

THE TORTURE QUESTION: THE ROLE OF RELIGION AND PSYCHOLOGY
IN PUBLIC OPINION OF TORTURE

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

THE TORTURE QUESTION

“Can torture be justified against suspected terrorists to gain key information?”

More than thirty-two thousand people nationwide were asked a variation of this question between 2001 and 2011. Most gave their answers over the telephone, some answered online. All gave their answer anonymously, most likely from their place of residence on a weekday evening after working hours. As landline numbers are used more frequently than mobile numbers, many of these respondents would have been sitting in their own living room, or standing in the kitchen when asked to weigh in on the government’s use of torture against prisoner detainees. One imagines a variety of respondents: some parents just home from driving the carpool, phone pinched in their neck, pulling dinner ingredients out of the freezer while they talk; some unemployed people, all-to-happy to take a break from the soul-crushing rejection of the job-search in order to answer a few survey questions for the public good; some young professionals who were eating dinner alone anyway and take the interruption in stride; some elderly folks who don’t mind missing an episode of their favorite show to help out the social scientific cause; maybe a few people who are laid up with some ailment or a newborn infant and welcome the chance to reconnect with the outside world. But none of the respondents is likely to have been in any immediate danger of attack – terrorist or otherwise. Very few of them are likely to be sadists or psychopaths, and most of them

(over 80%, in fact) consider themselves Christians. Yet based on this survey measure, approximately one-half of U.S. adults, presumably under no direct or immediate threat, think that using torture to extract information is “sometimes” or “often” justified; only about one-quarter of U.S. adults think that torture is “never” justified.

Christians, moreover, have tended to be more permissive of torture than members of other faith traditions, the religiously unaffiliated, and the nation as a whole. Despite the higher proportion of torture support among Christians, however, it is not immediately clear what role religious values, beliefs, and practices play in shaping moral attitudes towards torture. A 2007 analysis of torture opinion found that religious affiliation and church attendance have a modest influence on torture opinion, with more frequent church attendance associated with more restrictive views towards torture (Green 2007). A web graphic published by The Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life (Pew Forum) in April 2009 showed white evangelical Protestants to be the religious group with the most permissive views of torture, holding considerably more permissive views (+13%) than the population as a whole. This web graphic generated so much attention that a follow up article was published shortly after, in May 2009, to reiterate that political ideology and party identification are far more significant determinants of torture opinion, and that the source of differences in torture opinion across religious denominations is far from clear (Pew Forum 2009a, 2009b). So, *what is the role of religion in public opinion of torture?* This is a project within the broader study of Religion, Psychology, and Culture that attempts to understand the relationship between

religion and torture opinion through secondary analysis and interpretation of quantitative social research.

WHY TORTURE OPINION MATTERS

In this project I use public opinion of torture as a case study to explore how religion, psychology, and culture shape attitudes towards issues of national security, which in turn have great consequences for war and peace. Public opinion affects public policy, and it likewise reflects and shapes the culture in which we live (Hetherington 2005, 39). On the socio-political level, the public's acceptance of torture has the direct effect of lessening political will for investigating and prosecuting those throughout the chain of command who have sponsored its systematic use as a weapon of war. Torture support is further allied with the preference for using military force rather than diplomacy internationally, with support for the death penalty domestically, and on the familial level is correlated with the use of corporal punishment (Richards and Anderson 2007). Understanding torture support may thus lead to greater understanding of support for other forms of violent interventions, and may teach us something about the nature of Christians' complicity in collective violence more broadly.

Certainly national opinion polls are not the only evidence to suggest that torture is being seen in a more favorable light. Director of the Primetime Torture Project, David Danzig has noted two significant changes in the representation of torture in popular entertainment since 2001: (1) an increase in frequency and (2) a change in the narrative (Danzig 2007; 2012). The number of scenes depicting torture on primetime network television increased from an average of *four* scenes per year between 1999 and 2001, to

an average of 120 scenes per year post 9/11, including 228 scenes in 2003 alone (Danzig 2012; Parents Television Council 2005). The narrative surrounding torture has also changed dramatically, as Danzig observed in a 2007 radio interview: “It used to be the bad guys were the ones who tortured, the Nazis or aliens or something like that, and torture never worked. But now it’s people like Jack Bauer. It’s the heroes of these shows—Sidney on *Alias*—and it always works for these people” (Danzig 2007). These media representations have influenced interrogation practices in the war on terror, and have become symbolic for many high-level conservative republicans of the “dark side” of the war on terror — of the distasteful work that is no less essential and heroic for being dirty and covert (Erickson 2009; Sands 2008). Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia has even relied on the television program *24* to defend the government’s use of torture: “Jack Bauer saved Los Angeles . . . He saved hundreds of thousands of lives. Are you going to convict Jack Bauer?” (Erickson 2009, 7). Set against this cultural backdrop of torturing heroes, opinion polls reflecting such widespread acceptance of torture warrant serious consideration, and should not be dismissed out of hand as a mere contrivance of manipulative wording. To a significant degree, the wording used by polling surveys is an extension of the larger public discourse, and consistent with the ways government officials and the news media have framed the torture debate.

WHY FOCUS ON TORTURE OPINION IN PARTICULAR?

I have chosen to focus on torture opinion because the emergence of a public debate about the permissibility of torture in the war on terror surprised and angered me. I also found torture opinion to be a useful way to circumscribe the broader topic of

Christian complicity in collective violence. Unlike other forms of collective violence such as war, leaders and representatives from the world's major religious traditions have been outspoken, unequivocal, and (as far as I'm aware) unanimous in their rejection of torture. Religious leaders across faiths and denominations have interpreted public support for torture primarily as a moral issue and responded via moral exhortation, for example by issuing a joint statement under the auspices of the National Religious Campaign Against Torture (NRCAT) titled "Torture is a Moral Issue" in 2006. The U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops (USCCB) created a Catholic Study Guide by the same title in 2008. For the purpose of analysis, this unanimity simplifies things. No doubt the message has varied across different religious communities, both in content and frequency, but it is doubtful that many sermons expressed explicit support for torture in the decade following 9/11. It is therefore safer to presume religious proscription of torture than other violent interventions such as war, about which religious leaders' opinions tend to be more varied. This adds an element of control when investigating the already complex and ambiguous relationship between religion and collective violence.

WHY USE PUBLIC OPINION POLLS?

Relying upon survey data to understand the role of religion in public opinion of torture has limitations and drawbacks. Quantitative research is necessarily limited by its emphasis on what is most measurable, rather than what is most relevant or meaningful (Brink 1995). This is evident with respect to the available religion-related variables, which tend to be limited to questions of religious affiliation and frequency of church attendance. While these variables tell us something about religious identity and level of

engagement in a faith community, they are poor proxies for understanding different ways of being religious or feelings of belonging, and convey nothing of the content of messages conveyed in church services or of the values which are most prominent within a particular congregation. These dimensions are undoubtedly important in formulating a thorough understanding of the role of religion in torture opinion. Not only do the available surveys lack the more sophisticated measures developed in the psychology of religion (such as scales for Intrinsic, Extrinsic, and Quest orientations, religious fundamentalism, or Christian orthodoxy), surveys may not be the most appropriate means for collecting these other aspects of religiousness. Those might be better assessed using ethnographic research methods. Secondary analysis of opinion data is necessarily limited in what it can tell us about public opinion of torture and religion's role in it. A more robust portrait would require not only a follow-up study designed to test the interpretations proposed here, but these quantitative methods should be supplemented by qualitative approaches that explore torture opinion and its underlying rationales. We would also benefit from a discourse analysis of media coverage and of the manner and extent to which U.S. torture was discussed in faith communities. However, these other sources and methods are beyond the scope of the present study. I present a compelling interpretation of the available survey data and invite both further quantitative study capable of directly testing its veracity and further qualitative study capable of grounding torture opinion in narratives and lived experience. My research question emerged out of a particular human text – namely, survey studies assessing

attitudes towards torture – and so it is with the analysis of this text that my research begins, despite the limitations it imposes upon understanding the role of religion.

Of course, utilizing survey data as a primary text also has advantages. National public opinion polls afford a macro view of attitudes towards one of the moral problems of our day. They allow us to see trends and identify correlations that go beyond what an individual would likely self-report or be aware of. Unlike qualitative approaches that might focus on explicit and implicit rationales, this approach allows idiosyncratic details to fade into the background. It accepts the oversimplification of the torture debate into a multiple-choice question as an opportunity to understand public opinion from a different, less direct angle. This project presumes that a thorough analysis of public opinion data on torture can reveal psycho-cultural factors on the large-group and unconscious levels of human experience that are different from what could be revealed via qualitative research on the moral reasoning of individuals and small groups. In this way, this research project complements and contributes to future qualitative research undertaken on the subject of Christians' justifications of violent versus nonviolent methods for resolving conflict in various spheres of life.

Looking at public opinion of torture is also a way of looking at the “normal” rather than the extremes of human experience. This is not a study of either perpetrators or victims. It is not focused on psychopathology, or obedient soldiers following directives in horrible situations. Rather, this project is aimed towards understanding how the majority of people who, knowing that their government is using torture, are willing to accept this as justified. This is an examination of the many, the bystanders, the

complicit. In Christian narrative terms, it is in some ways an exploration of the nameless crowd that stood by as Jesus was crucified, and that continues to accept the torture of middle-eastern men 2000 years later. This project contributes to the post-9/11 literature on the intersections of religion and collective violence by approaching the subject from a perspective that focuses on moral psychology within the religious mainstream rather than among religious extremists. A review of the literature over the last ten years reveals that religious and social scientific studies on the relationship of religion and violence have focused primarily on the subjects of religious extremism and fundamentalism. My work differs from these in its focus on the center rather than the fringes of political and religious life, and in its driving concern with moral decision-making as part of the broader peacebuilding struggle.

METHODS

This is a project within the field of Religion, Psychology, and Culture, which itself is part of the broader academic study of religion, and encompasses both the study of *psychology and religion* and *psychology of religion*. While the psychological study of religion has mostly developed through the work of psychologists and psychoanalysts, theologians and scholars of religion have been the main protagonists in developing the study of *psychology and religion*. *Psychology and religion* is thus in part distinguishable from *psychology of religion* in its inspiration and ultimate aim, tending to be religiously inspired and engaging psychology as a means of furthering some theological goal rather than as a tool for understanding religion itself (Belzen 201, 6-7).

In contrast to psychology *of* religion, which tends to focus more narrowly on issues of individual religiosity, drawing upon mainstream theories of social and personality psychology, and utilizing empirical methods, psychology *and* religion tends to take up broad theoretical issues and psychological theories in general, typically drawing upon psychoanalytic theories and a hermeneutical philosophy of science to interpret cultural phenomena (Belzen 2010, 6). Whereas the empirical approaches typical of psychology *of* religion tend to focus on verifiability, usually relying on quantitative data and seeking to predict and control, the hermeneutical approaches more typical of psychology *and* religion tend to focus on meaning, usually relying upon qualitative data and ultimately seeking deeper understanding (Belzen 2010, 74, 76). Rooted in the hermeneutic philosophy of Hans-Georg Gadamer, a hermeneutic philosophy of science fundamentally sees all knowledge as a socially and historically situated dialogue that ultimately aims to understand, not just objectively explain and describe (Browning 2000). Gadamer conceptualized hermeneutics as dialogue, critiquing the claims to empiricism of modern human sciences and maintaining that genuine understanding (knowledge) proceeds through conversation rather than objectivism. Psychology *and* religion may thus also be described as a *hermeneutic social science*, invoking an older understanding of social science with more permeable boundaries between itself and philosophy (Bellah et al. 2008, 297-298).

This project falls more within the religion *and* psychology branch of RPC than psychology *of* religion because it is inspired by the theological aim of resisting Christian complicity in collective violence and utilizes a hermeneutical approach to social science.

However, I diverge from traditional works of religion *and* psychology by drawing upon political and cultural rather than psychoanalytic psychologies for my interpretation, and in the quantitative aspects of my method which are more typical in the psychology *of* religion. My use of quantitative data and analysis departs from the qualitative social research methods commonly used in hermeneutical approaches, and my efforts to verify some of the claims I make using statistical measures is consistent with empirical approaches commonly employed within the psychology *of* religion. Furthermore, while my interpretation contains some hypotheses yet to be tested, many of these untested hypotheses can be operationalized into future quantitative social research and thereby verified or falsified. However, while my own project adopts some elements of empirical-analytical approaches, it is more consistent with hermeneutical approaches in the sense that my focus is more on meaning than verifiability, and that my ultimate aim is to understand more than predict and control.

This research project uses three different types of sources: factual, inferential, and interpretative. Responses to the torture question on public opinion surveys constitute the directly observable and quantifiable *facts*. I also draw on related empirical studies in political psychology, moral psychology, and psychology of religion in order to infer more information about the facts via triangulation. And finally, political and cultural psychologies are used as *interpretative* discourses for achieving greater understanding of the situation as a whole. This paper moves from the empirical, quantitative description of observable correlations, towards the hermeneutical inference of possible meaning.

I borrow from the dialogue between theology and psychology the methodological moment of beginning with a “thick description” of the lived human situation, which pastoral theologians have appropriated from Clifford Geertz. Unlike most pastoral theological studies, however, I rely on national public surveys as my human text and use quantitative analysis to develop a thick description of the lived situation rather than the more typical qualitative analysis of ethnographic sources. Consisting of mostly nominal and ordinal variables, the surveys I utilize generate mostly categorical data, and these are analyzed using primarily descriptive statistics rather than the inferential statistics more commonly used in empirical social scientific work.

The results of this analysis are interpreted using political and cultural psychologies and I incorporate additional quantitative studies to support such interpretations. But this study is not an empirical investigation since not all of my interpretations can be verified through statistical analysis without further study. The validity of my interpretation is limited by the variables available for analysis. As I did not design the surveys and they weren’t necessarily intended to answer my particular research question, I do not always have the necessary variables for testing my hypotheses. In these situations, I draw on other studies which have found strong correlations between the phenomenon I *can* measure, such as political conservatism, and phenomena I can’t measure directly, such as authoritarianism, social dominance orientation, and Christian orthodoxy. Here my interpretation is inferred via these pre-established correlations.

My interpretation ultimately takes advantage of the creative license afforded by a hermeneutical approach, sometimes reaching beyond what is immediately testable within existing data and relying upon cumulative validation or triangulation that combines my interpretation of results with those from other studies (Belzen 2010, 79). The reliability of my interpretation is assessed not in terms of achieving certainty, but rather in the subjective judgment that mine is a useful interpretation of the available data for facilitating a deeper understanding of and engagement with the problem of public acceptance of torture.

CHAPTER OVERVIEW

In this project I use torture opinion as a case study to understand the role of religion in complicity with collective violence. I use quantitative analysis of torture opinion data and sources from the psychological study of politics, morality, and religion to interpret findings. The task of chapter one is descriptive, while the task of subsequent chapters is interpretative.

CHAPTER I: A DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS OF TORTURE OPINION

Chapter one contains two parts. In the first, I perform a meta-analysis of public opinion data pertaining to torture. This serves as a sort of quantitative literature review exploring the torture debate and the rise of the torture question. In the second part, I perform secondary analysis of national survey data from Pew Research Center for the People and the Press and American National Election Studies, using descriptive statistics

to make comparisons in torture acceptance between groups and over time. I look at the magnitude of difference to determine which variables have the greatest effect on torture opinion, and which groups are most and least torture supportive. Correlation is not causation, and when I say that x has y effect, I am referring to the independent variable's effect on the dependent variables, more than the actual phenomena that such variables are attempting to represent. The variables available for studying religion are especially limited in their ability to capture fully this complex phenomenon, but they do show us that something is happening which merits further attention and suggests directions for future research.

My question is: "What is the role of religion in torture opinion?" The analyses of chapter one yield two main findings. First, the role of religion is subordinate to that of political orientation; political party and ideology are the most significant determinants of torture opinion, with greater torture *support* associated with more conservative and/or republican political orientations (abbreviated as Consv/Rep) and greater torture *opposition* associated with more liberal and/or democratic political orientations (abbreviated as Lib/Dem). Over time, torture support increased among all political groups in 2009, but the increase was more pronounced among Lib/Dems than Consv/Reps. Second, the role of religion in torture opinion seems to be mediated through political orientation and race, with Christian religiousness *increasing* torture support among white Lib/Dems and *decreasing* torture support among Consv/Reps and Blacks. In subsequent chapters I interpret these two central findings.

CHAPTERS II & III: INTERPRETING PUBLIC OPINION OF TORTURE

Chapter two is primarily concerned with the first of these findings. In it, I attempt to understand the role of political orientation in torture opinion. Chapter three is primarily concerned with the second finding. In it, I attempt to understand the interaction of political orientation with religion in torture opinion. My interpretations of these data draw on various theories from the social sciences. In order to stay close to the data, I begin with theories based on similar sources – namely, national opinion surveys. Because the main variables under scrutiny are political ideology and party identification, I primarily draw on contemporary scholarship in political psychology to understand what these mean in the context of national surveys (chapter two). I subsequently connect these political psychologies to cultural psychologies of morality and religion to understand how political orientation interacts with these in shaping public opinion of torture (chapter three).

CHAPTER II: INTERPRETING TORTURE OPINION THROUGH THE LENS OF POLITICAL PSYCHOLOGY & AUTHORITARIANISM

SOURCES

Chapter two opens with a brief discussion about the nature and origins of public opinion and my effort to situate public opinion within the broader framework of ethical reflection and decision-making. The primary focus of chapter two is on the meaning of political orientations. I draw heavily on the field of political psychology and the theoretical construct of authoritarianism for understanding.

Political psychology combines aspects of political science and psychology in order to understand the attitudes and behavior of political groups from a psychological

perspective. Its practitioners see the mind of the *political being* as a composite of personality, values, identity, attitudes, emotions, and cognition, and conceive of political behavior as the product of a political being in dynamic relationship with political in-groups (“us”) and political out-groups (“them”) (Cottam et al. 2010). I draw upon the political psychological understanding of conservative versus liberal political orientations and their overlap with authoritarian and nonauthoritarian tendencies.

In addition to being studied as a leadership or organizational style, authoritarianism has been studied from a psychological perspective. Some have viewed it as a personality type or dimension; some as a constellation of co-occurring attitudes and behaviors; some as a psychological dynamic; and others as a motivated social cognition or world view. The precise nature and origins of authoritarianism are still debated, but there is general agreement (or at least considerable overlap) about its characteristics. The contemporary study of authoritarianism as a psycho-cultural phenomenon can trace its roots to two main figures since World War II: Theodore Adorno and Robert Altemeyer.

Interest in studying the authoritarian personality increased in response to World War II, beginning with *The Authoritarian Personality* (1950), written by Adorno et al. from a psychoanalytic perspective. Adorno et al. conceptualize authoritarianism as a personality comprised of several core traits, including: conventionalism, submission to authority figures, authoritarian aggression, anti-intraception, superstition and stereotype, high value placed on power and toughness, destructiveness and cynicism; projectivity, and excessive concern with the sexuality of others. Adorno et al. (1950)

argue that authoritarianism originates in rigid and punitive childrearing practices that cultivate a weak ego, inadequate for coping with sexual and aggressive drives. Unable to control those drives effectively, a person lives in fear of them, and so develops rigid defenses in the form of the above authoritarian traits to avoid confronting them. The authors developed the fascism scale (F scale) as a way to measure an individual's propensity toward fascism, and argue based on their empirical findings that authoritarianism was closely allied with anti-Semitism, ethnocentrism, and political conservatism. The F scale has been criticized for only measuring right-wing authoritarianism and not left-wing (ex. authoritarian communists), and has been alleged to produce false-positives through bias in wording. Adorno et al.'s experiments have been criticized for failing to control for education and income, and their interpretation of responses has been criticized for uncritically pathologizing those at the high end of the scale, but not those at the low.

Interest in authoritarianism resurged in the 1980s with Altemeyer's work. Altemeyer takes a trait-based approach rather than psychoanalytic. He conceptualized authoritarianism in terms of three of Adorno's nine personality traits, which Altemeyer refers to as "attitudinal clusters": authoritarian submission, authoritarian aggression, and conventionalism. Altemeyer understands the origins of authoritarianism in terms of a social learning model that sees it as a product of the social learning process where personality predispositions interact with life experience. Altemeyer developed the right-wing authoritarianism scale (RWA scale), which has proven to be a much more reliable measure than the F-scale. However, the reliability of Altemeyer's RWA scale has been

criticized by scholars who claim that its ability to predict intolerance and prejudice is largely attributable to its being itself a measure of these things, using them as indicators of authoritarianism (Hetherington and Weiler 2009, 47; Feldman 2003; Stenner 2005). Like Adorno, Altemeyer, has been criticized for focusing on high authoritarians to the exclusion of everyone else, and for treating authoritarianism like a discreet personality profile rather than situating it on a continuum.

Such critiques of Adorno et al. and Altemeyer are indicative of problems within political psychology as a whole, which has suffered from a liberal bias that often conflates conservatism with authoritarianism, and attributes both to negative unconscious motivations while at the same time ignoring the unconscious motivations underlying liberalism and nonauthoritarianism, uncritically accepting liberal and nonauthoritarian values as normative. For example, there has been a great deal of study about conservative endorsement of inequality, but virtually no scrutiny of why equality should be so important to liberals.

Seeking to avoid these pitfalls as much as possible, I use the more contemporary works of Stenner 2005 and Hetherington and Weiler 2009 to connect the strong correlation found between torture support, republicanism, and conservatism to the phenomenon of authoritarianism. These authors conceptualize authoritarianism and nonauthoritarianism similarly as political psychologies or worldviews, regarding authoritarianism as both a dispositional and situational phenomenon. Stenner 2005 and Hetherington and Weiler 2009 also use similar methods of measurement, relying on child-rearing batteries of questions designed to capture parenting values. These

questions provide a list of qualities and ask respondents to select or rank those that they value more. The qualities considered indicative of authoritarianism tend to include things like obedience, good manners, conformity to gender roles, neatness and cleanliness. The qualities considered indicative of nonauthoritarianism tend to include things like curiosity, consideration of others, and responsibility. Parental values are considered reliable measures in part because they capture ideals in a way that is independent from situational context and are thus not as susceptible to the influence of surrounding political discourse, as are other opinions. While parenting values tend to show a strong, stable, and reliable relationship with authoritarian attitudes and tendencies, it should be noted that they do not necessarily correspond to actual parenting practices, and that parenting practices themselves are actually far less reliable indicators of authoritarianism.

INTERPRETATION

The data analysis of chapter one shows that Consv/Rep political orientation is associated with greater torture support and Lib/Dem political orientation is associated with greater torture opposition. Chapter two proposes that this is because Consv/Reps and Lib/Dems have different political psychologies, defined by distinct attitudes towards change and equality, and structured in part by (a) distinct social dominance orientations, as well as (b) distinct positions on the authoritarian spectrum.

CHAPTER III: INTERPRETING TORTURE OPINION THROUGH THE LENS OF CULTURAL PSYCHOLOGY OF MORALITY & RELIGION

SOURCES

The second key finding of my data analysis is that the role of religion is mediated through political orientation, and thus understanding the relationship between political orientation, torture opinion, and religion is the central interpretative task of chapter three. For this I turn to Jonathan Haidt's moral foundations theory, which Haidt has used to understand contemporary politics in the U.S. as well as religion. In terms of social scientific discipline, Haidt's work is perhaps most appropriately considered a form of *cultural psychology*, incorporating as it does elements of anthropology, evolutionary theory, psychology of religion, political psychology, and experimental social psychology. Cultural psychology "tries to understand how the specific 'form of life' the person is embedded in constitutes and constructs feelings, thoughts, and conduct"; it sees human psychology as shaped, "constituted by, and rooted in particular cultural interactions." (Belzen 2000, 47).

Haidt's focus on the subject of morality means that his work is also a form of *moral psychology*, and it is largely from the perspective of his cultural psychology of morality that Haidt formulates his understanding of religion. Moral psychology began as part of developmental psychology, with the major figures Piaget (1930s) and Kohlberg (1960s) studying the cognitive process by which children develop a sense of the rules of right and wrong. Their cognitive-developmental approach led them to focus on the way the moral reasoning process unfolds in tandem with the maturation of children's cognitive abilities. This set the study of moral psychology on a rationalist trajectory that

presumes “reasoning is the most important and reliable way to obtain moral knowledge” (Haidt 2012, 7). Thus from Kohlberg through the 1990s, methods for studying moral psychology were mostly limited to presenting subjects with hypothetical moral dilemmas and subsequently analyzing their rationales (Haidt 2012, 9).

Haidt is one of the main scholars behind the development of the more contemporary “intuitionist” branch of moral psychology. Whereas moral psychology has historically tended to focus on the process of moral reasoning, moral intuitionists have stressed the important role of emotions and other unconscious modes of perception in shaping our morality. The intuitionist approach to morality is instrumental for understanding public opinion of torture because its focus on the non-rational aspects of morality, rather than articulated justifications, fits nicely with an understanding of public opinion as an expression of underlying psychology more than the product of deliberate moral reasoning.

The history of moral psychology has not only been rationalist, but liberal as well. Like political psychology where “the goal of so much research was to explain what was wrong with conservatives,” moral psychology has long operated with a strong liberal bias, with higher levels of moral development aligning with liberal ideals (Haidt 2012, 160). This made it impossible for an ideological conservative to merit a high moral level. Haidt goes so far as to accuse Kohlberg of effectively “us[ing] his research to build a scientific justification for a secular liberal moral theory” (Haidt 2012, 8). Haidt’s work diverges from this trend by providing a more balanced depiction of conservative versus

liberal moral intuitions, acknowledging the potential good in each as well as their potential to do harm.

INTERPRETATION

The first part of chapter three continues the task of trying to understand why torture support may be so high among Consv/Reps and so low among Lib/Dems. Applying Haidt's cultural theory of morality, chapter three proposes that this is, in part, because Consv/Reps and Lib/Dems have (1) different moral intuitions, which are characterized by (a) different emphases and interpretations of the Care, Fairness, and Liberty foundations, and (b) a broader moral palate and monopoly on the "groupish" foundations among conservatives; and (2) ultimately different social motivations and community boundaries.

The second part of chapter three turns to Haidt's cultural theory of religion in order to interpret the second main finding of chapter one, which is that religion has divergent effects on Consv/Reps and Blacks compared to white Lib/Dems. Chapter three proposes that religion is associated with decreased torture acceptance among Consv/Reps and Blacks, and with increased torture acceptance among white Lib/Dems because (1) the groups occupy different positions on the authoritarian spectrum; and (2) religion facilitates groupishness, and this may be more evident among the usually ungroupish Lib/Dems.

CHAPTER IV: CONCLUDING SUMMARY & DISCUSSION

Chapter four summarizes and synthesizes the findings and interpretations presented in previous chapters and draws out some preliminary implications of this work. It briefly reviews the main findings and brings together the various strands of theory presented in chapters two and three in support of the basic thesis that the role of religion in torture opinion is not only subordinate to, but also mediated through, political psychologies, which inform distinct moral intuitions and ultimately express distinct social motivations. These differences interact with religiousness in ways that may account for the decrease in torture support among Christian Consv/Reps and Blacks, and the increase in torture support among Christian white Lib/Dems relative their Unaffiliated counterparts. More particularly, the distinct positions of these groups along the authoritarian spectrum may affect the extent to which key Christian moral tenets such as enemy love are assimilated into a person's worldview. While authoritarianism seems to be an important factor underlying the high levels of torture support among Consv/Reps, it may also be the mechanism through which religion effectively decreases torture support among Consv/Reps and Blacks. Implications of my findings and interpretations are discussed in the final part of this concluding chapter.

CHAPTER II

A DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS OF TORTURE OPINION

CONTOURS OF THE TORTURE DEBATE

EMERGENCE OF THE TORTURE QUESTION

Torture, of course, is not new to the U.S., nor is the public's tacit acceptance of it. Many historians have pointed out that torture in the U.S. and by U.S.-Americans took place throughout the 20th century – practiced in public by lynching mobs, in private by prison guards, and around the world by the military and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Journalists were the first to draw attention to the similarities between the photos of Abu Ghraib and images of Jim Crow-era lynching in the U.S. (e.g. Luc Sante 2004; Sontag 2004; Rich 2004; Solomon-Godeau 2004; Apel 2005; Roberts 2008). Historiographer Carolyn Strange (2006) argues that a fuller understanding of violent bodily punishment and its rationalizations in the jurisprudence of 20th century liberal democracies such as the U.S. would help disabuse citizens of the notion that 21st century discourse on what constitutes torture, and whether it should be used in prisons, is anything new. In response to U.S. officials' claims that the events of Abu Ghraib were an "aberration" from the norm, academic activists Historians Against the War (2006) published a pamphlet outlining the ways in which the torture in Abu Ghraib was consistent with U.S. foreign and domestic policy of recent decades. Some legal scholars argue that these are extensions of colonial and neocolonial jurisprudence (Roberts

2008). In his history of CIA interrogation, McCoy (2006, 7) writes: “The abuse at Abu Ghraib, Guantanamo, and Kabul are manifestations of a long history of a distinctive U.S. covert-warfare doctrine developed since World War II, in which psychological torture has emerged as a central if clandestine facet of American foreign policy.”

Yet while torture in the U.S. and by the U.S. abroad is not new, national surveys asking the American public for its opinion on torture are a new phenomenon specific to the context of the war on terror. The permissibility of torture had never been questioned until October 2001, four weeks after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on U.S. soil. Nothing remotely comparable to this question appeared in national surveys since opinion polling began in the 1930s. It was not raised during the Korean War, the Vietnam War, the Cold War, the Persian Gulf War or the Yugoslav Wars; not even in the aftermath of the bombing of Pearl Harbor, the national tragedy to which 9/11 is most consistently compared. The permissibility of torture is a decidedly 21st century question.

The first time the word “torture” appeared in national opinion surveys was in *volunteered responses* to two open-ended questions posed by the Gallup organization towards the end of World War II, asking respondents what they thought should be done with Nazi leaders, Hitler, members of the German Gestapo and Nazi Storm Troopers after the war. In 1942, less than 2% of respondents thought Nazi leaders should be tortured, while 8% thought members of the German Gestapo and Nazi Storm Troopers should be killed slowly, tortured, sentenced to hard work, or starved to death.

The first *questions* about torture emerged in the late 1970s and continued through the 1990s. Prior to 2001, the word “torture” appeared in 19 questions over a total of 10 national surveys, all of which were conducted between 1977 and 1999. These few torture questions ask variations of the following: (1) Do you think the U.S. uses torture? (2) What do you think would be the best way to decrease the use of torture internationally and/or by the U.S.?; or (3) How should U.S. foreign policy deal with governments known to use torture? (ex. economic sanctions, U.N. intervention). All torture-related questions prior to 9/11 assume that torture is undesirable and aim to assess public attitudes towards different ways of eradicating its use.

In the decade following 9/11, by contrast, the word “torture” has appeared in 219 questions over a total of 100 national surveys, and has been the primary focus of some six national surveys. In addition to asking questions about whether or not the U.S. government has used torture and what should be done about it, a new question emerged within weeks of 9/11 that required respondents to disclose their beliefs regarding the acceptability of using torture in the war on terror. Questions asking respondents if torture could be “justified” or considered “acceptable” in some cases, or whether they would “support” its use by the U.S. government in the war on terror were distinct from all previous survey questions in that torture was no longer implicitly considered an unacceptable practice. For the first time, the public was asked to consider the morality of torture as a question open for debate. The results of this consideration have been chronicled by more than 62 public opinion polls (including 72 questions) between 2001 and 2011.

The sudden appearance of the permissibility of torture as a question in public opinion polls following the events of 9/11 is significant in understanding public support for torture. Every question I found that asks for an opinion on torture situates the question in the context of war, and all except one refer to terrorism or “attacks against U.S. forces in Iraq or Afghanistan.”¹ In fact, when referring to “public opinion of torture” we are only talking about torture in the war on terror context, and, more specifically, about (a) interrogational torture (b) performed in exceptional circumstances (c) by U.S. government agents against perceived enemies.

WHAT: THE LINE BETWEEN TORTURE AND ABUSE

On April 28, 2004, *60 Minutes II* (CBS) broke the story of U.S. torture by airing photos depicting prisoner abuse at Abu Ghraib, a prison facility in Iraq that at the time was under the joint control of U.S.-led forces and the Iraqi government. These photos were published in *The New Yorker* on May 4th, followed by a May 10th article by Seymour Hersh in the same magazine titled “Torture at Abu Ghraib.” One of the debates surrounding the Abu Ghraib scandal was over the definition of “torture,” a question that was reflected in surveys of this time by questions that sought to reveal the line between abuse and torture.

In late May 2004, an ABC News-Washington Post (ABC-WaPo) poll showed that the majority of respondents considered the events depicted at Abu Ghraib *abuse* rather than *torture*. The minority of respondents who thought that the events at Abu Ghraib

¹ The single exception is American Red Cross Adult Survey on International Humanitarian Law (February 2011), which simply refers to “war” in general.

amounted to torture (29%) were outnumbered two-to-one by those who considered the actions “abuse but not torture” (60%). Unsurprisingly, 12% more people thought it was more acceptable to abuse prisoners (48%) than to torture them (36%).

Also as expected, those who accepted torture tended to be more accepting of particular coercive techniques than those who accepted abuse but not torture. Yet, while there was a high correlation between acceptance of abuse and acceptance of torture, it is interesting to note that 21% of those who found torture acceptable in some cases felt that “abuse that falls short of torture” is never acceptable, and 14% of those who say abuse is never acceptable felt that torture is acceptable in some cases. This mutual exclusion suggests that in some peoples’ minds, the issue is less about the severity of the treatment and more about the purpose of it. Because torture is discussed as an intelligence-gathering tool but abuse is not, abuse may be perceived as mere cruelty. It is also interesting to see how much overlap there is in the acceptance of many techniques by the mutually exclusive categories of those who accept torture but not abuse, and those who accept abuse but not torture. This affirms that the line between torture and abuse remains vague when it comes to categorizing particular techniques.




Figure 1. Acceptability of Torture, Abuse, and Particular Interrogation Techniques, ABC-WaPo late May 2004

Notably, no surveys that ask about torture actually provide any type of definition, leaving it to respondents to determine in their own minds what constitutes torture. Except for the above questions used for comparative purposes, all other questions considered in this project explicitly ask about “torture” rather than prisoner abuse, enhanced-, harsh-, coerced interrogation, or any other euphemism.

WHEN: EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES AND THE TICKING TIME-BOMB SCENARIO

Public support for torture is limited to the particular context of the war on terror, and gains most of its support by being considered as an exception to the rule. There is little support for the legalization of torture or for relaxing international

restrictions on its use. When asked about the permissibility of torture, respondents are often primed by the question framing to think about torture as a tactic of war used by the U.S. government in exceptional circumstances, such as gathering life-saving intelligence. This is commonly referred to as the “ticking time bomb scenario.”

In its many variations, the ticking time-bomb scenario is one of the most common ways of framing torture as a moral debate – used by media pundits, politicians and pollsters alike. Following their 2004 independent panel investigation of U.S. detention operations, the authors of “The Schlesinger Report” recounted: “For the U.S., most cases for permitting harsh treatment of detainees on moral grounds begin with variants of the ‘ticking time bomb’ scenario” (Schlesinger et al. 2004, Appendix H). A typical sketch of this scenario might go something like this: Government intelligence suggests that there is a live bomb planted somewhere in a crowded U.S. city, and the person who planted it is in custody but refuses to disclose any information. The interrogator is faced with the dilemma of (a) torturing the suspect in order to discover the bomb’s location before it detonates, saving many lives, or (b) respecting international law and letting innocent Americans die. The scenario takes many forms with varying levels of detail, but the principle elements of the ticking time-bomb scenario are these: (1) lives are at risk, (2) a detainee has life-saving information, and (3) using torture would enable the interrogator to extract this information and possibly prevent the loss of life (Luban 2005).

The time-bomb scenario is as ubiquitous in survey questions as it is in public discourse, and it has a measurable effect in garnering public support for torture. Out of

72 survey questions that directly ask adult U.S. Americans respondents whether or not torture is permissible, 51 of them invoke some version of the time-bomb scenario. The questions vary in their degree of elaboration, but minimally, they all ask the respondent if it would be acceptable to torture a detained terrorist suspect in order to gain important information. Many further specify that the information could save “innocent” or “American” lives, or prevent a “terrorist attack.” Even if the potential loss of life is not stated explicitly, it is always implied through references to the broader context of the war on terror.

The ubiquity of the time-bomb scenario in torture survey questions has brought some to question their validity as a measure of public support for torture because the time-bomb scenario itself offers an implicit argument for torture, and no other counterbalancing argument against torture is usually offered (Council on Foreign Relations [CFR] 2009). Presenting a counter argument alongside the time-bomb scenario, where the potential positive outcomes implied by the ticking-time-bomb scenario (ex. extracting information; saving lives) are presented alongside potential negative outcomes seems to yield far less support for torture. Examples of potential negative outcomes include the potential of weakening international moral standards against torture and increasing the likelihood U.S. soldiers will be subjected to torture abroad; that torture is cruel; is ineffective; or morally wrong. Of the 51 questions that invoke the time-bomb scenario, 12 of them have significant variations in question wording or structure that makes their comparison problematic. Of the remaining 45 comparable questions, 39 of them invoke the time-bomb scenario without presenting any countervailing argument (see Appendix

A). Torture opposition among these questions averages 31%, which is consistent with torture opposition overall. Only five questions present the time-bomb scenario alongside a counter-balancing argument, and average torture opposition among these questions reaches a formidable 59%.

Embedded within the time-bomb scenario are two assumptions that have been particularly influential in garnering public support for torture: (1) the assumption that torture is useful, and (2) the assumption that torture is exceptional. The time-bomb scenario's implicit argument in favor of torture thus hinges on torture's utility and exceptionality. Based on a comparison of various arguments for and against torture, it seems that the implicit argument of torture's exceptionality may be more important than its implied utility, perhaps because the latter is taken for granted.

In 2004, a Program on International Policy Attitudes-Knowledge Networks (PIPA-KN) poll introduced respondents to the torture debate this way:

Currently there is a debate about whether, when it comes to interrogating detainees who are suspected of involvement in terrorism or who might have information that would be useful in the war on terrorism, the U.S. should be able to make exceptions to the legal prohibitions on the treatment of detainees. (Kull 2004: 7)

Respondents were then presented with eight arguments — four in favor and four against the exceptional use of torture — and asked whether or not they found them convincing. Stating that torture is a useful tool for gathering life-saving information was found to be a convincing argument *for* torture among 47% of respondents, while stating that torture is not effective was found to be a convincing argument *against* torture for 66%. While these results suggest that torture's perceived efficacy influences public

opinion to a significant degree, arguments that focused on torture's utility were less convincing than the other six arguments presented. One of the most convincing arguments *for* torture, garnering 75% favor, was one that underscored the importance of upholding the norms against torture, and then conceded, "at times, military necessity may call for making an exception to these rule." Likewise, the most convincing argument (75%) *against* torture was that the exceptional use of torture by the U.S. might encourage other nations to torture U.S. troops. In short, statements related to torture's efficacy, though considered convincing by a majority of respondents, proved to be the least persuasive arguments both for and against torture, while the most persuasive arguments both for and against torture were related to torture's exceptional use. The most convincing arguments were those that explicitly articulated what is usually only implied by the time-bomb scenario: that the use of torture is an exception rather than the norm. Given that the introduction to the question (quoted above) already frames torture as an exceptional practice, it is interesting that the most convincing argument in favor of torture should be the one that underscores its exceptionality. The results of the PIPA-KN 2004 survey seem to support the claim that the time-bomb scenario provides a compelling argument for torture partly because it presupposes torture's utility at extracting the truth and generating positive consequences, and partly because it casts torture as an exception to the rule rather than a systematically implemented government policy. Yet, while the time-bomb scenario conveys two implicit arguments in favor of torture based on torture's utility and exceptional use, it is the scenario's

ability to represent government use of torture as an exception to the rule that seems to be most influential in garnering support.

As these findings suggest, whether or not it is acceptable for the U.S. government to use torture against prisoner detainees is a separate issue from whether or not torture should be legalized in the U.S; support for torture as an exception does not imply support for torture as a rule. In terms of U.S. constitutional law, 62% agree with the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment in all cases, while 35% think such a unilateral prohibition is too restrictive (PIPA-KN Poll, July 2004). The public's willingness to accept torture on this exceptional basis is also distinct from the desire to relax international laws prohibiting torture. Indeed, a large majority (75%) of the U.S. population supports international treaties restricting governments' use of torture on enemy combatants (WPO-KN Poll, July 2006). In other words, relaxing international and constitutional prohibitions against torture is far less popular than torture's exceptional use.

The disparity between public support for torture and support for relaxing international legal standards has been a point of critique by analysts challenging the validity of the polling data, suggesting that survey questions on torture support "are tests to see if it is possible to persuade Americans to accept torture rather than being a reflection on whether there should be a norm against torture" (CFR 2009, 175). This is a fair point; the torture question more accurately measures passive acceptance of torture than active support for it. At the same time, as Brecher 2007 argues, it is precisely this acceptance that matters most. To object to legalized torture is to object to only one

particular kind of torture. “Once the concession is made that it might very, very occasionally be justified, in certain rare but not impossible cases, then all that stands in the way of justifying interrogational torture is the world's slowness in providing the requisite scenarios” (Brecher 2007, 19).

WHO: TORTURE BY THE U.S. GOVERNMENT AGAINST ENEMY COMBATANTS

The above considers the boundaries of *when* torture is acceptable. Now we turn to the question of *whom*: by whom and on who is torture acceptable? Some survey findings suggest that, in the public’s mind, relaxing international prohibitions is one thing, and the possibility of torture being used by foreign entities against U.S. soldiers is quite another – even though the latter is a logical outcome of the former. The PIPA-KN 2004 survey found that two-thirds (66%) of respondents favored having international treaties prohibiting governments from using torture to obtain information from detainees, while 30% thought these prohibitions were too restrictive. Because these questions on international law were worded in such a way that respondents would naturally be thinking about their own (i.e., U.S.) government activity in relation to enemy combatants, respondents who thought international regulations of the treatment of prisoner detainees were too restrictive were given a follow-up question that explicitly turned the tables, asking if it would be acceptable for another government to use torture against American prisoners, in order to prompt respondents to re-consider the normative impact of relaxing international regulations. Of the 30% who said international bans against torture were too restrictive, only 5% said it would

be acceptable for another government to use torture against U.S. prisoner detainees. It seems that when respondents claim prohibitions against torture are too restrictive, they mean too restrictive for the U.S. government – not the international community as a whole.

This double standard is consistent with a study of moral outrage that “found clear evidence of identity-relevant personal anger (anger when a person from one’s nationality is tortured) but little evidence of moral outrage (anger even when a person from an identity-irrelevant nationality is tortured)” (Batson et al. 2009, 155). Still, the disparity between those who think international laws governing the treatment of prisoners are too restrictive (30%) and those who would accept that torture might then be used by foreign governments against American prisoners (5%) leads Steven Kull, the primary author of the report on this survey to hypothesize that public support for torture might decrease if primed to consider the moral principle of reciprocity. He suggested that “if Americans were given the task of thinking through the full implications of international norms related to torture and abuse, a large majority would likely favor all of the restrictions of international law” (Kull 2004, 6). However, a later study specifically on the role of reciprocity in public opinion of torture found no support for this hypothesis. Flavin and Nickerson (2007) wondered about the possible role of reciprocity in torture opinion and tested the effects of question order on support for torture. They found that, when asked about torture *against* the U.S. first, and subsequently about torture *by* the U.S., attitudes towards torture remained the same as the control. By contrast, when asked about torture *by* the U.S. torture first, followed by

torture *against* the U.S., support for the latter tended to be higher. Their findings suggest that, rather than *diminishing acceptance of U.S. torture*, the morality of reciprocity seems to make the public *more accepting of foreign torture*.

WORDING: THE TARGET OF TORTURE

So we know that who is doing the torture and who is being tortured affects public opinion of torture: public support for torture is limited to the U.S. government using torture in exceptional circumstances against prisoners in the war on terror; given that question wording plays such a significant role in survey responses, does it matter how the target of torture is described? The PIPA-KN 2004 survey explored the possible effects of referring to the target in different ways, by using different terminology among subgroups within their sample. They did not find any significant difference (Kull 2004). A late May 2004 ABC-WaPo poll similarly found that changing the description of the target from “people suspected of terrorism” to “people who are suspected of involvement in recent attacks against U.S. forces in Iraq or Afghanistan” had almost no effect on the approval rates for either torture or abuse (Morris and Langer 2004).

SECTION SUMMARY

Surveying the landscape of public opinion on torture demonstrates that the torture question is a post-9/11 phenomenon, specific to the war on terror context. It shows that the line between torture and abuse continues to be a blurry one for the public, and that torture is only up for debate as an interrogational tool. We see that the ticking time-bomb scenario is an effective rhetorical device for garnering torture support

due to its implicit arguments in favor of torture, which are seldom balanced by counter arguments against torture. When the time-bomb scenario is balanced by a counter-argument, torture opposition increases dramatically. The time-bomb scenario presumes that torture is an effective interrogational tool, but most importantly for garnering public support, it casts torture as an exceptional practice by the U.S. government rather than the norm. Having reviewed the extent and limits of torture acceptance, we now turn to the question of how torture support has fluctuated over time and the social groups most and least likely to support torture.

THE TORTURE QUESTION

DATA SETS AND MEASURES

PEW DATA

Two months after journalists published photos of war prisoners being sexually abused and tortured at the American-run Abu Ghraib facility in Iraq, Pew Research Center for the People and the Press (Pew) began including this question on many of its surveys: “Do you think the use of torture against suspected terrorists in order to gain important information can often be justified, sometimes be justified, rarely be justified, or never be justified?” Since that first time in July 2004, Pew has generated the largest corpus of opinion data on the permissibility of torture by repeating this single question in eleven national telephone surveys from 2004-2011.² Merging the data from these

² Pew included the same question in some regional political surveys as well as its Opinion Leaders poll, but unless otherwise noted this analysis reflects the compiled data from the eleven national surveys only.

eleven surveys affords a comprehensive picture of torture opinion over time, reflecting the responses of nearly 13,000 U.S. Americans over an eight year period. (See Appendix B for complete list of survey dates, response frequencies, and derived variables.) The Pew data are valuable for exploring torture opinion in relation to demographic, political, and religious factors, and for analyzing these relationships over time. The Pew data also have some value for correlating torture opinion with other attitudes, but the variables available for such analysis are somewhat limited.

ANES DATA

The Pew data is complemented by data from the American National Election Studies 2008-2009 Panel Study (ANES-PS0809), which has the benefit of being a panel study and of having a diverse pool of attitudinal questions for relating to torture opinion. A panel study contacts the same participants with multiple surveys at different points in time. Individual respondents (i.e., cases) may not have participated in every survey and any single case may have responded to a different combination of surveys from others. Some questions are repeated by more than one survey, allowing for some analysis of changing attitudes across time. ANES data are used both to supplement Pew data and to compare its results where possible.

The entire ANES 2008-2009 Panel Study was conducted between January 2008 and October 2009, consisting of 22 total survey waves. Twelve of these surveys were made up of “off-wave” questions, which were written by outside researchers who also underwrote the administrative costs. The other ten surveys contain questions written by ANES, and these are the only waves used in the following analysis, conducted between

January 2008 and August 2009 and representing a total sample size of 4,240 cases. The ANES 2008-2009 Panel study asked this question about torture on two of the ten waves: “Do you favor, oppose, or neither favor nor oppose the U.S. government torturing people, who are suspected of being terrorists, to try to get information?” Respondents who either favored or opposed torture were subsequently asked a follow-up question about the strength of their favor or opposition. (Question wording and response frequencies are provided in Appendix B, along with information on the calculation of new derived variables used in this analysis.)

MEASUREMENTS

Pew responses to the torture question are divided among five categories: *often*, *sometimes*, *rarely*, *never*, and *don't know / refused (DK/ref)*. The last of these (*DK/ref*) was not offered as an option and would have been volunteered by the respondent without prompting. The first two of these (*often* and *sometimes*) are considered torture permissive responses and the second two (*rarely* and *never*) are considered torture restrictive. Non-responses and volunteered responses of *don't know* are counted as valid responses in order to ensure the most conservative calculation of torture permissiveness, which is why the total percentage of torture permissive plus torture restrictive responses does not always equal 100%. The combination of *often* and *sometimes* responses into a single torture permissive category and *rarely* and *never* into a single torture restrictive category is consistent with Pew's methodology, and the wording for the two categories is adopted from Green 2007.

In the context of a social-scientific inquiry, categorizing *rarely* and *never* together under the “torture restrictive” label makes sense. This treats the four available responses as if they were a Likert scale moving from least to greatest torture support, with the dividing line placed down the middle of them. Consolidating the four responses into two categories in this way places the dividing line down the center of the four response options and divides the pool of respondents into two roughly even halves. From a humanistic perspective, however, the consolidation of *rarely* and *never* into a single category poses some difficulty. This is because philosophical treatment of the torture question tends to differentiate between *never* and *ever*. Arguments for *ever* torturing – irrespective of frequency – tend to be rooted in teleological ethics, which are more results-oriented. From a teleological perspective, actions such as torture are judged on their ability to achieve the greatest good. The frequency with which torture is practiced is somewhat irrelevant, as this would depend on how often the circumstances arise to warrant it. Arguments for *never* torturing, by contrast, tend to be rooted in deontological ethics, focused on duty and moral obligation, where ends do not justify means. From a deontological perspective, persons should be treated as ends in themselves, and not as means to ends. From a humanistic perspective then, it would make more sense to divide torture responses by placing *never* on one side as the only response reflecting a deontological ethic, and placing *rarely*, *sometimes*, and *often* on the other side, as these all reflect a teleological approach to the torture question. Numerically, this would place two-thirds of the population in the torture permissive camp, and only one-third would be considered torture restrictive. I chose not to do this,

and instead to follow the social scientific method of categorization, because the latter results in the more conservative estimate of torture support.

From a philosophical perspective, whether torture is *rarely*, *sometimes*, or *often* justified is less important than the fact of its being *ever* justified. Yet from a social scientific perspective that treats torture question responses as if on a Likert scale, the frequency with which torture is justified matters as an indication of varying levels of torture acceptance. Thus, while the simplification of torture opinion into two categories does have some descriptive benefits, it has the drawback of treating varying degrees of torture acceptance as equal. In order to gauge levels of *torture acceptance* then, I also placed responses of *often*, *sometimes*, *rarely*, and *never* on a 0-to-1 scale, with 0 indicating the least torture acceptance (*never*) and 1 equaling the greatest torture acceptance (*often*). Non-responses and responses of *don't know* were excluded from this scale. ANES responses to the torture question are divided among seven possible categories: *favor greatly*, *favor moderately*, *favor slightly*, *neither favor nor oppose*, *oppose slightly*, *oppose moderately*, and *oppose greatly*. These too were placed on a 0-to-1 scale where 0 indicates the greatest torture aversion (*oppose greatly*), 1 indicates the greatest torture acceptance (*favor greatly*), and .5 indicates greatest ambivalence (*neither favor nor oppose*). Recoding the four Pew responses and seven ANES responses on a scale of 0-to-1 in this way allows us to simplify torture opinion into a single figure of torture acceptance that takes into account the varying degrees of favor, opposition, and ambivalence. It also makes comparisons of torture acceptance between the two response sets more meaningful.

Going forward, the most common indicators of torture support are torture permissiveness, torture favor, and torture acceptance. Torture permissiveness (TP) reflects the percent of the population who responded *often* or *sometimes* to the Pew torture question. Torture favor (TF) reflects the percent of the population who responded to the ANES question in favor of torture. Torture acceptance (TA) refers to the mean rate of acceptance on the 0-to-1 scale and applies to both Pew and ANES data sets. Sometimes torture acceptance is expressed as a decimal number rather than a percentage in order to further differentiate this measure from torture permissiveness and torture favor. Collectively, I refer to these distinct measures as “torture support.”

TORTURE OPINION OVERALL AND OVER TIME

TORTURE OPINION OVERALL

PEW OVERALL

Based on the Pew data collected between July 2004 and August 2011, a large minority (47%) of the population is torture permissive, considering torture to be *often* or *sometimes* justified. Another 20% considers torture to be *rarely* justified, while nearly one-third (29%) of the population considers torture to be *never* justified. During this time overall, restrictive views of torture (49%) thus outweighed permissive views (47%) by a difference of 2%. The most popular responses to the torture question were *never* (29%) and *sometimes* (31%), each representing roughly one-third of the population. *Often* was the least popular response (16%), followed by *rarely* (20%). This spread of responses is notable because it shows that torture opinion doesn't follow a normal

curve, with responses concentrated among the center-most options (*sometimes* and *rarely*). Placing Pew torture opinion on a scale of 0-to-1, overall mean torture acceptance was .45 between July 2004 and August 2011.




Figure 2. Average Torture Opinion, Pew 2004-2011

ANES OVERALL

Within the ANES data, the most popular response to the torture question between 2008 and 2009 was *neither* (38%), followed closely by *oppose* (37%), while about one-quarter of respondents (24%) said they *favor* torture. Notably, the percentage of respondents who favor torture (24%) is much lower in the ANES data set compared to those considered torture permissive (47%) in the Pew data. This is likely attributable to the effect of having different response options: ANES offered “neither favor nor oppose” as an option, whereas Pew respondents who were undecided or

ambivalent would have been left to choose from *sometimes* or *rarely*, or else to volunteer a *don't know* response or refuse to answer the question.




Figure 3. Average Torture Opinion, ANES 2008-2009

PEW AND ANES OVERALL

Due to their different response options, using the 0-to-1 torture acceptance scale may be the most appropriate way to compare torture opinion across these data sets. Based on this measure, mean torture acceptance among ANES respondents between 2008-2009 comes in at .44, which is very close to the Pew mean of .45 cited above. Measuring both data sets on a 0-to-1 scale thus shows nearly equal mean torture acceptance across ANES and Pew data sets, suggesting that this is a reliable descriptive measure of torture opinion.

TORTURE OPINION OVER TIME

PEW OVER TIME

Looking at mean torture acceptance over time shows that a marked increase took place in early 2009. Between July 2004 and February 2009, torture acceptance fluctuated between 42% and 47%, with an average of 45% of the population choosing torture permissive responses. After February 2009, torture support began to increase, and it continued to rise for the next three surveys up until its last measure in August 2011. Mean torture acceptance over this time increased from 47% to 50% and, for the first time, a slight majority (52% avg.) of the population chose torture permissive responses.




Figure 4. Torture Opinion Over Time, Pew 2004-2011

Fluctuations in particular response frequencies also convey some notable changes in torture opinion over time. Before 2008, permissive views were at their

lowest and restrictive views at their highest. After 2008, the opposite occurs: permissive views reach their highest, and restrictive views hit their lowest. Torture opinion remained relatively stable (fluctuating no more than 4%) between July 2004 and January 2007; during this time, the restrictive views averaged 54% (ranging between 52% and 56%) and permissive views averaged 46% (ranging between 44% and 48%). There is then a marked shift in opinion between January and November 2007, where for the first time permissive views ever-so-slightly exceed restrictive views by .5% (48.4% to 47.9%). But it is not until 2009, however, that permissive views begin to exert their dominance beyond the margin of error. In April 2009, permissive views exceeded restrictive ones by a margin of 4.1%. In November of the same year the number of *often* responses outstripped *rarely* for the first time. Permissive views of torture then remained the majority through August 2011, Pew's last survey to ask the question to date.

ANES OVER TIME

The ANES data corroborates the Pew data by also showing a slight increase in torture-accepting attitudes. The torture question was asked on two separate waves of the ANES 08-09 Panel Study: wave 6, which ended June 2008, and wave 17, which ended in May 2009. Comparing torture responses across these two dates shows a small increase in the percentage who favor torture (+3.7%). This increase is almost directly proportional to the decrease in neither responses (-3.5%), while oppose responses barely showed any change (-0.2%) over time. On a scale of 0-to-1, mean torture acceptance rose so slightly (.01) as to be insignificant, from June 2008's mean of 0.43 to May 2009's mean of 0.44

SECTION SUMMARY

To summarize, the Pew data shows that overall, between 2004 and 2011 torture restrictive views were somewhat more popular than permissive views, but that in 2009 torture acceptance began to rise and torture permissive attitudes gained a slight majority. The slight increase in mean torture support between ANES June 2008 and May 2009 survey waves is consistent with Pew results showing an increase during this same time frame.

WHO SUPPORTS TORTURE?

DEMOGRAPHIC OF TORTURE SUPPORT AND OPPOSITION

The Pew survey consistently asked the same or similar demographic questions for all surveys from 2004-2011, allowing us to examine their relationship with torture opinion both overall and over time. (Appendix B offers a detailed table of torture opinion among key social variables.) Greater torture support appears by this analysis to be associated with (in descending order of significance): Republicans, Conservatives, Males, ages 30-49, greater incomes, Rural areas, the Southern region of the U.S., limited education, Whites, and Christians. Greater torture restrictiveness appears by the same analysis to be associated with (in descending order of significance): Liberals, Non-Christians, Democrats, Blacks, Seniors (ages 65 and older), Females, greater education, Urban areas, lower incomes, and the Western United States.

Table 1. Demographic Associations with Greater Torture Support and Opposition, Pew 2004-2011

Variable	Support	Opposition
Political Party	Republicans	Democrats
Political Ideology	Conservatives	Liberals
Sex/Gender	Males	Females
Age	Ages 30-49	Seniors (65+)
Income	Higher income	Lower income
Community Type	Rural	Urban
U.S. Region	South	West
Education	Fewer years	More years
Race	Whites	Blacks; non-Whites
Religion	Christians	Other Religion, No Religion

In terms of the social categories available for analysis, the strongest associations for both torture permissiveness and restrictiveness are found among political party identification and ideology. Privilege also seems to play some role. With the exception of education, torture permissiveness tends to coincide with membership among socially dominant racial, economic, and religious groups. Torture restrictiveness in turn tends to overlap with socially disadvantaged racial, economic, and religious groups. These trends remained consistent over time.

POLITICS: POLITICAL PARTY AND IDEOLOGY AS MOST SIGNIFICANT VARIABLES

The two most significant variables in torture opinion relate to politics, and these include political party identification and political ideology. In terms of torture permissiveness, identification with the Republican Party seems to play a slightly greater role than ideological conservatism. In terms of torture restrictiveness, the obverse is true, with liberal ideology seeming to play a larger role than Democratic Party affiliation.

Political party and ideology are closely related but not equivalent, and the strength of the relationship between a given party identification and its most closely

associated ideology varies across groups: republicans and conservatives are much more strongly related than democrats and liberals, and whereas the Republican Party is dominated by ideological conservatives, the Democratic Party is not dominated by liberals but by moderates. Despite the ideological diversity that exists within each party, most ideological conservatives are republicans (49%), most moderates are independents (44%), and most liberals are democrats (37%). For the purpose of analyzing the relationship between torture opinion and these political variables it is simplest to treat the latter as a single variable where possible.³ The two political variables were thus combined into a single political orientation index along a 0-to-1 scale, with 1 indicating the strongest republican and/or conservative identification, 0 indicating the strongest democratic and/or liberal identification, and .5 indicating most independent and/or moderate identification. Cases were then binned into three discreet groups: *Lib/Dems* for those with more liberal and/or democratic inclinations, *Mod/Indeps* for those with more moderate and/or independent inclinations, and *Consv/Reps* for those with more conservative and/or republican inclinations. I refer to these groups using their abbreviations in order to avoid repeating the cumbersome qualifying descriptors of *more* and *and/or* that would need to accompany the full labels (e.g. *Lib/Dem* instead of “people with more liberal and/or democratic orientations”). However, the reader should keep in mind that, for example, *Lib/Dem* is a calculated construct not necessarily synonymous with *liberal democrats*, because it may also contain some moderate

³ Having performed extensive analysis treating them as separate variables, it is my judgment that the analysis loses nothing of relevance to the subject at hand by simplifying the results in this way, but gains much by enabling them to be communicated more clearly. In situations where distinguishing party and ideology variables yields relevant information, I will separate them.

democrats or liberal independents. (See Appendix C for details about the variable frequencies and measures used to calculate political orientation.)

POLITICAL ORIENTATION OVERALL

In terms of political party and ideology, republicans and conservatives tend to be the most torture permissive while democrats and liberals are the least; independents and moderates fall in between these two and correspond most closely with the national average overall. Torture opinion follows a linear relationship with both political party and ideology, with support for torture increasing with greater ideological conservatism and stronger identification with the Republican Party. Permissiveness among Consv/Reps (62%) is nearly twice that among Lib/Dems (35%), and nearly one quarter of Consv/Reps (23.4%) responded *often*, compared to one-tenth of Lib/Dems (10.5%) who did the same. Lib/Dems responded *never* at double the rate of Consv/Reps (39%, 17%, respectively). In terms of mean torture acceptance, Consv/Reps (0.56) significantly exceed the national mean of 0.45, and Lib/Dems (0.35) fall significantly beneath it. Like torture permissiveness, torture acceptance also increases with greater conservatism and republicanism.




Figure 5. Mean Torture Acceptance by Political Orientation (Scaled), Pew 2004-2011

POLITICAL ORIENTATION OVER TIME

Permissiveness among Consv/Reps over this decade has been consistently higher than among the general population, while permissiveness among Lib/Dems has been consistently lower. Between 2009 and 2011, permissiveness increased among Consv/Reps, as it did among the rest of the population, and reached a peak of 71% at the end of 2009, which was 6% above where it had been earlier that year. Lib/Dems showed a more dramatic up-tick in torture permissiveness during that time, increasing by 12% between early 2009 when it was at its lowest (29%) and late 2011 when it reached a peak of 41%. Mod/Indeps showed a similarly significant increase in torture permissiveness during that time, increasing by 13% between early 2009 when it was at one of its lowest points (42%) and late 2009 when it reached its peak of 55%. This shows that even though Consv/Reps are the most torture permissive group both overall and over time, the increase in torture permissiveness to the majority view seen from 2009

through 2011 is primarily due to an upsurge of support among Mod/Indeps and Lib/Dems.




Figure 6. Torture Permissiveness by Political Orientation Over Time, Pew 2004-2011

PARTY AND IDEOLOGY OVER TIME

The increase in torture permissiveness among Lib/Dems, who lean towards the left side of the political spectrum, seems to be more of a matter of ideology than party allegiance. The increase among democrats took place almost exclusively among those who identify as ideological conservatives or moderates. Torture support skyrocketed among ideologically conservative and moderate democrats from February 2009 to August 2011, while remaining steady and even slightly declining among democrats who are ideologically liberal. In fact, the increase in torture support across all parties seems to occur primarily among ideologically conservatives and moderates. This suggests that,

while party and ideology are deeply intertwined, torture support may be motivated somewhat more by ideology than by party cues.




Figure 7. Torture Acceptance Among Democrats, by Ideology Over Time, Pew 2004-2011

RELIGION: WHAT IS THE ROLE OF RELIGION IN PUBLIC OPINION OF TORTURE?

In terms of social characteristics associated with torture acceptance and aversion, religion is less significant than many other variables. The subordinate role of religion in torture opinion is in some ways consistent with other findings on the relationship between religion and moral decision-making. For example, Pew Forum for Religious and Public Life (Pew Forum) reported in June 2008 that, "When asked about what most influences their thinking about government and politics, a plurality of the general public (34%) says they rely most heavily on their own personal experiences. Roughly one-in-five (19%) say they rely on what they have seen in the media. Only 14% cite their religious beliefs as the most important influence in their thinking about

government and public affairs" (77). Historical, social and psychological studies have also shown that religion does not seem to be a significant factor influencing moral behavior (Hood et al. 2009, 385). Summarizing his review of historical and social psychological studies in his work *The Banality of Good and Evil*, David Blumenthal (1999, 130) concludes that, "There is no overall consistent pattern of pro-social influence in secular or religious moral teaching. Religious as well as secular moral teaching accounts for very little of humankind's ability to resist evil and do good." When religion does play a significant role in shaping public attitudes, it tends to be in relation to social issues more than economics or foreign policy (Froese and Bader 2008; Pew Forum 2008).

Yet while religion's role in torture opinion is small, especially relative to political orientation, it does appear to have some effect of statistical significance, and the nature of the relationship between torture opinion and religion is the focus of this section. The torture opinion data is unfortunately limited in terms of the quantity and quality of the religion variables available for correlational analysis, and essentially consists of two main variables that were included in all of the eleven of the Pew surveys conducted between July 2004 and August 2011, as well as the 2008-2009 ANES Panel Survey. These two main religion variables include a question about religious affiliation and a question about frequency of attendance at church. A few other relevant variables were included on some of these surveys, and they will be incorporated into this analysis as well. Altogether, the combined data provides variables corresponding to each of the three "B's" that scholars of religion sometimes use to conceptualize religion's multi-dimensionality: belonging, behaving, and believing.

BELONGING: RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION

The first and most obvious religion variable has to do with respondents' religious affiliation. Unfortunately, this is a less objective variable than one would wish. As scholars of religion know, individuals' relationships to religion are extremely complex, and its reduction to a multiple-choice question on a survey can be problematic. Question wording and context are extremely influential when it comes to assessing religious belonging. ANES-PS0809 and Pew surveys from July 2004 – June 2007 used the more ambiguous question wording: "What is your religious preference?" to which some people may respond with their religious heritage even if they have no current affiliation. Pew's question wording changed beginning with its November 2007 survey to a more direct solicitation of current affiliation, asking, "What is your present religion, if any?" and the response options offered altered slightly as well. (See Appendix C for religion variable frequencies and question text.)

The majority of the U.S. population claims some affiliation with the Christian tradition (81%); the percentages of Other Religions (5%) and the Unaffiliated (13%) are small by comparison. Nevertheless, comparing these groups does yield some meaningful information, namely, that (1) Christians tend to be the most supportive of torture relative to those who prefer Other Religions and the Unaffiliated; and (2) the effects of Christian religious affiliation on torture support are mediated through race and political orientation.

1. CHRISTIAN TRADITION IS MOST TORTURE PERMISSIVE

When it comes to comparing the religiously affiliated with the unaffiliated, both Pew and ANES data show that the unaffiliated tend to be less accepting of torture than their religiously affiliated counterparts. However, breaking down affiliation by religious tradition shows that not all religious traditions are associated with greater torture support. Within the Pew data it is primarily affiliation with the Christian tradition that is associated with greater torture support, while affiliation with every other tradition except Judaism corresponds to less torture support than found among the unaffiliated. Within the ANES data, affiliation with the Jewish tradition is associated with the greatest torture support. Because the Pew data offer a richer source for analysis, in part due to the large sample size and ability to track over time, and because the greatest supporters of torture in that data set identify with the Christian tradition, the religion analysis moving forward will focus primarily on Christian religiousness within the Pew data.




Figure 8. Torture Permissiveness by Religious Affiliation, Pew 2004-2011

The Pew data show that people who identify with the Christian tradition are 14% more torture permissive than those who identify with Other Religions, 9% more than those with No Religion, and 7% more permissive than the Unaffiliated overall. Muslims, Buddhists, Other Faiths (the majority of which belong to “Liberal Faiths” such as Unitarianism and do not consider themselves Christian) are the most torture restrictive faith traditions. Part of the reason for Christians’ high level of torture support may have to do with the out-sized proportion of Christians relative to other groups. Christians made up 81% of the total sample, and are thus more likely to reflect the torture

permissiveness of the population as a whole. When analyzed over time, Christian torture opinion unsurprisingly tracks closest with the national average, while other groups have sample sizes too small for meaningful analysis over time, except as composite categories of *Other Religions* and *Unaffiliated*. Within the Christian tradition, non-black Evangelical Protestants (52%) followed by Orthodox Christians (51%), Catholics (50%), and non-black Mainline Protestants (49%) make up the most torture permissive groups. These Christian groups are also the most torture accepting, showing rates of .49, .46, .47, and .47 mean torture acceptance respectively.




Figure 9. Mean Torture Acceptance by Religious Affiliation, Pew 2004-2011

2. THE ROLE OF CHRISTIAN AFFILIATION AND RELIGIOSITY IN TORTURE OPINION IS MEDIATED IN PART THROUGH RACE AND POLITICAL ORIENTATION

Race plays a significant role in both torture opinion and Christian denominational affiliation, and taking this variable into account shows that it is only among Whites that Christian affiliation is associated with greater torture support. Black⁴ Christians show a lower rate of torture support (40% TP; .38 TA) more commensurate with Other Religions (35% TP; .35 TA) and the Unaffiliated (42% TP; .42 TA) than with other groups of fellow Christians.

Religion is also significantly correlated with political orientation, which was itself shown to be the most significant variable when it comes to torture opinion. A positive association between religiousness and conservatism is born out in my data, and has been noted elsewhere. Pew Forum's 2008 U.S. Religious Landscape Survey, for example, found that "Americans who place a high value on religion in their lives or who are active religiously tend to be more politically conservative than other Americans" (82). Conservatives are more likely to consider issues of religion as relevant when deciding whether something is right or wrong, for example, "whether or not someone acted in a way that God would approve of" and "whether or not someone violated standards of purity and decency" (Haidt 2012; Graham, Haidt, and Nosek 2008).

Religion is popularly associated with conservative views on abortion and homosexuality, and with the Republican Party (Campbell, Layman, and Green 2011). By contrast, "religious groups provide an infinitesimal share of the groups associated with

⁴ Pew uses "Black" rather than "African American" as a racial category. Because "Black" is a broader category than "African American," I retain the former terminology in my racial descriptors based on Pew data. ANES uses the racial category "African American" and so I employ that term when describing ANES data.

the Democratic party” (Campbell, Layman, and Green 2011, 174). Ninety-four percent of Consv/Reps are religiously affiliated, compared to 81% of Lib/Dems. While Lib/Dems comprise 46% of the religiously Unaffiliated, only 7% of the Unaffiliated are Consv/Reps. Fifty-one percent of Consv/Reps frequently attend church services, compared to 30% of Lib/Dems, and roughly the same proportions are seen when it comes to participating in prayer meetings or bible studies: nearly half (48%) of Consv/Reps say they attend these gatherings, compared to less than one-third (31%) of Lib/Dems. Consv/Reps also exceed Lib/Dems in the level of importance placed upon religion and prayer in their lives, by +21% and +18% respectively.

Given that conservatism is the most significant factor in torture support and that religion, especially Christianity, is positively associated with conservatism in the U.S., we might suspect that the reason torture support is higher among Christians than the Unaffiliated is because of the disproportionate amount of conservatives represented within the Christian sample. Among Christians, 43% identify as Consv/Rep, while only 25% identify as Lib-Dem. Among Unaffiliateds, by contrast, 44% identify as Lib/Dem and only 19% identify as Consv/Rep. Controlling for political orientation is thus necessary for an accurate understanding of the role of religion in torture opinion. Once political orientation has been controlled for, we see that the positive relationship between Christian religious affiliation and torture support is limited to *white Lib/Dems*. White Lib/Dems are the only social group in the Pew data for whom Christian affiliation is associated with greater torture support relative to the Unaffiliated. Compared to their

Unaffiliated counterparts, white Lib/Dems who are Christian are 9% more torture permissive and 7% more torture accepting.




Figure 10. Mean Torture Acceptance by Religious Affiliation, Political Orientation, and Race, Pew 2004-2011

Among Consv/Reps and Blacks, by contrast, Christian religious affiliation is associated with *less* torture support compared to Unaffiliated Consv/Reps and Blacks. Christian white Consv/Reps and Blacks are respectively 3% and 14% less torture permissive and 3% and 10% less torture accepting than Unaffiliated Consv/Reps and Blacks. Ultimately, Christian affiliation appears to have the contrasting effects of *increasing* torture support among white Lib/Dems, while *decreasing* torture support among Blacks and Consv/Reps compared to their Unaffiliated counterparts. These findings are corroborated by ANES data, which also show that Christian affiliation decreases torture acceptance among Consv/Reps (-4%) and African Americans (-16%), and increases it among white Lib/Dems (+13%), compared to their Unaffiliated counterparts. This dual relationship of religion and torture opinion, whereby torture

support is increased among Christian affiliated white Lib/Dems and decreased among Christian affiliated Consv/Reps and Blacks, remains consistent even when controlling for other demographic variables of age, gender, income, region, evangelicalism, and education.

BEHAVING: RELIGIOUS COMMITMENT

Religious affiliation, which can be an expression of cultural heritage as much as faith, is limited in what it can convey about a person's level of religious commitment. Frequency of attendance at church services is commonly used as a proxy for religious commitment, and all of the Pew and ANES surveys under consideration ask respondents to report the frequency of their attendance at religious services, excluding funerals and weddings. Though studies have shown significant discrepancies between self-reported and actual attendance at religious services, (with people tending to substantially exaggerate their attendance), responses do express something about the level of importance placed on religion in one's life (Voas 2007). Voas (2007) writes, "If being a churchgoer is part of one's personal identity, there may be considerable resistance to answering in a way that places one outside the fold. Subjective feelings of regularity are being translated into unrealistic frequencies..." (151). In interpreting *religiosity* – which refers to intensity of religious commitment (Campbell, Layman, and Green 2011, 181) – in terms of attendance frequency then, one should resist taking the numbers too literally, and understand that they express a subjective element of the degree to which persons feel committed to their faith community. As previously mentioned, Consv/Reps tend to be more frequent church attenders (+21%) than Lib/Dems, irrespective of

religious affiliation. Among *Christians*, *Consv/Reps* and *Blacks* are respectively 26% and 19% more likely to frequently attend church than white *Lib/Dems*. Meanwhile, *most* Christian white *Lib/Dems* (60%) are infrequent church attenders. This discrepancy goes some way towards explaining the different effects of religious affiliation on each of these groups. That's because regardless of religious affiliation, infrequent attenders are uniformly the most accepting of torture compared to either those who frequently attend church (i.e., once per week or more) or those who never attend.




Figure 11. Mean Torture Acceptance by Religious Affiliation and Attendance Frequency, Pew 2004-2011

Looking at religion in terms of attendance frequency as well as affiliation allows us to focus on the effects of religion among the more committed Christians across racial and political groups. We will refer to the combination of Christian affiliation and attendance as a measure of *Christian religiosity*, and to the people who frequently attend church as the category of *practicing Christians*.

Controlling for attendance frequency in this way mitigates the impact of Christian affiliation on torture opinion among white Lib/Dems. Torture support among Christian white Lib/Dems in general is 9% greater than among Unaffiliated white Lib/Dems in terms of torture permissiveness, and 7% greater in terms of torture acceptance. Among *frequently attending* Christian white Lib/Dems, torture support is still greater than among Unaffiliated white Lib/Dems, but by a smaller margin, showing 4% greater torture permissiveness and 6% greater torture acceptance.

Table 2. Torture Support by Religious Preference and Attendance Frequency, Pew 2004-2011

	Unaffiliated	Christian	Christian		
			Frequently Attend	Infrequently Attend	Never Attend
<u>Torture Permissiveness</u>					
Blacks	47%	40%	37%	44%	33%
White Consv/Reps	65%	62%	58%	68%	55%
White Lib/Dems	28%	37%	35%	38%	35%
<u>Torture Acceptance</u>					
Blacks	0.45	0.38	0.35	0.41	0.32
White Consv/Reps	0.59	0.56	0.53	0.60	0.53
White Lib/Dems	0.30	0.37	0.36	0.39	0.34

At the same time, because frequent church attendance is associated with decreased support for torture compared to infrequent attendance, it actually enhances the impact of Christian affiliation on torture opinion among Consv/Reps and Blacks. Christian Consv/Reps are 3.4% less torture permissive and 3% less torture accepting than Unaffiliated Consv/Reps. When attendance frequency is taken into account, the effect of Christian affiliation on Consv/Rep torture opinion doubles: frequently attending Christian Consv/Reps are 7% less torture permissive and 6% less torture

accepting than Unaffiliated Consv/Reps. Church attendance frequency has a similar effect among Christian Blacks. Christian Blacks are 7% less torture permissive and 7% less torture accepting than Unaffiliated Blacks. *Frequently attending* Christian Blacks are 10% less torture permissive and 10% less torture accepting than Unaffiliated Blacks.

In short, among those who *ever* attend church, greater religious commitment (i.e. religiosity) in the form of more frequent attendance has the uniform effect of decreasing torture support across all religious, racial, and political categories. Among white Lib/Dems, frequent attendance lessens the qualitatively negative (though quantitatively positive) effect of Christian affiliation on torture support. Among Consv/Reps and Blacks, frequent attendance enhances the qualitatively positive (though quantitatively negative) effect of Christian affiliation on torture support among these groups. It is important to underscore, however, that this relationship is limited to Christians who attend church. Non-practicing Christians (Christians who *never* attend church) still tend to be equally or less torture supportive than even their frequent attending Christian counterparts.

Might other measures of religiosity effect similar decreases in torture support? For the most part, yes they do. (It should be noted, however, that there were so few Blacks who showed low religiosity on these measures, that they are excluded from this analysis.) Among white Christians, greater religiosity in the form of agreement with the statement “religion is a very important part of my life” is associated with less torture acceptance among Consv/Reps (-3%) and Lib/Dems (-1%) compared to those who disagree. Greater religiosity in the form of agreement with the statement “prayer is an

important part of my daily life” is associated with less torture acceptance among white Christian Consv/Reps (-6%) and Lib/Dems (-8%). And finally, greater religiosity in the form of participation in prayer meetings or bible study is associated with less torture acceptance among white Christian Consv/Reps and with equal torture acceptance among white Christian Lib/Dems.

BELIEVING: RELIGIOUS BELIEFS

When it comes to religious beliefs, we continue to see the same pattern that emerged with religious affiliation, whereby greater religiousness is associated with greater torture support among Lib/Dems and less torture support among Consv/Reps. Overall, agreement with the statement "I never doubt the existence of God" in the Pew data is associated with 5% greater torture acceptance compared to those who disagree. But when the population is broken down according to political orientation, we see that agreement with this statement is associated with greater torture acceptance among Lib/Dems (+4%) and with slightly less among Consv/Reps (-1%). The trend becomes more pronounced when controlling for Christian religiosity: Among practicing Christians, agreement with the statement "I never doubt the existence of God" is associated with 17% less torture support among Consv/Reps and 9% greater torture support among Lib/Dems. The same is true with the belief that “we all will be called before God at the Judgment Day to answer for our sins." Among Christians who frequently attend church, agreement with this statement is associated with slightly less torture support among Consv/Reps (-3%) and much greater torture support among Lib/Dems (+15%).

When it comes to views of the bible, greater literalism is associated with less torture acceptance among practicing Christian Consv/Reps and greater torture acceptance among practicing Christian Lib/Dems in the ANES data. Practicing Christian Consv/Reps who take a highly literal interpretation of the bible ("The Bible is the actual word of God and is to be taken literally") show 2% less torture acceptance than those take a less literal, more traditional view ("The Bible is the word of God but not everything in it should be taken literally, word for word"), who themselves show 12% less torture acceptance than practicing Christian Consv/Reps who take a more constructionist view ("The Bible is a book written by men and is not the word of God"). The opposite is true for practicing Christian Lib/Dems, for whom greater traditionalism and literalism are associated with increasing levels of torture acceptance (+10% and +11%, respectively).

Of the variables available for analysis, the only religious belief that did not correspond to the above pattern is that "AIDS might be God's punishment for immoral sexual behavior." Overall, agreement with this statement is associated with greater torture support. When examined according to political categories, this time we see that the statement is associated with 8% greater torture acceptance among Christian Consv/Reps who frequently attend church and 2% less among frequent attending Christian Lib/Dems.

CHAPTER CONCLUSION

In an effort to discern the role of religion in public opinion of torture, the second section of chapter one included an analysis of trends in torture opinion overall and over time based on Pew and ANES data, with a particular focus on political and religion variables. The analysis yielded several notable results, which subsequent chapters will attempt to interpret.

Overall, a significant minority of the population held torture permissive views between 2004 and 2009, at which point torture permissiveness increased to the majority view and remained so through the last Pew survey to ask the question, conducted in 2011. Political party and ideology are the most significant determinants of torture opinion, with Consv/Reps demonstrating the most torture support and Lib/Dems the least support for torture compared to all other social groups. The increase in torture acceptance over time seems to be driven by greater support among conservative and moderate independents and democrats (i.e., Mod/Indeps and Lib/Dems) since 2009.

Religion has a weaker relationship with torture opinion than nearly every other demographic variable. Still, the results of the religion analysis reveal two distinct dynamics operant in the relationship between religion and torture opinion that remain consistent even when controlling for age, gender, income, region, evangelicalism, and education. (1) Religiousness measured in terms of belonging (affiliation) and beliefs tend to be associated with greater torture support among white Lib/Dems and less torture support among Consv/Reps and Blacks. In terms of these measures, the role of religion is not only subordinate to political orientation when it comes to affecting attitudes

towards torture, it also seems to be *mediated through* political orientation. (2)

Religiousness measured in terms of commitment, or religiosity, tells a different story. Analysis of the church attendance variable showed that infrequent attendance was associated with greater torture support compared to those on either end of the attendance spectrum, who either frequently or never attend. Greater religiosity in the forms of greater importance placed on prayer and religion in one's life, as well as participation in prayer meetings or bible study groups had the same effect of decreasing torture support across the political spectrum. Among Christian Consv/Reps and Blacks, greater religiosity decreased torture support even more than did Christian affiliation alone. Meanwhile, white Christian Lib/Dems demonstrating greater religiosity continued to be more torture supportive than their Unaffiliated counterparts, but not as much as their less committed Christian Lib/Dems.

Subsequent chapters will focus on questions raised by two of these main findings. First, why is Consv/Rep political orientation associated with greater torture support and Lib/Dem political orientation associated with greater torture opposition? This question will be the focus of chapter two. There I look to the field of political psychology and in particular to the construct of authoritarianism for possible explanations. Second, why is Christianity associated with decreased torture support among Consv/Reps and Blacks, but with increased torture support among white Lib/Dems? This question will be the focus of chapter three. There I look to Jonathan Haidt's cultural psychology of morality and religion for a possible means of

interpretation. In addressing these two key questions, we will gain insight into many of the other findings discussed above as well.

CHAPTER III

INTERPRETING TORTURE OPINION THROUGH THE LENS OF POLITICAL PSYCHOLOGY AND AUTHORITARIANISM

In chapter two I seek to understand the relationships between political orientation and torture opinion, and particularly why Consv/Rep orientation should be associated with greater torture support and Lib/Dem orientation with greater torture aversion. Chapter two is comprised of two main sections. The first section offers a model for understanding the nature of public opinion and for contextualizing torture opinion within the broader process of ethical discernment. Beginning with a brief orientation to the origins and nature of public opinion according to John Zaller, I claim that Lib/Dem and Consv/Rep orientations express distinct political psychologies with distinct moral intuitions, and that public opinion of torture is more indicative of the premoral phase of the moral decision-making process than it is a product of reasoned ethical reflection. The second section focuses on the differences between conservative and liberal political psychologies and their relationships with authoritarianism and nonauthoritarianism. I claim that an understanding of these four psychological constructs helps explain differences in group attitudes towards torture.

THE NATURE AND ORIGINS OF PUBLIC OPINION

PUBLIC OPINION AS POLITICAL PSYCHOLOGY

In *The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion* (1992), Zaller describes public opinion as a product of three interacting variables: (1) variations among individual predispositions (specifically values); (2) variations in the information carried in elite discourse at the aggregate level; and (3) variations among individuals in the amount of attention paid to this discourse. In subsequent work, Zaller (2012) reconsiders the role of elite discourse in shaping public opinion and suggests that party politics may be a more significant factor. Most people are unlikely to have developed well thought-out positions on each of the topics presented by pollsters, and so respondents rely on the leaders they trust. Leaders who are seen as sharing similar values are entrusted to do the intellectual heavy lifting and to arrive at conclusions consistent with respondents' own values. Rather than think of people as having a single pre-determined view on a given subject, which is elicited by pollsters, Zaller maintains that we should think of people as having multiple, often inconsistent, "considerations" about any given subject, and that the ones that happen to be most salient at the time of the poll influence a person's response. Salience in this instance means not the most emotionally laden considerations or even the most important, but rather the most "at the top of one's head." Elite discourse and party politics can raise certain considerations above others at different times, and the extent to which an individual attends to this information influences the degree to which such considerations are internalized and brought to the

forefront in one's mind. Variations in the information carried through elite discourse and party politics account for much of the response instability observed across surveys (Zaller 1992).

Public opinions about torture and fluctuations over time are undoubtedly also related to changes in the dominant discourses relayed in the media at the time of each survey. However, an extensive content analysis of political messaging and media coverage over the decade between 2001 and 2011 would be necessary to understand the impact of cues from political parties on public opinion of torture. That task is beyond the scope of this project. Of the three interacting variables that shape public opinion, I focus on variations in individual predispositions and the values that accompany them.

The relationship between party politics and public opinion is not a one-way street, of course. People have latent opinions which are not easily altered and which political leaders tend to follow rather than to shape. A concept developed by V.O. Key Jr. (1961), *latent opinion* refers to opinions that citizens hold but that have not yet become manifest (Zaller 2012, 571). Political parties are concerned about what citizens are likely to think if ____, and accordingly put forward platforms they think the public will support. While to some extent, "political ideologies reflect uncritical mass acceptance of elite-packaged systems of opinion," members of the public determine for themselves which party's cues to accept based on whom they think offers an ideology most consistent with their values (Zaller 2012, 575). In other words, political ideologies are influenced by individual values as well as political parties. Though the two concepts of party and ideology are not identical, the self-referential nature of their relationship underlies my

decision to treat them as composite categories (Consv/Rep, Mod/Indep, Lib/Dem) based on a calculated political orientation index.

POLITICAL IDEOLOGY AS POLITICAL PSYCHOLOGY

Like Zaller, Stenner (2005) understands political orientation as a reflection of individual predispositions towards certain values, rather than the product of conscious deliberation. Stenner considers the self-reported conservatism and liberalism (as well as assessed authoritarianism and nonauthoritarianism) captured by surveys to be political *psychologies* rather than political *ideologies*. For Stenner, the term *political ideology* is intended to express reasoned doctrines proposed to help address universal human dilemmas rooted in basic human needs and desires, and entailing “some systematic analysis and reconciliation of values” (2005, 86). Survey respondents’ identification with a given political party or ideology, however, is less likely to reflect the results of systematic deliberation than it is to convey a constellation of value commitments, which themselves are adopted according to their ability to satisfy certain psychological needs. Stenner treats ideological self-identification on surveys as an expression of *political psychology*, reflecting the “the manner in which different value commitments tend to ‘go together’ *within* individuals, universally and perpetually” as psychological expressions of basic human needs, desires, and motivations (2005, 87 original emphasis). Zaller’s conceptualization of public opinion together with Stenner’s conceptualization of political psychology suggest that public opinion of torture, with political orientation as its main determinant, is less a product of rational deliberation

and more an expression of pre-conscious phenomena that Haidt calls “moral intuitions” and that theological ethicist Don Browning calls the “pre-moral.”

PUBLIC OPINION AS MORAL INTUITION

Moral intuitionism is a line of thought within the psychological study of morality that emphasizes the role of moral intuitions over the process of rational thought in directing our moral decision-making. Like David Hume who saw moral reasoning as “slave of the passions,” moral intuitionists see morality as rooted in and driven by intuitions (of which emotions are one form), and they see moral reasoning as biased by and subject to these (Haidt 2012). Moral intuitions are seen in this branch of moral psychology as primary and dominant in the process of forming moral judgments, while moral reasoning is a post-hoc process of finding rational support for the intuitions.

It is common to think of reasoning as a cognitive process and emotions as their contraries – as irrational and therefore non-cognitive processes. Haidt rejects this dichotomization of emotions and cognition, with its consequent reduction of cognition to reasoning. It is inaccurate, Haidt contends, to think in terms of emotions versus reasoning, with cognition only associated with the latter. Rather, like reasoning, “*emotions are a kind of information processing*” and therefore a form of cognition (Haidt 2012, 45, original emphasis). Furthermore, emotions are one form of the broader category of *intuitions*, most of which are subtle and entail a series of rapid, sub-conscious evaluations and decisions that seldom rise to the level of emotions (Haidt 2012). Rather than *emotions versus cognition*, the better distinction to be made,

according to Haidt, is between *intuitions* and *reasoning*, which should be understood as two different forms of cognition. As types of cognitive processes, reason is controlled while intuition is automatic (Haidt 2012, 49).

Haidt likens the relationship between moral reasoning and intuitions to that of a rider on an elephant: moral reasoning is the rider, who has some capacity to steer and direct the elephant of moral intuitions, but who ultimately can't compel the elephant to go anywhere she doesn't want to go. The task of the rider (reason) is most often to offer explanations when the elephant (intuitions) moves in a given direction and to offer justifications when the elephant wants to do something else. Haidt's analogy underscores the idea that if a change of direction is in order, discussing it with the rider is of limited use when it is really the elephant that is in charge. In other words, if you want to convince someone of the righteousness of your position, it's best to take it up with that person's elephantine intuitions, because pure reason has relatively little sway in the moral decision-making process. A second analogy Haidt uses is a dog (intuition) wagging its tail (reason). Here the tail (reason) is a means of communicating with others, while the dog (intuitions) is the source of what is being expressed. It would be a mistake to imagine that vigorously shaking the dog's tail will make the dog happy: "You can't make the dog happy by forcibly wagging its tail. And you can't change people's minds by utterly refuting their arguments" (Haidt 2012, 48).

Liberalism and conservatism are political psychologies that underlie what Haidt identifies as distinct moral intuitions, each comprised of different sets of moral foundations. Conservative moral intuitions are based on the six moral foundations of

Care/Harm, Fairness/Cheating, Liberty/Oppression, Loyalty/Betrayal, Authority/Subversion, and Sanctity/Degradation, while liberal moral intuitions are based on only the first three of these. The relationship of liberalism and conservatism to each of these foundations will be explored in greater detail in chapter three.

PUBLIC OPINION AS PREMORAL

Theological ethicist and noted scholar in the study of psychology and religion, Don Browning (2010) maintains that the phenomena upon which moral intuitionists focus might more accurately be understood as the “premoral.” Browning introduced the distinction between premoral and moral goods in *Religious Thought and Modern Psychologies* (1987; Browning and Cooper 2004) as the same distinction made by William Frankena, who differentiated nonmoral goods from moral goods, and Louis Janssens, who differentiated between premoral and moral goods. (Browning finds the “premoral” terminology more apt than “nonmoral,” and I concur, so I use that term henceforth.)

Browning (2006, 62) elaborates on the concept of the premoral by likening it to the distinction Paul Ricoeur makes in *Onself as Another* (1992) between ethics and morality, maintaining that what Ricoeur calls “ethics” is akin to his use of the term “premoral.” In *Reflections on the Just* (2007), Ricoeur continues developing his “little ethics,” first presented in *Onself as Another*, through what he terms a “rewriting” – not just a clarification, but not a retraction either (45). Whereas his 1992 work

differentiated between morality and ethics, his more recent (2007) work makes a tripart distinction between an *anterior ethic*, *morality*, and *posterior ethics*.

Ricour's later distinction is helpful for thinking about public opinion and its place in the moral decision-making process. However, Ricoeur's terminology for each phase can make it difficult to wield the terms morality or ethics with as much clarity, since "ethics" has two different meanings depending on what side of morality it is on. The colloquial understanding of ethics as reflection upon morality also gets lost in Ricoeur's terminology of anterior and posterior ethics. Thus taking Browning's lead, I apply different terms to two of Ricoeur's three categories, supplanting *pre-moral* for Ricoeur's anterior ethic and *post-moral* for Ricoeur's posterior ethics.

Premoral: Ricoeur's first category, *anterior ethic*, is what Browning would term the *pre-moral* and liken to *moral intuitions*. It refers to the life aim and striving for the good; it is grounded in human life and desire and springs from our pursuit of the good life (Ricoeur 2007). Ricoeur considers moral sentiments (i.e., emotions such as shame, modesty, courage, indignation) – which moral psychologists would recognize as moral intuitions – as part of this anterior ethic, "stitching together" the roots of desire with the plane of moral norms and obligations (2007, 45). Premoral goods may not be entirely moral goods, and there can be conflicts between them as there may be multiple premoral goods competing within an individual or between persons. Thus it is the role of the *moral* to reconcile conflicting *pre-moral* goods, both within the individual self and between self and others (Browning 2010, 60).

Moral: Morality for Ricoeur (2007) refers to the plane of norms and obligation. Norms presuppose obligation, and obligation presupposes a subject of obligation, which presupposes imputability (i.e., an imputable subject). Thus morality designates both the *object* of norms (obligatory actions and maxims) and the *subject* of norms. Norms refer to obligatory actions and maxims (“oughts”), and only that which can satisfy the test of universalization is considered obligatory. A subject of norms is obligated by them, and being subject to obligation requires imputability. Imputability refers to a “capable human being” with the capacity to speak, act, narrate, *and* the “capacity to posit oneself as an agent” (Ricoeur 2007, 45).

Postmoral: Ricoeur’s third category, *posterior ethics*, is described by Ricoeur himself at one point as “postmoral” (2007, 52). Whereas premoral refers to the upstream side of norms, connecting the ground of life and desire to the moral plane of norms and obligation, postmoral refers to the downstream application of those moral norms and obligations to concrete lived situations. *Phronesis* (practical wisdom) operates in this downward, postmoral trajectory similar to the way moral sentiments operate in the upward, premoral trajectory.

To summarize, Ricoeur divides morality and ethics into three distinct concepts – anterior ethic, morality, and posterior ethics – which I have dubbed premoral, moral, and postmoral. *Premoral* (Ricoeur’s anterior ethic) refers to the life aim and striving for the good. It is rooted in life and desire, and moral intuitions bring these premoral aims together with the plane of moral norms and obligations. Fundamental ethics is the disciplinary structure that guides this intellectual movement from life and desire to the

plane of morality. *Moral* refers to norms and obligations and entails the unfolding of these norms through the connection of premoral *moral intuitions* on the one side with postmoral *practical wisdom* on the other. Moral philosophy supplies the intellectual structure that links fundamental to applied ethics. *Postmoral* (Ricoeur's posterior ethics) refers to the ensuing decision or judgment. Grounded in lived experience, it uses practical wisdom (*phronesis*) to interpret and apply the plane of moral norms and obligations to the ground of particular situations and contexts. Applied ethics supplies the intellectual structure guiding movement from morality to lived situation. In this retelling of Ricoeur's model, *ethics* is the intellectual journey from the premoral aim on one side (grounded in life and desire for the good), through a central plane of moral norms and obligations, and ultimately to the postmoral judgment on the other side (grounded by concrete situations).

The purpose of this mental mapping of morality and ethics is to illustrate where public opinion of torture lies in the overarching process of ethical reflection. It is my contention that public opinion of torture is an expression of the *premoral* stage, most appropriately interpreted in terms of political psychology and the intuitionist branch of moral psychology. Public opinion of torture is less the result of conscious deliberation on the issue and more an expression of moral intuition. The practice of torture itself may be a moral issue, as the National Religious Campaign Against Torture (2006) claims, but *public opinion of torture* is a *premoral* one. Public opinion of torture serves as a case study for understanding the ways that political orientations express distinct moral intuitions, based on the different ways that liberals and conservatives emphasize and

prioritize some values over others. It is an object lesson in how politics and religion are engaged with the premoral in co-constructing the culture in which national security policies are developed and practiced.

POLITICAL PSYCHOLOGY AND AUTHORITARIANS

CONSERVATISM AND LIBERALISM

The survey data reveal that political orientation is the most significant determinant in public opinion of torture, with Conserv/Rep orientation being the most significant determinant of torture permissiveness and Lib/Dem orientation being the most significant determinant of torture restrictiveness. Our understanding of the nature of public opinion has shown that self-identification as liberal or conservative expresses an underlying political psychology more than it does the reasoned doctrine of ideas suggested by the term “ideology.” This begs the question, what is the nature of the political psychologies expressed by self-identification with conservatism versus liberalism? The scholarly consensus seems to be that conservatives and liberals are distinct along two dimensions: attitudes towards change and attitudes towards equality (Stenner 2005; Jost et al. 2003; Janoff-Bulman 2009). Whereas the core dimensions of conservatism include an aversion to change and acceptance of inequality, the core dimensions of liberalism include an acceptance of change and aversion to inequality.

Conservative aversion to change is most commonly attributed to an existential need for certainty identified by Jost et al. (2003). Jost et al. seek to understand

conservatism as a *motivated social cognition*, a term used to express the assumption that people adopt certain belief systems or ideologies based in part on their ability to satisfy certain psychological needs (2003, 340). Jost et al. identify fear and the need for certainty as the driving forces underlying both the core dimensions of conservative psychology (aversion to change and acceptance of inequality) as well as its more peripheral, associated characteristics (2003, 351). Unfortunately, the studies on which Jost et al. (2003) base their analysis employ measures of conservatism that conflate it with authoritarianism, and thus the association of conservatism with the need for certainty, order, structure, and closure may be more indicative of the psychological motivations underlying authoritarianism rather than conservatism *per se*. An alternative explanation for conservative aversion to change sees it as an effect of conservatism's other defining feature: endorsement of inequality.

Conservatives' high tolerance for inequality has been studied as a tendency called *opposition to equality*, one of the two components of a construct called *social dominance orientation* (Kugler et al. 2010). (Unfortunately, liberal aversion to inequality has not been similarly scrutinized.) According to Kugler et al. (2010), opposition to equality (OEQ) is rooted in system justification motives. It is correlated with high socioeconomic status and low social compassion and it predicts the other defining element of conservatism – resistance to changing the status quo. Members of either socially dominant or subordinate groups may endorse OEQ. However, whereas members of dominant groups experience a boost to their self-esteem in endorsing OEQ because it justifies their dominance, members of subordinate groups endorse OEQ at the

psychological cost of lower self-esteem and greater neuroticism, because accepting the status quo goes against their self-interest and implies a justification of their lower social status (Kugler et al. 2010).

CONSERVATISM AND SOCIAL DOMINANCE

Social dominance orientation (SDO) is a general attitudinal orientation toward intra- and inter-group relations, measuring the extent to which one prefers hierarchical versus equal intra-group relations and the “extent to which one desires that one’s in-group dominate and be superior to out-groups” (Pratto et al. 1994: 742). Unsurprisingly, levels of SDO are situationally dependent upon the social status of one’s group (Kugler et al. 2010). Members of groups with lower social status, or who are primed to think of their own group in relation to groups with greater social status, are more likely to have lower levels of SDO than members of groups with high social status, or who are primed to think of their group in relation to groups with lower social status.

The demographic data presented earlier showed a pattern suggesting that torture opinion is related to social privilege, by which is meant unearned advantage based on membership within a social category (Adams et al. 2010). In *Readings for Diversity and Social Justice* (Adams et al., 2010, p. 29), the authors identify privileged and disadvantaged social categories (sometimes referred to as dominant and

subordinate or oppressor and oppressed groups) in the U.S. in a table that looks something like this⁵:

Table 3. Oppressor and Oppressed Groups

Examples of Manifestations of Social Oppression	Examples of Oppressor Groups (U.S.-Based)	Examples of Oppressed Groups (U.S.-Based)
Sexism	Men	Women
Racism	Whites	African American; Asian American; Latina/o; Native American; Multi-Racial People
Classism	Owning Class, Upper Middle Class, Middle Class	Working Class, Poor
Religious Oppression	Christians	Jews, Hindus, Buddhists, Muslims, Atheists
Ageism and Adulthood ⁶	Adults	Young People, Elders

As I noted in chapter one, torture support tends to be greater among socially dominant gender/sex, race, age, religious, and socio-economic categories: men, Whites, ages 30-49, Christians, and people with greater socio-economic status. Conserv/Rep political orientation is also associated with these dominant social categories. For the social categories of sex and age, membership in the dominant group is associated with greater torture support independently of political orientation (i.e., across all political categories). For other social categories such as race and income, members of socially dominant groups tend to be more torture supportive if they are also Conserv/Rep and less torture supportive if they are also Lib/Dem. Religion is the only category in which social

⁵ Table is based on “Figure 4.2. Examples of Multiple Manifestations and Oppressor and Oppressed Groups.” The original table also includes rows for Heterosexism and Ableism, but since variables aren’t available to analyze those categories, I left them out. I added the row on “Ageism and Adulthood” based on the categories described in the chapter of that name (chapter 9).

⁶ Ageism and Adulthood are two distinct forms of oppression: Ageism refers to the oppression of Elders by Adults and Young People, while Adulthood refers to the oppression of Young People by Adults and Elders (Adams et al. 2010, 534). For our purposes, it is sufficient to note that Adults consistently hold a dominant position over both Young People and Elders.

dominance (in the form of Christian identification), when coupled with Consv/Rep orientation, doesn't result in greater torture support. In other words, when membership within any dominant social category, excluding religion, is coupled with Consv/Rep political orientation, torture support is greater than found among any of the socially dominant categories or Consv/Rep orientation by themselves. (See Appendix B for breakdown of socially dominant and subordinate categories by political orientation and torture acceptance.)

For the most part, members of socially dominant categories are more likely to be oriented towards Consv/Rep than are members of socially subordinate groups. In terms of sex, males are 6% more likely to be Consv/Rep than females. Male sexual identification continues to be positively associated with greater torture support, regardless of political orientation: male Consv/Reps, Mod/Indeps, and Lib/Dems are 8%, 8%, and 3% more torture accepting than their female counterparts. In terms of race, Whites are 26% more likely to be Consv/Rep than non-Whites and 33% more likely than Blacks. When controlling for political orientation, whiteness continues to be positively associated with greater torture acceptance among Consv/Reps (+4%) and Mod/Indeps (+8%), though not among Lib/Dems (-3%). In terms of socio-economic status, people with annual incomes at or above \$40,000 are 15% more likely to be Consv/Rep than those with incomes under \$40,000. People who self-identify as professional or business class are 9% more likely to lean Consv/Rep than working class people and 25% more likely than those who identify as a struggling family or household. When controlling for political orientation, greater household income is associated with greater torture

acceptance among Consv/Reps (+10%) and Mod/Indeps (+5%), but not among Lib/Dems (-1%).

Age is a social category that varies from the pattern described above among sex, race, and socioeconomic status. While Consv/Repm tends to increase with age, torture permissiveness tends to decrease with age. Seniors (ages 65 and older) are among the *most* likely to be Consv/Rep and are also among the *least* torture supportive age groups. Torture acceptance seems to peak between ages 30 and 40, which is arguably one of the “prime” periods of adulthood in terms of being out of the cross-hairs of both ageism and adultism. Adults aged 30-40 correspond to the more dominant age group, and though they aren’t necessarily the most likely to be Consv/Rep, they do tend to be the most supportive of torture. By contrast, seniors, who correspond to a disadvantaged age group, are among the most likely to be Consv/Rep and are at the same time the least torture supportive of demographic groups. When controlling for political orientation, ages 30-40 continue to among the most accepting of torture across all political groups, and torture acceptance tends to decrease with age, regardless of political orientation. Age is consistent with above patterns of dominance and torture support in the sense that adults aged 30-40, who are in a dominant age category, tend to be more accepting of torture even when controlling for political orientation.

In sum, with the variables of sex, race, income, and age, socially dominant categories (i.e., male, white, income above \$40k, ages 30-40) predict greater torture support. And while for sex, race, and income the dominant social categories tended towards Consv/Rep orientation as well, this did not bear out for age. Once political

orientation is taken into account, the dominant categories for sex, race, and income continue to be associated with greater torture acceptance among Consv/Reps but not among Lib/Dems, for whom dominant social categories were associated with less torture support. Social dominance, in other words, sometimes led to decreased torture support when combined with Lib/Dem orientation (i.e., in the cases of sex, race, and income). When combined with Consv/Rep orientation, by contrast, social dominance was consistently associated with greater support for torture. The single exception this pattern is Christian affiliation.

Compared to the demographic categories of sex, race, income, and age, religious affiliation has a unique relationship with torture opinion and political orientation. In the U.S. context, Christians are the socially dominant religious group, and Christian affiliation is associated with both conservatism and greater torture support. People who self-identify as Christian are 20% more likely to be Consv/Rep than those who do not. People who prefer some Christian tradition are 23% more likely to be Consv/Rep than people affiliated with some Other Religion and 20% more likely than the Unaffiliated. At the same time, people who prefer Christianity and/or self-identify as Christian are overall also more accepting of torture than those who do not, showing 5% and 12% greater torture acceptance respectively than the Unaffiliated and members of Other Religions. Yet once political orientation is taken into account, Christianity is associated with a 3% *decrease* in torture acceptance among Consv/Reps and a 7% *increase* among Lib/Dems compared to their Unaffiliated counterparts.

Christianity seems to have precisely the opposite effect on torture opinion in relation to political orientation than was seen for the other demographic categories of sex, race, income, and age. Consv/Reps from socially dominant sex, race, income, and age groups tend to demonstrate greater torture acceptance than Consv/Reps from subordinate groups, while Lib/Dems from those same socially dominant groups show greater torture aversion than Lib/Dems from subordinate groups. This dynamic is reversed when it comes to religion, where Christian identification is associated with decreased torture support among Consv/Reps and increased torture support among Lib/Dems. Why the relationship of social dominance, political orientation, and torture opinion should be different when it comes to religion is a question that will be taken up further in chapter three.

Linking torture support with opposition to inequality and social dominance shows how situational factors may contribute to torture opinion. Conservative acceptance of inequality and aversion to change may have less to do with cognitive rigidity and more to do with members enjoying and wanting to maintain positions of social privilege. To accept torture is to accept the unequal treatment of prisoners of war as a means for maintaining the status quo. Torture acceptance through this lens expresses how far we are willing to go to protect the status quo, and it makes sense that the greatest support for torture should be found among the greatest beneficiaries of the current order of things. For Consv/Reps, torture support may be related to OEQ and driven by similar system justification motives. Perhaps the unequal treatment of prisoner detainees is accepted by Consv/Reps because they are more likely to come

from social groups with a vested interest in believing in a just world where their privileged positions are deserved. In a just world, people aren't imprisoned unless they are guilty, and prisoners aren't tortured unless it's necessary and effective. Thus being imprisoned as an enemy combatant implies guilt as an enemy combatant, and being tortured for information implies both the possession of information and the utility of torture in extracting it. Lib/Dems, who are more likely to come from disadvantaged social groups, are not similarly motivated to justify inequality that would essentially validate their subordinate position as somehow deserved and come at a psychological cost of lowering self- and group-esteem.

As I noted earlier, there are two components of SDO: opposition to equality (OEQ) is one, and group-based dominance (GBD) is the other. Opposition to equality, previously discussed as a means of understanding conservative acceptance of inequality and resistance to change, is considered a system justification tendency, associated with greater self-esteem among dominant group members inasmuch as it validates their advantaged social position (Kugler et al. 2010). Whereas OEQ is a general endorsement of inequality and a driving force behind resistance to changing the status quo, GBD endorses inequality only in-so-far as it benefits one's group. Underpinned by the belief that the "world is a competitive, zero-sum game place," GBD conveys the extent to which one has negative attitudes towards out-groups and prefers one's own group above others (Kugler et al. 2010, 121). GBD is associated with prejudice towards out-groups and with a strong preference for hierarchical inter-group organization. Unlike OEQ, whose endorsement by subordinate groups comes at a psychological cost, GBD is

associated with greater esteem for both the self and the group regardless of social status.

Whereas OEQ is rooted in system justification motives, GBD is driven by social identity motives (Kugler et al. 2010). Social Identity Theory assumes that “social identity is derived primarily from group memberships,” and “proposes that people strive to achieve or maintain a positive social identity (thus boosting their self-esteem), and that this positive identity derives largely from favourable comparisons that can be made between the in-group and relevant out-groups” (Brown 2000, 746-747). The attitudes and characteristics associated with group-based dominance are attributed to this need to increase self- and group- esteem in part through the derogation of out-groups. Kugler et al. write, “GBD is a group-justifying construct linked to hostile attitudes towards out-groups, competitive worldview, feelings of concern about outside threats, pride in the in-group, lower cognitive engagement, and greater desire for cognitive closure” (2010, 147). Whereas OEQ is strongly correlated with conservative political orientation, GBD is strongly correlated with authoritarianism (Kugler et al. 2010, 127). GBD is also associated with the same cognitive styles, hostility towards out-groups, and elevated threat-sensitivity as authoritarianism. Together, GBD and Right-Wing Authoritarianism (which are strongly correlated), are the two most common constructs used to understand prejudice, and they “account[t] for a substantial portion of the variation in prejudice across individuals” (Kugler et al. 2010, 119).

CONSERVATISM AND AUTHORITARIANISM

In her 2005 work *The Authoritarian Dynamic*, Stenner identifies three distinct strains of conservatism within contemporary political science. The two defining features of conservatism noted above – aversion to change and acceptance of inequality – correspond to two distinct types of conservatism that Stenner calls *status quo* conservatism and *laissez-faire* conservatism. A third type of conservatism, *social* conservatism, most nearly corresponds with what Stenner identifies as *authoritarianism* (2005, 86). When authoritarianism has been controlled for, the self-reported conservatism captured by surveys reflects a combination of the first two forms of conservatism in equal measure: status quo conservatism, which is defined by a fundamental aversion to change, and laissez-faire conservatism, which is defined by a high tolerance for economic inequality and aversion to government intervention in the economy (Stenner 2005). Though many scholars conflate the two, conservatism and authoritarianism are distinct tendencies whose relationship varies with socio-historical context.

While in contemporary U.S. politics there is a great deal of overlap between them, authoritarianism is not an extreme form of conservatism, and neither authoritarianism nor conservatism is the root cause of the other (Stenner 2005). Authoritarianism operates on a continuum defined by attitudes towards *difference*, independently of continuums based on attitudes towards change and equality which define liberalism and conservatism (Stenner 2005). For Stenner (2005), authoritarianism is defined by this fundamental aversion to difference – be it racial, intellectual, political,

or moral difference, etc. – while its opposite, nonauthoritarianism, is defined by a basic openness to diversity.⁷ Authoritarian aversion to difference is distinct from conservative aversion to change. Unlike authoritarians, conservatives have no problem with difference and may strongly favor diversity if it is part of the status quo. Unlike conservatives, authoritarians are not opposed to change and may at times adamantly favor it if they believe that the proposed actions will help secure social order. Authoritarian aversion to difference is also independent of laissez-faire conservatives' acceptance of inequality. In fact, whereas the primary (and indeed only) determinant of laissez-faire conservatism is higher socio-economic status, authoritarianism is associated with lower levels of income and education (Stenner 2005). Some authoritarians prefer socialist economic systems (Heath et al. 1994; McClosky and Zaller 1984), and Stenner (2005) found that between 1972 and 2000, authoritarians were more likely to identify with the Democratic Party and its redistributive economic policies than with republicanism (167).

Although authoritarianism is distinct from conservatism, the two concepts are frequently conflated in political science scholarship. This is partially attributable to their convergence in contemporary U.S. politics. In *Authoritarianism and Polarization in American Politics*, Hetherington and Weiler (2009) argue that party politics in the U.S. has become increasingly defined by authoritarian issues and that this has created a party system defined along authoritarian lines. Those with an authoritarian worldview

⁷ International scholars such as Stenner 2005 (from New Zealand) and Heath et al. 1994 (from the United Kingdom) refer to the opposite of authoritarianism as “libertarianism.” But because this label can be confused with the U.S. political group of the same name, I will adopt Hetherington and Weiler 2009’s language and refer to the opposite of authoritarianism as “nonauthoritarianism.”

tend to identify as conservative and republican; those with a nonauthoritarian worldview tend to identify as liberal and democratic.

According to this telling, the current political party system is the result of an evolution that began with race in the 1960s. Since the 1930s, Democrats had enjoyed a strong majority with a coalition formed around support for the New Deal. After Goldwater's defeat in 1964, the GOP (Grand Old Party) sought to carve out a block of these democratic voters and bring them into the republican coalition. Until Lyndon Johnson pursued his agenda for racial equality, the Republican Party had been more in line with black interests, and their party platforms in the 1940s and 1950s placed more emphasis on promoting racial tolerance than did the Democrats'. However, realizing the Democrats' New Deal coalition splintered along regional lines when it came to issues of race, Republicans determined that they could attract southern democratic voters on a platform that ran against the interests of Blacks. Race and civil rights superseded New Deal politics and so became the new fissure along which party lines were drawn. This fissure deepened when Republican and Democratic Party platforms took their respective stances on issues such as women's and gay rights. Over the next forty years, the two dominant political parties took opposing positions on four key issue clusters, the preferences for which are all shaped by authoritarianism: (1) racial and ethnic difference; (2) crime and civil liberties; (3) feminism and family; and (4) foreign policy, force, and diplomacy (Hetherington and Weiler 2009). Authoritarians and nonauthoritarians thus came to be sorted along political party lines, as Republicans took more authoritarian positions and Democrats took the opposite. In this way, the two

parties became distinguished along their members' authoritarian preferences, with the effect of authoritarianism on political party identification markedly increasing between 2000 and 2004 (Hetherington and Weiler 2009, 150).

To summarize, parties and ideologies in contemporary U.S. politics have been significantly shaped by issues that are structured by authoritarian preferences. Thus respondents' political party and ideology currently expresses something about where they fall along the authoritarian spectrum: identification with conservatism and/or the Republican Party suggests greater authoritarian tendencies; identification with liberalism and/or the Democratic Party suggests greater nonauthoritarian tendencies. More to the point, Lib/Dem and Consv/Rep groups within the torture data are imbued with elements of nonauthoritarianism and authoritarianism, respectively. Thus, in order to understand Lib/Dem and Consv/Rep political orientations and their relation to torture opinion, it is necessary to understand the relation of all of these to authoritarianism.

AUTHORITARIANS AND NONAUTHORITARIANS

Hetherington and Weiler 2009 conceptualize authoritarianism as a worldview motivated by an existential, psychological need for order. In this sense, it is a form of motivated social cognition, in the same manner in which Jost et al. (2003) conceptualize conservatism (Hetherington and Weiler 2009, 42). Hetherington and Weiler's understanding of authoritarianism as a worldview is similar to Stenner's understanding of it as a political psychology. For Hetherington and Weiler 2009, "worldview" refers to a constellation of deeply held beliefs through which individuals interpret their life

experiences. These beliefs are “animated by some fundamental, underlying value orientation that is itself connected to a visceral sense of right and wrong” (Hetherington and Weiler 2009, 3). A worldview consciously and unconsciously guides an individual’s attitudes and actions in various spheres of life, including parenting, politics, religion, and moral decision-making. As a worldview, authoritarianism directly translates into political preferences and thus determines political opinion and behavior.

According to Hetherington and Weiler, authoritarians are distinguished from nonauthoritarians by a fundamental need for order that makes them sensitive to threats to social cohesion as well as a tendency to look to authorities (in the form of people, texts, institutions, traditions, etc.) to preserve the social order against such threats (2009, 41).⁸ Seeking to defend against the anxiety caused by the threat of disorder, authoritarians are characterized by low tolerance of ambiguity, a heightened need for certainty, and a visceral sense of right and wrong. Perhaps because difference is perceived to be a threat to the social order, authoritarianism manifests in the form of intolerance towards difference (racial, moral, political, etc.), animosity towards out-groups, and punitiveness towards deviants (Stenner 2005).

HOW IS AUTHORITARIANISM MEASURED?

There have been several measures of authoritarianism over the years, including Adorno et al.’s F-scale and Altemeyer’s RWA scale. More recently, scholars have used sets of questions designed to capture parenting values, which have been included in

⁸ Nonauthoritarianism is presumably also a motivated social cognition but, just like liberalism, scholarship on nonauthoritarianism is relatively thin. I have yet to find a compelling theory of what nonauthoritarians’ fundamental psychological motivation may be.

some national surveys and are sometimes referred to as child-rearing batteries (e.g., Hetherington and Weiler 2009, Feldman and Stenner 1997, Stenner 2005, Merolla and Zechmeister 2009). Such questions are less indicative of actual parenting practices than they are of preferences that extend into the political sphere. Actual parenting practices themselves are not as reliable indicators of authoritarianism as are the values expressed in these child-rearing batteries (Stenner 2005).

Hetherington and Weiler 2009 measure authoritarianism using a child-rearing battery of questions that ANES introduced in 1992 as a four-item authoritarianism index. It asks respondents to evaluate pairs of attributes in terms of what they think is more important for children to have: independence vs. respect for elders; obedience vs. self-reliance; curiosity vs. good manners; and being considerate vs. being well-behaved (Hetherington and Weiler 2009, 48). Respondents who value independence, self-reliance, curiosity, and considerateness score at the lowest end of the scale and are considered *nonauthoritarian*, while those who prefer respect for elders, obedience, good manners, and being well-behaved score at the highest end of the scale and are considered *authoritarian*.

TORTURE AS AN AUTHORITARIAN ISSUE

Having included a question about torture in the 2006 Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES), Hetherington and Weiler find that “people who scored at the maximum of the authoritarianism scale were more than twice as likely as those who scored at the minimum” to choose the more torture-permissive response, “suggest[ing] that preferences about torture are structured at least in part by authoritarianism”

(2009, 135). Unfortunately, none of the torture opinion data available to me included appropriate variables for measuring authoritarianism directly. But it is reasonable to suppose that the significant divide evident in torture opinion data between Consv/Reps and Lib/Dems may be symptomatic of this deeper divide in contemporary politics along authoritarian lines. Because authoritarianism has been a significant factor in shaping the contemporary political landscape – such that conservatives and republicans are highly correlated with authoritarianism and liberal and democrats with nonauthoritarianism – the strong relationship between torture opinion and political orientation may be partially explained by the fact that interrogational torture is itself an authoritarian issue that relates to all four issue clusters in different ways.

CHARACTERISTICS OF AUTHORITARIANS AND NONAUTHORITARIANS

Hetherington and Weiler 2009 aim to demonstrate the validity of their authoritarianism measure (based on the child-rearing battery of questions) in part by showing that those who rate high on the authoritarianism scale also tend to express attitudes and opinions that are commonly associated with authoritarianism.

Authoritarians' need for order makes them different from nonauthoritarians in (1) their cognitive preferences; (2) the value they place on individual autonomy versus social conformity; and (3) their attitudes towards difference. In the following subsections I describe the differences between authoritarians and nonauthoritarians with respect to each of these aspects. I incorporate torture opinion data in the process of description, showing that torture support is correlated with other known authoritarian tendencies,

and suggesting that torture support may itself be an expression of authoritarian attitudes.

1. COGNITIVE STYLES

Nonauthoritarians differ cognitively from authoritarians in accuracy motivation. That is, whereas authoritarians tend to seek out information that supports their view, nonauthoritarians tend to seek out a broader range of ideas to balance perspectives from credibly informed sources (Hetherington and Weiler 2009, 45). The cognitive preferences of authoritarians may be related to their need for order and consequent intolerance of difference in thought and opinion, which are perceived as a threat to group cohesion and identity. Seeking out a broad range of sources may help ease anxiety in an uncertain situation for nonauthoritarians in the same way finding information to support pre-existing views can ease anxiety for authoritarians (Hetherington and Weiler 2009, 45). Because scholars have been biased against nonauthoritarianism while uncritically accepting nonauthoritarianism as the norm, Hetherington and Weiler point out some of the potentially negative aspects of nonauthoritarian tendencies. In this vein, they note that when taken to a negative extreme, the need to collect and process such a comprehensive amount of information may inhibit action required in a crisis situation (i.e., “analysis paralysis”) (Hetherington and Weiler 2009, 46).

Testing their own measure of authoritarianism against these cognitive styles, Hetherington and Weiler 2009 find that, indeed, nonauthoritarians have a greater need for cognition, and take more pleasure in being responsible for thinking than do

authoritarians. Whereas authoritarians prefer simple problems, nonauthoritarians prefer complex problems. Nonauthoritarians tend to be more opinionated about a variety of things than authoritarians, to be more accurate in political knowledge, and to be perceived as more intelligent than authoritarians.

Using ANES data to test torture opinion against these cognitive styles, I found that, consistent with the authoritarian tendencies noted above, greater torture support is related with having opinions about fewer things, a preference for simpler problems, and less accurate political knowledge. However, torture support does not seem to be positively correlated with having fewer opinions than average or with dislike of responsibilities that require thinking (though among those who dislike responsibilities that require thinking, torture support is associated with greater dislike). These inconsistencies suggest that the relationship of torture opinion with cognitive styles is not as strong as its relationship with other aspects of authoritarianism explored below.

2. SOCIAL CONFORMITY VS INDIVIDUAL AUTONOMY

The cognitive differences between authoritarians and nonauthoritarians reflect different tolerance levels for complexity, ambiguity, and uncertainty that have broader reaching implications, shaping the social arrangements preferred by each.

Nonauthoritarians have a greater tolerance for complexity, uncertainty, and ambiguity in society as well as in cognition while authoritarians' high need for order drives a desire to ensure social cohesion through social conformity – to become one and the same, as Stenner (2005) puts it – consistent with their cognitive preference for simplicity, certainty, and clarity.

Nonauthoritarians value individual autonomy above the need for order, and indeed, the nonauthoritarian concept of social well-being is predicated on the exercise of individual autonomy. While authoritarians are more concerned with the ways individuals and their behavior threaten the social fabric by undermining social cohesion, nonauthoritarians are more concerned with the way institutions and groups in power may threaten the social fabric by undermining individual autonomy (Hetherington and Weiler 2009, 47). Nonauthoritarians' support for individual autonomy makes them reluctant to cast judgments on others or to take actions that curtail individuals' private behaviors. Taken to a negative extreme, nonauthoritarians have a tendency toward moral relativism and may fail to act for the protection of the community when social well-being is threatened by individuals' private behavior (Hetherington and Weiler 2009, 47). Testing their own measure of authoritarianism against these preferences, Hetherington and Weiler 2009 find that authoritarians tend to believe more strongly in the importance of maintaining some basic rules than nonauthoritarians, and to think there is a right and wrong way to do almost anything, whereas nonauthoritarians tend to disagree with these statements. Testing torture opinion against these preferences, I found that people who are torture permissive in the Pew data are similarly 4% more likely to agree than torture-restrictives that "there are clear guidelines about what's good or evil that apply to everyone regardless of their situation."

Authoritarians look to established figures and sources of authority to maintain social order when it is threatened, and tend to grant authorities great leeway in doing whatever needs to be done to impose such order. Authoritarians value obedience and

are also more likely to sacrifice civil liberties for security and to support forceful military and police interventions. Testing their measure of authoritarianism against these preferences, Hetherington and Weiler 2009 find that authoritarians tend to place more importance on: “preserving traditional ideas of right and wrong”; “respect for authority”; “following God’s will”; improving politeness”; strengthening law and order”; and “maintaining respect for America’s power in the world” (2009, 57-58). Using the Pew data, I likewise found that torture-permissives are more likely than torture-restrictives to agree that “the government should do more to protect morality in society” (+13%); “it is generally right for the government to monitor telephone and e-mail communications of Americans suspected of having terrorist ties without first obtaining permission from the courts” (+25%); and that “the police should be allowed to search the houses of people who might be sympathetic to terrorists without a court order” (+21%). Torture-permissives are also more likely to agree that “in order to curb terrorism in this country I think it will be necessary for the average person to give up some civil liberties” (+11%); “the best way to ensure peace is through military strength” (+17%); “using overwhelming military force is the best way to defeat terrorism around the world” (+25%); and “we should get even with any country that tries to take advantage of the United States” (+22%).

As these correlations suggest, the use of torture in the war on terror shares elements with the issues of (1) crime and civil liberties as well as (2) foreign policy, force, and diplomacy – two of the four clusters of issues structured by authoritarianism that have helped shape the contemporary political landscape. Authoritarians show a

greater willingness to curb civil liberties and turn to forceful measures for resolving conflict than nonauthoritarians, and both preferences are consistent with support for torture. Based on his understanding of right-wing authoritarianism, Altemeyer anticipates much of what we are seeing in torture opinion, speculating in one of his more recent works that high RWAs would be more likely to support government sanctioned torture, not only because authoritarian aggression often takes the form of greater punitiveness, but also because submission to authority is a core feature of high RWA, and authoritarian submission requires going along with what political and military leaders say is necessary (Altemeyer 2006, 26, 20). Torture support, in this view, can be understood as a manifestation of submission to authority as well as authoritarian punitiveness toward out-groups.

3. TOLERANCE OF DIFFERENCE

Differences of all kinds are perceived as particularly threatening to authoritarians who attempt to satisfy their need for order through social conformity. Meanwhile, nonauthoritarians' greater tolerance of disorder and ambiguity seems to translate into greater tolerance of difference in general.

The need for order affects social identity and the rigidity of social boundaries. People with greater tolerance for uncertainty and cognitive complexity (evident among nonauthoritarians) are better able to consider their multiple social identities as intersecting, rather than converging, leading to a more inclusive social identity (Brewer and Pierce 2005). This is, in turn, related to greater tolerance towards out-groups (Brewer and Pierce 2005). By contrast, people with greater need for certainty and

cognitive simplification (characteristic of authoritarians) tend to perceive their multiple social identities as overlapping or converging, and this is related to a more exclusive subjective social identity (Brewer and Pierce 2005). This low social identity complexity is in turn related to greater *intolerance* towards out-groups (Brewer and Pierce 2005).

Among the forms of diversity to which nonauthoritarians are more open is *thought diversity*. Testing their measure of authoritarianism against such tendency, Hetherington and Weiler 2009 find that nonauthoritarians tend to be more tolerant of others expressing controversial or opposing views and of others expressing criticism towards valued people and institutions. Authoritarians meanwhile have less tolerance of thought diversity. Testing torture opinion against such a tendency, I found that ANES respondents who favor torture are 23% more likely to feel there should be "less" criticism of the U.S. than those who oppose torture. Additionally, torture-permissives in the Pew data are more likely than torture-restrictives to agree that "freedom of speech should not extend to groups that are sympathetic to terrorists" (+9%) and that "we should all be willing to fight for our country, whether it is right or wrong" (+16%).

Authoritarian intolerance of difference also translates into ethnocentric and prejudicial thinking, and greater punitiveness towards social deviants and transgressors. Nonauthoritarians, by contrast, have a strong aversion to ethnocentric and prejudicial thinking and often demonstrate an out-group preference. In fact, their aversion to ethnocentrism and prejudice is far stronger than authoritarian's tendency towards it. Hetherington and Weiler speculate that this may be a way of repressing and denying the

anxiety generated by prejudicial feelings that run contrary to their professed beliefs (2009, 46).

Testing their measure of authoritarianism against such tendencies, Hetherington and Weiler 2009 find that non-black authoritarians tend to hold more anti-black racial stereotypes. Likewise, I found torture favor in the ANES data to be correlated with holding 16% more negative and 8% fewer positive black stereotypes, as well as with demonstrating 8% greater implicit anti-black bias. In fact, authoritarians tend to have greater hostility towards all out-groups (Stenner 2005). Pew's torture-permissives are 15% more likely than torture-restrictives to perceive immigrants as a threat to American culture. Compared to torture-opposers, those who favor torture in ANES data were more likely to report cold feelings not only towards Blacks (+4.4%), but also towards Hispanics (+14%), Women (+1%), Hindus (+5%) Muslims (+23%), atheists (+15%), as well as people who live in other countries, including Iran (+22%), Iraq (+12%), and Mexico (+12%). By contrast, ANES respondents who favor torture were either less or equally likely as torture-opposers to report cold feelings towards in-groups such as Christians (-3%), evangelical Christians (-18%), Whites (0%), people who are in charge of big companies (-15%) and members of the U.S. military (-1%).

Just as Hetherington and Weiler 2009 find that authoritarians tend to favor traditional gender roles, I found that people who are torture permissive in the Pew data are more likely than torture-restrictives to think women should return to their traditional roles in society (+5%), and to see homosexuality as socially unacceptable (+10%). In terms of punitiveness towards out-groups – which is related to attitudes

towards crime and use of force as well as to intolerance of difference – torture-permissives are 22% more likely to favor the death penalty for persons convicted of murder. Such a high correlation with death penalty support suggests that despite discursive attempts to justify torture by differentiating interrogational torture from torture-as-punishment, the former may nevertheless be entwined inextricably with attitudes towards crime and punishment. The correlation of torture opinion with these attitudes towards subordinate racial and sexual categories suggests that the use of torture in the war on terror also shares elements with issues of (1) racial and ethnic difference as well as (2) feminism and family – which are the other two of the four clusters of issues structured by authoritarianism that have helped shape the contemporary political landscape according to Hetherington and Weiler (2009).

On the one hand, it is possible that Lib/Dem aversion to torture is related to a nonauthoritarian openness to difference and an out-group preference that tends to make them want to protect marginalized groups usually depicted as the targets of torture. The negative relationship between social dominance and torture opinion among Lib/Dems may be an example of this. Membership among socially dominant categories of sex, race, and income is associated with greater torture support. But when these forms of social dominance are coupled with Lib/Dem orientation, support for torture decreases. On the other hand, it is possible that Consv/Rep support for torture is related to an authoritarian aversion to difference and group-based dominance orientation that makes them more likely to see the targets of torture as subordinate

racial and religious Others whose alleged acts of terror challenge the supremacy of the white, heterosexual, Christian, male.

Exploring the parallels between the Abu Ghraib photos circulated around the world in 2004 and lynching photos that circulated throughout the Jim Crow era, anthropologist Liz Philipose (2007) suggests that both sets of photos, though distinct in many ways, likely had some similar effects: Both were racializing images — marking dark skinned bodies as “raced,” and marking the “raced” as “criminal” by virtue of punishment. Both were also sexualizing images that sought to feminize male bodies — literally through the castration of lynched black men, and symbolically through the sexual abuse and humiliation of detainees at Abu Ghraib. Philipose writes (2007, 1066): “Circulating images of detainees surrounded by triumphant onlookers resurrect only partially repressed historical consciousness of lynching. Within this charged racial context, the detainee’s punishment appears as deserved as that of the lynched black body.”

Like public lynching before it, which served to ease public anxiety over increasing racial equality, the spectacle of Abu Ghraib was performed for a nation whose military prowess and position of dominance in the world was threatened by a racial Other. The targets of the 9/11 attacks were deliberately chosen as cultural symbols of U.S. power. From a psychoanalytic perspective, the homeland is usually associated with the maternal/feminine, and national boundaries with the incest barrier; the attacks of 9/11 violated this boundary, and may have been experienced unconsciously and abstractly as a sexual violation – and perhaps more specifically as the rape of one’s mother (Volkan

1994). Terror management theorists note that the 9/11 attacks were not merely reminders of our own mortality, they were also violent attacks on the symbols we use to shore up our cultural worldview (Pyszczynski et al. 2003). The twin towers were profoundly phallic symbols of U.S.-American financial power, whose penetration and castration were witnessed over and over again by a terrified U.S.-American public (Zoja 2002). For many American viewers who had limited knowledge of the animosity that U.S. foreign policy garnered in many parts of the world, the attacks were more terrifying for being wholly without context or meaning. Repeated exposure to the images alone – independent of physical or geographic proximity to the site of the attacks, or of knowing someone personally affected by the attacks – was sufficient to induce substantial stress reactions in many viewers for days, weeks, and months following the events (Schuster et al. 2001).

Such interpretations point to the potential role of torture as a psychological antidote to terror in the cultural imagination. Strathern and Stewart (2006) describe the relationship between terror and the imagination thusly:

. . . terror implies the imagination, and often the more general realm of 'the imaginary' as such, that is, the world of ideas that shapes people's response to events in terms of cosmologically established or recreated themes. This aura of ideas, strongly imbued with emotions, quickly surrounds the material acts involved. Terror is thus in the mind and in the interaction between the mind and the world at large. . . .

. . . 'The imaginary' here does not signal that the thoughts involved are either factually 'true' or 'untrue' with respect to the world. It simply indicates that people's thoughts about the world often run far beyond its obvious empirical manifestations, and that the frameworks that are built out of people's thoughts become as important as, or even more important than, their everyday empirical observations, especially where their emotions and their own sets of values are strongly present. (Strathern et al. 2005, 6-7)

Not only is it possible that the torture of terrorists is linked in the public imagination with the history of lynching, it may share some of its effects — reasserting the norm of whiteness and masculinity over subjugated bodies marked by race and sex.

At the same time, it must be remembered that torture serves to construct in the public imagination the very enemies we find gratification in destroying through torture. The fear aroused by the terrorist attacks of 9/11 united the U.S. population and allowed for sweeping political changes to be made in U.S. foreign and domestic policy. Yet even as the nation's fear was widely recognized as the source for this political unity, the objects of fear — namely Al Qaida — were understood as being “politically empty” (Robin 2004, 6). Al Qaida's terrorist activities were interpreted as the outward manifestations of their internal pathos — namely their pathological fear of the freedoms of the modern Western world. Attempts to contextualize the attacks within the larger political framework of globalization and U.S. foreign policy were met with anger and hostility by a population that experienced the attacks as beyond rational comprehension — as “senseless violence.” By depoliticizing the enemy, the enemy constructed through popular and political discourse appeared to be pathologically irrational, savage and barbarous — and infinitely more terrifying to imagine.

Robins & Post (1997, 57) say about paranoid cultures that “the power they attribute to the[ir] enemies suggests their underlying feelings of powerlessness.” By magnifying the enemy's power, a group is able to account for its feelings of powerlessness and absolve itself of responsibility for its humiliated condition. Furthermore, by making itself the center of attention of something so powerful, it

restores some its lost self-regard and sense of importance. Though it might seem counterproductive to exaggerate the strength of the enemy, such a move can be politically strategic. Says Robin (2004, 6): "Were we to understand the objects of our fear as truly political, we might argue about them, as we do about other political things." Only by removing the objects of fear from political controversy can a society achieve the political unity necessary to wage war. Cavanaugh (2006, 315) echoes this sentiment in relation to torture: "If we did not think of opponents of U.S. policy in the Middle East as enemies and backward fanatics, if we thought of them as rational beings, we would have to reconsider our own policies and consider the possibility that opponents might have some legitimate grievances. The extremity of torture helps to erase such gray areas, not only by reducing the tortured to subhuman status but also by identifying all righteousness with the torturer." The Abu Ghraib photos depicted degraded, subhuman creatures whose existence serves to justify the very acts of torture that created them (Cavanaugh 2006). Torture doesn't just destroy enemies, it produces them. And knowledge that the U.S. government employs torture as a tactic of war serves as its own circular argument for torture, suggesting that the enemy is so threatening as to make such acts necessary. A 2009 study, which found a status quo bias in favor of torture when it was framed as a long-standing practice offers some preliminary support for this interpretation (Crandall et al. 2008).

AUTHORITARIANISM AND THREAT

It is generally accepted that a positive relationship exists between authoritarianism, threat, and intolerance. However, the precise nature of this relationship remains contested. Namely, what types of threat elicit reactions of authoritarian intolerance, and among whom?

Focusing on the relationship between the threat of international terrorism and public opinion, Merolla and Zechmeister (2009) claim that collective threats are distinct from personal threats in the key aspect of control, and that the negative emotions (e.g., fear, anger) evoked by the perception of collective threat motivate people to employ coping strategies with the goal of re-establishing control, order, efficacy, and security. Merolla and Zechmeister found that in times of perceived terrorist threat, social trust (i.e., trust for neighbors) decreases, as does sympathy for out-groups. At the same time, trust in established authority figures (politicians, police, military) increases. And while the population as a whole becomes more authoritarian – demonstrating greater intolerance, punitiveness and submission to authority – this effect is most pronounced among those with authoritarian predispositions. As an example of greater punitiveness, Zechmeister and Merolla point to a 2006 survey by the Council on Foreign Relations demonstrating that “individuals who believe that international terrorism is a ‘critical threat’ are significantly more likely to approve of the use of torture, even after controlling for other likely predictors: ideology, education, income, and gender” (2009, 86). In this case, they argue that torture approval is an example of authoritarian punitiveness, which they attribute to a heightened state of perceived collective threat.

Hetherington and Weiler 2009 diverge somewhat from Merolla and Zechmeister 2009, contending that much of the explanatory power of authoritarianism as a political force is found among *non*authoritarians. Authoritarians, they argue, tend to have a heightened sensitivity to threat, and in the post-9/11 context of the war on terrorism and concomitant political polarization, simply being prompted to think about politics in a survey may prime authoritarians to think about such threats to the social order, activating authoritarian attitudes of intolerance in what are now “normal” times (Hetherington and Weiler 2009, 40). Indeed, according to Stenner (2005, 69) authoritarians tend to believe in a dangerous world, “reflect[ing] an enduring anxiety to which individuals are differentially inclined: specifically, a persistent fear of societal ‘disorder,’ ‘chaos,’ and ‘anarchy.’” This underlying anxiety makes them more inclined to perceive a dangerous world even without apparent indications.

Authoritarians are both more sensitive in their perception of collective threat and more emotionally reactive to its presence (Stenner 2005, 69). For Hetherington and Weiler 2009, it follows that when a collective threat is perceived generally, authoritarianism is unlikely to increase among authoritarians because they are more likely to have been at a heightened state of reactivity to threat all along; rather, an increase in authoritarian attitudes is likely to be more evident among *non*authoritarians. In other words, Hetherington and Weiler claim that when widely perceived, collective threat evokes authoritarian responses from *everyone*, authoritarians and *non*authoritarians alike. However, authoritarians’ heightened sensitivity to threat means that their authoritarian attitudes are activated in otherwise “normal” times, and so

increases are unlikely to be very noticeable in times when threat is more widely perceived. In such times, nonauthoritarians are more likely to exhibit the greatest changes in attitudes. When a collective threat comes to be perceived by the population at large, nonauthoritarians join their authoritarian counterparts in demonstrating increased authoritarian attitudes and behaviors. For that reason, authoritarian attitudes and behaviors tend to increase in the aggregate.

THREAT AND TORTURE OPINION

The interactive relationship between threat and authoritarianism proposed by these scholars helps shed light on Conserv/Reps’ consistently high level of torture support relative other groups, as well as on the general increase in torture support in seen 2009. Following a drop in conservatism in February 2008, conservatism rose among all political parties, reaching a peak in November 2009.




Figure 12. Fluctuations in Ideology by Political Party Over Time, Pew 2004-2011

Jost et al. 2003's assertion that the general population becomes more conservative in times of collective threat suggests that a more widely-perceived threat may have had something to do with the increases in both conservatism and torture support seen from early 2009. Merolla and Zechmeister's work demonstrating that authoritarian attitudes increase with heightened perception of threat of terrorist attack gives us a hint of where to look. Indeed, perceived threat did increase over time in the form of increased belief in the ability of terrorists to launch new attacks from February 2008 to February 2009 (+1%) and from February 2009 to August 2011 (+6%). Furthermore, a line graph shows that torture support in the general population tracks the percentage of the population who believe that terrorists now have a greater ability to launch new attacks.




Figure 13. Torture Support and Perceived Terrorist Threat (General Population), Pew 2004-2011

Notably, in so far as torture opinion is related to threat, it is to the specific threat posed by terrorists and not to the more indirect threats of unsatisfactory defense against terrorism, the normalization of terrorist attacks, or even of nuclear attacks. Neither does torture opinion seem to be related to the economic downturn experienced acutely in 2008 and 2009.

Meanwhile, Hetherington and Weiler’s assertion that the most significant increases in expressed intolerance may be found among nonauthoritarians helps shed light on the marked increase in torture support that took place on the left side of the political spectrum in 2009. Consv/Reps showed a significant increase (+8%) in the perceived threat of a terrorist attack from February 2008 to 2009; yet their level of torture support in terms of permissiveness barely increased (+1%), and in terms of mean acceptance actually decreased over that period (-3%).




Figure 14. Torture Support and Perceived Terrorist Threat (Consv/Reps only), Pew 2004-2011

When we look at Lib/Dems level of perceived threat, by contrast, we see that it declined from February 2008 to February 2009 (-12%) in concert with decreases in torture permissiveness (-8%) and acceptance (-5%). Lib/Dems then showed a marked increase in perceived threat of terrorist attack from February 2009 to August 2011 (+9%) and they showed a comparable elevation in torture support over the same period (+10% TP; +7% TA).




Figure 15. Torture Support and Perceived Terrorist Threat (Lib/Dems only), Pew 2004-2011

In short, while the rates of Lib/Dem torture support mirror the rates of perceived terror threat, the same is not true for Consv/Reps: the marked increase in perceived threat of terrorist attack among Consv/Reps was not mirrored by a similar marked increase in torture support.

Hetherington and Weiler’s supposition that the consistent expression of intolerant attitudes found among authoritarians is due to a consistently heightened

perception of collective threat may further explain the consistently high support for torture among conservatives relative to other groups. In so far as torture support is symptomatic of perceived threat, Consv/Reps' consistently high level of torture support suggests a consistently high level of perceived threat. And if Consv/Reps were already in a state of reaction to threat, it makes sense that the increase in perceived terrorist threat didn't trigger a commensurate increase in torture support as it did for Lib/Dems.

CHAPTER CONCLUSION

This chapter began with a discussion of the nature of public opinion, proposing that it be conceptualized as an expression of moral intuitions and the premoral, rather than the product of moral reasoning and decision-making. Because political party and ideology are the main determinants of torture opinion, I turned to the field of political psychology for insight into what it means to self-identify as a liberal or conservative, democrat or republican. Political psychology afforded a theoretical model for understanding liberals and conservatives as having fundamentally different attitudes towards change and equality. Liberals are defined by an openness to change and an aversion to inequality, while conservatives are defined by an aversion to change and endorsement of inequality.

I proposed that conservative aversion to change may be best understood together with the opposition to equality (OEQ) as rooted in system justification motives and as an expression of one aspect of social dominance orientation (SDO). I pointed to the correlation of Consv/Rep orientation with membership among social dominant

categories and suggested that torture support itself may be motivated by the need to justify and maintain a status quo in which such groups are privileged.

The other component of SDO is group-based dominance (GBD), and this is correlated with authoritarianism. I drew on Hetherington and Weiler's sorting hypothesis to interpret party identification as an indicator of authoritarian preferences. The Consv/Rep sample includes people who lean towards the Republican Party, indicating greater authoritarianism among this group. The Lib/Dem sample includes people who lean towards the Democratic Party, indicating greater *non*authoritarianism. Their different positions along the authoritarian spectrum may help explain Consv/Reps' consistently high level of torture support and Lib/Dems consistently high level of torture opposition. Consv/Repm is associated with authoritarianism and authoritarianism is associated with greater torture support. Torture is an authoritarian issue with connections to all four issue clusters, and Consv/Reps may support torture in part out of authoritarian submission to authority, aversion to difference, and punitiveness towards out-groups. Torture support may be an expression of authoritarian group-based dominance, which is rooted in social identity motives and seeks to assert the dominance of the in-group through the denigration of the out-group. Meanwhile, Lib/Dems may oppose torture in part out of nonauthoritarian openness to difference and strong out-group preference. Because the perception of collective threat can trigger authoritarian attitudes and behaviors even among nonauthoritarians, I proposed that an increase in the perceived threat posed by terrorists may help explain the concomitant increase in

torture support seen in 2009 through 2011 on the left side of the political spectrum, among conservative and moderate democrats and independents.

While this chapter aimed to identify psychological motives and defining characteristics of Lib/Dems and Consv/Reps, the next chapter aims to understand the particular constellation of values that are brought together by each political orientation. The second part of chapter three focuses on one particular value – Sanctity – to explore the role of religion in torture.

CHAPTER IV

INTERPRETING TORTURE OPINION THROUGH THE LENS OF CULTURAL PSYCHOLOGY OF MORALITY AND RELIGION

MORAL PSYCHOLOGY AND SOCIAL MOTIVATIONS

Stenner defined political psychologies as “the manner in which different value commitments tend to ‘go together’ *within* individuals, universally and perpetually” as psychological expressions of basic human needs, desires, and motivations (2005, 87, original emphasis). We have looked at the defining features of conservatism, liberalism, authoritarianism, nonauthoritarianism, and the psychological motivations underlying them. We now turn to a cultural psychology of morality, *moral foundations theory* (MFT), to understand the value commitments themselves, which tend to “go together” to form liberal and conservative moral intuitions. Following a brief account of the anthropological assumptions underlying MFT and the methods used to develop it, I describe each of the foundations, highlight their evolutionary origins, and define their characteristics and roles in liberal and conservative moralities.

MORAL FOUNDATIONS THEORY

Moral foundations theory attempts to explain the commonalities and differences in morality that exist between and within cultures. Haidt and his colleagues developed MFT in 2003 with the goal of identifying the “taste buds” of moral sentiments (Haidt

2013).⁹ Using the analogy of taste buds to conceptualize morality, Haidt explains that humans have five taste bud receptors, each designed to pick up one of the five different aspects of taste: bitter, sweet, salty, savory/umami, and sour. Despite this universal human trait, food preferences are shaped by and vary considerably across cultures. Like taste bud receptors, Haidt sees morality as a form of perception and he analyzes the way moral norms vary across cultures seeking to identify the common moral receptors that, like taste buds, are innate. Haidt came to identify six distinct moral foundations which, though culturally shaped, are not arbitrary. Haidt claims that human morality is organized along these six categories from birth and that cultural context and experience shape the way they are expressed and valued. Thus, while the foundations are ultimately socially and culturally constrained, they are rooted in universal and innate moral perceptions.

In his quest for universality, Haidt has been accused by some scholars of projecting contemporary phenomena into the prehistoric past. For example, Gray (2012) accuses Haidt of ascribing prehistoric morality with traits from contemporary western politics, and Campbell (2012) claims that supernatural deities were not concerned with moral norms, and that the entwinement of morality with supernaturalism did not occur until relatively recently in the Axial Age. Since the primary value of Haidt's theory for this project is in its ability to shed light on the contemporary U.S. political and religious context in which torture opinion is situated, such critiques are less important for our purposes than they might otherwise be. Haidt's theory strives for

⁹ The team of scholars who helped develop and continue to oversee the testing and application of MFT include: Peter Ditto, Jesse Graham, Ravi Iyer, Sena Koleva, Brian Noseck.

universal and historical applicability, but it need not be successful in this to be helpful in understanding the here and now, which is where he is accused of projecting back from.

Haidt formed his theory of moral foundations by studying the work of anthropologists and evolutionary psychologists, seeking to identify links between the adaptive challenges and responses identified by evolutionary psychologists and the recurring moral themes reported by anthropologists across various cultures. Haidt's taxonomy is an elaboration of cultural psychologist R. A. Shwede's notion of three moral themes: autonomy, community, and divinity. It is influenced by Alan Fiske's relational models theory. Haidt has conducted controlled psychological experiments to test aspects of this theory, and his findings add support to his claims.

Before describing each foundation and its role in liberal and conservative moralities, it is first important to note that Haidt doesn't differentiate between types of conservatism, nor does he control for authoritarianism. What Stenner calls *laissez faire* conservatism seems to be what Haidt calls *libertarianism*, which, he says, rests upon the two foundations of Care/Harm and Liberty/Oppression.¹⁰ Haidt makes no distinction between *status-quo* conservatism, which at the core is averse to change, and *social* conservatism, which is more like authoritarianism. Haidt does sometimes refer to those who embrace the last three foundations as "social conservatives," suggesting that his understanding of conservative morality is conflated with the authoritarian tendencies

¹⁰ *Laissez faire* conservatives are concerned with Care/Harm, but not as much as other conservatives or liberals. Sharing with other conservatives a concern for the liberty-from-tyranny aspect of the Liberty/Oppression foundation, *laissez faire* Conservatives value liberty the most, far above any other foundations.

that are likely to be over-represented in his sample. When exploring Haidt's moral foundations vis-à-vis contemporary U.S. political culture, it is fair to assume that nonauthoritarian and authoritarian tendencies are bound up with the descriptions of liberal and conservative moral intuitions, respectively.

Moral foundations theory (MFT) is intended to be a work in progress, but currently it includes these six moral foundations: (1) Care/Harm, (2) Fairness/Cheating, (3) Liberty/Oppression, (4) Loyalty/Betrayal, (5) Authority/Subversion, and (6) Sanctity/Degradation. (For brevity's sake, foundations are sometimes referred to by the first term in each pair.) Haidt has used MFT to understand U.S. political culture, interpreting liberalism and conservatism as distinct moral intuitions characterized by the reliance upon and prioritization of different moral foundations. As a political psychology, liberalism is defined by the core dimensions of openness to change and aversion to inequality. The value commitments that tend to "go together" as part of this political psychology are Care/Harm, Liberty/Oppression, and Fairness/Cheating; according to Haidt, these are the moral foundations that form liberal morality and are the basis of liberal moral intuitions. Conservatism, as a political psychology, is defined by the core dimensions of endorsement of inequality and aversion to change. In contrast to liberal morality, which tends to be ambivalent about three of the six foundations, conservative morality relies on all six foundations. The value commitments that tend to "go together" as part of conservative political psychology are thus Care/Harm, Fairness/Cheating, Liberty/Oppression, Loyalty/Betrayal, Authority/Subversion, and Sanctity/Degradation.

According to Haidt, these make up conservative morality and are the basis of conservative moral intuitions.

FIRST THREE FOUNDATIONS

1. CARE/HARM

The Care/Harm foundation evolved in response to the adaptive challenge of protecting one's offspring. It is characterized by compassionate emotions, originally triggered by children's expressions of distress. Both liberal and conservative moralities are shaped by the Care/Harm foundation, but in their hierarchy of values, liberals prioritize it above almost everything else. Of the three foundations forming liberal moral intuitions, liberals tend to be most committed to the Care and the Liberty foundations. They are willing to sacrifice Fairness in order to uphold them. Conservatives, in contrast, are more willing to set this foundation aside than any other when a conflict of values occurs.

2. FAIRNESS/CHEATING

The Fairness/Cheating foundation evolved in response to the adaptive challenge of ensuring that cooperative efforts were mutually beneficial, encouraging people to contribute their fair share. It is characterized by emotions of anger, guilt, friendship/liking, and gratitude. It was originally triggered by negative experiences with cheaters and free-riders, and positive experiences with mutually beneficial cooperation, both on the individual and communal levels (Haidt 2012, 136, 181). Fairness is a complex concept with multiple interpretations across different situations and contexts. The Fairness foundation is concerned with the particular problem of freeloaders and

with achieving a fairness of outcomes, such that these are proportional to the levels of investment or inputs contributed by different individuals or groups. In contrast to fairness-as-equality, which is more closely related to the psychology of liberty and oppression (the third foundation), Fairness-as-proportionality is more closely related to the psychology of reciprocity and exchange (Haidt 2012, 169).

This interpretation of Fairness-as-proportionality is embraced by both liberals and conservatives. However, Haidt considers it more characteristic of conservatives because liberals are more likely to elevate the value of equality (a different interpretation of fairness, expressed in the Liberty foundation) and Care above proportional Fairness when they come into conflict. Liberals tend to be more ambivalent about the retributive side of proportionality (i.e., low contribution merits low reward) and are more willing than conservatives to sacrifice this foundation for the sake of Care. Liberals are also more likely to sacrifice Fairness-as-proportionality when it exacerbates oppressive inequalities, perhaps because these are seen as social harms. Conservatives, in contrast, are not as concerned with equality for its own sake; they are more willing to sacrifice the Care foundation for the sake of upholding other values. In their eyes, proportionality remains a good even when it leads to massive inequality (Haidt 2012, 44).

Critique of Haidt's Fairness Interpretation

Haidt's interpretation of this foundation vis-à-vis U.S. political culture is somewhat limited and problematic. Liberals rely on Fairness-as-proportionality perhaps more than Haidt acknowledges, but, for liberals, the freeloaders about whom they are

most concerned are those who have benefited and continue to benefit from the subjugation and exploitation of social groups. To achieve more equal outcomes, liberals rely on Fairness-as-proportionality (i.e., equity) in their advocacy for special protections and supports for historically disadvantaged groups. Liberals seek a more *equitable* distribution of opportunities in order to yield a more *equal* distribution of rewards. Hetherington and Weiler 2009 attribute this in part to nonauthoritarians' higher tolerance for ambiguity, which allows for a more complex calculation of fairness that considers broader social context and favors marginalized groups, even to the point of overcompensating for socio-historical inequities.

Haidt may also underestimate conservative value of equality, perhaps because conservatives seem to presume that *equality of opportunity* is a reality. As previously discussed, the conservative endorsement of inequality appears rooted in system justification motives, and the belief that the system distributes rewards in proportion to contribution. These beliefs validate the wealth of some and explain the poverty of others: each outcome is the result of people's actions. Authoritarian elements within conservatism emphasize a need for order that leads to black and white thinking and to the simpler notion of fairness-as-equality. This means treating everyone exactly the same, without exception (Hetherington and Weiler 2009, 44). For conservatives, equality is not an end in itself, rather it is a presumed beginning. As Hunsberger et al. note, "when people assume that the ideal of freedom of opportunity is a reality, systemic intergroup biases may be overlooked and underprivileged groups may be blamed for their situation" (2005, 817). Conservatives presume an equal distribution of

opportunities and thus accept an *unequal* distribution of rewards as an *equitable* allocation reflecting Fairness-in-proportion to contribution.

3. LIBERTY/OPPRESSION

The Liberty/Oppression foundation evolved in response to the “adaptive challenge of living in small groups with individuals who would, if given the chance, dominate, bully, and constrain others”; it is characterized by emotions of righteous and group-unifying anger, originally triggered by bullies, tyrants, and “signs of attempted domination” (Haidt 2012, 172). The Liberty/Oppression foundation is one of the three pillars of liberal morality, and it is a significant part of conservative morality as well; yet each group emphasizes different aspects of this foundation.

Within the Liberty/Oppression foundation, conservatives focus upon *liberty*, less from oppression than from *tyranny*. Liberty, for conservatives, is inwardly directed, demonstrating a heightened concern for protecting the individual rights of members of the in-group against governmental constraints, which they perceive to be the main threats to liberty. While conservatives are generally pro-authority (especially within the family), the Liberty foundation can come into tension with the Authority foundation because conservatives oppose governmental domination, especially when it derives from a secular, liberal government intent on redistributing wealth (in violation of Fairness-as-proportionality) (Haidt 2012).

While conservatives are concerned with individual liberty from government tyranny, liberals are concerned with the liberty of groups from manifest and latent systems of oppression. Combined with liberals’ prioritization of Care/Harm and

nonauthoritarians' strong out-group preference, this makes liberals manifest heightened concern for the welfare of subordinate, vulnerable groups. Liberals look to government to help protect the weak, and this sometimes extends beyond seeking equality of rights to equality of outcomes (Haidt 2012).

Thus, while Liberty/Oppression is a foundation of both liberal and conservative moralities, liberals and conservatives disagree about the source of oppression and the path to liberty. Conservatives see big government as oppressive when it is intervening domestically through social programs and regulatory policies that infringe on the liberties of individuals within the in-group. At the same time, conservatives see big government as an instrument of liberty when it is intervening abroad through aggressive foreign policy or when its constraint of individual liberties at home protect the interests of the in-group. Government sanctioned torture is, through this inwardly-directed lens, one of the ways that the government keeps us free. Liberals, by contrast, see social and economic inequalities as oppressive and look to government (as liberator) to address domestic problems and inequalities through social programs and regulatory policies. They are critical of the government's pursuit of neoliberal economic and aggressive foreign policies that further U.S. interests at the expense of others. Government sanctioned torture is, through this outwardly directed lens, an expression of systemic oppression of the Other.

CARE, LIBERTY AND TORTURE OPINION

The significance of the Care and Liberty foundations in shaping public opinion of torture is evident in the discourses surrounding the issue that lessen concerns about

harm and tyranny. David Luban (2005), scholar of law and philosophy, argues that torture is normalized and made acceptable through what he calls the “liberal ideology of torture” – the belief that torture can be compatible with liberal democracies when separated from its historical associations with cruelty and tyranny.

The liberal ideology of torture pervades contemporary discourse in various ways, but it is distilled and presented most clearly in the ticking time-bomb scenario. Luban sees the time-bomb scenario as a rhetorical device that makes torture acceptable to liberal democracies by providing a moral justification for torture while it separates torture from its historical associations with cruelty and tyranny, both abhorrent to liberal democracies. The time-bomb scenario’s first rhetorical move is to frame the torture debate in terms of a utilitarian argument, where the wrong of torturing a single suspect is set against the greater evil of many deaths, and it is, therefore, made right by comparison. Having provided grounds for its moral justification, the time-bomb scenario further unlinks torture from its associations with tyranny and cruelty by portraying it as a last resort instead of a systematic, governmental policy. Rather than being used by a tyrannical government *against* its people as vengeful punishment for past crimes, torture is used by a democratically elected government *for* its people as a matter of present and future national security (Luban 2005). According to this scenario, even the torturer can be imagined as a conscientious interrogator rather than a tyrant.

As we saw with the meta-analysis in chapter one, the time bomb scenario is ubiquitous in surveys that ask about torture. Nearly all explicitly mention the purpose of torture as gaining information and protecting lives. The few questions (2-5) that don’t

mention gaining information or saving lives directly still invoke the fight against terrorism as the purpose. The exceptional nature of government use of torture, as portrayed in the time-bomb scenario, is instrumental in garnering acceptance. Legalizing torture is wildly unpopular, and the permissibility of torture in contexts outside the war on terror is not raised by any national survey.

According to philosopher Jessica Wolfendale (2009), the association of torture with cruelty is further diminished through the surrounding cultural discourse of “torture lite,” which presumes that certain techniques do not cause excessive pain and suffering and so are not *real* torture. “Torture lite” is used to differentiate certain interrogation techniques from what would otherwise simply be called “torture,” signified in contemporary discourse by terms such as *enhanced-*, *harsh-*, or *coercive interrogation*. Techniques such as sleep deprivation, extreme temperatures, standing for long periods of time, etc., are instances of “torture lite.” These techniques are popularly perceived as “lite” because they do not leave physical marks on the body and because they are conducted at a distance from the victim through some other medium.

When asked about particular interrogation techniques, the public overwhelmingly prefers non-abusive, non-torturous methods of interrogation, such as offering detainees positive incentives. However, among the coercive interrogation techniques offered, torture lite techniques such as sleep deprivation, prolonged standing, cramped confinement, hooding, noise bombing, and humiliation are the most accepted (each receiving majority support on at least one national survey), while techniques entailing direct contact such as electric shocks, waterboarding, punching,

kicking, and sexual assault are consistently the least accepted. Alternately called “clean techniques,” “stealth torture,” “gray torture,” or “stress and duress,” these are the torture techniques most familiar to the U.S. public and of most interest to opinion pollsters (Rejali 2009, 359). According to Rejali, they are popular among modern democracies in part because they leave no marks on the body and so can more easily evade the international human rights monitoring agencies to which they are subject (2009, 358). The CIA developed these techniques after discovering that the combination of “sensory disorientation” and “self-inflicted pain” was the fastest, most reliable means for “breaking” prisoners; whereas direct, physical pain often provoked heightened resistance, this “no-touch torture” “causes victims to feel responsible for their suffering and thus capitulate more readily to their torturers” (McCoy 2006, 8). Ironically, despite the fact that these methods break their victims faster, their traumatic effects last longer, and they are considered torture by international law – the public views clean techniques as less harmful and less cruel. In that sense, they are *not really torture*.

Given that the Care/Harm and Liberty/Oppression foundations are significant to both political groups, the liberal ideology of torture likely plays a major role in the high rates of torture acceptance in the decade following 9/11. Conservatives, who tend to prioritize the needs of the group above individual autonomy, are susceptible to an argument for torture that pits the care of the group against the rights of the individual. Conservatives are more likely to see violence as a necessary force for the social good, both when it comes to military intervention and the use of corporal punishment. The

casting of torture as an exceptional practice performed by the government sidesteps conservative sensitivity to government tyranny by placing government action in the position of protector of the people against an enemy Other. Liberals, who are more strongly attached to the Care/Harm foundation and tend to prioritize individual liberties above group security, need more convincing to get over their strong aversion to inflicting harm. Presenting the torture question within the context of the time bomb scenario appeals to the Care foundation by emphasizing the possibility of saving lives. By recasting torture as something less harmful than *real* torture, torture lite discourse may also be an effective means of garnering support for torture from Lib/Dems.

LAST THREE FOUNDATIONS

According to Haidt, liberal morality is composed of three foundations – Care, Fairness, and Liberty. Liberals are ambivalent about the remaining three foundations. Conservative morality, by contrast, includes the liberal foundations and three additional foundations: Loyalty/Betrayal, Authority/Subversion, and Sanctity/Degradation.

The paired-down morality of liberals is not peculiar to U.S. culture. It is ubiquitous among the subset of the global population who herald “from cultures that are Western, educated, industrialized, rich, and democratic” (Haidt 2012, 96, underlines added). Haidt calls this “WEIRD morality,” based on the concept developed by Joe Henrich, Steve Heine, and Ara Norenzayan in their paper “The Wierdest People in the World?” (Haidt 2012, 96). Most of the global population are members of non-WEIRD cultures, and so represent the statistical norm in terms of morality. Compared to the rest of the global population, people from WEIRD cultures are statistical outliers who

hold a relatively atypical worldview that informs their moral judgments. Haidt (2013, 40) reflects that “[t]here’s something about the process of becoming comparatively well-off and educated that seems to shrink the moral domain down to its bare minimum,” but he doesn’t speculate what that might be.¹¹

Members of WEIRD cultures think analytically, “detaching the focal object from its context, assigning it to a category, and then assuming that what’s true about the category is true about the object.” They conceptualize the self as an autonomous individual that perceives the world in terms of “separate objects rather than relationships” (Haidt 2012, 97, 96). As a result, WEIRD moral systems are individualistic and rule-based. Their morality focuses on issues of harm and fairness; the main moral goals are to reduce harm, and increase fairness. Liberals (as well as libertarians [Haidt’s term] or laissez faire conservatives [Stenner’s term]) share these characteristics of this WEIRD morality.

Members of non-WEIRD cultures, by contrast, think holistically, “seeing the whole context and the relationship among parts.” They conceptualize the self in terms of roles and relationships, and perceive the world in terms of relationships among parts (Haidt 2012, 97). In consequence, their moral systems are sociocentric, prioritizing the needs of the group above those of the individual (Haidt 2012, 97, 98). Non-WEIRD morality focuses on more than just issues of harm and fairness and, as with conservative morality, relies upon the additional foundations of Loyalty, Authority, and Sanctity.

¹¹ I would speculate that the diminishment of the moral palate to the non-groupish foundations is related to the encounter with social diversity, both physically through industrialization and urbanization, and intellectually through education. Moral foundations such as Loyalty, Authority, and Sanctity, which foster tribalism, may not be as adaptive in a social context that rewards greater interdependence among groups rather than divisive competition between them.

4. LOYALTY/BETRAYAL

The Loyalty/Betrayal foundation evolved in response to the “adaptive challenge of forming cohesive coalitions.” It is characterized by emotions of group pride and rage against traitors, originally triggered by indications of someone’s allegiance or disloyalty (Haidt 2012, 140).

5. AUTHORITY/SUBVERSION

The Authority/Subversion foundation evolved in response to the “adaptive challenge of forging beneficial relationships within hierarchies,” in order “to rise in status while cultivating the protection of superiors and the allegiance of subordinates” (Haidt 2012, 144). It is characterized by emotions of respect and fear, originally triggered by displays of higher and lower status. Unsurprisingly, Haidt et al. (2009) report that scores on this foundation (or at least the 2009 Authority/Respect version of this foundation) correlate with right-wing authoritarianism.

6. SANCTITY/DEGRADATION

The Sanctity/Degradation foundation evolved in response to the adaptive challenge of identifying new food sources while avoiding contamination from “pathogens, parasites and other threats that spread by physical touch or proximity” (Haidt 2012: 148). It is characterized by emotions of disgust, originally triggered by sights, smells or other signs that dangerous pathogens may be present. The ability to perceive the sacred is a byproduct of the ability to perceive contamination, which itself is rooted in emotional disgust (cf. Douglas 1969; Freud 1962).

SOCIAL MOTIVATIONS

Haidt thinks of liberalism and (social) conservatism as expressions of two competing visions for social order, the former favoring Mill's vision of society and the latter favoring Durkheim's. Mill's society is populated by equal and free autonomous individuals who come together voluntarily to forge a social contract that is mutually beneficial to all. Power may only be exerted against another's will to prevent harm coming to others (Haidt 2012, 165). Primarily valuing individual rights and freedoms as well as social equality, Mill's vision of the contractual society is based solely on the Care and Fairness foundations; the basic social unit is the individual, and openness, individualism, plurality, self-expression, and creativity are highly valued (Haidt 2012, 185, 165). Durkheim's society, meanwhile, is not an agreement but an organism, where the hierarchically ordered family serves as the organizational model for other social institutions. Society is comprised of many interconnecting networks of relationships which discipline negative individualistic tendencies; the basic social unit is the family, and order, hierarchy, and tradition are highly valued (Haidt 2012, 185). Durkheim's society depends on all six moral foundations.

Janoff-Bulman (2009) critiques Haidt's characterization of liberal morality as individualistic and conservative morality as communitarian, claiming that liberal and conservative moral foundations represent different attitudes towards groups and ultimately different social motivations. Janoff-Bulman (2009) looks at conservatism and liberalism in terms of two motivational orientations: approach and avoidance. As distinct motivational orientations, approach and avoidance are defined by different

regulatory foci and action tendencies. Conservatives are characterized by avoidance-based tendencies that focus on negative outcomes and seek to avoid potential losses. Conservatives are said to be generally more pessimistic about human nature than liberals (Janoff-Bulman 2009; Jost et al. 2003; Stenner 2005), and more likely to view social hierarchy as inevitable and human nature as something that needs to be disciplined and controlled by society. Liberals, by contrast, are generally more optimistic about human nature and are more likely to see society's role as facilitating human growth and flourishing; they are less tolerant of social and economic inequality, perhaps because it is perceived as a fundamental obstacle to this end. Liberals are characterized by approach-based tendencies that focus on positive outcomes and seek to achieve potential gains. Janoff-Bulman (2009) argues that while conservatives are ultimately motivated to *protect* the social group against potential threats by preserving social order, liberals are ultimately motivated to *provide* for the social group by advancing policies of social justice. In short, conservatives seek to ensure the social group survives; liberals seek to ensure that social group members thrive.

Janoff-Bulman's (2009) interpretation connotes a Hobbesian/Rousseauian divide between liberals and conservatives, which I would suggest is more fitting than the Mills/Durkheim divide proposed by Haidt. Conservatives share a Hobbesian view of the relationship between person and society, where society saves the inherently flawed individual from himself, while liberals share a Rousseauian or humanistic view of the relationship between individual and society, where a society that constrains individual freedom corrupts the innate goodness of the human person. Dividing liberals and

conservatives along these lines also resonates with Lakoff's (1996) model of moral and political psychology. He claims that conservatives observe a Strict Father morality and liberals a Nurturing Parent morality. Conservatives see the role of society (and God) as that of a strict father: nurturance follows *conditionally* as a result of obedience to authority; liberals see the role of society (and God) as that of a nurturing parent: obedience to authority follows from initial nurturance (Lakoff 1996, 248).

Liberals tend to be individualistic in the sense that while authoritarian conservatives place a higher value on obedience to group authority, nonauthoritarian liberals place a higher value on individual autonomy. But, I stop short of characterizing liberal morality as non-community oriented, and instead stress the difference highlighted by Janoff-Bulman (2009) between providing for and protecting the social group. Nonauthoritarian liberals have a complex social identity that makes for a more inclusive social group (Brewer and Pierce 2005). Nonauthoritarian liberals also have a strong out-group preference, which means that the community for which they feel responsible extends beyond any particular group to which they belong, making their vision of community lack clear boundaries as it extends to populations and non-human life forms around the globe. Hetherington and Weiler (2009) speculated that this out-group preference may be a psychological defense of overcompensating for unacknowledged feelings of hostility towards others. But it is also possible that this expansive sense of community is, paradoxically, a by-product of an extreme individualism coupled with a complex social identity and out-group preference. Maybe perceiving the world as populated by individuals *like me* rather than groups of Others

(not me) means there is no natural place to draw boundaries around one's community, so it just extends into the infinite.

A consequence of this re-framing is that no clear distinction can be drawn between community-oriented and individual-oriented moral foundations, with liberals only recognizing those based in an ethic of autonomy. On the one side, liberals interpret both the Fairness/Cheating and Liberty/Oppression foundations in community-oriented ways that belie their classification as individual-oriented foundations. On the other side, conservatives interpret these same foundations in individually-oriented ways that prioritize individual merit and personal freedoms over the well-being of the group. The common thread uniting the latter three foundations is not so much that they are community oriented, but rather their ability to facilitate group cohesion and, by extension, a propensity towards *groupishness* that is less about community flourishing or well-being and more about preserving the group itself – ensuring group survival and maintaining the status quo.

MORAL FOUNDATIONS THEORY, SOCIAL MOTIVATIONS, AND TORTURE OPINION

Differences in the composition of liberal versus conservative moral intuitions, and ultimately different social motivations, helps explain their different attitudes towards torture. Conservatives are more sensitive to threat, and when the safety of the group is at stake, as in the time bomb scenario, they sacrifice the Care/Harm foundation for the sake of Loyalty and Authority. Having evolved out of the adaptive challenge of competition between groups, the moral foundations of Loyalty and Authority are

manifestations of the same need to protect the group. On the group-level, natural selection favors those with greater cohesion and higher levels of cooperation, and both Loyalty and Authority are integral to facilitating these. Conservatives' driving social motivation is to enhance the group's survival. They are willing to accept the curtailing of human rights and civil liberties and are more likely to sanction the use of force to protect the group. Group loyalty and obedience to authority are elevated and – in a context where political leaders defend the necessity of “harsh interrogation” and terrorists are presumed to be an imminent threat – it becomes a point of loyalty and obedience to accept government sanctioned torture. In this light, conservative torture support may be interpreted as an expression of loyalty to the in-group (Americans) and obedience to authority (republican and military leaders).

In contrast, liberals' driving social motivation is to provide for the group's well-being; the curtailing of human rights and civil liberties and use of force are seen as undermining that goal. Liberals value Care above all else and sometimes fail to recognize Loyalty and obedience to Authority as virtues at all; thus, they are unlikely to sacrifice Care to uphold the latter values, especially given their lower threat sensitivity. Liberals value autonomy and the boundaries of their group are expansive and ill-defined. Their sense of group doesn't necessarily align with national boundaries. Liberals' complex social identity and nonauthoritarian out-group preference, moreover, makes them more likely to identify with and favor the targets of torture as members of marginalized out-groups who deserve appropriate legal protections. At the same time, when the lines between Us and Them are sharpened by perceived threat of terrorist attack, liberals are

likely to become more conservative, to exhibit more authoritarian tendencies, and thus to become receptive to the values of Loyalty and Authority as necessary for the survival of the group. In this situation, elements of contemporary torture discourse that minimize its cruelty, such as torture lite, help them overcome their aversion to harm, while emphasizing the lifesaving potential of torture through the time-bomb scenario appeals to their strong valuation of Care.

Haidt's Cultural Psychology of Religion

My analysis of the last three “groupish” foundations has focused on Loyalty and Authority, to the exclusion of Sanctity, which is the focus of the next section of this chapter. Based in Shweder’s ethic of community, the Loyalty and Authority foundations emerge from the need for group cohesion in order to meet the evolutionary challenge of competition between groups. In contrast, the Sanctity/Degradation foundation is attributed to the need to identify suitable food sources. It is not immediately clear how or why this foundation facilitates groupishness. To clarify this, I review Haidt’s theory of religion and the anthropological claims that underlie it. Subsequently I use Haidt’s functionalist view of religious groupishness to interpret the relationship of religion and torture opinion.

EVOLUTIONARY ORIGINS AND FUNCTION OF RELIGION

Haidt’s theory of religion rests upon fundamental claims about human nature, namely that human nature is both *selfish* and *groupish*, and that humans are not only

innately *moral*, but also *righteous*.¹² To understand the functional role of religion in facilitating groupishness, it is necessary to understand these anthropological assumptions of groupishness and righteousness.

Pointing to evolutionary theory, Haidt reminds us that natural selection occurs on two levels simultaneously – individual and group – with the challenges of individual competition selecting for some human traits, and the challenges of group competition selecting for others. While individual level competition rewards selfishness, which is the capacity to promote self-interests in competition with other individuals, group-level competition rewards cooperation and selflessness, which is the capacity to promote group-interests in competition with other groups (Haidt 2012, 191-192). Because group-level natural selection favors groups with greater cohesion and higher levels of cooperation, humans developed “the ability (under special conditions) to transcend self-interest and lose ourselves (temporarily and ecstatically) in something larger than ourselves” (Haidt 2012, 223). Haidt calls this the “hive switch.” Rooted in the evolutionary challenge of competition between groups, the hive switch did not develop to help bond individuals to humanity at large, or to create a global community; it developed as an advantage when competing *against* other groups. The “hive switch” is assisted biologically by oxytocin, which facilitates bonding between individuals in large groups. Humanity’s hive nature is thus necessarily parochial, reinforcing altruism only between members of the same group in order to make it more competitive against other groups (Haidt 2012, 234).

¹² By “innate” Haidt means genetically predisposed, but socially developed and shaped (like a rough draft).

In recounting the evolutionary origins and function of religion, Haidt favors the views of David Sloan Wilson, who synthesizes Darwin's hypothesis of moral evolution by group selection with Durkheim's definition of religion (Haidt 2012, 258-264). Durkheim conceptualized religion functionally in terms of the three interrelated dimensions introduced in chapter one: believing, belonging, and doing. Social scientists who think of religion simply in terms of belief in a supernatural deity tend to construct a religious psychology that essentially consists of a direct causal relationship between believing and doing. Durkheim's model, by contrast, gives rise to a psychology of religion that acknowledges the groupish nature of religious belief and practice, and understands that the three dimensions of believing, belonging, and doing are mutually reinforcing and re-interpreting.

Wilson's views on the origins of religion are that human cognition and religion co-evolved, and that gods and religion "are group-level adaptations for producing cohesiveness and trust" (Haidt 2012, 264). Belief in god(s) is understood to be a byproduct of an evolutionary trait within human cognitive development that makes humans attuned to seeing faces and sensing the presence of others. As a response to the adaptive challenge of perceiving dangerous contaminants and predators, survival was maximized by developing a hypersensitivity to a *possible* presence that erred on the side of caution, springing into action at the slightest perception. A byproduct of this hypersensitivity is that humans are also highly susceptible to false-positives, that is, of sensing presences when there are none. This is the source of belief in supernatural beings. While belief in supernatural deities may have originated "as an accidental by-

product of a hypersensitive agency detection device,” it has lasted because the power of a deity-concept to maintain moral order fosters greater cohesion and cooperation within the group, thus providing religious groups with a competitive advantage against less unified groups (Haidt 2012, 272). Belief in god(s) helps groups to create a moral community because god’s omniscience serves to suppress antisocial and promote pro-social behaviors, ultimately answering the problem of facilitating cooperation without kinship and helping with the management and resolution of problems within the group. Belief in god(s) also fosters group cohesion because rituals and practices arising from this belief enables individuals to (at least temporarily) become less self-conscious and more aware of being part of a greater whole.

The evolutionary advantage of religion has been its ability to help groups cohere and thus beat out competing groups. This means that religion bears the hallmark of a group-level adaptation: a parochial altruism that is focused on promoting the in-group (Haidt 2012, 256, 265). Because religion is evolutionarily and psychologically directed towards promoting in-group cohesion, it entails a certain amount of *blinding* – enabling members to cultivate a sense of moral superiority over other groups – as part of the *binding* process. Religion blinds by promoting the uncritical acceptance of texts and teachings as authoritative and affirming the righteousness of the in-group’s beliefs and practices, while devaluing, distrusting, and sometimes harboring outright hostility towards outsiders (Haidt 2012). Religion’s ability to bind non-kin into a moral community, in part through blinding us to the faults within our own system and to the virtues of other communities, gives it tremendous advantage over less organized

groups. This helps explain its evolutionary resilience. The Sanctity foundation, in the form of religion, as well as the Loyalty and Authority foundations, express the innate human propensity towards groupishness, and righteousness by extension.

Haidt's work has been criticized for its invocation of evolutionary theory to explain group behaviors (e.g., Pinker 2012, Gray 2012, Campbell 2012). Pinker (2012), for example, critiques theories of group selection (or multilevel selection) such as Haidt's as a misappropriation of natural selection, which in evolutionary theory is something that happens on the level of individual genes replicating over multiple generations, "yielding a cumulative result that was not obvious from cause and effect applying to a single event" (Pinker 2012). Group traits are not passed on genetically, but rather culturally, and groupishness is something that could be attributed to cause and effect. Groupishness may thus be a learned adaptation, but not an evolved one. Haidt (2012a) disagrees, maintaining that while most social and moral psychology can be attributed to individual-level selection, there are some psychological traits that emerge in times of intergroup conflict that cannot be adequately explained as individual-level adaptations.

It is neither necessary nor my intention to take a position on this debate. Whether applied literally or metaphorically, viewing religion through the lens of evolutionary theory contributes something important to our understanding by highlighting the adaptive nature of religious beliefs and practices for promoting groupishness in the context of group competition. Haidt's claims about the evolutionary

origins of religion in group-level selection are not essential to my interpretation. What is important to my argument is Haidt's claim that religion is an effective means of binding people together in a moral community, and that in doing so it promotes groupishness. This is a functionalist understanding of religion, and not necessarily an evolutionary one.

INTERPRETING RELIGION AND TORTURE OPINION

REVIEW OF RELIGION AND TORTURE OPINION FINDINGS

Chapter one's analysis of torture data vis-à-vis religion variables yielded some key findings. People who claim any religious affiliation or preference are more supportive of torture than those who claim no religion, no preference, or who identify as atheist or agnostic (collectively referred to as Unaffiliated). Yet, closer analysis reveals that the role of religion is by no means uniformly positive in increasing torture support. First of all, once religious affiliation is divided by tradition, it becomes apparent that its positive relationship with torture support is largely attributable to Christians within the sample. In the Pew data, Christians are the religious group most supportive of torture. Buddhists, Muslims, and members of Other Faiths, show less support for torture than the religiously Unaffiliated. Secondly, the effects of Christian religious affiliation on torture opinion seem to be mediated through political orientation and race. Christian affiliation isn't associated with greater torture support among everyone, but rather primarily among white Lib/Dems. Christian affiliation actually *decreases* support for torture among white Consv/Reps and Blacks. This pattern is specific to the Christian tradition and does not necessarily extend to Other Religions: white Lib/Dems affiliated

with Other Religions show less support for torture, while white Consv/Reps affiliated with Other Religions show more support for torture than their Unaffiliated counterparts. Thirdly, greater religious commitment (“religiosity”) is consistently associated with less support for torture. Analysis of church attendance frequency shows a curvilinear relationship with torture support, where regardless of religious affiliation or political orientation, people on either side of the attendance spectrum – who attend church either *frequently* (once per week or more) or *never* – show less support for torture than the *infrequent* attenders in the middle. Actively practicing Christian Consv/Reps and Blacks show an even greater decrease in torture support relative their Unaffiliated counterparts, and the increased torture support found among Christian white Lib/Dems is not as great among those who frequently attend church. Other measures of religious commitment – such as the importance placed on prayer or religion in one’s life, and participation in prayer groups or bible study – demonstrate a similar association between greater religiosity and less torture support.

None of these findings seem to be attributable to intersecting demographic variables such as age, income, gender, region, evangelicalism, or education. Christian affiliation, in fact, is unique among the dominant social categories in the U.S. in that, unlike whiteness, maleness, adulthood, or higher socio-economic status, it is not associated with greater torture support when combined with Consv/Rep political orientation. Whites, males, adults 30-40, and people with higher socio-economic status all show greater support for torture, and this support becomes even greater when membership among these privileged social categories is combined with Consv/Rep

political orientation. When membership among these advantaged social categories is combined with Lib/Dem political orientation, by contrast, torture support decreases. Christian affiliation is the only social characteristic to defy this pattern. Even when differing levels of religiosity are taken into account, Christian affiliation is associated with *greater* torture support among white Lib/Dems and *less* support for torture among Consv/Reps and Blacks.

Then what is the role of religion in torture support? The simple, quantitative answer is that the role varies across groups. Torture support is *greater* among Christian white Lib/Dems compared to Unaffiliated white Lib/Dems, and among infrequent church attenders. At the same time, torture support is *lower* among Christian Consv/Reps and Blacks compared to Unaffiliated Consv/Reps and Blacks, and among both frequently attending (actively practicing) Christians and never attending (non-practicing) Christians compared to Christians who attend church irregularly. The key interpretative question raised by these findings is: Why might Christianity be *positively* associated with torture support among some groups (namely, white Lib/Dems and infrequent church attenders) and *negatively* associated with torture support among others (namely, Consv/Reps, Blacks, active and non-practicing Christians)?

Below I address this question using the political psychology constructs from chapter two, together with Haidt's cultural theory of morality and religion. I also draw upon insights from empirical studies in the psychology of religion. Though the ability to interpret these religion and torture opinion findings is limited by the available survey data – none of which included measures for assessing religious orientation (such as

Intrinsic, Extrinsic, or Quest orientations), images of God, levels of religious orthodoxy, the content of sermons, or the quality of a person's relationships within the church community – these theories and studies suggest some interpretative inroads. In response to the question of why Christianity may be associated with greater torture support among some groups and with less torture support among others, I will develop the following interpretative propositions: (1) Christianity decreases torture support among Conserv/Reps and Blacks because these groups' authoritarian tendencies make them more receptive to the moral authority of the religious community. Like authoritarianism, more frequent church attendance may also facilitate the greater assimilation of and conformity to the moral system prescribed by the church (i.e., faith community). Christianity doesn't similarly decrease torture support among white Lib/Dems because this group's nonauthoritarian tendencies make them less likely to defer to the moral authority of religious leaders or tradition, and more likely to follow an individually-formulated morality. This phenomenon may have an analogy in the heightened torture support seen among infrequent church attenders, whose marginal relationship with the faith community makes them less likely to feel accountable to its mores. (2) Christianity increases torture support among white Lib/Dems because torture support is related to racial intolerance, and the segregated nature of Christian faith communities facilitates greater groupishness along racial lines. A previously observed relationship between racial prejudice and infrequent church attendance suggests an analogous phenomenon. The second interpretative proposition is necessarily more

tenuous than the first due to the dearth of empirical research on the relationship between political liberalism and religion.

GROUPISHNESS AND MORAL AUTHORITY

The first proposition aims to explain why torture support *decreases* among Christian Conserv/Reps and Blacks. Sanctity, in the form of religion, is one of the three groupish foundations, along with Loyalty and Authority. Emerging from the evolutionary challenge of competition between groups, these three foundations facilitate in-group cohesion in part by out-group denigration. We might expect these groupish foundations to be associated with greater torture support, as indeed they generally are, in part because interrogational torture is a powerful literal and symbolic exertion of dominance by one group over an enemy Other.

In chapter two we saw that torture-permissives in the Pew data are more likely to agree with statements expressing the values of Loyalty and Authority. Agreement with statements that express Loyalty, such as “we should be willing to fight for our country, whether it is right or wrong”; “American lives are worth more than the lives of people in other countries”; or “I am very patriotic” is associated with greater acceptance of torture than disagreement, by +14%, +15%, and +13% respectively. Similarly, agreement with statements that express Authority, such as “the government should do more to protect morality in society”; “it is generally right for the government to monitor telephone and e-mail communications of Americans suspected of having terrorist ties without first obtaining permission from the courts”; or “the police should be allowed to search the houses of people who might be sympathetic to terrorists without a court

order” is also associated with greater acceptance of torture than is disagreement with these statements, by +7%, +20%, and +14% respectively. When agreement with such statements of Loyalty and Authority is coupled with Consv/Rep political orientation, levels of torture acceptance climb even higher.

But while Consv/Reps who also express attitudes in accordance with the Loyalty or Authority foundations tend to be *more* torture supportive than those Consv/Reps who do not, Consv/Reps who uphold the value of Sanctity through greater Christian religiosity tend to be *less* torture supportive than Unaffiliated and less religiously committed Consv/Reps. That is, unlike the foundations of Loyalty and Authority, which when combined with Consv/Rep orientation show an increase in torture support, the combination of Sanctity with Consv/Rep orientation yields *decreased* support for torture. Lib/Dems, meanwhile, generally tend to show the greatest torture opposition and to be ambivalent about the Loyalty and Authority foundations; when these Lib/Dems are also white and Christian, the combination of Sanctity with Lib/Dem orientation yields *increased* torture support. If all three of these foundations – Loyalty, Authority, and Sanctity – promote groupishness, why should the Sanctity foundation have different effects upon Consv/Reps and Lib/Dems than Loyalty and Authority when it comes to torture opinion?

One way to interpret these differences is that both the Loyalty and Authority foundations operate within the construct of authoritarianism: Loyalty is related to authoritarians’ in-group preference; Authority is related to authoritarians’ preference for hierarchal social organization and prioritization of obedience to authority over

individual autonomy. As with Loyalty and Authority, authoritarianism is related to greater torture support both in concert with, and independent of conservatism. Sanctity is a distinctive construct, which, while sharing the groupishness of the other two foundations, doesn't necessarily share their authoritarian qualities. Though overall Lib/Dems may show ambivalence towards the three groupish foundations, *Christian Lib/Dems* have been selected out of the larger group as Lib/Dems who value Sanctity. This doesn't mean that they also value the other two groupish foundations of Loyalty and Authority, as Christian Consv/Reps do. The groupishness promoted by religion facilitates the maintenance of a moral community, and vice-versa. But without the complimentary foundations of Authority and Loyalty to endow religion with moral authority, it may promote groupishness among Lib/Dems without promoting the accompanying moral norms of the religious tradition.

Lib/Dems are very un-groupish. They have a complex social identity that makes their social group more inclusive, and their nonauthoritarian tendencies include a strong out-group preference and prioritization of individual autonomy over group authority that further weakens the boundaries separating Us from Them. Torture is acceptable exclusively by Us against Them, and Lib/Dems may not have a sufficiently firm line differentiating the two to make torture acceptable against anyone. Consv/Reps, who have a simpler and more exclusive social identity, an in-group preference, and prioritize the group over individuals, ultimately have a greater sense of Us to protect and can more readily distinguish the targets of torture as Them. Consv/Reps are already groupish by virtue of the Loyalty and Authority foundations, and the groupishness

fostered by religion may not be as evident among them as it is among typically ungroupish Lib/Dems. This is a similar interpretation to that used to explain why the widely perceived threat of terrorist attack had a more visible effect on the otherwise less threat-sensitive Lib/Dems.

The Loyalty and Authority foundations may, furthermore, interact with Sanctity in a way that endows religion with a moral authority capable of counteracting some of the negative aspects of groupishness among Conserv/Reps. This interpretation pertains to what Haidt calls the “conservative advantage.” Haidt claims that conservatives have a political advantage over liberals in two ways: (1) they have six moral foundations through which to communicate rather than three, and (2) the three additional moral foundations help facilitate group unity. Dominant within the Republican Party, conservative morality triggers all six moral “taste receptors” and is more adept at speaking directly to the elephant (Haidt 2012, 184). While Democratic arguments can only appeal to three common moral foundations, Republicans are able to appeal to their constituencies in terms of all six. The ability to communicate via all six moral receptors means not only having twice as many channels for getting their message across, it also means that the messages received are amplified by virtue of triggering multiple receptors at once. In other words, with six moral foundations rather than three, conservatives have both more ways of communicating with voters and greater potential to reach them on a deeper level.

Conservatives also enjoy the advantage of having greater group cohesion, facilitated by the three additional foundations. Liberals value diversity over unity and

individual autonomy over the needs of the group. These values undermine efforts to unite in support of a cohesive political platform. Conservatives, by contrast, respect the role of social hierarchies in maintaining order and unity within the group and they tend to place the needs of the group above those of the individual. By valuing conformity and obedience to authority above diversity and autonomy, conservatives have a distinct advantage when they unite in support of a given political platform. Conservatives enjoy this advantage in the realm of religion as well as politics. When combined with Sanctity, the values of Loyalty and Authority, which incline Consv/Reps to follow the party line and trust the government to do what is necessary to protect the status quo, make Consv/Reps more likely to assimilate religious messages and accept their moral authority. For religious Lib/Dems, by contrast, who value the Sanctity foundation without necessarily also adopting the Loyalty and Authority foundations, current methods of religious moral formation are comparatively ineffective when it comes to torture.

AUTHORITARIANISM AND RACE

The relationship of torture opinion to both political orientation and religiousness may hinge on the distinct attitudes of Lib/Dems and Consv/Reps toward the authoritarian values of Loyalty and Authority. For that reason, the theoretical construct of authoritarianism may offer the best interpretive lens for understanding the decrease in torture support among religious Consv/Reps and Blacks. As social groups, Consv/Reps and Blacks experience very little overlap. While 16-30% of Blacks consider themselves conservative, only 2-5% identify as republican, and only between 3% and 6% of Blacks

are represented within the Consv/Rep group. Consv/Reps are generally the most torture permissive of all social groups, while Blacks (together with white Lib/Dems) are among the least. Yet, despite this lack of overlap, Christian affiliation is associated with decreased torture support among both groups. What do Consv/Reps and Blacks have in common that may help explain their common relationship with Christianity and torture opinion? One answer is authoritarianism, and, by extension, Christian orthodoxy.

Authoritarianism may help explain the curious confluence of Consv/Reps and Blacks on the same side of the Christian religion-torture dynamic. As noted earlier, Hetherington and Weiler 2009 argue that the perception of increased political polarization in the U.S. is in large part attributable to the sorting of the population into political groups defined by authoritarian preferences, with authoritarians tending to associate with conservative values and republican groups and nonauthoritarians with liberal values and democratic groups. African Americans, however, were found to be an exceptional social group that defied this sorting hypothesis. African Americans are in fact by far the most authoritarian racial group – with a mean authoritarianism score of .75, compared to .55 for non-blacks – yet for historical reasons overwhelmingly vote Democratic as a group (Hetherington and Weiler 2009, 141). It is possible that Christianity lessens torture support among Blacks (who are already among the least pro-torture, and overwhelmingly Lib/Dem) and Consv/Reps (who are the most pro-torture group and overwhelmingly white) because both groups score high on the authoritarian spectrum.

Religion is most commonly associated with conservative positions on issues of abortion and homosexuality. Less notice has been taken of the leftward political influences of religion (Campbell et al. 2011, 169). Scholars of religion and public opinion have found that religion can move public attitudes towards the left as well as to the right. For example, Campbell et al. 2011 found that religiosity (measured by frequency of attendance and importance placed upon religion in one's life) is associated both with greater opposition to abortion and to the death penalty – the first being a more conservative position and the second a more liberal one. Historically, religion has been associated with such left-leaning positions as abolitionism, civil rights, and opposition to the U.S. war in Vietnam. More recently evidence suggests a relationship between religion and support for anti-poverty legislation and greater environmental regulation (attitudes typically associated with the political left) among evangelical Protestants (a group typically associated with the political right) (Campbell et al. 2011, 174-175).

Higher authoritarians are likely to obey religious authorities. When torture is mentioned, it is much more likely to be denounced by religious authorities than excused. Christianity may thus increase opposition to torture among high authoritarians in the way it increases opposition to abortion and homosexuality and decreases death penalty support among these groups. Just as authoritarianism may contribute to greater torture support among Consv/Reps because political authorities extol its necessity, authoritarianism may contribute to the decrease in torture support among *Christian* Consv/Reps because *religious* authorities condemn it.

CHRISTIAN ORTHODOXY AND IMPLICIT RACIAL BIAS

Studies of Christian Orthodoxy and racial prejudice offer support for such a hypothesis. In the discussion of authoritarianism in chapter two, I noted that both authoritarianism and torture support are related to greater intolerance towards out-groups. Christian Orthodoxy is strongly related to right-wing authoritarianism (RWA), but while the latter is correlated with *greater* racial prejudice and intolerance, Christian Orthodoxy is correlated with *less* (Rowatt and Franklin 2004; Powell and Clarke 2013). Christian Orthodoxy refers to the “authentic internalization of Christian beliefs” such as “love your neighbor as yourself; do unto others as you would have them do unto you,” etc. (Rowatt and Franklin 2004, 129). It is distinct from, but strongly correlated to right-wing authoritarianism (“beliefs that others should submit to authority”; $r=.50$), religious fundamentalism (“restrictive religious ideology”; $r=.58$), and intrinsic religious orientation (“religion as an end in and of itself”; $r=.55$) (Rowatt and Franklin 2004, 129, 132). Like RWA, religious fundamentalism (RF) and intrinsic religious orientation (I) are positively associated with greater racial bias against blacks (showing effective increases of $+.20$, $+.10$, and $+.06$ respectively), while *Christian Orthodoxy* has a negative association ($-.08$) with the same. In short, unlike RF, RWA, and I – all of which are strongly correlated with Christian Orthodoxy *and* with greater anti-black bias – Christian Orthodoxy is associated with a *decrease* in anti-black bias (Rowatt and Franklin 2004). In their review of the literature, Powell and Clarke conclude that “whereas RF and RWA are highly associated with prejudice and intolerance, Christian Orthodoxy (‘CO’) ... is negatively correlated with the same.” (2013, 17) Through the strong correlation with

Christian Orthodoxy, higher levels of authoritarianism among Conserv/Reps and Blacks may help explain why torture support is lower among Christian Conserv/Reps and Blacks compared to their Unaffiliated counterparts. On the other side, nonauthoritarianism may go some way towards explaining why torture support *doesn't* similarly decrease among Christian Lib/Dems. The nonauthoritarian tendencies of Lib/Dems make them less likely to recognize and obey the moral authority of the church and thus less likely to score high on Christian Orthodoxy.

Echoing Fromm's "escape from freedom," Stenner maintains that at the core of authoritarianism is the desire for oneness and sameness, and that groupishness is a secondary, inevitable means to this primary end (Stenner 2005, 29). Among authoritarians, there is a primary desire to place the group above self and individuals, "to transfer sovereignty to, and commit self and others to conformity with *some* collective order" (Stenner 2005, 141, original emphasis). Commitment to, identification with, and glorification of a particular group is a secondary outgrowth of this primary desire to submit to something greater than oneself (Stenner 2005, 141).

Authoritarianism expresses a desire to relinquish control to a higher authority and to become one and the same. In this sense it is optimally attuned and receptive to the call of the Christian religion to submit to God's will and to become one body as a community of faith. The authoritarian desire to relinquish control furthers the ends of any group – capitalist or communist, religious or atheist. When authority is granted to the Republican Party, authoritarianism furthers that agenda, which in the decade following 9/11 included interrogational torture as a tactic of war. When that same authority is

granted to the Christian religion, authoritarianism can just as readily further the agenda of Christian morality, which has been unequivocally against torture just as it has opposed abortion, homosexuality, and the death penalty.

In some respects, frequent church attendance may serve an analogous function to the authoritarian disposition or the “conservative advantage.” The three “B’s” of belonging, behaving, and believing are mutually reinforcing. Greater participation in the church community means greater opportunity for exposure to a religion’s moral claims and the beliefs that underpin them. It means greater opportunity to develop meaningful relationships, which reinforce beliefs and enhance a sense of belonging that extends beyond identity to include mutual accountability. Greater exposure to the faith community means greater opportunity to be molded by it and to develop the trust necessary to grant its moral system the authority to guide one's attitudes and behaviors. Perhaps this is why, regardless of authoritarian disposition, frequent attenders of all political orientations demonstrate less support for torture than infrequent attenders. White Lib/Dems, disposed towards a nonauthoritarian prioritization of the individual over the group and of autonomy over obedience, may share in their way of religious belonging and believing something akin to the behavior of infrequent attenders. Perhaps Christian affiliation among white Lib/Dems expresses but one aspect of a more complex social identity as opposed to a propriety sense of belonging that entails accountability to others in the group who share the label “Christian.” Lib/Dems embrace multiple social identities and this may lessen the loyalty felt towards, and moral authority given to, any single group to which they belong.

RELIGION, PREJUDICE, AND TORTURE OPINION

The literature on Christian Orthodoxy (CO) establishes a link between authoritarianism on the one hand and the internalization of Christian commands on the other, pointing to decreased racial bias as a manifestation of the latter. How this dynamic operates is unknown, but the manifestation of CO in the form of decreased racial bias is important given the positive relationship between authoritarianism, torture support and racial intolerance noted in chapter two. Just as authoritarianism is associated with negative attitudes towards out-groups, so too is torture support. When it comes to prejudice against Blacks in particular, torture favor is associated with holding more negative black stereotypes (+16% generally; +15% among whites), greater racial resentment (+22% generally; +23% among whites), and with greater anti-black bias (+.08 generally; +.08 among whites).

Authoritarian submission to authority and conformity to the group were proposed above as possible explanations for the decrease in torture support among Christian Blacks and Consv/Reps. Triangulating the connection between authoritarianism and Christian Orthodoxy on the one hand and between Christian Orthodoxy and decreased racial bias on the other may shed light on why torture support seems to decrease among Christian Consv/Reps and Blacks without affecting a similar decrease among Christian white Lib/Dems, who tend towards nonauthoritarianism. At the same time, this interpretation doesn't explain why torture support should actually go *up* in relation to Christian affiliation among the generally torture-averse Lib/Dems. It is difficult to interpret this increase in torture support among religious white Lib/Dems

because so because religion has most often been studied as a conservatizing force (without controlling for ideological conservatism), and little research has been conducted on religion and political liberalism.

Because much scholarship in the empirical study of religion has been devoted to investigating the relationship between religion and intolerance, it is significant that when political orientation is taken into consideration, a similar pattern is found between Christianity and racial attitudes as is found between Christianity and torture opinion. That is, the way that Christianity interacts with torture opinion across political orientations shares similarities with the way Christianity interacts with attitudes towards Blacks as a racial group. Just as Christianity is associated with greater torture support among white Lib/Dems, Christianity among white Lib/Dems is also associated with greater racial *intolerance* towards Blacks in the form of explicit prejudice and implicit bias. Likewise, just as Christianity is associated with less torture support among white Consv/Reps, it is also associated with greater racial *tolerance* towards Blacks, both explicitly and implicitly. Authoritarianism is typically associated with greater racial intolerance, but Christianity seems to utilize the authoritarian preferences evident among Consv/Reps to encourage greater tolerance between racial groups, which is a basic factor in torture opposition. Without authoritarianism as a tool for communicating morality to Lib/Dems, Christian affiliation seems to be counterproductive, reinforcing social boundaries along racial lines and an Us-Them mentality essential to torture support. The ANES data provides suitable variables for demonstrating these effects.

Table 4. Racial Prejudice Indicators by Political Orientation, Race, and Religion, ANES 2008-2009

	By Race		By Religion (Whites Only)		
	All Races	Whites Only	Christian	Christian, Frequently Attending	Nonreligious
Average Negative Black Stereotypes (0 to 1 scale)¹					
Cons-Rep	.3470	.3427	.3366	.2554	.3715
Mod/Indep	.3209	.3184	.3112	.3459	.2840
Lib/Dem	.2861	.3033	.3218	.3124	.2652
Total	.3202	.3244	.3243	.2937	.2942
Racial Resentment Index (0 to 1 scale)¹					
Cons-Rep	.7136	.7163	.7183	.6658	.7773
Mod/Indep	.5640	.6027	.5946	.5791	.5508
Lib/Dem	.4202	.4463	.4485	.4481	.4442
Total	.5757	.6095	.6127	.5993	.5469
Implicit Association Test Scores (-2 to +2 scale)²					
Cons-Rep	.12248	.11277	.13793	.07689	.17709
Mod/Indep	.17412	.19405	.15749	.21291	.24822
Lib/Dem	.07042	.12784	.17914	.16570	-.00815
Total	.12685	.14488	.15423	.13325	.09393

¹ See Appendix B for racism variable calculations.

² -2 indicates strongest anti-white bias, 0 indicates no bias, +2 indicates strongest anti-black bias. Mean IAT score = .13977. Median IAT score = .13666. See Appendix B for further details.

EXPLICIT PREJUDICE: STEREOTYPES AND RACIAL RESENTMENT

Within the ANES data, Consv/Reps are not only 21% more torture-accepting than Lib/Dems, white Consv/Reps also express more racial prejudice in the form of 4% more negative black stereotypes and 27% more racial resentment compared to white Lib/Dems. Christianity seems to mitigate this prejudice among white Consv/Reps. *Christian* white Consv/Reps express 3% fewer negative black stereotypes and 6% less racial resentment than Consv/Reps who are Nonreligious. Just as with torture opinion, the effects of Christianity upon Consv/Rep prejudice are even more pronounced when religiosity is taken into account: Christian white Consv/Reps who frequently attend church express 12% fewer negative black stereotypes and 10% less racial resentment than Consv/Reps who are Nonreligious. When we look at Christian white Lib/Dems, by

contrast, Christian affiliation is associated with 6% *more* negative black stereotypes and no change in racial resentment. Religiosity doesn't have the same magnitude of effect among white Christian Lib/Dems, but it remains consistent in its direction. Just as with torture opinion, where greater religiosity helped temper the increase in torture support among white Lib/Dems, *actively practicing* Christian white Lib/Dems express slightly less (-1%) negative black racial stereotypes than Christian white Lib/Dems in general; here the difference between actively practicing Christian white Lib/Dems and their Nonreligious counterparts is 5% more negative black racial stereotypes (compared to the +6% among Christian white Lib/Dems).

In other words, just as Christianity is associated with *decreased torture support* among Consv/Reps (who in general tend to be the most torture supportive), Christianity is also associated with *decreased racial intolerance* among Consv/Reps (who in general tend to be among the most expressly racially intolerant). At the same time, just as Christianity is associated with *increased torture support* among Lib/Dems (who in general tend to be the most opposed to torture), Christianity is also associated with *increased racial intolerance* among Lib/Dems (who in general tend to be among the most expressly racially tolerant). This trend holds true among the general population as well as among just Whites.

IMPLICIT BIAS

In addition to measuring explicit affirmations of racial stereotypes and resentments, a team of Harvard researchers has developed a computer-based measure of racial prejudice based on the strength of implicit associations between concepts (i.e.,

black people, gay people, women) and evaluations (i.e., good, bad) or stereotypes (i.e., homemaker, wealthy). The Implicit Association Test (IAT) aims to capture social biases that people may not explicitly espouse or even be consciously aware of. In the Rowatt and Franklin 2009 study of Christian Orthodoxy cited above, racial prejudice was measured in terms of the implicit racial bias reflected by IAT scores. A shortened version of the Racial Implicit Association Test was included in the nineteenth wave of the ANES 2008-2009 Panel Study, performed in two randomly ordered phases. Respondents were instructed to place one finger on the “P” key at the far right side of the computer keyboard and a second finger on the “Q” key on the far left side, and to press the appropriate key as quickly as possible when one of four types of stimuli flashed on the screen. The types of stimuli included black faces, white faces, positive words (such as love, good, friend), and negative words (such as hate, bad, enemy). In one phase, respondents were tasked with sorting words and pictures by pressing one key any time they saw a *white face* or *positive word*, and to use the other key for anything else that appeared. In the other phase, the associations were reversed and respondents were tasked with sorting words and pictures by pressing one key any time they saw a *black face* or *positive word*, and use the other key for anything else that appeared. The computer measured the amount of time it took for the respondent to sort each stimulus. Response times were combined into a single figure on a scale from -2 to +2; respondents who took longer to sort stimuli into the black/positive categories than the white/positive categories would have scored in the 0 to +2 range, demonstrating implicit anti-black bias. Overall, the mean IAT score was .13977, with a median score of

.13666. This means that on average it took people longer to associate black faces with positive words than white faces, suggesting implicit anti-black bias.

Looking at the relationship between Christianity and racial prejudice in terms of implicit bias shows similar trends to what emerged with explicit expressions of racial stereotypes and resentment, but with some variation. Overall, Lib/Dems tend to show less implicit anti-black bias (-.05) than Consv/Reps, just as they tend to show less explicit prejudice. Interestingly however, once race is controlled for, we see that implicit anti-black bias is actually slightly higher (+.02) among white Lib/Dems (who typically show a strong out-group preference on explicit attitudes measures) than among white Consv/Reps. Christian religiousness, moreover, seems to be a significant factor in this. Consv/Reps tend to be more religious, and vice-versa, than Lib/Dems. Controlling for religious affiliation as well as race, white Lib/Dems who are Nonreligious resume their familiar position as the more tolerant group, showing less (-.17) implicit negative black bias than Nonreligious white Consv/Reps. Among white practicing Christians, by contrast, Lib/Dems show greater (+.09) implicit bias against Blacks than Consv/Reps. Furthermore, practicing Christian white Consv/Reps show less (-.10) implicit bias against Blacks than their Nonreligious counterparts, while practicing Christian white Lib/Dems show more (+.17) implicit bias against Blacks than their Nonreligious counterparts. When it comes to implicit anti-black bias, in other words, Christianity seems to be a key factor. Absent a religious affiliation, Consv/Reps show more bias than white Lib/Dems; *with* Christian religious affiliation, Lib/Dems show more bias than Consv/Reps. We see the same patterns repeated when it comes to the effect of Christian religiosity *within*

political groupings. Christian affiliation seems to have the effect of increasing negative black bias among Lib/Dems, just as it increases explicit prejudice and torture support. At the same time, Christian affiliation seems to have the effect of decreasing negative black bias among Consv/Reps just as it decreases explicit prejudice and torture support. Just as with torture support and explicit prejudice, greater Christian religiosity (measured by frequent church attendance) lessens implicit anti-black bias among both groups of Christians, further decreasing (-.06) anti-black bias among Consv/Reps, and slightly lessening (-.01) the increase in anti-black bias among Lib/Dems.

Two more points of analysis suggest that the relationship between religion and torture opinion may be rooted in their interaction with racial attitudes. First, analysis of the ANES data shows that Christianity isn't associated with greater torture support among all Lib/Dems, but rather only among Lib/Dems whose IAT scores are above the mean, indicating greater than average anti-black bias. Among those scoring below the mean on the IAT, indicating less than average anti-black bias, active Christian Lib/Dems show *less* mean torture support compared to their Nonreligious counterparts, just like active Christian Consv/Reps. In short, while overall religion seems to be associated with greater torture support, the Pew data show that religion doesn't have the effect of increasing support among the whole population, but rather primarily among white Christian Lib/Dems. Meanwhile, the ANES data show that Christian affiliation doesn't have the effect of increasing torture support among all white Lib/Dems, but rather primarily among those who harbor above-average implicit bias against Blacks.

The second point of analysis supporting the significance of racism in the religion-torture relationship is that the effect of Christian affiliation on Lib/Dem attitudes towards torture is similar to its effect on attitudes towards the death penalty, but distinct from its effect on issues such as abortion and homosexuality. Torture acceptance among practicing Christian white Consv/Reps and Mod/Indeps is 6% less than among their Unaffiliated counterparts. Practicing Christian white Consv/Reps and Mod/Indeps are also 16% and 9% (respectively) less supportive of the death penalty. Among practicing Christian white Lib/Dems, meanwhile, torture support is 5% greater overall and 12% greater among Christian white Lib/Dems in the South, compared to their Unaffiliated counterparts. Practicing Christian white Lib/Dems are also 10% more supportive of the death penalty.

This pattern doesn't hold when it comes to social issues of abortion and homosexuality, however. Across all political orientations, white practicing Christians are all significantly more likely to favor "making it more difficult for women to get an abortion" (+40% Consv/Reps, +20% Mod/Indeps, +28% Lib/Dems) and to feel that "homosexuality is a way of life that should be discouraged in society" (+20% Consv/Reps, +54% Mod/Indeps, +25% Lib/Dems) than their Unaffiliated counterparts. For some reason practicing Christian white Lib/Dems tend to adhere to Christian mores when it comes to issues of abortion and homosexuality, but not when it comes to torture or the death penalty.

The issues of torture and the death penalty share racial underpinnings that arguably make them different from the issues of abortion and homosexuality, but their

differences by no means stop there. Attitudes towards torture and the death penalty also capture something of respondents' belief in the ability of force to restore order. Practicing Christian white Lib/Dems feel 17% stronger than their Unaffiliated counterparts that "using overwhelming military force is the best way to defeat terrorism around the world." Among white Consv/Reps, by contrast, Christian religiosity is associated with only 1% greater belief in the use of force; among practicing *Catholic* Consv/Reps, frequent church attendance is associated with 11% less support for military force. In short, it's possible that racism has something to do with the different effects of Christianity on torture support and the death penalty among white Lib/Dems, but such an interpretation by no means rules out other factors.

The data on religion and implicit racial bias are particularly interesting for a number of reasons beyond the fact that it mirrors the dynamic seen between religion and torture opinion. First, it exposes a disconnect among Lib/Dems between explicit prejudice and implicit bias that supports Hetherington and Weiler 2009's supposition that nonauthoritarians' strong out-group preference may be a defense against or compensation for underlying and perhaps unacknowledged racial hostilities. Second, it is notable that in controlling for religious affiliation and attendance, active Christian Consv/Reps showed less racial bias not only compared to Nonreligious Consv/Reps, but compared to active Christian *Lib/Dems* as well. Religiousness had the effect of decreasing torture support among Christian Consv/Reps and increasing it among Christian Lib/Dems, but not to the extent that the torture aversion of religious

Consv/Reps ever exceeded that of religious Lib/Dems. Third, implicit bias isn't a matter of obedience. Unlike explicit racial attitudes, IAT scores can't be consciously manipulated to conform even to one's own deeply held convictions, much less to others' moral exhortations. Persons can't adjust their scores in obedience to church teaching. Scores tend to reflect the associations which are reinforced by the surrounding culture. They illustrate the ever-present unconscious biases that a person's pursuit of racial justice must overcome. This final point suggests something more profound at work in the relation between religion and torture opinion among Consv/Reps and Blacks, which authoritarianism may very well facilitate but which goes beyond the superficial explanations of obedience to authority proposed above. The decreased implicit anti-black bias found among Christian Consv/Reps suggests that Christianity may benefit from the "conservative advantage" of being able to utilize six moral receptors to penetrate Consv/Rep attitudes. Not only does Christian affiliation not affect nonauthoritarians in this way, it seems to be counter-productive when it comes to influencing white Lib/Dem morality with respect to torture, the death penalty, and racial prejudice.

Racial segregation of religious communities may have something to do with this, though this is little more than speculation on my part. The Pew data show that Christian affiliation has the greatest effect on torture opinion in the South, where it increases torture acceptance by 12% among white Lib/Dems. The southern U.S. has historically been the most racially segregated region in the nation and this segregation extends to the composition of faith communities. Data on racial segregation in faith communities

are scarce (and not analyzed by region), but a 2010 study of over 11,000 faith communities found that only “14 percent of congregations are considered multiracial, with at least 20 percent of members coming from racial groups different from the congregation's majority race” (Thumma 2013). This social organization of religious communities may strengthen the boundaries between Us and Them for Lib/Dems, particularly along racial lines, as religion facilitates greater groupishness without the complimentary ability to wield greater moral authority.

This social segregation of religious communities may be particularly significant because, when it comes to forming public opinion, people don't just take cues from political parties and leaders, they also use social attachments as guides (Berinsky 2009, 140). In his research on public opinion in times of war and peace, Berinsky (2009, 130) found that “both in-groups – the collection of individuals of which a citizen is a part – and out-groups – those groups to which a citizen does not belong but toward which she feels enmity or affection – can be important reference points in political understanding and choice. Put simply, citizens can use their affect toward groups to comprehend and guide complex political decisions.” Furthermore, stereotypes about various different groups seem to affect attitudes about policies that may not be directly related, suggesting that attitudes towards particular groups may not matter as much as much as attitudes towards groups in general (Berinsky 2009, 131). Social attachments and attitudes towards groups can function as guides for political decision-making, both in terms of foreign as well as domestic policy, regardless of whether such attitudes are consciously acknowledged, and this “[g]roup-based thinking extends directly to public

opinion about war" (Berinsky 2009, 130, 134). Ethnocentrism (i.e., group identity and ethnic enmity) has been found to structure attitudes towards U.S. intervention in WWII and the first Gulf War (Berinsky 2009). Attitudes towards war, in turn, have a profound effect on support for restrictions on civil liberties. Respondents most supportive of military action in WWII, the Vietnam War, and the 2003 invasion of Iraq were also most supportive of restrictions on civil liberties, even when controlling for partisanship and perceived threat (Berinsky 2009, 168). Loyalty towards the in-group and animosity towards out-groups, even out-groups such as African Americans who are not directly relevant to the war at hand, influence public support for war and restrictions on civil liberties, such as the right of prisoners not to be tortured.

CHAPTER CONCLUSION

The relationships between political orientation, religiousness, and torture opinion are replicated in the relationships between political orientation, religiousness, and racial attitudes. This affirms that torture opinion is related to preferences for structuring relationships within and between groups, which is essentially what distinguishes the political psychologies of authoritarianism from nonauthoritarianism, conservatism from liberalism, and ultimately Consv/Rep from Lib/Dem political orientations.

Authoritarians have strong preferences for hierarchical organization both within and between groups, the latter in the sense that they show an in-group preference and hostility towards out-groups. Conservatism is associated with group-based dominance

(GBD), an orientation defined by the assertion of in-group dominance over out-groups. Conservatives value loyalty and obedience to group authority. Conservatives tend to have a less complex social identity, which is associated with greater social intolerance and exclusive social boundaries. Conservatives' ultimate social motivation is to preserve the group, both in the sense of resisting change and maintaining the status quo and in the sense of protecting against physical and existential threats. In short, conservatives and authoritarians, and thus Conserv/Reps, are characterized by strong boundaries delineating Us from Them and by a hierarchical relational paradigm requiring positions of relative dominance and subordination.

Lib/Dems, by contrast, are characterized by nonauthoritarian and liberal tendencies, less well-defined boundaries separating Us from Them, and an egalitarian relational paradigm. Nonauthoritarians value individual autonomy over obedience to authority within the group, and show a strong out-group preference in relations between groups. Liberals tend to have a complex social identity that is associated with greater social tolerance and inclusivity. Liberals strongly value equality and care, both within and between groups. Liberals' ultimate social motivation is to provide, but the group for whom liberals are so motivated to provide is necessarily broad, due to a complex social identity that makes for porous boundaries separating Us from Them, and a nonauthoritarian out-group preference that directs care to marginalized groups to which one may not necessarily belong. As we saw in chapter one, the idea of relaxing international bans on torture so that it may be used by other governments was very unpopular, but the idea of torture being used against U.S. soldiers was dramatically

more so. The use of torture against members of the in-group is almost completely unacceptable. Thus when it comes to formulating torture opinion, how inclusive or exclusive one's in-group is a matter of great import, and one which religion may play a role in. Through the assimilation of the love command, religion may extend the in-group. Conserv/Reps are motivated to protect to include the Other. Among the typically ungroupish Lib/Dems, the social attachments and attitudes towards groups fostered by segregated worship may reinforce social boundaries between Us and Them that make torture more acceptable.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUDING SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION

On the evening of September 11, 2001, immediately following the attacks on the World Trade Center, the Pentagon, and the hijack of Flight 93 over Pennsylvania, which together killed about 3,000 people, President George W. Bush gave a televised address to the nation that would have tremendous political and cultural implications. Bush directed Americans “who grieve” to find comfort in God; meanwhile, those Americans with “unyielding anger” could be comforted by his promise “to find those responsible and to bring them to justice.” It was clear from the surrounding word choices that “to bring them to justice” was not to be a process of diplomacy and criminal tribunals. He described a world split cleanly in two, along cosmic lines of good and evil. Bush infused his speech with words describing the perpetrators and their acts as “evil,” “deadly,” “enemies,” and “the very worst of human nature.” He described the U.S. as “strong,” “powerful,” resolved and ready to defend “peace,” “security,” “justice,” and “good,” and “to win the war against terrorism.” Before President Bush was even prepared to name who the perpetrators of 9/11 might be, he was ready to name their motives with certainty: America had been chosen for a violent attack on account of its role as “the brightest beacon for freedom and opportunity in the world.” The President emphasized the power and strength of the U.S. military, and other than the word “America,” which he used ten times, his most often used words were “attack” (six times), “terror” (five times), and “evil” (four times). Rather than creating a space for grief and national

mourning, Bush's speech presented the nation with a far more appealing panacea for its terror and trauma: the promise of spectacular revenge and victory over the Enemy.

The process that began with Bush's speech was crystallized almost immediately by three words that would come to define over a decade of U.S. policy and culture: war on terror. As its name implied, the war on terror was to become a hugely diffuse effort, fought not merely through the invasion of Afghanistan, but also domestically through the Department of Homeland Security, facilitated by the U.S.A. Patriot Act. The war on terror also came to include the widespread public support of the U.S. invasion of Iraq, support garnered largely through the Bush administration's deliberate conflation of Iraq and Saddam Hussein with Al Qaida and the war on terror.

The name "war on terror" was seen by the administration as befitting the magnitude of the threat posed by America's enemies abroad (Wilson and Kamen 2009).¹³ Against this awesome threat of terror, Vice President Dick Cheney said in a September 16, 2001 interview on NBC's *Meet the Press*, special tactics would be required:

We also have to work, though, sort of the dark side, if you will. We've got to spend time in the shadows in the intelligence world. A lot of what needs to be done here will have to be done quietly, without any discussion, using sources and methods that are available to our intelligence agencies, if we're going to be successful. That's the world these folks operate in, and so it's going to be vital for us to use any means at our disposal, basically, to achieve our objective.

¹³ Critics during the subsequent Obama administration argued that it exaggerated the enemy's capability by characterizing what were in fact disparate groups as a single super-enemy, and urged staff at the Pentagon to begin employing the term "Overseas Contingency Operation" (Wilson and Kamen 2009).

Seeming to follow Cheney's inferences, a CNN/Gallup/USA Today opinion poll conducted three weeks later (October 5-6, 2001) presented the public with a question it had never been asked before: "Would you be willing – or not willing – to have the U.S. government do each of the following, if the government thought it were necessary to combat terrorism? ...Torture known terrorists if they know details about future terrorist attacks in the U.S.?" Since national opinion polling first began in the 1930s, no survey had posed such a question about the permissibility of torture. Prior to October 2001, the relatively few questions that mentioned "torture" asked what should be done to curtail its use, taking torture's impermissibility for granted. But in the decade following 9/11, this new type of torture question was posed 72 times, included in 62 different national surveys.

Between 2004 and 2011, the Pew Research Center for the People and the Press included the same question about torture in eleven of its national surveys: "Do you think the use of torture against suspected terrorists in order to gain important information can often be justified, sometimes be justified, rarely be justified, or never be justified?" Over that period of time, torture acceptance averaged 45%, with a large minority of the population (47%) opting for the more torture-permissive responses of *often* and *sometimes*. While the torture-apologist discourse associated with the Bush administration likely contributed to its wide acceptance, support for torture actually *increased* to a small majority *after* the inauguration of President Barack Obama in early 2009, continuing to rise through 2011, the last date that Pew posed the question.

To be sure, there are limits to public acceptance of torture. Public acceptance of torture is specific to interrogational torture in the war on terror context, performed in exceptional circumstances by agents of the U.S. government. Most U.S. Americans do not wish to see international restrictions on torture relaxed, and they support unilateral legal (if not practical) prohibitions on its use domestically. People tend to be much more accepting of torture when it is presented in the context of the time-bomb scenario, which offers implicit arguments in favor of torture without presenting any counterbalancing arguments against its use. The time bomb scenario implies that torture is both effective and rare, and this framing of torture as an exceptional practice seems to be particularly effective in garnering public support. When counterbalancing arguments citing the potential negative consequences of torture are presented alongside the time bomb scenario, torture opposition is significantly higher (+28%).

Torture support is also circumscribed demographically and politically. It shows greater prevalence among privileged social groups and the political and ideological right. Conservatives and republicans are the most accepting of torture, while the greatest torture opposition is found among liberals, democrats, and the nonreligious. Religiousness, particularly within the Christian tradition, is associated with greater support for torture. This last finding raised for me the fundamental question guiding this research project: what is the role of religion in public opinion of torture?

To address this question I performed a quantitative meta-analysis of torture opinion data between 2001 and 2011. My analysis yielded two main findings. First, the role of religion in torture opinion is subordinate to political party and ideology. Those are

the most significant determinants of torture opinion, with greater torture *support* associated with Consv/Rep political orientation and greater torture *opposition* associated with Lib/Dem political orientation. Yet while torture support increased among all political groups in 2009, the increase was more pronounced among Lib/Dems than Consv/Reps. Second, the role of religion in torture opinion is not only subordinate to but also mediated through political orientation and race, with Christian affiliation *increasing* torture support among white Lib/Dems and *decreasing* torture support among white Consv/Reps and Blacks. Drawing on social scientific sources from the areas of cultural psychology, political science, and psychology of religion, I interpreted these key findings in the following ways. I proposed that Consv/Rep political orientation is associated with greater torture support and Lib/Dem political orientation is associated with greater torture opposition because the two groups have (1) different political psychologies, defined by distinct attitudes towards change and equality, and structured in part by (a) distinct social dominance orientations, as well as (b) distinct positions on the authoritarian spectrum; (2) different moral intuitions, which are characterized by (a) different emphases and interpretations of the Care, Fairness, and Liberty foundations, and (b) a broader moral palate and monopoly on the groupish foundations among conservatives; and (3) ultimately different social motivations and community boundaries. These differences interact with religiousness in ways that may account for the decrease in torture support among Christian Consv/Reps and Blacks, and the increase in torture support among Christian white Lib/Dems relative their Unaffiliated counterparts. More particularly, the distinct positions of these groups along the authoritarian spectrum may affect the extent to which key Christian moral tenets such as enemy love are assimilated into a person's worldview. I elaborate on these

interpretations below, summarizing and synthesizing previous chapters in the process. Implications of my findings and interpretations are discussed in the final part of this concluding chapter.

DIFFERENT POLITICAL PSYCHOLOGIES

The first layer of my interpretation points to the significance of political psychologies, which ultimately inform different moral intuitions and social motivations. I propose that Consv/Rep political orientation is associated with greater torture *support* and Lib/Dem political orientation is associated with greater torture *opposition* because the two groups have different political psychologies, defined by distinct attitudes towards change and equality. Conservatives are much more averse to change than liberals and are interested in maintaining the status quo, both socially and economically. In so far as torture is conceived as a weapon in the war on terror that keeps the homeland safe, it is endorsed as an instrument for maintaining the status quo: it is a necessary evil for maintaining the “American way of life.”

Conservatives also have greater tolerance for inequality than liberals, especially when it is the current order of things. Conservatism is correlated with opposition to equality (OEQ), which is an aspect of social dominance orientation (SDO) that is rooted in system justification motives. Members of socially dominant groups (whites, males, Christians, adults under 65, with higher household incomes) tend to be more conservative, having a vested interest in both preserving the status quo and justifying the system from which they have benefited. Torture support is highest among these

dominant groups, and it may serve a system-justification function. Similar to the way that poverty may be rationalized as the consequence of laziness, torture may be rationalized as the just desert of terrorism. In a just world, being punished implies the commission of a crime, and the torture of a prisoner implies both the possession of potentially life-saving information and the utility of torture in obtaining it. When combined with Consv/Rep political orientation, membership among every other socially dominant category yields greater support for torture than membership alone. In contrast, coupling social dominance with Lib/Dem political orientation yields less torture support than membership alone. “Christian” is the only socially dominant category to show a different pattern in relation to political orientation and torture opinion.

The second component of social dominance orientation is group-based dominance (GBD), which is rooted in social identity motives and correlated with authoritarianism. Torture support among socially dominant groups may thus also be a means of elevating the self-esteem of the in-group by denigrating the out-group. Whereas OED is correlated with conservatism, GBD is correlated with authoritarianism.

As the relationship with social dominance orientation implies, the different political psychologies of Lib/Dems and Consv/Reps also correspond to distinct positions on the authoritarian spectrum. Consv/Reps tend to be more authoritarian, and torture support is itself associated with greater authoritarianism. This is in part because torture is *an authoritarian issue*, which is to say that (interrogational) torture involves the four issue clusters that have shaped contemporary politics along authoritarian lines. The use of torture in the war on terror shares elements with the issues of crime and civil

liberties, as well as foreign policy, force, and diplomacy – two of the four clusters of issues informed by authoritarian preferences that have helped shape the contemporary political landscape. Responses to the torture question communicate beliefs about prisoners' rights in times of war, the efficacy of force in resolving conflict, and the right of the government to take extraordinary measures in the name of homeland security. Indeed, the torture question itself presents torture as a means for the authorities to restore order and security to a threatened U.S. population, as every question implies a terrorist threat and specifies that the actual act of torture would be carried out under the auspices of the U.S. government. The correlation of torture opinion with negative attitudes towards subordinate racial and sexual categories furthermore suggests that the use of torture in the war on terror also shares elements with issues of racial and ethnic difference as well as feminism and family, the remaining two clusters of issues structured by authoritarianism that have shaped the contemporary political landscape.

In addition to being an authoritarian *issue*, torture support may itself be an *expression* of authoritarian attitudes and behaviors, such as submission to authority and punitiveness toward out-groups. Authoritarians are more likely to adopt a position in support of torture because of cues from party leaders. They are more likely to accept the judgment of political and military authorities who defend its use – especially in times of war when perceived threat levels are high. Authoritarians are loath to question the judgment of political leaders and military authorities who defend torture as a necessary evil for protecting the safety of the group. Consv/Reps, for example, are overwhelmingly opposed to investigating torture allegations, much less prosecuting them.

Seventy-nine percent of republicans in a May 2009 Resurgent Republic poll agreed that “We should thank the people who kept us safe, not prosecute them.”

In addition to expressing loyalty and obedience to group leaders, torture support may also be an expression of authoritarian punitiveness towards out-groups.

Authoritarians are defined by an intolerance of moral, political, and racial difference, potentially because difference is perceived as a threat to the social order. Expressing a desire to achieve social order through unity and conformity – to become one and the same – authoritarianism ironically entails constructing and maintaining strong boundaries between Us and Them. Authoritarians favor the in-group, and those oriented towards social dominance seek to ensure that the in-group continues to assert a position of dominance over the out-group. In times of threat, authoritarians tend to express hostility toward out-groups and to be especially punitive of social deviants. Support for the torture of imprisoned enemy combatants, most of whom are non-white Muslims, may be one manifestation of this hostility and punitiveness, serving to reassert the norms of white Christian masculinity in the cultural imagination, similar to the way photos of lynching in the Jim Crow era helped ease public anxiety over increasing racial equality. Tellingly, ANES data show that compared to the general population – 24% of which reports feeling “cold” towards Muslims – coldness towards Muslims is 16% greater among those who favor torture, 17% greater among Consv/Reps, and 39% greater among Consv/Rep white men who favor torture.

While identifying a group as the “enemy” plays a role in making torture seem necessary, perceiving an enemy as socially subordinate and “other” likely plays an

important role in making torture more culturally acceptable. Kelman (1995) observes that designated enemies who are additionally “outside the ethnic or religious community of the torturers and of the dominant sector of the society” are especially vulnerable to torture by virtue of this otherness, which “facilitates exclusion and dehumanization, thus removing one of the constraints against torture and other serious violations of human rights” (32). Comparing U.S. treatment of enemy detainees from different wars, Forsythe (2011, 23) wonders whether subconscious racism influenced the relatively harsher prison treatment of Japanese, Vietnamese, and non-Westerners post-9/11, compared to European captured enemy combatants in World War II.

As with racism, sexism also seems to play a role. Sexual abuse and humiliation pervade modern and historical accounts of torture. Tombs (2009) linked the sexual abuse and humiliation depicted in the Abu Ghraib photos with the sexual humiliation depicted in gospel passion narratives, in the duration of which Jesus is stripped naked three different times: once when he is taken into the governor’s headquarters (*praetorium*) where a cohort of 600-1000 male soldiers strip and drape him with a purple robe to mock, spit, and whip him; a second time when he is stripped of this purple robe and dressed in his own clothes for the journey to Calvary; and a third time when Jesus is crucified naked on the cross. In modern times, published reports documenting human rights abuses in El Salvador and Guatemala during the 1980s suggest that sexual humiliation and violence have been common aspects of torture in Latin America and elsewhere, with such techniques aimed at humiliating and subjugating the tortured body via feminization (Tombs 1999, 2006). Domestic prisoner

abuse today is rife with reports of sexual abuse and humiliation (see Finley 2008). Sheriff of Maricopa County, Arizona, Joe Arpaio, gained immense popularity for dressing male inmates in pink underwear on live internet broadcasts. A 2007 study by the Bureau of Justice Statistics found that one in twenty inmates in the U.S. reports some form of sexual victimization (Beck and Harrison 2007).

In contrast to Consv/Reps, Lib/Dems tend to be nonauthoritarian, and nonauthoritarians are defined by a high tolerance for all forms of diversity. Nonauthoritarians tend to show a strong out-group preference, and are more interested in equalizing the relationship between groups than exerting dominance. Eighteen percent of Lib/Dems in the ANES data report feeling feel “cold” towards Muslims, a rate that is 6% lower than the general population. When these Lib/Dems are also white males, coldness towards Muslims is still only 3% greater than the general population, compared to the 19% greater coldness felt by white male Consv/Reps. This out-group favor is echoed in attitudes towards immigrants, where 62% of Lib/Dems in the Pew data think that immigrants strengthen American society, compared to 45% of Consv/Reps who feel the same. Lib/Dems are also 12% more likely than Consv/Reps in the Pew data to claim that “We should make every possible effort to improve the position of blacks and other minorities, even if it means giving them preferential treatment” and 30% more likely to agree that “Our society should do what is necessary to make sure that everyone has an equal opportunity to succeed.”

Levels of perceived threat seem to play a role in authoritarian intolerance and nonauthoritarian tolerance of difference. Conservatives have a heightened sensitivity to

social threats, and their consistently high level of torture support may in part reflect the authoritarian attitudes and behaviors triggered by a constant state of perceived threat. According to Jost et al. (2003), fear of threat and loss are among the psychological predictors of authoritarianism. Based on a longitudinal study of personality and cognitive development, Block and Block (2006) found that those who identified as conservative at age 23 were more likely to have been described as preschoolers as “feeling easily victimized, easily offended, indecisive, fearful, rigid, inhibited, and relatively over-controlled and vulnerable” (734). Lib/Dems’ consistently low level of torture support, meanwhile, may in part reflect their lower sensitivity to social threat. Compared to torture-permissive Consv/Reps, torture-restrictive Lib/Dems in the Pew data are 10% less likely to agree that “occasional acts of terrorism in the U.S. will be part of life in the future,” and 16% less likely to think that “the ability of terrorists to launch another major attack on the U.S. is greater.”

Despite clear differences between where Consv/Reps and Lib/Dems fall along the authoritarian spectrum characterologically, it is important to remember that authoritarianism is situational as well as dispositional. Authoritarian attitudes and behaviors, of which torture support is one expression, can be triggered even among nonauthoritarians by an increase in perceived threat to the collective. The 2009 increase in torture support among conservative and moderate Democrats may be related to an increase in perceived terrorist threat demonstrated in chapter two, which may have had the effect of both increasing conservatism and triggering authoritarian attitudes and behaviors in the form of greater torture support among the typically nonauthoritarian

Lib/Dems. That the increase in torture support was more pronounced among Lib/Dems than Consv/Reps may reflect that Consv/Reps were already at a heightened state of threat. When the more widely perceived threats of 2009 came, Consv/Reps were already strong supporters of torture as an expression of authoritarian attitudes, leaving little room for elevation.

DIFFERENT MORAL INTUITIONS

Political orientations express distinct psychological and social motivations which themselves inform the particular combinations of moral foundations that comprise Lib/Dem and Consv/Rep moral intuitions. Thus, in addition to expressing distinct political psychologies, differences in torture opinion between Consv/Reps and Lib/Dems may also be attributed to distinct moral intuitions, which are characterized in part by different emphases and interpretations of the first three moral foundations: Care/Harm, Fairness/Cheating, and Liberty/Oppression.

One of the most significant differences between liberal and conservative morality is their valuation of Care relative to other moral foundations. For liberals, Care is the preeminent foundation, and when different foundations come into conflict, Care is usually elevated above everything else. From a liberal perspective, torture is the ultimate violation of the Care foundation, with the potential to harm not only the immediate target of torture, but others as well. Lib/Dems are more likely than Consv/Reps to be persuaded by arguments against torture that highlight the possibility that U.S. torture may result in the harm of U.S. soldiers abroad, innocent prisoners, and

even the torturers themselves. For example, a former intelligence official quoted in a *New York Times* article appeals to the Care foundation as an argument against torture when he reported that even among interrogators who believed in the efficacy of interrogational torture, “seeing these depths of human misery and degradation has a traumatic effect” (Shane 2009). Among the 30% of PIPA-KN 2004 respondents who thought that international laws prohibiting torture were too restrictive, democrats were 23% more likely than republicans to find these arguments against torture convincing: “If the U.S. makes exceptions to international laws against torture and abuse, other countries and groups will feel freer to make exceptions, thus making it more likely that when Americans are detained they will be tortured or abused”; and “Because we often do not know for sure that someone actually has useful information or is in fact a terrorist, if torture or abuse is allowed a significant number of innocent people will end up being tortured or abused.” In fact, the potential that other countries will reciprocate and harm U.S. soldiers is the most convincing argument against torture among democrats.

At the same time, torture discourse that emphasizes its potential to save lives (such as the time-bomb scenario), and which downplays the potential harm inflicted (such as torture-lite), may be particularly influential in garnering liberal support for torture. Increase in torture support between April and November 2009 coincides with the August release of the CIA Office of Inspector General's “Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Activities Report” (completed in 2004 but not publically released until August 24, 2009) that claims interrogation practices yielded valuable intelligence, and

with a sequence of appearances by former Vice President Dick Cheney criticizing Obama administration policies for raising the risk of U.S. terror attacks (e.g., Cheney 2009). In those appearances Cheney credits the harsh interrogation techniques practiced during the Bush administration with preventing subsequent attacks and saving American lives. When asked by Chris Wallace on *Fox News Sunday* whether he had come to see these practices as wrong, Cheney was unapologetic, saying, “my sort of overwhelming view is that the enhanced interrogation techniques were absolutely essential in saving thousands of American lives and preventing further attacks against the United States, and giving us the intelligence we needed to go find Al Qaeda” (Cheney 2009a). Cheney reiterated the life-saving effects of enhanced interrogation techniques four different times in that single interview.

The preeminence of the Care foundation for liberals further colors their interpretations of the Fairness and Liberty foundations. It is possible that the high value liberals place on equality is guided by a perception of inequality as *the* major social harm, undermining human flourishing. Liberals are especially concerned about protecting civil liberties and ensuring that everyone, especially members from traditionally disadvantaged groups, receives equal treatment before the law. Liberals are also more likely to have a complex social identity that makes for a more inclusive notion of their own group, in turn making them more likely to identify with the targets of torture than with the perpetrators. Even without points of identification with the targets, liberals exhibit the strong out-group preference of nonauthoritarians. When coupled with a strong valuation of Care, this out-group preference makes them more

likely to advocate on behalf of enemy combatants, who are perceived as vulnerable by virtue of their imprisonment and (typically) their membership within oppressed racial and religious groups.

Conservatives also rely on the Care foundation, but not to the extent that liberals do. When different foundations come into conflict, Care is often the first to be sacrificed by conservatives, and this is especially so when the safety (or status quo) of the in-group is at stake. Conservatives tend to have a simpler social identity that makes for a more exclusive in-group, which in turn correlates with greater intolerance. For conservatives, the government's role is to protect the privacy and property of the in-group. In so far as torture is performed by the government for these ends (and not to terrorize the populace), it is acting consistently with conservative interpretations of the Liberty foundation. The time-bomb scenario provides an optimal rationalization for conservatives who are willing to sacrifice the Care of some individuals, especially members of other, subordinate social groups, for the protection of the in-group.

Liberal and conservative moral intuitions also differ regarding the last three foundations of Loyalty, Authority, and Sanctity. Whereas liberals rely on the three moral foundations of Care, Fairness, and Liberty, conservatives rely on all six foundations. Thus, they have both a broader moral palate and a monopoly on the groupish foundations. Having double the moral receptors through which to communicate their message, conservative political leaders are at a distinct advantage over liberals when it comes to influencing public opinion. While liberal leaders must articulate the morality of their positions primarily in terms of Care and equality, conservatives can additionally

appeal to the values of Loyalty, Authority, and Sanctity. When it comes to arguments against investigating prisoner treatment in the war on terror, for example, republicans can appeal to the values of Loyalty and Authority, in addition to Fairness and Liberty. For example, they may claim that investigating perpetrators of torture who were following orders is not only unfair to them, but it further threatens the authority structure because future interrogators will not want to follow such orders for fear of subsequent prosecution (e.g., Cheney 2009, 2009b). They may also invoke the need to remain Loyal to those who did what was necessary to keep Americans free from harm as a moral argument against investigation (e.g., Cheney 2009, 2009b). Valuing obedience to authority means conservatives are less inclined to question the judgment of officials and party leaders who claim torture is necessary. Valuing loyalty to the group makes them more likely to affirm the righteousness of interrogational torture against critics from opposing political parties and to see investigative efforts as partisan political attacks. Their broader moral palate means that messages are amplified by virtue of being communicated through all six moral taste receptors; consequently conservatives have greater ability to penetrate multiple levels of cognition, beyond the mere rational.

Although Lib/Dems overall show ambivalence towards all three of the groupish foundations of Loyalty, Authority, and Sanctity, actively practicing Christian Lib/Dems have been selected out of the larger group as valuing the Sanctity foundation. Yet while Christian Lib/Dems value the Sanctity foundation, it doesn't necessarily follow that they value the other groupish foundations of Loyalty and Authority, which are related to authoritarianism. While sharing the groupish qualities of the Loyalty and Authority

foundations, Sanctity, in the form of religion, does not share their implicit authoritarianism. Authoritarianism, I propose, makes for a key difference in the religiousness of Lib/Dems and Consv/Reps. This helps account for Christianity's differential effect on torture opinion among each group. Just as authoritarianism is an important factor underlying the high levels of torture support among Consv/Reps, it may also be the mechanism through which religion effectively decreases torture support among Christian Consv/Reps and Blacks. Because authoritarianism is associated with greater torture support, when Consv/Rep political orientation is coupled with the values of Loyalty or Authority, it yields greater torture support than either alone. By contrast, when Consv/Rep political orientation is coupled with Sanctity in the form of Christian religiosity, torture support *decreases*. Sanctity is exceptional among the groupish foundations; among the socially dominant categories, Christianity was the only one to decrease torture support among Consv/Reps.

DIFFERENT SOCIAL MOTIVATIONS AND BOUNDARIES

As political psychologies, liberalism, conservatism, authoritarianism, and nonauthoritarianism inform different moral intuitions and ultimately express distinct social motivations and community boundaries. While conservatives maintain clear, exclusive group boundaries and are motivated by a need to *protect* the in-group, liberals are motivated by a need to *provide* for the group, the boundaries of which are amorphous and inclusive. Conservatives tend to have a simpler social identity that makes for a more exclusive social group, with firmer boundaries between Us and Them.

Furthermore, Loyalty, Authority, and Sanctity (in the form of religion) are foundations that facilitate group cohesion, binding members together in a moral community with clear boundaries and a respected hierarchy. At the same time they blind members to the righteousness of out-groups and the fallibility of the in-group.

Even so, conservatives tend to be more pessimistic about human nature and see it as something that needs to be disciplined by society. Conservatives in the Pew data are, for example 15% *less* likely than liberals to say that “most people can be trusted” and 17% *more* likely to say that “you can’t be too careful in dealing with people.” Conservatives are both more sensitive and more reactive to social threats, and in situations of perceived social threat, they are likely to sacrifice the foundations of Care, Fairness, and Liberty for the more groupish foundations of Loyalty, Authority and Sanctity because the latter maintain social order and group cohesion. Conservatives are motivated by a need to protect the group from threats to cohesion within and without, largely through advancing policies pertaining to social order. For example, Conserv/Reps in the Pew data are 10% more likely to accept the curtailing of civil liberties as a means of restoring order and 29% more likely to support harsher punishments such as the death penalty, compared to Lib/Dems. In the same 2009 *Fox News Sunday* interview cited above, Cheney trivialized Miranda rights in the context of national threat, saying “I think that if they were faced with the kind of situation we were faced with in the aftermath of 9/11, suddenly capturing people that may have knowledge about imminent attacks, and they're going to have to have meetings and decide who gets to ask what question and who's going to Mirandize the witness, I think it's silly. It makes no sense. It doesn't

appear to be a serious move in terms of being able to deal with the nation's security” (Cheney 2009a). For Cheney there is clearly no contest when Care and Liberty foundations come into conflict with Authority and Loyalty in the context of national threat: Care and Liberty are readily subordinated to Authority and Loyalty for the sake of the group.

While conservatives are attuned to concerns about group survival, liberals are more concerned about the well-being of individual members. Liberals are motivated by a need to *provide* for the group, largely through advancing policies pertaining to social justice. Liberals tend to have a more complex social identity than do conservatives, making for a more inclusive social group with porous boundaries between Us and Them. Liberals also have strong out-group preferences that extend beyond any particular group to which they belong. In contrast to conservatives, liberals tend to be optimistic about human nature and see it as something that needs to be nurtured by society.

The value of Care permeates liberal morality, influencing how liberals interpret the foundations of Fairness and Liberty. Because liberals see the role of government as helping to facilitate human flourishing, in large part by upholding civil liberties and human rights intended to ensure the equal and dignified treatment of every person before the law, they are more likely to perceive government torture as tyranny. An important qualification to this characterization of liberals is that, while not as sensitive to social threats as are conservatives, in situations where collective threat is perceived, Lib/Dems will exhibit increased conservative and authoritarian attitudes and behaviors. Moving in concert with the up-tick in perceived threat of terrorist attack, the 2009

increase in torture acceptance among democrats and independents may be an example of this.

HOW THESE DIFFERENCES INTERACT WITH RELIGION

Differences between liberals and conservatives in their moral intuitions, social motivations, and community boundaries illuminate the importance of authoritarianism as a psychological dynamic underlying these differences. Because of its connection to all these differences as well as to torture opinion, authoritarianism offers a particularly helpful lens for understanding the role of religion in relationship to these matters.

Christianity, I suggest, is associated with decreased torture acceptance among Consv/Reps and Blacks, and with increased torture acceptance among white Lib/Dems primarily because these different groups occupy different positions on the authoritarian spectrum. And just as authoritarianism plays a role in the relationship between political orientation and torture opinion, so too does it play an important role in the relationship between religion and torture opinion.

Consv/Reps and Blacks tend to show greater authoritarian tendencies.

Authoritarianism may contribute to Consv/Rep support for torture when Republican Party leaders extol its necessity, and to Black opposition to torture when Democratic leaders denounce it. In the same manner, authoritarianism may contribute to the decrease in torture support among both Blacks and Consv/Rep Christians because religious authorities uniformly condemn it. High authoritarians like Consv/Reps and Blacks are more likely to obey religious authorities in the form of leaders, texts, and

tradition. Regarding torture, these religious authorities denounce it more often than they excuse it.

Meanwhile, Lib/Dems who embrace the Sanctity foundation in the form of religiousness do not necessarily embrace the authoritarian moral foundations of Loyalty and Authority. That is to say, religiousness among Lib/Dems does not coincide with an authoritarian disposition as it does for Consv/Reps and Blacks. Placing less value on obedience to authority, Lib/Dems are less likely to recognize and submit to the moral authority of religious leaders, texts, and traditions out of loyalty or duty to obey. Placing greater value on autonomy and diversity than unity and conformity, Lib/Dems are more likely to follow an individually determined morality. Religious moral exhortation is thus less likely to have as much effect on the opinions of nonauthoritarian white Lib/Dems. This may help account for the fact that torture acceptance doesn't decrease among Christian white Lib/Dems as it does for Christian Consv/Reps and Blacks.

Unfortunately, because the social scientific study of religion has tended to focus on conservatism, it is difficult to understand the relationship between religion and torture opinion among Lib/Dems beyond the *absence* of authoritarianism. But while the absence of authoritarianism may help explain why torture support doesn't *decrease* among Christian white Lib/Dems as it does among Christian Consv/Reps and Blacks, nonauthoritarianism can't account for the net *increase* in torture support among Christian Lib/Dems relative their Unaffiliated counterparts. I suggest that the latter dynamic has to do with the power of religion to reinforce the boundaries between Us and Them through increasing groupishness among the typically un-groupish Lib/Dems.

Torture is only acceptable by Us against an enemy Other, and Lib/Dems don't tend to see the world in these bifurcated terms. Religion may encourage precisely this splitting, however. Christian communities continue to be highly segregated along racial lines and this segregation may reify racial group boundaries. Religion is a group-level adaptation that facilitates group cohesion by binding members together in a moral community and by exalting the sense of righteousness among the in-group. It does that in part by blinding members to the fallibilities of the in-group and to the truths of out-groups. Independently of political orientation, social affiliations and attitudes towards groups inform opinions about foreign and domestic policy, including issues of national security, war, and civil liberties. Religion plays a role in forging those affiliations and in shaping those attitudes. In this way, the pronounced racial segregation of Christian faith communities may foster stronger boundaries between We who torture and They who are tortured. This is suggested by the fact that, just as Christianity seems to increase torture support among white Lib/Dems, it also seems to increase implicit bias and explicit prejudice against Blacks. Because we know that torture support is positively correlated with racial prejudice against Blacks, it is reasonable to suppose that the increased black prejudice evident among Christian white Lib/Dems may in turn contribute to increasing torture support among this same group. Perhaps because Lib/Dems tend to be ambivalent about the moral foundations of Loyalty and Authority, white Lib/Dems who embrace the Sanctity foundation in the form of religiousness may experience some of religion's groupish effects without internalizing Christianity's message to the same extent as Consv/Reps and Blacks. Such an interpretation is

strengthened by the fact that the opposite dynamic occurs among white Consv/Reps, for whom Christian affiliation is associated with greater racial tolerance, just as it is associated with decreased torture acceptance.

Torture may be deemed *necessary* against prisoner detainees because leaders such as President George W. Bush and Vice President Dick Cheney declare them to be a dangerous Enemy. But torture is deemed *acceptable* on a wide public scale because prisoner detainees belong to subordinate social categories, and in particular because they are non-white. It may thus be that religion plays a practical role in torture opinion in large part through its influence on race relations.

WHY THIS INTERPRETATION MATTERS: PRELIMINARY IMPLICATIONS

The relationship discovered between religion, political orientation, and public opinion of torture presents interesting findings for scholars of the empirical study of religion. My analysis shows that the effect of religion on public opinion is not uniform. It affects people on opposite ends of the political spectrum in different ways. This study demonstrates the limitation of religion in shaping human morality and it suggests that political orientation needs to be taken into account when measuring the effect of religion on public attitudes. Political psychology is an important variable for understanding the role of religion in moral decision-making. Yet scholars of the empirical study of religion rarely take political orientation into account when they examine the effects of religion on public attitudes. Few studies at the intersection of political psychology and the psychology of religion consider both religiousness and

political orientation as dependent variables as I have done. The well-documented correlation between religiousness and conservatism has fostered the presumption that religion is generally a conservatizing social force. However, if most religious persons are conservative, the attitudes of religious people as a whole will obviously skew towards conservatism. Controlling for conservatism paints a more complex relationship between religion and social attitudes, demonstrating that the effects of religion on moral decision-making varies in meaningful ways across political orientations and levels of religious commitment.

My interpretation of public opinion of torture also has implications for the *theology and psychology in dialogue* branch of religion and psychology. In this project, public opinion of torture functions as a case study for showing that Christian complicity in torture is not just a moral issue for ethicists to deliberate but a *pre-moral* issue that would benefit from the attention of pastoral theology and care. In this study I draw attention to the non-rational aspects of moral decision-making, suggesting that psychology and social situated-ness affect morality to a significant extent and in ways that are often unperceived. Political orientations, and the distinct moral intuitions that they inform, are powerful psychological forces that shape the more public and self-conscious process of moral reasoning. As for social situated-ness, my examination of torture data also shows that social group membership informs morality, with social dominance playing a key role. If asked, respondents would be unlikely to rationalize torture support based on white male Christian supremacy. However, supporters of

torture are more likely to come from these privileged social groups and to have negative feelings towards subordinate racial, sexual, and religious groups. It is also evident that the subjects of U.S. torture in the war on terror tend to be non-white Muslim men, and the techniques of torture used against them often entail some form of sexual humiliation via feminization. Unconscious system justification and social identity motives likely underlie torture support, and it is possible that torture in the post-9/11 context serves the psychological function of reasserting the norms of white male Christian dominance in the cultural imagination.

The dramatic increase of depictions of torture in popular culture may be manifestations of this. The average number of torture scenes on primetime television increased from four per year between 1999 and 2001 to 120 scenes post- September 11, 2001 (Danzig 2012, 21; Parents Television Council 2005). Leading the trend was the popular Fox television series *24*, which featured 89 scenes of torture within the first six seasons (Danzig 2012, 21). The program *24* was broadcast from 2001 through 2010, including eight regular seasons and a 2008 TV movie, *24: Redemption*. (It also recently returned to the airwaves in May 2014 as a limited series called *24: Live Another Day*). Over its initial nine-year run, *24* enjoyed considerable popularity, attracting between 9 and 14 million regular viewers annually.

Presenting a new ticking bomb scenario every season, each one-hour episode is meant to represent one actual hour, with twenty-four episodes in the season ultimately representing one day in the life of Counter Terrorist Unit (CTU) agent Jack Bauer as he races against the clock to prevent the next terrorist attack. Agent Jack Bauer is a strong,

patriotic white male who is willing to ‘do whatever it takes’ for the sake of national security – the quintessential action hero who combines the cultural archetypes of the cowboy, spy, and cop (Peacock 2007).

The first season of *24* began airing in November 2001, but it wasn’t until season two that torture became a regular and expected part of the show. A discourse analysis by Clews (2014) counted 43 total torture narratives over the 170 episodes from seasons two through eight, which were broadcast between 2002 and 2010. Season one features verbal threats of torture, but Jack Bauer never follows through (Howard 2007, 134-135). Season two – the first season to be written, produced, and broadcast after 9/11 – is considered to be the most graphically violent season, while season four is most violent in terms of the number of tortures depicted (Howard 2007, 137).

The torture narratives unfolding in popular culture through television and movies were hugely influential for U.S. military personnel. Military educators complained about the classroom time spent disabusing students about the necessity and efficacy of torture depicted in *24* (Sands 2008, 63). Lacking formal guidance from the Pentagon, interrogators were tasked with coming up with their own techniques and guidelines. At brainstorming meetings in Guantanamo, it was openly acknowledged that cable television, and particularly the second season of *24*, served as a source for developing these (Sands 2008).

A lot of ink has been spilled reflecting on the personal and popular appeal of this show. Even the head of Human Rights First’s *Primetime Torture Project* confessed to becoming “quickly hooked on the adrenaline rush that *24* provided,” even as he spent

his working days campaigning against torture (Danzig 2012, 24). The consensus, even expressed by the show's Executive Producer Howard Gordon, seems to be that the show has thrived as a form of "fear-based wish-fulfillment" (Keveney 2005). "24, in all its violent glory, makes us believe that, if the terrorists are out there, something, everything, in fact, is being done to stop them and to keep us safe" (Howard 2007, 143). But projecting a sense of safety is only part of the appeal of torture in 24. Its symbolic restoration of the dominant order is another part of its resonance: "Through the tortures and violence that it demonstrates, and through the temporary suspension of standards of humanity, benevolence, and civility, the series ultimately works to reinforce the order that it threatens and calm the fears that it and our newspapers inspire" (Howard 2007, 143). The nature of this order is symbolized by Jack Bauer, the primary agent of its restoration. As feminist television scholar Janet McCabe observed, "heterosexual masculinity is a structuring norm" of this "narrative universe where male action is paramount" (2007, 150).

The violent means by which Jack Bauer restores this order is also important to the show's appeal: torture quells public fears by reasserting the dominance of the existing order in a particularly satisfying way. An active CIA officer with 25 years of interrogational experience reflected that inadequate training and guidance for interrogating officers played a role in torture's proliferation during the war on terror, but "the larger problem here, I think, is that this kind of stuff just makes people feel better, even if it doesn't work" (Vest 2005). In his extensive history of torture by democratic nations, Darius Rejali (2009, 535) concludes that torture persists as a tactic

of war *despite* its inefficacy and negative consequences, because it is uniquely satisfying: “When zealous public officials torture for information, it may look like they are responding rationally to ineffectiveness. But it is difficult to understand why this response (as opposed to so many others) is so satisfying without acknowledging that officials are also purging the wounded community’s furious emotions with human sacrifices. ... Strategic talk about torture in the face of terrorism turns out to have a deep undercurrent of blood lust.” Diane Beaver, the highest ranking uniformed military lawyer at Guantanamo – and usually the only woman in the room during the interrogation technique brainstorming sessions – recalled surveying the looks on soldiers’ faces around the room at these meetings: “You could almost see their dicks getting hard as they got new ideas” (Sands 2008, 63). And most of these ideas, Beaver claims, came from the television series *24* (Sands 2008).

The premoral phase of moral decision-making studied by moral intuitionists and explored in this project does not receive sufficient attention from ethicists, practical theologians, or scholars of religion, who have historically tended to focus on moral reasoning to the neglect of unconscious and non-rational processes. Don Browning believes that Christian theological ethicists have paid insufficient attention to the premoral, and that Christian theological ethics must “develop a more adequate approach to the premoral dimensions of theological anthropology and moral theology” if it wants to enter into dialogue and be recognized as a useful source in the domains of “medical ethics biomedical research, ecology, business ethics, or public policy”

(Browning 2006, 213). Given that the premoral is entwined with moral psychology, it seems that pastoral theologians are well-suited to take up this work. Through their psychological expertise and attention to lived human experience, pastoral theologians may be the best-poised candidates to develop theories of the premoral that Browning has found lacking in Christian ethics.

Furthermore, it is perhaps through such exploration of the premoral that pastoral theologians can contribute to the study of war and peace, another domain traditionally allocated to theological ethicists. Psychologists of religion, and particularly pastoral theologians, have been woefully inattentive to issues of war and peace. A review of the pastoral literature over the last 14 years shows few indications that the U.S. has been embroiled in two major wars for most of that time frame. A search for the term “war” among the major pastoral theology journals between 2001 and 2014 yields *eleven* results.¹⁴ Only three of these address issues arising from the recent wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. These include articles by LaMothe (2012) and Graham (2011), and a reflection by Metcalf (2005). The remaining search results either employ the term “war” metaphorically or address other international conflicts.

Public opinion of torture is a case study that shows how personality and culture shape attitudes towards issues of national security, which in turn have great consequences for war and peace. Pastoral theologians’ understanding of the non-rational domains of human experience and cognition can be an important contribution in the adjudication between competing premoral goods of safety and liberty that

¹⁴ Journals included: *Journal of Pastoral Theology*, *Journal of Pastoral Counseling*, *Journal of Pastoral Care and Counseling*, and *Pastoral Psychology*.

motivate attitudes towards national security. For example, understanding torture opinion through the lens of authoritarianism suggests that support for torture reflects deep existential anxiety about social cohesion and about the very survival of the group and the Nation. Support for torture defends against anxiety not just about terrorism, but also about cultural, political, and moral diversity that seem threatening, especially to those who enjoy positions of power and privilege. Understanding the sources and nature of this anxiety can help pastoral practitioners meet people where they are. Recognizing the distinct moral intuitions animating contemporary political polarization can also help pastoral theologians and caregivers “shepherd public discourse” (LaMothe 2008) towards a more constructive dialogue on deeply salient issues.

The pivotal role that authoritarianism plays in the relationship between religion and torture opinion also opens further avenues for exploration that could benefit from a pastoral perspective. Authoritarianism has almost exclusively been studied as a negative phenomenon, related to intolerance and prejudice and other attitudes about which nonauthoritarian Lib/Dems disagree, such as the Consv/Rep opposition to abortion and homosexuality. Religion too has more often than not been implicated in increasing racial prejudice and political intolerance, despite proscribing against these attitudes. Though both religiousness and authoritarianism have separately been correlated with greater intolerance and prejudice, my study suggests that *in combination*, religion and authoritarianism *decrease* these attitudes, specifically in the forms of less support for torture, fewer expressions of racial prejudice, and less implicit anti-black racial bias. In

this sense, authoritarianism appears to be an effective mechanism for disseminating Christian morality. The study of authoritarianism could benefit from a perspective that honestly and critically acknowledges the ways in which communities of faith are strengthened by authoritarian leaders *and* followers. The effects of Christian religiosity on racial bias among Consv/Reps are particularly exciting in that this group, which is typically the most measurably prejudiced, becomes the most racially tolerant political orientation when Christian affiliation and religiosity are added to the mix. Furthermore, that Christianity among Consv/Reps is associated with decreased *implicit* anti-black bias suggests a deeper appropriation of racial tolerance than willful obedience to religious instruction. How religion facilitates this increased racial tolerance among Consv/Reps, and why it should have the opposite effect on Lib/Dems is a question well-worth further investigation. Practical and pastoral theologians are best positioned to take up this work.

It is important at the same time to underscore that while Consv/Reps' way of being religious may mitigate some of the negative tendencies of authoritarianism by promoting a certain moral order, it does not completely cancel out the negative social effects of authoritarianism, at least when it comes to torture support. Torture support among Christian Consv/Reps, though lower than Unaffiliated Consv/Reps, is still significantly greater than among any group of Lib/Dems. Authoritarianism presents a real conundrum for religious leaders, who need to wrestle with the fact that the moral authority of the religious community is strengthened by a personality structure that at the same time threatens to undermine democratic governance and legal accountability.

Obedience and conformity are essential to building and maintaining a strong, vibrant, community: for individuals to form *a group*, there has to be some measure of subordination of the self to the needs of the group (obedience) and some common way of being in the world, whether by birth or by choice (conformity). But human flourishing within the community requires an equal measure of respect for individual autonomy and embrace of diversity. Unfortunately, authoritarians' heightened sensitivity to collective threat makes for a consistently unbalanced prioritization of obedience over autonomy, and conformity over diversity that undermines the well-being of the group even as it increases its chance of survival as such. Yet *nonauthoritarianism* is an unsuitable antidote to authoritarianism for religious communities seeking to maintain a position of moral authority with any influence on public life. Nonauthoritarians' tendency toward idolatry of individual autonomy and diversity makes for weak and transitory communities, and facilitates a privatized spirituality incapable of transforming the "wicked problems" of social life.

As it is, the role of religion in moral decision-making within the public sphere is both important and limited. Insofar as people turn to religion for explicit moral guidance, it tends to be in relation to social issues such as abortion and homosexuality, more than either economics or foreign policy (Froese and Bader 2008; Pew Forum 2008). When it comes to an issue such as torture, the public mainly turns to its political leaders for guidance. Leaders such as former President George W. Bush and former Vice President Dick Cheney have the ability to make torture seem "necessary" against those who have been designated by them as extremely dangerous Enemies. But torture is

made more culturally *acceptable* when those Enemies are also perceived as racially Other. It is perhaps in this area of race relations that religion has the greatest capability of inform the level of Christian tolerance for state violence being perpetrated against Others in the name of Our safety, for good and ill.

APPENDIX A: TORTURE QUESTIONS 2001-2011

This Appendix provides the question wording and response frequencies to all questions about the permissibility of "torture" in the war on terror. Questions have been organized by date and grouped according to whether or not the time-bomb scenario (TBS) is balanced by a counter argument.

Table A-1. Torture Questions 2001-2011

39 Torture Questions with Time Bomb Scenario (TBS), Unbalanced by Counter Argument(s)											
1)	10/06/2001	<u>CNN/USA Today/Gallup</u> Would you be willing -- or not willing -- to have the US government do each of the following, if the government thought it were necessary to combat terrorism? How about . . . Torture known terrorists if they know details about future terrorist attacks in the US?	<table style="width: 100%; border: none;"> <tr> <td style="width: 30%;">Willing</td> <td style="text-align: right;">45%</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Not willing</td> <td style="text-align: right;">52%</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Don't know/Refused</td> <td style="text-align: right;">2%</td> </tr> </table>	Willing	45%	Not willing	52%	Don't know/Refused	2%		
Willing	45%										
Not willing	52%										
Don't know/Refused	2%										
2)	03/13/2002	<u>Fox News/Opinion Dynamics</u> Do you favor or oppose allowing the government to use any means necessary, including physical torture, to obtain information from prisoners that would protect the United States from terrorist attacks?	<table style="width: 100%; border: none;"> <tr> <td style="width: 30%;">Support</td> <td style="text-align: right;">41%</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Depends (vol.)</td> <td style="text-align: right;">4%</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Oppose</td> <td style="text-align: right;">47%</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Not Sure</td> <td style="text-align: right;">8%</td> </tr> </table>	Support	41%	Depends (vol.)	4%	Oppose	47%	Not Sure	8%
Support	41%										
Depends (vol.)	4%										
Oppose	47%										
Not Sure	8%										
3)	03/12/2003	<u>Fox News/Opinion Dynamics</u> Do you favor or oppose allowing the government to use any means necessary, including physical torture, to obtain information from prisoners that might protect the United States from terrorist attacks?	<table style="width: 100%; border: none;"> <tr> <td style="width: 30%;">Favor</td> <td style="text-align: right;">44%</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Depends (vol.)</td> <td style="text-align: right;">5%</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Oppose</td> <td style="text-align: right;">42%</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Not Sure</td> <td style="text-align: right;">9%</td> </tr> </table>	Favor	44%	Depends (vol.)	5%	Oppose	42%	Not Sure	9%
Favor	44%										
Depends (vol.)	5%										
Oppose	42%										
Not Sure	9%										
4)	09/07/2003	<u>ABC News September 11th Anniversary Poll</u> Please tell me if you support or oppose the federal government doing each of the following: Physically torturing people suspected of terrorism in an attempt to get information from them.	<table style="width: 100%; border: none;"> <tr> <td style="width: 30%;">Support</td> <td style="text-align: right;">20%</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Oppose</td> <td style="text-align: right;">78%</td> </tr> <tr> <td>DK/No opinion</td> <td style="text-align: right;">2%</td> </tr> </table>	Support	20%	Oppose	78%	DK/No opinion	2%		
Support	20%										
Oppose	78%										
DK/No opinion	2%										
5)	07/12/2004	<u>CFR: Global Views 2004: American Public Opinion and Foreign Policy</u> In order to combat international terrorism, please say whether you favor or oppose each of the following measures: Using torture to extract information from suspected terrorists.	<table style="width: 100%; border: none;"> <tr> <td style="width: 30%;">Favor</td> <td style="text-align: right;">29%</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Oppose</td> <td style="text-align: right;">66%</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Not sure/Decline</td> <td style="text-align: right;">5%</td> </tr> </table>	Favor	29%	Oppose	66%	Not sure/Decline	5%		
Favor	29%										
Oppose	66%										
Not sure/Decline	5%										
6)	07/18/2004	<u>PRCPP/CFR: Foreign Policy And Party Images Poll</u> Do you think the use of torture against suspected terrorists in order to gain important information	<table style="width: 100%; border: none;"> <tr> <td style="width: 30%;">Often justified</td> <td style="text-align: right;">15%</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Sometimes justified</td> <td style="text-align: right;">28%</td> </tr> </table>	Often justified	15%	Sometimes justified	28%				
Often justified	15%										
Sometimes justified	28%										

		can often be justified, sometimes be justified, rarely be justified, or never be justified?	Rarely justified Never justified Don't know/ Refused	21% 32% 4%
7)	01/09/2005	<u>CNN/USA Today/Gallup</u> Would you be willing -- or not willing -- to have the US government do each of the following, if the government thought it were necessary to combat terrorism? How about . . . Torture known terrorists if they know details about future terrorist attacks in the US?	Willing Not willing Don't know/Refused	39% 59% 3%
8)	03/27/2005	<u>PRCPP: Political Typology Callback Poll</u> Do you think the use of torture against suspected terrorists in order to gain important information can often be justified, sometimes be justified, rarely be justified, or never be justified?	Often justified Sometimes justified Rarely justified Never justified Don't know/Refused	15% 30% 24% 27% 4%
9)	10/24/2005	<u>PRCPP/CFR: America's Place In The World Survey</u> Do you think the use of torture against suspected terrorists in order to gain important information can often be justified, sometimes be justified, rarely be justified, or never be justified?	Often justified Sometimes justified Rarely justified Never justified Don't know/Refused	15% 31% 17% 32% 5%
10)	11/11/2005	<u>Princeton/Newsweek Poll: Abortion Restrictions/Torture</u> Would you support the use of torture by U.S. military or intelligence personnel if it might lead to the prevention of a major terrorist attack, or not?	Yes, support No, would not Don't know	58% 35% 7%
11)	11/11/2005	<u>Princeton/Newsweek Poll: Abortion Restrictions/Torture</u> Do you think the use of torture against suspected terrorists in order to gain important information can often be justified, sometimes be justified, rarely be justified, or never be justified?	Often Sometimes Rarely Never Don't know	16% 28% 20% 33% 5%
12)	11/13/2005	<u>Gallup/CNN/USA Today Poll: George W. Bush/Abortion/Iraq</u> Would you be willing -- or not willing -- to have the US government torture suspected terrorists if they may know details about future terrorist attacks against the US?	Yes, willing No, not willing No opinion	38% 56% 6%
13)	11/28/2005	<u>Associated Press/Ipsos-Public Affairs: Multi-Country Survey</u> How do you feel about the use of torture against suspected terrorists to obtain information about terrorism activities? Can that often be justified, sometimes be justified, rarely be justified or never be justified?	Often Sometimes Rarely Never Not sure	11% 27% 23% 36% 3%

14)	12/14/2005	<u>Harris Interactive</u> How often is torture justified when interrogating suspected terrorists?	Often Sometimes Never	12% 40% 48%
15)	08/24/2006	<u>Time/SRBI Poll</u> (Please tell me if you would favor or oppose the government doing each of the following as a way to prevent terrorist attacks in the United States.) ...Allow the use of torture against people who are suspected of being terrorists	Favor Oppose No answer/Don't know	15% 81% 4%
16)	09/19/2006	<u>CBS News/NYT Poll # 2006-09A: Congressional Elections/Political Parties/Terrorism/Middle East/Finances</u> Do you think it is sometimes justified to use torture to get information from a suspected terrorist, or is torture never justified?	Sometimes justified Depends (vol.) Never justified Don't know/No answer	35% 5% 56% 4%
17)	10/04/2006	<u>PRCPP/AP: Turnout Poll</u> Do you think the use of torture against suspected terrorists in order to gain important information can often be justified, sometimes be justified, rarely be justified, or never be justified?	Often justified Sometimes justified Rarely justified Never justified Don't know/Refused	18% 28% 19% 32% 3%
18)	11/01/2006	<u>Scripps Howard/Ohio University Poll</u> Do you think the United States is sometimes justified in using torture to get information from a suspected terrorist, or is torture never justified?	Sometimes justified Never justified Don't know/Other	38% 52% 10%
19)	01/09/2007	<u>PRCPP: Values Update Survey</u> Do you think the use of torture against suspected terrorists in order to gain important information can often be justified, sometimes be justified, rarely be justified, or never be justified?	Often justified Sometimes justified Rarely justified Never justified Don't know/Refused	12% 31% 25% 29% 3%
20)	11/26/2007	<u>PCRPP/AP: November 2007 Caucus and Primary Scene-setter Survey</u> Do you think the use of torture against suspected terrorists in order to gain important information can often be justified, sometimes be justified, rarely be justified, or never be justified?	Often justified Sometimes justified Rarely justified Never justified Don't know/Refused	18% 30% 21% 27% 4%
21)	02/24/2008	<u>PRCPP: Political Survey</u> Do you think the use of torture against suspected terrorists in order to gain important information	Often justified Sometimes justified	17% 31%

		can often be justified, sometimes be justified, rarely be justified, or never be justified?	Rarely justified Never justified Don't know/Refused	20% 30% 2%
22)	05/01/2008	<u>LAPOP: AmericasBarometer, 2008</u> With which of these opinions do you agree more: "In order to protect us, when the CIA catches terrorists red-handed, it should be allowed to use torture to get information," or "Even when the CIA catches terrorists red-handed, it should not be allowed to use torture to get information."	Should be allowed Should not be allowed Don't know/Refused	47% 52% 70%
23)	07/24/2008	<u>Third Way: Third Way Winning on National Security Survey</u> Do you think the use of torture against suspected terrorists in order to gain important information can often be justified, sometimes be justified, or never be justified?	Often justified Sometimes justified Never justified Don't know/Refused	16% 43% 37% 4%
24)	09/19/2008	<u>Faith in Public Life/Public Religion Research Inst.: Faith and American Politics/Pre-election American Values Survey 2008</u> Do you think the use of torture against suspected terrorists in order to gain important information can often be justified, sometimes be justified, rarely be justified, or never be justified?	Often justified Sometimes justified Rarely justified Never justified Don't know/Refused	18% 31% 21% 28% 2%
25)	10/31/2008	<u>Cooperative Congressional Election Study, 2008*</u> How comfortable do you feel about the use of torture against suspected terrorists in order to gain important information? Do you think this can often be justified, sometimes be justified, rarely be justified or never be justified? *Data not included in CCES common content. Response rates cited from secondary source (Gronke and Rejali's 2010).	Often Sometimes Rarely Never	47% 53%
26)	12/30/2008	<u>ANES 2008 Time Series Study - Post-election Survey</u> Do you FAVOR, OPPOSE, or NEITHER FAVOR NOR OPPOSE the U.S. government torturing people, who are suspected of being terrorists, to try to get information?	Favor Neither favor nor oppose Oppose DK/ Ref/No post-election IW	21% 21% 47% 11%
27)	01/28/2009	<u>Fox News/Opinion Dynamics</u> Do you favor or oppose allowing the CIA (Central Intelligence Agency), in extreme circumstances, to use enhanced interrogation techniques, even torture to obtain information from prisoners that	Favor Depends (vol.) Oppose Not Sure	43% 7% 48%

might protect the United States from terrorist attacks?

28)	02/08/2009	<u>PRCPP: Political & Economic Survey</u> Do you think the use of torture against suspected terrorists in order to gain important information can often be justified, sometimes be justified, rarely be justified, or never be justified?	Often justified Sometimes justified Rarely justified Never justified Don't know/ Refused	16% 28% 20% 31% 5%
29)	04/21/2009	<u>PRCPP: Values Survey</u> Do you think the use of torture against suspected terrorists in order to gain important information can often be justified, sometimes be justified, rarely be justified, or never be justified?	Often justified Sometimes justified Rarely justified Never justified Don't know/Refused	15% 34% 22% 25% 4%
30)	06/01/2009	<u>Associated Press/GfK</u> How do you feel about the use of torture against suspected terrorists to obtain information about terrorism activities? Can that...often be justified, sometimes be justified, rarely be justified, or never be justified?	Often be justified Sometimes be justified Rarely be justified Never be justified Don't know/Refused	20% 32% 18% 29% 2%
31)	09/30/2009	<u>ANES 2008-2009 Panel Study (Wave 6)</u> Do you favor, oppose, or neither favor nor oppose the U.S. government torturing people, who are suspected of being terrorists, to try to get information?	Favor Neither favor nor oppose Oppose Don't know/Refused/ No answer	10% 17% 20% 0%
32)	09/30/2009	<u>ANES 2008-2009 Panel Study (Wave 17)</u> Do you favor, oppose, or neither favor nor oppose the U.S. government torturing people, who are suspected of being terrorists, to try to get information?	Favor Neither favor nor oppose Oppose Don't know/Refused/ No answer	22% 40% 37% 0%
33)	11/08/2009	<u>PRCPP/CFR: America's Place in the World Survey</u> Do you think the use of torture against suspected terrorists in order to gain important information can often be justified, sometimes be justified, rarely be justified, or never be justified?	Often justified Sometimes justified Rarely justified Never justified Don't know/Refused	19% 35% 16% 25% 5%
34)	01/17/2010	<u>Associated Press/Gfk Poll</u> How do you feel about the use of torture against suspected terrorists to obtain information about	Often be justified Sometimes be	23% 29%

		terrorism activities? Can that...often be justified, sometimes be justified, rarely be justified, or never be justified?	justified Rarely be justified Never be justified Don't know/ Refused	19% 27% 3%
35)	02/27/2011	<u>American Red Cross Adult Survey on International Humanitarian Law</u> To what extent is it acceptable for soldiers and fighters to take the following actions in war? For each action, please tell me if it is always acceptable, is acceptable in some circumstances, or if it is never acceptable. ...Torturing captured enemy soldiers or fighters in order to get important military information	Sometimes acceptable Never Acceptable Not sure/ DK	51% 45% 4%
36)	05/09/2011	<u>Associated Press/Gfk Poll</u> How do you feel about the use of torture against suspected terrorists to obtain information about terrorism activities? Can that often be justified, sometimes be justified, rarely be justified or never be justified?	Often be justified Sometimes be justified Rarely be justified Never be justified Don't know/ Refused	25% 35% 14% 25% 3%
37)	05/10/2011	<u>Economist/YouGov</u> Do you favor or oppose using torture to obtain information from suspected terrorists?	Favor Oppose Not sure	36% 38% 26%
38)	08/15/2011	<u>Associated Press/NORC Poll: Civil Liberties and Security: Ten Years After 9/11</u> How do you feel about the use of torture against suspected terrorists to obtain information about terrorism activities? Can that often be justified, sometimes be justified, rarely be justified, or never be justified?	Often be justified Sometimes be justified Rarely be justified Never be justified Don't know/ Refused	20% 32% 19% 27% 3%
39)	08/21/2011	<u>PRCPP: Political Survey</u> Do you think the use of torture against suspected terrorists in order to gain important information can often be justified, sometimes be justified, rarely be justified, or never be justified?	Often justified Sometimes justified Rarely justified Never justified Don't know/ Refused	19% 34% 18% 24% 4%
AVG TBS		Average "No" for 39 Unbalanced TBS Torture Questions		31%

5 Torture Questions with Time Bomb Scenario (TBS) Balanced by Counter Argument(s)

1)	05/23/2004	<u>ABC News/Washington Post Poll: Religion & Politics, 2004</u> Some people say it's acceptable to torture people suspected of terrorism, in cases where	Acceptable in some cases	35%
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		other methods have failed and the authorities believe the suspect has information that could prevent terrorist attacks and save lives. Other people say the use of torture is never acceptable because it's cruel, it may violate international law, it may not work, and it could be used unnecessarily or by mistake on innocent people. What's your view--do you think it's acceptable to torture people suspected of terrorism in some cases, or do you think the use of torture is never acceptable?	Never acceptable No opinion	63% 1%
2)	06/27/2006	<u>PIPA/BBC World Service Poll</u> Most countries have agreed to rules that prohibit torturing prisoners. Which position is closer to yours? ...Terrorists pose such an extreme threat that governments should now be allowed to use some degree of torture if it may gain information that saves innocent lives. OR ...Clear rules against torture should be maintained because any use of torture is immoral and will weaken international human rights standards against torture?	Allow torture Neither/ Depends Against torture Don't know/ No answer	36% 4% 58% 3%
3)	07/09/2006	<u>CCFR: American Public Opinion and Foreign Policy</u> Most countries have agreed to rules that prohibit torturing prisoners to extract information. Which comes closer to your point of view? ...Terrorists pose such an extreme threat that governments should now be allowed to use torture if it may gain information that saves innocent lives. OR ...Rules against torture should be maintained because torture is morally wrong and weakening these rules may lead to the torture of [survey country] soldiers who are held prisoners abroad.	Allow torture Maintain rules against Not sure/decline	30% 67% 3%
4)	01/27/2008	<u>WPO/PIPA/KN: World Public Opinion on Torture</u> Most countries have agreed to rules that prohibit torturing prisoners. Which position is closer to yours? ... Terrorists pose such an extreme threat that governments should now be allowed to use some degree of torture if it may gain information that saves innocent lives. OR ... Clear rules against torture should be maintained because any use of torture is immoral and will weaken international human rights standards against torture.	Allow some torture Maintain rules against DK/NS	44% 53% 3%
5)	08/20/2008	<u>WPO/PIPA: World Public Opinion and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights</u> Most countries have agreed to rules that prohibit torturing prisoners. Which position is closer to yours? ... Terrorists pose such an extreme threat	Allow some torture Maintain clear rules against torture	44% 53%

that governments should now be allowed to use some degree of torture if it may gain information that saves innocent lives. OR ... Clear rules against torture should be maintained because any use of torture is immoral and will weaken international human rights standards against torture.

DK/NS 3%

AVG TBS+BAL	Average "No" for 5 Balanced TBS Torture Questions	31%
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APPENDIX B: KEY SOCIAL VARIABLES

Table B-1. Torture Opinion and Key Social Variables, Pew 2004-2011

	N	Permissive		Restrictive		DK/ Ref	Summary			Mean Acceptance	
		Often	Somet.	Rarely	Never		Perm	Restr	-47% ¹⁵	0-1 Scale	-0.4500 ¹⁶
GENDER											
Male	6308	21.3%	30.8%	18.2%	26.5%	3.2%	52%	45%	5%	0.4921	0.0421
Female	6682	11.3%	31.0%	22.6%	30.8%	4.3%	42%	53%	-5%	0.4101	-0.0399
AGE											
18-29	1695	17.3%	28.7%	23.5%	27.8%	2.8%	46%	51%	-1%	0.4520	0.0020
30-49	4161	17.7%	33.6%	19.6%	25.8%	3.3%	51%	45%	4%	0.4792	0.0292
50-64	3895	15.5%	30.9%	20.3%	29.7%	3.6%	46%	50%	-1%	0.4416	-0.0084
65+	3037	12.5%	27.8%	18.9%	35.1%	5.6%	40%	54%	-7%	0.3935	-0.0565
RACE / ETHNICITY											
White	10611	17.2%	31.4%	21.0%	27.1%	3.3%	49%	48%	2%	0.4637	0.0137
Black	1304	11.3%	28.8%	18.5%	36.0%	5.3%	40%	55%	-7%	0.3849	-0.0651
Other/Mixed ¹⁷	885	14.0%	30.9%	19.8%	30.8%	4.5%	45%	51%	-2%	0.4286	-0.0214
Non-white ¹⁸	2189	12.5%	29.7%	19.1%	33.8%	5.0%	42%	53%	-5%	0.4040	-0.0460
Hispanic ¹⁹	889	15.1%	32.2%	16.7%	31.5%	4.5%	47%	48%	0%	0.4382	-0.0118
EDUCATION											
<HS	988	16.1%	29.5%	13.2%	33.3%	7.9%	46%	47%	-1%	0.4334	-0.0166
HS Grad	3871	17.9%	32.2%	18.7%	27.7%	3.5%	50%	46%	3%	0.4693	0.0193
Some College	3362	17.5%	31.4%	19.5%	28.1%	3.5%	49%	48%	2%	0.4625	0.0125
<CollegeGrad ²⁰	8221	17.4%	31.5%	18.1%	28.8%	4.3%	49%	47%	2%	0.4612	0.0112
College+	4705	12.9%	29.6%	26.9%	28.3%	2.3%	42%	55%	-5%	0.4225	-0.0275
REGION											
Northeast	2392	14.2%	30.2%	22.9%	29.8%	2.9%	44%	53%	-3%	0.4295	-0.0205
Midwest	3169	16.0%	30.4%	20.4%	29.4%	3.7%	47%	50%	0%	0.4449	-0.0051
South	4834	18.1%	32.8%	18.1%	26.7%	4.3%	51%	45%	4%	0.4778	0.0278
West	2595	14.7%	28.8%	22.4%	30.2%	3.9%	44%	53%	-3%	0.4277	-0.0223
COMMUNITY											
Urban	3565	14.8%	28.0%	21.0%	32.3%	3.9%	43%	53%	-4%	0.4183	-0.0317
Suburban	6091	16.0%	32.2%	20.6%	27.9%	3.3%	48%	49%	1%	0.4553	0.0053
Rural	2668	18.9%	31.3%	19.2%	25.7%	4.8%	50%	45%	3%	0.4829	0.0329
INCOME											
Under \$40,000	4603	14.3%	29.7%	18.4%	33.6%	4.0%	44%	52%	-3%	0.4167	-0.0333

¹⁵ The column headed "47%" shows the percentage by which each social category deviated from the national average in torture permissiveness of 47%.

¹⁶ The column headed ".45" reflects the difference between the 0-to-1 scaled torture support of each social category and the overall national mean torture support of .45.

¹⁷ *Other/Mixed* indicates not White, not Black.

¹⁸ *Non-white* indicates all except White; includes Black.

¹⁹ *Hispanic* designation is independent of racial (i.e. Black, White, Other) category.

²⁰ *<CollegeGrad* is a composite category that includes all levels of education below that of college graduate.

\$40,000+	6657	18.0%	32.8%	22.8%	24.3%	2.1%	51%	47%	4%	0.4820	0.0320
RELIGION											
Christian Tradition	10629	16.6%	32.3%	20.2%	27.2%	3.7%	49%	47%	2%	0.4634	0.0134
Other Religion ²¹	604	11.5%	23.1%	22.5%	40.2%	2.7%	35%	63%	-12%	0.3509	-0.0991
Unaffiliated ²²	1538	15.6%	26.4%	21.0%	32.8%	4.1%	42%	54%	-5%	0.4172	-0.0328
No Particular Relig	604	18.3%	27.0%	17.8%	31.7%	5.1%	45%	50%	-2%	0.4428	-0.0072
No Religion	934	13.7%	26.0%	23.3%	33.6%	3.5%	40%	57%	-7%	0.3989	-0.0511
PARTY											
Republican	3675	24.3%	38.0%	17.8%	17.2%	2.8%	62%	35%	15%	0.5678	0.1178
Independent	4426	14.7%	31.9%	21.7%	28.6%	3.2%	47%	50%	0%	0.4426	-0.0074
Democrat	4136	11.6%	25.8%	22.2%	37.0%	3.3%	37%	59%	-10%	0.3721	-0.0779
IDEOLOGY											
Conservative	5048	21.1%	35.6%	17.6%	22.0%	3.6%	57%	40%	10%	0.5235	0.0735
Moderate	4901	14.4%	32.3%	23.0%	27.9%	2.4%	47%	51%	0%	0.4438	-0.0062
Liberal	2431	10.7%	22.1%	22.7%	41.7%	2.9%	33%	64%	-14%	0.3370	-0.1130
POLIT. ORIENT.											
Consv/Rep	4389	23.4%	38.5%	18.2%	17.3%	2.6%	62%	36%	15%	0.5624	0.1124
Mod/Indep	4016	14.8%	31.4%	21.3%	29.1%	3.3%	46%	50%	-1%	0.4406	-0.0094
Lib/Dem	3684	10.5%	24.7%	23.4%	39.1%	2.3%	35%	63%	-12%	0.3534	-0.0966

All of the demographic variables shown in the accompanying table showed a statistically significant correlation with torture ($p < 0.000$).

²¹ *Other Religion* is a composite category that includes members of all non-Christian religions. Details about this variable calculation available in Appendix C.

²² *Unaffiliated* is a composite category that includes *Nothing in Particular* and *No Religion*. Details about this variable calculation available in Appendix C.

Table B-2. Social Characteristics from Most-to-Least Torture Supportive, Pew 2004-2011

Most-to Least Torture Permissive		Most-to Least Torture Accepting	
Category	% Permissive	Category	Mean Acceptance
Republican	62.3%	Republican	0.5678
Consv/Rep	61.9%	Consv/Rep	0.5624
Conservative	56.7%	Conservative	0.5235
Male	52.1%	Male	0.4921
30-49	51.3%	Rural	0.4829
South	50.9%	\$40,000+	0.482
\$40,000+	50.8%	30-49	0.4792
Rural	50.2%	South	0.4778
Christian Trad	48.9%	White	0.4637
<College Grad	48.9%	Christian Trad	0.4634
White	48.6%	<College Grad	0.4612
Suburban	48.2%	Suburban	0.4553
Hispanic	47.3%	18-29	0.452
<u>AVERAGE</u>	<u>47.1%</u>	<u>MEAN</u>	<u>0.45</u>
Moderate	46.7%	Midwest	0.4449
Independent	46.6%	Moderate	0.4438
Midwest	46.4%	No Particular Relig	0.4428
50-64	46.4%	Independent	0.4426
Mod/Indep	46.2%	50-64	0.4416
18-29	46.0%	Mod/Indep	0.4406
No Particular Relig	45.3%	Hispanic	0.4382
Other/Mixed Race	44.9%	Northeast	0.4295
Northeast	44.4%	Other/Mixed Race	0.4286
Under \$40,000	44.0%	West	0.4277
West	43.5%	CollegeGrad+	0.4225
Urban	42.8%	Urban	0.4183
CollegeGrad+	42.5%	Unaffiliated Relig	0.4172
Female	42.3%	Under \$40,000	0.4167
Non-white	42.2%	Female	0.4101
Unaffiliated Relig	42.0%	Non-White	0.404
65+	40.3%	No Religion	0.3989
Black	40.1%	65+	0.3935
No Religion	39.7%	Black	0.3849
Democrat	37.4%	Democrat	0.3721
Lib/Dem	35.2%	Lib/Dem	0.3534
Other Religion	34.6%	Other Religion	0.3509
Liberal	32.8%	Liberal	0.337

APPENDIX C: VARIABLE MEASURES

TORTURE OPINION VARIABLES

Table C-1. Torture Opinion Frequencies and Means, Pew 2004-2011

Do you think the use of torture against suspected terrorists in order to gain important information can often be justified, sometimes be justified, rarely be justified, or never be justified?												
ABBRV	Survey Date		Often	Somet.	Rarely	Never	DK/NA ²³	Total	% Perm ²⁴	Avg.	Accept. ²⁵	Avg.
2004.07	Jul 2004	n	133	271	222	344	36	1006		45%		.43
		%	15%	28%	21%	33%	4%	100%	42%		.42	
2005.03	Mar 2005	n	141	340	271	301	37	1090				
		%	15%	30%	24%	27%	4%	100%	45%		.44	
2005.10	Oct 2005	n	147	302	188	319	47	1003				
		%	15%	31%	17%	32%	5%	100%	46%		.43	
2006.10	Oct 2006	n	292	515	358	575	64	1804				
		%	18%	28%	19%	32%	3%	100%	46%		.44	
2007.01	Jan 2007	n	228	619	509	597	54	2007				
		%	12%	31%	25%	29%	3%	100%	43%		.42	
2007.11	Nov 2007	n	240	434	310	366	49	1399				
		%	18%	30%	21%	27%	4%	100%	48%		.47	
2008.02	Feb 2008	n	125	224	159	234	27	769				
		%	17%	31%	20%	30%	2%	100%	48%	.45		
2009.02	Feb 2009	n	103	198	133	188	38	660				
		%	16%	28%	20%	31%	5%	100%	44%	.43		
2009.04	Apr 2009	n	115	249	167	186	25	742		52%		.49
		%	15%	34%	22%	25%	4%	100%	49%		.47	
2009.11	Nov 2009	n	187	324	162	270	58	1001				
		%	19%	35%	16%	25%	5%	100%	53%		.49	
2011.08	Aug 2011	n	293	504	282	371	59	1509				
		%	19%	34%	18%	24%	4%	100%	54%	.50		
			Often	Somet.	Rarely	Never	DK/NA	Total				
Total N			2004	3980	2761	3751	494	12990				
OVERALL AVG 1			16%	31%	20%	29%	4%	100%	47%		.45	
			PERMISSIVE	RESTRICTIVE	DK/NA	Total						
OVERALL AVG 2			47%	49%	4%	100%						

²³ DK/NA indicates nonresponses and volunteered responses of “don’t know.”

²⁴ Indicates percent of population with combined torture-permissive responses of *Often* and *Sometimes*.

²⁵ Indicates mean torture acceptance on a 0-to-1 scale, with 0 indicating greatest torture restrictiveness to torture and 1 indicating greatest torture permissiveness.

Percentages are weighted, number of cases (n) is not.

Darker gray fill indicates maximum value for that response over time. Lighter gray fill indicates lowest value for that response over time.

Table C-2. Torture Opinion Frequencies and Means, ANES 2008-2009

Do you favor, oppose, or neither favor nor oppose the U.S. government torturing people, who are suspected of being terrorists, to try to get information?											
If favors use of torture against suspected terrorists: do you favor that a great deal, moderately, or a little?											
If opposes use of torture against suspected terrorists: do you oppose that a great deal, moderately, or a little?											
Survey Info.		Favor			Neither	Oppose			NA ²⁶	Total	Mean Accept. ²⁷
		Greatly	Mod	Little		Little	Mod	Greatly			
June 2008 wave 6 ABBRV: 2008.06	n	305			498	612			5	1420	0.4265
	%	22.40%			40.10%	37.40%			.1%	100.00%	
	n	122	125	58	498	57	145	410	0	1415	
	%	9.40%	8.90%	4.10%	40.10%	4.40%	9.20%	23.80%	.1%	100.00%	
May 2009 wave 17 ABBRV: 2009.05	n	596			757	1032			4	2389	0.4265
	%	26.10%			36.60%	37.20%			.1%	100.00%	
	n	268	212	116	757	89	249	693	1	2385	
	%	11.30%	9.60%	5.10%	36.60%	3.80%	8.60%	24.30%	.0%	99.30%	
Average	%	24.30%			38.40%	37.30%				100%	0.439
	%	10.40%	9.30%	4.60%	38.40%	4.10%	8.90%	24.10%		99.80%	
Δ 08-09 ²⁸	%	3.70%			3.50%	-0.20%				0.07	> 0.0115
	%	-0.50%	0.60%	0.60%	3.50%	-1.00%	-0.70%	-1.90%		0.60%	

Percentages are weighted, number of cases (n) is not.

²⁶ NA indicates "no answer."

²⁷ Mean Acceptance reflects average response on a 0-to-1 scale, with 0 indicating greatest opposition to torture and 1 indicating greatest favor for torture.

²⁸ Δ indicates change over time.

POLITICAL VARIABLES

PEW MEASURES OF POLITICAL ORIENTATION

Table C-3. Political Variable Frequencies, Pew 2004-2011

Political Party			Political Ideology	
PARTY. In politics today, do you consider yourself a Republican, Democrat or Independent? PARTYLN. IF PARTY = "Independents", "Other", "No pref" or "DK": As of today do you lean more to the Republican Party or more to the Democratic Party?			IDEOL. In general, would you describe your political views as...	
	PARTY (n)	PARTYLN (n)		IDEOL (n)
Republican	3675	3675	Very conservative	936
Republican-leaning	4426	1626	Conservative	4112
Independent		1056	Moderate	4901
Democrat-leaning		2035	Liberal	1827
Democrat	4136	4136	Very liberal	604
No Preference (Vol.)	385	462	Don't know/Refused (Vol.)	610
Other (Vol.)	55		Total	12990
Don't know/Refused (Vol.)	313			
Total	12990	12990		

Table C-4. Political Orientation Calculation & Frequencies, Pew 2004-2011

Pew Political Orientation was calculated by placing responses to political variables on a 0-to-1 scale and averaging PARTYLN and IDEOL values. Consv/Rep: n=4389 Mod/Indep: n=4016 Lib/Dem: n=3684								
n	Very Conserv.	Consv.	Moderate	Liberal	Very Liberal	DK/Ref	Total	Political Orientation Scale Value
Republican	569	1960	943	106	32	65	3675	0.500
Rep-leaning	138	726	623	74	26	39	1626	0.375
Independent	53	263	500	113	42	85	1056	0.250
Dem-leaning	37	297	1036	424	150	91	2035	0.125
Democrat	128	781	1654	1075	339	159	4136	0.000
Oth/NoPre/DK/Ref	11	85	145	35	15	171	462	
Total	936	4112	4901	1827	604	610	12990	
Political Orient. Scale Value	0.500	0.375	.250	.125	.000			

Table C-5. Torture Support by Political Orientation, Pew 2004-2011

	Permissive		Restrictive		DK/NA	n	Summary		Mean Acceptance
	Often	Somet.	Rarely	Never			Permis.	Restrict.	0-to-1 Scale
Consv/Rep	23.4%	38.5%	18.2%	17.3%	2.6%	4389	62%	36%	0.5624
Mod/Indep	14.8%	31.4%	21.3%	29.1%	3.3%	4016	46%	50%	0.4406
Lib/Dem	10.5%	24.7%	23.4%	39.1%	2.3%	3684	35%	63%	0.3534

ANES MEASURES OF POLITICAL ORIENTATION

Table C-6. Political Variable Frequencies, ANES 2008-2009

Political Party						
<i>Questions about political party were presented on 6 different waves, and ANES consolidated responses for each wave into 6 derived variables. Question text, derived variable names, and frequencies are presented below for reference.</i>						
Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a [Republican/Democrat], a [Democrat/Republican], in independent, or what?						
IF SOMETHING ELSE: What is that?						
IF REPUBLICAN OR DEMOCRAT: Would you call yourself a strong [Democrat/Republican] or not a very strong [Democrat/Republican]?						
IF INDEPENDENT OR SOMETHING ELSE: Do you think of yourself as closer to the Republican Party or to the Democratic Party?						
n	der08w1	der08w9	der08w10	der08w11	der08w17	der08w19
0. Strong Democrat	327	589	597	685	560	521
1. Not very strong Democrat	240	390	405	353	357	368
2. Independent Democrat	172	278	257	243	216	252
3. Independent-Independent	200	334	330	260	263	263
4. Independent Republican	149	276	252	222	232	246
5. Not very strong Republican	249	379	412	355	378	383
6. Strong Republican	277	487	438	546	384	354
Total / n (Valid)	1614	2733	2691	2664	2390	2387
Political Ideology						
<i>Questions about political ideology were presented on 5 separate waves, and ANES consolidated responses for each wave into 5 derived variables. Question text, derived variable names, and frequencies are presented below for reference.</i>						
When it comes to politics, would you describe yourself as liberal, conservative, or neither liberal nor conservative?						
IF LIBERAL: Would you call yourself very liberal or somewhat liberal?						
IF CONSERVATIVE: Would you call yourself very conservative or somewhat conservative?						
IF NEITHER: Do you think of yourself as closer to liberals, or conservatives, or neither of these?						
n	der09w1	der09w2	der09w6	der09w10	der09w11	
1. Extremely Liberal	117	109	117	214	212	
2. Liberal	238	220	184	411	414	

3. Slightly Liberal	181	162	163	279	272
4. Moderate	354	309	307	580	484
5. Slightly Conservative	139	162	167	228	247
6. Conservative	386	298	309	647	651
7. Extremely Conservative	198	186	171	328	384
Total / n (Valid)	1613	1446	1418	2687	2664

Table C-7. Political Orientation Calculation, ANES 2008-2009

Political Variables	
<p>Party question was asked on 6 different waves, and ideology was asked on 5. Many cases thus include multiple responses to each of these political questions, which may be spread among as many as 11 variables. In order to capture the maximum amount of political identity information for each case, while also consolidating the number of variables analyzed, responses across waves were averaged for each case (summed for each case and divided by number of waves answered). Response values were then set on a uniform scale of 0-1, with 0 indicating the most Liberal and/or Democrat, and 1 the most Conservative and/or Republican. The political data were thus consolidated into 2 new scale variables: one that encapsulates all the ideology responses (IdeolAvg.scl), one that encapsulated all the party variables (PartyAvg.scl). Because Party and Ideology are so strongly related, IdeolAvg.scl and PartyAvg.scl scores were combined/averaged into a third new scale variable, Party@IdeolAvg.scl/"Political Index".</p> <p>__Avg.scl variables were subsequently recoded into simpler, 3-category nominal variables for the purpose of further analysis. This was accomplished by binning each of the __Avg.scl variables into 3 groups: (1) 0.000-.333 = Liberal/Democrat; (2) .334-.666 = Moderate/Independent; (3) .667-1.00 = Conservative/Republican.</p> <p>Formulas used to calculate new variables, as well as question text and frequencies for ANES derived variables used are listed below for reference.</p>	
__Avg.scl	Scale variables. Calculated average for each case based on responses across waves (summed responses and divided by number of waves answered). Response values were set on a scale of 0-1, with 0 indicating the most Liberal and/or Democrat, and 1 the most Conservative and/or Republican.
__Avg3	Categorical variables. Binned Avg.scl variables into 3 groups: 0.000-.333 = Liberal/Democrat; .334-.666 = Moderate/Independent; .667-1.00 = Conservative/Republican.
Calculation Formulas	
PartyAvg.scl	$\text{Party Average} = ((\text{der08w1}) + (\text{der08w9}) + (\text{der08w10}) + (\text{der08w11}) + (\text{der08w17}) + (\text{der08w19})) / (\# \text{ of waves answered})$ $\text{Party Average on 0-1 scale} = (\text{Party Average}) / 6$
IdeolAvg.scl	$\text{Ideology Average} = ((\text{der09w1}) + (\text{der09w2}) + (\text{der09w6}) + (\text{der09w10}) + (\text{der09w11})) / (\# \text{ of waves answered})$ $\text{Ideology Average on 0-1 scale} = (\text{Ideology Average} - 1) / 6$
Party@IdeolAvg.scl	$(\text{PartyAvg.scl} + \text{IdeolAvg.scl}) / 2$
PartyAvg3	PartyAvg.scl binned into 3 groups: (1) 0.000-.333 = Democrat; (2) .334-.666 = Independent; (3) .667-1.00 = Republican.
IdeolAvg3	IdeolAvg.scl binned into 3 groups: (1) 0.000-.333 = Liberal; (2) .334-.666 = Moderate; (3) .667-1.00 = Conservative.
Party@IdeolAvg3	Party@IdeolAvg.scl binned into 3 groups: (1) 0.000-.333 = Lib/Dem; (2) .334-.666 = Mod/Indep; (3) .667-1.00 = Cons-Rep.

Table C-8. Political Orientation Frequencies, ANES 2008-2009

ANES Political Orientation was calculated by placing responses to political variables on a 0-to-1 scale and averaging PARTYLN and IDEOL values. Consv/Rep: n=406 Mod/Indep: n=486 Lib/Dem: n=362

n	Extremely Consv.		Consv.		Slightly Consv.		Moderate		Slightly Liberal		Liberal		Extremely Liberal		Total	Political Orientation Scale Value
	3	1	22	8	3	58	33	17	4	1	8	3	2			
Strong Republican	139		81		15		9	1	2		0		0		247	0.5
Not very strong Republican	33		55		21	3	1	16	7		1		0		137	0.4175
Independent Republican	24		22	8	3	58	33		6		0		0		154	0.334
Independent	3	1	18		33		114	17	4	1	8	3			202	0.2505
Independent Democrat		1	11		18		46	8	4	34	15	2			139	0.167
Not very strong Democrat		11	27		18	14	16	54	48		37	6			231	0.0835
Strong Democrat		3	9		3	14	32		25	36	22				144	0.0
Total		215		231		200		330		147		98		33	1254	
Political Orientation Scale Value		0.5		0.4175		0.334		0.2505		0.167		0.0835		0.0		

Table C-9. Torture Opinion Frequencies & Means, ANES 2008-2009

	More in favor	More ambivalent	More opposed	n	Mean Accept. ²⁹
Consv/Rep	40.1%	40.4%	19.6%	935	.5620
Mod/Indep	19.5%	46.3%	34.2%	790	.4124
Lib/Dem	16.2	36.5%	47.3%	856	.3130
Total	25.6%	41.6%	32.8%	2581	.4360

²⁹ Mean Acceptance reflects average response on a 0-to-1 scale, with 0 indicating greatest opposition to torture and 1 indicating greatest favor for torture.

RELIGION VARIABLES

PEW MEASURES OF RELIGIOUSNESS

Table C-10. Religious Preference Variable Frequencies & Calculation, Pew 2004-2011

Religious Preference Variables				
RELIG. What is your religious preference – Protestant, Roman Catholic, Jewish, Muslim, Mormon, or an orthodox church such as the Greek or Russian Orthodox Church? {2004.07-2007.01}				
RELIG. What is your present religion, if any? Are you Protestant, Roman Catholic, Mormon, Orthodox such as Greek or Russian Orthodox, Jewish, Muslim, Buddhist, Hindu, atheist, agnostic, something else, or nothing in particular? {2007.11 – 2011.08}				
IF Other Religion or Something Else: Specify				
IF Something Else or DK/Ref: CHR. Do you think of yourself as a Christian or not?				
IF Christian (based on either RELIG or CHR): BORN. Would you describe yourself as a “born again” or evangelical Christian, or not?				
Variable Calculation & Frequencies				
Responses to religious affiliation question were recoded into 3 categories based on response to RELIG, CHR, and specification of “Other Religion” and “Something Else.”				
	Religiously Affiliated (n)		Unaffiliated (n)	Total
	Christian Affil/ID	Other Religion	Unaffiliated	
Protestant (Baptist, Methodist, Non-denominational, Lutheran, Presbyterian, Pentecostal, Episcopalian, Reformed, Church of Christ, Jehovah’s Witness, etc.)	6855	7	0	6862
Roman Catholic (Catholic)	2956	0	0	2956
Mormon (Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints/LDS)	212	0	0	212
Orthodox (Greek, Russian, or some other orthodox church)	89	0	0	89
Jewish (Judaism)	0	266	0	266
Muslim (Islam)	0	62	0	62
Buddhist {2007.11-2011.08}	0	28	0	28
Hindu {2007.11-2011.08}	0	17	0	17
Atheist (do not believe in God) {2007.11-2011.08}	0	0	88	88
No religion, not a believer, atheist, agnostic {2004.07-2007.01}	0	0	682	682
Agnostic (not sure if there is a God) {2007.11-2011.08}	0	0	157	157
(VOL) Something else (SPECIFY) {2007.11-2011.08}	15	64	1	80
Other religion (SPECIFY) {2004.07-2007.01}	27	143	4	174
Nothing in particular {2007.11-2011.08}	0	0	606	606
(VOL) Christian {2007.11-2011.08}	435	0	0	435
(VOL) Unitarian (Universalist) {2007.11-2011.08}	0	17	0	17
(VOL) Don't Know/Refused	40	0	0	40
Total Valid	10629	604	1538	12771
Missing (DK/Ref + no Christian ID)				219
Total				12990
%[weighted]	80.5%	4.6%	13.4%	

{Brackets} indicate which surveys this response was given as an option or volunteered.
 Note that in its 2007-2011.08 surveys, Pew added an optional response of “Nothing in particular”, alongside separate options for “Atheist” and Agnostic”, replacing what had been a single response of “No religion, atheist, agnostic, non-believer” in its earlier surveys. This makes non-religiousness a difficult thing to quantify.

Table C-11. Torture Support by Religious Affiliation, Pew 2004-2011

	Mean T-Acceptance	T-Permissive	T-Restrictive	DK/Ref	n
CHRISTIAN	<u>0.4633</u>	<u>49%</u>	<u>47%</u>	<u>4%</u>	<u>10629</u>
Protestant (all)	<u>0.4541</u>	<u>48%</u>	<u>48%</u>	<u>4%</u>	<u>7371</u>
Evangelical Protestant (Non-Black)	0.4887	52%	44%	4%	3200
Mainline Protestant (Non-Black)	0.4663	49%	48%	3%	3128
Black Protestant	0.3811	40%	56%	5%	1043
Catholic	0.4711	50%	47%	3%	2957
Mormon	0.4275	47%	49%	4%	212
Orthodox	0.4623	51%	49%	1%	89
OTHER RELIGION	<u>0.3509</u>	<u>35%</u>	<u>63%</u>	<u>3%</u>	<u>604</u>
Jewish	0.4327	42%	56%	3%	266
Buddhist	0.2422	23%	75%	3%	72
Muslim	0.2302	18%	74%	8%	62
Hindu	0.3887	42%	58%		26
Other Faith	0.3229	35%	64%	1%	178
UNAFFILIATED	<u>0.4172</u>	<u>42%</u>	<u>54%</u>	<u>4%</u>	<u>1538</u>
No Religion	0.3991	40%	57%	4%	934
No Particular	0.4428	45%	50%	5%	604
DK	0.3307	30%	59%	11%	219
Total	0.4500	47%	49%	4%	12990

ANES MEASURES OF RELIGIOUSNESS

Table C-12. Religious Preference Variable Frequencies, ANES 2008-2009

der22. What is your religious preference? Is it Protestant, Catholic, Jewish, some other religion, or no religion?				
	Religiously Affiliated (n)		Unaffiliated (n)	
	Christian	Other Religion	No Religion	Total (n)
Protestant	1284	0	0	1284
Catholic	634	0	0	634
Jewish	0	92	0	92

Other	0	338	0	338
No Religion	0	0	356	356
Total	1918	430	356	2704

Question of religious preference was posed on waves 1 (w1j2) and 9 (w9zg2). ANES combined these responses into a single derived variable, "der22", which is the primary variable used for this analysis.

Table C-13. Torture Support by Religious Affiliation, ANES 2008-2009

	Mean T-Acceptance	More in Favor	More Ambivalent	More Opposed	n (unweighted)
CHRISTIAN	<u>.4497</u>	<u>26.9</u>	<u>43.5</u>	<u>29.6</u>	<u>1669</u>
Protestant	.4506	28.0%	41.1%	30.80%	1121
Catholic	.4478	24.8%	47.9%	27.40%	548
OTHER RELIGIONS	<u>.4689</u>	<u>20.9</u>	<u>38.3</u>	<u>40.8</u>	<u>358</u>
Jewish	.6363	52.2%	26.1%	21.70%	82
Other	.4408	21.8%	40.6%	37.60%	276
No Religion	.3031	17.3%	32.7%	50.00%	313
Total	.4365	25.7%	41.4%	32.80%	2340

RACIAL PREJUDICE VARIABLES

Measures of racial prejudice are based on three sets of variables from the ANES 2008-2009 Panel Study data set.

RACIAL STEREOTYPES

The variables used in the racial stereotypes analysis were derived by combining 14 ANES variables (w20m2-15) into 4 new variables.

- Response values were recoded on a scale of 0-to-1, with 1 corresponding to strongest agreement with a given stereotype (i.e. 'Extremely well'), and 0 corresponding with no agreement. (i.e. "Not at all well")
- The 14 racial stereotype variables were grouped into four categories, divided according to race and whether the given stereotype was a positive or negative one, and the responses within each category were averaged to create 4 new variables, reflecting average black/white positive/negative stereotypes.
- Index variables were created to calculate the ratio of negative stereotypes held for each race relative to the positive stereotypes. Negative stereotypes were subtracted from positive stereotypes to yield a net stereotype valence on a scale of -1 to 1. A positive valence (≥ 0) means that positive stereotypes outweighed negative, while a negative valence (< 0) means that negative stereotypes outweighed positive for a given race or for both races combined.
- For the purpose of analysis, each of these derived scale variables were converted into nominal variables by binning scores into two categories, divided along the midpoint of their respective scales: .5 for the 0-to-1 scale; .00 for the -1-1 index scale.

Table C-14. Racial Stereotype Variables & Calculations, ANES 2008-2009

Next we'll ask how well some words describe blacks and whites. Which group you will be asked about first was chosen randomly by the computer.					
w20m2-15. How well do the words "[stereotype]" describe most [blacks/whites]? [Extremely well, very well, moderately well, slightly well, or not at all well? / Not at all well, slightly well, moderately well, very well, or extremely well?]					
w20	Race	Stereotype	Derived Variables	Calculated Index	
m2	Blacks	determined to succeed	Avg Black Positive Stereotypes	Black Stereotypes Index	Racial Stereotypes Index
m3	Blacks	hard working			
m4	Blacks	intelligent at school			
m5	Blacks	boastful	Avg Black Negative Stereotypes		
m6	Blacks	complaining			
m7	Blacks	lazy			
m8	Blacks	violent	Avg White Positive Stereotypes		
m9	Whites	determined to succeed			
m10	Whites	hard working			
m11	Whites	intelligent at school	Avg White Negative Stereotypes	White Stereotypes Index	
m12	Whites	boastful			
m13	Whites	complaining			
m14	Whites	lazy			
m15	Whites	violent			

RACIAL RESENTMENT

The racial resentment index is based on a battery of four questions (w20L1-4) that ANES calls the “racial resentment scale.”³⁰

Table C-15. Racial Resentment Scale Variables, ANES 2008-2009

(w20L1-4). Do you agree strongly, somewhat, neither agree nor disagree, disagree somewhat, or disagree strongly with this statement? ...	
L1	Irish, Italians, Jewish, and many minorities overcame prejudice and worked their way up. Blacks should do the same without any special favors.
L2	Generations of slavery and discrimination have created conditions that make it difficult for blacks to work their way out of the lower class.
L3	Over the past few years, blacks have gotten less than they deserve.
L4	It's really a matter of some people not trying hard enough; if blacks would only try harder they could be just as well off as whites.

Racial Resentment Index Variable Calculation:

- Racial Resentment questions were combined into a single Racial Resentment Index.
- Responses to w20L1-4 were recoded on a 0-to-1 scale, with 1 indicating the most resentment and 0 indicating the least resentment, and averaged into a single Index variable on a 0-to-1 scale.

³⁰ Kugler et al.2010 refers to the same questions as part of the 2000 version of the Symbolic Racism Scale (which is an 8-item scale as opposed to the 4 items used in ANES) and cites Henry & Sears 2002, “The symbolic racism 2000 scale.” *Political Psychology*, 23, 253-283.

- Formula: $((w20l1.scl) + (w20l2.scl) + (w20l3.scl) + (w20l4.scl)) / 4$
- Mean = .6172 (whites only, wgtcs20)
- SD = .23453 (whites only, wgtcs20)

IMPLICIT BIAS

- Analysis of Implicit Racial Bias is based on the summary score of the Implicit Association Test (IAT), ANES variable: "IAT_D. IAT OVERALL SUMMARY SCORE (D)." For this variable, responses to the IAT were scored on a scale of -2 to +2, with -2 indicating the strongest pro-black / anti-white bias, +2 indicating the strongest pro-white / anti-black bias, and 0 indicating no bias either way.
- IAT scores were divided into relatively higher and lower scoring groups along three different points of demarcation and mean torture acceptance was compared across lower and higher scoring groups.
- Greater mean torture acceptance was consistently associated with groups scoring higher on the IAT, indicating anti-black bias.

Table C-16. Torture Acceptance by Implicit Association Test Scores, ANES 2008-2009

Dividing Point	IAT Score	Mean Torture Acceptance	
		Lower Scores (\leq)	Lower Scores (\leq)
IAT Mean	.13977	.4205	.4462
IAT Median	.13666	.4204	.4463
No Bias	0	.4185	.4428
Standard Deviation	.483882		

ATTITUDES TOWARD GROUPS

This analysis is based on two batteries of questions, one presented on waves 6 and 17 and the other on wave 2.

Table C-17. Torture Acceptance by Attitudes Towards Groups, ANES 2008-2009

Variable Calculations for Torture Acceptance by Attitudes Towards Groups				Torture Acceptance by Attitudes Towards Groups			
Question text for both waves: "Do you feel warm or cold toward [group]?"				Group	Mean Torture Acceptance		
	Variable Names		Mean Torture Acceptance Calculation		Warm	> / <	Cold
1	w6ya42	w17ya42	$[(w6ya42 * Tw6.scl) \{wgtcs6\} + (w17ya42 * Tw17.scl) \{wgtcs17\}] / 2$	Christians	0.4458	>	0.3308
2	w2d26		$(w2d26 * Tw6.scl) \{wgtc6\}$	Evangelical Christians	0.4214	>	0.2673
3	w6ya45	w17ya45	$[(w6ya45 * Tw6.scl) \{wgtcs6\} + (w17ya45 * Tw17.scl) \{wgtcs17\}] / 2$	Jews	0.4313	>	0.3471

4	w6ya48	w17ya48	$[(w6ya48 * Tw6.scl) \{wgtcs6\} + (w17ya48 * Tw17.scl) \{wgtcs17\}] / 2$	Hindus	0.3823	<	0.5400
5	w6ya51	w17ya51	$[(w6ya51 * Tw6.scl) \{wgtcs6\} + (w17ya51 * Tw17.scl) \{wgtcs17\}] / 2$	Muslims	0.3460	<	0.5552
6	w6ya54	w17ya54	$[(w6ya54 * Tw6.scl) \{wgtcs6\} + (w17ya54 * Tw17.scl) \{wgtcs17\}] / 2$	atheists	0.3279	<	0.4915
7	w2d8		$(w2d8 * Tw6.scl) \{wgtc6\}$	Mormons	0.4131	>	0.3540
8	w6ya57	w17ya57	$[(w6ya57 * Tw6.scl) \{wgtcs6\} + (w17ya57 * Tw17.scl) \{wgtcs17\}] / 2$	People who live in Canada	0.3858	<	0.4977
9	w6ya60	w17ya60	$[(w6ya60 * Tw6.scl) \{wgtcs6\} + (w17ya60 * Tw17.scl) \{wgtcs17\}] / 2$	People who live in Mexico	0.3589	<	0.5660
10	w6ya63	w17ya63	$[(w6ya63 * Tw6.scl) \{wgtcs6\} + (w17ya63 * Tw17.scl) \{wgtcs17\}] / 2$	People who live in Iraq	0.3563	<	0.5512
11	w6ya66	w17ya66	$[(w6ya66 * Tw6.scl) \{wgtcs6\} + (w17ya66 * Tw17.scl) \{wgtcs17\}] / 2$	People who live in Iran	0.3219	<	0.5520
12	w2d2		$(w2d2 * Tw6.scl) \{wgtc6\}$	People who are in charge of big companies	0.4919	>	0.3723
13	w2d5		$(w2d5 * Tw6.scl) \{wgtc6\}$	Members of the U.S. military	0.4414	>	0.3826
14	w2d11		$(w2d11 * Tw6.scl) \{wgtc6\}$	Blacks	0.3428	<	0.5783
15	w2d14		$(w2d14 * Tw6.scl) \{wgtc6\}$	Whites	0.4101	>	0.4060
16	w2d17		$(w2d17 * Tw6.scl) \{wgtc6\}$	Latinos/Hispanics	0.3308	<	0.5680
17	w2d20		$(w2d20 * Tw6.scl) \{wgtc6\}$	Men	0.3775	<	0.5133
18	w2d23		$(w2d23 * Tw6.scl) \{wgtc6\}$	Women	0.4098	<	0.4407

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