“MER ALL SIN KÖLLE”: COLOGNIAN IDENTITY, COLOGNIAN CARNIVAL
AND THE EVOLUTION OF HEIMATWERTE

BY

JEREMY JOHN DEWAAL
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Professor Michael Bess
Introduction

Within the Rhine metropolis Cologne and throughout the entire Rhineland--from Düsseldorf to Mainz, and Aachen, it is difficult to overstate the extent to which carnival shapes local and regional identities and their understandings of Heimat. Indeed, in the Rhineland there are no distinguishable *Heimatlied* or a *Karnevalslied*, rather, the two categories essentially melt into one. Even the most casual observer easily recognizes that Colognian carnival is more than just the free-spirited merrymaking seen in the boisterousness of the nearly two million celebrants that fill the city’s streets each year. Rather, it is the primary ritual that defines what it means to be both a Colognian and a *Rheinländer*. The famous Colognian carnivalist, Thomas Liessem held that Colognian children grew up with carnival in their blood, and that they soaked up their local *Volkshumor* through their mother’s milk. His contemporary carnivalist from Mainz, Anton Keim, insisted that Rhenish carnival was not a casual affair, but rather a “gravely serious matter.” Such expression are not simply moments of hyperbole or romantic flourishes. As Dagmar Hänel has shown in a recent article, it is not unusual for members of carnival societies to wear their carnival uniforms to the funeral of one of its members. Hänel rightly presents this as evidence of the meaning that carnival has for the self-understanding of its devoted celebrants. It is partially for this reason that Helene Klauser has referred to the carnivalist as a “Lebensform.” Unlike many modern “traditions,” Colognian carnival is not one of those that was invented in the nineteenth century. While its origins are highly disputed, a continual history of its celebration, at least in Cologne, can be traced back to 1341 when it is first mentioned in the city’s *Eidbuch*. Behind the celebration of carnival, one finds a vast myriad of traditions, including *Weiberfastnacht*, the parade of *Rosenmontag*, the ceremonial duties of the *Dreigestirn*, the burning of *Knubbelmänner*, Councils of 11, carnival uniform persiflage, *Prunksitzungen*,
Geisterzüge, Tanzmariechen, Narrenschriften, Narrenkappen, Narrengrüssen, Narrenrufe and the notion of the Narrenreich, to name but a few. The object of this article is to look at how Colognians have constructed a notion of the broader meaning of carnival, and how this has informed their Heimat-identities over time.

Virtually all who have written on carnival have focused on the evolution and development of forms of celebration and the social structures that have produced these forms throughout the several hundred year history of carnival’s existence. Indeed, virtually all diachronic analyses of carnival have addressed only the form of celebration and not of how historical subjects constructed a notion of the celebration’s meaning. To do so, I will argue, reveals a very disparate and evolving notions of what the festival represents and what values it embodies. The tendency to overlook such trends is very typical in topics related to Heimatkunde, written by casual historians who overwhelmingly come from the regions or places about which they write. Indeed, Lokalpatriotismus and Heimat-identity rely on a discourse of continuity of meaning, and not one of drastic change which Heimatler would perceive as destabilizing to their identity. Thus, the general assumption has been that the spirit and underlying meaning of carnival has remained fairly constant—just as Heimatler perceive that what it means to be Colognian has remained constant. This mentality is very much illustrated by Joseph Hoster, the Domherr of Cologne in a sermon shortly after the fall of the Third Reich. Hoster insisted that all of the changes in the city in the postwar were only ones of external form, and that the city’s historical essence remained. He followed with an analogy to the physical body: “..im Innersten wechselt sie sich nie. Die Zellen eines Menschen vergehen und erneuern sich, alle sieben Jahre materiell ihn wendend, sein Ich wandelt sich nicht.”6 In this study, I argue precisely the opposite regarding both the meaning of carnivalistic celebration, and in turn, how Colognians perceive their own
local identity. While forms of celebration of their most beloved Heimatfest have changed at a steady pace over the course of history, I will argue that construction of its meaning has changed radically throughout its history.

The first part of this study focuses on twentieth-century Cologne, before and after World War II. Here I attempt to illustrate how, over the course of the late 1940's and 1950's, Colognians began to take on a new local and regional identity that they saw as rooted in the perceived denazified and deprivatized values of carnival. They believed that carnival contained within it a tradition of democracy, openness, resistance to authority, diversity, and above all, tolerance. Over the course of the 1950's and 1960's many of these notions began to be internalized, and are undoubtedly reflected in contemporary understandings of Colognian Heimatler. I argue that these changes in Cologne are representative of changes in understandings of Heimatwerte in different regions and localities throughout West Germany in the two decades after 1945. The initial suspicion is that these changes represents a petty and fully conscious attempt of Colognians and other German Heimatler to distance themselves from responsibility of the crimes of World War II. Horst Mazerath has argued that, after the war, “forms” were invented to hide responsibility—both in Cologne, and other localities and regions. He argues that in Cologne, the emphasis on Colognian resistance to authority, Rhineland Catholicism, and Colognian liberalism were all used to “hide” histories of the Third Reich and not confront the history of the period. Over the course of this study, I will argue that Mazerath’s argument is both oversimplified, and flawed in several aspects. I attempt, for example, to illustrate how Heimat sentiment in the postwar was more oriented toward the task of the future and the spirit of rebuilding, as opposed to using their new identities to reach an assessment of past guilt. More generally, however, I am interested in how Colognians looked to their carnivalistic Heimat
traditions as a place from which to cope with the disastrous effects of the Third Reich, and how many viewed regional and local culture as agents in a process of de-Germanization which they treated as running parallel to the process of denazification.

In the second part of this study, I attempt to illustrate how the changes in the meaning of Colognian carnival and thus Colognian identity in the post war, are neither aberrational nor exceptional. Indeed, the meaning of traditions such as carnival are subject to a constant process of evolution in the interpretation of their meaning–constantly conforming to the Zeitgeist of their respective period. To illustrate this, I look at the earlier history of carnival, from the Middle Ages to the 19th century. I argue that, while many forms of carnival’s celebration remained continuous throughout this period, by the nineteenth century, understandings of the meaning of the celebration and its elements, were the polar opposite of how they were conceived in previous periods. Here, I draw strongly on the research of Dietz-Rüdiger Moser and Werner Mezger, who have presented thorough and convincing arguments that carnival originated in the medieval period and not from the Ancient Germans or from the Romans. In doing so, they have illustrated how carnival throughout Europe was understood as an inscenation of the evil and fallen state of man. It stands thus contra posed to the period of fasting prior to Easter which directly precedes carnival. The meaning of carnival thus came through its rejection, when its celebrants turn away from the carnality of the fallen state of man and entered the holy sanctity of the church. The meaning of carnival thus relies on the day of its ending, on Ash Wednesday when celebrations end and the celebrants abandon the Narrenschiff in favor of the ship of the mother church. I explore their conclusions on how the different elements of medieval carnival fit into the Christian metaphor, allow me to later elaborate on how these concepts took on a new meaning in modern Colognian carnival. Moser and Mezger, who have a stronger background of Swabian
Fasnet than Rhenish carnival, aim their arguments about Christian carnival at earlier assertions that carnival has pagan origins. Both studies are fairly disinterested in the modern period. However, in this study, I compare their conclusions about medieval Christian carnival with later developments in Colognian-Rhenish carnival—which, by the 19th century, did not represent an empire of wickedness to be rejected after its celebration, but rather an empire of uninhibited jubilation that shaped the local identity of its Colognian celebrants year-round. It came to be described as a festival of life and a war of jollification against evil elements of curmudgeondom and lifeless sobriety. Yet, it retained many of the same forms and motifs of celebration that existed in earlier centuries—simply interpreting them within a different interpretive framework. There is no evidence that this shift was a fully conscious one, but rather an evolution that occurred over several generations. Historians of Rhenish and Colognian carnival have failed to recognize the changes behind these developments as a vast overarching Sinneswandel of Rhenish and Colognian carnival. Most have either completely overlooked the differences of meaning between medieval/early modern and modern carnival, while others have passively mentioned the “declining” role of religion in modern carnival. This is partially due to the reluctance of historians of Heimatkunde to recognize great historical shifts in their tradition, while it is also partially due to the limited nature of several studies to the history of carnival within a more limited period of time. However, I argued that the change in Rhenish-Colognian carnival that had been achieved by the nineteenth century, was not simply a “decline” in religion. Rather, a radical overturn and revision of carnival’s meaning had been realized.

I attempt to go through several elements of carnival and illustrate through a semiotic analysis how, by the nineteenth century, the motifs and forms of carnival with historical continuity were conceived within this new interpretive framework, showing continuity of form
and discontinuity in meaning. Finally, I am also interested in placing my findings in a broader context. While I am interested in Cologne, carnival and Colognian identity, on a broader level, I attempt to illustrate in this case study that Heimat and Heimat-traditions have a tremendous degree of flexibility, even though discourses of these traditions frequently emphasize continuity to provide for the stability of their own identities. Unlike nations and national traditions, Heimat-identity and constructing understandings of its traditions are subject to fewer pervasive discourses, less discipline by centralized spheres of power, and less historical scrutiny than nations, national belonging, and national tradition. Therein lies its flexibility, where individuals are given greater subjective sovereignty in imagining and constructing notions of where Heimat is, what it is about, and what its particular traditions mean. This interpretation differs greatly from traditional understandings which often view Heimat as imbued in a backward, unchanging traditionalism. The flexibility of the Heimat concept is no where better illustrated than in postwar-Germany. As a process of denazification began, many Germans wished to establish a new identity based on new principles that they could internalize as informing their identity. Yet the idea of nation, irrevocably tainted, lacked the flexibility to be shaped into a vessel of new identities. Regional and local Heimat identities, on the other hand, by their very nature provided this flexibility of definition. Heimatler—often considered as un-modern and reactionary, found in their local and regional traditions (whether consciously or unconsciously) a place where they could build a new identity in which they found positive values. In this case study on Colognian carnival and Colognian identity, I try to show this postwar dynamic, and further examine other periods to illustrate that this ability of such traditions to be radically reinterpreted and redefined is by no means exceptional to the postwar period. Rather it represents an inherent dynamic of Heimat traditions themselves, where notions of the metaphysical behind exterior forms of
tradition are constantly subjected to discrete and often unconscious periods of redefinition, particularly between different generations. While new generations take on historical forms of tradition, they invariably interpret their meanings according to their own needs, identities and mentalities. Colognian carnival is merely one example that illustrates this.

**Carnival to 1945**

While I am primarily interested in carnival in the postwar period, it is necessary to establish a background of the long history of Colognian carnival that preceded it, and to examine previous works of research relevant to the topics here discussed. Carnival, of course, is a festival that is not only celebrated in Cologne, but throughout the western world and particularly in places influenced by Catholicism. Much of its early history, however, has been plagued by an almost complete absence of historical records– leaving many of its elements and its origins inherently ambiguous. Even the origin of the word “Fastnacht” (and its respective regional variants) has been the subject of debate. The accepted interpretation of the word “Karneval”, is that it derives from the Latin term for meat or “Carne.” The word thus represents the indulgence and carnality prior to Lent--the forty days of fasting that follow carnival, when the carnivalistic world of indulgences is abandoned. This period of fasting reaches its conclusion in the celebration of Easter. The obvious explanation for the terms “Fastnacht”, “Fastenabend”, “Fasching” and “Fasnet” is simply that the root comes from “fasten,” as it immediately precedes the period of fasting. Yet, some have argued that these terms actually derive from the ancient Germanic world “faseln”. This interpretation particularly gained prominence in the Nazi period. An editorial in a Cologne newspaper in the late 1930's insisted that the term Fastnacht had been coopted by the Christians, who introduced the foreign term carne vale “Fleisch lebe wohl.” The
ancient Germanic “faseln”, meaning “Gedeihen” or “fröhlich sein,” the writer argued, revealed the true origins of carnival. The historian Karl Meisen, however, has convincingly argued that the term Fastnacht has Christian origins, and that the argument for a Germanic origin is irredeemably flawed. He uses several different sources to argue this point, including linguistics, and cross comparisons with non-Germanic terms. The origins of the different terms used to refer to the celebration have been deeply tied to the debate over its origins. This issue will be addressed in more detail later. Suffice to say, the debate has been fought between those who, on one side, believe carnival has pagan origins rooted in the Roman *Saturnalia* and/or in ancient Germanic festivals of banishing winter spirits, and those on the other side who argue that carnival has purely Christian medieval origins. The majority of serious scholars have concluded that carnival originated in medieval Christianity. Opponents of this position, however, have argued that carnival’s Christian elements merely originated from a past Christianization of these older pagan festivals.

While carnival-like celebrations did exist in the Roman Empire (of which Cologne was a part), a nearly 1000 year gap exists in which no carnivalistic celebrations can be confirmed to have taken place anywhere in Europe. The first historical record of Colognian carnival appears on March 5, 1341, where it is written in the *Eidbuch* of Cologne that the city will no longer provide public money for the celebrations. The nature of this record clearly indicates that Colognians celebrated carnival in years previous. Unlike in the previous 1000 years, however, there exists a patchy, but continual stream of accounts of Colognian carnival celebrations from 1341 to the present. This includes records by the famous Colognian Burgher Hermann von Weinsberg, who mentions the festivities in his writings. The sudden appearance of records of carnival celebrations appear all over Europe around the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries.
European cities like Venice and Nürnberg had notably prominent celebrations. The famous Nürnberg Schembartlauf, and the carnival celebrations of many other soon-to-be protestant cities, however, rapidly disappear after the Reformation. Protestants unequivocally opposed the festival, with some openly denouncing it as a “papal mischief”. In Cologne, throughout the early modern period, the festival continued to receive support and public organization through guilds, Gaffeln, and arguably, the Catholic church itself. These institutions continued to shape carnival throughout the early modern period.

After the invasion and annexation of Cologne by Napoleon, the guild system was abolished, taking away from Colognian carnival its traditional organizing force. These events paved the way for the birth of modern institutionalized carnival, which would be more centrally organized, with more clearly codified forms of romanticized celebration. A group called the Olympische Gesellschaft, made up of prominent city figures, such as Joseph de Noël, Heinrich von Wittgenstein and Franz Wallraff, led this romantic reform of Colognian carnival. The spirit of romanticism is important to the renewed interest in reinvigorating the festival. Indeed, earlier Enlightenment intellectuals viewed carnival with a general disdain, denouncing it as a vulgar uncivilized sort of festival. The city of Cologne became the first city to undertake such a reform of carnival, instituting their plans in 1823. In this year, the first, and still most prominent carnival society, die Funken Rut-wieß, often known as the Rote Funken was established. Even more importantly, a standing committee of Colognian carnival came into existence, which organized the most prominent carnival parade on Rosenmontag. This committee was also invested with the power to chose the newly introduced Dreigestirn, or “carnival triumverate”, that included the “kölsche Boor”, “Jungfrau”, and “Held Karneval”, who played prominent roles in the festivities. These romantic reform of in Cologne proved highly influential in other
cities. Within a few years, parallel reforms, modeled on Cologne, were instituted throughout the Rhineland in cities such as Aachen, Düsseldorf, Bonn, etc.

Most historical analyses of Colognian carnival have focused on this period of carnival reform, and on the nineteenth-century more generally. This is partly due to the sparsity of sources in earlier periods, and the general neglect of carnival’s later history. Nevertheless, some interesting research has been done on nineteenth-century carnival that has focused largely on the dynamics of class and authority. The bourgeoisie largely led and shaped the carnival reforms, allowing them to pursue their own interest and desires in the process. At the same time, however, carnival is also noted for its ability to act as a ventile for suppressed segments of society, who use the celebration to subvert or attack the authority of dominant groups or ruling powers. Throughout its history, the festival created unease among local princes, who frequently attempted to forbid it. Often, this simply made illicit carnival celebrations into even stronger lightning rods of opposition. The expression notion of equality between all classes in carnival clearly appears in nineteenth-century Cologne. In 1824, Held Karneval, the leading figure of the celebration, proclaimed that during carnival, all classes were equal. Indeed, the postwar Rhenish carnivalists, Heinrich Lützeler, wrote that Colognian carnivalistic humor has historically been used to relieve tensions between dominant social groups and the lower ranks of society. Lützeler sees this function of Colognian Volkshumor as being rooted in its antagonistic relationship to authority. According to this interpretation, in carnival, lower strata of society are able to challenge the dominance of their superiors through humor and the freedom of celebration. Lützeler insisted, the carnivalistic joke breaks through taboos and conventions and allows the unsaid to be said. The carnival historian Hildegard Brog, has noted that, during the French occupation, carnival provided an outlet that leveled the classes and allowed for a large amount of
interaction between different class groups. Here, the Rhenish Büttenreden also played an important role. These carnival speeches were made to crowds from a “Bütt”, Colognian for wash tub, a tradition still carried on today. It represents a washing of dirty laundry, in which the speaker comically voices grievances regarding current issues and the actions of local notables. These speeches are well known for their acerbic and critical wit that pummeled prominent figures and their actions through playful humor.

Although nineteenth-century Rhenish carnival contained a subversive element toward authority, as Herbert Schwedt points out, a single class, the bourgeoisie used carnival to create for themselves a forum for self-representation that served their own purposes. Other scholars have confirmed this argument. James Brophy, in an article on Colognian carnival and citizenship from 1823-1848, argues that the bourgeoisie reshaped carnival to push their own “cultural and political desires.” Brophy sees signs of bourgeois control in the creation of an orderly celebration out of the plebeian disorder of previous carnival celebrations. Brophy argues that, rather than tearing down borders, carnival reinforced social lines and distinctions. He further cites the two most prominent elements of pre-1848 carnival as being “Cologne’s identity as a great metropolis” and the position of the city’s bourgeoisie as “local and regional leaders.”

More generally, Brophy looks at these new bourgeois carnival societies as being representative of a newly emerging public sphere. Finally, he uses his analysis of these carnival societies to critique some of Habermas’s theories on the public sphere. Elaine Glovka Spencer in her article “Regimenting Revelry” on Rhenish carnival in the early nineteenth century, has arrived at similar conclusions. Spencer also notes the important role of the bourgeoisie in organizing carnival, and the significance of carnival societies in the emergence of a new bourgeois identity in Cologne. Spencer argues that the Rhenish bourgeoisie used carnival to deal with a changing
world—pursuing their interest through carnival societies, while masking their efforts behind regional tradition and “harmless fun” of carnival. The bourgeoisie engaged in the “regimenting of revelry” by taking control of the celebration away from lower-class hordes and bringing a notion of bourgeois decorum. The bourgeoisie intensified expressions of pride in the city of Cologne and local Gemeinschaft in order to displace the disruptive displays of the lower ranks. In turn, the bourgeoisie stylized themselves as the protectors of Colognian and Rhenish tradition.25 Like Brophy, Spencer argues that carnival reinforced class distinction in some ways, while also containing elements that broke down social boundaries. Carnival societies did, for example, use celebrations to collect donations for poor relief, though Spencer sees this as a strategic move to stave off anger from lower orders over the decadence of upper-class revelry. Spencer also noted that, toward the middle of the nineteenth century, newer carnival societies acted more strongly on the widespread “egalitarian rhetoric” of the carnival season—such as the popular carnival saying that all under the Narrenkappe are equals. Spencer also notes that many of the carnival societies that came into being after the romantic reforms, had much stronger democratic colorings than older societies, and frequently became politically active. Spencer concludes that, in spite of the role of class, carnival discourses remained “self-consciously inclusive”—with something for everyone.26

These discussions regarding class and social boundaries are relevant to this study, as postwar Heimatler praise Colognian carnival based on its perceived ability to tear down social borders between societal groups. The most important point of nineteenth-century carnival, however, is how it became the primary Hochburg of Colognian civic identity and Rhenish regional identity. The nineteenth century saw the emergence of many catch-phrases of Colognian identity. The idea of the Colognians having imperturbably happy dispositions—“die Kölsche han
em Hätze nur Sonnensching,” or notions of Colognian free-spiritedness, frolicsomeness, jollity, etc. all emerged in this period as stereotypical ways of describing what it meant in this period to be a Colognian Heimatler. These notions naturally had their origin in carnival, though Colognian’s used them year-round to describe themselves as a people of carnival. Brophy notes the very exaggerated nature of this local pride expressed in carnival, which drew on the memory of the Romans, Cologne’s medieval glory, and Cologne’s history of being a free imperial city; all were aimed at representing Cologne as though it represented the “cradle of civilization.” Even in the contemporary popular culture of Cologne, the memory of Cologne as a free imperial city of the Holy Roman Empire has remained present– embodied in such popular sayings as “kölsche Boor hald fass am Rich!” Spencer has also noted how carnival was used throughout the Rhineland to create a notion of Rhinelanders as different from, but not less German than other Germans. Spencer argues that nineteenth-century Rhinelander characterized themselves as “humorous and good natured” vis-a-vis the Prussian occupiers, who did not share their carnivalistic traditions. Emphasizing their Rhenish nature in carnival became a mode of maintaining a distinct character as a bulwark against homogenization after losing local control to Prussia. Brophy has also observed this hostility to Prussia in carnival, while also noting that Rheinländer have frequently emphasized their regional Rhenish culture since the earlier French occupation, as a means of expressing opposition to outside control.

As previously mentioned, nineteenth-century carnival has been known for the threat that it posed to authority. Even in the present day, carnival is the only time of year when the formal “Sie” is abandoned, with all, including the elite and powerful having to submit to being referred to by the informal “du”–even by unfamiliar social inferiors. Because of this perceived threat to authority, in the nineteenth century, the French forbid carnival for a substantial period of time
during their occupation under Napoleon. After 1815, the Prussians mostly permitted the festival, though they put several restrictions in place. While not forbidding carnival in Cologne, Prussian authorities did forbid it for several years in Bonn, whose citizens, in turn, took Cologne by storm during the carnival season. In the Revolutions of 1848, which occurred at the same period as carnival, several Colognian and Rhenish carnivalists became involved in the Frankfurt Parliament. After the failure of 1848, carnival continued to act as a vent for those desirous to express anti-Prussian sentiments. Many historians, such as Hildegard Brog, have argued that, in this period, carnivalists emphasized Rhenish exuberance as a sign of opposition to Prussian strictness. According to Brog, Prussian officials had a difficult time disciplining the Rhenish “Frohnaturen,” and carnivalists continually used carnival to challenge state authority. This can be seen in some of the floats of the famous Rosenmontag parade in the years after national unification. One float in 1901, bedecked with Prussian flags, persiflaged the naval forces of the nation, emphasizing a strict demand for order. Another, from 1914, called “Ausstellung für Armeedefarf” made an acerbic critique of the national army. On this float, a robust Wagnerian mother with five nursing babies, is surrounded by rations and supplies—a patent comic assault on the treatment of manpower as a mere military asset for the nation. (Figure 1) Colognian carnival, however, provided a forum for all modes of expression—and also included some patently nationalist displays. Among others, the highest position in the Narrenreich of carnival, Held Karneval, received the new title of “Prinz Karneval” after 1870, in honor of the Prussian monarch. In the early nineteenth century, Goethe himself noted that Colognian carnival could be a seed of a national German Volksfest. Certain Colognian carnival songs from the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries also contain lyrics colored with nationalism, such as Hubert Ebeler’s 1909 song “Die Mutter”, which upholds a notion of the ideal German mother serving
the Vaterland. Other carnival songs and rhymes played up the notion of the “Wach am Rhein.” One carnival song from the 1860's talked about German brothers joining to save Schleswig-Holstein from Danish chains. Other carnival songs denounced France and warned the “welscher Hahn” to keep their hands away from the Rhine. Directly after unification in 1870, some carnivalists opined that the festival should be steeped in national pride. In the same year, a group of carnivalists founded the notable carnival society die Blaue Funken, which contained strong national tones in comparison to the oldest and most prominent carnival society, die Rote Funken. As is so often the case with carnival, however, it allowed all different social and political groups to use its celebration and principles of freedom of expression to promote their own opinions. This meant both anti-Prussian and pro-Prussian nationalist sentiments, and everything in between.

The outbreak of World War I began a ten year period in which Colognian carnival was not celebrated. Until 1918, carnivalists abstained from celebrations of their own volition. From 1918-1924, the occupiers of the Rhineland forbid it. Celebrations of carnival in the Weimar Republic were fairly uneventful, and significantly toned down given the financial struggles of the period. Unsurprisingly, it is the Nazi period which imposed significant changes on the shape of their Heimatfest. As with virtually all other aspects of cultural life, the Nazis began a process of Gleichschaltung, submitting all carnival committees throughout Germany to the newly created Bund Deutscher Karneval (BDK). Carnival groups like the Rote Funken, which had previously had Jewish members, were obliged to take up the new rules stating that Non-Aryans could no longer join. Furthermore, the Nazis placed Colognian carnival under the authority of the program Kraft durch Freude–an action that carnival societies in Cologne openly protested. Through the veritable mouthpiece of the Nazi party in Cologne, the Westdeutscher Beobachter,
the powers that be insisted that everything in carnival would remain the same—as a
“bodenständiger Brauchtumskarneval.”38 Another article insisted that the Nazis were the
rescuers of the festival, which was now ascending like a Phoenix from the ashes.39 In spite of
such reassurances, the new levels of control alarmed many carnivalists. The Nazi party
mandated that carnival Büttenrede have no political content, and that all carnival speeches be
reviewed by censors before their presentation. Two Colognian newspapers openly opposed this
effort, arguing that it did away with the true spirit of carnival.40

Anton Keim, in his work, 11 mal Politischer Karneval, has argued that the Nazis were
disturbed by the political liberalism, freedom of opinion and Catholicism of carnival. Keim
describes the reaction of Rhenish carnivalists to these developments as “ein dorniger Weg
zwischen mißverständlicher Anpassung und Widerstand in Zwischentönen.” The opposition of
carnivalists took the form of both subtle and open rebellion. In Mainz, the entire organizing
committee of Mainzer carnival were arrested for a period of time. Seppel Glückert, a Mainzer
Büttredner received a Redenverbot after frequently attacking the Nazis through Rhenish insider
humor in his carnival speeches.41 In Cologne itself, the Colognian Büttredner Karl Küpper
received a Redenverbot, for carnival speeches criticizing Nazis, which he masked behind thinly
veiled jokes with double meanings.42 The major revolt of Colognian carnivalists, however, came
in 1935, when the Nazi-appointed Bürgermeister Willi Ebel planned to create a Verein Kölner
Karneval e.V. as an umbrella society to which all other Colognian carnival societies would be
directly subjected. Thomas Liessem, the president of the Prinzgarde led a revolt of carnivalists
against Ebel’s plans. In his memoirs written after the war, Liessem recorded outrage among many
Colognian carnivalists, and wrote that carnivalists believed nothing less was at stake than the
maintenance or destruction of their Heimafest. Five presidents of major Colognian carnival
societies, including the presidents of the Rote Funken and the Kölner Narrenzunft, met to take action against Ebel’s plans. Together, they drafted and officially issued a letter denouncing Ebel’s newly proposed carnival organization. City newspapers printed the letter under the title “Kölns Narren revoltieren.” Liessem claims that the police kept their meeting to draft the letter under strict surveillance, and had parts of the letter removed before printing. The protests of Colognian carnivalists yielded results, having also promised a boycott of carnival if they did not get their way. Willi Ebel withdrew his plans for a central Colognian carnival society, saying that all carnival societies should be allowed to maintain their own sovereignty. As the president of the reformed and denazified Bund Deutscher Karneval in 1956, Thomas Liessem recalled the carnivalist revolt in a public address. After praising carnival’s ability to help a people through difficult times, he argued that carnival under the Nazis had no soul and no local rootedness, which the new BDK sought to protect. He condemned the Kraft durch Freude “Vermassungsmühle,” and praised the revolt of the carnivalists who defended their own carnivalistic “Lebensart” and told the Nazis: “Hände weg von unserer Volksfastnacht!” Adolf Klein, in his work on the history of Cologne in the Third Reich has made similar arguments in describing these events as a “revolt” as well as an “assault” on Gleichschaltung. The Nazis attempted from the very beginning reinterpret the origins of carnival. The party stated explicitly before the celebration of the 1933 carnival, that the connection of carnival to Christianity should be negated and obscured. Instead, they should emphasize supposed “Germanic” origins of the festival. A large project to shift understandings of carnival’s meaning took place in the press. Articles appeared, for example, explaining the confusion of the Grimm brothers in their dictionary entry which connected “Fastenabend” to the fasting of Lent. They also attacked notions that carnival had Roman origins. A 1938 article in the Westdeutscher
Beobachter argued that Rhinelander should abandon all traces of Roman influence, criticizing, for example, Bonner carnival, whose monarch is called Princess “Bonna”—insisting that the monarch should have a Germanic name. As previously mentioned, the Nazi’s argued strongly that “Fastnacht” or “Fastenabend” came from the ancient Germanic word vaseln, meaning “gedeihen” or “Fruchtzeugen” and not from the period of fasting in Lent. Another 1938 article in the Neue Tag, argued that carnival represented a Germanic festival of growth, returning of life and the fertility of nature—a spring festival. The article concluded about carnival: “Uralte Erinnerungen an vorchristliche Glaubensformen schwingen darin mit.” The postwar historian Dietz-Rüdiger Moser has conducted several studies of early Christian carnival, and has argued convincingly that its origins lie in the Christian Middle Ages, and not in paganism. Above all, he has condemned postwar traces of the Nazi-propagated notion that carnival has Germanic origins. While Moser presents several convincing arguments, the most obvious is that carnival is celebrated in places all throughout Europe—and not just in Germanic areas. Moser also emphasizes how neatly and seamlessly carnival is integrated into the Christian calendar. In spite of the Nazi efforts to introduce a Germanic Umdeutung of carnival, many refused to go along with their proscribed interpretations. The Rhinelander Adolf Spamer, for example, wrote in his 1936 book Deutsche Fastnachtsbräuche, that attempts to tie carnival to pre-Christian or Germanic festivals, lacked sound reason.

The Nazis also made great significant efforts to suppress cross-dressing in carnival. Cross-dressing—both male-to-female and female-to-male, has a long tradition in carnival. It can be traced back as early as 1534, with accounts of women dressing up as men. In the nineteenth century, cross-dressing in Rhenish carnival outraged Prussian police forces, who believed that it put the entire gender spectrum into question. Cross-dressing played a central role in the
carnival triumverate, the *Dreigestirn*, where a man in drag traditionally depicted the female *Jungfrau*. In addition, every carnival society had a so-called *Tanzmariechen*—likewise a male dressed in drag.\(^{53}\) In 1936, the NSDAP decreed that all *Tanzmariechen* must be depicted by women, and in 1938 the position of *Jungfrau* in the *Dreigestirn* was subjected to the same requirement.\(^{54}\) (Figures 2 and 3) As one pamphlet from Wuppertal argued, it was believed that cross-dressing found in carnival could cause gender-sickness.\(^{55}\) This is generally reflective of the “gay-panic” and homophobia prevalent among the Nazis. After 1945, *Tanzmariechen* continued to be depicted by women, while carnivalists restored the tradition of having a male in drag play the role of the *Jungfrau*.

The Nazis controlled the celebration of carnival for seven years, from 1933 to 1940. According to Thomas Liessem’s correspondences, it was *Reichsführer SS* Himmler, himself who forbid its celebration after 1940. Most carnivalists also agreed that its celebration during war was ill-advised.\(^{56}\) However, during the years of its celebration between 1933-1940, the Nazi party used *gleichgeschaltete* carnival as a forum for propaganda. Where no accounts exist of anti-Semitism expressed in Colognian carnival before the coming to power of the Nazis, after 1933, two anti-Semitic carnival floats appeared in the *Rosenmontag* parade. One, after the Nuremberg laws, showed a Jewish man with a paragraph symbol pulling him in by the tie. Another, “die Letzten ziehen ab,” poked at Jewish Zionism—and celebrated that Jews were leaving Germany. Some anti-Semitic carnival songs also appeared. While there have been debates on the reaction of carnival societies to these events, little concrete evidence exists that can shed light on this. Carnival parades were not documented, and knowledge of the parade floats that appeared can only be reconstructed from random photographs and anecdotal accounts.\(^{57}\) As with many aspects of the history of the *Third Reich*, it is often very difficult to determine public
opinion regarding certain acts of the party—the same being true regarding their shaping of
carnival. Max-Leo Schwering has called into questioned arguments that the public opposed
these expressions of anti-Semitism. Schwering has also called into question how much carnival
was used popularly to express anti-Nazi sentiments. Some of the debates back and forth argue
about anecdotal accounts of whether anti-Semitic floats received an unusual silence from the
crowd or not—of course overlooking the fact that the crowds of the Rosenmontag parade are
several miles long, and different social groups often congregate along certain parts of the route.
Such arguments about anecdotal accounts, however are hardly purposeful. Clearly, however,
Cologne’s carnival was used to express anti-Nazi sentiments—and some in very unsubtle ways.
As previously mentioned, there is the opposition of Liessem and his carnivalists to Ebel, the anti-
Nazi Bütt speeches of Karl Küpper—yet overt opposition went further. During the 1938 carnival,
an unofficial Rosenmontagszeitung was printed in the Netherlands and distributed in Cologne,
showing a number of drafts for carnival floats that constituted acerbic attacks on the Nazi regime.
Among one of the most denunciatory was the float 7 in the newspaper, depicting a Nazi officer
milking an acutely malnourished cow. Behind him is a Nazi soldier portrayed by a pig, and a
Swastika atop the barn sided by two vultures. The captions of the Nazi officer reads: “What is
even worse than a Jew? When the Milk inspector comes by.” (Figure 4) Float 8 in the
newspaper, entitled “a visit that must be presented” depicted a fiendish skeleton and Nazi
soldiers dressed in black, with the caption reading: “With everything around us going up in
flames, we have to thank the FÜHRER”. (Figure 5) The strength of Nazi censorship also makes
it also necessary to consider areas of conspicuous silence. In a 1940 work on the Rote Funken
written by its president, Eberhard Hamacher, for example, several pages are set aside to address
the fact that carnival could not be celebrated due to the war. Hamacher wrote of the hope that
carnival could again be celebrated once peace returns, and noted how the war had taken many carnivalists into the Wehrmacht and away from their home city. In the year of astonishing Nazi victories, it is interesting that Hamacher writes that he hopes the return of carnival through “peace” and not victory, and that he never uses the words “Nazi”, “Führer”, or “Hitler” in his discussion.\textsuperscript{59} Other interesting silences occur in songs, such as Willy Klett’s 1943 song “Ming einzig Kölle” a heart-wrenched song mourning the bombed out city, and the loss of the all the places he once knew and grew up with. The song refers to rebuilding once the bells of peace ring–pulling on the memories of the Kölsche Boor of the Holy Roman Empire and old Roman Colonia. Again, notable is the use of the word “peace” instead of victory, and the absence of national sentiments, or the mention of the Nazis. In addition, while preoccupied with the sadness from the destroyed city, no statements of anger appear denouncing the allied bombers.\textsuperscript{60} Given the machine of censorship in the Third Reich.

Efforts to determine the level of popular support for different Nazi actions has often led to a fabrication of oversimplified schemas in a desire to create a clear picture of supporters and opponents–victims and perpetrators, that can be easily integrated into a cultural memory that is reticent to gradation and complexity. What is clear, however, is that the Nazi manipulation of carnival had both virulent opponents, convinced supporters, and apathetic bystanders. Some, such as Adolf Klein, in his 1983 work on Cologne in the \textit{Third Reich}, has argued that Nazism and Rhenish/Colognian carnival culture were inherently incompatible–with the latter being rooted in expressions of bourgeois freedom, the absence of a \textit{Führerprinzip}, freedom of speech, acerbic political critiques of the \textit{Bütt}, and uncontrolled riotous crowds. He further argues that Cologne had never been a center of anti-Semitism before the war, and that, in spite of its clearly lower voting for the Nazis than the rest of the nation, Cologne was taken along the same
Of course it is reasonable to assume that Nazi support varied throughout different German regions and cities. What is unreasonable, and quite inappropriate, would be to use historical analyses of such varied support as a springboard for the fashioning of regionally or locally based Schlussstrich-mentalities. Nevertheless, there is significant evidence suggesting that there was notable resistance to Nazism within Cologne that was expressed through carnival. While the Nazis used carnival to express antisemitism, the Jewish community supported, sometimes quite enthusiastically, the celebration of carnival, both before and after the war. Indeed, it was the returning Jewish community of Cologne, who convinced the British to allow carnival parades in 1946. Ralph Giordano, a member of the Cologne Jewish community before and after the war, recalled moving to the city from Hamburg, and being drawn to the positive force of carnival. Günther Ginzel, a fellow Jewish Colognian recalled how positively Jews saw carnival, and their activities to allow celebrations after the end of the war:

“Merkwürdig, welche Anziehungskraft der Karneval auf Juden auszuüben in der Lage ist. Das war vor dem Krieg so, und nicht wenige haben die Erinnerung an den Karneval mit in die Emigration genommen. Und das war bei den Befreiten so. Sicher etwas was nur in Köln denkbar war. Ein verwurzeltes Heimatgefühl, das selbst von Auschwitz nicht völlig ausgelöscht werden konnte. Vielleicht steht das Kölsche für die emotionale, die intellektuell nicht immer erklärbare Verbundenheit vieler Kölner Juden zu ihrer Stadt. Völlig undenkbar, daß soeben aus dem KZ Befreiten an irgendeinem anderen Ort in Deutschland volkstümliche Sänger in die Synagoge eingeladen hätten, so wie an Pessach 1946 die Kölner Juden, die kurz darauf die Engländer bewegen konnten, den ersten Rosenmontag zu genehmigen.”

Günther insisted that the Jewish community in Cologne had always been enthusiastic carnival supports, that belonged to city carnival socities. He holds that Jews felt they belonged in the city, and that non-Jews recognized them. Of course, such enthusiastic statements should not be
blown out of proportion—with some Jews in postwar Cologne likely taking a more distant position to carnival based on some of the floats that appeared during the Nazi period. The expression of such sentiments, however, do draw into question the arguments by Schwering, that carnival was neither a ventile for Nazi opposition, and that nearly all of the populace supported the antisemitism expressed in carnival by Nazi propaganda. As already noted, there is evidence of overt resistance, though one should also look for, as Anton Keim argued, resistance in Zwischentönen, for which there are many examples. A 1938 newspaper article for instance, called for an end the utterance of “Heil Hitler” at carnival events. The author argued that they should stick to the traditional Narrenruf “Kölle Alaaf”, (long live Cologne), a carnival call that frequently appears in many carnival song refrains, and is shouted on the streets during carnival parades. The author argued that using “Heil Hitler” did not fit the niveau of carnival. Perhaps the author was genuine in wanting to preserve the “dignity” of the phrase, though one could read this in multiple ways. Another such example can be illustrated in a 1935 draft for a carnival float in which the symbol of Cologne—the city’s cathedral, is appears behind chains, cut off by two large-handed guards, with legal paragraph insignias (§) on their caps. The bottom of the float is lined with question marks. There are several such actions behind which one could read a form of resistance. Indeed, given the stiff penalties of resistance under the Nazi regime, it should be expected that opposition would appear surrounded by uncertainty and ambiguity. However, while carnival societies may have been willing to openly revolt over Gleichschaltung, no societies registered official protests over the anti-Semitic floats that appeared in Nazi Rosenmontag parades. Just as prominent carnivalists engaged in overt opposition to certain Nazi policies, others, such as Willi Ostermann, the most famous prewar carnival song writer, joined the Nazi party in 1934 and remained a member until his death two years later. In short, it would be wrong
to create a mythology of mass opposition, just as it would be to create a mythology that brushes
the existence of opposition aside.

**Cologne and carnival after the War**

During the war, Cologne was subjected to relentless bombing raids that were more
intense than those on metropolises like Berlin or Munich. When American tanks entered
Cologne, pushing the remaining Nazi tanks across the Rhine, the once proud city of nearly one-
million inhabitants, with a nearly 2000 year history, was over 90% destroyed and had only
40,000 remaining residents. Thousands of years of history and many sites of cultural
significance lied in rubble. All twelve of Cologne’s famous Romanesque churches were either
completely destroyed or heavily damaged. Ironically, the headquarters of the SS remained
standing–its basement walls smeared with the scratchings of tortured and murdered prisoners.

Many Colognians had long fled the bombing raids, seeking a haven in the nearby Rhenish
countryside in places like the Eifel or Bergisches Land. At the war’s end, it goes without saying
that a deep psychological trauma was widespread. While local/regional culture and the Heimat
concept had been used and manipulated by the Nazis, the war had been an era in which the
elements of Heimat–security, stability, familiarity, warmth, family, inwardness and local
community, had been completely absent–buried beneath outward-looking ambition, war,
destructive radical ideologies, brutal genocide, and both physical and psychological dislocations.

While historian may perceive a decisive Caesura in the year 1945, those who had experienced the
war likely felt more continuity of trauma than anything else. In the years following the war, the
Colognians who had experienced it had to come to grips with an unprecedented level of
destruction, death and disorientation. Among those were many who actively supported and
participated in Nazi crimes and the perpetration of genocide, while many others had been victims of a regime that they never supported, while yet others were among those who did nothing to stop a murderous regime, of whose crimes they were fully aware. Here is not the place to discuss the Sisyphean task of drawing up a map of guilt and innocent, except to say that such a map would include sizable groups on all sides, with no clear cut lines that can easily organize the millions of perpetrators according to membership in any given collective, whether national, regional, local or otherwise.

Colognians returned to their city rapidly and in large numbers. Anecdotal accounts hold that many spontaneously began singing the famous Colognian *Heimatlied,* “Heimweh nach Köln” as they streamed into the city by foot and on horse-drawn wagons.67 As they entered the city, they found nearly complete destruction. Almost symbolically, however, the Cologne cathedral, the most notable landmark of the city, stood virtually untouched, towering over the fields of rubble. Symbolic, because *Lokalpatriotismus*, local culture and Heimat would be emphasized in the postwar years to provide an inspiration for rebuilding. It is not be surprising that extreme levels of trauma would re-energize Heimat sentiments in a large way. Indeed, one could argue that the first two decades of the postwar represented something of a Second Heimatbewegung –particularly given the irrevocable taintedness of national identity, which made local and regional identities more attractive.68 Heimat, and the security, intimacy, and familiarity of local traditions, provided a psychological panacea and a rallying point to generate new energies for the future. This brought a level of local self-confidence to the rebuilding process. As the notorious carnivalist Joseph Klersch argued:”Daß Köln tot sei, konnte nur der glauben, der die Kölnen nicht kannte.” He insisted that Colognians had a strong *Heimatliebe* and *Heimatstolz,* and that they would lift themselves up from the rubble fields and restore their city’s former glory through their
As Colognian citizens began the process of sorting through bombed out historical treasures, they also found new ones. All throughout the old Roman city, Colognians uncovered a veritable treasure trove of unknown Roman ruins, mosaics, etc. It was no coincidence that a few years later the notable carnival song writer, Karl Berbuer presented a carnival song that drew a parallel between the building of Roman “Colonia” and the rebuilding of modern Cologne.

It is clear that Colognians drew inspiration from their local culture and carnivalistic traditions as they faced reconstruction. Konrad Adenauer, the soon-to-be Chancellor of Germany, and former mayor of Cologne who had been driven out of office by the Nazis, told Colognians in 1945: “Jungens, tut mir eine Jefallen. Jeht auf die Trümmer un bringt den Kölner Humor!” Other Adenauer speeches made as chancellor, that addressed the Colognian people insisted that they needed to maintain their Kölsch dialect, rebuild their churches, protect their Eigenart, and be proud of their local identity. This sentiment of rebuilding through carnivalistic high-spirits is well illustrated by the 1945-46 membership card of the Rote Funken. (Figure 7) On it, carnivalists in their carnival uniforms are rebuilding their old city, next to a cracked image of a Cologne city crest. In the background appear the cathedral, and the half reconstructed Romanesque church Groß St. Martin. The caption reads: Dä Kreeg eß am Engk, Uns Kölle ging drop. Funk, späu en de Hängk un bau widder op! (The war is at its end. All of us Colognians, get to it. Carnival society members, rub the spit into your hands and rebuild!)

Carnival celebrations began slowly—with unofficial celebrations and spontaneous parades occurring between 1946-1948. It was primarily with the help of Jewish allies that the occupying forces could be convinced to permit celebrations. Helmut Goldschmidt, a Colognian Jew recalls how his father, a member of the Rote Funken before 1933, sought to convince the British
occupiers that they were mistaken in seeing carnival as a militaristic display. Official celebrations and an officially organized carnival parade occurred in 1949. For this parade, Colognian carnivalists chose the theme “Mer sin widder do un dun wat mer künne” (We are here again, and will do what we can), reflecting the spirit of rebuilding that imbued carnival during this period. Carnivalists also displayed this spirit in their spontaneous rebuilding actions that began on the Gürzenich—the unofficial temple of Colognian carnival. During these years of reconstruction there was a veritable explosion in the number of carnival societies. (Figure 8) This reflects both a greater interest in carnival, and a deeper desire for Gemeinschaft among Colognians. Carnival societies are known for having a strong element of community and promoting of a feeling of belonging between its members. This has a connection to the concept of Kölscher Klüngel—a notion that refers to a spirit of helping those of one’s acquaintance.

The Gemeinschaft of Kölscher Klüngel is also reflected in the Colognian notion of “Veedel”, in which the city quarter also represents an importance valence of community and belonging. With the insecurity and dislocation at the end of the war, these concepts tied to the notion of Heimat, reached a new Hochkonjuntur based on the need for emotional security, belonging and Gemeinschaft. As Klersch argued, with the aid of Colognian Heimat sentiments, even when many were without homes: “Man rückte enger zusammen und behalf sich.” This feeling of Heimat, Klersch argued, needed deep roots so that it would not to fall victim to romantics and false ideologies. The deep roots and genuine nature of their Colognian Heimat-feeling, Klersch opined, fueled the rapid and successful rebuilding of the city. Reinhold Louis, in his collection of Colognian folk and carnival songs, has termed this rebuilding the “Kölner Wunder”, which he believes cannot be separated from carnival and Colognian Humor which both fueled their Aufbauwillen.
Toward a new interpretation of Colognian carnival and Colognian identity

Written histories of postwar Colognian carnival have focused exclusively on developments in form of celebration and have overlooked how Colognians in this period began to see new Heimat values in their carnival traditions. From the early 19th century up to the end of the Weimar Republic, Colognians believed that their Rhenish humor and jovial nature, both rooted in carnival, defined them as a people. One could also argue that prewar Colognians also consciously identified with a carnivalistic disrespect for authority. However, from approximately 1945 to the mid 1960's, the old Colognian identity of light-heartedness and Rhenish humor saw an inflow of a new set of identity claims. These new elements of identity centered around the notions of the democratic Colognian, Colognian openness, and Colognian tolerance. The notion of Colognian tolerance is particularly important, eventually becoming a central pillar in modern Colognian identity. In addition to these developments, the expression of patriotic or nationalist sentiments in carnival virtually disappeared in the postwar, and was replaced by an accentuated Lokalpatriotismus. This shift clearly stems from the taintedness of German identity and expression of nationalist sentiment. A magnification of the notion of Colognian identity containing an element of resistance to authority accompanied these developments. Unsurprisingly, this also entailed a magnification of anti-Prussianism, which emphasized the already existing notion that Cologne and the Rhineland have roots in a very different tradition. This process and these new value claims paralleled with a process of denazification throughout Germany—perceived by some Heimatler in West Germany as a simultaneous process of deprussianization.

The idea that Colognian-Rhenish culture stood in contrast to Prussian culture on the grounds of the latter’s emphasis on authority and militarism, is undoubtedly not a creation of the
postwar. This is nowhere better exemplified than in the *Puppenspielen* of the nineteenth century at the city’s famous Hänneschen Theater. The three most prominent stock characters of the theater, still prominent in modern Cologne, are Tünnes, Schäl, and the Prussian policeman Schäuzekowsky. Colognians have revered Tünnes and Schäl as personifications of Colognian culture—much in the same way as Saint Michael has represented Germany or Marianne has for France. This is particularly true for Tünnes, Colognians see as embodying the menacing, carefree and playful carnival element.\(^79\) In the many theater pieces written for these characters, the Prussian policeman is regularly the victims of the Rhenish humor and trickery of the other two. Germans from outside Cologne noted this Prussia-mocking in prewar Colognian theater. In a 1929 travel book, Hans von Wedderkop recounted how the Volkstheater at the Cologne Hänneschen and Millowitsch theaters relentlessly attacked the Prussians and their police bureaucrats, whose “Steifheit”, “Ungelenkigkeit” and “Aufgeblasenheit” was always a point of gripe for the Colognian Tünnes.\(^80\) A sketch of carnival children taunting a policemen from the same year, seems to reaffirm that prewar Colognians consciously celebrated this opposition to Prussian authority. (Figure 9) In addition, the strength of Rhenish anti-Prussian sentiments are unmistakable in the events surrounding the Rhenish independence movement during the Weimar Republic—one of the few secession movements that ever posed a serious threat. At the same time, however, it is possible to overstate prewar anti-Prussian sentiment. Indeed, after national unification in 1870, the primary figure of the Dreigestirn, Held Karneval, became Prinz Karneval, in respect to the Prussian king.\(^81\) Max-Leo Schwering argued that in some ways, carnival brought Prussians and Colognians closer together.\(^82\) In the postwar, however, Colognians strongly emphasized and internalized these histories of anti-Prussianism. Prominent carnivalists like Joseph Klersch looked back on the memory of opposition to Prussia with
fondness. He argued that the “Rhenish-Colognian Temperament” was never able to reconcile itself with the Prussian notions of “duty and discipline” and the Prussian perception of the relationships between military and civil authorities vis-a-vis their subjects. Heinrich Lützeler, a 1950's Bonner carnivalist and professor of art history, insisted that the Rhineland stood in contrast to the Prussian “Mordmaschine”. The Rhinelander, he argued, had a history of humanism, and furthermore, since the eighteenth century, the call of the Rhenish carnivalists had been “Nieder die Waffen! Hoch die (Karnevals-)Uniformen!” Some anti-Prussian groups began petitioning that the old, recently rebuilt, Hohenzollern bridge, connecting the Cologne central station and Deutz, be renamed “Cathedral Bridge.” One-third of Colognians supported this initiative, arguing that it represented a symbolic rejection of “Prussiandom” and the Hohenzollern monarchy.

Anti-Prussianism manifested itself in postwar carnival in the heightened notion that the eighteenth-century military uniforms of carnival represented a historical persiflage and mockery of Prussian militarism. Certainly this element of parody in carnival uniforms existed in nineteenth century, though it was far more ambiguous prior to the postwar—an interesting development as one would expect that such cultural memories would normally weaken rather than strengthen over time. It is important to look at this ambiguity of military persiflage in the nineteenth century to illustrate that the new emphasis on this in the twentieth century marked a shift toward a more solidly anti-Prussian Colognian identity. Hildegard Brog, for example, in an article on the Rote Funken, has argued that the society, the first ever created, was conceived as a persiflage of the Prussian military from its beginnings in 1823. She insists that this persiflage came from the anger at the loss of independence that was still fresh in 1823, when the society was founded. Further, she argues that carnival in the early nineteenth century acted as a valve for
public objection to Prussian occupation. However, Brog has also argued that the spirit of
Prussianism can be seen in certain aspects of nineteenth-century carnival, particularly in the new
orderly fashion in which it was organized. She also points to the Blaue Funken, founded in 1870,
who actively celebrated Prussian militarism. Brog has also rejected the idea that
Karnevalssorden, military-like medallions awarded by carnival societies, have their origin in anti-
Prussian mockery. She holds that, in the nineteenth century, they actually represented pro-
Prussian sentiments. Max-Leo Schwering, on the other hand, has insisted that historically,
Karnevalssorden have been ambiguous—intended often as a joke or parody, while also representing
a certain Prussianization of carnival, and being worn with pride by their recipients. Other
academics, such as Herbert Schwedt, have denied that carnival societies had any element of
parody against Prussian militarism whatsoever, while others such as Elaine Spencer have held
that such parody was prominent. In short, the history of Colognian carnival and anti-Prussian
sentiment prior to World War II, remains mixed. Two sketches of the Rote Funken from the
early 19th century illustrates this—one depicting the Rote Funken as an exaggerated military
parody, while the other depicts them as a trained and disciplined military force. In the years after
1945, however, it became clear that the Anti-Prussian interpretation would be favored—indeed,
one survey held that 73% of Colognians believed that military costumes were a persiflage.
Certainly Joseph Klersch argued that carnival uniforms represented anti-Prussian parody. His
fellow carnivalist, Heinrich Lützeler, insisted that, with flowers in their armaments, chocolates in
their war pouches, and the oranges in their cannons, the mockery, the Rhenish opposition to
militarism, and Rhenish disrespect toward authority all shone through clearly. The same
strength of anti-Prussian interpretation appears regarding understandings of Karnevalssorden in
the postwar. In a postwar pamphlet, the Festkomitee Kölner Karneval insisted that the
Karnevalsorden were initially intended to disparage Prussian military pomp and affectation, and were aimed directly at the historical Ordenskult of the Prussians and their focus on military prestige. These anti-Prussian mentalities have persisted into present-day carnival. In a public statement in 2004, for example, the president of the Rote Funken praised the critical and humorous critique and persiflage that their society represented. He further drew on the memory of the Prussian occupation, and held that their traditions persiflaged the Prussians. Instead of guns, he argued, they had “hölzerne Knabüss”, instead of munitions, flower bouquets, and instead of a salute, they had the *Stippefötche*. As previously indicated, these anti-Prussian sentiments were paralleled with a virtual disappearance of patriotic sentiments in postwar carnival. Before the war, carnival acted as a vent through which different groups could express national, regional or local patriotism. Many of these nationalist expressions in nineteenth-century carnival, have already been mentioned, such as anti-French carnival songs warning their western neighbor to keep their hands off the Rhine, among others. In 1872, the carnivalist August Wilcke argued that carnival should be “truly German” and “embued with the national ideal.” This is in addition to nationalistic and jingoistic carnival songs that appeared during the same period. Furthermore, it was not unknown for carnivalists to sing “Deutschland, Deutschland über alles” at particular carnival sessions. Other prewar carnival songs contained assertions of the Germanness of the Rhine, the Germanness of Cologne, and the Germanness of Colognian folk songs. While prewar carnival songs vacillated between Colognian dialect and High German, after the war, carnivalists wrote virtually all of their songs in local dialect. Colognians and Rhinelander emphasized the un-German nature of their traditions, citing things such as Büttenreden or the presence of French words in their local dialect. Where carnivalists mentioned national sentiment, it was in terms of
the national healing that came from a turn toward Heimat and local traditions. Thomas Liessem, in a 1956 speech as the president of the Bund Deutscher Karneval, for example, argued that carnival fulfilled a “staatspolitische aufgabe,” as it strengthens a healthy sense of community, and brings families closer together in a spirit of happiness. Calling carnival a German celebration, he maintained that its celebration expresses love of the nation by showing love to their Heimat through carnival— a coming together that Liessem described as the most peaceful meetings in the world. Liessem completed his speech by saying: “In unserer Fastnacht lebt die Heimat, und unsere Heimat bleibt unser höchstes Gut, heute und immerdar!” This notion of healing the nation through a return to regional and local Heimat is quite common throughout Western Germany in this period.

The increase of anti-Prussianism and the decrease of patriotic sentiment in carnival only represented changes in degrees of emphasis vis-a-vis prewar carnival. The notion of Colognian democracy, openness, and tolerance, however, represented the crystallization of new concepts. Here, I would again like to turn to a comparison of two rather obscure but revealing images that present a microcosmic representation of these developments. (Figures 12 & 13) The first, a sketch from 1938 depicts the writer of Cologne carnival songs working in his laboratory. On his work shelves appear different potions representing stock elements of Colognian carnival identity—humor (in different doses), the Rhine, the gaiety of wine and sway, Rhenish love, and the old carnival songs of its long history. Somewhat ironic is the appearance of the book of carnival songs from 1000 B.C., clearly a playful mockery of their own tendencies to exaggerate the length of their tradition. The second image is the draft of a float that appeared in the Rosenmontag parade of 1950, called “Tünnes wird entnazisiert”. Tünnes, as previously remarked, represents a personification of Cologne and its carnivalistic nature. Here, Tünnes,
after emerging from the Nazi attempt to inculcate him with negative values, receives a thorough medical treatment. He is surrounded by a team of physicians and antidote medicines, titled, “Anti-Nazin Creme”, “Anti-Nazin-Puder” and “Anti-Nazi Präparat”. Meanwhile, Tünnes is being injected with new medicines—“Humanin extra-stark”, and a few doses of “demokratin.” It is significant to note the resemblance of one of the doctors to the old mayor of Cologne and new chancellor of Germany, Konrad Adenauer, well known for his Lokalpatriotismus. Had the float appeared a decade later, it may have contained medicines of openness and tolerance, concepts that later became more prominent. While the designers of this float saw only a denazification, I would argue that it represents a broader process of change that would inject Colognian identity and Colognian carnival with a new perceived values—the notion of a Colognian tradition of democracy being one of them.

The notion of Colognian democracy was one of the first of these new concepts to appear, and historical evidences was presented for its justification. This idea of Colognian-Rhenish democracy started among Heimatkundler and began to seep into the public consciousness. The Colognian carnivalist Joseph Klersch and the Mainzer carnivalist Anton Keim both claimed that Colognian and Rhenish carnival contained a tradition of democracy. Klersch pointed to Cologne’s history as a free city under the Holy Roman Empire and its democratic constitution, citing their constitution as the source of carnival’s historic resistance to organization. Klersch posited a continuity between the spirit of freedom of the city under the Holy Roman Empire and modern day Cologne, claiming that the democratic Erziehungsarbeit achieved as a free imperial city prevented the emergence of a rigid class system in Cologne. Klersch also argued for a notion of Colognian democracy based on the history of Gaffeln—the Colognian institution that brought together all of those who did not belong to a guild, and also played a central role in the
organization of carnival. Klersch asserted that Gaffeln shaped the Volkscharacter of Colognians by giving all citizens a forum within which to express their opinions freely. Colognians, he opined, always carry within them an “inner freedom,” which forms the basis of Colognian humor and has historically contributed to the strong Colognian tendency to form public societies. He called Colognian Gaffeln, historical “bearers of freedom,” that helped shape the “democratic-bourgeois city” of Cologne. Thus, he argued, while carnival historically appeared to have little organization, it was the democratic Grundanschauung of Colognians and their Gaffeln that provided its organization. Their Volksfest, Klersch believed, helped harvest an “Erziehuhung zur Demokratie” that took place over hundreds of years.

Anton Keim’s in his work 11 Mal Politischer Karneval, parallels those of Klersch’s, though he expanded his arguments to include all of Rhenish carnival. He insisted that carnival is a political activity, even if it may not appear so on the surface. It lifted the boundaries between the classes, challenged authority, and it permitted freedom of expression—which Keim dubbed the Narrenrecht. Indeed, the central thesis of Keim’s work is that Rhenish carnival belongs within the democratic tradition. Keim insinuates connections between the freedom of Roman and Rhenish carnival, while emphasizing the importance of Roman occupation and the much later French occupation, as the two defining moments in the Rhineland and Rhenish carnival, as it developed over a supposed 2000 year process. During the French Revolution, Keim wrote, Rhinelander had “eaten the apple of revolutionary knowledge.” Keim used terms such as the “konstitutionelle Narr” and held, not without some historical justification, that carnival had been at odds with the Nazis, because of the latter’s tendency toward highly-permissive free speech and resistance to disciplined unity. Notions about Colognian-Rhenish democracy began to seep into public consciousness as something that had roots in regional culture. Indeed, Lützeler
argued that, in Cologne, democracy is not a *Staatstheorie*, but rather a *Lebensgefühl*. During carnival in 1960, a letter to the editor in the *Kölnische Rundschau* rhapsodized on the democracy and permissiveness of carnival. He drew on the memory of carnival and the mistrust that absolutist princes historically harbored against it. The writer asserted that it was no coincidence that it was a free imperial city where carnival found fertile ground. Further, he argued that a political lesson could be found in the humor of carnival, and its power of disarmament.

Konrad Adenauer must have been seen as a sort of mascot of this new idea of Colognian democracy. Indeed, having already become somewhat of a favorite son the city, Colognians flattered him with the honor of depicting him in giganticized form on a 1959 float sitting arm-in-arm with Mutter Colonia.

While the notion of Colognian-Rhenish democracy had not existed before, carnivalists did not have to invent new histories to justify the idea. James Brophy’s article on Colognian carnival in the *Vormärz* illustrates the political side of carnival and how its celebration fits within the context of the bourgeois public sphere that emerged in the nineteenth century. He calls Colognian carnival a “contested terrain as a site upon which various political symbolisms vied for control.” Among other things, Colognian and Rhenish carniv alists often consisted of radical democratic forces, who often criticized the Prussian state and accommodationists among Colognian elites. Brophy’s study also concludes that Rhenish carnival, after the romantic reforms, “politicized public space” and contained both the politics of the bourgeoisie as well as “artisanal-democratic attitudes.”

Certainly, the modern carnivalist claim that their democratic tradition included a resistance to authority, also had deep historical roots. Local princes were often uneasy with carnival’s political aspects and its permissiveness in allowing carnivalists to criticize ruling figures. Because of this permissiveness, carnival often found itself at war with
restrictions, such as Prussian mandated censorship. Knowledge of these histories was not a new development of the postwar period. However, the accentuated internalization of them as part of their conscious regional identity was new. This development is well demonstrated by the Colognian citizen Jupp Engel in his postwar campaign to restore the sculptural figure the “Kallendresser” to its historical place across from the Cologne Rathaus. The sculptural figures of the Kallendresser formed a sculptural pair with the figure of the “Platzjabbeck” perched in the tower of the Rathaus. The latter sticks out his tongue toward the Altermarkt square from the Rathaus, while the Kallendresser, on the other side of the square, bends over exposing his posterior in the direction of the Rathaus in response. This sculptural pair has its origins in the Middle Ages, though its original meaning and circumstances of its creation remain unclear. Modern Colognians, however, have interpreted it as a symbol of their cultural antagonism with authority. Jupp Engel’s campaign to restore it made the Kallendresser a cultural symbol of the city in the postwar—with both a modern Colognian music group and a Karnevalsoorden now baring its name. The history of Cologne and carnival provided many things on which to base a claim to a tradition of democracy. One, for example, cited by Max-Leo Schwering, was the strong traditions of the “Veedel” in Cologne, in which town quarters historically played a role in protecting the freedom of its inhabitants from the ground upwards. As Colognians did in the postwar, it is not unusual in the process of identity formation for collective groups to emphasize and internalize parts of their history which most harmonize with the Zeitgeist and desired identity of their generation. Indeed, it would be unprecedented for the conscious identity of a people to be based on the entirety of their historical records. This process of plucking elements out of history, emphasizing them and internalizing them is generally a ubiquitous phenomenon of identity formation.
The notion of “Colognian tolerance”, in spite of its prominence, has not received proper historical analysis. Modern Colognians behave as though the concept has always existed as a pillar of their local identity. Helene Klauser, who has written on Colognian carnival, suggests argued that tolerance has deep roots in Colognian history, and points to the city’s frequent contact with foreign cultures as simultaneously contributing to greater Lokalpatriotismus and greater tolerance. Klauser further argued that tolerance is an inherent form the carnival phenomenon more generally, as it insists on the acceptance of different subjectivities. She concludes that the Lokalpatriotismus embodied in the carnival phrase “Kölle Alaaf” is inseparable from their tolerance and open-heartedness. In present day Cologne, the idea of tolerance in their local culture is ubiquitous. It can be found in discussions of carnival, and is peppered throughout the choruses of popular Kölschrock songs (a genre that has gained tremendous popularity, with some songs like Viva Colonia, which praises Colognian sexual liberalness and multi-culturalism, topping national charts). Well-known groups like die Bläck Föös, whose songs refer to Cologne as “super tolerant,” have contributed to the spread of the idea. In spite of what some may believe, however, this notion of “Colognian tolerance”, at least as an element of conscious identity, did not exist before 1945. In pouring over the books of prewar carnival songs, carnival images, discussions of carnival, Büttenreden, etc., the phrase “Colognian tolerance” is nowhere to be found. This is not to say that the idea was a complete fabrication. Indeed, prewar notions of a Colognian casual, happy, laid-back and permissive nature, did exist. It is conceivable that such notions could be augmented to arrive at a notion of Colognian tolerance. Whether or not prewar Cologne constituted a “tolerant” city, it appears clear that it was not a “catch word” of conscious identity. This is significant, as the process of internalization that accompanies identity formation often can have an effect of self-realizing
reinforcement of the very notions of identity that are internalized.

Both Klersch and Keim mentioned the idea of Rhenish or Colognian tolerance rooted in carnival, though the idea appeared secondary to the idea of Colognian-Rhenish democracy. Keim argued, succinctly, that the quintessential element of Narrheit is: “Der echte Narr übt Toleranz!” Klersch did not use the exact term “tolerance”, though he argued that Colognians have a “Duldsamkeit” and “Weltoffenheit.” He cited a poem by Dr. Wilhelm Schneider-Clauß, to illustrate the Colognian sentiment of openness to outsiders—“wer vun druße kütt”–who all Colognians welcomed in Colognian style. Klersch looked to the geography of the Rhine, and argued that Cologne had never been closed to foreigners from different countries, who had come to Cologne for centuries and made it their Heimat. For this reason, Klersch argued, the Rhineland had always remained a foreign place to the Prussian spirit of totalitarianism. The Cologne professor, Dr. Adam Wrede also propagated this notion of Colognian openness to outsiders in a 1948 article in the Kölnische Rundschau. After emphasizing civic pride as a source of power for rebuilding, he talked about the concept of “Kölsche Levve”—Colognian life. Wrede wrote that Cologne had a tremendous ability to pull people from outside the city, who melted into the culture of the city through a process of Verkösung. Wrede drew on the memory of Hermann Weinsberg’s account of the Dutch refugees who fled to the city in 1500. He argued that the inflow of foreigners to the city never threatened “Kölner Eigenart,” and he called once more upon the city to weld together its inhabitants. The idea of Colognian tolerance quickly entered public consciousness over the course of the 1950's. By 1960, Prince Peter IV, the prince of carnival spoke about the amazing spirit of Colognian tolerance, while the head carnivalist organizer Thomas Liessem bragged about how the number of carnival princes who were not native Colognians affirmed the “spirit of Colognian tolerance.”
Carnivalists have connected the idea of Colognian tolerance with carnival aphorism that go back to the nineteenth century, such as: “Jeck sin mer all, ävver jede Jeck eß anders.” The term Jeck or Geck, is a carnivalistic way of referring to “fellow,” particularly in the sense of “fellow carnivalist.” A short article in the Kölnische Rundschau, during the carnival of 1954 argued that the Colognian term “Jeck” embodied a sense of understanding between different people—a notion that embodied “good-naturedness” and “tolerance.” The author wrote that the idea that it expressed is that all have the right to their own individuality—their own “Jeckigkeit,” which demands respect. The author explained: “Do bess jeck heißt nicht anders als: Na ja, du bist mal so...keine Bewertung, keine Absonderung, keine Beleidigung.” One Colognian Hobbyforscher argued: “Jeck sein bedeutet ein Abweichen vom Normalen...Kein Kölner würde einen anderen deshalb verurteilen, man toleriert sich und sagt sich, Jeck loß, Jeck elans.” It is questionable, however, whether pre-war notions of these aphorisms, such as “jede Jeck eß anders” really referred to tolerance in the modern sense. In a 1937 article, for example, the term “Jede Geck es anders” appears merely to describe different personalities working together in cooperation in the planning of carnival. It is far more likely that it simply referred to individual differences, and not cultural difference, or tolerance of outsiders or those from different backgrounds. The idea of Colognian tolerance did sit somewhat at odds with the idea of the “Imi”, a term for the imitation non-native Colognian—a term used pejoratively to draw borders against outsiders. During the carnival celebrations of 1953, for example, a female carnivalist argued that imis should not take part in the Weiberfastnacht celebrations, which ought to be reserved for real Colognian girls. Some Colognians believed that they should welcome outsiders so long as they did not threaten to make native Colognians a minority. In 1957, a foreign exchange student in Cologne wrote in a letter to the editor that Cologne is a welcoming
city to outsiders, but that non-native Colognians are often not extended the privilege of sitting among the city’s “aristocracy.” It would, of course be easy to overstate the idea of Colognian tolerance. Even becoming a catch word of their Heimat-identity, it would be absurd to believe that this would somehow create a utopia of acceptance. The impulse, however, was toward greater acceptance of outsiders—which could be understood not as a compromise of local identity, but an act of practicing and reinforcing it. One carnivalist in 1961 emphasized the importance of considering the needs of immigrants in the city, to win them over to the carnival celebration. The year previous, both the Lord Mayor of Cologne and the president of the Festkomittee Kölner Karneval stated that the “imi” concept was obsolete and should be done away with.

**The New Values of Heimat: An Assessment**

The new values of what it meant to be a “Colognian,” or a “Rheinländer”—interpreted as existing in their carnivalistic traditions are merely microcosms of a greater phenomenon occurring all over West Germany in the two decades after 1945. Heimatler from different regions and cities interpreted new values in their regional and local cultures that had previously not informed identity—or at least not to the same degree. Newly emerging generations played an important role, interpreting their own regional and local histories according to the postwar values of the period in order to create a harmonious and stable identity—further propagating these emergent value notions forward in time through their transmission to future generations. The question must be asked why these shifts occurred, and if it is somehow aberrant to the evolution of such identities and the interpretation of the spiritual content of traditions more generally. Horst Mazerath has argued that this was part of a larger conspiracy of Geschichtsverdrängung. Germans from different regions hid behind regional shields—Bavarians behind Catholicism,
Colognians behind Rhineland liberalism, resistance to authority and Rhenish Catholicism, or Hamburg behind their Hanseatic tradition of liberalism. He treats this as an inability to mourn, and argues that treatment of Nazi history among such groups has been uncritical or glorifying. In Mazerath’s interpretations, Heimatler, such as Colognians who sought to form an identity based on liberalism, tolerance, and openness, become secret Nazis who attempted to use these developments to cover up their role in moral atrocities. In turn, these new notions of the Heimat values become cheap and fabricated shams that were woven for nefarious purposes—specifically that of erasing history.

While a simple and straightforward explanation, I would argue that this rationale is deeply flawed for a number of reasons that must be outlined. One of the misunderstandings of this argument, inherent in many theories of Geschichtsverdrängung, is that it fails to make the important distinction between different kinds of memory that have a fundamentally different dynamic—specifically directly experienced memory vs. learned cultural memory. Learned cultural memory is tremendously flexible and subject to manipulation. It is its manipulability which led Walter Benjamin to argue that the battles of history must be continually fought after the fact—over the course of several generations. This is nowhere more apparent than in the present day regarding the history of the Third Reich. With most knowing it only as learned cultural memory, it is constantly in need of protection from ideological revisionism and repression.

Experienced memory of the Third Reich, however, must be recognized as being radically different than learned cultural memory. The transmission of experienced memory did not occur through lectures and reading, but rather through the direct experience of war, genocide, the death of millions, waves of bombing raids, obliterated cities, etc. The formation of this memory lasted
over the course of years, and carried beyond the end of the war in the form of dislocation, scarcity, silent mourning for the dead, etc. It is important to note this distinction, as the flexibility and vulnerability of learned cultural memory is often improperly projected backwards onto the subjects who had experienced the war, who were often reticent to talk about their experiences. The Verdrängungs theory falsely assumes that this sort of memory is subject to the same process of “forgetting” or “Verdrängung” as learned cultural memory. If we are to truly realize the vast differences between these kinds of memory and their respective properties, it would be absurd to think that Heimatler finding new values in their respective local places could be a method of “forgetting,” in the way that one could “forget” learned cultural memory. Indeed, it is precisely the generation of postwar Germans whose knowledge of the Third Reich came from learned cultural memory that first brought discussion of the war more forcefully into the forum of public discourse. This was, not coincidentally the generation whose memory of the war relied entirely on public discourse. In short, I argue that the terms of “forgetting” or “repressing” must be recognized as being tremendously relative when applied to a modern world where the memory of the Third Reich is largely learned, as opposed to the years directly after World War II, when the memories and trauma of the war were ubiquitous, whatever may or may not have appeared in public discourses. Furthermore, the concepts of Schweigen versus Erzählen have often been oversimplified. While Schweigen can be a mode of repression, many neglect the connection between Erzählen and Wiedererleben that must invariably have been at least a significant source of the absence of Vergangenheitsbewältigung immediately after the war.

The perceived suggestion that support of Nazi ideology may have differed between regions and cities within Germany, strikes a nerve of sensitivity in the dynamics of cultural memory. Whether spoken or unspoken, popular cultural memory often relies on a perception of
collectives, and in turn, has a certain preoccupation with the notion of collective guilt, or collective innocence—both dangerous concepts. Indeed, popular cultural memory seems to be frighteningly incapable of containing notions of gradation, complexity and fluidity. If one could somehow determine different levels of ideological Nazi support across national German space (a massively problem-laden endeavor indeed!), it would undermine the seductive cognitive simplifier represented by the collective. In terms of popular cultural memory (importantly not directly experienced memory), the cognitively destabilizing effects of introducing variation and fluidity threatens to destroy it as an element of cultural memory altogether. One could attempt, for example, to look at the histories of Cologne, or Münster–of Swabia, the Rhineland or Westphalia and make arguments that Nazi ideology resonated less or perhaps more with their regional cultures. In Cologne, one could point to a range of things, such as lower voting levels for the NSDAP, notable resistance, local and regional histories, genuine traditions of resistance to authority, etc.\textsuperscript{128} Perhaps some of these arguments would even have scientific value, yet these arguments, if oriented toward exculpatory purposes, should be soundly rejected. Such a notion of collective innocence is precisely a development that grows out of the concept of collective guilt—the two notions are inextricably linked. It must be reinforced that collectives, whether local, regional, national or otherwise, must not be used as tools to artificially fashion a clean cognitive map of guilt and innocence—of Nazism and anti-Nazism—of \textit{Opfer} and \textit{Täter}. In fairness to the postwar Heimatler discussing the values of their regional or local culture, it was rare that they treated these ideas as though they should be taken into account in an assessment of guilt. In cases where they have, it has most often come from sources with strongly anti-Nazi credentials. Perhaps this is partly because the inward orientation of Heimat sentiment itself had a certain foreignness to the Nazi mentality of outward oriented ambition. In Cologne, one of the
A few examples is Konrad Adenauer’s comment related to locality and guilt which appeared in a 1945 speech. Adenauer said in his speech that Cologne had been one of the cities most bombed during the war, and one of those that had least deserved it—with no other city, he claimed, outdoing it in terms of the resistance offered to the Nazis since 1933. Another example comes from the Colognian carnivalist Karl Küpper, who held very anti-Nazi carnival speeches in the early 1930's, receiving a *Redeverbot* from the Nazis in response. After the war, in a carnival *Büttenrede*, Küpper is remembered for beginning one of his speeches by saying: “Grüss Gott! Fröher hess dat “Heil Hitler!” Dat is dasselbe - keine Unterschied. Kütt allebeids aus Bayern.”

Clearly there was an element of connecting local and regional culture with different levels of support for Nazism. The number of such statements, however, should not be exaggerated—with the few that exist often receiving a highly disproportionate degree of attention.

These new local and regional values were much more oriented toward the future of their *Gemeinschaft*, and less toward historical exculpatory purposes. Certainly this is reflected in the degree to which Germans associated the rebuilding of their respective regions and cities with their regional and local cultures. In all of this, however, there lurks the question of the boundary between denazification versus neglecting the duty of *Vergangenheitsbewältigung* by taking on new identities, or whether there may exist a fluid overlap between the two. Hermann Lübbe has made an interesting argument that the absence of *Vergangenheitsbewältigung* immediately after the war was necessary in order to build up a new cohesive denazified society in the BRD. Of course, it is undeniable that the decades after 1945 contained little in the way of deep reaching *Vergangenheitsbewältigung*. One could arguably apply Lübbe’s thesis to the regional and local level. Perhaps, one could argue, the creation of new identities based on new values, national or otherwise, required that *Vergangenheitsbewältigung* in the form of extensive and widespread
public discourse be delayed until new identities began to take root, and the direction of the future was on a more secure footing. Yet, even if postwar Germans did not immediately begin a process of *Vergangenheitsbewältigung*, this does not equate to a process of “forgetting.” Even in the jollity of carnival, it was always understood that the Merriment of the moment had a symbiotic relationship to mourning and sadness of the war. The 1951 theme of carnival—“Köln in Dur und Moll” drew on this idea.\textsuperscript{132} In the case of Cologne, carnival was not about forgetting the sadness, even if it provided a temporary moment of relief from it. The head Colognian carnivalist, in his memoirs, recalled the sadness and joy of carnival in the years after the war. He recalled seeing spontaneous carnival celebrations in 1946, and how it inspired hope. He also wrote of his own participation in the carnival of 1948—recalling the lovely scenes of gaiety juxtaposed with the memories of suffering. At the end of a day of carnival festivities, he recalls going home, locking himself into his room, and crying (e Stöckelche gekresche).\textsuperscript{133}

To assume that postwar Colognians invented the notion of their carnival tradition embodying tolerance, openness and democratic colorings in order to “hide” and repress histories, assumes that the spirit of such changes are aberrational and calculated manipulations. These new claimed Colognian Heimat values found in their carnival tradition, represent very modest changes in terms of the evolution of carnival’s perceived meaning throughout its history. In the final part of this study, I would like to turn to the early history of carnival in the medieval and early modern periods. In comparing these periods with nineteenth-century Colognian carnival, I make the argument that carnival in the nineteenth century came to mean precisely the opposite of what it had originally meant. Medieval carnival clearly was intended as an inscenation of the world of the evil and faulty nature of mankind. This explains figures such as ghosts, witches, devils, and bizarre animals that appear in carnival. The meaning of carnival came through the
rejection of the evil nature of humans that it embodied. It is thus no coincidence that carnival is so seamlessly integrated into the Christian calendar of Easter and the forty days of fasting that precedes it. This period of fasting begins on Aschermittwoch—the day when carnival ends. By the nineteenth century, I argue, carnival had become the embodiment of positive values. It came to be seen as the festival that banished the negative forces of “curmudgeondum”, the tedium and dreariness of the everyday, and the lifeless rigid sobriety and dehumanizing rationalization of society. The meaning of nineteenth-century Colognian carnival came not in its rejection, but in its enthusiastic acceptance and by claiming its values for identity beyond the period of its celebration.

Here, I will look at the elements and motifs of celebration and illustrate how their meanings shifted to fit within a new interpretive framework by the nineteenth century. While this flashback to carnival’s earlier history clearly disturbs the chronological progression that has heretofore been maintained in this study, it does so quite intentionally. The reversed chronology is intended to emphasize that these changes of interpretive meaning in Colognian carnival’s earlier history are analogous to those that occurred in the latter half of the twentieth-century, and further illustrates the modesty of those changes in comparison to earlier perceptions of what the carnival tradition meant. These postwar changes were far from aberrational, but rather, fit within the normal flexible dynamic by which the meaning of such Heimat traditions are discreetly and often unconsciously renegotiated as they elide from generation to generation—from Zeitgeist to Zeitgeist.

**Between Form and Content: Carnival from the Middle Ages to the Nineteenth Century**

The origins of carnival and the specifics of its celebration have long stood in a historical
haze, with a paucity of surviving sources. Rhenish towns discovered this problem in the 19th century, when the Prussian King, Frederich Wilhelm III ordered that carnival celebrations be banned in towns and cities throughout the Rhineland if they could not prove a continual local history of carnival celebration preceding the period of French occupation. Cities which patently had long carnival histories found it difficult to scrap up actual documentation of past celebrations.\(^{134}\) As previously mentioned, even the word “Karneval” of “Fastnacht” have been the subject of debates, as has the origin of the term “Rosenmontag,” the largest day of carnival celebrations in Cologne.\(^{135}\) Most studies of carnival have been preoccupied with the question of its origin. This is not surprising, given the reliance of Heimat-identity on discourses of continuity in which the origins are perceived as embodying meaning. The absence of sources has proven an asset to romanticists who wanted to project on carnival their own \textit{Wünschbilder}. The Nazi idea of carnival being an ancient-Germanic festival, for example, did not immediately disappear in the postwar period. In 1956, Thomas Liessem called carnival an “urdeutschen Volksbruches.”\(^{136}\) Others contented themselves with interpreting the festival as being of Roman origins, rejecting the notion of its Christian origins.\(^{137}\) The Christian roots of carnival, however, is widely accepted among academics, particularly in light of the works written by Dietz-Rüdiger Moser and Werner Mezger, who have presented extensive evidence. To understand the medieval Christian meaning of carnival, a close examination of their works is called for. The details of how different forms of the celebration fit within the interpretive framework of medieval carnival is also important to explore thoroughly in order to illustrate how medieval forms that continued into nineteenth-century Colognian carnival evolved to fit within a new interpretive schema.

D.R. Moser, in his work \textit{Fastnacht - Fasching - Karneval} has illustrated the Christian metaphor embodied in carnival. In this metaphor, the period of carnival represents the world of
the devil. The devilish depictions of the *Narrenfigur* that can be seen in hundreds of medieval and early modern images support this theory. Sebastian Brandt’s fifteenth-century work, *Das Narrenschiff*, illustrates this, where the text and the accompanying woodcuts show that the *Narr* is a figure that represents human sin and carnal weakness. (Figures 14-17) Each section of Brandt’s work illustrates a different folly and sin of the *Narr*, from vanity, to deceit, betrayal, lying, contempt for the scriptures, and finally, as a blasphemer of Christ. One woodcut illustrates the *Narr* torturing Christ on the cross. This genre of image is by no means limited to Brandt’s work. Rather, the woodcuts in his work representing the *Narr* as devilish and the embodiment of evil have been shown to be prevalent throughout the medieval and early modern periods. Moser presents many other images in which show the *Narr* also appears as poor, lowly, beggarly, and crippled with connections to other outcasts and non-Christian groups, such as Jews and Turks.138 Moser argues that the church created, shaped, and formed carnival as a consciously calculated Augustinian metaphor. In medieval piety, Moser points out, the Augustinian two-state notion of the Kingdom of God and the Kingdom of the Devil had a prominent place. St. Augustine presented the idea of a *Civitas Diaboli* which stood in contrast to the *Civitas Dei*. Carnival, with its devilish figures, lax morals, figures such as ghosts, witches and animals, all embodied this world of *Civitas Diaboli*. Lent, the period of fasting following carnival, represents the *Civitas Dei*. The two thus stand counterpoised as Jerusalem versus Babylon, and on Ash Wednesday, the devilish world of Babylon is rejected. Moser points to evidence of clerics justifying carnival by arguing “*Cum einm homo nescit morbum, non curat abhibere remedium*”—he who does not know the sickness, will not provide the right medicine. Moser insists that the emphasis of this two state model of St. Augustine rests on the idea of making a decision between the kingdom of God and the kingdom of the devil an *Entweder-oder*, and not a *sowohl-als-auch*.139 Brandt’s *Das
Narrenschiff illustrates this well, in which the Narr finds himself having to choose between his base human ways that center on the devil, and the purity of God. (Figure 15)

Moser illustrates how the Christian metaphor of carnival determined virtually all carnival traditions. The idea of Narrenreich, still present in modern-day carnival, reaffirms Moser’s argument about the two-state idea being central to carnival. The Narrenreich contains carnival princes and princesses, fools’ courts that held mock trials, administrators and regiments of the prince, etc. In modern Colognian carnival, for example, the carnival prince—referred to as seine Tollität—always issues a constitution that outlines the laws of the Narrenreich. In neighboring Düsseldorfer carnival, celebrations begin by the storming of the Rathaus, maintained as the exclusive right of the city’s female population. This idea of the Narrenreich is also reflected in the figure of the Narrenschiff, a motif that has remained prominent since the Middle Ages.

Moser shows how the Narrenschiff as an idea stands contrasted to the Kirchenschiff (it should be noted that in German, the word “ship” is also used to refer to the knave of a church). In an analysis of several medieval and early modern images, Moser shows how the Narrenschiff, run in a foolish and disorganized manner, ends in ultimate sinking and destruction. The Kirchenschiff, depicted in some medieval images with a crucified Christ as the mast, is able to rescue those from the Narrenschiff who come over to God. This is allegorical of the actions of the carnival celebrants who leave the world of carnival on Ash Wednesday, receiving the ash cross on their forehead by the priest, in so doing entering the ship of the church.140

Other carnival symbolism reaffirms the idea of carnival representing the Civitas diaboli. The Narrenzahl “11” reflects this. The number eleven plays a prominent role in carnival, though its historical origins have been somewhat unclear, leading to various interpretations, some claiming that its origins lie in the nineteenth century. In Cologne, the “carnival season” officially
begins on November 11\textsuperscript{th} (11/11) at 11:11 a.m.\textsuperscript{141} Carnival societies are led by councils of eleven, and members of the carnival \textit{Dreigestirn} are typically chosen from the membership of carnival societies celebrating an anniversary that is a multiple of 11. Furthermore, the constitution issued by the prince of carnival always contains eleven articles. The interpretations of the number eleven in the Rhineland, has had varying interpretations–including the notion of it being a symbol of equality and democracy. Moser has presented evidence, including a 1530 Nürnberg woodcut that illustrates that the \textit{Narrenzahl} had its roots in the medieval and early modern periods, and not in the nineteenth century. This essentially rules out theories in which the numbers meaning is believed to originate in the nineteenth century. The number eleven, Moser argues, symbolizes the overstepping of the ten commandments. In turn, eleven also represents a betrayal of God, being one less than the twelve apostles–pointing to Judas’s betrayal of Christ. Moser also shows how the number eleven represents the final hour, the time of the Anti-Christ–the twelfth hour symbolizing the end of the world in Christian mythology. He also posits a connection with the guilds who organized carnival. The guilds revered St. Martin as their patron saint, whose saints day falls on November 11\textsuperscript{th}. Moser also explores other symbolic connections, some tied to passages in the bible in which the number eleven is connected with sin–though Moser’s primary argument remains that it represents exceeding the ten commandments.\textsuperscript{142}

The origin of the Rhenish \textit{Narrenkappe} has also been disputed–with some believing that Rhinelander took up the cap during the French occupation under Napoleon, imitating the caps worn by the democratic Jacobins during the French Revolution. Moser casually dismissed this argument as a misunderstanding of origins, and argued that the \textit{Narrenkappe}, resembling a ship with full sails, is merely a symbol of the \textit{Narrenschiff}. (A Rhenish \textit{Narrenkappe} can be seen in
Moser also offers exegesis on a range of other carnival topoi that tie into the Christian allegory. He argues, for example, that *Narrenbrot*, a special pretzel eaten at some carnival celebrations, has ties to the forbidden fruit and thus the begin of sin. He also shows how the old carnival figure of “Hans Wurst” as representing the gluttony and *Fleischlichkeit* of the wicked Narr. The different animal figures that appear in carnival, in turn, each represent a different vice tied to the carnal nature of mankind. Ritual sacrifices of them therefore represented a victory over the evil characteristics that they represent. Finally, Moser elaborates on a connection between *Narrentum* and death, reflected in images of the carnival Narr, such as those in Brandt’s *Das Narrenschiff*. (Figure 16) In other medieval images, the *Totentanz*, is frequently done by *Narrenfiguren*. The death represented by the Narr, can only be overcome through Christ and his sacrifice. Thus the final act of carnival, varying between localities, was often to burn a carnival figure as an act of atonement and repentance. In some places, a burning of witches took place. In other places, it was merely a symbolic figure. Funeral processions existed, in which effigies of carnival were carried to a place, and either buried, burned, or both. This burning, in turn, this has symbolic connection with the ash cross placed on the foreheads of congregants the following day. It is this process of burning the figure of carnival that the meaning of carnival lied—the abandonment of *Narragonia*—the *Narrenreich*, and the carnal sins of mankind, and the entering of the ship of the church.

The exhaustive work of Werner Mezger on carnival from the thirteenth to the early eighteenth centuries, while written to modify many of Moser’s arguments, has removed any doubts about the Christian roots and Christian metaphor of carnival—confirming many of Moser’s arguments. In his 500 page work, Mezger sorts through hundreds of images, including some of those considered by Moser, and supplements this from a large patch-work of sources from
carnival celebrations throughout Europe. Mezger argues that Moser sees carnival as too static, and while he agrees about the Christian metaphor, he argues that the metaphor expanded in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries when evidence of carnival celebrations began appearing all over Europe, and reached its fullness in the 15th and 16th centuries. Mezger argues that Moser’s belief that the church instituted, controlled and initiated carnival based solely on their desire to inscenate the two state idea of St. Augustine, exaggerates the church’s role—while not denying that Augustine’s ideas were important to the meaning of carnival. Mezger traces the accentuation of the Christian metaphor of carnival to economic and social developments and shifts in medieval and early modern piety that occurred in the latter part of the Middle Ages. He points to a growing fear within late medieval piety, that the devil hid behind almost all aspects of human life. This often led to mass hysteria, and played a role in witch hunts, and led to, what Mezger calls the “diabolization process” of carnival, in which the Narr became the figure of the Anti-Christ. Mezger attempts to illustrate, however, that across time and space, the elements of metaphor in carnival celebrations fluctuated across time and space. Furthermore, the church did not retain control over the metaphorical celebration, and thus, unlike Moser, Mezger does not analyze the forms of celebration as though the church controlled them. Incidental developments and initiatives playing an important role. Mezger concludes that Fastnacht is not a phenomenon created “somewhere” by “someone” artificially, but rather developed gradually in the realm of the private and the public.\textsuperscript{145} Mezger expands on some of the \textit{Civitas Dei} vs. \textit{Civitas Diaboli} dualities presented by Moser, by illustrating the ideas of \textit{Gottesmutter} vs. \textit{Narrenmutter}, \textit{Lebensbaum} vs. \textit{Narrenbaum}, and \textit{Narrenbrunnen} vs. \textit{Lebensbrunnen}. At the same time, he criticizes certain elements, where he believes that Moser interpreted religious symbolism that was not present.\textsuperscript{146}
The important point of both Moser and Mezger’s work, is that they illustrate the irrefutable Christian origins of carnival. As Mezger points out, there are 1000 years that separate records of pagan spring celebrations from carnival. Given this gap, and the existence of carnival throughout Christendom, it is unacceptable to conclude anything other than medieval carnival has no connections with pagan carnival. Those who argue for continuity with pagan celebrations believe that at some period, these Roman or Germanic pagan festivals merely underwent a process of Christianization. D.R. Moser has made the point that Christianization of pagan elements is more typically the exception and not the rule. However, the glaring problem with the pagan argument is simply the lack of records that would have inevitably been produced by Christians encountering wild pagan celebrations, and their subsequent attempts to channel them into a Christian metaphor. In spite of the sparsity of historical records regarding local carnival celebrations, after its emergence around the thirteenth century, there is a steady flow of records and images that attest to the celebration of carnival. Furthermore, the connection between carnival and Lent, and its seamless place in the Christian calendar, all leave the proponents of the pagan continuity theory with little to stand on. Those, who continue to argue that carnival originated in ancient Germanic or Roman festivals, such as Helene Klauser in her work on Colognian carnival, have not been taken seriously by most academics. Klauser has little evidence to present, other than a claim to be able to divine from modern celebrations, a spirit of their ancient Germanic roots–such as connection Weiberfastnacht with pagan cults dedicated to mother earth. Klauser presents virtually no evidence backing up her claims, apart from things such as the use of Latin-educated clerics referring to carnival as a Saturnalia. She has also made the somewhat absurd assertion that the notion of Colognian tolerance, contained within their carnival traditions, has its roots in the pre-Roman ancient Germanic tribe of the Ubier, as well as
Cologne’s historical position as a city of trade. As previously mentioned, the widespread notion of Colognian tolerance does not appear until after 1945. Given her rejection of the Christian origins, it is astonishing that her rather extensive work devotes only a few sentences to the substantial book and several essays written by Dietz-Rüdiger Moser on carnival’s Christian origins. Nevertheless, Klauser has made several interesting observations on the sociology of carnival phenomenon, not specific to Cologne. Her primary thesis, though she fails to back it up with concrete histories, is that the form’s of carnival’s celebration in different periods reflects the *Volksimaginäre* of their time. Importantly, she is only referring to the forms that celebration takes, and not the content. She states explicitly, that while forms change, the content and deeper meaning of carnival never changes much (no doubt she would make an exception for her argument that Christians hijacked pagan festivals).

Here I argue precisely the opposite of Klauser—that is, that forms of celebration, while subject to substantial conscious change between generations, remains fairly continuous. It is the deeper meaning of these forms of celebrations which have shifted radically throughout history. I will now attempt to illustrate this, by showing how Colognian carnival, by the nineteenth century, had maintained many of these celebratory forms, but integrated them into a fundamentally different interpretive framework. It is common within *Volkskunde*, to ignore the modern period, and assume that all meaning is contained in the moment of a tradition’s birth. Indeed, D.R. Moser treats his work on the Christian origins of carnival as though it should banish all modern “misunderstandings” regarding the meaning of the celebration. Mezger does criticize Moser for this, arguing that a tremendous problem in the history of carnival comes from assuming that there is no development or change in meaning across hundreds of years. Indeed, this fits within Mezger’s argument that the strength of the Christian metaphor in carnival
increased greatly as one moves from the High to the Late Middle Ages. Mezger does, however, briefly mention that he believes that the Christian element of carnival is not prominent in the modern period, and that it is likely that few celebrate it based on religious reasons. Mezger believes that this is tied to carnival undergoing a process of secularization after the Enlightenment—a period that he does not elaborate on in his work. He does, however, insist that the medieval meanings of things like the Narr and Narrenschiff, described in his work, have become empty symbols in modern carnival.¹⁵⁰

In turning from medieval/early modern carnival to nineteenth-century carnival, I would like to consider a painting cited by D.R. Moser’s at the end of his work. The painting, not reproduced in his book, is Carl Spitzweg’s Aschermittwoch, depicting an incarcerated Karnevalsnarr on the morning of Ash Wednesday. (Figure 18) In closing his work, Moser writes of this painting:

“Die Einkerkerung des Narren, wie sie Carl Spitzweg um 1855 zum Thema des Aschermittwochs gemacht hat, bedeutete immer die Freisetzung des Christen von allem, was seinen rechten Glauben behindert. Dabei ist es geblieben bis auf den heutigen Tag.”¹⁵¹

Moser has fatally misread this image. Indeed, both Moser and Mezger have presented hundreds of medieval and early modern images of Narren as malformed, mischievous figures—typically far more evil and disfigured than even Brandt’s Narrenschiff depicts them. Spitzweg’s painting is decidedly different from these. Spitzweg’s Karnevalsnarr does not appear menacing in any way, nor deformed or involved in devilish activity. Nor does the painting depict the freedom of Christendom from his supposed evil carnivalistic influences, as Moser suggest. What we see in Spitzweg’s painting are cold stone walls, the reflection of bars from the window, and a sober water jug on the table. The Karnevalsnarr, still in his joyful carnival attire, bends his head in
sadness at his Spartan incarceration, as he sits, arms clasped, on a hard stone bench. The playful colors of the carnival figure is juxtaposed against the bland and dreary colorlessness of his cell. The viewer sees no folly and no wickedness, rather the viewer develops a silent sympathy for this seemingly unjust imprisonment. This is not representative of how carnival’s meaning remained the same, as Moser insists, rather it represents how carnival had drastically changed. No where is this better illustrated than in nineteenth-century Colognian-Rhenish carnival, where the celebration, in contrast to other regions and localities, represented the nest of their Heimat-identity.

Where the meaning of medieval and early modern carnival came from its rejection as an evil world, modern Colognian carnival meant the exact opposite–actively embracing carnival as a festival that embodied positive local values, that should be promoted and tended in the time beyond the period of celebration. This was a celebration that maintained many of the motifs of medieval carnival, such as the Narrenschiff, Narrenkappe, the obsession with the number 11, the animal figures, witches, ghosts, etc. Consequently, the burning of the Knubbelmänner at the end of carnival Tuesday, while still present, played a very minor and discrete role in celebrations, compared to the grand events of Rosenmontag and Weiberfastnacht. In this new interpretative framework of carnival, the Karnevalsnarr no longer embodied the enemy of Christianity, and he was no longer a ferocious cannibal, sexual predator or tool of the devil as portrayed in all of the earlier depictions. (A representative example of this can be seen in Figure 19) In a nineteenth-century illustration of the prominent Colognian carnival Narren, the Jungfrau and Kölsche Boor, we see that the Narrenreich is not the enemy, but the victor over devils of a different breed. In this image, the charming and cavalier carnivalists stand atop the deformed and devilish reptiles of “Griesgram” and “Neidhardt”– “curmudgeondum” and “wrath.” (Figure 19, detail) It is
interesting to compare these fiendish figures with former medieval and early modern figures of the *Narr*—clearly this was symptomatic of deeper changes in meaning. The inscription on an 1830 carnival ticket embodies the new mentality of Colognian-Rhenish carnival that so colored Colognian identity. (Figure 20) Above the playful Bacchian print is written “Glaubt, Freunde, die Freude macht jung und gesund. Beschwört drum auf’s Neue den fröhlichen.” As Johanna Schopenhauer recorded after her visit to Colognian carnival:

> “Die dem Feste dieses Mal zum Grunde gelegte Idee war der Kampf unbefangener Fröhlichkeit und Freiheit mit den bösertigen Elementen, welche teils in der menschlichen Natur selbst, teils aber in der Außenwelt liegen, namentlich Mißmut, Stumpfsinn, ängstliches Hängen am conventionellen und so weiter.”

The interpretive framework of the *Narrenreich*, came to be one of a war against these forces of sadness, drabness, austerity and lifelessness. The theme of the 1825 Cologne Rosenmontag parade “Der Sieg der Freude” or the 1897 theme “Die Griesgramschlacht” embodied this new mentality. An 1825 Colognian carnival song book is full of songs with this war analogy, referring to the battle of the carnivalists, arming themselves with all the forces of happiness to destroy the enemy in grand victory. Another Colognian carnival song from 1825 refers to their enemy—the *Sklavenreich*, who wants to subject them to its yoke. The carnivalists declared their freedom in their “Siegesfest”, and chanted “Triumph! Triumph! Die Freude hat gesiegt.” It was through indulgence of *Freude* that Colognian carnivalists would win the battle waged by the *Narrenreich* and their “good war”. This idea of the *Narrenreich* as a positive *Freudenreich* engaged in a war against its enemies, carried on into the twentieth century. In 1952, for example, Carnival Prince Johann Maria I declared in the first two paragraphs of his Constitution that those who did not show local pride through the chanting of “Kölle Alaaf”, and those *Mucker*...
and Miesmacher were all enemies of the state, and should be photographed, and ordered to wear a necklace of sour lemon as a form of public shame. In 1954, Prince Hubert II’s Constitution claimed to establish a network of secret spies to find the 11 jolliest carnivalists, and to incarcerate all enemies of Freude and Frohsinn.¹⁵⁴

Nineteenth-century Colognian carnival also saw the emergence of new notions, such as Narrenweisheit and Narrenfreiheit, and carnival mottos like “Allem wohl und niemand weh!”.

One Rhenish carnival song expressed both of these ideas:

> “Doch Weisheit liegt in unsern Karneval,  
> Begrüßt, belacht, bejubelt um die Wette.  
> Den Narrenstaat regiert man nicht feudel,  
> Und seine Macht sind nicht die Bajonette.”¹⁵⁵

Carnivalists in the nineteenth century were understood to be free citizens, not subject to the feudal rule of tyrants. In Cologne, this must have had a strong resonance with the pride in the figure of the Kölsche Boor—the free citizen of the free imperial city of Cologne in the Holy Roman Empire. It is not difficult to see how notions like Narrenfreiheit in the Rhineland came to play a part in the broader postwar claim to a tradition of democracy. The notion of Narrenweisheit is also particularly interesting, and contradicts the very essence of the word “Narr.” In Brandt’s Narrenschiff, the Narr is an embodiment of all manners of fooleries. This idea of Narrenweisheit likewise carried into the twentieth century. In his address to the Bund Deutscher Karneval, Thomas Liessem declared that the Narr is the “protector of wisdom.”¹⁵⁶

The motives of the Narrenschiff, Narrenkappe and mythology of the number 11 also morphed to fit within this new interpretative framework of Colognian carnival as the embodiment of an empire of a Rhenish-Colognian Heimat identity rooted in their joy and good-naturedness. While the Narrenschiff of Brandt and the medievals headed toward a watery grave
as a result of their follies, the modern *Narrenschiff*, found itself in the battle against *Griesgram*, staying afloat only through its spread of joy. This is reflected in the 1897 carnival float of the *Narrenschiff*, which appeared in the Rosenmontag parade, whose theme that year was *Der Griesgramschlacht*. The ship does not contain devilish rowdy fools, who bring the ship down through their disorder. Rather, they are courtly figures, in a ship covered in Colognian crests, and topped with a Colognian crown. (Figure 21) This new idea of the *Narrenschiff* also appears in a 1913 carnival song by Georg Müller, entitled the “*Narrenschiff,*” which declared that the ship could only stay free from harm and its enemies if they maintained their *Frohgesang*. The song continued with the line: “Volldampf allzeit voraus! Auf dem Freudenmeer.” The number 11 received two new interpretations, though its time of emergence, and its prominence are a bit unclear. The first interpretation, is that “eleven” or “e-l-f” has a connection to the French Revolutionary call for *Égalité, Liberté, Fraternité*. The other interpretation, related to the first, is that 11– or one-to-one, symbolized equality in its symmetric balance. This notion of equality in carnival, also came to be represented by the *Narrenkappe*, which many argued originated as an imitation of the cap of the French revolutionary Jacobins. The *Narrenkappe* as a symbol of equality is illustrated in a sketch which appeared in several different carnival publications in Cologne in the early nineteenth-century. (Figure 22) Here, the *Narrenkappe*, is stitched with the number 11–and the Narr, standing on a pedestal, holds them out evenly, as a statement of equality under the *Narrenkappe*. As previously mentioned, Moser has dismissed both of these interpretations of the number 11 and the *Narrenkappe* as simple misunderstandings, that he sees himself as correcting, showing the their true meaning by revealing their origin. The form of the *Narrenkappe* seen in this sketch, however, is not the traditional Rhenish *Narrenkappe*, which Moser argued is reminiscent of the *Narrenschiff*. It does, indeed, take on a
form similar to the Jacobin cap. Nevertheless, in twentieth-century carnival, the real Rhenish Narrenkappe has been given the same interpretation as representing equality, and being reminiscent of the Jacobin’s cap. At least in terms of the cap’s association with equality, there is evidence indicating that the Joseph de Noel, a major figure in the romantic reform, actively propagated the notion.158

While the origins of these interpretations of the Narrenzahl and the Narrenkappe lie in the nineteenth century, there is reason to suspect that their prominence grew to a level in postwar Cologne, that they had not had in the nineteenth century. In the early nineteenth-century, for example, Johanna Schopenhauer recalled seeing the number 11 everywhere in carnivalistic celebrations. She wrote, however, that while the “Geckenzahl” is everywhere, no one seemed to be aware of what it means and where it comes from.159 In 1938, the number 11 was explained on November 11th as merely a lucky number that has connections with cosmology and star constellations—though admittedly, such an interpretation may have better suited Nazi interpretations of the festival.160 In the postwar, however, these interpretations of the Narrenkappe and Geckenzahl harmonized well with the idea of Colognian liberalism and democratic colorings. An 1949 article in the Kölnische Rundschau opined that the Narrenkappe symbolizes the doing away all differences of opinion, status and class, with all living together under the same cap.161 It is easy to see how notions like these could morph into a postwar notions of Colognian tolerance or Colognian democracy rooted in their carnival tradition. In the 1950's, Heinrich Lützeler, for example, made the standard argument that the Narrenkappe represents a laying down all different titles, class distinctions, etc. He held that it was the disappearance of these Standesunterschiede in carnival that made the celebration so important for the development of Rhenish democracy. It was the Rhenish carnival tradition, Lützeler insisted,
that led to the Rhenish hate of elite government bureaucrats.\textsuperscript{162}

**Conclusion**

What the history of Colognian carnival demonstrates—from the Middle Ages to the Nineteenth century and the postwar, is that its meanings and the values ascribed to it are both flexible and continually subject to discreet processes of reinvention. I argue that the emergence of the notion of carnival as a celebration of tolerance, openness and democracy in the postwar period, should be seen within the framework of this evolutionary dynamic seen in its earlier history, and not as a conscious Nazi conspiracy to “erase” history. Heimatler in the postwar emphasized traditions such as carnival, not to “forget” the past, but to find a place of emotional security to generate the strength for the arduous process of rebuilding. While Heimatwerte may appear in scattered discussions regarding the level of Nazi support or lack of it in certain regions, such statements have been overemphasized. These developments in Heimatwerte were overwhelmingly oriented toward the future of their Gemeinschaft, and less toward an assessment of past regional variation of Nazi support. Thus, after the ubiquitous presence of death in the Third Reich, after 1945, Colognian carnivalists began to use the untranslatable word “lebensbejahend” to describe their Heimafest—its preparation becoming the “Mobilmachung Lebensbejahenden Kräfte.”\textsuperscript{163} In a speech, Thomas Liessem said: “Jede frohe Stunde ist ein echtes menschliches Erlebnis, sie befreit uns von der Sorge und der Last unserer Mühen und gibt uns neue Kraft, das Leben zu meistern.”\textsuperscript{164} This was not an attempt to forget, but a search for places to regain humanity after a decade of terror. Indeed, Lützeler, in his writings on the philosophy of Colognian humor described their Volkshumor as a mechanism of surviving the horrors of the Third Reich.\textsuperscript{165} Postwar Colognians described their carnival as an “oasis of
freedom” where all people would be respected regardless of their views.166

After 1945, Colognians sought to teach these new Heimat values to their children. Klersch particularly emphasized the importance of *Heimatliebe*, while Jean Küster and Ernst Mömkes in 1951 established the celebration of a Schul- and Kinderkarneval. They believed it would promote a feeling of community among students, and would constitute an “Erziehung zur Demokratie” Prewar calls for childrens’ and school carnival had fallen on deaf ears.167 This invigorated effort to teach children *Heimatliebe* is also seen in the 1950's recreation of the school magazine *Jung-Köln*, whose editor wrote that it was reintroduced to stave off fears that Colognian culture would be lost through the bombing and long period of evacuation. The publication targeting school children included articles about Colognian culture and history, and about the old Cologne before the bombings. At the end of the 1950's, articles also appeared discussing the Kristallnacht in Cologne, the Holocaust and medieval persecutions of Jews, while recounting the attempts to reach out to the Jewish community during the rebuilding of the Cologne synagogue.168 These new generations would pick up the notion of “Colognian tolerance,” and expand them to the understandings of their own time. In subsequent generations, it came to mean a strong tolerance of immigrant groups and other groups such as the gay and lesbian community. In the sexually conservative 1950's, for example, it was only in carnival that Colognian gays could find acceptance, dress as any gender, and dance with a person of any gender. Taking advantage of the momentary “vacuum of norms,” they were able to live out their identity, though after Ash Wednesday, the “tolerance” was over. The next generation of Colognians took the notion of Colognian tolerance, and embraced the gay community, earning the city the unofficial title of “Hauptstadt der Schwule”, having one of the largest Christopher Street Day celebrations in all of Europe—and the only such celebration with its own carnivallistic
Narrenruf. The gay carnival society “Rosa Funken”, a full member of the Festkomittee Kölner-Karneval, appears yearly in both carnival and CSD, wearing the eighteenth-century uniform of the Cologne city guard–only in bright pink instead of Colognian red. Modern Cologne has also become well known for its tolerance of foreign groups, with a high percentage of the city coming from outside of Germany. Raissa Orlowa, a Soviet academic who took refuge in Cologne during the Cold War, recalled her impressions after moving to the city:

“...diese freundliche, freizügige, fröhliche Stadt - weltoffen und urwüchsig und das nicht nur im bunten Treiben des Karnevals. Zuerst lernten wir Köln als Heinrich Bölls Stadt lieben, in der wir Zuflucht fanden. Im Laufe der Jahre festigte sich diese Verbundenheit mit der neuen Wahlheimat, drang ins Bewußtsein und Unterbewußtsein ein.”

Carnivalists and Heimatler, like Jan Brügelman have insisted that carnivalists must remain vigilant against any exclusivity in carnival’s celebration, repeating the standard lines that the celebration “lives from tolerance” and should promote reconciliation and a coming together.  

Colognian schools with students from diverse countries and diverse races, celebrate carnival together, and learn Colognian carnival songs.  

Of course it would be inappropriate to exaggerate the role of “Colognian tolerance” in the postwar, and paper over acts of hate, discrimination and closedness to the “other” that can even find expression within carnival itself. Indeed, the 1976 Rosenmontag parade proved to be tremendously controversial, with the appearance of two floats--one poking fun at the willingly unemployed, and another at immigrants and the Kindergeld that they receive for having multiple children. (Figures 23 & 24) The native Colognian, Heinrich Böll, known for many of his poems about his home city, denounced these floats in an open letter as “miesen spiesserhaften Geschmacklosigkeit”–explaining that real Colognian humor knows proper boundaries, and that it
only indulges in mockery of authority, prominence and secure powers but never in the mockery of minorities or the powerless, such as Turkish immigrants or the unemployed.\textsuperscript{171} Many Colognian Heimatler have attempted to fight against such mentalities of closedness. In 1992, for example a group of popular Kölschrock bands held a major concert “Arsch huh, Zäng Ussenander” (Colognian for: stand up and speak out) attended by 100,000 to urge people to fight against ethnic/racial hatred, and Neo-Nazism–as a response to the meeting of an anti-Islamic conference. In a similar development, Colognian carnivalists have reintroduced \textit{Geisterzüge}, a tradition with at least a 200 year history, but added the new twist of using the event to increase social awareness on certain issues, such as war or world hunger. In 1990, for example, after debates about whether to cancel carnival over the outbreak of the Gulf War, many carnivalists took to the streets protesting the war, holding signs bearing phrases such as “Rheinischer Frohsinn gegen Weltweite Wahnsinn!” Again, the point of displaying some of the results of the ideas of “Colognian tolerance” and \textit{Weltoffenheit} is not to white-wash histories or to create myths of societies free from racial or cultural hatred, or right-wing extremism. However, what it does illustrate is that the emergence of new Heimat values and a new perception about their carnivalistic traditions were not merely about the construction of “fake” identities to forget history. Indeed, once certain notions are internalized as a part of identity, whether they have a historical continuity or not, those notions, by being internalized, undergo a process of self-magnification. While the significance of these identities should not be overblown, what postwar Colognian carnival illustrates, is how the flexibility of Heimat allows itself to be reconciled with the principle of diversity.

Taking a broad step back from the particulars of Cologne and carnival, the assumption behind this study, is that the Heimat concept and the traditions and element that anchor it, are far
more flexible than traditionally believed. Indeed, the nineteenth-century image of Heimat as
closed, backwards, reactionary and narrow, still permeates intellectual and academic conceptions
of the notion. Mack Walker has written in his work *German Home Towns*, of the internalization
of the city walls into mentalities that shun the outsider, while Ina-Maria Greverus’s work, *Auf der
Suche nach Heimat*, compares to closedness of the Heimat concept to Nazi-like mentalities. The
nineteenth-century figure, Ferdinand Tönnies, while not writing specifically about Heimat,
introduced the concepts of *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft* as though they are mutually exclusive
and contradictory. Indeed, Heimat with its focus on the immediate, can easily spill over into
narrowness, intolerance, closed-mindedness and anti-cosmopolitanism. The elements in which
Heimat finds its anchoring, such as traditions, festivals, dialects, etc., can and have been used as
shibboleths to shun the outsider. Indeed, it would be patently absurd to argue that Heimatler in
the postwar were somehow at the forefront of the fight for tolerance, openness and multi-
culturalism. Those who have been at the forefront of such calls have frequently been skeptical of
the old nineteenth-century concept. However, Heimat and Heimat traditions are also not
inherently incompatible with these modern principles. Indeed, the core meaning of Heimat is not
the building of communities through the exclusion of the outsider as often as often believed, but
rather the insistence on the monumentality of immediately experienced space. The ability of
Heimat and its traditions to adapt to a modern value system, I would argue, makes it relevant and
legitimate in a modernizing world concerned with shaping societies in which its individuals are
best able to construct a notion of individual belonging and value. The cosmopolitan ideology of
*Gesellschaft*, insisting on openness, tolerance, broad global thinking, etc. plays an important role
in this endeavor. I would thus argue that Heimat ideology and cosmopolitan ideology—
Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft-- need not mutually exclusive, but rather, can be mutually corrective if held in suspension. To hold up Cologne and the imputed Heimatwerte of Colognian carnival as some sort of realization of this theoretical idea would be both presumptuous and misguided. However, it shows an obvious impulse in this direction. Indeed, in basing their postwar Heimat identity on notions of carnivalistic tolerance and openness, meant theoretically that practicing these values vis-a-vis the “outsider” entails not a weakening but rather a strengthening of local identity. The theme of a recent Colognian carnival, “Mer all sin Kölle”—“We are all Cologne”—illustrates this balance. Expressed in Colognian dialect, it symbolizes the maintenance and importance of their local-regional particularity. At the same time, the content of the statement demands inclusion, insisting that all—whatever cultural backgrounds, race, sexuality etc.—belong to their local Heimat community. As I have attempted to argue, the notion of Heimat and its traditions as being inherently anti-modern should be abandoned. New studies on the Heimat concept are needed which more radically question the discourses of continuity propped up by Heimatler and Heimatkunde—and not merely for the purpose of insisting that Heimat identities are somehow “artificial” or “fake” because of the absence of continuity, but rather, to illustrate the flexibility of the Heimatwerte and Heimat traditions more generally.
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DER HEIMAT DIE TREUE!: REGION AND HEIMAT
IN THE GERMAN SOUTHWEST (1945-1969)

BY

JEREMY JOHN DEWAAL

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Throughout German history, the prominence of the region has been a strand of continuity from the early medieval period down to the modern period. Since the early romantics, these regions have served as the foundation of Heimat feeling— the strong emotional attachment and sense of belonging that Germans construct in regional and local places. Kurt Stavenhagen once argued that “through Heimat a person becomes connected with the greatest reachable depth of existence.”

Iring Fetscher, writing in the postwar period, said that the very mention of the word “Heimat” made one warm in their heart. Expressions of the positive warmth and positive psychological associations that Germans feel for their Heimat can be seen in a plethora of forms. Understandings of Heimat and regionalism, however, are not static, and have been subject to discrete processes of redefinition and renegotiation over the course of German history. Here I seek to examine how the concept of Heimat and region developed in the years after World War II. I do so through a case study of the German Southwest in the area around the present-day state of Baden-Württemberg, where a 25-year long struggle raged regarding what kind of regional state or states ought to be created. These debates centered largely around assessments of which proposed regions shared a common heritage and regional culture, and what kind of territories could be called “Heimat.” This studies argues that this case studies reveals the inherent disparate nature of notions of regional Heimat in terms of what geographical territory it is projected onto. This study further argues that this ties directly back to the absence of a strong power dynamic which shape imaginings of Heimat, which pervasively shape how Heimat belongings manifest itself.

In my study, I am not just interested in the German Southwest. I am also interested in how these debates reveal broader changing understandings of the perceived role of Heimat in
postwar Germany. The very heatedness of the debates in the German Southwest created a large discourse in which different figures presented elaborate arguments about why their vision of Heimat and region ought to become reality. I believe that this discourse illuminates how the process of imagining regional communities differs essentially from the process of imagining national ones. I argue that, by comparison, the imagining of region and Heimat is by its very nature far more disparate, which is connected to their being imagined in the private sphere. In the second part of my study, I look at the same debates over region, and, instead of asking “where” they believed their regional Heimat to be, I look at what they believed it was about. In their arguments for their respective visions, what role did they ascribe to their planned regional states? Why did they believe Heimat and region were so important in the postwar? While some academics have incorrectly assumed that Heimat sentiments were discredited because of their supposed narrowness and use in Nazi propaganda, I find quite the opposite to be true. On an individual level, Heimat and region provided a haven of positive identity in the postwar. On a broader level, Heimatler did not understand the experiencing of the regional and local as a retreat from the nation and “broader” worlds. By focusing on more “narrow” worlds (for lack of a better term), they saw themselves as casting off unhealthy, expansionary, militarist ambitions, and returning to positive regional “traditions.” As I find in my study of the Southwest, many Heimatler saw the experiencing of the regional as having an inherently salutary effect on the nation, and on the project to create a unified Europe. Directly after World War II, I argue, Heimat came to be about positive postwar values, that, in the mind of Heimatler, made regions privileged sites in the process of making denazified Germans.
Territorial History of the Southwest to 1945

With history representing a key battleground in the Southwest question after World War II, a short background of the history of the region is called for-- and this history was anything but simple. It stretched back over more than a millennium, with hundreds of different states, principalities, kingdoms, bishoprics, etc. In the early medieval period, Germans were divided into separate Stämme (tribes) which settled in different parts of Germany. Different Stämme had ethnic and cultural differences, including linguistic differences that still define German dialectic spaces up to the present day. The Southwest was settled by a tribe called the Alemanni, which also came to be known as Swabians, who, until 1268, lived chiefly in the Stammmesherzogtum Schwaben. They not only formed a common cultural unit, but also had a common understanding of law among other things. The Swabian/Alemannic Stamm bordered on the Franconian Stamm in the north, the Bavarians in the east, and encompassed the German speaking areas of present day Switzerland, Alsace and the Vorarlberg. (Figure 1) After the disappearance of the Stammmesherzogtum, the Southwest devolved into a highly variegated mixture of over a hundred territorial entities of different sorts. It was there that many of Germany’s monarchial houses emerged, including the Stauffer, Hohenzollern, Habsburgs, and the Zähringer.

After the full establishment of the Swiss Confederation in 1499, the Alemannic speaking parts of Switzerland were increasingly seen as separate from their northern brothers. Thomas A. Brady’s work Turning Swiss, however, shows that the borders of Switzerland were not fixed in the early modern period in the sense that there was a real possibility that areas all over southern and central Germany might become Swiss and break out of the feudal system of the empire. Brady does, however, note a growing tension and hostility between the northern and southern parts of the Swabian-Alemannic language group. In 1512, Johannes Cochlaeus’s Brevis
Germanie Descriptio, defines Switzerland as a separate Stamm, tied to the old Celtic tribe of Helveti. He also included the cities of Freiburg and Basel as belonging to the Swiss area, while counting Augsburg, the Allgäu and Konstanz as Swabian cities.\textsuperscript{176} Despite the emergence of the Swiss confederation, the connections within the Swabian-Alemannic language group would never completely be forgotten.

Throughout the early modern period, the conceptual borders of Swabia had become somewhat fuzzy. While the Swabian Reichskreis of the Holy Roman Empire and the Swabian League of Cities may have influenced where people drew Swabia’s borders, there was definite ambiguity. This is well displayed by the cartographer Matthäus Merian’s in his 17\textsuperscript{th}-century *Topographia Sueviae*. Merian sees Swabia as extending from the river Lech in the east, to the Bodensee and the Alps in the south following the flow of the Rhine and including Alsace in the west. At the end of his *Topographia*, after giving descriptions of Swabian cities, he lists a slate of cities within Swabian territory that he has left out of his descriptions. He argues that they belong to Swabia, but, “because of their hearts” their loyalties have been pulled to other lands. Among these cities are many, such as Freiburg, that belonged to Anterior Austria, or Heidelberg, which belonged to the Electoral Palatinate, even though Heidelberg had never been a city within the Stammesherzogtum Schwaben.\textsuperscript{177} Merian includes quite a few cities fully within Swabia that lie clearly above the border between the Swabian-Alemannic and Franconian language groups.

The territorial patchwork in the Southwest continued through the 18\textsuperscript{th} century up until the dismantling of the empire by Napoleon in 1806 and his total revamping of German territory. As Napoleon redrew the German map, he was completely uninterested in regional cultural borders, and was far more interested in creating prospective client states. Two states, Baden and Württemberg, were substantially enlarged to fully encompass the German Southwest from the
Rhine, which demarcated the German-French and German-Swiss borders, to the Main in the north. (Two shaded areas of Figure 1) The only state that was able to retain its sovereignty was the small state of Hohenzollern, which remained a territorial entity belonging to Prussia until 1945. The area within the Swabian dialect space that lied between the city of Ulm and river Lech was given to Bavaria—a state which also greatly benefitted from its status as a client state under Napoleon. Napoleon rose Baden to the rank of a Duchy and Württemberg was made into a kingdom. The adopted daughter of Napoleon, Stephanie Beauharnais was made Duchess of Baden. She suggested that Baden and Württemberg be unified, though this never occurred. After Napoleon, the Congress of Vienna did not seriously attempt to reverse the territorial changes in the Southwest. According to Theodor Eschenburg in his 1951 anonymous pamphlet on the Southwest question, the Congress maintained the status quo in the Southwest because the French diplomat Talleyrand’s support for Baden, which the French would be more easily able to dominate. He also held that the only thing which melted the population of Baden together was the bureaucracy and the military.\(^{178}\) In the integration of such states, the scholar Abigail Green, though she has not written on the state of Baden, has emphasized the role of royal propaganda in such state integration.\(^{179}\) Whether one accepts Green’s argument or not, there appears to be surprisingly little mention of the old Badenese ducal house in the debates over the Southwest after World War II, even considering the fact that it had not existed since 1918. The dynastic states, themselves, however, would play a central role in the debates. Even after over 60 years of Baden’s existence, Otto von Bismarck claimed that the rooted connections (\textit{Wurzelbindungen}) of the Badenese to their dynasty was quite weak.\(^{180}\) A very important factor, in Baden and Württemberg, however, was the introduction of liberal constitutions, which allowed the new citizens of their respective states to play a greater role in state governance. Duke Karl of Baden
granted his state one of the most liberal constitutions in all of Germany, which was calculated to bring together the disparate elements of the state. This was certainly important to the emergence of a Badenese identity.181

Directly east of Baden, the state of Württemberg was noted for its liberalism. This is important, as many of those who want the state of Baden to be recreated after 1945 made claims that their democratic tradition sets them apart. In his work _Schwaben: Farben zu einem Portrait_, the first German president Theodor Heuss, originally from the Southwest, notes that when the rest of Germany was in absolutism, Württemberg went a different way. He quotes the comment of Ch.J. Fox to William Pitt that there were only two states in Europe who have a “proper” constitution – England and Württemberg.182 While sentiments for these states developed, few concrete “traditions” emerged that were shared by all members of the state, and not those directly outside its borders. Though, as I shall attempt to illustrate, other traditions would come to be understood within the framework of these states. Both states crossed Stamm lines—which colored regional culture and still determined dialect borders. The states of Baden and Württemberg mixed Swabian-Alemannic areas with northern Franconian areas, and, in the case of Baden, also Kurpfälzer in the area around Mannheim.

In the mid nineteenth-century, Baden and Württemberg joined the German customs union, which tied them into the greater German economy. In 1870, both states joined the other Southern German states in an alliance with Prussia against the French in the Franco-Prussian war, which led to the full integration of the southern states into a newly created Germany state. The Germans also acquired Lorraine and Alsace—the latter of which had been part of the old Stammesherzogtum Schwaben, and which belonged to the same dialect branch as those in the southern half of Baden and Württemberg and Bavarian Swabia. With Alsace-Lorraine as part of
Germany, Baden no longer had a border with France. The Archduke of Baden even presented Bismarck with a proposal to begin a merger of Alsace-Lorraine and Baden, that would include integration of military and political administration. Bismarck rejected this movement, arguing that it would not be in the best interest of trying to switch the sentiments of those in Alsace-Lorraine from France to Germany.  

After the conclusion of World War I in 1918, Germany again lost Alsace-Lorraine to the French making Baden a border state. In the process, dynastic states lost their “dynasts.” In the early years of the Weimar Republic, discussions began regarding a possible unification of Baden and Württemberg, with a possible inclusion of the Palatinate to the northwest. The president of Baden, Willy Hellpach, developed the idea, which he called “Rheinschwaben.” He was vigorously supported by the geographer and head of the Alemannic Institute, Friedrich Metz, who would play an important role in the discussions of state building in the Southwest after 1945. This proposal never attracted great interest during the Weimar years, and was no doubt overshadowed by the more pressing matters of the struggling democracy.

After the Nazi regime seized power in 1933, they began a process of *Gleichschaltung*, which included the dismantling of all federal states that would otherwise have stood in the way of the Nazi plans of total centralization. While the Nazi redrew several inner-German borders in the creation of new Gaus, the states of Baden, Württemberg and Hohenzollern in the Southwest retained their borders in their conversion into Nazi Gaus. After the invasion of France, however, the Gauleiter of Baden, Robert Wagner, pushed for a union of Alsace and Baden. The creation of such a Gau began, and administrative functions began to move from Karlsruhe to Strasbourg, which was to be the new capital. These plans were ended as the war drew to a close.

Nazis definitely used Heimat and regional identity in the Southwest and elsewhere for
propagandistic purposes. They also did this with a host of other traditions, histories, authors, artists, etc. where they had to redefine, obfuscate or recreate to make them fit with Nazi ideology.

In the Southwest, the Nazis used the history of the Alemannic Stamm to make a claim to Switzerland and the previous German territories within France. In a speech in 1936 at the “Alemannische Tagung” in Freiburg, Hermann Burte spoke about the “nonsense” of how the Alemannic Stamm had been separated by the Rhine. Jakob Schaffner, at the same meeting, argued that the Swiss would be forced back into “Alemannentum” where they belonged. The Nazi Rudi Keller argued that the real cultural space of the Alemannen had been separated between four nations and several different states. He condemned concepts like “Badenese” dialects, “Württembergish” folk songs, “Swiss” primordial history, or “Hohenzollern” traditions. He argued that holding to these beliefs was to misconceive cultural space. He held, rather, that Stamm decided regional culture. Such an interpretation of region no doubt received official approval primarily because it coincided with Nazi territorial ambitions. During the Nazi period, however, it was clear that formations of Gaus and definition of regions was not something that the people were able to help shape–rather they would be subject to the imperatives of the Reich. Nazis in no way tolerated those for whom regional identity held a greater attraction than national identity. Indeed, those who had been previously been involved in regional separatists movements were put into concentration camps. As Celia Applegate has argued, the Nazi theme of German expansion in Heimat propaganda was largely in contradiction to the core value of Heimat, which was about the experiencing of the local and regional.

With the beginning of the allied occupation, it was not only German cities and the German economy which had to be rebuilt. The German soul was also a site of devastation that had to be rebuilt and redefined. While not truly abandoning national identity, many postwar
Germans fled the twisted vision of the Fatherland to seek a haven in the comforting arms of mother Heimat. Despite clear exploitation of the concept by Nazis, it provided a haven of positive and healthy self-identification, which could allow Heimat to act as a site from which to redefine themselves. At the same time, Germans also had to grapple with the issue of which regional states ought to be established. Throughout its history, bordered space was by no means the most important part of Heimat. The most important aspects were all of the trappings of a region and locality—traditions, foods, local dialects, architectural styles, familiar places, etc., which imbued one with a sense of comfort, belonging and familiarity. Ina-Maria Greverus, in her work *Auf der Suche nach Heimat*, however, has rightly argued that Heimatler essentially identify with territorial space, and that the territorial imperative is indispensable. Here I seek to illustrate how, unlike national identity, those who conceived of a regional Heimat identity were more free to fashion for themselves their own subjective notion of where Heimat was, and that because of this, such imaginings were highly disparate. Much later, I will try to show how this subjective and free-floating construction of the geography of region and Heimat is mirrored in the realm of Heimatlers constructions of what their regional culture was all about.

Throughout the history of German regionalism, there has rarely been a moment when the people of a region could draw for themselves the borders of their own state based on an agreement that they shared a common regional culture and cultural values. Rather, the creation of states (exemplified by Baden and Württemberg) was normally based on political imperatives, with many Heimatler beginning to look to those entities as Heimat several decades after their creation. In the first few years of the allied occupation, however, a unique situation arose in which the entire slate was wiped clean and the map of Germany was essentially *Tabula Rasa* as the allies began to explore options of what to do with Germany. In the Southwest, there was but
one exception, as it was immediately clear that, in the corner of the Southwest, Germany would
end at the Rhine, with France taking Alsace and Lorraine. This made impossible the idea of an
Upper Rhine state, (which many saw as a cultural unit)—as well as any other construction that
might include Alsace. The allies split up the areas that had been Baden and Württemberg, with
the France receiving the lower half, and the Americans taking the more industry-rich northern
half for themselves. This was an obvious move for the Americans, as the allies agreed that they
would extract reparations from their respective zones of occupation. Thus the three interim
states of the Southwest were created, including South Baden (which maintained the name Baden
for “irredentist” purposes) and Württemberg-Hohenzollern in the French zone and Württemberg-
Baden in the American zone. (Figure 2) Within the northern state of Württemberg-Baden, the
Americans granted North Baden its own Regierungsbezirk.\textsuperscript{192} The border drawn between the
American and French zones could not have been more artificial. The American military drew
them by ordering the French to withdraw to all Kreise south of the Karlsruhe-Stuttgart-Ulm
freeway.\textsuperscript{193} These states would remain in existence until 1952, when a vote was held that led to
the creation of the state of Baden-Württemberg. Here I will outline the process by which
Germans in the Southwest arrived at this point after considering the viability of different plans
for various state creations. The state plans considered did not merely represent technical
strategies of state-building. Rather, all of their creators and most of their supporters claimed that
their plans were motivated by love and loyalty to their Heimat. In the following section, I will
look chiefly at how they drew geographic borders of their proposed Heimat states based on
notions of cultural space.
Disparate Imaginings of Region and Heimat

One of the earliest and perhaps the most bold proposal for the Southwest came from Otto Feger—a man who called himself, “a jurist by profession, and a historian by inclination.” Feger was a native of Alsace, living in Mülhausen, Masmünster and Thann, with a father from the Badenese Ortenau. He lived in Freiburg for many years as a student, and after the war, became the archivist in the city of Konstanz. Significantly, he does not appear to have ever lived in Württemberg. His 1946 work, Schwäbisch-Alemannische Demokratie: Aufruf und Programm, outlined a plan for an autonomous Swabian-Alemannic democracy whose borders were largely based on the tribal principal of Stamm. Feger made most of these plans during the war while in prison—and like most of the leading figures in the Southwest question, he was an no friend of the Third Reich during the war. The Nazis forbid him to work as a jurist, and Feger resorted to doing translation for the Wehrmacht in Italy until his imprisonment. In the years after the war he completed his work as the archivist of Konstanz.

Feger argued that, in their southwestern Heimat, they had to find a new territorial form that did away with the “artificially created” territorial entities of the past century—a clear reference to the Napoleonic states of Baden and Württemberg. Feger was very clear in outlining borders of his new state in some places, while intentionally obfuscating in others. In terms of the northern and eastern borders, he was fairly clear. Those territories in Baden north of the Murg and Oos rivers would not be included in the state; he would also cut out northern Franconian stretches of Württemberg. Feger wrote, however, that the cities of Heilbronn and Schwäbisch-Hall, in northern Württemberg, while Franconian, were still Swabian cities. Areas north of Mergentheim, Crailsheim and Vietingheim in his assessment, did not belong to the Alemannic Raum. To the east, he argued that Bavarian Swabia, between Ulm and the Lech, had always been
more Swabian than Bavarian. He also believed that the Alemannic groups in the Austrian Vorarlberg ought to belong to the state—though in all of these areas he maintained that the will of the people in these areas should be considered. In the west, Feger clearly would have wanted his native Alsace to be included in the state, though proposing its inclusion would have incurred the wrath of the French occupiers. This, no doubt, would have prevented his book from being published in the French zone. Thus, he called Alsace a “segue” into French cultural space, and did not state clearly if it should be included or not. With the southern border he offered no more clarity, saying “Switzerland, blood of our blood, will in the future also be spirit of our spirit if no foreign ideology stands between us.” He even referred to the “Schwäbischen Eidgenossenschaft,” clearly pulling the term from the Swiss handbook. He made no firm statement on whether the Swiss should or should not become part of the autonomous state.

Feger made his claims based on an analysis of regional Eigenart and traditions, which he wanted to form the basis a new autonomous and democratic state. He insisted that their regional culture was ideally suited to the challenges that the Southwest faced. Indulging in very anti-Prussian sentiment, Feger believed that the Southwest could claim a long democratic tradition which Swabians should no longer allow to be taken away from them by the “autocratic traditions” of the German North and East. For Feger, these democratic traditions would be well served by the large number of smaller towns and localities within the southwest. He planned to give them their own administrative status, which, in turn would cement the principle of decentralization within the Swabian-Alemannic state itself. As a capital city, he rejected the metropolis Stuttgart in favor of a smaller town such as Sigmaringen, Donaueschingen or Rottweil. Feger believed that larger cities tended to become too centralist.

Feger’s plan was not the first or the last to use Stamm as grounds for deciding certain
state formation. In his 1930 work, *Reichsland Großschwaben mit Stuttgart und Augsburg*, Dr. Konstantin Bertele outlined a comparable geographical plan in the Southwest with two administrative districts with capitals in Stuttgart and Augsburg. Feger’s plan, however, was certainly the most publicized. His book sold over 50,000 copies, making it the most sold book in the French zone in 1946. His readers ranged from the highly enthusiastic to the overtly hostile. The historian Karl S. Bader, in his diary, recorded reading the book which he called “the slightly crazy book by Otto Feger.” Bader insisted that Feger’s work was “immature,” with a sprinkling of a few lovely ideas and formulations. Feger found a somewhat shaky ally in the form of Bernhard Dietrich, the mayor of the Badenese city Singen, who also promoted a vision of an autonomous state according to Stamm. Dietrich, however, conceived of a Swabian-Alemannic state within the context of an Alpine Union that would stretch from the Rhine to Vienna, and include Bavarians, Franconians, Swabians and Austrians. Dietrich implicitly believed that the German-speaking Swiss areas would eventually become a part of the Alemannic group. Indeed, Dietrich based his state on the Swiss confederational model. Dietrich proposed as the capital of the Alpine Union the Austrian city of Salzburg.

While Bernhard Dietrich and Otto Feger could not agree on many points, they both were active in building up a Swabian-Alemannic Heimatbund that promoted the ideas of a state based on Stamm. Chapters of the Heimatbund were created all over the Southwest. Most of those who joined were academics, elites and people with high levels of education. The Heimatbund called for support from all social groups, though these calls failed to attract less educated ranks. While regional identity was always understood in terms of tradition and history—it no doubt required education and a fair amount of historical knowledge to locate this tradition in the depths of early medieval history. The Schwäbisch-Alemannischen Heimatbund was finally torn
apart by declining cooperation from the French occupiers, who curbed their efforts and forbid them to publish a newspaper. Bernhard Dietrich and Otto Feger also split ways over disagreements on state plans. Dietrich, for one, had a stronger notion of the state being based in Catholicism. Feger eventually said that Dietrich’s plans were chimerical, fantastical, and did not take into account real-world realities. The movement quickly lost steam and collapsed once it became apparent that their plans did not coincide with allied intentions. Future plans for the Southwest had to be reconciled with the fact that Germany would not be split into different autonomous regions—with the western occupying powers eventually opposing the dismemberment of Germany.

Otto Feger’s plan for a state based on Stamm provoked a hostile response from a Freiburger geographer and fellow member of the Alemannic Institute, Friedrich Metz, who drew up his own plan for a new state. Metz plucked up out of obscurity the old Weimar-era plans of the Badenese president for a state of “Rheinschwaben,” which would unify Baden, Württemberg and the Pfalz. (Figure 3) Metz drew state plans with the capital in Stuttgart and four Regierungsbezirke (the borders of which he also justified on the basis of cultural commonality) with district capitals in Mannheim, Sigmaringen, Ludwigsburg and Freiburg. In his plans, Metz claimed to look to the Swiss model, though he held that using a full out Swiss canton system would not make sense in the northern Franconian parts of the state. Metz virulently argued against using the concept of Stamm in state creation. He believed that the boundaries were too unclear and that it did not constitute a unified entity. He pointed, for one, to the lack of clear boundaries between dialect spaces. Metz believed considerations of Stamm in state-building to be dangerous and impractical, insisting that they had not played a decisive role in over 1000 years. Metz also wrote that it was inappropriate to give Stamm an ethnic definition,
since different *Stämme* had mixed, and now only corresponded to linguistic designations.\(^{209}\) Metz held firmly that his Rheinschwaben would not be based on common dialects.\(^{210}\) Neither would it be based on religion. He believed that the even religious division of Rheinschwaben would be one of its great advantages.\(^{211}\)

Unlike Feger, Metz justified Rheinschwaben primarily in terms of geography and not history, and he approached his justification with a highly scientific empiricism and a desire to bring Swabians and Pfälzer into a “larger common Heimat” in which they could work together in rebuilding.\(^{212}\) Metz’s geographical analysis is extensive. He begins with the premise of what he calls a “Swabian-Franconian geography” which constituted a land of gradations that alternated between forest and covered moutainlands and an open basin landscape. He defined the Southwest based on its river systems, claiming that the Southwest was a land of the Rhine, which differentiated it from the Danube landscape of the Southeast—conveniently arguing that, while the Danube began in the Southwest, it did not really begin in a metaphysical sense until Regensburg. The river Main, he believed to be a transition area to the north.\(^{213}\) He also noted common southwestern plant life, and he dedicated a substantial analysis to the different types of fruits that were grown in the area, further noting the Southwest taste for Apple wine as distinguishing.\(^{214}\) Metz then moved from geography to other justifications. He held the Southwest to be an area of active transportation, and that it was defined by small-scale farming.\(^{215}\) Metz also believed that the village character of the Southwest set it apart and left deep traces in the folkish character of the people. He rightly pointed out that the Southwest had many different middle points, which he believed made it inclined toward decentralization, and therefore differentiated from the Bavarian Southeast. Metz also looked at common architectural styles, and even common end fixes that southwestern towns shared, such as “-ingen”, “-hein”, “-kirch”, etc.\(^{216}\) While Metz
proposed clear boundaries for his Heimat state, he did realize that there were degrees of cultural fluidity. He argues, for example, that the areas to the north around Frankfurt, Wiesbaden and Mainz follow similar patterns as the Southwest. He believed, however, that they should not be included in the state, as it represented a center in and of itself and could not be relegated to the periphery of Rheinschwaben.\textsuperscript{217} With regards to the union of Baden, Württemberg and the Pfalz, however, Metz seemed to have a decent amount of support. In a 1948 survey on public opinions in the Southwest, the Institut für Demoskopie in Allensbach 1948 reported that 33\% found a union between Baden, Württemberg and the Pfalz desirable.\textsuperscript{218}

A host of other state plans emerged that were of lesser prominence. The Duke of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen proposed a state that unified Upper Swabia (roughly the southern half of Württemberg), with Hohenzollern and the Southern half of Baden. Such a state would not only be completely Swabian-Alemannic, but it would also be almost exclusively Catholic. (Figure 4) The Duke used common religion as justification for his plans, and pulled back to the historical memory of Anterior Austria as the historical basis of the state. The Duke entertained the notion of the state being within a confederation of southern catholic states.\textsuperscript{219} Another plan, by Manfred Eimer from Strasbourg, pushed for a union of Baden, Württemberg and Bavarian Swabia.\textsuperscript{220} Other state proposals would mix the ideas of previous proposals. Otto Färber was very much attracted by Otto Feger’s notion of \textit{Stamm}, but he was somewhat inclined toward creating two states within the \textit{Stamm} groupings. He preferred the creation of the states of Lower Swabia and an Upper Swabia, which he believed tended more toward Vienna in comparison to its northern neighbors.\textsuperscript{221} This seemed to be sort of a mix of what Feger and the Duke of Hohenzollern proposed, with Upper Swabia leaning toward Catholic Austria, with which it was connected by both history and religion. In another proposal, Count Fritz-Dietlof von der
Schulenburg drew a map in which Baden, Württemberg and Hohenzollern created a state called “Schwaben” with sizable chunks of the Franconian north ripped off and given to Bavaria and a state called Rhein-Main, with small territories of Bavarian Swabia being added to the new Swabian state. Other grew weary of this mania for proposing state borders that did not correspond to their own imaginings. The director of the Freiburg city library wrote that he would always find his sense of belonging in the space between Bern and the north of the Black forest, from Zurich to Lake Constance all the way to the Vosges forest. He opined that the southwest German and Swiss area constituted his Heimat, and that, in his most inner-feelings, he would never internalize any of these other borders as being “natural.” Indeed, there was little precedent of people fashioning their own states according to their geographic perceptions of where Heimat was. In the past, unelected statesmen drew state borders, which later became covered with a romantic patina of history—which would then have the legitimacy to shape public sentiments. Yet, as the Southwest well illustrates, whatever degree of sentiments such states might command, very diverse imaginings of region and Heimat continued to circulate.

The War for the Southwest, 1949-1952

In 1948-1949, the allies began to transfer power to a newly formed West German government in Bonn. The allies issued the so-called Frankfurt documents, the second of which called on the new government to review the borders of the states and ensure that they made sense and did not contain great disparities. For most areas of West Germany, attempts to change the borders would prove difficult. In the southeast, Bavaria had been recreated in its old form, and, with its history of strong particularism, they were not likely to give up any of their territory. In the rest of West Germany, in the states of Schleswig-Holstein, Rheinland-Pfalz, Nordrhein-
Westfalen and Niedersachsen, a state border could not be changed without affecting their neighbors, which could spark a chain reaction, sparking skirmishes over region throughout the entire country. Reinhold Maier gave just such an example, in which, if the Pfalz were taken out of Rheinland-Pfalz, the Southern Rhine areas would seek the recreation of the old Rhine Province. With the Rhenish areas of the north creating such a state, they would leave Westfalen to replace the loss somewhere elsewhere. This would greatly discourage attempts to change state borders outside of the Southwest, and Maier recounts how the very idea of changing state borders struck fear into many state presidents. The city-states of Hamburg and Bremen constituted a notable exception. They virulently defended their right to exist against those who suggested they ought to be swallowed up into the states of Schleswig-Holstein and Niedersachsen. Many of these newly created states in West Germany had grown used to their borders over several years of occupation. With Heimat and regional identity being more creatures of the private sphere, and with the political impracticality of redrawning borders, Heimatler in these areas continued to privately fashion for themselves their own sense of where region and Heimat were, without raising the call to war against the new borders. The impracticality of changing these state borders meant that these discussions of Heimat and regional culture never took place in the way it did in the Southwest. The necessity of redrawning the borders in the Southwest sparked voluminous discussion and debate, and allowed Heimatler in the area to argue that political space and Heimat/regional cultural space ought to align as closely as possible.

With other state formations within Germany beginning to harden, the Southwest became increasingly boxed in. The Swiss and French borders to the south and west were solid and far beyond the scope of the Southwest issue. Unlike other states in Germany, the borders within the Southwest could be changed or completely erased without shifting the borders of neighboring
states. The three states of Württemberg-Baden, South Baden and Württemberg-Hohenzollern awkwardly straddled the old line between the French and American zones drawn according to the freeway. As the president of Württemberg-Baden, Reinhold Maier, recorded in his memoirs, no one believed that the current three-way divisions of the Southwest was acceptable, and all universally agreed that these three states had to be done away with. Plans for the Southwest quickly boiled down to two solutions—either the recreation of the old states of Baden and Württemberg or the creation of a common Southwest state including both. Either way, the tiny state of Hohenzollern around Sigmaringen was slated to be integrated into Württemberg. The states of Baden and Württemberg commanded a considerable amount of loyalty among their people, having existed since Napoleonic times. As shall be illustrated, both states provided political borders that a great many citizens carbon copied in their own minds as they privately conceived of the boundaries of their Heimat--the place where they found belonging, and a geography which represented the borders of a space that Heimatler perceived as culturally unique.

In Article 29, paragraph 1 of the new national constitution, the Bonn government laid out guidelines for redrawing state borders. They wrote:

“Das Bundesgebiet ist unter Berücksichtigung der landsmannschaftlichen Verbundenheit, der geschichtlichen und kulturellen Zusammenhänge, der wirtschaftlichen Zweckmäßigkeit und des sozialen Gefüges durch Bundesgesetz neu zu gliedern. Die Neugliederung soll Länder schaffen, die nach Größe und Leistungsfähigkeit die ihnen obliegenden Aufgaben wirksam erfüllen können.”

Here the politicians in Bonn offered regional statesmen and Heimatler only vague definitions, which could be interpreted very disparately. In addition to cultural considerations, economic and
practical ones also needed to be considered. Furthermore, paragraph three of article 29 stipulated that the residents of a state had to approve of changes made to their borders. The Bonn government later added a new article to the constitution (Article 118) that would allow the governments of the three states of the Southwest to decide on the issue themselves without resorting to a vote. However, since the staunch Badenese partriot and South Badenese president, Leo Wohleb, would not agree to a union, Article 118 stipulated that they would have to vote and that the rules for voting in the Southwest would be regulated by federal law. The fact that the whole population would vote on the Southwest issue forced Heimat and regional identity completely out of the private sphere and into highly publicized political public discussions. An ideal emerged in the Southwest, that where it was politically possible, state boundaries ought to be drawn according to Heimat conceptions and regional cultural. Throughout Germany where it was politically impossible, Heimatler would continue to maintain their own imaginings of region and Heimat, and often relinquish the notion that state borders needed to correspond with their imaginings. Even by 1948, however, this ideal of Heimat and state being the same was an issue that was still being politicized. Statistics by the Allensbach Institut für Demoskopie reported in August 1948, that only 45% of people in the Southwest were aware that discussions were going on about the creation of a Southwest state. They also found that 54% of people in Baden would support the creation of a Southwest state, with 23% against and the rest undecided. The Institut reported that the public opinion on the suggestion to recreate the old states had a very shaky anchoring. The Allensbach Institut also asked Badenese citizens if love of their Badenese Heimat meant that they must be against the union of the states. 40% in South Baden and 33% in North Baden replied “yes” to this question. Two years later the picture would be different once politicians and propaganda began convincing people that the erasure of their state was the death
of their Heimat—or, on the flip side, that if a Napoleonic border were maintained between the two states, then it would cut in two a region that historically and culturally belonged together.

Before these debates, disparate conceptions of Heimat and region floated freely in the private sphere. Politicians began making publicized speeches about Heimat and regional culture, and *Plakatkriege* began raging in which propaganda plastered streets with statements about Heimat and which state ought to be created. Where disparate imaginings floated freely in the past, the new highly-charged public discussion meant that they had to publically define where Heimat was. Identities that were previously privately constructed now were projected onto a political stage, in which a mentality developed that they had to realize their state plans, or face the death or injury of Heimat feeling. The contest between the two plans would mobilize the entire populace of the Southwest in a very heated contest that would be fought out from 1949-1970 in state institutions, in the national Bundestag, in the Federal Constitutional court, and most importantly, on the streets, in newspapers, in postal leaflets and in propagandistic television commercials. Two votes would be conducted in 1951 and 1970, including a public opinion vote (*Volksbefragung*) in 1950, which mirrored the 1951 vote very closely. All of these would, within the context of respective voting rules, uphold the state which would be called Baden-Württemberg. It was not until the 1970 vote, however, that this issue would finally be closed.

Those who, in the years between 1945-1949, had believed in other state plans now had to compromise their visions and support either a common Southwest state or the recreation of the old states. Otto Feger saw the creation of a Southwest state as at least a partial realization of his dreams, though he was unhappy that other areas, such as Bavarian Swabia, would have to remain outside of the state. Nevertheless, he strongly pushed the Southwest state, arguing that it should be called “Schwaben” or “Schwabenland” rather than the emotionally empty name Baden-
Württemberg, as it would come to be named in 1952. One prominent supporter of Feger, Dr. Friedrich Hefele, stated from the very beginning that he supported the creation of an Swabian-Alemannic state, and in case of its failure, would seek the union of the states of Baden and Württemberg, including the northern Franconian areas. While a union of Baden and Württemberg was, for many, a compromise, they still the states as belonging to a common region with a common history. Like Otto Feger, Friedrich Metz also supported the Southwest state, giving numerous speeches in favor of union. He understood the fusion as a step in the direction of Rheinschwaben (needing then only union with the Pfalz), and indeed, the term Southwest state and Rheinschwaben were sometimes used interchangeably. The strong cultural connections between the Pfalz and the Badenese cities of Heidelberg and Mannheim provided a particularly important impulse for union with the Pfalz. The option of including the Pfalz was officially taken off the table in 1956, four years after the creation of Baden-Württemberg, due to the failure of a petition for referendum along with new complicated rules on changing state boundaries.

The debate over the fusion of Baden and Württemberg was highly complicated. It was complicated by the presence of both cultural and economic arguments. Altbadener, (as those who supported the recreation of Baden came to be called) would continually argue that Baden would constitute an economically viable state. Those in favor of fusion brought much more convincing arguments that a Southwest state would represent a more unified economic space and have the added advantage of reducing administration costs. By 1970, history proved them correct. After the fusion, Baden-Württemberg came to be the state with the second lowest level of administration costs per capita and the state with the second largest level of industrial output, only following behind the most populace state in the Federal Republic, Nordrhein-Westfalen.
The economic arguments for a unified Southwest would skew statistics in both directions. Economic considerations certainly won over supporters for the Southwest who were either undecided, or, for whatever reason, were not much taken in by notions of regional identity. On the other hand, the economic arguments for a Southwest state brought the Badenese an unlikely ally in the form of the Communist party. The Communists officially supported the recreation of the state of Baden, because they believed it would be economically less viable—which in turn would theoretically generate more support for the Communists. No doubt this Communist support alienated others who may have been inclined to support the recreation of Baden. Southwest supporters sought to capitalize on this by using a red-scare tactic in posters and leaflets. (Figure 5)

Regional culture, common history and Heimat, all played a more central in the debate than economics. This cultural debate had several facets, but it centered around two polarities. One argued that the borders of the old Napoleonic states did not represent culturally descriptive borders. They artificially cut the Swabian-Alemannic Stamm in two and mixed other Stämme and disparate dialect groups within the same states. By unifying the Southwest, they would ameliorate this separation and remove the bothersome Napoleonic borders. This was well illustrated by a political cartoon in the Stuttgarter Zeitung in 1950, in which a group of voters held up ballots with the word “Southwest state” to a Napoleon who is being catapulted out of the picture. The caption argues that those in the Southwest should prove that they are in control of their future and, in so doing, send Napoleon to the devil. (Figure 6) The pro-Badenese camp mostly rejected the notion that the South Badenese belonged to the same Stamm as the Swabians. Those few who recognized that they did historically belonged to the same Stamm argued that the concept of Stamm did not have the power to be the maker or breaker of region and Heimat. They
argued that the state borders of Baden represented a culturally distinct unit that made them a unique people. Not restoring these borders, they believed, put their uniqueness in grave jeopardy.

Even if the Germanic political tribal borders disappeared several hundreds of years ago, the concept of *Stamm* still retained much power among experts of folk and regional cultures in describing where certain cultural spaces lied. In the 19th century, the father of *Volkskunde*, Wilhelm Heinrich Riehl argued in his *Natural History of the German People* that ethnic traits were “sharply etched in the various German tribes”.

Shortly after the end of World War II, the Berlin geographer Albrecht Haushofer created plans for redrawing the entire map of Germany strictly according to *Stamm*. In the Southwest, his map looks similar to Feger’s, with the Swabian-Alemannic state stretching form the Rhine to the Lech, with the capital in Ulm.

Those who saw *Stamm* as important believed that regional cultural similarities based on the concept still existed, but that consciousness of these similarities had been repressed by modern dynastic states.

Academic figures agreed far more on the nature and geographic borders of the Swabian-Alemannic *Stamm* than the laymen. With over 700 years having passed since the end of the *Stamms Herzogtum Schwaben*, great misconceptions flourished about *Stamm*. The primary misconception revolved around the fact that the *Stamm* had two names—*Alemannen* and *Schwaben*. Many in the dynastic states of Baden and Württemberg had come to equate *Alemannen* with Baden and *Schwaben* with Württemberg, and believed that they were different *Stämme*. Part of this no doubt originated in the fact that “Schwäbisch” was the name designating the subdialect within the Swabian-Alemannic language group that predominated in Württemberg. The fact that the Badenese city of Pforzheim shared this sub-dialect no doubt explains why it
very strongly supported the Southwest state in the 1951 vote. (Figures 8 and 14) In their respective works, Otto Feger and Friedrich Metz, both members of the Alemannische Institut, condemned this misperception about *Stamm* and its assumed correlations with the two dynastic states. Feger, with a wide background knowledge on the subject, held with regards to the names *Alemannen* and *Schwaben* that “linguistically and culturally, the groups are the same.”

Metz argued that for 1000 years the two terms had meant the same thing. He traced the misunderstanding back to the 19th century, and was particularly ruffled by how the equation of *Alemannen* with Badenese also completely marginalized the presence of Franconian populations in the north. This is important to note, as the Franconians had a different dialect, as well as different traditions and festivals. Only one example is the different way in which they celebrate carnival.

Different theories have circulated on why there were two names for one *Stamm*. Ulrich Maier has written that *Schwaben* is merely an older term than *Alemannen*. Another explanation was presented on the floor of the Bundestag in 1951. The president of Württemberg-Hohenzollern and one of the primary proponents of the state fusion, Gebhard Müller, cited a 9th-century Abbot who said “Die Alemannen oder Schwaben sind zwei Namen für ein Volk. Alemannen nennen uns die benachbarten Völker welche lateinisch reden; Schwaben nennen uns die Nichtlateiner.” He held that this explained why those in Baden, closer to Latin areas, came to take on the name *Alemannen* for themselves, and those further east in Württemberg came to be called *Schwaben*. This explanation, however, begs the question where the Latin term “Sueve” originates, which also frequently appears as a Latin term for Swabian. Whatever the explanation, it was no doubt on the basis of belonging to a common *Stamm* that President Müller would argue that Baden and Württemberg shared a history that reached back 800,900 or even 1000 years.
Whatever academics had to say about *Stamm*, the broad public did not give way. In his *Erinnerungen*, Theodor Eschenburg called the topic a “tragi-comic” point of contention which the South Badenese men and women argued with “burning fervor”. In a memorial piece written after the death of the South Badenese president and the Archbadenese patriot Leo Wohleb, Hermann Kopf felt it necessary to clarify where the *Alemannische Raum* was when he praised Wohleb’s “Alemannic” humanism. He argued that the *Alemannische Raum* was bordered by the three-city triangle Strausbourg-Basel-Freiburg.\(^{244}\) This area was nearly six or seven times smaller than what Otto Feger, Bernhard Dietrich or Friedrich Metz would identify as the *Alemannische Raum*. Kopf’s suggested area roughly corresponds to an upper Rhenish sub-dialect within the Swabian-Alemannic language group. (Figures 8 and 9) These lingual borders, however, are incredibly fuzzy, with linguists themselves not completely agreeing on subdialect borders. None of these figures who equated the Alemannic *Stamm* with Baden were true academic historians. Paul-Ludwig Weinacht, a professional historian of Badenese origin whose writings are colored with Badenese pride, admitted that the Badenese did not represent a *Stamm*, but were rather, a dynastic-political grouping.\(^{245}\) Other Badenese patriot historians, like Prof. Dr. K.S. Bader, who wrote for the Heimatbund Badenerland, simply argued that *Stamm* was too fuzzy of a concept to be of use, and that those who did so were in a fantasy world. He declared that their culture was not Alemannic but Badenese.\(^{246}\) Among the general public, misconceptions about the meaning of *Schwaben* and *Alemannen* remained for a considerable time. Shortly before the 1970 revote, Dr. Paul Steiner of Ulm would write a perturbed letter to the editor on the issue of *Stamm* in the *Südwestpresse*. Wielding an encyclopedia excerpt that said the *Schwaben* and *Alemannen* were identical and that state boundaries were not borders of art, *Stamm*, dialect, custom or Tracht, Dr. Steiner decried the misconceptions of the “South Badenese Swabians.” He criticized them for
not taking joy in being unified with their Stamm-brothers, preferring rather to make a “geographically impossible Napoleon-state” with the north Badenese Franconians.247

The question of whether the Badenese had descriptive cultural differences that made them collectively unique (and different from those directly outside its borders), is a question that cannot be avoided. It is also a difficult question, given that stated Badenese commonalities were never about concrete traditions–but rather about grandiose subjective statements. Nevertheless, between 1815-1870, it was an independent state within the German confederation until it became a part of a unified Germany after the Franco-Prussian war. From 1870 to 1933, it was its own state, and from 1933 to 1945, its own Gau. From 1815-1870, it is clear that the Badenese began to identify themselves as “Badenese.” This in itself is an integrative feat, since the old Medieval state of Baden had a population of 90,000, with the additions brought by Napoleon, suddenly becoming a state of 900,000.248 In the late nineteenth century, however, over 50 years after the state enlargements, Wilhelm Heinrich Riehl labeled the states of the Southwest as “accidental states” that were created by Napoleon and the Congress of Vienna. Riehl wrote:

“In forming these states the diplomats proceeded like the plastic surgeon who cuts out a shred of skin from the forehead and uses it to construct a new nose. It became apparent, however, that plastic surgeons can meddle with God’s handiwork more successfully than plastic diplomats are able to do with history.”

Many in the postwar certainly agreed with these sentiments, including Friedrich Metz who claimed there was no such thing as a “Badenese Volk”.249 The president of Württemberg-Hohenzollern, Gebhard Müller, called the state of Baden a “Geburtsfehler”,250 while, on the floor of the Bundesstag, Representative August Euler declared “There is no Badenese Volk, there is a German Volk! The Badenese Volk is its own invention!”251 The very elongated shape of
Baden left it open to criticism by people who would claim that, along its snake like path from the Odenwald all the way down to Lake Constance, it cut “Badenese” out of groups across the thinner end of the border who were more culturally similar to the localities immediately to the east of its elongated borders. As Friedrich Metz argued, those in the far north of Baden in, say Mannheim, had a much different mentality than those in the South of Baden, in Freiburg for example. Furthermore, they share more in common with other groups just across the Badenese border. He argued that even the most extreme Badenese patriot would not be able to argue that those in the far north of Baden around the Tauber had more in common with those around Lake Constance, than both groups would have with their neighbors across the border in the Franconian or Lake Constance parts of Württemberg.\footnote{252} In short, while the political borders shaped how people identified themselves, from the point of view of Volkskunde, these borders had either very limited or no descriptive powers. Indeed, the Southwest seems to be distinguished not by borders, but by fluidity of regional culture, with very gradual shifts. This is illustrated in the Swabian-Alemannic dialect space itself. (Figure 9) A map of the glosses of certain Alemannic dialect properties reveals that one of the only firm borders exists between Bavarian Swabia and Bavaria along the river Lech, and in the north. A few lines converge over the Black Forest, and north of Lake Constance–making it appear more as a unified subdialect space, even though political borders split up the Lake Constance area between Baden and Württemberg. Most of these dialect lines, however, seem to criss-cross randomly throughout the Southwest.

Perhaps one of the most curious recurring element of Badenese definition of what their state was about was Badenese commonality being represented as a collection of local diversity. The Heimatbund Badenerland often stylized Baden in this way. Paul-Ludwig Weinacht has likewise seen the diversity of Baden as defining it, by bringing together three different religions,
and two different *Stämme*, Alemannics and Franconians, as well as the history of old Baden, Anterior Austria, the Kurpfalz, and many imperial cities, etc. Representative Kopf of Freiburg would also make the argument that the Badenese Heimat and state feeling were based on what he believed were four different *Stämme* (Schwaben, Alemannen, Franken and Pfälzer). The problem with claiming diversity as commonality is that it could be done with almost any territory. Interestingly enough, we see this justification of commonality through diversity arise in justification for other Heimat states that the Badenese themselves opposed. Metz would claim the very same thing for his idea of Rheinschwaben, saying that it would represent “Unity in Vielgestaltigkeit” that was rooted in geography and historical forces. This can be seen yet again after the creation of the state of Baden-Württemberg. The German president, Theodor Heuss, a native of Württemberg, insisted that a strong point of the state would not be its singularity, but rather its mixing of different groups.

There is another intriguing, and related trend in which local traditions within Baden were called “Badenese” even though they were not shared by the majority of the Badenese. There was an unmistakable phenomenon in which “Badenese” came to be a cognitive container and site of projection for these local traditions. Local identity was often very strongly tied to a regional one. The head Badenese patriot, Leo Wohleb, for example, dubbed himself, not a Badenese, but a Freiburger “Boppele.” The Southern Badenese excelled as seeing Baden as simply a projection their sub-region, as illustrated by equating Alemannic with Badenese–conveniently forgetting about the northern Franconian areas. This is reflected in the creation of the constitution for the state of South Baden—a state which they simply called Baden. In the preamble of their constitution, the South Badenese wrote that those in the South of Baden were the “Trustees of the Badenese tradition.” This had the capacity to irritate other groups within
Baden—even if they also saw themselves as Badenese. In his Erinnerungen, Reinhold Maier recalled how, during a meeting over the Southwest, he heard Justice Minister Fecht from South Baden speaking about the South of the state as being the “Badenese heartland of a land of tradition.” This provoked the immediate, somewhat irritated reaction of a group of Badenese from Karlsruhe. In a sense, these regional borders became a cognitive container for local traditions. In pro-Badenese propaganda, posters would appeal to local identities and while labeling them as Badenese. The Black Forest posters are but one example. They portrayed Black Forest Trachten, and the female Bollenhut, which by no means belonged to a shared Badenese tradition. Rather, it was native only to a small valley in a small part of Black Forest. Nonetheless, it was understood as Badenese, even in Southwest state propaganda. (Figure 10 and 11) Propaganda also played off of the region/locality relationship, with the Pro-Badenese camp claiming that those in Württemberg would be loyal only to their own localities. This is illustrated by the highly representative pro-Southwest state poster arguing that “Mannem” (Mannheim in local dialect), would be thrust forward in the Southwest state. The Badenese response was that Stuttgart would be put forward, and that “Mannem” would be left in the dust. (Figures 12 and 13) Pandering to local identities was a reoccurring motif in the arguments of the pro-Badenese camp, and it certainly resonated with some. Hubert Baum wrote a veritable ode to the Badenese president Leo Wohleb, when he strategically gave Baum’s native Sulzburg the full rights of a city. The Badenese would also use scare tactics in their attempts to solidify the bond between local and regional identity. In Konstanz, for example, they would make the argument that the Württemberger would make the city into a suburb of the bordering Württemberg cities on Lake Constance.

The votes on the Southwest issue reveals that the state of Baden as a Heimat state had
appeal throughout its entire boundaries. (Figure 14) The protestant city of Pforzheim, with its Swabian sub-dialect and with 25% of its population being born in Württemberg was a notable exception.\textsuperscript{261} Regions throughout Württemberg, however, approved the state overwhelmingly, with a stable percentage of around 90%. The areas of the old state of Hohenzollern would also vote overwhelmingly in favor of the Southwest state—as they were to lose their state either way, and no doubt were just as eager to jettison their historical connections with Prussia. There are a number of reasons, however, why Württemberg supported the state and the Badenese did not. Among other things, the Württemberger would constitute the majority by a ratio of 3 to 2, and they would also retain their capital in Stuttgart. Furthermore, there was no voice in high government on the Württemberg side to rally opponents. Without having to share the same fears as the Badenese, they must also have been more open to the idea that they shared a common culture in which the Württemberger were larger in numbers. Without as many cultural objections, superior economic arguments of those in favor of the Southwest state must also have become even more persuasive. Even the most virulent Pro-Badenese would argue not that Baden would be better economically, and only asserted that the state would be economically “viable.”

Nevertheless, one should not underestimate the opposition of Württemberger. In spite of being larger in numbers, being able to keep their capital, having solid economic arguments presented for a Southwest state, and all politicians at the top supporting the fusion, around 90,000 voters in Württemberg still wanted absolutely nothing to do with the Badenese.\textsuperscript{262}

While the votes on Baden show that “Badenese” as identity had an appeal all over Baden, significant variation between localities is apparent. There are many confounding factors involved, but much of this indicates that certain local identities were more tied to a Badenese regional identities than were others. The areas that voted most strongly for Baden centered
around the areas around Baden-Baden in approximately the middle of the state, whose support for fusion was below 20%. The Alemannic speaking Southern areas of Baden, with the exception of the Lake Constance area, mostly voted in the high 30% and low 40% range. Another area of low support for the Southwest state is the areas around Karlsruhe, with only 31.9% of the city voting for fusion with Württemberg. While larger cities typically favored the Southwest state, Karlsruhe, a city built as a Badenese capital, no doubt suffered a great blow to both their regional identity and the defining characteristic of their local identity with the creation of the Southwest state. After the creation of Baden-Württemberg, the Karlsruher would lick their wounds by looking to the newly founded Federal Constitutional Court founded in their city. They stopped calling themselves “the Residence City” and began calling themselves “the Residence of Law.”

Even Freiburg, which had been a huge hotbed of anti-Württemberg sentiments voted more highly in favor than Karlsruhe. There are several reasons why those in the cities may have voted more strongly in favor of the Southwest state. Firstly, Heimat attachment has historically commanded stronger loyalty in the countryside than in the cities. Because of this, many in the cities were likely won over by the Southwest states economic arguments—as all of the large cities had suffered incredible bombing raids and were concerned about the economics of rebuilding. It is also important to note, that those in the cities were far less likely to be natives to the area than residents in the countryside. Looking at the statistics from Konstanz, the city and its environs commanded a majority for the Southwest state, but a comparison of the inner city votes and countryside reveal that the margin in the country was much more narrow. Nevertheless, both favored the Southwest state.

It is very noticeable that the Franconian areas of the north, the Pfälzer areas around the Heidelberg and Mannheim, and the Badenese Lake Constance area all had much lower levels of
support for Baden than the rest of the state. Without an extensive study of these localities, it is impossible to figure out all of the reasons for this. The fact that Heidelberg and Mannheim are both urban cities no doubt played a role—though the Franconian areas to the Northeast certainly were not urban. Nor was the Bodensee heavily populated. Perhaps those in the Kurpfalz also thought the unification of Baden and Württemberg would be the first step that would lead to future unification with the rest of the Pfalz to the north. This dream, however, would die with the introduction of technical state drawing rules in 1956. The northern areas were also more protestant, with the state of Baden being 2/3rd catholic compared to one roughly balanced religiously. Surprisingly, religious arguments for Baden were almost completely absent, excepting an incident with the Archbishop of Freiburg breaking the church’s neutrality on the issue. For complicated reasons, there were also more *Heimatvertriebene* in North Baden, who voted in large numbers for the Southwest state. What all of these areas had in common, however, was that they had all been fringe areas that were not considered to be at the “heart” of Baden. Baden cut the Kurpfalz off from the rest of the Pfalz to the north, and Lake Constance area was cut in half by the state border with Württemberg. In his book proposing a Swabian-Alemannic democracy, Feger argued that Baden and the men in Karlsruhe, with all of their “centralist” tendencies, had unrightly treated Lake Constance as a fringe area. Those Swabian-Alemannics like Feger would not see Lake Constance as the fringe, but as the blue eye at the center of Alemannia. Some in Baden also supposedly saw the Franconian areas of the north as being “Hinterland.” Karl Heinz Neser argues that Karlsruhe treated these areas “step-motherly” and that some came to call it “Badenese Siberia.” Within North Baden, only 3 of 15 Kreise commanded a majority for the state of Baden. These alleged local prejudices of the state were not overt, and certainly others in these areas saw their local identity as being inseparably tied to
their Badenese regional one. Whatever variations between localities in Baden, with the exception of Pforzheim, the line that separates Baden and Württemberg in terms of voting patterns is sharply etched on the voting map. Significantly there is no clear trend that those closer to the border of Württemberg were more inclined to vote for the Southwest. In September 1950, an informational vote Volksbefragung was held in the three interim states, which would closely mirror the votes in 1951. In the vote, Württemberg-Hohenzollern and North Württemberg voted 93.5% and 92.5% in favor of the Southwest state respectively. North Baden voted 57.4% in favor of the Southwest state, with South Baden voting only 40.4% in favor. Within the total area of Baden, the vote was 49.1%—.9% short of being in favor of the Southwest state. Within the total area of the Southwest state, 70.2% voted in favor of the state.\textsuperscript{268} The results of this vote led to a major argument in the Bundestag over how votes would be counted when the Southwest issue was officially voted upon in December 1951. The major questioned centered around which regional territorial entities had a claim to sovereignty. Should votes be counted within all of Baden, or within different districts of Baden. Was it appropriate to force North Baden to be in a recreated Baden, simply because there was a large majority in the South which overturned their majority for the Southwest state? Was it right that South Baden should be part of the new Southwest state even though it voted in large numbers against it? Article 118 of the Bonner Constitution gave the Bundestag the power to make the decision of how the vote would be counted. The Badenese wanted a vote in Württemberg and Baden, with both needing to approve to create the Southwest state. If it was declined, the old states would be created. However, the Tübinger draft of the voting law passed through the Bundestag in Bonn. This law, passed in May 1951, outlined that the voting was to take place in four districts–South Baden, North Baden, Württemberg-Hohenzollern and North Württemberg. Approval of the
Southwest state in 3 of the 4 would lead to the creation of the Southwest state. Furthermore, those allowed to vote had to be at least 21 years of age, and have lived in the state for at least 3 months. The Badenese drafts of the laws had included much higher residency requirements, as they wanted to disenfranchise the *Heimatvertriebene*, who voted primarily for the Southwest state. In December of 1951 in the binding vote, in North Baden, they voted 57.1% in favor of the state compared to 57.4% the year before. North Württemberg and Württemberg-Hohenzollern voted 93.5% and 91.4% respectively in favor of the Southwest state. South Baden declined slightly to 37.8% for the Southwest state.

In all of Baden, 47.8% voted for the Southwest state, meaning that the voting rules were crucial in deciding the outcome of the election. This would provoke “holy anger” from Badenese patriots. The vote was complicated by many intertwined variables. The results, however, show that the appeal of the Napoleonic state of Baden commanded greater sentiment than the Southwest state. Economic arguments, no doubt won over supporters who were not native to the region—or those who were not attracted by regional identity. The Communist support of the Badenese, in contrast, likely offset itself by alienating yet other voters. In spite of the economic aspect, most arguments for a Southwest state had been made in terms of common history and common culture.

In terms of regional North-South voting differences, there are a number of reasons why North Baden voted 20% higher for the Southwest state than South Baden. The claimed “stepmotherly” treatment of these areas in the state may have played a role—but there were other reasons. For complicated reasons, North Baden had far more *Heimatvertriebene* than South Baden. The difference of Franconian *Stamm* may also have played a role. Furthermore, unlike South Baden, North Baden had already spent five years in a common state with the North
Württemberger. Also, the pro-Badenese propagandist leaders, like Leo Wohleb, centered in South Baden—and particularly around the city of Freiburg. Another factor, is that the North of Baden is more heavily protestant than the south. Religion was seldom mentioned in propaganda over the issue, and almost never appeared in speeches—though perhaps this was because they did not want to alienate protestant voters. Confessionalization went into a slight period of decline after World War II, with Catholic political parties being replaced by CDU/CSU, which brought the different confessions together. Some, however, associated Catholicism with Baden—having a population that was 2/3rds Catholic (Baden-Württemberg would come close to religious parity). The Archbishop of Freiburg created upset when he preached in favor of the state of Baden, in spite of the Freudenstadt agreements, which assured the neutrality of the church in the debates.\textsuperscript{271}

A look at the voting map and religious distribution seems to indicate that religion played a role, though not a determining one. (Figures 4 and 14) In the areas of the far north east around the Odenwald, with a higher percent of Catholics, voting for the Southwest state only reached the low 50% range. In the neighboring Southern Franconian areas of Mosbach and Sinsheim, where there were more Protestants, they approved the Southwest state in the high 70 range. In Lörrach and Säckingen, neighboring protestant and catholic Kreise, they voted 45.9% and 29.3% respectively. In other areas, religion contradicts with voting patterns for Baden—including the entire Lake Constance area, heavily Catholic, yet going decisively for the Southwest state. The catholic Kreis of Villingen also went for the Southwest state by 10% more than any of its Badenese neighbors. Many years after the state merger, Villingen itself would willingly form a dual city with the neighboring Württemberg city, Schwenningen, creating Villingen-Schwenningen.

With the creation of the Southwest state in 1952, the new Landtag voted to call the new
state Baden-Württemberg, as opposed to the names of Schwaben, Alemannia, Großschwaben or Rheinschwaben. This was a clear concession to the Badenese, whom the Southwestler did not want to further agitate. The new symbols of the state mixed those from both Baden and Württemberg, with the crest of the state mixing the Badenese Griffin with the Württemberg stag between a shield of Stauffer lions. Above those are six shield that represented Franconia, Anterior Austria, the Pfalz, Baden, Hohenzollern, and Württemberg—appealing to all of these local territorial traditions. Reinhold Maier became the first president of the new state, and refused to allow anyone into his ruling coalition who did not support the Southwest state. This would create great bitterness among many in the CDU who had fought for Altbaden.

Despite the loss of the election, the question remains why Baden so clearly commanded loyalty among the hearts of so many who lived within its Napoleonic borders. Indeed, it is difficult to scientifically assess the Badenese claims to particularity where they made broad claims about themselves. If we believe the observant father of Volkskunde, Wilhelm Heinrich Riehl, Baden was an artificial state that had been created by untalented politicians who were playing the game of “plastic surgeon.” Nevertheless, these Napoleonic borders would be used by people as a source of “information”—information about their identity, regional relationships, and who belonged to their imagined Heimat community. It also became a source of incorrect information. In the minds of some, it incorrectly became a line which designated a Badenese-Alemannic Stamm, a line that represented linguistic borders, or any host of other things. Some authors even wrote books on “Badenese” flora, which the geographer Metz held to be utterly ridiculous. Metz would likewise heap ridicule on Heimat atlases which made the Baden/Württemberg border into a lingual border, or those who would try to make the Badenese border into something that somehow went back into early history—with, for example, early
modern historical figures around Lake Constance suddenly being called “Badenese.” Some would mix this historical and linguistic confusion and speak of a “urbadische sprache” (primordially Badenese dialect). The Badenese border in no way represented a dialect border, and whatever one wanted to label Badenese, it was historically impossible to call it primordial. The long north to south spread of the Badenese state meant that it covered areas which spoke, Franconian dialects, as well as the sub-alemannic dialects Schwäbisch, Oberrhein Alemannisch, Southern Alemannisch, and Bodensee Alemannisch. Furthermore, none of these dialects or subdialects were contained entirely by Baden’s borders. (Figures 7 and 8) Badenese Heimatler, like Reinhold Grund, would often conveniently “forget” that the borders of Baden were Napoleonic and patriotically declare that Badenese history went back to the 11th century. This is true only by the technicality that the Napoleonic state was made by increasing the medieval state by ten times its size. The Heimatbund Badenerland would take a different strategy, by saying that it was not really Napoleon, but the Rhine which had made the state.

Indeed, it makes sense that the Badenese Heimatler would use these borders as a source of information about regional relationships. The academic Karl Steinbruch, in a short article, has presented the idea that Heimat is about an “informational necessity.” While not writing about borders, he argues that the local and regional view of Heimat allows people to disarm the complexity of real world relationships by looking at their more familiar regional ones. He argues that human consciousness is not capable of grasping the complexity of its world surroundings, but people must constantly act and behave. This is what he calls in informational insufficiency of human beings. Heimat, Steinbruch argues, provides a tool to simplify the world and render it harmless. In Baden, the conceived borders of their regional “Badenese” Heimat also served this function of rendering harmless incredibly complex real world relationships, which reflected
itself in understandings of “Badenese” regional culture. There is something psychologically mystifying and seductive about a border. Its seems they need only acquire a thin patina of history to gain power and legitimacy. Indeed, one wonders if the three interim states of the Southwest had been kept, if today there would be such a thing as a Württemberg-Hohenzollener or Württemberg-Badener. Even with the border having been drawn by the Karlsruhe-Ulm freeway, and the state only existing for five years, the president of Württemberg-Hohenzollern, Gebhard Müller wrote of his “old beloved, no-longer-existing Württemberg-Hohenzollern.” In rhyme he wrote “Was vergangen, kehrt nicht wieder, aber ging es leuchtend nieder, leuchtet’s lange noch zurück.” Reinhold Maier argued that the freeway border between the states was essentially the same thing as the “crazy” Napoleonic border drawing between Baden and Württemberg, which perpetuated the “irrational and inconceivable” sentiment for Baden. Yet, for many, these borders were a powerful tool, and arguments that they were artificial had a destabilizing influence on the way Badenese patriots perceived their place within their regional worlds. These borders provided a means of categorization and generalization according to space, no matter how inappropriate such generalization might have appeared to the scholar of culture and tradition. It was partly for this reason that the Badenese saw the disappearance of their borders as the death of Baden and the death of Heimat. Karl H. Neumeyer wrote, “Baden’s identity was to dissolve completely into the Southwest state, the yellow-red-yellow banners were to be taken in.” Leo Wohleb insisted that the plan for a Southwest state represented not a fusion but an erasure. The Finance Minister of Württemberg-Baden, native to Baden, would be in the minority when he expressed his astonishment that all of the Badenese patriots behaved as though Badenese peculiarities would disappear with the state borders—as though their “values of mind and spirit were in danger.” This notion of the death of Heimat would be reflected in propaganda posters.
One Pro-Badenese poster appealing to the *Heimatvertriebene* (Germans from the east who lost their home in eastern territories), declared “*Heimatvertriebene* you will eat with us from the same bowl! Vote for Baden!” This had a double meaning. It appears not only to be an invitation that *Heimatvertriebene* would be welcome at the Badenese table. It also meant that they were both faced with the same bitter pill of losing their Heimat—and that their vote for the Southwest state would force the Badenese to share in their miserable fate. (Figure 15) The *Heimatvertriebene*, however, must not have been convinced by such arguments and voted in large numbers for the Southwest state. No doubt the failed Badenese efforts to bar them from voting on the issue did not help their cause.

**Imagining Region and Heimat**

In the debates over Heimat and region in the Southwest, the most striking feature is how imaginings of these entities proved to be so tremendously disparate, fluid and diffuse. This disparity must be explained. The fact that this disparateness was revealed in public discussion has its roots in the unique political situation of the Southwest. Indeed, no other states in Germany had such virulent discussions about Heimat and region—even if many of them, like North-Rhine Westphalia, were patently artificial creations with no basis in regional culture. Outside of the Southwest, functionally viable states had already been created throughout West Germany, with the allies agreeing that the awkward constellation in the Southwest ought to be left to the new German government.284 The political situation in the Southwest was certainly unique and played a key role in exposing these disparate imaginings in public discussion. I would argue, however, that the disparateness of imaginings of region is best explained by the unique way in which region and Heimat are imagined more generally. This process is very
imaging the nation (at least in the modern period) is done very much within the public sphere, with its extensive discourses. The bureaucratic machinery of modern nations require precise demarcation of territory, and these demarcations become powerful borders that are the basis of all legislation, taxation systems, military complexes, social systems, etc. National laws of citizenship regulate who does and does not have certain rights within a given territory. Nations go to war, maintain embassies in foreign capitals, and promote images of themselves throughout the world. Indeed, national borders mark out spheres of incredible power. These factors constantly psychologically reaffirm the borders in the minds of its citizens, and has the power to shape descriptive cultural differences. Regional states also have their prerogatives and legislative bodies, but their power and authority are incredibly muted and not as capable of shaping descriptive cultural difference–nor do they generate the same extensive discourses that involves self-definition. The question of who does and does not belong to the national community is also something which often takes its cues from national spheres of power. National political actions and political debates often make both discreet and sometime not so discreet statements about who belongs and who does not. The power of these borders mean that they come to represent the hegemonic cognitive maps of individuals as they imagine national space.

Heimat was different in that it was an entity of the private sphere. The famous German author Hermann Hesse, from the Southwest, insisted that, for him, Heimat was never something political. Though from the Württemberg city of Calw, he certainly did not see himself as a Württemberger, as he opined that, for him, Heimat was on both sides of the Upper Rhine. In imagining region and Heimat, individuals had greater sovereignty to subjectively fashion for themselves their own definition of where Heimat was and what it was about. Regional state
borders, while they may, over time provide a powerful statement about where region and Heimat were, they remained far more porous than national borders. Being in the private sphere, disparate understandings of Heimat were allowed to float freely. Understandings of nation, by contrast, are constantly brought into discourses in the realms of power—and when difference of understanding emerges, conflicts of definition almost always manifests itself within the public sphere. In contrast to public discussion about understandings of nation, public discussion of Heimat was more minimal. The public sphere aspect of nation always revealed disparity of definition, which is largely the reason why definition of nation is often so highly contested. Despite being contested, this meant that understandings of nation and national space also always had an impulse toward consensus of definition. In contrast, Heimatler had a greater ability to decide for themselves where Heimat was, based on whatever factors they privileged, such as dynastic state borders, Stamm (or a misperception of Stamm), religion, lingual spaces, geography, etc. Individuals used these criteria as they made most sense to them subjectively. Indeed, it was no coincidence that a “historian by inclination” like Otto Feger would turn to ancient history, or that a geographer like Friedrich Metz would mostly ignore history and look at geography in his definition of where Heimat lied. It was also not a coincidence that they both found a following among educated segments of society. When the Southwest issue was thrust into the public sphere in the years after World War II, understandings were revealed to be so disparate that everyone appeared to be speaking a different language. A political cartoon in the Südwest deutsches Echo provides but one illustration of this phenomenon. (Figure 16) A woman looking through a magnifying glass engraved with the word “reason” could not seem to make sense of the miniaturized Leo Wohlb who is, no doubt, touting the glories of Baden. In all of these discussions, no argument about where Heimat was seemed to be above the charge of being
absurd, irrational, ahistorical, artificial or inorganic. However, while geographic definitions of where Heimat lied was highly disparate, the question of what Heimat values were about was an area where definitions seemed much more similar—even though they were defined within disparately defined geographical frameworks. It is to this discussion that I would now like to turn.

**Denazification through Deprussianization**

In 1945, the allies separated Germany into four national zones of occupation and began a process of denazification. Only in the French zone, the policy was not originally called “denazification” but “deprussianization” (déprussianisation culturelle). Many in the French camp held that it was not right to throw all the Germans into one pot, and believed that the differences in culture in the west and south of the country (the area which made up the majority of what became West Germany) ought to be recognized. In 1945, Charles de Gaulle gave a speech in which he argued that if the states on the Rhine wanted to spiritually belong to the west, then they had to turn away from the thought of a “Prussian-oriented Germany.” In appealing to the regional identities of the Germans closest to their border, the French merely pursued their own national interest. However, the idea that regions could be powerful sites from which to recreate a new Germany based on healthy (and assumingly non-Prussian) traditions, was a notion shared by nearly all Heimatler in the Southwest--whatever geographical state arrangement they supported. Many, however, would argue that it was only their vision of region that could contribute to this process of redefining and rebuilding the nation from the bottom up. In view of common beliefs that Heimat and region were narrow in vision, it is astonishing how much these Heimatler saw their region as playing a part in the goal of building a new unified, peaceful and
federal European Union. Here I would like to return to some of these regional Heimat debates from 1945-1952, and look at how they saw region building and Heimat within national and continental contexts.

The Heimatler and local patriot who couched his argument most in terms of anti-Prussianess was the Konstanzer archivist Otto Feger. He argued that, throughout history, while a “culture” formed in the Southwest, the Prussians busily pressed their subjects into a machine in which the individual became an object. He traced their violation of human rights from Friedrich the Great, who he believed forged the Prussian spirit. Feger insisted that Germany needed to turn away from the Prussian “Staatsgeist” of imperialism. To argue for his autonomous Swabian-Alemannic democracy, he held that larger states themselves have a tendency toward militarism. Feger believed that moving to the smaller world of the region was a movement away from the notion that the greatness of a people is found in battle. Feger saw the Nazis as carrying the banner of this Prussian militarist tradition. He held that the Nazis had “majorized” the South and the West of Germany where he claimed support for the Nazis had been weaker. Feger praised what he saw as the opposition of most Southwestern intellectuals to Nazism. Further he held that Nazis had very little interest in Heimat and that Heimatvereine became focal points of those who did not see eye to eye with the Nazis. Feger saw the Swabian-Alemannic tradition as distinctly different from the Prussian one. He looked back to the old monarchial houses that came from the Southwest, and noted how “European” they were in outlook. Feger bragged about how those in the south revered “Kleinstaaterei” (petty statism), which reigned in the regions golden times. While the Prussians created a military and bureaucracy, the Southwesterners built cathedrals and palaces—and while the Prussians obeyed, the Swabians had a history of revolt against authority that went back to the early modern period. He pointed to the Southwest tradition of radical
liberals, such as those in Baden in 1848, and those from the Southwest who fought with the Austrians against the Prussian “war machine” in 1866. Swabian figures who had compromised themselves by working with the Prussians, such as Kiderlin, in Fegers mind were not real Swabians, and had becoming throughly “hohenzollerized.” Feger insisted that the new Swabian-Alemannic state must be deeply rooted in the “1500 year old” tradition of democracy that they supposedly shared. As such, government forms in the new Swabian-Alemannic state were to be made so that participation of people in the legislative processed could be maximized. Furthermore, law would be simplified so that it could be understood by the laymen. Feger also planned for a strong intra-state federalism with a weak center. It was for this reason that Feger refused to propose Stuttgart as the capital, preferring a smaller city like Rottweil. For Feger, this all amounted to a process of democratization from below, and importantly, not from above. Feger’s state would also have no ministry of war. The charm of having autonomous regions, in his mind, was that regions did not entertain military ambitions and did not wage offensive wars. Feger asked facetiously whether they would be suspect of wanting to conquer part of Bavaria or a canton of Switzerland as Lebensraum? Regional autonomy ensured that their regional democratic traditions would no longer be taken over by eastern autocrats who wanted to march off and conquer Poland. Their Swabian Heimat was understood by Feger to be the basis of democracy–and it was for this reason that he believed teaching Heimat history and Heimatkunde made up the foundation the of democratic Erziehungspolitik. Feger insisted that looking back to regional traditions was not a narrowing of horizons, but rather a broadening of them. It was a cutting away of a great tumor and returning to the simple and the healthy. This healthy entity would then play a role in the project to create a peaceful and unified Europe and reduce the strength of national borders. He even mentioned the need to do away with passport controls and
the introduction of a common currency throughout Europe. He believed that the fall of such
borders would release incredible amounts of energy.\textsuperscript{294} It is indeed, quite interesting that Feger
would focus so much on European unification in a book dedicated to regional autonomy.

While Feger called for an autonomous state, he held firmly that his actions would help
revive a nation that would be imbibed with new positive values. In his plans, the Southwest was
to remain an “essential appendage on the body of the German spirit.”\textsuperscript{295} His plans for a Swabian-
Alemannic democracy could not be copied elsewhere in Germany, because he did not believe
that others shared their same traditions. However, he encouraged people in other regions to also
look to their own regional traditions in the process of building up a healthy nation. Feger wrote:
“The Southwest could possibly point the way for the rest of Germany. Why shouldn’t Bavaria,
the Rhineland, and Lower Saxony not also develop equally healthy political and economic
entities.” He believed that if these regions also based their states on their own regional natures
and temperaments, then Germany would be free from the harmful ambitions entertained by a
great power.\textsuperscript{296}

Similar themes of national healing and Pan-Europeanism coming from region and Heimat
are mirrored in Bernhard Dietrich’s plan for an Alpine Union, and in Friedrich Metz’s plan for a
Rheinschwaben state within Germany. Dietrich, like Feger, clearly saw his plan as a seed of a
greater European confederation. Indeed, he tried to create a Pan-European party called the
“European republican-democratic-social-evolutionary party” though this effort failed.
Nevertheless, he remained a committed European.\textsuperscript{297} Metz, who opposed the notion of a state
based on \textit{Stamm}, agreed with Feger that a democratic, decentralized and organic state needed to
be built from the bottom upwards. It was for this reason that Metz drew up state plans that would
include four \textit{Bezirksregierungen} and 94 Kreise. Metz argued that, because the Southwest was
rooted in diversity, decentralization was imperative. The state of Rheinschwaben, he held, was
not simply a state for itself, but rather he saw it as something that would be a lasting corner stone
in the organic foundation of Germany.

In the conflicts over the proposed fusion of Baden and Württemberg, the voluminous
debates are filled with claims that one state configuration would be better able to participate in
the spiritual rebuilding of the nation and be more able to infuse the nation with modern and
democratic values. The Southwest state supporter, Theodor Eschenburg, wrote that the question
of the Southwest state or the old states was nothing less than a question of maintaining a
“pseudo-democratic authoritarian regime or the recreation of a real democracy.” Eschenburg
held that the Southwest issue was so important, that he turned down a call to national politics so
that he could involve himself in the plans. The first president of Germany and supporter of the
Southwest, Theodor Heuss, argued in his book Schwaben that in regards to Heimat, it is a
wonder that it is called “narrow.” He believed that out of Heimat grew a spiritual life that knows
the “greatest of scales.” This attitude that smaller entities were privileged sites of spiritually
nourishing the nation appear fairly common in the years after the war. It figured into both
Badenese and Southwest state propaganda. In their posters, the Arbeitsgemeinschaften cleverly
portrayed the black-red Württemberg and yellow-red-yellow Badenese flag mixing together to
create a German flag. (Figures 17 & 18) Also of interest is how the Southwest state supporters
fashioned the Baden and Württemberg fusion as “step one” in the creation of a unified Europe.
One poster asked—Unified Europe? First step, Southwest state! The ascending European man
appears to stumble in the gap between the two beams of red-black and yellow-red-yellow.
(Figure 19) This European rhetoric would be picked up again in the 1970 revote over Baden.
Advertisements for the state in the Südwest Presse stylized the state of Baden-Württemberg as
being in the center of a new Europe, and that it was a state open to all of Europe. Next to these appeared economic arguments, and assertions that the state of Baden-Württemberg was a state with many localities that retained their tradition and were not ruled by a metropol.\(^{303}\)

The Badenese also fashioned arguments for the recreation of their state in terms of its role in the nation and in a new unified Europe. Leo Wohleb, who largely acted as the mouthpiece for the Altbaden movement, is of central importance here. He was both a Badenese patriot and a convinced European. The president of Rhineland-Pfalz, Peter Altmeier, said that anyone who knew Leo Wohleb, knew how deeply rooted he was in his Heimat, and how his Heimat, in turn, gave him the energy to look into broader horizons of the value and goal of a unified Europe.\(^{304}\)

Pierre Pène called him “Un patriote badois, un Européen”, and praised him for his simultaneous European and local political involvement.\(^{305}\) André François-Poncet, in a speech at Wohleb’s funeral seconded these sentiments, calling him a “firey advocate of the European Union,” fighter for Old Baden, and a convinced supporter of French-German reconciliation.\(^{306}\) Wohleb condemned the Prussian values of glorifying power, the idealization of war and the idolization of the state, which took history down a fatal course. Wohleb believed that the right sort of federalism, based on “organic” states, could also be a barrier to the future dehumanization of individuals.\(^{307}\) (187-188) In a speech in 1948, he said:

> “Der Wiederaufbau Deutschlands ist nicht nur eine Frage der Finanzen und der Wirtschaft, er ist auch eine Frage eines echten warmherzigen, in der Heimat verwurzelten Patriotismus, und die Liebe zur badischen, zur bayerischen oder zur württembergischen Heimat bildet den besten Nährboden für eine Liebe zu dem gesamtdeutschen Vaterland und zu dem unverbrüchlichen Eintreten für die Einheit Deutschlands.”\(^{308}\)

Further into the speech he discusses the plans for a European federation. He insisted that such a Europe had to be founded on true federalist principles, in which individual states had equal rights
and were free from centralist powers. He went on to say that this principle for European federalism should also be the principle for German federalism and that a German federal state could be a model for a future European Union. The state of Baden, he argued, would also be better at maintaining positive relations with France and Switzerland, and play a key role in the French-German reconciliation. His fellow Badenese patriot, K.H. Neumeyer argued that Baden was better suited for this, because it was a natural part of an Upper Rhine region with the French Alsace.

Wohleb believed firmly that the only way to rebuild Germany was by holding together upon that “small bit of land” that they shared, and to rebuild within the small circle of the Badenese Heimat. Wohleb said that, while the Badenese continue to think in terms of the entire German people, there must be no doubt of the strength of their federalism. This theme of Baden being a pillar of healthy and organic federalism proliferated in pro-Baden speeches. By holding true to the idea of Baden, the pro-Badenese saw themselves as holding onto a tradition of democracy. On the flip side, Wohleb and the Badenese patriots believed that the loss of Baden would be to lose the liberal Badenese voice and “Klangfarbe” in the nation. In a sense, it was thus both Heimat and national patriotic sentiments that drove them. With the eventual loss of Baden, the Badenese patriots claimed that a sickness had infected Germany that threatened democracy. Wohleb called this sickness “Morbus Badensis.” that infected Germany with the creation of the state Baden-Württemberg. It had not just infected the Southwest, he argued, but the entire German nation. He said those who argued the state was there to stay were like doctors who believed the disease should be tolerated. Wohleb held that the only way for the sickness to be healed was to restore the state of Baden. He urged the Badenese not to listen to the “disharmonious siren screeches” of the Southwest state, and to refuse the fruit that they offered
which would make them forget their Heimat. He called those offering salvation in the form of
the Southwest state “false prophets.”\footnote{314} This idea of the Badenese sickness would be picked up
by other Badenese patriots. In a speech by Paul Fleig of the CDU in the same year, he declared
that the state of Baden-Württemberg could not flourish because its roots were infected. He
argued that the best doctor could do nothing, because the Badenese sickness had spread
throughout the entire body. Fleig believed this to be a tremendous blow to democracy.\footnote{315} For
these men, Heimat was not just about localities and regions, it was about a democratic modern
value system-- and the perceived destruction of their Heimat values was the cause of their “holy
anger.”\footnote{316} In looking at how Heimat was fashioned to be a source of denazified values, it is
almost as revealing to see how they stylized those who they believed to be the enemies of their
visions for a Heimat state. Whether on a conscious or subconscious level, Heimatler in the
Southwest stylized those who opposed their vision of region, as Nazi-like figures themselves. I
argue that this is not a coincidence, and is psychologically connected with how they saw their
own vision of region as being a pillar of denazified traditions.

\textbf{Rapists, Nazis, Murderers and Imperialists}

The labels of imperialist, irredentist, tyrant, rapist, murderer, crazy and finally Nazi were
all used by Heimatler in the Southwest to describe those who threatened their goal to make their
vision of Heimat state a reality. These accusations were not one-sided, but were hurled in all
directions by all parties involved. For the Badenese, this took the form of a mass anti-Swabian or
anti-Württemberg campaign. In his memoirs, a lower level bureaucrat in a ministry of Baden-
Württemberg recalled that if the posters, essays and brochures of the pro-Badenese were to be
believed, than the Swabians would be frightful horrific figures, “mean, devious, egoists through
and through, robots without hearts or spirit “who were plundering Baden.” A cursory glimpse at some of the pro-Badenese political cartoons and posters reveals the way that the Badenese made Württemberger into villains. One such representative cartoon appeared on a postcard, which appeared many times in different newspaper as a political cartoon that depicted a “Southwest state” house. (Figure 20) Here, the tyrannical Württemberger in his black-red cap “greets” the cheerful Badenese girl in her yellow-red-yellow dress, who is about to move into the house. On the door is hangs a sign that informs Badener that they must ring twice. The tyrant orders her up into the attic and hands her the long list of “forbiddens.” Another Badenese poster depicts the Württemberger as land-grabbing imperialists and centralists. (Figures 21) Though it is only implied, the heartless machine-like Württembergers seem to take on those Prussian characteristics so reviled by Heimatler in the Southwest. Another political cartoon depicted Württemberg as a tyrannical ape-like wife who, clearly well-fed, stood across from her meager husband to whom she has just delivered a serious thrashing with a blunt object concealed behind her back. (Figure 22) Vicious jokes about evil Swabians began to circulate among Badenese patriots. Reinhold Maier recalled Leo Wohleb frequently making highly offensive anti-Swabian jokes at meetings of state officials. Maier also recalled rumors among the Badenese over Württemberg imperialism and centralism, and all sorts of nasty Swabian centralist plans. One cartoon would propagate the idea of Stuttgart imperialism by portraying the Swabian metropolis as a sea-monster who uses its slithery tenticals to suck the energy from Baden’s cities. (Figure 23) Such images grew and became more extreme. In one case, a group of Pro-Badenese made implications that Pro-Southwest forces had either murdered a Pro-Badenese supporter in the government or at least driven him to suicide. The Finance Minister of North Baden in the state of Württemberg-Baden, Dr. Otto Nikolaus had openly proclaimed his support for the recreation
of Baden. Suffering from a nervous breakdown, he eventually slit his own throat. Some Badenese held the pro-Southwest forces responsible. One obituary for Dr. Nikolaus wrote that, in his weak emotional condition, he stood across from a strong institution of powerful Southwest-supporting Stuttgarter. It continued, that, had the minister not officially supported the recreation of Baden, he would still be alive. The obituary further argued that citizens in South Baden ought to pay attention to such occurrences when they considered which side to vote for.320

The most prominent charge against the Württemberger by the Badenese was that they had raped their region. The analogy of a democratic region being raped by a tyrannical and imperialist neighbor was not new. The same analogy had been made by Otto Feger when he described how the Nazis from the north had raped the Southwest and taken away its democratic institutions.321 The Badenese use of the metaphor bares a striking resemblance, depicting liberal Baden being raped by their neighbors who would extinguish their liberal voice in the German nation. The analogy was not isolated and was made frequently in both formal and informal settings. One official statement by Pro-Badenese groups decried that they had been raped by the federal law on southwest voting districts passed in Bonn and drafted by the government of Württemberg-Hohenzollern.322 Leo Wohleb referred to rape on the floor of the Bundestag323 and it even appeared in appeals made by the pro-Baden camp to the Federal Constitutional Court.324 The Southwest state supporter Representative Fritz Erler of the SPD retorted to these cries about the rape of Baden that, indeed, there was a risk of a metaphorical rape of sorts. He argued, however, it was not states that were at risk of being raped, but the people within them whose sovereignty was being denied them. Erler argued, however, that it was more a risk of South Baden raping and overturning the will of the people of North Baden.325

The Southwest supporters would respond to Badenese charges of rape by calling them
“irredentists” who wanted to reconquer the Franconian areas of the north and keep for themselves the Lake Constance areas of the Southeast—both of which preferred a union with the Southwest state. Representative Richard Freudenberg of the FDP, himself a born native of Weinheim in the far North of Baden, argued in the Bundestag that the areas of Pforzheim, Heidelberg, Mannheim and the Franconian Bauland would not tolerate “Badenese Irredenta,” and would not be forced against their will into a state based on votes cast in the South.\textsuperscript{326} In his anonymous pamphlet \textit{Baden 1945-1951 was nicht in der Zeitung steht}, Theodor Eschenburg wrote that Leo Wohleb wanted to annex North Baden and make it subservient to South Baden. This would essentially break up the state of Württemberg-Baden when both sections of the state had voted for union.\textsuperscript{327} With the continued effort of the Altbadener and the Heimatbund Badenerland after the 1952 fusion, Prof. Dr. Waldemar Besson of Konstanz criticized Badenese irredentism by writing in a CDU magazine that the restoration of Baden, for Mannheimer, Pforzheimer, Tauberbischofsheimer, etc. would mean the victory of the law of Napoleon over that of local self-determination.\textsuperscript{328}

In the minds of some who supported the Southwest state, not only were the Badenese nasty irrendenstist who wanted to reconquer old territories, they also resorted to Nazi-like tactics in their attempts to do so. Rumors began circulating that the South Badenese had taken control of the post and were intercepting letters of the pro-Southwest \textit{Arbeitsgemeinschaften}. The South Badenese government was supposedly man-handling Southwest state supporters in the government. It was alleged that telephones in South Badenese ministries were being tapped and that the Altbadener were censoring the press.\textsuperscript{329} Prominent political Altbadener, such as Paul Zürcher, were said to be police state figures, who was caught up in authoritarian modes of thinking, and insinuations were continually made that the Altbadener used Nazi-like tactics.\textsuperscript{330}
Theodor Eschenbug, who reported many of these rumors, accused Zürcher and Wohleb of conspiracies to conquer the state of Hohenzollern for themselves. He compared them to Hitler and Stalin, who wished to annex territories against their will, and referred to Wohleb’s ideology as “Leo fascism.” Another Southwest state supporter made a direct comparison between Leo Wohleb and Hitler. Of course no one mentioned that Wohleb was never a member of the Nazi party, and had suffered setbacks and intimidation during the Third Reich. Pro-Badenese would strike back with their own cries about the “Nazi” Southwest state supporters. One Pro-Badenese representative shouted “à la Hitler” in the Bundestag at a pro-Southwest state supporter from the SPD, while Badenese supporters compared the new constitution of Baden-Württemberg with Hitler’s Ermächtigungsgesetz. One professor compared the fusion of Baden and Württemberg to the Anchluss of Austria in the 1930's. An article in the Herbolzheimer Rundschau compared what he called “pan-Swabian expansionary impulses” and drew a parallel between their expansion to the Soviet Union grasping for satellite states.

There is a clear link between the way Heimatler stylized their opponents, and what they believed their Heimat was about. With each believing their regional tradition was about modern values like tolerance and democracy, those who they perceived as threatening their region suddenly became stylized as irredentists, land-grabbers, imperialists, abusive tyrants, fiends of democracy, Prussian monsters, centralists, Nazis, etc. Regional and local orientedness had become, for many Heimatler, a bearer of a new set of values in which emphasis on local and regional worlds kept grand national ambitions in check. As such, regions became a privileged site from which to cope with the national and European challenges of dealing with the aftermath of the Third Reich. Thus it is easy to see how Heimatler, would subconsciously project on their opponents the image of a Nazi—the very thing they believed their cherished region to be standing
against. For Heimat to play its role in healing the nation, as K.S. Baden argued, they believed that states must be created which had a “soul.” Denazified regional Heimat values, not only helped the nation and the region, it also leant the individual an entity on which they could build a positive identity. For Germans in the postwar years, this was tremendously important.

The denazified values of Region and Heimat

By turning back to a system that emphasized regional fragmentation, one could argue that regionalists were, whether consciously or unconsciously, pulling on a German tradition that went back to the Holy Roman Empire. Indeed, the academic John Gagliardo has argued that the Holy Roman Empire should not be seen as an inadequate nation state, but rather a system with an intentionally weak center based on fragmentation. He argues that the Holy Roman Empire was a “living guardian of a set of fundamental values.” This value was Kleinstaaterei, in which power was dispersed among its regional states rather than centralized. Peter Blickle, in his work Obedient Germans? has also emphasized regional and local traditions of regional parliaments and uprisings in the early modern German tradition. Otto Feger certainly believed that the Holy Roman Empire represented such a value system. He argued that the old Imperial tradition gave different Gauen and Stämmen have their political freedom, which, he held, was inconceivable to present day centralists. He argued that it was an empire of European format. Feger wrote that it was the line of Prussians from Friedrich the Great to Bismarck who were in reality the enemies of the Imperial idea.

It is dangerous, however, to talk about traditions as though they were something that were ever present and a constant moving force. Traditions were subject to a constant process of renegotiation. Even if there was a bit truth to a given claim that a certain postwar value could be
rooted in regional history, the intention of Heimatler was to take those ‘traditions’ and emphasize them as strongly as possible. All Heimatler in the Southwest, for example, whatever their vision of state, would claim for their region a long tradition of democracy. Both Badener and Württemberger would make this claim, as Feger did for the entire Swabian-Alemannic *Stamm*. Friedrich Metz included the Pfalz in this tradition, meaning the entire area of “Rheinschwaben,” in his mind, had a democratic tradition. In fact, these were not unfounded claims, and the German Southwest did have a significant history of liberalism and democracy. The academic Hans Fenske has certainly illustrated this in his work *Der liberale Südwesten*. The point is not that these regional patriots fabricated histories. Historically, one can certainly illustrate that the Southwest had more democratic colorings. But where these trends may have been noted and recognized in previous times, in the postwar, these histories became powerful assets for Heimatler to guard, propagate, publicize and even exaggerate. They went from being a part of their history to becoming a core part of their conscious identity.

Local patriots like Otto Feger could look back to the Southwestern peasant rebellions in the early modern period, and disregard that the same area also saw the most violent and brutal witch hunts. One early Modern observer, Johannes Cochlaeus, not surprisingly, does not mention Swabian democracy in his description of the Swabians. Rather, he mentions how they donned the garb of war just as well as they donned the garb of peace. In the 19th century, the poet Justinius Kerner would also not praise them in terms of “democracy” but rather, in terms of the 19th century values of Swabian “Stammestugend” of “Biedersinn” and “loyalty to sovereign.” In a parallel move to that of Otto Feger, Badenese patriots in the postwar would point to their old democratic constitution, their role in the Revolution of 1848 and Badenese prominence in the Weimar Republic, while conveniently forgetting that the Badenese voting
averages for the Nazis exceeded the average throughout Germany in three of the four elections between 1930 and 1933. In short, “traditions” were a mixed bag. Those histories and “traditions” which harmonized with modern values were to be emphasized and internalized. For those that did not, it was not necessary to pluck them out of the obscurity of regional history and claim them as traditions which defined their region and Heimat. I suspect that this is a trend in definitions of region throughout Germany in the postwar.

Given how flexible the Heimat concept historically was, it is not surprising that it became the basis of highly generalized claims to certain regional values. Democracy was only one on a long list of traits that Heimatler in the Southwest used to describe as being among their traditional traits. Carlo Schmid, for example, praised Gebhard Müller for having the treasured Swabian values of intelligence, responsibility, hard work and tolerance, among other virtues. The president of Württemberg-Baden and first president of Baden-Württemberg, Reinhold Maier, believed that the Swabians had a “cosmopolitan” global outlook that came from their “Uralten Geisteserbes” (primordial spiritual inheritance). Otto Feger made the same argument about Swabians having cosmopolitanism (Weltöffentlichkeit). He wrote that it was the historic mission of Swabiandom to teach this cosmopolitanism to all of the German people. Friedrich Metz, on the other hand, believed that his Rheinschwaben, which mixed together different Stämme, would bring a combination of qualities that included things such as flexibility, a soft will, light-heartedness and also cosmopolitanism. The Badenese were just as inclined to describe themselves in terms of such general post-1945 values. Leo Wohleb said that the Badenese people were a people of tolerance, toleration, and balance (Duldung, Toleranz und Ausgleich). The Badenese patriot Hermann Kopf praised Leo Wohleb for his Badenese spirit of compromise and empathy–both of which he said were oriented toward justice.
Köhler argued that the Badenese were “cosmopolitan, tolerant, human and liberal”\textsuperscript{351} Other qualities proscribed as being Badenese were “open-minded progressivism,” and “readiness for revolutionary change,” among others.\textsuperscript{352} K.S. Bader claimed as Badenese Gemeingut liberalism, tolerance and open-mindedness.\textsuperscript{353} Reinhold Schneider stylized Baden as a hall on the Rhine with all of its windows open to the world.\textsuperscript{354} Regional identity, where ever one saw their cultural region as being, was flexible enough to contain very extensive and sweepingly general value statements. Just as the private sphere allowed one to see Heimat as being almost anywhere, it also allowed individuals to make it be about nearly any values that they wanted. While Heimatler couched their claims in terms of tradition, they were simultaneously participating in a discreet process of redefinition and renegotiation of what tradition meant. Such definition and stylization of their regions must be seen within the context of the emergence of a new postwar denazified value system.

**The Close of the Southwest Question**

By 1970, the Southwest question ended with a vote in the state of Baden with over 80\% of the Badenese confirming the Southwest state. In 1956, the Federal Constitutional Court in Karlsruhe had ruled on an appeal from the Heimatbund Badenerland that the will of the Badenese had been “over-played,” in 1951, and that a revote must be held in Baden.\textsuperscript{355} The fourteen year delay, resulting from Bonn not passing a law facilitating the vote, caused great anger among Pro-Badenese, who saw behind this delay a cabal of nasty Swabian tricksters. The reasons the Badenese voted in such high numbers to confirm the Southwest state are incredibly complex, and an adequate analysis cannot be offered here. Several factors may have played a role. Between 1952 and 1970, Germans began to move more than ever before with the so-called
Wirtschaftswunder, and where previously any proposed state had to be built from scratch after World War II, by 1970, those in the old areas of Baden were faced with the laborious task of building up a new state from nothing or keeping the successful system that was already in place. The reality of the Cold War may also have altered attitudes about nation and the role of regions and localities in federalist decentralizing processes.

Everyone had a different interpretation of what the vote in Baden meant. Some claimed it meant they had a common Heimat feeling had developed and that the state of Baden-Württemberg had entered the peoples’ consciousness. Others claimed it was a decline of Heimat feeling, while others merely claimed that it meant the Badenese Heimatler had come to grips with living in the state. The Badenese patriot Hermann Person said in 1970, “we live today as upright Badenese without a complex, in Baden-Württemberg.” Perhaps it was merely a decline of the postwar mania in the Southwest that the borders of Heimat and regional culture had to be identical with those of state. The borders of Baden-Württemberg seem to have acquired somewhat of a patina of history—at least enough to make the borders a basis of generalization. Where some had previously written about Badenese “language” or “flora,” many recent historical tomes began to trace the history of the area of Baden-Württemberg back to the stone age—as though the modern state presented the best framework for such histories. The coming of new generations has begun to blur the memory of the old states—as did a 1970 Kreisreform which meant that the old Badenese border could no longer be deciphered by the division of these administrative districts. There was a general understanding that it was death of the old and birth of the young that would heal the old wounds in the state left by 1951. Statistical reports by the Allensbach Institut reported that the support of the Altbadener declined steadily throughout the 1950's, and that time was against their cause. The confusion about whether there was or was
not a strong Badenese identity after 1970, or whether the state of Baden-Württemberg had become firmly rooted in consciousness, all seems to be indicative that disparate imaginings of region continued to float freely in the private sphere.

The events in the German Southwest from 1945-1970 were certainly unique. All other states had their boundaries drawn by the occupiers, and the debate over regional culture never emerged to produce a large public discourse on the issue. I would argue, however, that the phenomenon of redefining the meaning of region and Heimat according to new values in the postwar, was not unique—rather it was a subtle renegotiation of Heimat values that occurred in many other regions in West Germany. With several centuries of regional traditions and histories, regions could look back to those aspects which seemed most denazified and internalize them as part of their Heimat identity. It was as Heimatler and regionalists, and not as nationalists, that they believed they could build up a healthy nation and peaceful Europe. So for the regionalists in the Southwest, Heimat came to be about democracy, while in places like Bavaria and the Rhineland, it came to be about histories of federalism or inclinations toward tolerance. For those Heimatvertriebene from the east who had lost their homes, Heimat became an inalienable human right. The call of “der Heimat die Treue” was thus not only about Schwarzwaldtrachten, local building styles and dialects. It was also about a belief among postwar Heimatler that loyalty to local and regional places and traditions could provide a healthy foundation for a deprussianized and denazified nation.
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Südwestpresse

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[Eschenburg, Theodor?]. Baden 1945-1951 was nicht in der Zeitung Steht. Darmstadt, Germany: Friedrich Vorwerk Verlag, 1951.


**Secondary Sources**


FIGURES
Figure 1. Map of Württemberg, Baden and Hohenzollern (1819), including the medieval borders of the Stammesherzogtum Schwaben. (Source: Hans Schadek, *50 Jahre Baden-Württemberg: Badens Mitgift*. 2002., p.472)
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Figure 23. Political Cartoon against Stuttgarter centralism (Source: Crivellari; Klöcker; Oelze & Rügert, p.76)
ENDNOTES
1. Carnival or Karneval has many names—often depending on region or context. Often referred to as Fastnacht, Fastenabend, Fasnet (Swabia), or Fasching (Bavaria), the term “Karneval” is the standard term used in Cologne. Additionally, in local Colognian dialect, Karneval is referred to as “Fasteloovend” or, somewhat less frequently, “Fasteleer.”


5. The Eidbuch notes that the city will no longer finance carnival celebrations using public funds. The nature of this entry obviously illustrates that carnival had been celebrated in previous years.


8. Carnival in Cologne and the Rhineland is set apart by the fact that it is central to their local and regional identities, in a way that they are not in the other places where it is celebrated. It should be expected that this very fact should change the dynamics in terms of how its meaning evolves.

9. These 40 days of fasting prior to Easter exclude sundays, which are not included in the calculation of the date of carnival.


12. Ibid, pp.18.


14. A Gaffel is an institution that is unique to Cologne. Up until the guild system was done away with by the French, the city of Cologne required that all of its citizens belong to guilds. Those who belonged to professions that did not have guilds had to become members of a Gaffel. Gaffeln are often considered to have mobilized all Colognian burghers to participate in the public affairs of the city. See, Klaus Militzer “Gaffeln, Ämter, Zünfte: Handwerker und Handel vor 600 Jahren” in *Jahrbuch des Kölnischen Geschichtsvereins*, 1996, vol.67, pp.41-59.

15. Elaine Glovka Spencer. “Regimenting Relevry: Rhenish Carnival in the Early Nineteenth...
16. The concept of “kölische Boor” (Kölner Bauer), harkens back to the Holy Roman Empire and Cologne’s earlier status as an imperial free city. Throughout the 19th century, and even into the modern period, the notion of Kölsche Boor has been a revered idea of citizenship and rights to public participation within the community. The Jungfrau, a female figure, has traditionally been depicted by a man in drag. Held Karneval, the leading figure of the triumverate, became “Prinz Karneval” after national unification in 1870.


21. James M. Brophy. “Carnival and Citizenship: the Politics of Carnival Culture in the Prussian Rhineland, 1823-1848.” Journal of Social History, Vol.30, No.4, (Summer, 1997), pp.879. Büttenreden are given during the “Sitzung” phase of carnival. The Thursday (Weiberfastnacht), Friday, Saturday, Monday (Rosenmontag) and Tuesday (Veilchendienstag) prior to Ash Wednesday are considered the time of the street carnival. Sitzung carnival takes place in the weeks before this, and involve “Prunksitzungen” conducted indoors and organized by different carnival societies. These carnival sessions involve theatrics, stage humors, singing, dancing and the aforementioned acerbic wit of “Büttenreden.” These forms have remained continuous throughout the 19th and 20th centuries.

22. Schwedt in Matheus, pp.68.

23. Brophy, pp.877-880, 883. Brophy also notes the collection of donations for the poor at carnival celebrations of the wealthier classes through admission fees. This could be seen as both leveling and reinforcing class boundaries. Furthermore, Brophy notes an equality within carnival societies themselves, tearing down social boundaries within them.


27. Brophy, pp.881.

28. Spencer “Regimenting Revelry”, pp.471-473. Spencer notes the role of carnival in both
regional Rhenish identity and local city identities, as well as the civic rivalries between Rhenish cities that operates parallel within the region. This playful carnivalistic rivalry between Rheinish cities still exists in contemporary carnival, particularly between Cologne and Düsseldorf, whose rivalry has proven endless stock for local Volkshumor.

31. Rheinisches Bildarchiv, 104261.
35. Keim, pp. 87- 100.
37. Ibid, pp.211.
40. Brog pp.221, 227-230.
41. Keim, pp.190, 201-209.
42. Brog, pp.244.
43. Liessem, Kamelle und Mimosen, pp.28-33.
44. Thomas Liessem. Hauptreferat des Präsidenten des B.D.K. Thomas Liessem anläßlich der III. Haupttagung am 14. Oktober 1956 im Gürzenich zu Köln. (Köl: Bund Deutscher Karneval, E.V. Vereinigung zur Pflege fastnachtlicher Bräuche, 1956) pp.5-7. The Bund Deutscher Karneval, after the war maintained as one its primary goals the maintenance and not homogenization of regional and local carnival traditions. The Nazis attempted to weld local traditions together—in part by creating new traditions. One example, is illustrated by a controversial festival introduced by the Nazis in Köln Karneval and München Fasching, in which personifications of both,
Münchner Kindl and Kölscher Jung, were wed at both festivals. Brog, pp.224.


51. Ibid, pp.44.


53. The figure of the Tanzmariechen was based on the female figures who historically accompanied military camps. This fit into the army metaphor of the carnival society—all of whose traditional costumes drew back on the army uniforms of the Colognian guard during the 18th century under the Holy Roman Empire, while Cologne still retained its status as a free imperial city. Rather than fighting wars, they understood themselves to be fighting a war against “grumblers” and “curmudgeondom”.


63. Ibid, pp.11-12.


65. Amtenbrink, 8. 1938 III. Pg.341 - February 3, 1938. “Um den Deutschen Gruß”


67. “Wenn ich esu an ming Heimat denke...Ich mööch zo Foß noh Kölle jon.” in Louis, pp.87-89. Given the chorus of the song, it was particularly appropriate for Colognians who were streaming back into their city on foot.

68. If nothing else, this is illustrated by the sheer size of postwar carnival celebrations. In 1952, seven years after Cologne had been completely destroyed and depopulated, the Rosenmontag parade had an estimated 1.8 million visitors, with 50 tons of chocolate being thrown in the parade. Kölnische Rundschau, “50 Tonnen Kamellen”, February 27, 1952.


70. Karl Berbuer, “Es Kölle widder do!” in Louis, pp.78.

71. Louis, pp.69.


73. These uniforms, introduced in the 19th century reform of carnival, are replicas of the Colognian Imperial uniform from the 18th century before the abolition of the Holy Roman Empire. Many different carnival societies use the same uniform, but with their society’s colors.


75. The term *Kölscher Klüngel* is most always considered in a positive light, though in some
circumstances has been seen as having a facet of corruption.


77. Louis (introduction), pp.10.

78. Heinz Kroh’s 1929 drawing of Colognian carnival children harassing a police officer, for example, would imply that challenging authority was not an incidental, but rather something that Colognians actively celebrated. (See Figure 9)

79. The figure of Tünnes is clearly favored by Colognians as a the preferred half of their character—the carnivalistic half. Even today, Colognians on the left banks of the Rhine often teasingly refer to the Deutz quarter on the right side of the Rhine as “Schäl Sick”, or in other terms, the “wrong” side of the Rhine. A monument to both fictional figures has been built in Cologne that still stands outside of the Hänneschen Theater.


81. Zöller & Prass, pp.95.


83. Klersch, *Die Kölnische Fastnacht von ihren Anfängen bis zur Gegenwart.* pp.84.


85. *Kölnische Rundschau*, 13 May 1948 - “Dom oder Hohenzollernbrücke”


87. Brog, *D’r Zoch küt*, pp.89, 185 - 189, 194-197. Brog also notes as a Prussian influence the existence of carnival Korps with presidents who head them. In regards to the Blaue Funken, she points out that they have a uniform resembling the former Prussian Dragon regiment of Ansbach-Bayreuth. Blaue funken definitely had a stronger strain of patriotism. Certainly the Nazi perceived at least a danger of parody in these uniforms. The party thus forbid carnival uniforms that distinguish between military rank—a rule that was reversed in 1950.


90. Brog, *D’r Zoch küt*, pp.179.


94. Kölsche Funke rut-wieß. *Uns Leederheff*. Köln: Selbstverlag der Roten Funken, 2004. pp. 4. Hölzerne Knabüss are the fake wooden rifles held by the members of the Rote Funken while in uniform. The Stippeföttche is a comic dance that is specific to the carnival society, die Rote Funken. In this historic dance, the Funken twirl their Knabüss and, back-to-back, mutually rub their posteriors against each other in an orderly fashion.


96. Louis, pp.87-89.


99. This postwar process of magnifying certain traditions, minimizing others and creating new claims to certain traditions is not at all peculiar to Heimat-identity in Cologne. Rather, I would argue that this process occurred all throughout regions and localities in Western Germany during this period. This is reflective of Heimat notions more generally, to accommodate the emergence of new value systems.


103. In *Heimatkunde* a particular problem exist in the fuzziness between sources that could be classified as either primary or secondary sources. Keim was a professional historian, though simultaneously a carnivalist whose work on carnival embodies the prejudices and modes of thinking of his time here considered. With Joseph Klersch, a non-academic, the treatment of his works as sources is less troublesome. The works of the 1950's Bonn Art Historian, Heinrich Lützeler have likewise been considered as primary sources, given his obvious prejudice and
representation of the mentalities of the time, and the distance of the subject from his area of expertise.

104.Keim, pp.7-13,152,237. As is often the case with works in Heimatkunde, Keim’s work is difficult to categorize as either a primary or secondary source. While having an academic background and having done thorough academic research, the very basis of his work is reflective of the general historical trends regarding the injection of new value claims into Heimat-identities in which I am interested in examining.

105.Ibid, pp.13-14,30, 37.


111. Brog. pp. 7-12,82, 91-113. Brog also argues that carnival has democratic colorings.


113.Kölschrock has been a popular genre among all age groups. There has been a tremendous number of such rock bands, which sing in Rhenish dialect, though only the most prominent are known outside of the Rhineland.

114.Keim, pp.227.


117. Kölnische Rundschau, February 26, 1960


120.Zöller & Prass, pp.147.

122. Kölnische Rundschau, February 12, 1953 “Wieverfastelovend als Startsignal”
Weiberfastnacht (Weiverfastelovend in Colognian dialect), occurs on carnival Thursday, which marks the move from Sitzung carnival to street carnival. In Cologne, it is marked with a speech of the Dreigestirn at the Cologne Rathaus. The day is set aside for the celebration of women, who cut off men’s ties—the phallic symbol of male power. In the 19th century, this consisted instead of ripping off their bonnets—the symbol of their female servitude.

123. Kölnische Rundschau, January 29, 1956 “Kölns eingeborenen bleiben klar in der Mehrheit”
126. Mazerath, pp. 11-12, 23.
128. In the March 5, 1933 election, 33.1% voted for the NSDAP compared to 43.9% Germany wide. Nevertheless, many historians have decried to over-interpretation of such election results. Adenauer was noted for his hostility to the Nazis while mayor of Cologne—refusing to shake the hand of the party representative, having Swastikas removed, even after Hitler had become Reichskanzler, etc. Klein, pp. 64-68.
130. Brog, pp. 249.
132. The idea of “Cologne in major and minor keys” was openly understood as the major key representing the happiness of carnival and the minor key, the mourning and melancholy of the lingering effects of the war.
133. Liessem Kamelle und Mimosen, pp. 78. "krieschen" or “kreeschen” is the equivalent of weinen in Colognian dialect.
135. The head of the Rote Funken in 1948 claims that “Rosenmontag” comes from the word “Rasen” and not from the flower of the rose. Yet, this explanation is brought into question by the fact that carnival Tuesday in many Rhenish cities is called “Veilchen Dienstag” and that roses, among other things, are thrown during the Rosenmontag parade. Hamacher pp. 32.


140. Ibid, pp.51-62, 71-75.

141. The frequent use of the term “carnival season” is a bit misleading. After the day of November 11th, no carnival festivities are held until late January or early February, depending on the exact date of Ash Wednesday in any given year.


144. Ibid, pp.313-328.


146. Mezger argues, for example, that Moser incorrectly argued that the six days of carnival celebration, from carnival Thursday to carnival Tuesday, mirrored the six days of the creation. Mezger argued in this case, that it was merely economic considerations that led to this development. Ibid, pp.323, 486-487.


148. Klauser, pp. 187, 232 - 235. Some of the forms she refers to are in the strain of newly developed forms such as “Stunksitzungen,” known for being a radical alternative version of a Prunksitzung. Other such innovations of form can be traced in carnival throughout time and space.


155. Keim, pp.140.


162. Lützeler, *Kölner Humor in der Geschichte*. pp. 27


164. Klersch, Liessem and others also frequently referred to carnival as “lebensbejahend.”

165. Liessem, *Hauptreferat des Präsidenten des B.D.K. Thomas Liessem*, pp.4


178. [Theodor Eschenburg?]. Baden 1945-1951 was nicht in der Zeitung Steht. (Darmstadt, Germany: Friedrich Vorwerk Verlag, 1951) pp. 5-6.


188. Rudi Keller, ”Vom kulturellen Auftrag Freiburgs am Oberrhein” in Kerber, pp.117.


190. Ibid, pp.198-227


197. Ibid, pp.228.


199. Ibid, pp.81.


202. Jürgen Klöcker, Das Land der Alemannen: Pläne für einen Heimatstaat im Bodenseeraum


206. Crivellari, Klöcker, Oelze, Rügert, pp.35.


208. Metz, pp.84-85, 92-97.

209. Ibid, pp.53-54.


211. Ibid, pp.120-121.

212. Ibid, pp.137.

213. Ibid, pp.10-12.


217. Ibid, pp.79.


221. Ibid, pp.99-100

222. Ibid, pp.23-24

223. Ibid, Footnote, pp.87


226. Reinhold Maier, pp. 67.

227. "Artikel 29 des Bonner Grundgesetzes" in Albiez, pp. 329. Translation: “Federal territory is to be drawn into states according to consideration of common feeling of statesman-like connectedness, history and cultural relationships, economic purposefulness and social structures. The redrawing should create states that, according to their size and energies, are capable of fulfilling their respective duties.”


236. Boelcke, pp.305.


239. Feger, pp. 15 footnote.


243. “Die Beratung im Bundestag ueber den Entwurf eines zweiten Gesetzes zur Neugliederung


246. Prof. Dr. K.S. Bader, ”Badens Geschichte und Kultur” in *Baden als Bundesland*, pp. 8,11.


248. Metz, pp.42.

249. Metz, pp.130.


252. Metz, pp.16, 41-42.


254. Metz, pp.137.


256. [Eschenburg, Theodor?], pp. 13.


258. Reinhold Maier, pp.74.


262. ”Der Volkswille in der Badenfrage 1950-1970” Table in Albiez, pp.432-433.

263. Manfred Koch “Karlsruhe” in Weinacht *Regionen am Rhein*, pp.121-123


266. Karl Heinz Neser "Badisches Frankenland" in Weinacht Regionen am Rhein, pp.166.


270. Crivellari, Klöcker, Oelze, Rügert., pp.57.


277. Ibid, pp.56.

278. Ibid, pp.52.


280. Reinhold Maier, pp.159-160.


295. *Ibid*, pp.84.


298. Metz, pp.102-103, 107, 133.


300. [Theodor Eschenburg?], pp. 79.


302. Heuss, 202-203.


304. André François-Poncet “Se, Exzellenz” in Leo Wohleb 1888-1955, pp. 32.


308. Ibid, pp. 189. Translation: The rebuilding of Germany is not only a question of finances and economy. It is also a question of warm-hearted patriotism rooted in Heimat. The love for the Badenese, Bavarian or Württembergish Heimat constitutes the best nourishing soil for a love for the whole German Fatherland and for unwavering support of the united of Germany.”

309. Ibid, pp. 190


318. Reinhold Maier,pp.76-77.

319. Reinhold Maier,pp.364.

320. [Theodor Eschenburg?], pp. 43-45.


324. "Der Antrag auf bundesverfassungsrechtliche Feststellung des ersten und zweiten Neugliederungsgesetzes vom 25.5.51 mit der weiteren Begründung vom 31.7.1951" in Der Kampf um den Südweststaat pp. 266

325. "Das zweite Neugliederungsgesetz in dritter Lesung vor dem Bundestag am 25.4.1951" in Kampf um den Südweststaat. pp.243


328. "Im Südwesten was Neues“ CDU-Zeitschrift CIVIS, Ausgabe 30.9.1966 reprinted in Albiez, pp. 430.

329. [Theodor Eschenburg?] pp.45-52.


331. Ibid, pg.31-33.


337. "Badens Geschichte und Kultur“ von Prof. Dr. K.S. Bader, Baden als Bundesland, pp.11.


341. Metz, pp.74.
344. Boelcke, pp.258.
346. Reinhold Maier, pp.365.
347. Feger, pp.229.
348. Metz, pp.139.
352. Crivellari, Klöcker, Oelze, Rügert., pp.74-75.
353. Prof. Dr. K.S. Bader ”Badens Geschichte und Kultur” in Baden als Bundesland, pp.10.
354. Ibid, pp. 28