

Putting Reasons First: A Defense of Normative Non-Naturalism

By

Andrew T. Forcehimes

Dissertation

Submitted to the Faculty of the
Graduate School of Vanderbilt University

in partial fulfillment of the requirements

for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

in

Philosophy

May, 2015

Nashville, Tennessee

Approved:

Scott F. Aikin

Marilyn Friedman

Brad Hooker

Larry May

Robert B. Talisse

Jeffrey Tlumak


TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
Introduction	1
Reason-Implies-Can	3
Strong Modal Status.....	7
The Turn to Metaphysics.....	8
Overview.....	9
Sections	
1. Two Senses of Merely Apparent.....	10
2. Quietist Realism.....	12
3. The Appropriation Problem.....	15
Non-Analytic Naturalism.....	15
Hypotheticalism.....	17
4. The Extensional Plausibility Standoff (Again)	18
5. Non-Extensional Arguments	19
The Just-Too-Different Intuition.....	20
The Making/Being Argument.....	21
The Triviality Objection.....	23
6. Extreme Normative Realism.....	26
Clarifying Reasons Talk.....	26
The Reason-Relation Argument.....	28
Two Objections to Extreme Normative Realism.....	30
7. The Return of Quietist Realism?.....	31
Parfit’s Non-Metaphysical Cognitivism.....	31
Scanlon’s Domain-Specific Ontology.....	33
8. Non-Naturalism	34
The Reductionist Dilemma.....	35
Return of the Triviality Objection	37
9. From Non-Naturalism to the Value-Based Theory.....	38
What Reasons Are.....	38
Our Reasons.....	39
Conclusion.....	41
Works Cited.....	42

Introduction

When I say to my brother, “Your room is disorganized,” I take myself to be uttering a truth. When I go to his room, see his toppled stacks of paper, his unwashed clothes, and dirty dishes, I see, perhaps more vividly than I’d like, the portion of reality that my utterance corresponds to. But when I say to my brother, “You ought to call home,” I also take myself to be uttering a truth. Yet if I examine my brother’s room, our parents’ home, or hook my brother up to an MRI machine, I don’t see, at least not obviously, what my utterance corresponds to. This puzzle lies at the heart of meta-normative theorizing. This essay defends a particular solution.

Visualizing the landscape will be helpful. We can, by asking certain questions, map the competing meta-normative positions.



Addressing each of these positions is too ambitious for a single work. I will, accordingly, address what I take to be the most attractive options. In recent years, an impressive research program has developed around non-analytic reductions of the normative. At the same time, Parfit and Scanlon have formulated powerful accounts of quietist realism. Despite this impressive

work, these views, I'll argue, should be rejected in favor of robust realism. The broad thesis of this essay is accordingly this.

Broad Thesis: Robust realism is more plausible than either non-analytic naturalism or quietist realism.

There is an important commitment that theorists occupying each of these three positions typically share. Reasons – i.e., considerations that count in favor of responding in certain ways – are the basic currency in which all other concepts in the normative domain are cashed out. We can call this shared commitment *reasons basicness*.¹

There is much to be said for putting reasons first. Normativity seems, at base, justificatory. If my brother asks why he should call home, I supply him with facts that justify his calling: Mom is sick and Dad needs your help. These facts – that mom is sick and Dad needs my brother's help – provide reasons *to call*.² So, when I assert that my brother ought to call home, this just consists in my asserting my brother has decisive or conclusive reason to call.

This commitment affords a common metric for measuring the plausibility of non-analytic naturalism, quietist realism, and robust realism: reasons. For the purposes of this essay then, reasons will, to borrow a line from Parfit, “provide the decisive battlefield” (Parfit 2011b: 269).

There are two main accounts of reasons. Take again my brother's reason to call home. Some theorists hold that this reason depends on facts about my brother's motivational set – his wants, desires, ends, and interests. That is, that Mom is sick and Dad needs help is a reason for my brother to call *only if* my brother's antecedent wants, desires, ends, or interests are promoted by his calling. Since the existence of reasons must be tied to something within the agent, these accounts fly under the banner of *existence internalism*. Others demur. According to *existence externalists*, reasons need not hook up to the agent's motivational set. What divides internalists from externalists, then, is a necessary condition – for an agent to have a reason to ϕ , it must at least be possible for the agent to be motivated to ϕ .

Existence Internalism =_{df} An agent's having a reason to ϕ , depends on the agent's (perhaps idealized) motivational set (broadly construed).

Existence Externalism =_{df} It is possible for an agent to have a reason to ϕ , even if ϕ -ing does not connect to the agent's (perhaps idealized) motivational set (broadly construed).

The internalism/externalism distinction helps classify theories, but since the cut rests on a necessary condition,³ more needs to be said to fill in what reasons are.

Of internalist views, the most prominent in the literature are desire-based. According to these desire-based views, the source of an agent's reasons is her desires. On this view, my brother (qua

¹ Here's an abridged list of those who accept that reasons are the basic unit of the normative domain: Hampton (1998), Nagel (1986, 1997), Parfit (2001, 2006, 2011a, 2011b), Scanlon (1998, 2009, 2014), Schroeder (2007a, b), and Skorupski (2010). Finlay (2007: 835) rightly notes that “reasons are commonly regarded [in contemporary meta-ethics] as the fundamental components of moral reality” (cf. Berker 2007: 112). There are, however, those that resist the turn to reasons, e.g., Manne (2013) and Väyrynen (2011).

² As opposed to reasons *why*, which provide *explanations* for the occurrence of certain acts. If, for example, I stomp on your gouty toes out of clumsiness, my being clumsy is the reason for my stomping. It explains my stomping but does not justify it.

³ As Dancy writes, “Internalism amounts to a motivational constraint on good reasons” (Dancy 2000: 16).

agent) has a reason to call home because calling promotes the object of one of my brother's desires. That is, my brother's reasons are a function of the desire(s) that calling home will satisfy.

Desire-Based Theory =_{df} An agent's having a reason to ϕ -ing is provided by the fact that ϕ -ing promotes one of the agent's present desires.

Externalists, by contrast, take reasons to be value-based. On these views, the source of an agent's reason to ϕ is the value produced by ϕ -ing. On these views, my brother's reason has its source in facts about calling home (qua *object*), namely, that calling home is good or valuable. That is, my brother's reasons are a function of the values or goodness calling home will bring about.

Value-Based Theory =_{df} An agent's having a reason to ϕ -ing is provided by the fact that ϕ -ing promotes what is good or valuable.

But we need to be careful. By stating that ϕ -ing helps realize what is good or valuable, it might seem like the value-based theory gives up reasons basicness. This, however, is not so. We can preserve reasons basicness, by also being (positive) buck-passers. Buck-passers analyze evaluative claims in terms of normative claims.⁴ When buck-passers say, for example, that calling home is good or valuable, they mean that facts about calling home are reason providing. In short, on the value-based theory, agents' reasons are provided by facts that give her reasons to have them (Parfit 2011a: 45). Reasons are, in other words, primitive.

Over the last thirty years, theorists from both sides have exerted an enormous amount of effort on the extensional plausibility front. Both accounts, that is, have been charged with over or under generating the number of reasons we pre-theoretically believe there are. Though ingenious, none of these arguments are, I believe, decisive. To see this, and to get clearer on the distinction between desire-based and value-based theories, we can canvass the strongest extensional arguments against each view.

Reason-Implies-Can

A potentially devastating objection to externalist value-based theories maintains that such reasons violate ought-implies-can. To bring out this objection, we can use Williams' canonical formulation of internalism: "A has a reason to ϕ only if there is a sound deliberative route from A's subjective motivational set to A's ϕ -ing" (Williams 2001: 91).⁵ To specify: Motivational sets, according to Williams, include "such things as dispositions of evaluation, patterns of emotional reaction, personal loyalties, and various projects, as they may be abstractly called, embodying commitments of the agent" (Williams 1981: 105). Idealizing agents in three ways ensures soundness of deliberation: full (non-normative) information, perfect instrumental rationality, and

⁴ According to Scanlon, for example, "to call something valuable is to say that it has other properties that provide reasons for behaving in certain ways with respect to it" (Scanlon 1998: 96). For an overview of buck-passing accounts of value see Suikkanen (2009).

⁵ Williams' account went through a number of iterations. I've cited the most recent. His previous formulation is: "A could reach the conclusion that he should ϕ (or a conclusion to ϕ) by a sound deliberative route from the motivations he already has in his actual motivational set" (Williams 1995: 35). And prior to that he held: "A has a reason to ϕ only if A has some desire the satisfaction of which will be served by his ϕ -ing" (Williams 1981: 101).

full imaginative powers. So, for example, my brother does not have a reason to ϕ if either the member of his motivational set which ϕ -ing promotes is based on a false belief, or the belief that ϕ -ing will satisfy a member of his motivational set is false (Williams 1981: 103). Along with flawless means-ends reasoning, we assume that he is able to think about how the elements in his motivational set can be combined and how to find solutions where there are conflicts (Williams 1981: 104).⁶ Putting all this together, my brother has a reason to call home only if, apprised of all the relevant facts and procedurally rational, he would be motivated to call.⁷

Externalist value-based theorists, to repeat, deny this connection. They hold that my brother could have a reason to call home, regardless of whether he (or his idealized self) would be motivated to call. Enter the argument from ought-implies-can.

If oughts are what one has most or decisive reason to do, and ought implies can, then it's plausible to hold that for one to have a reason to ϕ it must be possible that one can ϕ .⁸ We should, I believe, accept some version of the reason-implies-can principle, if we take the 'can' here to be logical or physical possibility. But to be put in the service of an argument against externalism, the strength of 'can' needs to be modulated to the existence of internal but not external reasons. Since the difference between these accounts concerns motivation, the modality in question is psychological. The argument against externalism thus relies on what we might call the *reason-implies-can-be-motivated* principle.

Although less intuitive than logical or physical impossibility, this principle is, on its face, plausible. My reasons should stick to me. For a reason to be mine, it should at least be psychologically possible for me to act on it. If, absent rational motivation, it is psychologically impossible for me to act on a particular consideration, then that consideration cannot be a reason for me, or so it seems. But if psychological incapacity is reason-blocking, then external reasons are a non-starter. Call this the *impossibility argument*.⁹ Put precisely the argument runs as follows:

1. If it is psychologically impossible for an agent to ϕ , there cannot be a reason for her to ϕ .
2. If an agent cannot be motivated to ϕ , it is psychologically impossible for her to ϕ .
3. An agent can be motivated to ϕ only if there is a sound deliberative route from her subjective motivational set to her ϕ -ing.
4. Thus, all reasons must connect to the motivational sets of the agents to which they apply – i.e., all reasons are internal.

The impossibility argument poses a serious challenge to externalism: externalism generates too many reasons.

This argument has far-reaching implications. If our reasons extend only as far as our motivational sets, then, given that each person's motivational set differs, it is unlikely that there are any agent-neutral reasons – reasons for everyone. This, externalists will argue, is evidence for the impossibility argument's unsoundness.

⁶ As Hooker (1987) rightly points out, if deliberation is taken in this way, it is too restrictive to keep Williams from begging the question against externalism.

⁷ I follow Johnson's (1999: 56-57) formulation of Williams' three ways of idealizing agents.

⁸ See, for example, Streumer (2007: 358). But he takes the modality in question to track nomologically and historically accessible possible worlds. This would render the principle too weak to exclude external reasons.

⁹ Versions of this argument can be found in Shafer-Landau (2003: Chp. 7), Manne (2011: 69-70), and Markovits (2014: 29-33). Only Manne fully endorses it, however.

Return to my brother. If there fails to be a sound deliberative route from his subjective motivational set to his calling, he cannot, according to the reason-implies-can-be-motivated principle, have a reason to call. This yields immediately unintuitive results. Consider,

Call Home. Only my brother and Dad know the combination for the lock on the medicine cabinet. This cabinet contains Mom’s heart medicine. Without her medicine, if Mom gets sick, she soon dies. Mom is now sick. But Dad has, terrified by the prospects of her death, panicked. He cannot remember the combination. He’s contacted me to get my brother to call home. Time is ticking for Mom. Yet my brother happens to be, at base, a jerk. I tell him about the situation and hand him the phone. He shrugs, retreating into his disorganized room. Nothing about calling connects to his (even suitably idealized) existing commitments.

According to the impossibility argument, my brother does not have a reason to call home. Williams embraces this implication. He writes concerning an analogous case of a man who is wholeheartedly nasty to his wife:

There are many things I can say about or to this man: that he is ungrateful, inconsiderate, hard, sexist, nasty, selfish, brutal, and many other disadvantageous things. I shall presumably say, whatever else I say, that it would be better if he were nicer to her. There is one specific thing the external reasons theorist wants me to say, that the man has a reason to be nicer (Williams 1995: 39).

But following Williams in embracing this implication comes at a high cost. It conflicts with our intuitive sense of the jerk-to-reasons ratio: It shouldn’t be the case that the more of a jerk my brother is the fewer the reasons that apply to him. But that is what the reasons-implies-can-be-motivated principle suggests. It destroys, as the case of my brother brings out, many reasons we pre-theoretically think there are.¹⁰

Cases like *Call Home* seem sufficient to show that something in the impossibility argument has gone wrong. But externalists can perhaps do even better.

Our reasons are often provided by others failing to do what they have reason to do. In most instances, our reasons are provided by our trying to mitigate the bad effects that result from these failures – e.g., if someone neglects his child and I can costlessly help this child, I have a reason to help. But there is a subset of cases where one is strategically positioned to costlessly reduce wrongdoing as such. Call these *mitigating moral failure cases*. Consider, for example,

¹⁰ As Enoch writes: “We can always describe a Sufficiently Bad Bad-Guy in whose motivational set (or some such) there is just no ground for some normative judgments that – as pre-theoretically we would insist rather uncompromisingly – apply to him. If, for instance, Sufficiently Bad Bad-Guy doesn’t care at all about Victim’s well-being, and if there is nothing qualifying as sound deliberative route that can lead him to care about Victim’s well-being or in some other way to avoid hurting her, then Sufficiently Bad Bad-Guy has – Williams is committed to saying – no reason not to hurt Victim” (Enoch 2011c: 261). Similarly, Svavarsdóttir notes: “It seems wildly implausible to claim that it is inappropriate or somehow odd, say, to judge it wrong of an individual to sexually abuse children just on the grounds that he is not (either under the actual or some non-normatively specified counterfactual conditions) motivated to refrain from such conduct. Moral judgments are unconditional exactly in that they apply to agents regardless of what their motivations are” (Svavarsdóttir 1999: 172).

Colloquium. Every faculty member has a duty to attend colloquium. But we know that three members will not go simply because they don't want to.¹¹ Suppose now we are deciding where to hold colloquium. We have two options. The two options are equal in every respect for all faculty members except the undutiful three. Our first option puts colloquium next to these three members' offices. The second is across campus, and it is a hike.¹² Having colloquium in this second, less accessible location eliminates the three's duty to attend.

In *Colloquium*, we have, I believe, a reason to choose the second option. If we can costlessly remove an occasion for someone to morally fail, we should. This reason is provided by our costlessly keeping the three from failing to do what they have most reason to do, which, if we chose the first location, would be to attend colloquium.

Mitigating moral failure cases, like *Colloquium*, abound. And they can be wielded against the impossibility argument. To see this, consider,

Wedding Invitation. I am about to send out an invitation for my wedding. I am using a website that has all of my family's email addresses preprogrammed. My brother is on this list. If I invite him, he will have a duty to go.¹³ But he, in a moment of weakness, will fail to act in accordance with this duty.¹⁴ I know this.

If we assume that my removing my brother from the list is costless, then, just as in *Colloquium*, I have a reason to remove my brother's email address to prevent his moral failing. But now imagine a variant on *Wedding Invitation*,

Unmotivated Invitee. Same as *Wedding Invitation*, except this time my brother, even if apprised of all the relevant facts and procedurally rational, would not be motivated to come.

In *Wedding Invitation*, I removed my brother's name in order to prevent him from failing to do what he has most reason to do. But if the reason-implies-can-be-motivated principle is correct, my brother lacks a reason to attend my wedding. So, in *Unmotivated Invitee*, I should lack a reason to costlessly prevent his moral failing. He cannot morally fail to do what he has no reason to do. However, it seems that, just as in *Wedding Invitation*, I have a reason to take his name off the list. If I still have this reason, then the most plausible explanation is that the reason-implies-can-be-motivated principle is false. So again, the impossibility argument fails.¹⁵

¹¹ Assume that on both internal and external reason theories they have a duty to attend. In other words, they have, barring mitigating circumstances, most reason to go. As this suggests, I embrace moral rationalism. But we could, if necessary, reformulate the case to avoid it.

¹² We can assume the department currently occupies two buildings. Half of the department offices' are in building #1 with the undutiful three. But those whose offices' are in building #1 teach right before colloquium in building #2, where the other members' offices are. Our first option for the colloquium is in building #1. Our second option is in another building, which we can call building #3. Building #2 is equidistant from #1 and #3.

¹³ We can assume that weddings are very important in my family. We can additionally assume, to add a gloss of reciprocity, that I recently attended his wedding. And so we can assume my brother has, on both internalist and externalist accounts, a duty to attend.

¹⁴ We can also assume it is not inconvenient for him to go.

¹⁵ I do not want to overstate what can be gleaned from these cases. They are not supposed to be counterexamples to internalism. What I think they show is that the impossibility argument conflicts with the best explanation of our intuitions, and so we have good reason to reject it.

External value-based reasons are still in the running. We can next turn to the best extensional implausibility argument against internalism.

Strong Modal Status

One worry with internalist theories is that they cannot capture the modal strength of certain reasons. Moral reasons, it seems to many, have categorical force; they are immune to the contingencies of one's desires.¹⁶ Such reasons have what we might call a *strong modal status*: they apply to all persons "regardless of whether they want to act in a morally upright fashion, or whether they belong to a certain social group, or whether they have entered into certain agreements with others, and so forth" (Cuneo 2007a: 38). But if all reasons are contingent on desires, this contingency will carry over to moral reasons. This looks like a problem.¹⁷

To help see this problem consider,

Red Button. Imagine there is a red button that, if pushed, will prevent the prolonged agony of a dozen innocent children. No other costs will result to the pusher. The button is designed to appear in front of some randomly selected agent.

In the case of *Red Button*, it seems that whomever the button appears in front of has a reason to push it. This suggests that (i) some reasons have a strong modal status: they apply to all agents regardless of their desires. But (ii) according to the desire-based theory of reasons, an agent's reasons are desire-dependent. Hence, if there is a reason to push in *Red Button*, it must in some way hook up to the desires of the agent pushing. The conjunction of (i) and (ii), however, conflict with (iii): there is no necessary connection between an agent's desires and the responses demanded by reasons with strong modal statuses. Were a desire-based theory true, the potential button pusher might, given her idiosyncratic psychological makeup, lack such a reason. Since no one could lack a (at least *pro tanto*) reason to push, but desire-based theories imply they could, desire-based theories face a troubling trilemma – (i)-(iii).

But this trilemma is not inescapable. Desire-based theorists can argue that moral reasons do not have this strong modal status, or they can argue that this status can be accounted for. Schroeder (2007b: Chp. 6), for example, takes the latter tack. When a moral reason fails to get a grip due to a lack of desire promotion, instead of inferring that one lacks such a reason, we should, Schroeder argues, rather infer that one is not a moral agent. This latter inference opens up a new avenue. The desire-based theorist can argue that moral reasons are reasons for anyone simply in virtue of being a *moral agent*. Specifically, if the strong modal status of moral reasons entails they are reasons for anyone independent of their desires, then insofar as moral agents could lack such desires, and thereby not have such reasons, the desire-based theorist is in trouble. But if it can be shown that anyone who lacks at least some desire whose object would be promoted by pushing the red button, fails to be a moral agent, then the pressure produced by the

¹⁶ An abridged list of those who advocate this view includes most famously Kant (2002 [1785]) and Mackie (1977: 33), and more recently Joyce (2001: 177, 2006: 201-202), Scanlon (2003: 9-10), and Shafer-Landau (2003: Chp. 7&8).

¹⁷ Cuneo (2007a: Chp. 7), Enoch (2011c: 96-98), and FitzPatrick (Manuscript) express this worry generally. And Parfit's agony argument (2011a: 76-82) shares the core thought behind this worry. Evers (2009: 59-61), Enoch (2011a: 428-429), Shafer-Landau (2012: 436-438), and McPherson (2012: 446-447), formulate versions of this worry specifically for Schroeder. For a helpful overview see Finlay (2007: §4.3) and Finlay and Schroeder (2012: §1.2.2).

trilemma dissipates. Call this the *constitutivist strategy* (cf. Korsgaard 1986, 2009, Velleman 2000, 2009).¹⁸

To make good on this constitutivist strategy, we need to show that all moral agents must have at least some desire that can explain the strong modal status of moral reasons – like the reason in *Red Button*. Lacking any desire that explains this reason, one must fail to be a moral agent at all. This, as Schroeder argues, is not implausible. He writes,

[The] explanation of why all moral agents share reasons to act in accordance with moral requirements can start with an explanation of why all moral agents share a reason to expect that sort of behavior of one another. Then, at the second stage, it might explain why moral agents all have a reason to act in accordance with moral requirements, by explaining a reason to live up to the legitimate expectations of others. To have such a reason, you need only to have a desire that would be fulfilled by living up to others' legitimate expectations. This picture therefore fits together with a picture of moral agents as agents who have an interest in living up to one another's expectations. Such a desire could be a desire for esteem, love, or approval, or even just a desire not to be despised. It would have to be some sort of essentially social desire, but that fits with the idea that moral agency is essentially a kind of social agency. (Schroeder 2012: 470)

Moral agency and social agency are, on this picture, intimately linked. This gives the internalist more desires whose promotion could explain the moral reasons all moral agents seem to have. It thus seems plausible to think that an agent who lacked any desire that could explain moral reasons, like the reason in *Red Button*, would fail to be a *moral* agent as such.¹⁹ And this thought is plausible.

The argument from the strong modal status of reasons, accordingly, is not decisive. Thus internalism is still in the running.

The Turn to Metaphysics

If, as I think is the case, extensional plausibility arguments leave the debate between value-based and desire-based views underdetermined,²⁰ perhaps we can look elsewhere. One popular place to look is metaphysics.

Naturalism is one of the major trends in 20th Century metaphysics. Crudely put, naturalism is “the sensible thesis that *all* facts are facts of nature” (Harman 1977: 17). It is this sensible thesis that drives many to internalist desire-based accounts of reasons. As Parfit writes, “There is, I think, one main argument for [the desire-based] view. Of those who hold this view, many are *naturalists*, who believe that there cannot be any irreducibly normative truths. These people give reductive accounts of desire-based reasons for acting [... which] merely involve causal or psychological facts” (Parfit 2002: 312; cf., 2011a: 109-110). Chang concurs, “Internalism's main attraction: naturalism about the normative” (Chang 2013: 174).

¹⁸ I'm convinced, I should say, by Enoch (2006, 2011b) and Tiffany (2012), that at least when we are talking about unrestricted agency (and not, say, moral agency), the prospects of constitutivism look grim.

¹⁹ It is worth emphasizing that Schroeder initially (2007b: Chp. 6) tried capturing the strong modal status of reasons by deploying the constitutivist strategy for agents *qua* agents. But he now (2012) limits the argument to *moral* reasons for *moral* agents.

²⁰ More precisely, I mean contrastive underdetermination. Even once all of our first-order normative intuitions are in, they might equally confirm both value and desire-based theories.

Parfit and Chang are correct. For many, that desire-based accounts are compatible with naturalism, while value-based theories are not, counts significantly in favor of desire-based views.²¹ So it appears that in the face of an extensional standoff, the tie goes to desire-based theories.

But this, I believe, gets the metaphysical issues exactly backward. I shall argue that Putting reasons first pushes us toward a rather robust form of non-naturalism. If correct, metaphysical considerations, instead of favoring desire-based theories, favor the value-based account. The specific thesis of this essay is, accordingly, this.

Specific Thesis: If we accept reasons basicness, (a) we should be robust realist and (b) robust realism vindicates the value-based theory of reasons.

We are now in a position to summarize the coming argument's scope and assumptions. The scope is limited to non-analytic reductionism, quietist realism, and robust realism. The main assumption is that the normative domain is the domain of reasons – i.e. reasons basicness is correct. This essay's thesis, stated precisely, is thus: If we accept reasons basicness, then of non-analytic reductionism, quietist realism, and robust realism, we should be robust realists; and robust realism vindicates the value-based theory of reasons.

This conclusion, though highly qualified, is, nevertheless, significant. Many theorists accept both reasons basicness and quietist realism or non-analytic naturalism, but resist robust realism's heavy metaphysics. This is, if I'm correct, a mistake. If reasons are basic, we must be robust realists.

I have begun with much postulating, but there is still honest toil to be done. Before getting to it, however, I'll provide a brief sketch of the coming argument.

Overview

I start with quietist realism. These realists, like Parfit and Scanlon, maintain that there is nothing metaphysically substantive we can say about normative truths. They hold that reasons are unanalyzable, not reducible to or explained in other terms. But this presents a problem. It prevents quietists from answering alternative accounts that offer formally identical but substantively different interpretations of what reasons are. They face what I call the *reasons appropriation problem*. More specifically, since there are extensionally plausible naturalistic accounts of reasons, such as Schroeder's hypotheticalism, quietists are in an embarrassing position: To offer any non-question begging defense of their view defeats it.

Consider, for example, Parfit's preferred argument against naturalism. Naturalists, he argues, conflate what *makes* something normative with something's *being* normative. We should, he

²¹ To cite a few more examples: Darwall notes, "For the philosophical naturalist, concerned to place normativity within the natural order, there is nothing plausible for normative force to be other than motivational force" (Darwall, Gibbard, and Railton 1992: 168) And, Markovits writes, "[A] prominent motivation for embracing [internalism] has been the aim of finding an account of reasons that is naturalistically respectable" (Markovits: Forthcoming). Finally, Scanlon notes, "One source of support for the idea that it would be preferable, if possible, to explain reasons in terms of desires, lies in metaphysical and epistemological doubts about the notion of a reason. Desires, according to this line of thought, are obvious and familiar elements of our psychology. Insofar as reasons are provided by desires there is no difficulty in explaining how we have reasons or how we can know what reasons we have. But if this is not the case, then it is a mystery what reasons could be, since they do not seem to be either elements of our psychology or part of 'the furniture of the world' apart from us" (Scanlon 1998: 55-56).

argues, keep distinct the natural fact that calling home will promote one of my brother's desires from the normative fact that the truth of this fact – calling home will promote one of my brother's desires – gives him a reason to call. Naturalists collapse these two facts; they treat what is normatively relevant with normativity itself, or so Parfit argues.

The problem with the making/being argument is that it relies on two question-begging assumptions. First, it ascribes to naturalists a rather stringent form of reduction. And, second, it relegates natural facts to the making normative role. Why would naturalists accept either of these claims? But to defend either of these assumptions the quietist's silence would have to be broken. Thus, were quietism and naturalism the only two positions, quietism would be doomed to a naturalistic appropriation.

By rejecting quietism's hostility to metaphysics we can argue against non-analytic naturalism. We can begin by defending reasonhood as an abstract universal. Here's a quick sketch of how such a defense might run. The entities denoted by singular terms in true propositions exist. Necessarily, 'being a reason for' is a relation. The relata requisite for a particular reason to obtain include, minimally, agents. If agents are contingent, then there is one possible world where agents fail to obtain. There is, accordingly, at least one possible world where 'being a reason for' exists but is unexemplified. Reasonhood is thus an abstract universal. Call this view extreme normative realism. If reasonhood is an abstract universal, then we can non-question-beggingly assert that the counting in favor of relation is a general *kind* or *genus*. This poses a dilemma for reductionists: either they need to give the same reductive analysis for epistemic and practical reasons, or they can give a different analyses by treating epistemic and practical reasons as a species of the larger genus. However, the former looks extensionally implausible – epistemic reasons are not desire-based – and the latter entails that the reduction, *via* a violation of irreflexivity, fails to ground reasonhood. Naturalistic reductions of the normative, accordingly, face a damning dilemma.

If we accept reasons basicness, then reasons cannot be analyzed in other normative or evaluative terms. And if desire-based reductions fail, then reasons cannot be analyzed in naturalistic terms. Reasons are, accordingly, primitive. If reasons are primitive, then an agent's reasons are provided by facts that give her reasons to have them. That is, the value-based theory gives us the correct answer to *what reasons are*.

1. *Two Senses of Merely Apparent*

There are genuine reasons and there are merely apparent reasons. The genuine/apparent reasons distinction, however, is often underspecified.²² By specifying this distinction, we can clarify what is at stake between reasons firsters. To specify this distinction, we can begin by distinguishing two ways in which reasons can be merely apparent.

First, reasons can be merely apparent when what is supposedly reason-providing does not, in fact, obtain. For example, consider,

Fan Death. You are about to sleep in an unbearably hot, closed room. Fortunately an electric fan is running making the heat tolerable. You believe, however, that sleeping in a closed room with an electric fan running will kill you.²³ This gives you an apparent reason to turn off the fan.

²² The standard way of making the cut is: Genuine reasons are given by the facts, while apparent reasons are given by our perspective on the facts. See, for example, Whiting (2014: 4).

²³ I am told that, for a time, this claim had some traction in South Korea.

In *Fan Death* your reason is merely apparent because your belief that an electric fan running in a closed room will kill you is false. We can call this reason *apparent in the false proposition sense*. We can avoid the problems posed by apparent reasons in this sense by relying on the subjunctive mood. We could articulate reasons in the general form: If some proposition, (p), were the case, it would count in favor of ϕ -ing.

There is, however, a second sense in which reasons can be merely apparent. Reasons could be merely apparent if our preferred account – e.g., value or desire-based – for why some fact ‘counts in favor’ of our acting in certain ways is incorrect. We can clarify this second sense of merely apparent by examining how different theories look at the same reason. Consider,

Fan Comfort. The fact that turning on an electric fan in an unbearably hot, closed room will benefit you by making the heat tolerable, counts in favor of your turning on the fan.

Even if we stipulate that the reason you have in *Fan Comfort* is not merely apparent in the false proposition sense, this does not ensure that the reason is genuine. To see this, compare how the value-based view held by Parfit (2011a) and Scanlon (2014) and the desire-based view held by Schroeder (2007b) differ with regard to your reason in *Fan Comfort*.

Value-Based. The fact that turning on an electric fan in an unbearably hot, closed room will benefit you by making the heat tolerable, counts in favor of your turning on the fan, and ‘counts in favor’ on this value-based view just means ‘is a reason for’.

Desire-Based. The fact that turning on an electric fan in an unbearably hot, closed room will benefit you by making the heat tolerable, counts in favor of your turning on the fan, and ‘counts in favor’ is explained by your having a desire for the heat to be tolerable and that turning on the fan helps promote this desire.

These two views look at the same non-normative facts and hold that you should respond in the same way. They differ, however, concerning the characterization of why the facts ‘count in favor of’ acting in this way. Parfit and Scanlon think treating the reason you have in *Fan Comfort* as Reason_{desire} makes the reason merely apparent; Schroeder thinks treating the reason you have in *Fan Comfort* as Reason_{value} makes the reason merely apparent. Each side sees the other’s reasons as apparent in what we might call *the wrong relation sense*.²⁴

In order to be genuine, purported reasons must not be based on falsehoods or be the wrong relation. In *Fan Comfort*, for example, everyone agrees on the facts. The disagreement between the two camps concerns the right favoring-relation. As Markovits writes, “[T]he internalist thesis should be read neither as stipulating a definition nor as making a substantive normative claim about what we have reason to do. Instead, it makes a claim about *what it is* for some fact to be a reason in a sense of ‘reason’ that is shared by both internalists and externalists, according to which a reason is simply *a consideration that counts in favor*” (Markovits 2014: 8).

In what follows, I argue that these disagreements concerning the nature of the favoring-relation pose a problem for quietist realism.

2. Quietist Realism

²⁴ Not to be confused with the “wrong *kind* of reasons” problem, see (Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen 2004) and (Hieronymi 2005). I will not discuss this problem.

Nagel, Scanlon, and Parfit are the chief proponents of quietist realism.²⁵ Nagel's account is less clear than Parfit's or Scanlon's, so I will focus on the latter two.²⁶ Parfit defends a version of quietist realism that he clumsily calls non-metaphysical non-natural normative cognitivism. On this view, there are normative truths, but these truths have no ontological implications (Parfit 2011b: 486). Since this view "has no metaphysical implications," he maintains, "it cannot be open to metaphysical objections" (Parfit 2011b: 747). Similarly, Scanlon writes: "The disagreement between someone who thinks that all reasons [...] depend on the agent's desires and someone who thinks that there are some reasons that do not depend on agents' desires is a *normative* disagreement, not a metaphysical one" (Scanlon 2014: 17fn1). This claimed immunity to metaphysical objections is suspicious. Indeed, I believe that the absence of metaphysical backing ultimately renders Parfit and Scanlon's view indefensible.

To state the problem upfront: Quietist realists – realists who avoid positive ontological commitments – cannot resist what we can call the *reasons appropriation problem*.²⁷ They cannot respond to alternative accounts that offer formally identical but substantively different interpretations of what reasons are,²⁸ because they cannot make claims about what reasons substantively are.

Reasons Fundamentalism

Parfit claims that "reasons are fundamental" (2011a: 148), adding elsewhere: "If we are asked what reasons are, it is hard to give a helpful answer. Facts give us reasons, we might say, when they count in favour of our having some belief or desire, or acting in some way. But 'counts in favour of' means 'is a reason for'. Like some other fundamental concepts, such as those of reality, necessity, and time, the concept of a reason cannot be explained in other terms" (Parfit 2001: 18). Similarly, Scanlon writes: "[I take] normativity to be the domain of claims about the reasons people have, for actions or for attitudes such as intention or belief. [...] I maintain that reasons are irreducibly normative truths – not reducible to or identifiable with truths of other kinds, such as truths about the natural world of physical objects, causes and effects" (Scanlon 2014: 2; cf., 1998: Chp. 1).

We should keep distinct two senses of 'fundamental' that these quotes collapse. The first sense of 'fundamental' refers to something being unanalyzable, not reducible to or explicable in other terms. This is the sense of 'fundamental' used in the rejection of "what reasons *are*" as a candidate of theoretical investigation. Since on this view we cannot speak substantively concerning what reasons are, we can call this sense of 'fundamental' *reasons primitivism*.

²⁵ Here I leave aside Dworkin (1996, 2011), since I am focusing on those who put reasons, not value, first.

²⁶ For example, Nagel asserts, "[A] substantive realism need not (and in my view should not) have any metaphysical content whatever. It need only hold that there are answers to moral questions and that they are not reducible to anything else" (Nagel 1996: 205). See also Nagel (1986: Chp. 8-9, 1997: Chp. 6). For a helpful, but ultimately inconclusive, attempt at explicating Nagel's position see Svavarsdóttir (2001: especially 156-158).

²⁷ Here I follow the appellation given by Wedgwood (2007: 7), McPherson (2011, 2013) and Enoch (2011c: 121). Cuneo & Shafer-Landau (2014) call Parfit and Scanlon's view "relaxed realism." Relaxed, however, makes it sound like Parfit and Scanlon haven't gotten around to giving a normative ontology, as opposed to what is in fact that case: they repudiate it.

²⁸ When we make *formal* claims we clarify how a concept is used. When we make *substantive* claims we provide informative necessary and sufficient conditions for a concept's application.

Reasons Primitivism =_{df} Reasons cannot be analyzed in other normative, evaluative, or non-normative terms.

But there is a second sense of ‘fundamental’. Reasons might be ‘fundamental’ in the sense that they are the basic currency in which all other concepts in the normative domain are cashed out. That is, reasons could be ‘fundamental’ in that all normative concepts are definable distinctively in terms of reasons. Since on this view reasons are the basic normative entities, we can call this sense of ‘fundamental’ *reasons basicness*.²⁹

Reasons Basicness =_{df} “What it is to be normative, is to be analyzed in terms of reasons” (Schroeder 2007b: 81).

Parfit and Scanlon’s quietist realism adopts both reasons primitivism and reasons basicness.³⁰

We can sharpen the distinction between reasons primitivism and basicness by preempting a possible confusion. Parfit and Scanlon’s accounts are value-based. They hold that “we have reasons to act in some way only when, and because, what we are doing or trying to achieve is in some way good, or worth achieving” (Parfit 2011a: 2). If, as the unfortunate name ‘value-based’ seems to imply, reasons are analyzable in terms of value or goodness, Parfit and Scanlon, who are both buck-passers,³¹ would be hopelessly confused; they would hold that evaluative terms – e.g., goodness and value – are analyzable in terms of reasons, and then hold that reasons are analyzable in terms of goodness and value.³² Scanlon and Parfit are, of course, not confused (at least not in this way). They hold that goodness and value are, along with all other normative concepts, cashed out in terms of reasons. What makes something good or valuable, Scanlon argues, is that it has “purely formal, higher-order properties of having some lower-order properties that provide reasons” (Scanlon 1998: 97).³³

On their value-based view, then, reasons to do or achieve something are provided by the same facts that give this thing its value or goodness. Reasons are value-based because of their *source* – in the objects of what we are trying to do or achieve – not because they are reducible to, or analyzable in terms of, goodness or value. In *Fan Comfort*, that turning on a fan will benefit you simply is a reason to turn on the fan. This provides you directly with a reason, and this reason is part of what makes turning on the fan good or valuable. Reasons are, in short, fundamental in the basic unit sense.

We can thus reduce normative and evaluative concepts – e.g., oughts and the good – to other normative concepts, namely, reasons. If it is true that turning on a fan is good or valuable, we might be able to explain this truth in terms of other normative truths, but we “soon reach truths for which we can give no further explanation” (Parfit 2006: 331). It’s here that reasons basicness hooks up with reasons primitivism. If, as Parfit and Scanlon believe, normative truths are unlike any non-normative truths, once we hit the basic unit of the normative domain, we are out of

²⁹ Dancy (2006) nicely captures this sense of fundamental when he states that reasons are “the central normative facts, by reference to which the normativity of all others is to be understood” (Dancy 2006: 137). To take another example, Raz writes, “The normativity of all that is normative consists in the way it is, or provides, or is otherwise related to reasons. [...] So ultimately the explanation of normativity is the explanation of what it is to be a reason, and of related puzzles about reasons” (Raz 1999: 67).

³⁰ See Kauppinen (2014) for a recent helpful overview of these two commitments.

³¹ Recall, buck-passing accounts analyze evaluative claims in terms of normative claims.

³² For discussion, see Heathwood (2011: 88-89).

³³ Or, as Parfit puts it, when something has reason-giving features we can call this thing good, but “that is merely an abbreviation: a way of implying that it has such features” (Parfit 2001: 20, 2011a: 38).

explanatory resources. Here “our spade turns,” to invoke a famous quietist metaphor.³⁴ We can ask what reasons are, but “there are no answers to these questions that are both interesting and true” (Parfit 2006: 331). We have, in other words, reached the limit of meta-normative theorizing.³⁵ “The question ‘What is a reason?’ is,” as Scanlon explains, “misleading insofar as it suggests that reasons are a special ontological class. What is special about reasons is not the ontological category of things that can be reasons, but rather the status of being a reason” (Scanlon 1998: 56).³⁶

Though quietists concerning the substantive content of reasons, Scanlon and Parfit still need to differentiate talk about reasons from talk about everything else.³⁷ That is, they need to be able to identify those entities that have the status of being a reason. To do this, Scanlon and Parfit rely on the formal structure of a reason. On Scanlon’s account, reasons consist of the relation that holds between “a fact p , an agent x , a set of conditions c , and an action or attitude $[\phi]$.” (Scanlon 2014: 31; cf., 1998: 56-57). Parfit’s view is again similar. Returning to *Fan Comfort*, we distinguish the fact ‘that turning on an electric fan in an unbearably hot, closed room will benefit you,’ from the normative claim that ‘this fact – turning on an electric fan in an unbearably hot, closed room will benefit you – gives you a reason to turn on the fan’ (Parfit 1997: 124). So, for Scanlon, reasons take the form $R(p, x, c, \phi)$. For Parfit, reasons take the form: the truth of p in c counts in favor of ϕ -ing in c . To avoid reasons being apparent in the false proposition sense, both Scanlon and Parfit formulate reasons in the subjunctive mood, such that “whether p is the case or not, if p were the case it would be a reason for someone in c to $[\phi]$ ” (Scanlon 2009: L2.20-21 cf., 2014: 39-40, Parfit 2011a: 34).

Accepting reasons basicness and reasons primitivism has certain virtues. Chief among these is the preservation of the distinctiveness of normativity. The normative domain, on this view, is unique. This affords normativity the special importance many believe it has.³⁸ A view that lends itself to the objectivity of normativity while taking on minimal metaphysical baggage is, to be sure, attractive.³⁹ Reasons primitivism and reasons basicness are also nicely complementary.

³⁴ See Wittgenstein (1968: §217).

³⁵ Following McPherson (2011: 226) we can characterize the normative/meta-normative distinction as follows. *Normative* accounts concern “the sorts of considerations that count as reasons for action or belief;” whereas, *meta-normative* accounts “provide an interpretation of the content of the fundamental claims of a normative theory” (McPherson 2011: 226). For a similar formulation of this distinction, see Chang (2013: 163) and Streumer (2011: 333n20).

³⁶ Though Raz is difficult to pin down, he seems to subscribe to a similar view: “[T]he notion of a normative reason cannot be explained through an eliminative definition. That is, any explanation of it in which the word ‘reason’ does not occur will include another term or phrase whose meaning is close to that of ‘a reason,’ so that those who puzzle over the nature of reasons will not be helped by the definition” (2011: 18).

³⁷ Or as Raz puts it: We need to set out reasons’ “complex interrelations [...] not to explain, but to minimally locate what we are talking about” (Raz 2011: 18).

³⁸ Oddie, speaking on behalf of normativity’s special status, writes: “Reduction is more than a little suggestive of diminished ontological status. [...] Like the débutante who makes a successful match, [reduced entities] forfeit their names, they have an adjunct status, their identity is absorbed, and thereafter they are rendered virtually invisible” (Oddie 2005: 17). Or as Nagel puts it, “Even with all their uncertainties and liability to controversy and distortion, moral considerations occupy a position in the system of human thought that makes it illegitimate to subordinate them completely to anything else” (Nagel 1997: 107 cf., 1986: 144-145).

³⁹ To this point, Nagel asserts: “If values are objective, they must be so in their own right, and not through reducibility to some other kind of objective fact. They have to be objective *values*, not objective anything else” (Nagel 1986: 138). Scanlon also writes that seeing reasons in this way makes the demands of normativity inescapable, as it seems they should be (Scanlon 1998: 41-42 cf., Enoch 2011c). And Harman (2012: 14) argues that “naturalistic reductions have relativistic implications.”

Assuming there is a normative domain and reasons are part of it, were reasons fundamental in the unanalyzable sense but not in the basic unit sense, any alternative basic unit would be inadequate to fully capture all parts of the normative domain.

Nevertheless, as we shall see, one could accept reasons basicness but deny that reasons are primitive. Such a position, if plausible, might force Parfit and Scanlon to say more than their quietism allows. In the next section, I will spell out a version of this position and the problem it presents for reasons fundamentalism.

3. *The Appropriation Problem*

Many theorists accept reasons basicness. Some of these theorists are naturalists. Normative naturalism is an ontological thesis. There is only the natural, so if there is normativity it too is natural.⁴⁰ Reductive normative naturalism denies the autonomy of normativity; normative facts and properties just consist in certain naturalistic facts and properties. Reduction thus takes the form of a biconditional with some normative property on one side and some uncontroversially natural property (or properties) on the other. If this biconditional is true in virtue of its meaning, in the same way we think of ‘being a bachelor’ as just consisting in ‘being an unmarried male’, then the reduction is analytic. If the reduction is based on grounding, in the way ‘being water’ is grounded in ‘being H₂O’, the reduction is non-analytic.

Non-analytic naturalists can pose a unique challenge to quietist realism. They can accept that the normative domain cashes out in terms of reasons, accept that reasons take the same formal structure given by Scanlon and Parfit, but then deny that reasons are unanalyzable – they can deny reasons primitivism. Since these theorists seem to be seizing reasons out from under quietist realists, they pose the reasons appropriation problem.

Non-Analytic Naturalism

Naturalism is a notoriously difficult position to characterize.⁴¹ Here I think non-naturalists should be concessive. If one can reduce normative properties and facts to fairly uncontroversial natural properties and facts – like ‘being in pain’ or ‘having a desire’ – then the non-naturalist should accept that the reduction is at least a partial success.⁴² To be a complete success, this reduction needs to be global, capturing the entire normative domain.

Assuming reasons basicness, naturalists could attempt a complete reduction of the normative with the following strategy:

⁴⁰ As Bedke (2012: 113) metaphorically puts it: “[N]aturalists think that once God put in place the natural properties and facts of this world he got the ethical properties and facts for free.”

⁴¹ Copp (2007: 36-39), for example, offers the following four-fold typography: (1) “relational” which take a “base class of properties that are supposed to be uncontroversially natural and then requires, of any other property that is to qualify as natural, that it be suitably related to properties in the base class;” (2) “ostensive” which use “‘natural objects’ to be such as we find around us [...] to define natural properties in terms of the natural objects;” (3) “metaphysical” which define natural properties as either (a) “descriptive facts,” (b) part of “the causal order,” (c) part of the “spatiotemporal manifold,” or (d) part of the “material or the physical world;” or (4) “epistemological” which treat natural properties as those we have empirical access to. To add a fifth, Cuneo (2007b: 853-854) conceives, following van Fraassen, of naturalism as a stance – “a cluster of commitments, ideals, propositional attitudes (including beliefs and intentions), tendencies to weigh evidence of certain types, dispositions to emphasize (or deemphasize) certain theoretical ideals, and so forth.”

⁴² Contra McPherson (2014), I do not think such a strategy is too crude (at least not for our purposes).

[T]he reductive theorist can accept this characterization of the normative [i.e., reasons basicness]. Then she can accept whatever analyses of each *non*-basic normative property in terms of the basic property are accepted by the non-reductive theorists who share this conception of what is distinctive of the normative [e.g., buck-passing]. And finally, she gives her reductive theory [...] of the basic normative property [i.e., reasons]. (Schroeder 2007b: 81 cf., 2005: 12-13)

If a plausible reduction of reasons could be given in uncontroversially naturalistic terms, then normative naturalism would be vindicated. But what qualifies as a reduction?

In previous sections, I used ‘reducible to’ and ‘analyzable in terms of’ interchangeably. These are not obviously the same. There are, of course, competing theories of reduction.⁴³ But we can, by keeping in mind the target, set the debate between these theories aside. We can posit a form of reductionism that is uncontroversially the rejection of reasons quietism: the *real definition view*.⁴⁴ On this view, to offer a reductive account of *p* involves giving a non-circular and individuating account of *what it is* to be *p* (Schroeder 2007b: 61-62 cf., Rosen 2010: 122). *p* reduces to, say, *q* because, if the definition of *p* in terms of *q* is correct, then *p* is true in virtue of the fact that *q*. *q*, in other words, grounds *p*. This is, Wedgwood agrees, the best way to think about reduction: as a biconditional with a normative property on the left-hand side and a constitutive account of what it is for the left-hand side to be true on the right (Wedgwood 2007: 137). So, for example, if we assumed the truth of the divine command theory, we could reduce ‘x is good’ to ‘x is commanded by God’.

Insofar as the real definition view takes reduction to be a kind of analysis, what is being sought is a set of structured natural properties (rather than property identities). This structured way of thinking about properties, as Schroeder writes, is to think of them as “features that things have in common” (Schroeder 2007b: 67). For example, being a shaded square is just being shaded and being square; it is not some third thing over and above this. “It is,” as Schroeder explains, “a structured property, a property with parts. Its parts are *shaded* and *square*, and its structure is the conjunctive structure” (Schroeder 2007b: 67).⁴⁵

Importantly, counting constitutive explanations as reductive success allows reduction to be asymmetric. Borrowing again from Schroeder, “Figures are triangles *by* having three sides; they are not three-sided *by* being triangles” (Schroeder 2007b: 63).⁴⁶ Just as what it is for a figure to be a triangle is *in virtue* (or *by* or *because*) it has three sides, what it is to be a reason is, on this picture, going to be grounded in some structured set of natural properties.⁴⁷

⁴³ For a summary of the various forms of reduction, see Stoljar (2010: 160-162).

⁴⁴ The real definition view, as McPherson (2014) points out, has the additional benefit of making reduction a squarely metaphysical issue that divides realists (whereas, say, supervenience does not). One downside, however, of adopting this more concessive account is it makes Shafer-Landau (2003: 75) difficult to classify. But this classificatory problem is not unique. Bedke (2012: 111fn1), for example, counts Shafer-Landau as a non-reductive naturalist.

⁴⁵ It is worth pointing out that, on one intuitive reading, Parfit thinks of the reduction of personal identity similarly. As he writes, “Rather than claiming that there are no entities of some kind, Reductionists should distinguish kinds of entity, or ways of existing. When the existence of an X just consists in the existence of a Y, or Ys, though the X is *distinct* from the Y or Ys, it is not an *independent* or *separately existing* entity. [...] Though persons are distinct from their bodies, and from any series of mental events, they are not independent or separately existing entities. [...] Personal identity over time just consists in physical and/or psychological continuity” (Parfit 1995: 18-19).

⁴⁶ As Schroeder notes, this is merely to highlight that the right-hand side provides an explanation of triangularity. It tells us, as he puts it, “something further about the nature of that property” (Schroeder 2007b: 64-65).

⁴⁷ The natural/non-natural debate is, as stated at the outset, a metaphysical one. And, as Schroeder rightly notes, demanding property identity makes reduction metaphysically uninformative (Schroeder 2007b: 64 cf., McPherson 2014).

We can now see what divides naturalists from non-naturalists. The non-naturalist will deny the possibility of, while the naturalist will assent to, a constitutive account of reasons in naturalistic terms. So, if, as non-analytic naturalists maintain, we can give a real definition of reasons in terms of desires, we could reduce reasons to the non-normative (and eventually, perhaps, morality to psychology).

Given their quietism, in responding to these accounts, Parfit and Scanlon need to block appropriation without weighing in on what makes for a genuine reason (beyond the formal structure). One way to achieve this would be to show that all non-quietist accounts of reasons are extensionally implausible – i.e., they yield unintuitive results concerning what reasons there are (or aren't). This, as I've argued in the introduction, does not look promising. It leaves us in a dialectical stalemate since neither argument is decisive. Nevertheless, to give the reasons appropriation problem extra bite, we can identify a formally identical and extensionally plausible reduction of reasons. This account need not be defensible wholesale. It merely needs to be such that resisting it forces the fundamentalist to resort to claims about what reasons are, thereby breaching their quietism. In the remainder of this section, I will offer a sketch of one such account, Schroeder's hypotheticalism.

Hypotheticalism

Schroeder's account proceeds in two steps. First, he accepts reasons basicness – all normative claims are cashed out in terms of reasons. Since there is no disagreement between quietist realists and Schroeder concerning this first step, we can leave it aside. Second, he argues that reasons are reducible to facts about desires. Since this desire-based grounding-reduction of reasons amounts to an explicit rejection of reasons fundamentalism, we should examine this second step.

Consider again the reason you have in *Fan Comfort*. According to hypotheticalism, we can explain this reason in the following way. There is something that you desire, namely, a room that feels more comfortable. Turning on the fan is an action you can perform to promote the object of your desire. This is a reason for you because you are the one with the desire. If, by contrast, I find the room without the fan running exactly as I desire it, then I lack a reason like yours to turn on the fan. The fact that you, not I, desire a different environment brought about by turning on the fan explains why you have a reason to turn on the fan while I do not (Schroeder 2007b: 57-58). This seems intuitive and, according to Schroeder, it globalizes. All reasons are explained by the kind of psychological state that partially constitutes your reason (and the lack of mine) in *Fan Comfort* (Schroeder 2007b: 2).

Reasons can thus be given the following constitutive explanation:

Biconditional. For all propositions p , agents x , and actions ϕ , p is a reason for x to ϕ if and only if there is some d such that x has a desire whose object is d , and the truth of p is part of what explains why x 's ϕ -ing promotes d . (Schroeder 2007b: 57)⁴⁸

So, according to Schroeder, for p to be a reason for one to ϕ is for there to be some d , such that one has a desire whose object is d , and the truth of p is part of what explains why one's ϕ -ing promotes d (Schroeder 2007b: 59). Stated succinctly, insofar as p helps explain why ϕ -ing promotes the object of one of your desires, p is a reason for you to ϕ (Schroeder 2007a: 217). And

⁴⁸ I've modified Schroeder's language and symbolism for consistency with Scanlon and Parfit's account.

so, if we take desires to be uncontroversially natural (as we should),⁴⁹ by explaining the favoring relation in terms of desires, Schroeder’s account reduces reasons to a relation of non-normative properties. On the shared assumption of reasons basicness, if successful, this would amount to a complete reduction of the normative domain. Appropriation looms.

4. *The Extensional Plausibility Standoff (Again)*

One way for the quietist to block appropriation is to show that hypotheticalism is extensionally implausible. It might fail to capture *all* the reasons that there intuitively are, producing too few reasons. Or, it might fail to restrict itself to *only* those reasons there intuitively are, producing too many reasons. Schroeder argues that hypotheticalism neither over nor under generates (2007b: Chp. 5 & 6, respectively). As indicated in the introduction, desire and value-based theories are, I believe, underdetermined by the data provided by extensional implausibility arguments. Nevertheless, we can pause here to survey other examples, particularly those Schroeder seems most vulnerable to.

Perhaps Schroeder’s account incorrectly grants certain non-reasons the status of reasonhood. We are, after all, strange creatures. Many of us have idiosyncratic, compulsive desires. When I am alone in a room I often feel a strong urge to clap, even though I do not like the sound of clapping. It seems unintuitive to say that when I am alone in a room with this desire, I have a reason to clap. Schroeder’s view, however, seems to wrongly imply that I do have such a reason. The contemporary literature proposes other, wilder cases.⁵⁰

In responding to such cases, however, Schroeder argues that we cannot trust our negative existential intuitions (Schroeder 2007b: 96). These intuitions, he maintains, are unreliable on the basis of two interrelated considerations. First, genuine reasons can obtain while having very little weight. Second, Grice’s (1989) maxim of quantity – “make your contribution as informative as is required” – predicts that when we talk about reasons we stick to the weighty ones. So I might have a genuine reason to clap when alone in a room, but this reason is vanishingly weak; accordingly, when we talk about the reasons I have, if we say I have this reason, it will sound mistaken, but it is in fact merely infelicitous. By applying these two steps to these unintuitive cases, Schroeder believes he can deflect the charge that hypotheticalism generates too many reasons. I suggest we should agree with Schroeder.

But some might see Schroeder’s response as a dodge. Even if it is unsuccessful, however, Scanlon and Parfit also face problems on the idiosyncratic desires front. Reasons (or their absence) often track our differing tastes and preferences. In *Fan Comfort*, for instance, you have a reason because you like rooms that feel colder, while I do not because I like rooms that feel hotter. The objectivity of reasons, which is often touted as one of the value-based view’s chief virtues, makes these differences, without serious finessing, difficult to capture (Sobel 2005).⁵¹ Desire-based accounts, by contrast, handle differences of mere taste with ease. Considerations of extensional plausibility thus cut against both views.

⁴⁹ By Schroeder’s lights, you have a desire when “certain considerations strike you in a certain phenomenologically familiar way. [...] These salience-strikings play a certain functional role: they tend to prompt motivation to act in a way that is non-alienating. [...] They are the objects of our directed attention” (Schroeder 2007b: 159).

⁵⁰ These kinds of examples are widespread. There is Anscombe’s (1963: 70-71) saucer of mud desirer, Rawls’ (1999: 379) blades of grass counter, Quinn’s (1993: 236) radio turner, and Parfit’s (2011a: 56-57) future Tuesday indifferencer. For a sustained response to these types of cases, see Street (2009).

⁵¹ Parfit, for instance, tries to explain such examples away by introducing what he calls “meta-hedonic desires” (Parfit 2011a: 53-56 cf., Scanlon 1998: 44-45).

So far we've run our extensional worries from right-to-left. We can, however, challenge Schroeder's view from the other direction. Consider,

Streumer's World. This world is exactly like our current world, but a global error theory is true – normative properties do not exist (Streumer 2013: 194). This world is a world of merely apparent reasons.

Imagine that you love to dance. In our world, that you love to dance gives you a reason to attend a party at which there will be dancing. Now consider how things stand in *Streumer's World*. On Schroeder's account, it could not be the case that in *Streumer's World* the fact that there will be dancing at a party explains why going to the party is a way for your counterpart to go dancing, and this is the object of one of your counterpart's desires. Since the fact that there will be dancing at a party clearly explains why going to the party is a way for your counterpart to go dancing, it must be that what follows the conjunct is false. That is, in *Streumer's World* going dancing could not be the object of one of your counterpart's desires. If Schroeder's account is correct, then the inhabitants of *Streumer's World* could not have desires. Yet this seems implausible. Indeed, when error theorists in our world say they desire a cup of coffee, for example, we do not think this is a tacit rejection of their view.

Schroeder, however, can argue that though the inhabitants of *Streumer's World* have desires; desires alone are not reasons. So though these inhabitants might have desires, an error theory destroys the other parts of *Biconditional* – perhaps the promotion relation, for example. This would block the non-existence of reasons from leading to the non-existence of desires. Again, this response is not implausible, especially since, by Streumer's own admission, we could not believe we were actually in such a world, even if we were (Streumer 2013).

The upshot of surveying these cases is that hypotheticalism neither yields too many nor too few reasons sufficient to warrant a decisive modus tollens.⁵² Extensional plausibility is, at best, a wash. Thus, if Parfit and Scanlon are going to resist appropriation, they must adopt a different strategy. We can next turn to how they might proceed.

5. *Non-Extensional Arguments*

Some of Parfit and Scanlon's arguments against desire-based reductive views like Schroeder's are non-extensional. These arguments aim to show that desire-based accounts fail to capture *what reasons are*. These arguments could, if successful, block appropriation. Scanlon, for example, argues that desire-based accounts are "refuted by the evident lack of intrinsic normative significance of facts about desires" (Scanlon 2009: L1.10 cf., 1998: 58). For "to identify being a reason with a naturalistic property," Scanlon continues, "seems immediately to destroy its normativity" (Scanlon 2014: 46). Similarly, Parfit (2011b: 345) argues that reductionist accounts face "the lost [normative] property" problem.⁵³ We will look closer at these arguments, but it is worth flagging a worry upfront.

To claim that reductionist accounts necessarily lack normativity is, one might claim, to beg the question. Reductionists, like Schroeder, argue that reasons and hence normativity can be

⁵² But even if there turns out to be, the force of the appropriation problem does not hinge on the success of Schroeder's account alone. There are other alternatives. And it's hard to imagine that all of these alternatives extensionally fail, or, put more modestly, fair worse than the plausibility of value-based views.

⁵³ This kind of argument is not unique to Parfit and Scanlon. Wiggins (1993: 311), for example, writes: "When the naturalist reconstructs moral predicates, I suspect he loses hold of moral properties altogether."

analyzed in terms of desires. Whether this would eliminate normativity is precisely what is at issue.⁵⁴ To flatly assert that it would is merely to affirm what the desire-based theorist denies.⁵⁵ But Scanlon and Parfit's quietism seems to restrict them to giving only Moorean, foot-stomping responses.⁵⁶ We can state this problem more precisely.

Appropriation needs to be blocked. Non-question begging responses to appropriation roughly fall into two categories. First, there are arguments concerning extensional implausibility. As noted above, however, extensional implausibility is insufficient to decide the question in favor of reasons fundamentalism. Second, there are substantive arguments. These arguments attempt to show that non-normative reductions never give the *real* definition of reasons. That is, these arguments maintain that reductions, like Schroeder's desire-based account, fail to fully capture *what reasons are*. If this is the route Scanlon and Parfit take, then, if correct, they block appropriation. However, this second kind of argument, while not question-begging, must rely on a claim about what reasons substantively are. The quietists' silence would be broken. With this worry in mind, we can turn to Scanlon's and Parfit's arguments against reductionism.

The Just-Too-Different Intuition

Scanlon argues that a reduction of reasons "eliminates [reasons'] normativity altogether" (2014: 7). In defense of this claim, he writes:

Since the concept of a reason [...] is a normative concept, it would seem that any further characterization of what it is to fall under that concept would also need to be normative. But if the domain of the normative consists solely of claims about reasons, then no normative characterization of the concept of a reason itself can be given, since it would have to employ this very concept. So, given this way of understanding normativity, and this idea of what a further explanation of the concept would have to be like, it seems to follow that the concept of a reason is fundamental. (Scanlon 2009: L2.29)

This argument is not, I believe, successful. It is either question begging or rides on an equivocation between our two senses of fundamental – i.e., reasons primitivism and reasons basicness.

Again, the dispute between naturalists and quietists is over the claim that reasons are irreducibly normative. So Scanlon simply begs the question when he begins with the assertion that any characterization of reasons needs to be normative. Scanlon's next set of claims is puzzling. He tries to infer reasons primitivism from reasons basicness. But, even absent accounts like Schroeder's, the move from reasons basicness to reasons primitivism is not automatic.

We next turn to Parfit. Like Scanlon, Parfit starts by highlighting the distinctiveness of the normative domain. He begins uncontroversially, noting that some attempts at reduction are simply category errors. "Justice," for example, "could not be – as some Pythagoreans were said to have believed – the number 4" (Parfit 2011b: 324). Controversy enters when Parfit extends this

⁵⁴ I should note that Scanlon is less steadfast in this commitment than Parfit. He remains open to desires giving us reasons in very "special, rather trivial cases" (Scanlon 1998: 48).

⁵⁵ Schroeder's (Forthcoming) response to Parfit's lost property problem illustrates this point nicely. See also Schroeder (2011a).

⁵⁶ Moore's response to the question 'What is good?' was: "[G]ood is good, and that is the end of the matter" (Moore 1993: I.6).

point to normativity. “Reasons to act in some way,” he argues, “could not be the same as, or consist in, some natural fact, such as some psychological or causal fact” (Parfit 2011b: 325).

Parfit contends that the normative and natural, like justice and the number four, “differ too deeply” for any reduction of reasons to succeed (Parfit 2011b: 326). To illustrate the distinctiveness of normativity, Parfit asks us to consider,

Burning Hotel. You are in the top story of your hotel, and you are terrified of heights. You know that, unless you jump, you will soon be overcome by smoke. You might then believe, and tell yourself, that you have *decisive reasons* to jump, that you *should, ought to, and must* jump, and that if you don’t jump you would be making a *terrible mistake*. If these normative beliefs were true, these truths could not possibly be the same as, or consist in, some merely natural fact, such as [...] psychological facts. (Parfit 2011b: 326-327)

It is hard to see precisely what Parfit’s argument is supposed to be. Reductionists can agree that you have a reason to jump in *Burning Hotel*. But why, they might ask, would a reductive analysis of this reason rest on a conceptual impossibility?⁵⁷

Indeed, Schroeder seems quite able to handle *Burning Hotel*. On his account, your reason in *Burning Hotel* is explained by there being some object of your desire – presumably a desire to live – that jumping would promote. Schroeder’s hypotheticalism might be deficient in other respects, but it is not so obviously misguided as the claim that justice is 4.

Parfit’s and Scanlon’s arguments thus are mere assertions of what Enoch calls the “just-too-different intuition” (Enoch 2011c: 108). This is the intuition that the normative and natural are just too different for the former to be reduced to the latter. But this is to straightforwardly beg the question against naturalism. These arguments, accordingly, bear little hope of staving off appropriation. Without a separate argument, only those already onboard with normativity’s deep distinctiveness will find the conclusion Parfit draws from *Burning Hotel* compelling.

The Making/Being Argument

Parfit believes he has such an argument. The argument begins with the distinction between *making* something normative versus something’s *being* normative (Parfit 2011b: 299-300; 330-331). The non-normative fact that the smoke will kill you in *Burning Hotel* is normatively relevant; it *makes* it the case that you have a reason to jump. But we would not say your reason to jump *is* that the smoke will kill you.

The making/being distinction is a popular way of challenging naturalistic reductions of the normative.⁵⁸ This distinction is supposed to diagnose precisely where the naturalist goes wrong. The naturalist confuses the normatively relevant facts for normativity itself. Ultimately, however, the argument based on this distinction does not succeed. For the making/being distinction to be marshaled against naturalization, one needs to embrace two assumptions. First, one must hold that natural facts and properties are relegated to a reason-providing role. Second, one must accept that reduction amounts to equivalence, not asymmetry. If one accepts these two claims the making/being distinction provides a powerful argument against reductionism. The problem, of

⁵⁷ As Copp, when discussing this example, states: “We need to be given a reason to think that the concept of a reason ensures that the fact that a person has decisive reason to jump ‘could not possibly be the same’ as any natural fact” (Copp 2012: 47).

⁵⁸ Besides Parfit, the argument based on this distinction has been forcefully developed by Dancy (2004, 2006) and FitzPatrick (2008).

course, is that naturalists *qua* naturalists are going to deny the first; and, the second relies on a controversially stringent form of reduction. Naturalists can thus deflect the making/being argument simply by rejecting its assumptions. Nevertheless, the argument is instructive.

To get a better grip on the making/being distinction we can start, following FitzPatrick (2008: 186-189), with artifacts. Take, for example, black V-neck shirts. These shirts are a very good kind of shirt. Now, what accounts for the goodness of black V-necks is that they possess certain properties: namely, their being black conceals sweat and stains, their being V-shaped makes the wearer appear to have some sense of style, and these features combine to make a third – they are adequate attire for almost any event. These natural properties *provide* reasons for treating these shirts as good. But we should not thus conclude that *being* good just consists in having these properties (FitzPatrick 2008: 186). These properties do not translate to other artifacts. If my keyboard had the property of being V-shaped, no matter how stylish, it would not be a good keyboard. Having the properties black V-necks possess *makes* them good, but this does not mean that goodness is the same as *being* the natural properties black V-necks possess (FitzPatrick 2008: 186fn67).

It is worth making two points in this example explicit. First, natural properties or facts are normatively relevant, but not normative. Rather, and here's the second point, these natural properties must be combined with some normative property. That is, the goodness of black V-necks consist not just in having certain natural properties, but, as FitzPatrick puts it, having these natural properties "*together with* the fact that such properties satisfy the *standards of goodness* for [shirts]" (FitzPatrick 2008: 186).

Extending the lesson from artifacts to normativity, Parfit writes, "Whenever some natural fact gives us a reason, there is also the normative fact *that* this natural fact gives us this reason" (Parfit 2011b: 280). We should, for example, keep distinct the natural fact 'that turning on a fan will promote my desire' from the normative fact that 'the truth of this fact – that turning on a fan will promote my desire – gives me a reason to turn it on' (Parfit 1997: 124). That is, if (1) 'one has a reason to ϕ ' *in virtue* of (2) 'the fact that ϕ -ing promotes one's desire', then insofar as (1) holds in virtue of (2), they cannot be equivalent. The relation is therefore asymmetric (McNaughton and Rawling 2003: 33). This asymmetry is significant. There is a difference, as Dancy writes, "between the fact that another fact is of practical relevance and a fact that is of practical relevance" (Dancy 2006: 139). But, if we treat (1) as equivalent to (2) we've lost something (Dancy 2006: 139). And what we've lost is precisely what the reductionist was trying to capture in the first place – normativity. Having a desire might be normatively relevant (or reason-providing) but it is not itself normative (or a reason). That is, to return to black V-necks, in treating the goodness-making properties as equivalent to goodness, we've cut out the standards of goodness for shirts, and thereby lost normativity altogether.

While this may be a promising argument against naturalists who take reduction to amount to property identity (e.g., Jackson 1998), it has little purchase against accounts like Schroeder's. Since, *qua* reductionist, Schroeder believes he's capturing normativity, not making it disappear, this will look to him like success. In other words, that his account leaves nothing more to say is, by Schroeder's lights, a mark of success, not a defect. So again, the making/being argument begs the question.

To make this trouble more perspicuous, first, note that the making/being argument presupposes that natural properties and facts are consigned to the *making* normative role. But why would naturalists accept this premise? To think natural facts are relegated to the *making* normative role is, again, precisely what is at issue. Naturalists can, after all, use the comparison to artifacts to their advantage. The standards of goodness for t-shirts are, it seems,

unproblematically naturalizable.⁵⁹ So analogously, why not think the same holds for the rest of the normative domain? Echoing the previous subsection, the argument seems to bottom out on the just-too-different intuition.⁶⁰ But, as Copp (2012: 45-46; 54-55) correctly notes, no naturalist is going to share this intuition, and so it begs the question to start with it.

Second, and more importantly, the above argument mistakenly holds that for a reduction to be successful it must result in equivalence or property identity – equating normative facts and properties with non-normative facts and properties strips these properties and facts of their normativity. This is a powerful and intuitive thought; it makes reductionists look as though they’re trying to achieve a contradiction – the normative is non-normative.⁶¹ But the non-naturalist, as mentioned above, should recognize that more liberal conceptions of reduction are available to the naturalist. On this view, by grounding reasons in natural facts, reduction may come out to be asymmetric and informative.

Take, for example, naturalistic utilitarianism. What we should say about reduction, Schroeder argues, is not “*good* reduces to *contributing to overall happiness*,” rather, “it reduces to the constitutive *parts* of the property of *contributing to overall happiness* – namely, *contributing to*, *overall*, and *happiness*” (Schroeder 2005: 10). Thought of in this way, reduction does not require normative properties and facts to be equivalent to non-normative natural facts. Reduction does not lead to triviality. If we assume the more restrictive, property-identity view, then *contributing to overall happiness* needs to be a natural property for reduction to be a success. But if we adopt a weaker form of reduction, conceived of as analysis, then reduction can still be a success so long as *contributing to*, *overall*, and *happiness* are natural properties, even if it turns out *contributing to overall happiness* is not (Schroeder 2005: 11). Again, the reduction is both asymmetric and informative. And this is precisely how Schroeder thinks his reduction of reasons works. The making/being argument thus fails to cut ice against Schroeder’s account.

The Triviality Objection

But Parfit has another argument – the triviality objection – that builds on the making/being distinction, but is aimed directly at non-analytic naturalism. This argument is, I believe, on the right track. But, as I shall argue, its force requires a betrayal of quietism.

To begin, remember that non-analytic naturalists hold that some *concepts* (e.g., *good*) are distinctively normative, but the properties to which these concepts refer are natural (e.g., *contributing to*, *overall*, and *happiness*). If we make claims using these concepts, and these claims are true, then according to these non-analytic naturalists, we state facts that are both normative and natural (Parfit 2011b: 328).

Before turning directly to the triviality objection, notice that there is a difference between “the property that has some property” and “the property of *being the property that has this other property*” (Parfit 2011b: 329). Consider ‘heat’. Pre-scientifically, ‘heat’ meant the property,

⁵⁹ FitzPatrick readily admits we could naturalize the standards of goodness for artifacts. The example, he holds, is only meant to show “that the evaluative fact is not just the fact of possessing the features that make up the resonance base” (FitzPatrick 2008: 187). What FitzPatrick denies, however, is that the naturalist can reduce the standards of goodness for human conduct. But this thesis relies on first-order moral claims so I will not discuss it here.

⁶⁰ “There is a deep distinction,” as Parfit puts it, “between all natural facts and such reason-involving normative facts” (Parfit 2011b: 310). Reduction on the normativity front, is simply a category error – like “heat” turning out to be a “medieval king” (Parfit 2011b: 325). It is this deep distinction, Parfit believes, that explains why natural facts and properties cannot *be* normative.

⁶¹ It’s this thought that motivates Schroeder’s adoption of the real definition view of reduction (Schroeder 2005: 9).

whichever it is, that also has the *different* property of being the property that has certain effects, “such as those of melting solids, turning liquids into gases, etc.” (Parfit 2011b: 329). When we discovered that heat is molecular kinetic energy, we learned a substantive fact: namely, that molecular kinetic energy is the property that has this different second-order property of being the property that can have certain effects, such as those of melting solids, turning liquids into gases, etc. (Parfit 2011b: 330).

With this distinction in mind consider,

Standard Ought Claim. “When some act would have a certain natural property, this act would be what we ought to do” (Parfit 2011b: 355).

There are two competing ways of understanding this claim. On the naturalist reading, that ϕ -ing has the property of being an act that would have the natural property (\mathcal{N}) is the same as the property of being what we ought to do (O). The property of being \mathcal{N} and the property of being O are one and the same property. If our Standard Ought Claim is true, ϕ -ing having \mathcal{N} or having O state the same fact.

Naturalist Reading. The natural property that ϕ -ing has – \mathcal{N} – is the same as the property of being what we ought to do – O . When ϕ -ing has \mathcal{N} , this fact is the same as ϕ -ing being what we ought to do.

This naturalist picture, Parfit argues, is deeply mistaken. As he insists, ϕ -ing has \mathcal{N} is not the same as ϕ -ing being what we ought to do. Rather, if our *Standard Ought Claim* is true, \mathcal{N} has the different, second-order normative property of being the natural property that makes acts what we ought to do.

Non-Naturalist Reading. The natural property that ϕ -ing has – \mathcal{N} – is the same as the property that makes an act have the *different* property of being what we ought to do – O . When ϕ -ing has \mathcal{N} , this fact makes ϕ -ing have the different property of being what we ought to do – O .

We can clarify these two readings. Sticking with our utilitarian theme, suppose that for an action to be what we ought to do it must maximize happiness. Further suppose that the property of maximizing happiness is natural. Call this property H . Then the natural property, \mathcal{N} , in our standard ought claim would refer directly to H . On the non-analytic naturalist reading, when some act would maximize happiness – $H\phi$ – this is the same as this acts being what we ought to do – $O\phi$. And, if Utilitarianism and our Standard Ought Claim are true, asserting that ϕ -ing has H or has O state the same fact. This, Parfit argues, is incorrect. \mathcal{N} , he is happy to admit, refers to H . But some act’s having H is not the same as this act’s having O . When we claim that ϕ -ing has H we must also imply that ϕ -ing has the different normative property of having O – *via* H ’s being the natural property that has the different normative property that makes acts O . So, according to Parfit, if we assume the truth of utilitarianism, $\mathcal{N}\phi$, in our Standard Ought Claim, we would refer explicitly to $H\phi$, but only by also implicitly referring to $O\phi$, just as when we say ‘blood is red’ we must implicitly refer to redness (Parfit 2011b: 331). The normative and natural facts are hence, on Parfit’s reading, different.

We thus have two competing readings of our Standard Ought Claim. But why think Parfit's alternative should be preferred? To defend his reading, Parfit deploys the triviality objection. The argument runs as follows:

1. On the non-analytic naturalism reading, N is the same as O .
2. If N is the same as O , our Standard Ought Claim would not tell us how N is related to some other, different, normative property.
3. If our Standard Ought Claim could not tell us how N is related to some other, different, normative property, it would be trivial, and could not tell us positive substantive normative facts.
 - a. *Positive Claims* =_{df} claims "that state or imply that, when something has certain natural properties, this thing has some other, different, normative property" (Parfit 2011b: 343).
 - b. *Substantive Claims* =_{df} claims "that we could disagree with, or that might tell us something that we didn't already know" (Parfit 2011b: 343).
4. But our Standard Ought Claim is not trivial, and might tell us positive substantive normative facts.
5. Therefore, non-analytic naturalism is false. (Parfit 2011b: 355)

To clarify this argument, we can apply it to Schroeder's account. Suppose we held that (a) "when some fact explains why some act would fulfil one of our present desires, this fact is a reason for us to act in this way" and (b) "when some fact explains why some act would fulfil one of our present desires, that is the *same* as this fact's being a reason to act in this way" (Parfit 2011b: 357). But according to Parfit (a) is a substantive normative claim, while (b), if it were true, would render (a) trivial. That is, (b) makes (a) into "when some fact explains why some act would fulfil some desire, this fact explains why this act would fulfil this desire" (Parfit 2011b: 358). Since (a) is a substantive normative claim but, if (b) were true, it would be trivial, (b) must be false.⁶² Thus, Parfit argues, to avoid triviality, reductionists must "state or imply that, when something has certain [natural] properties, this thing has some other, different, normative property" (Parfit 2011b: 343). Non-analytic naturalists, however, lose this normative property; they, again, face the lost property problem.⁶³

Does this argument, as it stands, fare any better than the argument based on the making/being distinction? It does not seem to. It looks blatantly question-begging. Take premise (2): If N is the same as O , our Standard Ought Claim would not tell us how N is related to some other, different, normative property. When addressing this premise, Schroeder writes, "I grant that Parfit is very confident that no reductive theory is true, and that gives him great confidence that for any reductive hypothesis, the corresponding statement will state or imply that when [ϕ -ing is N], it has the *different* property of *being* [O]. But what is at issue here is precisely what rational

⁶² For example on Schroeder's account the reason-relation is explained in terms of desire promotion. But even so, Parfit maintains, non-normative properties, like psychological states and their relations could give a constitutive explanation of what reasons are, these non-normative properties and their relations would still fail to capture the different property of being a reason (Parfit 2011b: 359).

⁶³ Scanlon similarly writes, "[E]ven if there were a true, nontrivial biconditional of the form 'Something is a reason if and only if a person would regard it as one under conditions C,' this would not provide a satisfactory reductive analysis of what it is for something to be a reason. This is because "R is a reason" expresses a substantive normative judgment, while the righthand half of such a biconditional (where C is free of question-begging phrases like "responding in the right way") remains a mere prediction of my reactions. As long as C is free of such phrases, the question 'I would not regard R as a reason even under conditions C, but is it a reason nonetheless?' will have an 'open feel'" (Scanlon 1998: 57-58).

grounds there are for this sort of confidence” (Schroeder: Forthcoming). Parfit does not provide such grounds.

However, we can, as I’ll argue in the next section, give such grounds, but to do so we must make substantive metaphysical claims. We thus are back to the worry we flagged at the beginning of this section: Either quietist realists must give a substantive defense of their value-based account of reasons, distinguishing from alternative accounts that mirror their formal conditions; or they must forgo giving a substantive account and resort to question begging. Opting for the former enables one to resist appropriation; the downside is that this means giving up on quietism. Opting for the latter enables one to avoid making substantive metaphysical claims; the downside is that this fails to block appropriation. We should, I believe, opt for the former.

6. *Extreme Normative Realism*

What Parfit gets right in the triviality objection is that when we make claims, like our Standard Ought Claim, if true, we refer to natural properties, facts, or relations only by implicitly referring to some different normative properties, facts, or relations. But to flatly assert this would be, as we went to great pains to show in the previous section, question begging against the naturalist. We need to be able to back up this claim. This section and section 8 aim to provide such backing.

As illustrated in section 1, desire-based theorists, like Schroeder, and value-based theorists, like Parfit and Scanlon, agree that reasonhood is a relational property. But they disagree over what that relation amounts to. That these theorists agree this is a relation is, I will argue, enough to show that both sides should adopt a rather robust form of non-naturalism. We should, nevertheless, be wary that such a meager input could bear such a torrential output. But that is precisely what the coming argument aims to show.

Clarifying Reasons Talk

When we talk about reasons, we often speak loosely. We might, for example, say: That the milk is spoiled is a reason to throw it away. This gives the appearance that the fact – that the milk is spoiled – has the *property* of being a reason. Although not wrong, this is misleading. Facts, alone, do not have the property of reasonhood. We might alternatively say: That the milk is spoiled gives you a reason to throw it away. This suggests that reasons are *entities*. This better captures what reasons are.

Imagine next that, not only is the milk spoiled which (i) gives you a reason to throw it away, but also that you are in an unbearably hot room which (ii) gives you a reason to turn on the fan. Assume (i) and (ii) are genuine normative reasons. We might now ask: How many reasons do you have? This question – like the question, how many letters are in the word ‘fool’? – is instructively imprecise. We might, as the numbering indicates, sensibly answer: two. You have the reason to throw away the milk and the reason to turn on the fan. This question could, however, be taken in a second way. We might sensibly answer that there is only one type of reason. When we give accounts of reasons – e.g., value-based or desire-based – these accounts attempt to capture the type of reason that both (i) and (ii) are.

Something is a *universal* if it could be exemplified by multiple entities, otherwise it is a *particular*.⁶⁴ The first way of answering the above question concerns the number of particular reasons you have. The second concerns the general type of reason (i) and (ii) exemplify. We might, for example, stipulate that (i) and (ii) are desire-based. Then reasons (i) and (ii) would exemplify the desire-based reason relation by belonging to it.

Characterizing reasonhood as a universal leaves open whether the desire-based or value-based reason relation has genuine normative force. There is a debate concerning which account captures the normative reason-relation. We do not wish to settle this debate by fiat. But we need to be careful. Epistemic disputes need not bloat our ontology.

To clarify this last point, consider two arguments.

Argument I	Argument II
1. $P \rightarrow Q$	1. $P \rightarrow Q$
2. P	2. Q
---	---
3. $\therefore Q$	3. $\therefore P$

If we did not know which of these arguments were valid, we might leave the issue open by saying: <I.3 follows by modus ponens from I.1 and I.2>, and <II.3 follows by modus morons⁶⁵ from II.1 and II.2>.⁶⁶ But, since we know that only Argument I exemplifies the consequence relation, we say: <I.3 follows (unqualified) from I.1 and I.2>. If we personify arguments, we might say they aspire to the unqualified sense of follows. Argument I succeeds in its aims.

You might have a desire-based reason to throw out the spoiled milk. We may, that is, assert truly that: The milk's being spoiled helps explain why throwing it away promotes the object of one of your desires. Under uncertainty, it would be acceptable to say that you have this desire-based reason. Just as it would be acceptable, under uncertainty, to say II.3 follows by modus morons from II.1 and II.2. Nonetheless, it may be that desire-based reasons fail to capture the normative reason relation. If this were true, all desire-based reasons would turn out to be merely apparent.

Though we might not know which relation actually has normative force, the normative reason relation just is the desire-based, value-based, or some-other-based reason relation. Borrowing from Markovits again, we are capturing “*what it is* for some fact to be a reason in a sense of ‘reason’ that is shared by both internalists and externalists, according to which a reason is simply *a consideration that counts in favor*” (Markovits 2014: 8).

Both the non-analytic naturalist and quietist realist we’ve looked at thus far accept that *being a reason for* is a relational property.⁶⁷ They thus accept reasonhood as a universal.⁶⁸ This is partly what makes these people realists about reasons. What both non-analytic naturalists and quietists will deny, however, is that we should think of reasonhood as an abstract entity with ontological implications. For example, reasonhood is, on naturalistic views, ontologically dependent on

⁶⁴ Though MacBride (2005) challenges the tenability of the universal/particular distinction, we can, I believe, defend this cut based on exemplification. Entering this debate would, however, take us too far afield.

⁶⁵ This label for affirming the consequent is due to Haack (1976).

⁶⁶ We can use <...> to pick out propositions. If the proposition is obvious, I will, for ease of exposition, drop this notation.

⁶⁷ Here is an abridged list of those that accept (or seem to accept) reasonhood as a relational property: Smith (2000), Dancy (2004), Cuneo (2007a), Schroeder (2007b), Skorupski (2010), Parfit (2011b), Bedke (2012), and Scanlon (2014).

⁶⁸ I will not, accordingly, defend this aspect of extreme normative realism against nominalism or conceptualism.


concrete particulars; it exists *in re*. If we can show this *in re* view is mistaken, then we can argue that naturalistic reductions never fully succeed. We can show this *in re* view to be mistaken by defending the view that reasonhood is an abstract entity.⁶⁹

The Reason-Relation Argument

To begin, consider two lists,

- a) an atom, a cabbage, the Solar System
- b) the number 3, redness, validity

The items on list (a) are *concrete*. These concrete entities are part of the spatio-temporal manifold. The items on list (b) are not spatial or temporal. They do not enter into causal relations. They are *abstract*. If asked to place reasonhood on one of these lists, it would be more at home with the items on list (b). Of the items on both lists the intuitively closest to a reason is a valid argument. Validity is a relation – logical consequence – that holds between a set of objects (e.g., propositions or well-formed formulae). Returning to our spoiled milk, the reason is the relation that holds between the fact (that the milk is spoiled), the agent (you), and the action (throwing it away).⁷⁰ We can visualize reasonhood as an abstract relational entity as follows.



We can, I believe, defend this *ante rem* view,⁷¹ what I'll call *extreme normative realism*, with the following argument.

1. Necessarily, *being a reason for* is a relation.
 - a. The proposition *<being a reason for is a relation>* is true across all possible worlds.
2. The entities denoted by singular terms in true propositions exist.
3. The universal, *being a reason for*, exist in every possible world.
4. The relata requisite for a particular reason to obtain include, minimally: agents.
 - a. Absent agents, *being a reason for* could not be exemplified.
5. If agents are contingent, then there is one possible world where there are no agents.

⁶⁹ This argument extends a line of thought found in Donagan (1963), Loux (1978: chp. 5, 2006: 40-43), Bealer (1993), Hoffman & Rosenkrantz (2003), and developed more recently and most forcefully by Carmichael (2010).

⁷⁰ These are the bare minimum number of relata. Skorupski (2010), for example, conceives of reasons as a six-place relation.

⁷¹ *Ante rem*, in contrast to *in re*, realism maintains that unexemplified universals exist (as abstract entities).

- a. One of the relata required for particular reasons to obtain would be lacking in one possible world.
- 6. Agents are contingent.
- 7. There is at least one possible world where the universal *being a reason for* exists, but is unexemplified.
- 8. Everything that exists is either abstract or concrete.
- 9. *Being a reason for* is abstract.

We can see which premises need defending by noting that (3) follows from (1) and (2); (4), (5), and (6), are extremely plausible; and (7) follows from (1)-(6). The claims that need defending are, accordingly, (1), (2) and (8). Since Scanlon's view requires that we clarify (8), we can postpone discussion till section 7.

We can baptize premise (1) the *necessity thesis*. This thesis holds that, whatever genuine reasonhood turns out to be, *being a reason for* is a relation. Not only is this true; it is a necessary truth. To clarify this thesis we need to distinguish two senses of necessity – *de dicto* and *de re*.

To help see this distinction, consider two claims,

- c) Necessarily, the fattest cat is fatter than any other.
- d) The fattest cat is, necessarily, fatter than any other.

(c) is an example of *de dicto* necessity: it is the dictum – the proposition – that is necessary. And (c) is true. The fattest cat is fatter than any other, and necessarily so. (d), however, is an example of *de re* necessity: it is the thing – the entity – that is necessary. (d), accordingly, is false. The fattest cat, call him Sunny, is not by nature such that he is fatter than any other cat. Sunny may, if I had better monitored his diet, have turned out to be quite normal sized.

Next consider agony. The nature of agony is such that, necessarily, we have a (*pro tanto*) reason to avoid it. We can test this claim about agony by imagining we were gods ranking possible worlds. We would take the existence of agony in any world to be a strike against it. Were we confronted with a world with just agony or nothing at all, we would choose nothing. Agony is the kind of thing that, whatever the circumstances, gives us a reason to avoid it. That the nature of agony is reason-providing in this way is an example of *de re* necessity.

Note that we can conceive of a world without agony. Agony need not obtain. In the possible world where agony fails to obtain, there would fail to be reasons provided by agony. <Necessarily, agony is such that we have a reason to avoid it> is, accordingly, false. This proposition is an example of *de dicto* necessity. We can preserve the truth of our *de re* claim about agony, while putting it in the *de dicto* sense, by making it conditional: <Necessarily, if there were agony, we would have a reason to avoid it>.⁷²

We need a *de dicto* reading of the necessity thesis to be true if premise (3) is going to follow from premises (1) and (2). Consider a claim similar to premise (1), <red is a color>.⁷³ We can say truly that: <Necessarily, red is a color>. Red's *being a color* is, in every possible world, true. This captures the sense of premise (1): Reason's *being a relation* is, in every possible world, true.

One might next ask, if *being a reason for* is a relation, what is it that makes this claim true in every possible world? Take an ordinary case. Normally when we say that <the ball is red> is true, this truth depends on the existence of the ball and the ball's being the color red. Note that the truth of this proposition depends on the existence of the entity – the ball – denoted by the

⁷² Fine (2002: 273), following Moore (1922: 260-261), calls such claims “world-bound normative conditionals.”

⁷³ I take, following Chisholm (1989: 35), the expression <red is a color> to be not analytic.

singular term. Call this, which is premise (2) in the argument above, *the Fregean principle* (cf. Hale 1987). The Fregean principle is intuitive. As Donagan (1963: 217) notes, what could the truth of a proposition consist in if it refers to nothing?

Return to the claim that <necessarily, red is a color>. The Fregean principle entails that red exist in every possible world. This proposition, however, poses problems for those who deny the existence of unexemplified universals. As Loux points out, “Since its truth in a possible world, *W*, presupposes that red exists in *W*, we can be certain that the universal, *being a color*, is exemplified in every possible world” (Loux 1978: 95). But objects exemplifying the color red do not exist in every possible world (Loux 2006: 43).

If the necessity thesis and the Fregean principle hold, then in re realism is false. Now if <necessarily, *being a reason for* is a relation> is true, then, given the Fregean principle, for any possible world reasonhood exists. But given that the exemplification of *being a reason for* requires (minimally) agents, facts, and actions, and the existence of agents is contingent, reasonhood is not exemplified in every possible world. Therefore, *being a reason for* exists in every possible world, but *being a reason for* is not exemplified in every possible world. This is incompatible with in re realism. If *being a reason for* is an abstract entity, then reasonhood, qua abstract entity, would serve as the truthmaker for the necessity thesis.

The argument just given for *ante rem* realism is plausible. We should, however, pause to address a few leading objections to the necessity thesis and the Fregean principle.

Two Objections to Extreme Normative Realism

Start with the necessity thesis. Casullo (1981) argues that this thesis along with the Fregean principle yields implausible conclusions. Consider the claim, <the black V-neck t-shirt I’m wearing is concrete>. This claim is, Casullo argues, a necessary truth. If we take this truth to parallel our claim that <reasonhood is a relation>, then, in combination with the Fregean principle, the black V-neck I’m wearing must exist in every possible world (Casullo 1981: 196). But this is obviously false. Hence, Casullo concludes, we should reject the necessity thesis.

Casullo’s challenge is best thought of as a parity argument. Why isn’t the claim that <the black V-neck I’m wearing is concrete> necessarily true in the same sense as the claim that <*being a reason for* is a relation> is necessarily true? By relying on the de dicto/de re distinction we can answer this challenge.

Consider a more general claim. For any relation, that it is a relation is true and necessarily so. We can test this claim. Start with a more common relation, motherhood. Even if there were no mothers in our world, it would still be true that motherhood is a relation. Next take a more fanciful case. Imagine we had the ability to crush rectangular objects into circles with our minds. After a crushing, we might say one stands in the *wrecked-angled* relation, which holds between the crusher and the previously rectangular object. Wrecked-anglehood is not exemplified in our world. It is, nevertheless, true that it is a relation. So even though wrecked-anglehood does not obtain in our world, the claim that <wrecked-anglehood is a relation> is true in our world. The crucial point is this. When we plug in any relation, asserting it is a relation remains true, even if the relation never obtains. Wrecked-anglehood need not be exemplified for it to still be true that it is a relation (Hoffman and Rosenkrantz 2003: 65-66). This truth is necessarily true in the de dicto sense.

The same is not the case for Casullo’s claim: for any concrete entity, that it is concrete is true and necessarily so. Return to the black V-neck I’m wearing. It is true that <the black V-neck I’m wearing is concrete>. I am, after all, wearing it. But in the other possible worlds where my black

V-neck does not obtain, it is not true that my black V-neck is concrete. My black V-neck's being concrete is necessarily true, but only in the de re sense. We could, at best, claim: <Necessarily, if my black V-neck obtained, it would be concrete>. To preserve its truth, we do not need to make our claim about wrecked-anglehood conditional. Casullo's parity fails.

There is another objection to extreme normative realism worth addressing. This objection can be derived from a familiar passage in Plato's *Parmenides* (Plato 1997: 132a-132b cf., Bailey 2009).

1. Reasonhood, along with various other entities, has the property of *being an abstract universal*.
2. If *being an abstract universal* is multiply exemplified, then <*being an abstract universal* is an abstract universal>.
3. To explain the consequent in (2): either (a) there is a second order property, call it *being an abstract universal*₂, or (b) *being an abstract universal*₁ is self-exemplifying.
4. If we opt for (3.a), we face an infinite regress.
5. If we opt for (3.b), the explanation is circular.
6. Hence, if we explain reasonhood by appeal to abstract universals, our account either leads to a regress or is circular.

Neither the regress nor the circularity here seems vicious. At worst, the regress is 'uneconomical', as Armstrong (2004: 106) notes. But even tolerable regresses should, if possible, be avoided. Luckily, the circularity seems especially benign. There is no explanatory loss in holding that, for example, the property of being self-identical exemplifies itself. The same is the case for all self-predicating properties and relations. We can, accordingly, opt for (3.b) without troubling implications.

Reasonhood is thus, I conclude, an abstract universal.

7. *The Return of Quietist Realism?*

I've just argued for reasonhood as an abstract universal, and in section 8 I'll argue that this point can be put in the service of a powerful dilemma against normative naturalism. But at this point one might wonder whether quietist realists could also deploy the reason-relation argument. Perhaps they could avoid the appropriation problem after all. And if so, wouldn't a view that avoided the metaphysical baggage of extreme normative realism be preferable? I believe not. In this section, I argue that, though traveling light is a virtue, the quasi-metaphysics of quietist realism lacks the luggage to make the trip.

Parfit's Non-Metaphysical Cognitivism

One way we could get away with less is by holding that abstract entities need not actually exist in order to do the required work. We could, that is, relax the Fregean principle. Parfit defends such a view. On Parfit's alternative, *non-metaphysical cognitivism*, we can claim,

- A. There are some claims that are, in the strongest sense, true, but these truths have no positive ontological implications. When such claims assert that there are certain things, or that these things exist, these claims do not imply that these things exist in some ontological sense (Parfit 2011b: 479).

(A) paves the way for,

B. Abstract entities – e.g., reasonhood – exist in a distinctive, non-ontological sense (Parfit 2011b: 480).

In light of (B) we need to better specify the Fregean principle. Thus far I've proceeded as if 'exist' has only a single sense. That is, I've assumed that abstracta and concreta both exist in the same sense, despite the fact that the former are not spatio-temporal while the latter are. But (B) states that abstract entities exist in a non-ontological sense. And (A) entails that properties and relations "need not exist either as natural properties in the spatio-temporal world, or in some non-spatio-temporal part of reality" (Parfit 2011b: 486). Some entities, on this view, denoted by singular terms in true propositions exist without ontological implications. Since we get these truths without metaphysical costs, we can call this the *Fregean* principle.

Though enticing, this principle suffers serious drawbacks. (A) holds that some claims can be true but have no ontological implications. Consider two claims: <necessarily, seven is prime>, <necessarily, twelve is prime>. The first of these claims is true, the other false. But why?

If we accept the Fregean principle, we can give an answer. Seven's *being prime* is true in all possible worlds by seven existing and exemplifying the property *being prime*. There is, by contrast, no world where twelve exemplifies this property. Ontological implications – these numbers existing and exemplifying (or failing to exemplify) different properties – explains the different truth-values of our two claims. On the *Fregean* principle, we lack the ontological resources to assert this difference.⁷⁴ Recall Donagan's question: What could the truth of a proposition consist of if it refers to nothing?

Parfit attempts to preempt this objection. He states, "Most truths are true only because things of some other kind exist, in an ontological sense. But truths themselves do not have to exist in such a sense. Truths need only be true" (Parfit 2011b: 482). This assertion commits Parfit to the claim that even if nothing had existed in the ontological sense – i.e., nothing exists in either the spatio-temporal or non-spatio-temporal parts of reality – there could still *be* truths. Parfit embraces this implication. "Even if nothing had ever existed," he writes, "there would *have been* prime numbers greater than 100" (Parfit 2011b: 482). These truths do not correspond to any part of reality, but are nonetheless true (Parfit 2011b: 747). Parfit, concerning truth, is a dualist – there are truths *with* and *without* ontological implications.

But in virtue of what are these other truths true? What could 'be' or 'have been' mean in these last claims? Quine once wrote: "A curious thing about the ontological problem is its simplicity. It can be put in three Anglo-Saxon monosyllables: 'What is there?' It can be answered, moreover, in a word – 'Everything' – and everyone will accept this answer as true" (Quine 1961: 1). Parfit does not accept this answer. There is everything; then there's more.

Pace Parfit, however the debate concerning truthmakers shakes out, "what's true depends upon how things stand but how things stand doesn't depend upon what's true" (MacBride 2014: 370 cf., Armstrong 2004: Chp. 2). Non-metaphysical cognitivism allows some truths to float free. But it is baffling to think that, <even if there were nothing, there would have been prime numbers greater than 100>. Why not instead think that, <even if there were nothing, there would have been prime numbers greater than 100 all of which are even>?

⁷⁴ Phenomenalism, Rylean behaviourism and presentism face a similar challenge. As Cameron writes, "[T]he problem with them is not that they believe in some unacceptable things, but that they don't believe in *enough* things – their ontology is not rich enough to account for the truth of the propositions they believe in" (Cameron 2008: 115).

The *Fregean* principle yields the unacceptable implication that truths can exist outside of reality.⁷⁵ That makes nothing something; but that's something we should avoid.

Scanlon's Domain-Specific Ontology

Whereas Parfit holds that existence has both an ontological and non-ontological sense, Scanlon argues that ontological questions are domain-specific. He writes,

- C. [A]ll of these domains are capable of truth and falsity, and that the truth values of statements about one domain, insofar as they do not conflict with statements of some other domain, are properly settled by the standards of the domain that they are about (Scanlon 2014: 19).

We can clarify (C) by noting,

- D. [W]hat is required to justify any existential claim, and what follows from such a claim, varies, depending on the kind of thing that is claimed to exist. The claim that mountains exist is licensed by and licenses certain other claims about the physical world. The claim that there exists a number or set of a certain kind is licensed by and licenses certain other mathematical claims. And in each case that is all there is to it. Nothing more is claimed or required (Scanlon 2014: 25).

If correct, (C) and (D) would allow Scanlon to avoid the (alleged) metaphysical excesses of extreme normative realism. (C) and (D) entail that, “[T]ruths do not require strange metaphysical truth-makers. Such truths are determined by the standards of the [...] domain itself” (Scanlon 2014: 62). What it takes for an entity to exist, on this view, is a proposition quantifying the entity licensed by the standards internal to the domain (Scanlon 2014: 23; 25fn12). The conditions determining what there is, in other words, are indexed to the subject matter of the entity in question.

Premise (8) in the argument from section 6 holds that everything that exists is either abstract or concrete. By making truths domain-sensitive, Scanlon's view seems to call into question this dichotomy. Domain-sensitive existence, it might be argued, puts the extreme normative realist in an uncomfortable position. If one's ontology already permits both abstract and concrete entities, why not divide things further? Why not grant natural, mathematical, and normative entities their own domains?

Return to what it means for an entity to be abstract. An abstract entity is not spatial or temporal; it is unable to engage in causal interactions. But existence is, importantly, the same for abstracta as it is concreta. Extreme normative realists take correspondence to some existing portion of reality as determining the truth-value of a given proposition. This keeps existence conditions across entities fixed, but divides reality into spatio-temporal and non-spatio-temporal parts.

Different domains, on Scanlon's view, are not merely different parts of reality; different domains have different existence conditions. The internal standards of a given domain determine

⁷⁵ This violates the unity of realist metaphysics. As Fine (2001: 28) writes, “Questions of factuality and reality are to be answered by essentially the same means. [...] Any real proposition is factual and that any proposition grounded in the factual, and hence any proposition grounded in the real, is factual. But also if a proposition is factual, then it must be rendered true by the real world, and if it is not itself real, it must be grounded in the real.”

the criteria for the truth-values of the propositions within the domain. As Scanlon explains, as long as some way of talking is “well defined, internally coherent, and [does] not have any presuppositions or implications that might conflict with those of other domains, such as science, by accepting these statements we would be committed to the existence of things quantified over in the existential statements counted as true [...] They would be among our ‘ontological commitments’” (Scanlon 2014: 27).

Resting existence on our commitments, rather than the other way round, makes existence too easy. Consider,

The Theological Domain. Imagine we engage in God-discourse that is well defined and internally coherent. In this discourse we quantify over a number of propositions licensed by our best theological theories. Some of these include: God has tremendous importance for the afterlife. To ensure the right motivation structure, however, God does not causally interact with the natural world or make his presence known. (There is no conflict with the natural domain.) And, God’s commands, if made, always cohere with our best normative theory. (There is no conflict with the normative domain.)

Insofar as Scanlon allows existence conditions to fluctuate across domains, he cannot resist the implication that God exists in the *Theological Domain*. We should balk at establishing God’s existence in this way.

On Parfit’s view there could be truths absent reality. Truths, however, depend on how things stand. Scanlon improves on Parfit’s objectionable view, but only marginally. We are ontologically committed to certain truths, and these truths determine what exists. Though instructive for determining what entities are assumed by different theories, ontological commitments should not be conflated with ontology itself. Scanlon’s view rests on this conflation.

Given the untenability of quietism, we should hold that, without extreme normative realism’s heavier metaphysics, Parfit and Scanlon’s reasons fundamentalism falls prey to appropriation.

8. *Non-Naturalism*

Even if the *Reason-Relation Argument* is sound, and reasonhood is an abstract universal, this alone does not yet show that non-analytic naturalism is false. What it does show, however, is that reasonhood *qua* abstract universal is, to steal a line from Dworkin, “one big thing” (2011: 1). The counting in favor relation, that is, forms a general kind or genus. But, one might argue: This does not show that Schroeder’s reduction of reasons is mistaken. Redness, for example, could still be given, on the real definition view, a naturalistic reduction. In the same way that, even if in realism is false, we could still give a naturalistic real definition of water as being H₂O; water could still, that is, be grounded in H₂O. Nevertheless reasonhood’s being a genus or kind seems to pose a problem.

Thus far we’ve been focusing on practical reasons, but if normative reasons are abstract universals, the naturalist is going to need to account for *epistemic* reasons – considerations that count in favor of belief. There are two routes for the naturalist to go: either she could hold that the account of epistemic reasons and practical reasons is the same, or she could argue that epistemic and practical reasons are species of a broader genus or kind, reasonhood. In what follows, I argue that both of these paths lead to non-naturalism.

The Reductionist Dilemma

The first, identical definition route is rarely taken by naturalists. Sticking with Schroeder's account, if we took this route, epistemic reasons would depend on one's desires. But this seems implausible. Consider,

Epistemic Brahmana. One aim on certain versions of Buddhism is to rid oneself of desires – “Him I call indeed a Brahmana who fosters no desires for this world or for the next, has no inclinations, and is unshackled” (Müller 1898: 94). Imagine a community of successful Brahmana. If the desire-based theory gave the real definition of reasonhood, this would be a community without epistemic reasons.

But that this community lacks epistemic reasons is unintuitive. Brahmana-Clifford, for example, might still assert that, “It is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone to believe anything on insufficient evidence” (Clifford 1999). And Brahmana-Frege might still hold that, “[T]he laws of logic [...] prescribe universally the way in which one ought to think if one is to think at all” (Frege 1966). Given the unintuitiveness of the identical definition route, I will leave it aside.

The better route for the naturalist is to hold that epistemic and practical reasons are species of the larger genus. On this point Schroeder and I agree.⁷⁶ He writes: “Reasons for action and epistemic or evidential reasons for belief [...] are not two entirely different or merely parallel kinds of thing – they are both instances of a broader *kind, reasons*. That is why the same issues arise in each domain” (Schroeder 2008: 70, 2011b: 202-203). But if we take practical reasons to be a species of reasonhood, then Schroeder's *reduction* faces a serious problem.

Remember that, on the real definition view of reduction, we are trying to give a non-circular and individuating biconditional with *being a reason for* on the left-hand side, and what it is to be true on the right. Now it is worth pausing here to develop what is driving this kind of reduction: *grounding*.⁷⁷ The basic idea, as Chang (2013: 165) explains, is that p grounds q when p gives a “metaphysically necessary explanation” of q . If p grounds q then we are saying what it is *in virtue of which* something is q , in this case, p . For example, something being water is grounded in its being H_2O ; being water just consist in its being H_2O . Following Rosen (2010: 115), we can write the fact that p is grounded in the fact that q as: $[p] \leftarrow [q]$.

Real definition and grounding are intimately linked. For giving the real definition of something is, recall, to give an account of what it is for that thing to obtain. We can, as Rosen argues, think of real definition “as a relation among propositions that contain the target items as constituents” (Rosen 2010: 122). So let $\langle p \rangle$ stand for the structured proposition that p ,⁷⁸ and we can then write ‘for it to be the case that p just is for it to be the case that q ’ as: $\langle p \rangle \leftarrow \langle q \rangle$. This, Rosen explains, allows us to state the principle linking grounding and reduction as follows:

Grounding-Reduction Link: If $\langle p \rangle$ is true and $\langle p \rangle \leftarrow \langle q \rangle$, then $[p] \leftarrow [q]$ (Rosen 2010: 123).

That is, if p reduces to q , then p is true in virtue of the fact that q . As we saw, Schroeder, for example, holds

⁷⁶ So too does Markovits (2011, 2014: Chp 3.3)

⁷⁷ Fine (2001) was the first to introduce ground into contemporary metaphysics. However, the best recent overview is found in Rosen (2010). This section is deeply indebted to Rosen's analysis of grounding and reduction.

⁷⁸ Recall from section 3 and section 5 Schroeder's conjunctive structure, for example.

Biconditional. For all propositions p , agents x , and actions ϕ , p is a reason for x to ϕ if and only if there is some d such that x has a desire whose object is d , and the truth of p is part of what explains why x 's ϕ -ing promotes d .

The right side of *Biconditional*, according to Schroeder, grounds the left. Reduction, based on the grounding-reduction link, is asymmetric and informative, as we saw in section 3. The real definition of reduction, as Rosen explains, is “a relation between distinct propositions” (Rosen 2010: 124). What is in my glass is water in virtue of its being H_2O ; it is not H_2O in virtue of its being water. And this, recall, is how Schroeder sees his reduction of reasons: “whenever R is a reason for [one] to $[\phi]$, that is in part *because* of something about [one’s] psychology [*viz.* desires] — that this is part of *why* R is a reason for one to $[\phi]$ ” (Schroeder 2007a: 196fn3 cf., 2007b: 108). This asymmetry is why the argument based on the making/being distinction had little purchase against Schroeder’s account. And, in addition, it is what makes *Biconditional* an attack on *Reasons Primitivism*: it analyzes what reasons are in non-normative terms.

But *Biconditional* is only supposed to capture a species of the genus reasons, namely, practical reasons. Remember “reasons for action and epistemic or evidential reasons for belief are,” according to Schroeder, “instances of a broader *kind, reasons*” (Schroeder 2008: 70, 2011b: 202-203). Now, if we follow standard use and define a species as the conjunction of genus and differentia,⁷⁹ then to be a desire-based reason is just to be a practical (differentia) reason (genus). On the face of it, this does not seem to be a problem. *Biconditional*, Schroeder might argue, grounds reasonhood via capturing practical reasons. But if this is what Schroeder has in mind, and I do not see what else he could have in mind, the reduction fails.

To see why, let [D] stand for the right side of *Biconditional*, i.e., something’s being *Desire-Based*; [R] stand for the genus, *Reasonhood*; and [P] for the differentia, *Practical*. We can now, following Rosen (2010: 127-128), give the following argument. Call this the *irreflexivity argument*.

Assume for reductio that: Something, (z) , is a reason in virtue of its being desire-based:

1. $[Rz] \leftarrow [Dz]$ In words: z 's being a Reason is grounded in z 's being Desire-Based.

We can, by definition of species, hold:

2. $\langle Dz \rangle \Leftarrow \langle Rz \circ Pz \rangle$ In words: To be Desire-Based is just to be a Practical (differentia) Reason (genus).

Given the Grounding–Reduction Link, this gives us:

3. $[Dz] \leftarrow [Rz \circ Pz]$ In words: z 's being Desire-Based is grounded in z 's being a Practical (differentia) Reason (genus).

Since conjunctions are made true by the conjuncts taken collectively, we get:

4. $[Rz \circ Pz] \leftarrow [Rz], [Pz]$ In words: z 's being a Practical (differentia) Reason (genus) is grounded in z 's being collectively Practical (differentia) and a Reason (genus).

Grounding is transitive. Accordingly we can, by double application, get:

5. $[Rz] \leftarrow [Rz], [Pz]$ In words: z 's being a Reason is grounded in z 's being Practical (differentia) and z 's being a Reason (genus).

Grounding reductions demand strong irreflexivity. For reductive success, reasonhood cannot play a role in making itself obtain. As the argument shows, since (5) violates irreflexivity, Schroeder’s reduction fails to ground reasonhood. This is no revelation: A species can’t ground its genus. As Rosen writes, “A thing must belong to the species in part because it belongs to the

⁷⁹ For all x , $\langle \text{Species } x \rangle \Leftarrow \langle \text{Genus } x \wedge \text{Differentia } x \rangle$ (Rosen 2010: 127).

genus. But then it cannot also belong to the genus in virtue of belonging to the species” (Rosen 2010: 128). *Biconditional* as a grounding-reduction, therefore, fails.

We can now summarize the *reductionist dilemma* as follows:

1. Reasonhood is an abstract universal.
2. If reasonhood is an abstract universal, then either (a) epistemic and practical reasons are one and the same or (b) they are species of a larger genus.
3. If the non-analytic naturalist opts for (2.a), the desire-based definition of reasons – e.g., *Biconditional* – is extensionally implausible.
 - a. Epistemic reasons are not desire-based.
4. If the non-analytic reductionist opts for (2.b), the desire-based definition of reasons – e.g., *Biconditional* – violates irreflexivity.
5. If the desire-based definition of reasons violates irreflexivity, then it cannot ground reasonhood.
6. If a definition cannot ground, then it fails to reduce.
7. The desire-based definition of reasons is extensionally implausible or fails to reduce.

This argument is valid. I’ve argued for premise (1) in section 6. Premises (2) and (3) are extremely plausible. Schroeder accepts the antecedent of premise (4) and I’ve defended the consequent with the *irreflexivity argument*. Premises (5) and (6) are accepted by the chief proponents, including Schroeder, of the real definition view of reduction. We should, accordingly, accept this argument’s conclusion. *Biconditional* either is extensionally implausible or fails to reduce.⁸⁰

We can drive a nail into naturalism by returning to Parfit’s triviality objection.

Return of the Triviality Objection

In the run up to the triviality objection, in section 5, Parfit argued that we need to distinguish between “the property that has some property” and “the property of being the property that has this other property” (Parfit 2011b: 329). This distinction allowed Parfit to give two readings to our Standard Ought Claim – i.e., “When some act would have a certain natural property, this act would be what we ought to do” (2011b: 355). Unfortunately, Parfit’s argument for his preferred, non-naturalist reading of our Standard Ought Claim was hopelessly question-begging. Fortunately, however, extreme normative realism gives us the resources to make good on Parfit’s reading.

Take, for example,

Standard Normative Claim: When a certain natural relational property holds between a proposition, agent, and action, this proposition provides this agent with a reason to perform this action.

Call the natural relational property in our Standard Normative Claim, *N*. Call the property of *being a reason for*, *R*. Call the right-side of *Biconditional* taken conjunctively, *D*. On the naturalist reading, *N* in our standard normative claim would refer directly to *D*. On the naturalist reading, if *Biconditional* is true, to be *R* is just to be *D*; *R* and *D* are the same. So if we claim that $\langle R \rangle$ holds

⁸⁰ It is worth pointing out that Schroeder’s account was chosen deliberately. It is the least “flamboyant,” to use Schroeder’s (Forthcoming) terminology, form of reduction extant in the literature. If, accordingly, Schroeder’s conservative reduction fails, this is strong evidence that no account will succeed.

between a proposition, agent and action> and then claim that <*D* holds between the proposition, agent, and action>, we would state the same fact.

Given the *irreflexivity argument*, however, this reading is mistaken. Assuming the truth of *Biconditional*, *D* should be understood as the set of natural properties that conjunctively have the different second-order normative property of *being a reason for. R*, that is, refers to what is picked out by our answer to the what reasons are question. Thus *N*, assuming the truth of *Biconditional*, refers to *D*, but *D* is not the same as *R*. *R* is the genus, *D* the species. So, in our Standard Normative Claim, for *N* to be *D* it must also be *R*. Cumbersomely: The natural property that holds between a proposition, agent, and action, *N*, is the same as the property, *D*, that makes this relation have the *different* property of being a reason, *R*. So, our Standard Normative Claim, refers explicitly to *D* but only by also implicitly referring to *R*, just as when we say ‘I have a reason to ϕ ’ we must implicitly refer to the abstract universal reasonhood. The *irreflexivity argument* exonerates Parfit’s non-naturalist reading of the Standard Normative Claim.

We can now non-question-beggingly deploy Parfit’s Triviality objection. Since I’ve already discussed this argument in section 5, we need not rehearse it here. But we can restate its conclusion: normative naturalism is false.


The arguments given in sections 2-8 justify this essay’s *Broad Thesis*: For reasons first accounts of normativity, robust realism – i.e., extreme normative realism – is more plausible than either non-analytic naturalism or quietist realism.

9. From Non-Naturalism to the Value-Based Theory

If the broad thesis is true, we can justify reasons primitivism and the value-based theory. To begin, we can distinguish two questions. First, there is the meta-normative question: “What is it to have a reason to do something?” (Markovits 2014: 3). This is the question that has occupied us for the last eight sections. When we ask this question, we ask for an analysis of the favoring-relation. We get an answer to this question when we determine *what it is* for a fact to count in favor of our responding in certain ways. Call this the *what-reasons-are* question. Second, there is the first-order question: “What is it we have reason to do?” (Markovits 2014: 3). This question concerns what reasons *there* are. That is, what reasons obtain for us. We get an answer to this question when we determine what sorts of considerations count in favor of our responding in certain ways. Call this the *our-reasons* question.

What Reasons Are

We can, by asking certain questions, map the various answers to *what-reasons-are*.



Remember that, for the purposes of this essay, I am assuming reasons basicness – that “what it is to be normative, is to be analyzed in terms of reasons” (Schroeder 2007b: 81). If the *reductionist dilemma* and the *triviality objection* are sound, as I’ve argued in section 8, reasons cannot be analyzed in naturalistic terms. Hence, reasons cannot be analyzed in other normative, evaluative, or non-normative terms; reasons are therefore primitive.


If reasons primitivism is correct, reasons serve as their own ground. That is, something is a reason simply in virtue of itself. This, of course, violates irreflexivity, but that is precisely what we would expect if reasonhood is ineliminably normative. We thus have an answer to our meta-normative question. Scanlon captures this answer: “Any attempt to explain what it is to be a reason for something seems to [...] lead back to the same idea: a consideration that counts in favour of it. ‘Counts in favour how?’ one might ask. ‘By providing a reason for it’ seems to be the only answer” (Scanlon 1998: 17). Reasons are, qua non-natural entities, primitive.

This implies that, if desire-based accounts of reasons aspire to answer the *what-reasons-are* question, they fail. If reasons primitivism is correct, the source of an agent’s reasons is external; it is located in the non-natural normative facts of being a reason. In other words, an agent’s having a reason to ϕ -ing is provided by the fact that ϕ -ing promotes what is good or valuable – i.e., what has reason-giving features (Parfit 2011a: 45). But notice, this is just a different way of asserting the value-based view. Reasonhood is value-based.

Our Reasons

The value-based account gives us the answer to the meta-normative question: What is it to have a reason to do something? But does this mean the desire-based account is finished? Perhaps not. One might argue that the desire-based account gives us the correct answer to the first-order normative question: What is it that we have reason to do? On this two-tiered view, the value-based account answers the *what-reasons-are* question, while the desire based account answers (the practical) part of the *our-reasons* question. This proposal is interesting and has certain virtues.

To see how one might try to achieve such a rapprochement, return to our picture of reasonhood. We might fill in this picture in the following way:



Now, this looks immediately implausible. Reasonhood is value-based. Accordingly, an agent’s having a reason to ϕ -ing is provided by the fact that ϕ -ing helps promote what is good or valuable. How could a desire-based reason – an agent’s having a reason to ϕ -ing is provided by the fact that ϕ -ing helps promote one of the agent’s present desires – be exemplified by the value-based reason relation? Put differently, to use Parfit’s argot: since value-based reasons “are

provided by the facts that make certain outcomes worth producing or preventing, or make certain things worth doing for their own sake,” value-based reasons are “object-given” (Parfit 2011a: 45). Whereas, since desire-based reasons are provided by “certain facts about what would fulfill or achieve our present desires or aims [...or the] desires or aims that we would now have, or to the choices that we would now make, if we had carefully considered all of the relevant facts,” desire-based reasons are “subject-given” (Parfit 2011a: 45).

But, as Markovits argues, desire-based reasons also “are ‘object-given’ – they’re provided by facts about the objects of our desires, or what we want to achieve” (Markovits: Forthcoming). There are two points one can make to strengthen Markovits’ suggestion. First, in section 5, I argued that, absent agents, reasons would not obtain. One pushing the rapprochement might, drawing inspiration from section 5, argue that the difference here is merely the difference between, on the value-based view, reasons requiring agents *simpliciter* to obtain and, on the desire-based view, reasons requiring agents *with desires* to obtain. Second, in the introduction, I argued that the extensional data underdetermined the debate between value-based and desire-based theories. And it might be pointed out that the picture provided by the rapprochement would provide a neat explanation of this phenomenon. Both views appear extensionally plausible because they are both correct: the value-based view answers the meta-normative question concerning what reasons are, while the desire-based view answers the first-order question about our practical reasons. To use a slogan Parfit might enjoy, we have, on this suggestion, been climbing the same mountain at different altitudes.

Despite this rapprochement’s appeal, treating the desire-based account as the answer to the our-reasons question is ultimately untenable. If reasonhood, qua abstract universal, is value-based, then even if desire-based reasons are an extensional fit, they would be merely apparent in the *wrong relation sense* – the reason’s favoring relation is incorrect. This point is, I believe, decisive. But we can make another.

In the face of an extensional standoff, the argumentative burden is on the more restrictive view. As Svavarsdóttir writes,

When there is a conflict of intuitions (among intelligent and sensible people) about which hypotheses are in the running as an explanation [...] the burden of argument is on those who insist on a more restrictive class of explanations. [...] One cannot responsibly dismiss something that strikes other intelligent and sensible people as a feasible explanation without having some story about why it should be ruled out. (1999: 179)

The desire-based theory restricts the class of first-order reasons. We need agents with desires, not just agents *simpliciter*, for reasons to obtain.⁸¹ As a restriction on first-order normative theorizing, the desire-based view seems, for example, to rule out certain objective list theories.⁸² The desire-based view, accordingly, faces Svavarsdóttir’s explanatory burden. And naturalism, we can now confidently assert, cannot be put in service to discharge this burden. The value-based view, by contrast, does not. It respects meta-ethical neutrality. This is a meta-normative virtue. If the

⁸¹ The distinction here parallels a distinction Wood (1999: 130) thinks is crucial to understanding the Formula of Humanity: namely, rational agents as the source of good things (that is, what makes good things exist) and rational agents being the source of the value of good things (that is, what makes good things good).

⁸² On objective list theories, certain things are good or bad for us, whether or not we desire the good things or not, see (Parfit 1984: 492).

value-based theory gives us both the answer to the *what-reasons-are* and the *our-reasons* question, then there is much moral theorizing to be done. This is as it should be.

In light of the implausibility of the desire-based view answering the *our-reasons* question, we should, I believe, accept a value-based answer. We can now assert this essay's *Specific Thesis*: If we accept reasons basicness, (a) we should be robust realist and (b) robust realism vindicates the value-based theory of reasons.

Conclusion

Return to the claim I made to my brother that “You ought to call home.” If we accept reasons basicness, we should cash out this ‘ought’ along with all other evaluative and normative claims in terms of reasons. If my claim is true, and we think this truth can be true without ontological implications, then we are quietist realists. If we think this truth is true in virtue of ontologically committing non-natural facts then we are robust realists. Accepting either view, in conjunction with reasons basicness, means that we treat reasons as primitive. If we take my claim to be true, and we hold this truth to be true in virtue of natural facts, then we are normative naturalists. Accepting naturalism about the normative, in conjunction with reasons basicness, means reasons can be analyzed in naturalistic terms – e.g., desires.

That’s the general terrain we’ve been traveling. I will now summarize my results. In the face of extensional underdetermination, quietist realism falls prey to the appropriation problem. To ward off this problem, Parfit and Scanlon are either left begging the question against naturalism or they must forgo their quietist commitments. Quietist realism thus falls to either naturalism or extreme normative realism. Quietists ought to abandon their view in favor of robust realism. We can then argue, based on reasonhood being a relation, that reasonhood is an abstract universal. If reasonhood is an abstract universal, then we can pose a dilemma for non-analytic naturalists: either they need to give the same reductive analysis for epistemic and practical reasons, or they can give a different analyses by treating epistemic and practical reasons as a species of the larger genus. Since a desire-based account of epistemic reasons is implausible, the reductionist must opt for the latter. But if the desire-based account is merely a species of the larger genus, then, due to a violation of irreflexivity, the grounding-reduction fails. Non-analytic naturalism falls to extreme normative realism.

If extreme normative realism is correct, then the value-based account gives us the correct answer to the *what-reasons-are* question. And given that reasonhood is an abstract universal and that the desire-based theory is more restrictive, we should also hold that the value-based theory gives us the correct answer to the *our-reasons* question.

The theme of this essay is best captured by Ross: “It is more important that our theory fit the facts than that it be simple” (Ross 2002: 19). For those who put reasons first, extreme normative realism and the value-based account of reasons, though far from simple, provide the best account of the normative domain.

WORKS CITED

- Anscombe, G. E. M. 1963. *Intention*. 2nd ed. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Armstrong, D. M. 2004. *Truth and Truthmakers*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Bailey, D. T. J. 2009. "The Third Man Argument." *Philosophy Compass* no. 4 (4):666-681.
- Bealer, G. 1993. "Universals." *The Journal of Philosophy* no. 90 (1):5-32.
- Bedke, M. S. 2012. "Against Normative Naturalism." *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* no. 90 (1):111-129.
- Berker, S. 2007. "Particular Reasons." *Ethics* no. 118 (1):109-139.
- Cameron, R. P. 2008. "Truthmakers, Realism and Ontology." *Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement* no. 62:107-128.
- Carmichael, C. 2010. "Universals." *Philosophical studies* no. 150 (3):373-389.
- Casullo, A. 1981. "Unexemplified Universals and Possible Worlds." *Philosophical Studies* no. 40 (2):195-198.
- Chang, R. 2013. "Grounding Practical Normativity: Going Hybrid." *Philosophical Studies* no. 164:163-187.
- Chisholm, R. M. 1989. *Theory of Knowledge*. 3rd ed. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall.
- Clifford, W. K. 1999. *The Ethics of Belief and Other Essays*. Amherst: Prometheus Books.
- Copp, D. 2007. *Morality in a Natural World: Selected Essays in Metaethics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Copp, D. 2012. "Normativity and Reasons: Five Arguments from Parfit Against Normative Naturalism." In *Ethical Naturalism: Current Debates*, edited by S. Nuccetelli and G. Seay, 24-57. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Cuneo, T. 2007a. *The Normative Web: An Argument for Moral Realism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Cuneo, T. 2007b. "Recent Faces of Moral Nonnaturalism." *Philosophy Compass* no. 2 (6):850-879.
- Cuneo, T., and R. Shafer-Landau. 2014. "The Moral Fixed Points: New Directions for Moral Nonnaturalism." *Philosophical Studies* no. Online First:1-45.
- Dancy, J. 2000. *Practical reality*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Dancy, J. 2004. *Ethics Without Principles*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Dancy, J. 2006. "Nonnaturalism." In *The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory*, edited by D. Copp, 122-145. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Darwall, S., A. Gibbard, and P. Railton. 1992. "Toward fin de siècle ethics: Some Trends." *The Philosophical Review* no. 101 (1):115-189.
- Donagan, A. 1963. "Universals and Metaphysical realism." *The Monist* no. 47 (2):211-246.
- Dworkin, R. 1996. "Objectivity and truth: You'd better believe it." *Philosophy & Public Affairs* no. 25 (2):87-139.
- Dworkin, R. 2011. *Justice for Hedgehogs*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Enoch, D. 2006. "Agency, Shmagency: Why Normativity Won't Come from What Is Constitutive of Action." *Philosophical Review* no. 115 (2):169-198.
- Enoch, D. 2011a. "On Mark Schroeder's Hypotheticalism: A Critical Notice of Slaves of the Passions." *Philosophical Review* no. 120 (3):423-446.
- Enoch, D. 2011b. "Shmagency Revisited." In *New Waves in Metaethics*, edited by M. Brady, 208-233. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Enoch, D. 2011c. *Taking Morality Seriously: A Defense of Robust Realism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Evers, D. 2009. "Humean Agent-Neutral Reasons?" *Philosophical Explorations* no. 12 (1):55-67.

- Fine, K. 2001. "The Question of Realism." *Philosophers' Imprint* no. 1 (1):1-30.
- Fine, K. 2002. "The Varieties of Necessity." In *Conceivability and Possibility*, edited by T. S. Gendler and J. Hawthorne, 253–282. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Finlay, S. 2007. "Four Faces of Moral Realism." *Philosophy Compass* no. 2 (6):820-849.
- Finlay, S., and M. Schroeder. 2012. Reasons for Action: Internal vs. External. In *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, edited by E.N. Zalta.
- FitzPatrick, W.J. 2008. "Robust Ethical Realism, Non-Naturalism, and Normativity." In *Oxford Studies in Meta-Ethics*, edited by R. Shafer-Landau, 159-206. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- FitzPatrick, W.J. Manuscript. "Skepticism about Naturalizing Normativity."
- Frege, G. 1966. *Grundgesetze der Arithmetik*. 2 vols. Hildesheim: G.Olms.
- Grice, H. P. 1989. *Studies in the Way of Words*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Haack, S. 1976. "The Justification of Deduction." *Mind* no. 85 (337):112-119.
- Hale, B. 1987. *Abstract Objects*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
- Hampton, J. 1998. *The Authority of Reason*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Harman, G. 1977. *The Nature of Morality: An Introduction to Ethics*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Harman, G. 2012. "Naturalism in Moral Philosophy." In *Ethical Naturalism: Current Debates*, edited by S. Nuccetelli and G. Seay, 8-23. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Heathwood, C. 2011. "Desire-Based Theories of Reasons, Pleasure, and Welfare." In *Oxford Studies in Meta-Ethics*, edited by R. Shafer-Landau, 79-106. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Hieronymi, P. 2005. "The Wrong Kind of Reason." *The Journal of Philosophy* no. 102 (9):437-457.
- Hoffman, J., and G. S. Rosenkrantz. 2003. "Platonistic Theories of Universals." In *The Oxford Handbook of Metaphysics*, edited by M. J. Loux and D. W. Zimmerman, 46-74. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Hooker, B. 1987. "Williams' Argument Against External Reasons." *Analysis* no. 47 (1):42-44.
- Jackson, F. 1998. *From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Johnson, R. N. 1999. "Internal Reasons and the Conditional Fallacy." *The Philosophical Quarterly* no. 49 (194):53-72.
- Joyce, R. 2001. *The Myth of Morality*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Joyce, R. 2006. *The Evolution of Morality*. Cambridge: MIT Press.
- Kant, I. 2002. *Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Kauppinen, A. 2014. "Favoring." *Philosophical Studies* no. Online:1-19. doi: 10.1007/s11098-014-0381-1.
- Korsgaard, C. M. 1986. "Skepticism About Practical Reason." *The Journal of Philosophy* no. 83 (1):5-25.
- Korsgaard, C. M. 2009. *Self-Constitution: Agency, Identity, and Integrity*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Loux, M. J. 1978. *Substance and Attribute: A Study in Ontology*. Boston: D. Reidel Pub. Co.
- Loux, M. J. 2006. *Metaphysics: A Contemporary Introduction*. 3rd ed. New York: Routledge.
- MacBride, F. 2005. "The Particular–Universal Distinction: A Dogma of Metaphysics?" *Mind* no. 114 (455):565-614.
- MacBride, F. 2014. "How Truth Depends Upon Being." *Analysis* no. 74 (3):370-378.
- Mackie, J. L. 1977. *Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong*. New York: Penguin.
- Manne, K. 2011. *Not by Reason Alone*, Philosophy, MIT, Massachusetts.
- Manne, K. 2013. "Internalism About Reasons: Sad but True?" *Philosophical Studies*:1-29.

- Markovits, J. 2011. "Why Be an Internalist about Reasons?" In *Oxford Studies in Metaethics*, edited by R. Shafer-Landau. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Markovits, J. 2014. *Moral Reason*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Markovits, J. Forthcoming. "On What It Is to Matter, and Other Matter." In *Reading Parfit: On What Matters*, edited by K. Simon. London: Routledge.
- McNaughton, D., and P. Rawling. 2003. "Naturalism and Normativity." *Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume* no. 77 (1):23-45.
- McPherson, T. 2011. "Against Quietist Normative Realism." *Philosophical Studies* no. 154 (2):223-240.
- McPherson, T. 2012. "Mark Schroeder's Hypotheticalism: Agent-Neutrality, Moral Epistemology, and Methodology." *Philosophical Studies* no. 157 (3):445-453.
- McPherson, T. 2013. Quietism. In *International Encyclopedia of Ethics*, edited by H. LaFollette. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing
- McPherson, T. 2014. "What is at Stake in Debates Among Normative Realists?" *Nous* no. Online First:1-24.
- Moore, G. E. 1922. *Philosophical Studies*. London: K. Paul, Trench, Trubner & co.
- Moore, G. E. 1993. *Principia Ethica*. Rev. ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Müller, F. M. 1898. *The Sacred Books of the East*. 2nd ed. Vol. X. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Nagel, T. 1986. *The View from Nowhere*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Nagel, T. 1996. "Universality and the Reflective Self." In *The Sources of Normativity*, edited by O. O'Neill, 200-209. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Nagel, T. 1997. *The Last Word*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Oddie, G. 2005. *Value, Reality, and Desire*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Parfit, D. 1984. *Reasons and Persons*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Parfit, D. 1995. "The Unimportance of Identity." In *Identity: Essays Based on Herbert Spencer Lectures Given in the University of Oxford*, edited by H. Harris, 13-45. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Parfit, D. 1997. "Reasons and Motivation." *Proceedings of the Aristotelian society, supplementary volumes* no. 71:99-146.
- Parfit, D. 2001. "Rationality and Reasons." In *Exploring Practical Philosophy*, edited by D. Egonsson, J. Josefsson, B. Petersson and T. Rønnow-Rasmussen, 17-39. Aldershot: Ashgate.
- Parfit, D. 2002. What We Could Rationally Will. In *The Tanner Lectures on Human Values*. University of California at Berkeley.
- Parfit, D. 2006. "Normativity." In *Oxford Studies in Metaethics*, edited by R. Shafer-Landau, 325-380. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Parfit, D. 2011a. *On What Matters*. Vol. 1. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Parfit, D. 2011b. *On What Matters*. Vol. 2. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Plato. 1997. *Complete Works*. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company.
- Quine, W. V. O. 1961. *From A Logical Point of View: 9 Logico-Philosophical Essays*. 2nd ed. New York: Harper & Row, Harper Torchbooks.
- Quinn, W. 1993. *Morality and Action*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Rabinowicz, W., and T. Rønnow-Rasmussen. 2004. "The Strike of the Demon: On Fitting Pro-attitudes and Value." *Ethics* no. 114 (3):391-423.
- Rawls, J. 1999. *A Theory of Justice*. Rev. ed. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Raz, J. 1999. *Engaging Reason: On the Theory of Value and Action*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Raz, J. 2011. *From Normativity to Responsibility*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

- Rosen, G. 2010. "Metaphysical Dependence: Grounding and Reduction." In *Modality: Metaphysics, Logic, and Epistemology*, edited by B. Hale and A. Hoffman, 109-136. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Ross, W. D. 2002. *The Right and The Good*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Scanlon, T.M. 1998. *What We Owe to Each Other*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Scanlon, T.M. 2003. "Metaphysics and Morals." *Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association* no. 77 (2):7-22.
- Scanlon, T.M. 2009. "Being Realistic About Reasons." *The John Locke Lectures*.
- Scanlon, T.M. 2014. *Being Realistic About Reasons*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Schroeder, M. 2005. "Realism and Reduction: The Quest for Robustness." *Philosophers' Imprint* no. 5 (1):1-18.
- Schroeder, M. 2007a. "The Humean Theory of Reasons." In *Oxford Studies in Metaethics*, edited by R. Shafer-Landau, 195-219. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Schroeder, M. 2007b. *Slaves of the Passions*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Schroeder, M. 2008. "Having Reasons." *Philosophical Studies* no. 139 (1):57-71.
- Schroeder, M. 2011a. "Review: Derek Parfit, On What Matters, Volumes 1 and 2." *Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews*:Online.
- Schroeder, M. 2011b. "What Does it Take to 'Have' a Reason?" In *Reasons for Belief*, edited by A. E. Reisner and A. Steglich-Petersen, 201-222. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Schroeder, M. 2012. "Reply to Shafer-Landau, Mcpherson, and Dancy." *Philosophical Studies* no. 157 (3):463-474.
- Schroeder, M. Forthcoming. "What Matters About Metaethics?" In *Does Anything Really Matter? Responses to Parfit*, edited by P. Singer.
- Shafer-Landau, R. 2003. *Moral Realism: A Defence*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Shafer-Landau, R. 2012. "Three Problems for Schroeder's Hypotheticalism." *Philosophical studies* no. 157 (3):435-443.
- Skorupski, J. 2010. *The Domain of Reasons*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Smith, M. 2000. "Moral Realism." In *The Blackwell Guide to Ethical Theory*, edited by H. LaFollette, 15-37. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Sobel, D. 2005. "Pain for Objectivists: The Case of Matters of Mere Taste." *Ethical Theory and Moral Practice* no. 8 (4):437-457.
- Stoljar, D. 2010. *Physicalism*. New York: Routledge.
- Street, S. 2009. "In Defense of Future Tuesday Indifference: Ideally Coherent Eccentrics and the Contingency of What Matters." *Philosophical Issues* no. 19 (1):273-298.
- Streumer, B. 2007. "Reasons and Impossibility." *Philosophical Studies* no. 136 (3):351-384.
- Streumer, B. 2011. "Are Normative Properties Descriptive Properties?" *Philosophical studies* no. 154 (3):325-348.
- Streumer, B. 2013. "Can We Believe the Error Theory?" *Journal of Philosophy* no. 110 (4).
- Suikkanen, J. 2009. "Buck-Passing Accounts of Value." *Philosophy Compass* no. 4 (5):768-779.
- Svavarsdóttir, S. 2001. "Objective Values: Does Metaethics Rest on a Mistake?" In *Objectivity in Law and Morals*, edited by B. Leiter. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Svavarsdóttir, S. 1999. "Moral Cognitivism and Motivation." *Philosophical Review* no. 108 (2):161-219.
- Tiffany, E. 2012. "Why be an Agent?" *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* no. 90 (2):223-233.
- Väyrynen, P. 2011. "A Wrong Turn to Reasons?" In *New Waves in Metaethics*, edited by M. Brady, 185-207. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

- Velleman, J. D. 2000. *The Possibility of Practical Reason*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Velleman, J. D. 2009. *How We Get Along*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Wedgwood, R. 2007. *The Nature of Normativity*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Whiting, D. 2014. "Keep Things in Perspective: Reasons, Rationality, and the Apriori." *Journal of Ethics & Social Philosophy* no. 8 (1):1-22.
- Wiggins, D. 1993. "Cognitivism, Naturalism and Normativity: A Reply to Peter Railton." In *Reality, Representation, and Projection*, edited by J. Haldane and C. Wright, 301-314. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Williams, B. 1981. *Moral luck: Philosophical Papers, 1973-1980*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Williams, B. 1995. *Making Sense of Humanity and Other Philosophical Papers, 1982-1993*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Williams, B. 2001. "Postscript. Some Further Notes on Internal and External Reason." In *Varieties of Practical Reasoning*, edited by E. Millgram, 91-97. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Wittgenstein, L. 1968. *Philosophical Investigations*. Translated by G.E.M. Anscombe. 3rd ed. New York: Macmillan.
- Wood, A. W. 1999. *Kant's Ethical Thought*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.