THE MISSING CONNECTION: TRUST IN LEGISLATURES IN LATIN AMERICA

By

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To Antonio,

In many ways, this is the result of a collective enterprise

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INTRODUCTION

Legislatures are among the least trusted political institutions in the world; but they are the heart of liberal democracy: no legislatures, no democracy. How are democracies to survive and prosper if citizens distrust one of its bedrock institutions? With this preoccupation in mind, this dissertation relies on a multi-method approach to explore the determinants of trust in legislatures in 18 countries of Latin America,[1] the region of the world where legislatures are trusted the least.

This introductory chapter begins with a brief discussion of the reasons for studying trust in legislatures among Latin American citizens, followed by an outline of the theory proposed. Next, a description of the data and methods employed is presented. Last, in the final section, a road map of the dissertation is provided.

Why It Matters

Low levels of trust in institutions of representation can hurt the prospectus for democracy in several ways. Distrusting citizens are more likely to seek access to politics by non conventional ways such as contacting politicians directly or through direct action, or by voting for outsiders and anti-party or anti-establishment parties (Dalton and Weldon

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[1] The countries are: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela.

2005). On the other hand, individuals who trust their institutions of representation are more prone to reject authoritarian regimes than their less trusting fellow citizens (Mishler and Rose 1996). In extremis, low trust individuals are more supportive of illegal and unconventional forms of political participation (Blakelock 2006; Dalton 2006). Latin America has seen the emergence of electoral authoritarian leaders in the context of weakened institutions of representation, with the cases of Fujimori in Peru and Chavez in Venezuela being paradigmatic examples (Mainwaring, Bejarano, and Leongómez 2006; Mayorga 2006; Tanaka 2006).

The low levels of confidence in political institutions have been deemed a worldwide phenomenon (Dalton 1999; Dalton 2006; Norris 1999b). Legislatures, courts, and presidents receive decreasing levels of support from citizens across the world (Klingemann 1999; Norris 1999a), being legislatures the least trusted political institution (WVS 2006). Although some authors argue that less than optimal levels of trust might actually be good for democracy in the sense that they reflect citizens being critical of their political systems (Norris 1999a) or because they can promote political mobilization (Gamson 1968), the mainstream research points at the low level of trust in political institutions as potentially problematic for consolidating democracy (Dalton 1999; Newton and Norris 2000).

The Missing Connection

Across Latin America, legislative bodies present a lot of variation: they are called different names ("Asamblea" in Costa Rica, "Congreso" in Colombia, or "Parlamento" in

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Uruguay); in Central America they are unicameral, while in the Southern Cone all

legislative bodies are bicameral; their number of members ranges from 57 in Costa Rica

to 599 in Brazil.[2] Despite these differences, Latin American legislatures share a key

feature: the connection between citizens and their institutions of representation is

currently missing, or under risk of being missing. Individuals trust their legislatures very

little; the representational linkage has been or is under serious threat of being broken in

most Latin American countries (Boidi 2008). Political parties and legislatures are usually

blamed for this crisis of political representation (Achard and González 2004; Córdova

Macías 2004; Mainwaring, Bejarano, and Leongómez 2006).

In this context, my research aims at explaining the reasons for this missing

connection between citizens and their institutions of representation. I argue there are four

main determinants of trust in legislatures: citizens' views of the processes that occur

within the institution, the institution's performance as perceived by citizens, the image of

political parties that taints the views toward the legislatures they staff, and the features of

the party systems existing in the countries. More specifically, the depiction of trust I offer

stands on four main hypotheses:

i) *Views of congressional processes: more complex than a paradox*. Citizens'

views toward the processes that take place within the legislature affect the levels of trust

conferred to it. Contrary to previous research pointing to citizens' paradoxical rejection

of congressional democratic processes as the source of disregard for the institution, I

argue that views of these processes actually enhance support for legislatures. Trust in the

parliament only decreases when these processes are perceived as taken to their extreme.

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[2] For a complete list of the main characteristics of the legislative bodies in Latin America see Table I.1 in Annex F.

ii) *Poorly evaluated performance*. Citizens' evaluation of the job done by the legislatures impacts the levels of trust in the institution. The better the evaluation of performance of legislatures and legislators, the higher the levels of trust conferred.

iii) *The contagion from the parties*. Political parties provide the personnel legislatures are staffed with. Therefore, the images individuals have of parties should have some impact on the attitudes they have toward legislatures. The contagion from the parties upon legislatures would operate in a rather straightforward manner: the poorer the images of parties, the lower the confidence in the parliament.

iv) *The party system*. Political parties serve as the link between the represented and their representatives. At the country level, there are certain features of the party system that indicate parties being responsive to their voters and to citizens in general. Therefore, it can be expected that citizens living in polities which such characteristics will tend to trust legislatures more than those living in countries with less responsive parties. Specifically, I argue that the effective number of political parties, their degree of polarization, and the extent to which political parties have stable roots in society, all have an impact upon citizens' levels of trust in legislatures.

Data and Methods

This research relies on a multi-method approach that combines the analysis of public opinion data from 18 countries of Latin America with semi-structured interviews and focus groups. This research design allows me to combine the advantages of large-N approaches with the assets of small-N, qualitative oriented techniques, bringing together

the best of each tradition. Quantitative approaches, by relying on larger number of cases, are more powerful in theory testing and external validity (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994; Lijphart 1971). Qualitative research, on the other hand, has been characterized by focusing attention in few units, allowing to gain deep understanding of each one. In this sense, its main assets are theory development and internal validity (Collier 1995; Mahoney and Goertz 2006; Tarrow 1995). Along the tradition of the discipline, the goal of my research is to explain and to predict behaviors regarding citizens' trust in legislatures. In order to achieve such a goal, I see no better way to go about design than combining the strength of qualitative tools to gain understanding with the potential of quantitative techniques for theory testing and generalization of findings.

Case Selection

Latin America is the region of the world where legislatures are trusted the least. Figure I.1 presents the average levels of trust in legislatures by region of the world from the third and fourth waves of the World Values Survey.[3] Trust in legislatures is expressed as a numeric value that ranges from 0 "No confidence at all," to 100 "A great deal of confidence."[4] Latin America clearly stands out by having the lowest average, almost 25 points below Asia, the region of the world where parliaments are trusted the most.

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[3] In order to maximize the number of countries, the two most recent waves of the World Values Survey are explored. Considering only the last wave yields the same results: Latin America is the region of the world where legislatures are trusted the least.

[4] Individuals were asked to express their degree of confidence in the national parliament in a scale ranging from 1 "A great deal of confidence" to 4 "None at all." The original scale has been inverted for greater values to indicate higher levels of confidence. Also, in order to allow comparison of means values, the inverted values were converted into a 0 to 100 scale, in which 0 indicates "none at all" and 100 "a great deal of confidence."

Figure I.1. Trust in Congress, by region

Latin America is also a region where democracies are still under their way to consolidation, a way that has not been traveled without difficulties, especially for the institutions of representation. In more than one instance during the recent past, citizens of Latin America have gone to the streets to literally "oust" their rulers chanting "Throw them all out, not a single one stays." González (2006) has tallied nine "severe political crises" involving institutional weakening or rupture in seven countries in Latin America to date since 2000 (Paraguay 2000, Peru 2000, Argentina 2001, Venezuela 2003, Bolivia 2003 and 2005, Ecuador 2000 and 2005, and Nicaragua 2005). Even if the clamor to "throw them all out" seems to be a protest against the whole system, a demand to start over, the outrage is directed to the institutions of representative democracy. The targets of the complaint are the political parties and the legislatures, as they are the agents in charge of organizing, channeling, and representing interests in the public sphere. In such a

context, looking at what is driving the public disregard toward legislatures is a key task in order to understand and attempt to fix the broken representational linkage.

The Quantitative Approach

The public opinion data comes from the AmericasBarometer 2008 round by the Latin America Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) of Vanderbilt University. This project has conducted public opinion surveys on political attitudes and behaviors in Latin America since the 1970's. In this research, I employ data for 18 countries: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela. In every country, at least 1,500 nationally representative (urban and rural), face to face interviews were conducted. The data collection took place from December 2007 to April 2008.[5]

As a member of LAPOP, I had the unique opportunity to include a set of questions directly related to the dissertation research.[6] Some of these questions were drawn or adapted from previous studies, while some of them are original. All of them were carefully reviewed by the LAPOP team and were pre-tested on the field in every country, a procedure that aims at ensuring interviewees' understanding of the probe. I personally conducted pre-tests at the initial stages of questionnaire design in Mexico and

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[5] For more details and technical information, see Appendix B.
[6] A set of 8 questions related to attitudes toward congress and political parties was included. A sample questionnaire can be found in Appendix C. The questions exclusively designed for my research are: EPP1, EPP2, EPP3, EC1, EC2, EC3, EC4 and M2 (all of them appear on page 10 in the sample questionnaire).

Venezuela in November 2007, and later on in Honduras in December 2007, and in Uruguay in March 2008.

To the original AmericasBarometer dataset with the public opinion survey, information on institutional features and ecological data for each country have been added. These data come from several different sources. Two research assistants compiled and coded the information during May 2008. Their tasks were carefully explained and directly supervised by me. All the information was collected from at least two different sources in order to guarantee consistency across sources.

The Qualitative Approach

The high-quality standards LAPOP follows on its surveys ensure that the public opinion data is exempt from many of the problems often found when doing public opinion research in Latin America (Seligson 2005). Nonetheless, there are weaknesses that are inherent to the research technique and that posit limitations on the analytical leverage they provide (Zaller and Feldman 1992; Zaller 1992). As Geddes posits it, large-N approaches have many advantages, "multiple regression is an excellent tool for testing hypotheses, it is not always a good image to have in mind when trying to explain something complicated, because it focuses attention in the identification of causal factors rather on how causal factors work" (Geddes 2003, 23). In this sense, more qualitatively oriented techniques offer a nice addition to the research design by allowing more detailed exploration of what is behind individuals when they provide the answers they give in the context of the interview.

With the aim of untangling more than the "top of mind considerations" individuals may be reflecting on their answers, a series of focus groups and semi-structured interviews were carried in Ecuador and Uruguay. Ecuador has clearly been the country where legislatures are trusted the least, which has had serious consequences for its democratic stability (Pachano 2006). At the other extreme, Uruguay is one of the countries were legislatures are trusted the most.[7] Unlike Ecuador, Uruguay has had a long tradition of democratic stability within the frame of an institutionalized party system (González 1995)

The selection of countries so dissimilar in their political features resembles the strategy of most-different case selection (Lijphart 1971; Savolainen 1994). However, the purpose of the selection of these two countries is not to apply a strict comparative method, but to complement the public opinion data analyses by untangling the causal mechanisms behind the hypotheses formulated.

The qualitative methods employed consisted of focus groups and interviews with citizens and elites (scholars, politicians, businessmen) in both countries, but it also went beyond those particular techniques. Fieldwork activities included watching local media, buying and reading local press, talking to taxi drivers and shop dependents, all of which constituted a sort of ethnographic approach (Mason 2002, 55).

Fieldwork took place in Montevideo and Canelones, Uruguay, in May 2007 and February-March 2008, and in Quito, Ecuador, in April 2008.[8] During the first stage of

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[7] The data from the 2006-7 round of AmericasBarometer survey used to craft the research design of this project showed Uruguay as the country where the legislature was trusted the most. The 2008 round data show that Mexico is now where the legislature is trusted the most, with Uruguay in the second place, for a small margin.

[8] Fieldwork activities were approved by Vanderbilt IRB on March 2007 (IRB #070240). A copy of the approval notification can be found in Annex A.

fieldwork in Uruguay, in May 2007, I held several interviews with scholars (3), politicians of all levels of government and partisan background (5), and businessmen (2). Also in 2007 I held three formal interviews with young citizens and one focus group with middle-aged women. In addition to this, I maintained numerous informal conversations with individuals and groups of all socioeconomic extractions. The topic of these talks, as well as that of the more formal interviews, was their attitudes toward the political parties and the legislature. The second stage of fieldwork in Uruguay comprised two focus-groups and countless individual informal interviews. In both focus groups the participants were middle-class, middle-aged adults.

Fieldwork activities in Ecuador were more concentrated. I held four interviews with politicians of all extractions, three interviews with scholars, two interviews with political consultants, and four interviews with businessmen. In addition to that, I held 23 semi-structured interviews with citizens of all social and economic extractions (some of the interviews were individual and some of them were in groups of no more than 3 participants).

Road Map

In the next chapter, a survey of the literature on citizens' attitudes toward parliaments is presented and the main theory of this dissertation is outlined. The chapter begins with an overview of the ways in which citizens' views toward legislatures have been studied worldwide; special attention is paid to the dependent variables often explained and to the several kinds of explanatory factors identified. Later, I make a case

for analyzing trust in legislatures as indicator of support for the institution in the Latin American context, and I develop on the four hypotheses explaining what drives trust in legislatures: citizens' views of the legislative processes, evaluations of congressional performance, images of political parties, and characteristics of the partisan context in which those individual attitudes take place.

Chapter III and Chapter IV are devoted to testing the hypotheses outlined in Chapter II. In Chapter III, I explore the incidence upon trust in legislatures of each of the individual-level factors: views of congressional processes, performance evaluation, and views of political parties. The chapter begins with the discussion of the dependent variable –trust- and its measurement. Next, each of the three main explanatory factors is depicted, and its bivariate relationship with confidence in the legislature discussed. Then, alternative explanations of trust are explored. The chapter ends with a multivariate analysis of the determinants of trust in legislatures in Latin America and the discussion of the main findings. In Chapter IV, I analyze the features of the party system considered key to the development of trust in legislatures among citizens of Latin America: the effective number of political parties, the degree of polarization of the party system, and the extent to which political parties have stable roots in society. The impact of these contextual-level variables is assessed vis-à-vis one another, and the individual-level determinants explored in Chapter III.

Chapter V is the final chapter. It begins with a discussion of the ways in which low levels of trust in legislatures can hurt democracy in contemporary Latin America. A second section discusses a series of actions aimed at improving trust in legislatures given

the findings in the previous chapters. The third and final section discusses new avenues

of research.

CHAPTER II

CITIZENS' ATTITUDES TOWARD LEGISLATURES

The study of citizens' attitudes toward assemblies springs from a broader field of inquiry on representation. The scholarly research on citizens' views toward institutions of representation in general, and legislatures in particular is fragmented. The most comprehensive efforts to link theory and empirical evidence is concentrated in the field of American politics, and therefore circumscribed to the American Congress and its congressmembers (Bianco 1994; Cooper 1999b; Hibbing and Larimer 2008; Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 1995; Kimball and Patterson 1997; Patterson, Boynton, and Hedlund 1969; Patterson and Caldeira 1990; Patterson, Ripley, and Quinlan 1992).

In comparative perspective, most scholarly work has focused on regions of the world other than Latin America, and legislatures are not the center of the analyses; rather, they are often studied as part of a pool of political institutions. An exception to this is Hibbing and Patterson's 1994 piece on trust in the parliaments of the transitional democracies of East and Central Europe (Hibbing and Patterson 1994). The same group of countries is analyzed by Mishler and Rose (1997), although their work targets the broader institutional context, focusing only tangentially on the legislatures. Similarly, Norris (1999b) and Pharr, Putnam, and Dalton (2000), discuss support for legislatures as part of their analysis of citizens' democratic attitudes in industrial democracies.

To my knowledge, views toward Latin American legislatures have been object of little scholarly attention. In their work on the connections between trust and quality of

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democracy in Argentina and Mexico, Cleary and Stokes (2006) contend that those individuals who live in more democratic regions are more trusting of institutions than their fellow citizens, but this, again, is a finding not specific for congress.

Other studies follow exclusively theoretical or descriptive approaches. Thus, Nuñez Nascimiento (2004) explores the current levels of trust in legislatures in Argentina, Brazil, Costa Rica, Colombia, and Chile, but her piece does not go beyond the description of the observed trends. Similarly, Moisés 2005´s essay (Moisés 2005a) discusses the scope and implications of the low levels of confidence in political institutions in Brazil. In another article, the author (Moisés 2005b) suggests that trust in political institutions is driven by performance evaluation of such institutions. The same argument is held by Turner and Martz (1997), who analyze data from the 1995 round of the Latinobarometer on confidence in political institutions in eight countries.

Maiwaring, Bejarano, and Leongómez's thorough study of the reasons behind what they call a crisis of democratic representation is probably the most comprehensive work on the topic for the Latin American context, although only circumscribed to the Andean countries (Mainwaring, Bejarano, and Leongómez 2006). Mainwaring's concluding chapter on the impact that state deficiencies have had upon the decaying levels of trust in political parties and legislatures also points to the performance evaluation explanation for the current low levels of trust (Mainwaring 2006).

The reduced number of previous studies on the topic and the fact that it has never been studied before for the pool of 18 countries here covered, make this dissertation a unique contribution to the ongoing discussion on the role and limits of institutions of representation in the region. The scarcity of previous research, however, pushes the

search for theoretical backgrounds from other contexts, especially from the more prolific research in the field of American politics.

This chapter begins with an overview of the ways in which citizens' views toward legislatures have been studied worldwide. Special attention is paid to the dependent variable often explained and the explanatory factors identified. Next, I propose an analytical framework to look at citizens' attitudes toward legislatures by concentrating in trust as the main dependent variable. I argue that trust is driven by four main forces: citizens' views of the legislative processes, evaluations of congressional performance, images of political parties, and the features of the party system in which those individual attitudes take place.

Citizens' Views of Legislatures

Worldwide, public esteem for legislatures is not widespread. Scholars have identified a series of possible explanations for this disregard for congress, either specific to legislatures or in connection to broader attitudes toward political institutions (looking also at presidents and courts) or institutions of representation (including political parties).

Before digging into the explanations, a mention to what has been explained -that is, the dependent variables involved- is of order. Public appreciation for legislatures has been usually measured in terms of *feeling thermometers* (Asher and Barr 1994; Born 1990; Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 1995; Kimball and Patterson 1997), *job approval* (Asher and Barr 1994; Bowman and Carll Ladd 1994; Durr, Gilmour, and Wolbrecht 1997; Hibbing and Larimer 2003; Hibbing and Larimer 2008; Parker 1977; Patterson and Magleby 1992; Patterson and Caldeira 1990; Patterson, Ripley, and Quinlan 1992), and

trust (Asher and Barr 1994; Cook and Gronke 2005; Cooper 1999a; Hibbing and

Patterson 1994; Mainwaring 2006; Mishler and Rose 1997; Newton 1999; Patterson and

Caldeira 1990; Patterson, Ripley, and Quinlan 1992).[1] As a quick reading of the

references suggests, many of the pieces rely in more than one indicator of esteem.

Besides, each of these dimensions can be either studied regarding the institution itself or

its members. The focus in aggregate trends or individual determinants adds a third

possible categorization for the existing body of research.

Feeling Thermometers toward Legislatures

     Feeling thermometers are widely used in public opinion research as a tool to tap

general feelings toward individuals or institutions. Feeling thermometer questions ask

respondents how warm or favorable they feel toward others, and request that feeling to be

expressed in degrees from 0 (the least warm response) to 100 (the warmest).[2] By offering

such a wide range of options from which to choose, this type of question is praised by

providing information on the direction (favorable or unfavorable) and intensity (how

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[1] But also more complex dependent variables (typically, composite indexes of support) can be found. See Davidson, Roger H., and Glenn R. Parker. 1972. Positive Support for Political Institutions: The Case of Congress. *Western Political Quarterly* 25:600-612. and Patterson, Samuel C., G.R. Boynton, and Ronald D. Hedlund. 1969. Perceptions and Expectations of the Legislature and Support for It. *The American Journal of Sociology* 75 (1):62-76.

[2] Typically, feeling thermometer questions read like this: "I'd like to get your feelings toward some of our political leaders and other people who are in the news these days. I'll read the name of the person and I'd like you to rate that person using this feeling thermometer. You may use any number from 0 to 100 for a rating. Ratings between 50 and 100 degrees mean that you feel favorable or warm toward the person. Ratings between 0 and 50 degrees mean that you don't feel too favorable toward the person. If we come to a person whose name you don't recognize, you don't need to rate that person. Just tell me and we'll move on to the next one. If you do recognize the name, but don't feel particularly warm or cold toward the person, you would rate that person at the 50-degree mark." The Michigan Feeling Thermometer question is accompanied by a card where a thermometer is shown. The thermometer is graded and labeled from 0 "Very cold or unfavorable" to 100 "Very warm of favorable feeling" (Alwin 1997).

favorable or unfavorable) of attitudes (Alwin 1997). In this sense, feeling thermometers advantage questions that only offer dichotomous categorical answers (approve or disapprove) which only allow for differentiation of the direction of the attitude, but not its intensity. They also represent an improvement vis-à-vis questions with only three categories (approve, disapprove, or nor approve or disapprove) which allow the expression of neutrality, but do not permit the distinction of intensity.

Feeling thermometers, however, are not exempt from problems. Providing the respondents with several response categories potentially conveys more information, but having so many categories to express the feelings might result overwhelming. The use of these scales, thus, might project an exaggerated precision about individuals' attitudes. Nonetheless, feeling thermometers have been proved to be more reliable that 7-point scales (Alwin 1997).

Despite the wealth of information they provide and their reliability, feeling thermometers have a downside that goes beyond the technicalities of the measurement and how many categories scales should have. By definition, the feeling thermometer questions are broad; they provide very little guidance to the interviewee on what kind of feelings he is expected to report. What is it to feel warm toward an individual or an institution? According to what standards should they report how favorable they feel? It can be argued that this lack of constrains is a good thing because it does not frame interviewees in any particular way. However, if the aim is to ascertain what the determinants of such feelings are, then the broad questions might not be a good idea. The broader the question, the wider the range of aspects individuals might be considering at the time of providing an answer. And the broader the scope of considerations brought to

mind by different individuals, the harder it will be to find patterns of causality in the aggregate.

Thus, feeling thermometers seem to work all right for describing patterns of attitudes, but scholars rely less on them when it comes to explanation. As a matter of fact, of the four pieces above cited utilizing feeling thermometers, only two of them (Asher and Barr 1994; Born 1990) include these in the multivariate analyses.

Job Approval

Job approval questions are the most commonly used proxy to citizens' sentiments toward legislatures in the field of American politics. These questions aim at knowing how well citizens believe Congress or congresspersons have done their job. Typically, the questions contain a time frame ("lately," "the last few months," "the past year") in order to help the interviewee to provide a current evaluation (as opposed to a life-time evaluation). The format of the questions is rather standard, asking for an evaluation of the job being done and providing the interviewee with an ordinal or interval scale to rate it. [3]

Whatever their specific format, questions on job approval ratings provide a narrower frame to interviewees than feeling thermometers. The reference to the "job" stresses that the question is about performance evaluation, therefore giving the

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[3] Some examples: "How strongly do you approve or disapprove the way Congress is handling its job?" Scores range from 1, "strongly disapprove," to 4, "strongly approve" (Patterson, Ripley and Quinlan 1992, 316). "Generally speaking, how would you evaluate the job the United States Congress has been doing in the last few months? Has it been doing an excellent job, a good job, a fair job, or a poor job?" (Kimball and Patterson 1997, 705). "How would you rate the job done this past year by Congress- excellent, pretty good, only fair, or poor? (Patterson and Caldeira 1990, 27). "In general, do you strongly approve, approve, disapprove, or strongly disapprove of the institution of the US. Congress, no matter who is in office?" "What about the 535 members of Congress?" (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 1995, 166).

respondents hints on what considerations bring to mind in order to answer (Zaller 1992).

In this sense, the stimulus presented to the respondent is clearer than in the feeling

thermometers, constricted to one dimension: job.

On the other hand, the specificity of the job approval might be problematic in that

it is too closely bounded to short-term contextual assessments. The opinions reported are

"weakly crystallized" for many respondents, and they are rather unstable opinions

(Patterson and Caldeira 1990, 28). Thus, for the job approval ratings to be reliable,

several longitudinal measurements are necessary. Data availability, therefore, results in

an obstacle for utilizing the job approval measurements beyond the United States, where

there exists a long series of data points for the variable.

Trust

Trust is the least popular of the indicators of support for congress in the United

States, but it is, nonetheless, more widely used in comparative research. The fact that

trust presents less variance than the performance evaluation measures (Patterson and

Caldeira 1990, 30) makes it more suitable for cross-country comparisons for which

several data points of the same variable are usually unavailable.

Typically, trust questions request the interviewee to express to what extent he

trusts his country's legislature or what degree of confidence he has on it.[4] Some studies,

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[4] Some examples: "In order to get ahead, people need to have confidence and to feel that they can trust
themselves and others. To what degree do you think that you trust [the parliament] totally, to a certain
point, little, or not at all?" (Hibbing and Patterson 1994, 591); "There are many different institutions in this
country, for example, the government, courts, police, civil servants. Please show me on this 7-point scale,
where 1 represents great distrust and 7 represents great trust, how much is your personal trust in each of the
following" (Mishler and Rose 1997, 430); "How much confidence do you have in the following institutions
– a great deal, quite a lot, some, or very little?" (Cooper 1999a, 190)

though, ask about trust or confidence in congressmembers.[5] Trust in the legislature as an institution, however, cannot be carelessly equated to trust in its members, since individuals tend to have more positive views of the institution than of its members (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 1995, 45). Moreover, they tend to better evaluate their own representative than the whole body of congressmembers (Asher and Barr 1994; Born 1990; Fenno 1975; Patterson and Magleby 1992).

Trust in legislatures not only provides a more stable measurement of feelings toward the institution, it is probablythe best measure to reflect deeper, enduring attitudes or diffuse support for the institution (Easton 1965; Easton 1975), a measurement of greater relevance when assessing the consequences of trust. As argued by Lowenberg and Patterson, "[t]his part of the attitude toward legislatures is theoretically of great significance, since it can be a source of public commitment to the institution through good times and bad and a basis for public compliance with the enactments of the legislatures whether they are liked or not" (Lowenberg and Patterson 1979, 285-6). In this regard, trust or confidence in the institution cannot be equated to performance evaluation of it. As it will be argued in the next paragraphs, the different nature of these variables also speaks to their role in the causal explanation of support for legislatures: while trust is an indicator of support, performance evaluation can be one of its causes.

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[5] "As far as the people running Congress are concerned, would you say you have a great deal of confidence, only some confidence, or hardly any confidence at all in them?" (Patterson and Caldeira 1990, 27).

Determinants of Citizens' Views toward Legislatures

A survey of 16 scholarly pieces that analyze support for legislatures through multivariate procedures lends to more than 80 independent variables (potentially) shaping sympathy toward parliaments.[6]

Many of these independent variables are similar in nature. In fact, after collapsing different operationalizations of the same variable and leaving aside the interaction terms, the actual number of independent variables can be reduced and grouped in eight categories: performance evaluation, nature of legislatures, perceptions toward other political institutions, personal experience with the legislature, some classic attitudinal variables, sociodemographic characteristics, contextual factors, and "other" variables that do not fit in any of the previous groups.

Performance evaluation

Citizens' evaluations of the job done by the legislatures affect their attitudes toward them. Congressional approval leads to warmer feelings (Born 1990) and to more trust (Cook and Gronke 2005). In addition to that, the extent to which legislatures fulfill citizens' expectations about them has also been found to have explanatory power; the

---

[6] The survey covers scholarly work on attitudes toward legislatures that present multivariate analyses of the determinants of such attitudes. It includes studies on feeling thermometers, job approval ratings, and trust; focus on the institution and on congressmembers; and pieces that deal exclusively with American institutions as well as cross-country studies. The pieces surveyed are: Asher and Barr 1994; Born 1990; Cook and Gronke 2005; Cooper 1999b; Davidson and Parker 1972; Durr, Gilmour, and Wolbrecht 1997; Hibbing and Larimer 2003; Hibbing and Patterson 1994; Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 1995; Kimball and Patterson 1997; Mainwaring 2006; Mishler and Rose 1997; Parker 1997; Patterson, Boynton, and Hedlund 1969; Patterson and Caldeira 1990; and Patterson, Ripley and Quinlan 1992.

more citizens see their expectations fulfilled, the more they support (Patterson, Boyton, and Hedlund 1969) and approve of the institution (Kimball and Patterson 1997).

Furthermore, approval ratings of legislatures go up when individuals like the policies passed by them (Hibbing and Larimer 2003) and feel warmer toward senators (Patterson, Ripley, and Quinlan 1992). In some studies, positive evaluations of the incumbent legislator also lead to higher approval of parliament (Kimball and Patterson 1997).

Personal Experience with the Legislature

The evidence about the effects of personal contact with the representatives is mixed. Patterson, Ripley, and Quinlan (1992) found that contact with the legislator actually decreased the levels of approval of the institution. One possible explanation to this is that had they been satisfied with the job done by the legislature, individuals would not have to contact her in the first place. On the other hand, personal contact with the incumbent or her team was found to have a positive impact upon feeling thermometers of members (Asher and Barr 1994; Born 1990) and upon their job approval (Asher and Barr 1994). And, conversely, past contact with the challenger is negatively related to both feeling thermometer and approval of current members (Asher and Barr 1994).

Nature of Congress

Scholars have pointed out that there is something inherent to the nature of legislatures that hurts the way in which citizens look at them: "… the very activities that

characterize Congress and the legislative process –deliberation, debate, and decision making- cause it to appear quarrelsome, unproductive, and controversial, and thus diminishing it in the public eye" (Durr, Gilmour, and Wolbrecht 1997, 176). As a matter of fact, those individuals who see little value in debate and little need for compromise approve legislatures less than their fellow citizens (Hibbing and Larimer 2003). The counterbalance function that legislatures are called to perform is also troubling in the public eye in the American context: facing a presidential veto bolsters the approval of the institution, but overriding the veto lowers it (Durr, Gilmour, and Wolbrecht 1997).

There is some evidence that legislatures are liked the least when they work the most: the more major bills passed and the more intra congress conflict, the least the approval (Durr, Gilmour, and Wolbrecht 1997). But not everything is bad news for parliaments: the more professionalized they are perceived and the better the representation they are thought to engage in, the higher the approval (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 1995).

Perceptions toward other Political Institutions

Perceptions toward other political institutions, especially the president, have been found to significantly affect attitudes toward legislatures. In the United States and Latin American presidential systems, the president is the most salient political actor, so attitudes toward him are likely to spillover to other institutions. Performance evaluation of the president has been found to increase support for the legislature (Davidson and Parker 1972), performance evaluation (Asher and Barr 1994, Kimball and Patterson 1997), and trust (Cook and Gronke 2005). Similarly, presidential popularity bolsters

congressional approval, but has no significant impact upon trust in congressmembers (Patterson and Caldeira 1990).

Positive feelings toward other political institutions impact perceptions on legislatures as well. Trust in legislatures increases with trust in government and with trust in the most relevant political parties (Hibbing and Patterson 1994), and so does performance evaluation (Asher and Barr 1994). Good images of politicians also boost positive attitudes toward legislatures. The perceptions of lack of corruption in government and perceptions of politicians not being greedy increase trust in legislative bodies (Hibbing and Patterson 1994).

Classical Attitudinal Variables

A myriad of variables commonly assessed as determinants of attitudes toward institutions has been analyzed as potential determinants of views of legislatures. Attitudes toward other citizens and political parties, perceptions of the economy, political knowledge, sense of political efficacy, and political involvement have all been discussed as causes of attitudes toward parliaments.

Thus, citizens who trust other citizens more are more likely to trust legislatures (Cook and Gronke 2005; Mainwaring 2006). And similarly, those with bonds to political parties (those who have a partisan identification) tend to approve legislators more (Patterson, Ripley, and Quinlan 1992) and to trust more (Cook and Gronke 2005); in some cases, it has been demonstrated that partisan identification with a party other than the one holding the majority in the legislature actually leads to coldest views in feeling thermometers (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 1995; Kimball and Patterson 1997).

There is some mixed evidence of the impact of the strength of partisan identification. Cook and Gronke (2005) found that the stronger the partisan feeling, the more individuals trust political institutions. However, in other studies the relationship between the strength of partisanship and sympathy toward legislatures does not attain statistical significance (Kimball and Patterson 1997; Patterson, Ripley and Quinlan 1992). Similarly, ideological self-placement in the liberal-conservative continuum reaches statistical significance in some models (Born 1990; Cook and Gronke 2005; Hibbing and Larimer 2003) while not in others (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 1995; Kimball and Patterson 1997; Patterson, Ripley, and Quinlan 1992). And the strength of the ideological self-placement does not achieve statistical significance in any of the models that include it (Kimball and Patterson 1997; Patterson, Ripley and Quinlan 1992).

Again, the evidence is mixed regarding political knowledge and political awareness, being positively associated with support for legislatures in some models (Asher and Barr 1994), resulting non significant in others (Asher and Barr 1994; Hibbing and Patterson 1994; Kimball and Patterson 1997; Patterson, Ripley, and Quinlan 1992) and yet being negatively related to positive views of parliaments in others (Asher and Barr 1994; Hibbing and Larimer 2003).

Similar patterns of mixed evidence are found for the political involvement and participation indicators (Asher and Barr 1994; Davidson and Parker 1972; Hibbing and Patterson 1994; Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 1995; Kimball and Patterson 1997; Patterson, Ripley, and Quinlan 1992) and for the political efficacy measures (Hibbing and Patterson 1994; Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 1995; Mishler and Rose 1997; Patterson, Ripley, and Quinlan 1992).

On the other hand, and likewise with presidential approval, positive views of the economy –both idiotropic and sociotropic- bolster favorable feelings toward legislatures (Durr, Gilmour, and Wolbrecht 1997; Mainwaring 2006; Mishler and Rose 1997; Hibbing and Patterson 1994; Patterson and Caldeira 1990).

Sociodemographic Variables

Sociodemographic variables do not shed much light upon attitudes toward legislatures: age is non significant in most multidimensional models (Hibbing and Larimer 2003; Kimball and Patterson 1997) nor are race (Hibbing and Larimer 2003; Kimball and Patterson 1997; Patterson, Ripley, and Quinlan 1992) or gender in all (Hibbing and Larimer 2003; Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 1995; Kimball and Patterson 1997; Mainwaring 2006) but one study (Mishler and Rose 1997) . In the same way, income turns non significant in the analyses (Hibbing and Larimer 2003; Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 1995; Kimball and Patterson 1997; Patterson, Ripley, and Quinlan 1992).

On the other hand, the impact of education upon congressional approval has been nonsignificant in most cases (Hibbing and Larimer 2003; Kimball and Patterson 1997; Patterson, Boynton, and Hedlund 1969), but it has been found to bolster support for the institution insome studies (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 1995; Mainwaring 2006) and to decrease it in others (Asher and Barr 1994; Cook and Gronke 2005).

Contextual Factors

Political and economical conditions have also been found to affect the public mood toward legislatures. Unfavorable economic conditions such as unemployment affect negatively both trust and approval of legislatures (Parker 1972; Patterson and Caldeira 1990). Occurrence of scandals also decreases support for the institution (Durr, Gilmour, and Wolbrecht 1997), and corruption was found to decrease trust in legislatures in the Andes (Mainwaring 2006). On the other hand, there is evidence that when the whole system is threatened from the outside, the "rally around the flag" effect is observed regarding attitudes toward legislatures and its members (Parker 1977).

The media also exerts effects in the aggregate level: the more positive media coverage of congress, the higher the approval of the institution (Durr, Gilmour, and Wolbrecht 1997). Conversely, appreciation for the institution decays with negative media coverage (Patterson and Caldeira 1990).

Other contextual variables frequently included in multivariate models that attempt to explain support for legislatures are: the existence of a divided government and support for legislation promoted by the president (Patterson and Caldeira 1990).

Other Variables

Other variables tested in different models –all of them found to bolster appreciation for legislatures- include perceived increased freedom, and perceived increased fairness in the country (Mishler and Rose 1997), satisfaction with democracy (Hibbing and Patterson 1994), and salience of international issues (Patterson and Caldeira 1990).

This brief survey of the literature seems to point out that everything matters in shaping citizens' attitudes toward legislative bodies. Even when not the more than 80 independent variables operate the same way for the more different dependent variables discussed, the number of explanations is still overwhelming. The first step toward parsimony seems to be determining what the most appropriate dependent variable to focus on is, to explain attitudes toward legislatures in the Latin American context. Once that task is accomplished, then it is of order to move to the discussion of its most relevant determinants. Such is the aim of the final section of this chapter.

A Theory of Trust in Legislatures in Latin America

Why Trust?

> *Trust is the chicken soup of social life. It brings all sorts of good things [...]*
> *Yet, like chicken soup, it appears to work somewhat mysteriously.*
> (Uslaner 2002,1)

The study of trust has entertained scholars for a good time now. Trust in government, trust in politicians, and trust in other citizens have been studied as cause and consequence of all good things that take place within democracies. We know trust matters (Citrin 1974; Hetherington 1998; Hetherington 2005; Miller 1974), and we know it is a positive value (Uslaner 2001, but see Gamson 1968). But, as Uslaner points out, in which ways it matters it is somewhat more difficult to ascertain.

In this piece, trust is conceived as a demonstration of *support* for legislatures in Easton's terms (Easton 1965; Easton 1975). Trust can be conceived as an expression of

"… a reservoir of favorable attitudes or good will that helps members to accept or tolerate outputs to which they are opposed or the effect of which they see as damaging to their wants," which is how diffuse support has been defined by Easton (Easton 1965, 273).

This does not mean, however, that I argue trust is how support for legislatures should be operationalized. The concept of support is too complex to allow for single-variable indicators (Easton 1965, Easton 1975). Previous efforts to empirically measure system support have relied on several indicators (Klingemann 1999) or composite indexes of legitimacy or regime support (Finkel, Muller, and Seligson 1989; Seligson 2002). Scholars interested in measuring support for legislatures in particular have also devised rather complex composite measures of it (Boynton and Loewenberg 1973; Davidson and Parker 1972; Mishler and Rose 1994; Patterson, Boynton, and Hedlund 1969).

Trust in legislatures, therefore, is here conceived as *one* expression of diffuse support for legislatures. Following Carlin (2008), trust in the legislature is understood as the citizens' belief in trustworthiness of the national legislature.

The discussion in the previous section has suggested that trust is the most appropriate dependent variable to explore in order to ascertain citizens' views toward legislatures. It is such for both, theoretical and practical reasons. At the theoretical level, trust is a wide-encompassing measure of support that allows for digging into general orientations toward the institution. Unlike the broader feeling thermometers that potentially tap into a myriad of attitudes, however, trust points to a specific attitude. On the practical side, trust has proven to be a more stable variable than other indicators of

esteem for legislatures (Patterson and Caldeira 1990), thus using single data points for trust seems a reasonable choice.

The Missing Connection: Its Causes

I argue there are four main determinants of trust in legislatures: citizens' views of the processes that occur within the institution, the institution's performance as perceived by citizens, the image of political parties that taints the views toward the legislatures they staff, and the features of the party systems existing in the countries. More specifically, the depiction of trust I offer stands on four main hypotheses:

i) *Views of congressional processes: more complex than a paradox*. In contravention to the theories pointing to citizens' paradoxical rejection of congressional democratic processes as the source of disregard for the institution, I argue that views of these processes actually enhance support for legislatures. Trust in the parliament only decreases when these processes are perceived as taken to their extreme.

ii) *Poorly evaluated performance*. Citizens' evaluation of the job done by the legislatures impacts the levels of trust in the institution. The better the evaluation of performance of legislatures and legislators, the higher the levels of trust conferred. And, on the contrary, poorer performance evaluation would lead to lower levels of trust.

iii) *The contagion from the parties*. Political parties provide the personnel legislatures are staffed with. Therefore, the images individuals have of parties should have some impact on the attitudes they have toward legislatures. The contagion from the

parties upon legislatures would operate in a rather straightforward manner: the poorer the images of parties, the lower the confidence in the parliament.

iv) *The party system*. Political parties serve as the link between the represented and their representatives. At the country level, there are certain features of the party system that indicate parties being responsive to their voters and to citizens in general. Therefore, it can be expected that citizens living in polities which such characteristics will tend to trust legislatures more than those living in countries with less responsive parties. Specifically, I argue that the effective number of political parties, their degree of polarization, and the extent to which political parties have stable roots in society all have an impact upon citizens' levels of trust in legislatures.

Views of Congressional Processes: More Complex than a Paradox

Previous research on the link between citizens' views of the democratic procedures that take place in congress and esteem for the institution have resorted to an explanation I have called the *Paradox of Democratic Representation:* citizens would not like legislatures because they do precisely what they were intended to: deliberate and operate as a counterbalance to presidential power (Durr, Gilmour, and Wolbrecht 1997; Hibbing and Larimer 2003; Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 1995). Unlike the judiciaries, legislatures are open and transparent institutions; virtually everything that takes place within them can be observed by citizens (Caldeira 1986; Hibbing and Larimer 2003). Parliamentary politics are, thus, "painfully visible for all to see" (Hibbing and Larimer 2008, 9).

This is not a novel idea; scholars first pointed this out more than three decades ago (Davidson and Parker 1972; Parker and Davidson 1979). The obstacles that the nature of the institution represents for its gaining of public esteem have been acknowledged in many pieces on attitudes toward legislatures (Hibbing and Larimer 2008; Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 2002; Mann and Ornstein 1994; Patterson and Magleby 1992). Surprisingly, however, it has been empirically tested in just a few, yielding significant results in all of them. (Durr, Gilmour, and Wolbrecht 1997; Hibbing and Larimer 2003; Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 1995)

There is, nonetheless, a qualification to the argument. The force driving the disregard for assemblies would not be their democratic processes in the abstract, but the way in which they are actually carried out; "…it is not what government does but how it does it that seems to be telling" (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 2001, 244). Along the same lines, Funk argues there are two dimensions of public disregard for debate: one arises from the conflictive nature of the debate, but the other refers to the disregard for the way elites perform it (Funk 2001).

I argue, however, that the *Paradox* argument needs further specification. Advocates of the *Paradox* overlook the fact that citizens might have differential attitudes toward different exercises of the key congressional practices: some debate could be acceptable, even desirable in many citizens' minds, but if deliberative practices are perceived to last forever with no consequences, then, their views of one of the keystone of parliaments should be tinted of negative feelings. The evidence from the focus groups points to a certain level of desired debate and confrontation:

> Sometimes, when the issue at stake is worthy, [debate] it is important; the discussions
> have to be important. But I believe that what is under discussion sometimes is not very

technical, they end up being trapped into politics and not [paying attention] to the
technicalities.

Participant Group 2, Uruguay

That all of them [congressmembers] agree? No! No way!

Participant Group 2, Uruguay

Thus, it would not be that citizens reject congressional practices *tout court,* but only when they perceive such practices at their extreme. Therefore, views of a congress that debates and controls the president do not have to hurt levels of confidence in the institution –on the contrary, they might enhance them, given that the legislature is doing what it is supposed to by constitutional mandate. However, views of a parliament in which there is *too much debate* and *too much confrontation* with the executive, and that is therefore known for what it prevents rather from what it does, will impact negatively in the levels of support for the institution.

Poorly Evaluated Performance

Besides the *processes* that citizens observe, the *products* of those processes are also an input for general attitudes toward parliaments. Thus, *what* it is that legislatures produce before the citizens' eyes–regardless of *how* they do it- should also affect the levels of confidence in them.

Scholars have encountered that trust in government is affected by dissatisfaction with its outcomes (Citrin 1974; Dionne 1991; Fiorina 1992; Miller 1974). Likewise, appreciation for legislatures has been found to be primarily driven by evaluations of its

outcomes (Parker 1977). Citizens would not be happy with what comes out of legislatures and those negative feelings lower their level of appreciation for the institution.

One of the grounds for evaluation of performance is the type of legislation passed by congress. If citizens see it as self-interested or irrelevant, then their levels of confidence in the institution should decay.

> What we heard of representatives is that they raise their salaries and their vacation time. They do not realize we all need money!
>
> *Interviewee A4, Ecuador*

> There is not a single transcendental thing that congress has done that you would say "How great!"
>
> *Interviewee E3, Ecuador*

Previous research has found that the low levels of esteem toward political institutions would be driven by the unfulfilled expectations regarding their performance (Achard and González 2004; Pharr 2000b). When this thesis is applied to legislatures, it has been found that the difference between expectations and actual perceived performance generates dissatisfaction with the institution and negatively affects its evaluation (Kimball and Patterson 1997; Patterson, Boynton, and Hedlund 1969).

Under some conditions, the poor approval might be due to inaccurate –often magnified- expectations about what a legislature is supposed to do. Those aggrandized hopes might be fed by the legislators themselves:

> People do not know what a representative does. There are candidates that offer public works, the little soccer field, the school, the bus stop, a roof for the community meetings hall. And they win [the election]. And when they become representatives they cannot do those works, because representatives have other duties.
>
> *Interviewee E2, Ecuador*

Accurate or not, citizens' expectations about what legislatures should do shape their general views of it. Fulfilled expectations will bolster the confidence deposited in the institution. Conversely, when citizens perceive legislatures have failed in what they expected from them then trust levels will be negatively affected.

The Contagion from the Parties

Political parties are what legislatures are stuffed with. In most countries, individuals obtain seats in congress only in partisan basis.[7] And parties are often the most visible face of legislatures, even more than individual legislators might be. Therefore, what individuals think of political parties should influence how they see the legislatures they fulfill. Astonishingly, however, views of parties have been mostly absent in explanations of esteem for parliaments.

Some scholars argue that partisan identification with the political party that holds the congressional majority should be associated with more favorable views of the legislature. The expectation is that those identified with such a party should feel closer to the institution because they have more favorable feelings toward those who staff it. (Keele 2005; Richardson, Houston, and Hadjiharalambous 2001). The empirical evidence supports this hypothesis (Cook and Gronke 2005; Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 1995; Kimball and Patterson 1997; Patterson, Ripley, and Quinlan 1992). Others argue,

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[7] Although some countries do allow independent candidates to run for congressional office. Those countries are: Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Honduras, Paraguay, and Venezuela (AceProject 2008).

however, that partisanship should only have mild influence toward views of the legislatures (Hibbing and Larimer 2003), pointing to the fact that partisanship is relevant only to certain groups of the citizenry (Hibbing and Larimer 2008).

Hibbing and Larimer's (2008) assertion that partisanship is relevant only for a subset of individuals holds true for Latin America. According to the AmericasBarometer 2008, partisans are less than one third of Latin Americans (33%), and they can be as few as 16% in some countries, like in Ecuador. Thus, even when partisanship might affect the way citizens see legislatures, there are other, more universal attitudes toward political parties that might affect the levels of confidence in legislatures as well.

The conventional wisdom is that parties do a poor job (Córdova Macías 2004). They are considered self-absorbed and away from people, and they are seen as corrupt entities. Theses views of parties cannot but hurt confidence in legislatures.

Individuals view parties as organizations pursuing only their own objectives. As an interviewee puts it:

> Each party works for itself, for its own benefit.
> *Interviewee A11, Ecuador*

Even if they are perceived as helping someone, they are thought to do so because they would obtain some benefit from it. Not infrequently parties are seen as co-opted by big interests:

> During the past 30 or 40 years, political parties in Ecuador have been job placement agencies, lobbying agencies, agencies that allowed interests to flow from political parties. You could identify –you still can- what party backed which bank or business.
> *Interviewee E1, Ecuador*

These images of distant parties are fostered by the perception that they get

close to citizens only when elections get close to them:

> Only during campaign they [the political parties] reach out to talk to the
> people.
>
> *Interviewee A1, Ecuador*

> They think only of themselves. They only come to request the vote.
>
> *Interviewee A3, Ecuador*

> I have never felt represented. I see they have their careers, they are very well
> paid, they have their own prerogatives… And well, that is what they do. They do
> not take into account people's opinions.
>
> *Participant Group 2, Uruguay*

If parties fail to provide the representational link they are supposed to in a

democratic polity (Sartori 1976), then it seems reasonable for individuals to transmit the

arising frustration to the institution that typically holds them: the parliament. One of the

young politicians interviewed in Ecuador exposes this idea very clearly:

> Congress is a reflection of what politicians, political parties, and the
> political structure of the country are. If we have decaying political parties, with
> people linked to corruption episodes, well, that is the congress we have: it is the
> collection of those people.
>
> *Interviewee E14, Ecuador*

The generalized poor images of political parties need to be improved for citizens

to regain esteem in the legislatures where they operate. For this to happen, it seems

necessary for parties to do a better job and establish a closer representation link with their

constituents.

The Party System

The role of institutions has lately come to center stage in explaining citizens' political attitudes and behaviors (Helmke and Levistky 2006; Norris 1999b; Norris 2004). Formal and informal institutions provide the framework in which citizens relate to each other and to political institutions (North 1990, 3-6), therefore circumscribing the possibilities for those relationships.

Previous research has found that the type of system –whether parliamentary of presidential- makes a difference in the dynamics through which system support and confidence in legislatures are shaped (Criado and Herrero 2007). There is no, however, conclusive evidence regarding what type of system leads to greater support (Anderson and Guillory 1997; Norris 1999b). In Latin America all regimes are presidential, which prevent us from engaging in the analyses of the impact of type of regime

However, Latin American countries differ greatly in other institutional characteristics, such as the party system. At the country level, there are certain features of the party system that indicate parties being responsive to their voters and to citizens in general. Therefore, it can be expected that citizens living in polities with such characteristics will tend to trust legislatures more than those living in countries with less responsive parties.

The number of political parties with representation in the legislative assembly shapes the way in which the body operates. In multi-party systems, legislative bargains and negotiations can take long, since there are (perhaps too) many positions to conciliate. As one interviewee puts it:

> There are too many [parties]. In the Unites States there are only two. Here, we should have two. Otherwise, they do not reach agreements. When one says "this," the other says "that."
>
> *Interviewee A1, Ecuador*

Therefore, as the number of political parties with seats in the assembly increases, so would the disaffection with the institution that hosts them, probably seen as unproductive or, at least, inefficient. Similarly, as the political positions in the assembly are polarized, gridlock will be the most probable outcome and therefore support for the institution will decay (Norris 1999b).

Finally, when a stable party system exists, it means that competition for representation has been routinized (Kuenzi and Lambright 2005). If parties have stable roots in society, it means they are meaningful to citizens and that they are accomplishing (at least partially) their expected functions (otherwise citizens would not continue voting for them, or identifying with them). Thus, I expect to find greater levels of trust in legislatures among those individuals living in polities where political parties have stable roots in society.

CHAPTER III

TRUST IN LEGISLATURES: MORE COMPLEX THAN A PARADOX

In the previous chapter it was argued that the relationship between citizens' views of the processes that take place in the Legislature and their expressed lack of support for the institution might be more complex than previous theorizing has argued and empirical research has found. I argue instead that it is not that citizens reject the democratic practices that take place in Congress *tout court*, but only when they perceive those practices to be excessive. In other words, they do not support democracy when its practices are viewed as extreme or at least excessive. Rather, as Aristotle argued long ago, citizens prefer all things "in moderation," which is, after all, the argument that Almond and Verba made in the classical work that began all modern research on political culture (Almond and Verba 1963).

I have also argued that if confidence in the legislatures is built at least partially on the basis of its outcomes, then performance evaluation of the institution and of those who staff it should affect such confidence. I hypothesize that positive evaluations of legislators and positive views of political parties would increase the overall level of support for the institution, as expressed by the level of confidence in it.

This chapter explores citizens' attitudes in all these three dimensions: congressional processes, performance evaluation of legislatures, and views of political parties; their impact upon trust in parliaments is assessed. It begins with the discussion of the dependent variable –citizen trust- and its measurement. Next, each of the three main

explanatory factors is depicted, and its bivariate relationship with confidence in the legislature discussed. Then, alternative explanations of trust are explored. Finally, the chapter ends with the multivariate analysis of the determinants of trust in legislatures in Latin America and the corresponding discussion of the main findings.

Trust in Legislatures in Latin America

Low levels of confidence in political institutions have been found worldwide (Dalton 1999; Dalton 2006; Norris 1999b). Not only do individuals have very little trust in legislatures, courts, and presidents -the pillar institutions of democracy; they trust them less than they used to (Klingemann 1999; Norris 1999a). In this context, parliaments hold the dubious distinction of being –by far, in many cases- the least trusted national political institution, a position only contested by political parties, the other key institution of representation (Dalton and Weldon 2005; Dalton 2000).

Legislatures have never been the most trusted of the three branches of government; in three of the four waves of survey data available from the World Values Survey (WVS 2006), they have been the least trusted institution (Figure III.1), having surpassed the midpoint of the scale only during the eighties.[1]

---

[1] The World Values Survey asks its respondents the following: "I am going to name a number of organizations. For each one, could you tell me how much confidence you have in them: is it a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very much confidence, or none at all?" Valid results range from 1 "A great deal of confidence" to 4 "None at all." For the data here presented, the original scale was inverted for greater values to indicate higher levels of confidence. Also, in order to allow comparison of means values, the inverted values were converted into a 0 to 100 scale, in which 0 indicates "none at all" and 100 "a great deal of confidence."

Confidence

Period	Legislature	Government	Justice System
1981-1984	51.4		58.4
1989-1993	46.4	44.9	51.6
1994-1999	40.3	44.6	48.7
1999-2004	43.8	49.9	45.8

Legislature Government Justice System

Source: Author's calculation based on World Values Survey

Figure III.1. Confidence in political institutions across the world

The AmericasBarometer data depict the same patterns for Latin America. Legislatures hold the lowest levels of trust (41.3) when compared to the courts (44.6) and the presidents (51.0), the only institution that achieves levels of trust higher –though barely- than the midpoint of the scale (Figure III.2).[2]

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[2] The scores reported are the mean levels of trust in the institutions in a scale that ranges from 0 "Not at all" to 100 "A lot." These values correspond to a recoded version of the original scale that ranged from 1 "Not at all" to 7 "A lot."

To what extent do you trust...?

| | 41.3 | 44.6 | 51.0 |

Legislature   Supreme Court   President

Figure III.2. Trust in political institutions in Latin America

On the Measurement of Trust

Following Carlin (2008), in this research trust in legislatures indicates the belief trustworthiness of the institution; individuals are thought to trust the institution if they see it as a depository of their confidence. This definition is empirically measured by means of a survey question included in the set of questions about trust of the AmericasBarometer, which is preceded by the following statement:

Now we will use a card. This card has a 7 point scale; each point indicates a score that goes from 1, meaning NOT AT ALL, to 7, meaning A LOT. For example, if I asked you to what extent you like watching television, if you don't like watching it at all, you would choose a score of 1, and if, on the contrary, you like watching television a lot, you would indicate the number 7 to me. If your opinion is between not at all and a lot, choose an intermediate score. So, to what extent do you like watching television? Read me the number. *[Make sure that the respondent understands correctly]*.

This introductory statement aims at familiarizing the interviewee with the 1 to 7 scale, what it means, and how it should be used to express his attitudes. The TV example serves to practice the use of the scale, without prompting the confidence questions in anyway.

Individual respondents are handed a card showing a scale as depicted in Figure III.3. As for many other questions in the AmericasBarometer and other public opinion surveys, the use of the card facilitates comprehension of the scale provided to answer.

Figure III.3. Card used in AmericasBarometer survey

Following the same format all questions on trust in institutions have, the question on confidence in legislatures says:

To what extent do you trust the National Congress?[3]

An additional step in helping to ensure comprehension is made by using in each country the word most commonly employed by citizens to refer to the national legislature. Thus, in Argentina the question refers to "Congreso," in Costa Rica to the "Asamblea Legislativa," and in Uruguay to "Parlamento." Likewise, in those countries where local legislatures operate, the question specifies it is about the "national" assembly.

This question aims at measuring *degrees* of confidence in legislatures, one of the ways in which trust in institutions can be and has been approached (Levi and Stoker 2000, 476). Although not specifically designed for this dissertation,[4] the question format shares common ground with that used in other research. It shares the assumption of graded levels of trust -from none to a great deal- with the operationalizations of Hibbing and Patterson (1994) and Cooper (1999a):

> In order to get ahead, people need to have confidence and to feel that they can trust themselves and others. To what degree do you think that you trust [the parliament] totally, to a certain point, little, or not at all? (Hibbing and Patterson 1994, 591)
>
> How much confidence do you have in the following institutions – a great deal, quite a lot, some, or very little? (Cooper 1999a, 190)

The reliance on a 7-point scale rather than on four ordinal categories improves the quality of the question in terms of the alternatives offered to the respondent to express his feelings (Alwin 1997; Cox 1980), and also in terms of reliability (Cox 1980).

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[3] This is question B13 in the AmericasBarometer questionnaire. In Spanish, it reads: "¿Hasta qué punto tiene Usted confianza en el Congreso Nacional?" A sample Spanish questionnaire can be found in Annex C.

[4] The question of trust in legislatures has been part of the trust series of the LAPOP surveys since the 1970s.

Some scholars argue, however, that the continuum from "no trust at all" to "a lot of trust" is incomplete because it offers a truncated range of possibilities (Cook and Gronke 2005, 785). They argue that the negative side of the continuum should be offered as well, allowing for the expression of distrust, as an attitude distinguishable from lack of trust (Cook and Gronke, 785; Mishler and Rose 1997, 420). The supporters of this perspective ask questions like this:

> There are many different institutions in this country, for example, the government, courts, police, civil servants. Please show me on this 7-point scale, where 1 represents great distrust and 7 represents great trust, how much is your personal trust in each of the following. (Mishler and Rose 1997, 430)

One of the strongest arguments in favor of this type of question is that it allows for separating mere *skeptical* from *distrusting* citizens. For instance, Mishler and Rose separate their respondents into trusting (scores of 6 and 7), distrusting (scores of 1 and 2), and skeptical (scores of 3, 4, or 5) (Mishler and Rose 1997, 424).

There are reasons, though, to question this argument in the context of my research. On theoretical grounds, the conceptual definition of trust as the belief in the trustworthiness of the trustee posits the negative end of the continuum in the lack of confidence, equivalent to the "Not at all" option provided in the survey question. It is not the intention of this research to separate the individuals into groups according their type – whether trusting, distrusting, or skeptical- but to dig into how the degrees of trust or confidence in legislatures are shaped.

On a more empirical vein, it is not clear at all how a 7-point scale that ranges from 1 to 7 –as employed by Mishler and Rose (1997) would capture a bipolar range of attitudes toward legislatures, while those typically are measured using a negative to positive scale (in this case, the corresponding would be a -3 to 3 scale). Experimental

research has shown how results drastically change when using only positive as opposed to negative-to-positive scales, even when the same concepts are involved in both (Schwarz et al. 1991).

Thus, even when the conceptualization of a continuum from active distrust to active trust might be an analytical gain for some research enterprises, it does not add theoretical leverage to mine, and its measurement remains, at least, problematic.

Trust in Legislatures

It has been shown that legislatures are the least trusted institution worldwide and also in Latin America (Figures III.1 and III.2). This general picture, however, hides important variations at the country level. Trust in legislatures is at its lowest value in Ecuador, where it only achieves an average of 21.8 points in a 0 to 100 scale, and its highest is Mexico, with 55.6 points (Figure III.4).[5] It is worth noticing than in only five countries does trust in parliaments reach averages above the midpoint of the scale, situated at 50 points. Those countries are: Mexico, Dominican Republic, Uruguay, Colombia, and Chile. The differences at the country level are statistically significant, as shown by the analysis of variance presented in Table III.1.

---

[5] The original values of the 1-7 scale were recoded into a 0-100 scale to facilitate the analysis.

Figure III.4. Trust in legislatures, by country

Table III.1. Analysis of variance. Trust in legislatures by country

Source	Sum of squares	Degrees of freedom	Mean Sum of Squares	F	Prob > F
Between groups	2689524.91	17	158207.348	192.63	0.0000
Within groups	23200483.3	28249	821.285117		
Total	25890008.2	28266	915.941703		

More Complex than a Paradox

The *Paradox of Democratic Representation* refers to the irony that parliaments would be disregarded for doing precisely what they are supposed to do by constitutional mandate: to debate, to deliberate, and to work as a counterbalance of the president. Previous research has shown that the more debate there is in the United States Congress, and the more Congress counterbalances the President, the less citizens approve of the institution (Durr, Gilmour, and Wolbrecht 1997). Similarly, citizens see little value in debate, and therefore they do not approve the institution (Hibbing and Larimer 2003).

Funk's (2001) and Hibbing and Theiss-Morse (2001) argue that popular disregard for this legislative practices does not arise from the practices themselves, in the abstract, but rather by how they are carried out by legislators. If this qualification to the argument is accepted, then the paradox is no longer a paradox: there is nothing inherent in the nature of the activities legislatures must engage in that would make citizens hold them in low esteem. On the contrary, it would be the way in which such practices are actually (mis?) performed that raises the negative feelings toward the institution.

Advancing one step further in this line of reasoning, I argue that citizens view these bedrock congressional activities in a negative light only when they perceive them to be taken to the extreme: when there is too much debate and too much gridlock. And when that is the case, then perceptions about those legislative activities affect support for the institution negatively. Conversely, when citizens see legislative debate and counterbalance within the boundaries of what they deem reasonable, perhaps even

healthy, then positive views about such practices should translate into greater levels of confidence in the institution.[6]

The evidence from the fieldwork suggests that for some citizens it is clear that the parliament needs to engage in debate and control of the executive, and that is even portrayed as an obligation of the institution:

> There has to be dialogue because they have to reach an agreement.
> *Participant Group 2, Uruguay*

For the most sophisticated ones, the link between the legislative activities and a healthy democracy is crystal clear:

> Democracy has to exist. And for democracy to exist and to prevent the executive from having and overwhelming power, then a legislative power has to exist, and it has to fulfill a counterbalance function. It has to investigate, it has to stop [the president] when necessary.
> *Participant Group 2, Uruguay*

But these citizens who claim these practices must be carried out for the institution to function properly are also dissatisfied with the way they have been performed. Even in Uruguay, where –again, according to the evidence from the fieldwork- individuals appear to have higher respect for the institutional practices than in Ecuador, citizens are concerned, sometimes even angry at how legislative debate is taken to the extreme:

> You see…they took school kids to Congress, they sat [in the legislators' seats]. Thus, the kids were really proud of being there, playing that role. A few days later, the gentlemen that occupy the seats engage in a fight, a fistfight.
> *Participant Group 2, Uruguay*

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[6] How much debate or gridlock is too much is a subjective matter, and the thresholds probably vary from one individual to another. What is important for the argument, however, is that once that threshold is passed, then trust is negatively affected by views of congressional processes.

In Ecuador, the complaint about a legislature that debates too much is nearly unanimous. The clash of points of views has at times reached grotesque levels:

> They are all the same; they fight among themselves all the time. I remember once when someone pulled out a gun. And they don't even know what they are fighting for. They should look for solutions, but they do not act in that fashion.
> *Participant Group Interview 4, Ecuador*

Thus, if the predominant view of legislatures is one of excessive confrontation and obstructionism, then it should translate into low levels of confidence. To test this hypothesis, it is first necessary to know how it is that citizens view the legislative activities that raised the argument of the paradox. Two questions were devised to tap citizens' feelings regarding the quintessential activities parliaments perform: one of them aims at attitudes toward discussion and debates, the other toward the check and balance to presidential power.

> To what extent do members of Congress waste time discussing and debating?
>
> To what extent does the national Congress hinder the President's job?

The respondents were asked to express their feelings in a 7-point scale ranging from 1 "Not at all" to 7 "A lot," with the aid of a card as shown in Figure III.3. To facilitate analysis, the original responses were recoded into a $0 - 100$ scale, in which 0 means "Not at all" and 100 means "A lot."

The wording of the question was conceived for it to reflect not the ideal activities assemblies *should* perform in a democratic polity, but the *actual practices* carried out by the institution and its members, with special interest in tapping the *excess* that is key to

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the hypothesis. Simply asking whether there is or should be debate or counterbalance of power posits the risk of obtaining responses in the normative side: "yes, there should be debate in the parliament," "the assembly must operate as a counterbalance to the president." Also, there is the risk of the social desirability effect. Social desirability refers to present oneself in most favorable light possible (Tourangeau, Rips, and Rasinski 2000, 5). Applied to the context of legislative procedures, the social desirability effect might make citizens provide favorable responses toward debates and counterbalance of power just because they think that is the right thing to say.

Thus, the question wording was carefully selected for it to make it clear that the questions were about actual performance of those democratic processes asked about. Some could argue that the framing of the questions is somehow negative ("waste time," "hinder"). The decision to adopt this wording was founded on the aim of elucidating the most negative attitudes toward debates and counterbalance practices. By simply asking whether there are debates or counterbalance activities in the legislature, it is not possible to distinguish among those who view the activities in a favorable light from those who see them negatively (everyone who perceives there is a lot of debate, for instance, would provide a high number in the scale, regardless of whether they see this as a good practice or a bad one). Thus, adding this somehow negative slant or bias allows those who see the current practices of democratic processes in bad light to state it.

Finally, the question about legislative debate could be criticized by some for being double-barreled because it states "discussing and debating." If the two activities were of different nature (for instance, discussing and passing pork barrel legislation) the criticism might be accurate. Discussing and debating, however, are close knitted

activities that go together; they can even be used as synonyms. [7] The decision for using both of them was made aiming at providing the clearest possible frame for interviewees, reinforcing the idea of what was meant to ask.

Excessive Congressional Debate

Citizens of Latin America believe there is excessive congressional debate in the legislatures. The average response for the question "To what extent do members of Congress waste time discussing and debating?" is 67.1 (for a 0-100 possible range), with a standard deviation of 32.1 (for 27,142 cases across the 17 countries). This mean value is far above the midpoint of the scale (50), which indicates most citizens lean toward strong sentiments about congressmembers wasting their time discussing and debating. One third of the sample (33.9%) gave the most extreme possible response: they believe "a lot" congressmen waste their time discussing and debating (Figure III.5).

---

[7] Actually, according to the Merriam-Webster dictionary they are synonyms; the distinction would be that: "discuss implies a sifting of possibilities especially by presenting considerations pro and con […] debate suggests formal or public argument between opposing parties." Merriam-Webster, Dictionary. 2008 [cited September 2008. Available from http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/discuss.]

Figure III.5. Perceived excessive congressional debate, Latin America

When analyzing the individual country data, we find a set of countries in which there is near perfect consensus that legislators waste time in discussion and debate: in El Salvador, Costa Rica, and Nicaragua, the average of agreement with the statement reflecting the waste of time by congressmembers is above 75; that is, it is in the upper quarter of the scale (Figure III.6). Most of the remaining countries show averages between 50 and 75, with the only exception of Venezuela. This country has an exceptionally low average for the context: only 40 points.[8]

---

[8] This figure is not surprising when the actual distribution of power within the Venezuelan legislature is taken into account. All of 167 congressmember are either from the President's party of from a party sympathetic to him (Freidenberg 2007, 75). The lack of opposition surely impacts in the perceived levels of discussion and debate; if they all are on the same side, it is to expect little perceived waste of time in debates.

Figure III.6. Perceived excessive congressional debate, by country

Thus, most Latin American citizens believe their legislators waste too much time discussing and debating. If the hypothesis above stated holds true, the levels of trust in the assembly among those citizens most critical of the excessive congressional debate should be low.

Figure III.7. Trust in legislature by levels of perceived excessive debate, Latin America

Figure III.7 depicts the bivariate relationship between perceived levels of excessive debate and confidence in the assemblies. Contrary to the argument of the *paradox*, the observed relationship is curvilinear. Latin American legislatures are not disregarded as they do what they are supposed to do; rather, confidence increases as the level of perceived time devoted to discussion and debate increases. But this positive relationship holds only to a point, upon which it turns negative. Consistently with my hypothesis about a more complex landscape than that portrayed by the argument of the *paradox,* the negative part of the curve suggests that only when the democratic processes –in this case, debate and discussion- are perceived as carried out in extreme fashion is that support for the institution drops.

The eyeball observed quadratic relationship is confirmed by additional tests. A quadratic fit models the data much better than a linear one (see Figure AIII.1 in Annex F). Furthermore, when the effect of perceived excessive debate upon trust in legislatures is modeled in a polynomial regression function, the quadratic relation is confirmed by the statistical significance of the quadratic term (see Table AIII.1 in Annex F).[9]

The pattern shown in Figure III.7 is striking in terms of what it suggests about citizens' views of congressional democratic practices in Latin America Congressional debate is perceived as excessive by most of them. Even responses in the lower end of the scale indicate they believe, to some extent, that legislators "waste time discussing and debating." That belief, however, does not affect negatively trust in the institution except for when it is perceived as truly excessive.[10] On the contrary, time devoted to discussion and debate, yet framed as a "waste" in the question wording, would be valued positively given that it bolsters confidence in the institution. The relationship between perceived excessive debate and trust in legislatures turns negative only at the highest levels of perceived excessive debate. This indicates, again, that it is not the process itself, but how it is perceived as carried out to the extreme what affects negatively the support for the institution.

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[9] One way of testing a curvilinear relation between variables is to introduce the independent variable of interest as a quadratic term in the model (Agresti and Finlay 1999, 544; Gujarati 2003, 226). In this case, to test the impact of disregard for congressional debate upon trust in legislatures, both disregard for congressional debate and disregard for congressional debate *squared* are introduced as independent variables in a simple OLS model explaining trust in legislatures. As shown in Table AIII.1, the impact of the quadratic term is statistically significant, although the disregard for congressional debate itself does not reach major explanatory power, given the low Adjusted R-Square of the model.

[10] The change of direction in the relation occurs when the slope has a value 0, the point where trust reaches its maximum. This happens when the perception of excessive congressional debate reaches 58. This figure is the result of dividing the negative value of the regression coefficient for perception of excessive congressional debate by twice the value of the coefficient for perception of excessive congressional debate squared (shown in Table AIII.1) as suggested by Agresti and Finlay (1999, 547).

In any case, debates and discussion are only one of the democratic processes that take place in congress. Further confirmation of the hypothesis linking views of those processes and trust in the legislature is sought in the following section.

Excessive Counterbalance Function

The doctrine of separation of powers rules contemporary democracies; in the frame of such institutional arrangement, parliaments are called to oversee and control the executive. Are assemblies punished by the public when perceived playing this role? I argue that such is the case only when they are seen as doing it in excess.

Latin American attitudes toward the role of parliaments as a counterweight to presidential authority seem more moderate than the views they hold toward congressional debate. The average of responses to the question "To what extent does Congress hinder the Presidents' job?" is 48.2, with a standard deviation of 30.1 (for 25,823 interviews). This mean value is slightly lower than the midpoint of the scale (50 points), which suggests that, on average, Latin Americans do not see parliaments as excessively blocking the job of their presidents. As depicted by the histogram shown in Figure III.8, the distribution of responses is approximately normal, with a high concentration of cases among the middle values (56.9% of the sample lies in the three middle values), and few cases found at the extremes.

Figure III.8. Perceived excessive congressional counterbalance, Latin America

The levels of perceived congressional counterbalance vary significantly by country, although the range of variation is smaller than that observed for perceived excessive debate. While in Venezuela, Argentina and Honduras citizens do not seem to see the Congress as a hinder to the President's job, in seven other countries (Costa Rica, Ecuador, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Bolivia, and Guatemala) the perceived function of counterbalance as a hinder reaches averages that surpass the midpoint of the scale (Figure III.9).

I

Country	Value
Costa Rica	56.0
Ecuador	55.5
Brazil	54.6
Chile	53.9
Mexico	52.0
Bolivia	51.7
Guatemala	50.9
Colombia	49.5
Dominican Republic	49.3
Panama	49.2
El Salvador	49.1
Uruguay	45.4
Paraguay	44.8
Peru	44.3
Nicaragua	43.5
Argentina	35.6
Honduras	35.4
Venezuela	32.1

To what extent does Congress hinder the President's job?

Source: AmericasBarometer 2008   N = 25,822

Figure III.9. Perceived congressional counterbalance, by country

When the link between views of excessive congressional counterbalance and trust in legislatures is assessed, the expected relationship is found: trust in legislatures drops only when congressional counterbalance is seen as operating at its extreme.

Figure III.10. Trust in Legislature by perceived congressional counterbalance, Latin America

Trust in legislatures grows as the institution is perceived to be engaged in the control function, but the relationship shifts to the opposite direction after crossing a threshold of perceived counterbalance, after which levels of confidence in the institution drop (Figure III.10). Also in this case, it is not the disregard for the parliamentary democratic process itself what would drive confidence levels low, but the disregard for that process performed in such an extreme manner that it is no longer appreciated.

Also in this case the quadratic relationship is confirmed by the fitted models (Figure AIII.3 in Annex F) and a polynomial regression function (Table AIII.2, also in Annex F). The analysis of the coefficients (presented in Table AIII.2) indicates that the

relationship between the two variables turns negative after values of perceived congressional counterbalance of 60,1.[11]

In citizens' views, then, some counterweight is acceptable, but when it turns to gridlock then it is no longer seen in a positive light:

> [Congress] has to be a counterweight, but it cannot be an obstacle
>
> *Participant Group 1, Uruguay*

> [The issue of counterbalancing] is a serious problem, it [for the Congress] can be a stick in the spokes
>
> *Participant Group 2, Uruguay*

The preceding analysis suggests that Latin Americans do not reject congressional democratic procedures *tout court*, even when they are asked about them in a relatively negative framing. Views of legislatures engaged in debate and in counterweighing the power of the president enhances the levels of trust in the institution. However, when the perceived levels of debate and counterbalance reach high, then the relationship with trust reverses, and it turns negative: too much confrontation (within the legislature and with the president) lowers confidence in the institution.[12]

Hence, there should not be a concern about citizens' rejection of the democratic processes that take place in congress and its consequences for trust. For the most part, perceptions of a legislature engaged in such processes and trust in it rise together. Trust is only hurt when too much debate and too much obstruction to the presidential will is perceived. In this sense, this is good news in terms of perspectives for institutional support. Views of the institutional processes would not be deterministically sabotaged by

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[11] See footnote 9 above.
[12] Although the pattern of relationship between each of the two independent variables and trust is similar, the variables do not add to a unique index. The coefficient of reliability is too low: Cronbach's Alpha 0.528.

its own nature, so they can be enhanced, leading -according to the hypothesis- to higher levels of confidence in it.

Performance Evaluation

Is has just been shown that confidence in legislatures moves with perceptions about how those *processes* are carried out. A second major hypothesis of this research argues that trust is also affected by the views about the *products* of such processes.

An institution that fails to produce the outcomes it is supposed to (or those individuals expect from it) could maintain the confidence of the public in the short term, but consistently low achievement ratings would hurt this link in the mid and long run. Why would citizens trust an institution that fails to provide what it is supposed to? An institution that does not deliver cannot be held worthy of trust for long. Thus, in this section, the focus of the analysis changes from how legislators do their job to how the output of such processes is evaluated.

A positive evaluation about legislative outcomes can enhance support for the institution regardless of how the processes by which that outcome is reached are viewed. In that sense, evaluation of what congress does is an independent explanatory factor of trust. According to the hypothesis about performance evaluation of legislatures, then, the more satisfied citizens are with the job done by the institution, the higher the confidence they will deposit in it.

An Ecuadorian interviewee said he trusted the new Congress more than the older one because

they are passing good laws.
Participant Group Interview A7, Ecuador

Conversely, a participant in one of the focus groups in Uruguay expressed her disappointment with legislators:

There are too many, and they do not do much
Participant Group 2, Uruguay

These views of institutional performance are related to the professed trust: they trust more when they see the institution doing a better job. Three different, complimentary measures of performance evaluation are to be used: importance of the laws passed by congress, job approval of congressmembers, and extent to which citizens' own expectations of parliament are fulfilled.

How important citizens believe the laws passed by the legislature are, expresses the perceived *relevance* of the institution; this is a general indicator of the perceived importance the institution has for the country. Certainly, passing laws is not the only task performed by congress, but it is surely the most visible one to the general public. Even without having abundant information about the specifics on the approved laws, individuals hold general views of whether the bulk of those laws are trivial or important for the country. As the laws are perceived as important, then the confidence in the institution should raise.

Now, what an individual perceives is important for the country, might bear no relationship with what he deems personally important. For instance, a protective measure for the importation of agricultural goods could not be considered a law important for the country by many, but it can be the only concern of a farmer whose entire business

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depends on such a law. Therefore, if legislatures are assessed in light of more personal concerns -a sort of "pocketbook" evaluation of the institution- then an additional indicator tapping into these more personal concerns should be explored. The way to do it is to inquire to what extent the institution has accomplished what it was expected to, whatever that expectation is in the citizens' mind.

The idea that unfulfilled expectations would lead to lower levels of esteem for the United States Congress is the driving hypothesis of Kimball and Patterson (1997); it is also one of the main findings of Miller and Listhaug (1999) in their study about confidence in political institutions in Norway, Sweden, and the United States. The approach here is different from theirs in some respects. Kimball and Patterson were concerned with expectations about performance of the members, not about the institution, as it is the case here. To develop their indicator of to what extent expectations were fulfilled, the authors asked a series of question on traits congressmembers should have, and then they asked about which one of them they actually had. The difference between *expectations* and *actual performance* is their indicator of the extent to which expectations are fulfilled (Kimball and Patterson 1997, 707-708). Miller and Listhaug, on the other hand, relied on the Eurobarometer question of satisfaction with the way democracy works in the country as a proxy measure for the degree to which citizens' expectations are fulfilled by the regime (Miller and Listhaug 1999, 205).

In an approach more similar to that of Miller and Listhaug, in this research the difference between expectations and actual performance is not assessed ex-post by the investigators but it is left to the interviewee. An additional advantage of this operationalization is that it avoids the noise from country-level differences in the

important activities or traits congress should have, which might obscure the individual-level analysis. However, unlike the general "satisfaction with democracy" question used by Miller and Listhaug, the extent to which citizens' expectations are fulfilled are tapped by means of a specific question on congressional performance.

Finally, beyond the evaluation of the importance of the laws and the fulfilled expectations, congressional performance is evaluated also through the appraisal of the job done by congressmembers. This adds to the previous two measures the assessment of the job done by those who staff the institution. It might be argued that the question on general expectations already reflects the evaluation of legislators. But this is, however, a different aspect of the institutional performance.

Asking interviewees how well legislators are doing their job changes the focus from the institution to the individual members, bringing a new element into consideration.[13] Surely, one might expect citizens to hope for legislators to do a good job, and if they perceive them to do it, then their expectations about the institution should be fulfilled, but only in that regard.[14]

The first dimension discussed –the importance of the laws passed by the legislature- aims at tapping citizens' general views about the relevance of the work done by the institution. The second, the one on expectations, aims at tapping the other end: the evaluation of congressional performance in light of the individual concerns and expectations. Finally, the third dimension –job approval of legislators- digs into the evaluation of those who staff the institution, a distinct assessment from the previous two.

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[13] Individuals were told to think of members of the legislature as a whole, regardless the parties they represented. With this framing, I hoped to avoid the consideration of only a subset of members (such those belonging to the majority party or those the interviewee had voted for).
[14] Actually, although positively related, the correlation between the two variables is 0.37 (for N = 25,840).

The survey questions specifically designed to tap into these three aspects are the following:

> How important are for the country the laws passed by the legislature?
>
> To what extent does the Parliament do what you expect it to do?
>
> Now speaking of Congress. Thinking of members of congress as a whole, without considering the political parties which they belong to, do you believe that the congressmembers are performing their jobs very well, well, neither well nor poorly, poorly, or very poorly?

For the first two questions, the interviewees were told to provide a response with the aid of a 1-7 scale as shown in Figure III.1. For the question on congressmembers' job approval, the original five response categories ranged from 1 (very well) to 5 (very poorly). To facilitate the analysis, responses to all three questions were recoded into a 0-100 scale. In all cases, low values, close to zero, indicate the least favorable responses to the institution (laws not important at all for the country, expectations not fulfilled at all, and very poor job performance evaluation). High values, close to 100, indicate the most favorable responses (laws have a lot of importance for the country, expectations are fulfilled a lot, and perception of congressmembers doing their job very well).[15]

Importance of Laws Passed by the Legislature

If the laws passed by the legislature are deemed unimportant by the citizens, then the institution is failing to deliver one of its central functions, therefore eroding a key ground of support for itself. On average, however, citizens of Latin America consider that the laws passed by their national assemblies are important. The mean response –after the

---

[15] For consistency purposes, the responses to the question on congressmembers job performance were inverted, so higher values indicate positive views, as it is the case with the other two variables.

recodification of the original scale- for this question is 56.9 (with a standard deviation of 30.16, for 27,405 observations). That is, the belief in the importance of the laws passed by congress surpasses the midpoint of the scale, with a relative majority of individuals (20.6%) providing as a response exactly the midpoint of the scale, and half of the interviewees answering the highest three values (Figure III.11).

As it is usual, however, the average for the continent does not reflect accurately the reality for every country. In some countries, such as Uruguay, Dominican Republic, Colombia, Bolivia, and Costa Rica, the belief that the laws passed by the parliament are important is nearly unanimous (Figure III.12). In other countries, however, such approval does not even reach the midpoint of the scale. In Venezuela, Ecuador, and Brazil, most citizens do not believe that the laws passed by Congress are important.

Source: AmericasBarometer 2008   N = 27,405

Figure III.11. Perceived importance of the laws passed by the legislature, Latin America

Ecuador is one of the countries with the lowest levels of perceived importance of congressional laws. What the elites interviewed there said coincides with the citizens' perception: Congress would not do much good.

> Congressional outputs have been extremely poor in the past 15 or 20 years… the quality of it has been far less than desirable, and the practices have been absolutely regrettable.
>
> *Interviewee E14, Ecuador*

> Congress has never been an institution that you would say "Congress will solve it." I don't know… Then something happens and it all turns on its head… We [as businessmen] have never looked for Congress for support.
>
> *Interviewee E3, Ecuador*

Figure III.12. Perceived importance of the laws passed by the legislature, by country

Individuals who hold these kinds of negative views toward the outputs of the institution are expected to hold low levels of confidence in it. Figure III.13 depicts the relationship between the perceived importance of the laws passed by the legislature and the levels of trust in the institution. As predicted by the overarching hypothesis on

performance evaluation, there is a positive relationship between the importance conferred to the laws and the confidence deposited in the institution: the highest levels of trust in the institution are found among those who perceive its laws as extremely important. Conversely, the lowest levels of trust are found among those who do not see the laws passed by the assembly important at all.

Figure III.13.Trust in legislatures by perceived importance of the laws passed by it, Latin America

The gap between the levels of confidence in the institution among those who see its laws as not important at all (18.2) and those who see those laws as very important (51.1) is of more than 30 points (32.9, exactly). Trust in the institution increases with every increase in the perceived importance of its laws, proving the expected positive relationship. The only exception is the slight decrease in confidence between the second

to last and last levels of perception of the importance of the congressional laws. This difference of 1.8 points is not, however, statistically significant.

Hence, the bivariate relationship between perceived importance of the laws passed by Congress and trust in the institution operates in the predicted direction, with the latter increasing with every increment of the former.

Job Approval of Legislators

What legislators are perceived to do should affect support for the institution as well. Poorly evaluated congressmembers should affect confidence levels in legislatures negatively, since their mere presence in the chamber would contribute to the erosion of the trust in the institution itself.

The average approval rating of legislators for the whole continent is significantly lower than the perceptions about the importance of the laws: 42.9 (with a standard deviation of 22.4, for 28,009 observations). Almost half of respondents provided an evaluation of "regular," expressed by the midpoint of the scale. Less than 2% of the sample gave congressmembers the highest possible evaluation score, but more than five times that figure (10.4%) provided the most negative evaluation (Figure III.14).

Figure III.14. Job approval of legislators in Latin America

This average value below the midpoint of the scale indicates that the job of legislators in Latin America is deemed less than acceptable by the citizens. In only three of the 18 countries –Uruguay, Dominican Republic, and Colombia- the mean levels of approval for legislators are above the midpoint of the scale, though not for much (Figure III.15)

Figure III.15. Job approval of legislators, by country

For most of the remaining countries, job approval ratings of legislators suggest evaluations of performance are lower than acceptable. In most of those countries, the ratings are within a range of ten points below the midpoint. However, in Ecuador and

Paraguay, the mean approval scores barely surpass 30 points, indicating a much poorer

perceived performance than in the rest of the continent.

Figure III.16. Trust in legislatures by job approval of legislators, Latin America

Figure III.16 depicts the relationship between legislators' job approval ratings and

trust in assemblies. The relationship runs in the predicted direction: confidence in the

institution increases with favorable approval ratings. The gap in confidence levels

between those who see the legislators doing a poor job (21.2) and those who see them

doing a very good one (62.9) is of more than 40 points.

Unfulfilled Expectations

The extent to which citizens' expectations are fulfilled is the third dimension to explore along the lines of the perception evaluation hypothesis. Individuals disappointed with the legislative outcomes should trust their parliaments less. Unfulfilled expectations are a sign that legislatures failed to do what the citizens were expecting them to do. If such failure is seen as deceiving, then the levels of trust in the institution should be negatively affected.

On average, citizens of Latin America do not see their expectations about congress fulfilled by the institution. The mean response to the question about fulfilled expectations is 37.3 (with a standard deviation of 27.9, for 27,648 observations), clearly below the midpoint of the scale -situated at 50 points. While only 3.5% of Latin Americans said congress does what they expect it to do "a lot," more than 20% stated that congress does not fulfill their expectations "at all," the two extreme values depicted in Figure III.17.

Figure III.17. Fulfillment of expectations by legislatures in Latin America

While in any of the 18 countries the mean value of fulfillment of expectations reaches the midpoint of the scale, in some of them it is close: Dominican Republic, Uruguay, Bolivia, and Chile show scores of above 45 points (Figure III.18). At the other extreme, Paraguay, Brazil, and Ecuador are the countries with the least satisfied citizens in terms of congress' accomplishment of what they expected it to do.

Figure III.18. Fulfillment of expectations by the legislature, by country

The relationship between fulfillment of expectations and trust also runs in the predicted direction: confidence in the institution is higher among those who see their expectations fulfilled to a greater extent (Figure III.19).

Figure III.19. Trust in legislature by levels of fulfillment of expectations, Latin America

The gap in levels of trust between those who think the legislature does not fulfill their expectations at all and those who think it does it a great deal is 44.2 points. Again, there is a clear trend of rising levels of trust with greater levels of fulfillment of expectations.

All three measures of performance evaluation converge to the same pattern in its relationship with trust: perceptions of good performance enhance levels of confidence in assemblies. What previous research has shown true for the government (Citrin 1974; Hetherington 1998; Miller 1974) proves also right for legislatures: performance evaluation matters for trust.

When looking at the performance measures by country, a rather consistent pattern emerges: there are countries in which legislative performance is positively evaluated, and

there are others in which it is not, and that is a trend that remains across the three different indicators. Thus, for instance, if we look at the highest values for each of the three performance indicators, there are four countries that repeatedly appear among the top five in all three measures: Bolivia, Colombia, Dominican Republic, and Uruguay. Similarly, if we look at the bottom five countries in each of the indicators, two countries are always in the group: Ecuador and Brazil, and four other countries are found there for two of out the three variables: Honduras, Panama, Paraguay, and Peru.

Does this mean the three measures are different expressions of a unique construct? What the three variables have in common is that they capture evaluative attitudes toward legislatures. Those evaluations are of different nature, though. The importance of the laws, as it has been stated, reflects a more general assessment of the relevance of assemblies' job. The job approval variable aims at tapping attitudes toward legislators and their performance. Finally, the fulfilled expectations variable digs into the more personal evaluation of legislative accomplishment in light of the hopes individuals had for it.

If each indicator is conceived as one evaluative dimension, then the three of them could be combined into a general performance measure. The empirical tests of the suitability of such combination, however, are not conclusive. The coefficient of reliability for the three variables is slightly below the acceptable standard in social science: the Cronbach's is Alpha 0.64,[16] and the correlation among the variables is not very high (see Table AIII.3 in Annex VI). On the other hand, the three variables do load into a same

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[16] The convention is that reliability coefficient needs to be 0.70 or higher to be considered acceptable (UCLA Academic Technology Services 2006).

factor, but the loadings are not strong, and most of the variance of each variable is not explained by the factor (see Table AIII.4 in Annex F).

Given this borderline evidence of the existence of a single evaluative factor, what seems most appropriate to do is playing in both sides of the border: multivariate models will assess the impact of each individual performance evaluation variable upon trust, but mirror models with only the combined index will also be assessed. The Performance Evaluation Index is the simple mean of the three individual performance variables: importance of the laws passed by congress, job approval, and fulfilled expectations. The index is calculated for all those cases with valid values in at least two out of the three variables. If for one case there is missing information for two variables, then that case is considered missing and therefore left out of the index. This Performance Evaluation Index has a mean value of 45.613 with a standard deviation of 20.558, for 27,979 valid values).

The Contagion from the Parties

Legislatures are formed on a partisan basis, and parties have a predominant role in legislative politics. In Latin America that role is enhanced by their relevance for legislative elections, given the main features of the electoral systems, which generates incentives for parties to have greater visibility and power (Nohlen 2004).

The key function of representative institutions is that of responsiveness; as Pitkin states it, "representing here means acting in the interest of the represented, in a manner responsive to them" (Pitkin 1967, 209). In democratic polities, the link between

represented and representatives is provided by political parties (Sartori 1976; Schattschneider 1942). In this context, whether individuals see parties as responsive to them should affect how they evaluate legislatures, the institution where representation takes place. Lack of responsiveness sets the ground for lack of confidence; how can citizens trust an institution that is non responsive to them? Thus, if political parties are negatively evaluated, then those views should contaminate the views of the parliament as well.

A measure of political party responsiveness was devised to tap citizens' views of it: the belief that political parties represent their voters well. In addition, a supplementary indicator of a more general attitude toward parties –partisan identification- is assessed.

According to the *contagion from the parties* hypothesis, then, more positive evaluations of party responsiveness would contribute to higher levels of confidence in parliaments. Similarly, those individuals with a partisan identification should be more leaning to support assemblies than their fellow citizens who do not hold such identification.

The survey question used to measure evaluation of party responsiveness was the following:

> Thinking of political parties in general, to what extent do [country] political parties represent their voters well?

Like for questions previously discussed, respondents provided their answers on a 1-7 scale, with the aid of a card (shown in Figure III.3). The original responses were also recoded in this case, so the data to be presented range from 0 –"not at all," to 100- "a lot."

For the partisanship variable, the question used was:

At this moment, do you identify with a political party?

The possible responses for this question were only two: "yes" or "no." The data has been coded as a dummy variable, with 0 indicating no partisanship and 1 indicating a partisan affiliation.

Political Party Responsiveness

Political parties have been designed to be the "central intermediate and intermediary structure between society and government" (Sartori 1976: iv); they perform that role by means of representing citizens' interests. The quasi omnipresent institutional frame of proportional representation, closed and blocked ballots, and relative high district magnitude found in Latin America (see Table AII.1, in Annex F) generates conditions for individuals to see themselves represented by political parties much more than by individuals. The link between represented and representative is not dyadic but collective (Weissberg 1978), and such collective nature is embodied in the political parties.

Perceptions about political party performance are not very encouraging in terms of support for political parties. Discontent with parties is so widespread that many citizens in the Americas agree with the statement that "There can be democracy without political parties,"[17] therefore challenging the idea that "modern democracy is unthinkable save in terms of the parties" (Schattschneider 1942:1).

---

[17] Individuals were asked to indicate to what extent they agreed with the statement, in a 1-7 scale that ranged from 1 "Strongly disagree" to 7 "Strongly agree." Original responses were recoded into a 0-100 scale. The average response, expressed in the new scale, is 46.05 (with a standard deviation of 34.82, for

Citizens are not satisfied with the representational function performed by political parties: one out of five Latin Americans (20.2%) said political parties do not represent their voters well at all (Figure III.20). The average response for the question was 38.57 (with a standard deviation of 28.24, for 28,110 cases).

Figure III.20 Evaluation of political party representation, Latin America

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27,272 observations). The average support for the statement is slightly below the midpoint of the scale, which suggests that the mainstream rejects the idea of a democracy without political parties, but not for much. Complete results by country can be found in Annex E.

Figure III.21 Evaluation of political party representation, by country

Cross-country differences are, once again, important. Evaluation of
political parties is twice as high in Uruguay and the Dominican Republic as it is in
Paraguay or Brazil. In any of the countries, however, evaluation of political party
representation surpasses the midpoint of the scale, which points to a deficit in

partisan representation in Latin America, already detected by previous research

(Achard and González 2004; Córdova Macías 2004; Mainwaring 2006; Marenghi

and García Montero 2006). In addition, the significant differences among

countries are also supported by the evidence from the fieldwork: while in Uruguay

political parties are seen in relatively high regard –despite their less than expected

performance, in Ecuador some people think there is not even room to make a case

for the parties:

> I do feel represented, but it has not fulfilled my expectations yet… I know there is still time to come.
>
> *Participant Focus Group 1, Uruguay*

> Political parties are against the wall, and anyone who attempts to talk favorably about them would not find a space [to do so].
>
> *Interviewee E1, Ecuador*

The relationship between perceptions about how well parties are representing

their voters and trust in legislatures lends support for the *contagion from the parties*

hypothesis: the better parties are perceived to represent their voters, the higher the trust in

the legislature in which such representation takes place (Figure III.22). The gap in the

confidence levels between those who perceive parties not representing their voters at all

(23.7) and those who see them representing them a lot (62.1) is significant (38.4 points).

Figure III.22 Trust in legislatures by levels of political party representation, Latin America

Thus, the evidence discussed so far suggests that whether political parties are seen responsive to citizens or not does matter for trust in the institution that holds them. Views of legislatures, however, might also be tinted by how favorable to parties individuals are in a more general vein –regardless of how they evaluate their performance in terms of responsiveness. Thus, partisanship should also be explored as a factor affecting trust in legislatures.

Partisanship

Partisanship "is a psychological identification [with a political party], which can persist without legal recognition or evidence of formal membership and even without a

consistent record of party support"; it is an affective orientation that lasts in time (Campbell et al. 1960, 121). The existence of this type of bonding feeling toward a party should predict a more favorable view toward the institution they staff. However, when the mean levels of support for legislatures among those who hold a partisan affiliation are compared with the support among those who do not have such and affective orientation, the differences are only modest (Figure III.23), although statistically significant (see Table AIII.5 in Annex F).

Figure III.23 Trust in legislatures by levels partisanship, Latin America

The affective orientation partisanship refers to is oriented to a *specific* political party; it is social group identification (Green, Palmquist, and Schickler 2002, 21) directed not to political parties in general, but only to *one* of them. Therefore, partisanship should

matter in shaping attitudes toward legislatures only to the extent in which the parties toward which there exists an affective orientation play an important role in the legislature. Thus, it is identification with a political party in relation to its role in congress –and not partisanship in general- what should affect confidence in the institution more positively. Actually, there is strong evidence in the United States pointing that partisans of the political party in control of Congress have more positive views toward the institution (Cook and Gronke 2005; Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 1995; Kimball and Patterson 1997; Patterson and Magleby 1992).

Now, determining which party is in control of the legislature is a straight forward task in the context of the two-party United States system. In multi-party presidential systems, however, it becomes a more difficult enterprise (Elgie 2001; Shugart 1995). A party can hold more seats than its competitors and still not control the legislature, a "no - majority situation" in Shugart's terms (Shugart 1995, 327). Under these circumstances, a party with the highest percentage of seats might not have enough power to get laws passed with the party votes only.

Therefore, in order to assess citizens' partisan ties to the parties in the legislatures, a three-fold category seems the most accurate to describe the role the party object of such identification plays in the assembly. Parties will be classified as holding an *absolute majority* (50 percent or more of the seats in both chambers), holding a *relative majority* (less than 50 percent of seats, but still the highest share of seats in at least one of the chambers), or a *minority* position (any of the parties with less than the highest proportion

of seats). Individuals are classified according to whether they identify themselves with any of those parties, or if they do not have a partisan affiliation at all.[18]

Therefore, for the hypothesis on the impact of party identification upon trust in legislatures to hold true, then trust should increase with the power of the party object of the identification. Those individuals identified with parties holding absolute majorities should trust legislatures more than their fellow citizens, in the sense than their partisan feelings should translate more clearly to the legislatures.

The overwhelming majority of Latin Americans (68.8%) do not identify themselves with a political party (Table III.2). Those who do are distributed evenly among the three defined categories: identification with a party in the minority, identification with a party with a relative majority, and identification with a party holding the absolute majority of the legislative power.

---

[18] Thus, individuals received a score of 3 if they declared to identify themselves with Partido Revolucionario Democrático of Panama, Alianza País and allies in Ecuador, Frente Amplio in Uruguay, Partido Justicialista or Frente para la Victoria in Argentina, Partido de la Liberación Dominicana in Dominican Republic, or Movimiento V República and allies in Venezuela. These are the political parties that hold control of the legislature with more than 50% of the seats. Accordingly, individuals received a score of 2 if the identified with parties that hold only a relative majority in one or both chambers. Individuals who declared party sympathy for Partido Acción Nacional of Mexico, Unidad Nacional de la Esperanza of Guatemala, Alianza Republicana Nacionalista of El Salvador, Partido Liberal of Honduras, Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional of Nicaragua, Partido Liberación Nacional of Costa Rica, Partido Liberal or Partido de la U of Colombia, Movimiento al Socialismo or PODEMOS of Bolivia, Unión por el Perú of Peru, Asociación Nacional Republicana of Paraguay, any of the parties members of Concertación Democrática of Chile, Partido dos Trabalhadores or Partido Frente Liberal of Brazil, received a score of 2. Such score indicates that the party they identify with controls only a relative majority of the legislature or one of its chambers. The individuals who identify with political parties other than the above mentioned, received a score of 1, indicating their attachment to a party with no legislative majority. Finally, those who do not identify with a political party received a score of 0.

Table III.2. Position in the legislature of political party object of identification, Latin America

Position of party object of identification	Frequency	Percent
No identification	19,927	68.8
Minority	3,449	11.9
Relative Majority	3,235	11.2
Absolute Majority	2,349	8.1
Total	28,960	100.00

N = 28,960

Figure III.24 Position in the legislature of political party object of identification, by country

Figure III.24 depicts the distribution of partisan identities by country. The landscape is one of great variation, with countries in which only a small percentage of citizens identify with political parties –such as Mexico, Guatemala, or Chile- and other

countries with important proportions of partisans: Uruguay and Dominican Republic, most notably.

The relationship between the role the party object of identification plays in the legislature and trust in the institution runs in the predicted direction, with confidence increasing as the role played for the party of identification is more important (Figure III.25).

Figure III.25. Trust in legislatures by role of party object of identification, Latin America

A Multivariate Model of Individual-Level Causes of Trust in Legislatures

The bivariate data analyzed in the previous sections of this chapter lend support for each of the three hypotheses about individual-level determinants of trust in legislatures. Figure III.26 summarizes such findings. The upper-left quadrant shows the quadratic fit between perceptions of congressional processes and trust in legislatures: when debate and counterbalance are seen as excessive, trust in legislatures decays.

Figure III.26. Summary of individual bivariate relationships between main independent variables and trust, fitted values, Latin America

The upper-right quadrant shows the bivariate relationships between each of the three individual indicators of congressional performance – importance of the laws, job approval, and fulfilled expectations- as well as the Perfomance Evaluation Index.

Finally, the bottom-left quadrant shows the relationship involved in the *contagion from the parties* hypothesis: the link between assessments of party responsiveness and party identification with trust.

In order to determine the impact that each of these independent variables has upon trust in legislatures, a multivariate analysis is of order. Such analysis –the object of this section of the chapter- should include all the individual-level independent variables above discussed but also acknowledge for possible alternative explanations.

The Alternative Explanations

Previous research has resorted to a myriad of variables to explain and control for the determinants of attitudes toward legislatures. Although it is not feasible to account for all of them, in this section I concentrate in those alternative explanations that are particularly interesting to look at, especially in the context of comparative research in trust in legislatures. Those comprise: presidential approval, views of the economy, political efficacy, political awareness, influence of mass media, personality traits, and sociomodemographic features.

Presidential Approval

Views of other political institutions might tint how citizens view legislatures. Among political institutions, the president seems to be the most prominent, especially in the context of the Latin American presidential democracies. Some scholars argue that given the complexity of the legislative process and the absence of knowledge to evaluate

it, citizens might build their views of congress based on the views of the presidency (Parker 1977, 98). It is said that congress is assessed in the "shadow" of the president.[19] In the United States, presidential approval leads to greater congressional approval (Kimball and Patterson 1997). The impact would remain under both, divided and unified types of government (Bernstein 2001). This link seems to be present in Latin America as well; some citizens have expressed this somehow blurry connection between president and congress:

> Congress is the law that rules the country. We have had *politiquería* [playing politics], but now the President has handled it well. [We have] new laws, new reforms, it seems everything is going to be all right.
>
> *Interviewee A1, Ecuador*

The impact of attitudes toward the president upon views of legislatures needs not be a direct one. If the president is held accountable for most of what happens in the country, then if he is seen in a negative view, all the other institutions might be, as well, or vice versa. In that sense, it would not be that the president is tailed to congress specifically, but that views of the presidency spread to the whole political system. In any case, it seems important to control for the impact that views of the presidency have upon attitudes toward parliaments.

The influence of the president can be assessed by means of feeling thermometers or approval questions. In this case, an indicator of presidential approval will be assessed. The question used to measure it was the following:

> Speaking in general of the current administration, how would you rate the job performance of President [NAME CURRENT PRESIDENT]: very good, good, neither good nor bad, bad, or very bad?

---

[19] Davidson, Kovenock and O'Leary 1966, as cited in Hibbing and Theiss Morse (2001b, 80).

Following the standardization procedure, the original responses were coded into a 0 to 100 scale, in which the value 0 represents the response "very bad" and the value 100 "very good."[20]

According to the previous findings, the expectation is a positive relationship between presidential approval and confidence in parliaments. The impact of approval upon trust, however, might be mediated by the institutional context, in particular, whether congress and the presidency are controlled by the same political party. Patterson and Caldeira (1990) and Bernstein (2001) found some evidence of that mediating effect. For purposes of parsimony, however, the impact of the context (in this case, whether there is a divided government or not) will be assessed in Chapter IV.

Views of the Economy

Just as views of the president can impact the attitudes toward other political institutions, views about the economy are often present in explanatory models of political attitudes. Attitudes toward the economy are typically divided into those concerning the *personal* economic situation (or "pocketbook" economics) and those referring to the *country's* economic conditions, or ("sociotropic") measures (Kinder and Kiewiet 1981). The hypotheses linking perception of the economy and support for political institutions point to a positive relationship between them. Weatherford found evidence of the positive link between perceptions of the economy and system support (Weatherford 1984; Weatherford 1987), and Kinder and Kiewiet encountered that sociotropic perceptions of the economy affected vote choice in congressional elections, but also found that

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[20] The by-country descriptives for this variable can be found in Annex E.

pocketbook views did not (Kinder and Kiewiet 1979; Kinder and Kiewiet 1981).

However, Rudolph did find a positive link between pocketbook attitudes and

congressional approval (Rudolph 2002). Similarly, Hibbing and Patterson (1994) and

Mishler and Rose (1997) discovered a positive relationship between perceptions of the

economy and favorable attitudes toward parliaments.

More than 45% of Latin Americans mentioned problems of economic nature as

the most important problem the country faced. In eleven countries, economic aspects are

the most frequently mentioned national problem; in the remaining seven, it is the second,

after safety concerns. In this context of nearly omnipresent economic preoccupations, it is

to foresee a high sensibility related to economic aspects, and therefore I expect to find

sociotropic views of the economy having a positive impact upon confidence in

legislatures.

Feelings toward the current national economic situation were asked through the

following question:

> How would you describe the country's economic situation? Would you say that it is
> very good, good, neither good nor bad, bad or very bad?

The original codes for these five possible valid responses ranged from 1

"very good" to 5 "very bad." To facilitate the analysis, the scale was inverted so

higher values indicate more positive views. Likewise, the scale was recoded into a

0-100 scale in which 0 corresponds to "very bad" and 100 means "very good."

Political Awareness

Ample evidence points to the fact that what individuals know about politics affects their political attitudes and behaviors (Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996; Luskin 1987; Zaller 1992). According to Zaller (1992, 21) political awareness "refers to the extent to which an individual pays attention to politics *and* understands what he or she has encountered;" the author suggests political knowledge as its operationalization.

The evidence of the impact of this political knowledge upon attitudes toward legislatures is mixed. Some scholars have found that the most knowledgeable citizens support the institution less (Hibbing and Larimer 2003; Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 1995; Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 2002). Others state that political knowledge affects the type of considerations individuals bring to mind at the time of evaluating assemblies, with less sophisticated individuals relying more on general judgments toward politics and more informed citizens having institution-specific considerations. This, in turn, implies different directions for relationships between knowledge and attitudes toward congress for sophisticated and unsophisticated individuals (Mondak et al. 2007). Yet other studies have found no impact at all of political sophistication upon attitudes toward legislatures (Kimball and Patterson 1997; Patterson, Ripley, and Quinlan 1992), or even a positive relationship among the two variables (Davidson and Parker 1972). Given the contradictory findings of previous research, political knowledge will be tested with no previous expectation about the direction of its impact upon confidence in legislatures.

The operazionalization of political knowledge has been done following the mainstream trend that measures it by testing factual information about politics (Barabas 2002; Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996; Delli Carpini 1993; Mondak 2001): the more an

individual knows about the facts of politics, the higher the level of political knowledge he

has. In order to do so, five questions were devised to tap on general political factual

knowledge among citizens of Latin America:

> Now we want to know how much information about politics and the country is
> transmitted to the people...
> What is the name of the current president of the United States?
> What is the name of the President of Congress in country?
> How many provinces does the country have?
> How long is the presidential/prime ministerial term of office in country?
> What is the name of the current president of Brazil?

The design of the questions was not an easy task for them had to be applicable in

every country and posit approximately the same degree of difficulty in all of them. The

same five questions were asked in all the countries covered by the AmericasBarometer –

with the corresponding vocabulary adjustment- with two exceptions. The question about

the name of the president of congress was not asked in Bolivia, and in Brazil, the

question on the name of the president asked about the President of Chile, in order to keep

the practice of asking for the name of a foreign president.

In order to obtain a summary measure, correct responses to the four questions

asked in all the countries (all of them but the one about the president of congress, not

asked in Bolivia) were combined into an index that ranges from 0 (none of the questions

correctly answered) to 100 (the four questions correctly answered).[21] Additionally, in

order to have a measure of specific knowledge of Congress, the question about the name

of the president of the congress has been left apart, to be tested independently. With the

purpose of keeping the same metric, this variable on knowledge of congress ranges from

0 (incorrect response) to 100 (correct response).

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[21] For every question, a correct response was assigned a value of 100, and incorrect, "don't answer," and "don't know" responses were assigned a value of 0. To create the index, the values for the four responses were added and the simple average was calculated. The Cronbach's Alpha for the four variables is 0.635.

Political efficacy

Political efficacy refers to the feeling that one's political action might affect politics.[22] Political efficacy has two dimensions: *internal efficacy*, pointing "to beliefs about one's own competence to understand and to participate effectively in politics," and *external efficacy*, which refers to "beliefs about the responsiveness of governmental authorities and institutions to citizens' demands" (Craig, Niemi, and Silver 1990, 290).

It is hypothesized that those citizens who feel more efficacious will see political institutions in a more favorable light (Patterson, Ripley, and Quinlan 1992), and there is some evidence supporting the claim that political efficacy affects views of congress positively (Davidson and Parker 1972; Hibbing and Patterson 1994; Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 1995; Patterson, Ripley, and Quinlan 1992). Thus, confidence in legislatures would be bolstered by feelings of political efficacy.

Two questions were designed to tap feelings of political efficacy; one aims at measuring external political efficacy, whereas the other aims at measuring internal efficacy. The exact wording of the questions is as follows:

> Those who govern this country are really interested in what people like me think. How much do you agree or disagree?
> I feel that I understand the most important political issues of this country. How much do you agree or disagree?

Individuals were asked to what extent they agreed with those statements, and were requested to provide an answer with a number within a 1 to 7 range, for which 1 meant "strongly disagree" and 7 meant "strongly agree." [23] The original responses were

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[22] Campbell, Gurin And Miller 1954, 187, as cited in Craig, Niemi, and Silver (1990, 290).

[23] Respondents were given a card, showing all the numbers from one to seven and the labels for the extreme responses. A sample card (Tarjeta B) can be found in the attached sample questionnaire, in Annex C.

recoded into a 0 to 100 scale, in which 0 means "strongly disagree" and 100 means "strongly agree."

The Impact of Media

The impact of the media on attitude formation, in particular upon feelings toward the President is uncontestable (Brody 1991; Edwards III, Mitchell, and Welch 1995; Gronke and Newman 2000). The debate is not settled, though, about the magnitude of such an impact and the mechanisms through which it operates (Krosnick and Kinder 1990; Miller and Krosnick 2000; Moy and Pfrau 2000).

In the American context at least, a negative effect of news media upon attitudes toward political institutions in general and Congress in particular is often denounced (Moy and Pfrau 2000). The reason behind this pernicious effect would be that media coverage of politics is mostly negative (Patterson 1993). "The conventional wisdom is that the press has grown increasingly hostile toward Congress in recent years and that its coverage, reflecting that development, has become increasingly derogatory" (Coursen Parker 1994, 157). Accordingly, Durr, Gilmour and Wolbrecht (1997) found that positive media coverage of congress leads to more positive attitudes toward the institution, whereas negative media coverage operates in the opposite way.

However, Hibbing and Theiss-Morse encountered that exposure to news had a significant negative impact only upon emotional reactions toward the institution (such as feelings of fear, anger, unease, or disgust), while it generated no impact upon cognitive evaluations of the institution, such as job approval ratings (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 1998, 480, 490). Similarly, studying the patterns of attitudes in the industrialized

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democracies, Norris (2000) found that exposure to television decreases the level of support at a significant rate only in a few countries, and it has no statistical significant impact on confidence in political institutions.

A pattern of negative media coverage which, in turn, has a negative impact on support for institutions has been suggested as also occurring in Latin America. Media portrayals of Congress would be "overwhelmingly negative" in the Andean region (Mainwaring 2006, 296). Likewise, media attacks were deemed the sixth cause in importance of poor images of political parties in a survey of Central American elites (Achard and González 2004, 87).

Individuals learn about legislatures mainly through media. Every single person asked about how they learned about Congress in the groups and the interviews mentioned the media, especially the television as the main, if not only, source:

> *Moderator*: Through which channels do you learn about what is going on in Congress?
> *All*: TV
> *Participant 1*: Radio, papers, and TV
> *Participant 2:* The Congress webpage, sometimes
>
> *Group 1, Uruguay*

Thus, in light of the available evidence and claims about the role of media, it seems reasonable to control for the impact media exposure has upon confidence in assemblies. In light of the previous findings for the role of media in views of political institutions in Latin America, the expectation is to find a negative relationship between exposure to media news and trust in legislatures. Media exposure will be operationalized as frequency with which the individual declares watching TV news. The AmericasBarometer survey asked respondents:

How often do you listen to news on TV: everyday, once or twice a week, rarely, or never?

The original codes ranged from 1 "every day" to 4 "never." To facilitate the analysis, the scale was inverted for higher values to reflect higher frequency, and it was rescaled into a 0-100 scale in which 0 means "never" and 100 indicates "every day."

Personality Traits

Socio-psychological accounts of political attitudes highlight the impact that personality traits might have upon orientations toward the system; some individuals would naturally be more trusting, while others would be more cynical (Newton and Norris 2000, 59). Thus, some individuals would be more naturally predisposed to trust legislatures than others just because of this personality trait (Richardson, Houston, and Hadjiharalambous 2001).

A way of testing this assertion is by testing how levels of interpersonal trust affect confidence in legislatures. Trust in other individuals, has been argued, to "encourage faith in larger social entities" (Cook and Gronke 2005, 793). The empirical evidence from previous research suggests a moderate to non significant impact (Cleary and Stokes 2006; Cook and Gronke 2005; Newton and Norris 2000; Richardson, Houston, and Hadjiharalambous 2001). However, for purposes of controlling for this trait among Latin Americans, a measure of interpersonal trust is in order. I expect to find that higher levels of interpersonal trust would lead to higher levels of confidence in Congress.

The proxy for interpersonal trust is the following question:

Now, speaking of the people from here, would you say that people in this community are generally very trustworthy, somewhat trustworthy, not very trustworthy or untrustworthy...?

The original responses were scored in a 1 -"very trustworthy"- to 4 - "untrustworthy"- which was recoded into a 0-100 range where 0 indicates "untrustworthy" and 100 means "very trustworthy."

Sociodemographic variables

Sociodemographic variables have not shown great explanatory power upon attitudes toward legislatures. As stated in Chapter II, only in a few instances they yield statistically significant results.

Education is the only variable whose impact has been more controversial, being nonsignificant in most cases (Hibbing and Larimer 2003; Kimball and Patterson 1997; Patterson, Boynton, and Hedlund 1969), but found to increase support for the institution of congress in one study (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 1995) and to decrease it in other two (Asher and Barr 1994; Cook and Gronke 2005). Therefore, based on the previous experience, and with the aim of keeping the number of parameters within a manageable range, education is the only sociodemographic variable to be included in the multivariate analyses.

In order to know the educational level of interviewees, they were asked:

What is the highest level of education you have achieved?

The responses were there transformed into an ordinal scale with the following

values: 0, no formal education; 1, elementary school; 2, high school; 3, College and

more.

The Model

The dependent variable this research aims at explaining, trust in legislatures, is an

interval variable ranging from 0 to 100. The interval nature of the dependent variable

makes OLS the most appropriate procedure to follow in pursuing the multivariate

statistical analysis. The fact that individuals are nested in countries, however, adds a

special characteristic to the analysis, inserting an additional level of analysis: the country-

level. There are several ways to model this multilevel nature of the data. A common

approach used to account for the country-level differences is the fixed effects approach,

that consists of including in the OLS regression dummy variables for each country so that

the dummy variables "'absorb' the unique variation among groups" (Steenbergen and

Jones 2002, 220). Another alternative to account for by-group difference is interactive

modeling, which consists of including subgroup level predictors as main effects in

regression models (Franzese 2005; Steenbergen and Jones 2002). Yet a third way of

modeling data of this nature is by means of multilevel models or random effects models

(Beck 2005; Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal 2008). Typically, the multilevel nature of the

data is modeled in multivariate linear regressions functions, as described in Equation 1:

$$(\text{Equation 1}) \qquad Y_{ij} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 x_{1ij} + \beta_2 x_{2\,ij} + ... + \beta_p x_{p\,ij} + \varepsilon_{ij}$$

where Y stands for the dependent variable to explain (i.e., trust in legislatures), β_o is the intercept (the value Y assumes when the covariates have a value 0), $\beta_1 x_{1ij}$ to $\beta_p x_{p\,ij}$ are the coefficients for each of the independent variables entered in the model, and ε_{ij} stands for the residual, or the variation in Y not explained by the model. Following Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal (2008, 94), the equation specifies a model for individuals i within countries j. This specification better suits the nature of the cross-national survey data object of analysis, and allows for considering residuals due to individuals and residuals due to countries separately, therefore splitting the error between those two levels and allowing for a random-intercept that accounts for the country-specific error component.

Thus, a first step is to assess the suitability of the data for a multilevel model; that is, to find out whether considering that individuals are nested in countries adds analytical leverage. This is done by testing the null hypothesis that country-level variations are not significantly different from zero, in which case a simple OLS would be a better fit for the data. A likelihood-ratio test of variance components models (one with the country-level random intercept and one without it) indicates that the assumption that individuals are nested in countries is safe (the significance of the test -shown in Table AIII.6 in Annex F- indicates the null hypothesis that there is no random intercept in the model can be rejected). Therefore, a random intercept model is appropriate for the data.

Four slightly different multivariate models of trust in legislatures are to be analyzed. In all of them, the variables involved in the individual level determinants of trust hypotheses are assessed vis-à-vis one another and the alternative explanations. In Model 1, the impact of each of the three dimensions of congressional performance is individually assessed, whereas in Model 2 the variables are substituted by the index of

Congressional performance. Model 3 and Model 4 replicate the Models 1 and 2 with a slight change: in Models 3 and 4, political knowledge is measured as congress-specific knowledge. Since the congress-specific knowledge question was not asked in Bolivia, Models 3 and Models 4 are run over 17 countries.

A summary of the results for each of the four models are reported in Table III.3 (individual full models are presented in Tables AIII.7 to AIII.10 in Annex F). The upper part of Table III.3 presents the results of the fixed part of the linear regression. For each variable, the β coefficients are reported together with their level of statistical significance (whether $p < 0.001$, $p < 0.01$, or $p < 0.05$). The magnitude and significance of the coefficients are interpreted as in the standard OLS regression.

The lower part of Table III.3 presents the random-effects parameters and the goodness of fit indicators. The first row sd(_cons) presents the between-country variability, whereas the second row sd(Residual) presents the within-country variability not explained by the model. The results suggest that there is country-level variability – indicated by value of sd(_cons), but that there still is individual-level variation –indicated by sd(Residual)- not yet explained by the current model. The significance of the p-value for the likelihood-ratio test (LR) confirms that the mixed model with random-intercept is a better fit for the data than a simple OLS regression model.

Table III.3. Random-intercept linear regression on trust in legislatures

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4	
	β		β		β		β	
Excessive debate	0.124	***	**0.121**	***	0.118	***	**0.116**	***
Excessive debate Sq	-0.001	***	**-0.001**	***	-0.001	***	**-0.001**	***
Excessive counterbalance	0.084	***	**0.085**	***	0.084	***	**0.086**	***
Excessive counterbalance Sq	-0.001	***	**-0.001**	***	-0.001	***	**-0.001**	***
Importance of laws	0.092	***			0.094	***		
Job approval legislators	0.198	***			0.201	***		
Fulfilled expectations	0.213	***			0.219	***		
Congressional Performance			**0.472**	***			**0.483**	***
Party responsiveness	0.177	***	**0.183**	***	0.170	***	**0.175**	***
Partisan ID	0.522	**	**0.531**	**	0.523	**	**0.538**	**
Presidential approval	0.042	**	**0.050**	***	0.046	***	**0.053**	***
Economic situation	0.021	**	**0.027**	***	0.026	**	**0.031**	***
Political Knowledge	-0.020	**	**-0.024**	***				
Congress-specific knowledge					-0.956	*	**-0.985**	*
Internal political efficacy	0.040	***	**0.037**	***	0.036	***	**0.033**	***
External political efficacy	0.057	***	**0.063**	***	0.059	***	**0.066**	***
TV news	0.004		**0.003**		0.003		**0.001**	
Interpersonal trust	0.033	***	**0.032**	***	0.027	***	**0.026**	***
Education	-0.983	***	**-1.076**	***	-1.079	***	**-1.224**	***
_cons	4.092	**	**4.739**	***	3.061	*	**3.596**	*

Random-effects Parameters. Estimates reported (std error in parentheses)

country: Identity				
sd(_cons)	4.551	4.673	4.590	4.722
	(0.775)	(0.795)	(0.804)	(0.826)
sd(Residual)	24.119	24.243	24.232	24.364
	(0.117)	(0.115)	(0.124)	(0.122)
LR vs OLS Chibar p	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
R^2 (model)	0.428	0.418	0.421	0.411
R^2 (between-country)	0.507	0.494	0.503	0.489
R^2 (within-country)	0.158	0.154	0.154	0.150
Observations	21,345	22,048	19,199	19,842
Groups	18	18	17	17
Wald chi2(17)	8196.5	8119.6	7684.2	7589.2
Prob > chi2 =	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000

p < 0.05 * || p < 0.01 ** || p < 0.001 ***

Each model explains more than 40% of the total variance, as indicated by the coefficients of determination R^2. The covariates explain around half of the variance at the country level, while they explain 15% of the individual-level variance, as expressed by the between and within country coefficients of determination.[24]

The results for all four models present little difference both in terms of magnitude of coefficients and in terms of their significance. Every variable included in the model, with the sole exception of TV news exposure, achieves statistical significance. The impact of evaluations of congressional performance is well captured in any of its two forms: with all three variables separately (Model 1) and with the summary Index (Model 2). Model 2, however, seems to be a better option than Model 1 for two reasons. First, relying on fewer parameters (and still achieving very similar substantive results) Model 2 is more parsimonious than Model 1. Second, Model 2 takes advantage of more observations for the analysis than Model 1. The difference in the number of observations lies in the way missing values are treated in the regression analysis. Every case with a missing value in any of the variables involved in the analysis is dropped out of the model for the multivariate analysis. Thus, in Model 1, observations with missing cases in any of the three performance evaluation variables –importance of the laws passed by congress, job approval of legislators, and fulfilled expectations- were left out of the analysis. Recall that the composite index of congressional performance used in Model 2 is the simple average of the values of those three variables, computed for all cases with valid values for at least two of them. Thus, not every case with a missing value in any of the three

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[24] The coefficients of determination are not readily available from the statistical output. Following Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal (2008, 102) they were calculated as the proportional reduction in the estimated total residual variance the model provides when compared with the unconditional model (in which only the dependent variable is entered in the random intercept model).

variables of performance was dropped out: only those cases with two or more missing values –out of the three variables- were left out, therefore yielding to a greater number of cases than under the first model.

The second difference across the models was the operationalization of political knowledge. In Models 1 and 2, political knowledge is a summary index of factual political information about several features of the country, whereas in Models 3 and 4 only congress-specific factual information comprises the measure. In all four models political knowledge yields statistically significant results, but its substantive impact is greater for the congress-specific variable. The congress-specific knowledge has a greater impact upon trust in legislatures than general political knowledge, consistently with findings from previous research. Ideally, this should be the variable to keep in future models. However, the fact that the survey question on congress-specific knowledge was not asked in Bolivia, relying on that measure of political knowledge would leave an entire country outside of the analysis. Therefore, considering the previous discussion, Model 2, the most parsimonious model with data for all 18 countries is the one to keep.

A difficulty often found in random effects models is endogeneity (Neuhaus and McCulloch 2006). Endogeneity is a problem when the random component and at least one of the regressors are correlated, making the random effects estimators biased (Gujarati 2003, 650-651). To find out whether there is endogeneity, a Hausman test needs to be performed (Gujarati 2003 651; Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal 2008, 123). Table AIII.10 in Annex F shows the results for the random effects Model 2. The significance of

the test indicates presence of endogeneity, although these results should be taken with a grain of salt.[25]

First, endogeneity most likely occurs due to misspecification of the models, by absence of cluster-level omitted-variable bias (Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal 2008, 114). Given that at this stage of the analysis only individual-level explanatory variables have been included in the model, there are, indeed, country-level omitted variables -those to be discussed and analyzed in Chapter IV. Thus, keeping in mind that the results presented in Table III.3 are partial and the full model is developed in the next chapter, should put concerns about endogeneity on hold.

Second, when the usual recommendation when facing endogeneity is followed – i.e.: turn to a fixed effects model (Gujarati 2003, 651; Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal 2008, 122), the achieved results are almost identical (see Table III.4, and Table AIII.11 for the full results), and they remain the same also when robust standard errors are calculated (see Table AIII.12 in Annex F).

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[25] A Hausman test consists of testing the consistency of covariates under fixed and random effects models. A significant test indicates that the random effects estimator is inconsistent, more likely due to a violation of the assumption of independence between the random intercept and the covariates.

Table III. 4. Random vs fixed effects models

	Model 2 Random effects		Model 2 Fixed effects	
	β		β	
Excessive debate	0.121	***	0.122	***
Excessive debate Sq	-0.001	***	-0.001	***
Excessive counterbalance	0.085	***	0.085	***
Excessive counterbalance Sq	-0.001	***	-0.001	***
Congressional Performance	0.472	***	0.471	***
Party responsiveness	0.183	***	0.182	***
Partisan ID	0.531	**	0.535	**
Presidential approval	0.050	***	0.050	***
Economic situation	0.027	***	0.026	***
Political Knowledge	-0.024	***	-0.024	***
Internal political efficacy	0.037	***	0.037	***
External political efficacy	0.063	***	0.063	***
TV news	0.003		0.003	
Interpersonal trust	0.032	***	0.032	***
Education	-1.076	***	-1.070	***
Guatemala			-9.975	***
El Salvador			-11.298	***
Honduras			-9.467	***
Nicaragua			-12.616	***
Costa Rica			-7.299	***
Panama			-11.169	***
Colombia			-7.250	***
Ecuador			-22.801	***
Bolivia			-7.412	***
Peru			-13.124	***
Paraguay			-16.348	***
Chile			-4.917	***
Uruguay			-7.114	***
Brazil			-10.434	***
Venezuela			-7.364	***
Argentina			-11.950	***
Dominican Republic			-6.966	***
_cons	4.739	***	14.657	***
R^2 (model)	0.418		0.3492	
Adj R2 (model)			0.3483	
Observations	22,048		22,048	

Country of reference: Mexico

$p < 0.05$ * || $p < 0.01$ ** || $p < 0.001$ ***

In the second column of Table III.4 the by-country effect is incorporated by means of individual dummy variables (with exception of Mexico, taken as the reference category). Thus, the β coefficients for the independent variables should be assessed as in any linear regression; the β coefficients for each of the countries should be evaluated in contrast with the reference category. For instance, the -9.975 coefficient for Guatemala indicates that Guatemalans have, on average, 9.975 points less of confidence in legislatures than Mexicans.

Discussion

Figure III.27 shows the impact of each of the variables involved in the three hypotheses about individual-level determinants of trust. For each variable, its influence on trust in legislature –after controlling for all the other variables included in the model- is depicted by the green lines, which is the regression line for each individual covariate, that is, how much trust in legislatures varies given the variations in the covariate (holding all the others constant).

All the variables discussed in the hypotheses have a statistical significant impact upon confidence in assemblies in the predicted direction. They eyeball scrutiny of the data indicates that performance evaluation of congress and perceived responsiveness of political parties are the two main determinants of trust in legislatures; in other words, politicians and parties doing a good job in the citizens' eyes would grant the institution the qualification of trustworthy.

Figure III.27. Individual regressors of trust in legislatures and residuals (from fixed effects model)

There is support for the argument that citizens' views of legislatures are more complex than the *paradox of representation* argument implies. In order to model the curvilinear relationship between perceptions of excessive debate and counterbalance and trust (presented in Figure III.7 and Figure III.10), for each of the independent variables both, a linear and a quadratic term were included in the model. Both terms yield significant results in the expected direction. The linear terms show a positive relationship with trust: the more individual perceive congress engaged in debate and in counterbalancing the president, the more they confer the institution the status of trustworthy. However, the significance of the quadratic term indicates that the linear relationship is only partially accurate: at a point, the positive association reverses, and

from that point, the more debate and counterbalance to the executive are perceived as excessive, the less individuals trust the legislatures.

These results confirm the hypothesis about the impact of attitudes toward legislatures being more complex than a simple rejection of the democratic processes that take place in congress translated into disregard for the institution. As citizens perceive assemblies doing what their constitutional mandate is, that is, as they see legislators devoting time to discuss and debate and congress controlling the president, their levels of trust in the institution grow. It is only when discussion and debate become excessive, and when the separation of power becomes a big obstacle for the president's job that citizens' levels of trust in the institution decay.

Also as predicted, positive evaluations of congressional performance lead to higher levels of trust in the institution. Actually, congressional performance is the single most important predictor of trust: holding everything else constant, the average level of trust in legislatures can vary up to 47 points due to congressional performance evaluation.[26] Similarly, political party responsiveness – operationalized as the belief that political parties represent their voters well- can increase trust in legislatures up to 18 points.[27] The role that the political party object of identification plays in congress does not exert much influence upon trust in parliaments, although it yields significant results in the predicted direction: the more important the role the party object of identification plays in the legislature, the higher the trust conferred to the institution.

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[26] The maximum possible impact of a single regressor is calculated by multiplying its β coefficient by the difference between the maximum (100 in this case) and minimum (0) value the variable can assume. For the case of congressional performance, the index varies from 0 to 100, and the β coefficient is 0. 47; therefore, the maximum possible impact of the variable upon trust is 47 (100 * 0.47).

[27] Figure obtained following the same procedure describe in note 26.

With the exception only of the exposure to TV news, the variables included as controls for alternative explanations also achieve statistical significance, although their impact is moderate to low in substantive terms. Remarkably, spillover from presidential popularity can only affect trust in up to 5 points. If we bear in mind that performance evaluation of congress and parties have the greatest impact on trust, then it is clear that in Latin America citizens evaluate the legislature in its own terms, with little contamination from their views of the executive. Along the same lines, trust in congress is barely affected by perceptions about the economic situation, for which citizens appear to blame the executive power much more than the legislative:

> *Participant A*: You always first think the government is responsible [for economic problems]
> *Participant B*: Yes and [you blame] the Secretary of Economy
> *Participant A*: one tends to complain [about the economy] first blaming the government rather than the Parliament
> *Group 1, Uruguay*

Trust in Legislature increases at a statistically significant rate with feelings of political efficacy, with external political efficacy having almost twice the impact internal political efficacy has. In agreement with the findings previously discussed, those who see the government –at least potentially responsive- to individuals tend to trust its institutions more. When individuals believe those who govern care about what they think, they hold political institutions in higher regard, and the feeling of political efficacy in general seems to spill over trust in parliament.

Those citizens who trust other citizens more are also more trusting of legislatures in statistically significant terms, but the substantive impact interpersonal trust has upon trust in legislatures is very small: its maximum impact can be 3 points within a 100-point

scale. In this sense, trust in other individuals does not translate into trust in political institutions. This is also consistent with the ongoing discussion pointing at institutional performance and responsiveness as the main determinants of those institutions being deemed trustworthy.

Finally, political knowledge and education are both negatively related to trust in parliaments at statistically significant rates, although in both cases the substantive impact is small. More educated and more knowledgeable individuals trust the institution less than their less sophisticated fellow citizens; they are probably stricter in terms of what they believe legislatures need to provide in order to become depositaries of trust.

The assessment of the individual level determinants of trust in legislatures leads to a first conclusion that represents good news for those concerned about public images of the institution: congress does not sabotage itself by doing what it is supposed to do by constitutional mandate. On the contrary, as legislatures engage in debate and counterbalance of the practices of the president, citizens' confidence in the institution grows. It is only when such practices are seen taken to an extreme that individuals reject them. Thus, there is nothing inherent to the nature of congressional activities that push citizens apart from them; it is the negative evaluation of *specific ways* in which those practices are carried out –i.e. excessive debate and counterbalance- that affects confidence in the institution negatively.

In this sense, there is no such thing as the unavoidable faith of congress to be held in low public esteem. Conversely, the results suggest that the responsibility for low levels of confidence in the institution does not lie in citizens' misunderstanding of the conflictive nature of congressional politics, but on congress itself. The greater impact

upon trust comes from performance evaluation of the institution and from political

parties' responsiveness.

CHAPTER IV

DOES CONTEXT MATTER?

Institutional context has increasingly come to occupy a center stage in explaining citizens' political attitudes and behaviors, and cross-national studies constitute the ideal setting to test many institutional theories (Helmke and Levistky 2006; Norris 1999b; Norris 2004; Pharr and Putnam 2000). By bringing institutions into the analysis there is the explicit acknowledgment that context matters and that -as North puts it- formal and informal institutions provide the framework in which citizens relate to each other and to political institutions (North 1990, 3-6); in this sense, institutions mediate attitudes (Anderson and Guillory 1997, 66).

In which ways can political institutions shape citizens' attitudes toward legislatures? It is reasonable to expect that institutional frameworks that contain incentives that bring institutions of representation and citizens closer together lead to more positive attitudes toward those institutions. I believe that certain characteristics of the party system are more favorable to the development of trusting attitudes toward legislatures than others. More precisely, I expect to find that as the number of political parties and political party polarization are held within moderate levels, trust in legislatures should increase. Similarly, in polities where parties have strong roots in societies, trust in legislatures should be greater than in those with weak part systems.

Prior research has shown that the type of system–whether parliamentary of presidential- affects they ways in which system support and confidence in legislatures are

configured (Criado and Herrero 2007). Similarly, Norris argues that "parliamentary systems, where all parties continue to have a stake in the policymaking process, should generate greater system support than winner-take all presidential systems" (Norris 1999, 223). There is no empirical evidence, however, to sustain this claim. Likewise, Anderson and Guillory (1997) studied several European democracies and found that the type of system –whether consensual or majoritarian- affects the levels of citizens' satisfaction with democracy, and Norris (1999) found that institutional confidence is higher in majoritarian systems.

In Latin America all regimes are presidential and the most typical electoral system is proportional representation (Payne, Zovatto, and Díaz 2006; Roberts and Wibbels 1999), which prevents us from testing the impact that variations along these dimensions can have upon citizens' levels of trust in legislatures. There are other institutional arrangements, however, that should explain in part the country-level variance in trust in legislatures. Thus, in the pages that follow I assess the impact each of them has upon trust in legislative bodies. The chapter begins by analyzing the bivariate relationships between the features of the party system considered key to the development of trust and trust in legislatures among citizens of the Americas. Next, alternative explanations are explored, including some institutional features such as unified government and federalism, as well as measures of institutional performance. Finally, the impact of the contextual-level variables is assessed vis-à-vis each other and the individual-level determinants explored in the previous chapter.

The Influence of the Party System

Political parties serve as the link between the represented and their

representatives. The importance of citizens' views of political parties upon their feelings

toward legislatures was established in the previous chapter: those individuals who see

parties being responsive to their needs tend to trust legislatures more. At the country

level, there are certain features of the party system that indicate parties being responsive

to their voters and to citizens in general. Therefore, it can be expected that citizens living

in polities with such characteristics will tend to trust legislatures more than those living in

countries with less responsive parties. In this section, I analyze the impact upon trust in

legislatures of the effective number of political parties with representation in the

assembly, the degree of polarization of the party system, and the extent to which political

parties have stable roots in society.

The Number of Political Parties

The number of parties there are in a political system can affect the dynamics of

the political system (Sartori 1976), and such dynamics, in turn, can affect citizens' views

of the system. According to the number of relevant political parties a system can range

from being highly fragmented to having very little fragmentation (Sartori 1976, 122-23);

previous research has suggested that both extremes have similar –negative- consequences

for citizens' support for legislatures. Party systems with only one party and political

systems with too many parties share a common characteristic: they do not provide individuals clear options (Norris 1999, 225). In one-party systems, citizens do not get to choose between different alternatives, which would lead to growing dissatisfaction with the body that holds them, and, in turn, it would lead to lower levels of trust in legislatures. In a somewhat paradoxical sense, highly fragmented party systems have the same effects: the more parties there are, the closer to each other the options would be, therefore diminishing the clarity of the options (Kuenzi and Lambright 2005, 424). Additionally, highly fragmented party systems posit other threats to the system, mainly in terms of undermined accountability and diminishing governability (Freidenberg 2006, 16; Kuenzi and Lambright 2005, 424) which might as well erode citizens' support for legislatures.

The more parties there are in a parliament, the more legislative bargaining and negotiation will take place due to the many positions to reconcile. Therefore, as the number of political parties with seats in the assembly increases, so would the disaffection with the institution that hosts them, probably seen as unproductive or, at least, inefficient. In this sense, and in contradiction with Norris' hypothesis, if citizens value effectiveness more than the ability of representing a wide array of interests, then the relationship between the number of political parties in the assembly and trust in legislatures should be a direct, negative one (rather than curvilinear).

A widespread used measure of the number of political parties is the *Effective Number of Political Parties* (ENPP), developed by Laakso and Taagepera (1979). The ENPP is an indicator of the number of political parties weighted by their relative strength

either in votes received in the election (*Effective Number of Electoral Parties* or ENEP)

or in seats obtained in the Parliament (*Effective Number of Legislative Parties* or ENLP).[1]

Figure IV.1. Effective Number of Legislative Parties, by country

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[1] The formula to calculate the ENPP is N=1/$\sum p_i^2$, where *N* indicates the ENPP, and *p* stands for the individual parties share of votes or seats.

The average ENLP for the 18 countries studied in this research is 3.87 (with a standard deviation of 1.98).[2] Venezuela is an exceptional case, with only one party in the legislature. This is due to the fact that all opposition parties withdrew from the competition in the 2006 legislative elections, leaving only pro-Chavez groups to be elected. At the other extreme we find Brazil, with more than nine effective parties according to the Laakso and Taagepera Index. [3] Most countries, however, have between two and four legislative parties.

According to the hypothesis above stated, as the number of parties increases, trust in legislatures would decrease. The relationship depicted in Figure IV.2 lends support to it. Figure IV.2 presents the fitted relationship between the existing ENLP and the levels of trust in legislatures expressed by the citizens. The data fits quite nicely in a linear regression line with a negative slope, which indicates that those citizens living in countries with a higher number of political parties tend to trust legislatures less than those who live in a more reduced partisan space.

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[2] I use the ENLP instead of the ENEP because I am mainly interested in how the dynamics of parties in the Legislature might affect citizens' views of the institution. In any case, given that most Latin American electoral systems for selection of legislative authorities are either pure proportional representation or some variant of proportional representation the ENLP does not differ much from the ENEP.

[3] The source for the ENLP for all countries except Argentina and Venezuela is Freidenberg 2006, page 18. Argentina had legislative elections after Freidenberg's work was published, so I calculated the ENLP based on data from Rodríguez 2007. For Venezuela, Freidenberg reported a ENLP greater than 1, but in fact, the Venezuelan Congress is operating as a one-party system. Finally, for Ecuador, Freidenberg reports an ENLP of 5.6. This figure corresponds to the configuration of Congress previous to the destitution and substitution of 57 of the original congressmembers (see Escobar 2007). Since the Ecuadorian Congress is suspended in its functions anyways and several reconfigurations of power have occurred since the election, I chose to keep the original figure.

Figure IV.2. Trust in legislatures by effective number of legislative parties, Latin America (Fitted Values)

If, as often conveyed, fragmentation of the party system is associated with diminished governability and gridlock, then the negative relationship between the ENLP and trust lends additional support for the hypothesis discussed in the previous chapter: when there is too much debate (and few outcomes) in the legislature, then individuals tend to trust the institution less, because they no longer see it as a responsive, worth of their confidence.

Party System Polarization

The above discussed ENLP accounts for a very important part of the legislative and political dynamics. There is, however, another key component to look at when considering the impact the party system might have: the degree of polarization. Polarization refers to the ideological distance (measured in a left-right continuum) of the parties operating in the assembly (Sartori 1976). High levels of partisan polarization are thought to affect political system stability negatively (Evans 2002, Sartori 1976, but see González and Queirolo 2008). I argue that the degree to which the political parties are close to, or far away from, each other in their ideological positions also affects legislative debates and ultimately legislative outcomes. As the political positions in the assembly are polarized, gridlock will be the most probable outcome and therefore support for the institution will decay. The evidence from the United States supports this assertion; King found that as the political parties moved away from their political center, trust in government decayed (King 1997, 156).

The measurement of political party ideology has been approached in several different ways, including content analysis of party manifestos, analysis of public opinion data, and experts' judgments (Huber and Inglehart 1995, 75-76). The data obtained from these different sources, however, is not always convergent. For instance, in Latin America, experts' judgments tend to present a more polarized landscape than that depicted by citizens' ideological self-placements (González and Queirolo 2008). Thus, it seams reasonable to test, alternatively, both operationalizations. Up- to- date polarization data measured through citizens' ideological self-placement and through experts'

judgments is readily available in Queirolo and González (2008).[4] For the measure based

on citizens' self-placement, the authors resort to Sani and Sartori's (1983) formula for

calculating party system polarization. For the experts' judgments measures, González and

Queirolo rely on an updated version of Coppedge's clasification of political parties

(Coppedge 1997).[5]

Figure IV.3 presents the polarization ratings according to each of the two

measurements, for the 15 countries for which there are data available. As the graph

shows, there is only partial agreement between citizens' self-placements and experts'

judgments. If the five most polarized countries according to each indicator are

considered, only two countries appear among the top five in both indicators: El Salvador

and Uruguay. Nicaragua, the most polarized country according to experts' judgment,

occupies the eighth position in the scale based on citizens' ideology. When the five least

polarized countries are considered, matches among the two indicators rise to three:

Honduras, Panama, and Peru.

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[4] The data are available for 15 of the 18 countries here analyzed. Therefore, any analysis containing polarization as independent variable would exclude Argentina, Paraguay, and Dominican Republic.
[5] The authors describe the procedures followed to create the indicators of polarization as "(a) estimating Sani and Sartori's (1983) definition of polarization (ideological distance between the two most extreme *relevant* parties, where the position of the parties result from their voters' self placement in the left right scale), and (b) estimating Coppedge's (1998) indicator of polarization, which differs from Sani and Sartori's in two basic ways: it is based on the experts' classification, and it takes into account the position of all the parties (not merely the two most extreme ones) except those of the center. Polarization according to Sani and Sartori's definition (the difference between the positions of the two most extreme relevant parties divided by nine, the maximum possible difference) varies between 0 (an extremely unlikely case: all relevant parties should be in the same place in the ten-point scale) and 1 (when the most extreme relevant parties are found at both ends of the scale, 1 and 10). Coppedge's indicator measures the dispersion of the vote away from the relative center of the party system; polarization ranges from zero to 100." (González and Queirolo 2008, 15).

Figure IV.3. Party system polarization in Latin America

Despite these differences, the impact of party system polarization upon citizens'

levels of trust in legislatures runs in the same direction, whatever the measurement

(Figure IV.4). The relationship observed, however, is contrary to that expected. Figure

IV.4 depicts a positive relationship between the level of party system polarization and

trust in legislatures.

The observed bivariate relationship between party system polarization and trust in legislatures contradicts the hypothesis above stated. The positive impact of polarization upon trust in legislatures, however, is mild. Changes in party system polarization can make trust vary only within a range of 4 points (in a 100-point scale); if confidence intervals are taken into account, the maximum possible variation in trust due to party system polarization is less than 2 points.

Figure IV.4. Trust in legislatures by levels of party system polarization, Latin America (Fitted values)

The impact of party system polarization upon trust in legislatures does not operate in the expected direction. A potential explanation for the falsification of the hypothesis is that the degree of party system polarization might not have impact at all upon trust in legislatures (already suggested by the little substantive impact shown by the regression

lines in Figure IV.4). Alternative explanations, however, should be put on hold until the results from the multivariate analyses are explored.

Parties with Stable Roots in Society

Political parties with stable roots in society are a key indicator of party system institutionalization (Mainwaring and Scully 1995). If parties have stable roots in society, it means they are meaningful to citizens and that they are accomplishing (at least partially) their expected functions (otherwise citizens would not continue voting for them, or identifying with them).

A polity with parties with stable roots is a polity in which the function of political representation is channeled mainly through political parties. If, as seen in the previous chapter, citizens' evaluations of parties and legislatures' responsiveness are key to the development of confidence in legislatures, a political system where most citizens confer (again, at least partially) such attribute to political parties should be a system where conditions are given for individuals to trust legislatures more. Thus, I expect to find greater levels of trust in legislatures among those individuals living in polities where political parties have stable roots in society.

The degree to which political parties have stable roots in society can be established by the percentage of self- described partisans living in such a society (Dalton and Weldon 2007); a polity with elevated proportions of party identifiers is deemed as a polity in which parties have stable roots. The AmericasBarometer 2008 asked citizens whether they identified themselves with a political party; by computing the total number

of affirmative answers to that question in each country, an indicator of parties' stable roots is obtained.

Figure IV.5. Percent of partisans as indicator of parties' stable roots, Latin America

Figure IV.5 shows the percentage of self-described partisans in each of the countries. Dominican Republic, Paraguay, Uruguay, and Honduras have clearly

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established parties according to the indicator of percentage of partisans. In the four

countries, at least half of the citizens identify themselves with a political party. At the

other extreme, only 15.9% of Guatemalans self-identify with a political party. The

landscape of partisan identification as indicator of parties' roots is, thus, one with a lot of

variations across countries in Latin America.

Figure IV.6. Trust in legislatures by parties' stable roots measured as percentage of partisans, Latin America (Fitted Values)

Do parties' stable roots in society foster citizens' levels of trust in legislatures?

The preliminary evidence from the bivariate relationship among the two variables

suggests so (Figure IV.6). As the percentage of partisans in the polity they inhabit

increases, so does the confidence citizens confer to legislatures. Thus, countries with more stable party systems (again, measured as the percentage of partisans) seem to provide a frame more favorable for trusting legislatures than those countries with weak partisan roots.

Alternative Explanations

Previous research might have ignored the impact that some characteristics of the party system can have in shaping citizens' attitudes toward institutions of representation, but other institutional characteristics have been explored. These alternative explanations converge in two broad categories: *political institutions* and *institutional performance*. The first category comprises the type of government (whether divided or unified), and the distribution of power within the polity (whether federal or unitary). The second category, institutional performance, includes regimes' economic performance as well as other indicators of the effectiveness of governments such as crime and corruption rates. Each of them is here briefly described and later included in the multivariate analyses.

Unified Government

As discussed in the previous chapter, as citizens perceive congress wasting too much time discussing and debating and as they perceive the assembly obstructing the executive in excess, their levels of trust in the institutions decay. Whether a divided or unified government is in place, it conditions the stage for those situations of excessive

debate and gridlock to exist. Thus, it could be reasonable to expect that under unified

government congressional activities would run smoother, and so will the legislative-

executive relations, therefore leading to lower levels of perceived conflicts and hence

higher levels of trust. Conversely, it could be expected that under divided government

inter branches conflicts arise, leading to lower levels of trust in legislatures among

citizens. Evidence from the United States lends support for the hypothesis: views of

Congress improve under periods of unified government (Patterson and Caldeira 1990),

which is probably linked to more perceived effectiveness.

The idea of divided government is easily grasped and operationalized in the

context of the stable American two-party system. In multiparty systems the classification

is not that straightforward (Elgie 2001; Shugart 1995). In multiparty systems – especially

those configured under proportional representation rules- there is the possibility for a

party to obtain only a relative majority, a situation that must be distinguished from that in

which a party holds the absolute majority (Shugart 1995, 327). Following such guideline,

in this research, countries in which the executive and more than 50% of the legislature

(and each of the chambers in bicameral systems) are controlled by the same political

party will be counted as cases of *unified government*; all the other situations (whether the

party controlling the executive is in minority or holding only a relative majority in one or

both chambers) will be considered cases of *non unified government*.

The countries holding unified governments at the time the public opinion data

were collected were: Argentina (Executive and both chambers controlled by the coalition

Alianza Frente para la Victoria), Dominican Republic (Executive and both chambers

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controlled by the *Partido de la Liberación Dominicana*), Uruguay (Executive and both chambers controlled by the *Encuentro Progresista – Frente Amplio*), and Ecuador. [6]

Contrary to previous findings, citizens living in countries with unified governments have, on average, lower levels of trust in legislatures than those living under non unified governments (Figure IV.7). The mean trust in legislatures among those living under non unified government is almost four points higher than among those living under unified government. This mean value for those living under unified government, however, is highly influenced by the presence of Ecuadorians, who stand up for their low levels of trust in assemblies.

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[6] Ecuador is a special case. The original configuration of a non unified government product of the vote share resulting from the 2006 legislative election (Freidenberg 2006, 63-68) was clearly modified by the electoral authority ruling enacting the destitution of 57 out of the 100 originally elected congressmembers in March 2007, and their replacement by new legislators identified as supporters of the President (Escobar 2007) . Thus, since March 2007 Ecuador held a unified government. Since November 2007, however, the Ecuadorian Congress has been suspended on its functions, following the mandate of the Assembly conformed to create the new Constitution – the *Asamblea Constituyente*. At the *Asamblea Constituyente*, supporters of President Correa hold the majority (ADNMUNDO 2007). Thus, since the last operating Congress did so in a unified government configuration and the functioning institution that more closely resembles a legislative body, the *Asamblea Constituyente*, is also conformed by a majority of individuals loyal to the President, it is reasonable to assume Ecuador is also a case of unified government.

Figure IV.7. Trust in legislatures by type of government, Latin America

When Ecuadorians are removed from the analysis, the mean level of trust in legislatures for those citizens living under unified governments rises to 45.1, surpassing the average confidence among citizens living under non unified governments (which is not altered). When this outlier is removed, then, the predicted trend emerges: those living under unified governments, on average, trust legislatures more than their fellow citizens living under non unified governments.

The case of Ecuador comprises a clear refusal of the positive link between unified government and trust in legislatures. This does not mean, however, that the hypothesis proposing such a link is altogether inaccurate. A unified government, as the other institutional features, is thought to *promote* –not *determine*- a more positive environment for the development of trust in legislatures. Additional variables might exert effects in the

opposite direction, therefore neutralizing the impact a unified government can have upon trust in legislatures. Thus, the effect unified government has upon trust in legislatures, if any at all, can only be clearly assessed in a multivariate analysis, conducted in the final section of this chapter.

Federalism

"Federalism is a political organization in which the activities of government are divided between regional governments and a central government in such a way that each kind of government has some activities on which it makes final decisions" (Riker 1975, 101 cited by Lijphart 1999, 186). This is a widely-used definition of federalism that stresses the constitutional division of powers across the space.

Norris hypothesized that confidence in institutions of representation should be higher among citizens living in federal states because "federalism manages to accommodate simultaneously the needs of different regions" (Norris 1999, 225). The empirical evidence she found when she analyzed data for 25 democracies, however, pointed in the opposite direction: individuals living under unitary states trusted institutions of representation –on average- more than their fellow citizens living under federal systems. A possible explanation Norris found is that unitary states are better than federal ones at producing accountability and responsible party government (Norris 1999, 233), therefore constituting a framework for citizens to be more satisfied with the government outcomes which would ultimately lead to higher levels of trust.

In Latin America there are four formally federal countries: Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, and Venezuela (Gibson 2004, 3). If Norris' hypothesis is accurate for the Latin American context, then individuals living in those four countries should express higher levels of trust in legislatures than their fellow citizens from the rest of the continent. If, on the other hand, the explanation developed for the 25 democracies analyzed in her piece holds – that is, if individuals value unitary government outputs more- then higher levels of trust should be found among those living in unitary systems.

Figure IV.8. Trust in legislatures by Federalism, Latin America

The bivariate relationship between federalism and trust in legislatures lends mild support for Norris' hypothesis: trust in legislatures is higher among those living in federal systems; the difference is substantively small, but statistically significant (see Table

AIV.3 in Annex F). The extent to which a federal environment provides a frame more favorable for citizens to trust legislatures can only be assessed by means of the multivariate analysis, where other covariates are introduced and controlled for.

Institutional Performance

Some scholars argue that citizens' support for the system is driven by how well the government is doing its job, and they explore measurements of institutional performance at the aggregate level.[7] Thus, Miller and Listhaug argue that "countries with governments that turn in a better performance should also exhibit relatively higher levels of diffuse public support than countries with poorly performing governments" (Miller and Listhaug 1999, 206).

Assessments of governmental performance upon institutional trust have mainly focused on economic performance. In most cases, Miller and Listhaug's hypothesis has been supported; Lipset and Schneider (1983 62-65) found that unemployment and inflation were associated with weak support for the incumbent U.S. government. Similarly, poor economic performance has been identified as one of the reasons for declining trust in institutions in Sweden (Holmberg 1999, 121). Finally, per capita income and per capita income growth are both positively associated with trust in legislatures in the Andean countries (Mainwaring 2006, 300). Lawrence, on the other hand, observed that governmental economic performance has a negative impact upon

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[7] Specific, *individual*-level performance evaluations of legislatures and legislators do affect individual levels of trust, as discussed in Chapter 3. In this section the focus shifts to *country*-level objective indicators.

political trust, but that it does not account for the dramatic changes in trust suffered by the US. Government (Lawrence 1997). Moreover, some studies have found a negative association between GDP and institutional trust at the country level; the outlined explanations for this counter-intuitive finding is that individuals living in the most affluent countries have higher expectations for their institutions, which would lead them to be less satisfied with the performance –and therefore to trust them less (Mcallister 1999, 197).

Among Latin American countries, a great deal of variation on GDP per capita is found. In 2007, the GDP per capita ranged from 863 USD for Nicaragua to 8,744.4 for Argentina (ECLAC 2007, 88).[8] If what has been seen for the Andean countries holds true for the rest of Latin America, then we should observe higher levels of trust among those individuals living in richer countries. Figure VI.9 shows that it is, indeed, the case. For Latin America, the country's per capita GDP is positively associated with trust in legislatures: those individuals who live in countries with a higher GDP per capita trust parliaments more than their fellow citizens who live in more modest environments.

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[8] The complete list of GDP per capita values for all countries included in the analysis is found in Annex E.

Figure IV.9. Trust in legislatures by level of GDP, Latin America

Economic institutional performance is a powerful indicator of government effectiveness, but it might not be the only one. Mainwaring argues that the low levels of confidence in institutions of representation in the Andes have been caused by *state deficiencies*; together with a poor economic performance; the author identifies crime and corruption as key indicators of poor governmental performance (Mainwaring 2006, 296-302). The impact of these state deficiencies is worth exploring, given that they might constitute a structural hinder for the development of trusting bonds between individuals and institutions of representation.

In order to control for the impact the level of corruption existing in the country might affect trust in legislatures, I rely on the *Corruption Victimization Index* developed by LAPOP (Seligson 1997; Seligson 1999) and available from the AmericasBarometer

round 2008. The *Corruption Victimization Index* indicates the proportion of individuals in a given country that have been victims of corruption during the past year, according to their responses in the survey. The index is obtained by computing the total number of individuals who answered they were victims of at least one of the following forms of corruption: bribe solicited by a police officer, bribe solicited by a public official, corruption at the city hall, corruption in the courts, bribe solicited in the job, at the children's school, or in state-run hospitals.

Also regarding corruption victimization there is important variation across countries. The countries with the highest corruption victimization rates -Mexico and Bolivia, with over 30% of their population being victims of corruption in the past year- have almost four times the level of corruption found in the countries with the lowest values of corruption victimization, such as Uruguay, Panama, and Colombia.[9]

The bivariate relationship between degree of corruption in the country –measured by the percentage of victims of corruption during the past year- and the levels of trust individuals have on legislatures is negative, rendering further confirmation to what was found for the Andean countries. Figure IV.10 depicts such a relationship.

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[9] For a complete list of the corruption victimization see Annex E.

Figure IV.10. Trust in legislatures by level of corruption, Latin America

The regression line revealed in Figure IV.10 shows that as the level of corruption in the country increases, individuals tend to trust legislatures less. The substantive impact of the degree of corruption, however, is only modest; given the different levels of corruption victimization trust in legislatures varies within 44 and 38 points (if confidence intervals are taken into account, the range of variation is even narrower).

Finally, the impact of the overall level of crime and its impact upon trust in legislatures are to be assessed. Crime is a serious problem that many Latin American countries face, and it constitutes an area in which the state has proven deficient in many circumstances. Crime is also a phenomenon rather difficult to measure, a problem that becomes worse when cross-national comparisons are intended due to differential criteria for defining and reporting what constitutes a crime. A way in which this difficulty is

overcome is by means of crime victimization surveys, which consist of asking citizens directly whether or not they have been victims of crime (UNODC 2008). The AmericasBarometer 2008 asked such a question, therefore national-level crime victimization rates can be obtained by computing the percentage of individuals expressing they were victims of a crime during the past year.

Again, cross-country variation is found, with crime victimization rates that range from 13% in Honduras to 27% in Argentina.[10] The bivariate correlation between crime and trust in legislatures run in the direction predicted by Mainwaring: those individuals living in countries with higher crime rates tend to trust legislatures less than their fellow citizens living in safer environments (Figure IV.11)

Figure IV.11. Trust in legislatures by level of crime, Latin America

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[10] See complete results in Annex E.

The range in the predicted values of trust for given levels of crime is wider than the observed for the relationship between trust and corruption, which suggest crime would have a more significant impact upon trust in legislatures than corruption does. The relative impact of each independent variable, however, can only be assessed vis-à-vis the impact of the other, the task that occupies the next section of the panel.

A Multivariate Multi-level Model of Trust in Legislatures

In order to single out the impact that each of the contextual variables has upon trust in legislatures in Latin America, those variables have to be tested in a model that controls for the other contextual variables as well as for the individual-level variables explored in Chapter III. Therefore, the way of assessing whether context matters in shaping citizens' confidence in legislatures is by adding the eight contextual variables – effective number of legislative parties, degree of polarization of the party system, parties' roots in society, unified government, federalism, GDP, corruption, and crime- to the model presented in Table III.4 in the previous chapter.

Table IV.1 presents the results from three random effects models upon trust in legislatures. All three models are identical except for the polarization variable. Model 5 includes citizens' ideological identification as a proxy for party system polarization; it is substituted in Model 6 by polarization according to experts' judgments. Given that the available data on polarization only covers 15 countries (therefore leaving out of the

analysis all cases from Argentina, Dominican Republic, and Paraguay), Model 7 replicates the model without a proxy for party system polarization which allows for the inclusion of cases from all 18 countries.

An important advantage of running multi-level models with the *xtmixed* command of Stata 10 –as I did- is that unlike other statistical software, Stata does not impose severe constrains in the number of country-level variables to include in the model. Therefore, including seven or eight country-level variables as I do in Models 5 to 7 does not violate any modeling assumption.[11]

The random effects models analyzed in Chapter 3 explained around 40% of the total variance of trust in legislatures. By adding the country-level variables the model reaches higher explanatory power: according to the R Squared values the explanatory power of the new models is around 53% for the models including the polarization variables (models 5 and 6) and 49% for Model 7, which excludes it (Table IV.1). Accordingly, the country-level unexplained variance -sd(_cons)- is significantly reduced in reference to the model with individual-level variables only, especially in models 5 and 6.

Although the significance of the *p*-value for the likelihood-ratio test (LR) confirms that the mixed model with random-intercept is a better fit for the data than a simple OLS regression model for all three models, a Hausman test reveals that despite the fact these are better specified models than those analyzed in the previous chapter, they still suffer from endogeneity (Tables AIV.7 to AIV.9, Annex F).

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[11] This is so because Stata treats country-level variables in the same way it does individual-level variables, in a unique data matrix (Gutierrez 2008).

Table IV. 1. Individual and contextual determinants of trust in legislatures in Latin America, random effects models

	Model 5		Model 6		Model 7	
	β		β		β	
Excessive debate	0.115	***	0.115	***	0.121	***
Excessive debate Sq	-0.001	***	-0.001	***	-0.001	***
Excessive counterbalance	0.089	***	0.089	***	0.085	***
Excessive counterbalance Sq	-0.001	***	-0.001	***	-0.001	***
Congressional Performance	0.474	***	0.473	***	0.472	***
Party responsiveness	0.183	***	0.183	***	0.183	***
Partisan ID	0.459	*	0.456	*	0.534	**
Presidential approval	0.051	***	0.052	***	0.051	***
Economic situation	0.024	**	0.024	**	0.027	***
Political Knowledge	-0.022	***	-0.022	***	-0.025	***
Internal political efficacy	0.039	***	0.039	***	0.037	***
External political efficacy	0.059	***	0.059	***	0.063	***
TV news	0.000		0.000		0.002	
Interpersonal trust	0.033	***	0.033	***	0.032	***
Education	-1.076	***	-1.083	***	-1.062	***
Effective N of parties	-0.973	**	-1.044	**	-0.786	
Polarization (Citizens)	4.717					
Polarization (Experts)			0.032			
Parties' roots in society	-0.044		-0.042		0.016	
Unified government	-8.357	***	-7.933	***	-6.597	***
Federalism	1.876		1.565		0.782	
GDP	0.002	***	0.002	***	0.002	***
Corruption	-0.042		-0.006		-0.036	
Crime	-0.306		-0.296	*	-0.361	
_cons	11.583		9.610		10.227	
Random-effects Parameters. Estimates reported (std error in parentheses)						
country: Identity						
sd(_cons)	1.776		1.719		2.744	
	(0.373)		(0.368)		(0.494)	
sd(Residual)	24.239		24.239		24.243	
	(0.123)		(0.123)		(0.115)	
LR vs OLS Chibar p	0.000		0.000		0.000	
R^2 (model)	0.529		0.531		0.493	
R^2 (between-country)	0.808		0.814		0.703	
R^2 (within-country)	0.154		0.154		0.154	
Observations	19,381		19,381		22,048	
Groups	15		15		18	
Wald chi2(23)	7199.67		7217.25		8242.63	
Prob > chi2 =	0.000		0.000		0.000	
$p < 0.05$ * || $p < 0.01$ ** || $p < 0.001$ ***						

The usually recommended palliative for this situation, the reliance on fixed effects models yields similar substantive results (Table IV.2). The fixed effects models have a diminished explanatory power (around 33% of the total variance), but thanks to the inclusion of country-level dummy variables, they do provide additional hints on country-level specific features.

Although the results shown in tables IV.1 and IV.2 do not provide strong confirmation for all the hypotheses stated in this chapter, they do suggest very interesting patterns. First, the impact of the individual-level variables remains strong and practically unchanged when the contextual variables are included in (any of) the models. Second, none of the characteristics of the party system has a statistically significant impact consistent across models, but the ENLP reaches such an impact in five out of the six data analysis. Among the contextual-level control variables, unified government and GDP per capita are the only ones with consistent effects across models.

Party system polarization, either measured through the proxy of citizens' self-identification or by experts' judgments does not have a statistically significant impact upon trust in legislatures. Given this, models 5 and 6 can be abandoned and replaced by Model 7, which mirrors models 5 and 6 in all other variables, with the advantage of having cases from all 18 countries. To facilitate comparisons, Table IV.III presents the results from both random and fixed effects analyses for Model 7 next to the results obtained for the final model analyzed in Chapter 3 (that is, results from Model 2, originally presented in Table III.4)

Table IV. 2. Individual and contextual determinants of trust in legislatures in Latin America, fixed effects model

	Model 5		Model 6		Model 7	
	β		B		β	
Excessive debate	0.114	***	0.114	***	0.122	***
Excessive debate Sq	-0.001	***	-0.001	***	-0.001	***
Excessive counterbalance	0.089	***	0.089	***	0.085	***
Excessive counterbalance Sq	-0.001	***	-0.001	***	-0.001	***
Congressional Performance	0.472	***	0.472	***	0.471	***
Party responsiveness	0.183	***	0.183	***	0.182	***
Partisan ID	0.456	*	0.456	*	0.535	**
Presidential approval	0.051	***	0.051	***	0.050	***
Economic situation	0.023	**	0.023	**	0.026	***
Political Knowledge	-0.023	***	-0.023	***	-0.024	***
Internal political efficacy	0.040	***	0.040	***	0.037	***
External political efficacy	0.059	***	0.059	***	0.063	***
TV news	0.001		0.001		0.003	
Interpersonal trust	0.033	***	0.033	***	0.032	***
Education	-1.084	***	-1.084	***	-1.070	***
Effective N of parties	-1.041	***	-0.983	***	-1.599	***
Polarization (Citizens)	(dropped)					
Polarization (Experts)			-0.009			
Parties' roots in society	0.028		0.033		0.150	***
Unified government	-8.323	***	-8.197	***	-12.292	***
Federalism	1.588	*	1.603	*	1.067	
GDP	0.002	***	0.002	***	0.001	***
Corruption	-0.035		-0.040		-0.097	**
Crime	-0.088		-0.069		-0.065	
Guatemala	2.935	*	3.169	**	-1.325	
El Salvador	-2.200	*	-1.665		-10.143	***
Honduras	(dropped)		(dropped)		-10.304	***
Nicaragua	-0.699		(dropped)		-10.053	***
Costa Rica	-3.139	***	-3.251	***	-6.255	***
Panama	(dropped)		(dropped)		(dropped)	
Colombia	4.797	***	4.999	***	0.685	
Ecuador	(dropped)		(dropped)		(dropped)	
Bolivia	4.279	***	4.817	***	-2.795	
Peru	-2.346	*	-2.384	*	-6.230	***
Paraguay					-16.843	***
Chile	(dropped)		(dropped)		(dropped)	
Uruguay	(dropped)		(dropped)		-0.403	
Brazil	(dropped)		(dropped)		(dropped)	
Venezuela	(dropped)		(dropped)		(dropped)	
Argentina					(dropped)	
Dominican Republic					(dropped)	
_cons	5.297	*	4.791		13.037	***
R^2 (model)	0.340		0.340		0.349	
Adj R2 (model)	0.339		0.339		3.348	
Observations	19,381		19,381		22,048	
Country of reference: Mexico	$p < 0.05$ * || $p < 0.01$ ** || $p < 0.001$ ***					

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Model 7 lends almost identical results for the individual-level variables under random and fixed effects analyses.[12] Moreover, for the individual-level variables, the coefficients and their statistical significance are almost identical to those of Model 2 (originally presented in Table III.4 and copied in the first two columns of Table IV.3). This not only means that individual attitudes and behaviors remain strong predictors of attitudes toward legislatures even after controlling for contextual variables, but also that the introduction of contextual-level variables does not alter the direction, magnitude, or significance of such an impact, either.

Among the contextual predictors of trust in legislatures, the ENLP reaches statistical significance under the fixed effects model and it does so in the predicted direction: as the number of political parties with representation in the assembly increases, the confidence in the Legislature expressed by individuals living in a the polity decreases, for each additional political party with parliamentary representation, trust in legislatures decreases 1.5 points. Similarly, the positive and significant coefficient for parties' roots in society indicates that as parties are better established in a polity, the individuals who live in such a polity tend to trust legislatures more.

Among the institutional variables, only unified government achieves statistical significance, but it does so in a direction opposite to that predicted by the theory: individuals living in countries with unified governments trust legislatures less than their citizens living under non unified arrangements. In the previous section it was shown how the results changed when Ecuador was removed from the group of cases defined as unified government.

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[12] The results remain strong under a robust standard error analysis (see Table AIV.13, in Annex F).

Table IV. 3. Individual and contextual determinants of trust in legislatures in Latin America, Model 7, random and fixed effects models

| | Model 2 | | | | Model 7 | | | |
| | Random effects | | Fixed effects | | Random effects | | Fixed effects | |
	β		β		β		β	
Excessive debate	0.121	***	0.122	***	0.121	***	0.122	***
Excessive debate Sq	-0.001	***	-0.001	***	-0.001	***	-0.001	***
Excessive counterbalance	0.085	***	0.085	***	0.085	***	0.085	***
Excessive counterbalance Sq	-0.001	***	-0.001	***	-0.001	***	-0.001	***
Congressional Performance	0.472	***	0.471	***	0.472	***	0.471	***
Party responsiveness	0.183	***	0.182	***	0.183	***	0.182	***
Partisan ID	0.531	**	0.535	**	0.534	**	0.535	**
Presidential approval	0.05	***	0.05	***	0.051	***	0.05	***
Economic situation	0.027	***	0.026	***	0.027	***	0.026	***
Political Knowledge	-0.024	***	-0.024	***	-0.025	***	-0.024	***
Internal political efficacy	0.037	***	0.037	***	0.037	***	0.037	***
External political efficacy	0.063	***	0.063	***	0.063	***	0.063	***
TV news	0.003		0.003		0.002		0.003	
Interpersonal trust	0.032	***	0.032	***	0.032	***	0.032	***
Education	-1.076	***	-1.07	***	-1.062	***	-1.07	***
Effective N of parties					-0.786		-1.599	***
Parties' roots in society					0.016		0.15	***
Unified government					-6.597	***	-12.292	***
Federalism					0.782		1.067	
GDP					0.002	***	0.001	***
Corruption					-0.036		-0.097	**
Crime					-0.361		-0.065	
Guatemala			-9.975	***			-1.325	
El Salvador			-11.298	***			-10.143	***
Honduras			-9.467	***			-10.304	***
Nicaragua			-12.616	***			-10.053	***
Costa Rica			-7.299	***			-6.255	***
Panama			-11.169	***			(dropped)	
Colombia			-7.25	***			0.685	
Ecuador			-22.801	***			(dropped)	
Bolivia			-7.412	***			-2.795	
Peru			-13.124	***			-6.23	***
Paraguay			-16.348	***			-16.843	***
Chile			-4.917	***			(dropped)	
Uruguay			-7.114	***			-0.403	
Brazil			-10.434	***			(dropped)	
Venezuela			-7.364	***			(dropped)	
Argentina			-11.95	***			(dropped)	
Dominican Republic			-6.966	***			(dropped)	
_cons	4.739	***	14.657	***	10.227		13.037	***
R^2 (model)	0.418		0.3492		0.493		0.349	
Adj R2 (model)			0.3483				3.348	
Observations	22,048		22,048		22,048		22,048	
Country of reference: Mexico								
$p < 0.05$ * || $p < 0.01$ ** || $p < 0.001$ ***								

When such a thing is done, and Ecuador is therefore considered a case of non unified government, the variable is dropped out of the model under a fixed effects robust standard errors analysis (see Table AIV.14, in Annex F). I will return to the issue of dropped variables in the upcoming paragraphs.

Finally, two of the institutional performance variables lend significant results under the fixed effect model: GDP and corruption. The substantive impact of GDP per capita is, however, almost zero, whereas the overall corruption level in the country –as expressed by the percentage of self-declared victims of corruption during the past year- affects trust in legislatures in the predicted direction: citizens living in countries with higher levels of corruption tend to trust legislatures less than their fellow citizens living in less corrupt environments.

These results, however, should be carefully assessed in light of the by-country variation of each of the contextual independent variables. In this sense, the fixed effects model sheds light over how these country-level variables might actually overlap with the country-dummy variables. In the previous chapter, the significance of the tests showing that a random effects model controlling for country level random variation was a better fit for the data than a simple OLS regression, and the magnitude and statistical significance of the country dummy variables encouraged the exploration of the contextual variables as potential determinants of the trust in legislatures pursued in this chapter. What those results suggested was that there were factors at the country level that explained part of the variance observed in the dependent variable. Facing this scenario, some particularities of the party system considered key in shaping citizens' attitudes toward legislature were explored, together with additional, control contextual-level variables such as the type of

government, and indicators of institutional performance. Some of these country-level variables, as it has just been discussed, prove to be statistically significant, which suggests contextual variables do have an impact upon citizens' levels of trust in legislatures.

Now, in the fixed effects final model (Model 7), in addition to the seven contextual variables, the country-level effects are included in the model as country dummies. The dummy variables for Panama, Ecuador, Chile, Brazil, Venezuela, Argentina, and Dominican Republic are automatically dropped out of the model by the software used to process the analysis. This is due to perfect collinearity between the dropped variable and some other variable included in the model.

Why does this happen? Recall that in order to calculate the impact contextual variables have upon trust in legislatures at the individual level, each case (that is, each individual) was assigned the value corresponding to the country he resides in for each of the contextual level variables. Thus, for instance, all Brazilians received a score of 9.3 for the ENLP parties, because that is the number of parties with representatives in the national Congress in the country they inhabit. Similarly, all Dominicans and Bolivians received a score of 2.4 in the same variable, because that is the ENLP for their respective countries. Brazil is the only case of the Americas with a ENLP of 9.3 therefore, when a country dummy for Brazil was included (for which all Brazilians were assigned the value 1), then there is perfect collinearity between ENLP and the country dummy for Brazil, and that is why the model automatically drops one of the variables in order to avoid multicollinearity and the violation of a basic assumption of the OLS regression. The same situation of perfect collinearity happens with some other of the contextual variables and

the country dummies for Panama, Ecuador, Chile, Venezuela, Argentina, and Dominican Republic.

Several alternative avenues can be pursued to overcome this problem, although none of them is optimal. For instance, the values of the independent variables of interval nature (ENLP, parties' roots in society, GDP, corruption, and crime) could be collapsed into fewer categories, therefore transforming them into ordinal scales. This procedure, however, would eliminate most of the by-country existing variation for most of these variables, which renders their inclusion in the analysis almost pointless. Besides, it does not solve the multicollinearity problem posited by the dummy variables (federalism and unified government), which cannot be recoded in such a way.

Another alternative would be to collapse the different contextual independent and control variables into fewer variables by means of creating indexes of party systems features, institutional features, and institutional performance, for instance. This procedure, however, does not seem advisable due to theoretical as well as methodological reasons. The aim of including each of the above listed contextual independent variables is to test their impact upon trust in legislatures with the ultimate goal of identifying the institutional features that promote trusting bonds between citizens and legislatures. If two or more of those variables are collapsed into a unique indicator, then the individual effect of each institutional feature fades and it will no longer be possible to identify the features that better promote –or hinder- confidence in legislatures. Therefore, collapsing several different independent variables into summary measures yields the same results as recoding each independent variable into fewer categories: it renders the analysis pointless from the perspective of the theory driving the exploration. Additionally, even if this issue

was ignored, there is a methodological obstacle to do it: the variables do not conform

reliable scales.[13]

Finally, a third strategy consists of removing the country dummies from the

model, which would wipe out the collinearity problem between the country dummies and

the institutional context variables. Following such strategy, however, implies that the

only contextual differences the model accounts for are those captured by the seven

contextual variables included in the model. The problem of pursuing this strategy is,

though, that for El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Peru, and Paraguay the

country dummies not only do not suffer from collinearity with the contextual variables

but they also achieve statistically significant results. This means that in these countries

there is something beyond the contextual variables included in the model that accounts

for variation in the levels of trust in legislatures expressed by the citizens in the survey.

The random and fixed effects analyses of Model 7 presented in Table IV.3 are not

free of problems, as it has been discussed. The ways to overcome those problems

however, are not free of caveats, either. The main issue probably resides in the limited

number of countries, something that cannot be solved with any of the data manipulation

processes just discussed. With 18 countries, the collinearity problem between the country

dummy variables and some of the contextual variables is something not to be surprised

about. The focus of this research, however, is trust in legislatures among Latin

Americans, and therefore the limitation is inherent to the object of research. Variation in

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[13] The Alpha coefficient of reliability for the party system variables (ENLP and parties' roots in society) is 0.23. The Alpha coefficient for the institutional control variables: federalism and unified government is 0.26. Finally, the Alpha coefficient for the institutional performance variables is 0.4 for crime and corruption considered together. The results are not reported when a coefficient of reliability for crime, corruption, and GDP is requested (probably because the coefficient is too small to be reported). Thus, any of the groups of variables achieves values of the coefficient of reliability high enough to justify their combination in an index.

the institutional features –especially those concerning the party systems- does exist among the studied countries; the range of that variation, however, is not wide enough to allow for additional data analysis (collapsing categories, for instance). This does not mean, however, that the analysis of the impact of the contextual variables pursued in this chapter is valueless. It suggests, rather, that contextual factors matter, but they do so in more complex ways than originally expected.

Discussion

Two major lessons are drawn from the preceding analyses. The first one is that individual-level attitudes are the stronger predictors of trust in legislatures; their impact is not altered in any significant way when the contextual variables are included in the multivariate models. The second lesson is that assessing the impact of the contextual features is a complex enterprise. The consequences of institutional arrangements and institutional performance upon trust might not be something that can be assessed straightforward.

In spite of the methodological challenges that the introduction of contextual-level variables posited, the results from all the multivariate analyses show the strong influence individual attitudes toward legislatures have upon confidence in the institution. The finding that views about parties and legislatures responsiveness is the main determinant of the confidence individuals deposit in the legislatures remains unchallenged. These results reassure the assertion that for citizens to trust legislatures more, the key step is for them to become –and be perceived as- responsive to citizens' representational needs.

Beyond this keystone factor, however, I expected the institutional context to play a role in the trusting linkages between citizens and legislatures. This chapter began with the discussion on how specific features of the party systems were expected to affect how citizens' view their legislatures. Specifically, it was argued that the number of political parties with legislative representation –the ENLP- and their degree of polarization could negatively affect trust in legislatures by constituting obstacles to efficient legislative outcomes. If citizens reject excessive legislative bargain, then as the number of parties represented in congress and the ideological distance among them increase, the conditions are given for individuals to trust legislatures less, because citizens would see legislatures often engaging in the processes they abhor. Along the same lines, I expected to find greater levels of trust in legislatures among those citizens living in polities in which political parties have strong roots in society, given that the strength of parties would speak of the effectiveness of the representation. Similarly, under non-unified government there should be expected higher congressional gridlock to the presidential agenda –a practice also rejected when perceived as carried out in excess- that would also make trust in legislatures decay.

The available evidence suggests that the number of parties with legislative representation existing in a country affects the confidence deposited in legislatures by the citizens, and it does so in the expected direction. As the ENLP increases, trust in legislatures decreases at a statistically significant –although substantively moderate- rate. This moderate effect, however, remains constant across the different multivariate models analyzed in this chapter.

Conversely, the degree of party system polarization does not attain statistical significance in any of its versions. It might be possible that polarization does not affect levels of trust in any significant way, therefore disconfirming the hypotheses about its impact upon confidence in legislatures. It could also be, however, that its effect upon trust is contingent to other characteristics of the party systems –such as the ENLP, for instance. Unfortunately, matching the ENLP and the degree of polarization into a single scale that accounts for both (as suggested by Sartori 1976) is unfeasible given that with only 18 countries, it is highly likely that there would be a unique value for each country, therefore leading to collinearity between this variable and the country-level dummies.

On the alternative explanations, only one of the institutional variables –unified government- attains statistical significance. Federalism, on the other hand, does not affect levels of trust in legislatures in any significant way. For the case of unified government, the impact operates in a direction contrary to that expected: individuals living under unified governments trust their legislatures less than those living in non unified polities. Among the institutional performance variables, GDP and corruption achieve statistical significance in the predicted direction, but their substantive impact is very small.

For the above exposed methodological reasons, these results on the impact of contextual variables cannot be taken as definitive. The significance of both, the contextual variables and the country dummy variables reassures the claim that context matters in shaping trust in legislatures. The limited number of countries, however, posits some limitations to the confidence with which the results from the statistical analyses are read. The consistent impact of the ENLP across different models, for instance, suggests that this particular feature of the party system might affect citizens views of legislatures

in the predicted direction; in those polities with more political parties with legislative

representation citizens trust legislatures less, probably because the more the parties at

play, the more chaos and ineffectiveness of the whole legislative body individuals

perceive. In sum, context matters for citizens attitudes toward legislatures but it does so

in a complex manner, not easily grasped by multivariate statistical analyses.

CHAPTER V

TRUST IN LEGISLATURES AND DEMOCRACY

Legislatures have been operating as political institutions since its rudimentary origins in medieval Europe (Loewenberg and Patterson 1979), long before democracies were established and consolidated in the modern world. In today's polities, parliaments play essentially the same old role: to allow for different views, groups, and interests to have a voice; it is in the legislatures where political representation takes place. In performing such a role, parliaments constitute a centerpiece of democratic institutional arrangements. However, as it has been argued throughout this dissertation, citizens hold legislatures in very low esteem; this attitude can represent a threat not only for the institution itself but also for democracy.

This chapter begins with a discussion of the ways in which low levels of trust in legislatures can hurt democracy in contemporary Latin America. A second section discusses a series of actions aimed at improving trust in legislatures given the findings in the previous chapters. The third and final section digs into the questions that remain unanswered, setting the road for new avenues of research.

Trust in Legislatures and Democratic Values

Previous research has shown that across the world, low levels of trust in institutions of representation represent a challenge for democracy in more than one way. Individuals that see institutions of representation not worthy of trust are more prone to get involved in non conventional, even illegal forms of political action (Blakelock 2006; Dalton and Weldon 2005; Dalton 2006). Previous research has also established that it is in difficult times when political institutions require the most support in order to properly carry out their role (Dalton 1999; Hetherington 2005; Mcallister 1999). Therefore, under the current globally spread turbulent economic and also (at least for some countries) political conditions, the issue of trust in legislatures requires even more special consideration.

In Latin America, as it will be discussed in the upcoming paragraphs, low levels of trust in legislatures posit a threat to democracy in at least two different ways: mistrusting individuals are less likely to believe the law should always be obeyed, and they support democracy less than their more trusting fellow citizens.

Trust in Legislatures and Respect for the Law

Tyler's classic book on the motives that lead people to obey the law makes an argument in favor of trust as a key value to develop in order to ensure compliance with the law, because "[c]itizens who view legal authority as legitimate are generally more likely to comply with the law" (Tyler 1990, 62). In Chapter III, it was shown that

individuals who see their national congress passing important laws tend to trust

legislatures more; but what about observance of such laws? Can trust in the institution

affect whether a person thinks there should be compliance with the law? The available

evidence suggests so.

Measuring individual compliance with the law comes with an important

methodological caveat: it can hardly be expected that those who do not follow the law

will report it to a third party (an interviewer, for instance), therefore rising concerns for

reliability due mostly to under reporting of violations of the law. A less problematic

measure to tap individuals' views on law compliance consists of asking them whether the

law should be respected. A proxy indicator for this attitude is available in the

AmericasBarometer 2008: a question that asks individuals whether they think authorities

should always respect the law in their attempt to apprehend criminals was included in

every country survey. Although not specifically aimed at digging into law compliance

attitudes but rather attitudes related to crime and crime victimization, the question does

serve the purpose of testing Tyler's argument in the Latin American context.

Figure V.1 presents the mean levels of trust in legislatures split by attitudes

toward compliance with the law. Trust in legislatures is higher among those who believe

the law should always be respected (42.8) than among those who believe authorities can

sometimes act on the margins of the law (39.6). This difference is statistically significant

at the .001 level.[1]

Some could argue that the substantive difference between the average levels of

trust in legislatures is far from striking. We should keep in mind, however, that despite

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[1] See Table AV.1 in Annex V.

the fact that this is a very specific, crime-related question, trust in legislatures

significantly differs from one group to the other.

Figure V.1 Mean levels of trust in Congress by support for compliance with the law

Moreover, trust in legislatures positively and significantly affects the probability

that an individual will prefer authorities to always respect the law when entered in a

multivariate random effects logistic model on support for compliance with the law. Trust

in the legislature increases the probability of preferring compliance with the law even

after controlling for crime victimization, interpersonal trust, and control attitudinal -

political knowledge, political efficacy- and sociodemographic –education, age, and

gender- variables (see Table AV.2 in Annex VI).

Ideally, a question on compliance with the laws passed by the parliament would

be, of course, a better test for the hypothesis stating that trust in the institution leads to

greater compliance with the laws. In absence of it, however, the alternative indicator
tends to confirm it.

Trust in Legislatures and Support for Democracy

If legislatures are perceived by the public as the centerpiece institution they are
for democracy, then disregard for parliaments can certainly translate into less support for
the democratic regime itself. This section explores precisely that: how trust in legislatures
can affect support for democracy.

The extent to which citizens are sympathetic to their democratic government has
been object of prolific research (see Canache, Mondak, and Seligson 2001 for a brief
review of the literature). Since Mishler and Rose's benchmark work on post-communities
societies (Mishler and Rose 1996), public support for democracy has been measured in
terms of survey questions about "Churchillian democracy:" that is, support for democracy
as a regime in spite of the problems the democratic regime might have.

Although trust in political institutions is not a key explanatory variable of support
for democracy within this body of research, it has been examined, nonetheless, as a
potential determinant of support for the democratic regime. In the pioneer AfroBarometer
studies it was found that trust in government does not significantly increase support for
democracy among Africans (Bratton and Mattes 2000, 37). On the other hand, trust in
parliaments was found to decrease support for authoritarian regimes in postcommunities
societies (Mishler and Rose 1996, 46).

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Support for democracy is relatively widespread among Latin Americans. [2]

Country	Support for democracy
Honduras	59.9
Guatemala	60.5
Paraguay	62.9
Ecuador	64.8
Peru	65.5
El Salvador	68.4
Mexico	68.5
Chile	69.5
Brazil	70.5
Bolivia	70.5
Panama	71.6
Nicaragua	72.9
Colombia	73.0
Dominican Republic	74.9
Costa Rica	78.2
Venezuela	83.8
Uruguay	85.3
Argentina	86.9

Support for democracy

Source: AmericasBarometer 2008   N = 28,175

Figure V.2 Support for democracy, by country

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[2] For an extensive treatment of the factors that might affect support for democracy in Latin America see the complete series of 2008 AmericasBarometer country reports on "Political Culture, Governability, and Democracy" by the LAPOP team. Available from www.lapopsurveys.org

When asked to what extent they agree with the statement "Democracy may have problems, but it is better than any other form of government," the average response for the continent is 70.2 in a scale that ranges from 0 "Strongly disagree" to 100 "Strongly agree."[3]

The country with the lower level of support for democracy is Honduras, with an average of 59.9, a figure way beyond the midpoint of the scale (Figure V.2). At the other extreme, Venezuela, Uruguay, and Argentina present the highest levels of public support for the democratic regime.

Figure V.3 presents the relationship between trust in legislatures and support for democracy in Latin America. The line depicted in the figure is the regression line of trust in legislatures on support for democracy for the whole continent. The inclination of the regression lines indicates a positive relationship between the two variables, lending preliminary support for the hypothesis that trust in legislatures contributed to increase support for democracy.

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[3] The original scale employed in the survey question ranges from 1 "Stronly disagree" to 7 "Strongly agree." The original values were rescaled to fit the standard 0-100 scale.

Figure V.3 Support for democracy by level of trust in legislatures (Fitted values)

The positive impact of trust in legislatures upon support for democracy is confirmed in a multivariate analysis. A multilevel linear regression on support for democracy validates the statistically significant impact of trust, even after controlling for other variables such as presidential approval, political knowledge, political efficacy, interpersonal trust, age, gender, and education (see Table AV.3 in Annex VI).

Improving Trust in Legislatures

The evidence analyzed in the previous chapters pointed to a series of factors that shape trust in legislatures among Latin Americans. Some of those factors lie in the

broader environments in which legislatures operate, and therefore there is little room to manipulate them in order to promote trusting feelings among citizens. Other factors, however, are more precisely circumscribed to the legislative and partisan arenas, thus action upon them seems more feasible.

Where Not to Direct Efforts

Some of the explanatory variables of trust in parliaments are related to factors clearly distinct from the legislative bodies themselves: presidential approval and the national economy (both the actual GDP and the evaluation of the economic situation) are clear examples of such type of factors. It does not seem reasonable, however, to discuss actions (if any possible at all) for improving citizens' perceptions on those variables in order to bolster trust in legislatures. If the president in office is popular and the economic times are good, then it would be good for legislatures because general feelings will translate into greater levels of support for parliaments. If, as foreseeable will be the case in the coming times, economic conditions worsen and presidential approval decays, then it is to expect a decrease in the overall levels of trust in legislature.

Similarly, characteristics of the individuals' personality such as feelings of political efficacy, partisan identification, and interpersonal trust along with the sociodemographic characteristics could hardly be modified in order to bolster favorable feelings toward legislatures. This group of variables also lies beyond the reach of feasible action: some individuals will be more prone than others to trust legislatures given these characteristics, and that is about it.

Finally, the contextual variables are not an easier target for change, either. Of course that improving state deficiencies in Mainwaring's terms (Mainwaring 2006) would be a nice achievement and it could translate into higher levels of trust in legislatures in the region together with a myriad of other good things. However, aiming at improving crime and corruption rates does not seem to be the way to promote trust in legislatures, either.

What Could Be Done

Performance evaluation is the single most relevant determinant of trust in legislatures in Latin America. The explanatory factor that seconds it in magnitude is political party responsiveness. This is good news, because it is feasible to think of actions aimed at improving citizens' perceptions in these two dimensions.

The first thought would be, of course, to encourage legislators and parties to do a better job so citizens' views of their performance will improve. This is certainly a possibility. As a matter of fact, international donors have devoted numerous resources in programs aimed at improving legislative performance.

Besides actually improving performance, however, there is a series of measures – probably easier to achieve in the short term- than can also contribute to improve the images of legislative performance and ultimately heighten the levels of trust in the institution. The centerpiece of such a strategy should be *moderating expectations* among citizens. By this I do not mean citizens should be instructed to lower their expectations

about congressional performance but rather focusing those expectations in the tasks that can actually be performed by the assembly and its members.

The indicator of congressional performance developed in Chapter III is constituted by three dimensions: job approval of legislators, belief in the importance of the laws passed by the legislatures, and the extent to which expectations are satisfied. It has been argued that one of the problems with expectations is that they are too high, and therefore they are often unfulfilled, which, in turn, leads to lower levels of trust in the assembly. Legislators themselves hold great part of the responsibility for these magnified expectations for they often promise to their constituents more than can possibly be done. Encouraged many times by candidates' promises, citizens expect from legislatures actions and goods that are way beyond the parliaments' constitutional attributions, and it is in that sense that expectations about legislative assemblies should be moderated.

How to moderate those expectations, then? Controlling campaign promises is probably not a feasible strategy; the temptation of gaining votes in exchange for the promise of public works or goods for the constituency is too high for candidates to resign to. What can be done, then, it is to attack the other end: to inform individuals about what they should and should not expect from the national congress.

The available evidence suggest that citizens of Latin America do not need to be instructed as much in congressional *processes* as in congressional *outcomes*. As discussed in earlier chapters, citizens' perceptions of congressional processes of debate and counterbalance to the executive do not affect trust negatively; rather, when individuals see legislators devoting time to discuss and debate and when they perceive congress controlling the president, their levels of trust in the institution grow. Only at extreme

levels of perceived debate and counterbalance the relationship with trust turns negative

Therefore, the negative impact on trust does not come from perceptions about the

activities a parliament must perform by constitutional design, but rather from perceptions

of those activities being miscarried by legislators. This takes us back to the performance

and congressional outcomes.

I envision a two-fold strategy for initiating citizens on what they should expect

from their legislatures. The long-term strategy consists of imparting knowledge on these

matters as a part of a broader program of civic education through the school system. The

short-term strategy consists of a massive multimedia campaign aimed at letting citizens

of all ages and conditions know what they should expect from their parliaments, as well

as the available channels for trying to affect congressional outcomes.

Finally, a word on political parties. We have seen that perceptions of parties not

being responsive to citizens lead to lower levels of trust in legislatures. Thus, improving

political parties' performance in the public eye should also contribute to increasing the

levels of trust in legislatures among Latin Americans. Parties are held in very low esteem

and citizens' views of political parties are far from encouraging (Córdova Macías 2004;

Mainwaring 2006; Mainwaring, Bejarano, and Leongómez 2006).

The generalized disregard for political parties, however, does not entail a plain

rejection for their role in a democratic polity: support for the idea that democracies can

exist without parties is far from receiving unanimous support in the region: when Latin

Americans were asked to what extent they agreed with the statement that "democracy can

exist without political parties," the average response given was 46 points in a 100-point

scale ranging from 0 "Strongly disagree" to 100 "Strongly agree."[4] This support for the

normative role of political parties in spite of their poor performance indicates that there

still exists a reservoir of support for them, and that dissatisfaction is directed at their

actual performance, not at the role they are supposed to fulfill in a democratic polity

(Boidi 2008).

Parties are not believed to represent their voters well, and in that sense they fail to

deliver the representational linkage they are supposed to. For parties to be seen as more

responsive, they need to reach out. A first step toward the recovery of this

representational linkage is for parties to open up diverse channels for their voters to

express their concerns, so that their demands can be eventually picked up by the parties.

Two other aspects that those concerned with improving partisan performance usually

point out are the recruitment of high-quality political personnel for their cadres and the

development and communication of clear policies and programs (Caton 2007).

Where to Go Now: Future Avenues for Research

This dissertation has shed light upon several factors driving the current low levels

of trust in legislatures in Latin America. By digging into topics never explored before for

the Latin American context, it has contributed to a better understanding of the dynamics

of the relationships between citizens and institutions. Several questions, however, remain

unanswered, and they pave the road for future avenues for research.

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[4] See the average country support for a democracy without parties in Figure AV.1 in Annex VI.

One significant finding is that the relationship between citizens' perceptions of legislative constitutional processes and support for parliaments is more complex than conceived by previous research. Contrary to previous research on the topic focused in the United States Congress, support for legislatures in Latin America is actually enhanced by views of assemblies engaging in debates and counterbalance to the president. Only when these duties are perceived as taken to their extreme is that the relationship between such perceptions and trust in legislatures becomes negative.

A second major contribution of this research has been bringing political parties in for explaining the low levels of confidence in legislatures. Prior research on the topic had not explicitly conceived attitudes toward political parties and characteristics of the party system as key explanatory factors of attitudes toward legislatures. As demonstrated by the analyses, these variables account for an important part of the explanation of the current levels of trust.

Finally, it has been demonstrated that contextual factors also play a role in shaping public support for the legislatures across Latin America. Some limitations inherent to the number of countries studied prevented us from a deeper exploration of the contextual determinants of trust in parliaments. Future research should attempt to ascertain more specifically in which way context matters. In order to do so, research projects should go *deeper* and *broader*. By deeper I mean intensifying qualitative research in order to better grasp the institutional history of each country. Going broader implies augmenting the range of countries covered by the quantitative analyses so collinearity problems are avoided.

Future research can go deeper and broader in a different sense, too. Citizens'

attitudes toward legislatures can be more fully assessed throughout additional focus

groups and experiments aimed at testing and measuring the influence media portrayals of

parliaments have upon their attitudes toward them. Also, it would be interesting to test

whether the observed influence of views about processes and the role of political parties

also affect support for other political institutions such as courts and the presidency.

APPENDIX A

IRB APPROVAL

Vanderbilt University
Institutional Review Board

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www.mc.vanderbilt.edu/irb

03/15/2007

Maria F. Boidi, B.A.
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Mitchell A. Seligson, Ph.D.
Political Science
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RE: IRB# 070240 "Understanding Citizens' Attitudes Toward Political Parties in Latin America"

Dear Ms. Boidi:

A designee of the Institutional Review Board reviewed the Request for Exemption application identified above. It was determined the study poses minimal risk to participants. This study meets 45 CFR 46.101 (b) category (2) for Exempt Review. Approval is extended for the Request for Exemption application dated February 18, 2007 and the supplemental materials submitted March 9, 2007, Principal Investigator Maria F. Boidi.

Exempt studies do not require annual reviews, however, any changes to the research proposal must be presented to the IRB for approval before implementation.

DATE OF IRB APPROVAL: March 15, 2007

Sincerely,

Paige D. Moore, M.Ed.
PAII, Institutional Review Board
Behavioral Sciences Committee

Electronic Signature: Paige Moore/VUMC/Vanderbilt : (AB102CF68C1BB7A73EF973DA09AD3D86)
Signed On: 03/15/2007 10:04:27 AM CDT

Boidi, Maria F. IRB # 070240   1   03/15/2007

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APPENDIX B

TECHNICAL REPORTS

This appendix contains the by country technical reports of the surveys as

published in the LAPOP web site (http://sitemason.vanderbilt.edu/lapop).[60] The country-

specific questionnaires and reports here mentioned are downloadable from the web site as

well.

Argentina

This survey was carried out between January and February of 2008, as part of the LAPOP
AmericasBarometer 2008 wave of surveys. It is a follow up of the national survey of 2006 carried out by
the Latin America Public Opinion Project (LAPOP). The 2008 survey was conducted by Vanderbilt
University and Central American Population Center of the University of Argentina with field work being
carried out by CIO Research. Funding came from the Interamerican Development Bank (IDB).
The project used a national probability sample design of voting-age adults, with a total N of 1,486 people
involving face-to-face interviews in Spanish. The data set can be best described as a complex sample
design taking into account stratification and clustering. The sample was stratified by regions (Metropolitan
area and province of Buenos Aires, Central, Northeastern, Northwestern, Cuyo, and Patagonia) and by
urban and rural areas. Respondents were selected in clusters of 6-8 in urban areas and 10-12 in rural areas.
The sample consists of 74 primary sampling units (municipalities) and 61 final sampling units, which
represent 21 of 24 provinces (including Buenos Aires). The total number of respondents surveyed in urban
areas is 1327 and 159 in rural areas. The estimated margin of error for the survey is ± 2.54. The
questionnaire can be found at www.AmericasBarometer.org.

Bolivia

This survey was carried out between February and March of 2008, as part of the LAPOP
AmericasBarometer 2008 wave of surveys. It is a follow up of the national surveys of 1998, 2000, 2002,
2004, and 2006 carried out by the Latin America Public Opinion Project (LAPOP). The 2008 survey was
conducted by Vanderbilt University, Ciudadania, Comunidad de Estudios Sociales y Acción Pública and
Universidad Católica Boliviana, with field work being carried out by Encuestas y Estudios (the Bolivian
Gallup International organization specialized in surveys) Funding came from the United States Agency for
International Development (USAID).
The project used a national probability sample design of voting-age adults, with a total N of 3,003 people
involving face-to-face interviews in Spanish, with some interviews in Quechua, and Aymara for

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[60] Technical reports for the surveys carried in Brazil, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Mexico, Paraguay
and Peru are not yet publicly available. They were kindly facilitated to me by Rubi Arana, from the LAPOP
Central staff.

monolingual speakers of those languages. The data set can be best described as a complex sample design taking into account stratification, clustering, and weighting.

The sample is composed of nine strata representing the departments of the country: La Paz, Santa Cruz, Cochabamba, Oruro, Chuquisaca, Potosí, Pando, Tarija and Beni. Each department was divided into urban and rural strata, and respondents were selected in clusters of 6-8 in urban areas and 10-12 in rural areas). The sample is weighted by department population size.

The sample consists of 183 primary sampling units and 437 final sampling units which represent the 9 departments. The total number of respondents surveyed in urban areas is 1,889 and 1,114 in rural areas. The estimated margin of error for the survey is ± 1.79.

The complete report and the questionnaire can be found at *Political Culture of Democracy in Bolivia, 2008: the Impact of Governance*, written by Mitchell Seligson, Daniel Moreno, Eduardo Córdova Eguívar, Vivian Schwarz-Blum, Gonzalo Vargas Villazón, Miguel Villarroel Nikitenko.

Brazil

This survey was carried out between April and May 2008, as part of the LAPOP AMericasBarometer 2008 round of surveys. It is a follow up on the national survey 2006 carried out by the Latin America Public Opinion Project (LAPOP). The 2008 survey was conducted by Vanderbilt University and Universidade de Brasilia with the fieldwork being carried out by CEDATOS. Funding came from the Interamerican Development Bank (IDB).

The project used a national probability sample design of voting-age adults, with a total N of 1,497 people involving face-to-face interviews in Portuguese. The data set can be best described as a complex sample design taking into account stratification and clustering. The sample was stratified by regions (north, northeastern, mid-west, southeastern, and south) and by urban and rural areas. Respondents were selected in clusters of 6-8 in urban areas and 10-12 in rural areas.

The sample consists of 60 primary sampling units (municipalities) and 178 final sampling units, which represent 21 of the 27 states (including Brasilia). The total number of respondents surveyed in urban areas is 1216 and 281 in rural areas. The estimated margin of error for the survey is ± 2.53. The questionnaire can be found at www.AmericasBarometer.org.

Chile

This survey was carried out in February of 2008, as part of the LAPOP AmericasBarometer 2008 wave of surveys. It is a follow up of the national survey 2006 carried out by the Latin America Public Opinion Project (LAPOP). The 2008 survey was conducted by Vanderbilt University and Instituto de Ciencia Política of the Pontifica Unviersidad Católica de Chile. Funding came from the Interamerican Development Bank (IDB).

The project used a national probability sample design of voting-age adults, with a total N of 1,527 people involving face-to-face interviews in Spanish. The data set can be best described as a complex sample design taking into account stratification and clustering. The sample was stratified by regions (Central, North, and South regions) and by urban and rural areas. Respondents were selected in clusters of 6-8 in urban areas and 10-12 in rural areas.

The sample consists of 91 primary sampling units (municipalities) and 259 final sampling units, which represent 7 provinces and 53. The total number of respondents surveyed in urban areas is 1311 and 216 in rural areas. The estimated margin of error for the survey is ± 2.51. The questionnaire can be found at www.AmericasBarometer.org.

Colombia

This survey was carried out in February of 2008, as part of the LAPOP AmericasBarometer 2008 wave of surveys. It is a follow up of the national surveys of 2004, 2005, 2006, and 2007 carried out by the Latin America Public Opinion Project (LAPOP). The 2008 survey was conducted by Vanderbilt University,

Universidad de los Andes, and the Observatorio de la Democracia with field work being carried out by Centro Nacional de Consultoría. Funding came from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID).

The project used a national probability sample design of voting-age adults, with a total N of 1,503 people involving face-to-face interviews in Spanish. The data set can be best described as a complex sample design taking into account stratification and clustering. The sample was stratified by regions (Bogota, Atlantic, Pacific, Central, and Oriental regions and the Antiguos Territorios Nacionales) and by urban and rural areas. Respondents were selected in clusters of 6- 8 in urban areas and 10-12 in rural areas.

The sample consists of 53 primary sampling units (municipalities) and 193 final sampling units, which represent 26 de los 32 departments of Colombia. The total number of respondents surveyed in urban areas is 1106 and 397 in rural areas. The estimated margin of error for the survey is ± 2.53.

The complete report and the questionnaire can be found at *Political Culture of Democracy in Colombia, 2008: the Impact of Governance*, written by Juan Carlos Rodríguez-Raga and Mitchell A. Seligson. Readers can access the publication through a link on the LAPOP website: www.AmericasBarometer.org.

Costa Rica

This survey was carried out in February of 2008, as part of the LAPOP AmericasBarometer 2008 wave of surveys. It is a follow up of the national surveys of 2004, and 2006 carried out by the Latin America Public Opinion Project (LAPOP). The 2008 survey was conducted by Vanderbilt University and Central American Population Center of the University of Costa Rica with field work being carried out by Borges y Asociados. Funding came from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID).

The project used a national probability sample design of voting-age adults, with a total N of 1,500 people involving face-to-face interviews in Spanish. The data set can be best described as a complex sample design taking into account stratification and clustering. The sample was stratified by regions (metropolitan area, San José, the rest of central valley and areas beyond the central valley) and by urban and rural areas. Respondents were selected in clusters of 6-8 in urban areas and 10-12 in rural areas.

The sample consists of 29 primary sampling units (cantons) and 194 final sampling units, which represent 7 provinces in Costa Rica. The total number of respondents surveyed in urban areas is 949 and 551 in rural areas. The estimated margin of error for the survey is ± 2.53.

Dominican Republic

This survey was carried out in March of 2008, as part of the LAPOP AmericasBarometer 2008 wave of surveys. It is a follow up of the national surveys of 2004, and 2006 carried out by the Latin America Public Opinion Project (LAPOP). The 2008 survey was conducted by Vanderbilt University with field work being carried out by Gallup República Dominicana. Funding came from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID).

The project used a national probability sample design of voting-age adults, with a total N of 1,500 people involving face-to-face interviews in Spanish. The data set can be best described as a complex sample design taking into account stratification and clustering. The sample was stratified by regions (Santo Domingo Metropolitan Area, North, East, and South) and by urban and rural areas. Respondents were selected in clusters of 6-8 in urban areas and 10-12 in rural areas.

The sample consists of 57 primary sampling units and 238 final sampling units, which represent 31 provinces. The total number of respondents surveyed in urban areas is 1107 and 400 in rural areas. The estimated margin of error for the survey is ± 2.52.

The complete report and the questionnaire can be found at *Political Culture of Democracy in Dominican Republic, 2008: the Impact of Governance*, written Jana Morgan Kelly, and Rosario Espinal. Readers can access the publication through a link on the LAPOP website: www.AmericasBarometer.org.

Ecuador

This survey was carried out between February and March of 2008, as part of the LAPOP AmericasBarometer 2008 wave of surveys. It is a follow up of the national surveys of 2001, 2004, and 2006 carried out by the Latin America Public Opinion Project (LAPOP). The 2008 survey was conducted by Vanderbilt University, with field work being carried out by CEDATOS under the direction of Dr. Angel Polibio Córdova. Funding came from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). The project used a national probability sample design of voting-age adults, with a total N of 3,000 people involving face-to-face interviews in Spanish, with some interviews in Quichua for monolingual speakers of that language. The data set can be best described as a complex sample design taking into account stratification, clustering, and weighting.

The sample is composed of six strata representing the three main regions in the country: coast, highlands and the Amazon. Each region was divided into urban and rural strata, and respondents were selected in clusters of 6-8 in urban areas and 10-12 in rural areas). Given the small size of the population in the Amazon region, a larger number of respondents were drawn as to provide sufficient cases for the analysis. The data set includes weights to compensate for this design.

The sample consists of 135 primary sampling units and 437 final sampling units which represent 23 provinces. The insular province of Galapagos is not included in the survey. The total number of respondents surveyed in urban areas is 1,832 and 1,168 in rural areas. The estimated margin of error for the survey is ± 1.79.

The complete report and the questionnaire can be found at *Political Culture of Democracy in Ecuador, 2008: the Impact of Governance*, written by Mitchell Seligson, Abby Córdova, Margarita Corral, Juan Carlos Donoso, Brian Faughnan, Daniel Montalvo and Diana Orcés.

El Salvador

This survey was carried out between February and March of 2008, as part of the LAPOP AmericasBarometer 2008 wave of surveys. It is a follow up of the national surveys since 1991 carried out by the Latin America Public Opinion Project (LAPOP). The 2008 survey was conducted by Vanderbilt University and IUDOP-UCA. Funding came from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID).

The project used a national probability sample design of voting-age adults, with a total N of 1,549 people involving face-to-face interviews in Spanish. The data set can be best described as a complex sample design taking into account stratification and clustering.

The sample is stratified by municipalities and by urban and rural areas. Respondents were selected in clusters of 6-8 in urban areas and 10-12 in rural areas.

The sample consists of 66 primary sampling units (municipalities) and 213 final sampling units, which represent the 14 departments in El Salvador. The total number of respondents surveyed in urban areas is 965 and 584 in rural areas. The estimated margin of error for the survey is ± 2.49.

The complete report and the questionnaire can be found at *Political Culture of Democracy in El Salvador, 2008: the Impact of Governance*, written by Ricardo Córdova and Miguel Cruz.

Guatemala

This survey was carried out between February and March of 2008, as part of the LAPOP AmericasBarometer 2008 wave of surveys. It is a follow up of the national surveys since 1992 carried out by the Latin America Public Opinion Project (LAPOP). The 2008 survey was conducted by Vanderbilt University and Asociación de Investigación y Estudios Sociales (ASIES). Funding came from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID).

The project used a national probability sample design of voting-age adults, with a total N of 1,538 people involving face-to-face interviews in Spanish with some interviews in Mam, K'iche', Kaqchikel, Q'echi, Achi, and Ixil for monolingual speakers of these languages. The data set can be best described as a complex sample design taking into account stratification and clustering.

The sample is composed of five strata representing the five main regions in the country: metropolitan area, northeastern, southeastern, southwestern, and northwestern, and by urban and rural areas. Respondents were selected in clusters of 6-8 in urban areas and 10-12 in rural areas.

The sample consists of 95 primary sampling units (municipalities) and 194 final sampling units, which represent the 22 departamentos - in Guatemala. The total number of respondents surveyed in urban areas is 716 and 822 in rural areas. The estimated margin of error for the survey is ± 2.5.

The complete report and the questionnaire can be found at *Political Culture of Democracy in Guatemala, 2008: the Impact of Governance*, written by Dinorah Azpuru.

Honduras

This survey was carried out in February of 2008, as part of the LAPOP AmericasBarometer 2008 wave of surveys. It is a follow up of the national surveys of 2004, and 2006 carried out by the Latin America Public Opinion Project (LAPOP). The 2008 survey was conducted by Vanderbilt University with field work being carried out by Borges y Asociados. Funding came from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID).

The project used a national probability sample design of voting-age adults, with a total N of 1,522 people involving face-to-face interviews in Spanish. The data set can be best described as a complex sample design taking into account stratification and clustering. The sample was stratified by regions and by urban and rural areas. Respondents were selected in clusters of 6-8 in urban areas and 10-12 in rural areas.

The sample consists of 93 primary sampling units (municipalities) and 163 final sampling units, which represent the 22 departments in Honduras. The total number of respondents surveyed in urban areas is 662 and 860 in rural areas. The estimated margin of error for the survey is ± 2.51.

The complete report and the questionnaire can be found at *Political Culture of Democracy in Honduras, 2008: the Impact of Governance*, written by Kenneth M. Coleman, José René Argueta.

Mexico

This survey was carried out in February of 2008, as part of the LAPOP AmericasBarometer 2008 wave of surveys. It is a follow up of the national surveys of 2004, and 2006 carried out by the Latin America Public Opinion Project (LAPOP). The 2008 survey was conducted by Vanderbilt University and ITAM, with field work being carried out by DATA Opinión Pública y Mercados under the direction of Pablo Parás García. Funding came from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID).

The project used a national probability sample design of voting-age adults, with a total N of 1,560 people involving face-to-face interviews in Spanish. The data set can be best described as a complex sample design taking into account stratification and clustering.

The sample is composed of four strata representing the four main regions in the country: north, midwest, central region and south and by urban and rural areas. Respondents were selected in clusters of 12 in urban and rural areas. The sample consists of 105 primary sampling units and 130 final sampling units, which represent 29 of the 32 Federal States of Mexico. The total number of respondents surveyed in urban areas is 1,080 and 480 in rural areas. The estimated margin of error for the survey is ± 2.48.

The complete report and the questionnaire can be found at *Political Culture of Democracy in Mexico, 2008: the Impact of Governance*, written by Pablo Parás García and Alejandro Moreno.

Nicaragua

This survey was carried out in February of 2008, as part of the LAPOP Americas Barometer 2008 wave of surveys. It is a follow up of the national surveys of 1999, 2004, and 2006 carried out by the Latin America Public Opinion Project (LAPOP). The 2008 survey was conducted by Vanderbilt University with field work being carried out by Borges y Asociados. Funding came from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID).

The project used a national probability sample design of voting-age adults, with a total N of 1,540 people involving face-to-face interviews in Spanish. The data set can be best described as a complex sample

design taking into account stratification and clustering. The sample was stratified by regions (Metropolitan, Central, North, North-Pacific, South-Pacific and Caribbean) and by urban and rural areas. Respondents were selected in clusters of 6-8 in urban areas and 10-12 in rural areas.

The sample consists of 43 primary sampling units (municipalities) and 164 final sampling units, which represent 17 departments in Nicaragua. The total number of respondents surveyed in urban areas is 856 and 684 in rural areas. The estimated margin of error for the survey is ± 2.5.

The complete report and the questionnaire can be found at *Political Culture of Democracy in Nicaragua, 2008: the Impact of Governance*, written by Orlando Pérez.

Panama

This survey was carried out in February of 2008, as part of the LAPOP AmericasBarometer 2008 wave of surveys. It is a follow up of the national surveys of 2004, and 2006 carried out by the Latin America Public Opinion Project (LAPOP). The 2008 survey was conducted by Vanderbilt University and Alianza Ciudadana Pro Justicia with field work being carried out by Borges y Asociados. Funding came from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID).

The project used a national probability sample design of voting-age adults, with a total N of 1,536 people involving face-to-face interviews in Spanish. The data set can be best described as a complex sample design taking into account stratification and clustering. The sample was stratified by regions (metropolitan area, oriental, central, and occidental region) and by urban and rural areas. Respondents were selected in clusters of 6-8 in urban areas and 10-12 in rural areas.

The sample consists of 76 primary sampling units (districts) and 112 final sampling units, which represent 10 provinces in Panama. The total number of respondents surveyed in urban areas is 960 and 576 in rural areas. The estimated margin of error for the survey is ± 2.5.

The complete report and the questionnaire can be found at *Political Culture of Democracy in Panama, 2008: the Impact of Governance*, written by Orlando Perez.

Paraguay

This survey was carried out in February of 2008, as part of the LAPOP AmericasBarometer 2008 wave of surveys. It is a follow up of the national survey of 2006 carried out by the Latin America Public Opinion Project (LAPOP). The 2008 survey was conducted by Vanderbilt University and Centro de Información y Recursos para el Desarrollo (CIRD) and the field work was carried out under the direction of Alejandro Vial and Manuel Orrego. Funding came from the United States
Agency for International Development (USAID).

The project was carried out in the oriental region and used a national probability sample design of voting-age adults, with a total N of 1,166 people involving face-to-face interviews in Spanish.

The data set can be best described as a complex sample design taking into account stratification and clustering. The sample was stratified by regions (Capital, Central Department, North, Central, South, and East regions) and by urban and rural areas. Respondents were selected in clusters of 6-8 in urban areas and 10-12 in rural areas.

The sample consists of 116 primary sampling units (municipalities) and 233 final sampling units, which represent 15 of the 18 departments of Paraguay. The total number of respondents surveyed in urban areas is 712 and 454 in rural areas. The estimated margin of error for the survey is ± 2.87. The complete questionnaire can be found at www.AmericasBarometer.org.

Peru

This survey was carried out in February of 2008, as part of the LAPOP AmericasBarometer 2008 wave of surveys. It is a follow up of the national survey of 2006 carried out by the Latin America Public Opinion Project (LAPOP). The 2008 survey was conducted by Vanderbilt University and Instituto de Estudios Peruanos with field work APOYO Opinión y Mercadeo. Funding came from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID).

The project used a national probability sample design of voting-age adults, with a total N of 1,500 people involving face-to-face interviews in Spanish. The data set can be best described as a complex sample design taking into account stratification and clustering. The sample was stratified by regions (North and South Coast, Metropolitan Lima, the Amazon, Central, North and South Highlands) and by urban and rural areas. Respondents were selected in clusters of 6-8 in urban areas and 10-12 in rural areas. The sample consists of 96 primary sampling units and 289 final sampling units, which represent the 24 departments and 1 constitutional province of Peru. The total number of respondents surveyed in urban areas is 1125 and 375 in rural areas. The estimated margin of error for the survey is ± 2.53.
The complete report and the questionnaire can be found at *Political Culture of Democracy in Peru, 2008: the Impact of Governance*, written by Julio Carrión, and Patricia Zárate Ardela.

Uruguay

This survey was carried out between April and May of 2008, as part of the LAPOP AmericasBarometer 2008 wave of surveys. It is a follow up of the national survey of 2006 carried out by the Latin America Public Opinion Project (LAPOP). The 2008 survey was conducted by Vanderbilt University, CIFRA, González Raga & Associates and La Universidad de Montevideo with field work being carried out by CIFRA, González Raga & Associates. Funding came from Vanderbilt University and University of Notre Dame.
The project used a national probability sample design of voting-age adults, with a total N of 1,500 people involving face-to-face interviews in Spanish. The data set can be best described as a complex sample design taking into account stratification and clustering. The sample was stratified by regions (Montevideo and Interior) and by urban and rural areas Respondents were selected in clusters of 6-8 in urban areas and 10-12 in rural areas.
The sample consists of 37 primary sampling units and 292 final sampling units, which represent the19 departments of Uruguay. The total number of respondents surveyed in urban areas is 1375 and 125 in rural areas. The estimated margin of error for the survey is ± 2.53.

Venezuela

This survey was carried out between January and February of 2008, as part of the LAPOP AmericasBarometer 2008 wave of surveys. It is a follow up of the national surveys of 2006 carried out by the Latin America Public Opinion Project (LAPOP). The 2008 survey was conducted by Vanderbilt University and Centro de Investigaciones en Ciencias Sociales (CISOR) with field work being carried out by CEDATOS. Funding came from Interamerican Development Bank (IDB).
The project used a national probability sample design of voting-age adults, with a total N of 1,500 people involving face-to-face interviews in Spanish. The data set can be best described as a complex sample design taking into account stratification and clustering. The sample was stratified by regions (capital, zuliana, west, mid-west, east and Los Llanos) and by urban and rural areas. Respondents were selected in clusters of 6-8 in urban areas and 10-12 in rural areas.
The sample consists of 55 primary sampling units and 178 final sampling units, which represent 21 of 23 states. The total number of respondents surveyed in urban areas is 1221 and 279 in rural areas. The estimated margin of error for the survey is ± 2.53.
The complete report and the questionnaire can be found at *Political Culture of Democracy in Venezuela, 2008: the Impact of Governance*, written by Maria Fernanda Boidi.

ANNEX C

SAMPLE QUESTIONNAIRE

UNIVERSIDAD DE MONTEVIDEO

CIFRA

Latin American Public Opinion Project

LAPOP

Proyecto de Opinión Pública de América Latina

VANDERBILT UNIVERSITY

LA CULTURA POLÍTICA DE LA DEMOCRACIA: Uruguay, 2008

País: 1. México 2. Guatemala 3. El Salvador 4. Honduras 5. Nicaragua 6. Costa Rica 7. Panamá 8. Colombia 9. Ecuador 10. Bolivia 11. Perú 12. Paraguay 13. Chile **14. Uruguay** 15. Brasil. 16. Venezuela 17. Argentina 21. República Dominicana 22. Haití 23. Jamaica 24.Guyana 25. Trinidad 40. Estados Unidos 41. Canadá	**PAIS**	
IDNUM. Número de cuestionario [asignado en la oficina]_____	**IDNUM**	

ESTRATOPRI:
     1. Montevideo
     2. Interior
	ESTRATOPRI	

UPM. **[Localidad]** (Unidad Primaria de Muestreo): _____	**UPM**	
Departamento:_____	**URUPROV**	
[SECCION] SEGMENTO CENSAL_____	**URUSEGMENTO**	
[SEGMENTO] Sector_____	**URUSEC**	
[ZONA] CLUSTER. (Unidad Final de Muestreo) (Punto muestral) [Máximo de 8 entrevistas urbanas, 12 rurales]	**CLUSTER**	
UR (1) Urbano (2) Rural [Usar definición censal del país]	**UR**	
Tamaño del lugar: (1) Capital nacional (área metropolitana) (2) Ciudad grande (3) Ciudad mediana (4) Ciudad pequeña (5) Área rural	**TAMANO**	
Idioma del cuestionario: (1) Español	**IDIOMAQ**	
Hora de inicio: _____:_____ [no digitar]		
Fecha de la entrevista día: ____ mes:_____ año: 2008	**FECHA**	

Q1. Género (anotar, no pregunte): (1) Hombre (2) Mujer	**Q1**	34

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A4 [COA4]. Para empezar, en su opinión ¿cuál es el problema **más grave** que está enfrentando el país? [**NO LEER ALTERNATIVAS; SÓLO UNA OPCIÓN**]				A4	— __ 35 36
Agua, falta de	19	Inflación, altos precios	02		
Caminos/vías en mal estado	18	Los políticos	59		
Conflicto armado	30	Mal gobierno	15		
Corrupción	13	Medio ambiente	10		
Crédito, falta de	09	Migración	16		
Delincuencia, crimen	05	Narcotráfico	12		
Derechos humanos, violaciones de	56	Pandillas	14		
Desempleo/falta de empleo	03	Pobreza	04		
Desigualdad	58	Protestas populares (huelgas, cierre de carreteras, paros, etc.)	06		
Desnutrición	23	Salud, falta de servicio	22		
Desplazamiento forzado	32	Secuestro	31		
Deuda Externa	26	Seguridad (falta de)	27		
Discriminación	25	Terrorismo	33		
Drogadicción	11	Tierra para cultivar, falta de	07		
Economía, problemas con, crisis de	01	Transporte, problemas con el	60		
Educación, falta de, mala calidad	21	Violencia	57		
Electricidad, falta de	24	Vivienda	55		
Explosión demográfica	20	Otro	70		
Guerra contra terrorismo	17	Conflicto con Argentina, bloqueo de puentes	71		
		NS/NR	88		

Ahora, cambiando de tema… **[Después de leer cada pregunta, repetir "todos los días", "una o dos veces por semana", "rara vez", o "nunca" para ayudar el entrevistado]**

Con qué frecuencia …	Todos los días [Acepte también casi todos los días]	Una o dos veces por semana	Rara vez	Nunca	NS		
A1. Escucha noticias por la radio	1	2	3	4	8	**A1**	3
A2. Mira noticias en la TV	1	2	3	4	8	**A2**	3
A3. Lee noticias en los periódicos	1	2	3	4	8	**A3**	3
A4i. Lee o escucha noticias vía Internet	1	2	3	4	8	**A4i**	4

URUCP. De todas las fuentes que brindan información sobre el problema de la **pobreza** ¿a cuál le cree más? **[Leer opciones]** 　1. Al gobierno 　2. A los políticos de la oposición 　3. A los medios de comunicación 　4. A especialistas y expertos 　5. A la familia, amigos y conocidos 　6. A organizaciones no gubernamentales 　7. A la Iglesia 　8. A su experiencia personal 　9. **[No leer]** Ninguna (no confía en ninguna opinión) 　77. **[No leer]** Otro 　88. NS/NR	**URUCP**	$\overline{41}$
URUCP. De todas las fuentes que brindan información sobre el problema de la **delincuencia** ¿a cuál le cree más? **[Leer opciones]** 　1. Al gobierno 　2. A los políticos de la oposición 　3. A los medios de comunicación 　4. A especialistas y expertos 　5. A la familia, amigos y conocidos 　6. A organizaciones no gubernamentales 　7. A la Iglesia 　8. A su experiencia personal 　9. **[No leer]** Ninguna (no confía en ninguna opinión) 　77. **[No leer]** Otro 　88. NS/NR	**URUCP**	$\overline{43}$
SOCT1. Ahora, hablando de la economía…. ¿Cómo calificaría la situación económica **del país**? ¿Diría usted que es muy buena, buena, ni buena ni mala, mala o muy mala? (1) Muy buena　(2) Buena　(3) Ni buena, ni mala (regular)　(4) Mala　(5) Muy mala (pésima)　(8) NS/NR	**SOCT1**	$\overline{45}$
SOCT2. ¿Considera usted que la situación económica actual **del país** es mejor, igual o peor que hace doce meses? (1) Mejor　　　　　(2) Igual　　　　　(3) Peor　　　　　(8) NS/NR	**SOCT2**	$\overline{46}$
IDIO1. ¿Cómo calificaría en general **su** situación económica? ¿Diría usted que es muy buena, buena, ni buena ni mala, mala o muy mala? (1) Muy buena　(2) Buena　(3) Ni buena, ni mala (regular)　(4) Mala　(5) Muy mala (pésima) (8) NS/NR	**IDIO1**	$\overline{47}$
IDIO2. ¿Considera usted que **su** situación económica actual es mejor, igual o peor que la de hace doce meses? (1) Mejor　　　　　(2) Igual　　　　　(3) Peor　　　　　(8) NS/NR	**IDIO2**	$\overline{48}$

Ahora, para hablar de otra cosa, a veces la gente y las comunidades tienen problemas que no pueden resolver por sí mismas, y para poder resolverlos piden ayuda a algún funcionario u oficina del gobierno.

¿Para poder resolver sus problemas alguna vez ha pedido usted ayuda o cooperación ...	Sí	No	NS/NR		
CP2. A algún diputado del Parlamento?	1	2	8	**CP2**	$\overline{4}$
CP4A. A alguna autoridad local (intendente, presidente de la junta local, centro comunal)?	1	2	8	**CP4A**	$\overline{5}$
CP4. A algún ministerio, secretaría, institución pública, u oficina del estado?	1	2	8	**CP4**	$\overline{5}$

Ahora vamos a hablar de su intendencia...

NP1. ¿Ha asistido a una reunión de la Junta Departamental, Junta Local o Centro Comunal Zonal durante los últimos 12 meses? (1) Sí　　　　　(2) No　　　　　(8) NS/NR	**NP1**	
NP1B. ¿Hasta qué punto cree usted que los funcionarios municipales hacen caso a lo que pide la gente en estas reuniones? Le hacen caso (1) Mucho　(2) Algo　(3) Poco　(4) Nada　(8) NS/NR	**NP1B**	
NP2. ¿Ha solicitado ayuda o ha presentado una petición a alguna oficina o funcionario de la intendencia durante los últimos 12 meses? (1) Sí　　　　　(2) No　　　　　(8) NS/NR	**NP2**	5
SGL1. ¿Diría usted que los servicios que la intendencia está dando a la gente son: **[Leer alternativas]** (1) Muy buenos　(2) Buenos　(3) Ni buenos ni malos (regulares)　(4) Malos　(5) Muy malos (pésimos) (8) NS/NR	**SGL1**	

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LGL2A. Tomando en cuenta los servicios públicos existentes en el país, ¿A quién se le debería dar *más responsabilidades*? **[Leer alternativas]** (1) Mucho más al gobierno central (2) Algo más al gobierno central (3) La misma cantidad al gobierno central y a la municipalidad (4) Algo más a la municipalidad (5) Mucho más a la municipalidad (8) NS/NR						**LGL2A**
LGL2B. Y tomando en cuenta los recursos económicos existentes en el país ¿Quién debería *administrar más dinero*? **[Leer alternativas]** (1) Mucho más el gobierno central (2) Algo más el gobierno central (3) La misma cantidad el gobierno central y la municipalidad (4) Algo más la municipalidad (5) Mucho más la municipalidad (8) NS/NR						**LGL2B**
LGL3. ¿Estaría usted dispuesto a pagar más impuestos a la intendencia para que pueda prestar mejores servicios municipales o cree que no vale la pena pagar más impuestos a la intendencia? (1) Dispuesto a pagar más impuestos (2) No vale la pena pagar más impuestos (8) NS/NR						**LGL3**
MUNI6. ¿Qué grado de confianza tiene usted en el buen manejo de los fondos por parte del municipio? **[Leer alternativas]** (3) Mucha confianza (2) Algo de confianza (1) Poca confianza (0) Nada de confianza (8) NS/NR						**MUNI6**

	Una vez a la semana	Una o dos veces al mes	Una o dos veces al año	Nunca	NS/NR	
CP5. Ahora, para cambiar el tema, ¿En los últimos doce meses usted ha contribuido para la solución de algún problema de su comunidad o de los vecinos de su barrio? Por favor, dígame si lo hizo por lo menos una vez a la semana, una o dos veces al mes, una o dos veces al año, o nunca.	1	2	3	4	8	**CP5**

Voy a leer una lista de grupos y organizaciones. Por favor, dígame qué tan frecuentemente asiste a reuniones de estas organizaciones: una vez a la semana, una o dos veces al mes, una o dos veces al año, o nunca. **[Repetir "una vez a la semana," "una o dos veces al mes," "una o dos veces al año," o "nunca" para ayudar al entrevistado]**

	Una vez a la semana	Una o dos veces al mes	Una o dos veces al año	Nunca	NS/NR		
CP6. ¿Reuniones de alguna organización religiosa? Asiste…	1	2	3	4	8		**CP6**
CP7. ¿Reuniones de una asociación de padres de familia de la escuela o colegio? Asiste….	1	2	3	4	8		**CP7**
CP8. ¿Reuniones de un comité o junta de mejoras para la comunidad? Asiste…	1	2	3	4	8		**CP8**
CP9. ¿Reuniones de una asociación de profesionales, comerciantes, productores, y/o organizaciones rurales? Asiste…	1	2	3	4	8		**CP9**
CP10. ¿Reuniones de un sindicato? Asiste…	1	2	3	4	8		**CP10**
CP13. ¿Reuniones de un partido o movimiento político? Asiste…	1	2	3	4	8		**CP13**
CP20. [Solo mujeres] ¿Reuniones de asociaciones o grupos de mujeres o amas de casa? Asiste…	1	2	3	4	8	9 (HOMBRE)	**CP20**

LS3. Hablando de otras cosas. En general, ¿hasta qué punto se encuentra satisfecho con su vida? ¿Diría usted que se encuentra: **[Leer alternativas]** (1) Muy satisfecho (2) Algo satisfecho (3) Algo **in**satisfecho (4) Muy **in**satisfecho (8) NS/NR	**LS3**

IT1. Ahora, hablando de la gente de aquí, ¿diría que la gente de su comunidad es: **[Leer alternativas]** (1) Muy confiable (2) Algo confiable (3) Poco confiable (4) Nada confiable (8) NS/NR	**IT1**	

IT1A. ¿Cuánto confía usted en la gente que conoce por primera vez? ¿Diría usted que: **[Leer alternativas]** (1) Confía plenamente (2) Confía algo (3) Confía poco (4) No confía nada (8) NS/NR	**IT1A**	
IT1B. Hablando en general, ¿diría Ud. que se puede confiar en la mayoría de las personas o que uno tiene que ser muy cuidadoso cuando trata con los demás? (1) Se puede confiar en la mayoría de las personas (2) Uno tiene que ser muy cuidadoso cuando trata con los demás (8) NS/NR	**IT1B**	

[ENTREGAR TARJETA # 1]

L1. (Escala Izquierda-Derecha) En esta hoja hay una escala de 1 a 10 que va de izquierda a derecha, donde 1 significa izquierda y el 10 significa derec
Hoy en día mucha gente, cuando conversa de tendencias políticas, habla de gente que simpatiza más con la izquierda y de gente que simpatiza más co
derecha. Según el sentido que tengan para usted los términos "izquierda" y "derecha" cuando piensa sobre su punto de vista político, ¿dónde se coloca
usted en esta escala? Indique la casilla que se aproxima más a su propia posición.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	**L1**	
Izquierda									**Derecha**	(NS/NR=88)	72 73

[RECOGER TARJETA # 1]

IMMIG1. ¿Qué tan de acuerdo está usted con que el gobierno uruguayo ofrezca servicios sociales, como por ejemplo asistencia de salud, educación, vivienda, a los extranjeros que vienen a vivir o trabajar en el país? Está usted… **[Leer alternativas]** (1) Muy de acuerdo (2) Algo de acuerdo (3) Ni de acuerdo ni en desacuerdo (4) Algo en desacuerdo (5) Muy en desacuerdo (8) NS/NR	**IMMIG1**
IMMIG2. En general, ¿usted diría que la gente de otro país que viene a vivir aquí hace los trabajos que los uruguayos no quieren, o que les quitan el trabajo a los uruguayos? **[Asegurarse de enfatizar en general]** (1) Hacen los trabajos que los uruguayos no quieren (2) Le quitan el trabajo a los uruguayos (8) NS/NR	**IMMIG2**

PROT2. ¿En los últimos doce meses, ha participado en una manifestación o protesta pública? ¿Lo ha hecho algunas veces, casi nunca o nunca?	(1) algunas veces	(2) casi nunca	(3) nunca	(8) NS/NR	**PROT2**

Ahora hablemos de otros temas. Alguna gente dice que en ciertas circunstancias se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder por un golpe de estado.
su opinión se justificaría que hubiera un golpe de estado por los militares frente a las siguientes circunstancias…? **[Leer alternativas después de cada
pregunta]**:

JC1. Frente al desempleo muy alto.	(1) Se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder	(2) No se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder	(8) NS/NR	**JC1**
JC4. Frente a muchas protestas sociales.	(1) Se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder	(2) No se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder	(8) NS/NR	**JC4**
JC10. Frente a mucha delincuencia.	(1) Se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder	(2) No se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder	(8) NS/NR	**JC10**
JC12. Frente a la alta inflación, con aumento excesivo de precios.	(1) Se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder	(2) No se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder	(8) NS/NR	**JC12**
JC13. Frente a mucha corrupción.	(1) Se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder	(2) No se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder	(8) NS/NR	**JC13**

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JC15. ¿Cree usted que alguna vez puede haber razón suficiente para que el presidente cierre el Parlamento, o cree que no puede existir razón suficiente para eso?	SI puede haber razón (1)	NO puede haber razón (2)	NS/NR (8)	JC15
JC16. ¿Cree usted que alguna vez puede haber razón suficiente para que el presidente disuelva la Suprema Corte de Justicia o cree que no puede existir razón suficiente para eso?	SI puede haber razón (1)	NO puede haber razón (2)	NS/NR (8)	JC16

VIC1. Ahora, cambiando el tema, ¿ha sido usted víctima de algún acto de delincuencia en los últimos 12 meses? (1) Sí **[siga]** (2) No **[pasar a VIC20]** (8) NS/NR [**pasar a VIC20]**	VIC1	
AOJ1. ¿Denunció el hecho a alguna institución? (1) Sí **[pasar a VIC20]** (2) No lo denunció **[Seguir]** (8) NS/NR **[pasar a VIC20]** (9) Inap (no víctima) **[pasar a VIC20]**	AOJ1	
AOJ1B. ¿Por qué no denunció el hecho? **[No leer alternativas]** (1) No sirve de nada (2) Es peligroso y por miedo de represalias (3) No tenía pruebas (4) No fue grave (5) No sabe en dónde denunciar (6) Otro (8) NS/NR (9) INAP	AOJ1B	

[PREGUNTAR A TODOS]: Ahora por favor piense en lo que le pasó en los últimos doce meses para responder las siguientes preguntas **[Si contesta "Sí," preguntar ¿Cuántas veces? y anotar el número de veces; si contesta "No" anotar "0" cero]**	**¿Cuántas veces?** **NO = 0,** **NS/NR=88**		
VIC20. Sin tomar en cuenta robo de vehículo, ¿alguien le robó a mano armada en los últimos doce meses? ¿Cuántas veces?		VIC20	___ 87
VIC21. ¿Se metieron a robar en su casa en los últimos doce meses? ¿Cuántas veces?		VIC21	 89
VIC27. ¿En los últimos doce meses algún policía lo maltrató verbalmente, lo golpeó o lo maltrató físicamente? ¿Cuántas veces?		VIC27	___ 9

AOJ8. Para poder capturar delincuentes, ¿cree usted que las autoridades siempre deben respetar las leyes o en ocasiones pueden actuar al margen de la ley? (1) Deben respetar las leyes siempre (2) En ocasiones pueden actuar al margen (8)NS/NR	AOJ8	
AOJ11. Hablando del lugar o barrio donde usted vive, y pensando en la posibilidad de ser víctima de un asalto o robo, ¿se siente usted muy seguro, algo seguro, algo **in**seguro o muy **in**seguro? (1) Muy seguro (2) Algo seguro (3) Algo inseguro (4) Muy inseguro (8) NS/NR	AOJ11	

AOJ11A. Y hablando del país en general, ¿qué tanto cree usted que el nivel de delincuencia que tenemos ahora representa una amenaza para el bienestar de nuestro futuro? **[Leer alternativas]** (1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (8) NS/NR	AOJ11A	
AOJ12. Si usted fuera víctima de un robo o asalto, ¿cuánto confiaría en que el sistema judicial castigaría al culpable? **[Leer alternativas]** Confiaría…(1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (8) NS/NR	AOJ12	
AOJ12a. Si usted fuera víctima de un robo o asalto, ¿cuánto confiaría en que la policía capturaría al culpable? **[Leer alternativas]** Confiaría…(1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (8) NS/NR	AOJ12a	
AOJ16A. En su barrio, ¿ha visto a alguien vendiendo drogas en los últimos doce meses? (1) Sí (2) No (8) NS/NR	AOJ16A	
URUPB ¿Conoce usted a alguien que sufra de adicción a la pasta base? (1) Sí (2) No (8) NS/NR	URUPB	
AOJ18. Algunas personas dicen que la policía de este barrio (pueblo) protege a la gente frente a los delincuentes, mientras	AOJ18	

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otros dicen que es la policía la que está involucrada en la delincuencia. ¿Qué opina usted? **[Leer alternativas]**
(1) La policía protege, o
(2) La policía está involucrada en la delincuencia
(3) **[No leer]** No protege, no involucrada con la delincuencia o protege e involucrada
(8) NS/NR

[ENTREGAR TARJETA A]

Esta nueva tarjeta contiene una escala de 7 puntos que va de 1 que significa NADA hasta 7 que significa MUCHO. Por ejemplo, si yo le preguntara hasta qué punto le gusta ver televisión, si a usted no le gusta nada, elegiría un puntaje de 1, y si por el contrario le gusta mucho ver televisión me diría el número 7. Si su opinión está entre nada y mucho elija un puntaje intermedio. ¿Entonces, hasta qué punto le gusta a usted ver televisión? Léame el número.
[Asegúrese que el entrevistado entienda correctamente].

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Nada						**Mucho**	NS/NR

Anotar el número, 1-7, y 8 para los que NS/

B1. ¿Hasta qué punto cree usted que los tribunales de justicia de Uruguay garantizan un juicio justo? *(Sondee: Si usted cree que los tribunales no garantizan en <u>nada</u> la justicia, escoja el número 1; si cree que los tribunales garantizan <u>mucho</u> la justicia escoja el número 7 o escoja un puntaje intermedio)*	**B1**
B2. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted respeto por las instituciones políticas del Uruguay?	**B2**
B3. ¿Hasta qué punto cree usted que los derechos básicos del ciudadano están bien protegidos por el sistema político uruguayo?	**B3**
B4. ¿Hasta qué punto se siente usted orgulloso de vivir bajo el sistema político uruguayo?	**B4**
B6. ¿Hasta qué punto piensa usted que se debe apoyar al sistema político de Uruguay?	**B6**
B10A. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en el sistema de justicia?	**B10A**
B11. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en la Corte Electoral?	**B11**
B12. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en las Fuerzas Armadas?	**B12**
B13. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en el Parlamento?	**B13**
B14. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en el Gobierno?	**B14**
B18. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en la Policía?	**B18**
B20. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en la Iglesia Católica?	**B20**
B21. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en los partidos políticos?	**B21**
B21A. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en el presidente?	**B21A**
B31. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en la Suprema Corte de Justicia?	**B31**
B32. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en su Intendencia?	**B32**

B43. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted orgullo de ser uruguayo?	**B43**	
B37. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en los medios de comunicación?	**B37**	
B42. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en la Dirección General Impositiva (DGI)?_	**B42**	
B47. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en las elecciones?	**B47**	
B48. ¿Hasta qué punto cree usted que los tratados de libre comercio ayudarán a mejorar la economía?	**B48**	

Usando la misma escala…	**Anota** **8 = N**	
N1. ¿Hasta qué punto diría que el Gobierno actual combate la pobreza?	**N1**	
N3. ¿Hasta qué punto diría que el Gobierno actual promueve y protege los principios democráticos?	**N3**	
N9. ¿Hasta qué punto diría que el Gobierno actual combate la corrupción en el gobierno?	**N9**	
N10. ¿Hasta qué punto diría que el Gobierno actual protege los derechos humanos?	**N10**	
N11. ¿Hasta qué punto diría que el Gobierno actual mejora la seguridad ciudadana?	**N11**	
N12. ¿Hasta qué punto diría que el Gobierno actual combate el desempleo?	**N12**	

Ahora voy a leer una serie de frases sobre los partidos políticos de Uruguay y voy a pedirle sus opiniones. Seguimos usando la misma escala de 1 a 7 donde 1 es nada y 7 es mucho.

	Anotar 1-7, **8 = NS/NR**	
EPP1. Pensando en los partidos políticos en general ¿Hasta qué punto los partidos políticos uruguayos representan bien a sus votantes?	**EPP1**	
EPP2. ¿Hasta qué punto hay corrupción en los partidos políticos uruguayos?	**EPP2**	
EPP3. ¿Qué tanto los partidos políticos escuchan a la gente como uno?	**EPP3**	
EC1. Y ahora, pensando en el Parlamento. ¿Hasta qué punto el Parlamento estorba la labor del presidente?	**EC1**	
EC2. ¿Y qué tanto tiempo pierden los diputados y senadores del Parlamento discutiendo y debatiendo?	**EC2**	
EC3. ¿Qué tan importantes son para el país las leyes que aprueba el Parlamento ?	**EC3**	
EC4. ¿Hasta qué punto el Parlamento cumple con lo que usted espera de él?	**EC4**	

[RECOGER TARJETA A]

M1. Y hablando en general del actual gobierno, ¿diría usted que el trabajo que está realizando el Presidente Tabaré Vázquez es...?: **[Leer alternativas]** (1) Muy bueno (2) Bueno (3) Ni bueno, ni malo (regular) (4) Malo (5) Muy malo (pésimo) (8) NS/NR	**M1**
M2. Hablando del Parlamento y pensando en todos los diputados y senadores en su conjunto, sin importar los partidos políticos a los que pertenecen, usted cree que los diputados y senadores del Parlamento uruguayo están haciendo su trabajo muy bien, bien, ni bien ni mal, mal, o muy mal? (1) Muy bien (2) Bien (3) Ni bien ni mal (4) Mal (5) Muy Mal (8) NSNR	**M2**

[ENTREGAR TARJETA B]

Ahora, vamos a usar una tarjeta similar, pero el punto 1 representa "muy en desacuerdo" y el punto 7 representa "muy de acuerdo". Un número entre el el 7, representa un puntaje intermedio. Yo le voy a leer varias afirmaciones y quisiera que me diga hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo co esas afirmaciones.

Anotar Número 1-7, y 8 para los que NS/NR

1	2	3	4	5	6	7		8
Muy en desacuerdo					Muy de acuerdo			NS/NR
								Anotar Número 1-7, y 8 los que N

Teniendo en cuenta la situación actual del país, quisiera que me diga siempre usando la tarjeta hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con las siguientes afirmaciones..	
POP101. Para el progreso del país, es necesario que nuestros presidentes limiten la voz y el voto de los partidos de la oposición. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo? 8. NS/NR	**POP101**
POP102. Cuando el Parlamento estorba el trabajo del gobierno, nuestros presidentes deben gobernar sin el Parlamento. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo? 8. NS/NR	**POP102**
POP103. Cuando la Suprema Corte estorba el trabajo del gobierno, debe ser ignorada por nuestros presidentes. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo? 8. NS/NR	**POP103**
POP106. Los presidentes tienen que seguir la voluntad del pueblo, porque lo que el pueblo quiere es siempre lo correcto. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo? 8. NS/NR	**POP106**
POP107. El pueblo debe gobernar directamente, y **no** a través de los representantes electos. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo? (8) NS/NR	**POP107**
POP109. En el mundo de hoy, hay una lucha entre el bien y el mal, y la gente tiene que escoger entre uno de los dos. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con que existe una lucha entre el bien y el mal? (8) NS/NR	**POP109**
POP110. Una vez que el pueblo decide qué es lo correcto, debemos impedir que una minoría se oponga. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo? 8) NS/NR	**POP110**
POP112. El **mayor** obstáculo para el progreso de nuestro país es la clase dominante u oligarquía que se aprovecha del pueblo. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo? 8. NS/NR	**POP112**
POP113. Aquellos que no concuerdan con la mayoría representan una amenaza para el país. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo? (8) NS/NR	**POP113**

EFF1. A los que gobiernan el país les interesa lo que piensa la gente como uno. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo?	**EFF1**
EFF2. Siento que entiendo bien los asuntos políticos más importantes del país. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo?	**EFF2**

ING4. Puede que la democracia tenga problemas, pero es mejor que cualquier otra forma de gobierno. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?	**ING4**

PN2. A pesar de nuestras diferencias, los uruguayos tenemos muchas cosas y valores que nos unen como país. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?	**PN2**
DEM23. Puede haber democracia sin que existan partidos políticos. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?	**DEM23**

Ahora le voy a leer unas frases sobre el rol del Estado. Por favor dígame hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con ellas. Seguimos usando misma escala de 1 a 7.
NS/NR = 8

ROS1. El Estado uruguayo, en lugar del sector privado, debería ser el dueño de las empresas e industrias más importantes del país. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?	**ROS1**
ROS2. El Estado uruguayo, más que los individuos, debería ser el principal responsable de asegurar el bienestar de la gente. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?	**ROS2**
ROS3. El Estado uruguayo, más que la empresa privada, debería ser el principal responsable de crear empleos. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?	**ROS3**
ROS4. El Estado uruguayo debe implementar políticas **firmes** para reducir la desigualdad de ingresos entre ricos y pobres . ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?	**ROS4**

[RECOGER TARJETA B]

PN4. En general, ¿usted diría que está muy satisfecho, satisfecho, **in**satisfecho o muy **in**satisfecho con la forma en que la democracia funciona en Uruguay? (1) Muy satisfecho (2) Satisfecho (3) **In**satisfecho (4) Muy **in**satisfecho (8) NS/NR	**PN4**
PN5. En su opinión, ¿Uruguay es un país muy democrático, algo democrático, poco democrático, o nada democrático? (1) Muy democrático (2) Algo democrático (3) Poco democrático (4) Nada democrático (8) NS/NR	**PN5**

[ENTREGAR TARJETA C]
Ahora vamos a cambiar a otra tarjeta. Esta nueva tarjeta tiene una escala que va de 1 a 10, con el 1 indicando que usted *desaprueba firmemente* y el 10 indicando que usted *aprueba firmemente*. Voy a leerle una lista de algunas acciones o cosas que las personas pueden hacer para llevar a cabo sus metas y objetivos políticos. Quisiera que me dijera con qué firmeza usted aprobaría o desaprobaría que las personas hagan las siguientes acciones.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	88
Desaprueba firmemente								**Aprueba firmemente**		**NS/NR**

	1-10, 88	
E5. Que las personas participen en manifestaciones permitidas por la ley. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba? **E5**	157	
E8. Que las personas participen en una organización o grupo para tratar de resolver los problemas de las comunidades. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba? **E8**	159	
E11. Que las personas trabajen en campañas electorales para un partido político o candidato. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba? **E11**	161	
E15. Que las personas participen en un cierre o bloqueo de calles o carreteras. Siempre usando la misma escala, ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba? **E15**	163	
E14. Que las personas invadan propiedades o terrenos privados. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba? **E14**	165	
E2. Que las personas ocupen (invadan) fábricas, oficinas y otros edificios. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba? **E2**	167	
E3. Que las personas participen en un grupo que quiera derrocar por medios violentos a un gobierno elegido. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba? **E3**	169	

E16. Que las personas hagan justicia por su propia mano cuando el Estado no castiga a los criminales. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba?		**E16**	171

Las preguntas que siguen son para saber su opinión sobre las diferentes ideas que tienen las personas que viven en Uruguay. Siempre usaremos la escala de 10 puntos.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	88
Desaprueba firmemente								**Aprueba firmemente**		**NS/NR**

	1-10, 88	
D1. Hay personas que siempre hablan mal de la forma de gobierno del Uruguay, no sólo del gobierno de turno, sino de la forma de gobierno, ¿con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba usted el **derecho de votar** de esas personas? Por favor léame el número de la escala: *[Sondee: ¿Hasta qué punto?]*	**D1**	173
D2. ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba usted que estas personas puedan llevar a cabo **manifestaciones pacíficas** con el propósito de expresar sus puntos de vista? Por favor léame el número.	**D2**	175
D3. Siempre pensando en los que hablan mal de la forma de gobierno de Uruguay ¿con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba usted que estas personas puedan **postularse para cargos públicos**?	**D3**	177
D4. ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba usted que estas personas salgan en la televisión **para dar un discurso**?	**D4**	179
D5. Y ahora, cambiando el tema, y pensando en los homosexuales, ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba que estas personas **puedan postularse para cargos públicos**?	**D5**	181

[RECOGER TARJETA C]

Ahora cambiando de tema…

DEM2. Con cuál de las siguientes frases está usted más de acuerdo: (1) A la gente como uno, le da lo mismo un régimen democrático que uno **no** democrático, o (2) La democracia es preferible a cualquier otra forma de gobierno, o (3) En algunas circunstancias un gobierno autoritario puede ser preferible a uno democrático (8) NS/NR	**DEM2**
DEM11. ¿Cree usted que en nuestro país hace falta un gobierno de mano dura, o cree que los problemas pueden resolverse con la participación de todos? (1) Mano dura (2) Participación de todos (8) NS/NR	**DEM11**
AUT1. Hay gente que dice que necesitamos un líder fuerte que no tenga que ser elegido a través del voto. Otros dicen que aunque las cosas no funcionen, la democracia electoral, o sea el voto popular, es siempre lo mejor. ¿Qué piensa usted? **[Leer alternativas]** (1) Necesitamos un líder fuerte que no tenga que ser elegido, o (2) La democracia electoral es lo mejor (8) NS/NR	**AUT1**
AUT2. ¿Con cuál de las siguientes afirmaciones está Usted más de acuerdo? **[Leer alternativas]** (1) Como ciudadanos deberíamos ser más activos en cuestionar a nuestros líderes, o (2) Como ciudadanos deberíamos mostrar más respeto por la autoridad de nuestros líderes (8) NS/NR	**AUT2**

Ahora, me gustaría que me indique si usted considera las siguientes actuaciones (1) corruptas y que deben ser castigadas; (2) corruptas pero justificada bajo las circunstancias; o (3) no corruptas.	
DC10. Una madre con varios hijos tiene que sacar una partida de nacimiento para uno de ellos. Para no perder tiempo esperando, ella paga 100 pesos de más al empleado público municipal. ¿Cree usted que lo que hizo la señora…? **[Leer alternativas]** (1) Es corrupto y ella debe ser castigada	**DC10**

194

(2) Es corrupto pero se justifica (3) No es corrupto (8) NS/NR					
DC13. Una persona desempleada es cuñado de un político importante, y éste usa su palanca para conseguirle un empleo público. Cree usted que lo que hizo el político…? **[Leer alternativas]** (1) Es corrupto y él debe ser castigado (2) Es corrupto pero justificado (3) No es corrupto (8) NS/NR	**DC13**				

	INAP **No trató o tuvo contacto**	**No**	**Sí**	**NS/ NR**	
Ahora queremos hablar de su experiencia personal con cosas que pasan en la vida...					
EXC2. ¿Algún agente de policía le pidió una coima (o soborno) en el último año?		0	1	8	**EXC2**
EXC6. ¿Un empleado público le ha solicitado una coima (o soborno) en el último año?		0	1	8	**EXC6**
EXC11. ¿Ha tramitado algo en la junta o intendencia en el último año? **No → Marcar 9** **Sí → Preguntar:** Para tramitar algo en la intendencia (como un permiso, por ejemplo) durante el último año, ¿ha tenido que pagar alguna suma además de lo exigido por la ley?	9	0	1	8	**EXC11**
EXC13. ¿Usted trabaja? **No → Marcar 9** **Sí → Preguntar:** En su trabajo, ¿le han solicitado alguna coima en el último año?	9	0	1	8	**EXC13**
EXC14. ¿En el último año, tuvo algún trato con los juzgados? **No → Marcar 9** **Sí → Preguntar:** ¿Ha tenido que pagar una coima en los juzgados en el último año?	9	0	1	8	**EXC14**
EXC15. ¿Usó servicios médicos públicos en el último año? **No → Marcar 9** **Sí → Preguntar:** Para ser atendido en un hospital o en un puesto de salud durante el último año, ¿ha tenido que pagar alguna coima (o soborno)?	9	0	1	8	**EXC15**
EXC16. En el último año, ¿tuvo algún hijo en la escuela o colegio? **No → Marcar 9** **Sí → Preguntar:** En la escuela o colegio durante el último año, ¿tuvo que pagar alguna coima (o soborno)?	9	0	1	8	**EXC16**
EXC17.¿Alguien le pidió una coima (o soborno) para evitar el corte de la luz eléctrica?		0	1	8	**EXC17**
EXC17a ¿Y alguien le pidió una coima (o soborno) para colgarlo de la TV cable, del teléfono o de la luz?		0	1	8	**EXC17a**
EXC18. ¿Cree que como están las cosas a veces se justifica pagar una coima (o soborno)?		0	1	8	**EXC18**

EXC7. Teniendo en cuenta su experiencia o lo que ha oído mencionar, ¿la corrupción de los funcionarios públicos está: **[LEER]** (1) Muy generalizada (2) Algo generalizada (3) Poco generalizada (4) Nada generalizada (8) NS/NR	**EXC7**	___ 201
Ahora queremos saber cuánta información sobre política y sobre el país se le transmite a la gente… **GI1.** ¿Cuál es el nombre del actual presidente de los Estados Unidos? **[NO LEER**: George Bush**]** (1) Correcto (2) Incorrecto (8) No sabe (9) No Responde		**GI1**
GI2. ¿Cómo se llama el Presidente de la Asamblea General de Uruguay? **[NO LEER**: Rodolfo Nin Novoa**]** (1) Correcto (2) Incorrecto (8) No sabe (9) No Responde		**GI2**

GI3. ¿Cuántos departamentos tiene Uruguay? [**NO LEER**: 19] (1) Correcto (2) Incorrecto (8) No sabe (9) No Responde	**GI3**	
GI4. ¿Cuánto tiempo dura el período presidencial en Uruguay? [**NO LEER**: 5 años**]** (1) Correcto (2) Incorrecto (8) No sabe (9) No Responde	**GI4**	
GI5. ¿Cómo se llama el presidente de Brasil? [**NO LEER**: Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, aceptar también "Lula"**]** (1) Correcto (2) Incorrecto (8) No sabe (9) No Responde	**GI5**	

VB1. ¿Tiene usted credencial cívica? (1) Sí (2) No (3) En trámite (8) NS/NR	**VB1**	___ 207
VB2. ¿Votó usted en las últimas elecciones presidenciales de 2004? (1) Sí votó **[Siga]** (2) No votó **[Pasar a VB50]** (8) NS/NR **[Pasar a VB50]**	**VB2**	___ 208
VB3. ¿Por quien votó para Presidente en las últimas elecciones presidenciales de 2004? **[NO LEER LISTA]** (00) Ninguno (fue a votar pero dejó boleta en blanco, o anuló su voto) (1401) Tabaré Vázquez, Frente Amplio-Encuentro Progresista (1402) Jorge Larrañaga, Partido Nacional (1403) Guillermo Stirling, Partido Colorado (1404) Pablo Mieres, Partido Independiente (77) Otro (88) NS/NR (99) Inap (No votó)	**VB3**	___ ___ ___ ___ 209 210 211 212

VB50. [Preguntar a todos] En general, los hombres son mejores líderes políticos que las mujeres. ¿Está usted muy de acuerdo, de acuerdo, en desacuerdo, o muy en desacuerdo? (1) Muy de acuerdo (2) De acuerdo (3) En desacuerdo (4) Muy en desacuerdo (8) NSNR	**VB50**	

VB10. ¿En este momento, simpatiza con algún partido político? (1) Sí **[Siga]** (2) No **[Pase a POL1]** (8) NS/NR **[Pase a POL1]**	**VB10**	___ 214

VB11. ¿Con cuál partido político simpatiza usted? **[NO LEER LISTA]**. (1401) Frente Amplio – Encuentro Progresista (1402) Partido Nacional (1403) Partido Colorado (1404) Partido Independiente (77) Otro (88) NS/NR **[Pase A POL1]** (99) INAP **[Pase A POL1]**	**VB11**	___ ___ ___ ___ 215 216 217 218
VB12. ¿Y usted diría que su simpatía por ese partido **[partido que mencionó en VB11]** es muy débil, débil, ni débil ni fuerte, fuerte o muy fuerte? (1) Muy débil (2) Débil (3) Ni débil ni fuerte (4) Fuerte (5) Muy fuerte (8)NS/NR (9) INAP	**VB12**	___ 219

POL1. ¿Qué tanto interés tiene usted en la política: mucho, algo, poco o nada? (1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (8) NS/NR	**POL1**	___ 220
POL2. ¿Con qué frecuencia habla usted de política con otras personas? **[Leer alternativas]** (1) A diario (2) Algunas veces por semana (3) Algunas veces por mes (4) Rara vez (5) Nunca (8) NS/NR	**POL2**	___ 221

VB20. **[Preguntar a todos]** ¿Si este domingo fueran las próximas elecciones presidenciales, por qué partido votaría usted? **[No leer]** (1) No votaría (2) Votaría por el candidato o partido del actual presidente (Frente Amplio) (3) Votaria por algún candidato o partido opositor al actual gobierno (P. Colorado, P Nacional, P Independiente, otros partidos) (4) Iría a votar pero dejaría en blanco o anularía (8) NS/NR	**VB20**	
VB21. ¿Cuál es la forma en que usted cree que puede influir más para cambiar las cosas? **[Leer alternativas]** (1) Votar para elegir a los que defienden su posición (2) Participar en movimientos de protesta y exigir los cambios directamente (3) Influir de otras maneras (4) No es posible influir para que las cosas cambien, da igual lo que uno haga (8) NS/NR	**VB21**	

[ENTREGAR TARJETA D]
LS6. Por favor imagine una escalera con los escalones numerados del cero al diez, donde cero es el escalón de abajo y diez el más alto. Suponga que yo le digo que el escalón más alto representa la mejor vida posible para usted y el escalón más bajo representa la peor vida posible para usted.
...si el de arriba es 10 y el de abajo es 0, ¿en qué escalón de la escalera se siente usted en estos momentos?(RESPUESTA ÚNICA / ESPONTÁNEA)

0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	88
Peor vida posible								**Mejor vida posible**			**NS/NR**

[RECOGER TARJETA D]

En esta ciudad/ área donde usted vive, está satisfecho(a) o insatisfecho(a) con… **[Repetir "satisfecho" e "insatisfecho" después de cada pregunta para ayudar al entrevistado]**

	Satisfecho(a)	Insatisfecho(a)	NS/NR o No Utiliza	
SD1. El sistema de transporte público	1	2	8	**SD1**
SD2. Las calles, carreteras y autopistas	1	2	8	**SD2**
SD3. El sistema educativo y las escuelas	1	2	8	**SD3**
SD4. La calidad del aire	1	2	8	**SD4**
SD5. La calidad del agua	1	2	8	**SD5**
SD6. La disponibilidad de servicios médicos y de salud de calidad	1	2	8	**SD6**
SD7. La disponibilidad de viviendas buenas y a precios accesibles	1	2	8	**SD7**
SD8. La belleza física del lugar	1	2	8	**SD8**
SD9. El flujo del tránsito	1	2	8	**SD9**
SD10. Las veredas o vías peatonales	1	2	8	**SD10**
SD11. La disponibilidad de parques, plazas y áreas verdes	1	2	8	**SD11**
SD12. La disponibilidad de sitios públicos adecuados para que la gente pueda practicar deportes	1	2	8	**SD12**

LS4. Considerando todo lo que hemos hablado de esta ciudad/zona, usted diría que se encuentra satisfecho o insatisfecho con el lugar donde vive?
(1) Satisfecho   (2) insatisfecho   (8) NS/NR

			LS4	

A continuación, le voy a leer una serie de situaciones que usted podría presenciar en cualquier momento. Quisiera que me indicara para cada una de la reacciones, si usted la aprobaría, no la aprobaría pero la entendería o no la aprobaría ni la entendería.

	Aprobaría	No aprobaría pero entendería	No aprobaría ni entendería	NS/NR	
VOL201. Suponga que una persona agrede a alguien que le quitó el esposo o la esposa. Usted…	(3)	(2)	(1)	(8)	**VOL201**
VOL202. Suponga que una persona mata a alguien que le ha violado a un hijo o hija. Usted…	(3)	(2)	(1)	(8)	**VOL202**
VOL203. Si hay una persona que mantiene asustada a su comunidad y alguien lo mata, usted…	(3)	(2)	(1)	(8)	**VOL203**
VOL204. Si un grupo de personas comienzan a hacer limpiezas sociales, es decir, matar gente indeseable. Usted…	(3)	(2)	(1)	(8)	**VOL204**

Ahora para terminar, le voy hacer algunas preguntas para fines estadísticos...
ED. ¿Cuál fue el último año de enseñanza que usted aprobó?
_____ Año de _____ (primaria, secundaria, universitaria, superior no universitaria) = _____ años total **[Usar tabla abajo para código]**

	1^0	2^0	3^0	4^0	5^0	6^0		
Ninguno	0						**ED**	
Primaria	1	2	3	4	5	6		___ ___
Secundaria	7	8	9	10	11	12		243 244
Superior no universitaria (Técnica)	13	14	15	16				
Universitaria	13	14	15	16	17	18+		
NS/NR	88							

Q2. ¿Cuál es su edad en años cumplidos? _____ años (0= NS/NR)	**Q2**	
		___ ___
		245 246

Q3. ¿Cuál es su religión? **[No leer alternativas]**	**Q3**	
(1) Católica		
(2) Protestante tradicional o protestante no evangélico (Adventista, Bautista, Calvinista, Ejército de Salvación, Luterano, Metodista, Nazareno, Presbiteriano).		___
(3) Otra no cristiana (Judíos, Musulmanes, Budistas, Hinduistas, Taoístas)		247
(5) Evangélico y pentecostal (Pentecostal, Carismático no católico, Luz del Mundo).		
(6) Mormón, Testigo de Jehová, Espiritualista y Adventista del Séptimo Día		
(7) Religiones tradicionales o nativas (Candomble, Vodoo, Rastafarian, Religiones Mayas).		
(4) Ninguna		
(8) NS/NR		
Q5A. ¿Con qué frecuencia asiste usted a servicios religiosos? **[Leer alternativas]**	**Q5A**	
(1) Más de una vez por semana		
(2) Una vez por semana		
(3) Una vez al mes		___
(4) Una o dos veces al año		248
(5) Nunca o casi nunca		
(8) **[No leer]** NS/NR		

[ENTREGAR TARJETA E] **Q10**. ¿En cuál de los siguientes rangos se encuentran los ingresos familiares mensuales de este hogar, incluyendo las remesas del exterior y el ingreso de todos los adultos e hijos que trabajan? **[Si no entiende, pregunte: ¿Cuánto dinero entra en total a su casa por mes?]** (00) Ningún ingreso (01) Menos de \$4.500 (02) Entre \$4.501 y 6.000 (03) Entre \$6.001 y 8.000 (04) Entre \$8.001 y 10.000 (05) Entre \$10.001 y 12.000 (06) Entre \$12.001 y 14.000 (07) Entre \$14.001 y 18.000 (08) Entre \$18.001 y 23.000 (09) Entre \$ 23.001 y 33.000 (10) \$33.001 y más (88) NS/NR **[RECOGER TARJETA E]**	Q10 ‾‾ ‾‾ 249 250

Q10A. ¿Usted o alguien que vive en su casa recibe remesas (dinero) del exterior? (1) Sí (2) No **[Pase a Q10C]** (8) NS **[Pase a Q10C]**	Q10A		‾‾ 25
Q10A2 [Sólo si recibe remesas] ¿Y por qué medio le son enviadas principalmente las remesas (el dinero)? **[No leer]** (1) A través del banco, giro bancario (2) Empresa de transferencias internacionales (Western Union, Money Gram, etc) (3) Con gente que viaja o el emigrante mismo la entrega (4) Ordenes de compra en supermercados o comercios enviadas por Internet (5) Otro (8) NS/NR (9) INAP	Q10a2		‾‾ 25
Q10A3 [Sólo si recibe remesas] ¿Y con qué frecuencia recibe dinero del exterior? **[Leer alternativas]** (1) Una o más veces por mes (2) Una vez cada tres meses (3) Una vez cada seis meses (4) Una vez al año (8) NS/NR (9) INAP	Q10a3		‾‾ 25
Q10A1. [Sólo si recibe remesas] ¿En qué utiliza generalmente el dinero de las remesas? **[No leer]** (1) Consumo (alimento, vestido) (2) Vivienda (construcción, reparación) (3) Gastos en educación (4) Comunidad (reparación de escuela, reconstrucción iglesia/templo, fiestas comunitarias) (5) Gastos médicos (6) Ahorro/Inversión (7) Otro (8) NS/NR (9) Inap	Q10a1		‾‾ 25
Q10B. [Sólo si recibe remesas] ¿Hasta qué punto dependen los ingresos familiares de esta casa de las remesas del exterior? **[Leer alternativas]** (1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (8) NS/NR (9) Inap	Q10B		‾‾ 25
Q10C. [Preguntar a todos] ¿Tiene usted familiares cercanos que antes vivieron en esta casa y que hoy estén residiendo en el exterior? **[Si dijo "Sí", preguntar ¿dónde?]** **[No leer alternativas]** (1) Sí, en los Estados Unidos solamente **[Siga]** (2) Sí, en los Estados Unidos y en otros países **[Siga]** (5) Sí, en España **[Siga]** (3) Sí, en otros países (no en Estados Unidos o España) **[Siga]** (4) No **[Pase a Q14]** (8) NS/NR **[Pase a Q14]**	Q10C		‾‾ 25
Q16. [Sólo para los que contestaron Sí en Q10C] ¿Con qué frecuencia se comunica con ellos? **[Leer alternativas]** (1) Todos los días (2) Una o dos veces por semana (3) Una o dos veces por mes (4) Rara vez (5) Nunca (8) NS/NR (9) INAP	Q16		‾‾ 25
Q14. [Preguntar a todos] ¿Tiene usted intenciones de irse a vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los próximos tres años? (1) Sí (2) No (8) NS/NR	Q14		‾‾ 25

Q10D. [Preguntar a todos] ¿El salario o sueldo que usted recibe y el total del ingreso familiar: **[Leer alternativas]** (1) Les alcanza bien, pueden ahorrar (2) Les alcanza justo sin grandes dificultades (3) No les alcanza, tienen dificultades (4) No les alcanza, tienen grandes dificultades (8) **[No leer]** NS/NR		**Q10D**	___ 25
Q11. ¿Cuál es su estado civil? **[No leer alternativas]** (1) Soltero (2) Casado (3) Unión libre (acompañado) (4) Divorciado (5) Separado (6) Viudo (8) NS/NR		**Q11**	___ 26
Q12. ¿Tiene hijos? ¿Cuántos? _____ **(00= ninguno → Pase a ETID)** NS/NR (88)	**Q12**		___ 261
Q12A. [Si tiene hijos] ¿Cuántos hijos viven en su hogar en este momento**? _____** **00 = ninguno, (99) INAP (no tiene hijos)**	**Q12A**		___ 263

ETID. ¿Usted se considera una persona blanca, mestiza, indígena, negra (afrouruguaya), mulata, u otra? (1) Blanca (2) Mestiza (3) Indígena (4) Negra (afrouruguaya) (5) Mulata (7) Otra (8) NS/NR	**ETID**	___ 26
WWW1. Hablando de otras cosas, ¿Qué tan frecuentemente usa usted Internet? **[Leer alternativas]** (1) Todos los días o casi todos los días (2) Por lo menos una vez por semana (3) Por lo menos una vez al mes (4) Rara vez (5) Nunca (8) **[No leer]** NS/NR	**WWW1**	___ 26

Para finalizar, podría decirme si en su casa tienen: **[L*eer todos]***

R1. Televisor		(0) No		(1) Sí	**R1**
R3. Heladera		(0) No		(1) Sí	**R3**
R4. Teléfono de línea(no celular)		(0) No		(1) Sí	**R4**
R4A. Teléfono celular		(0) No		(1) Sí	**R4A**
R5. Vehículo (auto o camioneta) Cuántos?	(0) No	(1) Uno	(2) Dos	(3) Tres o más	**R5**
R6. Lavadora de ropa		(0) No		(1) Sí	**R6**
R7. Microondas		(0) No		(1) Sí	**R7**
R8. Moto		(0) No		(1) Sí	**R8**
R12. Agua potable dentro de la casa		(0) No		(1) Sí	**R12**
R14. Cuarto de baño dentro de la casa		(0) No		(1) Sí	**R14**
R15. Computadora		(0) No		(1) Sí	**R15**

Columna de números de campo: 267, 268, 269, 270, 271, 272, 273, 274, 275, 276, 277

OCUP4A. ¿A qué se dedica usted principalmente? ¿Está usted actualmente: **[Leer alternativas]** (1) Trabajando? **[Siga]** (2) No está trabajando en este momento pero tiene trabajo? **[Siga]** (3) Está buscando trabajo activamente? **[Pase a MIG2]** (4) Es estudiante? **[Pase a MIG2]** (5) Se dedica a los quehaceres de su hogar? **[Pase a MIG2]** (6) Está jubilado, pensionado o incapacitado permanentemente para trabajar? **[Pase a MIG2]** (7) No trabaja y no está buscando trabajo? **[Pase a MIG2]** (8) NS/NR	**OCUP4**	27
OCUP1. ¿Cuál es la ocupación o tipo de trabajo que realiza? **(Sondee: ¿En qué consiste su trabajo?) [No leer alternativas]** (1) Profesional, intelectual y científico (abogado, profesor universitario, médico, contador, arquitecto, ingeniero, etc.) (2) Director (gerente, jefe de departamento, supervisor) (3) Técnico o profesional de nivel medio (técnico en computación, maestro de primaria y secundaria, artista, deportista, etc.) (4) Trabajador especializado (operador de maquinaria, albañil, mecánico, carpintero, electricista, etc.) (5) Funcionario del gobierno (miembro de los órganos legislativo, ejecutivo, y judicial y personal directivo de la administración pública) (6) Oficinista (secretaria, operador de máquina de oficina, cajero, recepcionista, servicio de atención al cliente, etc.) (7) Comerciante (vendedor ambulante, propietario de establecimientos comerciales o puestos en el mercado, etc.) (8) Vendedor demostrador en almacenes y mercados (9) Empleado, fuera de oficina, en el sector de servicios (trabajador en hoteles, restaurantes, taxista, etc.) (10) Campesino, agricultor, o productor agropecuario y pesquero (propietario de la tierra) (11) Peón agrícola (trabaja la tierra para otros) (12) Artesano (13) Servicio doméstico (14) Obrero (15) Miembro de las fuerzas armadas o personal de servicio de protección y seguridad (policía, bombero, vigilante, etc.) (88) NS/NR (99) INAP	**OCUP1**	279 28
OCUP1A. En su ocupación principal usted es: **[Leer alternativas]** (1) Asalariado del gobierno? (2) Asalariado en el sector privado? (3) Patrono o socio de empresa? (4) Trabajador por cuenta propia? (5) Trabajador no remunerado o sin pago? (8) NS/NR (9) INAP	**OCUP1A**	
OCUP 12A ¿Cuántas horas trabaja habitualmente por semana en su ocupación principal? _____ **[Anotar número de horas] (88) NS/NR (99) INAP**	**OCUP 12A**	282
OCUP12. ¿Quisiera trabajar más, menos o igual número de horas? (1) Menos (2) Igual (3) Más (8) NS/NR (9) INAP	**OCUP12**	
OCUP1C. ¿Está Usted registrado en el BPS (está en caja) a través de su empresa o su empleador? (1) Sí (2) No (8) NS/NR (9) INAP	**OCUP1C**	
Ahora nos gustaria hacerle algunas preguntas sobre su situacion laboral en octubre 2004		
OCUP27. –En esa fecha, tenía usted el mismo trabajo que tiene ahora? (1) Sí **[Pase a MIG2]** (2) No **[Siga]** (8) NS/NR **[Siga]** (9) INAP	**OCUP27**	286
OCUP28. En esa fecha estaba usted: **[Leer alternativas]** (1) Desempleado? **[Siga]** (2) Trabajando? **[Pase a MIG2]** (3) Estudiando? **[Pase a MIG2]**	**OCUP28**	287

(4) Dedicándose a los quehaceres del hogar? **[Pase a MIG2]** (5) Otros (jubilado, pensionista, rentista) **[Pase a MIG2]** (8) NS/NR **[Pase a MIG2]** (9) INAP		
OCUP29. ¿Cuál era la razón por la cual se encontraba desempleado en esa fecha? **[No leer alternativas]** (1) Dejó voluntariamente su último empleo **[Pase a OCUP31]** (2) Fin de empleo temporal **[Pase a OCUP31]** (3) Buscaba empleo por primera vez **[Pase a OCUP31]** (4) Cierre de la empresa donde trabajaba anteriormente **[Siga]** (5) Despido o cese **[Siga]** (8) NS/NR **[Pase a OCUP31]** (9) INAP	**OCUP29**	___ 288
OCUP30. ¿Recibió algun pago en concepto de cesantía o despido por parte de la empresa donde usted trabajaba? (1) Sí **[Pase a MIG2]** (2) No **[Pase a MIG2]** (8) NS/NR **[Pase a MIG2]** (9)INAP	**OCUP30**	___ 289
OCUP31. ¿En esa fecha, estaba buscando empleo? (1) Sí **[Siga]** (2) No **[Pase a MIG2]** (8) NS/NR **[Pase a MIG2]** (9) INAP	**OCUP31**	___ 290
OCUP31A ¿En esa fecha, cuánto tiempo llevaba buscando empleo? (1) Menos de un mes (2) Entre un mes y tres meses (3) Entre tres meses y seis meses (4) Más de seis meses (8) NS/NR (9) INAP	**OCUP31A**	___ 291

MIG2. Hace 5 años, ¿donde residía usted? **[Leer alternativas]** (1) En este mismo barrio **[Pase a TI]** (2) En otro barrio en el país **[Siga]** (3) En otro país **[Pase a TI]** (8) NS/NR **[Pase a TI]**	**MIG2**	
MIG3. El lugar donde vivía hace 5 años era: **[Leer alternativas]** (1) Un pueblo o una ciudad más pequeño que este (2) Un pueblo o una ciudad más grande que este (3) Un pueblo o ciudad igual que este (8) NS/NR (9) INAP	**MIG3**	

Hora terminada la entrevista _____ : _____ **TI**. Duración de la entrevista *[minutos, ver página # 1]* **_____**	**TI**	___ ___ ___ 294 295 296

Estas son todas las preguntas que tengo. Muchísimas gracias por su colaboración.

Yo juro que esta entrevista fue llevada a cabo con la persona indicada.
Firma del entrevistador_____ Fecha ____ /_____ /_____
Firma del supervisor de campo _____
Comentarios: _____
_____
Firma de la persona que digitó los datos _____
Firma de la persona que verificó los datos _____

Tarjeta #1

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10

Izquierda   **Derecha**

Tarjeta A

Mucho 7

6

5

4

3

2

Nada 1

Tarjeta B

Muy de Acuerdo | 7

6

5

4

3

2

Muy en Desacuerdo | 1

Tarjeta C

Aprueba firmemente

10

9

8

7

6

5

4

3

2

1

Desaprueba firmemente

Tarjeta D

Mejor vida posible

10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0

Peor vida posible

Tarjeta E

(00) Ningún ingreso
(01) Menos de $4.500
(02) Entre $4.501 y 6.000
(03) Entre $6.001 y 8.000
(04) Entre $8.001 y 10.000
(05) Entre $10.001 y 12.000
(06) Entre $12.001 y 14.000
(07) Entre $14.001 y 18.000
(08) Entre $18.001 y 23.000
(09) Entre $ 23.001 y 33.000
(10) $33.001 y más

ANNEX D

DESCRIPTION OF VARIABLES

Unless specification in the contrary, the source for the variables listed here is the 2008 round of the AmericasBarometer survey.

Trust in congress (World Values Survey)
Individuals were asked to express their degree of confidence in the national parliament in a scale ranging from 1 "A great deal of confidence" to 4 "None at all." The original scale has been inverted for greater values to indicate higher levels of confidence. Also, in order to allow comparison of means values, the inverted values were converted into a 0 to 100 scale, in which 0 indicates "none at all" and 100 "a great deal of confidence."

Trust in government (World Values Survey)
Individuals were asked to express their degree of confidence in the national government in a scale ranging from 1 "A great deal of confidence" to 4 "None at all." The original scale has been inverted for greater values to indicate higher levels of confidence. Also, in order to allow comparison of means values, the inverted values were converted into a 0 to 100 scale, in which 0 indicates "none at all" and 100 "a great deal of confidence."

Trust in justice system (World Values Survey)
Individuals were asked to express their degree of confidence in the justice system in a scale ranging from 1 "A great deal of confidence" to 4 "None at all." The original scale has been inverted for greater values to indicate higher levels of confidence. Also, in order to allow comparison of means values, the inverted values were converted into a 0 to 100 scale, in which 0 indicates "none at all" and 100 "a great deal of confidence."

Trust in legislatures
Response to survey question "To what extent do you trust legislatures?"
Ranges from 0 "Not at all" to 100 "A lot"

Excessive debate
Survey question: "To what extent do members of congress waste time discussing and debating?"
Ranges from 0 "Not at all" to 100 "A lot"

Excessive counterbalance
Survey question: "To what extent does the Congress hinder the President's job?"
Ranges from 0 "Not at all" to 100 "A lot"

Importance of the laws passed by the legislature
Survey question: "How important are for the country the laws passed by the legislature?"
Ranges from 0 "Not at all" to 100 "A lot"

Unfulfilled expectations
Survey question: "To what extent does the Congress do what you expect from it?"
Ranges from 0 "Not at all" to 100 "A lot"

Job approval
Survey question: "Now speaking of Congress. Thinking of members of congress as a whole, without considering the political parties to which they belong, do you believe that the congressmembers are performing their jobs very well, well, neither well nor poorly, poorly, or very poorly?"
Ranges from 0 "Very poorly" to 100 "Very well"

Performance evaluation index
The Performance Evaluation Index is the simple mean of the three individual performance variables: importance of the laws passed by Congress, job approval, and fulfilled expectations. The index is calculated for all those cases with valid values in at least two out of the three variables. If for one case there is missing information for two variables, then that case is considered missing and therefore left out of the index.
Ranges from 0, the worst possible performance score to 100, the best possible score

Political party responsiveness
Response to survey question "Thinking of political parties in general, to what extent do [national] political parties represent their voters well?"
Ranges from 0 "Not at all" to 100 "A lot"

Role in Congress of party object of identification
Survey question "Do you currently identify with a political party?" Those who expressed a partisan identification were classified according to the role the party object of identification plays in the national Congress.
0.   No partisan ID
1.   ID with party holding minority
2.   ID with party holding relative majority
3.   ID with party holding absolute majority

Presidential approval
Survey question: "Speaking in general of the current administration, how would you rate the job performance of President [NAME CURRENT PRESIDENT]: very good, good, neither good nor bad, bad, or very bad?"
Ranges from 0 "Very bad" to 100 "Very good"

Sociotropic view of economy
Survey question: "How would you describe the country's economic situation? Would you say that it is very good, good, neither good nor bad, bad or very bad?"
Ranges from 0 "Very bad" to 100 "Very good"

Political knowledge
Average of responses to the following questions;
"What is the name of the current president of the United States?
How many provinces does the country have?
How long is the presidential/prime ministerial term of office in country?
What is the name of the current president of Brazil?"
For every question, a correct response was assigned a value of 100, and incorrect, "don't answer," and "don't know" responses were assigned a value of 0. To create the index, the values for the four responses were added and the simple average was calculated.
Ranges from 0 (zero responses correct) to 100 (al responses correct)

Internal political efficacy
Survey question: "I feel that I understand the most important political issues of this country. How much do you agree or disagree?"
Ranges from 0 "Strongly disagree" to 100 "Strongly agree"

External political efficacy
Survey question: "Those who govern this country are really interested in what people like me think. How much do you agree or disagree?"
Ranges from 0 "Strongly disagree" to 100 "Strongly agree"

Exposure to TV news
Survey question: "How often do you watch news on TV?"
Ranges from 0 "Never" to 100 "Everyday"

Interpersonal trust
Survey question: "Now, speaking of the people from here, would you say that people in this community are generally very trustworthy, somewhat trustworthy, not very trustworthy or untrustworthy...?"
Ranges from 0 "Untrustworthy" to 100"Very trustworthy"

Education
Highest educational level attained
0 No formal education
1 Elementary School
2 High School
3 College

Effective Number of Legislative Parties
Each case was assigned a figure corresponding to the ENLP of the country they reside.[1]

Party System Polarization
Each case was assigned a figure corresponding to the party system polarization of the country they reside.[2]

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[1] The source for the ENLP for all countries except Argentina and Venezuela is Freidenberg 2006, page 18. Argentina had legislative elections after Freidenberg's work was published, so I calculated the ENLP based on data from Rodríguez 2007. For Venezuela, Freidenberg reported a ENLP greater than 1, but in fact, the Venezuelan Congress is operating as a one-party system. Finally, for Ecuador, Freidenberg reports an ENLP of 5.6. This figure corresponds to the configuration of Congress previous to the destitution and substitution of 57 of the original congressmembers (see Escobar 2007). Since the Ecuadorian Congress is suspended in its functions anyways and several reconfigurations of power have occurred since the election, I chose to keep the original figure.

[2] The source for the two indicators of polarization is González and Queirolo (2008). For the measure based on citizens' self-placement, the authors resort to Sani and Sartori's (1983) formula for calculating party system polarization. For the experts' judgments measures, González and Queirolo rely on an updated version of Coppedge's clasification of political parties. The authors describe the procedures followed to create the indicators of polarization as " (a) estimating Sani and Sartori's (1983) definition of polarization (ideological distance between the two most extreme *relevant* parties, where the position of the parties result from their voters' self placement in the left right scale), and (b) estimating Coppedge's (1997) indicator of polarization, which differs from Sani and Sartori's in two basic ways: it is based on the experts' classification, and it takes into account the position of all the parties (not merely the two most extreme ones) except those of the center. Polarization according to Sani and Sartori's definition (the difference between the positions of the two most extreme relevant parties divided by nine, the maximum possible difference) varies between 0 (an extremely unlikely case: all relevant parties should be in the same place in

Parties' roots in society
Each case was assigned the percentage of self-declared partisans in each country

Unified government
Individuals living in countries where the executive and more than 50% of the legislature (and each of the chambers in bicameral systems) are controlled by the same political party are counted as living under unified government; all other situations (whether the party controlling the Executive is in minority or holding only a relative majority in one or both chambers) are considered cases of non unified government.
0. Non unified
1. Unified

Federalism
Individuals living in Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, and Venezuela were coded as living under federal government. Cases from all the other countries are coded as unitary
0. Unitary
1. Federal

GDP
Each case was asigned the GDP per capita in value (in US Dollars) corresponding to the country he lives in (CEPAL 2008)

Corruption
Each case was assigned the national corruption victimization rate. (As calculated by the LAPOP corruption victimization measures that computes the percentage of self-declared victims of corruption in a country in a given year)

Crime
Each case was assigned the national crime victimization rate. (As calculated by the LAPOP crime victimization measure that computes the percentage of self-declared victims of crime in a country in a given year)

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the ten-point scale) and 1 (when the most extreme relevant parties are found at both ends of the scale, 1 and 10). Coppedge's indicator measures the dispersion of the vote away from the relative center of the party system; polarization ranges from zero to 100." (González and Queirolo 2008, 15).

DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF VARIABLES

Table E1. Trust in legislatures, by country

Country	Mean	Std. Dev.	Freq.
Mexico	55.570807	29.196809	1457
Guatemala	40.231946	31.041614	1394
El Salvador	40.26045	32.236408	1523
Honduras	41.063321	24.314784	1395
Nicaragua	36.453999	32.553464	1442
Costa Rica	47.612392	31.399723	1431
Panama	38.032454	26.743195	1479
Colombia	51.578327	28.536623	1415
Ecuador	23.138388	26.144544	2941
Bolivia	47.992987	25.873742	2757
Peru	33.164528	26.198194	1481
Paraguay	24.508941	26.972566	1137
Chile	50.496166	27.105847	1478
Uruguay	53.625772	29.003353	1402
Brazil	35.797523	29.21257	1373
Venezuela	43.562231	31.547914	1398
Argentina	37.367915	26.546015	1388
Dominican Rep.	53.742732	33.753742	1376
Total	41.342083	30.264529	28267

Table E2. Trust in president, by country

Country	Mean	Std. Dev.	Freq.
Mexico	58.101402	32.2301	1545
Guatemala	50.838574	32.929894	1431
El Salvador	45.201037	36.021189	1542
Honduras	41.051681	24.857464	1477
Nicaragua	33.277405	36.165199	1490
Costa Rica	60.319077	33.781353	1473
Panama	43.209054	30.777656	1502
Colombia	70.320556	30.762608	1487
Ecuador	56.604834	31.68637	2965
Bolivia	53.762532	33.394127	2959
Peru	33.923796	27.462763	1496
Paraguay	17.602187	26.428965	1158
Chile	61.348941	29.12658	1495
Uruguay	59.101174	34.732953	1476
Brazil	56.734926	32.241851	1465
Venezuela	51.789549	36.255329	1397
Argentina	45.815801	30.049094	1426
Dominican	62.846748	38.346045	1466
Total	50.963532	34.338338	29250

Table E3. Trust in supreme courts, by country

Country	Mean	Std. Dev.	Freq.
Mexico	54.603926	29.662662	1477
Guatemala	42.838067	30.299457	1373
El Salvador	45.65845	29.574599	1501
Honduras	38.040621	24.363079	1395
Nicaragua	36.216402	31.730368	1451
Costa Rica	55.18648	29.80681	1430
Panama	40.407432	27.379822	1489
Colombia	60.094899	28.2634	1405
Ecuador	34.677512	26.066451	2889
Bolivia	48.951896	24.655445	2751
Peru	34.445208	24.897622	1454
Paraguay	21.230502	25.821147	1154
Chile	49.719037	27.458507	1483
Uruguay	57.003295	29.00991	1416
Brazil	48.276309	28.868431	1286
Venezuela	41.512125	30.953531	1402
Argentina	40.432551	27.539819	1364
Dominican Rep.	55.539637	32.239449	1396
Total	44.600346	29.584344	28116

Table E4. Excessive congressional debate, by country

Country	Mean	Std. Dev.	Freq.
Mexico	73.656648	30.6151	1464
Guatemala	65.665126	34.143687	1298
El Salvador	79.89611	27.372534	1508
Honduras	51.895375	30.448447	1319
Nicaragua	75.859546	32.612117	1367
Costa Rica	79.079254	28.558926	1430
Panama	60.46755	30.554417	1433
Colombia	70.186727	29.899081	1321
Ecuador	64.142114	33.915976	2885
Bolivia	67.298118	26.790551	2745
Peru	74.380165	28.96679	1452
Paraguay	68.42283	34.122841	987
Chile	66.061452	28.689144	1432
Uruguay	71.543526	30.467841	1367
Brazil	64.893343	34.797194	1297
Venezuela	39.989599	29.294475	1282
Argentina	63.554687	33.529441	1280
Dominican Rep.	68.640523	31.061785	1275
Total	67.060889	32.065855	27142

Table E5. Excessive congressional counterbalance, by country

Country	Mean	Std. Dev.	Freq.
Mexico	52.037579	28.217221	1366
Guatemala	50.859521	31.233237	1241
El Salvador	49.077278	30.825474	1445
Honduras	35.430021	24.737998	1248
Nicaragua	43.45191	34.275119	1265
Costa Rica	55.979073	32.422749	1338
Panama	49.173352	30.107362	1371
Colombia	49.48083	27.321534	1252
Ecuador	55.509065	32.201823	2868
Bolivia	51.711026	26.110195	2630
Peru	44.348244	24.367739	1386
Paraguay	44.834413	30.707614	926
Chile	53.909464	24.7779	1377
Uruguay	45.402298	29.467903	1247
Brazil	54.60671	29.196998	1212
Venezuela	32.114447	28.517155	1299
Argentina	35.561342	27.551798	1152
Dominican Rep.	49.263888	32.096382	1200
Total	48.235423	30.019583	25823

Table E6. Importance of the laws passed by the legislatures, by country

Country	Mean	Std. Dev.	Freq.
Mexico	64.314928	29.70151	1467
Guatemala	56.897416	33.006636	1329
El Salvador	57.419712	31.244762	1505
Honduras	49.882297	29.349476	1416
Nicaragua	63.127272	32.479325	1375
Costa Rica	64.810849	28.054049	1401
Panama	48.484848	27.363602	1463
Colombia	65.856395	27.044787	1337
Ecuador	43.049275	28.522207	2875
Bolivia	65.009746	24.961802	2736
Peru	51.918217	27.121762	1451
Paraguay	51.969546	33.716066	1007
Chile	61.782407	25.852505	1440
Uruguay	69.825467	25.597779	1356
Brazil	43.651399	29.137952	1310
Venezuela	42.33436	30.192622	1298
Argentina	59.406322	27.996341	1297
Dominican Rep.	69.448584	29.784388	1342
Total	56.884996	30.162643	27405

Table E7. Extent to which legislatures fulfills expectations, by country

Country	Mean	Std. Dev.	Freq.
Mexico	43.607922	28.097047	1481
Guatemala	34.456355	30.07041	1306
El Salvador	36.478811	28.749423	1526
Honduras	33.204406	24.683923	1422
Nicaragua	33.769379	30.797672	1376
Costa Rica	40.62795	30.590932	1412
Panama	35.897435	25.739262	1469
Colombia	44.208302	26.997574	1341
Ecuador	29.391114	25.451167	2896
Bolivia	46.621456	24.408623	2728
Peru	30.460164	23.552927	1456
Paraguay	21.444235	24.46015	1064
Chile	45.423925	24.748157	1435
Uruguay	46.985045	26.656918	1382
Brazil	28.012121	25.754188	1375
Venezuela	35.8605	29.523252	1319
Argentina	33.699494	25.411958	1320
Dominican Rep.	48.097014	31.415882	1340
Total	37.349898	27.919931	27648

Table E8. Job approval of legislators, by country

Country	Mean	Std. Dev.	Freq.
Mexico	45.677332	21.364411	1469
Guatemala	40.87936	19.150808	1376
El Salvador	42.559133	23.273482	1522
Honduras	47.025129	22.466299	1353
Nicaragua	40.561404	23.747426	1425
Costa Rica	44.221369	23.44473	1432
Panama	38.225256	23.220634	1465
Colombia	51.341912	19.969182	1360
Ecuador	31.438332	22.28862	2854
Bolivia	46.072187	17.961624	2826
Peru	39.181386	18.220244	1472
Paraguay	33.975521	23.428703	1103
Chile	45.313565	18.229172	1467
Uruguay	54.382889	18.966396	1426
Brazil	39.864395	23.041196	1438
Venezuela	44.139194	24.658422	1365
Argentina	42.112299	19.264664	1309
Dominican Rep.	53.192279	25.130021	1347
Total	42.920133	22.35534	28009

Table E9. Index of performance evaluation

Country	Mean	Std. Dev.	Freq.
Mexico	51.169198	20.170276	1492
Guatemala	43.996982	20.396488	1344
El Salvador	45.391868	21.813451	1529
Honduras	43.09598	18.809774	1443
Nicaragua	45.760441	20.800618	1410
Costa Rica	49.718154	19.962039	1434
Panama	40.803886	19.324979	1481
Colombia	53.648775	18.498099	1357
Ecuador	34.716498	19.330933	2912
Bolivia	52.627573	16.086452	2774
Peru	40.457906	17.307117	1465
Paraguay	35.137979	20.266611	1069
Chile	50.872851	17.578454	1448
Uruguay	56.840648	19.094467	1405
Brazil	36.875904	20.206495	1382
Venezuela	40.620585	24.529213	1337
Argentina	44.881725	18.702417	1334
Dominican Rep.	56.851716	23.058449	1363
Total	45.612532	20.85787	27979

Table E10. Political party responsiveness

Country	Mean	Std. Dev.	Freq.
Mexico	44.170004	29.084298	1498
Guatemala	37.728524	29.590767	1331
El Salvador	44.893006	28.928395	1511
Honduras	32.984901	23.551204	1435
Nicaragua	33.884976	31.958506	1420
Costa Rica	42.961672	31.090536	1435
Panama	37.704359	26.404461	1468
Colombia	45.275035	27.472368	1418
Ecuador	31.989059	27.008463	2864
Bolivia	39.479863	24.073293	2839
Peru	33.264272	23.973894	1448
Paraguay	24.080882	25.42037	1088
Chile	43.525596	26.171547	1439
Uruguay	49.917022	26.443929	1406
Brazil	28.652886	27.175346	1403
Venezuela	41.33236	28.436546	1371
Argentina	34.88372	25.734044	1376
Dominican Rep.	49.754902	33.036779	1360
Total	38.572868	28.238985	28110

Table E11. Role in congress of party object of identification

Country	No identification	Minority	Relative majority	Absolute Majority	Total
Mexico	1,298 86.19	3 0.20	205 13.61	0 0.00	1,506 100.00
Guatemala	1,258 84.77	85 5.73	141 9.50	0 0.00	1,484 100.00
El Salvador	909 60.68	394 26.30	195 13.02	0 0.00	1,498 100.00
Honduras	750 52.19	347 24.15	340 23.66	0 0.00	1,437 100.00
Nicaragua	908 60.74	294 19.67	293 19.60	0 0.00	1,495 100.00
Costa Rica	1,025 70.21	128 8.77	307 21.03	0 0.00	1,460 100.00
Panama	1,028 68.44	180 11.98	0 0.00	294 19.57	1,502 100.00
Colombia	1,049 71.36	173 11.77	248 16.87	0 0.00	1,470 100.00
Ecuador	2,401 81.28	136 4.60	0 0.00	417 14.12	2,954 100.00
Bolivia	2,155 73.75	116 3.97	651 22.28	0 0.00	2,922 100.00
Peru	1,206 81.43	248 16.75	27 1.82	0 0.00	1,481 100.00
Paraguay	476 41.54	331 28.88	339 29.58	0 0.00	1,146 100.00
Chile	1,152 80.22	25 1.74	259 18.04	0 0.00	1,436 100.00
Uruguay	731 50.07	256 17.53	0 0.00	473 32.40	1,460 100.00
Brazil	1,103 75.29	132 9.01	230 15.70	0 0.00	1,465 100.00
Venezuela	979 68.37	163 11.38	0 0.00	290 20.25	1,432 100.00
Argentina	1,061 77.90	114 8.37	0 0.00	187 13.73	1,362 100.00
Dominican Republic	438 30.21	324 22.34	0 0.00	688 47.45	1,450 100.00
Total	19,927 68.81	3,449 11.91	3,235 11.17	2,349 8.11	28,960 100.00

Table E12. Presidential approval

Country	Mean	Std. Dev.	Freq.
Mexico	58.523841	20.332431	1531
Guatemala	56.141016	16.388858	1319
El Salvador	51.311528	25.87383	1544
Honduras	47.501666	20.21767	1501
Nicaragua	43.227425	27.313352	1495
Costa Rica	62.424038	21.827761	1481
Panama	47.606383	22.172177	1504
Colombia	69.261745	21.521818	1490
Ecuador	62.187922	22.047844	2964
Bolivia	54.576871	22.621186	2966
Peru	44.487265	20.085878	1492
Paraguay	30.62066	26.638019	1152
Chile	55.026543	20.064619	1507
Uruguay	62.702977	22.84558	1478
Brazil	62.288709	23.280192	1479
Venezuela	53.09903	29.008289	1444
Argentina	54.109589	20.472489	1314
Dominican Rep.	62.827401	27.785017	1489
Total	54.989708	24.44309	29150

Table E13. Sociotropic views of the economy

Country	Mean	Std. Dev.	Freq.
Mexico	38.178295	21.740117	1548
Guatemala	31.964761	19.857596	1504
El Salvador	28.483474	21.78633	1543
Honduras	38.343353	21.752151	1497
Nicaragua	25.326371	21.608064	1532
Costa Rica	43.132612	22.706899	1478
Panama	37.312214	23.679709	1531
Colombia	45.715726	20.121734	1488
Ecuador	43.021113	21.627462	2984
Bolivia	42.472213	20.37183	2969
Peru	38.370147	20.168518	1494
Paraguay	24.313305	22.020973	1165
Chile	46.831911	19.984208	1523
Uruguay	46.918955	21.400797	1493
Brazil	46.452933	23.698983	1466
Venezuela	44.908968	24.475782	1483
Argentina	46.111869	21.510179	1466
Dominican Rep.	36.239145	25.450833	1497
Total	39.589865	22.866654	29661

Table E14. Political knowledge

Country	Mean	Std. Dev.	Freq.
Mexico	51.458333	28.029208	1560
Guatemala	51.202861	31.007531	1538
El Salvador	64.880568	28.024455	1549
Honduras	67.805519	27.074913	1522
Nicaragua	39.334416	31.521858	1540
Costa Rica	61.05	27.379687	1500
Panama	64.208984	29.065398	1536
Colombia	52.278776	28.23975	1503
Ecuador	57.591667	32.914324	3000
Bolivia	67.640693	31.505947	3003
Peru	60.333333	30.599779	1500
Paraguay	60.827616	32.610675	1166
Chile	55.56647	32.946549	1527
Uruguay	81.216667	24.40287	1500
Brazil	49.532398	31.621959	1497
Venezuela	57.8	31.514369	1500
Argentina	74.579408	28.563971	1486
Dominican Rep.	47.727273	27.502154	1507
Total	59.453297	31.488495	29934

Table E15. Congress –specific political knowledge

Country	Correct	Incorrect	Total
Mexico	1,407 90.19	153 9.81	1,560 100.00
Guatemala	1,352 87.91	186 12.09	1,538 100.00
El Salvador	1,445 93.29	104 6.71	1,549 100.00
Honduras	455 29.89	1,067 70.11	1,522 100.00
Nicaragua	1,267 82.27	273 17.73	1,540 100.00
Costa Rica	1,089 72.60	411 27.40	1,500 100.00
Panama	886 57.68	650 42.32	1,536 100.00
Colombia	1,459 97.07	44 2.93	1,503 100.00
Ecuador	1,704 56.80	1,296 43.20	3,000 100.00
Bolivia	1,289 85.93	211 14.07	1,500 100.00
Peru	911 78.13	255 21.87	1,166 100.00
Paraguay	1,023 66.99	504 33.01	1,527 100.00
Chile	1,117 74.47	383 25.53	1,500 100.00
Uruguay	1,385 92.52	112 7.48	1,497 100.00
Brazil	875 58.33	625 41.67	1,500 100.00
Venezuela	908 61.10	578 38.90	1,486 100.00
Argentina	1,293 85.80	214 14.20	1,507 100.00
Dominican Republic	19,865 73.76	7,066 26.24	26,931 100.0
Total			

Table E16. Internal political efficacy

Country	Mean	Std. Dev.	Freq.
Mexico	49.102648	29.787247	1523
Guatemala	42.142298	29.752604	1279
El Salvador	53.196792	30.521199	1538
Honduras	45.861049	24.64641	1353
Nicaragua	47.989143	34.881734	1351
Costa Rica	56.245662	29.79366	1441
Panama	53.81806	27.629243	1506
Colombia	49.609733	29.916813	1452
Ecuador	48.243492	25.900934	2894
Bolivia	50.718954	24.730639	2805
Peru	47.684865	25.703112	1447
Paraguay	40.292397	31.810584	1140
Chile	49.382716	29.074806	1458
Uruguay	55.582524	31.241372	1442
Brazil	41.531664	28.897319	1358
Venezuela	51.867816	30.709445	1392
Argentina	47.443534	29.598245	1343
Dominican Rep.	52.906287	33.582514	1405
Total	49.316789	29.32839	28127

Table E17. External political efficacy

Country	Mean	Std. Dev.	Freq.
Mexico	41.40591	31.982649	1534
Guatemala	34.716103	30.579434	1362
El Salvador	34.782608	33.377535	1541
Honduras	33.759208	26.288695	1448
Nicaragua	33.529956	36.011614	1441
Costa Rica	43.106639	35.036063	1441
Panama	36.680098	28.25627	1489
Colombia	43.44788	31.418923	1455
Ecuador	42.712596	29.610505	2932
Bolivia	43.429487	27.790893	2808
Peru	35.183923	27.544698	1468
Paraguay	21.466905	27.035918	1118
Chile	43.662607	30.121445	1478
Uruguay	50.51511	33.577597	1456
Brazil	32.608695	31.031904	1403
Venezuela	42.444923	33.089706	1392
Argentina	31.783225	28.90568	1387
Dominican Rep.	48.669517	36.708194	1403
Total	39.209506	31.620057	28556

Table E18. Exposure to TV news

Country	Mean	Std. Dev.	Freq.
Mexico	80.747863	28.361458	1560
Guatemala	66.536542	36.621427	1537
El Salvador	80.2238	30.848027	1549
Honduras	63.835856	39.355487	1519
Nicaragua	77.235243	37.051999	1536
Costa Rica	89.201249	24.961117	1494
Panama	86.083931	27.815906	1533
Colombia	88.112663	24.309546	1503
Ecuador	84.870766	24.844964	2992
Bolivia	73.237393	34.484612	2988
Peru	82.554517	27.725611	1498
Paraguay	85.591766	25.506739	1166
Chile	87.972058	23.183664	1527
Uruguay	86.777777	26.60577	1500
Brazil	87.967914	24.339361	1496
Venezuela	82.044444	28.848344	1500
Argentina	77.545044	30.685606	1480
Dominican Rep.	77.866312	32.741021	1506
Total	80.752241	30.646564	29884

Table E19. Interpersonal trust

Country	Mean	Std. Dev.	Freq.
Mexico	57.334842	28.661026	1547
Guatemala	60.233422	29.229112	1508
El Salvador	64.916721	32.13946	1537
Honduras	51.783212	29.89398	1513
Nicaragua	58.091931	33.009697	1512
Costa Rica	68.069036	30.844054	1463
Panama	57.992079	29.584238	1515
Colombia	62.553378	29.874153	1480
Ecuador	55.718001	30.284839	2961
Bolivia	52.880556	28.919005	2947
Peru	47.062458	27.346212	1489
Paraguay	66.06304	27.725946	1158
Chile	56.638667	30.441187	1500
Uruguay	62.423393	28.283726	1462
Brazil	53.721345	29.458819	1457
Venezuela	60.512113	29.775719	1486
Argentina	54.150209	24.927753	1438
Dominican Rep.	59.376812	30.725867	1449
Total	57.821596	30.018861	29422

Table E20. Education

Country	None	Elementary	High School	College	Total
Mexico	97 6.22	517 33.14	757 48.53	189 12.12	1,560 100.00
Guatemala	254 16.56	726 47.33	449 29.27	105 6.84	1,534 100.00
El Salvador	138 9.05	529 34.69	582 38.16	276 18.10	1,525 100.00
Honduras	102 6.71	770 50.66	541 35.59	107 7.04	1,520 100.00
Nicaragua	133 8.77	498 32.85	615 40.57	270 17.81	1,516 100.00
Costa Rica	48 3.24	640 43.18	603 40.69	191 12.89	1,482 100.00
Panama	23 1.51	361 23.64	845 55.34	298 19.52	1,527 100.00
Colombia	36 2.40	446 29.69	717 47.74	303 20.17	1,502 100.00
Ecuador	40 1.33	868 28.95	1,380 46.03	710 23.68	2,998 100.00
Bolivia	101 3.38	982 32.88	1,060 35.49	844 28.26	2,987 100.00
Peru	19 1.27	290 19.35	594 39.63	596 39.76	1,499 100.00
Paraguay	12 1.03	473 40.57	481 41.25	200 17.15	1,166 100.00
Chile	35 2.32	217 14.38	928 61.50	329 21.80	1,509 100.00
Uruguay	20 1.33	498 33.22	732 48.83	249 16.61	1,499 100.00
Brazil	84 5.68	588 39.73	669 45.20	139 9.39	1,480 100.00
Venezuela	2 0.14	336 23.05	773 53.02	347 23.80	1,458 100.00
Argentina	11 0.74	342 23.08	716 48.31	413 27.87	1,482 100.00
Dominican Republic	97 6.48	721 48.13	461 30.77	219 14.62	1,498 100.00
Total	1,252 4.21	9,802 32.96	12,903 43.38	5,785 19.45	29,742 100.00

Table E21. Effective number of political parties

Country	Mean	Freq.
Mexico	3.54	1560
Guatemala	4.8600001	1538
El Salvador	3.04	1549
Honduras	2.3699999	1522
Nicaragua	3.1500001	1540
Costa Rica	3.3199999	1500
Panama	2.9200001	1536
Colombia	6.9000001	1503
Ecuador	5.8400002	3000
Bolivia	2.3900001	3003
Peru	3.78	1500
Paraguay	3.1800001	1166
Chile	5.5799999	1527
Uruguay	2.3900001	1500
Brazil	9.3199997	1497
Venezuela	1	1500
Argentina	3.6199999	1486
Dominican Rep.	2.3800001	1507
Total	3.8951938 1.9116219	29934

Table E22. Party system polarization (citizens' self placement)

Country	Mean	Freq.
Mexico	.23	1560
Guatemala	.03	1538
El Salvador	.46000001	1549
Honduras	.03	1522
Nicaragua	.19 .	1540
Costa Rica	.07 .	1500
Panama	.03	1536
Colombia	.2	1503
Ecuador	.31	3000
Bolivia	.17	3003
Peru	.02	1500
Chile	.30000001	1527
Uruguay	.43000001	1500
Brazil	.04	1497
Venezuela	.30000001	1500
Total	.19363376	25775

Table E23. Party system polarization (experts' judgments)

Country	Mean	Freq.
Mexico	29	1560
Guatemala	43	1538
El Salvador	89	1549
Honduras	12	1522
Nicaragua	96	1540
Costa Rica	13	1500
Panama	27	1536
Colombia	68	1503
Ecuador	44	3000
Bolivia	59	3003
Peru	24	1500
Chile	59	1527
Uruguay	73	1500
Brazil	67	1497
Venezuela	47	1500
Total	50.206945	25775

Table E24. Partisan identification (parties' roots in society)

Country	No	Yes	Total
Mexico	1,042 67.84	494 32.16	1,536 100.00
Guatemala	1,258 84.15	237 15.85	1,495 100.00
El Salvador	909 59.06	630 40.94	1,539 100.00
Honduras	750 51.26	713 48.74	1,463 100.00
Nicaragua	908 59.70	613 40.30	1,521 100.00
Costa Rica	1,025 69.73	445 30.27	1,470 100.00
Panama	1,028 67.94	485 32.06	1,513 100.00
Colombia	1,049 70.83	432 29.17	1,481 100.00
Ecuador	2,401 81.06	561 18.94	2,962 100.00
Bolivia	2,155 72.68	810 27.32	2,965 100.00
Peru	1,206 80.83	286 19.17	1,492 100.00
Paraguay	476 41.00	685 59.00	1,161 100.00
Chile	1,152 78.58	314 21.42	1,466 100.00
Uruguay	731 49.56	744 50.44	1,475 100.00
Brazil	1,102 74.81	371 25.19	1,473 100.00
Venezuela	979 67.42	473 32.58	1,452 100.00
Argentina	1,061 75.25	349 24.75	1,410 100.00
Dominican Republic	438 29.74	1,035 70.26	1,473 100.00
Total	19,670 67.03	9,677 32.97	29,347 100.00

Table E25. GDP per capita

Country	Mean	Freq.
Mexico	6322.8	1560
Guatemala	1610.8	1538
El Salvador	2188.3	1549
Honduras	1365.6	1522
Nicaragua	863.0	1540
Costa Rica	4792.4	1500
Panama	4749.1	1536
Colombia	2674.4	1503
Ecuador	1608.1	3000
Bolivia	1058.9	3003
Peru	2555.8	1500
Paraguay	1396.4	1166
Chile	5873.3	1527
Uruguay	6770.2	1500
Brazil	4021.3	1497
Venezuela	5429.6	1500
Argentina	8733.4	1486
Dominican Rep.	3240.3	1507

Table E26. Crime victimization

Country	Victim	No victim	Total
Mexico	251	1,306	1,557
	16.12	83.88	100.00
Guatemala	261	1,268	1,529
	17.07	82.93	100.00
El Salvador	294	1,253	1,547
	19.00	81.00	100.00
Honduras	207	1,304	1,511
	13.70	86.30	100.00
Nicaragua	254	1,282	1,536
	16.54	83.46	100.00
Costa Rica	237	1,250	1,487
	15.94	84.06	100.00
Panama	128	1,399	1,527
	8.38	91.62	100.00
Colombia	233	1,269	1,502
	15.51	84.49	100.00
Ecuador	622	2,361	2,983
	20.85	79.15	100.00
Bolivia	527	2,464	2,991
	17.62	82.38	100.00
Peru	381	1,117	1,498
	25.43	74.57	100.00
Paraguay	193	971	1,164
	16.58	83.42	100.00
Chile	339	1,186	1,525
	22.23	77.77	100.00
Uruguay	330	1,167	1,497
	22.04	77.96	100.00
Brazil	242	1,240	1,482
	16.33	83.67	100.00
Venezuela	318	1,170	1,488
	21.37	78.63	100.00
Argentina	401	1,059	1,460
	27.47	72.53	100.00
Dominican Republic	223	1,284	1,507
	14.80	85.20	100.00
Total	5,441	24,350	29,791
	18.26	81.74	100.0

Table E27. Corruption victimization

Country	Mean	Std. Dev.	Freq.
Mexico	30.320513	45.979049	1560
Guatemala	19.570871	39.687432	1538
El Salvador	14.848289	35.569284	1549
Honduras	13.797635	34.498851	1522
Nicaragua	16.623377	37.241128	1540
Costa Rica	17.466667	37.980836	1500
Panama	9.1796875	28.883303	1536
Colombia	9.5143047	29.351008	1503
Ecuador	24.8	43.192382	3000
Bolivia	31.268731	46.366534	3003
Peru	27.066667	44.445238	1500
Paraguay	18.181818	38.586011	1166
Chile	11.656843	32.101046	1527
Uruguay	8.8666667	28.435681	1500
Brazil	11.489646	31.900351	1497
Venezuela	10.6	30.794028	1500
Argentina	27.456258	44.644384	1486
Dominican Rep.	16.323822	36.970556	1507
Total	18.751253	39.032892	29934

Table E28. Support for a democracy without political parties

Country	Mean	Std. Dev.	Freq.
Mexico	51.092515	33.216352	1434
Guatemala	49.718165	33.100559	1301
El Salvador	47.218528	36.521698	1504
Honduras	40.205547	29.26243	1346
Nicaragua	46.860436	39.39117	1359
Costa Rica	37.902462	38.638938	1408
Panama	53.155339	33.046754	1442
Colombia	53.664731	33.952062	1378
Ecuador	53.017444	31.257282	2828
Bolivia	50.718761	30.889977	2713
Peru	46.107572	30.352204	1413
Paraguay	41.296296	37.761972	990
Chile	51.759981	31.294837	1411
Uruguay	38.427896	39.065999	1410
Brazil	44.693932	34.0827	1247
Venezuela	35.34166	35.666615	1361
Argentina	31.502423	34.677363	1238
Dominican Rep.	41.066282	38.071131	1388
Total	46.054617	34.823664	27171

Table E29. Respect for the law

Country	Can act on the margins	Should always respect the law	Total
Mexico	469 30.65	1,061 69.35	1,530 100.00
Guatemala	603 42.41	819 57.59	1,422 100.00
El Salvador	682 44.58	848 55.42	1,530 100.00
Honduras	748 52.20	685 47.80	1,433 100.00
Nicaragua	789 53.31	691 46.69	1,480 100.00
Costa Rica	619 43.38	808 56.62	1,427 100.00
Panama	550 37.06	934 62.94	1,484 100.00
Colombia	517 35.24	950 64.76	1,467 100.00
Ecuador	1,326 45.16	1,610 54.84	2,936 100.00
Bolivia	1,109 38.07	1,804 61.93	2,913 100.00
Peru	637 43.69	821 56.31	1,458 100.00
Paraguay	544 48.66	574 51.34	1,118 100.00
Chile	723 48.62	764 51.38	1,487 100.00
Uruguay	726 49.83	731 50.17	1,457 100.00
Brazil	424 28.90	1,043 71.10	1,467 100.00
Venezuela	463 32.02	983 67.98	1,446 100.00
Argentina	527 37.32	885 62.68	1,412 100.00
Dominican Republic	497 33.74	976 66.26	1,473 100.00
Total	11,953 41.30	16,987 58.70	28,940 100.00

Table E30. Support for democracy

Country	Mean	Std. Dev.	Freq.
Mexico	68.481183	28.955912	1488
Guatemala	60.507523	31.800208	1307
El Salvador	68.387381	28.566095	1511
Honduras	59.870435	29.519286	1415
Nicaragua	72.879684	31.330525	1352
Costa Rica	78.189876	28.257658	1429
Panama	71.558817	27.956562	1499
Colombia	72.966339	26.443764	1426
Ecuador	64.759278	28.274119	2901
Bolivia	70.501004	24.053582	2821
Peru	65.523215	25.668021	1443
Paraguay	62.912088	33.411848	1092
Chile	69.517544	26.647422	1444
Uruguay	85.345612	23.67309	1466
Brazil	70.479705	28.499447	1355
Venezuela	83.835961	23.581027	1459
Argentina	86.914995	22.255934	1396
Dominican Rep.	74.908826	29.460921	1371
Total	71.267672	28.565517	28175

ANNEX F

ADDITIONAL TABLES AND FIGURES

Table AI.1. Main characteristics of Latin American Legislatures

Country	Denomination of Legislative Power	Number of Chambers	Name of legislative bodies	Size of legislative body	Legislative term (years)
Mexico	Honorable Congreso de la Unión	2	Cámara de Diputados	500[d]	3[e]
			Senado de la República	128[b]	6[b]
Guatemala	Congreso de la República	1	Congreso de la República	158[c]	4[e]
El Salvador	Asamblea Legislativa	1	Asamblea Legislativa	84[d]	3[e]
Honduras	Congreso Nacional	1	Congreso Nacional	128[d]	4[e]
Nicaragua	Asamblea Nacional	1	Asamblea Nacional	90[d]	5[e]
Costa Rica	Asamblea Legislativa	1	Asamblea Legislativa	57[d]	4[e]
Panama	Asamblea Legislativa	1	Asamblea Legislativa	71[b]	5[e]
Colombia	Congreso de la República	2	Cámara de Representantes	166[d]	4[e]
			Senado	102[d]	4[h]
Ecuador	Congreso Nacional	1	Congreso Nacional	100[d]	4[e]
Bolivia	Honorable Congreso Nacional	2	Cámara de Diputados	130[d]	5[e]
			Cámara de Senadores	27[b]	5[i]
Peru	Congreso de la República	1	Congreso de la República	120[d]	5[e]
Paraguay	Congreso	2	Cámara de Diputados	80[d]	5[e]
			Cámara de Senadores	45[b]	5[j]
Chile	Congreso Nacional	2	Cámara de Diputados	120	4[e]
			Senado de la República	38[b]	8[b]
Uruguay	Asamblea General/Parlamento	2	Cámara de Representantes	99[d]	5[e]
			Cámara de Senadores	30[d]	5[e]
Brazil		2	Câmara dos Deputados	518[d]	4[e]
			Senado Federal	81[f]	8[f]
Venezuela	Asamblea Nacional	1	Asamblea Nacional	167[d]	5[e]
Argentina	Congreso de la Nación	2	Cámara de Diputados de la Nación	257[d]	4[e]
			Senado de la Nación	72[b]	6[b]
Dominican Republic	Congreso Nacional	2	Cámara de Diputados	178[d]	4[e]
			Senado de la República	32[g]	4[b]

Sources: a. Legislatina 2008b; b. Legislatina 2008a; c. Congreso de la República de Guatemala 2009; d. IDEA 2008; e. IIDH 2008; f. Senado Federal do Brasil 2009; E-lecciones.net 2009; h. Wikipedia 2009; i. Congreso Bolviano 2009; j. Cámara de Senadores de Paraguay 2009.

Table AII.1. Main characteristics of legislative electoral systems in Latin America

Country	Electoral System for low chambers	Average district magnitude	Ballot
Argentina	PR	5.4	Closed and blocked list
Bolivia	PR, and personalized	14.4	Closed and blocked list
Brazil	PR	19.0	Closed and unblocked list
Chile	Binomial	2.0	One vote per candidate
Colombia	PR	4.9	Closed and unblocked or blocked list
Costa Rica	PR	8.1	Closed and blocked list
Ecuador	PR	4.5	Open list with panachage
El Salvador	PR	5.6	Closed and blocked list
Guatemala	PR	6.6	Closed and blocked list
Honduras	PR	7.1	Open list with panachage
Mexico	Mixed		Single candidate in uninominal district and closed and blocked list
Nicaragua	PR	5.0	Closed and blocked list
Panama	PR	1.8	Closed and unblocked list
Paraguay	PR	4.4	Closed and blocked list
Peru	PR	4.8	Closed and unblocked list
Dominican R.	PR	3.1	Closed and unblocked list
Uruguay	PR	5.2*	Closed and blocked list
Venezuela	PR, and personalized	6.1	Closed and blocked list

* This value is different from that presented in the original source because the original was incorrect. It has been fixed to reflect the actual district magnitude according to the Uruguayan institutional arrangements
Source: Payne at al. 2006, 48.

Table AII.2. Type of government at the time of fieldwork

Country	President's party	Party holding legislative majority (low chamber) and type of majority	%	Party holding legislative majority (high Chamber) and type of majority		Type of government
Argentina	Partido Justicialista - Alianza Frente para la Victoria	Partido Justicialista - Alianza Frente para la Victoria	50	Partido Justicialista - Alianza Frente para la Victoria	58	Unified
Bolivia	Movimiento al Socialismo	Movimiento al Socialismo	50	Poder Democrático y Social	48	Non majority
Brazil	Partido dos Trabalhadores	Partido dos Trabalhadores	16	PArtido da Frente Liberal	22	Non majority
Chile	Concertación Democrática	Concertación Democrática	54	Alianza	47	Non majority
Colombia	Partido Liberal Colombiano	Partido Liberal Colombiano	21.	Partido Social de Unidad Nacional	20	Non majority
Costa Rica	Partido Liberación Nacional	Partido Liberación Nacional	44			Non majority
Ecuador	Alianza País	Alianza País				Unified
El Salvador	ARENA	ARENA	40			Non majority
Guatemala	UNE	UNE	32			Non majority
Honduras	Partido Liberal de Honduras	Partido Liberal de Honduras	45			Non majority
Mexico	Partido Acción Nacional	Partido Acción Nacional	41	Partido Acción Nacional	41	Non majority
Nicaragua	Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional	Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional	42			Non majority
Panama	Partido Revolucionario Democrático	Partido Revolucionario Democrático	54			Unified
Paraguay	Asociación Nacional Republicana	Asociación Nacional Republicana	46	Asociación Nacional Republicana	36	Non majority
Peru	Partido Aprista Peruano	Unión por el Perú	21	Unión por el Perú	38	Non majority
Dominican R.	Partido de la Liberación Dominicano	Partido de la Liberación Dominicano	54	Partido de la Liberación Dominicano	71	Unified
Uruguay	Encuentro Progresista-Frente Ampio	Encuentro Progresista-Frente Ampio	53	Encuentro Progresista-Frente Amplio	53	Unified
Venezuela	Movimiento V República	Movimiento V República	100			Unified

Table AIII.1. OLS. Excessive congressional debate as determinant of trust in legislatures

	Coefficient	P>t
Excessive congressional debate	.8149162	0.000
Excessive congressional debate squared	-.0069283	0.000
Intercept	24.94316	0.000
Adjusted R- Square	0.0473	
N	26,357	

Table AIII.2. OLS. Excessive congressional counterbalance as determinant of trust in legislatures

	Coefficient	P>t
Congressional counterbalance	.523805	0.000
Congressional counterbalance squared	-.0043571	0.000
Intercept	30.23554	0.000
Adjusted R- Square	0.0301	
N	25,251	

Table AIII.3. Correlation matrix for importance of laws passed by congress, job approval of legislators, and fulfillment of expectations by congress

	Importance of laws	Job approval	Fulfilled expectations
Importance of laws	1.000	-	-
Job approval	0.480	1.000	-
Importance of laws	0.274	0.375	1.000

Table AIII.4. Factor analysis in principal factors of importance of laws passed by Congress (ec3r), job approval of legislators (m2r), and fulfillment of expectations by Congress (ec4r).

```
Factor analysis/correlation                      Number of obs    =     25840
    Method: principal factors                    Retained factors =         1
    Rotation: (unrotated)                         Number of params =         3

    ┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
    │   Factor   │  Eigenvalue  Difference  │   Proportion   Cumulative
    ├─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
    │   Factor1  │    0.99967    1.07896    │     1.4548       1.4548
    │   Factor2  │   -0.07929    0.15393    │    -0.1154       1.3394
    │   Factor3  │   -0.23322       .       │    -0.3394       1.0000
    └─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────

    LR test: independent vs. saturated:  chi2(3)  = 1.1e+04 Prob>chi2 = 0.0000

Factor loadings (pattern matrix) and unique variances

    ┌──────────────────────────────────────────┐
    │  Variable  │  Factor1  │  Uniqueness     │
    ├──────────────────────────────────────────┤
    │     ec3r   │  0.5864   │   0.6561        │
    │     ec4r   │  0.6533   │   0.5732        │
    │     m2r    │  0.4785   │   0.7710        │
    └──────────────────────────────────────────┘
```

Table AIII.5. Comparison of mean levels of trust across partisan identification

```
Two-sample t test with equal variances
┌───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
│  Group  │   Obs    │   Mean    │  Std. Err.  │  Std. Dev.  │ [95% Conf. Interval]
├───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
│     No  │  18454   │  39.3239  │  .2174578   │  29.54066   │  38.89767   39.75014
│    Yes  │   9303   │ 45.14852  │  .3249122   │  31.33845   │  44.51162   45.78542
├───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
│ combined│  27757   │ 41.27607  │  .1817461   │  30.27968   │  40.91984   41.63231
├───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
│    diff │          │ -5.824614 │  .383434    │             │  -6.576164  -5.073064
└───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────

    diff = mean(No) - mean(Yes)                                    t = -15.1907
Ho: diff = 0                                      degrees of freedom =    27755

    Ha: diff < 0                  Ha: diff != 0                     Ha: diff > 0
 Pr(T < t) = 0.0000       Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0000            Pr(T > t) = 1.0000
```

Table AIII.6. Likelihood-ratio test. Null hypothesis: country-level differences are not significant

```
Likelihood-ratio test                               LR chibar2(01)  =   2991.18
(Assumption: . nested in lr1)                       Prob > chibar2  =    0.0000
```

Table AIII.7. Multilevel regression (xtmixed) Model 1

```
. *Model 1. Full Model with PK
. xtmixed b13r  ec2r ec2rsq ec1r ec1rsq ec3r m2r ec4r epp1r idcong m1r soct1r pk intpolef extpolef  a2r it1r edr|| pais:,
> mle

Performing EM optimization:

Performing gradient-based optimization:

Iteration 0:    log likelihood = -98261.729
Iteration 1:    log likelihood = -98261.729

Computing standard errors:

Mixed-effects ML regression              Number of obs     =      21345
Group variable: pais                     Number of groups  =         18

                                         Obs per group: min =        784
                                                        avg =     1185.8
                                                        max =       2458

                                         Wald chi2(17)     =    8196.53
Log likelihood = -98261.729              Prob > chi2       =     0.0000
```

b13r	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P>|z|	[95% Conf. Interval]	
ec2r	.1235627	.0242279	5.10	0.000	.0760769	.1710486
ec2rsq	-.0013452	.0002049	-6.56	0.000	-.0017468	-.0009435
ec1r	.0836582	.0201396	4.15	0.000	.0441853	.1231312
ec1rsq	-.0008404	.0001947	-4.32	0.000	-.001222	-.0004587
ec3r	.0918635	.0069251	13.27	0.000	.0782905	.1054366
m2r	.1977315	.0087371	22.63	0.000	.1806071	.2148559
ec4r	.2129541	.0078525	27.12	0.000	.1975635	.2283446
epp1r	.177365	.0070522	25.15	0.000	.1635429	.1911872
idcong	.5217832	.1845392	2.83	0.005	.1600931	.8834733
m1r	.0418984	.0085097	4.92	0.000	.0252198	.0585771
soct1r	.021263	.0082267	2.58	0.010	.005139	.037387
pk	-.0202767	.0063892	-3.17	0.002	-.0327994	-.007754
intpolef	.0400057	.006345	6.31	0.000	.0275697	.0524417
extpolef	.0567919	.006047	9.39	0.000	.04494	.0686438
a2r	.0037031	.0061927	0.60	0.550	-.0084344	.0158406
it1r	.0329161	.0056331	5.84	0.000	.0218755	.0439567
edr	-.9830298	.2424801	-4.05	0.000	-1.458282	-.5077776
_cons	4.092209	1.451911	2.82	0.005	1.246515	6.937902

Random-effects Parameters	Estimate	Std. Err.	[95% Conf. Interval]	
pais: Identity				
sd(_cons)	4.55141	.7749655	3.259962	6.354473
sd(Residual)	24.11885	.1167818	23.89105	24.34883

```
LR test vs. linear regression: chibar2(01) =    869.53 Prob >= chibar2 = 0.0000
```

Table AIII.8. Multilevel regression (xtmixed) Model 2

```
. *Model 2. Parsimonious Model with PK
. xtmixed b13r  ec2r ec2rsq ec1r ec1rsq conper epp1r idcong m1r soct1r pk intpolef extpolef  a2r it1r edr|| pais:, mle

Performing EM optimization:

Performing gradient-based optimization:

Iteration 0:    log likelihood = -101610.48
Iteration 1:    log likelihood = -101610.48

Computing standard errors:
```

Mixed-effects ML regression		Number of obs	=	22048
Group variable: **pais**		Number of groups	=	18

	Obs per group: min =	818
	avg =	1224.9
	max =	2569

	Wald chi2(**15**)	=	8119.56
Log likelihood = **-101610.48**	Prob > chi2	=	0.0000

b13r	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P>|z|	[95% Conf. Interval]	
ec2r	.1211844	.0238473	5.08	0.000	.0744446	.1679242
ec2rsq	-.0014567	.0002017	-7.22	0.000	-.001852	-.0010614
ec1r	.0848624	.0198845	4.27	0.000	.0458895	.1238353
ec1rsq	-.0008772	.0001925	-4.56	0.000	-.0012545	-.0004998
conper	.4722478	.0102022	46.29	0.000	.4522518	.4922437
epp1r	.1826935	.0069113	26.43	0.000	.1691476	.1962394
idcong	.5310527	.1827093	2.91	0.004	.172949	.8891564
m1r	.0498445	.0082252	6.06	0.000	.0337235	.0659656
soct1r	.0265558	.0081009	3.28	0.001	.0106782	.0424333
pk	-.0244229	.0063079	-3.87	0.000	-.0367862	-.0120596
intpolef	.0369088	.0062595	5.90	0.000	.0246405	.0491771
extpolef	.0631202	.0059632	10.58	0.000	.0514325	.0748078
a2r	.002623	.0060691	0.43	0.666	-.0092723	.0145183
it1r	.031912	.0055647	5.73	0.000	.0210055	.0428186
edr	-1.076155	.2394023	-4.50	0.000	-1.545375	-.6069349
_cons	4.738842	1.452944	3.26	0.001	1.891124	7.58656

Random-effects Parameters	Estimate	Std. Err.	[95% Conf. Interval]	
pais: Identity				
sd(_cons)	4.67331	.7945193	3.34896	6.521375
sd(Residual)	24.24271	.1154935	24.0174	24.47013

LR test vs. linear regression: <u>chibar2(01) =</u>   **955.64** Prob >= chibar2 = **0.0000**

```
.
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```

Table AIII.9. Multilevel regression (xtmixed) Model 3

```
.  *Model 3. Full Model with PKCON
.  xtmixed b13r  ec2r ec2rsq ec1r ec1rsq ec3r m2r ec4r epp1r idcong m1r soct1r pkcon intpolef extpolef  a2r it1r edr|| pai
> s:, mle

Performing EM optimization:

Performing gradient-based optimization:

Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -88473.351
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -88473.351

Computing standard errors:
```

| Mixed-effects ML regression | | | | Number of obs | = | 19199 |
| Group variable: **pals** | | | | Number of groups | = | 17 |

				Obs per group: min =		784
				avg =		1129.4
				max =		2458

| | | | | Wald chi2(**17**) | = | 7684.22 |
| Log likelihood = **-88473.351** | | | | Prob > chi2 | = | 0.0000 |

b13r	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P>|z|	[95% Conf. Interval]	
ec2r	.1176044	.0254019	4.63	0.000	.0678176	.1673912
ec2rsq	-.0012824	.0002155	-5.95	0.000	-.0017049	-.00086
ec1r	.0840744	.0211303	3.98	0.000	.0426597	.1254891
ec1rsq	-.0008262	.0002047	-4.04	0.000	-.0012274	-.000425
ec3r	.0942794	.0072564	12.99	0.000	.0800572	.1085016
m2r	.2010822	.0091481	21.98	0.000	.1831523	.2190122
ec4r	.2191638	.0083077	26.38	0.000	.2028809	.2354467
epp1r	.1703902	.0074173	22.97	0.000	.1558526	.1849278
idcong	.5226057	.1936163	2.70	0.007	.1431247	.9020867
m1r	.0455033	.0089755	5.07	0.000	.0279117	.0630948
soct1r	.0259861	.0086337	3.01	0.003	.0090643	.0429079
pkcon	-.9562588	.4374694	-2.19	0.029	-1.813683	-.0988346
intpolef	.0355918	.0066089	5.39	0.000	.0226385	.0485451
extpolef	.0589342	.0063447	9.29	0.000	.0464988	.0713696
a2r	.0027934	.006636	0.42	0.674	-.010213	.0157998
it1r	.0271153	.0059514	4.56	0.000	.0154507	.0387798
edr	-1.078659	.2459637	-4.39	0.000	-1.560739	-.5965788
_cons	3.061012	1.510636	2.03	0.043	.1002186	6.021805

Random-effects Parameters	Estimate	Std. Err.	[95% Conf. Interval]	
pals: Identity				
sd(_cons)	4.589912	.8043539	3.255641	6.471012
sd(Residual)	24.23152	.1237135	23.99026	24.47522

LR test vs. linear regression: chibar2(01) =   802.35 Prob >= chibar2 = 0.0000

Table AIII.10. Multilevel regression (xtmixed) Model 4

```
. *Model 4. Parsimonious Model with PKCON
. xtmixed b13r  ec2r ec2rsq ec1r ec1rsq conper epp1r idcong m1r soct1r pkcon intpolef extpolef  a2r it1r edr|| pais:, mle

Performing EM optimization:

Performing gradient-based optimization:

Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -91544.353
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -91544.353

Computing standard errors:

Mixed-effects ML regression                   Number of obs      =      19842
Group variable: pals                          Number of groups   =         17

                                              Obs per group: min =        818
                                                             avg =     1167.2
                                                             max =       2569

                                              Wald chi2(15)      =    7589.16
Log likelihood = -91544.353                   Prob > chi2        =     0.0000
```

b13r	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P>|z|	[95% Conf. Interval]	
ec2r	.1160275	.0249907	4.64	0.000	.0670466	.1650083
ec2rsq	-.001402	.000212	-6.61	0.000	-.0018176	-.0009865
ec1r	.0863091	.0208619	4.14	0.000	.0454206	.1271976
ec1rsq	-.0008789	.0002024	-4.34	0.000	-.0012755	-.0004823
conper	.4834534	.0106885	45.23	0.000	.4625043	.5044024
epp1r	.1753059	.0072672	24.12	0.000	.1610625	.1895493
idcong	.5376123	.1917098	2.80	0.005	.161868	.9133566
m1r	.0533361	.0086748	6.15	0.000	.0363339	.0703383
soct1r	.0309352	.0085067	3.64	0.000	.0142623	.0476081
pkcon	-.9853169	.4330854	-2.28	0.023	-1.834149	-.136485
intpolef	.0326795	.0065205	5.01	0.000	.0198996	.0454593
extpolef	.0659534	.0062555	10.54	0.000	.0536929	.078214
a2r	.0011989	.0065005	0.18	0.854	-.0115419	.0139397
it1r	.0258435	.0058812	4.39	0.000	.0143166	.0373703
edr	-1.224112	.2426044	-5.05	0.000	-1.699608	-.7486164
_cons	3.596423	1.51337	2.38	0.017	.6302731	6.562573

Random-effects Parameters	Estimate	Std. Err.	[95% Conf. Interval]	
pals: Identity				
sd(_cons)	4.722388	.8262945	3.351379	6.654259
sd(Residual)	24.36415	.1223568	24.12551	24.60515

```
LR test vs. linear regression: chibar2(01) =    882.40 Prob >= chibar2 = 0.0000
```

Table AIII.11. Hausman test for endogeneity (Model 2)

```
. hausman HAUFIX2 HAURAN2

Note: the rank of the differenced variance matrix (14) does not equal the number of coefficients being tested (15); be
      sure this is what you expect, or there may be problems computing the test.  Examine the output of your estimators
      for anything unexpected and possibly consider scaling your variables so that the coefficients are on a similar
      scale.
```

| | ——— Coefficients ——— | | | |
	(b) HAUFIX2	(B) HAURAN2	(b-B) Difference	sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B)) S.E.
ec2r	.1217382	.1072981	.0144401	.
ec2rsq	-.0014611	-.0013423	-.0001188	.
ec1r	.0847152	.0902213	-.0055061	.
ec1rsq	-.0008738	-.000987	.0001132	.
conper	.4711668	.5028124	-.0316457	.0014381
epp1r	.1824226	.1887738	-.0063512	.
idcong	.5353088	.4629064	.0724024	.0406449
m1r	.049642	.0488819	.0007602	.0014634
soct1r	.0263884	.0294688	-.0030804	.0009316
pk	-.0244275	-.02311	-.0013175	.0013188
intpolef	.0368044	.0393501	-.0025457	.
extpolef	.0630815	.0625609	.0005206	.
a2r	.0026275	.001963	.0006645	.0001072
it1r	.0319427	.0316225	.0003202	.
edr	-1.069662	-1.254415	.184753	.0333427

```
                      b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg
            B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg

    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic

                 chi2(14) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)
                          =        160.92
                 Prob>chi2 =        0.0000
                 (V_b-V_B is not positive definite)

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```

Table AIII.12. Fixed effects regression (Model 2)

```
. *Model 2. Parsimonious Model with PK
. regress b13r  ec2r ec2rsq ec1r ec1rsq conper epp1r idcong m1r soct1r pk intpolef extpolef  a2r it1r edr  Guatemala ElSal
> vador Honduras Nicaragua CostaRica Panama Colombia Ecuador Bolivia Peru Paraguay Chile Uruguay Brazil Venezuela Argentin
> a DominicanR
```

Source	SS	df	MS
Model	6948364.46	32	217136.389
Residual	12947264.4	22015	588.111036
Total	19895628.9	22047	902.418874

Number of obs = 22048
F(32, 22015) = 369.21
Prob > F   = 0.0000
R-squared   = 0.3492
Adj R-squared = 0.3483
Root MSE   = 24.251

b13r	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P>|t|	[95% Conf.	Interval]
ec2r	.1217382	.0238583	5.10	0.000	.0749743	.1685021
ec2rsq	-.0014611	.0002018	-7.24	0.000	-.0018567	-.0010656
ec1r	.0847152	.0198967	4.26	0.000	.0457163	.1237141
ec1rsq	-.0008738	.0001926	-4.54	0.000	-.0012513	-.0004962
conper	.4711668	.0102135	46.13	0.000	.4511475	.491186
epp1r	.1824226	.0069152	26.38	0.000	.1688682	.195977
idcong	.5353088	.1830745	2.92	0.003	.1764697	.8941479
m1r	.049642	.0082378	6.03	0.000	.0334954	.0657886
soct1r	.0263884	.0081102	3.25	0.001	.0104919	.0422849
pk	-.0244275	.0063193	-3.87	0.000	-.0368138	-.0120411
intpolef	.0368044	.0062622	5.88	0.000	.0245301	.0490787
extpolef	.0630815	.0059661	10.57	0.000	.0513875	.0747755
a2r	.0026275	.0060741	0.43	0.665	-.0092781	.0145331
it1r	.0319427	.0055685	5.74	0.000	.021028	.0428574
edr	-1.069662	.239696	-4.46	0.000	-1.539483	-.5998404
Guatemala	-9.975058	1.084528	-9.20	0.000	-12.10081	-7.849306
ElSalvador	-11.29823	.9777472	-11.56	0.000	-13.21468	-9.381775
Honduras	-9.467303	1.070648	-8.84	0.000	-11.56585	-7.368757
Nicaragua	-12.61645	1.048368	-12.03	0.000	-14.67133	-10.56158
CostaRica	-7.299142	1.007743	-7.24	0.000	-9.27439	-5.323894
Panama	-11.16923	.9991723	-11.18	0.000	-13.12768	-9.210776
Colombia	-7.249887	1.016227	-7.13	0.000	-9.241766	-5.258009
Ecuador	-22.80094	.871054	-26.18	0.000	-24.50827	-21.09361
Bolivia	-7.411648	.8867776	-8.36	0.000	-9.149796	-5.6735
Peru	-13.12369	.9867956	-13.30	0.000	-15.05788	-11.1895
Paraguay	-16.34818	1.126563	-14.51	0.000	-18.55632	-14.14004
Chile	-4.917135	.9975874	-4.93	0.000	-6.872478	-2.961793
Uruguay	-7.114122	1.048446	-6.79	0.000	-9.169152	-5.059092
Brazil	-10.43391	1.052426	-9.91	0.000	-12.49674	-8.371075
Venezuela	-7.364923	1.057562	-6.96	0.000	-9.43782	-5.292026
Argentina	-11.95002	1.123543	-10.64	0.000	-14.15224	-9.747793
DominicanR	-6.966405	1.075022	-6.48	0.000	-9.073525	-4.859285
_cons	14.65685	1.172395	12.50	0.000	12.35887	16.95483

Table AIII.13. Fixed effects regression (Model 2) with robust standard errors

```
. **Model 2. Fixed Effects with Robust Standard Error
. regress b13r  ec2r ec2rsq ec1r ec1rsq conper epp1r idcong m1r soct1r pk intpolef extpolef  a2r it1r edr  Guatemala ElSal
> vador Honduras Nicaragua CostaRica Panama Colombia Ecuador Bolivia Peru Paraguay Chile Uruguay Brazil Venezuela Argentin
> a DominicanR, vce(robust)

Linear regression                                    Number of obs =     22048
                                                     F( 32, 22015) =    424.06
                                                     Prob > F      =    0.0000
                                                     R-squared     =    0.3492
                                                     Root MSE      =    24.251
```

b13r	Coef.	Robust Std. Err.	t	P>|t|	[95% Conf.	Interval]
ec2r	.1217382	.025166	4.84	0.000	.072411	.1710654
ec2rsq	-.0014611	.0002106	-6.94	0.000	-.0018739	-.0010483
ec1r	.0847152	.0213384	3.97	0.000	.0428904	.12654
ec1rsq	-.0008738	.0002062	-4.24	0.000	-.0012779	-.0004696
conper	.4711668	.0112953	41.71	0.000	.4490272	.4933063
epp1r	.1824226	.0081117	22.49	0.000	.1665231	.1983221
idcong	.5353088	.1834813	2.92	0.004	.1756723	.8949453
m1r	.049642	.0087987	5.64	0.000	.0323959	.0668881
soct1r	.0263884	.0084447	3.12	0.002	.0098362	.0429406
pk	-.0244275	.0064837	-3.77	0.000	-.0371361	-.0117189
intpolef	.0368044	.0068231	5.39	0.000	.0234306	.0501782
extpolef	.0630815	.0066608	9.47	0.000	.0500259	.0761371
a2r	.0026275	.0063167	0.42	0.677	-.0097537	.0150088
it1r	.0319427	.005829	5.48	0.000	.0205175	.0433679
edr	-1.069662	.2421354	-4.42	0.000	-1.544264	-.595059
Guatemala	-9.975058	1.13911	-8.76	0.000	-12.2078	-7.74232
ElSalvador	-11.29823	1.019812	-11.08	0.000	-13.29713	-9.299324
Honduras	-9.467303	1.019412	-9.29	0.000	-11.46542	-7.469182
Nicaragua	-12.61645	1.181462	-10.68	0.000	-14.9322	-10.3007
CostaRica	-7.299142	1.070133	-6.82	0.000	-9.39668	-5.201603
Panama	-11.16923	.999668	-11.17	0.000	-13.12865	-9.209805
Colombia	-7.249887	1.057753	-6.85	0.000	-9.323159	-5.176615
Ecuador	-22.80094	.9009916	-25.31	0.000	-24.56695	-21.03493
Bolivia	-7.411648	.8932886	-8.30	0.000	-9.162558	-5.660738
Peru	-13.12369	.9747492	-13.46	0.000	-15.03427	-11.21311
Paraguay	-16.34818	1.116895	-14.64	0.000	-18.53737	-14.15899
Chile	-4.917135	.9930572	-4.95	0.000	-6.863599	-2.970672
Uruguay	-7.114122	1.043886	-6.82	0.000	-9.160213	-5.068031
Brazil	-10.43391	1.101837	-9.47	0.000	-12.59359	-8.274225
Venezuela	-7.364923	1.019109	-7.23	0.000	-9.362449	-5.367397
Argentina	-11.95002	1.087513	-10.99	0.000	-14.08162	-9.818416
DominicanR	-6.966405	1.154653	-6.03	0.000	-9.229608	-4.703202
_cons	14.65685	1.22747	11.94	0.000	12.25092	17.06278

```
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```

Table AIV.1 Comparison of mean levels of trust across type of government (all cases)

```
. ttest b13r, by (unigov)

Two-sample t test with equal variances
```

Group	Obs	Mean	Std. Err.	Std. Dev.	[95% Conf.	Interval]
Not unif	18283	42.79476	.2203497	29.79451	42.36286	43.22667
Unified	9984	38.68189	.3095676	30.93198	38.07508	39.28871
combined	28267	41.34208	.1800089	30.26453	40.98926	41.69491
diff		4.112873	.3758264		3.376235	4.849511

```
    diff = mean(Not unif) - mean(Unified)                          t =    10.9435
Ho: diff = 0                                         degrees of freedom =     28265

   Ha: diff < 0                    Ha: diff != 0                      Ha: diff > 0
Pr(T < t) = 1.0000         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0000         Pr(T > t) = 0.0000
```

Table AIV.2 Comparison of mean levels of trust across type of government (excluding Ecuador)

. ttest b13r, by (unigov), if pais !=9

Two-sample t test with equal variances

Group	Obs	Mean	Std. Err.	Std. Dev.	[95% Conf. Interval]	
Not unif	18283	42.79476	.2203497	29.79451	42.36286	43.22667
Unified	7043	45.17251	.3629842	30.46258	44.46095	45.88407
combined	25326	43.456	.1885122	30.00011	43.08651	43.82549
diff		-2.377748	.420473		-3.201899	-1.553597

diff = mean(**Not unif**) - mean(**Unified**)   t = **-5.6549**
Ho: diff = 0   degrees of freedom =   25324

    Ha: diff < 0   Ha: diff != 0   Ha: diff > 0
Pr(T < t) = **0.0000**   Pr(|T| > |t|) = **0.0000**   Pr(T > t) = **1.0000**

Table AIV.3 Comparison of mean levels of trust across Federalism

. ttest b13r, by (fed)

Two-sample t test with equal variances

Group	Obs	Mean	Std. Err.	Std. Dev.	[95% Conf. Interval]	
0	22651	40.86942	.2010563	30.25947	40.47534	41.26351
1	5616	43.24846	.4031579	30.21264	42.45811	44.0388
combined	28267	41.34208	.1800089	30.26453	40.98926	41.69491
diff		-2.379032	.4509314		-3.26288	-1.495185

diff = mean(**0**) - mean(**1**)   t = **-5.2758**
Ho: diff = 0   degrees of freedom =   28265

    Ha: diff < 0   Ha: diff != 0   Ha: diff > 0
Pr(T < t) = **0.0000**   Pr(|T| > |t|) = **0.0000**   Pr(T > t) = **1.0000**

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Table AIV.4 Random effects regression (Model 5)

```
. xtmixed b13r  ec2r ec2rsq ec1r ec1rsq conper epp1r idcong m1r soct1r pk intpolef extpolef  a2r it1r edr enl
> p polgkSS countryID unigov fed gdpcap corruption crime|| pais:, mle

Performing EM optimization:

Performing gradient-based optimization:

Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -89301.256
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -89301.256

Computing standard errors:

Mixed-effects ML regression                     Number of obs      =      19381
Group variable: pais                            Number of groups   =         15

                                                Obs per group: min =        882
                                                               avg =     1292.1
                                                               max =       2569

                                                Wald chi2(23)      =    7199.67
Log likelihood = -89301.256                     Prob > chi2        =     0.0000
```

b13r	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P>|z|	[95% Conf.	Interval]
ec2r	.1147615	.0256056	4.48	0.000	.0645754	.1649476
ec2rsq	-.0014117	.0002161	-6.53	0.000	-.0018351	-.0009882
ec1r	.0892966	.0214694	4.16	0.000	.0472174	.1313757
ec1rsq	-.0009242	.0002064	-4.48	0.000	-.0013288	-.0005196
conper	.4736834	.0108751	43.56	0.000	.4523686	.4949983
epp1r	.1826659	.0073953	24.70	0.000	.1681713	.1971604
idcong	.4592165	.200071	2.30	0.022	.0670846	.8513485
m1r	.0514517	.0088008	5.85	0.000	.0342025	.068701
soct1r	.0239824	.0086335	2.78	0.005	.0070611	.0409037
pk	-.0218639	.0066517	-3.29	0.001	-.034901	-.0088267
intpolef	.0394609	.0067791	5.82	0.000	.0261741	.0527478
extpolef	.0593612	.006368	9.32	0.000	.0468802	.0718423
a2r	3.04e-06	.0064633	0.00	1.000	-.0126648	.0126709
it1r	.0325065	.0058708	5.54	0.000	.0209998	.0440131
edr	-1.075525	.2553154	-4.21	0.000	-1.575934	-.5751161
enlp	-.9730017	.3535938	-2.75	0.006	-1.666033	-.2799706
polgkSS	4.717447	4.819981	0.98	0.328	-4.729543	14.16444
countryID	-.0438286	.0807124	-0.54	0.587	-.202022	.1143648
unigov	-8.356591	1.383814	-6.04	0.000	-11.06882	-5.644365
fed	1.875966	1.490241	1.26	0.208	-1.044853	4.796784
gdpcap	.0017694	.000327	5.41	0.000	.0011284	.0024103
corruption	-.0424091	.0923912	-0.46	0.646	-.2234924	.1386743
crime	-.3056351	.1613145	-1.89	0.058	-.6218058	.0105356
_cons	11.58316	5.962449	1.94	0.052	-.1030267	23.26934

Random-effects Parameters	Estimate	Std. Err.	[95% Conf.	Interval]
pais: Identity				
sd(_cons)	1.775817	.3730641	1.176461	2.680518
sd(Residual)	24.23854	.1231601	23.99835	24.48113

```
LR test vs. linear regression: chibar2(01) =     71.94 Prob >= chibar2 = 0.0000

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```

Table AIV.5 Random effects regression (Model 6)

```
. xtmixed b13r  ec2r ec2rsq ec1r ec1rsq conper epp1r idcong m1r soct1r pk intpolef extpolef  a2r it1r edr enl
> p polgkC countryID unigov fed gdpcap corruption crime|| pais:, mle

Performing EM optimization:

Performing gradient-based optimization:

Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -89300.906
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -89300.906

Computing standard errors:
```

| Mixed-effects ML regression | | Number of obs | = | 19381 |
| Group variable: **pais** | | Number of groups | = | 15 |

		Obs per group: min =	882
		avg =	1292.1
		max =	2569

| | | Wald chi2(**23**) | = | 7217.25 |
| Log likelihood = -89300.906 | | Prob > chi2 | = | 0.0000 |

b13r	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P>|z|	[95% Conf. Interval]	
ec2r	.1148851	.0256054	4.49	0.000	.0646994	.1650707
ec2rsq	-.0014146	.0002161	-6.55	0.000	-.0018381	-.0009911
ec1r	.0893048	.0214685	4.16	0.000	.0472274	.1313823
ec1rsq	-.0009244	.0002064	-4.48	0.000	-.001329	-.0005198
conper	.4734095	.0108804	43.51	0.000	.4520842	.4947348
epp1r	.1827454	.0073932	24.72	0.000	.1682549	.1972359
idcong	.4556119	.2000453	2.28	0.023	.0635303	.8476935
m1r	.0517435	.0087976	5.88	0.000	.0345006	.0689865
soct1r	.0241635	.0086338	2.80	0.005	.0072415	.0410855
pk	-.0216553	.0066525	-3.26	0.001	-.0346939	-.0086166
intpolef	.0394525	.0067789	5.82	0.000	.0261662	.0527389
extpolef	.0593681	.0063679	9.32	0.000	.0468872	.071849
a2r	-.0000877	.0064632	-0.01	0.989	-.0127553	.0125799
it1r	.0325057	.0058689	5.54	0.000	.0210028	.0440087
edr	-1.083041	.2553639	-4.24	0.000	-1.583545	-.5825372
enlp	-1.04372	.353145	-2.96	0.003	-1.735871	-.3515681
polgkC	.0316757	.0240341	1.32	0.188	-.0154303	.0787817
countryID	-.0418654	.0742594	-0.56	0.573	-.1874111	.1036802
unigov	-7.93331	1.270966	-6.24	0.000	-10.42436	-5.442262
fed	1.565358	1.450555	1.08	0.281	-1.277678	4.408395
gdpcap	.0019562	.0003342	5.85	0.000	.0013012	.0026112
corruption	-.0057725	.0915201	-0.06	0.950	-.1851486	.1736036
crime	-.2956502	.142134	-2.08	0.038	-.5742277	-.0170727
_cons	9.609959	5.22291	1.84	0.066	-.6267559	19.84667

Random-effects Parameters	Estimate	Std. Err.	[95% Conf. Interval]	
pais: Identity				
sd(_cons)	1.718904	.3679423	1.129917	2.61491
sd(Residual)	24.23863	.1231615	23.99843	24.48123

LR test vs. linear regression: <u>chibar2(01) =</u>   **59.53** Prob >= chibar2 = **0.0000**

```
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```

Table AIV.6 Random effects regression (Model 7)

```
. *Model 7. Without Polarization
. xtmixed b13r  ec2r ec2rsq ec1r ec1rsq conper epp1r idcong m1r soct1r pk intpolef extpolef  a2r it1r edr enl
> p countryID unigov fed gdpcap corruption crime|| pais:, mle

Performing EM optimization:

Performing gradient-based optimization:

Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -101601.41
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -101601.41

Computing standard errors:

Mixed-effects ML regression                     Number of obs      =      22048
Group variable: pais                            Number of groups   =         18

                                                Obs per group: min =        818
                                                               avg =     1224.9
                                                               max =       2569

                                                Wald chi2(22)      =    8242.63
Log likelihood = -101601.41                     Prob > chi2        =     0.0000
```

b13r	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P>|z|	[95% Conf.	Interval]
ec2r	.1213686	.0238454	5.09	0.000	.0746325	.1681047
ec2rsq	-.0014599	.0002017	-7.24	0.000	-.0018551	-.0010646
ec1r	.0848279	.0198847	4.27	0.000	.0458547	.1238012
ec1rsq	-.0008768	.0001925	-4.55	0.000	-.0012541	-.0004995
conper	.4724614	.0102007	46.32	0.000	.4524684	.4924544
epp1r	.1827615	.0069102	26.45	0.000	.1692177	.1963053
idcong	.5340514	.1829533	2.92	0.004	.1754695	.8926332
m1r	.0508522	.0082203	6.19	0.000	.0347407	.0669637
soct1r	.0265803	.0080997	3.28	0.001	.0107052	.0424555
pk	-.0248411	.0062968	-3.95	0.000	-.0371826	-.0124997
intpolef	.0368116	.0062593	5.88	0.000	.0245437	.0490795
extpolef	.0633991	.0059623	10.63	0.000	.0517132	.0750851
a2r	.0023824	.0060672	0.39	0.695	-.009509	.0142738
it1r	.0316248	.0055624	5.69	0.000	.0207226	.042527
edr	-1.061834	.2391701	-4.44	0.000	-1.530599	-.5930693
enlp	-.7862705	.4466407	-1.76	0.078	-1.66167	.0891292
countryID	.016086	.0612553	0.26	0.793	-.1039722	.1361441
unigov	-6.597358	1.716344	-3.84	0.000	-9.96133	-3.233385
fed	.7820851	2.156515	0.36	0.717	-3.444607	5.008778
gdpcap	.0017077	.0004485	3.81	0.000	.0008287	.0025867
corruption	-.0355496	.1139812	-0.31	0.755	-.2589486	.1878495
crime	-.3609838	.1868392	-1.93	0.053	-.7271819	.0052143
_cons	10.22677	5.743325	1.78	0.075	-1.029935	21.48348

Random-effects Parameters	Estimate	Std. Err.	[95% Conf.	Interval]
pais: Identity				
sd(_cons)	2.743821	.4937829	1.928288	3.904267
sd(Residual)	24.24284	.1154955	24.01753	24.47027

```
LR test vs. linear regression: chibar2(01) =    189.26 Prob >= chibar2 = 0.0000

.
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\.
```

Table AIV.7 Hausman Test for Random Effects (Model 5)

```
. hausman HAUFIXSS_2 HAURANSS_2
```

| | ——— Coefficients ——— | | (b-B) | sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B)) |
| | (b) | (B) | | |
	HAUFIXSS_2	HAURANSS_2	Difference	S.E.
ec2r	.1143594	.118946	-.0045866	.
ec2rsq	-.0014005	-.0014997	.0000993	.0000174
ec1r	.0888686	.0922222	-.0033536	.0006674
ec1rsq	-.0009157	-.0009769	.0000612	.0000112
conper	.4716061	.488913	-.0173069	.0016323
epp1r	.1828769	.180485	.0023919	.0001488
idcong	.4560947	.4983156	-.0422209	.
m1r	.0509891	.0532322	-.002243	.0013495
soct1r	.0231994	.0303118	-.0071123	.0012314
pk	-.022666	-.0164733	-.0061926	.0016305
intpolef	.0397831	.0373852	.0023979	.
extpolef	.0592358	.060338	-.0011022	.
a2r	.0005145	-.002845	.0033594	.0006561
it1r	.0328756	.0297327	.0031429	.0004478
edr	-1.083874	-.9779942	-.1058795	.0533471

```
                            b = consistent under Ho and Ha;  obtained from xtreg
              B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho;  obtained from xtreg

     Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic

                chi2(15) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)
                         =        133.26
                Prob>chi2 =        0.0000
                (V_b-V_B is not positive definite)

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```

Table AIV.8 Hausman Test for Random Effects (Model 6)

```
. hausman HAUFIXC_2 HAURANC_2

Note: the rank of the differenced variance matrix (14) does not equal the number of coefficients being tested
      (15); be sure this is what you expect, or there may be problems computing the test.  Examine the
      output of your estimators for anything unexpected and possibly consider scaling your variables so
      that the coefficients are on a similar scale.
```

| | ——— Coefficients ——— | | (b-B) | sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B)) |
| | (b) | (B) | | |
	HAUFIXC_2	HAURANC_2	Difference	S.E.
ec2r	.1143594	.1192376	-.0048782	.000592
ec2rsq	-.0014005	-.0015121	.0001116	.000018
ec1r	.0888686	.0918626	-.002994	.0009533
ec1rsq	-.0009157	-.000974	.0000582	.0000137
conper	.4716061	.4846287	-.0130226	.0012591
epp1r	.1828769	.181144	.0017329	.0005038
idcong	.4560947	.4669944	-.0108997	.0082163
m1r	.0509891	.0552697	-.0042805	.0014539
soct1r	.0231994	.0313361	-.0081366	.0012709
pk	-.022666	-.015526	-.00714	.0016201
intpolef	.0397831	.0374633	.0023199	.
extpolef	.0592358	.0603761	-.0011403	.
a2r	.0005145	-.0032333	.0037478	.0006694
it1r	.0328756	.0298347	.0030408	.0006152
edr	-1.083874	-1.052826	-.0310476	.0507252

```
                            b = consistent under Ho and Ha;  obtained from xtreg
              B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho;  obtained from xtreg

     Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic

                chi2(14) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)
                         =        122.64
                Prob>chi2 =        0.0000
                (V_b-V_B is not positive definite)
```

Table AIV.9 Hausman Test for Random Effects (Model 7)

```
. hausman HAUFIXNP HAURANNP

Note: the rank of the differenced variance matrix (13) does not equal the number of coefficients being tested
      (15); be sure this is what you expect, or there may be problems computing the test.  Examine the
      output of your estimators for anything unexpected and possibly consider scaling your variables so
      that the coefficients are on a similar scale.
```

| | ——— Coefficients ——— | | | |
	(b) HAUFIXNP	(B) HAURANNP	(b-B) Difference	sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B)) S.E.
ec2r	.1217382	.1207218	.0010164	.
ec2rsq	-.0014611	-.001494	.0000328	6.93e-06
ec1r	.0847152	.0874952	-.00278	.
ec1rsq	-.0008738	-.0009261	.0000523	.
conper	.4711668	.4921889	-.0210222	.0014503
epp1r	.1824226	.1854656	-.003043	.000123
idcong	.5353088	.5493458	-.014037	.
m1r	.049642	.0631832	-.0135412	.001572
soct1r	.0263884	.0313207	-.0049323	.0010858
pk	-.0244275	-.0278194	.003392	.0017546
intpolef	.0368044	.0363252	.0004792	.
extpolef	.0630815	.0669776	-.0038961	.
a2r	.0026275	-.0010549	.0036824	.0005999
it1r	.0319427	.0270702	.0048726	.0005733
edr	-1.069662	-.9092756	-.1603862	.0478519

```
                        b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg
            B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg

    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic

             chi2(13) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)
                      =      246.40
             Prob>chi2 =      0.0000
             (V_b-V_B is not positive definite)

.
end of do-file
```

Table AIV.10 Fixed effects regression (Model 5)

```
. regress b13r   ec2r ec2rsq ec1r ec1rsq conper epp1r idcong m1r soct1r pk intpolef extpolef  a2r it1r edr enl
> p polgkSS countryID unigov fed gdpcap corruption crime   Guatemala ElSalvador Honduras Nicaragua CostaRica
> Panama Colombia Ecuador Bolivia Peru Paraguay Chile Uruguay Brazil  Venezuela Argentina DominicanR
```

Source	SS	df	MS			
Model	5847941.65	29	201653.16			
Residual	11377686.3	19351	587.963737			
Total	17225627.9	19380	888.83529			

Number of obs = 19381
F(29, 19351) = 342.97
Prob > F   = 0.0000
R-squared   = 0.3395
Adj R-squared = 0.3385
Root MSE   = 24.248

b13r	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P>|t|	[95% Conf.	Interval]
ec2r	.1143594	.025626	4.46	0.000	.0641302	.1645886
ec2rsq	-.0014005	.0002163	-6.47	0.000	-.0018245	-.0009764
ec1r	.0888686	.0214877	4.14	0.000	.0467508	.1309863
ec1rsq	-.0009157	.0002067	-4.43	0.000	-.0013208	-.0005107
conper	.4716061	.0108982	43.27	0.000	.4502446	.4929676
epp1r	.1828769	.0074011	24.71	0.000	.1683701	.1973836
idcong	.4560947	.2002209	2.28	0.023	.0636445	.8485449
m1r	.0509891	.0088233	5.78	0.000	.0336946	.0682837
soct1r	.0231994	.0086521	2.68	0.007	.0062406	.0401582
pk	-.022666	.0066879	-3.39	0.001	-.0357749	-.0095571
intpolef	.0397831	.0067833	5.86	0.000	.0264873	.053079
extpolef	.0592358	.0063712	9.30	0.000	.0467476	.071724
a2r	.0005145	.0064742	0.08	0.937	-.0121756	.0132045
it1r	.0328756	.0058779	5.59	0.000	.0213543	.0443968
edr	-1.083874	.2564227	-4.23	0.000	-1.586484	-.581263
enlp	-1.041463	.1719351	-6.06	0.000	-1.378471	-.7044553
polgkSS	(dropped)					
countryID	.0282758	.036157	0.78	0.434	-.0425951	.0991467
unigov	-8.322751	.6227908	-13.36	0.000	-9.543475	-7.102027
fed	1.588443	.6237928	2.55	0.011	.3657556	2.811131
gdpcap	.0020862	.0001587	13.15	0.000	.0017752	.0023972
corruption	-.034531	.0386417	-0.89	0.372	-.1102721	.04121
crime	-.0881805	.057213	-1.54	0.123	-.2003229	.0239619
Guatemala	2.934748	1.17338	2.50	0.012	.6348211	5.234676
ElSalvador	-2.200442	.969764	-2.27	0.023	-4.101264	-.299621
Honduras	(dropped)					
Nicaragua	-.699332	1.099539	-0.64	0.525	-2.854525	1.455861
CostaRica	-3.138926	.9468077	-3.32	0.001	-4.994751	-1.283101
Panama	(dropped)					
Colombia	4.797337	.9519222	5.04	0.000	2.931487	6.663187
Ecuador	(dropped)					
Bolivia	4.278554	1.054149	4.06	0.000	2.212332	6.344777
Peru	-2.345984	1.133958	-2.07	0.039	-4.56864	-.1233286
Paraguay	(dropped)					
Chile	(dropped)					
Uruguay	(dropped)					
Brazil	(dropped)					
Venezuela	(dropped)					
Argentina	(dropped)					
DominicanR	(dropped)					
_cons	5.297376	2.667555	1.99	0.047	.0687372	10.52601

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Table AIV.11 Fixed effects regression (Model 6)

```
. regress b13r  ec2r ec2rsq ec1r ec1rsq conper epp1r idcong m1r soct1r pk intpolef extpolef  a2r it1r edr enl
> p polgkC countryID unigov fed gdpcap corruption crime   Guatemala ElSalvador Honduras Nicaragua CostaRica P
> anama Colombia Ecuador Bolivia Peru Paraguay Chile Uruguay Brazil Venezuela Argentina DominicanR
```

Source	SS	df	MS		
Model	5847941.65	29	201653.16		
Residual	11377686.3	19351	587.963737		
Total	17225627.9	19380	888.83529		

```
Number of obs =    19381
F( 29, 19351) =   342.97
Prob > F      =   0.0000
R-squared     =   0.3395
Adj R-squared =   0.3385
Root MSE      =   24.248
```

b13r	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P>|t|	[95% Conf. Interval]	
ec2r	.1143594	.025626	4.46	0.000	.0641302	.1645886
ec2rsq	-.0014005	.0002163	-6.47	0.000	-.0018245	-.0009764
ec1r	.0888686	.0214877	4.14	0.000	.0467508	.1309863
ec1rsq	-.0009157	.0002067	-4.43	0.000	-.0013208	-.0005107
conper	.4716061	.0108982	43.27	0.000	.4502446	.4929676
epp1r	.1828769	.0074011	24.71	0.000	.1683701	.1973836
idcong	.4560947	.2002209	2.28	0.023	.0636445	.8485449
m1r	.0509891	.0088233	5.78	0.000	.0336946	.0682837
soct1r	.0231994	.0086521	2.68	0.007	.0062406	.0401582
pk	-.022666	.0066879	-3.39	0.001	-.0357749	-.0095571
intpolef	.0397831	.0067833	5.86	0.000	.0264873	.053079
extpolef	.0592358	.0063712	9.30	0.000	.0467476	.071724
a2r	.0005145	.0064742	0.08	0.937	-.0121756	.0132045
it1r	.0328756	.0058779	5.59	0.000	.0213543	.0443968
edr	-1.083874	.2564227	-4.23	0.000	-1.586484	-.581263
enlp	-.9826599	.1724695	-5.70	0.000	-1.320715	-.6446048
polgkC	-.0086411	.0135861	-0.64	0.525	-.035271	.0179888
countryID	.0329931	.0371971	0.89	0.375	-.0399164	.1059026
unigov	-8.196506	.5716425	-14.34	0.000	-9.316975	-7.076037
fed	1.602658	.6236502	2.57	0.010	.3802465	2.82507
gdpcap	.0021238	.0001387	15.31	0.000	.0018519	.0023957
corruption	-.0400414	.0407959	-0.98	0.326	-.1200048	.039922
crime	-.0688308	.0683796	-1.01	0.314	-.2028608	.0651992
Guatemala	3.168777	1.123944	2.82	0.005	.9657491	5.371806
ElSalvador	-1.665324	.9202357	-1.81	0.070	-3.469066	.1384173
Honduras	(dropped)					
Nicaragua	(dropped)					
CostaRica	-3.250964	.9985266	-3.26	0.001	-5.208162	-1.293765
Panama	(dropped)					
Colombia	4.999367	.9239179	5.41	0.000	3.188408	6.810326
Ecuador	(dropped)					
Bolivia	4.816553	1.037548	4.64	0.000	2.782868	6.850237
Peru	-2.384306	1.154345	-2.07	0.039	-4.646921	-.1216907
Paraguay	(dropped)					
Chile	(dropped)					
Uruguay	(dropped)					
Brazil	(dropped)					
Venezuela	(dropped)					
Argentina	(dropped)					
DominicanR	(dropped)					
_cons	4.791343	2.601622	1.84	0.066	-.3080618	9.890747

```
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```

Table AIV.12 Fixed effects regression (Model 7)

```
. **Fixed effects Model 7 . without polarization
. regress b13r  ec2r ec2rsq ec1r ec1rsq conper epp1r idcong m1r soct1r pk intpolef extpolef  a2r it1r edr enl
> p countryID unigov fed gdpcap corruption crime   Guatemala ElSalvador Honduras Nicaragua CostaRica Panama C
> olombia Ecuador Bolivia Peru Paraguay Chile Uruguay Brazil Venezuela Argentina DominicanR
```

Source	SS	df	MS		
Model	6948364.46	32	217136.389		
Residual	12947264.4	22015	588.111036		
Total	19895628.9	22047	902.418874		

Number of obs = 22048
F(32, 22015) = 369.21
Prob > F = 0.0000
R-squared = 0.3492
Adj R-squared = 0.3483
Root MSE = 24.251

b13r	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P>|t|	[95% Conf. Interval]	
ec2r	.1217382	.0238583	5.10	0.000	.0749743	.1685021
ec2rsq	-.0014611	.0002018	-7.24	0.000	-.0018567	-.0010656
ec1r	.0847152	.0198967	4.26	0.000	.0457163	.1237141
ec1rsq	-.0008738	.0001926	-4.54	0.000	-.0012513	-.0004962
conper	.4711668	.0102135	46.13	0.000	.4511475	.491186
epp1r	.1824226	.0069152	26.38	0.000	.1688682	.195977
idcong	.5353088	.1830745	2.92	0.003	.1764697	.8941479
m1r	.049642	.0082378	6.03	0.000	.0334954	.0657886
soct1r	.0263884	.0081102	3.25	0.001	.0104919	.0422849
pk	-.0244275	.0063193	-3.87	0.000	-.0368138	-.0120411
intpolef	.0368044	.0062622	5.88	0.000	.0245301	.0490787
extpolef	.0630815	.0059661	10.57	0.000	.0513875	.0747755
a2r	.0026275	.0060741	0.43	0.665	-.0092781	.0145331
it1r	.0319427	.0055685	5.74	0.000	.021028	.0428574
edr	-1.069662	.239696	-4.46	0.000	-1.539483	-.5998404
enlp	-1.598613	.1911342	-8.36	0.000	-1.97325	-1.223976
countryID	.1500636	.0227735	6.59	0.000	.105426	.1947012
unigov	-12.2924	.8052056	-15.27	0.000	-13.87066	-10.71414
fed	1.066519	.6619657	1.61	0.107	-.2309816	2.364019
gdpcap	.0008496	.0002	4.25	0.000	.0004575	.0012417
corruption	-.0966619	.0351041	-2.75	0.006	-.1654685	-.0278552
crime	-.0653974	.0604991	-1.08	0.280	-.1839801	.0531853
Guatemala	-1.324502	1.304625	-1.02	0.310	-3.881661	1.232658
ElSalvador	-10.14292	1.302744	-7.79	0.000	-12.69639	-7.589444
Honduras	-10.30366	1.466858	-7.02	0.000	-13.17881	-7.428511
Nicaragua	-10.05306	1.442956	-6.97	0.000	-12.88136	-7.224764
CostaRica	-6.255312	1.043671	-5.99	0.000	-8.300982	-4.209643
Panama	(dropped)					
Colombia	.6849186	.9738844	0.70	0.482	-1.223965	2.593802
Ecuador	(dropped)					
Bolivia	-2.795088	1.511573	-1.85	0.064	-5.757878	.1677029
Peru	-6.23	1.345542	-4.63	0.000	-8.867359	-3.592641
Paraguay	-16.84279	1.475083	-11.42	0.000	-19.73406	-13.95152
Chile	(dropped)					
Uruguay	-.4031285	1.121446	-0.36	0.719	-2.601244	1.794987
Brazil	(dropped)					
Venezuela	(dropped)					
Argentina	(dropped)					
DominicanR	(dropped)					
_cons	13.03651	2.574124	5.06	0.000	7.991046	18.08198

```
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```

Table AIV.13 Fixed effects regression with Robust standard errors (Model 6)

```
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. regress b13r  ec2r ec2rsq ec1r ec1rsq conper epp1r idcong m1r soct1r pk intpolef extpolef  a2r it1r edr enl
> p polgkC countryID unigov fed gdpcap corruption crime   Guatemala ElSalvador Honduras Nicaragua CostaRica P
> anama Colombia Ecuador Bolivia Peru Paraguay Chile Uruguay Brazil Venezuela Argentina DominicanR, vce(robus
> t)
```

Linear regression

					Number of obs	=	**19381**
					F(29, 19351)	=	**393.02**
					Prob > F	=	**0.0000**
					R-squared	=	**0.3395**
					Root MSE	=	**24.248**

b13r	Coef.	Robust Std. Err.	t	P>|t|	[95% Conf. Interval]	
ec2r	.1143594	.0272848	4.19	0.000	.0608788	.16784
ec2rsq	-.0014005	.0002273	-6.16	0.000	-.001846	-.0009549
ec1r	.0888686	.0230709	3.85	0.000	.0436476	.1340896
ec1rsq	-.0009157	.0002209	-4.15	0.000	-.0013488	-.0004827
conper	.4716061	.0119934	39.32	0.000	.4480979	.4951143
epp1r	.1828769	.0086471	21.15	0.000	.1659279	.1998259
idcong	.4560947	.1984377	2.30	0.022	.0671397	.8450498
m1r	.0509891	.0093716	5.44	0.000	.03262	.0693583
soct1r	.0231994	.0090059	2.58	0.010	.005547	.0408518
pk	-.022666	.0068637	-3.30	0.001	-.0361193	-.0092126
intpolef	.0397831	.0073827	5.39	0.000	.0253123	.0542539
extpolef	.0592358	.0070428	8.41	0.000	.0454313	.0730403
a2r	.0005145	.0067193	0.08	0.939	-.0126559	.0136848
it1r	.0328756	.0061393	5.35	0.000	.0208419	.0449092
edr	-1.083874	.2593563	-4.18	0.000	-1.592234	-.575513
enlp	-.9826599	.1758078	-5.59	0.000	-1.327258	-.6380615
polgkC	-.0086411	.0142644	-0.61	0.545	-.0366006	.0193185
countryID	.0329931	.035806	0.92	0.357	-.0371897	.1031759
unigov	-8.196506	.5618842	-14.59	0.000	-9.297848	-7.095164
fed	1.602658	.5948665	2.69	0.007	.4366682	2.768648
gdpcap	.0021238	.0001373	15.47	0.000	.0018547	.002393
corruption	-.0400414	.0403751	-0.99	0.321	-.11918	.0390972
crime	-.0688308	.0668136	-1.03	0.303	-.1997912	.0621297
Guatemala	3.168777	1.161438	2.73	0.006	.892258	5.445297
ElSalvador	-1.665324	1.019041	-1.63	0.102	-3.662734	.3320849
Honduras	(dropped)					
Nicaragua	(dropped)					
CostaRica	-3.250964	1.018802	-3.19	0.001	-5.247904	-1.254023
Panama	(dropped)					
Colombia	4.999367	.9654359	5.18	0.000	3.107029	6.891705
Ecuador	(dropped)					
Bolivia	4.816553	1.107033	4.35	0.000	2.646672	6.986433
Peru	-2.384306	1.100734	-2.17	0.030	-4.541841	-.2267714
Paraguay	(dropped)					
Chile	(dropped)					
Uruguay	(dropped)					
Brazil	(dropped)					
Venezuela	(dropped)					
Argentina	(dropped)					
DominicanR	(dropped)					
_cons	4.791343	2.562864	1.87	0.062	-.2320923	9.814778

Table AIV.14 Fixed effects regression with Robust standard errors (Model 7)

```
. **Fixed effects - Model 7 with robust STD ERR
. regress b13r  ec2r ec2rsq ec1r ec1rsq conper epp1r idcong m1r soct1r pk intpolef extpolef  a2r it1r edr enl
> p  countryID unigov fed gdpcap corruption crime    Guatemala ElSalvador Honduras Nicaragua CostaRica Panama
> Colombia Ecuador Bolivia Peru Paraguay Chile Uruguay Brazil Venezuela Argentina DominicanR, vce(robust)
```

```
Linear regression                                   Number of obs =     22048
                                                    F( 32, 22015) =    424.06
                                                    Prob > F      =    0.0000
                                                    R-squared     =    0.3492
                                                    Root MSE      =    24.251
```

b13r	Coef.	Robust Std. Err.	t	P>|t|	[95% Conf. Interval]	
ec2r	.1217382	.025166	4.84	0.000	.072411	.1710654
ec2rsq	-.0014611	.0002106	-6.94	0.000	-.0018739	-.0010483
ec1r	.0847152	.0213384	3.97	0.000	.0428904	.12654
ec1rsq	-.0008738	.0002062	-4.24	0.000	-.0012779	-.0004696
conper	.4711668	.0112953	41.71	0.000	.4490272	.4933063
epp1r	.1824226	.0081117	22.49	0.000	.1665231	.1983221
idcong	.5353088	.1834813	2.92	0.004	.1756723	.8949453
m1r	.049642	.0087987	5.64	0.000	.0323959	.0668881
soct1r	.0263884	.0084447	3.12	0.002	.0098362	.0429406
pk	-.0244275	.0064837	-3.77	0.000	-.0371361	-.0117189
intpolef	.0368044	.0068231	5.39	0.000	.0234306	.0501782
extpolef	.0630815	.0066608	9.47	0.000	.0500259	.0761371
a2r	.0026275	.0063167	0.42	0.677	-.0097537	.0150088
it1r	.0319427	.005829	5.48	0.000	.0205175	.0433679
edr	-1.069662	.2421354	-4.42	0.000	-1.544264	-.595059
enlp	-1.598613	.1858999	-8.60	0.000	-1.96299	-1.234236
countryID	.1500636	.0243728	6.16	0.000	.1022913	.197836
unigov	-12.2924	.780116	-15.76	0.000	-13.82148	-10.76332
fed	1.066519	.6386033	1.67	0.095	-.1851898	2.318227
gdpcap	.0008496	.0001864	4.56	0.000	.0004843	.0012149
corruption	-.0966619	.0342328	-2.82	0.005	-.1637606	-.0295632
crime	-.0653974	.0582956	-1.12	0.262	-.1796609	.0488661
Guatemala	-1.324502	1.308013	-1.01	0.311	-3.888301	1.239298
ElSalvador	-10.14292	1.289338	-7.87	0.000	-12.67011	-7.615722
Honduras	-10.30366	1.381439	-7.46	0.000	-13.01138	-7.595939
Nicaragua	-10.05306	1.489301	-6.75	0.000	-12.9722	-7.133925
CostaRica	-6.255312	1.076625	-5.81	0.000	-8.365575	-4.14505
Panama	(dropped)					
Colombia	.6849186	.9886053	0.69	0.488	-1.252819	2.622656
Ecuador	(dropped)					
Bolivia	-2.795088	1.485725	-1.88	0.060	-5.707215	.1170397
Peru	-6.23	1.302371	-4.78	0.000	-8.78274	-3.67726
Paraguay	-16.84279	1.465542	-11.49	0.000	-19.71536	-13.97022
Chile	(dropped)					
Uruguay	-.4031285	1.108152	-0.36	0.716	-2.575185	1.768928
Brazil	(dropped)					
Venezuela	(dropped)					
Argentina	(dropped)					
DominicanR	(dropped)					
_cons	13.03651	2.471463	5.27	0.000	8.192268	17.88076

```
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Table AIV.15 Fixed effects regression with Robust standard errors (Model 7: Ecuador considered non unified government)

```
. regress b13r  ec2r ec2rsq ec1r ec1rsq conper epp1r idcong m1r soct1r pk intpolef extpolef  a2r it1r edr enl
> p polgkC countryID unigovsE fed gdpcap corruption crime   Guatemala ElSalvador Honduras Nicaragua CostaRica
>  Panama Colombia Ecuador Bolivia Peru Paraguay Chile Uruguay Brazil Venezuela Argentina DominicanR, vce(rob
> ust)
```

Linear regression

```
                                          Number of obs =    19381
                                          F( 29, 19351) =   393.02
                                          Prob > F      =   0.0000
                                          R-squared     =   0.3395
                                          Root MSE      =   24.248
```

b13r	Coef.	Robust Std. Err.	t	P>|t|	[95% Conf. Interval]	
ec2r	.1143594	.0272848	4.19	0.000	.0608788	.16784
ec2rsq	-.0014005	.0002273	-6.16	0.000	-.001846	-.0009549
ec1r	.0888686	.0230709	3.85	0.000	.0436476	.1340896
ec1rsq	-.0009157	.0002209	-4.15	0.000	-.0013488	-.0004827
conper	.4716061	.0119934	39.32	0.000	.4480979	.4951143
epp1r	.1828769	.0086471	21.15	0.000	.1659279	.1998259
idcong	.4560947	.1984377	2.30	0.022	.0671397	.8450498
m1r	.0509891	.0093716	5.44	0.000	.03262	.0693583
soct1r	.0231994	.0090059	2.58	0.010	.005547	.0408518
pk	-.022666	.0068637	-3.30	0.001	-.0361193	-.0092126
intpolef	.0397831	.0073827	5.39	0.000	.0253123	.0542539
extpolef	.0592358	.0070428	8.41	0.000	.0454313	.0730403
a2r	.0005145	.0067193	0.08	0.939	-.0126559	.0136848
it1r	.0328756	.0061393	5.35	0.000	.0208419	.0449092
edr	-1.083874	.2593563	-4.18	0.000	-1.592234	-.575513
enlp	-.064921	.1585513	-0.41	0.682	-.3756954	.2458534
polgkC	-.0128629	.0134282	-0.96	0.338	-.0391833	.0134576
countryID	.2401265	.0348289	6.89	0.000	.1718589	.3083941
unigovsE	(dropped)					
fed	4.306581	.6726457	6.40	0.000	2.988137	5.625025
gdpcap	.0009714	.0001563	6.21	0.000	.000665	.0012779
corruption	.2965746	.0431271	6.88	0.000	.2120418	.3811075
crime	-.1198171	.0591822	-2.02	0.043	-.2358193	-.0038149
Guatemala	6.335844	1.157267	5.47	0.000	4.0675	8.604189
ElSalvador	.5219772	.9899768	0.53	0.598	-1.418463	2.462417
Honduras	(dropped)					
Nicaragua	(dropped)					
CostaRica	2.534918	.9493229	2.67	0.008	.6741629	4.395673
Panama	(dropped)					
Colombia	8.17325	1.027372	7.96	0.000	6.159511	10.18699
Ecuador	-8.135528	.8221951	-9.89	0.000	-9.747102	-6.523955
Bolivia	3.395807	1.12268	3.02	0.002	1.195258	5.596357
Peru	(dropped)					
Paraguay	(dropped)					
Chile	9.257795	1.054426	8.78	0.000	7.191028	11.32456
Uruguay	(dropped)					
Brazil	(dropped)					
Venezuela	(dropped)					
Argentina	(dropped)					
DominicanR	(dropped)					
_cons	-9.798469	2.352314	-4.17	0.000	-14.40921	-5.18773

Table AV.1 Comparison of mean levels of trust across attitudes of respect for the law

Two-sample t test with equal variances

Group	Obs	Mean	Std. Err.	Std. Dev.	[95% Conf. Interval]	
Can act	11446	39.59316	.2797767	29.93218	39.04475	40.14157
Always r	16048	42.77584	.2397462	30.37121	42.30591	43.24577
combined	27494	41.45086	.1823101	30.22941	41.09352	41.8082
diff		-3.182677	.3693461		-3.906614	-2.45874

```
    diff = mean(Can act) - mean(Always r)                    t =  -8.6171
Ho: diff = 0                                degrees of freedom =    27492

   Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                    Ha: diff > 0
Pr(T < t) = 0.0000        Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0000          Pr(T > t) = 1.0000
```

Table AV.2 Random effects logistic regression on preference for authorities to always respect the law when attempting to apprehend criminals

```
. xtlogit aoj8r b13r vic1d pk intpolef extpolef it1r q2 female edr , i(pais)

Fitting comparison model:

Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -17252.938
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -17122.711
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -17122.652

Fitting full model:

tau = 0.0      log likelihood = -17122.652
tau = 0.1      log likelihood = -16912.552
tau = 0.2      log likelihood = -16938.875

Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -16911.371
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -16909.347
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -16909.345
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -16909.345
```

```
Random-effects logistic regression        Number of obs     =      25388
Group variable: pais                       Number of groups  =         18

Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian              Obs per group: min =       1048
                                                          avg =     1410.4
                                                          max =       2748

                                           Wald chi2(9)      =     236.46
Log likelihood  = -16909.345               Prob > chi2       =     0.0000
```

aoj8r	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P>|z|	[95% Conf.	Interval]
b13r	.00214	.000473	4.52	0.000	.001213	.003067
vic1d	-.0024278	.0003319	-7.32	0.000	-.0030782	-.0017773
pk	-.0006632	.0005033	-1.32	0.188	-.0016496	.0003233
intpolef	.0005714	.000486	1.18	0.240	-.0003811	.001524
extpolef	.0004786	.0004477	1.07	0.285	-.0003988	.0013561
it1r	.002865	.0004412	6.49	0.000	.0020002	.0037298
q2	.0064411	.0008996	7.16	0.000	.0046779	.0082043
female	.0402719	.0266778	1.51	0.131	-.0120155	.0925594
edr	-.0313223	.0201086	-1.56	0.119	-.0707344	.0080899
_cons	-.0847941	.0993552	-0.85	0.393	-.2795267	.1099384
/lnsig2u	-2.380416	.346178			-3.058912	-1.701919
sigma_u	.304158	.0526464			.2166535	.427005
rho	.0273512	.0092094			.014067	.0525123

```
Likelihood-ratio test of rho=0:  chibar2(01) =   426.61 Prob >= chibar2 = 0.000
```

Table AV.3 Random effects linear regression on support for democracy

```
Mixed-effects REML regression              Number of obs     =        25013
Group variable: pais                       Number of groups  =           18

                                           Obs per group: min =          992
                                                          avg =       1389.6
                                                          max =         2735

                                           Wald chi2(9)      =      1961.06
Log restricted-likelihood = -117541.93     Prob > chi2       =       0.0000
```

ing4r	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P>|z|	[95% Conf. Interval]	
b13r	.0292851	.006237	4.70	0.000	.0170608	.0415094
m1r	.0712565	.0076719	9.29	0.000	.0562197	.0862932
pk	.0530197	.0065271	8.12	0.000	.0402268	.0658126
intpolef	.2034658	.0063282	32.15	0.000	.1910628	.2158688
extpolef	-.0166803	.0059467	-2.80	0.005	-.0283357	-.0050249
it1r	.0653495	.0057372	11.39	0.000	.0541048	.0765942
q2	.1151158	.0115895	9.93	0.000	.0924009	.1378307
female	.5736274	.3462248	1.66	0.098	-.1049609	1.252216
edr	.9778948	.2600088	3.76	0.000	.4682869	1.487503
_cons	42.94553	1.911508	22.47	0.000	39.19904	46.69202

Random-effects Parameters	Estimate	Std. Err.	[95% Conf. Interval]	
pais: Identity				
sd(_cons)	7.052096	1.224234	5.018233	9.910273
sd(Residual)	26.51584	.1186157	26.28437	26.74934

```
LR test vs. linear regression: chibar2(01) = 1321.65 Prob >= chibar2 = 0.0000
```

Figure AIII.1. Trust in legislature by levels of perceived excessive congressional debate, scatterplot with linear and quadratic fits

Figure AIII.2. Trust in legislature by levels of perceived excessive congressional counterbalance, scatterplot with linear and quadratic fits

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