The Highway to Segregation

By

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Thesis
Submitted to the Faculty of the
Graduate School of Vanderbilt University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS
in

Medicine, Health, and Society
May, 2016
Nashville, Tennessee

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to thank my thesis advisor Doctor Aimi Hamraie of the Center of Medicine, Health, and Society at Vanderbilt University. The door to Professor Hamraie’s office was always open. They always steered me in the right direction whenever they thought I needed it. I would also like to thank the rest of my thesis committee Professor JuLeigh Petty and Professor Laura Stark of the Center of Medicine, Health, and Society at Vanderbilt University. I am indebted to all of your valuable comments and encouragement.

Finally I must express my gratitude to my parents and to my family for providing me with unfailing support and continuous encouragement throughout my years of study and through the process of researching and writing this thesis. This accomplishment would not have been possible without them.

Thank You.

Sabre J. Rucker
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INTRODUCTION

Transportation issues are not new to Nashville. In the past 5 years we have seen numerous interventions by the Tennessee Department of Transportation to mitigate road issues. Those interventions include, the Tennessee Department of Transportation’s fast track eight, several attempts to create a new system that would arguably increase the speed of the Metropolitan Transportation Authority buses, and numerous efforts to expand and repave public roads throughout the city. These projects fall under the jurisdiction of the Tennessee State Department, and citizens often expect that the government will keep these routes in good condition. This expectation arises, in part, because we believe our government is supposed to take care of us, and because we pay governmental taxes to contribute to the upkeep of these resources.

The construction of highways, interstates and public roadways under the federal highway system in the mid-1950s were implemented to connect the United States together, and to make it easier for the suburban citizen to travel into the city for work. The Federal Highway and transportation system has allocated money to the highway design plans that would work best for the individual city and the connectivity of the overall federal transportation system. The federal highway act of 1956 incentivized city designers and local governments to construct new—or expand on existing roadways—in order to make the lives of the residents easier. The residents who would benefit from a city-wide project like this often do so at the cost of residents’ lives who would be negatively affected. Stories of displacement have become more commonplace throughout history, but it is important to note that these narratives are coming from people with similar backgrounds—racial and ethnic minorities who often have low incomes. Across the United States, there are cases of transportation routes that act as pseudo boundaries between
racial groups. Looking at the racial dot maps with our most current consensus data in cities like Miami, St. Louis, Chicago, New York, New Orleans, and Detroit, one can see just how segregated these cities remain.1 Upon closer inspection, one can see that these racial boundaries are only separated by a roadway (See figure 1).2

Although it would be easy to blame one individual, or pinpoint one area of racial injustice, that is not how these design plans were made. The social and political context that existed across the nation during this time contributed to the way these roadways were designed, and contributed to the way that those agents in power understood how the design plans would be implemented. Placing a designer in their social and political context, reveals that some of the construction plans that would have the greatest negative effects on existing communities were often created by the most well-intentioned designer. By analyzing the narratives surrounding the construction of transportation routes, this thesis reveals a similar narrative of displacement occurring over and over again throughout history. How does a legal system decide what is best for their city, and what people do they have in mind when they make these decisions? Because of the high number of cases surrounding displacement that can be traced back to federally sanctioned transportation routes, I challenge the assumption that all of the governmentally sanctioned public roadways were implemented to benefit all of the residents of a city. While Tennessee’s interstate loop effectively connected rural areas of Tennessee with the larger surrounding cities (Nashville found itself connected to cities like Memphis and Knoxville), the people who lived in those areas in the line of the highway route (namely, African-American

1 Griffin, Kate. Dividing America?: The Role of "Division Streets" in Residential Segregation. Orlando: The University of Florida, 5 October 2012
2 For more information about segregated cities, check out this website http://demographics.coopercenter.org/DotMap/index.html
families) faced the greatest loss. Using the complex narrative surrounding Nashville's construction of Interstate-40, we can gain a deeper understanding to how social structures, political structures, and—in this instance—racism in the 1950s contributed to public infrastructure that is still affecting lives in the present-day.

This primary research question of this thesis is to critically interrogate who public works—specifically roadways and interstates were designed to benefit. In order to do this, I analyze the process by which Interstate-40 was designed to go through a section of North Nashville—the historic Jefferson Street. The effects of this construction not only impacted the physical health of the community, but it also disrupted the Jefferson Street business district’s ability to remain economically successful.

METHODS

This research was primarily conducted from the literature surrounding the construction of interstate-40. These articles were published over the span of time between the mid-1960s up to the present day. The second set of literature revolved around the idea of recreating the narrative of Jefferson Street, by contextualizing its past. In this same manner, Nashville’s own political history will be contextualized in this larger transportation policy history. This project will produce a comprehensive time line of the time period between 1947 and 1970. In order to get the most accurate representation, primary documents from archival sources in Nashville will be examined. Historical documents from this time period between the late 1940s and the early 1970s will be analyzed to gain a sense of the argument each side had over the construction of Interstate 40. Some of these documents will include Newspapers from this time period and legal documentation regarding the construction of Interstate-40.

I analyze secondary sources as primary sources for this thesis. Several newspaper articles from The Tennessean from 1954 to 1968 were analyzed to track the release of related information
regarding interstate-40 being re-routed through Jefferson Street. All of the secondary literature describes a 10 year period where there was no mention of the local highway department’s new plan to place interstate-40 through Jefferson Street. Part of my thesis theorizes that many of the white Nashvillians did not recognize the consequences of displacement until after they occurred. This is corroborated by the few newspaper articles that I did recover from local papers between the dates of 1945 and the mid-1970s. These newspaper articles were pulled from the archives of the downtown branch of the Nashville Public Library and from microfilm at the Vanderbilt University Library. Many of these articles came from "The Tennessean," or "The Nashville Banner." The media during this time documents the plans for the city to build an interstate, but none of these media platforms fully discuss how the construction will intersect the successful Jefferson Street. It isn’t until the land surrounding the interstate was being purchased that the story about displacing community members comes out. Prior to 1968, the local newspapers expressed their frustration with the development of the highway. The newspapers expressed a wide-spread desire to expedite the highway construction process. There are even several occasions where newspaper compares the progression of the Nashville interstate systems to other cities across the nation who had already completed their interstate construction projects. The lack of articles about the re-routing of Interstate-40 through Jefferson Street reveal the public’s disinterest in the dislocation of African-American bodies and businesses. Interest began to rise after 1966, because of the national attention that the I-40 steering committee brought to Nashville.

After 1968, there were several articles that express city-wide sympathy to the families and businesses that were displaced by the interstate. This sympathetic shift occurs because of two factors. The first factor is the result of the I-40 steering committee. The steering committee brought attention to the plight of the Jefferson Street community, and these issues became part of
national discourse. The second factor is the national political context regarding race relations that existed in 1968. The Civil Rights Act and the Civil Rights movements that preceded it created a nation-wide shift in understanding the needs of blacks, especially in the south. Acts of racial injustice that were continuing to happen were being met with more and more public discontent.

In 1969, Nashville became a likely candidate for the Models City Program. Model Cities Programs were created under the direction of former president Lyndon B. Johnson. It was part of his war on poverty effort. Similar to Urban Renewal Programs of the past, the Model Cities program provided funding to cities. The funding was used to create anti-poverty programs, and it included more citizen participation, instead of creating top-down programs that did not consider the desires of community members. In 1969 Coles A. Flournoy conducted a survey on the remaining North Nashville community in response to the model city plan. He notes some of the major differences in the area since the construction of the project, but he also reveals that the construction of Interstate-40 through the area only benefited 34% of the community. This 34% represented the number of people in the North Nashville community who had access to private transportation.

In his 1971, a report from the Nashville Race Relations Information Center released a report claiming that the model cities program would not improve the North Nashville area. They suggest that they no longer trust the state and local government to determine what is best for the community, and they reference the construction of I-40 as the reason for their

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distrust.⁴ They reveal the inconsistencies between the desires of the North Nashville Community and the plans from the programming committee.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

This project’s research was conducted through the lenses of two broad, overarching themes. The first major theme is critical race theory (CRT). Critical Race theory is broadly defined as movements and collections of scholars interested in, studying, and transforming the relationships between race, racism, and power.⁵ More specifically in the field of Critical Race Theory, this thesis uses the concept of revisionist theories. Revisionist theory works to replace the majoritarian interpretations of events with the interpretation and accounts of minority experiences.⁶ Mary L. Dudziak uses the revisionist theory to suggest that many of the changes that occurred in the name of Civil Rights were actually put into place to the benefit of White America. She argues that White America had the potential to gain allies during the Cold War if they continued to project ideas of freedom and democracy.⁷ Dudziak’s argument provides a structure by which we understand how state and local governments maintained their racial power. In this way, the creation of physical structures were used to maintain racial power, and the federal highway act contributed to this system by providing funding to states without putting a system in place that would hold leaders accountable.

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This project analyzes the idea of institutional racism, as it is defined by many critical race scholars, on a material level. Camara Phyllis Jones defines institutional racism as the structures, policies, practices, and norms resulting in differential access to goods, services, and opportunities of society by race. For Jones, understanding how racism operates on this level contributes to our overall understanding of how health disparities are created. Normally, Institutional or Structural Racism is described as a process, and—because of this—it exists in this intangible form. This project attempts to understand how this specific institutionalized racism process occurred through the creation of a material structure. The construction of Interstate-40 is a physical object that is a product of structural racism that developed in a specific racial context.

The second overarching theme that this project draws upon is the idea of Health. Health is defined by the World Health Organization (WHO) “as a state of complete physical, mental, and social well-being—not merely the absence of disease or infirmity.” This definition, while it attempts to broaden the scope of health, actually limits our scope of what is defined as a health issue. In the scope of this health definition, it is easy to find several articles that focus on the physical health issues that are associated with living in close proximity to high traffic areas like interstates. Several articles mark a correlation between interstates and higher rates of respiratory and cardiovascular issues. Although the physical

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health issues associated with the interstate are important, I argue that the process of constructing Interstate-40 had negative health effects on the North Nashville Jefferson Street Community. The concept that a construction process could have such a strong effect on a community falls outside of the normative scope of health, and falls into the (more contemporary) scope of the social determinants of health. The social determinants of health are “the economic and social conditions – and their distribution among the population – that are the result of a toxic combination of poor social policies, unfair economic arrangements and bad politics.”\(^\text{13}\) The construction of Interstate-40 changed the economic and social conditions of Jefferson Street community by destroying economic, health, and social resources that existed in this community. Destroying these resources diminished the residents’ life opportunities.

Health in this project is so closely related to ideas of power. In the case of this—and many other construction projects-- those with the power to organize the layout of the city, are oftentimes the ones who have the power to determine who has greater economic, health, and social opportunities in their lives. The determination of an individual’s life opportunities stem from Michel Foucault’s theory of bio-power. Broadly, the idea of bio-power can be understood as having the power to let live and the power to let die\(^\text{14}\). Governors, mayors, urban planners, city designers, and the highway engineers were the individuals who held the power to shape the city. Their perception of the world, and their value systems were the base foundation for transportation system that we can still see the ramifications of today.

To understand how I am conducting research on this historical event, one must first understand how I define health. Health is defined as the overall well-being of an individual


\(^\text{14}\) For more on the theory of bio-power, please see Michel Foucault’s \textit{The History of Sexuality Volume 1}. 
beyond the normative scope of physical health and disease.\textsuperscript{15} This definition may seem vague, but the important thing to keep in mind is that this definition pushes us past only examining the physical ailments of the body. With this definition of health, one understands that their overall well-being is just as important as being in good physical condition, or simply the absence of a physical disease. I stress the importance of not focusing purely on physical health because my project doesn't focus on physical health. Research has shown that intervening on a health issue at an individual level goes not have as large of an effect as intervening on a community level or a population based level. It is these larger levels of health that the importance of social determinants becomes evident.\textsuperscript{16}

The social determinants of health are anything that really falls outside of the realm of health as we know it. Anything that is not specifically related to a biomedical disease, but it can have an effect on how you live and experience the world could be considered a social determinant of health. The social determinants of health are factors such as SES, class, race, education, where you live, social mobility, access to fresh produce, childhood SES, etc. The factors listed above plus numerous others are all factors that contribute to the overall well-being of an individual. I am studying the construction of interstate 40 as a social determine of the health of people in that Jefferson Street community. Unlike many of the social determinants, the public transportation route is a tangible, material object that negatively impacted a large group of people while benefiting an even larger group of people. This case can be representative of a

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number of cases that exist across the United States from the 1956 development of the highway system.

This project is not a traditional historical account. I approach this research topic by observing the processes that determined the construction of a highway that was built in the 1950s, but it goes beyond a simple historical account. Through the lens of Critical Race Theory, the decision-making that went into constructing this highway tells the story of a surreptitious plan that would destroy a large portion of Nashville’s business district as a byproduct. This project is fundamentally based in critical race theory, but this project also uses sociology and psychology to understand and weave together a collective analysis of how the North Nashville Residents rallied against a whole city for the right to live in this area.  

HISTORICAL ANALYSIS

“Like nothin’ you’ve ever seen”: The Rise of Nashville’s Historic Jefferson Street

Jefferson Street, circa 1942, was an area booming with successful black businesses and a music scene that included musical greats like Aretha Franklin, Tina Turner, and Ray Charles who frequented the hotels on the street as musical meccas (Figure 2). Alongside this music scene, the Jefferson Street community was contributing to the under-served black community in Nashville. During a time where individuals could be denied rights and services based on the color of their skin, black-owned storefronts on Jefferson Street provided clothing, books, and other goods to their black patrons. It was during this post-war era that the Jefferson Street community had a short-lived “golden era” and became relatively successful.

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18 “Tennessee 4 Me - An African American Community’s Fight over I-40”
Black families living in North Nashville during this golden era felt safe from the persecutions of segregation and reinforcement of the Jim Crow era. This was especially true because Jefferson Street was an independent and thriving business district. Mrs. Beard, one of my informants, lived in the North Nashville Area until she got married at 18. She described Jefferson Street as her “stomping grounds,” and she told me stories about the days of her youth. In one particular story, she described how the local businesses would encourage the community children. According to her, at the end of each school year, The Ritz—a black-owned movie theater across the street from Fisk campus would let the kids watch a free movie with free concessions if they received As and Bs on their report cards (Figure 3). Here, we have an example of how the community bonded together to support their youth. Something as simple as having incentives for good grades would force the students to invest in their own education—or at the very least, it would encourage the kids to go to class instead of skipping.

Mrs. Beard also described how great it was to be in that area when the celebrities were coming through town. She looked at me with pride as she described how many brilliant musical artists would come into town. When I asked about the popularity of the entertainment scene (noting my difficulty in finding this information in the archives), she threw her head back and laughed. After she stopped laughing, she leaned in close and told me that there was “a lot about the Jefferson Street that the white people would never know,” and that the music scene there “was like nothin’ [I’d] ever seen.”

Mrs. Beards memories attest to this very special sense of community that existed, and that final quotation from really speaks to how little anyone from outside of this community could

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understand what it meant to be accepted into this community. This was revealed by my analysis of Sanborn insurance maps from 1959. In an attempt to see what sorts of recreational entertainment venues were noted, it seemed that many places along Jefferson Street were either hidden from the public eye, or they just weren’t important enough for white insurers to draw out on their Sanborn insurance maps. Upon examination, the names of the buildings were not listed, the drawings of many buildings in this areas were only as “colored.” This is a clear sign to that businesses in these black communities had to take care of themselves because they were often overlooked by those in power from the greater Nashville area.

By the mid-1950s, North Nashville was a hotspot of growing civil rights sentiments. Because of its proximity to three black universities, the neighborhood had a great deal of college age students (primarily from the south) who were becoming more disgruntled with the social status of blacks in the Nation. Non-violent protest trainings, and civil rights organizing was taking place in this area of the city. This type of organizing was happening more frequently as we moved closer to the Civil Rights Acts of 1964. The teaching sessions that were occurring at the churches and on the college campuses, along with the Nashville sit-ins that took place in 1960 contributed to growing racial tension that paralleled national racial tensions.

The Emergence of Desegregation as a Foreign Policy Tactic and the Rise of the Federal Transportation System

After The Allied Forces had finally defeated the Axis Power at the end of WWII, the fear of Adolf Hitler’s socialist ideas and the horror of the genocide that Nazi Germany had fostered

was still fresh on people’s minds. The United States government saw this surge of nationalism as an opportunity to create federal initiatives that would focus on uniting the many citizens of the United States around the ideas of democracy and freedom. Because of the Allied Victory, there was also a resurgence in the belief in the American Dream across the nation — especially in opposition to Communist Russia as Cold War tensions are coming to a head. The end of the war provided opportunities for many war veterans to create the life that followed the ideas of the American dream. The federal program that contributed to this was the G.I. Bill that was signed in 1944. This bill would provide funding for school, the opening of small businesses, and a better chance to get a loan to purchase a home. For many immigrants who had served in the war, the G.I. Bill provided an opportunity to become assimilated into the American Society, and gain "white status." Unfortunately, this opportunity was not passed on to African-Americans who served in World War II.

Because of the existence of Jim Crow laws, African-Americans (and many other minorities) were barred from many of the same benefits with the G.I. Bill provided to their immigrant and white counterparts. Less than one percent of all the initial GI bill loans were granted to minorities. After recognizing that they were not receiving the same benefits as some

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28For more information on how Jewish people and other immigrants assimilated into white racial norms, see Karen Brodkin’s book How Jews Became White People and What That Says about Race in America. The first chapter of the book focuses on how important the GI bill was, in that it provided services and money to Jewish people and other immigrants.
of the other World War II veterans, African-Americans rallied together to get the arm services desegregated. It is easy to understand the rationale behind this, if all of the soldiers were willing to sacrifice their lives for their country, shouldn't they all be receiving the same treatment? If the African-Americans rallying for dissemination of the arm services win, it would also put them in position to gain better benefits in the future.

In 1948, then President Harry S Truman signed the executive order 9981, which desegregated all branches of the armed services. It is hard know whether this executive order was implemented because Truman truly believed in civil rights, or if he signed this order to have a better international standing. Racial discrimination became recognized as an Un-American ideology during World War II. It is possible that the execution of this order provided an illusion of national unity to face the threat of communism. Mary L. Dudziak’s article Desegregation as a Cold War Imperative analyzes numerous historical documents and personal letters to reveal that many of the advances towards desegregation in the United States was to have a greater opportunity to win over allies. No matter what his intentions were, signing executive order 9981 was a large win for the early civil rights movement, and the presidential support of civil rights was a huge blow to segregationists across the nation.

Understanding this background knowledge it allows us to understand the social and political context of the nation during the time when many of the highway transportation routes were planned. Although the civil rights era is linked to the year 1964, there were several successful movements that were taking place between the 1950s and the 1960s that would

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31 For more information about how the idea of desegregation was used as a tactic to expand United States Foreign Policy, see Mary L. Dudziak’s article Desegregation as a Cold War Imperative.
continue to threaten the segregationist way of life up until the Civil Rights Act was passed in 1964.

A second plan to unify the nation manifested itself in the physical form of highway routes. The need for more highway routes only increased after World War II. The implementation of the GI Bill meant that many individuals could now afford to move from the inner-city areas to go out to the land of suburbia.\textsuperscript{32} This idea came from former President Dwight Eisenhower’s campaign plan to unify the nation with a number of transportation routes that would link city to city. The federal transportation aid system was created in 1956 to provide funding to cities. This funding was used to create transportation routes.

The city of Nashville, was no different from other cities across the nation in this regard. There were plenty of people moving into suburban areas, now facing the hassle of traveling into the city for work. Elected state officials were projecting that there would be about 70,000 automobiles on Nashville roads by the year 1965. This increase in traffic meant that more roadways were necessary to accommodate the future of Nashville citizens. Nashville saw the rumored Federal highway transportation aid system program as an opportunity to improve the city and help the citizens without breaking the bank.\textsuperscript{33} \textsuperscript{34}

Nashville Plans to Build a Highway

For Nashville, the plan to build a highway system was not new. State officials have been mulling over the idea of building several interstates to match the transportation growth since the 1940s, possibly even earlier. It is possible that the plans for the interstate were placed on the back-burner because the state did not have the adequate funds to take on such an extensive project, and that the war also placed any major transportation route plans on the back-burner. It is crucial to understand that these plans are being developed during a time when the idea of keeping racial and ethnic groups separated was the popular discourse of those who held developmental power.

From the mid-1940s through the late 1960s, highway developers, in particular, held the power to create or destroy an urban area. As Yale Rabin argued in 1980, highway developers yield a great deal of power because they have complete control over the production of highway facilities. The placement of transportation routes, in turn, have a “fundamental influence on land development.” Businesses, for instance attempt to find property that exists near a transportation route that has a good deal of traffic flow to increase their opportunity of gaining new clientele. Many of the higher priced suburban neighborhoods are on land that is generally farther away from high traffic areas. The development of transportation routes work to dictate what can happen in the space around the road.

Interstate 65 and Interstate 40 were the big routes that Nashville focused on. Interstate 65 would run from the north of the state to the south, connecting Nashville to Louisville, Kentucky and Chicago. Interstate 40 would run from the east of the state to the west, and would connect Nashville to Memphis on the west and Nashville to Knoxville on the east. The goal for this routing structure was to make Nashville, Tennessee’s capital, the central hub.

The route for Interstate-40 was created in 1955, but before the highway could be built, highway developers entertained several ideas for its placement. Most of the routes centered around North Nashville, the area between Jefferson Street and downtown. The first route, planned in 1946 ran parallel to charlotte pike and it crossed over Avenue. A second route proposed that the highway cross over the south western portion of Charlotte Avenue before running parallel up towards Broadway Avenue just north of Downtown. The third route proposed in 1955 differs greatly from the first two routes. This route forms a wavy T across North Nashville. The intersection of this T, as can be seen in figure 5, crosses over Jefferson Street.

The 1955 Interstate Corridor Plan

By 1955, the state and local-level highway departments heard rumors that the federal highway department was in the final stages of creating a plan that would provide funding for interstates. The state would be guaranteed funding for up to 90% of their highway project if they were one of the first states to send in a plan for approval. A New York Company, Clarke and Rapuano were hired to draft up an interstate plan that could be submitted to the federal

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highway department. Clarke and Rapuano were hired because they designed and managed the Capitol Hill redevelopment project, and they were contracted to implement an urban renewal plan in Edgehill. Zuzak reports that the State and Local Highway department believed Clarke and Rapuano were best-suited for the job because of their past experience designing in Nashville. Both of those highway departments believed that their familiarity with Nashville would also allow the Clarke and Rapuano Company to draft up an interstate corridor plan faster than any other design company.

Clarke and Rapuano felt pressured by the local and state highway department to create their initial design as quickly as possible. This became evident based on the initial plan that was submitted for funding was flawed—and these flaws were recognized by the Clarke and Rapuano Company as well as the local highway engineers. The plan that they created updated the initial 1945 route by shifting the route over to the east a few miles (figure 5).

As Houston Notes, “the initial consultation commissioned by the city recommended a path that ran eastward from Memphis along Route 70S, then hugged the Louisville & Nashville Railroad tracks for several miles before continuing directly between the Broadway and Charlotte Avenues.” This plan was considered flawed by the local and State Highway Department

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because it would be close to an area of Bell Meade that housed several influential and elite white families. Highway officials also noted several other flaws with this plan. First, highway officials claimed that the route was too close to the railroad lines and the white-only hospitals. Highway engineers claimed that the proposed route did not follow the engineering interchange guidelines, which stated that all planned interchange routes must exist three miles apart. One of the largest issues for the state department was that this initial corridor plan did not relieve traffic. The proposed route would “congest traffic further where it was already heavy,” and the proposed plan “would be sending interstate traffic through the downtown area just to get it back out-of-town again.” Charles A. Zuzak questions how this plan could have been suggested when it was so grossly flawed. Zuzak points that this plan would congest the traffic, which was the very thing that the highway department was trying to fix.

The Highway Shift to Jefferson Street and the Silence that Followed

According to Zuzak’s sources within the state governments, it was Rapuano’s idea to shift the route of interstate 40 to Jefferson Street. The new route as Houston claims "was drastically different: it called for the interstate to parallel Charlotte, bend sharply north to cross 28th Avenue

North, and then twist again to trample over Jefferson Street. Clarke and Rapuano believed that the demolition of the homes in this area had to happen in order to "improve the business district and the Fisk-Meharry complex through urban renewal." They believe that if they could perfectly place the urban renewal program next two or near this interstate route that it would actually benefit the business district. Zuzak also states "if racial discrimination ever operated it would've been in the decision to abandon the urban renewal program, not in the decision to change the route." It is here where I have to disagree with Zuzak. The business district of Jefferson Street located in North Nashville was one of the only economically sustainable areas in North Nashville, and this area's business district housed 80% of the black owned businesses in Nashville. A great deal of the North Nashville area was at or below the poverty line of the city, the majority of people making between $3000-$4499 a year. Removing this business district removes economic opportunity for people in the area, it would racially isolate this community from the rest of the city, and it would create physical barriers between the colleges which would disrupt not only this locations' sense of community but also the hinders the community's ability to organize for the Civil Rights movement. Pairing the destruction of this business district with an Urban Renewal probably would create a successful business district, but not a successful black business district.

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58 White, Jack E. *Nashville’s Model Cities Program: An Unborn Partnership*. Race Relations Information Center, 1971. 37. Print- Note that this data was collected in 1969, but the area outside of the route of interstate 40 maintained a similar stability throughout this time.
Urban Renewal programs were plans for “city improvement” occurred prominently between the late 1940s and the mid-1960s. These programs were not new to Nashville, or the rest of the nation, and for the individuals who were not displaced by the programs, they looked forward to the new businesses or housing areas that would be constructed. In 1958, there were articles that mentioned excitement about the new urban renewal programs that were being proposed in Nashville, and how the city officials were going to vote on the new programs, and that Clarke and Rapuano were going to do it because of their recent work on the Capitol Hill building. The span of time between 1955 and 1967 is where our story gets a little derailed. The literature has some discrepancies about when the second interstate route was created. There are sources that they was created as early as 1955, which means it was a mere few months after the initial corridor route had been proposed. It is likely that a plan had been in the works since 1955 but a more finalize plan was not submitted to the highway department until 1957. Note that Clarke and Rapuano have the authority on this project they were working very closely with the local and the state level highway department. If the highway department did in fact have a finalize route in 1955 as Andrew Mohl suggests then breaking federal law by not publicize that information in their 1957 public hearing.

The date of the updated interstate-40 plan is important, but only because of what happen after this plan was put in place. In 1956 the federal highway department proposed a law that mandated all interstate highway plans must have some form of the public hearing that alerts the community about the interstate route. The local federal highway committee followed suits in the

fall of this mandate by having a public hearing in 1957 but the existing literature claims that was the last anybody heard of the Interstate 40 route in that 1957 public hearing, and that public hearing supposedly made no mention of the route going through the Jefferson Street community. I looked through old newspaper articles over the years between 1954 and 1967 to see when the proposed route through Jefferson Street was mentioned in media. Although I did find a couple of much linking the interstate-40 route to Jefferson Street in the early 1960s, I argue that the radio silence occurred because they were running out of federal funding.

Beginning in May of 1958 all the way up to August of 1959, there were reports of concern about Tennessee not receiving enough federal funding to complete all of their highway projects.61 The article discusses the delay in federal funding halted the city’s ability to purchase land, and that the state highway department would have to cancel the remainder of the project.62 At the same time that the State Highway department was pushing to construct interstate-40, they had also already started their construction plans to build Interstate-65. Zuzak suggests that the attention to the construction of I-65 from the rural areas to the city63 prevented the state and local highway departments from fully developing and publicizing the I-40 route through Jefferson Street. I agree with him in part, but the issues of funding posed a larger threat to the project as a whole. As the entire project (which was supposed to be completed by 1973) continued to get delayed, the state highway department looked to the federal government for

more funding. The fear of not being able to fund the future projects, would be enough to halt anything.

Perhaps the If the project was halted, then the local highway department thought that they had nothing to tell the Jefferson Street Community. Even then, the math doesn’t add up. The first reports of funding issues (based on the newspapers) were not reported until the middle of 1958. The earliest reports about the Jefferson Street Route place it in 1955, and the latest reports place it in the middle of 1957.\textsuperscript{64} The Newspapers note that the highway route had been shifted in May of 1961, and this in conjunction with seedy land developers going into the North Nashville area to purchase land tipped the Jefferson Street Community that \textit{something} big was on the horizon.\textsuperscript{65}

**The Formation of the I-40 Steering Committee in Response to Growing Concerns**

Two things happened that pushed the business owners on Jefferson Street to ask questions. In 1967, Zuzak reports that the governor allegedly decided to expedite the construction plans for the city because they were three years behind\textsuperscript{66} This is the first time that there is any public mention of the interstate crossing through the Jefferson Street business district, as all other public hearing about this case referenced the route that went across Charlotte Pike. I could not locate this article for this press release, but I do believe that it exists, and perhaps it was lost to the public archives over the years. I did find an article from 1967, where Councilman Love Publicly opposed the route claiming that it would isolate the community.\textsuperscript{67}

\textsuperscript{64}Mohl, Raymond A. “Citizen Activism and Freeway Revolts in Memphis and Nashville: The Road to Litigation.” \textit{Journal of Urban History} Vol. 40. 5 (2014) 823. Describe both reports respectively.


\textsuperscript{66}Zuzak, Charles A., Kenneth E. McNeil and Frederic Bergerson. \textit{Beyond the Ballot: Organized Participation in Metropolitan Nashville}. The University of Tennessee, 1971. 29. Print

Although this opposition occurred after the steering committee was formed, Councilman Love would not be the last public official to speak in opposition of the route.\textsuperscript{68}

In 1964 developers started approaching Jefferson Street business owners to purchase land. Developers would scare the neighborhood by telling them that they wouldn’t get any money from the state when they were forced off of their property for the rumored interstate that would be built “somewhere near TSU.”\textsuperscript{69} As the TN government moved in to purchase the land that was needed to construct the interstate in 1965, the community realized that that refusing to sell was not an option, and that they had been targeted by their state.\textsuperscript{70,71} They continued to go to the local highway department to ask questions about where the construction was located or when it would start all the way up to August of 1967. They were consistently given the run around. Often times they were told that the final project was not “finalized,” and they had nothing to worry about.\textsuperscript{72}

When representatives of the State Highway department came to get land on behalf of the construction program, North Nashville mobilized the I-40 steering committee.\textsuperscript{73} The committee consisted of several black professionals and students from the business district and the local colleges. There are reports that the committee had somewhere between 30 and 100 members.\textsuperscript{74}

\textsuperscript{73}Zuzak, Charles A., Kenneth E. McNeil and Frederic Bergerson. \textit{Beyond the Ballot: Organized Participation in Metropolitan Nashville}. The University of Tennessee, 1971. 27. Print.
\textsuperscript{74}The committee had something closer to 30 members, and at its height, it had at least 100 people who sympathized and identified with the steering committees’ principles.
The committee had a short amount of time to mobilize their efforts. The deposition from the court of appeals case against the city offers an example of how decisions were made in favor of the city to move forward with the completion of the interstate. The documentation suggests that the position of the state regarding the construction was also influenced by national forces regarding the amount of funding this project could receive, if they completed it before 1967. In the court case, the Nashville city designers admit that the true issue of the situation lies in the inability for the steering commission to have enough time to do anything organize against the construction of the interstate. The judges claim that there is no way to prove that the plan for Interstate-40 was decided with a racial intent.

Despite all of their best efforts, the construction on Jefferson Street resumed in 1968. For the most part, the Steering committee was simply asking for the opportunity to develop a new route that would be less harmful to the business district of Jefferson Street. I don’t agree that the steering committee had enough time to mobilize as the State court and the Supreme Court suggest. Although the plan to construct on Jefferson Street had been on the state books for quite some time, the information was never presented to the residents of North Nashville, or the business district of Jefferson Street. I do agree that re-routing the interstate after so much of the land has been purchased, would have led to greater displacement of the North Nashville residents.

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The Consequences of the Tennessee Highway Department’s Plan

After construction began, it was clear to Nashville leaders that this North Nashville Community was a perfect candidate for the new “Models City Program” that was being pushed nationally. The Model City Program was an initiative that was supposed to replace the Urban Renewal Plans that Clarke and Rapuano originally designed alongside the construction of interstate-40. Federal funding for Urban Renewal was halted as the program became more widely recognized as Negro Removal. The Steering Committee that had originally formed to relocate the interstate, set their eyes to stop the newly proposed model city program, stating that it would only destroy the Jefferson Street Community more. The Steering Committee, Yale Rabin, and the newly formed Race Relations Council in Nashville worked together to show that the proposed revitalization plans did not address the needs of the neighborhood. This group surveyed as many members of the community that were left (as Rabin notes), and the survey gained a comprehensive knowledge about what resources the community had.\textsuperscript{76} The survey also revealed that 47.5\% of people in the North Nashville Community did not have a car that way in running condition.\textsuperscript{77} In addition to this, 24\% of the north Nashville population relied on public transportation to get them to their jobs.\textsuperscript{78} In 1968, a Tennessean article notes that there was discussion about whether or not the bus route should continue to be present on that road.

While the construction was ongoing, the local highway department erected 6 foot tall chain-link fences (see figure 7). Although the highway department claimed the fence was placed

in front of businesses and residences as part of a safety regulation, it also functioned as another barrier to deter visitors and potential clientele from shopping at these storefronts.

CONCLUSION

Although Nashville’s movement against the Interstate-40 did not win, it did assist in preventing this construction from destroying Overton Park in Memphis Mohl suggests that Jefferson Street’s loss on Interstate-40 helped prepare Memphis. By 1971, the Overton Park committee had formed allies with the Sierra club and The Memphis revolts took place in 1971, which means that the public would have played a large role in shaping the future of Overton Park. The 1971 revolts were far enough after the Civil Rights Act of 1964 that it was less controversial and more widely accepted, federally. I do not mean to say that racism did not exist in the 70s—it still exists in 2015, but it would have been more difficult for the transportation systems in the south to get away with destroying a black community. The other big difference is that the Memphis Revolts did not rely solely on racism alone to make their case for why the interstate was bad. They relied on the idea of environmental sustainability, and by recruiting people who were involved in protecting the environment, they got a whole group of people to care and benefit a movement that might not have appealed to them before.

I recently took a walk down Jefferson Street. In many ways, things haven’t changes. It is still surrounded on the North, East, and West by the Cumberland River. It is still a hub for small businesses—there are several florist shops, wing joints, consignment shops, barber shops, small

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markets, and beauty salons. There are a plethora of churches—many that existed before the
construction of the interstate. The area of North Nashville is still an areas predominantly black
population (see figure 9). It continues to be known now for its three historically black colleges
and the memories of the happier days. There are also distinct differences. The most obvious is
the Interstate 40 which limits an individual’s view from the TSU campus which still sits at the end of Jefferson Street. In the bottom left corner of figure 9, one can see the top floors of some of the TSU campus buildings. In 2009 this underpass was dedicated to restoring the historical glory back to Jefferson Street. The entire area became known as the Gateway to Heritage project. A mural (figures 2 &3), was created based on children’s’ sketches and photographs from the early 1960s were brought together to create an image that would be representative of several different aspects that made up the Jefferson Street experience. The columns that hold up the overpass have African American leaders, and images of some historic Jefferson Street Hot Spots that no longer exist (figure 9).

Initially, I set out to find out who roadways and interstates were designed to benefit. I
used the case of Nashville’s Interstate-40 as a case study to illustrate the answer. Although the city planners claimed that they were constantly aware of the impact that their construction would have on the North Nashville Area, they chose to implement a design that would destroy the business district, and they failed to give adequate notice to the Jefferson Street community. Although the land developers planned to implement projects that would mitigate the damages caused by the construction process, none of those projects were actually created. Instead of implementing projects that would benefit the community, the construction process exasperated existing problems and created a need for a revitalization project. Arguably, the greatest answer to the question of who this area was
built for resides in the design itself. The shift of the plan from the white, well-off Vanderbilt and Bell-Meade area to the African-American populated area of North Nashville suggests that city designers were looking for an area that could not oppose the plan. The design plans for interstate-40 also suggest that blacks in the North Nashville area were not the intended user of the interstate because there were no entrance and exit ramps for the North Nashville community to access Interstate-40. The actions of the highway planners do not match up with all of their claims that they wanted to create a transportation route that would benefit all of Nashville.

Although there is a great deal of context through the literature above, this thesis only scratches the surface of the information that Jefferson Street can provide. Future research should trace the local businesses that existed on Jefferson Street and create an interactive map, showing statistics in a community. Although there is a recent resurgence in Nashville to understanding the historical narrative of Jefferson Street, there is hardly any focus on understanding the root cause of this, and it is a one-dimensional understanding that normally blames the individuals who reside there. There are projects that have occurred in Nashville to better the city as a whole, but many of these projects succeed at a cost. The cost here, seems to be the well-being of the black community on Jefferson Street in this case. I hope that this will assist urban designers and city planners will consider the lives of the people they are dislocating for the “betterment” of the city as a whole. The job of the state department is to create the most effective and cost-friendly design plan, so they did this by choosing the most marginalized group in the most marginalized area.
Transportation routes such as interstates and other public roads are permanent structures that influence the affluence of a community for decades after they are built. The materiality of these structures carry the weight of the time that they were made in. In the case of Interstate-40 intersecting Jefferson Street, the plans were derived during a time where unifying the United States through transportation routes was a national campaign. As civil unrest across the United States relating to racial justice began to threaten the unity that post-World War II was fostering, the opportunity to fracture that organizing was found in designing a plan that would disorganize the population of Nashville that had shown itself to be a threat with their civil rights organizing. Building an interstate would drive the property value in the area down, along with shutting down several prominent businesses. Like many other natural disasters throughout history, people who could afford to leave the area would—effectively trapping lower income individuals to the area. The city designers claimed that their plans would assist the Jefferson Street business district by opening them up to more patron variety. This plan was only to work in conjunction with the Urban Renewal project that never took place in that area. While members of the community argued that allowing this interstate to cross through the business district would irrevocably destroy the community. This process did not end in the late 1960s, as we see with the processes of gentrification that are occurring throughout the nation. Nashville has not been unaffected by this process, as gentrification can easily be seen in areas of East Nashville. By continuing these processes which dislocate people, we may really being doing more harm than good.

Figure 1: Mapping out the 2010 census data East of Miami International Airport reveals that Highway 195 almost completely racially segregates some of Miami’s Hispanic population (orange) from the African-American population (green). Source: Image Copyright, 2013, Weldon Cooper Center for Public Service, Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia (Dustin A. Cable, creator)
Figure 2: This section of the Jefferson Street Mural highlights the importance of the music scene. The Influence of Music on Jefferson Street, Nashville. Personal photograph by author. 2016.
Figure 3 The Jefferson street Mural highlights the community’s interactions with the movie theater. The Jefferson Street Community Outside the Ritz Movie Theater, Nashville. Personal photograph by author. 2016.
Figure 4 This Mural created by Michael Cooper Pays Homage to the Freedom Riders who boarded buses in Nashville to the heart of Dixie, Nashville. Personal photograph by author. 2016.
Figure 5 This Map created by James Hubert shows the various routes for interstate 40 between 1946 and 1967. Ford, Hubert James. Interstate 40 through North Nashville: A Case Study in Highway Location Decision-Making. N.p.: U of Tennessee, n.d. 30. Print
Figure 6 A photograph of the Ritz Movie theatre before it closed down because of highway construction. N.d. Metro Nashville Archives, Nashville, Tennessee 4 Me- An African American Community’s Fight over I-40. Web. 9 Dec. 2015.
Figure 7: This image from 1970 shows 6 foot tall fences that were erected around the homes and businesses during the time of construction. Ellis, Jimmy. 1970. The Tennessean, Nashville. Tennessee 4 Me-An African American Community’s Fight over I-40. Web. 9 Dec. 2015.
Figure 8: Mapping out the 2010 census data in North Nashville reveal that this area of North Nashville is predominately African-American (green) and almost completely racially isolated from the other parts of Nashville. Due to gentrification, I expect these demographics of this area to change. Source: Image Copyright, 2013, Weldon Cooper Center for Public Service, Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia (Dustin A. Cable, creator).
Figure 9: This image shows part of Interstate-40’s underpass which has columns that showcase the extraordinary efforts that many African Americans have made. This underpass now serves as a homage to the Civil Rights Movement, and Nashville’s role in it, Nashville. Personal photograph by author. 2016.
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