civilian life. What differed was their postwar circumstances. While westerners sought to recreate lost *Heimat* in their home towns and typically viewed *Heimat* as a means of de-centering the nation, for many expellees, a more assertive national idea figure more prominently into confronting their loss. Only through an assertive vision of nation could they either recover lost *Heimat* or maintain the symbolic territorial claims that offered recognition of their plight. Nationality had been the reason for their expulsion, and afterwards, it became a means of demanding solidarity from their co-nationals.

Different circumstances and experiential profiles led to substantial divergences between West German *Heimat* enthusiasts and the expellee movement on understandings of *Heimat*. No events can offer us a crisper picture of this than expellee *Heimat* reunions— in particular, the expellee tradition “*Tag der Heimat*” (Day of the *Heimat*). As this chapter argues, the tradition revealed the funneling of lost local *Heimat* into assertive nation, while demonstrating West German and expellee society divergences on the *Heimat* concept. It further revealed some of the

key factors that informed the cultural devaluation of the concept in the 1960s.

On an annual basis, the Federal Republic witnessed massive expellee reunions on the *Tag der Heimat* and in other Heimat meetings that mixed personal reunion, sensual replication of lost local worlds, and strident national politics. In West Berlin alone *Tag der Heimat* saw upwards of 100 to 200 annual town and regional reunions. Attendance at some Heimat meetings reached into the hundreds of thousands. Expellees converged on event halls, where they peppered their former townsmen with questions, asking if anyone knew if their house was still standing, how their city now looked, or if they knew the fates of others.<sup>3</sup> They exchanged photographs, talked about memories, and participated in cultural evenings. Events were simultaneously saturated with nationally-strident symbolism and language. Events were organized around the principle that it was about more than personal reunions: it was about using Heimat to express their “national political will.” With substantial attendance and scores of cities holding events, the tradition gave the expellee societies control of a national political megaphone.

Heimat is at its core an experienced space that has been described as being “prior” to politics.<sup>4</sup> It is a personal world of immediate surroundings, community, and sites of personal life narrative. How it is related to nation and politics is flexible. While many western Heimat enthusiasts turned to local spaces to decentralize and moderate nation, expellees relied on precisely the opposite: an assertive redemptive nation capable of rescuing lost Heimat or pressing theoretical claims as a route of recognition politics. This divergence led to the failure of *Tag der Heimat* in becoming a national tradition as its originators intended. Instead, it remained an expellee affair. Few offered as poignant a description of such divergent visions of redemptive geographies than one Silesian in a letter to his regional expellee organization in 1949. Denouncing decentralized regional orientations of West Germans, he wrote: “Be German and not

Bavarian or Hessian, or God knows what else....” The regional expellee society shared these feelings so much that they publicized the relation in the press.<sup>5</sup> Similar expellee voices could be heard at *Tag der Heimat*, with the tone of speeches ranging from the nationally-strident to nationalist. Expellee speakers used the tradition to both lecture West Germans on national consciousness and to project an image of their societies’ political influence. At the same time, the tradition became a discursive forum on the Heimat concept. To give the tradition a national feel, organizers acquired West German political speakers, using their societies’ electoral influence to ensure they delivered supportive statements. Nevertheless, many West German speakers chaffed at nationalist displays and went off script at events by emphasizing regaining Heimat through emotional integration into the West. West German speakers further angered the expellee societies by defining their tradition as primarily about personal reunion. Protests at events and reaction to the tradition in the press further made *Tag der Heimat* into a discursive site.

Probing the *Tag der Heimat* as a discursive forum on Heimat, this chapter first examines recreation of local personal worlds through early postwar Heimat meetings that later became part of *Tag der Heimat*, formally invented in 1949/50. Both before and after this date, Heimat meetings large and small funneled lost personal worlds of Heimat into assertive nation. The chapter then examines the tradition’s formal invention, and its nationally-strident language and symbolism. The chapter concludes by illustrating how aggressive expellee wielding of the Heimat concept against *rapprochement* informed its cultural devaluation. In the 1960's, the tradition became the site of attempted neo-Nazi appropriation, 68er protest, and political spectacle that included vociferous anti-*Tag der Heimat* propaganda from the Eastern bloc. A new generation of youth who had never faced the ruptures and destruction of the immediate postwar years associated Heimat primarily with expellee societies’ Cold War politics. The growing turn

against Heimat was discussed at *Tag der Heimat* beginning in the early 1960s, growing throughout the decade. To achieve *rapprochement* with the West, some on the political left sought to discredit expellee claims of a right to the Heimat by appropriating histories of Nazi abuse of the Heimat concept.

This study refers to the “expellee movement” as the collection of cooperating expellee societies, their members, and non-member supporters. While this study traces divergence between this group and West German Heimat enthusiasts, consideration of the relationship between the expellee movement and non-vocal lay expellees goes beyond the framework of this study. This relationship remains an area of needed research. In a recent work, Andrew Demshuk suggests a broad gap between lay expellees and expellee societies— a conclusion he reaches partly by underestimating the importance of lay expellee’s lack of vocal criticism of the societies and their failure to form alternative organizations. Demshuk, who argues that many lay expellees privately gave up early on the idea of return, also underestimates the complexity of the expellee-society agenda, which, rather than systematically pursuing policies that could realize return, often held up theoretical rights as a form of recognition politics. They seldom offered details on how return could be achieved.<sup>6</sup> Whether lay expellees privately entertained hopes of return or not, after expulsion based on nationality, expellees often responded by insisting on their regions’ Germanness, turning to the national idea as a force that could secure either literal return or recognition of injustice through symbolic territorial claims. As Ulrike Frede notes in her study of expellee Heimat books, such books differed from West German Heimat books in their emphasizing the message: “Our Heimat was German!”<sup>7</sup>

Whatever divergences may have existed between the expellee movement and non-vocal lay expellees, the societies possessed the megaphone that shaped West German images of

expellee ideas of Heimat and most informed the Heimat concept's cultural devaluation. Expellee discourses on the concept could be heard much more loudly than the intra-local conversations that took place in the rubble of postwar cities. Their message proliferated in the media and could be heard in the national and international halls of power. At *Tag der Heimat*, the expellee societies sought to acquire the largest international audience possible. For West Berlin events alone, expellee leaders sent press invitations to 140 institutions, one-third to foreign countries.<sup>8</sup>

While a tremendously dynamic tradition, *Tag der Heimat* remains almost entirely unresearched.<sup>9</sup> Its complexity means that not all of its facets can be considered here. Issues of cultural performances, regional cultural preservation, and passing on eastern Heimat feeling to children all surfaced at *Tag der Heimat*, and are worthy of further consideration. This case study, however, seeks to greatly expand our knowledge of the tradition in its own right. Our current knowledge comes from limited directives published by expellee leaders—sources that do not tell us what was actually said and done at events. This chapter looks at a host of new sources, including speech transcripts, letters, fliers, directives, an extensive newspaper collection, and a collection of Heimat meeting programs (strewn across several libraries) from events that ranged from small town reunions to mass gatherings. They tell a story of a complicated, contested tradition in the earliest phases of invention.

### **Inventing Tradition: Channeling Lost Local Heimat into Redemptive National Convictions**

One hardly need dig deeply in expellee reports to find descriptions of lost personal worlds of Heimat. The personal meaning of these lost places of home is difficult to overestimate. This could be seen, among other places, in expellee funerals, often filled with songs and signifiers of their local Heimat.<sup>10</sup> Trauma from its loss was pervasive, with expellees suffering higher rates of

morbidity and psychological illness.<sup>11</sup> Amidst this trauma and isolation, expellees had deep desires to recreate elements of Heimat in expulsion. Personal reunion was the most crucial. As an expellee from Königsberg wrote, while surroundings, landscapes, households, routines and so forth were all parts of Heimat, its center was “first and foremost people.” “He who has lost Heimat” he argued, “has lost...people among whom your life took place.”<sup>12</sup> Expellees remained uncertain about the fates of those from their lost worlds and used several strategies to reconnect. Small groups established *Stammtische* (regular private meetings), while others turned to new *Heimatblätter*, circulatory letters, Heimat calendars, and Heimat books. Indexes of former inhabitants of a city or region, often located in Western German patron cities, allowed individuals to investigate other’s fates and contact lost friends and family.<sup>13</sup> No form of personal reunion, however, could rival the simultaneity and critical mass of a Heimat reunion, where entire communities could be temporarily reconstructed and signifiers of Heimat evoked. Such Heimat meetings preceded the invention of the *Tag der Heimat* in late 1949/1950, though many of them would later willingly join the tradition. Villages often arranged their own reunions. The East Prussian villagers of Gerdauen, for example, held annual Heimat reunions since 1945; at their fourth meeting in 1948 they observed their town’s 550 anniversary. The Upper-Silesians of Falkenberg observed their ninth annual meeting in 1954, indicating that they too began reunions in 1945.<sup>14</sup> At *Tag der Heimat* several year later, an organizer noted how such earlier Heimat reunions were filled with grievance, protest, and “melancholic retrospect.”<sup>15</sup>

These ad hoc meeting emerged from grass-roots desires for personal reunion. As a Sudeten German recounted during his town’s first reunion in 1949, many made great financial sacrifice to attend in order to see family and friends.<sup>16</sup> Such accounts of personal sacrifice for reunion continued after ad hoc reunions were subsumed into *Tag der Heimat* and the meetings of

the *Landsmannschaften*. During a meeting in Hamburg in 1951, few expellees could afford accommodations, leading organizers to rent a straw-filled bunker where visitors could sleep. At the 1953 Danziger reunion in Kiel on *Tag der Heimat*, thousands slept on straw pallets in gymnasiums; reports held that “the joy of reunion with old friends could not be inhibited through discomforts or the gushing rain.” Danziger broke out in jubilation when they exited the main station to find a replica of the *Krantor*, a medieval Danzig city gate and site of personal life memory for many. During the event, Danzig dialect filled Kiel’s streets—sounds that similarly evoked memories of a lost place of home.<sup>17</sup>

With such strong desire for Heimat meetings before 1949, it is perhaps more accurate to refer to *Tag der Heimat* as an appropriated tradition rather than a fully invented one. This did not mean that these earlier ad hoc meetings were first politicized from above—they were often filled with political and nationally-strident rhetoric. The official creation of a federal-wide *Tag der Heimat*, however, was to marshal, strengthen, and streamline the channeling of personally lost Heimat into politics. Plans for the new tradition emerged in 1949, with Paul Wagner, an East Prussian expellee functionary and former Neidenburg mayor, often given credit as its originator.<sup>18</sup> The original proposals have never been found, though one expellee functionary later recalled how Wagner approached his fellow expellee leader, Ottomar Schreiber, with the proposal in 1949. Both agreed that such a tradition would be an excellent means to mobilize against the Soviet threat, upkeep memory of Heimat, and protest the Potsdam treaty.<sup>19</sup> Personal loss of Heimat, in short, was to be funneled in a more disciplined and organized fashion into national conviction and global politics. As an internal *Bund der Vertriebenen* (BdV) document made clear, private remembering of Heimat at observances was not enough: “political commitment to this Heimat must be at the center (of events).”<sup>20</sup> Society leaders did not force the

project down local throats. While giving extensive suggestions and guidelines, they left organization entirely to local expellee groups who decided how to arrange it, or whether to hold observances at all. Beyond the tepid voice of elite expellee intellectuals, few lay expellees ever vocally objected to such national politicization of this loss of private worlds of home.

Expellee leaders issued the first guidelines for *Tag der Heimat* in October 1949. They held that the tradition should impress on West Germans and foreign countries the expellee situation, their “rootedness in the Heimat,” and their vitalness for the Eastern economy. Lay expellees targeted West Germans with this same message in Heimat books.<sup>21</sup> At *Tag der Heimat*, the expellees were to underscore their region’s Germanness as stretching back nearly 1000 years, and insist on Heimat as a human right. Events were to be held in as many cities as possible in similar form, and include church services of both confessions. Local groups should aggressively advertize events, issue extensive press invitations, and invite a representative from the occupying powers. They must also encourage churches to include sermons on lost Heimat and use East German liturgies. After church services, open-air meetings were to be held that opened with Heimat songs, poetry reading, and speeches based on appropriate themes. To give an image of national unity, and perhaps to submit politicians to a litmus test, Western mayors or other prominent locals were to be invited to give a key speech. Finally, the tradition was to be above confession and political party. The guidelines largely remained the same in later years, with minor revisions.<sup>22</sup> Expellee leaders secured federal subsidies for observances, while local groups sought subsidies from West German cities with varying degrees of success.<sup>23</sup>

October 1949 saw the first trial-run observance, with main events in West Berlin and Regensburg, and smaller events elsewhere. Twenty-thousand gathered in Berlin, where the West German mayor spoke, labeling Berlin their “temporary Heimat.”<sup>24</sup> The tradition’s full unveiling



came the next year in 1950, with expellee leadership issuing their founding document, the “Charta of the Expellees” to an audience of 150,000 in front of Stuttgart’s palace ruins.<sup>25</sup> Framed as a “solemn declaration to the German people and to the entire world,” shaped by consciousness of their “German origins,” and dedicated to a “free and united Europe,” the document declared expellee renunciation of “revenge and retaliation.” It further insisted to a “right to the Heimat.”<sup>26</sup> Historians have viewed the document as either a genuine declaration or as a sham, and have yet to consider how its language was used in different ways by different groups.<sup>27</sup> The charta structured the primary vocabulary of *Tag der Heimat*, used in disparate ways by speakers as distant as the SPD reformer Willy Brandt to Linus Kather, who later joined the Neo-Nazi NPD.

From 1950 to 1954, *Tag der Heimat* took place in the first week of August, coinciding with the Potsdam Treaty anniversary—a symbolic rejection of its legitimizing expulsion. Other Heimat meetings of similar form took place annually throughout the months from May to October. The meetings of the “*Landsmannschaften*,” societies organized according to East German region, often held concentrated reunions on either Pentecost, *Tag der Heimat*, or an alternative date. With entire former German regions converging on a single city, the meetings of the *Landsmannschaften* made for impressive events. The 1953 Silesian meeting in Cologne attracted 400,000, while 300,000 Sudeten Germans met in Frankfurt. They came not only for personal reunion, but also for political speeches. In Cologne, the spacious *Messegelände* could hardly facilitate the crowds seeking to hear political speeches. Afterwards, the Rhenish metropole was blanketed with reunions of cities, towns, and a smattering of occupational groups, schools and so forth.<sup>28</sup> The historian Matthias Stickler, in a brief consideration of such reunions, incorrectly places these meeting and *Tag der Heimat* in separate categories, arguing that the former was a reunion, while the other about politics. Both were very similar in principle and

format. Stickler overlooks how *Tag der Heimat* included extensive reunion, and how many *Landsmannschaft* meetings were highly political and often took place on *Tag der Heimat* itself. Nor did they attract more attendees overall than *Tag der Heimat*, as he argues. They only appeared larger through concentration in a single city.<sup>29</sup> The *Tagesspiegel* estimated that eight million attended *Tag der Heimat* in 1952. Though this estimate seems high, attendance far outstripped the two million expellee organization members.<sup>30</sup> *Tag der Heimat* events covered the map each year. Between 1952 and 1954, for instance, more than fifty-six cities held large annual events. Newspapers reported prolifically on observances.<sup>31</sup>

Early observances quickly became a magnet for ad hoc village reunions. Organizer of such reunions were free to hold events on their own terms, to hold them on a separate day, or have purely non-political event. Many chose, however, to hold events on *Tag der Heimat*, and those that did not almost never chose to divorce personal reunion from national fervor and politics. Many towns opted to hold reunions on West Berlin's *Tag der Heimat*, a symbolic site that also facilitated attendance of expellees from the Soviet zone.<sup>32</sup> Expellees in the GDR had themselves attempted to hold their own covert *Tag der Heimat* reunions in Leipzig and Halle beginning in 1950. The GDR government briefly turned a blind eye, but by 1953, they shut down such events and made mass arrests.<sup>33</sup> Elsewhere in the West, scores of events were held in patron cities, which took up a cultural and caritative sponsorship for East German cities and regions. Lübeck, the patron city of Stettin, saw 20,000 Stettiner come to the city for *Tag der Heimat* each year throughout the 1950's. In 1951, they shared the city with 25,000 Danziger, the Lübecker's fellow *Hanseaten*, who always held their reunions on *Tag der Heimat*— often near a large body of water that would have indulged illusions of being in their old coastal city.<sup>34</sup> Other West German towns witnessed similar scenes. To present a few examples, in 1953 on *Tag der Heimat*, 40,000

Südmährer converged on Geislingen, 20,000 Danziger on Kiel, an unspecified number of Carpathian Germans on Munich, and 50,000 Egerländer on Würzburg.<sup>35</sup>

Event programs reveal the extent of reunion at these politicized meetings, with main events followed by breaking down into smaller reunion groups. While some small villages simply held a single reunion, others broke down into sub-units. At the Heimat meeting of the Silesian city of Waldenburg in their sponsor city Dortmund, for example, reunions were scheduled for the city's former teachers and students, administration officials, employees of former local businesses, public workers, members of past local societies and political parties, former churches, old Waldenburger soccer teams, and a reunion of the town garrison. The Waldenburger then partitioned a large Dortmund arena into sixty-two geographical districts. Larger Heimat meetings for entire regions, such as the West Prussian, Silesian, Upper-Silesian, or Sudeten German Day, plastered their host city with small level reunions. In the case of the 1952 Sudeten German Day on *Tag der Heimat* in Stuttgart, the plethora of scheduled reunions even included one for survivors of the Neurohlau concentration camp. Programs included maps and lists of where social networks would be reconstituted.<sup>36</sup> (Figures 6-1, 6-2, 6-3, and 6-4)

Expellee leadership embraced reunion, while seeking to channel it. As a Berlin *Tag der Heimat* program held, the tradition offered a “time and place to meet old friends and acquaintances.” At the same time, organizers at all levels repeated the argument that the tradition must be about *more* than personal reunion. This can be seen in model speeches that expellee leaders drafted and distributed to planned speakers as examples of an ideal speech. They were to act as inspiration, but not copied. Model speeches openly aimed to guide the Heimat of “trusted” private human relations, and “lived memories” into full-throated national politics.<sup>37</sup> At *Tag der Heimat* in the Hessian village of Kirchhain in 1951, one article in the program emphasized that,

while “reunion and memories” were the “beginning motives” for Heimat meetings, out of this grew an “obligation” to “fight!” and declare the battle cry “give us back our Heimat again.” The article argued that they should not come just for reunion, and must ever remember their broader political obligations.<sup>38</sup>

National leadership led by example through the circulated model speeches and the *Tag der Heimat* mottos first introduced in 1954. They further set up the Berlin observances as their mouth piece by pushing events on the Spree one week earlier than the rest. The power of example remained the primary means to influence observances given the scattered nature of local organization, which was impossible to control from above. Typical organizing groups for a particular event included the profusion of expellee groups, the German Youth of the East, hiking and nature societies, local religious authorities, the Society of Returning Soldiers, the Society of German Soldiers, the German Saar Union, and the German Singers Society.<sup>39</sup> *Tag der Heimat* in Heidelberg was typical for having a list of organizers that included fourteen groups—primarily expellee organizations.<sup>40</sup> Lack of central organization makes the strong overlap of personal reunion and aggressive national politics all the more stunning. This fusion could be found at meetings large and small, rural and urban, whether held on *Tag der Heimat*, Pentecost, or other dates. This is well illustrated in the Heimat reunions of the Pommerian village of Marienburg. Held neither on *Tag der Heimat* or Pentecost, their reunion was a grass-roots affair that became ever more political and nationally strident over the 1950s. The Marienburg Heimat newspaper recalled the earliest “reunion scenes” from 1949, and concluded that their Heimat meetings were about more than personal reunion, they were to make a political statement about their “robbed Heimat.”<sup>41</sup> The redemptive geography was not the local places of home for which they pined—it was the nation as political actor that could redress their loss. The national category further proved

central to expellee strategies for making sense of their postwar plight.

### **Nation as a Redemptive Geography: *Tag der Heimat* and National Sentiment**

In an event program from a small reunion of the *Oberes Adlergebirge* in 1955, organizers printed a telling poem that sought to make sense of expulsion. After recalling personal spaces of Heimat—from possessions, to one’s house, yard, cities, and villages—it asked: “Why have we been abandoned?” “What have we done?” “Why did one drive us out onto the streets; treated like criminals?” It concluded with the answer: “Because we were born as Germans, and held true to our Fatherland; thus revenge was sworn upon us; driven to the edge of the grave.”<sup>42</sup> Expulsion disturbed expellee’s relationship to Heimat in a way qualitatively different from West Germans facing destroyed cities. Inherent to the expellee experience was loss of Heimat based solely on nationality. After 1945, they relied on the nation to rescue their lost Heimat or to secure symbolic recognition of injustice. One model speech for *Tag der Heimat* noted this: the expellee’s “disturbed relationship to Heimat,” it held, produced “compensational energies” useful for “awakening of a complete-German consciousness.”<sup>43</sup> Expellee functionaries did not single-handedly maintain the link between lost Heimat and strident national fervor; lay expellee loss based on nationality made them inclined to view their personal fates in national and political terms. As Michael Engelhardt has illustrated in a study of expellee private life narratives, expellees, more than other groups, could not come to grips with their personal biographies, nor gain an image of their future, without simultaneously confronting societal history at large.<sup>44</sup>

The national idea, in turn, proved a more central medium in understanding and redressing their plight. West Germans, secure in their ability to stay and rebuild places of home, could cast overboard obsession with touting their region’s Germanness and weave notions of their regions

as international bridges. Expellees, by contrast, had to double-down on emphasizing their region's Germanness. Though expellee societies were fragmented and heterogeneous, they were largely unified by their emphasis on national fervor. As Stickler argues, they saw themselves not simply as interest groups, but as the avant garde of the nation.<sup>45</sup> Most expellee society leaders fit within a spectrum that ranged from the "patriotic middle" to full nationalism.<sup>46</sup> Looking at expellee *Tag der Heimat* speeches, some rejected nationalism altogether, while others only rejected "exaggerated nationalism"—implying embrace of lesser forms of nationalism.<sup>47</sup>

The framework of *Tag der Heimat* deeply underscored national sentiment. This included observing the tradition on the anniversary of the Potsdam treaty. After the uprisings in the GDR on June 17, 1953, several organizers argued for moving the tradition to this date to bolster its national symbolism and help make it a national holiday. Higher-ups rejected the suggestion, believing it would reduce the centrality of the expellee issue. Beginning in 1955, they reluctantly moved the date to early September to overlap with the school holiday to bolster attendance. Organizers insisted that the tradition was still a symbolic rejection of Potsdam and an event of "German self-assertion."<sup>48</sup> Though never becoming an official holiday, expellee societies sought to maintain its national significance by lobbying the government to forbid other functions during observances and to require schools to teach about lost eastern territories.<sup>49</sup> Where symbolic observance dates stumbled, other national symbolism took up the slack. This included holding events at nationally-charged locations, such as the *Paulskirche* at Frankfurt or at the *Deutsches Eck* in Koblenz. Lay expellees also held provocative town reunions on the Eastern border. Others labeled the tradition as the "Day of German Heimat"—with "German" underlined to make clear that Heimat was a national space. In politically crucial years, expellee leaders held West Berlin events under the title "*Tag der Deutschen*" (Day of the Germans), with an added "complete-

German pre-parliament” that underscored the provisional nature of national borders.<sup>50</sup> All observances were to include nationally symbolic music and poetry, ending with communal singing of the third verse of the *Deutschlandlied*. This symbolism was re-enforced with yearly themes such as “East and West- German Heimat!,” or “Self-Determination also for Germans.”<sup>51</sup>

National expellee leaders certainly did not have to push national fervor down local throats. For one, the same provocative national sentiments can be seen at the ad hoc small village reunions prior to the invention of *Tag der Heimat*. “Be German!”— so read a poem in the program of the Gerdauen village reunion from 1948, perched adjacent to another poem soaked in national fervor, recounting how they must have full loyalty to Germany, honor Germany, and build Germany.<sup>52</sup> After the invention of *Tag der Heimat*, it was often those meetings farthest from the center where national ardor was strongest, often outstripping that of national leaders. The Neudeker village reunion on *Tag der Heimat* offers us one example. Events emphasized preparedness for eastern resettlement, included a torched processions to a new monument, and had in its program statements such as: “Our old German Heimat is worthy of the last drop of blood!”<sup>53</sup> The East Prussian Heiligenbeil village reunion revealed much of the same; attendees heralded the “hard core of the German border peoples,” who protected against the Slavic danger for eight centuries and would continue to fight until East Prussia was again German.<sup>54</sup> At the Isergebirger reunion in 1952, one local wrote in full defense of nationalism. Rejecting claim that Sudeten Germans were too nationalistic, he argued: “our nationalism was nothing more than a defensive battle, a battle for the assertion of our regional culture and of our German Heimat plowed by our ancestors.”<sup>55</sup> Old nationalist songs that praised their border regions’ Germanness were easily dusted off and sung at reunions. Expellees at West Prussian Heimat meetings frequently sang the “West Prussia song,” which emphasized their “German efficiency, German

work-ethic, German strength and science, German character, and German nature.”<sup>56</sup> At the *Weichsel/Warte* meeting, organizers included the “Song of the foreign Germans,” which recounted “chord of German blood ” tying co-nationals together.<sup>57</sup> Some small groups ignored national expellee leader’s directions to only sing the third verse of the *Deutschlandlied*, instead of the nationalist first, considered tainted by Nazism. At one event in Goslar, local expellees not only sang all three verses, but also included military marches among the music numbers.<sup>58</sup> In the same year, attendees in Passau sang the first verse, as did the Pommeranians and Brandenburger at their Heimat meeting, accompanied by readings of the nationalist poet Ernst Moritz Arndt.<sup>59</sup>

Yet, all of this national symbolism at both national and small-scale events represented only the frame for nationally-strident language that repeatedly hit home how personal Heimat should feed into national fervor. The word “*gesamtdeutsch*” (complete-German) proliferated—a word notable for both its ubiquity in expellee discourses and its near complete absence in Western Heimat discourses. More surprising was evocation of national *Lebensraum* by both national and grass-roots figures. At the 1954 *Tag der Heimat* in Landshut, for example, an upper-Silesian addressed their “*völkische*” right to “a common German *Lebensraum*” for which both expellees and West Germans were obliged to fight.<sup>60</sup> Expellee elites like Theodor Oberländer, the West German minister for expellee affairs, used similar language. His words of greeting and speeches at the West Berlin events referred to the “right of a people to its *Lebensraum* which it developed over thirty generations.” Eleven years of capriciousness, he argued, could not do away with 800 years of “East German work and sacrifice.” The return of these territories would remain a “complete-German demand,” he argued, even after the expellees were no longer living.<sup>61</sup> He evoked the right to Heimat not as a claim to a personal rootedness in space; rather, it was an irredentist trans-generational claim to territory.



Definition of Heimat as a primarily national space could be seen at federal-wide events. *Tag der Heimat* exhibitions, like one entitled “German land without Germans” were based on ideas of Heimat as a national geography irrespective of personally experienced locality.<sup>62</sup> As local expellee leaders in Bad Kreuznach insisted, the center point of *Tag der Heimat* was to be the “restless efforts for that German space, that is and will remain German Heimat.” Expellees, they held, must be an “inexhaustible admonishing conscience” for the national idea. They further wrote words of greeting in the program that insisted on a right to “German *Lebensraum*.”<sup>63</sup> Expellee youth leaders involved with children without memories of the East, used similar language. The head of the League of East German Youth at *Tag der Heimat* argued that his society targeted their message at both Eastern and Western youth, with the message being: “the German *Lebensraum* in the East is a matter of the entire German people.”<sup>64</sup>

Illustrating the popular breadth of such mentalities, this type of nationalist language can also be found at lower-level Heimat meetings beyond *Tag der Heimat*. A particularly disturbing relation could be heard at the 1957 regional Heimat meeting for Danziger and West Prussians who lived in Hessen. Here, a local leader offered a garbled quotation from the early-nineteenth century *Friesenlied*, which was supposed to read: “He who does not love Heimat and does not value Heimat is a rogue and not worthy of the happiness of the Heimat.” Instead, he wrote: “He who does not value Heimat is not worthy of life!” The program further emphasized again and again proving their love of Heimat and the “German cultural achievements” of West Prussia.<sup>65</sup> The next year, highly disturbing language could be found at events in Kronach, where a local leader discussed forging a new “*Volksgemeinschaft*” between all Germans who would fight for a restored nation.<sup>66</sup> While such vocabulary was almost no where to be found in West German Heimat discourses, in expellee-society rhetoric, it proliferated.

This rhetoric stood alongside the ubiquitous language of the *expelle charta*, repeated in formulaic fashion. This included renouncing revanchism, dedication to peace and a unified Europe, and insistence on a right to the *Heimat* and national self-determination. In repeating their dedication to peace and democracy, frustrated expellee speakers frequently attacked how their critics labeled them as hard-core nationalists, militarists, and revanchist. In spite of the internationalist language of human rights, *Tag der Heimat* almost never thematized the plights of other refugees or self-determination of other nationalities.<sup>67</sup> Emphasis on their own national fervor was the tradition's true staple. But if the nation was to be the redeemer of lost *Heimat* and if they were to acquire recognition for their suffering, expellees could not act unilaterally.

### **Preaching National Fervor to the West**

“The *Landsmannschaften* alone cannot win back their *Heimat* if it doesn't become a complete-German issue. The West German population must be shaken into consciousness through every means of propaganda—through the press, radio, and at every opportunity.” So argued the Sudeten German *Landsmannschaft* president, Rudolf Lodgman von Auen at the *Tag der Heimat*. A profusion of expellee speeches at events in the 1950's and 1960's conveyed the same message. As von Auen put it, West Germans were, “obliged to advocate” for the expellee cause.<sup>68</sup> Of course, national organizers sought and failed to attract West German attendees, though they loudly trumpeted the presence of the few who came.<sup>69</sup> Still, they did not have to give up their soap-box; events were covered extensively in the press. Shortly after the tradition's invention, one expellee newspaper clearly outlined how the tradition gave expellees a pedestal for preaching to West Germans about their national duty: “Through the *Tag der Heimat* we wrestle amongst our own people for true understanding of our difficult fate, and we will not stop

struggling until the entire German people values the expellee fate as a complete-German matter.” The paper continued that West Germans were not conscious of how essential the German East was to the nation, and must be taught that its reacquisition was an act of “**self-preservation**” for “**all Germans**” (emphasis in original).<sup>70</sup> As the head of the Bund vertriebenen Deutschen (BvD) wrote in a letter to the Interior Minister, by founding *Tag der Heimat* as a national tradition “the expellees in particular have made themselves into the mouthpiece of this complete-German issue.” It was the duty of all Germans, he argued, to fight for expellee return.<sup>71</sup>

Both local and national leaders used meetings to preach this message to West Germans. National leaders were more guarded in their delivery. One in 1951 spoke in mild tones about how “winning back Heimat” cannot be an expellee duty, but must be a “complete” German one. Local organizers in Kirchhain in the same year packaged this message in a more aggressive tone. Their event program read: “We demand also, that this German West makes our issue into one of their own and that they do everything to ensure that the German East as a settlement region of the entire people is never given up.”<sup>72</sup> Scores of other examples can be found. In Koblenz, attendees were lectured on the need to continually remind themselves that they are German, and that the German East was not an expellee matter, but a “vital matter of the entire nation.”<sup>73</sup> Illustrating the presence of this national missionary zeal among many grass-roots expellees, small-town Heimat meetings unaffiliated with *Tag der Heimat* saw the same preaching of “common German solidarity” and the need to convince their West German brothers that the lost East represented a complete-German issue.<sup>74</sup> One local pastor from a small Silesian village argued at his village reunion that expellees must ensure the entire German people stand together. After all, he argued, the spiritual impulses of their region was ever closely tied to their nation.<sup>75</sup>

Not limiting themselves to the press to project their message, reunion organizers sought

to etch their message to West Germans in stone by unveiling admonishing monuments. Jeffrey Luppé has illustrated that expellee gatherings like *Tag der Heimat* were frequently used for such purposes.<sup>76</sup> The unveiling of such a monument on Theodor-Heuss-Platz in West Berlin on *Tag der Heimat* in the mid 1950's presents us with an image of what they looked like. It began with a torched procession of East German youth from the main observances to the shrouded monument. As it was unveiled, the head of the Berlin expellee organization explained that the monument was an admonition directed toward the West German people.<sup>77</sup> The expellee societies were frank about their strategy of using all routes available to get their message to West Germans. As a press release from national expellee leaders on *Tag der Heimat* in 1956 held, they used city sponsorships and advocacy of education on the German East in schools to make “their issue into an issue of the entire German people.”<sup>78</sup>

The lecturing tone toward the West German public only increased over time. The 1958 events, held under the title “Heimat obligates,” reflected this, chosen to emphasize all Germans’ duty to help expellee rights to Heimat to “victory,” while eastern regions and the Soviet zone were described as at risk of losing its character as “German Heimat.”<sup>79</sup> Expellee leaders used the tradition to denounce “West German rump state disposition,” and to remind West Germans that they had lost a constituent part of their nation.<sup>80</sup> As one national leader wrote during the tradition’s observance in the mid 1950's, expellees must demonstrate that not only they were robbed of Heimat, but that Westerners had “a piece of their Fatherland ripped away, that for us must be won back as ‘living space,’ and for the others as a crucial part of an inseparable Germany.”<sup>81</sup> To reinforce mental maps of Germany as including the East, speeches and exhibits frequently thematized the East German economy, agriculture, and historic cultural production as vital to the nation. They also actively reminded West Germans how many authors, poets,

scientists, artists or past Nobel prize winners came from the East.<sup>82</sup> To get this message to non-attendees, national organizers introduced a *Tag der Heimat* book program. Attendees were to purchase books about the German East from a list and give them as gifts.<sup>83</sup> This became all the more pressing with the coming of a new generation who had no mental maps of a Germany that extended to the Memel. For this reason, they argued, *Tag der Heimat* must impress the youth with “love of Heimat and Heimat loyalty to the complete-German Fatherland.”<sup>84</sup>

Even more telling than the argument that West Germans lost a part of their nation was the additional argument that by losing the German East, West Germans had *ipso facto* lost Heimat as well. This argument required a definition of Heimat not as private, local, and personally experienced space, but as national territory at large. At one event in the mid 1950's, the national expellee leader, Heinrich Zillich argued: “It is above all necessary to sharpen the consciousness of interior Germans that not only East Germans have lost their Heimat, but rather they as well, because German Heimat has been robbed from all of us.”<sup>85</sup> This same argument can be found in model speeches. One held that Bolshevist robbing of the German East deprived Germany and all of Europe, of parts of its “Heimat earth.”<sup>86</sup> The national expellee leader, Alfred Rojek similarly insisted at events in West Berlin that, by definition, since Germany shrank, West Germans lost Heimat.<sup>87</sup> Such an understanding of Heimat contrasted with that evoked by citizens in early postwar rubble cities who reflected chiefly on Heimat as local places of private life and desire for civilian existences in reconstructed localities. For expellee society leaders, West German’s idea of Heimat was not adequately oriented toward an expanded national geography. Tellingly, one Badenese newspaper on *Tag der Heimat* in the mid 1950s clarified to its West German readers how the concept was used at events, reporting: “a spatially-large Heimat concept circulated.”<sup>88</sup>

## **Shared Views of Heimat: Life-affirming, De-massifying, Anti-Communist, and European**

The expellee societies preferred that their tradition only be a microphone with a unified message rather than a discussion forum. This proved difficult. Others could protest or respond in the press, and West German town mayors often went off script.<sup>89</sup> The expellee societies relied on their electoral influence to keep western politicians on message. Some remained on script, while others lightly cloaked their own messages hidden between the lines of seemingly sympathetic utterances. As *Ostpolitik* approached, West German speakers went ever more blatantly off message. As the head of the Berlin BdV argued with frustration at Western mayors going off script: “The *Tag der Heimat* is not a discussion event. It never has been.”<sup>90</sup> At least he wished that it never had been. In reality it became a discursive forum that revealed both divergences and convergences in popular West German vs. expellee-society understandings of Heimat.

Before embarking on the differences in understandings of Heimat that the tradition revealed, there are several points of overlap that are worthy of consideration. They included a shared sense of lost Heimat and use of the Heimat concept to insist on the continued existence of their community—one amidst the bombings and dislocation and the other amidst expulsion. While Colognians in the rubble, for example, used Heimat feeling to tie dislocated locals to their home town and to insist that their locality would continue to exist, as one expellee wrote, at Heimat meetings, they sought to convey to all that they “remain across time and space a connected community.”<sup>91</sup> Western speakers at *Tag der Heimat* often evoked a shared sense of lost Heimat to unify natives and expellees. The deputy mayor of Karlsruhe in 1953 used his speech to argue that natives understand what it is like to lose Heimat, given their experiences of the bombings.<sup>92</sup> West German Heimat enthusiasts in other rubble cities often evoked the same argument. Expellees, however, were less likely to see such parallels, often referring to West Germans was

“*Heimatverbliebenen*” (Heimat-stayers).

One could also find parallels in expellee Heimat meetings to West German Heimat enthusiasts association of Heimat with “life-affirmation” and a resource in facing postwar challenge. One Sudeten German in 1949 addressed at his village meeting their community’s “life-affirming and life-building” nature. At the same event, the former village mayor wrote about how recreation of Heimat and reunion would give them energies to face a difficult future.<sup>93</sup> A Silesian newspaper similarly described *Tag der Heimat* as providing “new energies to hold through.” An Upper Silesian described his town’s Heimat meeting as about “strengthening” and “collecting energies.”<sup>94</sup> Still, unlike West Germany, expellees did not have a common place for rebuilding and permanently reconnecting communities. Reunion at meetings was but fleeting. While West Germans in shattered home towns came to feel themselves a part of a community of rebuilders, expellee attempts to replicate this were limited to symbolic actions like one exhibition at a 1950 Silesian Heimat meeting, entitled “Silesian work far from the Heimat.”<sup>95</sup>

Another shared view on Heimat between expellees and West German Heimat enthusiast was the role of Heimat in rallying against dangerous processes of “massification.” Local and national expellee organizers described *Tag der Heimat* as a bulwark against massification.<sup>96</sup> By tending to their regional traditions at Heimat meetings, they were, as one Gablonzer noted, pushing against “uprootedness and the threat of massification.”<sup>97</sup> The West German and government expellee minister, Peter Paul Nahm, similarly addressed concerns with massification in his Hamburg *Tag der Heimat* speech. He tied massified technocratic society to expulsion, where people could be uprooted *enmasse* in the name of technical progress. While Heimat should not be a romantic concept, he argued, it could help push against massification. Heimat was personal individualist freedom and therefore impossible in massified systems of communism,

totalitarianism or nationalism, the final of which he labeled “falsely led and abused love of Heimat.” He described the duties of Heimat as democratic engagement and concern for those globally who lost Heimat.<sup>98</sup> A divergence still existed, however, in many West German Heimat enthusiasts’ association of massification with the Prussian tradition. Former residents of Prussia, by contrast, used *Tag der Heimat* to praise Prussia as a positive force in German history.<sup>99</sup>

This consensus on Heimat as anti-massification and anti-communist shone through at *Tag der Heimat*. Speakers of many different backgrounds argued that communist and totalitarian governments, by disrespecting individuals’ rootedness in places of home and by moving them around like pieces on a chessboard, were essentially anti-Heimat. Model speeches continually lambasted Bolshevism and the GDR as anti-Heimat forces. The 1956 model speech broke down Germans into three categories: West Germans who kept Heimat, expellees who lost Heimat, and Germans in the Soviet bloc who lived in the same place but lost Heimat because they lacked freedom.<sup>100</sup> The expellee minister Ottomar Schreiber similarly set up the Eastern bloc as an anti-Heimat by elucidated a theory of democracy as a *sine qua non* for Heimat, arguing at *Tag der Heimat* that: “The people rooted in Heimat are in this dispute the core troops of the free world. In them are collected the powers that sets the total claim of free peoples against the total claims of the state.”<sup>101</sup>

Finally, West German Heimat enthusiasts and expellee societies converged in viewing Heimat as harmonious with European unification, though often for different reasons. Expellee societies frequently described European unity as a means to confront the Eastern bloc and rescue a constituent part of lost Europe. A unified Europe that included the East also offered hope for return. National expellee leaders depicted Europeanness as going hand in hand with national stridency.<sup>102</sup> Using a different argument, the West German Ernst Lemmer at *Tag der Heimat*



argued that rootedness in “close Heimat” (local Heimat and not Heimat as the nation) should be the foundation of a unified Europe.<sup>103</sup> Despite overlaps in Heimat as harmonious with European unity, and contradictory to Communism, totalitarianism, and massification, *Tag der Heimat* also revealed explosive divergences. In some cases they could only be seen behind the image of unity propped up by organizers. In other cases, they emerged into full view.

### **West German participants, the Expellee Movement, and tensions over Heimat**

On an overcast day in September 1954, crowds of expellees gathered in Hamburg’s city park, *Planten un Blumen*, to hear political speeches on *Tag der Heimat*, largely unaware of the drama taking place behind the scenery of the events. Flag processions were followed by expellee speeches and a keynote by the head of the Hamburg Senate, Edgar Engelhard (FDP). The senator delivered what, on the surface appeared to be a sympathetic speech. Briefly touching on the theme dictated by the organizers (*East and West - German Heimat*), his speech conveyed his own Heimat feeling for Hamburg. He addressed the Hamburg evacuees and recounted their desires to return to their city. Engelhard further appealed to Hamburgers’ “sense of Heimat,” which should facilitate understanding with the expellee plight. Drawing on Hamburg’s past as a “world open and old democratic community,” he portrayed expellee integration as a practice of Hamburg tradition. Further underscoring Hamburg’s Europeanness, the senator insisted that *Tag der Heimat* must not become a nationalist event. Notably, his speech never referred to return to the East. Instead, he focused on the need to give expellees Heimat in the West. Despite the outwardly sympathetic tones, his speech was controversial. Local expellee leaders described it as a “slap in the face,” and illustrative of their need to keep tighter control over events.<sup>104</sup> Far worse than this were the dramatic tensions that had preceded events of which the audience was unaware.

What visitors did not know was that, at the last minute, the Hamburg senator nearly boycotted the event over its aggressive national symbolism. Expellee organizers went to great lengths to give festivities a “complete-German meaning.” Beyond securing a West German speaker and local funding, they sought to attract western attendance by appealing to Hamburger Heimat sentiment and lecturing them on the “complete-German duty of all Germans.”<sup>105</sup> Finally, they invited a series of groups to participate, among them two military groups: a society of former *Wehrmacht* soldiers, and the *Bund der Frontsoldaten*, known as the “*Der Stahlhelm*”—the paramilitary society that helped undermine the Weimar Republic. The Hamburg senator, upon learning of their planned attendance in uniform with banners, threatened to withdraw. The *Stahlhelm* flag proved a particular concern, depicting an iron cross with the years 1813, 1870, 1914, and 1939. The two societies were ultimately forced to appear in normal clothes without flags. The heads of both military organizations fumed with anger. Expellee organizers did not share Engelhard’s view, but acquiesced to maintain the illusion of national unity.<sup>106</sup>

Much evidence points to a cleft between the expellee movement and West German Heimat enthusiasts in their understandings of Heimat. Even after twenty years of living side-by-side in West Germany, in one poll, nearly one-third of expellees agreed to the rather strongly worded assertion that “Heimat feeling and connection to Heimat is something that the West German knows nothing about.”<sup>107</sup> Some expellee *Tag der Heimat* speakers said as much. In the Bavarian town of Hof in 1952, one speaker argued that only the expellee truly knows what Heimat is, while the West German, whom he claimed never lost Heimat, was not conscious of the true meaning of Heimat.<sup>108</sup> Ernst Lehmann, a national expellee leader gave a more detailed explanation of why West Germans understood Heimat incorrectly. At a Heimat meeting, he argued that West Germans were too regionally oriented, and disappointed expellees who

emphasized national solidarity. Expellees, he insisted, were unlike western Heimat organizations, as they aspired to being far more than mere “tradition and socialization societies”<sup>109</sup> Notably, while such western societies often promoted focus on locality as crucial to federalism, expellees were almost nowhere to be found among federalist enthusiasts.

Such clefs resulted in the type of conflict witnessed in Hamburg in 1954 and in the absence of West German attendees. The tradition offered West Germans no connection to their own personal worlds of local Heimat. Attempts to attract them with appeals to national duty and insistence that they too lost Heimat in the East proved unpersuasive. The failure was apparent already in 1949. One paper reporting on the eve of the first observances in Regensburg, held that thousands of expellees would gather and hopefully many West Germans. The next day, they reported only the attendance of 10,000 expelles.<sup>110</sup> In 1954, an expellee publication lamentingly noted this ongoing failure, reporting that *Tag der Heimat* found only “weak resonance” among West Germans who viewed it as an expellee event. Over two decades, organizers frequently wrote of the need to redress the problem.<sup>111</sup> After a decade of trying to get other Heimat societies to sign up as co-organizers, they acquired very few. The *Deutsche Heimatbund*, a loose umbrella organization of Heimat societies, was one of the few to join. In signing joint statements supporting the tradition, however, they insisted that politically charged passages be removed. If their regional branch, the *Rheinische Heimatbund*, was representative, they couldn’t even get their members to attend. The branch noted members absence at *Tag der Heimat*, recording that many of them objected to expellee politics and would rather stick to cultural activities.<sup>112</sup>

To find further clefs between West Germans and expellee societies on Heimat, we must look beyond elite national politicians who felt most threatened by expellee electoral influence. Even Willy Brandt’s *Tag der Heimat* speeches as Berlin mayor took up expellee-society rhetoric

to an astonishing degree. He never missed a year speaking, and evoked the “right to the Heimat,” German self-determination, the provisional nature of the Oder-Neiße border, and rejected labeling the societies as nationalist or revanchist. Only close analysis of his rhetoric reveals that he did not explicitly interpret the right to the Heimat as a right to return. Not until the early 1960's did he insert subtle references that they could not turn back the clock.<sup>113</sup> As Pertti Ahonen’s study of the expellee societies shows, their political pressure led West German politicians to adopt rhetoric vis-a-vis the expellees that conflicted with their actions.<sup>114</sup> The societies took full advantage of their leverage, inviting national politicians to offer sympathetic words and provide an image of national unity.<sup>115</sup> When politicians did not fall into line, Heimat meetings offered a platform to blast them.<sup>116</sup> National politicians preferred to issue generally supportive statements. Adenauer continually avoided *Tag der Heimat*, but issued friendly words of greeting. At the Silesian reunion, he promised the expellees that return would come. When Ludwig Erhard spoke at events, he rejected the Oder-Neiße border, affirmed a right to Heimat, and praised expellees for not giving into “false nationalism.”<sup>117</sup>

Local politicians of all political parties delivered speeches that were far more interesting. Expellee electoral influence was more solidly placed on politicians with a national profile and those with the reins of foreign policy. Of course, some town mayors, like the SPD mayor of Northeim were eager not to create tensions, simply welcoming visitors, offering words of support for their mutual “tending to the Heimat concept,” and expressing hopes that someday they would be able to return.<sup>118</sup> Others, like the Hamburg Senator Ernst Weiß (SPD) made overtures to an expansive Heimat idea, arguing that on *Tag der Heimat*, the Heimat concept “exploded” out of its normal narrow borders into a “common avowal to Germany.”<sup>119</sup> On the whole, however, West German mayors more often appealed to Heimat as a personal and chiefly local world. Two years

after Senator Engelhard caused a ruckus in Hamburg, the Lord Mayor spoke, laying on a very thick definition of Heimat as a world of relatives, friends, and everyday personal life. Rather than calling for national action, he held that *Tag der Heimat* would allow them to keep Heimat in memory. Leaving open that someday return would be possible, by that day, he held, many will have found a second Heimat in the West; he held that the world prior to expulsion could not be restored.<sup>120</sup> A few years later, the CDU Justice Minister of NRW and native Westphalian, though not a speaker, used the occasion of *Tag der Heimat* to aggressively advocate for Heimat as a strictly personal space. Using mass rallies for politics, he argued, was the “bad style of dictatorships,” and *Tag der Heimat* should be about “personal contact with the old Heimat.”<sup>121</sup>

Many West German town mayors similarly frustrated national expellee leaders by portraying Heimat meetings as primarily about personal reunion. From Rhenish villages like Hilden, to the North Saxon town of Hameln, mayors underscored personal reunion and how most people attended for “joy of seeing each other again and discussions about the old Heimat.”<sup>122</sup> The contrast between Western emphasis on events as about personal reunion vs. expellee society emphasis on politics could be seen side-by-side in programs. At a Heimat meeting of the Adlersgebirge in Darfeld, the program included greetings from the mayor and district authorities who depicted it as a “reunion event” which they hoped would give expellees new “bravery to live.” On the same page, the Sudeten German society president wrote of politics of territorial reacquisition.<sup>123</sup> A Heimat meeting of the Falkenberger held in Peine in 1954 saw similar contrasts. A statement from the Peine district administrator in the program noted that expellees waited years for a return that never came. He hinted that they should come to grips with their fate, contrasting with the statement of the *Landsmannschaft* president, who emphasized “complete German will to live” and how “German land and German cities” had been ripped

away from the “Motherland.”<sup>124</sup>

National expellee leaders pushed back at the idea that people attended simply based on desires for personal reunion. Purely political expellee rallies without reunion—which could attract up to 100,000 expellees—offered a prime opportunity make this point. Expellee societies bragged that crowds did not simply show up when personal reunion was involved; they attended rallies to express their “unshakeable Heimat- and social-political will.”<sup>125</sup> West German mayors couching their tradition as about personal reunion certainly proved a nuance. But what irked them even more was contrarian suggestions on how expellees were to restore a lost feeling of Heimat.

### **Heimat Re-Gained: Private versus Political Visions of Reacquiring Feelings of Home**

“Integration is the precondition for return.” So argued the expellee functionary Linus Kather on *Tag der Heimat*, 1952. In his speech, the right to Heimat was not a personal right to places of home; it was the nation’s right to territory. The youth, who had never lived in the East, he argued, must be impressed with Heimat feeling for the East, as they would have to realize these rights. Integration into the West was to be purely material. Emotional integration seemingly meant giving up their rights and the national struggle. Promotion of purely material integration as a stepping stone to return can be found in dozens of expellee event speeches.<sup>126</sup> Many West Germans on *Tag der Heimat*, however, offered a contrasting vision of Heimat regained through emotional integration into new localities in the West. The West German author and state minister for expellee issues, Harald von Koenigswald offers a salient example. In a pamphlet issued on *Tag der Heimat*, he defined their tradition as about personal reunion and memory and underscored that the past could not be restored. He depicted Heimat as a local space in which individuals develop, rather than touting the national idea. Finally, he pushed directly against a

politicized Heimat concept, arguing that Heimat lies “entirely in the personal,” and that political struggle destroyed it. He finally encouraged integration into a new Heimat in the West.<sup>127</sup>

There were two vision of Heimat re-gained that revealed different approaches to the Heimat concept. One focused on national-political assertion and territorial claims while the other emphasized reacquisition of a personal and local Heimat in a new place. West German speakers that defined Heimat meetings as about personal reunion simultaneously promoted the latter route. On the other side was the bulk of expellee speakers and West German national politicians who largely towed the national-assertion line. If we break down integration into five categories, as Thomas Grosser does, we find that expellee speakers at *Tag der Heimat* generally rejected one of them. They embraced “systematic integration” (legal integration), “cognitive integration” (acquiring knowledge of surroundings), “structural integration” (economic integration), and to some degree, “social integration” (creating new social networks). Anathema to most expellee leaders was “identificational-emotional integration”– positive emotional affiliation with new places of home.<sup>128</sup> They believed that such integration would lead them to cease to exist as a people and recognize the legitimacy of expulsion. It would decouple personal loss from national-political struggle, a link that they sought to maintain at all costs.

Maintaining this link required a vigorous “politics of self-delusion,” a term applied to the expellee society agenda by youth protestors in the 1960's.<sup>129</sup> This consisted of conveying to themselves and lay expellees, far beyond the early years, the patent illusion that return was possible through national-political assertion. *Tag der Heimat* proved an ideal venue to push this message. The vision of the expellee societies, however, was more complicated than simply territorial reacquisition and return. They never had concrete plans or detailed visions of how either could work in practice. They satiated emotional desires for recognition of injustice by

asserting theoretical rights to territory. Insistence on such theoretical rights constantly fluctuated between illusions of return and symbolic recognition politics. Notably, the cascades of *Tag der Heimat* speeches about their right to the East demonstrate an astonishing silence: they almost never offered the slightest detail about what territorial reacquisition and return would look like or how it could be achieved, beyond qualifying that it would not be through armed conflict. While achieving actual return would have required elaborate planning, simple assertion of theoretical rights was sufficient to pursue symbolic recognition of the expellee plight.

Questions of a right to return were deeply intertwined with questions of integration into the West. Expellee integration was a complex affair, with a conflicting historiography. In the early years, cut-throat competition between West Germans and expellees over resources was a constant source of tension, but softened after the late 1940s following greater material integration. From the Economic Miracle to the 1980s, both scholars and the West German public touted a rapid successful integration.<sup>130</sup> Subsequent scholars, partly by changing conceptions of what constitutes “successful integration,” have challenged this thesis, rightly pointing to continued economic inequalities and ongoing cultural tensions.<sup>131</sup> Such works, however, have rarely offered concrete definitions of successful integration, referring to any tensions as evidence of failure. In 1945, many West Germans measured failed integration against fears that such an occurrence would topple their infant democracy. Some contemporary scholars, however, have openly asserted the thesis of failed integration.<sup>132</sup> Andreas Kossert, a key proponent of expellee memorialization, advances this notion; he points to the “hard-heartedness” of West Germans as the key explanatory factor, with West Germans, he argues, filled with pervasive hatred and even racial animus toward expellees. Expellees, by contrast, he argues, were “ideal” figures of integration and if anything exhibited an exaggerated conformism.<sup>133</sup> The existence of mixed



hostilities from West Germans has been clearly established, though other works offer more balance. Michael von Engelhardt separates expellees into young eager assimilators and the middle-aged to elderly who maintained double identities or rejected integration.<sup>134</sup> Other scholars hold that prolonged hopes for return inhibited integration.<sup>135</sup> No consensus exists on when “successful integration” occurred, with positions ranging from the 1950s to the 1970s and beyond.<sup>136</sup>

*Tag der Heimat* cannot provide a full picture of integration, but it does provide a cross-sample of the rhetorics on integration and illustrates contrasting positions on how expellees were to regain a sense of Heimat. National expellee leaders like Oberländer took to the microphone on *Tag der Heimat* to promote an image of Heimat regained through anything but emotional integration into western localities. Expellees must not melt into the West German population, he argued, they must propagate their “East German substance” to demonstrate that the German people cannot live without the East.<sup>137</sup> Local society members mimicked such arguments. One expellee city councilman at the 1954 Coburg *Tag der Heimat* rejected emotional integration into the West, declaring integration a short-term goal that would facilitate the long-term one of “winning back the old ancestral Heimat.” For him, a right to Heimat extended to their progeny who only experienced local places of home in the West, but who would be responsible for the reacquisition of the East.<sup>138</sup> Expellee society leaders’ “integrate in order to return” argument had long duration, continuing into the mid 1960's. After two decades of expulsion, the Sudeten German expellee leader, Ernst Lehmann still argued that the two expellee goals were achieving “the right to live in the West” and “the right to Heimat in the East.”<sup>139</sup>

In order to maintain illusions of possible return, expellee society leaders used a rigidly legalistic language of rights that brushed over the human complexities of what return would look

like. Leaders pushed abstract visions of return in model speeches into the mid 1960s. They warned lay expellees against becoming comfortable in the West, which could destroy them as a people, and swung at those who dared argue that expulsion was permanent.<sup>140</sup> Even for lay expellees who may have privately decided against return, such assertion of theoretical rights satiated deep-seated emotional desires for recognition. As the psychologists Ebermann and Möllhoff concluded in a 1957 study based on treating expellees, the most prominent cause of neurosis amongst expellees was lack of recognition.<sup>141</sup> Whether particular lay expellees privately knew that they did not want to return often proved irrelevant, as maintaining theoretical territorial claims became a symbolic route to insist on the injustice of their fate. The symbolic recognition politics behind such claims perhaps explain the high percentages of expellees who claimed desire to return for several years—statistics that expellee leaders frequently touted in their speeches.<sup>142</sup>

Unlike expellee leaders promoting theories of Heimat regained through laying claim to rights to Heimat in the East, many West German speakers throughout the 1950s carefully sandwiched between words of sympathy a vision of Heimat regained through emotional integration into the West. Some went further and hinted that expulsion was permanent. Local speakers often encouraged expellees to see their Western cities as “familiar,” “heimatlich,” or as a “replacement Heimat” in which they were “new citizens.” Local officials in Kirchhain in 1951, for example, took to *Tag der Heimat* to tout improving expellee-West German relations and their union in a common community. The mayor subtly doubted return and said that natives and expellees should view West Germany as their common Heimat.<sup>143</sup> The Lord Mayor of Trier at his city’s events similarly encouraged acquisition of a new local Heimat. Their city could not truly replace their lost Heimat, he argued, but they could offer them a “Heimat of choice.”<sup>144</sup> In the same year, the mayor of Bielefeld emphasized natives and expellees becoming one, while the

state president of Baden-Württemberg at the meeting of the Donau Swabians touted their people's common culture.<sup>145</sup> West German speakers often presented lay expellees with an image of themselves as having already put down new roots in the West. The *Bundestag* president used his speech in 1956 to assert that, while he supported a right to Heimat, many had put down roots in their "new Heimat."<sup>146</sup>

A host of other West German small town mayors at events from Schleswig-Holstein to Bavaria declared that expellees and natives were overcoming divisions and that expellees were developing a love to a "second Heimat."<sup>147</sup> In Lübeck, a city whose population was nearly one-third expellee, the mayor declared at a Heimat meeting in the late 1950s that expellees were no longer viewed as a burden but as new citizens and "as Lübecker."<sup>148</sup> President Theodor Heuss, one of the few national politicians more distant from electoral pressure, similarly pointed to Heimat regained through emotional integration. Heimat, he argued, should not be about historic romanticism, but rather about integrating expellees into a "new Heimat of choice."<sup>149</sup> Expellee society leaders, usually without calling out names, denounced such insistence on full emotional integration and coming to grips with "realities" of expulsion. As Ernst Lehmann insisted at the Sudeten German Heimat meeting, he heard many westerners ask what expellees wanted to achieve with their Heimat meetings. Wasn't their old Heimat already lost, and were they not illustrating their "insufficient preparedness" to accept their situation and integrate into the new environment? Lehmann vociferously rejected such calls to give up the national struggle.<sup>150</sup>

Some West German Heimat enthusiasts directly challenged expellee functionaries' funneling of Heimat into asserting national territorial claims. One Heimat enthusiast in a Lübecker Heimat journal, for example, blasted Theodor Oberländer for insisting on Heimat as about the nation's right to territory; he took particular issue with Oberländer's defense of Hitler's

Munich treaty incorporating the Sudetenland. The Lübecker Heimat enthusiast referred neither a “right to *the ancestral* Heimat” nor a “right to *the* Heimat;” but rather to the “right to Heimat”—the most flexible formulation that did not imply irredentist territorial rights. The right to Heimat, he argued, has nothing to do with deciding national borders—it was the right of people not to be driven out of their homes. Pulling on memories of a pre-national world with ethnic mixing, he laid responsibility for expulsion at the feet of modern nationalism and argued for supranational thinking.<sup>151</sup> Such chaffing from West German lay citizenry can be found elsewhere. One local study of expellee integration in Heilbronn notes a tension between locals and politicized expellee-society Heimat activities. *Tag der Heimat* became a fixture of local cultural life in Heilbronn, but natives were ambivalent about event politics.<sup>152</sup> Cultural preservation proved to be more palatable than aggressive politics, with 296 West German cities and regions taking up cultural sponsorships for former East German communities by the end of the 1950s.<sup>153</sup>

Of course, a complex web of factors inhibited lay expellees from acquiring an emotional sense of home in new places, including the foreignness of new landscapes and cultural practices, hostility from locals, and economic disadvantages. The degree to which expellee-society emphasis on regaining Heimat through national assertion inhibited integration remains an open question. Different expellee population segments realized diverging levels of emotional integration. This is reflected, among other places, in the profusion of terms for their new places of residence. Terms like “temporary Heimat,” “flight Heimat,” “place of flight,” “place of residence,” “new living environment”, and “forced Heimat” suggested temporary and/or non-emotive relationships to such places; those suggesting a degree of affinity included “Heimat place,” “replacement Heimat,” or “second Heimat.” Among many expellees, an emotional integration anxiety was discernable. This extended beyond the early years, in which expellee peer

pressure not to integrate was embodied in the phrase: “beware he who unpacks his suitcase.”<sup>154</sup> In the late 1950's, the expellee folklorist, Josef Hanika, writing on the “process of changing Heimat” (*Prozeß der Umheimatung*) noted the tensions of “double-heimatedness” in which many expellees incorrectly viewed acquiring a second Heimat as rejecting the old one. Hanika held that after over a decade, far too many expellees still saw their expulsion as provisional.<sup>155</sup> As the West Prussian, and editor of *Die Welt* noted on *Tag der Heimat*, as expellees increasingly found a new existence, they feared this meant forgetting their Heimat. The West Germans, however, he argued, had long since accepted them as fellow citizens.<sup>156</sup>

As the years dragged on, West Germans became increasingly impatient with expellee societies' politically dangerous emphasis on rights to return. Some regional states even began bypassing expellee Heimat meetings altogether by holding their own pan-Heimat festivals to instill expellees with a new feeling of Heimat in the West. The state of Hessen arranged such a yearly event, followed by Baden-Württemberg, whose festival sought to promote a “free, pluralistic, and Heimat-connected democratic life form” that they argued would contrast with the Communist East.<sup>157</sup> The expellee functionaries were outraged and denounced such events. Taking a direct shot at West German Heimat enthusiasts, one model speech years later insisted that they understood those who wanted to go on foot to Cologne, see the North Sea waves, or sing about their Heimat in the Westerwald. But West Germans, they insisted, “for heavens sake,” must understand desire for Heimat in the mountains of Silesia and the dark forests of East Prussia. Finally, the speech depicted expellees as the true “advocates of the Heimat concept.”<sup>158</sup>

Throughout the 1960s, with prospects of *rapprochement* with the East growing, illusions of return seeming ever more absurd, and expellee children coming of age in the West, many formerly sympathetic West Germans cringed at the ever more strident national tones coming out

of *Tag der Heimat*. Expellee rhetoric at the tradition succeeded in provoking a new generation of West German students, the Soviet propaganda machine, and even older generations of West Germans. As one West German wrote in a letter to the editor in the *Saarbrücker Zeitung* on *Tag der Heimat* in the mid 1960's—he supported and sympathized with the expellees, but was increasingly concerned about the harsh, threatening tones of events which rejected compromise.<sup>159</sup> Subtle critiques in mayoral speeches quickly become more blatant. The mayor of Biberach, for example, frustrated at expellee insistence that their children had Heimat in the East, asked rhetorically in his speech what Heimat truly means if it is a place that one never experienced? A local expellee subsequently wrote to national leaders to report that the mayor was not on their side.<sup>160</sup> As *Ostpolitik* took center stage, so too would the heated conflicts that had formerly been concealed behind nuances and event scenery.

### **Heimat in the Cross-hairs of Cold-War Politics**

In the iconic year of 1968, *Tag der Heimat* did not lack for drama. In West Berlin, it began with false rumors that the allies would ban events. With national elections looming, observances were to emphasize national stridency even more thickly. West Berlin events were titled the “Day of the Germans,” opening with an “entire-German pre-parliament.” It did not begin well. Parliament participants included fifteen Neo-Nazi NPD members whom organizers refused to ban. They were only blocked from speaking by other participants who showed up early to fill the speaking list. The turmoil, however, was just beginning when attendees converged on the outdoor auditorium for the main events. As the rain poured, leftists students and Neo-Nazis crashed the event and broke out in fist-fights. As expellees waited for speeches to begin, the West Berlin mayor, Klaus Schütz, a supporter of *Ostpolitik*, took to the stage. Neo-Nazis then

unrolled a large sign declaring they would “never betray the Heimat;” leftists students began shouting down the speaker, and fist-fights again ensued. Mayor Schütz denounced radicals on both sides from the podium, while the German Youth of the East chanted to drown out the protestors. Neo-Nazis shouted “Sieg Heil” while leftists students sang the “*Internationale*.” After police separated the groups, the NPD distributed party literature. As if nothing more could go wrong, a bomb exploded in a West Berlin apartment. Police suspected that it was intended for *Tag der Heimat*, with leaflets protesting the event found at the scene. When all was said and done, the Soviet ambassador lodged protests with the western powers. As per tradition by that year, the Eastern propaganda machine churned out a slew of attack articles which regularly described *Tag der Heimat* as a Nazi military meeting led by SS-functionaries, orchestrated by the CIA, and resembling a Sabbat.<sup>161</sup>

Throughout the 1950s, expellee politics at *Tag der Heimat* rarely caused such an uproar. Prospects of return did not seem so patently absurd in these earlier years. By the 1960's, things were changing. Not only did return seem absurd to westerners, making the assertion of theoretical rights all the more tenuous, expellees also felt more palpably that the state might renounce these theoretical claims to the East. In turn, political tones became more virulent as expellee societies fiercely wielded the Heimat concept against *rapprochement* with the Eastern bloc. By bringing Heimat more firmly into a sphere of international political struggle, the concept became embroiled in a discursive arena different from the intra-local discourses found in early rubble cities. The Colognean or Lübecker dialect poet writing about Heimat as lost personal memories, intimate communities, and destroyed local landscapes could hardly be heard in other German cities, much less by leaders in Moscow, London, or Washington. Nor did they prove a threat to global stability, as did expellee society claims to a “right to the ancestral Heimat.”

Moreover, by the mid 1960's, West German desires for *Heimat* had been satiated by reconstruction, stability, and restored communities. A new generation of youth emerged that had never lost *Heimat* and associated the concept increasingly with its loud, political, and nationally-strident use by expellee organizations. The intersection of these developments strongly informed the concept's subsequent cultural devaluation.

Though Cold War politics had always been a part of *Tag der Heimat*, it first provoked a strong response from the Eastern bloc beginning in the mid to late 1950's, after which the tradition slowly became an international political spectacle. In earlier years, the Eastern bloc occasionally reacted to events. One communist newspaper in 1951 labeled *Tag der Heimat* the "Day of the *Wehrmacht*," denouncing expellees' "crocodile tears." Expellee integration in the GDR, the paper opined, had already been solved.<sup>162</sup> Three years later, a communist group threatened to invade events in Oldenburg, though event crashing was rare in the 1950s.<sup>163</sup> The 1955 events in West Berlin, held for the first time as a "Day of the Germans," was the first to attract serious attention from the bloc. Seven-hundred communists protested, while the eastern press denounced it as a Day of "Brown Pan-Germanism," led by Nazi mass murderers. The SS-organizers, the Eastern press argued, were led by the capitalists elite, salivating over the eastern resources; the event was, they reported, also orchestrated by the CIA to acquire spies in the East. That year, the bloc also reacted to "border meetings," *Tag der Heimat* reunions of eastern villages like the Sudeten German Dreisselberger, held in towns on West Germany's eastern-most border. Czech police that year lined the border with machine guns.<sup>164</sup>

From 1956 to 1959, such propaganda attacks grew into a permanent feature of the *Tag der Heimat*. The GDR even distributed fliers at events on forged expellee-society letterhead, depicting speakers as exploitive militarist capitalists who subverted social justice.<sup>165</sup> The eastern



press continued to attack the tradition as an SS- and capitalist, militarist, and “fascist meeting” to prepare for a military conquest. GDR citizens could read about how expellee leaders pushed on their tear ducts, rattled their sabers, and pushed Hitler’s goal of a “re-ordering of East European space.” By the end of the decade, the tradition had become a full-fledged international problem. The GDR press noted that the events in West Berlin complicated ongoing negotiations with the United States, while the West German government even arranged to have Heimat meetings delayed and moved so as not to complicate diplomatic negotiations.<sup>166</sup>

Throughout the 1960's, bloc propaganda reached absurd proportion, with *Tag der Heimat* article titles reading: “Strauss and Brandt mobilizing SS murder-groups in NATO-Headquarter West Berlin” or “Witches Sabbat in West Berlin.” Political cartoons depicted Willy Brandt as West Berlin mayor pouring money onto SS soldiers beating drums of revenge, while another following Ludwig Erhard’s Heimat meeting speech, depicted him parachuting into Silesia with a skull military uniform, and a rifle, breaking a Polish flag, with a German eagle beladen with missiles. The GDR further distributed leaflets in West Berlin during events calling the people to arms against the “clique of reactionary Prussian *Junker* and industrial barons” responsible for the tradition. It concluded that if organizers were honest about their intentions, they would put up swastikas and chant things like “Jews, Negros, Bolshevists, it is time to get rid of you.”<sup>167</sup> The Eastern press heard expellee voices that depicted the bloc as an anti-Heimat, and did not leave the challenge unanswered. During *Tag der Heimat* in 1960, an East Berlin newspaper wrote of how the West was the real anti-Heimat. The Heimat concept, the paper argued, was a “beautiful and intimate word of the German language, but the imperialists have poisoned it, and have abused it for purposes of military conquest.” The article equated expellee ideas of Heimat with Nazi conceptions, abusing the concept for expansion plans. It concluded that those who truly

love Heimat should turn away from “false prophets” and “rat catcher melody” of the capitalist *Tag der Heimat* organizers who wanted to conquer eastern industries.<sup>168</sup>

The shrill voices from the Eastern bloc raised allied concerns, and attracted added Western press scrutiny to nationally strident tones at *Tag der Heimat*. Both London and Paris expressed misgivings about the tradition, while the British had to reassure eastern bloc countries that the events did not threaten their territorial integrity.<sup>169</sup> In London, *The Times* reported on how *Tag der Heimat* was “designed to keep irredentism alive,” and the paper denounced Adenauer’s address at another 1960 Heimat meeting as fueling the flames of irredentism, calling such meetings a “disturbing a reminder of latent German nationalism.” Several months later, in the days before *Tag der Heimat*, *The Times* re-iterated denunciation of the tradition as a survived nationalist bastion, charges that the expellee leadership angrily rejected.<sup>170</sup> The allies, however, found themselves in the awkward position of defending expellee rights to hold the event based on freedom of speech, as the Eastern bloc protested by blocking West German travel to East Berlin and rolling out tanks onto the street. Walter Ulbricht also delivered an address on *Tag der Heimat* denouncing use of West Berlin for “revanchism and preparation for war.”<sup>171</sup>

The Eastern bloc was not the only emerging political problem at *Tag der Heimat*. Expellee organizers were at a loss as to how to deal both with increasing Neo-Nazi attempts to appropriate their cause and how to deal with growing acerbic criticism from leftist students. Both groups kept showing up at events. By the 1960s, they also faced the added problem of growing opposition from mainstream politicians and West Germans. NPD event crashing made for particularly poor optics and frustrated expellee society attempts to portray themselves as the patriotic avant garde that eschewed exaggerated nationalism. At events like one in Frankfurt in 1964, Neo-Nazis distributed nationalist leaflets, interrupted speakers, and drowned out the third

verse of the *Deutschlandlied*, by singing the nationalist first. The NPD conducted a similar invasion in West Berlin in 1966. That year, the expellees had difficulty differentiating themselves from the NPD, given expellee speakers' emphasis on the need for "purified national feeling" for Germany to assert itself between "Soviet patriotism and Gaullistic national state politics."<sup>172</sup> Organizers again struggled to keep Neo-Nazis at bay after the Brandt government cut off subsidies to the tradition after deciding it was a political rally against *Ostpolitik*. The NPD stepped in and offered to fund the event. Though the BdV rejected the offer, the spectacle gave the NPD an opportunity to declare their solidarity against the "robbing of primordial German *Volksboden*."<sup>173</sup> Still, the BdV refused West German politicians' calls for their organization to ban NPD members. West Berlin Mayor, Klaus Schütz, made such a plea in his 1969 *Tag der Heimat* speech, arguing that "reorganized National Socialism" was a betrayal of their country.<sup>174</sup> The failure of the BdV to heed such calls further damaged their self-proclaimed position in the hard-fought "patriotic middle."<sup>175</sup>

Compared to their tepid response to the NPD, expellee leaders used *Tag der Heimat* to vociferously attack leftist students. Students protesters opposed the societies based on *Ostpolitik* and their failure to connect expulsion to Nazi crimes. They regularly crashed all types of expellee events, including the "Germany Rally" in Bonn against *rapprochement* in May 1966. Fist-fights broke out between students and police, while students chanted that they wanted to give up the East. Long-haired students reportedly confronted a group of Eastern Prussians calling out: "Have you ever read reports from Auschwitz?" One article on the rally labeled the expellee groups a "questionable Heimat cult."<sup>176</sup> Student protestors again showed up that year at *Tag der Heimat*, where Wenzel Jaksch denounced how the student movement took up the "political vocabulary" of the Eastern bloc. Jaksch was partly justified in criticizing the student movement for charging

the expellee societies with bizarre crimes, including a recent bombing in the South Tirol.<sup>177</sup> A student-movement newspaper shot back, arguing that *Tag der Heimat* inflamed the Cold War and that the expellee societies supported the Americans in Vietnam.<sup>178</sup> The next year, student protestors showed up again denouncing expellee “politics of self-delusion,” and picketing an exhibition on German achievements in East that left out the years 1939 to 1945. They called boisterously for recognizing the new border. One student pamphlet argued: “By demanding your right to Heimat, you deny the same right to the Polish people;” it continued: “We will relinquish Silesia – and a new Auschwitz. We will relinquish East Prussia – and a new Stalingrad.”<sup>179</sup>

Conflict with the student movement, as such examples demonstrate, were inflected with historical memory battles. *Tag der Heimat* events, as Luppés argues, inadequately recognized expulsion as a result of Nazi crimes. Nevertheless, some mention of Nazi crimes appeared since the earliest observances. This can be seen throughout the 1950s, when, for example, an East Prussian exiled in 1933 caused a scandal not over his substantial discussion of Nazi war crimes, but because he praised the allies.<sup>180</sup> At 1955 events, Jakob Kaiser, without scandal, assigned responsibility for expulsion to German war crimes and genocide.<sup>181</sup> Mayors from Hamburg to Mainz similarly used speeches to reference Nazi crimes. As such speakers simultaneously maintained expellee rights to Heimat and the injustice of expulsion, no outcries ensued.<sup>182</sup> Others, like one Schleswig-Holstein parliamentarian discussed at *Tag der Heimat* Nazi crimes as the cause of expulsion, but turned this around to attack the Eastern bloc. He argued that the Soviets were guilty of equal crimes and labeled the GDR a large concentration camp.<sup>183</sup> Attacks from the student movement regarding the Nazi past, however, were more explosive, as they argued for renouncing claims to the East and seemed to argue that Nazi crimes not only caused but also justified expulsion. The student movement also brought up the Nazi past more

frequently. As the *Berliner Morgenpost* in 1960 noted, at Heimat meetings, it often seemed like there was never a Hitler, invasion of Poland, or concentration camps. The paper caused a scandal by printing the article with a cartoon depicting *Tag der Heimat* participants dancing on the graves of Lidice—a Czech village summarily murdered in for the assassination of Reinhard Heydrich. The evocation of this particular history did come out of the blue. One expellee letter to the editor argued that, indeed, they must remember Lidice, and nothing at *Tag der Heimat* suggested otherwise.<sup>184</sup>

With expellee societies wielding the Heimat concept in ways that ever more antagonized the bloc, alienated the allies, won the radical right's applause, and stymied *rapprochement*, local politicians on the left and center opposed the societies more strongly from the podium. Few equaled the theatrics of Klaus Schütz's mayoral speech in West Berlin in 1969. A few months before, he spoke at a *Landsmannschaften* meeting where he called for recognition of the new border, arguing that "life has relocated." The crowd called him a traitor, and the West Berlin *Tag der Heimat* organizers considered uninviting him and ending their tradition of mayoral addresses. After Schütz's *Tag der Heimat* speech weeks later, they regretted their hesitance.<sup>185</sup> In strong terms, he recounted Nazi crimes, the invasion of Poland, concentration camps, the annexation of Czechoslovakia, and depicted expulsion as solely the result of Nazism, without mentioning Soviet actions. He gave up a right to the Heimat by talking instead about the expellee "right to memory," arguing that twenty-five years could not artificially be reversed. He concluded that they should not talk about revising national borders but rather overcoming them in the East.<sup>186</sup> The expellee crowd reacted angrily and tried to drown out the speech with denunciations, including "traitor," "swine," "charlatan," "prolific liar," and calls for him to step down. One man jumped up on the stage declaring: "You should be ashamed of yourself. How much has Poland

paid you for this betrayal?” They also did not react well to his call to block NPD members from expellee societies. Directly after his speech, the BdV president took to the microphone to applaud the booing, and rejected outright his call for an NPD member ban. The drama ended with the entrance of a procession in full regional costume marching to the tune of “Prussia’s Gloria.”<sup>187</sup>

Such incidents led cities like West Berlin to revoke funding for *Tag der Heimat*, labeling it a political rally; by the next year, the new Brandt government followed suit, restoring funding later only for cultural aspects of the event. The West Berlin government further considered banning the tradition due to its use by right-wing extremists. Meanwhile the West Berlin public was outraged at the treatment of the mayor.<sup>188</sup> Other local politicians also increasingly dropped their pandering language at events. A CDU mayor of Stuttgart even lectured the expellees in his speech that the Heimat concept must not be “abused as a vehicle of nationalist goals.”<sup>189</sup>

Different local politicians underscored that they could not deprive the Poles of their Heimat after living in former German regions for many years.<sup>190</sup> Others, like the mayor of Munich, rejected invitations to speak altogether, arguing that the event was simply an anti-*Ostpolitik* rally.<sup>191</sup> In Bonn, the mayor refused to even take on the title of event patron as its theme “Danger for Germany, Danger for Europe,” denounced *Ostpolitik*. He agreed to speak, and emphasized integration and how lost Heimat must not cause embitterment.<sup>192</sup>

These battles over *Ostpolitik* increasingly soured West German attitudes toward *Tag der Heimat*. With most West Germans having accepted expulsion as permanent, such inflammation of Cold War politics seemed pointless. Public opinion turned decidedly in favor of recognizing the new border, with West Germans (including the expellee population) approving by 46% to 35% in 1967, shifting to 58% to 25% three years later.<sup>193</sup> The BdV president, who decried “left-intellectual shallowness,” saw this as a West German “de-solidarization” with the expellees.<sup>194</sup>

West German criticism of the tradition mushroomed in the press and letters to the editor. The political coordinator of *Deutsches Fernsehen* argued that the tradition was a “frivolous festival,” with a vocabulary from the “dictionary of the brutes,” organized by ahistorical societies that were not representative of most lay expellees who had found a new Heimat in the West. He further denounced the societies for making the Federal Republic look like a “revanchist juggernaut,” that would destroy Europe.<sup>195</sup> Citizens wrote letters to the editor denouncing heckling of mayors and the BdV’s refusal to ban NPD members. Other letters rhetorically asked: “Who really wants to go back?” or “Do you all want another war?” One letter writer, perturbed at insistence that expellee children had Heimat in the East, asserted that those under thirty were not expellees. Yet another argued that a new generation of youth was growing up in a new Heimat, and they should not have national peace threatened every time the expellees held a Heimat meeting. One of the few letters in defense did note that youth protests, foreign calumnies, and party politics made expellee societies look more radical than they truly were.<sup>196</sup>

One group, however, remained suspiciously absent in the chorus of critics of the expellee societies’ bellicose rhetoric: lay expellees themselves. What of claims that the societies did not represent lay expellees? The question is in need of more research, but in regards to *Tag der Heimat* almost no lay expellee voices of opposition can be found beyond a small group of elite intellectuals.<sup>197</sup> Given, expellees showed up in decreasing numbers over the course of the 1960s, perhaps due to progressed integration and temporal distance from expulsion.<sup>198</sup> By the end of the 1960's, one journalist reported that lay expellees at events were just beginning to realize that society leaders dangled illusions of return in front of them for years.<sup>199</sup> Private reunion still took place, though to a lesser extent, and lay expellees disagreed whether the event was primarily about reunion or about full-throated national politics. Two contrasting expellee letters to the

editor responding to the 1969 *Tag der Heimat* in two Berlin newspapers illustrated this. The first denounced views of the tradition as primarily about reunion: the national political message was key. Two days later, an expellee woman's letter denouncing left-wing students, argued that they misunderstood the event; it was, she held, primarily unpolitical, devoted to memories and tending to their local and regional cultures.<sup>200</sup> Whatever views or private conceptions of Heimat may have quietly circulated amongst lay expellees, it had little bearing on the spectacle seen by West Germans, the allies, and the Eastern bloc. The societies' claims to a right to the "ancestral Heimat" inflamed the Cold War in an era of nuclear weapons, while their nationally-assertive tones won them few friends beyond the radical right.

## **Conclusion**

While, after 1945, many West Germans turned to local spaces as sites of civilian life, restored communities, and flexible identity, for the expellees, a turn to a local redemptive geography proved impossible. *Tag der Heimat* and Heimat meetings demonstrated the channeling of such worlds into redemptive visions of nation as the sole force capable of either literally re-acquiring Heimat or securing symbolic recognition of injustice by maintaining theoretical territorial claims. This not only meant that expellees were largely absent from the Heimat-infused strains of federalist enthusiasm that spiked in the early postwar period, it also meant that in arranging common Heimat events, the expellee societies and many West Germans were often on different pages. West German Heimat enthusiasts found little to attract them to the tradition, which offered them nothing in the way of a personal world of Heimat. Nor were they attracted by lectures on their "complete German duty" or the notion that they too had lost a national Heimat in the East. Beyond elite national figures who cow-towed to electoral influence,



local West German speakers often went off script, objected to aggressive national political symbolism and language, and presented visions of Heimat regained through emotional integration into new places of Heimat in the West. Expellee societies chaffed at both Western emphasis on emotional integration into new places of Heimat and many West German's definition of their tradition as primarily about personal reunion. Instead, they sought to ensure that lost personal Heimat remained strongly connected to a strident vision of nation and theoretical territorial claims.

With expellee societies ever more forcefully insisting on their right to Heimat in Cold War struggles, therein threatening international stability, the Heimat concept entered into a discursive arena very different from local community discourses that took place in early postwar rubble cities. Expellee-movement evocations were heard by a national and international audience. Attacking claims to a right to Heimat and the Heimat idea, in turn, became a tool for arguing for a policy of *Ostpolitik*. These political developments, along with the emergence of a new generation of youth and changing material conditions, would all inform cultural devaluation of the Heimat concept throughout the 1960s.

“Superficial knowledge of the world and languages, gained through tourism and business trips, is no compensation for home. The barter proves to be a dubious one.” -Jean Améry  
“How Much Home Does a Person Need?”<sup>1</sup>

### **Coda: Decline and Tepid Re-valuations**

“Heimat Heimat Heimat – again and again it provokes sentimental-recalcitrant impulses that do not allow any thoughts of peace without ‘Heimat.’” These lines appeared in 1964 in an essay entitled “Heated Words,” published in an edited volume of authors against the atom bomb. The student movement likely forgave its author, Gabriele Wohmann, born in 1932, for being ever so slightly beyond the age of thirty. Still, she reflected their generational profile. Heimat for Wohmann was not a lost personal local world. Twenty years earlier, civilians in the rubble discussed Heimat as the very essence of “peace.” Wohmann saw precisely the opposite; her essay was consumed with expellee rhetoric at *Tag der Heimat*. Expellee-society wielding of the concept led her to associate it with “visions of war,” that mixed love, honor, “and a bit of aggression.” In order to counter expellee rhetoric on their right to the Heimat, Wohmann sought to tie the concept strongly with Nazism. Illustrating little knowledge about the concept’s history, she opined that Heimat in Weimar Germany was a word on its death bed, until it had a renaissance under the Nazis, who were the ones, she claimed, to have invented all kinds of compound words with Heimat that had not previously existed. Now, she argued, it had been taken up by the “Heimat manipulators” at the *Tag der Heimat*, which she argued was a “Festival Day for revanchists and those out of touch with reality.” It was a tradition filled with “search for revenge” and “impertinent tempers.” Whatever a “commitment to Heimat” was, Wohmann wrote, she hadn’t a clue. What it was not, she concluded, was an action against war. If there must be a “*Tag der Heimat*,” which she doubted, they must conduct some historical-political research

about the past to make the day one of facts, shame, guilt, and desire for peace.<sup>2</sup>

Wohmann reflected the decline of cultural valuation of the Heimat concept throughout the 1960s and the many factors that informed it. On the one hand, expellee wielding of the concept in Cold War politics proved crucial. The youth generation most clearly associated Heimat with the expellee societies' aggressive political use of the term. However, this came together with a range of other factors, including long-term economic stabilization which meant reduced need for local solidarity to confront early postwar challenges. Increasing mobility also played a role. Generational divergences proved crucial, with the youth not having the same experiences of lost Heimat as their parent's generation. They often grew up in a time of greater stability in which their parents deeply emphasized Heimat, Heimatkunde, local culture, and so forth. As the Württemberg author Margarete Hannsmann described her youth growing up in the Swabian Alb in the Heimat-saturated early postwar period: "Albverein, Bund für Heimatschutz, Schwäbischer Heimatbund, Naturschutz, Vogelschutz, Amt für Denkmalpflege, Museums- und Altertumsverein, Volkskunstvereinigung, Höhlenforscher"— she had been "fatted up" with "Heimat"— a word she could no longer stand to hear. Tired of the nearness of home, she wanted to go far way—to France, Belgium and Greece.<sup>3</sup> The new youth generation had experienced neither the jarring ruptures of destruction and death, nor forced dislocation. The greater intactness of their local worlds ultimately meant less concern and reflection on Heimat. Stabilization from rebuilt cities, repaired communities, and new material security also led obsession with Heimat to plateau amongst their parent's generation

Decline in cultural valuation of the Heimat concept, particularly among the youth, first began to be noted in the early 1960s. At the turn of the decade, the state minister for expellee issues of NRW, an expellee himself, noted in a *Tag der Heimat* pamphlet that "suddenly" they

were surprised to hear West German voices that were asking what Heimat means in the twentieth century. Though he noted that growing mobility and economic growth likely contributed to this, he held that many did not want anything to do with the expellee organizations as they were viewed as dangerous for foreign politics.<sup>4</sup> Around the same time, the state minister president of Schleswig-Holstein noted in a *Tag der Heimat* speech that the youth increasingly viewed the Heimat concept with disinterest—as something out of the “moth box of the national and romantic past.” He held materialism and growing technocracy to be prominent factors, but asserted that such attitudes against the concept were still minority views.<sup>5</sup>

In the first half of the 1960s we also see other early signs of the decline of the Heimat concept. The turn away from Heimat films and Heimat novels began. The same applied to Heimatkunde, which several regional states began to abandon at the beginning of the decade, with full abandonment and replacement by “*Sachkunde*” fully achieved by 1969. In 1963, the name change of the *Bundeszentrale für Heimatdienst* (Federal Center for Heimat Service) to the *Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung* (Federal Center for Political Education) was also reflective of declining cultural valuation of the word. Heimat enthusiasm was never a part of the institution’s activities, with the term merely delineating that its duties were only within the nation’s borders.<sup>6</sup> It was decided that the new name better reflected their activities and did not sound as antiquated. Some noted that it would likely increase the standing of the institution.<sup>7</sup> The term Heimat in its name, in short, had become more of a burden than a benefit.

Still, in the first half of the 1960s, critique of Heimat would not reach the fervid pitch that it would in the second half of the decade. In 1963, in a radio program where twelve German authors took a position on the Heimat concept, we see both the beginning cultural devaluation and remaining positive views of the term. The program, held by the *Westdeutsche Rundfunk* on

the occasion of *Tag der Heimat*, asked the authors to take a position on the word Heimat, with particular reflection on the expellees. The West German authors Paul Schallück and Marie Luise von Kaschnitz-Weinberg both conveyed sympathies to those who lost Heimat, but argued that if they had lost their own Heimat in an age of nuclear weapons, they would not risk global peace by insisting on return. “Heimat” Schallück further argued, could no longer be considered the “value above all values” and hinted that the expellees were capable of finding a second Heimat in the West. Another West German author, and avid localist, Norbert Johannimloh emphasized Heimat as a private rather than politicized term. In spite of expellee political drum-beatings on Heimat, Johannimloh argued that he would never stop viewing the concept as a purely private space. Heimat, he argued, was like bread and water—essential, but not to be talked of incessantly. Werner Bergengruen, the German-Baltic author, took a similar position, arguing that Heimat was not *Vaterland*, with the former an experienced landscape and not a state. Other West German authors argued for finding a new Heimat in Europe or outside of geographic spaces. As the expellee author Willy Kramp argued—noting that they could not stop the youth from ripping themselves away from the roots of Heimat— they should redefine Heimat as inter-human solidarity absent of “social or geographic prejudice.”<sup>8</sup> In these assessments, Heimat appears as adaptable and changeable, if damaged. Few were arguing for tossing out the concept altogether.

Voices against Heimat first reached a fervid pitch by the second half of the 1960s, closely paralleling debates over *Ostpolitik*. Again, *Tag der Heimat* offered a lense into this growing process. One could hear voices on the “crisis of Heimat consciousness,” while the head of the Berlin BdV argued at the *Tag der Heimat* that “pessimists” now viewed Heimat as an “expired sentimental anachronism.”<sup>9</sup> The expellee societies would often denounce groups as anti-Heimat when they disagreed with expellee-society politics. When representatives from the Evangelical

Church, for example, wrote their famous 1966 *Ostdenkschrift*, in which they advocated abandonment of Eastern territorial claims, expellee functionaries used *Tag der Heimat* to attack them as people against the Heimat concept who saw it as a mere “antiquated, sentimental anachronism.”<sup>10</sup> The 1967 events in West Berlin proved even more revealing. Students brought protest signs, where, intermingled among placard calling for recognition of the Oder-Neiße line, one could find others that read: “Stop with the Heimat-LIES,” and “Instead of Heimat, I’ll take changing the world.”<sup>11</sup> At the Berlin mayor’s speech that year, he regretted that people who used the word Heimat were increasingly accused of revanchism. He articulated Heimat as a personal experience of space and recognized the complexities of the situation by arguing that the Poles in Eastern regions had already found Heimat in former German territories.<sup>12</sup> Other speeches at events noted forces beyond the Cold War that challenged the Heimat concept, including increasing mobility and the problem of “modern nomadism.” As one pastor explained at the 1968 events, those alienated from their surroundings by increased societal mobility needed a feeling of “Heimat and protection.”<sup>13</sup> Observers of the growing cultural trend against Heimat could be found at a range of venues beyond *Tag der Heimat*. At meetings like the Rhenish Heimat Day in 1968, for example, celebrants observed the festival under the theme: “Heimat today, duty or anachronism?”— a question that hovered ever more prominently in public consciousness.<sup>14</sup>

The philosophical outlook that dominated the 68er movement promoted new attitudes toward space, politics, and personal life that informed the turn against the Heimat concept. Often advocating abstract global visions in which locality and region had no place, many followed the mantra that the personal *must* be political. In contrast to earlier Heimat enthusiasts who posited space for harmony between local rootedness and cosmopolitanism, over the course of the 1960s, many youth protestors jettisoned such notions. Only focus on vast and global geographies above

the personal realm could, they often believed, possibly be progressive.

These mentalities are perhaps most concisely conveyed and critiqued in a subsequent cinematic portrayal by Edgar Reitz, a former 68er, in his series *Zweite Heimat*. Here, Reitz traces the life of a striving musician who leaves his Heimat in the *Hunsrück*, and finds himself in the rebellious student scene of the University of Munich. In one of the final episodes from the year 1968, Reitz offers us a scene that is particularly telling. Here a young girl, fresh from the Hunsrück, is caught up in the enthusiasm of the 68er rebellion in Munich. Told that she will join her “comrades” to fight their “reactionary professor,” she arrives amidst students denouncing authoritarian paternalist structures and demanding open discussions. Stepping up enthusiastically to participate in the discussion, the newcomer declares her solidarity with the working class by talking about her family’s working class background in her home town. Heckling and hurling insults, the crowd of 68ers denounces her for unscientific terminology, leaving out economics and abstract analysis, and finally, for presenting them with “privatist shit.”<sup>15</sup> Here, Reitz critiques the lack of space for personal life and home in the political movement for which he retains significant sympathies. Unlike many of the “anti-Heimat films” of his time which depicted spaces of Heimat as inherently repressive places, Reitz sees Heimat as something that can and should be re-shaped and reformed. He sought openly to encourage his viewers to view Heimat and personal lives seriously.<sup>16</sup> Reitz’s films, however, would only appear over the course of the 1980s and 1990s. Throughout the 1970s, the tabooization of the concept had fully ripened. Many noted in the 1970s how the very use of the word “Heimat” put one under the suspicion of being a right-wing radical, and how their age of “growing mobility” lacked desperately needed “powers of rootedness.”<sup>17</sup>

## Re-valuations of Heimat

By the late 1970s and 1980s, with *Ostpolitik* behind them, many gradually noted surprising reappearances of the Heimat concept. Some spoke of a “Heimat renaissance,” “Heimat boom,” or “Heimat discussion.”<sup>18</sup> In 1981, the literary scholar Hans-Friedrich Foltin and the political scientist Wilfried von Bredow composed a work describing the growing view of localities and regions as “ambivalent refuges.” The “renaissance” was ambivalent, in that they were conscious of past abuses of the concept and its “prostituting” for political ideologies. Foltin and von Bredow embraced Heimat, while criticizing its misuse for exclusion. They argued for an “enlightened Heimatkunde” which taught about the local, but emphasized the possibilities of balancing preservation, change, and development. It would not praise the local for its own sake, but rather create a feeling of “critical loyalty” to their surrounding world.<sup>19</sup>

The unprecedented taboo that preceded and intermingled with staggered up ticks in valuations of Heimat made the revivals of the concept all the more eye-catching. With the novelty of breaking a taboo, these contested re-valuation have found their way into narratives of the Heimat concept’s cultural vicissitudes. While the tendency has been to overstate the degree of the “Heimat renaissance,” it represented only a tepid and contested revival. After the 1960s, we would never again see the same positive cultural valuation of the Heimat concept reached during both the Heimat movement of the late nineteenth century and the local turn in the two decades after 1945. Still, at the end of the 1970s and during the 1980s, the upturn in its cultural valuation was apparent in a number of areas. It became a new point of emphasis and discussion in radio, literature, and the press.<sup>20</sup> Other indicators included renewed interest in dialect poetry, village renewal projects, regional histories, and city festivals.<sup>21</sup> These years also saw a rise in foundings of Heimat museums.<sup>22</sup> Notoriously, environmentalists appealed to the Heimat concept to



advocate for greater protection of the landscape, including at the earlier protests against building a nuclear power plant at Wyhl. Attraction to locality and region could be seen in other places, including in France, where it was strong amongst the Greens.<sup>23</sup> During these years, there was even a turn to localist folklore in the GDR.<sup>24</sup>

But what factors informed this partial turn back to locality, region, and Heimat? A much forgotten 1978 volume of young regional German authors from the Southwest proves helpful in answering this question. Writing on a re-awakening of regionalism in Alemannic literature, the contributors, mostly in their early 30's and themselves participants in the regionalist awakening, noted a shift in views of Heimat among a significant fraction of literary figures in their region. Heimat, dialect, and regionalism were emerging from the shadows of tabooization, in part as a reaction to “plundering” of the geographic landscape, but also due to a range of other factors.<sup>25</sup> Reaction against the hostilities of the 68er generation certainly played a role. One contributor, Manfred Bosch, recounted his experienced as a 68er in Munich. The 68ers, he wrote, repressed dialect and pined for the “outside” as a means of liberation. He did not see the 68er movement as negative, but saw the regional push back as a positive means of making the world “experienceable” amidst bureaucratization, centralization, and the rule of functionaries. Regionalism, he believed, was a response to emotional needs and was generally resistant to ideology.<sup>26</sup> Others turned to Heimat reacted against their own previous hostility to the concept. Margarete Hannsmann, the author who had recounted being “fattened up” with Heimat in her youth and turning against it, wrote of how she later shed her abhorrence of the concept. She wrote that her generation’s reaction to their parent generation led to its own problems, including exploitation of the landscape, refusal to talk about nature, and dismantling the “green Heimat” through commercialism. She felt a desire to return home and noted that many of her

contemporaries were beginning to feel the same: “Heimat” she wrote “is no longer scorned.”<sup>27</sup>

Forces that traditionally inform desires for Heimat also began to surface in the 1970s. It was, as scholars have pointed out, a decade of turbulence and deflating confidence, and revealed contradictions and problems of the utopian political ideologies of the 1960s.<sup>28</sup> Here, a range of different factors converged that informed reevaluation of Heimat, including industrial take over of the landscape, growing insecurities in society, and reaction against anonymity, functionalism, uniformism, and centralization. Others have pointed to reaction against growing bureaucratization and growth of technocratic planning— such as the *Gemeindereform*, as well as destabilization of identities, and general desire for “comprehensible spaces.”<sup>29</sup> Building projects of the period also reduced the “Heimat quality” of the local lived environment, often generating feelings of alienation.<sup>30</sup> Albrecht Lehmann has briefly noted that the return to Heimat was a reaction from below against the “self-righteous and dogmatic theories” of a fraction of the 68er movement, with individuals unable to situate their private lives within its abstractions.<sup>31</sup> Foltin and von Bredow, while advocating a harmonious unity between internationalism and Heimat, argued that the turn to Heimat was also informed by disappointment with the internationalist euphoria of the 1960s and utopian projects of re-shaping the globe. They noted that students, Greens, and leftists were important to the revival, though not the only participants.<sup>32</sup>

Mixed progressive groups, in short, sought to re-claim a concept that many had hastily abandoned in the 1960s. Some public figures like Hilde Domin believed that progressives must push back against the monopoly that the expellee societies had gained over the Heimat concept. Heimat, she insisted, must not be a taboo word after the “odium of militancy” that the expellee societies had given it.<sup>33</sup> In 1980, one young Heimat enthusiasts described it as a new emerging part of “leftist identity,” with Heimat becoming a progressive rally cry.<sup>34</sup> While not recognizing

the many early postwar precedents, several revived notions of world-citizenship and Heimat as harmonious and potentially re-enforcing.<sup>35</sup> Some took up Heimat poetry as a venue of critique and arguing for a more human and tolerant notion of Heimat.<sup>36</sup> Several noted how, in turning to the concept, they were altering the dominant spatial imaginary of the 68er movement, revising it so that the world around them could again “be experienced as Heimat.”<sup>37</sup> One young budding Konstanz author in his early 30's candidly discussed the shift. Describing the growth of Heimat amongst the German left, he argued that it resulted from the “debacle of a political, cultural, and geographic departure.” Return to Heimat, he argued, was the desire of people for “comprehensibility” that had been missing from the 68er movement. Heimat, he believed, could be the source of emancipation and solidarity with one’s fellow man that would extend not merely over the “garden gate” but across different skin colors, ethnicities, and histories.<sup>38</sup>

Yet, revival among progressive groups was only ever partial. Ideas that only orientation toward vast and abstract spaces could be progressive lingered in significant quarters of the German intelligentsia and the broader public. Throughout the “Heimat Renaissance” of the late 1970s and 1980s, certain groups continued to harangue the concept. In 1979 Hermann Bausinger noted that, amidst the revival of Heimat, when using the concept, one still had to watch over one’s shoulder to see who might be listening.<sup>39</sup> The next year, one writer noted how the word Heimat was slowly re-emerging in a rather “shy” manner.<sup>40</sup> Throughout the 1980s, figures like the songwriter Walter Mossmann still refused to use the term Heimat, as he saw it as too tainted and full of “sweet lies.”<sup>41</sup> The ambiguities also appeared in *Heimatkunde*, which started to reappear in some states, while stagnating and continuing its decline in others.<sup>42</sup> In the mid 1980s, the German journalist Dietrich Strothmann wrote on how there was a new “Heimat fashion” that could be seen in works like that of Günther Grass or the television series *Heimat* by Edgar Reitz.

He insisted that people of good conscience could never join this revival of the concept.<sup>43</sup> This ambiguity in progressive appeals to the concept continue into the present. While some still refer to an ongoing “Heimat-boom,” others have rightly noted that, in contemporary Germany, the use of the word Heimat is, by some groups, still considered as “suspect.”<sup>44</sup>

Heimat, its cultural valuations and potential progressive uses remain prominent issues. Heimat remains a question in areas diverse as immigrant integration and urban planning. Are urban planners, for example, to build cities primarily as “throughway stations” or as places that can be felt and experienced as “Heimat”?<sup>45</sup> While Heimat cannot simply be “built,” different architectural frameworks can facilitate greater engagement between fellow citizens and between citizens and the local landscape.<sup>46</sup> Alexander Mitscherlich and others have been among those who strongly advocated constructing cities that could become “Heimat” for its citizens.<sup>47</sup> Regarding integration of immigrants and newcomers, the possibilities of the Heimat concept have long been neglected. As Bausinger argued during the early years of immigrant influx, foreign workers should be given a sense of Heimat in their new places of home, and the concept of Heimat must be promoted as a “life possibility” rather than as a “proof of origin.”<sup>48</sup>

Nevertheless, contemporary stereotypes of local rootedness as inherently regressive has inhibited the harnessing of Heimat for outsider integration. In many ways, the experienced worlds of local Heimat offer newcomers something that the broader space of nation cannot: “walkability.” While the nation is laid claim to through mastery of elaborate national cultural practices and native command of national languages, often difficult to acquire for non-nationals, local spaces of Heimat can be more easily laid claim to as a comprehensible space that can be experienced. Increasing mobility and economic compulsion to be uprootable will also both likely sustain concern with Heimat and local rootedness into the future. Zygmunt Bauman has

described a movement toward a “liquid phase” of modernity in which he argues society must accommodate to greater fluid changes in norms, standards, and institutions, and the weakening of interhuman bonds that are becoming “increasingly frail and admitted to be temporary.”<sup>49</sup> Yet, he does not address the question of how certain cultural and structural interventions could mediate the harsher contours of such developments. Here, strategies of place-making that can facilitate Heimat and rootedness again become significant. Of course, some have argued for having multiple places that they can call Heimat.<sup>50</sup> Certainly the acquisition of new places of Heimat is a necessary reality amidst movement. However, the idea of continual reacquisition of a new feeling of Heimat in new places must take into account the considerable time necessary for acquiring orientation, social networks, and community feeling.<sup>51</sup> The ivory tower notion of Heimat being possible anywhere and everywhere and rapidly capable of being recreated offers few solutions.

Others have argued for “deterritorializing” Heimat, finding it in “language” or attaching feelings of Heimat to “mobile objects.”<sup>52</sup> Yet, one could argue that such strategies miss the point of Heimat, which is about human solidarities and communities in addition to traditions, familiar objects, and landscapes.<sup>53</sup> Of course, as Peter Sloterdijk has noted in a *Spiegel* article on Heimat, with increased movement, Heimat will decreasingly be found in one’s place of origin. The result is the need to find Heimat through forging new social networks and recreating Heimat elsewhere.<sup>54</sup> This presents significant challenges, and requires specific strategies to be developed.

Promoting notions of local tolerance and the possibility of a harmonic balance between local rootedness and cosmopolitanism seems to offer a more realistic path forward. This strategy has continued into the present, even if its early postwar precedents have been lost from public consciousness. In 2000, Rüdiger Görner wrote in the *Stuttgarter Zeitung* that tolerance is a prerequisite for many to experience a place as Heimat.<sup>55</sup> Others over the past few decades have

continued to espouse a notion of Heimat infused with “world-openness” and “tolerance.”<sup>56</sup> With increasing experience of uprootedness, realizing tolerant ideals of local “Heimat” will remain an ongoing priority. As the author Heinz Pionthek argued in 1963 in a long forgotten radio broadcast, Heimat is not something that is instilled by birth. Rather it is a “task” to make places of residence more human as a “harborage” and “Heimat for everyone.”<sup>57</sup>

## APPENDIX

## ENDNOTES



\*In cases where multiple quotations appear in an adjacent series of sentences, the citation appears in the endnote at the end of the series.

## Introduction

1. Anton Stille, "D'r Letzte Ress" and "No lange Johre," in *Kölsche Blömcher*, Anton Stille (Cologne: Greven, 1960), 17.
2. For the term "personal geography" in an anecdotal relation, see Friedrike Hassauer, "Kulissenheimat Würzburg: Ein erwachsener Blick auf die Kinderstadt," in *Heimat: Analysen, Themen, Perspektiven*, vol.1, eds. Will Cremer and Ansgar Klein (Bielefeld: Westfalen, 1990), 390-398. Heiner Treinen describes Heimat as a symbolic relationship to place. While a useful term, such geographies were more than scenery to social connections as he maintains. Among other things, they provided functional orientation. Heiner Treinen, "Symbolische Ortsbezogenheit: Eine soziologische Untersuchung zum Heimatproblem," *Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie* 17 (1965): 73-97.
3. Peter Fritzsche, "Cities Forget, Nations Remember: Berlin and Germany and the Shock of Modernity," in *Pain and Prosperity: Reconsidering Twentieth-Century German History*, eds., Paul Betts and Greg Eghigian (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003), 35-59.
4. Looking to an expansive vision of nation as a redemptive geography could go hand-in-hand with a "redemptive anti-Semitism," a similar-sounding term that is currently a subject of debate. The concept "redemptive geography" is not intended here to evoke the concept of redemptive anti-Semitism, nor do I take a position in this historiographical debate. For discussions of redemptive anti-Semitism, see Saul Friedländer, *The Years of Extermination: Nazi Germany and the Jews, 1939-1945* (New York: Harper Perennial, 2008); Christian Wiese, ed., *Years of Persecution, Years of Extermination: Saul Friedländer and the Future of Holocaust Studies* (London: Continuum, 2010).
5. Celia Applegate, *A Nation of Provincials: The German Idea of Heimat* (Berkeley, CA: California University Press, 1990). Applegate illustrates how Heimat was often a more pacific and inclusive notion of belonging that encouraged consensus. Applegate overturned both notions of locality and nation as in inherent conflict and argued against ideas of Heimat as anti-modern. For views on Heimat as anti-modern see Edeltraud Klüeting, ed., *Antimodernismus und Reform: Zur Geschichte der deutschen Heimatbewegung* (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1991).
6. For liberalism and Heimat in Hamburg, see Jennifer Jenkins, *Provincial Modernity: Local Culture and Liberal Politics in Fin-de-Siècle Hamburg* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2003). Eric Kurlander similarly finds a connection between progressive liberalism and localism in Schleswig-Holstein and Alsace around the same period. Eric Kurlander, "The Landscapes of Liberalism: Particularism and Progressive Politics in Two Borderland Regions," in *Localism, Landscape, and Ambiguities of Place: German-Speaking Central Europe, 1860-1930*, eds., David Blackburn and James Retallack (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2007), 124-145. On environmentalism, see William Rollins, *A Greener Vision of Home: Cultural Politics and Environmental Reform in the German Heimatschutz Movement, 1904-1918* (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1997); Frank Zelko, ed., *From Heimat to Umwelt: New Perspectives on German Environmental History* (Washington D.C.: German Historical Institut, 2006); Thomas Lekan, "A 'Noble Prospect': Tourism, Heimat, and Conservation on the Rhine 1880-1914," *Journal of Modern History* 81, no.4 (December 2009): 824-858; John Alexander Williams, "'The Chords of the German Soul are Tuned to Nature: The Movement to Preserve the Natural Heimat from the Kaiserreich to the Third Reich,'" *Central European History* 29, no.3 (1996): 339-384. Continuities in environmental protection between National Socialism and other periods has been a subject of debate, as has the progressive or regressive nature of environmental protection within Heimat enthusiasm. For more on "vernacular modernism" through the lense of architecture, see Maiken Umbach and Bernd-Rüdiger Hüppauf, eds., *Vernacular Modernism: Heimat, Globalization and the Built Environment* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2005).
7. Confino incorrectly dates the emergence of the modern Heimat idea to the period of national unification, rather than the early nineteenth century. Alon Confino, *The Nation as a Local Metaphor*; Alon Confino, *Germany as a Culture of Remembrance: Promises and Limits of Writing History* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2006).

8. Steber further problematically draws on Heimat enthusiasts use of terms such as Volk/völklich, labeling such language as “völkisch.” Steber concludes that regionalists used Heimat to imagine a “German modernity.” Martina Steber, *Ethnische Gewissenheiten. Die Ordnung des Regionalen im bayerischen Schwaben vom Kaiserreich bis zum NS-Regime* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2010).

9. Applegate, 18, 85-86, 198-229, 264-265.; Celia Applegate, “Democracy or Reaction?: The Political Implications of Localist Ideas in Wilhelmine and Weimar Germany,” in *Elections, Mass Politics, and Social Change in Modern Germany*, eds., James Retallack and Larry Eugene Jones (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 264-265; Celia Applegate, “The Question of Heimat in the Weimar Republic,” *New Formations* 17 (1992): 64-74.

10. This is the case of a recent edited volume on “Heimat” and “region” by Maiken Umbach and Claus-Christian Szejnmann. The volume focuses primarily on how Gauleiter were not simply pawns of Berlin and how Nazi institutions used region as an administrative tool in top-down economic planning and racial categorization of borderland populations. Throughout the volume, regional administrative and party structures and their actions become stand-ins for “Heimat,” while counter-arguments are ignored. Gauleiter could also easily be defined as members of the center. One essay considers uprooting of ethnic Germans to move them Eastward without considering how this conflicted with rootedness in local Heimat. In a commentary, Geoff Eley, noting the volume’s “institutionally bound analysis,” and the resulting disconnect to the volume’s title, proposes a shift to cultural history to unlock the role of space in “the broader philosophical ground for thinking about the human experience.” Claus-Christian Szejnmann and Maiken Umbach, eds., *Heimat, Region, and Empire: Spatial Identities under National Socialism* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012). See in particular Geoff Eley, “Commentary: Empire, Ideology and the East: Thoughts on Nazism’s Spatial Imaginary,” 252-267. See also Szejnmann’s essay on soldiers’ desires for home in the field. Claus-Christian Szejnmann, “‘A sense of Heimat Opened Up During the War.’ German Soldiers and the Heimat Abroad.” One could question his conclusion that pining for home simply fueled war-making. The overarching position of Umbach and Szejnmann’s volume is not new, reflecting stereotypes that emerged in the 1960s which have been reproduced in other works which posit an “affinity” between regionalism and Nazism. This is the argument of a collection of essays on regional northern German culture during the Nazi period, though it rejects creating a straight line of continuity between Heimat enthusiasm and Nazism. Kay Dohnke, Norbert Hopster and Jan Wirrer, eds., *Niederdeutsch im Nationalsozialismus. Studien zur Rolle regionaler Kultur im Faschismus* (Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 1994).

11. Andrea Bastian, *Der Heimat-Begriff: Eine begriffsgeschichtliche Untersuchung im verschiedenen Funktionsbereichen der deutschen Sprache* (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer, 1995), 133-136. Johannes von Moltke similarly has pointed out that the Nazis “erased the distinction between Heimat and nation.” von Moltke, 61.

12. Julia Faehndrich, “Entstehung und Aufstieg des Heimatbuchs,” in *Das Heimatbuch: Geschichte, Methodik, Wirkung*, ed. Matthias Beer (Göttingen: V & R Unipress, 2010), 62-72.

13. Dietrich Klagges, *Geschichtsunterricht als nationalpolitische Erziehung* (Frankfurt: Moritz Diesterweg, 1937), 165-167.

14. Volker Dahm has looked at how Nazi control mechanisms did away with decentralized focus on regional culture. Volker Dahm, “Kulturpolitischer Zentralismus und landschaftlich-lokale Kulturpflege im Dritten Reich,” in *Nationalsozialismus in der Region. Beiträge zur regionalen und lokalen Forschung und zum internationalen Vergleich*, ed., Horst Möller (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1996), 123-138. Willi Oberkrome and Thomas Schaarschmidt illustrate processes of *Gleichschaltung*, while downplaying its importance, positing overlap and affinity between the Heimat movement and the ideas of National Socialism. Oberkrome, *Deutsche Heimat*; Thomas Schaarschmidt, *Regionalkultur und Diktatur: Sächsische Heimatbewegung und Heimat-Propaganda im Dritten Reich und in der SBZ/DDR* (Cologne: Böhlau, 2004).

15. For a similar example in the Soviet Union, see Lisa Kirschenbaum, “‘Our City, Our Hearths, Our Families’: Local Loyalties and Private Life in Soviet World War II Propaganda,” *Slavic Review* 59, no.4 (Winter 2008): 828-847. As Jean Améry has argued, Heimat was at odds with the type of expansive national vision that Nazism embodied. Jean Améry, *At the Mind’s Limit: Contemplations by a Survivor on Auschwitz and its Realities*, trans., Sidney and Stella Rosenfeld (New York: Schocken, 1980), 55. Others have similarly noted that in many ways the Nazi period was when Heimat became most irrelevant. William Rollins, “Heimat, Modernity, and Nation in the Early Heimatschutz Movement,” in *Heimat, Nation, Fatherland: The German Sense of Belonging*, eds. Jost Hermand and James Steakley (New York: Peter Lang, 1996), 87-105.

16. For examples of works on Heimat that repeat the myth of Heimat as tainted in the early postwar years, see Jens Korkampf, *Die Erfindung der Heimat: zu Geschichte, Gegenwart und politischen Implikaten einer gesellschaftlichen Konstruktion* (Berlin: Logos, 2006); Helfried Seliger, "Vorwort," in *Der Begriff "Heimat" in der deutschen Gegenwartsliteratur*, ed. Helfried Seliger (Munich: Iudicium, 1987), 7; Christopher J. Wickham, *Constructing Heimat in Postwar Germany: Longing and Belonging* (Lampeter: Edwin Mellen, 1999), 7.; Rainer Jooß, "Heimat Geschichte," in *Heimat Heute*, ed. Hans-Georg Wehling (Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer, 1984), 60; Beate Herget and Berit Pleitner, "Heimat im Museum? Statt einer Einleitung," in *Heimat im Museum?: Museale Konzeptionen zu Heimat und Erinnerungskultur in Deutschland und Polen*, eds. Beate Herget and Berit Pleitner (Munich: Martin Meidenbauer, 2008), 16; Wolfgang Lipp, "Heimatbewegung, Regionalismus, Pfade der Modern," in vol.1, Cremer and Klein, eds., 135-154; Eduard Führ, "Heimat - süße Heimat: Decollage architektonischer Leitbilder," in *Worin noch Niemand war: Heimat. Eine Auseinandersetzung mit einem strapazierten Begriff, historisch-philosophisch-architektonisch*, ed. Eduard Führ (Wiesbaden: Bauverlag, 1985), 185. For a rare, short essay that points to the strong need for a feeling of Heimat in the early postwar period, see Everhard Holtmann, "Heimatbedarf in der Nachkriegszeit," in *Von der Währungsreform zum Wirtschaftswunder: Wiederaufbau in Niedersachsen*, ed. Bernd Weisbrod (Hannover: Hahn, 1998), 31-45. Longer narratives often skip over the period, perhaps briefly mentioning Heimat films, expellees, and repression of the past, before turning to the Heimat Renaissance of the late 1970s and 1980s. See, for example, Maiken Umbach and Claus-Christian Szejnmann, "Towards a Relational History of Spaces under National Socialism," in Szejnmann and Umbach, eds., 5-8; Michael Neumeyer, *Heimat: zu Geschichte und Begriff eines Phänomens* (Kiel: Geographisches Institut der Universität Kiel, 1992), 39-40; Karen Joisten, *Philosophie der Heimat - Heimat der Philosophie* (Berlin: Akademie, 2003), 21.

17. Palmowski shows how lay citizens, while publically acknowledging socialist Heimat, quietly developed their own notions in the private realm. As Palmowski is interested in how Heimat became bound up in the public-private dynamic of dictatorship, he does not consider the FRG. Jan Palmowski, *Inventing a Socialist Nation: Heimat and the Politics of Everyday Life in the GDR, 1945-1990* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009). As Thomas Schaarschmidt argues, the GDR inhibited societal independence more than the Nazis. He argues that this was due to Heimat enthusiasts being intellectually closer to Nazi ideology, even though the Nazi regime transformed and trimmed down Heimat societies. Nevertheless, Schaarschmidt points out that Heimat enthusiasts did not simply surrender to the SED. Thomas Schaarschmidt, *Regionalkultur und Diktatur: Sächsische Heimatbewegung und Heimat-Propaganda im Dritten Reich und in der SBZ/DDR* (Cologne: Böhlau, 2004). Willi Oberkrome, looking at Thüringen, finds a similar tension between older Heimat enthusiasts and refusal to fully submit to the GDR, with these figures increasingly replaced with SED functionaries. Nevertheless, some Heimat enthusiasts were able to continue independent Heimat activities, such as environmental preservation. Oberkrome, *Deutsche Heimat*, 520-526; Willi Oberkrome, "'Durchherrschte Heimat?': Zentralismus und Regionalismus im organisierten Heimatschutz der frühen DDR. Das Beispiel Thüringens," in Knoch, ed., 261-274. On the SED regime's definition of Heimat as only possible by eliminating capitalist exploitation and rejecting the "reactionary" and "imperialist" Heimat concept of the West. See also von Moltke, 170-200; Bastian, 136-139; von Bredow and Foltin, 195-202; Günter Lange, *Heimat - Realität und Aufgabe: zur marxistischen Auffassung des Heimatbegriffs* (Berlin: Akademie, 1973).

18. Confino points out the skepticism of the regime to the Heimat concept, though he argues, in contrast to Palmowski, that the regime was hostile to the notion of Heimat as referring to the entire nation, focusing instead on Heimat as a question of class relations. Alon Confino, "Heimat, East German Imagination and an Excess of Reality," in Confino, *Germany as a Culture of Remembrance*, 97-107.

19. Applegate, 18, 228-248.

20. Gordon Burgess and Hans-Gerd Winter, eds., *"Generation ohne Abschied: " Heimat und Heimatkehr in der "jungen Generation" der Nachkriegsliteratur* (Dresden: Thelem, 2008); Elena Agazzi and Erhard Schütz, eds., *Heimkehr: Eine zentrale Kategorie der Nachkriegszeit. Geschichte, Literatur und Medien* (Berlin: Duncker und Humblot, 2010); Annette Kaminsky, ed., *Heimkehr 1948* (Munich: C.H. Beck, 1998). On POWs, see Frank Biess, *Homecomings: Returning POWs and the Legacies of Defeat in Postwar Germany* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006). On urban evacuees see Gregory Schroeder, "Ties of Urban Heimat: West German Cities and Their Wartime Evacuees in the 1950s," *German Studies Review* 27, no.2 (May 2004): 307-324.

21. For Heimat and radio see Alexander Badenoch, *Voices in Ruins: West German Radio Across the 1945 Divide* (New York, NY: Palgrave MacMillan, 2008).

22. Oberkrome ignores other Heimat societies, non-societal Heimat enthusiasm, and destroyed cities. Willi Oberkrome, *Deutsche Heimat: Nationale Konzeptionen und regionale Praxis von Naturschutz, Landschaftsgestaltung und Kulturpolitik in Westfalen-Lippe und Thüringen (1900-1960)* (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöning, 2004); Willi Oberkrome, "Heimat in der Nachkriegszeit. Strukturen, institutionelle Vernetzung und kulturpolitische Funktionen des Westfälischen Heimatbundes in den 1940er und 1950er Jahren," *Westfälische Forschungen* 47 (1997): 153-200.
23. For a collection of essays that looks at Heimat as a rural integrative concept that was simply about forgetting Nazi crimes, see Habbo Knoch, ed., *Das Erbe der Provinz: Heimatkultur und Geschichtspolitik nach 1945* (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2001). The volume argues that cultural federalism was among the strategies concocted for repressing the past. See particularly the introduction and essay by Habbo Knoch and the essay on federalism by Undine Ruge.
24. For the shortcomings of local *Vergangenheitsbewältigung*, see Gavriel Rosenfeld and Paul Jaskot, eds., *Beyond Berlin: Twelve German Cities Confront the Nazi Past* (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2008).
25. Quotation from Edith Raim, "Coping with the Nazi Past: Germany and the Legacy of the Third Reich," *Contemporary European History* 12, no. 4 (November 2003): 548.
26. Manfred Enssle, "Five Theses on German Everyday Life after World War II," *Central European History* 26, no. 1 (1993): 1-19.
27. H.P. Schwarz, "Die ausgebliebene Katastrophe: Eine Problemskizze zur Geschichte der Bundesrepublik," in *Den Staat denken: Theodor Eschenburg zum fünfundachtzigsten*, ed. Hermann Rudolph (Berlin: Siedler, 1990), 151-174.
28. Alon Confino, "Dissonance, Normality, and the Historical Method: Why Did Some Germans Think of Tourism after May 8, 1945?," in *Life after Death: Approaches to a Cultural and Social History of Europe during the 1940s and the 1950s*, eds., Richard Bessel and Dirk Schumann (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 329; Alon Confino, "'This lovely country we will never forget.' Kriegserinnerungen und Heimatkonzepte in der westdeutschen Nachkriegszeit," in Knoch, ed., 235-249; Alon Confino, "Heimat and Memories of War in West Germany, 1945-1960," in *Germany as a Culture of Remembrance*, ed., Confino, 81-91.
29. Christian Graf von Krockow, *Heimat: Erfahrungen mit einem deutschen Thema* (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1989), 67-68.
30. For Heimat in films as about escapism and repression of the past, see Elizabeth Boa and Rachel Palfreyman, *Heimat, a German Dream: Regional Loyalties and National Identity in German Culture, 1890-1990* (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2000); Heide Fehrenbach, *Cinema in Democratizing Germany: Reconstructing National Identity after Hitler* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1995), 149-151; Olaf Kühne and Annette Spellerberg, *Heimat in Zeiten erhöhter Flexibilitätsanforderungen. Empirische Studien im Saarland* (Wiesbaden: VS-Verlag, 2010), 14-15.
31. Johannes von Moltke, *No Place Like Home: Locations of Heimat in German Cinema* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2005).
32. Ina-Maria Greverus, *Der Territoriale Mensch: Ein literaturanthropologischer Versuch zum Heimatphänomen* (Munich: Athenäum, 1972), 3-4.
33. Peter Nahm, a West German and secretary of expellee affairs referenced the novels, films, and songs that took on the theme of Heimat, but argued that they "seldom succeed" in presenting a valid representation of popular desires. StAHH, 121-1 II, Senatskanzlei I, Nr.1243, Peter Paul Nahm, Speech at Tag der Heimat 1958, "Heimat als Aufgabe: Das Unrecht der Vertreibung." In 1958, one Lower Saxon Heimat enthusiast, speaking on "the Heimat thought in our time" argued that Heimat in film and tourism represented areas where the concept was misapplied. He referred to "Heimatschnulzen" in film, where businessmen took "maudlin story lines," placed it in a rural landscape, and slapped the title of "Heimat film" onto it for marketing purposes. He believed touristic stereotypes of Heimat to be equally egregious. He also warned against conflating experiences of Heimat with any single organization that claimed the title. Herbert Röhrig, "Die Heimatgedanke in unserer Zeit," *Jahrbuch Deutscher Heimatbund* (1959): 29-32.
34. For the anti-urban strain in Heimat films see Jürgen Trimborn, *Der deutsche Heimatfilm der fünfziger Jahre. Motive, Symbole und Handlungsmuster* (Cologne: Teiresias, 1998), 41-101.

35. See Klaus Bergmann, *Agrarromantik und Großstadtfeindschaft* (Meisenheim am Glan: Hain, 1970).
36. This includes scholars and public intellectuals. In a discussion in the late 1960s about Heimat, Heinrich Böll, Günter Grass, and Eugen Lemberg all agreed on the existence of urban Heimat feeling. Diskussion: "Was ist Heimat" in *Hauptworte - Hauptsachen. Zwei Gespräche: Heimat, Nation*, eds. Alexander Mitscherlich and Gert Kalow (Munich: R. Piper, 1971), 35. Hermann Bausinger argued in the 1980's that Heimat was a concept with urban potential. Hermann Bausinger, "Heimat in einer offenen Gesellschaft: Begriffsgeschichte als Problemgeschichte," in *Die Ohnmacht der Gefühle: Heimat zwischen Wunsch und Wirklichkeit*, ed. Jochen Kelter (Weingarten: Drumlin, 1986), 111. For others who have argued for the reality of Heimat feeling in urban centers, see Iring Fetscher, "Heimatliebe – Brauch und Mißbrauch eines Begriffs," in *Heimat im Wort: Die Problematik eines Begriffs im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert*, ed. Rüdiger Görner (Munich: Iudicium, 1992), 17. Dieter Kramer, "Die Provokation Heimat," *Zeitschrift für sozialistische Politik und Wirtschaft* 13 (1981): 37-39.
37. In the 1950s, the sociologist Wilhelm Brepohl found intense Heimat feeling in and for industrial urban centers like the Ruhrgebiet. Wilhelm Brepohl, "Die Heimat als Beziehungsfeld," *Soziale Welt* 4, nr. 1 (1952/53): 12-22; Wilhelm Brepohl, "Heimat und Selbstentfremdung," *Zeitschrift für Evangelische Ethik* 2, nr.1 (January 1958): 358-368; Wilhelm Brepohl, "Heimat, Heimatlosigkeit und Heimatfinden" in *Wege und Ziele: Gedanken zur Gesellschaftlichen Eingliederung der Vertriebenen*, ed. Harald von Königswald (Troisdorf: Der Wegweiser, 1952), 24-31. The socio-psychologist Hans-Joachim Busch similarly argues that Heimat is a reality in urban centers, with abstract notions of Heimat for non-experienced spaces resulting in a "pseudo-Heimat." Hans-Joachim Busch, "Heimat als ein Resultat von Sozialisation – Versuch einer nicht-ideologischen Bestimmung," in *Wem gehört die Heimat?: Beiträge der politischen Psychologie zu einem umstrittenen Phänomen*, eds. Wilfried Belschner, et. al (Opladen: Leske & Budrich, 1995), 82-85. While there was an anti-urban tone in much nineteenth-century Heimat literature, this dichotomy declined in the twentieth century, with Heimat in urban centers increasingly thematized. Norbert Mecklenburg notes that the rural-urban dichotomy in Heimat literature declined into the twentieth century. Andrea Bastian cites such a decline as taking place in the postwar period. Norbert Mecklenburg, *Die grünen Inseln: Zur Kritik des literarischen Heimatkomplexes* (Munich: Iudicium, 1986), 83; Bastian, 198. Christian Sieg has examined early twentieth century literature on Berlin as Heimat. Christian Sieg, "Heimat Berlin: Siegfried Kracauer und Alfred Döblin als urbane Ethnografen der klassischen Moderne," in *Heimat: At the Intersection of Memory and Space*, eds. Friederike Eigler and Jens Kugele (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2012), 93-107. For nineteenth-century urban Heimat societies that remained active in the postwar period and are mentioned in this work, see for example the *Heimatverein Alt-Köln* and the *Verein der Hamburger*. These types of urban Heimat societies often emerged as back-breaking urbanization was changing their cities. Such societies also sat along side those that focused on regional landscape, which, as Applegate demonstrates, often had predominantly urban membership. Applegate, *Nation of Provincials*, 70-71, 104. As one Berliner indignantly wrote in 1902 on stereotypes of Heimat as rural: "Do we love our Heimat less, because we have grown up on the cobbles of the large city?" Hugo Jüngst, "Los von Berlin" in *Heimat deine Heimat: Ein Lesebuch*, ed. Jürgen Liebing (Darmstadt: Luchterhand, 1982), 39.
38. Celia Applegate, "A Europe of Regions: Reflections on the Historiography of Sub-National Places in Modern Times," *American Historical Review* 104, no.4 (October 1999): 1179.
39. Heimat books were often written by lay researchers and amateur Heimat enthusiasts, were often self-published, and promoted identities. For a work on the genre of the "Heimat book" see Beer, ed., *Das Heimatbuch*.
40. Wolfgang Borchert, "In Hamburg," in *Lieder und Sprüche auf Hamburg*, ed. Paul Neumann (Hamburg: Hans Christians, 1960), 77.
41. The early postwar period, they argue, represented a significant "social and psychological turning point." Richard Bessel and Dirk Schumann, "Introduction: Violence, Normality, and the Construction of Postwar Europe," in *Life after Death: Approaches to a Cultural and Social History of Europe During the 1940s and 1950s*, eds. Richard Bessel and Dirk Schumann (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 1-12.
42. Leo Wohleb, "Rede vor den Delegierten der Landestagung der Badischen Christlich-Sozialen Volkspartei," February 24, 1946, reprinted in Leo Wohleb, *Humanist und Politiker: Leo Wohleb, der Letzte Staatspräsident des Landes Baden*, eds. Paul Ludwig-Weinacht and Hans Maier (Heidelberg: F.H. Kerle, 1969), 171.

43. On the emergence of urban centers as the “epicenters of modern warfare,” see Marcus Funck and Roger Chickering, “Introduction: Endangered Cities,” in *Endangered Cities: Military Power and Urban Societies in the Era of the World Wars*, eds. Marcus Funck and Roger Chickering (Boston: Brill, 2004), 1-11. As Jörg Echternkamp points out, in World War II, the idea of the home front went from metaphor to reality. Jörg Echternkamp, “Im Kampf an der inneren und äußeren Front. Grundzüge der deutschen Gesellschaft im Zweiten Weltkrieg,” in *Die Deutsche Kriegsgesellschaft 1939 bis 1945: Erster Halbband, Politisierung, Vernichtung, Überleben*, ed. Jörg Echternkamp (Munich: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 2004), 68.
44. Hans Gumbrecht finds such latency to be a prominent theme in early postwar literature. Hans Gumbrecht, *Nach 1945. Latenz als Ursprung der Gegenwart* (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 2012).
45. As Christian Graf von Krackow argued, “Heimat is concrete or not at all.” Beate Mitzscherlich has defined Heimat as, at its core, the “inner relationship of a person to their surroundings” - situated within biography, human relationships, and habits within place. Von Krackow, 137; Beate Mitzscherlich, *“Heimat ist Etwas was Ich mache:” Eine psychologische Untersuchung zum individuellen Prozeß von Beheimatung* (Pfaffenweiler: Centaurus, 1997). Applegate has argued that Heimat represents “a myth about the possibility of community in the face of fragmentation.” Applegate, *A Nation of Provincials*, 19.
46. Though they focus on home as a domestic place, rather than locality and region in the sense of “Heimat,” see Paul Betts and David Crowley, “Introduction: Notions of Home in Post-1945 Europe,” *Journal of Contemporary History* 40, no.2 (April 2005): 213-236. See also Axel Schildt and Detlef Siegfried, *Deutsche Kulturgeschichte. Die Bundesrepublik– 1945 bis zur Gegenwart* (Munich: Carl Hanser, 2009).
47. For such challenges to the term of “normalization” see Lutz Niethammer, “‘Normalization’ in the West: Traces of Memory Leading Back into the 1950s,” in Schissler, ed., 237-261; Lutz Niethammer, “‘Normalisierung’ im Westen: Erinnerungsspuren in die 50er Jahre,” in *Ist der Nationalsozialismus Geschichte?: Zu Historisierung und Historikerstreit*, ed. Dan Diner (Frankfurt: Fischer, 1987), 153-184.
48. Eckart Conze has read the entire postwar period as a “search for security.” Eckart Conze, *Die Suche nach Sicherheit. Eine Geschichte der Bundesrepublik von 1949 bis Heute* (Munich: Siedler, 2009). The role of local solidarities in overcoming centripetal forces can also be seen in Neil Gregor’s study of Nuremberg. As he illustrates, this did not help coming to grips with the past. Neil Gregor, *Haunted City: Nuremberg and the Nazi Past* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2007). On the tremendous centripetal forces in early postwar Europe, see Keith Lowe, *Savage Continent: Europe in the Aftermath of World War II* (London: Penguin, 2012).
49. Martin Kohlrausch and Stefan-Ludwig Hoffmann, “Introduction: Post-Catastrophic Cities,” *Journal of Modern European History* 9, no.3 (November 2011): 308-313.
50. Arnd Bauerkämper, “Landwirtschaft und ländliche Gesellschaft in der Bundesrepublik in den 50er Jahren,” in *Modernisierung im Wiederaufbau: die westdeutsche Gesellschaft der 50er Jahre*, eds. Axel Schildt and Arnold Sywottek (Bonn: J.H.W. Dietz, 1993), 189.
51. For the argument of desires for normality undermining democratization, see Rebecca Boehling, *A Question of Priorities: Democratic Reform and Economic Recovery in Postwar Germany* (Oxford: Berghahn, 1996).
52. After World War I, lack of cultural demobilization redounded to the benefit of National Socialism. John Horne, “Kulturelle Demobilisierung 1919-1939: Ein sinnvoller historischer Begriff?,” in *Politische Kulturgeschichte der Zwischenkriegszeit 1918-1938*, ed. Wolfgang Hardtwig (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2005), 129-150.
53. Bundesarchiv B 144 Nr. 253, Walter von Cube, “Um die Selbständigkeit des Landes Baden: Vortrag vor dem Badischen Hilfsverein in München am 1. Juli 1951,” Published by the Landesverband der Arbeitsgemeinschaft der Badener e.V. Karlsruhe. Circulatory, “Vom See bis des Maines Strand.”
54. Applegate notes the role of postwar Heimat as a guard against excessive Germanness. Applegate, 228-248. Andreas Schumann points to Heimat as re-enforcing or putting a check on nation in nineteenth-century Heimat literature. Schumann’s work also provides evidence reaffirming that Heimat could be used by a range of different ideological groups. Andreas Schumann, *Heimat denken: Regionales Bewußtsein in der deutschsprachigen Literatur zwischen 1815 und 1914* (Cologne: Böhlau, 2002). Similarly, Rudy Koshar has pointed out that Heimat could be evoked to either “reinforce” or “modify” the appeal of nation. Rudy Koshar, “The Antimonies of Heimat: Homeland, History, Nazism,” in Hermand and Steakley, eds., 113.

55. For description of early postwar desires for private life as anti-modern, see Ulrich Herbert, "Liberalisierung als Lernprozeß. Die Bundesrepublik in der deutschen Geschichte – eine Skizze," in Herbert, ed., 25. Peter Heil describes desires for what he labels an "organic federalism" as anti-modern and culturally pessimistic. Peter Heil, "Gemeinden sind wichtiger als Staaten: Idee und Wirklichkeit des kommunalen Neuanfangs in Rheinland-Pfalz, 1945-1957 (Mainz: Hase & Koehler, 1997). For a contrasting view of the turn to federalism as a result of learning from the past, see Jochem Huhn, *Lernen aus der Geschichte?: Historische Argumente in der westdeutschen Föderalismusdiskussion 1945-1949* (Melsungen: Kasseler Forschungen zur Zeitgeschichte, 1990).
56. No study has looked in depth at twentieth-century discussions about massification. Such a study would certainly reveal that the concept was evoked in tremendously different ideological discourses, ranging from Nazi and nationalist discourses, to democratic federalist and conservative ones. For examples of historiographical description of early postwar concerns about massification as inherently anti-democratic, see Mark Roseman, "The Organic Society and the 'Massenmenchen: Integrating Young Labour in the Ruhr Mines, 1945-58," in *West Germany under Construction: Politics, Society and Culture in the Adenauer Era* (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1997), 287-300; Volker Berghahn, "Recasting Bourgeois Germany," in *The Miracle Years: A Cultural History of West Germany, 1949-1986*, ed. Hanna Schissler (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001), 336-337; Schildt and Detlef, 156-158; Kurt Lenk, "Zum westdeutschen Konservativismus," in Schildt and Sywottek, eds., 638-642.
57. Maurice Halbwachs, *On Collective Memory*, trans. Lewis A. Coser (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992).
58. Scores of works have been done on postwar memory of the Nazi past. Work on early postwar memory of the long haul of German history, by contrast, has focused on elite historian's grand national narratives. Such works view historical memory of German history as a passive body that early postwar Germans sought to save from a Nazi taint. Historians have generally not considered how historical memory was a tool brought into discourse with imagining different national futures in a time of crisis. See, Winfried Schulze, *Deutsche Geschichtswissenschaft nach 1945* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1989); Ernst Schulin, ed., *Deutsche Geschichtswissenschaft nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg (1945-1965)* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1989). On West German preoccupation with Bonn not becoming Weimar, see Sebastian Ullrich, *Der Weimar-Komplex. Das Scheitern der ersten deutschen Demokratie und die politische Kultur der frühen Bundesrepublik, 1945-1959* (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2009).
59. Fritz Rörig, "Stand und Aufgaben der Hansischen Geschichtsforschung," *Hansische Geschichtsblätter* 69 (1950): 1-13; AHL, 05.4-30 Hansischer Geschichtsverein, Jahresmitglied Versammlung, Soest: 1947, "Hansischer Geist," *Westfalenpost*, May 30, 1947.
60. The American occupiers were conflicted on whether German traditions could be used in democratization. Thomas Reuther, *Die ambivalente Normalisierung: Deutschlanddiskurs und Deutschlandbilder in den USA, 1941-1955* (Stuttgart: Steiner, 2000).
61. Arnd Bauerkämper, Konrad Jarausch, and Marcus Payk, eds., *Demokratiewunder: Transatlantische Mittler und die kulturelle Öffnung Westdeutschlands 1945-1970* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2005), 31.
62. On the modernization and Americanization paradigms see Schildt and Sywottek, eds.; Konrad Jarausch and Hannes Siegrist, eds., *Amerikanisierung und Sowjetisierung in Deutschland 1945-1970* (Frankfurt: Campus, 1997).
63. Manfred Görtemaker, *Geschichte der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Von der Gründung bis zur Gegenwart* (Munich, C.H. Beck: 1999). Konrad Jarausch, *Die Umkehr: Deutsche Wandlungen, 1945-1995* (Munich: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 2004), 133; For other works that privilege the 1960s as the true period of West German democratization, see Ulrich Herbert, ed., *Wandlungsprozesse in Westdeutschland. Belastung, Integration und Liberalisierung, 1945-1980* (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2002); Matthias Frese, Julia Paulus and Karl Teppe, eds., *Demokratisierung und gesellschaftlicher Aufbruch. Die sechziger Jahre als Wendezeit der Bundesrepublik* (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2003). Amongst those who emphasize the 1960s as the crux of democratization, there is disagreement on whether this was caused by the 68er movement or was the result of changes already underway. Udo Wengst, ed., *Reform und Revolte. Politischer gesellschaftlicher Wandel in der Bundesrepublik vor und nach 1968* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2011). For essays that downplay the importance of the first postwar decade for West German democratization see Robert Moeller, ed., *West Germany under Construction: Politics, Society, and Culture in the Adenauer Era* (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1997). Wolfgang Benz has highlighted a story of emergent democratic structures in the early period that the allies forced on a largely unreceptive population. Wolfgang Benz, *Auftrag Demokratie: die Gründungsgeschichte der Bundesrepublik und die Entstehung der DDR*

1945-1949 (Berlin: Metropol, 2009).

64. Christoph Kleßmann, "Ein stolzes Schiff und krächzende Möwen. Die Geschichte der Bundesrepublik und ihre Kritiker," *Geschichte und Gesellschaft* 11 (1985): 476-494. Edgar Wolfrum, *Die geglü ckte Demokratie: Geschichte der Bundesrepublik Deutschland von ihren Anfängen bis zur Gegenwart* (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 2006); Diethelm Prowe, "The 'Miracle' of the Political-Culture Shift: Democratization Between Americanization and Conservative Reintegration," in Schissler, ed., 451-457.

65. For criticism of the zero hour narrative, see Stephen Brockmann and Frank Trommler, eds., *Revisiting the Zero Hour 1945: The Emergence of Postwar German Culture* (Washington D.C.: American Institute for Contemporary Studies, 1996); Stephen Brockmann, *German Literary Culture at the Zero Hour* (Rochester, NY: Camden House, 2004). On integration of former Nazis into early postwar society, see Ulrich Brochhagen, *Nach Nürnberg. Vergangenheitsbewältigung und Westintegration in der Ära Adenauer* (Hamburg: Junius, 1994). On persisting racist attitudes in early postwar Germany, see Rita Chin, et al., *After the Nazi Racial State: Difference and Democracy in Germany and Europe* (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2009); Juliana Wetzel, "An Uneasy Existence: Jewish Survivors in Germany after 1945," in Schissler, ed., 131-144; Maria Höhn, "Heimat in Turmoil: African Gis in 1950s West Germany," in *Ibid.*, 145-163; Heide Fehrenbach, "Of German Mothers and 'Negermischlingskinder': Race, Sex, and the Postwar Nation," in *Ibid.*, 164-186. Some have pointed to important early caesuras, including the dismantling of Prussia, rapid growth of the Western alliance, and the quick break with militarist traditions. For more on the early postwar break with Prussian traditions, see Gerhard A. Ritter, *Über Deutschland: Die Bundesrepublik in der deutschen Geschichte* (Munich: C.H. Beck, 1998). One recent volume reasserts the importance of a so-called "long zero hour" from 1945 to 1949. Hans Braun, Uta Gerhardt and Everhard Holtmann, eds., *Die lange Stunde Null: Gelenkter sozialer Wandel in Westdeutschland nach 1945* (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2007).

66. Raimund Lammersdorf, "'Das Volk ist streng demokratisch': Amerikanische Sorgen über das autoritäre Bewusstsein der Deutschen in der Besatzungszeit und frühen Bundesrepublik" in Bauerkämper, Jarausch, and Payk, eds., 31.

67. On scarcity as a postwar "continuity" see Martin Broszat, Karl Dietmar Henker, and Hans Woller, eds., *Von Stalingrad zur Währungsreform. Zur Sozialgeschichte des Umbruchs in Deutschland* (Oldenbourg: Oldenbourg Wissenschaftsverlag, 1988). On a large social state as a postwar "continuity" see Axel Schildt and Arnold Sywottek, "'Reconstruction' and 'Modernization': West German Social History during the 1950s," in Moeller, ed., 417.

68. Daniel Fulda, Dagmar Herzog, Stefan-Ludwig Hoffmann and Till Raden, "Zur Einführung," in *Demokratie im Schatten der Gewalt: Geschichten des Privaten im deutschen Nachkrieg*, eds. Daniel Fulda, et al (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2010), 7-8.

69. Paul Nolte makes this point in an important recent work on historical ideas of democracy. Paul Nolte, *Was ist Demokratie?: Geschichte und Gegenwart* (Munich: C.H.: Beck, 2012), 9-18.

70. For democracy as a "search" for different forms, see Nolte, *Was ist Demokratie?*.

71. On the historical legitimizing force of defeat, see Jörg Echternkamp, "Wege aus dem Krieg. Für die Historisierung von Nachkriegsgesellschaften im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert," in *Kriegsenden, Kriegsnachordnungen, Folgekonflikte: Wege aus dem Krieg im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert*, ed. Jörg Echternkamp (Freiburg: Rombach, 2012), 7. On the impossibility of assigning responsibility to anything but Nazism, see Hermann Lübke, "Der Nationalsozialismus im deutschen Nachkriegsbewußtsein," *Historische Zeitschrift* 236, no.3 (June 1983): 579-599. Peter Kielmansegg has briefly noted that the catastrophe after the war redounded to the benefit of democratization. Peter Graf Kielmansegg, *Nach der Katastrophe. Eine Geschichte des geteilten Deutschlands* (Berlin: Siedler, 2000).

72. The volume on Germany's "democracy wonder" particularly emphasizes mediating figures who translated allied projects into the German cultural sphere. Bauerkämper, Jarausch and Payk, eds., *Demokratiewunder*. For other works on democratization as a complex mixture of German traditions and outside impulses, see Friedrich Kießling and Bernhard Rieger, eds., *Mit dem Wandel leben. Neuorientierung und Tradition in der Bundesrepublik der 1950er und 60er Jahre* (Cologne: Böhlau, 2010); Wolfrum, 57. Thomas Mergel, looking at the electoral political culture, similarly argues for an interlocking of German traditions and foreign influences. Thomas Mergel, *Propaganda nach Hitler. Eine Kulturgeschichte des Wahlkampfes in der Bundesrepublik, 1949-1990* (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2010).

73. Nolte, 298-301.



74. For discussion of democratization as a “search for democracy as a life form,” see Daniel Fulda, Dagmar Herzog, Stefan-Ludwig Hoffmann, and Till van Rahden, “Zur Einführung,” in Fulda, et al, eds., 12-13
75. Heinrich August Winkler, *Der lange Weg nach Westen: Deutsche Geschichte vom “Dritten Reich” bis zur Wiedervereinigung*, vol.2 (Munich: C.H. Beck, 2005); Axel Schildt, *Ankunft im Westen. Ein Essay zur Erfolgsgeschichte der Bundesrepublik* (Frankfurt: S. Fischer, 1999).
76. Willi Oberkrome opines that Heimat organizations in early postwar West Germany were saturated with anti-western attitudes. The American-German literary scholar, Peter Blickle, argues that the Heimat concept is inherently in contradiction to European unification and represents a mode of thought that refuses to recognize the “other.” Willi Oberkrome, “‘Durchherrschte’ Heimat?: Zentralismus und Regionalismus im organisierten Heimatschutz der frühen DDR. Das Beispiel Thüringens,” in Knoch, ed., 255; Blickle 6, 12.
77. Andreas Schumann in a study of nineteenth-century Heimat literature finds that it was border regions that most emphasized their Germanness. Schumann, 66-67, 233; Celia Applegate demonstrates this phenomenon in the nineteenth and early-twentieth century Pfalz. Applegate 120-148; On the same phenomenon in Schleswig-Holstein, see Bernd Jörg Diebner, “‘Das Plattdeutsche hat Heimatrecht auch bei uns!’: Zur Rolle des Niederdeutschen in der deutschsprachigen Presse Nordschleswigs während der NS-Zeit,” in Dohnke, Hopster and Wirrer, eds., 441-492. For a study on the case of the southwestern border, see Thomas Williams, “‘Grenzlandsschicksal.’ Historical Narratives of Regional Identity and National Duty in ‘Gau Oberrhein,’ 1941-1944,” in Umbach and Szejnmann, eds., 56-71.
78. Giles MacDonogh argues that brutalities of allied occupation have often been overlooked. See Giles MacDonogh, *After the Reich: The Brutal History of Allied Occupation* (New York: Basic, 2007).
79. Horne describes undoing absolute enemy images as crucial to cultural demobilization. John Horne, “Kulturelle Demobilmachung 1919-1939,” in ed. Hardtwig, 129-150.
80. Edith Sheffer has looked at the processes by which West and East Germans burned bridges across an increasingly rigid border that had been more permeable in the earliest postwar years. Edith Sheffer, *Burned Bridge: How East and West Germans Made the Iron Curtain* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).
81. Detlef Bald, “‘Bürger in Uniform.’ Tradition und Neuanfang des Militärs in Westdeutschland,” in Schildt and Sywottek, eds., 395; Ulrich Herbert, “Liberalisierung als Lernprozeß. Die Bundesrepublik in der deutschen Geschichte – eine Skizze,” in Herbert, ed., 33.
82. Michael von Engelhardt, *Lebensgeschichte und Gesellschaftsgeschichte. Biographieverläufe von heimatvertriebenen des Zweiten Weltkriegs* (Munich: Iudicium, 2001).
83. The use of historical memories in the protest cultures of the 1960s has been shown to have established other deeply ingrained historical myths. Dagmar Herzog illustrates how the myth of the Nazis as summarily against sexual indulgence resulted from the struggles over sexual liberation in the 1960s. Dagmar Herzog, *Sex after Fascism: Memory and Morality in Twentieth-Century Germany* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005).
84. From 1945 to 1957, Wildt argues, Western German society continued to battle with scarcity. Michael Wildt, *Am Beginn der “Konsumgesellschaft.” Mangelerfahrung, Lebenshaltung, Wohlstandhoffnung in Westdeutschland in den fünfziger Jahren* (Hamburg: Ergebnisse-Verlag, 1994). Merith Niehuss has arrived at similar findings. Merith Niehuss, *Familie, Frau und Gesellschaft: Studien zur Strukturgeschichte der Familie in Westdeutschland, 1945-1960* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2001).
85. This is the argument of the American-German literary scholar Peter Blickle (not the Swiss historian of the same name). Peter Blickle, *Heimat: A Critical Theory of the German Idea of Homeland* (Rochester, NY: Camden House, 2002), x, 1, 7, 28-29, 72. The Swiss historian, Peter Blickle, by contrast, has argued for early modern fragmentation in Germany as the source of proto-democratic German traditions. See Peter Blickle, *Deutsche Untertanen: ein Widerspruch* (Munich: C.H. Beck, 1981).
86. Anthropologists have analyzed Heimat as a principle of human territoriality, the need for locality, and the need for “comprehensible” spaces. Ina-Maria Greverus, while viewing Heimat as an anthropological need, also warns against political manipulation by self-appointed Heimat-experts. Ina-Maria Greverus, *Auf der Suche nach Heimat*, 10-52. For a useful essay on Heimat as a need for comprehensible spaces, see Karl Steinbach, “Heimat als Informationelle Notwendigkeit,” in *Heimat - Tradition - Geschichtsbewußtsein*, ed. Klaus Weigelt (Mainz: von Hase

& Koehler, 1986), 45-56.

87. Applegate has noted the importance of developing strategies to make studies of sub-national places think in larger terms. See Celia Applegate, "A Europe of Regions: Reflections on the Historiography of Sub-National Places in Modern Times," *American Historical Review*, 104, nr.4 (October 1999): 1182.

## Chapter I

1. Local Cologne dialect: “Denn nur die Sehnsucht trook mich zu dir hin; Zu dir, ming Heimat, Kölle am Rhing!,” Karl Jahn, “Ming Heimat,” (1946), reprinted in Reinhold Louis, *Kölnischer Liederschatz: Wat kölsche Leedcher vun Kölle verzälle* (Cologne: Greven, 1986), 178.
2. Heinrich Böll, “Stichworte,” in *Werke: Kölner Ausgabe*, vol.14, eds., Árpád Bernáth and Jochen Schubert (Cologne: Kiepenheuer & Witsch, 2002), 312.
3. Heinrich Schroder, *Colonia Deleta* (Cologne: Balduin Pick, 1947), 68-74.
4. Carl Sasse, “...daß Sehnsucht ich nach Köln hab’...,” *Unser Köln* 6/7 (June/July 1949): 53-54. Sasse continued to write in later years on the foreignness of the local landscape, disappearance of childhood places, and determination to retain attachment to his locality. Carl Sasse, “Ein Kölner Vater an seinen Sohn,” *Unser Köln* 5/6 (1950): 54.
5. Richard Bessel and Dirk Schumann, eds., *Life after Death: Approaches to a Cultural and Social History of Europe during the 1940s and 1950s* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003); Richard Bessel, *1945: From War to Peace* (London: Simon & Schuster, 2009).
6. Lutz Niethammer argues that early postwar German’s use of the term “normal” to describe their personal lives after reconstruction was a misnomer, as reconstruction and the Economic Miracle did not restore prewar circumstances. Lutz Niethammer, “‘Normalisierung’ im Westen: Erinnerungsspuren in die 50er Jahre,” in *Ist der Nationalsozialismus Geschichte?: Zu Historisierung und Historikerstreit*, ed. Dan Diner (Frankfurt: Fischer Taschenbuch, 1987), 153-184. Such measurements of “normalization,” I would argue, miss the point of how early postwar Germans conceived of the idea. They often perceived of normality as a state in which private everyday life could again, like in prewar periods, proceed without ceaseless subjection to violence, dislocation, destruction, and the threat of death that defined war-time experiences.
7. “Besuch in Köln 1946,” *Südkurier*, July 9, 1946, reprinted in *Die Niederlage, die eine Befreiung war: Das Lesebuch zum 8. Mai 1945*, ed. Ilse Brusis (Cologne: Bund-Verlag, 1985), 90.
8. Joseph Klersch, “Vorwort” and “Volkstumspflege und Volkskunde,” in *Volkstumspflege und Volkskunde: Festschrift zum 50 jährigen Bestehen des Heimatvereins Alt-Köln e.V.*, ed. Joseph Klersch (Cologne: Unser Köln, 1952), 5, 12.
9. Peter Felten, “Erinnerungen eines achtzigjährigen Kölner Arztes,” (1943), *Alt Köln: Heimatblätter für die Stadt Köln* 5, no.14 (November 1951): 53-55.
10. Willy Klett, “Ming einzig Kölle” (1943) reprinted in Louis, 174.
11. Unknown author, “Kölle ming Heimat” (1943) reprinted in Louis, 172. The piece was written by a member of the Carnival society *Lyskircher Junge* and was first found several decades later.
12. “Patentwohnung für evakuierte Kölsche” (Float draft: Siegfried Kuchler), *Kölner Rosenmontagszeitung*, Fastelovend, 1954.
13. Lauren Kiesgen, “Evakueet un Verbomb!” and “Et Fläschge: Wehmutige Erinnerungen an einen Fliegerangriff” (1943), in “*Vum Ale Kölle*: Lebensweg und Lebenswerk, Gedeichte un Verzällche Unter den Domtürmen – Erinnerungen”, ed. Laurenz Kiesgen (Cologne: Heimatverein Alt-Köln, 1970), 35-37.
14. Peter J. Hasenberg, *Ist das erst 15 Jahre her?: Die Ersten Nachkriegsjahre im Spiegel der Zeitung* (Cologne: Deutsche Glocke, 1960), 13.
15. Heinrich Böll, “Stichworte,” in *Werke: Kölner Ausgabe*, vol.14, 314.
16. For primary accounts of travels back to the city, see Anja vom Stein, ed., *Unser Köln: Erinnerungen 1910-1960* (Erfurt: Sutton, 1999), 61 - 63; Peter Fröhlich, *Kölle noh ‘45* (Cologne: Greven, 1972), 10.
17. “Köln wird auferstehen,” *Kölnischer Kurier*, April 9, 1945.
18. “Nein, es muß Köln sein!,” *Kölnische Rundschau*, October 11, 1946.
19. “Lob für ein Amt: Die Tradition des kölnischen Volkes: Eine Behörde ohne Bürokratie – Um Karneval und Puppenspiel,” *Westdeutsche Zeitung*, January 19, 1949.

20. Jupp Berg, "Kölle – uns Heimat" in *Sonnesching us Köllen am Rhing: Rümcher un Verzällcher*, ed. Jupp Berg (Bonn: Verlag der europäischen Bücherei, 1948), 4.
21. Two decades later, the city still reported an apartment shortage. "In Köln fehlen noch 27000 Wohnungen: Wird das Defizit bis zum Jahre 1968 beseitigt," *Kölner Stadtanzeiger*, November 12, 1964.
22. Gregory F. Schroeder, "Ties of Urban Heimat: West German Cities and Their Wartime Evacuees in the 1950s," *German Studies Review* 27, no.2 (May 2004): 307-324.
23. See, for example, "Do, mie leev, alt Kölle!: Zur Erinnerung an den 2. März 1945," *Alt-Köln: Heimatblätter für die Stadt Köln* 9, no.4 (April 1955): 16; and "Ein Dokument inniger Verbundenheit," *Kölner Almanach* (1951/52): 340. In 1950, the number of evacuees who sought return was estimated at 75,000. "75000 Kölner wollen nach Hause: Können die Evakuierten in absehbarer Zeit zurückgeführt werden?," *Kölner Stadtanzeiger*, February 3, 1950.
24. "Holt die Evakuierten heim!," *Kölner Stadtanzeiger*, January 24, 1951; Statistischen Amt der Stadt Köln, ed., *Verwaltungsberichte der Stadt Köln, 1954/55* (Cologne, 1955), 83.
25. Hans Jonen, *16 Tage Fürst: Mit Prinz Theo I. durch den Kölner Karneval* (Cologne: Kölnische Verlagsdruckerei, 1949), 51-57.
26. "Ein Prinz aus feinen Landen...Glückwunsch Sr. Tollität Caspar I. aus Chicago," *Rosenmontagszeitung*, Weiberfastnacht, 1949. A group of former regionalists in New York likewise celebrated Carnival from afar. "Karl Berbuer als Fastelovendsdiplomant," *Kölner Stadtanzeiger*, February 10, 1955; Alfred Neven-DuMont, *18 Tage Narrenfürst* (Cologne: M. DuMont Schauberg, 1955), 23.
27. "Stoßseufzer eines Fastelovends-Redaktuers," *Rheinische Zeitung*, February 7, 1949; "Rolle-bum un bums-valldera im Sonderzug," *Rheinische Zeitung*, March 2, 1949; "Kölle wirklich en Dur un Moll," *Rheinische Zeitung*, February 6, 1951; "Rosenmontag: Kölns größter Volksfesttag,," *Kölner Stadtanzeiger*, February 6, 1951. Signs in later Carnival parades sent similar message to evacuees, such as one proclaiming: "we will bring you home." "Triumphfahrt des Rosenmontagszug 1954," *Kölner Stadtanzeiger*, March 2, 1954.
28. Lis Böhle, "Bref us der Evakuierung," in *Kölsche Saison*, Lis Böhle (Cologne: Greven, 1963), 58-59. The mayor, Theodor Burauen emphasized the strength of Colognean Heimat sentiment during Carnival by highlighting the story of an elderly woman who returned to Cologne after fifteen years in evacuation. By that time, however, of the 45,000 Colognean evacuees, fewer than 3000 planned to return, in spite of their strong local Heimat sentiment for Cologne. "Wo jitt et dat söns noch op der Welt?," *Kölner Stadtanzeiger*, February 10, 1961; "Ihre Sehnsucht heißt Heimkehr: 2333 Kölner in der Fremde wollen zurück," *Kölner Stadtanzeiger*, February 19, 1963.
29. Frank Biess, *Homecomings: Returning POWs and the Legacies of Defeat in Postwar Germany* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006), 65-69. For another study which illustrates similar emphasis on Heimat amongst POWs and renewed sense of loss upon return home, see Burghard Ciesla, "Auf Schienenwegen nach Hause. Deutsche Reichsbahn, Eisenbahner und Heimkehrertransporte," in *Heimkehr 1948*, ed. Annette Kaminsky (Munich: C.H. Beck, 1998), 64.
30. Wilhelm Staffél, *Willi Ostermann* (Cologne: Greven, 1976), 84-85.
31. Hans Schmitt-Rost recalled POWs singing *Heimweh nach Köln* as a vent for feelings of "weariness" and "desire for Heimat." Fritz Franz Florian [pseud., Hans Schmitt-Rost], *Köln am Rhein: du schönes Städtchen* (Cologne: Greven, 1955) 8. The local, Günther Hochgürthel, in an interview, recounted in 1948 being on the Hohenzollern bridge and hearing returning POWs and singing the song, which he recounted became like a local national hymn in the postwar period. Interview in ed., vom Stein, 80.
32. Heinz Weber, "Ich mööch noch ens" (1943/44), in *Kölsche Verzällcher för Hären un Mamsellcher*, 12<sup>th</sup> ed., ed. Heinz Weber (Cologne: Greven, 1964), 205.
33. "Die Stadt ehrt ihre Heimatkehrer: Empfang der Stadt Köln zu Ehren ihrer aus Rußland zurückgekehrten Mitbürger," *Kölner Stadtanzeiger*, February 8, 1954.
34. Barbara Becker-Jäkli, ed., "Ich habe Köln doch so geliebt:" *Lebensgeschichten jüdischer Kölnerinnen und Kölner* (Cologne: Volksblatt, 1993), 185; Kirsten Serup-Bilfeldt, *Zwischen Dom und Davidstern: Jüdisches Leben in Köln von den Anfängen bis heute* (Cologne: Kipenhauer & Witsch, 2001), 10, 107.

35. Wilhelm Unger, "Un sin d'r Dom su vör mir ston" (excerpt), reprinted in "...vergessen kann man die Zeit nicht, das ist nicht möglich...." *Kölner erinnern sich an die Jahre 1929-1945*, ed. Horst Mazerath (Cologne: Stadt Köln, 1985), 219-221.
36. Discussion between Ralph Giordano and Günter Ginzel, "Zwei Kölner Juden im Gespräch," in "*Zuhause in Köln: Jüdisches Leben, 1945 bis Heute*," eds., Günter B. Ginzel and Sonja Güntner (Cologne: Böhlau, 1998), 11.
37. Jean Améry, "How much Home does a Person Need?," in *At the Mind's Limit: Contemplations by a Survivor of Auschwitz and its Realities*, trans. Sidney and Stella Rosenfeld (New York: Schocken Books, 1980), 43-44, 50.
38. Artur Joseph, *Meines Vaters Haus: Ein Dokument* (Stuttgart: Cotta'sche Buchhandlung, 1959), 53-56, 144. Artur Joseph recounted his "desire for the old Heimat" every time that the calendar hits the Carnival season—wishing privately, that he too, like in Ostermann's song, could set out on foot to Cologne. Joseph still referred to Cologne after the war as his "Heimat city."
39. One of the most incisive analyses of this phenomenon comes from Jean Améry, who recounted his torn sense of Heimat after fleeing from the Nazis. Jean Améry, "Wieviel Heimat braucht der Mensch" in Jean Amery, *Jenseits von Schuld und Sühne: Bewältigungsversuche eines Überwältigten* (Munich: Szczeny, 1966), 71-100.
40. A dialogue by Böll in 1953 thematized Jewish loss of a sense of Heimat which they had for prewar Cologne, and lack of public memory of this in postwar Cologne. Heinrich Böll, "Ach, so...ein Jude," in *Werke: Kölner Ausgabe*, vol. 6, eds. Árpád Bernáth and Annamária Gyurácz (Cologne: Kiepenheuer & Witsch, 2007), 496-499.
41. Ull Tuerk, "Heimatliche Melodie," *Kölnischer Kurier*, August 14, 1945.
42. Heinz Fries, Introduction to Schroder, 5-6.
43. Alon Confino has reduced Heimat to a local metaphor and strategy of imagining Heimat, in which it becomes largely an empty signifier of the nation. Alon Confino, *The Nation as a Local Metaphor: Württemberg, Imperial Germany, and National Memory, 1871-1918* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1997); Alon Confino, *Germany as a Culture of Remembrance: Promises and Limits of Writing History* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2006). This contrasts with the position of Celia Applegate, who, rather than collapsing Heimat and nation, argues convincingly that local Heimat represented a mediating point for imagining nation. Celia Applegate, *A Nation of Provincials: The German Idea of Heimat* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1990).
44. For works which have more narrowly seen Heimat as a place of lost childhood, see Ernst Bloch, *Das Prinzip Hoffnung*, vol. 3 (Berlin: Aufbau, 1959), 484-489; Christian Graf von Krockow, *Heimat: Erfahrungen mit einem deutschen Thema* (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1989), 9, 131-132; Bernd Hüppauf identifies past notions of Heimat with childhood, but argues that the Heimat concept is currently undergoing a decoupling from the notion of childhood. See, Bernd Hüppauf, "Heimat - Die Wiederkehr eines Verpönten Wortes. Ein Populärmythos im Zeitalter der Globalisierung" in *Heimat. Konturen und Konjunkturen eines umstrittenen Konzepts*, eds. Gunther Gebhard, Oliver Geisler, and Steffen Schröter (Bielefeld: transcript, 2007), 131-132.
45. Jupp Becker, "Et Schöppeleed," reprinted in Louis, 244.
46. The binary has often been seen as a key component to the Heimat concept; the words *heimlich/unheimlich* share a common root with *Heimat*. For Freud's discussion of this binary, see Sigmund Freud, "Das Unheimliche," in *Sigmund Freud, Gesammelte Werke*, ed. Anna Freud (Frankfurt: Fischer, 1999), 227-278.
47. For interviews of past returnees which convey this, see in particular, ed. vom Stein, 476-482.
48. Anton Stille, "D'r Letzte Ress," and "No lange Johre," in *Kölsche Blömcher*, Anton Stille (Cologne: Greven, 1960), 17.
49. "Vorträge im Heimatverein Alt-Köln," *Unser Köln* 2 (August 1948): 4.
50. Goswin P. Gath, "Erinnerunge," in *Draum un Spill*, Goswin P. Gath (Cologne: Balduin Pick, 1947), 39.
51. Albrecht Bodde, "Kölle – es war einmal" (1945), reprinted in Louis, 188.
52. Often written by amateur and little-known lyricists, such song lyrics were typically written to pre-existing melodies.

53. Joachim Hening, "Köln du kannst niemals untergehn" (1945), Karl Jahn, "Ming Heimat" (1946), Rudolf Roonthal, "Köln, mein Köln, du wirst wiedererstehn," Jupp Schmitz, "Ming herrlich Kölle" (1949), all reprinted in Louis, 176, 178, 187, 189; Wilhelm Stumpf, "Kölle, domols un jetz," *Rheinische Zeitung*, February 9, 1949.
54. Dialect translations: "dat eß ming Heimat, Kölle he am Rhing;" "Bes dat uns Heimat Kölle widder steiht," Ibid.
55. Waldemar Cosson, "Treuschwur," in *Kölsche Klaaf*, Waldemar Cosson (Cologne: Balduin Pick, 1951), 6.
56. Lis Böhle, "Widder doheim," *Kölnischer Kurier*, August 14, 1945; Lis Böhle and Willy Key, *Skizzierte Erinnerungen* (Cologne: Gustav Göller, 1947), 31; Lis Böhle, "Domols un hück," in Lis Böhle, *Jeck op Kölle* (Cologne: J.P. Bechem, 1955), 192; Lis Böhle, "Avsched vum Hohenstaufenbad" and "Avsched vum Openhus," "Tschüss Bahnhofsohr," in Lis Böhle, *Kölsche Saison* (Cologne: Greven, 1963), 107-112. Attempts to bridge between lost local realities and the present could be found, for example, in several series of texts and images on old Cologne during the early postwar period. See, for example, Johann Hässlin, *Wanderungen durch das alte Köln* (Cologne: EA Seemann, 1955).
57. Unknown Author, "Gote Mot" (1946), reprinted in Louis, 182-183.
58. See, for example, Hans Jonen, "Alt Kölle," *Alt- und Neu-Köln: Heimatblätter für kölnische Kunst, Sprache und Eigenart* (1946): 5. Louis describes the gathered energies as the "Colognian wonder," and argues that Carnival and Carnival songs became a site for rallying the necessary sentiment for its realization. See Louis, 10.
59. Larenz Kiesgen, "E Leed vum ale Kölle" (Late 1940's), printed in Heimatverein Alt-Köln e.V. ed., *Kölsche Deechter un Gedeechte: Ein Lied- und Vortragsbuch in Kölner Mundart* (Cologne: Kölnisches Verlagsdruckerei, 1973), 95; Laurenz Kiesgen, "Alt-Kölle," in Laurenz Kiesgen, "Vum Ale Kölle:" *Lebensweg und Lebenswerk, Gedeechte un Verzällche Unter den Domtürmen – Erinnerungen* (Cologne: Heimatverein Alt-Köln, 1970), 38.
60. Peter Felten, "Erinnerungen eines achtzigjährigen Kölner Arztes," *Alt-Köln: Heimatblätter für die Stadt Köln* 5, no.14 (November 1951): 53-55.
61. Boskamp was at least in his mid 70's, having finished his dissertation in Bonn in 1895. Paul Boskamp, "Köln, Du alte heilige Stadt," *Alt- und Neu-Köln: Heimatblätter für kölnische Kunst, Sprache und Eigenart* (1946): 3.
62. For use of these term in reference to local reconstruction, see "So fingen wir wieder an!," *Westdeutsche Zeitung*, February 4, 1949. For an example of the motif in local postwar Heimat song, see Gerhard Ebeler, "Meer losse de Flögele nit hange," reprinted in Louis, 183. Jonen's piece was first presented in 1949, and published later. Hans Jonen, "Mir sin noch do!," in Hans Jonen, *Gesträusel us Blömcher un Blumen am Wäg* (Cologne: Selbstverlag Joseph Klersch und Karl Vogler, 1956), 19; Joseph Klersch, *Volkstum und Volksleben in Köln: Ein Beitrag zur historischen Soziologie der Stadt* (Cologne: J.P. Bachem, 1965), 26 - 28.
63. Adam Wrede, "Kölsche Seele - Kölsche Art," *Kölner Almanach* (1954/55): 299-300.
64. Joseph Hennecke, "Köln im Dezennium Null bis Zehn," *Kölner Almanach* (1955/56): 15-16.
65. Konrad Adenauer, untitled excerpt, *Kölner Almanach* (1965/66): 8.
66. Von Krockow, 137-140.
67. "Das Amt für kölnisches Volkstum," *Unser Köln* 5/6 (November/December 1948): 13.
68. Diefendorf illustrates this for the case of Cologne and other postwar cities. Jeffrey M. Diefendorf, *In the Wake of the War: The Reconstruction of German Cities after World War II* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993).
69. Heinz Peters, ed., *Die Baudenkmäler in Nord-Rheinland: Kriegschaden und Wiederaufbau* (Kevelaer: Butzon & Bercker, 1951), 290 -342.
70. Franz A. Hoyer, "Geleitwort" in Hermann Classen, *Gesang im Feuerofen: Köln - Überreste einer alten Deutschen Stadt* (Düsseldorf: L. Schwann, 1947), ix-x. Around the same time, depictions of the lost landscape of old Cologne also flourished, including re-publications of artistic reproductions of local scenes like that of Karl Bernhard Roesing's 1925 volume, reprinted under a title emphasizing cherishing the memory of old Cologne. Karl Bernhard Roesing, *Erinnerungen an Alt-Köln: Federzeichnungen* (Cologne: Selbstverlag, 1947).

71. Statistisches Amt der Stadt Köln, *Verwaltungsbericht der Stadt Köln, 1945/47* (Cologne, 1947), 50; “Lob für ein Amt: Die Tradition des kölnischen Volkes: Eine Behörde ohne Bürokratie – Um Karneval und Puppenspiel,” *Westdeutsche Zeitung*, January 19, 1949.
72. Kurtz Koszyk, in an essay on the press in the early postwar period, briefly references an unusually strong presence of *Heimatblätter* and Heimat newspapers within all the printed matter of the period. This phenomenon, which can be seen strongly in Cologne, therefore reflected a broader trend. Kurt Koszyk, “Presse und Pressekonzentration in den 50er Jahren,” in *Modernisierung im Wiederaufbau: die westdeutsche Gesellschaft der 50er Jahre*, eds. Axel Schildt and Arnold Sywottek (Bonn: J.H.W. Dietz, 1993), 441. Celia Applegate notes a similar proliferation of Heimat societies and publications in her chapter on the Pfalz after 1945. Applegate, *A Nation of Provincials*, 230-231.
73. Early Heimat publications growing in the rubble often sought to cater to disconnected locals outside the city. The new Colognian Heimat magazine *Unser Köln* held in 1948 that one of their primary duties in the publication was to bridge between Colognians in the city and those evacuated who were waiting to return home. “Mit diesem Mitteilungsblatt,” *Unser Köln* 1 (July 1948): 2.
74. “Zum Geleit,” *Alt-Köln: Heimatblätter für die Stadt Köln* 1 (August 1947): 1.
75. While many such examples of Carnival spurring rebuilding can be found, one particular incident particularly caught the public imagination. In 1949, on April fools day, a local newspaper reported that the Carnival triumvirate had taken to rebuilding the Gürzenich in costume. The bombed medieval building had been a historical center of Carnival celebrations for centuries. The next day, the Carnival triumvirate responded to the article by actually appearing as reported, sparking a wave of public involvement in the rebuilding project. Jonen, *16 Tage Fürst*, 57-58.
76. Reinhold Heinen, “Introduction,” in *Erbe der Vergangenheit. Zeitung und Mundart: Aufgabe der Gegenwart*, ed. Peter J. Hasenberg (Cologne: Deutsche Glocke, 1951), 2.
77. Peter J. Hasenberg, “Hüter der Heimat,” in *Im Schritt der Zeit: Wollen und Wirken einer deutschen Zeitung*, ed. Peter J. Hasenberg (Cologne: Deutsche Glocke, 1953), 58-59.
78. “Lob für ein Amt: Die Tradition des kölnischen Volkes: Eine Behörde ohne Bürokratie – Um Karneval und Puppenspiel,” *Westdeutsche Zeitung*, January 19, 1949; Max-Leo Schwering, “Sinn und Aufgabe großstädtischer Volkstumspflege,” *Kölner Almanach* (1957/58): 66; Statistisches Amt der Stadt Köln, *Verwaltungsbericht der Stadt Köln, 1945/47* (Cologne, 1947), 54-55; Statistisches Amt der Stadt Köln, *Verwaltungsbericht der Stadt Köln, 1949/1950* (Cologne, 1950), 77-78; Statistisches Amt der Stadt Köln, *Verwaltungsbericht der Stadt Köln, 1950/1951* (Cologne, 1951), 82-83; Statistisches Amt der Stadt Köln, *Verwaltungsberichte der Stadt Köln, 1951/52* (Cologne, 1952), 90-91; Statistisches Amt der Stadt Köln, *Verwaltungsberichte der Stadt Köln, 1952/53* (Cologne, 1953), 98-99; Statistisches Amt der Stadt Köln, *Verwaltungsberichte der Stadt Köln, 1953/54* (Cologne, 1954), 110; Statistisches Amt der Stadt Köln, *Verwaltungsberichte der Stadt Köln, 1954/55* (Cologne, 1955), 116; Statistisches Amt der Stadt Köln, *Verwaltungsberichte der Stadt Köln, 1955/56* (Cologne, 1956), 131; Statistisches Amt der Stadt Köln, *Verwaltungsberichte der Stadt Köln, 1956/57* (Cologne, 1957), 145.
79. “Dr. Robert Grosche, Domkapitular Stadtdechant v. Köln,” “Der verdienstvolle und frühere Oberbürgermeister der Stadt Köln, Dr. Konrad Adenauer,” and “Hans Jonen, Schriftsteller,” *Alt und Neu-Köln: Heimatblätter für kölnische Kunst, Sprache und Eigenart* (1946): 2.
80. Konrad Adenauer, Speech upon receiving Honorary Citizenship of the City of Cologne, January 4, 1951 (excerpt), reprinted in *Quellen zur Geschichte Kölns in Neuester Zeit, 1945-1960*, ed. Peter J. Hasenberg (Cologne: J.P. Bachem, 1960), 37-38.
81. Joseph Klersch, “Unsere Heimat-Vereine,” *Alt-Köln: Heimatblätter für die Stadt Köln* 1, no.1 (August 1947): 4; Joseph Klersch, “Volkstumspflege und Volkskunde,” in *Volkstumspflege und Volkskunde: Festschrift zum 50 jährigen Bestehen des Heimatvereins Alt-Köln e.V.*, ed. Joseph Klersch (Cologne: Unser Köln, 1952), 33.
82. Detmar Heinrich Sarntzki, “Köln” (Poem), *Jung-Köln* 8 (1951/52): 236; Albert Schneider, “Klingendes Volkstum,” *Kölner Almanach* (1951/52): 286.
83. Universität- und Stadtbibliothek zu Köln (hereafter USBK), RhKGB1b, 1K833, Ohm Willi, “Alaaf der kölsche Klaaf,” in K.G. Köllen, *Die Alt Köllen im Wort und Bild: Festschrift 75 Jahre, 1883-1958*, 101; W.M. Esser, “Sterbende Mundart?,” *Alt-Köln: Heimatblätter für die Stadt Köln* 3, no.4 (April 1949): 13-14.

84. Statistisches Amt der Stadt Köln, *Verwaltungsbericht der Stadt Köln, 1947/48* (Cologne, 1948), 47; Joseph Klersch, "Zur Einführung," in *Rheinische Puppenspiele: Et Gespens om Schötzeßeß*, ed. Amt für kölnisches Volkstum (Cologne: Greven, 1948), 3; Statistisches Amt der Stadt Köln, *Verwaltungsbericht der Stadt Köln, 1948/1949* (Cologne, 1949), 59; Willy Millowitsch, "Mein Köln: Erinnerungen," in *Die Stadt in alten Bildern. Mit Erinnerungen von Willy Millowitsch*, ed. Stefan Pohl (Cologne: Wienand, 1993), 20; Peter Alter, "Die Briten am Rhein: die frühen Besatzungsmonate in Köln," in *"Wir haben schwere Zeiten hinter uns: Die Kölner Region zwischen Krieg und Nachkriegszeit"*, ed. Jost Düllfer (Vierow bei Greifswald: SH-Verlag, 1996), 84.
85. Wilhelm Hoßdorf and Professor Firmenich-Richartz, "Et Gespens om Schötzeßeß," in *Rheinische Puppenspiele: Et Gespens om Schötzeßeß*, ed. Amt für kölnisches Volkstum (Cologne: Greven, 1948), 64.
86. "Je mehr die Heimat äußerlich zerstört ist, umso fester müssen wir sie unzerstörbar in den großen und kleinen Herzen wieder aufbauen." Joseph Klersch, "Aufgaben und Möglichkeiten der Rheinischen Mundartdichtung," in *Die Rheinische Mundartdichtung: Aufgaben, Ziele, Möglichkeiten*, eds. Josef Lenzen and Joseph Klersch (Cologne: Greven, 1949), 19-21.
87. For more on the phenomenon of early postwar parents projecting their own loss onto the future of their children, see Dorothee Wierling, "'Mission to Happiness': The Cohort of 1949 and the Making of East and West Germans," in Schissler, ed., 110-123.
88. "Heimatchichtung in der Schule," *Kölner Stadtanzeiger*, January 23, 1950; Peter J. Hasenberg, "Zeitung und Mundart in Köln," in *Erbe der Vergangenheit*, ed. Hasenberg, 4.
89. Karl Arnold, "Heimat und Jugend" (Speech on the Rheinischer Heimattag 1954), *Alt-Köln: Heimatblätter für die Stadt Köln* 8, no.9 (September 1954): 33-34.
90. Among other things, the society decided to bolster youth events. "Niederschrift über die Jahreshauptversammlung," *Rheinischer Verein für Denkmalpflege und Heimatschutz Mitteilungsblatt* 2 (1953): 10.
91. Untitled introduction to first edition, *Jung-Köln* 1 (1949/50): 1.
92. Theo Burauen, Max Adenauer, and Johannes Giesberts, "Grußwörter," *Jung-Köln* 1 (1959/1960): 2.
93. These articles appeared mostly in the late 1950's and 1960s. Ernst Mömkes, "Die dunkelste Nacht," *Jung-Köln* 1 (1959/1960): 22; Theo Burauen, "Rede anlässlich des 20. Jahrestages der 'Kristallnacht,'" *Jung-Köln* 1 (1959/1960): 23; Max-Leo Schwerin, "Im alten Kölner Judenviertel," *Jung-Köln* 3 (November 1960): 9-10; Ernst Simons, "Jom Hakipurim und wie sie starben," *Jung-Köln* 3 (November 1960): 3-4; Pfarrer Gerhard Blinne, "Schalom: oder wie sie leben," *Jung-Köln* 3 (November 1960): 5-8; "So erfüllte sich das Opfer," *Jung-Köln* 2 (July 1962): 9-10.
94. Dr. G.M. Werner Jüttner, "Bürgerliches Leben in Köln um das Jahr 1530," in *Köln: Werden-Wachsen-Wirken*, ed. Ernst Mömkes, *Jung-Köln*, Sonderheft 1 (Cologne: Greven, 1950), 126.
95. Johannes Sigmond, "Heimatgestaltung als Aufgabe der Jugend," *Rheinischer Verein für Denkmalpflege und Heimatschutz Mitteilungsblatt* 1-2 (1954): 9.
96. Spranger's *Heimatkunde* was hardly as regressive as sometimes described. Spranger's outlined a forceful rejection of ideas that Heimat was an inborn trait. His thesis was that Heimat only comes through individual and subjective human experience of space. Moreover, the idea of nation as equivalent to Heimat, so prevalent in Nazi propaganda, is utterly absent in Spranger's theories. Spranger's rural idealism and idea that Heimat could not exist in the large city were naturally not shared by Colognean Heimat enthusiasts. Eduard Spranger, "Das Bildungswert der Heimatkunde" (1923), in Eduard Spranger, *Gesammelte Schriften II: Philosophische Pädagogik* (Heidelberg: Quelle & Meyer, 1975), 294-319.
97. Numerous articles can be found which elucidate the need to bridge between the prewar world of parents/grandparents and the local world that children experienced. Such articles often appeared in *Jung-Köln*. See, for example, Werner Jüttner, "Vor fünfzig Jahren," *Jung-Köln* 5 (1951/52): 135-139.
98. Johannes Kirschweg, "Über die Heimat," *Kölner Rundschau*, January 20, 1949.
99. Günther Hochgürtel interview in, vom Stein, 63.
100. Adam Wrede, "Um die Erhaltung Kölner Eigenart," *Alt-Köln: Heimatblätter für die Stadt Köln* 2, no.3 (March 1948): 10.



101. Unknown author, "Nur so, mein Köln, wirst du wieder erstehn," (1946) reprinted in Louis, 206.
102. Thomas Liessem recalled seeing the first Carnival procession while standing in line at the black market. Thomas Liessem, *Kamelle und Mimosen* (Cologne: DuMont Schauberg, 1967), 74-78.
103. Grosse Karnevalsgesellschaft Närrischer Insulaner e.V. Köln Nippes, *Festschrift. 25 Jahre* (Cologne: Selbstverlag Grosse Karnevalsgesellschaft, 1952), 45.
104. The Kölsche Grielächer were but one of many Carnival society foundings in the rubble. See, Kölsche Grielächer, *25 Jahre Karnevals-Gesellschaft* (Cologne: Selbstverlag Kölsche Grielächer, 1952), 6; Hans Jonen, *Fünfzig Jahre Rubbedidupp: Korpsgeschichte der Ehrengarde der Stadt Köln* (Cologne: Gustav Göller, 1952), 66-67, 99-109.
105. Arthur Vieke, *Die Geschichte der Großen Allgemeinen Karnevalsgesellschaft von 1900 Köln e.V.*, vol. 3 (Cologne: Selbstverlag, 1988), 421-428; Günter B. Ginzel and Sonja Günter, "Juden in Köln: Erlebte Geschichte in Texten und Bildern," in Ginzel and Günter, eds., 136.
106. Jonen, *Fünfzig Jahre Rubbedidupp*, 12, 117, 124.
107. J. Werner, "Das Karnevals-Lied," *Unser Köln* 1/2 (1952): 4.
108. USBK, RhKG 419, "Wat uns blevv vum ale Kölle," in Prinzen-Garde e.V., "Liederheft zum 2. Grossen Damen-Komitee mit Tanz am Mittwoch, dem 15. Februar 1950," 14-16; USBK, RhKG 419, Prinzen-Garde e.V., "Liederheft zur Sitzung des 11. im 11., 1950 am Samstag, dem 11 November 1950," 8-9; Wilhelm Warsch in Jonen, *16 Tage Fürst*, 54; August Schnorrenberg, "Wir sind des Rheinlands Söhne," in *Karnevalslieder 1952*, ed. Karl Berbuier (Cologne: Melodia Hans Gerig, 1951), 19; Jonen, *16 Tage Fürst*, 20-21; Hans Jonen, "Kölsche sin nit klein zo krigge" (1948), Christian Wolfgarten, "Hundert-fünfundzwanzig Johr Fastelovend" (1948), August Schnorrenberg, "Kölle blieb Kölle" (late 1940s); "Fruhsenn trotz aller Nut" (1948), reprinted in Louis, 226, 228, 229. Louis notes in his compilation of Carnival songs from this period the role that it played in whipping up sentiment for reconstruction.
109. Mikhail Bakhtin, *Rabelais and His World*, trans. Hélène Iswolsky (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1965), 251.
110. Joseph Klersch, *Kölner Fastnachtsspiegel* (Cologne: J.P. Bachem, 1948), 134 - 137; Albrecht Bodde, "Zum Geleit," in *Ibid.*, I.
111. Albrecht Bodde, President of the Standing Committee of Cologne Carnival, "Rheinland - Kölle - Karneval," *Kölner Almanach* (1951/52): 280.
112. "Närrisches Parlament," *Rheinische Zeitung*, February 9, 1949; "Krütz un queer durch d'r Fasteleer," *Kölner Stadtanzeiger*, February 4, 1950; "Krütz un queer durch d'r Fasteleer," *Kölner Stadtanzeiger*, February 6, 1950; "Prunksitzung der Kriegsbeschädigten," *Kölner Stadtanzeiger*, March 1, 1954.
113. Karl Küpper, "*Dr Verdötschte: 20 ausgewählte Büttreden und Vorträge des preisgekrönten rheinischen Karnevalisten*" (Cologne: Theodor Milles, 1953), 4.
114. Johannes Leptien, "Alaaf die Köllsche Gecke" (poem), in Joseph Klersch, *Kölner Fastnachtsspiegel* (Cologne: J.P. Bachem, 1948), iii-iv.
115. Gebhard Ebeler, "Auftakt zum närrischen Spiel" and "Der närrische Philosoph," in *16 Erfolgreiche Rheinische Büttreden und Zweigespräche namhafter Karnevalisten*, vol. II, ed. Gebhard Ebeler (Cologne: Musikverlag Charly Oehl, 1953), 5, 24; Jonen, *Fünfzig Jahre Rubbedidupp*, 77-78.
116. Jonen, *Fünfzig Jahre Rubbedidupp*, 68.
117. Many such examples are given in private accounts, including messages on rubble-buried doors scrawled with "push hard, the door sticks," or offering windows for rent to view the non-existent Carnival parade, directing those interested to bring their own floor to stand on, or to contact the bare-buttocks sculpture on the Altermarkt for inquiries. Grosse Karnevalsgesellschaft Närrischer Insulaner e.V. Köln Nippes, 41.
118. Louis, 169.
119. Heinrich Lützel, *Philosophie der Kölner Humors* (Bonn: Dr. Hans Peter, 1954), 24, 66-68, 77; Heinrich Lützel, *Kölner Humor in der Geschichte* (Bonn: Dr. Hans Peter, 1960), 43.
120. Louis, 69.

121. "Karneval - einst und jetzt," *Rheinische Zeitung*, February 5, 1949; "Fastelovend," *Rheinische Zeitung*, February 28, 1949.
122. "Mer sin widder do...," *Westdeutsche Zeitung*, February 28, 1949.
123. Jonen, *16 Tage Fürst*, 12, 14.
124. "Rückblick auf den Karneval 1949," *Unser Köln* 3/4 (March/April 1949): 25.
125. Statistisches Amt der Stadt Köln, ed., *Verwaltungsbericht der Stadt Köln, 1948/49* (Cologne, 1949), 59; Interview, Ferdi Hartmann (b.1927), Interview, Günther Hochgürtel (b. 1930), and Interview Hans Georg Paßmann (b.1919) in ed., vom Stein, 124-126.
126. Theo Röhrig, "Vorwort," (Letter to Hans Jonen, April 19, 1949), in Jonen, *16 Tage Fürst*, 4; Jonen, *16 Tage Fürst*, 6 - 7, 25, 39, 43.
127. "Mobilmachung aller Lebensbejahenden Kräfte," *Kölnische Rundschau*, January 25, 1951; "Prinz Edmund I. Regiert!," *Rosenmontags-zeitung*, Fastelovend 1951.
128. Josef Fischer, "Auf dem Thron der tollen Tage: Prinz Karneval, Fabelmensch unserer Zeit," *Kölner Stadtanzeiger*, February 17, 1954.
129. Matthias Zender, *Heimat und lebendiges Brauchtum: Rheinisches Brauchtum in unserer Zeit* (Neuss: Rheinischer Heimatbund, 1955), 4-5. The work consists of a transcript of a speech at the Rhenish Heimat Day.
130. Adam Wrede, "Köln - Standhafte Stadt," *Kölner Almanach* (1955/56): 34.
131. Wolfgang Braunfels, "Die Ausstellungen bildender Kunst in den Kölner Kulturtagen," in *Der Rhein und Europa: Kölner Kulturtag Vom 18. bis 27. Oktober 1946*, ed. Hermann Pünder (Cologne: J.P. Bachem, 1947), 87-89.
132. August Schnorrenberg, "Am Dom zu Kölle, zu Kölle am Rhing" (1948) reprinted in Louis, 246.
133. Robert Frohn, *Köln 1945-1981: Vom Trümmerhaufen zur Millionenstadt, Erlebte Geschichte* (Cologne: Bachem, 1982), 200-201. For an account on the Cathedral jubilee from an everyday citizen, see Interview Karl Josef Reuland, (b.1925), in vom Stein, 123.
134. Adam Wrede, "Köln - Standhafte Stadt," *Kölner Almanach*, 1955/56, 32; Florian, 7-8.
135. Johann W. Koch, *700 Jahre Dom zu Köln: Heiliges Vermächtnis* (Cologne: Gustav Göller, 1948), 103.
136. Jeffrey Diefendorf, "Das Stadtjubiläum 1950 und die Selbstdarstellung Kölns," in *Köln in den 50er Jahren: Zwischen Tradition und Modernisierung*, ed. Jost Düllfer (Cologne: SH-Verlag, 2001), 239-250.
137. "Köln wird auferstehen," *Kölnischer Kurier*, April 9, 1945; Konrad Adenauer, "Kölner, Kölnerinnen!," *Kölnischer Kurier*, July 3, 1945.
138. "Meer sin noch do: Festspiel auf dem Altermarkt zur 1900-Jahrfeier der Stadt Köln 1950," *Kölner Almanach* 1951/52, 324-335. One song written for the anniversary drew parallels between the Roman building of Cologne and postwar rebuilding. Louis, 78.
139. "Köln ist wieder da," *Zweite Sonderbeilage zum Stadtjubiläum, Kölnische Rundschau*, June/July, 1950.
140. Ina-Maria Greverus outlines these principles as the three primary pillars of the Heimat concept. Ina-Maria Greverus, *Auf der Suche nach Heimat* (Munich: C.H. Beck, 1979).

## Chapter II

1. Peter Sabel, "Es gibt noch das echte Köln," *Kölner Stadtanzeiger*, February 6, 1963.
2. Jeremy DeWaal, "The Reinvention of Tradition: Form, Meaning, and Local Identity in Modern Cologne Carnival," *Central European History* 46 (2013): 495-532.
3. Parallels could be found in other border regions, with the Nazis strongly magnifying such ideas. As Andreas Schumann points out, nineteenth-century Heimat literature in border regions most strongly emphasized their region's Germanness. Andreas Schumann, *Heimat denken: Regionales Bewußtsein in der deutschsprachigen Literatur zwischen 1815 und 1914* (Cologne: Böhlau, 2002), 233. For analysis of Pfälzer notions of placeness as a border region, see Celia Applegate, *A Nation of Provincials: The German Idea of Heimat* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1990), 197-227.
4. John Horne, "Kulturelle Demobilmachung 1919-1939: Ein sinnvoller historischer Begriff?," in *Politische Kulturgeschichte der Zwischenkriegszeit 1918-1939*, ed. Wolfgang Hardtwig (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2005), 129-150.
5. "Kölner Kulturwoche: Europa als geistige Einheit," *Kölnische Rundschau*, October 22, 1946; Hermann Pünder, "Vorwort," and "Begrüßungsansprache beim Festakt," in *Der Rhein und Europa: Kölner Kulturtag vom 18. bis 27. Oktober 1946*, ed. Hermann Pünder (Cologne: J.P. Bachem, 1947), 7-9, 93-95.
6. Wilhelm Steinförth, "Einleitende Ansprache," in *Der Rhein und Europa*, 13 - 14.
7. Karl Schwarzmann, "Die Tradition der Stadt Köln in ausgewählten Denkmälern ihrer Geschichte: Ausstellung des Historischen Archivs," in *Der Rhein und Europa*, 52-53.
8. Statistisches Amt der Stadt Köln, ed., *Verwaltungsbericht der Stadt Köln, 1945/47* (Cologne, 1947), 50.
9. Jürgen Brügger, "Das Kölner Domjubiläum 1948," in *Köln in den 50er Jahren: Zwischen Tradition und Modernisierung*, ed. Jost Dülffer (Cologne: SH-Verlag, 2001), 219-223.
10. "Köln—eine tote Stadt?," *Unser Köln* 1 (July 1948): 1-2.
11. "Dr. Haubrich vermachte seine Sammlung moderner Kunst der Stadt Köln," in *Quellen zur Geschichte Kölns in Neuester Zeit, 1945-1960*, ed. Peter Hasenberg (Cologne: J.P. Bachem, 1960), 18-19; Hans Peters, "Im Geiste des Abendlandes," *Kölner Almanach* (1963/64): 88-92.
12. J. Werner, "Ein Mannesalter: Zum 50jährigen Bestehen des Heimatvereins Alt-Köln," *Unser Köln* 3/4 (1952): 1.
13. This approach can be found throughout the youth magazine from its creation in 1949 to its cessation in 1969.
14. Karl Arnold, "Heimat und Jugend: Ministerpräsident Arnold zum Rheinischen Heimattag 1954," *Alt-Köln: Heimatblätter für die Stadt Köln* 8, no.9 (September 1954): 33.
15. By viewing identification with European unification as a major shift, I disagree with Jost Dülffer, who dismisses its importance by arguing that it took much time to evolve from vague concept to political notion. This, however, should not demean its importance. The move from identification with a rabid national project to a European project represented an astonishing inversion. Jost Dülffer, "Köln und Europa 1945 bis 1948," in Dülffer, ed., 183-202.
16. Winfried Herbers, "'Denn die Zeit von 1948 bis 1960 war doch in den Anfängen fürchterlich und am Ende nicht leicht:' Ernst Schwering in der Kölner Lokalpolitik," in Dülffer, ed., 24-25.
17. Applegate, 197-227. For more on Nazi Heimat propaganda, see Claus-Christian Szejnmann, "'A Sense of Heimat Opened Up during the War:' German Soldiers and Heimat Abroad," in *Heimat, Region, and Empire: Spatial Identities under National Socialism*, eds. Maiken Umbach and Claus-Christian Szejnmann (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 112-147.
18. For discussion of *Vermassung* as representative of postwar anti-modernism, see Axel Schildt and Arnold Sywottek, eds., *Modernisierung im Wiederaufbau: die westdeutsche Gesellschaft der 50er Jahre* (Bonn: J.H.W. Dietz, 1993).

19. Joseph Klersch, "Volkstum und Volkstumspflege," in *Heimatchronik des Landkreises Köln*, ed. Joseph Klersch (Cologne: Archiv für Deutsche Heimatpflege, 1954), 82.
20. Joseph Klersch, "Volkstumspflege und Volkskunde," in *Volkstumspflege und Volkskunde. Festschrift zum 50 jährigen Bestehen des Heimatvereins Alt-Köln e.V.*, ed. Joseph Klersch (Cologne: Unser Köln, 1952), 12 - 13.
21. Joseph Klersch, "Volk und Heimat," *Unser Köln* 5/6 (1952): 33-35.
22. Joseph Klersch, *Volkstum und Volksleben in Köln: Ein Beitrag zur historischen Soziologie der Stadt*, vol.1 (Cologne: J.P. Bachem, 1965), 28.
23. Joseph Klersch, *Die Aufgaben der Heimat- und Volkstumspflege in der Gegenwart* (Neuss: Rheinisches Heimatbund, 1953), 8-12.
24. Max-Leo Schwering, "Sinn und Aufgabe großstädtischer Volkstumspflege," *Unser Köln* 3 (March 1956): 2-4. Re-published: *Kölner Almanach* (1957/58): 68.
25. "Heimat, Volkstum und Staat: Ansprache des Ministerpräsidenten Karl Arnold auf dem Rheinischen Heimattag 1953 in Krefeld," *Rheinischer Verein für Denkmalpflege und Heimatschutz: Mitteilungsblatt* 2 (1953): 2-3.
26. Adolf Flecken, "Zum Geleit," *Rheinischer Verein für Denkmalpflege und Heimatschutz Mitteilungsblatt* 1 (1952): 1.
27. "Niederschrift über die Jahreshauptversammlung," *Rheinischer Verein für Denkmalpflege und Heimatschutz, Mitteilungsblatt* 2 (1953): 8.
28. This comes from a presentation at the Rhenish Heimat Day in Düsseldorf. Matthias Zender, *Heimat und lebendiges Brauchtum: Rheinisches Brauchtum in unserer Zeit* (Neuss: Rheinischer Heimatbund, 1955), 9.
29. James Brophy, *Popular Culture and the Public Sphere in the Rhineland, 1800-1850* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 171-215; James Brophy, "Carnival and Citizenship: the Politics of Carnival Culture in the Prussian Rhineland, 1823-1848," *Journal of Social History* 30 (1997): 873-904.
30. DeWaal.
31. Reinhold Billstein, ed., *Das andere Köln: Demokratische Traditionen seit der Französischen Revolution* (Cologne: Paul-Rugenstein, 1979); Jonathan Sperber, *Rhineland Radicals: The Democratic Movement and the Revolution of 1848* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1991).
32. In the early postwar period, Klersch eagerly appropriated, among other things, the memory of the strength of the 1848 revolutionaries in the Rhineland to prop up a democratic and anti-militarist Rhenish identity, arguing that the history contained useful application to their postwar circumstances. Joseph Klersch, "Die geistigen Grundlagen der Revolution von 1848 und ihre Auswirkungen auf Köln," *Unser Köln* 4 (October 1948): 4-5; (Continuation), *Unser Köln* 5/6 (November/December 1948): 12-13.
33. Among the floats that celebrated Adenauer as a local hero was one presenting him in giganticized form sitting arm-in-arm with "Mother Colonia." For depictions of the Adenauer floats, see, *Rosenmontagszeitung* 1950; Adenauer Float (Image), *Kölnische Rundschau*, February 10, 1959. Tünnies appeared for nearly a century in the dialect plays of the localist Hänneschen Theater and was quickly adopted as a personification of Cologne. See, Max-Leo Schwering, *Das Kölner "Hänneschen" Theater: Geschichte und Deutung* (Cologne: Bachem, 1982).
34. Maurice Halbwachs, *On Collective Memory*, trans. Lewis A. Coser (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992).
35. For more on West German preoccupation with Bonn not becoming Weimar, see Sebastian Ullrich, *Der Weimar-Komplex. Das Scheitern der ersten deutschen Demokratie und die politische Kultur der frühen Bundesrepublik, 1945-1959* (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2009).
36. H.P. Schwarz, "Die ausgebliebene Katastrophe: Eine Problemskizze zur Geschichte der Bundesrepublik," in *Den Staat denken: Theodor Eschenburg zum fünfundachtzigsten*, ed. Hermann Rudolph (Berlin: Siedler, 1990), 151-174.
37. Applegate, 228-246.
38. Heinrich Böll, "Köln gibt's schon, aber es ist ein Traum: Gespräch mit Werner Koch" (1979), in *Werke: Kölner Ausgabe*, vol.25, eds. Robert Conrad and Werner Jung (Cologne: Kiepenheuer & Witsch, 2010), 608-609.

39. "Kölns demokratische Verfassung 1396," *Rheinische Zeitung*, September 14, 1946; "Bericht über die erste Tagung der Rheinischen Mundartdichtern Köln vom 11. bis 13. März 1948," in *Die Rheinische Mundartdichtung: Aufgaben, Ziele, Möglichkeiten*, eds. Josef Maria Lenzen and Joseph Klersch (Cologne: Greven, 1949), 24.
40. Klersch repeated this argument on historical memory and local identity quite frequently. See, Joseph Klersch, "Kölnische Demokratie: Der Verbundbrief von 1396," *Alt-Köln: Heimatblätter für die Stadt Köln* 1, no.1 (August 1947): 2-3; Joseph Klersch, "Kölnische Demokratie: Vom Verbund zur Gegenwart," *Alt-Köln: Heimatblätter für die Stadt Köln* 1, no.2 (September 1947): 3; Joseph Klersch, "Die Verfassung und Verwaltung der Stadt Köln," in *Köln: Werden-Wachsen-Wirken, Jung-Köln*, Sonderheft 1 (Cologne: Greven, 1950), 51-56; Joseph Klersch, "Kölns Kampf um die Freiheit," *Unser Köln*, Sondernummer zum Altermarktspiel, 1950. After Klersch no longer oversaw *Jung-Köln*, they still published articles that memorialized the "guild democracy" as representing early seeds of local democratic natures. See, for example, "Wie würde unsere Stadt früher regiert," *Jung-Köln* 3 (September 1961): 2-6.
41. Klersch, *Volkstum und Volksleben in Köln*. vol.1, 47-48; vol.2, 14-15.
42. Max-Leo Schwering, "Handwerk und Demokratie: im mittelalterlichen Stadtstaat Köln," *Kölner Almanach* (1959-1960), 351-358.
43. Hans Vogts, "Zum Geleit," in *Wanderungen durch das alte Köln*, ed. Johann J. Hässlin (Cologne: E.A. Seemann, 1955), 5-6. Vogts originally gave this verbal tour through the old city during the Cologne Culture Days. Hans Vogts, "Kölner Baudenkmäler," in *Der Rhein und Europa*, 83-85.
44. Former mayor Theo Burauen elaborated on interpretation of city architecture along these lines. Theo Burauen, "Kölnisches Wesen in Architektur geprägt," in *Theo Burauen, Oberbürgermeister der Stadt Köln 1956-1973: Ausgewählte Ansprachen*, ed. Peter Fuchs (Cologne: Greven & Bechtold, 1986), 216. Democratic symbolism of the Platzjabbeck, a clock figure which sticks its tongue out on the hour symbolizes Cologne's guild's seizure of power from ruling elite families in the Middle Ages. Valmar Cramer, "Die Sinndeutung des Platzgabbeck. Kein bloßes Spielwerk: ein demokratisches Wahrzeichen!," *Alt-Köln* 8 (1954): 23-24.
45. "Niedergang und Auferstehung einer Stadt," *Jung-Köln* 4 (1949/1950): 122. Several other early postwar associations of the Gürzenich as a symbol of Colognian democracy can be readily found. See, for example: "Der Gürzenich," *Unser Köln* 6 (1955): 1-13.
46. Werner Holbeck, "Freiheitsrechte in Köln von 1396 bis 1513," *Jahrbuch des Kölnischen Geschichtsvereins* 41 (1967): 31-95. In Peter Fröhlich's 1972 history of Cologne written in local dialect, we see a similar emphasis on their historical democratic constitution of 1396 as representing a Colognian democratic tradition. Peter Fröhlich, *Kölle noh '45* (Cologne: Greven, 1972), 48.
47. Prewar association of the Prussian tradition with Nazism came from both Nazi supporters and opponents. For Heinrich Böll's prewar association of Prussianism with Nazism see, Heinrich Böll, "Die Preußen und wir am Rhein" (1938), in *Werke. Kölner Ausgabe*, vol.1, eds. James Reid and Árpád Bernáth (Cologne: Kiepenheuer & Witsch, 2004), 139-140. The Nazis clearly sought to link themselves to the Prussian tradition, as illustrated at the Day of Potsdam.
48. "Die ersten Stadtvertreter von Köln eingeführt" (17.1.1946), in ed. Hasenberg, 14-15.
49. Fritz Franz Florian [pseud. Hans Schmitt-Rost], *Köln am Rhein: du schönes Städtchen* (Cologne: Greven, 1955), 121.
50. Klersch, *Die Aufgaben der Heimat- und Volkstumspflege*, 8-12.
51. "Dom- oder Hohenzollernbrücke?," *Kölnische Rundschau*, May 13, 1948/June 3, 1948; Arnold Stelzmann, "Köln wird preußische Stadt," *Jung-Köln* (1956/57): 106-113.
52. "Dem Vater folgt der Sohn," *Kölner Stadtanzeiger*, January 26, 1954; "Krütz un quer durch d'r kölsche Fasteleer," *Kölner Statanzeiger*, January 31, 1956.
53. DeWaal, 495-532.
54. Werner Mezger, "Fasnacht, Fasching und Karneval als soziales Rollenexperiment," in *Narrenfreiheit. Beiträge zur Fastnachtsforschung*, ed. Hermann Bausinger (Tübingen: Tübinger Vereinigung für Volkskunde e.V., 1980), 203-220; Hermann Bausinger, "Narrenfreiheit nach Vorschrift: Zwischen Organisation und Spontaneität," in

Bausinger, ed., 239-248.

55. "Fastelovend Zosammel," *Unser Köln* 1/2 (January/February 1949): 1.

56. "Inthronisation des Prinzen Karneval," *Kölner Stadtanzeiger*, February 14, 1952; Hans Jonen, *16 Tage Fürst: Mit Prinz Theo I. durch den Kölner Karneval* (Cologne: Kölnische Verlagsdruckerei, 1949), 41. Edmund Pesch pointed to absolutist Princes' mistrust of the tradition and insisted that it was more than a coincidence that the democratic tradition flourished in a Free Imperial City. Edmund Pesch, "Politik und Narretei," *Kölnische Rundschau*, February 27, 1960.

57. "Prinz Edmund I. regiert!," *Rosenmontags-Zeitung*, Fastelovend 1951.

58. "Freude und Frieden," *Kölnische Rundschau*, February 17, 1949.

59. Hans Jonen, *Fünfzig Jahre Rubbedidupp: Korpsgeschichte der Ehrengarde der Stadt Köln* (Cologne: Gustav Göller, 1952), 144-145.

60. See, for example, the Carnival proclamation of Prince Hubert II. Many other such examples can be found. "Proklamation des Prinzen Hubert II," *Rosenmontags-zeitung*, Fastelovend 1954.

61. Political parties, such as the SPD, held their own Carnival celebrations, continuing a tradition of Carnival as a medium of political representation. "Närrisches Parlament," *Rheinische Zeitung*, February 9, 1949. For the famous 1955 anti-Nazi Carnival song proclaiming their hostility and skepticism to future would-be dictators, see, Jupp Schösser, "D'r Molli," reprinted in Louis, 83-84.

62. Some nineteenth-century Cologne carnivalists, such as the *Blaue Funken*, even displayed overt pro-Prussian sentiments in portrayals of the uniformed figures—particularly in the latter half of the century Hildegard Brog, *Was auch passiert, D'r Zoch kütt!: Die Geschichte des rheinischen Karnevals* (Frankfurt: Campus, 2000), 179.

63. *Rosenmontagszeitung*, 1949, 1950, 1951.

64. Hans Jonen, *16 Tage Fürst*, 16, 266.

65. "Polizeilich Gesperrt," *Rheinische Zeitung*, February 18, 1950.

66. Partykiewicz [pseud.], *Närrische Prominenz sitzt Model* (Cologne: Unser Köln, 1952), 14; Hans Jonen, *Fünfzig Jahre Ruppeditupp*, 119; Ernst Heyter [pseud. Eva Stünke], *Verführung zum Karneval: eine Einführung in die Rheinischen Mysterien* (Düsseldorf: Euch Dietrichs, 1953), 22.

67. Peter Härtling, "Colombine, bitte, spiele mit den Tauben: Konfetti - gesammelt beim Kölner Karneval," in *Köln*, ed. Heinrich Böll (Hamburg: Hoffmann und Campe, 1960), 39. In a 1960 Carnival speech, Franz Unrein skewed the Bundeswehr as an unneeded institution, and held that there was no rigid military marching in Carnival. Franz Unrein, "Schütze Bumm," in *Lachende Bütt: 16 Büttreden*, vol. 8, ed. Hans Friedrich (Cologne: Bergwald, 1961), 54; Max-Leo Schwering pointed to Carnival military medals as representing an insult of Prussian love for order, though some expressed a vain desire for such medals. Max-Leo Schwering, *Kölner Karnevalsorden 1823-1914: Noblesse op Plütsch* (Cologne: Greven, 1989), 9-10. In 2004, the head of the *Rote Funken* elaborated on the anti-militarist and anti-Prussian nature of their local tradition, insisting on Carnival's persiflage and critical humor as underscoring its unmilitarist nature. USBK, RhKG377, Kölsche Funke rut-wieß, *Uns Leederheff* (2004), 4. Definition of Carnival as a democratic tradition also persists. See Ilse Prass and Klaus Zöller's writing on Cologne Carnival's democratic symbolism. Ilse Prass and Klaus Zöller, *Vom Helden Karneval zum Kölner Dreigestirn, 1823-1992* (Cologne: Greven, 1992), 12.

68. Rainer Steinberg, "Die Mittwochgespräche 1950-1956," in *Freier Eintritt, Freie Fragen, Freie Antworten: Die Kölner Mittwochgespräche 1950-1956*, ed. Historisches Archiv der Stadt Köln (Cologne: Historisches Archiv der Stadt Köln, 1991), 10-31.

69. Heinrich Lützel, *Philosophie der Kölner Humors* (Bonn: Dr. Hans Peter, 1954), 29, 60-64; Heinrich Lützel, *Kölner Humor in der Geschichte* (Bonn: Dr. Hans Peter, 1960), 13 - 14, 24-27.

70. Affiliation of democracy with a strong middle class could be seen in Schelsky's idea of the new democracy as a "leveled middle-class society," though scholars debate the degree to which this accurately described West Germany. See, Hans-Ulrich Wehler, *Deutsche Gesellschaftsgeschichte*, vol. 5 (Munich: C.H. Beck, 2008); Paul Nolte, *Die*

*Ordnung der deutschen Gesellschaft: Selbstentwurf und Selbstbeschreibung im 20. Jahrhundert* (Munich: Beck, 2000). While Cologne Carnival traditionally permitted challenge of authority and hierarchies, it also allowed venues for their re-assertion. Elaine Glovka Spencer, "Regimenting Revelry: Rhenish Carnival in the Early Nineteenth Century," *Central European History* 28 (1995): 457-462, 477-478.

71. For more on the vicissitudes of the equality symbolism of the Carnival caps and the Carnival number 11, see DeWaal, 500, 514-515, 523.

72. "Unter der Narrenkappe," *Kölnische Rundschau*, January 18, 1949.

73. Heinrich Böll, "Was ist kölnisch?," in *Köln*, ed. Böll, 3.

74. Max-Leo Schwering, "Köln - ein Wegbereiter sozialen Fortschritts: I. Kranken- und Armenfürsorge im reichsstädtischen Köln," *Jung-Köln* 1, (1951/1952): 5-14; Max-Leo Schwering, "Köln - ein Wegbereiter sozialen Fortschritts: II. Armen- und Krankenfürsorge in neuer Zeit," *Jung-Köln* 2 (1951/1952): 50-55; Max-Leo Schwering, "Köln - ein Wegbereiter sozialen Fortschritts: III. Ein letztes Kapitel zum kölnischen Gesundheitswesen," *Jung-Köln* 3 (1951/1952): 87-92; Max-Leo Schwering, "Köln - ein Wegbereiter sozialen Fortschritts: IV. Vom Weberaufstand bis zum endgültigen Sieg der Zünfte," *Jung-Köln* 5 (1951/1952): 140-144; Max-Leo Schwering, "Köln - Ein Wegbereiter sozialen Fortschritts: V. Nikolaus Gülich: Ein Kämpfer widder den Kölner Klüngel," *Jung-Köln* 7 (1951/1952): 207-212.

75. Joseph Klersch, "Unsere Heimat-Vereine," *Alt-Köln: Heimatblätter für die Stadt Köln* 1, no.1 (August 1947): 4.

76. Cognians after 1945 involved children in Carnival far more than in prewar years. Joseph Klersch, *Die Kölnische Fastnacht von ihren Anfängen bis zur Gegenwart* (Cologne: J.P. Bachem, 1961), 55, 203 - 205. Max-Leo Schwering much later supported Klersch's view and evoked it as a reason for supporting children's Carnival. Max-Leo Schwering, *Fastelovend op dr Stroß: Geschichte der Schull- und Veedelszög 1933-1983* (Cologne: Verein der Freunde und Förderer des Kölnischen Volkstums, 1983), 58.

77. Eberhard Hamacher, *Die Kölsche Funke rut-wieß: 125 Jahre im Kölner Karneval, 1823-1948* (Cologne: Dumont, 1948), 5.

78. Hans Jonen, *16 Tage Fürst*, 32.

79. "Zur Mittagsstunde an Weiberfastnacht," *Kölner Stadtanzeiger*, February 18, 1955.

80. Even scholars have failed to question such assumptions. Helene Klauser, in a book on Cologne Carnival argues that the spirit of "Colognian tolerance" originated with the *Ubier*, the tribal people that the Romans invited to settle the city. Helene Klauser, *Kölner Karneval zwischen Uniform und Lebensform* (Münster: Waxmann, 2007), 232. One can also find local discourses which trace "Colognian tolerance" back to Cologne's Roman history. "Dionysos und die Kölner," *Unser Köln* 1 (1962): 14.

81. Günther Sawatzki, "Unendlich viel Talent zur Welt," in *Köln*, ed. Böll, 54. Albert Schneider in the Cologne Almanach of 1952 defined Cologne as a large city that remained personalized. Albert Schneider, "Klingendes Volkstum," *Kölner Almanach* (1952/1953): 285-286.

82. Wilhelm Becker, "Heimat - ein Wort des Herzens," *Alt-Köln: Heimatblätter für die Stadt Köln* 4, no.11 (July 1950): 81.

83. Earlier elided reference to Cologne as a tolerant city can be found. In a local song from 1946 by an unknown author the lyricist briefly mentions Cologne as a city of historic trade which was "smart and tolerant" vis-a-vis foreigners. Unknown Author, "Nur so, mein Köln, wirst du wieder erstehn" (1946), in Louis, 206. The idea of Colognian tolerance, however, did not become a trope of local identity and self-understanding until the 1950's.

84. Adam Wrede, "Um die Erhaltung Kölner Eigenart," *Alt-Köln: Heimatblätter für die Stadt Köln* 2, no.3 (March 1948): 9-10.

85. Joseph Klersch, *Köln und Europa. Sonderdruck aus Erbe und Auftrag* (Cologne: Kölner Universitätsverlag, 1951), 6, 18; Klersch, *Volkstum und Volksleben in Köln*, vol.1, 47-48.

86. Konrad Adenauer, "Vorwort," *Kölner Almanach* 1961/1962, 8; "Köln und die Welt," (Interview between Oberbürgermeister Theo Burauen, and Almanach editor Joseph Hennecke), *Kölner Almanach* (1961/1962): 15. Similar interpretations of Cologne's trade history as instilling modern citizens with a balanced rootedness and "world-openness" can be found as early as the late 1940's. See, for example, Joseph Klersch, "Geist und Gestalt des künftigen Köln," *Unser Köln* 8/9 (August/September, 1949): 72.
87. In this instance, the assertion was made by members of the city's Carnival Honor Guard, who insisted on their local loyalty and their devotion to their local tradition, local natures and local practices. "Mer loße nit vum Fasteleer," *Rheinische Zeitung*, January 24, 1949.
88. "Prinz Edmund I. regiert!," *Rosenmontags-Zeitung*, Fastelovend 1951.
89. In the sixteenth century, the Cologne burgher Hermann von Weinsberg uses the term "Geck" to reference the Carnival celebrant. Josef Stein, ed., *Das Buch Weinsberg*, vol.5 (Bonn: P. Hanstein, 1926), 124.
90. "Kölsch für Imis," *Kölnische Rundschau*, February 11, 1954. This section of the newspaper "Kölsch für Imis" was a regularly appearing column that taught outsiders local dialect.
91. Prass and Zöllner define the *Jeck* term as a deviation from the normal and how it should be respected. The Colognian tolerates them, they argue, and says *Jeck loß, Jeck elans*. Prass and Zöllner, 147.
92. The *Kölner Stadtanzeiger* in 1950 reported that the celebration of Carnival by expellees represented their increasing integration into the city. "Krütz un quer durch d'r Fasteleer," *Kölner Stadtanzeiger*, February 9, 1950; "Das Regierungsprogramm," *Kölner Stadtanzeiger*, February 5, 1953.
93. "Karneval zu vornehm," *Kölnische Rundschau*, January 28, 1961.
94. "Kölsche Toleranz stimmt immer versöhnlich: Offene Bekenntnisse der Stadtoberhäupter – 'Imis' und Kölsche ziehen stets an einem Strick," *Kölnische Rundschau*, February 26, 1960,
95. Peter Sabel, "Es gibt noch das echte Köln: Prof. Lützelers Gestern Abend in der Uni," *Kölner Stadtanzeiger*, February 6, 1963.
96. Anton Keim, a Mainzer carnivalist, for example, identified Mainzer Carnival with both democracy and tolerance, insisting that the "true jester practices tolerance!" Anton M. Keim, *11 Mal Politischer Karneval, Weltgeschichte aus der Bütt. Geschichte der demokratischen Narrentradition vom Rhein* (Mainz: Hase & Koehler, 1966), 227.
97. Florian, 131. A 1946 article in a new Cologne Heimat publication recalled how to be an "Eingesessenen" meant that one's family had been in Cologne since 1800, with "Alteingesessenen" going further back to 1750. To be an "Alt-Kölner" meant that one's paternal line had been in Cologne for at least 100 years. "Stadtkölnisches Bürgertum: Wer ist Alt-Kölner?," *Alt- und Neu-Köln: Heimatblätter für kölnische Kunst, Sprache und Eigenart* (1946): 7.
98. USBK, RhK150, 1962, G1292, Ehrengarde der Stadt Köln, "Liederheft. Session 1960/61." Franz Geller, "Uns Hobby," 20.
99. "Es leb das edle, närrische Brauchtum!," *Kölnische Rundschau*, February 28, 1960.
100. Willi Ostermann, "Och wat wor dat fröher schön doch en Colonia!" (1930), reprinted in Louis, 47.
101. USBK, XK 1371-1965, Kölnische Karnevals-Gesellschaft 1945 e.V., "Programm und Liederheft 1965," 47.
102. USBK, XK 1371-1964, Kölnische Karnevals-Gesellschaft 1945 e.V., "Programm und Liederheft 1964," 13.
103. "Wieverfastelovend als Startsignal," *Kölnische Rundschau*, February 12, 1953.
104. "Dem Prinzen das jecke Volk ans Herz gelegt: Plädoyer gegen die Exklusivität im Karneval," *Kölner Stadt-Anzeiger*, February 2, 1978.
105. Andreas Kossert, *Kalte Heimat: Die Geschichte der deutschen Vertriebenen nach 1945* (Berlin: Siedler, 2008). For work on lingering economic advantages of expellees, which lasted beyond cultural integration, see Paul Lüttinger, *Integration der Vertriebenen: Eine empirische Analyse* (Frankfurt: Campus, 1989).
106. Under the pseudonym Fritz Franz Florian, Hans Schmitt-Rost lambasted Prussian authoritarian traditions, associating them spiritually with Nazism. Florian, 124-125.



107. The carnivalist, Hans Jonen, for example, argued in 1952 that those expellees who expressed hostility to local culture in Cologne should settle elsewhere in order to make room for the Colognean evacuees who were forced to live outside of the city. Hans Jonen, *Fünzig Jahre Rubbedidupp*, 125, 188.
108. "Lieber in Köln im Bunker als im Lipperland im Fett!: Evakuierte Kölner als Gäste zum Jubiläumsfestabend," *Kölnische Rundschau*, July 9, 1950.
109. Randolph Hillebrand, "Migrantenpolitik der Stadt Köln 1950-1961: Vertriebene und Flüchtlinge versus Evakuierte," in Dülffer, ed., 82. Peter van Hauten, "Der Einfluß der Wanderungsbewegung auf das kölnische Volkstum," in Klersch, *Volkstumspflege und Volkskunde*, 54.
110. "Kölns eingeborenen bleiben klar in der Mehrheit," *Kölnische Rundschau*, January 29, 1956.
111. Johannes Giesberts, "Expedition des Vertrauens," *Jung Köln* 3 (1960/1961): 1.
112. Joseph Klersch, "Aufgaben und Möglichkeiten der Rheinischen Mundartdichtung," in Lenzen and Klersch, eds., 20. In following years, Klersch continued to call on the expellees to help their children acquire a sense of Heimat in Cologne. Joseph Klersch, "Volk und Heimat," *Unser Köln* 5/6 (1952): 33-35.
113. Klersch, *Die Aufgaben der Heimat- und Volkstumspflege*, 9.
114. "Der Heimat verschrieben," *Unser Köln*, 3/4, 1950: 31.
115. Theo Burauen, "'Alaaf, ming Kölle am Rhing:' Abschiedsansprache von Theo Burauen nach seinem Ausscheiden aus dem Rat und aus dem Oberbürgermeisteramt am 17. Dezember 1973 und nach seiner Auszeichnung mit dem Ehrenbürgerrecht der Stadt Köln am 17. Januar 1974 im Rathaus, Spanischer Bau," in *Theo Burauen, Oberbürgermeister der Stadt Köln 1956-1973: Ausgewählte Ansprachen*. ed. Peter Fuchs (Cologne: Greven & Bechtold, 1986), 259.
116. Rappaport emphasized, in particular, open spaces, green spaces, and avoiding mass towered structures as a means to facilitating a feeling of Heimat in large rebuilt cities. This would play an important role, he believed, in expellees and newcomers finding a sense of Heimat in new places. Philipp Rappaport, "Nach der Heimat möcht' ich wieder," *Rheinischer Verein für Denkmalpflege und Heimatschutz, Mitteilungsblatt* 1-2 (1954): 5.
117. Wilhelm Hossdorf, "Kölle," *Alt-Köln: Heimatblätter für die Stadt Köln* 4, no.4 (January 28, 1950): 29.
118. Untitled article, *Jung Köln* 2 (March 1960): 1; "Alte Heimat - Neue Heimat," *Jung Köln* 2 (March 1960): 2-4.
119. Ministerpräsident Peter Altmeier, "Schlusswort," in *Gestaltung der Heimat nach rheinischer Eigenart: Festansprache am 24 Oktober 1965 zum Rheinischen Heimattag in Trier*, Adolf Flecken (Neuss: Verlag Gesellschaft für Buchdruckerei, 1966), 30.
120. Expellees held large gatherings in Cologne, including a 1949 event of 30,000 expellees, a massive crowd of Silesians in 1950, and a meeting of 100,000 Pommernian expellees in the 1960's, where the mayor declared solidarity with expellees, emphasizing historical ties between Cologne and Pomerania. The *Kölnische Rundschau* used the Silesian Heimat week to argue for a Colognean Silesia house, and a Silesia card-catalogue to help expellees track down friends and relatives. "Das Recht auf Heimat: Bemerkungen zur Ostvertriebenen-Großkundgebung am 8. Mai in Köln," *Westdeutsche Zeitung*, May 6, 1949; "Auch ein Stück Schlesien in Köln," *Kölnische Rundschau*, October 12, 1950; "100000 Pommern bekennen sich in Köln zur alten Heimat," *Kölnische Rundschau*, May 10, 1964; "Pommern-Tag in Köln begonnen," *Kölnische Rundschau*, May 10, 1964; Randolph Hillebrand, "Migrantenpolitik der Stadt Köln 1950-1961: Vertriebene und Flüchtlinge versus Evakuierte" in Dülffer, ed., 90-91. Colognean Heimat enthusiasts, like other West Germans, often hesitated to become involved in Tag der Heimat because of the increasingly strident and political tones of the events. Adolf Flecken mentioned this lack of Western Heimat enthusiast involvement at Tag der Heimat in 1965 at the Rhenish Heimat Day in Trier. Flecken, 23.
121. Klersch, *Volkstum und Volksleben in Köln*, vol.1, 52; G. Wilczek, "Kölner Patenstadt Breslau, 1 Teil," *Jung Köln* 4 (November 1965): 23-24.
122. "Das Heimatgefühl wird beleidigt: Die aus dem Osten kriegen alles," *Kölner Stadtanzeiger*, Feb 13/14, 1960.
123. Flecken reported that many expellees with whom he had contact described the Rhineland as their new Heimat and as a place where they had acquired new personal life experiences. Flecken, 13-14.

124. Albrecht Bodde's poem appeared in a 1968 Carnival program for the *Grosse Kölner Karnevals-Gesellschaft*. USBK, RhKG 371, 1968, Grosse Kölner Karnevals-Gesellschaft e.V. 1882, *Sessions Liederheft 1968*, 69.
125. In a study on Württemberg, Herbert Schwedt argues that such a displacement occurred. Herbert Schwedt, "Heimatvertriebene in württembergischen Landgemeinden," *Jahrbuch für ostdeutsche Volkskunde* 12 (1969): 27-40.
126. Natalie Muntermann, "Ausländische Arbeitnehmer in Köln 1955-1966: Vom 'Gastarbeiter' zum Einwanderer," in Dülffer, ed., 140-141. Turkish immigrants first came in large numbers in the late 1960s and 1970s. The need to come to grips with Turkish guest workers as new members of their local community was delayed by a common belief that Turkish guest workers, mostly made up of men, would not remain permanently in West Germany.
127. "Kölns kulturelle Ausstrahlungskraft," *Kölner Almanach* (1957/1958): 32-34.
128. Flecken, 15 -16.
129. Wolfgang Schulze-Olden, Vorsitzender des AstA der Universität Köln, "Ausländische Studenten in Köln," *Kölner Almanach* (1963/1964): 55-58.
130. The article does not reveal the national origins of the writer. "Betrachtung eines Ausländers von Köln," *Kölnische Rundschau*, January 12, 1957.
131. K. Brambing, "Ausländer in Köln: Mohamed Kassim Younossi im Severinsviertel," *Jung-Köln*, July 1963, 22-23; G.B., "Ausländer in Köln: Auch Irawati aus Indonesien spielt mit Ömmere," 18-19; Timm Köllmann-Gatter, "...Adapazari antwortet nicht...," *Jung-Köln* 2 (November 1967): 7-9; Helmut Keller, "Parekevi in Köln: Besuch in einer griechischen Schulklasse," *Jung Köln* 2 (November 1967): 10-11.
132. Such use of Heimatkunde to promote broader horizons and global purviews was not entirely new, with significant Weimar precedents. Applegate, *A Nation of Provincials*, 165.
133. Theo Burauen, "Sinn für Geschichte und Heimat: Ansprache bei der Eröffnung des Kölnischen Stadtmuseums am 11. Januar 1958 im Zeughaus," in Fuchs, ed., 54 - 55.
134. H. Klösges, "Sie haben unsren Dank verdient," *Jung-Köln* 3 (September 1961): 15.
135. Kurt Stavenhagen, *Heimat als Lebenssinn, 2. veränderte Auflage* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1948), 9-10.
136. Willi Oberkrome, *Deutsche Heimat: Nationale Konzeption und regionale Praxis von Naturschutz, Landschaftsgestaltung und Kulturpolitik in Westfalen-Lippe und Thüringen (1900-1960)* (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh, 2004), 9.
137. For more on the move from early modern *Heimatrecht* to Heimat as emotional sentiment, see, Hermann Bausinger, "Heimat in einer offenen Gesellschaft: Begriffsgeschichte als Problemgeschichte," in *Die Ohnmacht der Gefühle: Heimat zwischen Wunsch und Wirklichkeit*, ed. Jochen Kelter (Weingarten: Drumlin, 1986), 89-106.
138. Lutz Niethammer points to the ecstasy of early home-appliance purchases. Lutz Niethammer, "'Normalization' in the West: Traces of Memory Leading Back into the 1950s," in *The Miracle Years: A Cultural History of West Germany, 1949-1968*, ed. Hanna Schissler (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001), 237-261.
139. René König, "Der Begriff Heimat in den Fortgeschrittenen Industriegesellschaft," reprinted in *Soziologische Studien zu Gruppe und Gemeinde*, ed. Kurt Hammerich (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaft, 2006), 357-362.
140. Heinrich Böll, "Heimat und keine" (1965), in *Werke: Kölner Aufgabe*, vol.14, eds. Jochen Schubert and Árpád Bernáth (Cologne: Kiepenhauer & Witsch, 2002), 376-379.
141. This is the long-standing argument of Hermann Bausinger in perhaps his most famous work. Hermann Bausinger, *Volkskultur in der technischen Welt* (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1961).
142. "Gesetz gegen Übertreibung der Außenwerbung im Lande Nordrheinwestfalen," *Rheinischer Verein für Denkmalpflege und Heimatschutz, Mitteilungsblatt* 2 (1952): 7.
143. Karl Arnold, "Heimat und Jugend: Ministerpräsident Arnold zum Rheinischen Heimattag 1954," *Alt-Köln: Heimatblätter für die Stadt Köln* 8, no.9 (September 1954): 33.

- 144.USBK, RhKGB1b, 1K833, Fritz Höning, "Alaaf Kölle!" (Born 1833, Carnival Prince in 1875), in K.G. Alt Köllen, "Die Alt Köllen im Wort und Bild: Festschrift 75 Jahre, 1883-1958."
- 145.USBK, RhKG 371, 1968, Albrecht Bodde, "De Heimat," in Grosse Kölner Karnevals-Gesellschaft e.V. 1882, "Sessions Liederheft 1968." This same motif of rejecting the possibility of wealth to leave his Heimat can be found in a 1958 dialect poem by Bodde. See Albrecht Bodde, "Mie Glöck," *Unser Köln* 3 (1958): 10.
- 146.USBK, RhKG 399, August Schnorrenberg, "Am Dom zo Kölle, zo Kölle am Rhing," in Kölner Narren-Zunft, "Liederheft zur Session 1966," 14.
- 147.Michael Wildt, *Am Beginn der "Konsumgesellschaft: " Mangelserfahrung, Lebenshaltung, Wohlstandhoffnung in Westdeutschland in den fünfziger Jahren* (Hamburg: Ergebnisse, 1994).
- 148.Hilde Domin, "Köln," in *Gesammelte Essays: Heimat in der Sprache* (Munich: Piper, 1992), 35-36, 40.
- 149.Heinrich Böll, "Heimat und keine" (1965), in Schubert and Bernáth, eds., 378.
- 150.Joseph Hennecke, ed., *Kölner Almanach 1969/1970* (Cologne: Stemmler, 1969).
- 151.Josef Harnisch, Speech at Heimattag, in Flecken, 9; Peter Altmeier, "Schlusswort," in Flecken, 29.
- 152.USBK, RhKG 399, Kölner Narren-Zunft, "Liederheft zur Session 1966," 13.
- 153.Ludwig Dehner, "Ein Heimatfest" (Letter to the editor), *Kölner Stadtanzeiger*, February 1, 1963.
- 154.Max-Leo Schwering, *Jeck em Baselümche: 60 Jahre Veedelszög, 40 Jahre Schullzög* (Cologne: Verein der Freunde und Förderer des Kölnischen Volkstums e.V. und dem Verein Heimatmuseum Köln e.V., 1993), 86-87.
- 155.Albrecht Lehmann, *Im Fremden ungewollt zuhaus: Flüchtlinge und Vertriebene in Westdeutschland 1945-1990*, (Munich: C.H. Beck, 1991), 87-88.
- 156.Hermann Bausinger, "Heimat in einer offenen Gesellschaft," 107-109.
- 157.Peter Hasenberg, *Alt-Köln: Jubiläums-Kalender zum 75-jährigen Bestehen des Heimatvereins Alt-Köln* (Cologne: Heimatverein Alt-Köln, 1977), 5; "Rheinisch und Hochdeutsch im westdeutschen Karneval," *Rheinisches Jahrbuch für Volkskunde* (1978): 71. A Cologne dialect rock group would later write a protest song against overly-ambitious plans to make-over the city, entitled "We'll leave the cathedral in Cologne." Bläck Föös, "Mer loße d'r Dom in Kölle," reprinted in Louis, 61-62.
- 158.Heinrich Böll, "Weil die Stadt so fremd geworden ist: Gespräch mit Heinrich Vormweg" (1977), in Conrad and Jung, eds., 214-217. Böll also noted in his work "Straßen wie diese" how street-life disappeared. Heinrich Böll, "Straßen wie diese: Nachwort zu 'Unter Krahenbäumen – Bilder aus einer Straße'" (1958) in *Werke: Kölner Ausgabe*, vol.10, eds. Viktor Böll & Árpád Bernáth (Cologne: Kiepenheuer & Witsch, 2005), 427-429. For more on his disjointed Heimat sentiment between prewar, rubble, and reconstructed Cologne, see, Heinrich Böll, "Heimat und keine" (1965), in Schubert and Bernáth, eds., 378.
- 159.We see this strongly in a 1953 youth Heimat publication. "Kinder wachsen ins Leben: Gemeinschaftskundliche Beilage der Jugendzeitschrift 'Jung Köln,'" *Jung Köln* 6 (1953/1954): 1-4.
- 160.For more on Cologne's gay subculture in the 1950's and 1960's, see Jürgen Müller, "Das Lokal am Abend: Subkultur im neuen Köln," in "*Himmel und Hölle: Das Leben der Kölner Homosexuellen 1945-1969*, eds. Kristof Balsler et al., (Cologne: Emons, 1994), 12 -32. Günter Schröder has demonstrated how Cologne Carnival offered an outlet for Cologne's early homosexual community. Günter Schröder, "'Eintracht und Liebe, Frohsinn und Freude: Am Aschermittwoch war noch nicht alles vorbei: Homosexuelle und Karneval im Köln der Nachkriegszeit,'" in eds. Balsler et al., 105-113.
- 161.Christina Frohn traces such moralist activities in the late nineteenth century. Christina Frohn, *Der Organisierte Narr: Karneval in Aachen, Düsseldorf und Köln von 1823 bis 1914* (Marburg: Jonas, 2000), 299-324. Postwar moralism in the same vein continued. An article in the *Kölner Stadtanzeiger* in 1953, for example, complained that there was too much eroticism in Carnival. When Cologne carnivalists engaged in too much bawdiness, such as Horst Muys in 1968, zealous moralists took action. "Unfreiwillige Narretei," *Kölner Stadtanzeiger*, February 4, 1953; "Horst Muys droht ein Karnevals-Boycott," *Kölner Stadtanzeiger*, January 10, 1968; "Für Muys die Bütt gesperrt: Festkommittee: Auch in Zukunft," *Kölner Stadtanzeiger*, January 12, 1968.

162. Mario Kamp makes this argument in an essay on prosecution of homosexuality in early-postwar Cologne. Mario Kamp, “‘Homosexuelle machen sich in Köln breit.’ Vom Untergang städtischer Behörden mit einer diskriminierten Minderheit der Adenauer-Ära,” in eds. Balser et al., 213.
163. Peter Fröhlich, *Kölle noh '45* (Cologne: Greven, 1972), 47. Fröhlich’s association of Nazism with deviant sexuality reflects a broader moralist narrative of Nazism as sexually deviant and bourgeois sexuality as denazifying. Dagmar Herzog, *Sex after Fascism* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005).
164. Brog, 264.
165. Die Hühner, *Viva Colonia*, ©2004 by EMI Music Distribution; Tommy Engel, *Do bes Kölle* ©2007 by Carlton Musikvertrieb, Compact Disc. Engel’s music video of the song portrays the *Rote Funken*, the earliest Cologne Carnival society from 1823, dancing with the gay carnivalists of the *Rosa Funken* in pink Carnival uniforms.
166. “WDR unterschlug die umstrittenen Wagen,” *Kölnische Rundschau*, March 2, 1976; Heinrich Böll, “An die Redaktion des Kölner Volks-Blatt” (1976) in *Werke: Kölner Ausgabe*, vol. 19, eds. Werner Jung and Árpád Bernáth (Cologne: Kiepenheuer & Witsch, 2008), 258.
167. For more on the movement of localists against xenophobic violence, see, AG Arsch huh, ed., *Arsch huh, Zäng ussenander! Gegen Rassismus und Neonazis* (Cologne: Kiepenheuer & Witsch, 1992).
168. Raissa Orłowa and Lew Kopelew, *Wir lebten in Köln*, trans. Eva Rönnau (Hamburg: Hoffmann & Campe, 1996), 13.
169. Sachs notes how competition in housing and employment has caused tensions between Germans and foreigners. He also notes how Italian versus Turkish immigrants conceive of Heimat differently, with Italians having a more romanticist sense of the notion. Sachs further finds immigrant Heimat acquisition to be often caught up in tension between plans and illusions of future return to their native home. Klaus Sachs, *Ortsbindunge von Ausländern: Eine sozialgeographische Untersuchung zur Bedeutung der Großstadt als Heimatraum für ausländische Arbeitnehmer am Beispiel von Köln* (Cologne: Geographisches Institut der Universität Köln, 1993) 1, 111, 118, 120-122.
170. “Wenn Ali und Alfonso in die Bütt steigen: Auch die ausländischen Kinder mischen bei Schulsitzung am Zugweg kräftig mit,” *Kölnische Rundschau*, February 25, 1987.
171. The above derive from my own observations during a DAAD grant in Cologne from 2011-2012, where I witnessed the protests. Protests were held near the site of the new Mosque in Venloerstr (adjacent to my residence, Vogelsangerstr 23). Much of the research for this project was conducted during this period.
172. USB Köln, RhK 3939, “Neunzig Jahre Heimatvereine Alt”-Köln,” (1991), 2.

### Chapter III

1. Uncited quotation by R. Burke, "Lübecker Heimatmuseum," *Lübeckische Blätter* 87, no.10 (June 3, 1951): 125.
2. "...Hamburg kennt keine Grenzen, es liegt am Tor zur Unendlichkeit, geöffnet gegen fünf Kontinente und Sieben Meere." Staatsarchiv Hamburg, (hereafter StAHH), Bestandsbibliothek, A 541/0383a. Introduction, Bernard Meyer-Marwitz, ed., *Hamburg Heimat am Strom: Ein Erinnerungsbuch* (Hamburg: Hamburgische Bücherei, 1947), 5.
3. Arthur Geoffrey Dickens, diary entry, July 31, 1945, in *Lübeck 1945: Tagebuchauszüge von Arthur Geoffrey Dickens*, ed. Gerhard Meyer (Lübeck: Schmidt-Römhild, 1986) 30-32.
4. Arthur Geoffrey Dickens, diary entry, July 9, 1945, in Dickens, 29.
5. This term has been coined by Maiken Umbach and Bernd-Rüdiger Hüppauf in a work on the built environment and Heimat. Maiken Umbach and Bernd-Rüdiger Hüppauf, eds., *Vernacular Modernism: Heimat, Globalization and the Built Environment* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2005).
6. Wolfgang Borchert, "In Hamburg," in *Lieder und Sprüche auf Hamburg*, ed. Paul Neumann (Hamburg: Hans Christians, 1960), 77.
7. Röthel continues that the cities were like children of a single family. Hans Konrad Röthel, *Die Hansestädte: Hamburg, Lübeck, Bremen* (Munich: Prestel, 1955), 7-8, 95-96. Among the litany of commonalities that Röthel explores, he argues that the "original element of their commonality" is Hanseatic Republicanism. Röthel argues that Hamburger, Lübecker and Bremer felt at home in each other's sister cities. Thomas Mann shared this sentiment, viewing his own sense of home as being in any of the Hanseatic cities. Matthias Wegner, *Hanseaten: Von Stolzen Bürgern und schönen Legenden* (Berlin: Siedler, 1999), 12.
8. Ideas of Hanseatic republicanism and freedom evolved over their long histories. Katherine Aaslestad notes how the meaning of these notions shifted in the early-nineteenth century. Katherine Aaslestad, *Place and Politics: Local Identity, Civic Culture, and German Nationalism in North Germany during the Revolutionary Era* (Boston, MA: Brill, 2005). The tropes of Hanseatic freedom and republicanism can be seen in hundreds of nineteenth-century Heimat songs, though "freedom" often meant little more than independence from feudal lords.
9. Wegner, 415-428.
10. Johannes von Moltke has challenged the notion that *Heimat* and the foreign inherently form a rigid binary. In his analysis of *Heimatfilme*, he emphasizes how the idea of *Heimat* in such films represented not a point of opposition, but rather of negotiation between the two. Johannes von Moltke, *No Place Like Home: Locations of Heimat in German Cinema*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005). Mack Walker associates local orientations with regressive and exclusionary tendencies in his work on *German Home Towns*. Though his study looks at smaller early-modern towns, he argues that the essence of appeal to the local is hatred and exclusion of outsiders—a force which, in the modern period, was internalized as the isolation of such towns were undermined. These phenomenon, he argues, fed into Nazi ideologies. Leaving Nazism behind, he held, required rejecting the exclusionary nature of orientation to local worlds and building the nation anew with "new lumber." Mack Walker, *German Home Towns: Community, State, and General Estate* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1971).
11. Jan Heitmann, *Das Ende des Zweiten Weltkrieges in Hamburg: Die kampflose Übergabe der Stadt an die britischen Truppen und ihre Vorgeschichte* (Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 1990), 22; Walter Tormin, *Der schwere Weg zur Demokratie: Politischer Neuaufbau in Hamburg 1945/46* (Hamburg: Landeszentrale für politische Bildung, 1995), 39-41.
12. Klaus Wedermeier, "Vorwort," in *Kriegsende in Bremen: Erinnerungen, Berichte, Dokumente*, eds. Hartmut Müller and Günther Rohdenburg (Bremen: Edition Temmen, 1995), 7; Herbert Schwarzwälder, *Geschichte der Freien Hansestadt Bremen*, vol.IV (Hamburg: Hans Christians, 1985), 599.
13. Gerhard Meyer, "Vom Ersten Weltkrieg bei 1985: Lübeck im Kräftefeld Rasch Wechselnder Verhältnisse," in *Lübeckische Geschichte*, ed. Antjekathrin Graßmann (Lübeck: Schmidt-Römhild, 1988), 724-728.
14. This statistic originated from the Lübeck culture offices. Luise Klinsmann, "Kulturpolitik und Kulturpflege Lübecks: Im Banne von Traditions- und Gegenwartsfragen," *Vaterstädtische Blätter* 9, no.5 (May 1958): 3.

15. Gerhard Meyer, "Vom Ersten Weltkrieg bis 1996," in *Lübeckische Geschichte*, Graßmann, ed., 747.
16. Johannes Leptien, "Hanseatische Pole: Gedanken über zwei alte Städte," *Unser Köln* 5/6 (November/December 1948): 10-11.
17. Tormin, 39-41.
18. "Drang zur Heimat," *Hamburger Echo*, April 10, 1946.
19. "Heimatlos in der eigenen Heimat: Die Sorgen der evakuierten Hamburger," *Hamburger Echo*, October 30, 1946.
20. "Zwischen Schutt und Ruinen: Eine Betrachtung zum Neubau der Stadt," *Hamburger Echo*, April 20, 1946.
21. This account referenced the destruction of the Grimm street in Hamburg. This parallels similar accounts in other rubble cities. "Im Grimm," *Hamburger Echo*, February 4, 1947.
22. Archiv der Hansestadt Lübeck, (hereafter AHL) 05.4-085, Verein für Heimatschutz, Nr. 9, Jahresbericht 1948/49.
23. Both remained members until their death. AHL 05.4-81, Vaterstädtische Vereinigung, Nr. 5. "30 Jahre Vaterstädtische."
24. "Um unser altes traditionelles Lübecker Volksfest," *Vaterstädtische Blätter* 4, no.7 (July 1953): 1.
25. StAHH, 731-8, Zeitungsausschnittssammlung, A 507 Hamburg Gesellschaft, "Kontakte mit aller Welt: Hamburg-Gesellschaft wirkt und wirbt seit 12 Jahren," *Hamburger Echo*, January 25, 1958. The *Historische Gesellschaft* reconvened already in December 1945 to petition the American occupiers to reconstitute their society. Staatsarchiv der Hansestadt Bremen (hereafter StAHB), 7,1006, Historische Gesellschaft Bremen (1846-1974), Nr.3, Satzungen, Document: "Satzung des 'Historischen Gesellschaft' in Bremen."
26. Max Brauer, "Rede in der Sitzung der Hamburger Bürgerschaft am 22. November 1946," in Max Brauer, *Nüchternen Sinnes und Heissen herzens: Reden und Ansprachen* (Hamburg: Auerdruck, 1956), 24-25. Max Brauer's strong anti-Nazism preceded 1945. In exile in the United States in the 1930's, Brauer penned tracts denouncing Nazism, the Third Reich, its hatred of democracy, its attachment to Prussian militarism and the danger of anti-Semitism. Max Brauer, "Ansicht eines Nichtjuden über den Weltkongreß" (written for the American Jewish Congress), in *Max Brauer im Exil: Briefe und Reden aus den Jahren 1933-1946*, eds., Christa Fladhammer and Michael Wildt (Hamburg: Christians, 1994), 275-278.
27. Theodor Spitta, "Ansprache an Professor Carl Jacob Burckhardt am 1 Februar 1952," in Theodor Spitta, "*Keine andere Rücksicht als die auf das Gemeine Beste:*" *Briefe und Reden*, eds., Hans-Albrecht Koch and Anna-Kathrina Wöbse (Bonn: Bouvier, 1997), 121.
28. For an example of this in the Hamburg district of Hamm, see Malthe Thiessen, *Eingebrannt ins Gedächtnis: Hamburgs Gedenken an Lufikrieg und Kriegsende 1943 bis 2005* (Hamburg: Dölling und Galitz, 2007), 223.
29. In Hamburg, for example, the *Vereinigung Niederdeutsches Hamburg* brought together localists in meetings with optimistic titles, like "Laughing and Sunshine" (Lachen un Sünnschien), clearly reflecting localism as a vein of optimism. Such events included dialect poetry readings and localist theater performances. These were similar to the so-called "Colognian evenings." "Stimmen der Heimat," *Hamburger Echo* April 17, 1946.
30. Paul Nevermann, "Ein Eigenes Gedicht," in Paul Nevermann, *Metaller - Bürgermeister - Mieterpräsident* (Cologne: Deutschen Mieterbundes, 1977), 48.
31. StAHB, 7,97/0 - Kaisen, Wilhelm, Nr. 11, vol.11 (1960), "Grundsteinlegung der Synagoge am Freitag, den 29 Janr. 1960."
32. Wolfgang Borchert, "In Hamburg," in Neumann, ed., 77.
33. Max Brauer, "Ansprache zum Überseetag auf dem Werftgelände von Blohm & Voß am 7. Mai 1952," in Brauer, *Nüchternen Sinnes*, 243.
34. Poster reproduced in Andreas Matschenz, "'Der Onkel da ist dein Vater: Die Heimkehr der Kriegsgefangenen nach Berlin bis 1948,'" in *Heimkehr 1948*, ed. Annette Kaminsky (Munich: C.H: Beck, 1998), 121.
35. Bernhard Böhme, "Bremen: März 1945," in *Bremen in der Dichtung*, ed. Hans Kasten (Bremen: Bremer Schlüssel, 1946), 28.

36. "Am Lautsprecher," *Hamburger Echo*, February 18, 1947.
37. Max Brauer, "Rede in der Sitzung der Hamburger Bürgerschaft am 22. November 1946," in Brauer, *Nüchternen Sinnes*, 25; Wilhelm Kaisen, "Heimatgrüße an die Bremer Kriegsgefangenen," in Wilhelm Kaisen, *Bereitschaft und Zuversicht: Reden von Bürgermeister Wilhelm Kaisen, Präsident des Senats der freien Hansestadt Bremen* (Bremen: Bremer Schlüssel, 1947), 7-8.
38. Hans Kasten, "An Bremen: Mai 1945," in Kasten, ed., 30.
39. Thiessen.
40. "Lübecks dunkle Tage—ein Rückblick," *Vaterstädtische Blätter* 5, no.6 (June 1954): 5-6.
41. "Sie gehören in jedes Haus," *Vaterstädtische Blätter* 5, no.2 (February 1954): 4.
42. Armin Flender, "Identitätwechsel einer Grenzregion: Öffentliche Erinnerungskultur im Saarland nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg," in *Das Erbe der Provinz: Heimatkultur und Geschichtspolitik nach 1945*, ed., Habbo Knoch (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2001), 144-163.
43. Werner Hartung, *Konservative Zivilisationskritik und regionale Identität: Am Beispiel der niedersächsischen Heimatbewegung 1895 bis 1919* (Hannover: Hahnsche Buchhandlung, 1991); Peter Blickle, *Heimat: A Critical Theory of the German Idea of Homeland* (Rochester, NY: Camden House, 2002); Celia Applegate, *A Nation of Provincials: The German Idea of Heimat* (Berkeley, CA: California University Press, 1990); Alon Confino, *The Nation as a Local Metaphor: Württemberg, Imperial Germany, and National Memory, 1871-1918* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1997); William Rollins, *A Greener Vision of Home: Cultural Politics and Environmental Reform in the German Heimatschutz Movement, 1904-1918* (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1997); Jennifer Jenkins, *Provincial Modernity: Local Culture and Liberal Politics in Fin-de-Siècle Hamburg*, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003). Though not focusing specifically on Heimat as the center point of her analysis, Meike Werner argues that modernity did not simply emanate from large central urban centers, and convincingly illustrates the alternative modernizing projects from provincial spaces. Meike Werner, *Moderne in der Provinz: Kulturelle Experimente in Fin-de-Siècle Jena* (Göttingen: Wallenstein, 2003).
44. Umbach and Hüppauf, eds.
45. Hans Ewers, "Stadtgemeinde oder Stadtstaat?: Politische Gedanken und Erfahrungen aus fünf Jahrzehnten, Dritter Teil," *Lübeckische Blätter* 15 (April 1956): 85-87. Max Brauer, the mayor of Hamburg, similarly argued that rootedness in local tradition, which informed their city's desire to remain an independent city state, did not mean they were backward romanticists. Max Brauer, "Ansprache zum Überseetag auf dem Werftgelände von Blohm & Voß am 7. Mai 1952," in Brauer, *Nüchternen Sinnes*, 243.
46. StAAH, 731-8 Zeitungsausschnittssammlung (A 507 Hamburg Gesellschaft), *Die Welt*, 22.11.1965, "Zwanzig Jahre Hamburg-Gesellschaft; Senator a.D. Plate zog Bilanz- Mit Kabarett begann es," *Hamburger Echo*, 25.1.1958, "Kontakte mit aller Welt: Hamburg-Gesellschaft wirkt und wirbt seit 12 Jahren."
47. Hans Leip, *Hamburg: Das Bild einer Stadt* (Hamburg: Hoffmann und Campe, 1955), 12.
48. "Tradition und Fortschritt," *Lübeckische Blätter* 121, no.12 (June 10, 1961): 153-154.
49. Herbert Röhrig (Niedersächsisches Heimatbund), "Die Heimatgedanke in unserer Zeit," *Jahrbuch Deutscher Heimatbund* (1959): 27-37.
50. The Hamburg local enthusiast Heinrich Reincke emphasized maintaining the unique natures of cities in rebuilding by preserving the amphibian character of Hamburg, which intermixed stretches of water and land. Heinrich Reincke, "Hamburg die Stadt der Fleete," StAAH, 622-2/50 Heinrich Reincke, 1881-1960, *Hamburgische Geschichte*, Nr. 66. Wiederaufbau nach 1943.
51. Hans Högg, "Vortrag gehalten in der Verneigung für Städtebau zu Bremen am 13 Dezember 1946 (gekürzt)," in *Bremen: Der Wiederaufbau 1945-1960*, ed. Niels Aschenbeck (Bremen: Temmen, 1997).
52. Quotation from Klaus D. Toppel, 1949, in Jörg C. Kirschenmann, "Architektur und Städtebau," in *Bremen in den fünfziger Jahren: Politik, Wirtschaft, Kultur*, ed. Karl-Ludwig Sommer (Bremen: Bremen Verlagsgesellschaft, 1989), 128.

53. The rapid reconstruction of city churches was more a testament to the importance of such structures to community and Heimat rather than to piety. Their towering spires provided ubiquitous reference points of the local environment. Stadtbaudirektor Dr. Ing. G. Münther, "Vom Geiste unserer Stadt," *Lübeckische Blätter* 85 (July 1, 1949): 13-14.
54. The Heimat society held that they saw supporting reconstruction as their primary duty. To involve citizens in the process, they led frequent tours through reconstruction sites and held lectures and public discussions on rebuilding. They also held regular localist events in conjunction with a host of other Heimat societies. AHL, 05.4-085 Verein für Heimatschutz, Nr. 10, "Verein für Heimatschutz nach Kriegesende;" AHL, 05.4-085 Verein für Heimatschutz, Nr. 9, Jahresbericht 1947/48, 2, Jahresbericht 1956/57.
55. "Mit schönen Worten ist nichts getan!," *Vaterstädtische Blätter* 1, no.6 (November 1950): 6-8.
56. "Zum Wiederaufbau Lübecks," *Lübeckische Blätter* 87, no.1 (January 14, 1951): 5-6.
57. For examples of equation of concerns with *Vermassung* with the anti-modern and anti-democratic, see essays in Axel Schildt and Arnold Sywottek, eds., *Modernisierung im Wiederaufbau: Die westdeutsche Gesellschaft der 50er Jahre* (Bonn: J.H. Dietz, 1993) and Robert Moeller, ed., *West Germany under Construction: Politics, Society, and Culture in the Adenauer Era* (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1997). For more on the "reactionary modernism" of National Socialism, see Jeffrey Herf, *Reactionary Modernism: Technology, Culture, and Politics in Weimar and the Third Reich* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984). Nor was such association of massification and Soviet Communism all that off the mark. See, for example, David L. Hoffmann, *Cultivating the Masses: Modern State Practices and Soviet Socialism, 1914-1939* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2011).
58. The publication took up the name of former section of the *Lübeckischer Anzeiger*. The postwar publication, however, was produced solely by the *Vaterstädtische Vereinigung*.
59. As one member reflected, the very name of their society embodied the idea of "Heimat." AHL, 05.4-81 *Vaterstädtische Vereinigung*, Nr.1, Gerhard Boldt, Speech on the Occasion of Election to Society Chair. 24.4.1969.
60. Johannes Behrmann, "Zum Geleit," *Vaterstädtische Blätter* 1 (June 1950): 1.
61. H. Wittmack, "Gemeindefreiheit contra Weltregierung," *Lübeckische Blätter* 85, no.5 (December 1949): 117-118.
62. "Eine Doppelaufgabe der 'Vaterstädtischen,'" *Vaterstädtische Blätter* 6, no.10 (October 1955): 2; Hans Wittmack, "Demokratie - unter uns," *Vaterstädtische Blätter* 7, no.3 (March 1956): 2.
63. "Gemeindefreiheit - Schlüssel zur wahren Demokratie: Professor Gassers Vortrag in Lübeck - Gegen Kommando- und Autoritätsgläubigkeit," *Vaterstädtische Blätter* 8, no.4 (April 1957): 1-2.
64. "Beruht unsere Vermassung nur auf Einbildung?: Die Krise des Menschen ist eine Vertrauenskrise," *Vaterstädtische Blätter* 4, no.10 (October 1953): 2; "Sie gehören in jedes Haus," *Vaterstädtische Blätter* 5, no.2 (February, 1954): 4; "Was will die 'Vaterstädtische?,'" *Vaterstädtische Blätter* 4 (April 1954): 1.
65. "Die Freiheit eine Gasse!," *Vaterstädtische Blätter* 10, no.7 (July 1959): 1-2; Hans Wittmack, "Die Vaterstädtische am Scheideweg," *Vaterstädtische Blätter* 17 (April/May 1966): 1; Hans Wittmack, "Bürokratie und Scheindemokratie," *Vaterstädtische Blätter* 6, no.11 (November 1955): 2.
66. Hans Wittmack, "Deutsche Zukunft aus hansischem Geist," *Vaterstädtische Blätter* 6 (June 1965): 1.
67. "...nur noch Deutsche," *Vaterstädtische Blätter* 7, no.12 (December 1956): 4.
68. Waldemar Kurtz, *Gemeinden sind Wichtiger als Staaten* (Stuttgart: Jung, 1951), 23 - 24, 27, 44. For positive review of the work by a Lübecker Heimat enthusiast, see, "Gemeinden sind wichtiger als Staaten," *Vaterstädtische Blätter* 3, no.10 (October 1952): 4-5.
69. "Gemeindefreiheit - Schlüssel zur wahren Demokratie: Professor Gassers Vortrag in Lübeck - Gegen Kommando- und Autoritätsgläubigkeit," *Vaterstädtische Blätter* 8, no.4 (April 1957): 1-2; "Demokratie und Bürokratismus," *Vaterstädtische Blätter* 11, no.6 (June 1960): 3.
70. Theodor Spitta, "Ansprache an Professor Carl Jacob Burckhardt am 1. Februar 1952," in Theodor Spitta, *Keine andere Rücksicht*, 121.



71. StAHB, 7, 63 Spitta, Theodor (1911-1969) Nr. 1/1 Reden und Schriften (mit Notizen und Excerpten, evtl. Auch zugehöriger Korrespondenz) H.c. Carl J. Burckhardt, "Städtegeist: Festvortrag gehalten bei Anlaß der Säkularfeier des Germanischen Nationalmuseums zu Nürnberg am 9 August 1952."
72. Hans Wittmack "Versinkt der Mensch in der Masse?," *Vaterstädtische Blätter* 16, no.5 (May 1965): 1.
73. In 1926, Lübecker held extensive public festivities to celebrate 700 years of "Imperial Freedom. "Zur 700-Jahrfeier der Reichsfreiheit Lübeck," *Vaterstädtische Blätter: Unterhaltungsblatt der Lübeckischen Anzeiger* 19 (June 13, 1925/1926): 77-80.
74. Suggestions had been brewing for decades that Lübeck was too small to be a viable state. Some localists had even pre-empted dissolution by suggesting unification of Lübeck with its Hanseatic sister city, Hamburg. Gerhard Schneider, *Gefährdung und Verlust der Eigenstaatlichkeit der Freien und Hansestadt Lübeck und seine Folgen* (Lübeck: Schmidt-Römhild, 1986), 18, 65-67.
75. Schneider, 163-166.
76. "Unsere Förderung bleibt: Lübeck muß wieder frei werden!," *Vaterstädtische Blätter* 7, no.2 (February 1956): 1. "Das Echo unserer Aktion," *Vaterstädtische Blätter* 7, no.2 (February 1956): 1.
77. This included Gerhard Schneider, the mayor of Lübeck in 1945 prior to his removal by the British; Schneider argued that independence was illogical in terms of administration and finance. Gerhard Schneider, "Gedanken zur Gemein Hansestadt Lübeck," *Der Wagen: ein Lübeckisches Jahrbuch* (1954): 87-91. In a book on the statehood issue, written several decades later, Schneider argued that, after losing their statehood, Lübecker accustomed themselves quickly to their new status and realized that not being an independent state did not erase their local Hanseatic traditions. Schneider, 186.
78. The Federal Courts ruled that no states had a right to vote on the redistricting of their borders, excepting those states whose borders or statehood had been altered after May 1945. Schneider, 176-177. Hans Wittmack, "Hat Lübeck noch genug geistige Substanz?," *Lübeckische Blätter* 92/116, no.4 (February 19, 1956): 42-43; "Alljährliches Gedenken an Lübecks Reichsfreiheit," *Vaterstädtische Blätter*, 8, no.1 (January 1957): 1; Hans Wittmack, "Kein Volksbegehren – eine Enttäuschung: 'Die Welt.' Karlsruhe sieht durch die gleiche Brille wie Bonn," *Vaterstädtische Blätter* 7, no.12 (December 1956): 1-2.
79. Hans Wittmack, "Keine Volksbegehren – eine Enttäuschung: 'Die Welt.' Karlsruhe sieht durch die gleiche Brille wie Bonn," *Vaterstädtische Blätter* 7, no.12 (December 1956): 1-2.
80. The 300 neighborhood cooperatives founded in the Federal Republic included the Lübecker "Nachbarschaft Lachwehr." Its primary goals were: creating community solidarity, following local issues and promoting the general good, helping those of the community in need, looking to local communities to solve the problems and promoting exchange of ideas. "Nachbarschaft 'Lachwehr' berichtet," *Vaterstädtische Blätter* 3, no.8 (August 1952): 7; "Nachbarschaften wachsen," *Vaterstädtische Blätter* 3, no.3 (March 1953): 2. "Nachbarn müssen miteinander reden," *Vaterstädtische Blätter* 2, no.6/7 (June/July, 1951): 4; "Der Freiheit eine Gasse," *Vaterstädtische Blätter* 10, no.7 (July 1959): 1-2; "Ziel der Nachbarschaften: Volk und Staat als lebendige Einheit: Auf dem Weg zur echten Demokratie – Eindrücke in Minden," *Vaterstädtische Blätter* 7, no.12 (December, 1956): 1956.
81. Friedrich Pruser, *Heimatchronik der Freien und Hansestadt Bremen* (Cologne: Archiv für Deutsche Heimatpflege, 1955), 235-247, 257.
82. Their society politics was dedicated to being "open for one another," "respecting other ways of thinking" and having a "willingness to reconcile conflict." "Die 'Vaterstädtische' bleibt überparteilich," *Vaterstädtische Blätter* 5, no.3 (March 1955): 1; Hans Wittmack, "Was will die 'Vaterstädtische?'," *Vaterstädtische Blätter* 5, no.4 (April 1954): 1-2; Hans Wittmack, "Gemeinschaft verpflichtet," *Vaterstädtische Blätter* 7, no.1 (January 1956): 6.
83. Hans Wittmack, "Die Vaterstädtische am Scheidewege," *Vaterstädtische Blätter* 17, no.4/5 (April/May 1966): 1.
84. "Die Freiheit, die schwer errungen die Alten, möge die Nachwelt würdig erhalten!," Preface, *Hamburger Journal: Monatschrift des Hamburgischen Lebens* 1, no.1 (December 1952): I.
85. Thomas Hill, "Vom öffentlichen Gebrauch der Hansegeschichte und Hanseforschung im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert," in *Ausklang und Nachklang der Hanse im 19. Und 20. Jahrhundert*, ed. Antjekathrin Graßmann (Trier: Porta Alba, 2001), 87.

86. Rudolf Ferber, "Die Volksthümlichen Lieder: 'Auf Hamburgs Wohlergehen' im 18. und 19. Jahrhundert," *Zeitschrift des Vereins für Hamburgische Geschichte* 12, I (1908): 1-64; Friedrich von Hagedorn, "Die Alster" (1830), Wilhelm Chistern Sen, "Die Beste Stadt" (1845); C. Fürstenau "Gesellschaftslied" (1839), Unknown "Hamburgisches Volkslied," Georg Lotz "Mein Hamburg" (1820), Dr. G. Buek "Die Farben der Hamburger Bürgergarde" (1828) in Neumann, ed., 20-21, 23, 27, 29; Professor Grautoff "Ein Vaterstädtisch Lied," (1815) in *Vaterstädtische Blätter: Altes und Neues aus Lübeck. Unterhaltungsblatt der Lübeckischen Anzeiger* 20 (May 23, 1897): 160; Wilhelm Deecke, "Lübeck" (1863), in *Vaterstädtische Blätter: Altes und Neues aus Lübeck. Unterhaltungsblatt der Lübeckischen Anzeiger* 19 (July 1926): 86.
87. Quoted in Percy Ernst Schramm, *Hamburg, Deutschland und die Welt: Leistung und Grenzen hanseatischen Bürgertums in der Zeit zwischen Napoleon I und Bismarck* (Munich: Georg D.W. Callwey, 1943), 13.
88. H.W. Buek, "Hansa" (1830), in Neumann, ed., 32.
89. Garlieb Merkel, *Briefe über Hamburg und Lübeck* (Leipzig: bei Johann Friedrich Hartknoch, 1801), 110-111.
90. Volksmund, "Laternenlied," "Hamburg, Lübeck und Bremen, die brauchen sich nicht zu schämen; denn sie sind eine freie Stadt, wo Bismarck nichts zu sagen hat." in Neumann, ed., 37.
91. Helmers also argues that the Bremer Bürger, in a technical sense ceased to exist after national unification. The phrase later emerged as a representation of the spirit of Bremer freedom. Heinrich Helmers, *Bremer Land und Leute: kultur-historische Bilder* (Bremen: Mar Nößlers Buchdruckerei, 1905), 54-56.
92. "Only to our council of German men should our freedom extend." Johann Smidt, "Kriegslied der Bremischen Hanseaten" (1813), in B. Schulze-Smidt, *Bürgermeister Johann Smidt: das Lebensbild eines Hanseaten: Ein Erinnerungsbuch* (Bremen: Franz Leuwer, 1913), 247-248.
93. Johann Jakob Rambach, *Versuch einer physisch-medizinischen Beschreibung von Hamburg* (Hamburg: bei Carl Ernst Bohn, 1801), 183.
94. Merkel did recognize that their Republican constitution informed their natures and the city's historical anti-aristocratic strain. He praised the level of involvement of politics in Bremen, but was less impressed with Lübeck, which he argued had a more aristocratic flair. Merkel, 6, 112, 158-160, 166-167, 212, 404-406.
95. Hamburg provides an excellent example. Percy Ernst Schramm describes its history as a democratic *Sonderfall*. Richard Evans, Mary Lindeman, and Jost Hermand have pointed to how an elite oligarchy controlled the city that paid little heed to its citizens, was suspicious of democratization, and did not facilitate popular political participation. Katherine Aaslestad has demonstrated how Hanseatic republicanism was unlike the more modern French equivalent and became less about the public good over time Percy Ernst Schramm, *Hamburg: ein Sonderfall in der Geschichte Deutschlands* (Hamburg: Hans Christians, 1964); Richard Evans, *Death in Hamburg: Society and Politics in the Cholera Years, 1830-1910* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1987); Mary Lindemann, "Fundamental Values: Political Culture in Eighteenth-Century Hamburg," in *Patriotism, Cosmopolitanism and National Culture: Public Culture in Hamburg 1700-1933*, ed. Peter Uwe Hohendahl (Amsterdam: Rodopi B.V., 1994), 17-30; Jost Hermand, "The Jacobins of Hamburg and Altona," in *Ibid*, 133-142; Katherine Aaslestad, "Old Visions and New Vices: Republicanism and Civic Virtue in Hamburg's Print Culture, 1790-1810," in *Ibid*, 143-166; Aaslestad, *Place and Politics*. Joachim Whaley has also demonstrated how Hamburger religious toleration emerged from oligarchic self-interests rather than a democratic spirit. Joachim Whaley, *Religious Toleration and Social Change in Hamburg, 1529-1819* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985). Jennifer Jenkins has illustrated several of the modern and even progressive elements of localism in late nineteenth-century Hamburg. Jenkins. Paul Nolte, moreover, has argued that in histories of democracy, we cannot simply dismiss relevant proto-democratic structures from the medieval and early modern periods. Paul Nolte, *Was ist Demokratie?: Geschichte und Gegenwart* (Munich: C.H. Beck, 2012), 54-59.
96. See Antjekathrin Graßmann, ed., *Ausklang und Nachklang der Hanse*. The medieval League itself was little more than a collection of cities with no common identity, only common interests. The historian Ahasver von Brandt has argued that the real medieval league of cities only functioned insofar as cities shared such common interests, sharing no common "Hanseatic" identity. Ahasver von Brandt, "Das Ende der Hanseatischen Gemeinschaft: Ein Beitrag zur neuesten Geschichte der Hansestädte," in Ahasver von Brandt, *Lübeck, Hanse, Nordeuropa: Gedächtnisschrift für Ahasver von Brandt*, ed. Klaus Friedland and Rolf Sprandel (Cologne: Böhlau, 1979), 97.

- 97.AHL, 05.4-30 Hansischer Geschichtsverein, Nr. 438, Jahresmitglied Versammlung Soest: 1947, "Geschichte als Lehrmeisterin," *Westfalenpost*, 7.6.1947.
- 98.AHL, Hansischer Geschichtsverein 05.4-30, Nr.438, Jahresmitglied Versammlung, 1953, "Die Hanse verbindet Länder und Völker," *Osnabrücker Stadtanzeiger*, June 4, 1953.
- 99.Rörig's article, in addition for arguing for its application to the present, insists at length on the importance of "methodic cleanliness" in research. Fritz Rörig, "Stand und Aufgaben der Hansischen Geschichtsforschung," *Hansische Geschichtsblätter* 69 (1950): 1-13. Rörig expressed identical sentiments in a speech at the yearly assembly of the society in 1947. AHL, 05.4-30 Hansischer Geschichtsverein, Jahresmitglied Versammlung, Soest:1947, "Hansischer Geist," *Westfalenpost*, May 30, 1947.
- 100.Karl Pagel, *Die Hanse* (Braunschweig: Georg Westermann, 1952), "Vorwort 1952," I.
- 101."Lübeck: Deutschlands älteste Republik," *Vaterstädtische Blätter*, 7, no.4 (April 1956): 2; Röthel, *Die Hansestädte*.
- 102."Es ist der hansische Geist der schon einmal ganz Europa umfaßte, der neu geweckt werden muß. Hansischer Geist ist mehr als bloß der Geist einer einzelnen Stadt, sei sie selbst so groß, so weltoffen und kühn wie Hamburg. Hansischer Geist war bündischer Geist, der einen ganzen Städtebund erfüllte. Er könnte heute wieder als Vorbild wirken..." Hans Wittmack, "Hat Lübeck noch genug geistige Substanz?," *Lübeckische Blätter* 92/116, no.4 (February 18, 1956): 42-43.
- 103.Axel Schildt, *Max Brauer* (Hamburg: Ellert & Richter, 2002).
- 104.Max Brauer, "Die Friedensziele der Demokratie," (1943) in *Max Brauer*, eds. Fladhammer and Wildt, 314.
- 105.Max Brauer, "Zur Verfassung der Freien und Hansestadt Hamburg: Rede in der Hamburger Bürgerschaft am 28 April 1948," in *Max Brauer, Nüchternen Sinnes*, 57-63.
- 106.StAHH, 135-1 Staatliche Pressestelle VI, Nr.341, "Neues Hamburg," Rede von Max Brauer, 17.4.1950.
- 107.Max Brauer, "Rede in der Sitzung der Hamburger Bürgerschaft am 22. November 1946," in *Max Brauer, Nüchternen Sinnes*, 24.
- 108.Kaisen simultaneously denounced movements toward separatism. Wilhelm Kaisen, "Gefahren für Bremen," *Weser-Kurier*, January 12, 1946, reprinted in *Occupation, Enclave, State: Die Wiederbegründung des Landes Bremen nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg: Dokumente zu Politik und Alltag*, ed. Staatsarchiv Bremen (Bremen: Staatsarchiv Bremens, 2007), 30-31.
- 109.StAHB, 7,97/0 Kaisen, Wilhelm, Nr.4, vol.4, (1953), Bürgermeister Kaisen, Pressebeitrag, "Wesen und Geist einer Hansestadt," March 7, 1953, 1-4.
- 110.Wilhelm Kaisen, "Rückblick und Ausblick," in Kaisen, *Bereitschaft und Zuversicht*, 46.
- 111.In a joint statement issued in the same year, the cities argued that in case of their dissolution, a "substantial decentralization" of federal state power and significant communal independence should be ensured. StAHB, 05. Senatsregistratur (1875-1958) 05.02, 3-R.1.n. Nr.4 Quadr.10, "Stellungnahme der Hansestädte Hamburg und Bremen zum Neuaufbau der Ländern in der britischen Zone Deutschlands," (1946); "Stellungnahme der Hansestädte Hamburg und Bremen im Falle der Eingliederung in ein größeres Land," 28.August 1946.
- 112.StAHB, 05. Senatsregistratur (1875-1958) 05.02, 3-R.1.n. Nr.4 Quadr.10, Dr. Spitta, "Der Neuaufbau des Reiches und Bremens Stellung darin," (6.8.1946).
- 113.StAHB, 05. Senatsregistratur (1875-1958) 05.02 Auswärtige Angelegenheiten, 3-B.10.a., Nr.2, Quadr.1, Akte I, Gestaltung, Abgrenzung und Verwaltung der Enklave Bremen und Regelung der Verhältnisse im Unterweserraum 1945, Mai 20.-1946, Juli 29; Bremen unter Hannover? (1946).
- 114.StAHB 05. Senatsregistratur (1875-1958) 05.02, 3-R.1.n Nr.4, Quadr. 10, "Bremen als freie Stadt und Land (Stadtstaat)," 3-9.
- 115.Renatus Weber, "Hamburg im Licht oder Schatten Bonns: Ein Brief an den Herausgeber des "Neuen Hamburg," in *Hamburgisches Reden im Bundesrat*, ed. Renatus Weber (Hamburg: Cram, De Gruntyer & Co., 1957), 113-114.

116. Hanseatic tradition, he declared, was a real force which, among other things, had facilitated a good relationship with the occupying powers. Kurt Sieveking, "Hansische Aufgaben Heute - von Aussen Gesehen: Vortrag, gehalten am 21 November 1954 vor der Evangelischen Akademie Loccum," in *Bürgermeister a.D. Dr. Kurt Sieveking zum 70 Geburtstag am 21. Februar 1967*, eds. Renatus Weber, Carl-Gisbert Schultze-Schlutius, and H.C. Wilhelm Güssefeld (Neumünster: Karl Wachholtz, 1967), 57-63.
117. Dominix, "Nie wedder Krieg! Dooden-Sünndag," *Vaterstädtische Blätter* 10, no.11 (1959): 11. On the founding of Totensonntag in 1816 by decree of Friedrich Wilhelm III of Prussia, see Hans Dieter Betz, et al., eds., *Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart: Handwörterbuch für Theologie und Religionswissenschaft*, 4<sup>th</sup> ed., vol.8 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2005), 498.
118. The patriarchal, and in many ways, socially-regressive tradition, continues to be a point of controversy in the contemporary city.
119. Gisela Jaacks, *Das Lübecker Volks- und Erinnerungsfest (Allgemeines Scheibenschießen): Untersuchungen zur Entstehung und Entwicklung eines Großstadt-Volksfestes* (Hamburg: Museum für Hamburgische Geschichte, 1971), 15-26, 37-38, 47-69, 137-139, 158-164.
120. "Das Volks- und Erinnerungsfest," *Vaterstädtische Blätter: Altes und neues aus Lübeck. Unterhaltungsblatt der Lübeckischen Anzeiger* 27 (July, 14 1901): 209. "Es ist und bleibt ein patriotisch in vaterländischem Sinne gefeiertes Volksfest, ein Erinnerungsfest an das Freiheitsjahr 1848, ein Erinnerungsfest ferner an die nationale Großthat 1870/71, und die Wiederaufrichtung eines machtvollen Deutschen Reiches."
121. Jaacks, 163.
122. Jaacks, 82-90, 128-131, 166.
123. AHL, 05.4-81, Vaterstädtische Vereinigung von 1949, Nr.45, Volksfestkomitee Lübeck, *Lübecker Volksfest 1957, 14-28 Juli. Festschrift*, "Zum Geleit."
124. AHL, 05.4-81, Vaterstädtische Vereinigung von 1949, Nr.45, Volksfestkomitee Lübeck, *Lübecker Volksfest 1957, 14-28 Juli. Festschrift*, Conrad Neckels "'Hurra, Schiebenscheeten!' Das Lübecker Volksfest entsteht wieder im alten Glanz."
125. Jaacks, 10-11.
126. Memorandum der Bremer Militärregierung vom 22.6.1946, StAHB 3-B.10.a.Nr.2/1/Bd.2, facsimile printed in: Staatsarchiv Bremen, ed., 34-40.
127. StAHH 135-1 Staatliche Pressestelle VI, Nr. 341, Senat. Bürgermeister und Senatorenreden (1950-1953), Rede des Herrn Bundespräsidenten in Hamburg am 8.3.1950.
128. Klöcking took up work during the early 1940s with the *Reichsstelle für Musikbearbeitung*, where he accepted the task of re-writing Handel's oratorios to remove their Jewish themes. See, Pamela Potter, "The Politicization of Handel and His Oratorios in the Weimar Republic, the Third Reich, and the Early Years of the German Democratic Republic," *The Musical Quarterly* 85, 2 (Summer 2001): 323. The *Verein für Heimatschutz*, which existed before, during, and after the Third Reich, also allowed the old head of their society under the Nazis to continue in a lesser capacity after 1945. He was presumably a member of the party, as he stepped down after 1945 due to "political reasons." AHL, Verein für Heimatschutz, 05.4-085, Nr.9, "Verein für Heimatschutz: Jahresbericht 1945-1946."
129. Mosche Zimmermann has illustrated how many Hamburger Jews had a sense of local patriotism for Hamburg, and looked to city institutions rather than the nation for their emancipation. Mosche Zimmermann, *Hamburgischer Patriotismus und deutscher Nationalismus: Die Emazipation der Juden in Hamburg, 1830-1865* (Hamburg: Hans Christians, 1979). Evidence of Jewish Heimat feeling for their city can also be seen in the early twentieth century. For Hamburger Jew's sense of lost home in exile in the shadow of the Third Reich, see Charlotte Ueckert-Hilbert, ed., *Fremd in der eigenen Stadt: Erinnerungen jüdischer Emigranten aus Hamburg* (Hamburg: Junius, 1989); Ursula Wamser and Wilfried Weinke, eds., *Ehemals in Hamburg zu Hause: Jüdisches Leben am Grindel* (Hamburg: VSA, 1991).
130. Schneider, 100-101. Schneider argues that this ban on Hitler speaking in the city was lifted prior to 1932. For Senator Ewers arguments before the *Bundesverfassungsgericht*, see "Stadtgemeinde oder Stadtstaat?," *Lübeckische Blätter* (March 4, 1956): 53-55.

131. Before the rise of the Nazis, his brother declared that their coming to power would bring “a state of unfreedom and a destruction of spiritual and material values.” Quoted in *Hamburg: Von den Anfängen bis zur Gegenwart: Wendemarken einer Stadtgeschichte*, Jörgen Bracker (Hamburg: Ernst Kabel, 1987), 249.
132. StAHH, 131-1 II Senatskanzlei I, Nr.2798, “Antrittsrede des Hamburger Bürgermeisters Rudolf Petersen, 16 Mai 1945.”
133. Wilhelm Drexlius and Renatus Weber, eds., *Die Verfassung der Freien und Hansestadt Hamburg vom 6. Juni 1952* (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1972), 1.
134. Garlieb Merkel, *Briefe über Lübeck und Hamburg*, excerpt in *Hamburg*, ed. Helmuth Thomsen (Munich: Prestel, 1962), 148, 182. Merkel argues that the Hamburger character is made up of an assortment of the best characteristics of Germany’s different regions and cities who blended together. They even brought to Hamburg, he argued, their “provincialism.”
135. Rambach, 182-184. He particularly emphasizes their taste for things French and its gradual replacement by their enthusiasm for all things English. Rambach’s 400-page description of Hamburg, however, was not written to promote the city. Among other things, he argues that it is the froggish nature of the Hamburger which prevents them from committing suicide during the city’s winter months.
136. Jonas Ludwig von Heß, “Topographisch-politisch-historische Beschreibung der Stadt Hamburg” (1796), excerpt in Thomsen, ed., 149.
137. Carl Wefing, *Bremische Heimatkunde: Für Schule und Haus* (Bremen: Rühle & Schlenker, 1903).
138. Hans Rudolf Vaget has pointed to how Thomas Mann promoted a liberal idea of “Hanseatum.” Mann praised, among other things, the traditions of Lübeck and its historical willingness to enact change. Vaget argues, however, that Mann’s attempts to create a liberal idea of the Hanseat failed. After 1945, I argue, such notions of “Hanseatum” became prolific— even if Hanseaten did not discuss such ideas as having a connection to Thomas Mann. Hans Rudolf Vaget, “The Discreet Charm of the Hanseatic Bourgeoisie. Geography, History and Psychology in Thomas Mann’s Representations of Hamburg,” in Hohendahl, ed., 193-204. In comparisons to postwar notions of the idea, however, Thomas Mann’s idea of *Hanseatum* focused less on penetration from the outside world. Mann argued in his famous speech on Lübeck that the essence of the “Lübeck form of life” was the “idea of the middle”—a principle, he argued, which was fundamentally rooted in Germanness. The idea of tolerance and world-openness, moreover, while appearing in the margin’s of Mann’s narratives of the Hanseatic, never play a central role. Thomas Mann, *Lübeck als geistige Lebensform: Rede gehalten am 5. Juni im Stadttheater zu Lübeck aus Anlaß der 700 Jahrfeier der Freien und Hansestadt* (Lübeck: Otto Quitzow, 1926).
139. Such definitions of Hanseatic localness were particularly strong in the local chapters of the Navy League. See Thomas Hill, in Graßmann, ed., 75-87. Earlier examples of the Hanseatic league as spreading Germanness abroad can be found, such as Max von Schenkendorf’s 1815 song that the league spread the German character from Riga to Nowgorod.” Song reprinted in Wegner, 128.
140. Richard von Hoff, “Die rassische Eigenart des Bremers,” in *Bremen: Lebenskreis einer Hansestadt*, eds. H. Knittermeyer and D. Steilen (Bremen: Arthur Geist, 1940), 1-20.
141. Hermann Tardel, immediately after the war, recounted how this localist trope had been appropriated in Nazi propaganda. In Bremen, whose crest contained a key, the notion of the city being a “*Tor zur Welt*” circulated parallel to notions of them being a “*Schlüssel zur Welt*.” The Christian symbol of the key was reshaped by the Nazis to make it signify a key to expansionary national ambitions. See, Hermann Tardel, *Der Bremer Schlüssel: Zur Geschichte des Wahrzeichens* (Bremen: Bremer Schlüssel Hans Kasten, 1946), 25-26.
142. *Hamburger Journal: Monatsschrift des Hamburgischen Lebens*. 1, no.1 (December 1953): I.
143. StAHH, 131-1 Senatskanzlei I, Nr.2798, Antrittsrede des Hamburger Bürgermeisters Rudolf Petersen, May 16, 1945; Max Brauer, “Rechenschaftsbericht über das Jahr 1950 erstattet am 24 Januar 1951 vor etwa 1000 Gästen im großen Festsaal des Hamburger Rathauses,” in Brauer, *Nüchternen Sinnes*, 135.
144. Röthel, 300-301.

145. "Bevölkerungsbewegung 1956 in Hamburg: 90000 Einwohner mehr als 1939," *Monatschrift: Verein geborener Hamburger e.V.* 60, no.1 (February 1957): 2; Nils Aschenbeck, *Bremen hat Zuzugssperre: Vertriebene und Flüchtlinge nach dem Krieg in Bremen* (Bremen: Temmen, 1998), 11.
146. "Das neue Gesicht der alten Stadt," *Vaterstädtische Blätter* 1, (June 1950): 2; "Lübeck 1967 - moderne Großstadt mit hansischer Tradition," *Lübeckische Blätter*, January 1, 1967.
147. AHL *Vaterstädtische Verienigung* 05.4-81, "30 Jahre der 'Vaterstädtischen.' 4. April 1949 im Lübecker Restaurant Concordia;" "Die 'Vaterstädtische' am Scheidewege," *Vaterstädtische Blätter*, 17, no.4/5 (April/May 1966): 1.
148. Ingeborg Esenwein-Rothe, *Die Eingliederung der Flüchtlinge in die Stadtstaaten Bremen und Hamburg* (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1955), 108-140.
149. Uwe Weiher, *Flüchtlingssituation und Flüchtlingspolitik: Untersuchungen zur Eingliederung der Flüchtlinge in Bremen, 1945-1961* (Bremen: Staatsarchiv Bremen, 1998),
150. Klaus J. Bade, "Einführung: Wege in die Bundesrepublik," and Uwe Kleinert, "Die Flüchtlinge als Arbeitskräfte - zur Eingliederung der Flüchtlinge in Nordrhein-Westfalen nach 1945," in *Neue Heimat im Westen: Vertriebene, Flüchtlinge, Aussiedler*, ed. Klaus J. Bade (Münster: Westfälischer Heimatbund, 1990), 7, 56-75; Franz J. Bauer, *Flüchtlinge und Flüchtlingspolitik in Bayern 1945-1950* (Stuttgart: Ernst Klett, 1982), 343-344.
151. Andreas Kossert is one of the foremost proponents of the failed integration thesis. He argues that West German society was instilled with pervasive hatred of the expellees, which he argues even had roots in ideas of expellees' racial inferiority. For Kossert, successful integration connotes the absence of any significant tension. In early postwar Germany, however, successful integration from the outset was defined by fears that expellees would fail to integrate to a degree that would topple the infant democracy. By these standards, it is easy to see why West Germans so quickly declared expellee integration a success. Andreas Kossert, *Kalte Heimat: die Geschichte der deutschen Vertriebenen nach 1945* (Munich: Siedler, 2008). Uwe Weiher, in his study on Bremen, points out that failed integration has often been measured according to subjective categories. Weiher, 185.
152. StAHH, 131-1 II Senatskanzlei I, Nr. 1243, Veranstaltung des Tages der deutschen Heimat, Zuwendung des Senats, (1954-1974), "TAG DER HEIMAT 1954 in Hamburg."
153. StAHH, 131-1 II Senatskanzlei I, Nr. 1243. Veranstaltung des Tages der deutschen Heimat, Zuwendung des Senats (1954-1974), Edgar Engelhard, "Tag der Deutschen Heimat," September 12, 1953, Dokument 30; Letter, Verband Deutscher Soldaten, to Hamburger Senator and Government Director, Dr. Jess, September 14, 1954 Dokument 21.
154. StAHH, 135-1 VI, Staatliche Pressestelle VI.Nr. 341, "Ansprache von Bürgermeister Max Brauer anlässlich der Eröffnung der Ostdeutschen Heimatwoche im Schauspielhaus am 13.5.1950."
155. StAHH, 131-1 II Senatskanzlei I, Nr. 1243, Veranstaltung des Tages der deutschen Heimat, Zuwendung des Senats. (1954-1974) "Bürgermeister Dr. Kurt Sieveking am 'Tag der Heimat' in Hamburg 9. Sept. 1956."
156. Wilhelm Kaisen's strident positions in support of the expellees exceeded the lip-service that some politicians paid to procure their votes. The smaller number of expellees in Bremen also meant he was under less expellee electoral pressure. StAHH, 7,97/0, Wilhelm Kaisen, Nr. 3, Bd.3, 1952, "Zum 'Tag der Heimat' (3. August 1952); Nr.4, Bd.4, 1953, "Tag der Heimat am Sonntag den 2. August. 1953 i/d. Glocke;" Nr.5, Bd.5, 1954, "Tag der Heimat am 12.9.1954;" Nr.6, Bd.6, 1955, "Ansprache Bürgermeister Kaisen 'Tag der Heimat' am Sonntag, den 7. August im Rathaus;" Nr.10, Bd.19, 1959, "Tag der Heimat am 13. Sept. 1959;" Nr.11, Bd.11, 1960, "12. Tag der Heimat am 11. Sept. 1960."
157. StAHH, 131-1 II Senatskanzlei I, Nr. 1243, Veranstaltung des Tages der deutschen Heimat, Zuwendung des Senats. (1954-1974), "Begrüßung zum Tag der Heimat am 13.9.1970 durch Senator Weiss;" "Tag der Heimat Hamburg 1966;" "Heimat, Vaterland, Europa;" "Tag der Heimat im Jahr der Menschenrechte, Hamburg 1965;" "Wahrer Friede wurzelt in Gerechtigkeit;" "Programm: Tag der Heimat Hamburg 1964 "Freiheit, Recht, Friede."
158. Siegfried Schier, *Die Aufnahme und Eingliederung von Flüchtlingen und Vertriebenen in der Hansestadt Lübeck: Eine sozialgeschichtliche Untersuchung für die Zeit nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg bis zum Ende der 50er Jahre* (Lübeck: Schmidt-Römhild, 1982), 11, 258-265.

159. For more on politicians' overtures to the expellees in the early Federal Republic, see Pertti Ahonen, *After the Expulsion: West Germany and Eastern Europe, 1945-1990* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2003).
160. "Wie hören wir des Volkes Stimme?," *Vaterstädtische Blätter* 2, no.10 (October 1951): 3; "Zum Geleit," *Vaterstädtische Blätter* 1, no.1 (June 1950): 1.
161. "...durch künstliche Atmung erhalten," *Vaterstädtische Blätter* 5, no.10 (October, 1954): 1.
162. AHL, 05.4-085, Verein für Heimatschutz, Nr.16, "Heimatschutz vor neuen Aufgaben: Gespräch mit dem Vorsitzenden des Vereins für Heimatschutz. Die Königstraße als kultureller Mittelpunkt Lübecks," July 31, 1946.
163. Ewers particularly emphasized Lübeck's attraction of innovative individuals. The city was, Ewers believed, not museum-like or pre-occupied with romantic reminiscence. Hans Ewers, "Stadtgemeinde oder Stadtstaat?: Politische Gedanken und Erfahrungen aus fünf Jahrzehnten," *Lübeckische Blätter* 15 (April, 1956): 85-87.
164. "Fangen wir an!: Die Vaterstädtische Vereinigung und das alte Lübecker Volksfest," *Vaterstädtische Blätter* 3, no.8 (August 1952): 1. "Um unser altes traditionelles Lübecker Volksfest," *Vaterstädtische Blätter* 7, no.4 (July 1953): 2. The number of *Heimatvertriebene* living in Lübeck at that point had declined to 90,000, as the expellees began fanning out across the Federal Republic. The society cited this number in their call to integrate the group into a sense of community through the festival. This effort was repeated in both 1952, when polls of Lübecker showed 90% wanted a revival of the festival, and in 1953. The festival would reach full bloom in 1957.
165. Paul Brockhaus, "Ein Neues Lübecker Volksfest: Ost und West – Eine Heimat," *Lübeckische Blätter: Zeitschrift der Gesellschaft zur Beförderung Gemeinnütziger Tätigkeit* 88, no.8 (April 27, 1952): 77-79.
166. StAHH, 731-8 Zeitungsausschnittsammlung, A 507 Hamburg Gesellschaft, "Kontakte mit aller Welt: Hamburg-Gesellschaft wirkt und wirbt seit 12 Jahren," *Hamburger Echo*. 25.1.1958; "Zwanzig Jahre Hamburg-Gesellschaft: Senator a.D. Plate zog Bilanz - Mit Kabarett begann es," *Die Welt*, November 22, 1965.
167. Introduction, Meyer-Marwitz, ed., 5.
168. Hermann Tardel, *Bremen im Sprichwort, Reim und Volkslied* (Bremen: Bremer Schlüssel, 1947), 8.
169. Hans Driesch, Excerpt, *Lebenserinnerungen. Aufzeichnungen eines Forschers und Denkers in entscheidener Zeit* (1951), in Thomsen, ed., 159.
170. Gustav Hillard [pseud. Gustav Steinbömer], "Rede auf Lübeck," *Der Wagen: Ein Lübeckisches Jahrbuch* (1952-1953): 171-175. It is unclear whether this speech was actually delivered or only published as a written work.
171. In 1956, the number of members was just over 4000. StAHH, 731-8 Zeitungsausschnittsammlung (A 507 Verein geborener Hamburger), "60 Jahre 'Verein geborener Hamburger: Alte Zeit treu gewahrt/Dem Neuen aufgeschlossen,'" *Hamburger Anzeiger*, January 4, 1957.
172. The society had a parallel women's group that was largely inactive. Female youth were allowed to be in the youth group until age 30. With the truest of *Hanseaten* seen as the entrepreneur, women, often ascribed domestic, roles did not quite fit the bill. Their society publication agreed with the claim of one local writer that Hamburg was a "manly city." It jokingly followed by arguing that for this reason, Hamburger women preferred not to live anywhere else. "Hamburg - Tor zur Welt," *Vün Düt un Dat un Allerwat ut Hamborg, Verein geborener Hamburger e.V.* 68, no.7 (July 1965): 11; "Tradition und Gegenwart: 60. Stiftungsfest des Vereins geborener Hamburger - Ehrung der Jubilare," *Monatschrift: Verein geborener Hamburger e.V.* 60, no.3 (April 1957): 1; "Unser 70 jähriges Vereins - ABC," *Vün Düt un Dat un Allerwat ut Hamborg, Verein geborener Hamburger e.V.* (February 1967): 4.
173. In turn, elite local traditions, like the *Schäfermahlzeit* in Bremen, which for centuries has brought together the city's elite tradesman has, even in the contemporary city, excluded women.
174. The term "Quiddje" or "Quittje" is, according to a dictionary of Hamburger dialect, a "half joking" "half mocking" term for non-Hamburger or those who have recently moved to the city. The word's origin is unknown, though the first documented appearance is in 1865. Daniel Tilger, *Kleines Lexikon Hamburger Begriffe* (Hamburg: Ellert & Richter, 2004), 121.
175. Joining the society required sponsorship from an existing member, investigation of one's birth place, and publication of one's name in the society newsletter to permit society-wide scrutiny. The leadership also preferred that members speak local dialect. No similar societies (which exclude non-natives) can be found in other Hanseatic cities,

Cologne, or the German Southwest. "Liste der im März 1958 zur Aufnahme vorgeschlagenen Hamburger," *Monatschrift: Verein geborener Hamburger e.V.* 61 (April 1958): 6. Unser 70 jähriges Vereins - ABC," *Vün Düt un Dat un Allerwat ut Hamborg, Verein geborener Hamburger e.V.* (May 1967): 4.

176. The society president held that circulation of their publication was meant to represent their views to "Hamburger by choice," ensuring that the views of native Hamburger find their "due recognition." Adolf Heitmann, "Die Bedeutung unserer Zeitschrift," *Monatschrift: Verein geborener Hamburger e.V.* 60, no.10 (November 1957): 1.

177. "Heimotleev mut lüchten as 'ne hevenshoge Flamm...," *Vün Düt un Dat un Allerwat ut Hamborg, Verein geborener Hamburger e.V.* (September 1961): 5.

178. StAHH, 731-8, Zeitungsausschnittsammlung (A 507 Verein geborener Hamburger), "Hamburgisches Wesen muß bewahrt bleiben: 'Verein geborener Hamburger' wird morgen sechzig Jahre alt," *Hamburger Abendblatt* January 11, 1957.

179. "Hamburgs Eigenart wahren," *Monatschrift Verein geborener Hamburger e.V.* 61 (April 1958): 7.

180. "Unser 70 jähriges Vereins - ABC," *Vün Düt un Dat un Allerwat ut Hamborg, Verein geborener Hamburger e.V.* (April 1967): 4; Dr. Adolf Heitmann, "Hamburg als Freie und Hansestadt," *Vün Düt un Dat un Allerwat ut Hamborg, Verein geborener Hamburger e.V.* 66, no.1 (January 1963): 1-2.

181. In 1954, for example, society heads reported that 420 people had been proposed as members, 62 of whom withdrew their applications (likely pre-emptively due to their ineligibility), with two others whose applications were officially declined after being found not to have been born in Hamburg. Untitled article, *Verein geborener Hamburger e.V., Mitteilungen für die Mitglieder*, 58, no.1 (January 1955): 2.

182. StAHH, 731-8, Zeitungsausschnittsammlung (A 507 Verein geborener Hamburger), "Hamburgisches Wesen muß bewahrt bleiben: 'Verein geborener Hamburger' wird morgen sechzig Jahre alt," *Hamburger Abendblatt* January 11, 1957.

183. StAHH, 731-8, Zeitungsausschnittsammlung (A 507 Verein geborener Hamburger), "Verein der Hamburger kämpft ums überleben: Nur noch 300 Mitglieder kümmern sich um die Pflege hanseatischer Traditionen," *Hanse Journal* 3, no.7, (November, 10 2007). The contemporary society has gone into significant decline.

184. Prüser, 229-232.

185. Prüser, 234-257. "Es ist ein Prüfstein eines jeden echten lebenden und zukunftsreichen Gemeinwesen, daß es von außen kommende Menschen in seinen Bann zieht und ihnen seine Züge ein- und aufprägt, ohne sie ihrer mitgebrachten Eigenart ganz zu entkleiden."

186. Prüser, 226.

187. Emphasis in original. Röthel also links the idea of Hanseatic urbanity with Hanseatic tolerance. He repeats his central notion of the Hanseat as a form of German cosmopolitanism throughout his work. Röthel, 10-12, 324. This idea of Hanseatic cosmopolitanism has significant prewar precedence, as illustrated in such writings as those of Gerhard Heile, who, looking to Hamburg, argued that it was the "cosmopolitan achievement of the Germans." See Gerhard Heile, "Unsere Hamburg" (1911), in Meyer-Marwitz, ed., 26.

188. This type of "Engländererei" in reference to Hamburg did have much deeper roots, going back to the early nineteenth-century, but it gained in prominence and new meaning after 1945. Bremen was, on occasion, identified for its American or Dutch flavor, while Lübeck was often defined by its Scandinavian nature. At the same time, localism in earlier periods also saw emphasis of the cities Germanness, such as one nineteenth-century Lübecker song which declared the city to be "the most German of all cities." "Heil Lübeck," *Vaterstädtische Blätter: Altes und Neues aus Lübeck: Unterhaltungsblatt der Lübeckischen Anzeiger* 8 (Feb 27, 1898).

189. "Lübeck: Deutschlands älteste Republik," *Vaterstädtische Blätter* 4, no.4 (April 1956): 2.

190. Hans Wittmack, "Deutsche Zukunft aus hansischem Geist," *Vaterstädtische Blätter*, 16, no.6 (June 1965): 1.

191. Hans Wittmack, "Gemeinschaft verpflichtet," *Vaterstädtische Blätter* 7, no.1 (January 1956): 6; "Abwehr des Bolschewismus und politische Toleranz," *Vaterstädtische Blätter* 4, no.4 (April 1953): 4. Wittmack contextualizes this need for political tolerance against the foil of Bolshevism, arguing that the central question of their new democracy is "political tolerance." Wittmack argued that within Heimat, political tolerance is exercised by



facilitating a view of people as human individuals rather than as figures with interests to be “dealt with.”

192. This sentiment was particularly aimed at accusations that Lübecker were behaving as separatist in their attempts for federal statehood. He emphasizes here that the turn toward Heimat is neither in contradiction to national identity or maintaining broader horizons. “Vaterstadt und Vaterland,” *Vaterstädtische Blätter* 12, no.8 (August 1961): 2.

193. The article also praises how they will now be building ships for peaceful commerce in their harbor rather than war ships. Georg Zimmermann, “Alle Gedanken gehen zum Hafen,” *Hamburger Journal: Monatsschrift des Hamburgischen Lebens* 1, no.1 (December 1953): 10-12.

194. Max Brauer, “Überseetag 1950: Rede anlässlich des Überseetages und des Besuches des französischen Hohen Kommissars Francois-Poncet in Hamburg am 6 Mai 1950,” in Max Brauer, *Nüchternen Sinnes*, 107-109.

195. He further argued for the Overseas Day as a time of reflection on their independence and historic freedom from absolutism. “Ansprache zum Überseetag auf dem Werftgelände von Blohm & Voß am 7. Mai 1952,” in Max Brauer, *Nüchternen Sinnes*, 241-243.

196. StAHB, 7/97 - Kaisen, Wilhelm, Nr.5, vol.5 (1954), Bürgermeister Wilhelm Kaisen Pressebeitrag: “Die weltoffene Hansestadt Bremen.”

197. StAHB, 7/97 Kaisen, Wilhelm, Nr.1, vol.1 (1949-1950), Speech delivered in the presence of the German Federal President.

198. Theodor Spitta, Letter to Herrn Staatssekretär Dr. Karl Carstens, Auswärtiges Amt, 15 June, 1961, in Spitta, *Keine Rücksicht*, 138.

199. Kurt Sieveking, “Hansische Aufgaben Heute - von Aussen Gesehen: Vortrag, gehalten am 21 November 1954 vor der Evangelischen Akademie Loccum,” in eds. Weber, Schultze-Schlutius, and Güssefeld, 57-63.

200. Herbert Weichmann, “Erklärung vor der Bürgerschaft am 16 Juni 1965,” “Zur Eröffnung des Hamburg Centrums am 20. September 1966,” “Zur Matthiae-Mahlzeit im Rathaus am 23 Februar 1968,” “Das Liberale Hamburg: Senatsfrühstück aus Anlaß der Konferenz der FDP-Landtagsfraktionsvorsitzenden im Rathaus am 14. Januar 1966,” “Auf dem Boden der Demokratie: Senatsempfang zum Antrittsbesuch des sowjetischen Botschafters S.K. Zarakin im Rathaus am 5. April 1967,” in Herbert Weichmann, *Von Freiheit und Pflicht: Auszüge aus Reden des Bürgermeisters der Freien und Hansestadt Hamburg*, ed. Paul O. Vogel (Hamburg: Hans Christians, 1969), 7, 82, 98, 112-113, 123, 154, 181. In a speech in front of the Soviet ambassador, Weichmann emphasized the return to Hamburger democratic traditions as a repudiation of the Third Reich.

201. Nora Räthzel and Ülkü Sarica, *Migration und Diskriminierung in der Arbeit: Das Beispiel Hamburg* (Hamburg Argument, 1994), 23.

202. Rolf Italiaander, *Vielvölkerstadt: Hamburg und seine Nationalitäten* (Düsseldorf: Droste, 1986); Hans-Dieter Loose, “Vor der Geschichte besser dastehen,” in *Ibid*, 7-12.

203. Wolfgang Voigt and Klaus Weinrich, eds., *Hamburg ahoi: Der Schwule Lotse durch die Hansestadt* (Berlin: Rosa Winkel, 1981), 3, 6.

204. AHL, 05.4-085, Verein für Heimatschutz, Nr.9, Stier, “Jahresbericht 1958/1959,” and “Jahresbericht 1960/61.”

205. In closing, they cited declining and aging membership, though they argued that the society dissolved because it “achieved its goals” and was thus no longer needed. AHL, 05.4-085, Verein für Heimatschutz, Nr.9, Jahresbericht 1963/64, 1965/66. AHL, 05.4-085, Verein für Heimatschutz, Nr.7, Leaflet: Stier, “Verein für Heimatschutz,” 1978.

206. Hans Wittmack argued that, while the society still had a healthy number of members, the developments could not continue without serious consequences. He viewed them as the result of the triumph of political parties in gaining a monopoly on politics. Hans Wittmack, “Demokratie - unter uns,” *Vaterstädtische Blätter* 7 (1956): 2; Hans Wittmack, “Die ‘Vaterstädtische’ am Scheidewege,” *Vaterstädtische Blätter*, 17, no.4/5 (April/May 1966): 1.

207. For emphasis in the late 1960's on Hanseatic Heimat enthusiasm as buttressing European unity, see “Freie Gemeinden in einem bundesstaatlichen Europa!,” *Vaterstädtische Blätter* 18, nr.10/11 (October/November 1967): 1.

208. Carl J. Burckhardt, “Heimat,” *Lübeckische Blätter* 170, no.15 (October 5, 1957): 182-185.

## Chapter IV

1. Die ideellen Kräfte, welche die Beschäftigung mit der Heimat uns gibt, sind heute beim Zusammenbruch so vieler anderer Grundlagen wertvoller, als sie es in ruhigen Tagen je gewesen wären. Otto Feger, *Konstanz: Aus der Vergangenheit einer alten Stadt* (Konstanz: Curt Weller, 1947), 11
2. Max Picard, *Hitler in uns Selbst* (Zürich: Eugen Rentsch, 1946). 262.
3. Stadtarchiv Mannheim, NL Hermann Heimerich, Zug. 24/1972, 176; Theodor Pfizer "Der Oberbürgermeister zur Volksbefragung," (Ulm, September 1950) both reproduced in *Mannem Vorne: Erst Recht im Südweststaat*, Stadtarchiv Mannheim [CD-ROM], eds., Ulrich Niess and Barbara Wilderotter (Mannheim: Stadtarchiv Mannheim, 2002).
4. Merian described the Swabian region as extending from the river Lech to Lake Constance, the Alps, and Alsace. Among the long list of Swabian cities whose "hearts" he recounted took them out of the region, were both Heidelberg and Freiburg. After the disappearance of the tribal duchy, the defensive Swabian *Reichskreis* did aid in keeping the idea of the region alive. Matthaeus Merian, *Topographia Suevia*, ed. Lucas Heinrich Wüthrich, (Kassel: Bärenreiter, [1663] 1960) 1, 227.
5. Attempts to redraw the German federal map in the 1920s, including proposals to unify the Southwest into a single state, made little headway. Jürgen Klöckler, "Reichsreformdiskussion, Großschwabenpläne und Alemannentum im Spiegel der südwestdeutschen Publizistik der frühen Weimarer Republik: 'Der Schwäbische Bund,' 1919-1922," *Zeitschrift für Württembergische Landesgeschichte* 60 (2001): 271-315.
6. Leo Wohleb, "Rede vor den Delegierten der Landestagung der Badischen Christlich-Sozialen Volkspartei," February 24, 1946, reprinted in Leo Wohleb, *Humanist und Politiker: Leo Wohleb, der Letzte Staatspräsident des Landes Baden*, eds. Paul Ludwig-Weinacht and Hans Maier (Heidelberg: F.H. Kerle, 1969), 171.
7. StAF C 5/1 Nr. 5667, Leo Wohleb, "Vom Odenwald zum Bodensee."
8. StAF T1 Leo Wohleb Nr.42, Letter Elsa Bechberger (Messkirch) to Leo Wohleb, September 26, 1950.
9. StAF T1 Leo Wohleb Nr.64, Letter Ella Gorski (Heidelberg) to Leo Wohleb, November 22, 1949.
10. Frank Pfetsch, "Zur Verfassung des Landes Baden im Mai 1947," in *Gelb-Rot-Gelbe Regierungsjahre, Badische Politik nach 1945: Gedenkschrift zum 100. Geburtstag Leo Wohlebs (1888-1955)*, ed. Paul-Ludwig Weinacht (Sigmaringendorf: Glock und Lutz, 1988), 135.
11. StAF T1 Leo Wohleb Nr. 65, Conrad Archbishop of Freiburg, "Fastenhirtenbrief 1946," 3-5, 24.
12. Otto Feger, *Schwäbisch-Alemannische Demokratie: Aufruf und Programm* (Konstanz: Curt Weller, 1946), 50-51, 64-65.
13. Jürgen Klöckler, *Das Land der Alemannen: Pläne für einen Heimatstaat im Bodenseeraum nach 1945* (Konstanz: Universitätsverlag Konstanz, 1999), 44; Jürgen Klöckler, "Stammesföderalistische Konzepte zu Grenzziehung und Staatsbildung nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg – Der Ortsverband Singen und der Landschaftsverband Hegau des 'Schwäbisch-Alemannischen Heimatbundes,'" *Hegau: Zeitschrift für Geschichte, Volkskunde und Naturgeschichte des Gebietes zwischen Rhein, Donau und Bodensee* 58 (2001): 203-224, here 207.
14. Feger, *Schwäbisch-Alemannische Demokratie*, 8, 25-27, 131-132, 138.
15. Otto Borst, "In memoriam Otto Feger," *Jahrbuch für Geschichte der Oberdeutschen Reichsstädte* 14 (1968): 180-182.
16. Feger, *Schwäbisch-Alemannische Demokratie*, 7.
17. Their policy of decentralization did run into a snag given certain administrative imperatives and some voices among the French occupiers who viewed greater centralization in their zone more positively. Charles de Gaulle, however, forcefully supported decentralization in Germany based on French fears of a strong central German state. Henning Köhler, *Das Ende Preussens in Französischer Sicht* (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1982); Edgar Wolfrum, "Französische und Deutsche Neugliederungspläne für Südwestdeutschland 1945/46," *Zeitschrift für die Geschichte des Oberrheins* 137 (1989): 428-452.

18. Feger, *Schwäbisch-Alemannische Demokratie*, 12-22, 35-43.
19. Hans Fenske, *Der liberale Südwesten. Freiheitliche demokratische Traditionen in Baden und Württemberg 1790-1933* (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1981); Dieter Langewiesche, *Liberalismus und Demokratie in Württemberg zwischen Revolution und Reichsgründung* (Düsseldorf: Droste, 1974). Some contemporary historians have also pointed to the history of fragmented local communes as the roots of a proto-democracy, see in particular Peter Blickle, *Obedient Germans? A Rebuttal: A New View of German History*, trans. Thomas Brady (Charlottesville, VA: University Press of Virginia, 1997).
20. Feger could only get to these disparities by adding in nationalist parties. Considering votes for the Nazis alone reveals only slight lower voting for the Nazis in Württemberg, with Baden around average, and in some elections, one or two points above the national average. For regional voting returns, see Willi Boelcke, *Handbuch Baden-Württemberg: Politik, Wirtschaft, Kultur von der Urgeschichte bis zur Gegenwart* (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1982), 258; Feger, *Schwäbisch-Alemannische Demokratie*, 9, 27-30, 55-62, 71 - 75, 277. Feger's emphasis on the memory of the Holy Roman Empire as representing an imperial idea rooted in the dispersion of power is not far beyond the realm of possible interpretations. The historian John Gagliardo has also advanced a thesis on the Holy Roman Empire in which he argues that it was viewed by many constitutional thinkers of its time as a guardian of regional and local dispersion of power. John Gagliardo, *Reich and Nation: The Holy Roman Empire as Idea and Reality, 1763-1806* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1980).
21. Feger, *Schwäbisch-Alemannische Demokratie*, 106, 118, 127-128, 158-183, 218.
22. Feger, *Schwäbisch-Alemannische Demokratie*, 15, 31-35, 145, 156-157. As Feger wrote in response to a prospective author of a Swabian-Alemannic history in 1947, the author's inclusion of Alsace was correct, though he advised against asserting this in writing so as not to give the French occupiers the wrong impression. Stadtarchiv Konstanz (hereafter SK), S XVIII, Nr. 101, Letter from Studienrat Adolf Fehrle (Münsingen) to the Curt Weller & Co Verlag, July 23, 1947; Letter from Otto Feger to Adolf Fehrle, August 2, 1947.
23. Feger, *Schwäbisch-Alemannische Demokratie*, 82-84, 93 - 94, 210-213, 227-229.
24. Feger, *Schwäbisch-Alemannische Demokratie*, 11-12, 23 - 27, 50, 84-92, 144-153.
25. Feger, *Schwäbisch-Alemannische Demokratie*, 11-12, 23 - 27, 50, 84-92, 144-153. After the establishment of the Swiss Confederation in 1499, southern Alemannic areas (present-day Switzerland) would increasingly be seen as a separate region, and, as Thomas Brady has shown, there was a fear that other localities in the southern and central German lands would break from the feudal system and turn Swiss. Thomas Brady, *Turning Swiss: Cities and Empire, 1450-1550* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985). Throughout the early modern period, ideas of regional belonging became increasingly fuzzy. In 1512, Johannes Cochlaeus defined Switzerland as a separate *Stamm* and included not only Basel, but also Freiburg as Swiss. In Konstanz, as one sixteenth-century chronologist recounted, locals did not clearly identify as Swabian, Thurgauer, or Swiss, and only wanted to be "Constanztzer." Johannes Cochlaeus, *Brevis Germanie Descriptio*, ed. and trans. Karl Langosch (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, [1512] 1976) 67, 95.; Fabio Crivellari, et al., *Baden am Scheideweg: Konstanz und die Gründung des Südweststaats* (Konstanz: UVK, 2002), 12.
26. Feger was sent the work to review. Though his book was never published, the author wrote how it was inspired by Feger's book. SK, SXVIII, Nr. 101, Letter from Studienrat Adolf Fehrle (Münsingen) to the Curt Weller & Co Verlag, July 23, 1947; Letter from Otto Feger to Adolf Fehrle, August 2, 1947.
27. SK, SXVIII, Nr. 107, Letter from Dr. Franz Beyerle to Otto Feger, September 30, 1946.
28. Karl S. Bader, "Tagebuch, Juli 1945-Juli 1946," in *Gelb-Rot-Gelbe Regierungsjahre*, 60, 71; Karl S. Bader, "Badens Geschichte und Kultur," in *Baden als Bundesland: Denkschrift des Heimatbundes Badenerland an den Sachverständigen-Ausschuß für die Neugliederung des Bundesgebiets*, 25. February, 1955, ed. Heimatbund Badenerland (Waldkirch: Waldkircher Verlag, 1955), 8.
29. Dietrich held that the confederation would have a customs union with Switzerland and France. The state would be rooted in southern German Catholicism. Jürgen Klöckler, *Abendland - Alpenland - Alemannien: Frankreich und die Neugliederungsdiskussion in Südwestdeutschland 1945-1947* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1998), 1, 127-130.

- 30.StAF T1 Leo Wohleb, Nr.53, Bernhard Dietrich, "Singener Manifest der Autonomen Föderalisten," 8-10 October, 1947.
- 31.StAF C 5/1, Nr.2749 "Programmatisches Manifest des Schwäbisch-Alemannischen Heimat-Bundes" (1946); Bernhard Dietrich, "Warum Heimatbund und was will er?"
- 32.Feger, *Schwäbisch-Alemannische Demokratie*, 138 - 142.
- 33.StAF C 5/1, Nr. 2749, Bernhard Dietrich, "Warum Heimatbund und was will er?"
- 34.For more on use of biological metaphors to reject Nazi as a sickness, see Jennifer Kapczynski, *The German Patient: Crisis and Recovery in Postwar Culture* (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2008).
- 35.StAF C 5/1, Nr. 2749, Bernhard Dietrich, "Warum Heimatbund und was will er?"; "Programmatisches Manifest des Schwäbisch-Alemannischen Heimat-Bundes" (1946); Feger, *Schwäbisch-Alemannische Demokratie*, 128, 206-211. Despite clarification that citizenship would in no way be based on race, opponents of their proposals, like Badenese president Leo Wohleb, accused them of shaping a citizenship policy reminiscent of Nazi "blood and earth" ideas. StAF T1 Leo Wohleb, Nr.31, Letter to the Schwäbisch-Alemannischer Heimatbund, September 2, 1946.
- 36.StAF C 5/1, Nr.2749 "Programmatisches Manifest des Schwäbisch-Alemannischen Heimat-Bundes" (1946); Bernhard Dietrich, Pamphlet: "Separatisten" (1946), 15; Feger, *Schwäbisch-Alemannische Demokratie*, 53, 58, 200.
- 37.Feger, *Schwäbisch-Alemannische Demokratie*, 135-136.
- 38.StAF C 5/1, Nr.2749, Bernhard Dietrich, Pamphlet: "Separatisten" (1946); "Warum beschäftigen wir uns mit Fragen staatlicher Neugestaltung?." Klöckler, *Abendland - Alpenland - Alemannien*, 163-164, 257-261; Klöckler, "Stammesföderalistische Konzept," 204, 223. South Baden, which investigated the Heimatbund for illegal separatist activities, decided they did not have enough membership to threaten the government. The Baden Ministry of the Interior therefore advised that a legal case not be brought against them. The investigation was likely initiated by Leo Wohleb. StAF C 5/1, Nr.2749, Badische Ministerium des Innern, "Förmliche Anfrage Nr.36 der demokratischen Partei vom 10. Dezember vorigen Jahres."
- 39."Die Beratung im Bundestag über den Entwurf eines zweiten Gesetzes zur Neugliederung am 18-19.4.1951," in Institut für Staatslehre und Politik e.V. in Mainz, ed., 179.
- 40.Leo Wohleb attacked Feger by blocking him from presenting an invited lecture on an unrelated historical topic at the University of Freiburg. Feger defended himself, appealing to the CDU to reign in Wohleb, insisting on his rights to free speech, and subtly threatening to go to the press. StAF C 25/3, Nr.205. Letter, Prof. Dr. H. Bobek to Otto Feger, December 1, 1947; Letter from the Mayor of Konstanz Franz Knapp to Leo Wohleb, December 4, 1947; Letter Otto Feger to the Head of the Landtagsfraktion der CDU Baden, March 1, 1948.
- 41.His work further emphasized Konstanz's rich constitutional history to promote a localist democratic identity. Feger, *Konstanz*, 10-12, 75-109.
- 42.Paul-Ludwig Weinacht, "Auf den Geburtstagstisch des Landes – zum Vierzigsten!," in *Der Überspielte Volkswille: die Badener im südwestdeutschen Neugliederungsgeschehen (1945-1970); Fakten und Dokumente*, ed. Robert Albiez (Karlsruhe: Braun, 1992), 18.
- 43.Wilhelm Heinrich Riehl, *The Natural History of the German People*, ed and trans. David J. Diephouse (Lampeter: Edwin Mellen, 1990), 110-111. For more on dynastic states attempt to shape regional identities for their new states, see Abigail Green, *Fatherlands: State-Building and Nationhood in Nineteenth-Century Germany* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001) and Siegfried Weichlein, *Nation und Region: Integrationsprozesse im Bismarckreich* (Düsseldorf: Droste, 2004).
- 44."Die Beratung im Bundestag über den Entwurf eines zweiten Gesetzes zur Neugliederung am 18. 19.4.1951," in *Kampf um den Südweststaat: Verhandlungen und Beschlüsse der gesetzgebenden Körperschaften des Bundes und des Bundesverfassungsgerichtes*, ed. Institut für Staatslehre und Politik e.V. in Mainz (Munich: Isar, 1952), 190-194.
- 45."Proklamation der Militärregierung in Deutschland vom 19. September 1945," in Institut für Staatslehre und Politik e.V. in Mainz, ed., 1.
- 46."Artikel 118 des Bonner Grundgesetzes," in Albiez, ed., 330.

47. Paul-Ludwig Weinacht, "Auf den Geburtstagstisch des Landes – zum Vierzigsten!," in Albiez, ed., 12.
48. The Southwest state working committee was funded mostly by industry and the Württemberg-Baden government. It is unclear how the Baden working committee was funded, but their funds likely came through membership fees in regionalists groups and private donations. Carola Bury, *Der Volkentscheid in Baden: die 'Arbeitsgemeinschaft der Badener' und die 'Arbeitsgemeinschaft für die Vereinigung Baden-Württemberg: ' eine Beitrag zu den Auseinandersetzungen um die Bildung des Landes Baden-Württemberg* (Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 1985), 83-86.
49. A Badenese finance minister argued in a letter to the head of the CDU that those leading the Pro-Badener were more concerned with "personal advantage" than "Heimat." StAF T1 Leo Wohleb Nr. 44, Letter from Edmund Kaufmann, Finanzminister to the Landevorsitzenden der badischen CDU and Mayor Fridolin Heurich.
50. StAF T1 Wohleb Nr.94, Letter from Max Picard to Leo Wohleb, May 26, 1952, reproduced in *Dokumente zur Entstehung des Südweststaats: 50 Jahre Baden-Württemberg* [CD-ROM], ed. Staatliche Archivverwaltung Baden-Württemberg (Stuttgart: Landesarchivdirektion Baden-Württemberg, 2002).
51. StAF T1 Leo Wohleb Nr.44, Letter from Ludwig Birk (Heidelberg) to Leo Wohleb, August 14, 1948.
52. StAF T1 Leo Wohleb Nr. 46, "Umfrage über Südwestdeutschen Staat," (1949) Frage 2, Antwort Nein, (Südbaden), 3; Frage 4, Antwort Ja, (Südbaden).
53. StAF T1 Leo Wohleb Nr.82, Letter from Edith Leiner (Bund der Badener) to Leo Wohleb, May 6, 1950.
54. BArch B 144 Nr.253, Walter von Cube, "Um die Selbständigkeit es Landes Baden: Vortrag vor dem Badischen Hilfsverein in München, am 1. Juli 1951," Published by Landesverband der Arbeitsgemeinschaft der Badener e.V. Karlsruhe circulatory "Vom See bis an des Maines Strand."
55. StAF T1 Leo Wohleb Nr.33, "Rundfunk Band," 1-3. The radio station and name of the speaker is not listed, though, as the address can be found in the papers of Leo Wohleb, it is likely that Wohleb himself was the speaker.
56. Hauptstaatsarchiv Stuttgart, (Hereafter HSAS) Q 1/35 Bü 333, Hans Haupt (Stuttgart), "Zur Volksabstimmung" program in the Süddeutscher Rundfunk, December 4, 1951.
57. StAF T1 Leo Wohleb Nr. 66, Letter Leo Wohleb to G.W. Hank, October 17, 1951; T1 Leo Wohleb Nr.77, Letter Lisa Kitt (Überlingen) to Leo Wohleb, December 11, 1951; T1 Leo Wohleb Nr. 79, Julius Kränzle "Treue zum Badner Land!" sent to Wohleb; T1 Leo Wohleb Nr.77, "Hoch Badnerland!" Heimat song composed 1950 by Joseph Kleibrink and mailed to Wohleb; T1 Leo Wohleb Nr.125, Letter and Heimat song, Frau N.N. to Leo Wohleb, March 3, 1953; "Die staatsrechtliche Neugestaltung Westdeutschlands," *Badischen Tagblattes*, Weihnachtsausgabe, Nr.121, 1948 reprinted in *Leo Wohleb - der andere politische Kurs: Dokumente und Kommentare*, ed. Paul-Ludwig Weinacht (Freiburg: Rombach, 1975), 48-50. StAF C 5/1 Nr. 5667, Leo Wohleb, "Vom Odenwald zum Bodensee."
58. StAF T1 Leo Wohleb Nr. 48, Letter from Franz Bücher to Leo Wohleb, December 10, 1951.
59. StAF T1 Leo Wohleb Nr.63, G. Sch., "Lass't Jene 'Schwaben' uns 'Bad'ner' sein!"
60. "...nur noch Deutsche," *Vaterstädtische Blätter* 7, no.12 (December 1956): 4.
61. Carola Bury notes this, and the contrasting emphasis on a private Heimat idea among Southwest staters, in her *Magisterarbeit* on the competing working committees. Bury, 134, 168-169.
62. Karl Glunk, "Wenn's um's Recht goht - Chronik der letzten Dekade," in Albiez, ed., 299.
63. Stadtarchiv Mannheim, Plakatsammlung Nr. 1580, Poster, Heimatbund Badenerland, "Volksbegehren," September 1951 reproduced in Niess and Wilderotter, eds., [CD-ROM]. Staatsarchiv Sigmaringen Wü 2 T 1 Nr 237, Postcard, "Der Heimat die Treue, Baden der Stimme," reproduced in Staatliche Archivverwaltung Baden-Württemberg, ed, [CD-ROM].
64. Leo Wohleb, "Das Land Baden," *Rheinischer Merkur*, December 7, 1951.
65. HSAS 1/35 Bü 819, "Baden: Geschichte, Verwaltung, Kultur, Wirtschaft: Denkschrift der Badischen Landesregierung 1949," Zweite erweiterte Auflage, 33, 41. The statement drudged up memories of unitarian efforts to unify Baden and Württemberg during the Weimar Republic.
66. HSAS Q 1/39 Bü 19D, "Wohleb zur Südweststaat-Frage, Sendung 20.9.1950."

- 67.StAF T1 Leo Wohleb Nr.692, "Föderalistentag in Karlsruhe," *Südwestpresse* September 1951, 6.
- 68.HSAS Q 1/22 Bü 216, "Die Vorsitzenden der politischen Parteien in Bayern," *Stimme der Pfalz* 7, Nr.1 (January 1956): 7.
- 69.StAF T1 Leo Wohleb Nr. 65, Franz J. Guth (Regensburg) Letter to Leo Wohleb, September 4, 1951; C 5/1 Nr. 5667, Letter from Gert Wenninger to Leo Wohleb, December 17, 1951.
- 70.Vollert fiercely opposed Bavarian Swabia remaining with Bavaria, arguing that the Bavarian state was the model of internal centralization. Ernst Vollert, *Nie Wieder München* (Augsburg: Schwäbischen Arbeitskreis, 1949).
- 71.StAF T1 Leo Wohleb Nr.58, Letter Hanns Adam Faerber to Leo Wohleb, October 27, 1951.
- 72.Stadtarchiv Mannheim, Plakat Nr. 554, "Hände weg von Baden" reproduced in Niess and Wilderotter, eds., [CD-ROM].
- 73.Jörg Drews, "'...bewundert viel und viel gescholten...:' Hermann Hesses Werk zwischen Erfolg und Mißachtung bei Publikum und Literaturkritik," in *Hermann Hesse Heute*, eds. Ingo Cornils and Osman Durrani (New York, NY: Rodopi, 2005), 15.
- 74.HSAS 1/35 Bü 819, Generalsekretariat der Arbeitsgemeinschaft für die Vereinigung Baden-Württemberg, Freiburg-Heidelberg, eds., *Südweststaat-Fibel: Zur Staatlichen Neuordnung im südwestdeutschen Raum* (Konstanz: Verlagsanstalt Merk & Co, 1951), 21-22.
- 75.HSAS, EA 1/106 Bü 183, "Der Südweststaat – eine deutsche Frage: Rede von Ministerpräsident Dr. Reinhold Maier anlässlich der Volksabstimmung vom 9. Dezember 1951," 19-20; "'Unsere Heimat bleibt unsere Heimat.' Dr. Maier: Badener und Württemberger können zusammenleben," *Stuttgarter Nachrichten*, November 26, 1951. In his 1966 memoirs, Maier repeated these views of politicizing Heimat as often entailing abuse of the concept. Reinhold Maier, *Erinnerungen 1948-1953* (Tübingen: Rainer Wunderlich Verlag, 1966), 84.
- 76.StAF C 5/1, Nr.5667, J.P. Brandenburg, Oberbürgermeister von Pforzheim, "Aufruf an die Bevölkerung der Stadt Pforzheim und ihre Umgebung."
- 77.HSAS Q 1/35 Bü 334, Staatspräsident Dr. Gebhard Müller, "Ein Wort zur Abstimmung," September 8, 1951.
- 78.StAF W 134, Nr. 19355, Image: Straßenbahnwagen mit Südwestsstaat-Werbung in Freiburg, December 1951, reproduced in Staatliche Archivverwaltung Baden-Württemberg, ed.[CD-ROM]; Stadtarchiv Mannheim, Plakatsammlung Nr.3269, Poster, "Öffentliche Versammlung in Sandhofen," September 15, 1951 reproduced in Niess and Wilderotter, eds., [CD-ROM].
- 79.StAF T1 Leo Wohleb Nr. 77, Joseph Kleibrink, "Hoch Badnerland!," Reim und Volksweise (1950).
- 80.StAF T1 Leo Wohleb Nr.79, Julius Kränzle, Ebersteinburg, "Treue zum Badner Land!"
- 81.StAF C 5/1 Nr. 5667, Leo Wohleb, "Vom Odenwald zum Bodensee."
- 82.Stadtarchiv Mannheim, Plakatsammlung Nr. 557, Poster, "Mannem Vorne, erst Recht im Südweststaat," reproduced in Niess and Wilderotter, eds., [CD-ROM].
- 83.Mannheim was offered as evidence, as it was a north Badenese city that was already unified in a common state with North Württemberg. Stadtarchiv Mannheim, Plakatsammlung Nr. 556, "Im Südweststaat, Stuttgart vorne, Mannem hinne!" reproduced in Niess and Wilderotter, eds., [CD-ROM].
- 84.HSAS Q 1/35 Bü 317, Gebhard Müller, "Der Südweststaat as psychologisches Problem," 5; StAF W 110/2 Nr.0210, Poster for "Tag der Heimat," July 15, 1951; Staatsarchiv Sigmaringen Wü 2 T 1 Nr 237, Postcard, "Der Heimat die Treue, Baden der Stimme," reproduced in Staatliche Archivverwaltung Baden-Württemberg, ed. [CD-ROM]; Bury, 68; Uwe Uffelmann, *Identitätsstiftung in Südwestdeutschland: Antworten auf politische Grenzziehung nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg* (Idstein: Schulz-Kirchner, 1996), 50; Theodor Eschenburg [published anonymously], *Baden 1945-1951 was nicht in der Zeitung Steht* (Darmstadt: Friedrich Vorwerk, 1951), 71.
- 85."1. Wahlperiode - 4. Sitzungsperiode - 17. Sitzung, Mittwoch, den 5. September 1951, Kaufhaussaal zu Freiburg im Breisgau," *Verhandlungen des Badischen Landtags* (1951): 29-30.

- 86.HSAS 1/35 Bü 819, Generalsekretariat der Arbeitsgemeinschaft für die Vereinigung Baden-Württemberg, Freiburg-Heidelberg, eds., *Südweststaat-Fibel: Zur Staatlichen Neuordnung im südwestdeutschen Raum* (Konstanz: Verlagsanstalt Merk & Co, 1951), 41.
- 87.StAF T1 Leo Wohleb Nr.46, "Umfrage über Südwestdeutschen Staat" (1949), Frage 2, Antwort Ja, 5-6 & Frage 2, Antwort Unentschieden, 2; Frage 4, Antwort Nein, 1.
- 88.HSAS Q 1/35 Bü 287, Karl Freudenberg, "Warum Südweststaat?," *Stuttgarter Zeitung*, December 1, 1951.
- 89.A 1959 poll by the Allensbach institute reported that 40% of citizens in the Southwest saw *Kleinstaaterei* as having no place in an era of European unification. Among Southwest state supporters, this went up to 61% and plummeted among pro-Badener to 15% among supporters of Baden. When the question was asked differently, 28% held this position against *Kleinstaaterei*, 50% among Southwest state supporters, and 8% among Baden supporters. HSAS 1/35 Bü 819, Institut für Demoskopie Allensbach, *Die Stimmung in Baden: Gutachten über Stärke und Motive der altpadischen Bewegung*, 1959 (vertraulich), 15, 17.
- 90.StAF T1 Leo Wohleb Nr.18, "Warum wollen wir den Südweststaat," Pro-Southwest booklet; "Flugschrift von Anton Schwan vom August 1950" (Stadtarchiv Sigmaringen, Wü 2, Nr. 260, Q 36) reprinted in Uffelmann, 143-144.
- 91.Stadtarchiv Mannheim, Plakatsammlung, Nr.3274 & Nr.3275, "Südweststaat," reproduced in Niess and Wilderrotter, eds., [CD-ROM].
- 92.StAF T1 Leo Wohleb Nr.65, "Badische Nachbarschaft: Ist Wohleb ein Separatist?," October 1, 1948 (Zeitungsausschnitt), publication source not given.
- 93.HSAS, EA 1/106 Bü 183, Landesverband der Arbeitsgemeinschaft der Badener, "An alle Haushaltungen! Baden oder Südweststaat." Southwest state supporters like Württemberg-Hohenzollern state president Gebhard Müller argued against such charges of Stuttgarter centralism by insisting that cultural landscapes within the state would retain autonomy. HSAS Q 1/35 Bü 332, Staatspräsident Gebhard Müller, "Die Entscheidung liegt beim Volk," 1950.
- 94.Their information on the article by Metz was taken from a report by a Basel newspaper. It is based on Metz's 1934 lecture in Innsbruck: Friedrich Metz, *Die Alpen im deutschen Raum* (Berlin: Grenze und Ausland, 1934); StAF, T1 Leo Wohleb Nr.35, Arbeitsgemeinschaft der Badener, "Rundbrief Nr.30," February 21, 1952.
- 95.HSAS Q 1/35 Bü 287, Friedrich Metz, "Gibt es ein badisches Volk?," *Stuttgarter Zeitung*, December 8, 1951.
- 96."Die Bundestagsitzung vom 10.1.1951," reprinted in Institut für Staatslehre und Politik e.V., ed., 86-108.
- 97.Dietrich Berger, "Das Erbe der Väter. Für Demokratie und freie Wirtschaftsordnung," in *Die FDP/DVP in Baden-Württemberg und ihre Geschichte*, ed. Paul Rothmund (Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer, 1979), 192.
- 98.HSAS, EA 1/106 Bü 183, "Freiburger..."
- 99.StAF T1 Leo Wohleb Nr.46, "Umfrage über Südwestdeutschen Staat" (1949) Frage 2, Antwort Ja, 3.
- 100.StAF T1 Leo Wohleb Nr. 692, "Unsere Antwort: Der Südweststaat," *Südwestpresse*, September 1951, 13.
- 101.Such vandalism was reported by a "Heimat-loyal Badener" in Mannheim. StAF C 5/1 Nr.5667, Letter from Bernhard Reichert (Mannheim) to Leo Wohleb, December 14, 1951.
- 102.As one pro-Southwest state poster declared, "unity creates strength." Stadtarchiv Mannheim, Plakatsammlung Nr. 567, "Einigkeit macht stark," reproduced in Niess and Wilderrotter, eds., [CD-ROM]. One pro-Badener argued that geo-political issues like Berlin and the Cold War were being used to cover up the violation of regional democratic concerns. Karl Glunk, "Berlin ist kein Deckmantel für das undemokratische Spiel in unserem Lande - Badenerland Flugschriften, Nr.3, 1962," in Albiez, ed., 408-410.
- 103.Cochlaeus, 105.
- 104.Eschenburg [anonymous], 37; "Äusserung des Französischen Militärgouverneurs am 1. Januar 1949," reprinted in Institut für Staatslehre und Politik e.V. in Mainz, ed., 23.
- 105.Elsewhere, Kopf rhapsodized about the Alemannic region as a place of upper-Rhenish humanism. "Die Beratung im Bundestag über den Entwurf eines zweiten Gesetzes zur Neugliederung am 18. 19.4.1951," reprinted in Institut für Staatslehre und Politik e.V. in Mainz, ed., 216-217; Hermann Kopf, "In Memoriam Leo Wohleb," in Maier and

Weinacht, eds., 139.

106.StAF T1 Leo Wohleb Nr.44, Letter from Carl Bihler to Leo Wohleb, May 17, 1952.

107.Jean Sigmann, *Die Revolution von 1848 in Baden* (Freiburg: Rombach, 1948).

108.StAF T1 Leo Wohleb Nr. 33, Leo Wohleb, "Baden: Landschaft und Geschichte," 6-7; Otto Roegele, "Begegnungen mit Leo Wohleb," in Maier and Weinacht, eds., 152.

109.Elmar Krautkrämer, "De Gaulles Deutschlandpolitische Ambitionen 1945," in *Gelb-Rot-Gelbe Regierungsjahre*, ed. Weinacht, 108.

110.Wohleb did clarify that not *all* Prussian values had been bad. Leo Wohleb, "Weihnachtsansprache gehalten im Südwestfunk, Sender Freiburg (24 Dezember 1948)," reprinted in Maier and Weinacht, eds., 187.

111.StAF T1 Leo Wohleb Nr. 79, Letter from Dr. Johann Kottmaier & Dr. Elisabeth Kottmaier, October 29, 1951; StAF T1 Leo Wohleb Nr.45, Letter from Wilhelm Bisom to Leo Wohleb, October 15, 1951.

112.HSAS Q 1/35 Bü 317, Gebhard Müller, "Der Südweststaat als psychologisches Problem," 9.

113.Stadtarchiv Mannheim, NL Heinrich Heimerich, Zug. 24/1972, 176, Theodor Pfizer, "Der Oberbürgermeister zur Volksbefragung," September 20, 1950, reproduced in Niess and Wilderotter, eds., [CD-ROM].

114.As one Southwest state supporter wrote, they should not reconstruct dynastic states, as this principle could be used to restore Prussia. StAF C 5/1 Nr.5667, Otto Färber, "Wohleb und der Südweststaat," *Stuttgarter Nachrichten*, (no date given).

115.Jakob Schaffner, "Rings um die alemannische Kulturtagung," in *Alemannenland: Ein Buch von Volkstum und Sendung: Für die Stadt Freiburg im Breisgau*, ed. Franz Kerber (Stuttgart: Engelhorn, 1937), 28-31.

116.HSAS EA 1/106 Bü 183, "An alle Haushaltungen! BADEN oder *Südweststaat?*." The pamphlet also depicted French-annexed Kehl again becoming a German city.

117.Karl Glunk, "Wenn's um's Recht goht - Chronik der letzten Dekade," in Albiez, ed., 287, 297.

118.Heimatbund Badenerland, ed., Back Cover, 28; Karl S. Bader, "Badens Geschichte und Kultur," in Heimatbund Badenerland, ed., 9.

119."Die Beratung im Bundestag über den Entwurf eines zweiten Gesetzes zur Neugliederung am 18. 19.4.1951," in Institut für Staatslehre und Politik e.V. in Mainz, ed., 217.

120.BArch B 144 Nr.253, Walter von Cube, "Um die Selbständigkeit es Landes Baden: Vortrag vor dem Badischen Hilfsverein in München, am 1. Juli 1951," Published by Landesverband der Arbeitsgemeinschaft der Badener e.V. Karlsruhe circulatory "Vom See bis an des Maines Strand."

121.StAF C 5/1 Nr.5667, Leo Wohleb, "Vom Odenwald zum Bodensee;" Leo Wohleb, "Die Staatsrechtliche Neugestaltung Westdeutschlands" (1948), reprinted in *Leo Wohleb*, Weinacht, ed., 47/52; Pierre Pène, "Un patriote badois, un Européen: Leo Wohleb," reprinted in Maier and Weinacht, eds., 146-147; Leo Wohleb, *Leo Wohleb 1888-1955: zum 10 Todestag am 12 März 1965*, ed. Maria Wohleb (Karlsruhe: Badenia Verlag, 1965), 16; Leo Wohleb, "Was ist Europa," *Nouvelles de France*, Summer 1948, reprinted in ed. Maria Wohleb, 43-44; Leo Wohleb, "Hebelpreis für Traugott Meyer" (Speech, May 17, 1948), reprinted in *Leo Wohleb*, ed. Weinacht, 76-77.

122.BArch B 136 Nr.1731, "Falsche Töne im Abstimmungskampf: Beobachtungen bei einer Fahr durch Südbaden," *Christ und Welt*, September 6, 1951; HSAS, Q 1/39 Bü 21C, "Regierungserklärung von Ministerpräsident Dr. Reinhold Maier zur Volksabstimmung vom 9. Dezember 1951 in der Sitzung des württ.-badischen Landtags am Mittwoch, den 5. Dezember 1951." In a 1949 poll, one business owner from Müllheim, age 61, for example, argued that she supported the Southwest state because she did not want them to go the way of Saar. StAF T1 Leo Wohleb Nr.46, "Umfrage über Südwestdeutschen Staat" (1949), Frage 2, Ant. Ja (Südbaden), 1-3.

123.HSAS, J 153, Nr.762, Poster: "Vereinigtes Europa? Der erste Schritt SÜDWESTSTAAT" reproduced in ed. Staatliche Archivverwaltung Baden-Württemberg [CD-ROM]; HSAS Q 1/35 Bü 326, "Rede des Herrn Staatspräsidenten Dr. Gebhard Müller zur Volksabstimmung über den Südwest-Staat am 30.11.51 in der 'Scheffel-Halle' in Singen a.H," 21.



- 124.HSAS, EA 1/106 Bü 183, "Freiburger..."
- 125.HSAS 1/35 Bü 819, Generalsekretariat der Arbeitsgemeinschaft für die Vereinigung Baden-Württemberg, Freiburg-Heidelberg, eds., *Südweststaat-Fibel: Zur Staatlichen Neuordnung im südwestdeutschen Raum* (Konstanz: Verlagsanstalt Merk & Co, 1951), 18-19.
- 126.HSAS Q 1/35 Bü 287, "Zehn prominente Bürger antworten auf unsere Frage: 'Warum sind Sie für den vereinten deutschen Südwesten?,'" *Stuttgarter Nachrichten*, December 8, 1951.
- 127.HSAS Q 1/35 Bü 331, Letter from Professor Karl Hils (Stuttgart) to Gebhard Müller, December 6, 1951.
- 128.Hans Maier, "Aus der Gründungszeit der CDU Südbaden," in *Gelbt-Rot Gelbe Regierungsjahre*, ed., Weinacht, 121; Karl S. Bader, "Badens Geschichte und Kultur," in *Heimatbund Badenerland*, ed., 10.
- 129.Otto Feger, *Schwäbisch-Alemannische Demokratie*, 98-99.
- 130.The referendum debates became a moment for discussing the proper role of propaganda in a democracy. As Thomas Mergel has illustrated, questions of conducting electoral campaigns represented crucial points of debates about democratization, with West Germans preoccupied with overcoming Nazi propaganda methods. Thomas Mergel, *Propaganda nach Hitler. Eine Kulturgeschichte des Wahlkampfes in der Bundesrepublik 1949-1990* (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2010).
- 131.StAF T1 Wohleb Nr.44, Letter from Suzanne Birk to Leo Wohleb, October 27 1951.
- 132.StAF T1 Leo Wohleb Nr. 46, Letter from Walter Boettler (Heidelberg) to Leo Wohleb, December 10, 1951.
- 133."Die Badische CDU am Scheideweg - Flugschrift 1954," excerpt from a Speech of Paul Fleig, reprinted in Albiez, ed., 389.
- 134.HSAS Q 1/35 Bü 447, Südweststaat cartoon, 1950; "Lieber ledig als schlecht verheiratet," *Badisches Tagblatt*, September 9, 1950, reprinted in *Die badischen Regionen am Rhein: 50 Jahre Baden in Baden-Württemberg - Eine Bilanz*, ed. Paul-Ludwig Weinacht (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2002), 522.
- 135."Auszug aus der 'Herbolzheimer Rundschau,' vom 23. Dezember 1959," reprinted in ed. Albiez, 160-161.
- 136.The line appeared in a series of shocking comments of pro-Baden propaganda quoted in the *Südwestpresse*. StAF T1 Leo Wohleb Nr.692, Friedrich Werber, "Werber-Werbung: Blütenlese aus 'Badenerland, Heimatzeitung für das Land Baden,'" *Südwestpresse*, September 1951, 8; BArch B 144, Nr. 252, Ortsausschuß Oberachtern der Arbeitsgemeinschaft der Badener, "Kritische Betrachtungen zur Volksabstimmung vom 9. Dezember 1951."
- 137.HSAS 1/39 Bü 21C, Edmund Kaufmann, "Vergewaltigung," December 12, 1951.
- 138."Der Antrag auf bundesverfassungsrechtliche Feststellung des ersten und zweiten Neugliederungsgesetzes vom 25.5.51 mit der weiteren Begründung vom 31.7.1951," in Institut für Staatslehre und Politik e.V. in Mainz, ed., 266.
- 139.StAF T1 Leo Wohleb Nr. 125, Text by "P.K." to Leo Wohleb, "Alles schon da gewesen."
- 140.StAF T1 Leo Wohleb Nr. 34, Arbeitsgemeinschaft der Badener, Rundbrief Nr. 25, September 19, 1951, 4.
- 141.There were fewer expellees in South Baden and Württemberg-Hohenzollern than the North, as the French had temporarily blocked expellee relocation to their zone. Boelcke, 196, 309.
- 142.StAF T1 Wohleb Nr.65, Conrad Erzbischof von Freiburg, "Fastenhirtenbrief 1946."
- 143.StAF T1 Leo Wohleb Nr.79, "Tag der Heimat 15.Juli 1951," Eugen Falk-Breitenbach, Untitled dialect poem.
- 144.StAF T1 Leo Wohleb Nr.58, Letter from Hanns Adam Faerber to Leo Wohleb, October 27, 1951.
- 145.StAF T1 Leo Wohleb Nr.63, Letter Julius Glatz to Leo Wohleb, July 21, 1951; attached report "Bewerbung um Anstellung im Finanz- oder Zolldienst im badischen Staat," and Julius Glatz, "Preußen-Deutschland und Südweststaat: Badens Untergang."
- 146.StAF T1 Leo Wohleb Nr. 41, Dr. Karl Bartunek, "Zum Südweststaat," Süddeutscher Rundfunk, Sendung, December 3, 1951.

- 147.HSAS Q 1/35 Bü 320, Hans Cyanek, Schriftsteller, "Heimatvertriebener! Der Südweststaat, dein Staat," *Südwestpresse*, June 1951, 13.
- 148.StAF C 5/1 Nr.5667, Letter from J.F. Hanagarth (Karlsruhe) to Leo Wohleb, September 11, 1948; StAF T1 Leo Wohleb Nr. 59, Letter from J.B. Ferdinand (Ettenheim) to Leo Wohleb, May 12, 1952; Barch, B 144/252, Ortsausschuß Oberachern der Arbeitsgemeinschaft der Badener, "Kritische Betrachtungen zur Volksbestimmung vom 9. Dezember 1951 in Baden."
- 149.Stadtarchiv Mannheim, Plakatsammlung Nr. 560, "Die alte Heimat verloren - eine neue gewonnen! reproduced in *Mannem Vorne - Erst Recht im Südweststaat* [CD-ROM].
- 150.Crivellari et al., 64.
- 151.HSAS EA 1/106 Bü 183, Dr. Reinhold Maier, "Der Südweststaat – eine deutsche Frage," December 9, 1951.
- 152."Der Landtag ruft zum 'Ja' für den Südweststaat auf," *Stuttgarter Nachrichten*, December 6, 1951.
- 153.Crivellari et al., 55-57.
- 154.HSAS Q 1/35 Bü 324, Reporting of Election results, Finance Minister Edmund Kaufmann to Hermann Hagen, October 2, 1950.
- 155.SK, Bestand S XVIII, Nr. 145, Letter from Otto Feger to G. Krieger (*Rheinischer Merkur*), February 18, 1952.
- 156.StAF, T1 Leo Wohleb Nr.32, "Der Verrat des Protestantismus an der Alt-Badischen Sache!"
- 157.Stadtarchiv Mannheim, Hauptverwaltung, Zug. -/1955-1964, Nr.73, "...Nach bester Überzeugung..." reproduced in Niess and Wilderotter, eds., [CD-ROM].
- 158.The movement failed when the Federal Constitutional Court ruled in 1956 that states created after a certain date did not have a right to change borders based on popular votes. See Chapter V.
- 159.HSAS EA 99/002 Bü 13, "Nochmals: Wie soll das Land heißen? - Schwaben oder Altschwaben?," *Stuttgarter Zeitung*, January 28, 1953; EA 99/002 Bü 36, "Landesnamen, Landeswappen und Landesfarben des südwestdeutschen Bundeslandes. Meinungsäußerung von Landeskundlern aus dem schwäbischen Raum;" EA 99/002 Bü 47, "Entschliebung" February 21, 1953 (meeting of the society for Familien- und Wappenkunde in Württemberg und Baden, the Württembergischen Geschichts- und Altertumsvereins and the Schwäbischen Heimatbundes).
- 160.HSAS Q 1/39 Bü 21A, "Rheinschwaben und Alemannien an der Spitze," *Schwarzwälder Bote*, January 9, 1953.
- 161.StAF T1 Leo Wohleb Nr. 61, Letter Anton Frey, Regierungsrat to Leo Wohleb, not dated. Suggests the name Land Donau-Rhein; HSAS EA 1/920 Bü 599, Dr. Karl Gabrich, Letter to the Minister president, March 15, 1952.
- 162.HSAS EA 1/920 Bü 599, W. Günther, (Lehrer, Baiersbronn) Letter to the Ministerrat des Südweststaates, February 25, 1952.
- 163.HSAS EA 1/920 Bü 599, Letter, Heinrich Horsch (Möckmühl) to Minister president Maier, March 31, 1952.
- 164.HSAS Q 1/22 Bü 213, Letter from Dr. Robert Steiger (Priest, Baden-Baden) to Justice Minister Dr. Hauszmann (Stuttgart), October 29, 1953; Robert Steigerm "Immer noch Staat ohne Klang und Namen?;" 1/920 Bü 599, Dipl.-Ing F. Oswald to the Ministerpräsident Dr. Maier, April 2, 1952; Unsigned postcard suggesting the name Wühoba, March 31, 1952.
- 165.HSAS EA 1/920 Bü 599, Letter from Irene Wiedel to Reinhold Maier, March 28, 1952; Letter from the Fürst zu Hohenzollern to Reinhold Maier, March 29, 1952.
- 166.HSAS EA 99/002 Bü 11, Draft, Hermann Hofstetter (Stuttgart-Degerloch), Wappen "Rheinschwaben;" EA 99/002 Bü 13, Letters to Staatsarchivdirektor Dr. Miller from Rudi Keller, Nachrichtenblatt der öffentlichen Kultur- und Heimatpflege, January 31, 1953, January 25, 1955; Letter from Staatsarchivdirektor Dr. Miller to Rudi Keller, December 23, 1952; Letter from Rudi Keller to Fürsten Franz von Waldburg-Wolfegg, December 20, 1952; Rudi Keller, "Denkschrift über Name, Wappen und Farben des neuen Bundeslandes;" EA 99/002 Bü 17, Richard Sieber, "Der Südweststaat und sein Wappen;" EA 99/002 Bü 24, Schnibbe, "Denkschrift Betreffend Wappen und Flage des Landes SCHWABEN;" EA 99/002 Bü 27, "Ideen von Staatsarchivrat Dr. Sieber-Karlsruhe;" EA 99/002 Bü 41, Untitled spoof crests produced by archivists in Stuttgart.

- 167.Klöckler, *Abendland - Alpenland - Alemannien*, 87, footnote.
- 168.Conrad Schroeder, "Von der 'badischen Aussenpolitik' zur grenzüberschreitenden Zusammenarbeit des Landes Baden-Württemberg," in *Badischen Regionen am Rhein*, ed. Weinacht, 232.
- 169.Vollert, 21.
- 170.Klöckler, *Abendland - Alpenland - Alemannien*, 23-24, 76, 99-101.
- 171.HSAS Q 1/35 Bü 287, Friedrich Metz, "Gibt es ein badisches Volk?," *Stuttgarter Zeitung*, December 8, 1951; Friedrich Metz, *Rheinschwaben* (Heidelberg: F.H. Verlag, 1948), 5, 10-17, 130-132.
- 172.HSAS Q 1/35 Bü 820, "Die Neugliederung des Bundesgebietes: Gutachten des von der Bundesregierung eingesetzten Sachverständigenausschusses, 1955," 95-96.
- 173.Leo Wohleb, "Die Badische Krankheit," (1954), Speech held at a meeting of the Heimatbund Badenerland, reprinted in *Der andere politische Kurs*, ed., Weinacht, 104-106.
- 174.Karl Glunk, "Berlin ist kein Deckmantel für das undemokratische Spiel in unserem Lande," *Badenerland Flugschriften*, Nr.3, 1962, reprinted in Albiez, ed., 409-415.
- 175.HSAS 1/35 Bü 819, Institut für Demoskopie Allensbach, *Die Stimmung in Baden: Gutachten über Stärke und Motive der altbadischen Bewegung*, 1959 (vertraulich), 3, 6, 22, 33, 35.
- 176.Hermann Reiff, *Erlebtes Baden-Württemberg: Erinnerungen eines Ministerialbeamten* (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1985), 139.
- 177."Jetzt ist dieses Bundesland unanfechtbar etabliert," *Südwestpresse*, June 8, 1970.
- 178.StAF W 100/1 Nr.15, Pamphlet "Information zur Baden-Frage: Die Jugend, Europa und die Baden-Frage."
- 179.BArch B 234, Nr.1006, Speech, Jean-Louis Tixier-Vignancour, Heimattag in Kehl, 1966.
- 180."Nochmals: Das Wirtschaftliche an der Badenfrage," *Rheinischer Merkur*, May 22, 1970, reprinted in Albiez, ed., 384; StAF W 100/1 Nr.15 Pamphlet "Informationen zur Baden-Frage: Warum ich für Baden Stimme," 5, 9.
- 181."Baden-Württemberg offen für Europa," *Südwestpresse*, May 27, 1970; "Baden-Württemberg wohin?," *Südwestpresse*, May 20, 1970.
- 182.StAF W 100/1 Nr.15, Leaflet "Zurück ins 19.Jahrhundert?" (1970).
- 183."Reinhold Grund legte Stadtratsmandat nieder," *Turmberg-RS*, June 20, 1970, reprinted in Albiez, ed., 446.
- 184.HSAS Q 3/3, Bü 1, Mannheimer Leaflet: "Freiheit für die Pfalz," (1970).

## Chapter V

1. Heinrich Böll, "Nordrhein-Westfalen," in *Werke: Kölner Ausgabe*, vol.12, ed. Robert C. Conrad (Cologne: Kiepenheuer & Witsch, 2008), 141.
2. The idea of redrawing interior borders was also taken up at the behest of the occupying powers, whose orders in the 1949 Frankfurt documents directed the new republic to re-examine its interior state borders. The Parliamentary Council outlined the principles according to which new states were to be created. "Frankfurt Dokumente," 7.1.1948, in *Weniger Länder–mehr Föderalismus?: Die Neugliederung des Bundesgebietes im Widerstreit der Meinungen 1948/1949-1990, Eine Dokumentation*, ed. Reinhard Schiffers (Düsseldorf: Droste, 1996), 119.
3. Some scholars did consider re-bordering the entire national map in anticipation of unification. The geographer Werner Münchheimer composed a work with plans for re-bordering East Germany after reunification. His plans reveal the fluidity and contradictions in notions of regional belonging that also existed in the East. A number of ambiguities arose: Did Altmark and Prignitz have a common regional feeling? Did Kurmark, Neumark, and Meißen feel a sense of belonging with Lower Silesia? Münchheimer provided no clear answers. Werner Münchheimer, *Die Neugliederung Mitteldeutschlands bei der Wiedervereinigung* (Göttingen: Otto Schwartz, 1954), 103-104.
4. "Luther-Ausschuß bereiste die Pfalz," and Ludwig Reichert "Wohin gehört die Pfalz?: Referat vor dem Luther-Ausschuß in Neustadt, am 25. Mai 1954," *Kurpfalz*, July 26, 1954.
5. The discussion has been largely limited to political science. Further consideration of the history appears in the margins of works on German federalism. See Werner Rutz, *Die Gliederung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland in Länder: Ein neues Gesamtkonzept für den Gebietsstand nach 1990* (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1995); Peter Burg, *Die Neugliederung deutscher Länder: Grundzüge der Diskussion in Politik und Wissenschaft (1918-1996)* (Münster: Lit Verlag, 1996); Bettina Blank, *Die westdeutschen Länder und die Entstehung der Bundesrepublik: Zur Auseinandersetzung um die Frankfurter Dokumente vom Juli 1948* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1995).
6. Charles Maier argues that the overlapping of decision-making and national-identity spaces was fundamental to the theory of modern nation. He holds that this overlap is currently receding. While Maier considers the implications of such a divergence for decision-making processes, it would be equally of interest to consider the impact that it could have on notions of belonging. Charles Maier, "Transformations of Territoriality, 1600-2000," in *Transnationale Geschichte: Themen, Tendenzen und Theorien*, eds. Gunilla Budde, Sebastian Conrad, and Oliver Janz (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2006), 32-55.
7. Some scholars have defined modern German history as a long process of determining the question of "where" the nation was to be found in geographic space and "who" belonged to it. For an image of the fluid national borders of early modern nationhood in Germany and its transition into modern, more rigidly-defined imaginings of nation, see Helmut Walser Smith, *The Continuities of German History: Nation, Religion, and Race across the Long Nineteenth Century* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008); Stefan Wolff argues that the expulsion of millions of expellees from the East represented one of the final chapter in a long troubled national history of territorial definition that ended with national reunification. Stefan Wolff, "Introduction: From Colonists to Emigrants: Explaining the 'Return- Migration' of Ethnic Germans from Central Eastern Europe," in *Coming Home to Germany?: The Integration of Ethnic Germans from Central and Eastern Europe in the Federal Republic*, eds. David Rock and Stefan Wolff (New York: Berghahn, 2002), 2-13.
8. For more on the division of mixed border regions into defined national groups, see Jeremy King, *Budweisers into Czechs and Germans: A Local History of Bohemian Politics, 1848-1948* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002); Helmut Walser Smith, "An Preußens Rändern oder: Die Welt, die dem Nationalismus verloren ging," in *Das Kaiserreich Transnational: Deutschland in der Welt, 1871-1914*, eds. Sebastian Conrad and Jürgen Osterhammel (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2004), 149-169; Peter Sahlin, *Boundaries: The Making of France and Spain in the Pyrenees* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1989); Eugene Weber, *Peasants into Frenchmen: the Modernization of Rural France, 1870-1914* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1976).
9. Abigail Green, *Fatherlands: State Building and Nationhood in Nineteenth-Century Germany* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001); Siegfried Weichlein, *Nation und Region: Integrationsprozesse im Bismarckreich* (Düsseldorf: Droste, 2004).

10. Heiner Treinen, "Symbolische Ortsbezogenheit: Eine soziologische Untersuchung zum Heimatproblem," *Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie* 17 (1965): 73-97, 254-297.
11. Even in the abstract reference to the nation as a valence of Heimat, it was always the prerogative of the individual to designate the nation as Heimat. In cases where there may have been ambiguity on whether Heimat referred to the locality or nation, the phrase "engere Heimat" (narrow Heimat) was used to verify that the locality/region and not the nation were the referents in question.
12. Peter Blickle, *Heimat: A Critical Theory of the German Idea of Homeland* (Rochester, NY: Camden, 2002).
13. Bundesarchiv Koblenz (Hereafter BArch) B 106/2660, Lutherausschuß, Hermann Aubin, Gutachten, "Die geschichtlichen Kulturräume Deutschlands. Versuch einer ersten Übersicht in Hinblick auf Art 29 GG," 2.
14. BArch B 144, Nr.254, Oldenburgischen Landesbund, "Oldenburg und Niedersachsen: Eine Abrechnung," 40.
15. Jochem Huhn, *Lernen aus der Geschichte?: Historische Argumente in der westdeutschen Föderalismusdiskussion 1945-1949* (Melsungen: Kasseler Forschungen zur Zeitgeschichte, 1990), 45-46.
16. Thomas Nipperdey, "Der Föderalismus in der deutschen Geschichte," in *Nachdenken über die deutsche Geschichte. Essays*, ed. Thomas Nipperdey (Munich: C.H. Beck, 1986), 60-109. While the Nazis utilized the Heimat idea in propaganda, postwar Heimat enthusiasts reacted to Nazi aversion to focusing on local/regional concerns at the expense of national ambitions. The Nazis claimed openly to be the "liquidators" of the old states "for the benefit of the empire." Nazi assertions that the German future would not be about the individual *Stämme* provided fodder for postwar federalist, who imagined a new federalist system against the foil of National Socialism. On Nazis as the liquidators of regional states, and the German future as not about the individual *Stämme*, see Adolf Hitler, *Der Nürnberger Parteikongreß*, 1./3. September, 1933, "Proklamation des Führers zur Eröffnung, 1. September 1933," in *Deutsche Reichsgeschichte in Dokumenten, 1849-1934: Urkunden und Aktenstücke zur inneren und äußeren Politik des Deutschen Reiches*, vol.4, ed. Johannes Hohlfeld (Leipzig: G. Reichardt Groitzsch, 1934), 695.
17. Celia Applegate, "Democracy or Reaction?: The Political Implications of Localist Ideas in Wilhelmine and Weimar Germany," in *Elections, Mass Politics, and Social Change in Modern Germany*, eds. James Retallack and Larry Eugene Jones (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 261.
18. Examinations of a host of amateur drafts for a new national democracy, while having had little chance of being of becoming reality, are nonetheless revealing in terms of popular engagement with the creation of a new democracy and what past German traditions citizens believed could be used in a new German democratic state. See, for example, the state drafts produced by Robert Scholl. Staatsarchiv Bremen, 3-R.1.n, Nr.7, 7, Robert Scholl, Oberbürgermeister in Ulm, "Grundriss für einen Neubau Deutschlands," (1947).
19. Waldemar Kurtz, *Gemeinden sind Wichtiger als Staaten* (Stuttgart: Jung, 1951); Adolf Gasser, *Gemeindefreiheit als Rettung Europas. Grundlinien einer ethischen Geschichtsauffassung* (Basel: Bücherfreunde, 1947).
20. Both the British and the French occupiers rallied against the "Prussian" tradition. Prior to the end of the war, prominent anti-Prussianism led some in the British foreign office to entertain the idea of an independent Rhenish state. Beate Dorfey, *Die Teilung der Rheinprovinz und die Versuche zu ihrer Wiedervereinigung (1945-1956): Das Rheinland zwischen Tradition und Neuorientierung*. (Cologne: Rheinland-Verlag, 1993), 84, 97. The British further illustrated their hostility for Prussian "tradition" in Occupation Law 46, which justified abolishing the state as a "bearer of militarism and reaction in Germany." British Occupation Law No.46, "Abolition of the State of Prussia," reprinted in Klaus-Jürgen Matz, *Länderneugliederung. Zur Genese einer deutschen Obsession seit dem Ausgang des Alten Reiches* (Idstein: Schulz-Kirchner, 1997), 141.
21. Bundesminister des Innern, *Die Neugliederung des Bundesgebietes: Gutachten des von der Bundesregierung eingesetzten Sachverständigenausschusses* (Cologne: Carl Heymanns, 1955), 24.
22. Peter Heil refers to an early postwar "organic federalism." The phrase "cultural federalism," I would argue is more accurate. Though they used the term organic in certain circumstances, the primary point was not obsession with the organic as such, as it was desire for sub-national polities rooted in local and regional communities, rather than random technocratic constructions created from the top-down. Heil largely describes such early postwar federalist desires as regressive. Peter Heil, *'Gemeinden sind Wichtiger als Staaten: Idee und Wirklichkeit des kommunalen Neuanfangs in Rheinland-Pfalz, 1945-1947* (Mainz: Hase & Koehler, 1997).

23. Burg, 88-89.
24. Peter Schöller, "Die Problematik des Richtbegriffes 'Landsmannschaftliche Verbundenheit,'" *Westfälische Forschungen* 28 (1974): 27.
25. Hermann von Mangoldt (commentator), *Das Bonner Grundgesetz*, vol.2 (Berlin: Franz Wahlen, 1966), 728; Institut für Raumforschung, *Beiträge zur innergebielichen Neuordnung* (Bonn: Institut für Raumforschung, 1952), 12.
26. Almut Hennings, *Der unerfüllte Verfassungsauftrag: Die Neugliederung des Bundesgebietes im Spannungsfeld politischer Interessengegensätze* (Hamburg: R.v. Deckers, 1983), 170.
27. German translation: "heimatliche Zusammengehörigkeitsgefühl." Werner Münchheimer, *Materialien zur Auslegung der Neugliederungs-Prinzipien in Art 29 Abs.(1) des Grundgesetzes*, ed. Institut zur Förderung öffentlicher Angelegenheiten e.V. Frankfurt (N.p.: n.p., 1954), 31, 35.
28. Kurt Brüning and Heinz Sting, *Probleme der Innergebielichen Neuordnung Gemäss Art.29 Abs.1 GG: Gutachten im Auftrage des Bundestagsausschusses für innergebieliche Neuordnung* (Bremen: Dorn, 1951), 13-14.
29. Heinz Beckmann, *Innerdeutsche Gebietsänderungen nach dem Bonner Grundgesetz: Entstehungsgeschichte, Auslegung und Bedeutung der Artikel 29/118 GG* (PhD Diss., Christian-Albrechts-Universität Kiel, 1954), 77.
30. Theodor Maunz, Roman Herzog, and Ruper Scholz, "Art.29" (October 1996), in *Grundgesetz Kommentar*, Roman Herzog, et al (Munich: C.H. Beck, 2011), 29-30.
31. Werner Münchheimer, *Worum geht es bei der Neugliederung Deutschlands?: Vier Karten und ein einführender Text von Werner Münchheimer* (Frankfurt: Dr. Waldemar Kramer, 1951).
32. "Eulers Vorschläge zur Länderneuordnung," in Schiffers, 141-142.
33. Erwin Scheu, "Zweites Referat, Geographische, Wirtschafts-, Verkehrs- und Sozialpolitische Gesichtspunkte für die Länderreform," in *Die Bundesländer: Beiträge zur Neugliederung der Bundesrepublik. Referate von H.L. Brill, E. Scheu und C.W. Aubin. Vorberichte von W. Münchheimer, F. Glum, H. Hartmann. Diskussion und Ergebnisse der Weinheimer Tagung*, ed. Hermann Brill (Frankfurt: Institut zur Förderung öffentlicher Angelegenheiten, 1950), 21.
34. BArch, B 106, Nr.2660, Lutherausschuss, Literaturliste.
35. BArch B 136, Nr.4344, F.2-3, "Probleme der Neugliederung," Anlage 2.; Bundesminister des Innern, 20-21.
36. Given that Article 29 required that the *Bundestag* redraw inner-German borders, they were widely seen as in breach of the constitution in not having done so. In order to remedy this, Article 29 was later redrafted to read that the Federal Government "can" redraw inner-German borders.
37. Institut für Raumforschung, 19.
38. Original German phrases: *Kernräume, ausstrahlen, tendieren, zugewandt, Übergangsräume, überschichtet, überschneiden, and Spannung*.
39. Given the different connotations, the word "tribe" is used here only in referring to the original Germanic tribes.
40. Kurt Stavenhagen, *Heimat als Lebenssinn* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1948), 49-50.
41. Hermann Aubin, "Kräfte aus der geschichtlichen Entwicklung Deutschland als raumbildende Faktoren," in Brill, ed., 56. The Weimar constitutional reference to *Stamm* reflected interests in overcoming randomly constructed dynastic borders, made more feasible by the disappearance of dynastic houses. Bundesminister des Innern, 16.
42. Hartung's work, which focuses on the concept of *Stamm* among a small cabal of conservative intellectuals in Lower Saxony does not cover the broad political range and divergences between scientific and popular usage of the term. Unfortunately, this obscures the tremendous subjectivity and diverse understandings of the concept. Werner Hartung, *Konservative Zivilisationskritik und regionale Identität: Am Beispiel der niedersächsischen Heimatbewegung 1895 bis 1919* (Hannover: Hahnsche Buchhandlung, 1991), V; Martina Steber, *Ethnische Gewissheiten: die Ordnung des Regionalen im bayerischen Schwaben vom Kaiserreich bis zum NS-Regime* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2010).

43. At the discussion of *Stamm* at the 1930 Sociologists conference, some scholars, including a left-liberal, saw biological and racial differences as existing within differences of *Stamm*. Franz Eulenberg and socialist professor, Friedrich Hertz, however, denounced racial views of the concept, which posited *Stamm* as immovable. Eulenberg also denounced racial usage of the concept in propaganda and argued that *Stamm* was not simply a German issue, but a global phenomenon. Franz Eulenberg “Einleitende Worte: Untergruppe für politische Soziologie. Gegenstand: ‘Die deutschen Stämme;’” Willy Hellpach, “Die anthropologischen Grundlagen der Stammesforschung;” “Diskussion;” all in *Verhandlungen des Siebenten Deutschen Soziologentages vom 28. September bis 1. Oktober 1930 in Berlin*, ed. Deutschen Gesellschaft für Soziologie (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1931), 233-268.
44. Hugo Preuß, *Reich und Länder: Bruchstücke eines Kommentars zur Verfassung des Deutschen Reiches*, ed. Gerhard Anschütz (Berlin: Carl Heymanns, 1928), 21, 157. For an analysis of Preuß’s ideas of localism, regionalism, and its importance in federalism, see Celia Applegate, “Democracy or Reaction?: The Political Implications of Localist Ideas in Wilhelmine and Weimar Germany,” in Retallack and Jones, eds., 251-260. Other Weimar federalist also argued for a system of decentralized democratic federalism based on *Stamm*, such as Rudolf Henle. Centralism, Henle argued, allowed *Stamm* only to remain in form, but not to develop. This, he insisted, uprooted the “Heimat concept,” treading it underfoot. Rudolf Henle, *Reichsreform und Länderstaat*, (Rostock: G.B. Leopolds Universitäts-Buchhandlung Paul Badendererde, 1931), 13-14.
45. The Rhineland proved a prime example of such deviations, where the idea of belonging to a Franconian *Stamm* was moribund. It has become common to refer to *Rheinländer* as a *Stamm* in popular circles, in spite of the idea of the “Rhineland” as a common geography emerging in the early nineteenth century. Joseph Nadler, *Die Deutschen Stämme* (Stuttgart: Fr. Frommanns, 1925), 7 - 8, 13-48. After joining the Nazi party, Nadler tellingly deleted reference to a “German-Slavic” group of *Stämme* in his new 1941 work on *Stamm*, arguing that the tribes were of “nordic” origin and were sandwiched between Roman and Slavic groups. Joseph Nadler, *Das stammhafte Gefüge des Deutschen Volkes* (Munich: Michael Beckstein, 1941), 7, 221-228.
46. Urban centers and eastern regions, Schrepfer insisted, had particularly weak identification with *Stamm*. H. Schrepfer, *Deutschlands Neugliederung in 12 Reichsländer nach dem “Frankfurter Entwurf” von A. Weitzel, Statistik der Reichsländer nach Fläche und Einwohnerzahl* (Frankfurt: Geographische Verlagsanstalt und Druckerei Ludwig Ravenstein, 1931), 2.
47. “Diskussion,” in Deutschen Gesellschaft für Soziologie, ed., 268.
48. Alfred Karasek-Langer noted the weakness of the *Stamm* concept in urban centers. Alfred Karasek-Langer, “Volkskundliche Erkenntnisse aus der Vertreibung und Eingliederung der Ostdeutschen,” *Jahrbuch für Volkskunde der Heimatvertriebenen* 1 (1955): 58.
49. Wolfgang Bolten, *Verfassungsrechtliche Probleme einer künftigen Neugliederung des Bundesrepublik* (Diss., Universität zu Köln, 1954), 117.
50. BArch, B 106, Nr.2660, Dr. Ahasver von Brant, “Die Vorschriften des Art.29, Ziffer 1 GG in ihrer Anwendung auf Lübeck,” 2.
51. BArch, B 106, Nr.2660, Dr. Deyn, “Schleswig-Holstein, eine historische und kulturelle Einheit?: Eine gutachtliche Äusserung zu Art.29 Abs.I des Grundgesetzes,” 1-2.
52. Bundesminister des Innern, 111.
53. BArch B 106, Nr.2661, D VIII, Anlg.2, Protok.v. 10-12.2.55, “Bericht über Baden-Württemberg,” 1-4. The report brushes over the dominance of Franconian dialect in the north of the new Southwest state by positing a historical bridge between the Schwaben and Franken. The committee interpretation of *Stamm* was rendered even more complicated in their arguing that the Alemannen were themselves not a single *Stamm* but rather a league of smaller *Stämme* that was led by the dominant group, the *Sueben*. They concluded, however, that the differentiation between *Schwaben* and *Alemannen* was artificial. Bundesminister des Innern, 96.
54. Münchheimer, *Materialien*, 33; Akademie für Raumforschung und Landesplanung, 13-14.
55. Though Aubin defensively insisted that his analysis would not regurgitate “Blut und Boden” propaganda, ethnic and racial elements could be found in his reports. Aubin also expressed his opposition to replacing *Stamm* with “*landmannschaftliche Verbundenheit*.” BArch, B 106, Nr.2660, Hermann Aubin, “Die geschichtlichen

- Kulturräume Deutschlands: Versuch einer ersten Übersicht in Hinblick auf Art.29 GG;” BArch, B 144, Nr.1157, “Stellungnahme des Institut für Raumforschung zu dem Auftrag vom 16 Juli 1951 des Bundestagsausschuss für innergebieliche Neuordnung,” 13. Hermann Aubin, “Kräfte aus der geschichtlichen Entwicklung Deutschlands als raumbildende Faktoren,” in Brill, ed., 56 -58; Hermann Aubin, “Die geschichtlichen Grundlagen der deutschen Stämme,” in Deutsche Gesellschaft für Soziologie, ed., 257-267.
- 56.BArch B 106, Nr.2661 - Anlage 5, z. Protok.v. 10-12.2.1955, Thesen über das Land Rheinland-Pfalz, 1.
- 57.Bundesminister des Innern, 86.
- 58.BArch 136, Nr.4343 Hermann Aubin, “Die geschichtlichen Kulturräume Deutschlands: Versuch einer ersten Übersicht in Hinblick auf Art.29 GG,” 6.
- 59.Bundesminister des Innern, 56.
- 60.BArch, 106, Nr. 2661, Heinrich Landahl, “Zum Gutachten der Regierung des Landes Hessen am 14.10.1954 in Schlangenbad,” 1; Regierung des Landes Hessen, *Das Land Hessen im Rahmen der Neugliederung des Bundesgebietes* (Wiesbaden: Regierung des Landes Hessen, 1954), 35.
- 61.Dorfey, 419-420.
- 62.Aubin made a similar point to the Luther Committee, arguing that geography was critical due to its influence on both culture and history. BArch, B106, Nr.2660 Hermann Aubin, “Die geschichtlichen Kulturräume Deutschlands. Versuch einer ersten Übersicht in Hinblick auf Art.29 GG,” 4.
- 63.Bolten, 118.
- 64.Institut für Raumforschung, 17.
- 65.Erwin Scheu, “Geographische, Wirtschafts-, Verkehrs- und Sozialpolitische Gesichtspunkte für die Länderreform,” in Brill, ed., 19-20.
- 66.Werner Münchheimer, *Die Neugliederung Deutschlands. Grundlagen– Kritik – Ziele und die Pläne zur “Reichsreform” von 1918-1945* (Frankfurt: Dr. Waldemar Kramer, 1949), 40.
- 67.Bundesminister des Innern, 30.
- 68.BArch, B106, Nr.2661, “Bericht über Baden-Württemberg,” Anlg.2, z.Protok.v.10-12.2.1955., 2-3.
- 69.Peter Schöller, *Neugliederung: Prinzipien und Probleme der politisch-geographischen Neuordnung Deutschlands und das Beispiel des Mittelrheingebietes* (Bad Godesberg: Bundesanstalt für Landeskunde und Raumforschung, 1965), 64-95; Bundesminister des Innern, 23-24.
- 70.BArch B106, Nr.2660, Dr. Olaf Klose, Direktor der Landesbibliothek in Kiel, “Schleswig-Holstein, eine historische und kulturelle Einheit?: Eine gutachtliche Äußerung zu Art. 29 Abs.I des Grundgesetzes,” 1-2.
- 71.BArch B106, Nr.2660, Dr. Deyn, “Schleswig-Holstein, eine historische und kulturelle Einheit?: Eine gutachtliche Äusserung zu Art.29 Abs.I des Grundgesetzes.” Peter Schöller would later argue that folk art and regional building styles are essential for *landsmannschaftliche Verbundenheit*. Nevertheless, its influence on geographic imaginings of regional Heimat proved to be inconsistent. Peter Schöller, *Die Problematik des Richtbegriffes*, 30-31
- 72.Gisela Riescher argues that explosive reactions to the *Gemeindereform* derived from a disruption of bonds to local Heimat based on purely technocratic considerations. She does not, however, examine geographical properties of imagining Heimat. Gisela Riescher, *Gemeinde als Heimat: die Politisch-Anthropologische Dimension Lokaler Politik* (Munich: tuduv, 1988). For more on the *Gemeindereform* debate, see Ulrike Haus, *Zur Entwicklung lokaler Identität nach der Gemeindereform in Bayern: Fallstudien aus Oberfranken* (Passau: Passavia, 1989); Everhard Holtmann and Winfried Killisch, *Lokale Identität und Gemeindegebietsreform: Der Streitfall Ermershausen: Empirische Untersuchung über Erscheinungsformen und Hintergründe örtlichen Protestverhaltens in einer unterfränkischen Landgemeinde* (Erlangen: Universitätsbund Erlangen-Nürnberg, 1991).
- 73.Bundesminister des Innern, 23, 31, 132. The Luther Committee particularly pointed to dynastic borders which disrupted the radiating influence of cities. The city of Ulm and Neu-Ulm for example, split a common city between two historical dynastic states. The “City-Gedanke” dictated doing away with such borders. This position dovetailed



with the notion represented by Werner Münchheimer and others that regional borders should be placed in the least populated areas. Münchheimer, *Neugliederung Deutschlands*, 38.

74.BArch B136, Nr.4344 “DVI. Hessen,” 4. This list left out the nearby city of Mainz in the state of Rheinland-Pfalz, whose orientation toward Hessen became a heated debate.

75.Erwin Scheu, “Geographische, Wirtschafts-, Verkehrs- und Sozialpolitische Gesichtspunkte für die Länderreform,” in Brill, ed., 23.

76.Bundesminister des Innern, 95.

77.BArch, B106, Nr.2660 Hermann Aubin, “Die geschichtlichen Kulturräume Deutschlands. Versuch einer ersten Übersicht in Hinblick auf Art.29 GG,” 6; Erwin Scheu, “Geographische, Wirtschafts-, Verkehrs- und Sozialpolitische Gesichtspunkte für die Länderreform,” in Brill, ed., 19.

78.Landeshauptarchiv Koblenz (Hereafter LHK), 860, Nr.1246, Friedrich M Illert, “Der rheinisch-pfälzische Raum als kunstgeschichtliche Einheit.”

79.Bundesminister des Innern, 81.

80.BArch B 106, Nr. 2661, Vollversammlungen, Luther-Ausschuß, “Protokoll der 4. Vollversammlung des Sachverständigen Ausschusses für die Neugliederung des Bundesgebiets. Schlagenbad, den 14/15 Oktober 1954,” 13.

81.Burg, 88-89.

82.Bundesminister des Innern,, 31, 51-61.

83.Münchheimer, *Materialien*, 34-35.

84.Akademie für Raumforschung und Landesplanung, 14-16.

85.Heimerich’s statement was not completely accurate. As we shall see, while identification with Baden as regional Heimat proved less extensive in the north end of the state, thousands supported the pro-Baden movement. BArch B106, Nr.2661, “Protokoll; der 4 Vollversammlung des Sachverständigen Ausschusses für die Neugliederung des Bundesgebiets, Schlagenbad, den 14/15 Oktober 1954,” 14 - 17; Protokoll über die Sitzung der 5. Vollversammlung des Sachverständigen - Ausschusses für die Neugliederung des Bundesgebiets vom 10. bis 12. Februar 1955 in Bad Ems, 5-6.

86.Bundesminister des Innern, 129.

87.In Bavarian Swabia this included separatist tendencies witnessed at the beginning of the postwar period. Blank, 126-127.

88.Dr. Meinhart of the *Fraänkische Arbeitsgemeinschaft* expressed these positions in a letter to the president of Rhineland-Palatinate as Bavaria was seeking the return of the Palatinate to Bavaria. LHK 860, Nr. 5167, Letter, Dr. Meinhart of the “Fränkische Arbeitsgemeinschaft” to Ministerpräsident Peter Altmeier, December 19, 1949.

89.Hall himself defined Westphalia as a space whose central axis was formed by Osnabrück and Emsland– a land that would be defined as being between the Rhine and Weser. He rejected theories that the border of Westphalia was the Teutoburger forest. Karl Hall, *Die Niedersächsisch-Westfälische Grenze und die Neugliederung Niedersachsens* (Marburg: NG Elwert, 1954).

90.The idea of a Westphalian “*Stamm*” that differentiated them from Lower Saxony was, if we conceive of the term as referring to the Germanic tribes, a misnomer. Indeed, both areas were both “tribally” Saxonian.

91.The report also noted that the controversial literature on the subject of the border of Westphalia and Lower Saxony brought no consensus and often differed based on the origins and background of the respective authors. BArch B 136, Nr.4344, F.4, “E III, Grenzraum zwischen Niedersachsen und Nordrhein-Westfalen,” 5.

92.Georg Schnath, *Heimat und Staat. Betrachtungen eines Niedersachsens* (Hameln: Niedersächsischen Landeszentrale für Heimatdienst, 1958), 15-28.

93.Bundesminister des Innern, 81.

- 94.BArch B106, Nr.266, "Protokoll; der 4 Vollversammlung des Sachverständigen Ausschusses für die Neugliederung des Bundesgebiets, Schlagenbad, den 14/15 Oktober 1954," 34.
- 95.Dorfey, 198.
- 96.The Heimatbund also did not include the Saarland, which had been part of the province. Adolf Flecken, *Gestaltung der Heimat nach rheinischer Eigenart: Festansprache am 24 Oktober 1965 zum Rheinischen Heimmattag in Trier* (Neuss: Gesellschaft für Buchdruckerei, 1966), 13-14.
- 97.BArch B106, Nr.2660, Dr. Deyn, "Schleswig-Holstein, eine historische und kulturelle Einheit?: Eine gutachtliche Äusserung zu Art.29 Abs.I des Grundgesetzes;" Olaf Klose, "Schleswig-Holstein, eine historische und kulturelle Einheit?: Eine gutachtliche Äußerung zu Art.29 Abs.I des Grundgesetzes." In spite of such a long history of unity, Schleswig-Holstein was one of the less federalist-oriented states. Dr. Pagel, the interior minister of Schleswig-Holstein wrote to the committee arguing that Northern German states should be gotten rid of altogether and replaced with *Landschaftsverbände*, while full states should be kept in the South. This reflected the Luther-Plan from the Weimar Republic. A *Landschaftsverband*, Pagel insisted, would be enough to reflect Schleswig-Holstein's common history, geography, and Stamm. BArch, B106, Nr.2660, Kabinettsvorschlag 136/51, Dr. Pagel, Der Innenminister des Landes Schleswig-Holstein an Herrn Ministerpräsidenten, Herren Minister, Herren Ministerialdirektoren. Betreff. Territoriale Neuordnung im Nordwestdeutschen Raum.
- 98.Brandt also emphasized his doubts that Lübeck would ever feel a sense of common regional feeling with Schleswig-Holstein, insisting that its cultural ties were decidedly "trans-territorial." BArch B106, Nr.2660, Dr. Ahasver von Brandt, "Die Vorschriften des Art.29, Ziffer 1 GG."
- 99.Bundesminister des Innern, 69-72; BArch B106, Nr.2661, DII Thesen über Hamburg, gesehen unter den Richtbegriffen des Art.29 Abs.1 GG (Anlage 6 z. Protok.v.10.-12.55).
- 100.BArch B106, Nr.4343, F.4, Hamburger Senatskanzlei, January 1953, "Memorandum zur Frage der staatlichen Selbständigkeit der Freien und Hansestadt Hamburg"
- 101.BArch, B 144, Nr.257, vol.2, Leaflet: Oldenburgischer Landesbund, "Oldenburg und die Neugliederung des Bundesgebietes;" BArch 144, Nr.254, Pamphlet: Oldenburgischen Landesbund, "Oldenburg und Niedersachsen: Eine Abrechnung," 2.
- 102.Schnath, 1-28.
- 103.Schiffers, 18-19.
- 104.Akademie für Raumforschung und Landesplanung, 10.
- 105.Hans Karl Geeb, "Sieben Volksbegehren zugelassen. In den Ländern Niedersachsen und Rheinland Pfalz - Zur Frage der Neugliederung des Bundesgebiets," *Bulletin des BPA* Nr.34, February 18, 1956, reprinted in Schiffers, 183-189.
- 106.The state of Hessen, for example, noted movements around Waldeck-Upland to leave Hessen and join North-Rhine Westphalia. Regierung des Landes Hessen, 50.
- 107.The ministry calculated the following numbers of signatures needed in each area accordingly: Pfalz 28,218; Rheinhessen 28,218; Koblenz-Trier 93,696; Oldenburg 49,807; Schaumburg-Lippe 5,491. Hans Karl Geeb, "Sieben Volksbegehren zugelassen. In den Ländern Niedersachsen und Rheinland Pfalz - Zur Frage der Neugliederung des Bundesgebiets," *Bulletin des BPA* Nr.34, February 18, 1956, reprinted in Schiffers, 183-189.
- 108.LHK, 860, Nr.8366, "RHEINLAND-PFALZ Bericht über Eindrücke bei der Bereisung des Landes in der Zeit vom 19. bis 26.5.1954," 6-7.
- 109.The society was founded in November 1949, with their primary goals being promotion of unification and maintaining Pfälzer cultural unity. LHK 860, Nr.4, "Satzung des Vereins 'Kurpfalz.'"
- 110."Luther-Ausschuß bereiste die Pfalz" and Ludwig Reichert, "Wohin gehört die Pfalz?: Referat vor dem Luther-Ausschuß in Neustadt, am 25. Mai 1954," *Kurpfalz*, July 26, 1954.
- 111.LHK 860, Nr.14, "Die Pfalz ein Herzstück Bayerns," *Bayern und Pfalz: Pfälzische Blätter für die Freunde der Wiedervereinigung*, May 1951.

- 112.BArch, B 136, Nr.4343, F.2, Letter, Gebhard Orth, Landesverband der Pfälzer im Rechtsrheinischen Bayern to Konrad Adenauer, March 22, 1950. The Bavarian Minister president Hans Ehard had likewise pushed the idea of a 700-year long connection between Bavaria and the Pfalz and praised the connections between them formed by a common dynasty. LHK 860, Nr.4, "Bayern und die Pfalz am Rhein" Aus der Rede des Bayerischen Ministerpräsidenten Dr. Hans Ehard vor dem Bayerischen Landtag am 30. Juli 1948.
- 113.LHK 700,145, Nr.566/3, Anton Keim, "Probleme der Länderneugliederung vor 100 Jahren: Aus einem Werk des Münchener Professors Wilhelm Heinrich Riehl (1823-1897)," *Staats-Zeitung*, December 11, 1955.
- 114.BArch B 106, Nr.2661, Referat Landahl zum Gutachten der Regierung des Landes Hessen am 14.10.1954 in Schlangenbad, 6. Debates revolved around the number of members of the Bavarian society, with the Kurpfalz society arguing that they had made numerous people members without their knowledge. "Wie man Mitglieder gewinnt," *Kurpfalz*, May 24, 1954.
- 115.LHK 860, Nr.7325, "Eine einmalige, nie wiederkehrende Gelegenheit," *Kurpfalz*, April 6, 1956.
- 116.LHK 700,145, Nr.566/1, "Verein Kurpfalz," *Kurpfalz*, December 12, 1955.
- 117.LHK 860, Nr.5110, Adolf Scharpff, "Die Pfalzfrage," *Zeitschrift für Geopolitik* 26 (March 1955): 141-143.
- 118.LHK 860, Nr. 7325, "Kurpfalz als Aufgabe und Symbol," *Kurpfalz*, April 18, 1956; "Wer will die Pfalz annektieren?: Eine irreführende Behauptung des Bundes Bayern und Pfalz," *Kurpfalz*, January 14, 1956.
- 119.LHK 860, Nr.4, "Tagung der Arbeitsgemeinschaft junger Pfälzer," *Stimme der Pfalz* 5, Nr.4 (April 1954): 8.
- 120.LHK 860, Nr.4, Letter, Lorenz Fey to Peter Altmeier, January 5, 1954; Typed copy: "Gott, können die Bayern charmant sein...," *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, October 12, 1951.
- 121.LHK 860, Nr.5, "Die Einmischung eines deutschen Landes in die Angelegenheiten eines anderen Landes." BArch, B 136/4343, Letter, Georg Stang, Präsident des Bayerischen Landtags, and Vorsitzender of the Bund der Pfälzfreunde in Bayern to Konrad Adenauer, April 6, 1951.
- 122.LHK 860, Nr.5, "Pfälzer tranken auf das 'bayerische Vaterland:' Das Landtagsbesuch aus Bayern in Bergzabern – Bürgermeister kredenzte einen Ehrentränk."
- 123.LHK 712, Plakat 2719.
- 124.LHK 700,145, Nr.566/3, Gustav Wolff, "Pfalz und Baden."
- 125.LHK 860, Nr.7325, "Die Pfalz im deutschen Südwesten," *Kurpfalz*, April 6, 1956.
- 126.LHK 860, Nr.4, "'Kurpfalz oder bayerische Pfalz?:' Eine Stellungnahme des Vereins Kurpfalz," *Die Rheinpfalz*, December 29, 1949.
- 127.Friedrich Metz, *Rheinschwaben* (Heidelberg: F.H. Kehle, 1948).
- 128.The magazine further re-iterated exaggerated histories of the Pfalz and Bavaria organically growing together since the Middle Ages. LHK 860, Nr.4, "Anonymes Zwecklos," *Stimme der Pfalz* 5, Nr.4 (April 1954): 2; "Kurpfälzer ohne Staatsheimat," *Stimme der Pfalz* 5, Nr.4 (April 1954): 2; "Die Pfalzfrage vor dem Luther-Ausschuß," *Stimme der Pfalz* 5, Nr.4 (April 1954): 3-5.
- 129.LHK 860, Nr. 5110, Adolf Süsterhenn, Circulatory Letter "Betrif. Arbeit des Luther-Ausschusses," February 14, 1955, 4-6.
- 130.LHK 860, Nr. 15, "Rheinland-Pfalz-Dienst," March 3, 1956; LHK 860, Nr. 4980, "Ein Ja zu Rheinland-Pfalz," *Union Presse Korrespondenz*, April 9, 1956; LHK 860, Nr.4, "Protokoll Zur Gründung des Bundes der Pfälzer," LHK 860, Nr.15, "Erst Einheit, dann Neugliederung!: Bund Rheinland-Pfalz konstituierte sich in Mainz," *Rheinzeitung*, February 29, 1956; "Neugliederer jetzt in einer Kampf-Front: Rheinland-Pfalz Gegner schlossen sich in Mainz zu einer Arbeitsgemeinschaft zusammen," *Pfälzische Volkszeitung*, March 13, 1956.
- 131.BArch B 136, Nr.4343, F.1, "Resolution des Landesverbandes der Pfälzer im rechtsrheinischen Bayern wegen Beteiligung an einem Volksentscheid nach Art. 29 des Grundgesetzes," February 23, 1950; B 144, Nr.256, Letter, Gebhard Orth to Bundesminister Heinrich Hellwege, March 22, 1950; B 136, Nr.4343, F.1, Circulatory Letter to all Bundestag representatives from the Landesverband der Pfälzer im Rechtsrheinischen Bayern, March 2, 1950.

- 132.LHK 712, Plakat 2712 and 2721, "Volksbegehren in Rheinland-Pfalz."
- 133.Statistischen Landesamt Rheinland-Pfalz, *Die Volksbegehren nach Artikel 29 Absatz 2 des Grundgesetzes vom 9. bis 22. April 1956* (Bad Ems: Statistischen Landesamt Rheinland-Pfalz, 1956), 27.
- 134.Dorfey, 14.
- 135.Dorfey, 453.
- 136.Dorfey, 89, 119, 130, 204.
- 137.LHK 860, Nr.9, Lutz Röhrich, "Volkskundliche Zusammenhänge und Grenzen in Rheinland-Pfalz;" LHK 860, Nr.9, Prof Dr. Eugen Ewig, "Die landsmannschaftliche Zusammensetzung der Bevölkerung im mittelhessischen Raum;" LHK 860, Nr.8366, "RHEINLAND-PFALZ Bericht über Eindrücke bei der Bereisung des Landes in der Zeit vom 19. bis 26.5.1954."
- 138.LHK 860, Nr.5186, Letter, Ministerium für Unterricht und Kultus to the Staatskanzlei, Mainz. Betr. Informationsreise des Sachverständigenausschusses für die Neugliederung des Bundesgebietes, August 31, 1954.
- 139.LHK 860, Nr.10, "Stenographische Niederschrift über die Sitzung des Luther-Ausschusses," Mainz, May 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup>, 1954, 10-11.
- 140.BArch B 106, Nr.2661, Referat Landahl zum Gutachten der Regierung des Landes Hessen am 14.10.1954 in Schlangenbad, 5.
- 141.Dorfey, 490.
- 142.Statistischen Landesamt Rheinland-Pfalz (1956), 16; "Volksbegehren: Angliederung der Regierungsbezirke Koblenz und Trier an das Land Nordrhein-Westfalen," in *Ibid*, 1-2.
- 143.While heavily Catholic counties reached only single digits, majority Protestant areas like Simmern could exceed 20%. Statistischen Landesamt Rheinland-Pfalz (1956), 16.
- 144.LHK 860, Nr.4979, "Versammlung des Heimatbundes Hessen-Nassau: Erste Diskussionen um umstrittene Rückgliederungsfrage – Geld für Unterschriften geboten?" The Bund Rheinland-Pfalz made a similar argument that one could not speak of a "re-uniting" of a larger Hessen, as the idea was itself a totally new construction. LHK 860, Nr. 4980, Dr. Armbruster, Bund Rheinland-Pfalz, "Das heutige Hessen ist nicht älter als Rheinland-Pfalz," March 19, 1956.
- 145.LHK 712, Plakat 2720.
- 146.LHK 860, Nr. 4536, Circulatory Letter, Helmut Pohl, Heimatbund Hessen-Nassau to the Teachers of Regierungsbezirk Montabaur, April 15, 1956.
- 147.LHK, 860, Nr. 4979, "Hessen-Nassau: Das Land, seine Menschen und seine Geschichte," *Nassauer Land*, Extrablatt, 1956 (date not given).
- 148.LHK 860, Nr.4979, "Auszug aus dem 'Nassauer Bote' vom 19. Januar 1956 'Die Stimmen 'Zurück nach Hessen' überwiegen.' Tradition spielt eine gewichtige Rolle."
- 149.LHK 860, Nr. 5185, Willi Hüfner, "Die abgetretenen althessischen Gebiete und die Kreise Kreuznach und St. Goar unter dem Gesichtspunkt des Art.29 I Grundgesetz," 2. Hüfner reported that Rheinhessen spoke a "Hessian-Pfälzer" dialect and that the four counties around Montabaur spoke a "Hessian-Nassauer dialect."
- 150.LHK 860, Nr.4980, State of Hessen, "Erklärung," Abschrift, January 6, 1956.
- 151.Statistischen Landesamtes Rheinland-Pfalz (1956), 16. This success in signature collection was in spite of extensive documentation by the Heimat society that the state of Rheinland-Pfalz impeded signature collection. Rheinhessen-Bund e.V., *Weissbuch zum Volksbegehren in Rheinhessen vom 9. bis 22. April 1956* (Mainz: Rheinhessen-Bund e.V., 1957).
- 152.LHK 860, Nr.8366, "RHEINLAND-PFALZ Bericht über Eindrücke bei der Bereisung des Landes in der Zeit vom 19. bis 26.5.1954," 7; Bundesminister des Innern, 94. Heinrich Landahl maintained the orientation of these areas to the left-Rhenish areas, though he argued that the areas around Montabaur were culturally oriented toward Hessen. BArch B 106, Nr.2661, Referat Landahl zum Gutachten der Regierung des Landes Hessen am 14.10.1954 in

Schlangenbad, 6.

153.LHK 860, Nr. 5161, Leaflet, Rheinessen-Bund e.V: Zur Wiedervereinigung von Rheinessen mit Hessen, April 9, 1956.

154.LHK 860, Nr. 4980, "Geschichtliche Verbundenheit maßgebend: Professor Hermann Brill und MdB Willy Müller sprachen Gestern Abend in Mainz," *Die Freiheit*, April 6, 1956.

155.LHK 860, Nr.4980, Advertisement: Volksbegehren in Rheinessen, March 16, 1956.

156.The Bund Rheinland-Pfalz particularly attacked notions of Hessen being reunified, insisting that current-day Hessen was a modern construct. LHK 860, Nr.15, "Rheinland-Pfalz-Dienst," March 3, 1956. This position echoed earlier statements to the same effects by Adolf Süsterhenn of the Luther Committee. BArch B106, Nr.2661, "Protokoll: der 4. Vollversammlung des Sachverständigen Ausschusses für die Neugliederung des Bundesgebiets. Schlagenbad, den 14./15. Oktober 1954."

157.Bettina Blank notes that in North Hessen, citizens only gradually became accustomed to the regional idea of a larger unified Hessen. Blank, 79, 89.

158.Schöller, Die Problematik, 37.

159.Flecken, 15.

160.Statistisches Landesamt Rheinland-Pfalz, *Die Volksentscheide in Rheinland-Pfalz am 19. Januar 1975* (Bad Ems: Statistisches Landesamt Rheinland-Pfalz, 1975), 9.

161.The Commission officially classified the constitutional requirement of "*landsmannschaftliche Verbundenheit*" as of secondary importance vis-a-vis practical considerations. "Forum: Welchem Verfassungspolitischen Rang hat die Föderalistische Gewaltenteilung in der BRD?," in *Neugliederung des Bundesgebietes: Tagung vom 15. bis 17. November 1973 in Bad Boll*, ed., Kurt Naumann (Bad Boll: Evangelische Akademie, 1975), 37.

162.Peter Schöller, "Problematik des Richtbegriffes," in *Vorschläge zur Neugliederung des Bundesgebietes gemäß Art.29 des Grundgesetzes: Materialien zum Bericht der Sachverständigenkommission*, ed.

Sachverständigenkommission für die Neugliederung des Bundesgebietes (Bonn: Bundesministerium des

Innern,1972), 163-165; Peter Schöller, "Problematik des Richtbegriffes," *Westfälische Forschungen*, 25, 42.

Hermann Aubin had attempted to create such a map. In the end he produced one that posited "core landscapes," but held that the borders of his map did not actually represent sharp borders, that all of the borders did not have the same value, and that the spaces he drew together were not always unified. BArch, B106, Nr.2660, Hermann Aubin, "Die Geschichtlichen Kulturräume Deutschlands: Versuch einer ersten Übersicht in Hinblick auf Art.29 GG."

163.Helmut Quaritsch, "Der unerfüllte Verfassungsauftrag," in *Neugliederung der Länder: Tagung vom 22. bis 25. März 1968*, ed., Werner von Hadel (Loccum: Evangelischen Akademie, 1968), 20-21.

164.Nipperdey has pointed to how federalism often served these functions and how such ideas of federalism in contemporary Germany have often been viewed as regressive "post-coach federalism." Nipperdey, 106 - 107.

165.BArch B106, Nr.2660, Dr Ahasver von Brandt, "Die Vorschriften des Art.29, Ziffer 1 GG;" BArch, B 106, Nr.2661, Prof Dr. Strickrodt, "Neugliederungsbericht über Nordrhein-Westfalen," Anlage 9, November 25, 1954.

166.Johannes Dietlein, "Artikel 29," (March, 2002) in *Bonner Kommentar zum Grundgesetz*, eds. Rudolf Dolzer, et. al. (Heidelberg: C.F. Müller, 2012), 51.

167.Heuss pointed out that "federalist" histories that such enthusiasts drew upon came from a feudal-dynastic past and not a democratic one. He also emphasized the problems of such visions given modern mobility. Theodor Heuss, "'Föderalismus: Eine Betrachtung vor Durchführung der Londoner 'Empfehlungen' Neuformung staatlicher Einheiten'" (Reprinted from *Rhein-Neckar Zeitung*, July 1, 1948), and Theodor Heuss, "Neugliederung der Länder" (Reprinted from *Rhein-Neckar-Zeitung*, August 2, 1948), both in *Streiten um das Staatsfragment: Theodor Heuss und Thomas Dehler Berichten von der Entstehung des Grundgesetzes*, eds., Thomas Hertfelder and Jürgen Heß (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlagsanstalt, 1999), 43-50.

## Chapter VI

1. Bundesarchiv Koblenz, hereafter BArch B 234, Nr. 626, "Polnische sorgen um die Oder-Neiße-Linie," *Ost-West-Kurier*, October 22-28, 1949.
2. Andreas Kossert, *Kalte Heimat. Die Geschichte der deutschen Vertriebenen nach 1945* (Munich: Siedler), 56-59.
3. BArch B 234, Nr. 631, "Wiederkehrende Frage: Steht unser Haus noch? Großes Begegnen: Manche Heimatvertriebene kamen nicht bis Berlin," *Telegraf*, September 16, 1958.
4. Maiken Umbach and Claus-Christian Szejnmann note that "Space is never unpolitical, but it exists prior to political instrumentalization." Maiken Umbach and Claus-Christian Szejnmann, "Introduction: Toward a Relational History of Spaces under National Socialism," in *Heimat, Region and Empire: Spatial Identities under National Socialism*, eds. Maiken Umbach and Claus-Christian Szejnmann (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 7.
5. BArch B 234, Nr. 626, "Polnische sorgen um die Oder-Neiße-Linie," *Ost-West-Kurier*, October 22-28, 1949.
6. Andrew Demshuk, *The Lost German East: Forced Migration and the Politics of Memory, 1945-1970* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012).
7. Heimat books were works by lay researchers, who emphasized identification. Ulrike Frede, "'Unsere Heimat war deutsch!': Überlegungen zum Umgang mit Geschichte und Geschichtsbildern in ostdeutschen Heimatbüchern," in *Das Heimatbuch. Geschichte, Methodik, Wirkung*, ed. Matthias Beer (Göttingen: V&R Unipress, 2010), 179-202.
8. BArch B 234, Nr. 627, Presseeinladung, Tag der Deutschen, 1955; B 136, Nr.4937, Fiche 1, Arbeitsbrief, Nr.11, Juni 1962, BdV, "Empfehlungen, Anregungen und Arbeitsunterlagen zum TAG DER HEIMAT am 9. September 1962;" Bund der Vertriebenen Private Archives, Bonn (Hereafter BdV-Bonn), Akte 452, Organizational Directions, BdV, "Freiheit, Recht, Friede: Der Tag der Heimat, 1964."
9. One exception is an article that looks at unveiling of monuments at events. Jeffrey Luppé, "The Commemorative Ceremonies of the Expellees: Tag der Heimat and Volkstrauertag," *German Politics and Society* 2, no.30 (Summer 2012): 1-20.
10. Josef Hanika, *Volkskundliche Wandlungen durch Heimatverlust und Zwangswanderung: Methodische Forschungsanleitung am Beispiel der deutschen Gegenwart* (Salzburg: Otto Müller, 1957), 123-126.
11. Harry Ebermann and Gerhard Möllhoff, "Psychiatrische Beobachtungen an heimatvertriebenen Donaudeutschen," *Der Nervenarzt: Monatsschrift für alle Gebiete nervenärztlicher Forschung und Praxis* 28 (1957): 399-405.
12. Erwin Krämer, "Lobgesänge in der Nacht," in *Volk von Morgen. Gedanken zur Begegnung von Einheimischen und Vertriebenen*, ed. Harald von Koenigswald (Troisdorf: Max Jarschel, 1951), 25.
13. Email J. Gutzzeit, "Die Kreisstadt Heiligenbeil," in *Heimattreffen des Kreises Heiligenbeil in der Landsmannschaft Ostpreußen, Sonntag, 15. Juli 1951 in Kiel*, ed. Paul Rosenbaum (Kiel: Kreisgemeinschaft Heiligenbeil, 1951), 7; At the 1952 Rhenish Heimat Day, Ernst Birke noted how all of these mediums were being used to reconnect. Ernst Birke, *Der Ostdeutsche Mensch im westdeutschen Raum. Vortrag gehalten auf dem Rheinischen Heimattag in Trier am 28 Juni 1952* (Troisdorf: Max Jarschel, 1953), 11. Personal tracing services and indexes were also highlighted at several *Tag der Heimat* observances. Events in Oppenheim, for example, had its own tracing services center to find lost loved ones. BArch B 234, Nr.626, "Tag der Heimat: am 3 August Treffen der Heimatvertriebenen in Oppenheim," *Die Freiheit, Mainz*, June 30, 1952.
14. Erich Papp and Robert Will, eds., *550 Jahre Stadt Gerdauen 1398-1948: zum 3. Heimattreffen in Hannover am 24 September 1948* (Hannover: Eckert, 1948); Landkreis Peine, ed., *Festschrift zum 9. Heimattreffen der Falkenberger aus Stadt und Land anlässlich der feierlichen Übernahme der Patenschaft durch den Landkreis Peine, 14. August 1954 in Peine* (Peine: Otto Fischer, 1954).
15. Georg Goebel, "Dem Tag der Heimat zum Gruß!," in *Heimattreffen der Ostvertriebenen in der Stadt und des Landkreises Minden, 1. Oktober 1950*, ed. Georg Goebel (Minden: Wilhelm Köhler, 1950), 3.
16. Emil Janke, "Meine lieben Egerer!," in *Festschrift zum Ersten Egerer Heimattreffen, 2. u. 3 Juli 1949 in Rothenburg O.D.T.*, ed. Heribert Sturm (Ansbach: Gg. Fischer, 1949), 6.

- 17.BArch B 234, Nr.626, "Danziger sahen sich Wieder," *Die Welt*, August 3, 1953, 20,000; "Rückchau auf unser Bundestreffen in Hamburg," *Der Westpreuße*, June 1951, 2.
18. See the BdV guide for holding *Tag der Heimat* observances. Gustl Huber, ed., *Tag der Heimat, Tag der Deutschen* (Bonn: Bund der Vertriebenen, 1988).
- 19.BArch B 234, Nr.636, Speech, Director of the Berlin Office of the BvD, Werner Guillaume, "Tag der Heimat" in Münster, 1962, 2.
- 20.BArch B 234, Nr. 638, Kulturreferat des Bundes der Vertriebenen, "Der Tag der Heimat 1963," BdV Arbeitsbrief Nr.13, July 1963, 1-3. Matthias Stickler, "*Ostdeutsch heisst Gesamtdeutsch:*" *Organisation, Selbstverständnis und Heimatpolitische Zielsetzung der Deutschen Vertriebenenverbände 1949-1972* (Düsseldorf: Droste, 2004), 155-171.
- 21.Ulrike Frede demonstrates this in her study of Heimat books written by lay figures for a series of Silesian villages. See Ulrike Frede, "'Unsere Heimat war deutsch!'" in Beer, ed., 184.
- 22."Richtlinien für Ansprachen am Tag der Heimat dem 9.10.1949," reprinted in Bernd Sonnewald, *Die Entstehung und Entwicklung der ostdeutschen Landsmannschaften von 1947 bis 1952* (Doctoral Dissertation, Freie Universität Berlin, 1975), 295-298. For the 1951 version, see BArch B 234, Nr.1382, Rundschreiben, Kulturreferat der Landesverband der Ostvertriebenen NRW, Düsseldorf, den 20.6.1951 an alle Kulturwarte der Kreisvereinigungen.
- 23.For example, while Hamburg gave 3,000 DM, cities like Kiel refused funds. StAHH 131-1 II, Nr.1243, Doc 49.
- 24.BArch B 234, Nr.626, "Zusammenschluß der Heimatvertriebenen: Großkundgebung in der 'Neuen Welt,'" *Der Tag*, July 19, 1949. Berlin also saw a rally demanding return of their Heimat. "Ruf an die Welt aus Berlin!," *Ost-West Kurier*, October 28, 1949; "Niemals Oder-Neiße-Linie!," *Telegraf*, October 19, 1949.
- 25.Volkmar Zühlsdorf, "Die schwierigen Anfänge: Von der Vertreibung zur 'Charta der deutschen Heimatvertriebenen'" in *Verständigung der deutschen Vertriebenen mit den östlichen Nachbarn: Vergangenheit und Zukunft*, ed. Christof Dahmen (Bonn: Kulturstiftung der deutschen Vertriebenen, 1992), 18.
- 26.English translations derive from the official translation issued by the expellee leadership in 1950. This does not include the translation "right to the Heimat" (Recht auf die Heimat,) which the English version renders as "right to our native land." BArch B 234, Nr. 1119, "Charta der deutschen Heimatvertriebenen in 19 Sprachen, 1950."
- 27.For discussion of the Charta as a farce, see Kurt Nelhiebel, "60 Jahre Charta der deutschen Heimatvertriebenen. Ursprung und Rezeption eines umstrittenen Dokuments," *Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft* 9 (2010): 730-743.
- 28.Institut für Stadtgeschichte Frankfurt (Hereafter ISF), PIA-Sammlung, S6b-38, Nr.351, "300,000 Sudetendeutsche trafen sich in Frankfurt," *Frankfurter Neue Presse*, May 6, 1953; BArch B 234, Nr. 626, "Glänzender Höhepunkt der Schlesiertreffens," *Neuer Deutscher Kurier*, August 8, 1953; Kulturstelle Schlesien, ed., *Viertes Bundestreffen der Schlesier, Köln 1953* (Cologne: Kölnische Verlagsdruckerei, 1953).
- 29.Stickler, 157-171.
- 30.BArch B 234, Nr.626, "Anspruch auf die ostdeutsche Heimat," *Der Tagesspiegel*, August 5, 1952. For expellee society membership figures, see Pertti Aho, *After the Expulsion: West Germany and Eastern Europe 1945-1990* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 5-12.
- 31.Those which I have been able to confirm include: West Berlin, Hamburg, Munich, Frankfurt, Stuttgart, Bremen, Essen, Düsseldorf, Dortmund, Hannover, Nuremberg, Bonn, Mannheim, Karlsruhe, Mainz, Wiesbaden, Trier, Lübeck, Bielefeld, Freiburg, Regensburg, Osnabrück, Bayreuth, Kassel, Celle, Hameln, Heilbronn, Passau, Landshut, Fürth, Gießen, Cuxhaven, Pforzheim, Lüneburg, Sinzig, Ansbach, Wetzlar, Poppenhausen, Oppenheim, Rosenheim, Braunau, Bingen, Fulda, Kempten, Schwäbisch-Gmünd, Felsenburg, Steinfeld, Waldshut, Gersfeld, Hof, Wilhelmshaven, Fallingb., Bad Kissingen, Korbach, and Bad-Wildungen. Observances in these cities are recounted in the newspaper clippings found in BArch B 234, Nr. 626, Tag der Heimat, 1949-1954.
32. Even in 1960, *The Times* reported that some East Germans found their way to observances in West Berlin, with a degree of personal risk. "Cautious Note at Rally of the German Refugees," *The Times*, September 5, 1960.
- 33.Michael Schwartz, "Der historische deutsche Osten in der Erinnerungskultur der DDR," in *Die Vertreibung der deutschen aus dem Osten in der Erinnerungskultur*, ed. Jörg-Dieter Gauger (Sankt Augustin: Konrad-Adenauer Stiftung, 2005), 75.

- 34.BArch B 234, Nr.626, "Tag der Danziger," *Montags-Echo*, August 6, 1951; "Zeittafel: Tag der Stettiner," in *25 Jahre Patenschaft der Hansestadt Lübeck für Stettin, 1953-1978*, ed. Senat der Hansestadt Lübeck und der Heimatkreisausschuß Groß Stettin (Lübeck: Eugen Radkte, 1978), 12. In 1958, Danziger met on Lake Constance. BArch B 234, Nr. 631, "Vertriebene gedachten der Heimat," *Der Mittag*, September 15 1958.
- 35.BArch B 234, Nr. 626, "Sie die Posaunen Jerichos...Tage der Heimat auch diesmal wieder ein machtvolles Bekenntnis," *Berliner Morgenpost*, August 4, 1953.
- 36.BArch B 234, Nr.630, "Heimattag der Waldenburger in Dortmund," *Der Vertriebenen: Organ des Berliner Landesverbandes der Vertriebenen*, September 15, 1956. "Während des Heimattreffens finden folgende Sondertreffen statt," in Patenschafts-Arbeitskreis Waldenburg-Dortmund, 9-10; Rudolf von Auen, ed., *Festschrift Sudetendeutscher Tag 1952, Stuttgart 30. Mai-2. Juni* (Geislingen: Maurersche, 1952), 10-13. For another example of schematics for reunion, see also Heimatgruppe Isergebirge, ed., *Festschrift zum Heimattreffen der Isergebirgler, Kreis Gablonz, in Schwäbisch Gmünd* (Schwäbisch Gmünd: Alfons Urban, 1952), 11-13.
- 37.For particularly salient examples of such model speeches that channeled private worlds of Heimat into national politics see "Selbstbestimmung und Heimatrecht – Zum Tag der deutschen Heimat 1956," in *Erklärungen zur Deutschlandpolitik. Eine Dokumentation von Stellungnahmen, Reden und Entschliefungen des Bundes der Vertriebenen - Vereinigte Landsmannschaften und Landesverbände*, vol.1, 1949-1972, eds. Werner Blumenthal and Bardo Faßbender (Bonn: Kulturstiftung der deutschen Vertriebenen, 1984), 53. BvD Bonn, Akte 452, Tag der Heimat, Program "Tag der Heimat," August 30, 1964, Tag der Heimat, "Vorschläge für die Gestaltung einer Ansprache zum "Tag der Heimat," 1967;" "Redeentwurf zum Tag der Heimat, 1971," 2.
- 38."Erinnerung - Verpflichtung - Forderung," in *Festschrift zum Tag der Heimat: Kirchhain 1951, Treffen der Heimatvertriebenen, Fest der Gemeinschaft* (Marburg: Kreisverband der Heimatvertriebenen Marburg, 1951), 9.
- 39.BArch B 234, Nr.1382, Abschrift, "Zum Tag der Deutschen Heimat: Grundsatz und Redner Material für die Verbände," July 30, 1954.
- 40.These included, in the case of Heidelberg, the Cultural Organization of the German East in Heidelberg, the local branch of the BdV, the Union of Landsmannschaften, the Union of Soviet Expellees, the Middle German Landsmannschaften, the expellee Catholic religious organization the *Ackermannsgemeinde*, the Union of Victims of Stalinism, the German Youth of the East, the Baltic-German Landsmannschaft, the Working Group of Expellee and Refugee Women, the Working Group of Expellee Teachers, the Organization of Expellees, and the Student Working Organization for Eastern Questions. BArch B 234, Nr.1006, Programm, Heidelberg, Tag der Heimat, 1966.
- 41.StAHH 131-1 II, Nr.1244, Letter, Hubert Dettmeyer to the Hamburg Senate, April 27, 1955; "Heimattnachrichten und Erinnerungen für alle vertriebenen Marienburger," *Marienburger Zeitung*, August/September 1963.
- 42.E. Hoffmann, "Heimatgedenken!" in *Oberes Adlersgebirge Heimattreffen in Darfeld vom 23. bis 25. Juli 1955*, ed. W. Netta (Billerbeck: Max Knüppel, 1955), 31.
- 43.BdV-Bonn, Akte 452, Draft Speech for Tag der Heimat 1964, "Ein Entwurf und eine Anregung" 7-8, in Organizational Directions, BdV, "Freiheit, Recht, Friede: Der Tag der Heimat, 1964."
- 44.Michael von Engelhardt, *Lebensgeschichte und Gesellschaftsgeschichte. Biographieverläufe von heimatvertriebenen des Zweiten Weltkriegs* (Munich: Iudicium, 2001).
- 45.This is not to say that expellee society leaders were a homogenous group. Recent work emphasizes their diversity, including Wolfgang Fischer who argues that they were both diverse and unified by the common experience of expulsion. Stickler. Wolfgang Fischer, *Heimat-Politiker?: Selbstverständnis und politisches Handeln von Vertriebenen als Abgeordnete im Deutschen Bundestag, 1949 bis 1974* (Düsseldorf: Droste, 2010). For further work emphasizing the need to differentiate between different groups of expellee leaders, see Reinhard Rohde, "Heinrich Albertz und Erich Schellhaus: Zwei Flüchtlingspolitiker der ersten Stunde," in *Zwischen Heimat und Zuhause. Deute Flüchtlinge und Vertriebene in (West-)Deutschland 1945-2000*, ed. Rainer Schulze (Osnabrück: Secolo, 2001), 126-140.
- 46.The expellee leader Wenzel Jaksch argued that the expellee societies bravely staked out the position of the "patriotic middle." BdV-Bonn, Akte Deutschlandkundgebung, "Ansprache Dr. h.c. Wenzel Jaksch, MdB, Präsident des BdV, DEUTSCHLANDKUNDGEBUNG des BdV am 14. Mai 1966 am Marktplatz in Bonn," 15.



47. For one example of an often re-appearing trope of rejecting “exaggerated” nationalism, see BdV-Bonn, Akte 452, Vorsitzenden des BdV-Landesverband Bayern, Walter Richter, “Redeentwurf zum Tag der Heimat, 1968,” 14. At a 1951 event, a Sudeten German Bundestag member in a *Tag der Heimat* speech rejected labeling of the expelled organizations as nationalist or neo-fascist— illustrating in his rejections the early prevalence of such accusations. BArch B 234, Nr. 626, “Gegen Potsdam, für Europa: Hunderttausende demonstrieren am ‘Tag der Heimat,’” *Ost-West-Kurier*, August 1951.
48. The 1954 *Tag der Heimat* in Berlin was also held in the first week of August, while the rest in West Germany occurred in early September. Thereafter it would be held in early September in all locations. The date change was originally supposed to be temporary. BArch B 234, Nr. 1382, Letter, Aufbaugemeinschaft Hamburg to the BvD Headquarters in Bonn, October 6, 1953; Letter Landesverband Schleswig Holstein to BvD Bonn, July 10, 1953; Letter from the Landesverbandvorsitzender von Bayern, BvD, to BvD headquarters in Bonn, 9.10.1954; Abschrift, “Zum Tag der Deutschen Heimat: Grundsatz und Redner Material für die Verbände,” July 30, 1954; Letter, Bundesgeschäftsführer, A. Langen an den Vorsitzenden des Landesverbandes Rheinland-Pfalz des Bundes der Vertriebenen Deutschen, May 3, 1955; B 136, Nr.4937, Arbeitsbrief, Nr.11, Juni 1962, BdV, “Empfehlungen, Anregungen und Arbeitsunterlagen zum TAG DER HEIMAT am 9. September 1962.” As late as 1978, *Tag der Heimat* model speeches included references to the tradition as a protest against Potsdam and designation of the event as about national self-assertion. BArch B 234, Nr. 1208, Speech, Tag der Heimat 1978, Redevorlage, BdV Bundesgeschäftsführung to BdV-Landesverbände and Bundeslandmannschaften, July 10, 1978.
49. BArch B 234, Nr.1382, Letter BvD, Landesverband Hessen to BvD Bonn, April 21, 1954.
50. The first “Day of the Germans” was held in 1955 and was not observed again until the 1960's, when it was held quite regularly. Pre-parliament representatives included members of the Bundestag, regional parliaments, and member of the expelled organizations
51. For a list of *Tag der Heimat* themes see Guberl, ed.
52. J. Wolff, “Kommt und laßt uns Deutschland lieben,” and “Deutsch sein!,” in *550 Jahre Stadt Gerdaun*, 8, 27.
53. Der Ausschuss, “Willkommen,” “Neudek: Ein geschichtlicher Überblick,” and “Anton Günter, der Sänger des Erzgebirges,” in *Festschrift: 2. Heimattreffen Landkreis Neudek: Patenschaft Göggingen-Neudek, 31.7-1.8.1954* (Kochel am See: Josef Ziegler, 1954), 2-6, 14, 32.
54. Paul Rosenbaum, “Ostpreuße, deine Heimat ruft dich!,” in *Heimattreffen des Kreises Heligenbeil*, 1.
55. Otto Demuth, “Unsere Schutzverein,” in *Festschrift zum Heimattreffen der Isergebirger*, 35-38.
56. L. Lauritzen, ed., *Zweites Danzig-Westpreußisches Heimattreffen in Hessen* (Kassel, 1957), 5.
57. Julian Will, “Fern vom Land der Ahnen,” (Lied der Auslandsdeutsche) in *Heimattreffen der Landsmannschaft Weichsel/Warthe, Landesverband Nordrhein-Westfalen e.V. in Gelsenkirchen am 4./5. Juli 1953* (N.p: n.p., 1953), 6.
58. BArch B 234, Nr. 1382, Program, “Tag der deutschen Heimat am Sonntag, den 2. August 1953 in Goslar.”
59. BArch B 234, Nr. 626, “‘Tag der Heimat’– Bekenntnis zum Vaterland,” *Passauer Neue Presse*, August 3, 1953. Landsmannschaft der Pommern und Brandenburger in Stuttgart, ed., *Heimattreffen der Pommern und Brandenburger in Baden-Württemberg am 30. und 31. August 1952* (Stuttgart: Selbstverlag, 1952), 1.
60. BArch B 234, Nr.626, “Der ‘Tag der Heimat’ soll Brücken Schlagen: MdL Dr. Kolarczyk sprach im Leiderersaal: ‘Man kann uns die Heimat nicht für immer nehmen!’,” *Isar-Post, Landshut*, September 13, 1954.
61. BArch B 234, Nr. 626, “Tag der deutschen Heimat: Gedenken an die Ostgebiete/Geleitworte von Kaiser und Oberländer,” *Memminger Zeitung*, September 11, 1954; B 234, Nr. 630, Theodor Oberländer, “Grußwort zum Tag der Heimat in Berlin am 9.9.1956.”
62. BArch B 234, Nr. 1006, Letter, Walter Herles, BdV, Kreisverband Lindau to BvD Bundesgeschäftsführung, Bonn, September 18, 1966.
63. “Zum Tag der Heimat,” in *Tag der Heimat am 14. September 1958* (Bad Kreuznach: Kreis- und Stadtbund Bad Kreuznach im Bund vertriebener Deutscher, 1958), 2.

64. BArch B 234, Nr. 626, "Protokoll der Pressekonferenz am 2. August 1952 in 'Haus der ostdeutschen Heimat' anlässlich des 'Tages der Heimat 1952.'"
65. Geo Jercke, "Liebe Danziger Landsleute!" and Helmut Behrend, "Liebe Landsleute aus Westpreußen," in *Zweites Danzig-Westpreußisches Heimattreffen in Hessen*, 3. For the original text from the *Friesenlied*, see Gertrud Stendal, *Die Heimathymnen der preußischen Provinzen und ihrer Landschaften. Eine literarische Charakteristik* (Heidelberg: Carl Winters, 1919), 125.
66. "Rede Erich Simmels zum 10 jährigen Bestehen des Kreisverbandes Kronach des BvD am 1. Juni 1958," Speech at Tag der Heimat, reprinted in *Bayerns vierter Stamm. Die Integration der Flüchtlinge und Heimatvertriebenen nach 1945*, ed. Rudolf Endres (Cologne: Böhlau, 1998), 114-117.
67. Only a few exceptions can be found. One 1963 *Tag der Heimat* exhibition included a small section on African rights to self-determination. In Frankfurt in 1965, refugees in several Asian countries were mentioned, while the 1966 events in Lindau included collection of donations for African and Asian refugees. Nevertheless, such examples were extremely uncommon. BArch B 234, Nr. 638, "Veranstaltungen zum Tag der Heimat in Berlin: Haus der Ostdeutschen Heimat;" B 234, Nr. 1006, "'Wir berufen uns auf die Atlantik-Charta!:' Gutbesuchte Feierstunde des Bundes der Vertriebenen am 'Tag der Heimat' in Lindau," *Lindauer Zeitung*, September 13, 1966. ISF, S3/T, 3.906. "Heimat als Aufgabe," *FAZ*, September 4, 1965.
68. BArch B 234, Nr. 627, Rudolf Lodgman von Auen, Zweiter Vorsitzender des Verbandes der Landsmannschaften, Speech at Tag der Deutschen, West Berlin, 1955.
69. Organizers of the *Tag der Heimat* noted how they needed to attract West German participants and speakers to bolster the tradition's "complete-German meaning." StAHH 131-1, II, Nr. 1243. Landesverband der vertriebenen Deutschen in Hamburg, e.V. "Protokoll über die Sitzung zum 'Tag der Heimat' am 10.09.1954."
70. "3. August: Tag der Heimat," *Der Schlesier*, August 5, 1952.
71. BArch B 234, Nr. 1382, Letter from the Vorsitzender of the BvD, Alfons Langen, an den Herrn Bundesminister des Innern, August 16, 1954; Letter to the Innenminister Gerhard Schröder (CDU).
72. BArch B 234, Nr. 626, "Vertriebene feiern den Tag der Heimat: Kundgebung in Berlin und im Bundesgebiet," *Die Neue Zeitung*, August 7, 1951; Eduard Eberle, 1. Vorsitzender and Heinz Lang, Kreisgeschäftsführer, "In der Einigkeit liegt unsere Zukunft!" in *Festschrift zum Tag der Heimat: Kirchhain 1951*, 6.
73. BArch B 234, Nr. 626, "Gedanken zum 'Tag der Heimat,'" *Rhein-Zeitung, Koblenz*, September 12, 1954; "Wir rufen das Gewissen der Welt!: Erhebende Kundgebung am Deutschen Eck zum 'Tag der Heimat'– Mehr als 2000 Teilnehmer," *Rhein-Zeitung*, September 13, 1954.
74. Herr Brücker, Kreisverband des BvD, "Schicksalsgenossen der Stadt und des Landkreises Schlochau!," and Joachim von Münchow, Untitled in *Festschrift zum Heimattreffen des Kreises Schlochau: Pfingsten 1954 in Northeim*, ed. Festausschuss Heimattreffen des Kreises Schlochau (Hademarschen: Constabel, 1955), 4, 6.
75. Pfarrer Hoppe, "Ansage," and Kulturreferenten des Ortverbandes Hilden des BvD und des Ortsverbandes der schlesischen Landsmannschaft, Ernst-Günther Häring, "Schlußwort," in *Gabe der Stadt Hilden für das erste Wohlauler Heimattreffen in Hilden, 24-26. Mai 1958*, ed. Heinrich Strangmeier (Hilden: Fr. Peters, 1958), 58, 71.
76. Luppens, "The Commemorative Ceremonies of the Expellees," 1-20.
77. BArch B 234, Nr. 631, "Haus der Ostdeutschen Heimat," Veranstaltungen September 1957; B 234, Nr. 629, Berliner Landesverband der Vertriebenen, "Vorschläge für die Gestaltung des 'Tages der deutschen Heimat,'" 1956.
78. BArch B 234, Nr. 628, Berliner Landesverband der Vertriebenen, "Presseinformationen zum 'Tag der Heimat' am 9 September 1956 in Berlin."
79. BArch B 234, Nr. 631, Verband der Landsmannschaften, "Empfehlungen für den Tag der Heimat 1958," Bonn, June 1958, 6.
80. BArch B 234, Nr. 1452, Tag der Heimat, Berlin, 1966, "Ansprache des 1. Vorsitzenden des Berliner Landesverbandes der Vertriebenen, Herrn Dr. Hans Matthee;" B 234, Nr. 642. Wenzel Jaksch, Press Release, "BdV/Deutscher Ostdienst," August 15, 1966. The 1978 model speech, for example, denounced equation of Germany with West Germany in public consciousness. B 234, Nr. 1208, Speech, Tag der Heimat 1978, Redeavorlage,

- BdV Bundesgeschäftsführung to BdV-Landesverbände and Bundeslandmannschaften, July 10, 1978.
- 81.BArch B 234, Nr.628, Dr. Rosek, "Vorschläge für Veranstaltungen anlässlich der zehnjährigen Wiederkehr der Vertreibung für Berlin, 1955."
- 82.BdV-Bonn, Akte 452, Organizational Directions, BdV, "Freiheit, Recht, Friede: Der Tag der Heimat, 1964."
- 83.BArch B 234, Nr. 633, "Empfehlungen, Anregungen und Arbeitsunterlagen zum TAG DER HEIMAT am 11 September 1960, BdV, Kulturreferat. Arbeitsbrief Nr.4, Juli 1960."
- 84.BArch B 136, Nr.4937, Fiche 1, "Arbeitsbrief, Nr.11, Juni 1962, BdV, Empfehlungen, Anregungen und Arbeitsunterlagen zum TAG DER HEIMAT am 9. September 1962."
- 85.BArch B 234, Nr. 626, "Kein zweite Zuhause kann ersetzen, was ihnen einmal gehörte," *Donau-Kurier*, Ingolstadt, September 12, 1954.
86. The speech continued that loss of the East must be considered "a matter of all Germany and of all the German people." BArch B 234, Nr. 1382, "Unterlagen für die Festrede des Vertriebenen-Redners am 'Tag der Heimat'" (2 August 1953)."
- 87.BArch B 234, Nr. 626, "Protokoll der Rede des 1. Vorsitzenden der Berliner Landesverbandes der Heimatvertriebenen e.V. Dr. Alfred Rojeck, anlässlich des 'Tages der Deutschen Heimat' am 2. August 1953."
- 88.BArch B 234, Nr.626, "'Ach, die Heimat hinter den Gipfeln...:' Die Vertriebenen feierten den 'Tag der deutschen Heimat,'" *Badische Zeitung*, August 3, 1953.
- 89.Despite often going off script, two factors informed the continued invitation of local politicians. The first was to give events complete-German symbolism. The second was that the expellee organizers received significant subsidies for events from both the Federal government and from cities themselves. Alfred Rojeck, among others, pointed in 1955 in West Berlin to West German politicians speaking at events as conveying the tradition's complete-German meaning. BArch B 234, Nr. 627, Dr. Alfred Rojeck, Der erste Vorsitzende des Berliner Landesverbandes der Vertriebenen, Speech at Tag der Deutschen, 1955.
- 90.BArch B 234, Nr. 648, "Erklärung des Berliner Landesverbandes der Vertriebenen," (1970).
- 91.Willi Koch, "Liebe Heimatfreunde aus dem Waldenburger Bergland!," in *Festschrift zum 4. Waldenburger Heimattreffen in der Patenstadt Dortmund am 23 Juli und 24 Juli 1955* (Leer: Gerhard Rautenberg, 1955), 1.
- 92.BArch B 234, Nr. 626, "Unvergessene alte Heimat: Heimatvertriebene und Altbürger feierten gemeinsam den 'Tag der Heimat,'" *Badische Neueste Nachrichten*, August 3, 1953.
- 93.Otto Zerlik, "Von der Werk- und Festtagsfreude der Egerländer," and Emil Janke, "Meine lieben Egerer!," in *Festschrift zum Ersten Egerer Heimattreffen*, 6, 11.
- 94."3. August: Tag der Heimat," *Der Schlesier*, August 5, 1952; Alfon Perlick, "Bleibende Verpflichtung der Beuthener Bürger: Ein Vortrag gehalten auf dem Beuthener Heimattag 1953 in der Patenstadt Recklinghausen," *Mitteilungen des Beuthener Geschichts- und Museumsvereins* 15/16 (1954/55): 8.
- 95.BArch B 234, Nr. 626, "Heimattage in Köln und Berlin," *Die Welt*, October 9, 1950.
- 96.Alfons Langen, the head of the ZvD, emphasized *Tag der Heimat* as pushing against massification. BArch B 234, Nr.1382, Rundschreiben Nr. 129, ZvD, A. Langen to Herrn Landesvorstizenden und Landesgeschäftsführer, June 3, 1953. Local organizers at the 1954 events similarly emphasized how Heimat gained meaning as a bulwark against "shapeless massification" of society. StAHH 131-1 II, Nr. 1243, "TAG DER HEIMAT 1954 in Hamburg."
- 97.Alfons Urban, "Pflege des Heimatgedankens der Isergebirgler in Schwäbisch Gmünd," in *Heimattreffen der Isergebirgler, Kreis Gablonz in Schwäbisch Gmünd, 25.-26. Juni 1960*, ed. Alfons Urban (Schwäbisch Gmünd: Einhorn, 1960), 15.
- 98.StAHH 131-1, II, Nr. 1243, Staatssekretär Nahm, Speech, Tag der Heimat 1958, "Heimat als Aufgabe: Das Unrecht der Vertreibung."
- 99.Sonneward, 134.

100. For other examples of expellee model speeches from the 1950s through the 1970s that insisted that the Soviet bloc was a zone of non-Heimat, see BArch B 234, Nr. 1382, "Unterlagen für die Festrede des Vertriebenen-Redners am 'Tag der Heimat'" (2 August 1953); StaHH 131-1, II, Nr. 1243, BdV & Vereinigte Landsmannschaften und Landesverbände, "Arbeitsbrief Nr.11, Juni 1962: Empfehlungen, Anregungen und Arbeitsunterlagen zum TAG DER HEIMAT am 9. September, 1962;" BArch B 234, Nr. 1208, BdV Bundesgeschäftsführung, Rede vorlage zum Tag der Heimat, July 10, 1978, to the BdV-Landesverbände und Bundeslandsmannschaften; Model Speech, BvD & BL, "Selbstbestimmung und Heimatrecht – Zum Tag der deutschen Heimat 1956," June 11, 1956, reprinted in ed. Werner Blumenthal and Faßbender, 53-54.

101. This quotation is derived from the 1962 Tag der Heimat speech of Werner Guillaume, which quoted Schreiber's 1950 speech. BArch B 234, Nr. 636, Festansprache des Leiters des Berliner Büros des BdV, Werner Guillaume, "Tag der Heimat 1962 in Münster/Westf." Another expellee speaker argued that "Where unfreedom dominated, where a regime of violent rule is used, Heimat will become foreign." "Wo die Unfreiheit herrscht, wo ein Regime der Gewalt Herrschaft ausübt, wird die Heimat zur Fremde." BArch B 234, Nr.648, Herbert Hupka, MdB, Bundesvorsitzender der Landsmannschaft Schlesien, Speech, "Heimat in Freiheit," Tag der Heimat, Berlin, September 6, 1970, 7. Such examples support Marion Frantziach's argument that expellee anti-communism assisted in their identification with the democracy in the FRG. Marion Frantziach, *Die Vertriebenen: Hemmnisse, Antriebskräfte und Wege ihrer Integration in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland* (Berlin: Dietrich Reimer, 1987), 155.

102. See, in particular, examples from Hans Matthee, Wenzel Jaksch, and Erich Mende. BArch B 234, Nr.1452, Tag der Heimat, Berlin, 1966, "Ansprache des 1. Vorsitzenden des Berliner Landverbandes der Vertriebenen, Herr Dr. Hans Matthee," and "Ansprache des Vizekanzlers und Bundesministers für gesamtdeutsche Fragen, Dr. Erich Mende zum TAG DER HEIMAT, 1966," "Dr. h.c. Wenzel Jaksch zum TAG DER HEIMAT BERLIN 1966."

103. BArch B 234, Nr. 638, "Wortlaut der Rede von Bundesminister a.D. Ernst Lemmer zum diesjährigen TAG DER HEIMAT 1963 in der Berliner Waldbühne am 1. September 1963."

104. StaHH 131-1 II, Nr. 1243, Edgar Engelhard, "Tag der Deutschen Heimat," "Protokoll über die Sitzung anlässlich des 'Tages der Heimat' am 23. September 1954."

105. StaHH 131-1 II, Nr. 1243, Landesverband der vertriebenen Deutschen in Hamburg e.V., "Protokoll über die Sitzung zum 'Tag der Heimat' am 10.8.1954," "TAG DER HEIMAT 1954 in Hamburg."

106. StaHH 131-1 II, Nr. 1243, Letter from the Verband Deutscher Soldaten, Landesverband Hamburg to the Hamburg Senator Dr. Jess, September 14, 1954; Senatkanzlei, Vermerk, September 15, 1954, Betrifft: Teilnahme von Fahnenabordnungen militärischer Traditionsverbände in Uniform am Tag der Deutschen Heimat am 12. September 1954;" Letter from the Kyffhäuserbund to the Hamburg Senate, September 16, 1954.

107. Klaus Hinst, *Das Verhältnis zwischen Westdeutschen und Flüchtlingen: Eine empirische Untersuchung* (Berlin: Hans Huber, 1968), Poll Question 52, 120, 131.

108. BArch B 234, Nr. 626, "Zum Tag der Heimat am 3. August!," *Frankenpost*, July 31, 1952.

109. Ernst Lehmann, "Wir Sudetendeutsche," in *Festschrift Sudetendeutscher Tag 1952*, 23.

110. "Tag der Heimat," *Mittelbayerische Zeitung*, October 8, 1949; "Tag der verlorenen Heimat: Über 10000 Ostervertriebene demonstrieren gegen das Unrecht von Potsdam," *Mittelbayerische Zeitung*, October 10, 1949.

111. BArch B 234, Nr. 629, "Zum Tag der Heimat: Es geht um die Menschenwürde: Das Geist des Nationalismus und es Chauvinismus muß überwunden werden," *Gesamtdeutscher Kurier*, September 11, 1954; B 234, Nr. 1382, Bundesgeschäftsführer Alfons Langen, "Rundschreiben Nr. 129," ZvD, to the Landesvorsitzenden und Landesgeschäftsführer, June 3, 1953; B 136, Nr. 4937, F.1, Vereinigte Landsmannschaften Mitteldeutschlands, "Rundbrief. Tag der Heimat 1962, 9. September 1962," July 24, 1962. For another piece on the lack of West German attendance see BArch B 234, Nr. 626, "Tag der Heimat werde Tag der Heimkehr!," *Deister- und Westerzeitung*, August 3, 1953.

112. BArch B 234, Nr. 1399, Letter, Adolf Flecken, Rheinischer Heimatbund to the Herren Vorsitzenden der angeschlossenen Vereine, June 8, 1966; B 234, Nr. 1103, "Zum Tag der Heimat, 1970," Drafted joint statement of the BdV and the Deutsches Heimatbund; Letter from Dr. H.c. Köchling, Vorsitzender of the Deutschen Heimatbundes to the BdV, August, 28, 1970.

113. BArch B 234, Nr. 627, Rede des Präsidenten des Abgeordnetenhaus von Berlin, Willy Brandt, Tag der Deutschen, 1955; BArch B 234, Nr. 631, Program, Tag der Heimat, September 8, 1957, Berlin; Protocoll, "Tag der Heimat 1958;" B 234, Nr. 632, "Deutschlands Spaltung widernatürlich: Brandt zum Tag der Heimat," *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, September 7, 1959; B 234, Nr. 633, Willy Brandt, Tag der Heimat, Berlin, September 4, 1960. B 136, Nr. 4937, Willy Brandt, "Tag der Heimat," 1961; B 234, Nr. 636, "Wortlaut der Ansprache des Reg. Bürgermeisters von Berlin Willy Brandt am 2. September 1962 zum TAG DER HEIMAT 1962 in der Berliner Waldbühne."

114. Ahonen.

115. Expellee leaders often discussed this symbolic function quite openly. StAHH 131-1 II, Nr. 1245, Letter from the Landsmannschaft Ostpreussen to Max Brauer, Betrf: Ostdeutsche Heimatwoche in Hamburg, March 10, 1950.

116. The national expellee leader Wenzel Jaksch did precisely this at the 1953 *Tag der Heimat*. BArch B 234, Nr. 626, "Ergreifende Kundgebung im Kurgarten," *Wiesbadener Kurier*, August 3, 1953.

117. BArch B 234, Nr. 626, "Deutsche Heimat ohne Deutsche," *Telegraf*, August 4, 1953; B 136, Nr. 4937, Fiches 1-3, Correspondence between Hans Krüger and Konrad Adenauer; B 234, Nr. 631, "Die deutsche Frage gehört vor die UNO: Zehntausende begingen 'Tag der Heimat,'" *Der Kurier*, September 17, 1958.

118. Herr Michel, Oberkreisdirektor and Herr Thurm, Landrat, "Willkommen!," and Heinrich Tolle, Mayor of Northeim (SPD) and Herr Galland, Stadtdirektor, "Herzlich Willkommen in Northeim!," in *Festschrift zum Heimattreffen des Kreises Schlochau*, 3-5.

119. He argued further for the reconstruction of their "complete-German Heimat." StaHH 131-1 II, Nr. 1243, Senator Ernst Weiss, "Heimat als Aufgabe: Das Unrecht der Vertreibung. Reden zum 'Tag der Heimat 1958' in Hamburg."

120. StAHH 131-1 II, Nr. 1243 Bürgermeister Dr. Kurt Sieveking am 'Tag der Heimat' in Hamburg 9. Sept. 1956."

121. BArch B 234, Nr. 633, "Heimatvertriebene fordern das Recht auf Selbstbestimmung: Flehinghaus für außenpolitische Zurückhaltung bei Kundgebungen," *Die Welt*, September 12, 1960.

122. Bürgermeister Krampe, "Geleitwort," and Herr Obst, Vorsitzender der Sudetendeutschen Landsmannschaft, Ortsgruppe Darfeld, "Liebe Landesleute aus dem Adlergebirte!," in *Oberes Adlersgebirge Heimattreffen in Darfeld*, 9-11; Bürgermeister Robert Gies (Hilden) and Heinrich Reinartz, Vorsitzender für den Patenschaftsausschuss, "Unseren Wohlaue Patenkindern zum Gruß," and Heinrich Strangmeier, "Hilden übernimmt die Patenschaft über die Stadt und den Kreis Wohlau," in *Gabe der Stadt Hilden für das erste Wohlaue Heimattreffen*, 1, 44; Heinrich Janssen, mayor of Hameln, Untitled and "Treffpunkte der Einzelnen Ortschaften" in *Festschrift zur Partenschaftsübernahme beim 1. Heimattreffen in Hameln am 14. und 15. August 1954: Rattenfängerstadt Hameln/Weser, Patenstadt für den Kreis Neumarkt/Schles.* (Hameln: Lemhoefer und Krause, 1954), 1.

123. Landrat Beckholt and Oberkreisdirektor Koch, "Zum Geleit;" Bürgermeister Krampe, Amtsbürgermeister Averdick and Amtsdirektor Hecker, "Geleitwort;" Friedrich Weiss, 1. Vorsitzender des Kreisverbandes der Sudetendeutschen Landsmannschaft, Untitled in *Oberes Adlersgebirge Heimattreffen in Darfeld*, 7-9.

124. Dr. Schütz, Landrat, Peine, Untitled, and Anton Belda, Landesvorsitzender der Landsmannschaft Schlesien, Untitled, in *Festschrift zum 9. Heimattreffen der Falkenberger*, 4.

125. Notable political rallies without organized reunion that offered the pretense for such arguments included the 1956 rally in Bonn against proposed re-unification without the East, or at the "Germany rally" in the mid 1960's, both of which attracted between 70,000 to 100,000 expellees. BArch B 234, Nr. 1400, "Pfi Rufe für Adenauer: Von unserem Korrespondenten," *Die Welt*, October 8, 1956; "70,000 demonstrieren in Bonn: Heimatanspruch - ohne Kompromisse," *Vertriebenen-Anzeiger*, October 13, 1956; "'Gesamtdeutscher Rat führt zur Einheit.' Bund vertriebener Deutscher protestierte auf dem Marktplatz - Linus Kather brachte fünf Forderungen vor," *Generalanzeiger*, October 8, 1956; B 234, Nr. 1006, "Organisation und Aktionen," Report, 1966.

126. BArch B 234, Nr. 626, "Die Eingliederung ist Voraussetzung für die Rückkehr," *Heilbronner Stimme*, September 15, 1952.

127. Harald von Koenigswald, "Wesen der Heimat," in *Tag der Heimat im Weltflüchtlingsjahr 1959: Heimat in Freiheit!*, 13. September 1959, ed. Arbeits- und Sozialminister des Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen (Troisdorf: Max Jarschel, 1959), 12-16.

128. Thomas Grosser, *Die Integration der Heimatvertriebenen in Württemberg-Baden (1945-1961)* (Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer, 2006), 7.
129. BArch B 234, Nr. 644, Deutsche Jungdemokraten, Flugblatt, "Die Politik der Selbsttäuschung muß endlich aufhören!" (1967). The group began as the youth organization of the FDP and became part of the APO.
130. Researchers supported this thesis with extensive polling data and indices such as commerce, intermarriage, and social-network formation. See Hinst, *Das Verhältnis zwischen Westdeutschen und Flüchtlingen*; Frantziach, *Die Vertriebenen*.
131. Paul Lüttinger, *Integration der Vertriebenen: eine Empirische Analyse* (Frankfurt: Campus, 1989); Uwe Kleinert, "Die Flüchtlinge als Arbeitskräfte: Zur Eingliederung der Flüchtlinge in Nordrhein-Westfalen nach 1945," in *Neue Heimat im Westen: Vertriebene, Flüchtlinge, Aussiedler*, ed. Klaus J. Bade (Münster: Westfälischer Heimatbund, 1990), 56-57.
132. Several scholars, including Philipp Ther, have pointed to the lack of definition of what defines successful vs. failed integration and how it can be measured. Philipp Ther, *Deutsche und Polnische Vertriebene: Gesellschaft und Vertriebenenpolitik in der SBZ/DDR und in Polen, 1945-1956* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1998), 329.
133. Kossert, 13-15, 71, 131-135. Ulrich Tolksdorf's essay on phases of integration similarly present a time-line that stretches credulity, in which phases of cultural contact and cultural conflict do occur until the mid 1950s, formation of an expellee minority group in the 1960's, and the acculturation phase only beginning in the early 1970s. Ulrich Tolksdorf, "Phasen der kulturellen Integration bei Flüchtlingen und Aussiedlern," in Bade, ed., 106-124.
134. As Engelhardt has argued, expellee integration often differed based on individual profiles, including the presence of family and the size of the city in which they settled, with integration better in larger cities. Engelhardt.
135. Klaus J. Bade, "Einführung: Wege in die Bundesrepublik" in Bade, ed., 7. Contemporary scholars have not been the only ones to note how extended hopes for return delayed integration. The Lower Saxon Heimat historian Georg Schnath wrote in 1958 that expellees in Lower Saxony illustrated an "inner tornness" about growing into the "Lower Saxon flower pot" as many believed it would lead to them losing connection to their former Heimat. Georg Schnath, *Heimat und Staat: Betrachtungen eines Niedersachsen* (Hameln: Niedersächsischen Landeszentrale für Heimatdienst, 1958), 26-28. Rainer Schulze argues that using the *Landsmannschaften* to recreate lost social networks did much to set expellees apart from West Germans. Rainer Schulze, "The Struggle of Past and Present in Individual Identities: the Case of German Refugees and Expellees from the East," in *Coming Home to Germany?: The Integration of Ethnic Germans from Central and Eastern Europe in the Federal Republic*, eds. David Rock and Stefan Wolff (New York: Berghahn, 2002), 41-47.
136. Franz Bauer argues that after early years of conflict over resources, rapid integration began. Daniel Levy argues that socio-economic integration was achieved by the 1950s, followed later by political and psychological integration, with successful integration by the 1960s. Comparatively, Ahonen dates successful integration to the early 1970s given progress in economic and social integration, the lack of political radicalization, and the fact that expellees no longer threatened political stability. Volker Ackermann has argued that integration was not achieved until the second or third generation of expellee children. Franz J. Bauer, *Flüchtlinge und Flüchtlingspolitik in Bayern 1945-1950* (Stuttgart: Ernst Klett, 1982); Daniel Levy, "Integration Ethnic Germans in West Germany: The Early Postwar Period" in Rock and Wolff, eds., 27-30; Ahonen, 272-273; Volker Ackermann, "Integration: Begriff, Leitbilder, Probleme" in Bade, ed., 14-28.
137. BArch B 234, Nr.626, "Tag der deutschen Heimat: Gedenken an die Ostgebiete/Geleitworte von Kaiser und Oberländer," *Memminger Zeitung*, September 11, 1954.
138. The speech was given by Friedrich Kowalski, a city councilman. BArch B 234, Nr.626, "'Tag der deutschen Heimat' überall," *Neue Presse, Coburg*, September 13, 1954.
139. Ernst Lehmann, "Grundfragen der Eingliederung insbesondere in der politischen Bildung," in *Eingliederung der Vertriebenen und Flüchtlinge in Westdeutschland als Unterrichtsaufgabe. Eine Handreichung*, ed. Ernst Lehmann (Hannover-Linden: Jaeger, 1964), 166.
140. BdV-Bonn, Akte 452, Model Speech 1964, "Ein Entwurf und eine Anregung," 10-12, in *Organizational Directions*, BdV, "Freiheit, Recht, Friede: Der Tag der Heimat, 1964." Reference to feasible return can also be found in the 1959 model speech. BArch B 234, Nr. 631, Arbeitsbrief Nr.1, July 1959, BdV, "Empfehlungen, Anregungen

und Arbeitsunterlagen zum TAG DER HEIMAT am 13. September 1959 im Weltflüchtlingsjahr.”

141.Ebermann and Möllhoff, 399-405.

142.One expellee himself noted that the numbers on those desiring return were aimed directly at foreign powers. Herbert von Dircksen, “Möglichkeiten und Aufgaben der deutschen Ostpolitik,” *Der Westpreuße* 3, No.6 (June 1951): 3; During the 1957 Tag der Heimat in West Berlin, the head of the Union of the *Landsmannschaften* (VdL) insisted that 70% wanted to return, including the youth. Polls on return were quite variant, and I would argue illustrated not simply preparedness to return, but also a symbolic way to demand recognition for their circumstances and suffering. In one 1961 poll, 50% of expelles claimed that they wanted to return, while a poll four years later found 28%. BArch B 234, Nr. 631, “Die Heimat als wirkende Kraft: Die Kundgebung der Dreißigtausend auf der Berliner Waldbühne: ‘Mit Treue und Recht werden wir die Gewalt besiegen!’” *Ostpreussenblatt*, Nr. 37, September 14, 1957; Stickler, 426; Hinst, 124, 129.

143.“Zum Geleit!” and “Vorwort,” in *Festschrift zum Tag der Heimat: Kirchhain 1951*, 3-4.

144.BArch B 234, Nr. 626, “Kundgebung zum Tag der deutschen Heimat,” *Trierische Landes-Zeitung*, September 13, 1954.

145.BArch B 234, Nr.626, “Erinnerung an Heimat gibt Kraft für Einigkeit,” *Westfalen-Blatt*, September 13, 1954; “‘Recht auf Heimat als erstes der Menschenrechte!’ Heimatrecht unveräußerliches Menschenrecht: Überall eindrucksvolle Kundgebungen zum Tag der deutschen Heimat,” *Der Kurier*, Berlin, September 13, 1954.

146.BArch B 234, Nr. 630, Grusswort, Eugen Gerstenmaier, Präsident des Deutschen Bundestags, Tag der Heimat, 1956, Berlin.

147.BArch B 234, Nr.626, “Deutschland - up ewig ungedeelt,” *Flensburger Tageblatt*, August 3, 1953; “Zum Tag der Heimat,” *Oberpfälzer Nachrichten, Weiden*, September 11, 1954.

148.Siegfried Schier, *Die Aufnahme und Eingliederung von Flüchtlingen und Vertriebenen in der Hansestadt Lübeck: Eine sozialgeschichtliche Untersuchung für die Zeit nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg bis zum Ende der 50er Jahre* (Lübeck: Schmidt-Römhild, 1982), 266-267.

149.Fr. Hörner, “Liebwerte Egerer Gäste,” in *Festschrift zum Ersten Egerer Heimattreffen*, 5-6; Otto Miehl, “Zum Geleit,” in *Festschrift: 2. Heimattreffen Landkreis Neudek*, 1; Heinz Beckmann, *Innerdeutsche Gebietsänderungen nach dem Bonner Grundgesetz: Entstehungsgeschichte, Auslegung und Bedeutung der Artikel 29/118* (Dissertation, Christians-Albrechts-Universität Kiel, 1954), 78.

150.Ernst Lehmann, “Wir Schönhengster: Zum Werden des Schönhengster Selbstbewußtsein,” in *Festschrift Sudetendeutscher Tag 1952*, 96.

151.“Das Recht auf Heimat,” *Vaterstädtische Blätter* 15, no.6 (June 1964): 5.

152.Guido Fleischhauer, *Vom Neubürger zum Heilbronner. Die Eingliederung der Flüchtlinge und Heimatvertriebenen im Stadtkreis Heilbronn nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg* (Heilbronn: Stadtarchiv Heilbronn, 1992), 298, 305-306.

153.BArch B 234, Nr. 634, BdV, Liste I: Bestehende west-ostdeutsche kommunale und Landespatenschaften, 1961.

154.Translations of terms: “vorübergehende Heimat,” “Fluchtheimat,” “Zufluchtsstatt,” “Wohnort,” “neue Umwelt,” “Zwangsheimat,” “Heimatstatt,” “Ersatzheimat,” “zweite Heimat.” For discussion of the social pressures of expellees not to “unpack” one’s suitcase in the early years, see Ernst Lehmann, “Grundfragen der Eingliederung, insbesondere in der politischen Bildung,” in ed., Lehmann, 161.

155.Hanika, 70-73.

156.BArch B 136, Nr. 4937, Fiche 7, Wilfried Hertz-Eichenrode, “Konfrontationen am Tag der Heimat,” *Die Welt*, September 5, 1970.

157.Hauptstaatsarchiv Stuttgart (hereafter HSAS) EA 1/107, Bü 431, “Heimattag vorgeschlagen: Eine Idee der Arbeitsgemeinschaft für Heimat und Volkstum,” *Stuttgarter Nachrichten*, December 30, 1970; Rolf Messerschmidt, “Erinnerungskultur und gelungene Eingliederung – ein unlösbares Spannungsverhältnis?: Regionalhistorische Integrationsbilanzen für Hessen und Rheinland-Pfalz,” in *Integrationen: Vertriebenen in den deutschen Ländern*

nach 1945, ed. Marita Krauss (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2008), 62.

158.BArch B 234, Nr. 1208, BdV Bundesgeschäftsführung, Redevorlage zum Tag der Heimat, July 10, 1978, to the BdV-Landesverbände und Bundeslandsmannschaften.

159.BArch B 234, Nr. 642, Letter to the Editor, J.W. "Harte Töne," *Saarbrücker Zeitung*, August 30, 1966.

160.BArch B 234, Nr. 1006, Letter, Karla Mazur, BdV, Kreisverband Biberach to BdV Bundesgeschäftsstelle, Bonn, September 18, 1966; Karla Mazur, "'Heimat-Vaterland-Europa:' Unter diesem Leitwort steht der 'Tag der Heimat' am 11 September 1966," "'Heimat-Vaterland-Europa:' Eine würdige Feierstunde in Biberach am 'Tag der Heimat,'" *Schwäbische Zeitung*, September 13, 1966.

161.BArch B 234, Nr. 645. "Absage an die Extremisten: Tenor des Reden zum 'Tag der Deutschen'– NPD-Leute prügeln APO," *Der Tagesspiegel*, September 3, 1968; "Polizei trennt Demonstranten und Teilnehmer: Zwischenfälle bei Abschlußkundgebung zum 'Tag der Deutschen,'" *Die Welt*, September 2, 1968; "Bombenattentat auf 'Tag der Deutschen' in Berlin geplant?," *Neue Westfälische*, September 4, 1968; "NPD kam nicht zu Wort," *Telegraf*, September 1, 1968; "Nach dem 'Tag der Heimat:' Vertriebene fühlen sich von SPD Politiker beleidigt," *Die Welt*, September 20, 1968; "Westberlin- Brückenkopf des Kalten Krieges," *Die Andere Zeitung*, September 12, 1968; Deutsche Jugend des Ostens, "TAG DER DEUTSCHEN 1968 in Berlin - Ein Bekenntnis zu Frieden und Freiheit," B 136, Nr. 4937, Fiche 3, Depeche, September 6, 1968. Soviet Ambassador in East Berlin, Aprassimov; "Nachrichtenspiegel/Inland I. Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung, 3. August 1968."

162.BArch B 234, Nr. 626, "Den Flüchtlingen kann geholfen werden," *Süddeutsche Wochenzeitung*, August 1951.

163.BArch B 234, Nr.1382, Letter, BVD president to Oldenburg regional representative regarding *Tag der Heimat*, September 12, 1954; "Westdeutscher Flüchtlingkongreß in Aktion," *Ostpreußenblatt*, September 11, 1954, 4.

164.BArch B 234, Nr. 627, "'Mein Kampf' in Frontstadttheater," *Berliner Zeitung*, September 2, 1955; Untitled Article, *Neues Deutschland*, September 6, 1955; "Das Recht auf Heimat," *Morgenpost*, September 11, 1955. BArch B 234, Nr. 627, "Die Jugend und das Brauchtum," *Der Tag*, September 10, 1955; B 234, Nr. 628, Article transcribed by the BdV, "Bonner Rattenfänger," *Berliner Zeitung am Abend*, September 6, 1955. The theory of *Tag der Heimat* in West Berlin as a CIA event for acquiring agents continued throughout the 1960s, for examples, see B 234, Nr. 629, BvD-transcribed newspaper article from the *Berliner Zeitung*, September 7, 1956 and B 234, Nr. 644, "CIA lenkte 'Heimattreffen,'" *Berliner Zeitung*, September 10, 1967.

165.BArch B 234, Nr. 629, GDR Counterfeited Leaflet, "Heimatvertriebene in Berlin! Berliner Landesverband der Vertriebenen e.V.," (1956).

166.BArch B 234, Nr. 631, "Nazis brüllen: 'Heim ins Reich:' Revanchekundgebungen in Westdeutschland und Westberlin," *Neues Deutschland*, September 15, 1958; Political Cartoon and "Europa gegen Faschismus," *Der Abend*, September 16, 1958; BArch B 234, Nr. 632, "Revanchisten wollen OdF-Gednktag schänden," *Berliner Zeitung*, August 19, 1959; "Störaktion nicht ohne Willy Brandt," *Berliner Zeitung*, August 8, 1959; Stickler, 164.

167.Werner Guillaume cited the newspaper title of the SS-murder bands in his 1962 *Tag der Heimat* speech. BArch B 234, Nr. 636, "Festansprache des Leiters des Berliner Büros der Vertriebenen, Werner Guillaume. Tag der Heimat 1962 in Münter/Westf." A mountain of such newspapers can be found in the newspaper article collection of the BdV. For mentioned examples, see B 234, Nr. 637, "Wundfieber," *Berliner Zeitung am Abend*, September 4, 1962; B 234, Nr. 648, Flier, Copy, Distributed at Tag der Heimat, 1970; B 234, Nr.650, "Hexensabbat in Westberlin," *Nationale Zeitung*, September 8, 1970; B 234, Nr. 633, Karikatur, *Neues Deutschland*, August 31, 1960.

168.BArch B 234, Nr. 633, TH. Schulze-Walden, Kommentator des demokratischen Rundfunke, "Heimat," *Berliner Zeitung*, September 2, 1960.

169.BArch B 234, Nr. 633, "Paris regiert nervös auf Flüchtlingstreffen," *Die Welt*, August 30, 1960; B 234, Nr. 637. "London weist Prager Protest gegen 'Tag der Heimat' zurück," *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, September 16, 1962.

170.The allies similarly expressed concern over Adenauer's speech. "German Refugees Counter-Attack: Vigorous Speeches on 'Homeland Day,'" *The Times*, September 13, 1959; "Bismarckian Frontiers as Bonn Aim," *The Times*, August 29, 1960; "German Refugees Counter-Attack: Vigorous Speeches on 'Homeland Day,'" *The Times*, September 13, 1959. "Dr. Adenauer takes up the Refugees' Cry," *The Times*, July 11, 1960; "Survival of German Nationalism," *The Times*, September 1, 1960; "Stand in West Berlin," *The Times*, September 7, 1960; BArch B 234,



Nr. 633, "SPD west Kritik der 'Times' zurück," *Die Welt*, September 3, 1960. The day after events, *The Times*, in contrast to their earlier criticism, reported that the event had been toned down compared to previous years. "Cautious Note at Rally of German Refugees," *The Times*, September 5, 1960.

171. "Allies Protest against Berlin Obstruction," *The Times*, September 1, 1960; "Firm Support by the British government," *The Times*, September 1, 1960; BArch B 234, Nr. 633, "Panzer rollten Nachts in Ostberlin," *Der Mittag*, September 5, 1960; "Walter Ulbricht an die Westberliner," *Berliner Zeitung am Abend*, September 5, 1960.

172. ISF, S3/T, 3.906, "Recht auf Heimat - aber Verzicht auf Gewalt: Vertriebenen-Kundgebung in der Paulskirche," *FAZ*, September 9, 1964; BArch B 234, Nr. 642, "Es geht um Deutschland," *Telegraf*, August 8, 1966; Wenzel Jaksch, Press Release, "BdV/Deutscher Ostdienst," August 15, 1966.

173. BArch B 234, Nr. 648, Letter, BdV president Gerhard Dewitz to the Head of the NPD Adolf von Thadden, August 28, 1970; Letter, Helmut Feld, Landesvorsitzender NPD, Berlin to the BdV über den Berliner Landesverband der Vertriebenen, August 31, 1970.

174. BArch B 234, Nr. 647, Der Regierende Bürgermeister Klaus Schütz hielt am Sonntag dem 7. September, anlässlich des 'Tag der Heimat' in der Waldbühne eine Ansprache, die folgenden Wortlaut hatte, "Den Trennenden Charakter der Grenzen Überwinden." (1969), 1-7; "So sieht es Dewitz," *Der Abend*, September 12, 1969.

175. Wenzel Jaksch made this claim at a Tag der Heimat speech, and it became a trope of expellee society self-description. BArch B 234, Nr. 1452, "Dr. h.c. Wenzel Jaksch zum TAG DER HEIMAT BERLIN 1966."

176. BdV-Bonn, Akte Deutschland Kundgebung, "Generationen stießen aufeinander," *Geislinger Zeitung*, May 17, 1966; "Fragwürdiger Heimatkult," *Der Bund*, May 19, 1966; "Polizei schritt gegen Studenten ein," *Rhön und Streubote*, May 16, 1966.

177. BArch B 234, Nr. 642, "Heimat- Vaterland - Europa: Optimistische Rede des Vertriebenen-Präsidenten zum Tag der Heimat in Berlin," *Echo der Zeit*, September 4, 1966; B 234, Nr. 1452, "Dr. h.c. Wenzel Jaksch zum TAG DER HEIMAT BERLIN 1966."

178. BArch B 234, Nr. 642, Hartmut Bunke, "'Vertriebene' schüren die Kalten Krieg: Verleumdungen und Drohungen auf dem 'Tag der Heimat,'" *Die Andere Zeitung*, September 9, 1966.

179. BArch B 234, Nr. 644, Deutsche Jungdemokraten, Flugblatt, "Die Politik der Selbsttäuschung muß endlich aufhören!" (1967); "Linksgruppen demonstrieren in Berlin: Zwischenfälle beim 'Tag der Heimat,'" *FAZ*, September 5, 1967.

180. StAHH 131-1 II, Nr. 1245, Eugen Schreyer, "Ansprache auf der Ostdeutschen Heimatwoche, (14. Mai 1950 in Pflanzen und Blumen)," "Sechzigtausend kamen zur Heimatwoche," *Die Welt*, May 15, 1950.

181. BArch B 234, Nr. 627, Speech at Tag der Deutschen, 1955.

182. BArch B 234, Nr. 626, "Ein eindrucksvolles Bekenntnis zur deutschen Heimat in Ost und West," *Die Freiheit, Mainz*, September 13, 1954; StAHH 131-1, II, Nr. 1243, "Ansprache von Bürgermeister Dr. Nevermann zum Tag der Heimat im Großen Saal der Musikhalle am 24. September 1961."

183. BArch B 234, Nr. 636, Kai-Uwe von Hassel, Zum Tag der Heimat, September 18, 1962.

184. Other letters to the editor, in contrast, wrote in support of the cartoon. BArch B 234, Nr. 633, "Was Berlins Freunde Denken," *Berliner Morgenpost*, September 4, 1960; Political Cartoon: "Nicht vergessen!," *Berliner Morgenpost*, September 4, 1960; Letters to the editor: "Nicht vergessen!," "Im Gegenteil!," "Tag der Heimat," "Symbolische Mahnung!," "Oskar nimmt Stellung!," "Das Echo!," "Nur nicht rechten!," *Berliner Morgenpost*, September 6, 1960.

185. BArch B 234, Nr. 647, "Vertriebene am Zuge," *Der Abend*, September 4, 1969.

186. BArch B 234, Nr. 647, Der regierende Bürgermeister Klaus Schütz hielt am Sonntag dem 7. September, anlässlich des 'Tag der Heimat' in der Waldbühne eine Ansprache, die folgenden Wortlaut hatte, "Den Trennenden Charakter der Grenzen Überwinden" (1969), 1-7.

187. BArch B 234, Nr. 647, "Berliner Diskussionen über die Rede von Schütz," *FAZ*, September 11, 1969; Jörg Beyer, "'Was hat Ihnen Polen bezahlt?': Vertriebene wollten Schütz 'fertigmachen,'" *Spandauer Volksblatt*, September 9, 1969.
188. Berlin professors signed a statement of solidarity with Schütz, while letters to the editor denounced the crowd's behavior. The CDU, however, called for the mayor to step down. BArch B 234, Nr. 647, "Disput um den 'Tag der Heimat,'" *Die Welt*, September 6, 1969; "Heftige Mißfallenskundgebungen gegen Schütz beim 'Tag der Heimat,'" *Der Tagesspiegel*, September 9 1969; "FU-Professoren solidarisch mit Schütz," *FAZ*, September 15, 1969; B 234, Nr. 650, "Keine Staatsgelder für Vertriebene," *Freie Presse*, August 19, 1970; "Keine Mittel für 'Heimattag,'" *Nordwest-Zeitung*, August 19, 1970; "Berlin: Verboten Alliierte. Vertriebenentreffen?," *Osnabrücker Zeitung*, August 17, 1970; B 136, Nr. 4937 F.7, "Wieder Streit um 'Tag der Heimat: Berliner Vertriebenenverband fordert Bundeszuschuß ohne Bedingungen," *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, August 31, 1971.
189. HSAS 1/107, Bü 357, "Recht auf Selbstbestimmung betont: Begriff Heimat nicht abwerten," *Stuttgarter Nachrichten*, September 20, 1970.
190. StAHH 131-1 II, Nr. 1244. "Niemand will gen Ostland reiten: Die Marienburger trafen sich gestern in ihrer Patenstadt," *Die Welt*, June, 23 1969.
191. HSAS 1/107, Bü 431, "Vogel gibt Einladung zum Schlesiertreffen zurück," *Stuttgarter Nachrichten*, June 22, 1971.
192. BArch B 234, Nr. 1161, "BdV-Vize tat Verträge als Formelkram ab Hauser: Oder-Neiße-Linie festgeschrieben: Heftige Diskussion auf dem Römerplatz," *Bonner Stadtanzeiger*, September 20, 1971; "Fragezeichen," *General-Anzeiger, Bonn*, September 17, 1971.
193. Heinrich August Winkler, *Der lange Weg nach Westen. Deutsche Geschichte vom "Dritten Reich" bis zur Wiedervereinigung*, vol.2 (Munich: C.H. Beck, 2000), 287.
194. Curiously, Kossert uses the example of president Herbert Czaja's statement to support his narrative of an unbroken continuity of pervasive West German "hard heartedness" vis-a-vis expellees from early expulsion to the 60s and 70s. Kossert, 154. BArch B 136, Nr. 4937, F.7, Dokumentation: "Tag der Heimat" Berlin 1970, (Beilage zu *Deutscher Ostdienst*, Nr. 29/30 vom 17. September 1970) "Wortlaut der Ansprache des Präsidenten des Bundes der Vertriebenen Dr. Herbert Czaja, 5 September, Berlin."
195. The CDU subsequently called for him to step down because of his heated comments. HSAS EA 1/107, Bü 431, "Zum Kommentar von Dieter Gütt - Die nationale Pfingsttour - Bismack - Überspitzte Formulierungen - CDU/CSU: Als Kommentator Streichen! *AFD*" (1969).
196. BArch B 234, Nr. 647, Letters to the Editor: "Nur Randalierer?," *Berliner Morgenpost*, September 9, 1969; Hilde H., "Wer will wieder zurück?," *Berliner Morgenpost*, September 11, 1969; Luise Beck, "Zwei Fragen," *Telegraf*, September 14, 1969; Herward Beschorner, "Tag der Heimat," *Tagesspiegel*, September 14, 1969; Margarete Heuer, "Tag der Heimat," *Tagesspiegel*, September 14, 1969.
197. One stunning exception was the Prussian aristocrat, Graff von Lehndorf at the 1962 *Tag der Heimat* in Frankfurt, where he argued that they had brought expulsion on themselves through their approval of Hitler, and that it would be unimaginable for him to return. ISF, S3/T, 3.906, "Kein Recht auf Ansprüche: Graf Lehndorff sprach," *Frankfurter Rundschau*, September 9, 1962; "Tag der Heimat: Forderung fehl am Platze," *NP*, September 10, 1962.
198. Stickler similarly argues that attendance at Heimat meetings declined throughout the 1960s, though he does not present evidence. Stickler, 160. In West Berlin we find this evidence. The *Waldbühne*, the site of political speeches had all of its 25,000 filled in the 1950s. By the 1960's it attracted anywhere from 5,000-15,000. Heimat meetings like those of the Stettiner in Lübeck went from 20,000 in the 1950's to 10,000 by the early 1960's, and 4,000 by the end of the decade. Measuring expellee attendance at events is particularly problematic, though several sources point to declining attendance. While such a decline can be verified for West Berlin, in the 1960s, East Berliner, who attended in the 1950's had been cut off. Nevertheless, with 180,000 expellees living in West Berlin, this showing was poor. In 1967, the West Berlin Tag der Heimat organizers only filled the Waldbühne by having a raffle with prizes. Several newspapers also noted declining attendance. Few centralized recordings of attendance exist. BArch B 234, Nr. 642, "10 000 beim 'Tag der Heimat,'" *Tagesspiegel*, August 8, 1966; B 234, Nr. 638, "Mauer gegen Selbstbestimmung: Über 10 000 Vertriebene zum 'Tag der Heimat' in der Waldbühne," *Der Kurier*, September 2, 1963; "Tag der

Heimat in Berlin," *Wolfenbütteler Zeitung*, September 2, 1963; "12 000 beim 'Tag der Heimat in Berlin,'" *Cuxhavener Allgemeine*, September 2, 1963; Program, "Tag der Heimat, 1967, September 3;" B 234, Nr. 644, "25,000 in der Berliner Waldbühne," *Der Schlesier*, September 9, 1967; B136, Nr. 4937 Fiche 7, "Wieder Streit um 'Tag der Heimat:' Berliner Vertriebenenverband fordert Bundeszuschuß ohne Bedingungen," *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, August 31, 1971; B 234, Nr. 637, "15,000 Menschen beim 'Tag der Heimat in Berlin,'" *Die Welt*, September 3, 1962; "15,000 Menschen beim 'Tag der Heimat in Berlin,'" *Die Welt*, September 3, 1962. "Zeittafel: Tag der Stettiner" in ed. Senat der Hansestadt Lübeck und der Heimatkreisausschuß Groß Stettin, 12.

199.BArch B 234, Nr. 651, Günter Walter, "Abschied von Illusionen: Beobachtungen beim 'Tag der Heimat' in Berlin," *Publik*, September 11, 1970; "Vorwürfe Sickerts von Berliner Heimatvertriebenen zurückgewiesen: Streit um Verteilung von NPD-Flugblättern beim 'Tag der Heimat,'" *Der Tagesspiegel*, September 9, 1970; "Absage an die Scharfmacher," *Pariser Kurier*, September 7, 1970.

200.BArch B 234, Nr. 647, Letters to the Editor, "Vertriebene für faire Lösung," *Berliner Morgenpost*, September 12, 1969; "Tag der Heimat," *Tagesspiegel*, September 14, 1969.

## Coda

1. Jean Améry, "How Much Home Does a Person Need," in *At the Mind's Limit: Contemplations by a Survivor of Auschwitz and its Realities*, trans. Sidney and Stella Rosenfeld (New York: Schocken, 1980), 56.
2. Gabriele Wohmann, "Wörter mit Temperatur," in *Gegen den Tod. Stimmen deutscher Schriftsteller gegen die Atombombe*, ed. Gudrun Ensslin (Stuttgart: Edition cordeliers, 1964, reprint 1981), 104-106.
3. Margarete Hannsmann, untitled contribution, in *Literatur im Alemannischen Raum: Regionalismus und Dialekt*, eds. Jochen Kelter and Peter Salomon (Freiburg: Dreisam, 1978), 46-47.
4. Ludwig Landsberg, Ministerialdirigent, "Heimatverbundenheit, Heimatverlust und Heimatgewinn in unserer Zeit," in *Tag der Heimat im Weltflüchtlingsjahr 1959: Heimat in Freiheit!*, 13. September 1959, ed., Arbeits- und Sozialminister des Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen (Troisdorf: Max Jarschel, 1959), 7-11.
5. BArch B 234, Nr.633, "Über jede Politik steht der Mensch: Zwei Großveranstaltungen im Schlußfeld der Kalten SED-Krieges," *Echo der Zeit*, September 11, 1960; "Wortlaut der Rede des schleswig-holsteinische Ministerpräsidenten Kai Uwe von Hassel anlässlich des Plenums der Landtage mit dem Landsmannschaften und Landesverbände," (1960), 9.
6. The name "Bundeszentrale für Heimatdienst" was chosen in the early postwar period to harken back to the Weimar institution the "Reichszentrale für Heimatdienst." Created in 1918 following World War I, this name was chosen to make clear that this institution's duties were internal only and not related to propaganda for the troops. These histories were discussed in detail in the 1963 discussions over the name change. BArch B 168 Nr. 55, Bundeszentrale für Politische Bildung, Tätigkeits- und Planungsberichte, Bd.1: 1963-1965, "Tätigkeitsbericht der Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung für das Rechnungsjahr 1963," January 31, 1964. For more on the original naming of the Reichszentrale für Heimatdienst and its lack of connection to Heimat enthusiast activities, see Johannes Karl Richter, *Die Reichszentrale für Heimatdienst* (Berlin: Landeszentrale für politische Bildungsarbeit, 1963), 17, 117-118; Klaus Wippermann, *Politische Propaganda und Staatsbürgerliche Bildung: Die Reichszentrale für Heimatdienst in der Weimarer Republik* (Dissertation, Universität Göttingen, 1975), 21.
7. One member of the youth organization wrote to the organization praising the name change as likely increasing their standing. The organization itself insisted that the name change would not change their activities. BArch B 168 Nr. 55, Bundeszentrale für Politische Bildung, Tätigkeits- und Planungsberichte, Bd.1: 1963-1965, "Tätigkeitsbericht der Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung für das Rechnungsjahr 1963," January 31, 1964; BArch B 168 Nr. 70, Bd.13, Letter, Theo Schiller, Liberaler Studentenbund Deutschland to the Bundeszentrale für Politische Bildung, July 13, 1963. See also Benedikt Widmaier, *Die Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung: Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte staatlicher politischer Bildung in der Bundesrepublik* (Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 1987), 72.
8. Westdeutscher Rundfunk, Historisches Archiv, Hauptabteilung Politik, Standort 2855, Alte Heimat - Neue Heimat "Heimat Heute?!: Deutsche Dichter und Schriftsteller zum Tag der Heimat. Eine Umfrage des Westdeutschen Rundfunks" Sendung: Samstag, 14. September 1963, 15:05-15:30 Uhr, 1-12.
9. BArch B 234, Nr.1452, Program, Tag der Heimat, Berlin, 1966, "Heimat, Vaterland, Europa," August 28, 1966.
10. Jaksch used the same speech to argue for Hitler's Munich accords as legally binding. BArch B 234, Nr. 642, "Vertriebene kündigen harten Kurs an: Angriffe auf die Denkschrift der evangelischen Kirche stehen bevor," *Südkurier*, August 26, 1966; Speech, Wenzel Jaksch, "Tag der Heimat Berlin, 1966," 8.
11. BArch B 234, Nr. 644, Photos of Tag der Heimat in Berlin, September 5, 1967.
12. The mayor also spoke of the need of the expellees to face hard realities. BArch B 234, Nr. 644, "Der Regierende Bürgermeister Heinrich Albertz, Ansprache, Tag der Heimat, 3 September 1967."
13. In 1958, the *Deutsche Heimatbund* and the expellee societies agreed that alongside expulsion, the threat of modern nomadism in the West should also be thematized at *Tag der Heimat*. BArch, B 234, Nr. 631, "Empfehlungen für den Tag der Heimat 1958," 8; Hannover Ostkirchenausschuss, *Predigthilfen zum Tag der Heimat* (Hannover: Ostkirchenausschuss, 1968), 2.

14. Barch B 234, Nr. 1399, Programm, Rheinischer Heimattag 1967, 20. bis 23. Oktober in Düsseldorf; Walter Künneht, "Die Frage des Rechts auf die Heimat in evangelischer Sicht," in *Das Recht auf die Heimat: Vorträge, Thesen, Kritik*, ed. Kurt Rabl (Munich: Robert Lerche, 1965), 9-10.
15. *Die Zweite Heimat. Chronik einer Jugend in 13 Filmen*, Episode 12 "Die Zeit der vielen Worte," directed by Edgar Reitz (Chicago, IL: Facets Video, 2006), DVD.
16. Johannes von Moltke, "Home Again: Revisiting the New German Cinema in Edgar Reitz's 'Die Zweite Heimat,'" *Cinema Journal* 42, no. 3 (Spring 2003): 114-143; Johannes von Moltke, *No Place Like Home: Locations of Heimat in German Cinema* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005), 203-226; Michael E. Geisler, "'Heimat' and the German Left: The Anamnesis of a Trauma," *New German Critique* 36 (Fall 1985): 25-66; Franz A. Birgel, "You Can Go Home Again: An Interview with Edgar Reitz," *Film Quarterly* 39, no. 4 (Summer 1986): 2-10. For discussion of Reitz's argument that his film urged taking private life seriously, see Alon Confino, "Edgar Reitz's *Heimat*, Memory, and Understandings of the Past, 1871-1990," in *Germany as a Culture of Remembrance: Promises and Limits of Writing History*, ed. Alon Confino (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 2006), 66. Confino prescriptively denies the validity of Reitz's argument of *Heimat* as something more than about Germanness. Reitz argues that *Heimat* represents a universal human experience. Confino interprets the turn to *Heimat* in the later decades as singularly about the new left trying to re-establish a relationship to nation.
17. BdV-Bonn, Pressereferat C, 1971-1974, "In eine Zwickmühle hineinmanövriert: Am 'Tag der Heimat' setzte sich Oberstudeinrat Fyrnys (Heilbronn) mit der Ostpolitik auseinander," *Schwäbische Zeitung*, September 20, 1971; HSAS, EA 1/107, Bü 357, Staatssekretär Dr. Karl Mocker, "Zum Tag der Heimat 1972."
18. For revived interest of *Heimat* as a "Heimat discussion" see Erich Wimmer, "Heimat: Ein Begriff und eine 'Sache' im Wandel," in *Volkskultur und Heimat. Festschrift für Josef Dünninger zum 80. Geburtstag*, ed. Dieter Harmening (Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 1986), 14.
19. Wilfried von Bredow and Hans-Friedrich Foltin, *Zwiespältige Zufluchten: Zur Renaissance des Heimatgefühls* (Bonn: J.H.W. Dietz, 1981).
20. For revival in radio, see Josef Othmar Zöller, "Heimat als Welt - Das Regionalprogramm des Bayerischen Rundfunks" and Manfred Rühl, "Regionalisierung des Hörfunks – Dienst an der konkreten Lebenswelt des Menschen," in *Bekennnis zur Provinz: Neue Mode oder echtes Bedürfnis*, ed. Claus-Jürgen Roepke (Tutzing: Evangelische Akademie, 1981), 45, 55-57. For revival of *Heimat* literature in this period, see Norbert Mecklenburg, *Die grünen Inseln: Zur Kritik des literarischen Heimatkomplexes* (Munich: Iudicium, 1986).
21. von Bredow and Foltin, 203.
22. Beate Hergert and Berit Pleitner, "Heimat im Museum? Statt einer Einleitung," in *Heimat im Museum?: Museale Konzeptionen zu Heimat und Erinnerungskultur in Deutschland und Polen*, eds. Beate Hergert and Berit Pleitner (Munich: Martin Meidenbauer, 2008), 20.
23. Michael Bess, *The Light-Green Society: Ecology and Technological Modernity in Modern France, 1960-2000* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2003), 126.
24. Jan Palmowski, *Inventing a Socialist Nation: Heimat and the Politics of Everyday Life in the GDR, 1945-1990* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 135-137.
25. Peter Salomon and Jochen Kelter, "Vorbemerkung," in Kelter and Salomon, eds., 7.
26. Manfred Bosch, "Referat, gehalten auf dem Konstanzer Symposium über Regionalismus und Dialekt, 11./12. April 1978," in Salomon and Kelter, eds., 92-96.
27. Margarete Hannsmann, untitled contribution in Kelter and Salomon, eds., 46-47.
28. For more on the 1970s as a period of crisis in West Germany, see Konrad Jarausch, ed., *Das Ende der Zuversicht?: Der Siebziger Jahre als Geschichte* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2008).
29. For discussions of these factors, see Hermann Bausinger, "Heimat in einer offenen Gesellschaft: Begriffsgeschichte als Problemgeschichte," in *Die Ohnmacht der Gefühle: Heimat zwischen Wunsch und Wirklichkeit*, ed. Jochen Kelter (Weingarten: Drumlin, 1986), 107-108; Hermann Bausinger, "Heimat und Identität," in *Heimat und Identität, Probleme regionaler Kultur. 22. deutscher Volkskunde-Kongreß in Kiel vom 16. bis 21. Juni*

1979, ed. Konrad Köstlin (Neumünster: Karl Wachholtz, 1980), 20-22; Michael Neumeyer, *Heimat: zu Geschichte und Begriff eines Phänomens* (Kiel: Geographisches Institut der Universität Kiel, 1992), 1; Hans-Georg Wehling, "Vorwort," in *Heimat Heute*, ed. Hans-Georg Wehling (Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer, 1984), 7.

30. Konrad Buchwald, "Heimat heute: Wege aus der Entfremdung," in Wehling, ed., 34-54. Buchwald outlines the goals of a progressive Heimat idea in a post-industrial society.

31. Albrecht Lehmann, *Im Fremden ungewollt zuhaus: Flüchtlinge und Vertriebene in Westdeutschland 1945-1990* (Munich: C.H. Beck, 1991), 87-88.

32. Foltin and von Bredow.

33. Quoted in Walter Hinck, "Heimatliteratur und Weltbürgertum. Die Abkehr vom Ressentiment im neuen Heimatroman," in *Heimat: Neue Erkundungen eines alten Themas*, ed. Horst Bienek (Munich: Carl Hanser, 1985), 44.

34. Albert Herrenknecht, "Heimatsehnsucht – Eine verdrängte Kategorie linker Identität," in *Heimat: Sehnsucht und Identität*, ed. Elisabeth Moosmann (Berlin: Ästhetik und Kommunikation, 1980), 194-198.

35. The authors Walter Jens and Walter Hinck argued for such a compatibility in an essay on Heimat in 1985. Walter Jens, "Nachdenken über Heimat, Fremde und Zuhause im Spiegel deutscher Poesie," in Bienek, ed., 15-25; Walter Hinck, "Heimatliteratur und Weltbürgertum: Die Abkehr vom Ressentiment im neuen Heimatroman," in Bienek, ed., 42-56.

36. Christopher Wickham, "Heimatdichter als Nestbeschmutzer: Entartete Mundart?," in *Der Begriff "Heimat" in der deutschen Gegenwartsliteratur*, ed. Helfried Seliger (Munich: Iudicium, 1987), 183-197.

37. Heinz G. Huber, "Thesen zum Regionalismus," in Salmon and Kelter, eds., 112.

38. Jochen Kelter, "Provinz – Aufmarschbasis gegen die Metropolen?: Zur Renaissance von Heimat und Dialekt in der westdeutschen Linken," in Salomon and Kelter, eds., 98-100.

39. Hermann Bausinger, "Heimat und Identität" in Köstlin, ed., 22.

40. "Sehnsucht nach Heimat: Schwierigkeiten mit Heimat von links her umzugehen," in Moosmann, ed., 48.

41. Walter Moosmann, "Liedermacher," in *Heimat deine Heimat: Ein Lesebuch*, ed. Jürgen Liebing (Darmstadt: Luchterhand, 1982), 143.

42. For the case of Heimatkunde in Bavaria in the 1970s, see Monika Fenn, *Zwischen Gesinnungs- und Sachbildung: Die Relevanz der Kategorie Heimat im Volksschulunterricht und Lehrerbildung in Bayern seit 1945* (Idstein: Schulz-Kirchner, 2008), 30-31, 93, 100-108, 322-338. The educational policies of the state mentioned both tolerance and world-openness as the goals of Heimatkunde. In Baden-Württemberg, Heimatkunde was done away with as an official school subject in 1977.

43. Dietrich Strothmann, "'Schlesien bleibt unser': Vertriebenenpolitiker und das Rad der Geschichte," in *Die Vertreibung der Deutschen aus dem Osten: Ursachen, Ereignisse, Folgen*, ed. Jörg-Dietrich Gauger (Frankfurt: Fischer, 1985), 218.

44. Paul Gerhard Klusmann and Frank Hoffmann, in 2009 have referred to an ongoing "Heimat-boom." Paul Gerhard Klusmann and Frank Hoffmann, "Zum Geleit," in *Heimat als Erfahrung und Entwurf*, eds. Natalia Donig, Silke Flegel, and Sarah Scholler-Schneider (Berlin: Lit, 2009), 9. One year later, Olaf Kühne and Annette Spellerberg, in a work on Heimat in the Saarland have rightly noted the persistence of groups who reject the term as regressive. Olaf Kühne and Annette Spellerberg, *Heimat in Zeiten erhöhter Flexibilitätsanforderungen. Empirische Studien im Saarland* (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag, 2010), 14.

45. See Felizitas Lenz-Romeiß, *Die Stadt- Heimat oder Durchgangsstation?* (Munich: D.W. Callwey, 1970).

46. Roland Günter, "Architektur als Bühne" and Klaus Vogt, "Ist Heimat machbar?," in Führ, ed., 76-77, 90.

47. Mitscherlich particularly argued for a turn away from monotony in construction, opting instead for creating local uniqueness within a specific built environment. Alexander Mitscherlich, *Die Unwirklichkeit unserer Städte: Anstiftung zum Unfrieden* (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp 1965).

48. Hermann Bausinger, "Heimat und Identität," in Köstlin, ed., 23.
49. Zygmunt Bauman, *Liquid Times: Living in an Age of Uncertainty* (Cambridge: Polity, 2007), 1-4.
50. Walter Hinck, "Heimatliteratur und Weltbürgertum: Die Abkehr von Ressentiment im neuen Heimatroman," in Bienek, ed., 46.
51. Bernhard Waldenfels, "Heimat in der Fremde," in *Worin noch Niemand war: Heimat. Eine Auseinandersetzung mit einem strapazierten Begriff, Historisch-philosophisch-architektonisch*, ed. Eduard Führ (Wiesbaden: Bauverlag, 1985), 35.
52. Günther Grass made the suggestion of finding Heimat in language. See Monika Schafi, "Heimat, Modernity, and the Archive: Günter Grass's *Grimms Wörter. Eine Liebeserklärung*," in *Heimat: At the Intersection of Memory and Space*, eds., Friederike Eigler and Jens Kugele (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2012), 179-192. Gisela Ecker has argued for investing Heimat into mobile objects. See Gisela Ecker, "Prozesse der 'Beheimatung': Alltags- und Memorialobjekte," in Eigler and Kugele, eds., 208-225.
53. Suggestions of creating Heimat by forging social networks of "like-minded" people across broad geographical spaces also seems to be of questionable use. Beyond overlooking the realities of the breakdown of experienced human solidarities with geographic distance, such an idea, if possible, would facilitate a means of re-creating homogeneous communities, rather than forging solidarities in local landscapes that are increasingly heterogeneous.
54. Peter Sloterdijk, "Der gesprengte Behälter. Notiz über die Krise des Heimatbegriffs in der globalisierten Welt," *Spiegel Spezial*, 6 (June 1999): 29.
55. Rüdiger Görner, "Heimat und Toleranz," *Stuttgarter Zeitung*, May 13, 2000.
56. See, for example, Horst Lässig, *Heimatverbunden und Weltoffen: Festansprache von Landrat Horst Lässig beim 10. Welzheimer Heimattag am 21. Juli 1995* (Rems Murr Kreiss: Selbstverlag, 1995). The SPD politician Güter Markscheffel similarly described Heimat as a place of "tolerance and freedom." "Mehr als egoistische Liebe an den Ort seiner Jugend: Gespräch mit Günter Markscheffel," in Moosmann, ed., 84.
57. Westdeutscher Rundfunk, Historisches Archiv, Hauptabteilung Politik, Standort 2855, Transcript, Alte Heimat - Neue Heimat "Heimat Heute?!: Deutsche Dichter und Schriftsteller zum Tag der Heimat. Eine Umfrage des Westdeutschen Rundfunks" Sendung: Samstag, 14. September 1963, 15:05-15:30 Uhr, 10 - 11.

## FIGURES



## Chapter I



Figure 1-1. Grosse Budengasse, Köln, 1945.  
Source: Heinrich Schroder, *Colonia Deleta*  
(Cologne: Pick, 1947), 49.



Figure 1-2. Cologne, Groß St. Martin,  
1945/48, Hermann Claasen. From: Klaus  
Honnef and Walter Müller, eds., *Hermann  
Claasen: Nie Wieder Krieg!. Bilder aus dem  
Zerstörten Köln* (Cologne: Wienand, 1994),  
24.



Figure 1-3. Rubble of Cologne 1945/1948, (Photographer: Hermann Claasen), Source: Klaus Honnef and Walter Müller, eds., *Hermann Claasen: Nie Wieder Krieg!. Bilder aus dem Zerstörten Köln* (Cologne: Wienand Verlag, 1994), 14-15.



Figure 1-4. “Patentwohnung für evakuierte Kölsche,” Barrell apartment of the Colognean evacuee, with Cathedral picture, and Tünnes and Schäl figures. *Kölner Rosenmontagszeitung*, Fastelovend 1954.



Figure 1-5. Cover, Heinz Paffrath, *Ech Kölsch direk vum Faaf* (Cologne: Greven Verlag, 1949).




Figure 1-6. Kölle Bliev Kölle Plakat (1946). Text Supertitle (rhyming local dialect): “He who with thrift turns stone upon stone, builds the foundation of a new Cologne.” Source: Robert Frohn, Köln 1945-1981: Vom Trümmerhaufen zur Millionenstadt, Erlebte Geschichte (Cologne: J.P. Bachem, 1982), 141.

Text (rhyming local dialect): “Colognian men, Colognian Women! Boys and Girls large and small: In order to rebuild Cologne we need bricks. Buried for years in the rubble, they lied there waiting to be animated, as, after all sorrows, we rebuild Cologne. Therefore, do not despair, collect stones! For each piece we will give you two pennies and something else for good luck. Everyone must set their hands in motion, Aunt and Child, Grandfather and Market woman, now lay stone upon stone so that Cologne may be beautiful once more. If laughing will be done seldom : Indeed, sunshine will come at some point, our Cathedral will quietly guard Cologne, our Father-City on the Rhine.”



Figure 1-7. Rote Funken membership card, 1945/46. Above text in local dialect: “The war is at an end, we of Cologne will go to. Carnivalists, spit on your hands and rebuild!” Source: Heinz-Günther Hunold, Winfried Drewers, and Michael-Euler Schmidt, eds., *Vom Stadtsoldaten zum Roten Funken. Militär und Karneval in Köln* (Cologne: Greven, 2005), 13.

Figure 1-8. Spontaneous postwar Cologne Carnival procession (1947), Photographer: Walter Dick. Source: *Das Neue Köln, 1945-1995: Eine Ausstellung des Kölnischen Stadtmuseums in er Josef-Haubrich-Kunsthalle Köln 22. April bis 18 August 1995* (Stadt Köln: Selbstverlag, 1995), 127.



NÜNGZEHNHUNDERT JOHR KÖLLE AM RHING



Figure 1-9. “Nüingzeshnhundert Johr Kölle am Rhing,” *Rheinische Zeitung*, February 18, 1950.



Figures 1-10 (left), 1-11 (next page left), and 1-12 (next page right). Hermann Claasen, photos of first official postwar Cologne Carnival (1949). Source: Hermann Claasen, *Nichts erinnert mehr an Frieden: Bilder einer zerstörten Stadt*, eds. Hans J. Scheurer and Jan Thorn-Prikker (Cologne: DuMong Buchverlag, 1985), 144, 146, 148.



Figure 1-13. Cathedral Jubilee, Cologne, 1948. Source: Kölner Metropolitan-Kapitel, ed., *Kölner Domjubiläum 1948: Dokumentenband* (Düsseldorf: Verlag L. Schwann, 1950), 14.

VII. Abteilung  
**Das tausendjährige Reich**



nevals-Gesellschaft Eindrücke vom 1000-jährigen Reich

Figure 2-1. "Tünnnes wird entnazisiert." Rose Monday Carnival Float, 1950. Introduction float to parade section on Cologneian history: "the thousand-year empire" Source: *Rosenmontagszeitung*, 1950.





The illustration features a central framed scene of a cityscape with a large cathedral, likely Cologne. Above the frame is a stylized sun with rays and a face. Below the frame, a ribbon banner curves across the page with the text 'Für das Glück im Haus'. To the left of the banner is a simple house outline containing three stylized figures. At the bottom center is the Leisten logo, which includes a stylized sun icon above the word 'OFEN' in a circle, followed by 'LEISTEN' in large, bold letters, and 'K O L N' in smaller letters below it.

Seit nahezu einem halben Jahrhundert:  
*Ofen die gut wärmen, Herde die gut brennen,  
 Schränke die gut kühlen, Maschinen die gut  
 waschen von Ofen-Leisten — — für das Glück  
 im Haus. Alle bewährten und fortschrittlichen  
 Modelle stets am Lager. Fachsichere und objek-  
 tive Beratung.*

**OFEN LEISTEN**  
 K O L N

Hahnenstr. 55 und Neuffer Str. 241 · Ruf 73777 | 77989

Figure 2-2. Leisten appliances advertisement. “For Happiness at Home” Cologne, 1951. Source: *Kölner Almanach 1951/52*, 187.



Figure 2-3. Cologne Carnival Float, 1961. “Tradition wonder-children.” 1945: Under-developed. 1961: well-developed. Source: Karl Heinz Schmitz, *50 Jahre Kölnische Karnevalsgesellschaft, 1945-1995* (Wermelskirchen: Bernhard Medien, 1995), 132.

Chapter IV



Figure 4-1. Draft of important historical states and borders of “Stamm.” Bold black lines represent the borders of the Tribal Duchy of Schwaben. The shaded area represents the Alemannic dialect area. All areas within the bold border in white and below the dash line represents areas of Swabian dialect. The dashed line represents the border between the Swabian-Alemannic dialect region with northern Franconian areas. The dotted line represents the proposed unified Southwest state borders. Source: Hauptstaatsarchiv Stuttgart, EA 99/002 Bü 43, “Schwaben als Überwölbungsbegriff des Südweststaats,” 1.




Figure 4-2. Provisional occupation states and their territorial sub-units. South Württemberg and the small territory marked in bold within the state formed the state of Württemberg-Hohenzollern. This state, along with South Baden was in the French zone. Württemberg-Baden in the North was in the American zone. The shaded borders represent the borders between the four voting districts in the 1950 and 1951 referendums. Source: Hauptstaatsarchiv Stuttgart, 01/35 Bü 819, Generalsekretariat der Arbeitsgemeinschaft für die Vereinigung Baden-Württemberg, Freiburg-Heidelberg, eds., *Südweststaat-Fibel: Zur Staatlichen Neuordnung im südwestdeutschen Raum* (Konstanz: Verlagsanstalt Merk & Co, 1951).




Figure 4-3. The Swabian Alemannic Space. Note the lack of reference to Feger’s native Alsace—a clear attempt to prevent upsetting the French. Source: Otto Feger, *Schwäbisch-Alemannische Demokratie: Aufruf und Programm* (Konstanz: Curt Weller, 1946), front leaf.



Figure 4-4. Postcard with theme that also appeared on posters. “Your loyalty to Heimat, your voice to Baden.” (1950-51). Source: *Dokumente zur Entstehung des Südweststaats: 50 Jahre Baden-Württemberg* [CD-ROM], ed. Staatliche Archivverwaltung Baden-Württemberg (Stuttgart: Landesarchivdirektion Baden-Württemberg, 2002).



Figure 4-5 (Left). Pro-Baden poster “Keep our your hands off of Baden.” Note the technocratic suited hand that is stopped from grabbing their Heimat state by the arm of a common man. Source: Stadtarchiv Mannheim, Plakatsammlung Nr. 554, reproduced in “*Mannem vorne, erst recht im Südweststaat:*” *Plakate und ergänzendes Material zur Entstehung Baden-Württembergs* [CD-ROM], eds. Ulrich Niess and Barbara Wilderotter, eds., (Mannheim: Stadtarchiv Mannheim, 2002).

Figure 4-6 (Right). Pro-Baden poster that sought to strengthen the link between local Heidelberger identity with the state of Baden. This link was much weaker in Heidelberg or Mannheim in the Kurpfalz than it was in Freiburg or the former capitol Karlsruhe. Source: Stadtarchiv Mannheim, Plakatsammlung, Nr.3276, reproduced in “*Mannem vorne, erst recht im Südweststaat:*” *Plakate und ergänzendes Material zur Entstehung Baden-Württembergs* [CD-ROM], eds. Ulrich Niess and Barbara Wilderotter, eds., (Mannheim: Stadtarchiv Mannheim, 2002).





Figure 4-7. A pro-Southwest state poster that depicts the yellow-red-yellow of the Badenese flag combing with the red-black flag of Württemberg to form the German flag. Other variations of this poster also appeared prior to the 1951 election. Source: Stadtarchiv Mannheim, Plakatsammlung Nr. 3275, reproduced in *“Mannem vorne, erst recht im Südweststaat:” Plakate und ergänzendes Material zur Entstehung Baden-Württembergs* [CD-ROM], eds. Ulrich Niess and Barbara Wilderotter, eds., (Mannheim: Stadtarchiv Mannheim, 2002).



Figure 4-8. Sea monster Southwest state devouring Badenese cities from its center in Stuttgart. Source: Hauptstaatsarchiv Stuttgart, EA 1/106 Bü 183, Landesverband der Arbeitsgemeinschaft der Badener, “An alle Haushaltungen! Baden oder Südweststaat.”




Figure 4-9. Depictions of the transformation of a postwar Baden from a militarized rigid borderland to an international bridge. Note the changing of the Rhine from black to white, the removal of military figures, and the trains crossing bridges over the Rhine to Switzerland and France. This strongly paralleled arguments of Badenese world-openness vis-a-vis their national neighbors. Source: Hauptstaatsarchiv Stuttgart, EA 1/106 Bü 183, Landesverband der Arbeitsgemeinschaft der Badener, “An alle Haushaltungen! Baden oder Südweststaat.”



Figure 10. Pro-Baden poster aimed at the expellees, “The old Heimat lost, a new one won. Expellees, vote for Baden.” Source: Stadtarchiv Mannheim, Plakatsammlung Nr. 560, reproduced in “*Mannem vorne, erst recht im Südweststaat: Plakate und ergänzendes Material zur Entstehung Baden-Württembergs* [CD-ROM], eds. Ulrich Niess and Barbara Wilderotter, eds., (Mannheim: Stadtarchiv Mannheim, 2002).






Figure 4-11. Breakdown of the 1951 referendum results by county. Note the area of Pforzheim, a former part of Baden, with overwhelming votes for the Southwest state. Pforzheim was the only Swabian-speaking area of Baden. Excepting Karlsruhe, whose local identity as former Baden state capitol was closely tied to the state, Franconian areas clearly diverged from the Southern Alemannic portions of Baden. Badenese areas around Lake Constance, east of the Black forest and a hot bed of earlier Swabian-Alemannic state activities brought a poor showing for Baden. Source: Hans Schadek, ed., *Badens Mitgift: 50 Jahre Baden-Württemberg* (Freiburg: Stadtarchiv Freiburg, 2002), 447.




Figure 4-12. Important dialect borders with the Swabian-Alemannic dialect space. Note the few minor lines that converge through the Black forest. The strongest line, however, are in the north vis-a-vis Franconian areas and in the East at the river Lech that separated Bavarian Swabia from Bavaria proper. Dialect borders vis-a-vis Switzerland and the former German-speaking Alsace are negligible. Source: find page number from book - recently checked out.

## Chapter V




Figure 5-1. A limited list of popular initiatives for border redrawings. Dark lines represent current German state borders; heavy dotted lines indicate prewar state borders. Light dotted lines indicate the old provincial borders within the Prussian state. Source: Reinhard Schiffers, ed., *Weniger Länder-mehr Föderalismus?: Die Neugliederung des Bundesgebietes im Widerstreit der Meinungen 1948/1949-1990, Eine Dokumentation* (Düsseldorf: Droste, 1996), 182.




Figure 5-2. Luther Committee Report. Approximations of West German dialect zones. Source: Bundesminister des Innern, *Die Neugliederung des Bundesgebietes: Gutachten des von der Bundesregierung eingesetzten Sachverständigenausschusses* (Cologne: Carl Heymanns, 1955), Anlage 6 zu C, Nr.3.




Figure 5-3. Map of the cities and their spheres of influence in the Westerwald. The purple lines represent the zones of influences of larger cities, while the dark brown lines represent the influence of middle-sized cities. Source: Peter Schölller, *Neugliederung: Prinzipien und Probleme der politisch-geographischen Neuordnung Deutschlands und das Beispiel des Mittelrheingebietes* (Bonn: Bundesanstalt für Landeskunde und Raumforschung, 1965), Karte 37.



Figure 5-4. Luther Committee Report, Map of the *Stämme* and Tribal Duchies of the Middle Ages. Source: Bundesminister des Innern, *Die Neugliederung des Bundesgebietes: Gutachten des von der Bundesregierung eingesetzten Sachverständigenausschusses* (Cologne: Carl Heymanns, 1955), 151.




Figure 5-5. Luther Committee map of *Stamm* according to the building styles of cities. Source: Bundesminister des Innern, *Die Neugliederung des Bundesgebietes: Gutachten des von der Bundesregierung eingesetzten Sachverständigenausschusses* (Cologne: Carl Heymanns, 1955), Anlage 6 zu C, Nr.5.




Figure 5-6. Luther Committee Report. Influential Territories and Provinces of the Nineteenth Century. Source: Bundesminister des Innern, *Die Neugliederung des Bundesgebietes: Gutachten des von der Bundesregierung eingesetzten Sachverständigenausschusses*, (Cologne: Carl Heymanns, 1955), Anlage 6 zu C, Nr.9.





Figure 5-7. Contested areas of belonging between Westphalia and Lower Saxony are depicted in the red zones in the middle. Source: Hermann Brill, ed., *Die Bundesländer: Beiträge zur Neugliederung der Bundesrepublik* (Frankfurt: Institut zur Förderung Öffentlicher Angelegenheiten, e.V., 1950), Detail, Kartenbeilage 4.

## Chapter VI

### Wie finden Sie den Treffpunkt ihres Heimatortes in der Westfalenhalle?

Suchen Sie bitte im alphabetischen Ortsverzeichnis den betreffenden Ort. Die hinter der Ortsbezeichnung angeführte Zahl bezeichnet den Abschnitt in der Westfalenhalle. Um diesen Abschnitt zu finden, gehen Sie nur den Hauptgang im Erdgeschoß solange entlang, bis Sie an den Eingängen oder Treppenaufgängen die für den einzelnen Ort angegebene Zahl finden. Diese Eingänge oder Treppenaufgänge führen dann zu dem Abschnitt, zu dem der gesuchte Ort gehört. Dabei ist zu beachten, daß der Treffplatz für die früheren Einwohner der Stadt Waldenburg (außer W.-Altwasser) in der Mitte der Westfalenhalle liegt und die Abschnitte 3 (Weißstein), 6 (Hermsdorf) und 10 (Gottesberg und Umgebung) im zweiten Range sind. Die Treppenaufgänge 2-4 liegen rechts des Einganges, die Aufgänge 5-10 links davon.

#### Beispiel:

Langwaltersdorf. Im alphabetischen Ortsverzeichnis steht hinter Langwaltersdorf die Zahl 7. Langwaltersdorf gehört zum Abschnitt 7 (Friedland und Umgebung). Sie gehen also den Hauptgang im Erdgeschoß solange nach links, bis Sie zum Treppenaufgang 7 kommen, der Sie zum Abschnitt Friedland und Umgebung führt. Dort finden Sie dann die Landsleute aus Langwaltersdorf.

Adelsbach (5)	Heinrichau (9)	Reimswaldau (7)
Altlässig (10)	Hermsdorf (6)	Reußendorf (8)
Altreichenau (5)	Kaltwasser (4)	Rosenau (7)
Altwasser (W.-Altw.) (2)	Kohlau (10)	Rothenbach (10)
Bärsdorf (6)	Kynau (9)	Rudolfswaldau (9)
Dittersbach (W.-Dittb.) (1)	Langwaltersdorf (7)	Bad Salzbrunn (5)
Bad Charlottenbrunn (8)	Lehmwasser (8)	Sandberg (2)
Dittmannsdorf (8)	Liebersdorf (5)	Schenkendorf (9)
Dörnau (4)	Liebichau (5)	Schmidtsdorf (7)
Donnerau (4)	Lomnitz (4)	Seitendorf (2)
Dorfbach (9)	Michelsdorf (9)	Sophienau (8)
Erlenbusch (8)	Neudorf (9)	Sorgau (5)
Fellhammer (10)	Neugericht (9)	Stadtspark (1)
Friedland (7)	Neuwaldenburg (1)	Steinau (7)
Fröhlichsdorf (5)	Ndr.-Salzbrunn (5)	Steingrund (8)
Gaablau (10)	Oberwaldenburg (1)	Wäldchen (8)
Göhlenau (7)	Oberwüstegiersdorf (4)	Waldenburg (o. Altw.) (1)
Görbersdorf (7)	Polnitz (5)	Weißstein (3)
Gottesberg (10)	Quolsdorf (5)	Wüstegiersdorf (9)
Großhain (7)	Raspenu (7)	Wüstewaltersdorf (9)
Hausdorf (9)	Reimsbach (7)	

#### Zur Beachtung!

Die oben angeführte Platzeinteilung in der Halle ist für die Feierstunde am Sonntagvormittag beibehalten worden, um alle Landsleute bei diesem gemeinsamen Bekenntnis zur Heimat in einem Raum zu vereinen. Nach Schluß der Feierstunde, um 13 Uhr, wird die neuerrichtete sogenannte „Kleine Westfalenhalle“ für die Landsleute der Ortschaften Weißstein, Hermsdorf und Gottesberg geöffnet.

Figure 6-1 and 6-2. Schematic plans for local reunion at the Waldenburg Heimat meeting in the Westfalenhalle in Dortmund, 1955. Source: Patenchafts-Arbeitskreis Waldenburg-Dortmund, ed., *Festschrift zum 4. Waldenburger Heimattreffen in der Patenstadt Dortmund am 23 Juli und 24 Juli 1955* (Leer: Gerhard Rautenberg, 1955), 10-11




Treffpunkt der Heimatorte in Schwäbisch Gmünd			Kreisgemeinde	Gastwirtschaft	Anschrift
Gablonz	Stadtgarten	Stadtgarten 4	Antonienwald	Kanne	Rinderbachergasse 7
Seidenhwanz	Sonne	Bodsgasse 17	Albrechtstorf	Schwabenbräu	Hintere Schmidgasse 21
Kufan	Adler	Bodsgasse 15	Marienberg	Hahnen	Kappelgasse 13
Marzhowitz			Georgental		
Reichenau	Traube	Bodsgasse 35	Tannwald-Schumburg	Weißer Döfen	Parlerstraße 47
Puletschnei			Tiefenbach		
Radonowitz			Defendorf		
Peltowitz			Pelau		
Nadel-Gutbrunn	Hafen	Waldstetter Gasse 2	Grüntal		
Kohlstadt			Klein-See		
Profshwitz			Siefensruh		
Johannesberg	Kath. Vereinshaus	Freudental 26	Burgelsdorf	Bürgergarten	Katharinenstraße 41
Friedrichswald			Wulfung		
Gränzdorf			Barachsdorf-Neuwelt		
Vaurshnei					
Reinowitz	Stern	Vordere Schmidgasse 41			
Lurdorf					
Grünwald	Fuchs	Lordher Straße 42	Kreistagung	Zorbäderei	Bodsgasse 38
Wiesental	Neue Welt	Rechbergstraße 1	Lehrertagung	Zorbäderei	Bodsgasse 38
Bad-Schlag	Hopfenstüß	Klarenbergstraße 6	Metnerbund	Stadtgarten	Kolofosloßlöchen
Hennersdorf			Bierwirtschaftstagung der	Gmünder Hof	Marktplatz
Neudorf	Kreuz	Sebalstraße 1	Gablener Industrie		
Ober-Schwarzbrunn			Turnertreffen	Kleiner Saal	Stadtgarten
Unter-Schwarzbrunn	Königsturm	Rosenstraße 5			
Schumburg-Gistei					
Labau	Schützen	Klosterlestraße 10			
Pintschnei					
Klirshnei	Kübele	Engelgasse			
Mordchenstern					
Josefstal	Krone	Marktplatz 18			
Unter- u. Ober-Marzdorf					

Tagungen		
Kreistagung	Zorbäderei	Bodsgasse 38
Lehrertagung	Zorbäderei	Bodsgasse 38
Metnerbund	Stadtgarten	Kolofosloßlöchen
Bierwirtschaftstagung der	Gmünder Hof	Marktplatz
Gablener Industrie		
Turnertreffen	Kleiner Saal	Stadtgarten

Landsleute! Berücksichtigt bei Eueren Einkäufen die Geschäfte, die in unserer Festschrift inserieren!



Figures 6-3 and 6-4. Schematic plans for small village reunions at the Day of Heimat events in Schwäbisch Gmünd, 1952. This year, Schwäbisch Gmünd hosted the Heimat reunion of the Isergebirgler from the Sudenteland. Source: Heimatgruppe Isergebirge, ed., *Festschrift zum Heimattreffen der Isergebirgler, Kreis Gablonz, in Schwäbisch Gmünd* (Schwäbisch Gmünd: Alfons Urban, 1952), 10-13.

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