RELIGION IN THE REMAKING OF RWANDA AFTER GENOCIDE

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To Sizeli Marcellin, David Bucura, Rachel Bugenimana, Cecile Nyiramana, Eugène Twizerimana, Bridget Butt, and Zachée Nzeyimana, and the thousands of unnamed peacemakers in Rwanda and in the Great Lakes region of Africa. Together, we planted seeds.

and

To my grandparents Harry Bazuin, Kathy de Haan, and Ted Steenhof, and in memory of Hilly Bazuin

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ADEPR   Pentecostal Church Association of Rwanda (Association des Eglises de la

               Pentecôte du Rwanda)

AER   Evangelical Alliance of Rwanda (Alliance Evangélique du Rwanda)

CAPR   Peacemaker's Commission of Rwanda (Commission des Artisans de la Paix au

               Rwanda)

CPR   Protestant Council of Rwanda (Conseil Protestant du Rwanda)

EEAR   Evangelical Friends Church of Rwanda (Eglise Evangélique des Amis au

               Rwanda)

EER   Episcopal (Anglican) Church of Rwanda (Eglise Episcopale du Rwanda);

               sometimes also EAR

EP   Evangelical Protestant

EPR   Presbyterian Church of Rwanda (Eglise Presbytérienne du Rwanda)

FARG   Survivor Assistance Fund (Fond d'Assistance pour les Rescapés du Génocide)

FPH   Friends Peace House (Urugo rw'Amahoro)

HDI   Human Development Index

MCC   Mennonite Central Committee

MINALOC   Ministry of Local Government and Social Affairs

MP   Mainline Protestant

NURC   National Unity and Reconciliation Commission

PPP   Purchasing Power Parity

RPF   Rwandan Patriotic Front

PTSD   Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder

TRC   Truth and Reconciliation Commission

UNAMIR   United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda

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Chapter I

INTRODUCTION AND KEY CONCEPTS

Some stories from Rwanda will haunt me forever. I doubt I can ever retell many of them, for they are sufficiently awful that I can barely allow myself to bring them to the forefront of my consciousness. The full horror of the genocide overwhelms, even though I have only heard the careful reconstructions of events that survivors have chosen to share with me. I know they spare themselves—and me—the worst details. It is therefore with some awe, some trepidation, and a certain feeling of honor that I share the story of Clémentine,[1] a survivor of the genocide.

I interviewed Clémentine as part of an effort to evaluate a reconciliation program called Women in Dialogue. In addition to standard questions about participants' satisfaction and dissatisfaction with the program, my interviews also contained some preliminary questions about the connection between religious faith and reconciliation, for I knew it would likely be a topic I would want to further explore. As I explained the purpose of my research, Clémentine immediately began telling me her story. We were in the middle of the informed consent process, so there is no audio recording or transcript of the interview. I also did not have the chance to tell her that I would not be asking her to tell me stories of what happened to her during the genocide, for I knew that asking about such details often provoked sometimes severe emotional reactions, and I wanted to avoid

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[1] Clémentine's and all other names in this dissertation are pseudonyms. To preserve the anonymity and protect the identity of the people I interviewed, I did not ask their names, and I did not keep records names that were volunteered. Generally, however, I have chosen to refer to interview numbers and interviewee characteristics rather than pseudonyms when presenting quotations, for keeping straight a cast of sixty and more characters by name is quite difficult.

causing distress. Nonetheless, she shared some searing details about what happened to her during the genocide and what has happened since. Her description was a generally bare narrative, somewhat clinical in nature and devoid of emotional details. Even so, she sobbed during the telling, and we stopped several times so she could recover. After Clémentine finished her story, she encouraged me to share it with others.

Like many people, Clémentine heard about the death of the President of Rwanda shortly after his plane had crashed during the evening of April 6, 1994. The associated explosion had shaken the capital city Kigali, where she lived, and rumors had quickly spread through her neighborhood. She knew immediately that the death of the president meant that she and the other Tutsi were in trouble. Ethnic tensions had been rising in Rwanda for several years, and in other crisis events in recent years had led to violence. During previous periods of ethnically-motivated violence in Rwandan history, many Tutsi had sought refuge in churches, and militant Hutu generally respected the sanctuary of those spaces. As the radio began exhorting Hutus to kill their Tutsi neighbors, Clémentine gathered up some belongings and food and went to her local church to wait out the storm. But this time the violence did not pass in a few days. The radio kept up an endless stream of hate speech against the Tutsi. The church became crowded. After a week or so, the *interahamwe*, organized gangs of Hutu men armed with guns, grenades, spears, and machetes, arrived at the church. After a short while, they forced their way into the building and began indiscriminately killing the people inside. When they found Clémentine, they paused. She was an attractive teenager. They set her aside and continued their butchery. When they had largely finished killing the others, they put her on the altar of the church and raped her. After the last man had violated her, one of them

took his machete and slashed her neck and head to kill her. But Clémentine survived, though she bears—and made sure to show me—the thick scars which remind her and the world of what she endured.

Like Clémentine's scar, if you know where to look, remnants of the genocide exist throughout Rwanda. Less than a kilometer from my house was on the outskirts of Kigali, there is a secondary school close to the neighborhood market. During the years prior to the genocide, the school served as a camp for Belgian soldiers who were members of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR). UNAMIR sought to stabilize the country through its difficult and violent transition to democracy. When the genocide began, people from all over the neighborhood sought sanctuary at the school. White missionaries and aid workers joined Rwandan teachers and pastors and farmers sheltering behind barbed wire. Many of these people became my friends and told me stories of their ordeals.

When the Belgian government decided to terminate its involvement in UNAMIR following the execution of ten of its soldiers by Rwandan government forces, the men defending the camp gathered the Europeans and Americans and left. The Rwandan government forces then overran the camp, captured the people, and forced them to march several kilometers up a hill, where nearly everyone was slaughtered. Their graves are marked with wooden crosses. Until recently, the sign that stood outside the school's main gate in 1994 was still there, holed by bullets. If you look carefully, the compound wall and gate of the house opposite the school are also pockmarked with holes; someone— probably an opposition politician or activist—was likely executed against that wall before

the rest of the camp's occupants were marched away to face death by grenade and machete.

Such damage can be seen country wide. The Parliament building still has holes from when it was shelled. There are official memorials and mass graves beside roadways up and down the country. The office building I rented in Byumba, a town in the north of the country, had a large hole in the ceiling, likely where the *interahamwe* ripped open the wood searching for people hiding in the attic. While doing maintenance on the church beside my house nearly ten years after the genocide, workers found small bones—from human hands and feet—on the roof, carried there by carrion birds during those terrible days in 1994. Even where there are no physical reminders of what happened in a place, anyone familiar with the genocide can hardly pass a prominent place in the country and not know of some massacre, some concentration camp, some particularly notorious road block which took place nearby. Far too many of these sites are churches, cathedrals, and religious office buildings.

The genocide ended in July 1994, but by then the country was shattered. Perhaps one million people were dead—one in six people—and many of their bodies were left to rot in their homes or on the street. Another two million or so Rwandans had fled the country. Some were guilty of participating in the genocide and wanted to avoid being held accountable. Others were convinced by government propaganda that the Tutsi rebels who were slowly overrunning the country would seek revenge, and they fled, afraid for their own security. Many of the dead and missing held critical positions in Rwandan society: lawyers, doctors, nurses, teachers, shop owners, factory foremen, local government bureaucrats. The human infrastructure of the government and the essential

institutions of civil society had been largely disrupted or destroyed. There was

significant damage to the physical infrastructure of the country and its economy.

Perhaps more seriously, the social fabric of the country had been torn asunder.

Neighbors had killed each other. Classmates plotted to rape their female colleagues.

People who had prayed or sung in church suddenly dehumanized the Tutsis with labels

like cockroach, dog, and snake. The country was and remains ethnically integrated

geographically: there are no segregated neighborhoods reserved for Tutsis or Hutus. In

this context, it is difficult to imagine how a survivor of the genocide can possibly engage

in everyday life—shopping at the market, helping each other harvest fields, participating

in a Bible study together—when they know that the person on the opposite side of that

transaction, that relationship, participated in the systematic extermination of a whole

class of people of which they were a part.

And yet signs of recovery are omnipresent in Rwanda. The physical

infrastructure of the economy and society has largely been rebuilt and repaired. Kigali is

transforming itself from a backwater African capital to a regional economic center. The

health, educational, and judicial sectors have been rebuilt. People are building bigger and

bigger houses. Beyond the memorials, you truly have to know where to look to see the

physical reminders of the genocide.

Table 1 lists a range of development indicators over time for Rwanda,

demonstrating the remarkable strides the country has made in 18 years. The growth in

the country's Human Development Index (HDI) score is the highest in the world for the

period from 1990 to 2011 and second highest (after Afghanistan) for the period 2000 to

2011. This change is all the more noteworthy given that HDI scores declined between

1990 and 1995. In education, health, and gender equality particularly, government and civil society have made remarkable progress, far surpassing pre-genocide indicators. While the country remains very poor, and economic inequality is increasing, per capita incomes are rising. Not everything is perfect: politics are authoritarian and oppressive, and the civil rights of the population are severely restricted. Nonetheless, given Rwanda's utter devastation of the genocide and civil war, its recovery is extraordinary.

There are also signs the social fabric is being stitched back together. Communities function as they do in most places around the world: people greet each other on the street, cooperate on their farms and in the market, and celebrate weddings and births together. In some ways, the explanation for this normalcy is pragmatic: everyday life continues because it must. A person in Rwanda cannot survive by withdrawing from life in depression or anger. There is no economic safety net in the country, which means that people must work or depend on their family and neighbors. In addition, Rwandan life is by nature intensely social in ways unfamiliar to most people from the global North.   Nonetheless, Clémentine's tears and those of thousands of other survivors remind us that significant pain remains.

Despite her tears, Clémentine has found a great deal of solace and support in her recovery. She told me that for several years after the genocide, she was extremely angry at God and refused to reenter a church. Eventually, as neighbors and congregation members asked her to come back, she felt a spiritual calling to return. Eventually, she returned to church. The pastor's teachings on forgiveness and the stories of suffering experienced by people like Naomi in the Bible helped convince her that she had to let go of some of her anger. She also joined Women in Dialogue, a faith-based group which

Table 1 Selected Development Indicators for Rwanda, 1980-2012

Measure	Source	1980	1985	1990	1995	2000	2005	2010	2011/2012
Human Development Index *(Scored 0 to 1; higher numbers represent higher levels of development)*									
HDI--Score	UNDP	0.28	0.30	0.23	0.22	0.31	0.38	0.43	0.43
HDI--Rank	UNDP	96 / 106	101 / 114	120 / 123	134 / 136	142 / 153	158 / 174	165 / 187	166 / 187
Education Subindex									
HDI--Education Index--Score	UNDP	0.16	0.20	0.22	0.24	0.27	0.34	0.41	0.41
HDI--Education Index--Rank	UNDP	128 / 141	127 / 141	130 / 141	131 / 141	144 / 157	154 / 175	158 / 188	158 / 188
HDI--Education Index--Inequality adjusted score	UNDP								0.282
Mean years of schooling (years)	UNDP	1.1	1.5	1.8	2.0	2.3	2.8	3.3	3.3
Literacy rate, adult female (%)	World Bank				60%		67%		
Literacy rate, adult male (%)	World Bank				71%		75%		
Ratio of girls to boys in prim/sec education (%)	World Bank	90%	95%		97%	101%	101%	102%	
Ratio of female to male tertiary enrollment (%)	World Bank	16%	22%				76%	77%	
Public spending on education, total (% of GDP)	World Bank	3%			4%	3%		5%	5%
Health Subindex									
HDI--Health Index--Score	UNDP	0.45	0.46	0.20	0.17	0.42	0.51	0.55	0.56
HDI--Health Index--Rank	UNDP	166 / 194	172 / 194	194 / 194	194 / 194	181 / 194	168 / 194	168 / 194	168 / 194
HDI--Health Index--Inequality adjusted score	UNDP								0.33
Expenditure on health, public (% of GDP)	World Bank				2%	2%	4%	4%	
Maternal mortality (deaths/100,000 live births)	UNDP			1,100	1,400	1,100	720		
Under-five mortality rate (per 1,000 live births)	UNDP	203		171		180	138		
Hospital beds (per 1,000 people)	World Bank		1.65						
Community health workers (per 1,000 people)	World Bank								
Nurses and midwives (per 1,000 people)	World Bank						0.45		
Physicians (per 1,000 people)	World Bank	0.03					0.02		
Improved sanitation facilities (% pop w access)	World Bank		36%	51%	47%	51%		55%	
Life expectancy at birth, female (years)	World Bank	50.8	34.6	31.9	47.4	53.4	56.0	56.4	
Life expectancy at birth, male (years)	World Bank	47.8	31.1	29.1	45.6	51.2	53.4	53.8	
Income Subindex									
HDI--Income Index--Score	UNDP	0.30	0.30	0.29	0.26	0.27	0.31	0.34	0.35
HDI--Income Index--Rank	UNDP	113 / 125	125 / 139	141 / 155	168 / 179	171 / 183	175 / 187	168 / 187	167 / 187
HDI Income Index Score Inequality Adjusted	UNDP								0.23

Table 1 (continued)

Measure	Source	1980	1985	1990	1995	2000	2005	2010	2011/2012
Population living below $1.25 PPP per day (%)	UNDP		63%			77%	77%		
Poverty (% of population)	UNDP							80%	
GDP per capita (current US$)	World Bank	$225	$282	$364	$232	$214	$281	$530	
GDP per capita (constant 2000 US$)	World Bank	$264	$256	$235	$192	$214	$272	$338	
GDP per capita, PPP (current $)	World Bank	$389	$486	$524	$481	$586	$840	$1,163	
GDP per capita, PPP (constant 2005 $)	World Bank	$815	$790	$726	$591	$661	$840	$1,044	
Income share held by highest 10%	World Bank	25%			43%			43%	
Income share held by lowest 10%	World Bank	4%			2%			2%	
Income Gini coefficient (inequality)	UNDP/World Bank		28.9			51.1		53.1	

Gender Equality (Scored 0 to 1; lower scores represent more equality)

Measure	Source	1980	1985	1990	1995	2000	2005	2010	2011/2012
Social Institutions and Gender Index--Score	OECD							0.17	0.15
Social Institutions and Gender Index--Ranking	OECD							66 / 102	28 / 86
Gender Inequality Index--Score	UNDP				0.58	0.55	0.49	0.45	0.45
Gender Inequality Index--Rank	UNDP				84 / 130	59 / 84	75 / 135	75 / 137	82 / 146
Shares in parliament, female-male ratio	UNDP					0.346	0.828		1.038

Human Rights

Press Freedom (Press Freedom (Scored -10 to 150; smaller numbers mean more freedom of the press)

Measure	Source	1980	1985	1990	1995	2000	2005	2010	2011/2012
Press Freedom Index—Score	Reporters without Borders						38	81	81
Press Freedom Index--Rank	Reporters without Borders						122 / 167	169 / 178	156 / 179

Democracy Index (Scored 0 to 10; higher scores means fuller democracy)

Measure	Source	1980	1985	1990	1995	2000	2005	2010	2011/2012
Democracy Index--Score	Economist Intelligence Unit						3.82	3.25	3.25
Democracy Index--Rank	Economist Intelligence Unit						118 / 167	134 / 167	136 / 167

Freedom Index (Scored 1 to 7; 7 being least free)

Measure	Source	1980	1985	1990	1995	2000	2005	2010	2011/2012
Political Rights--Score	Freedom House					7	6	6	6
Civil Rights--Score	Freedom House					6	5	5	5

Corruption (Scored 0 to 10, 10 being least corrupt)

Measure	Source	1980	1985	1990	1995	2000	2005	2010	2011/2012
Corruption Perceptions Index--Score	Transparency Int'l						3.1	4.0	5.0
Corruption Perceptions Index--Rank	Transparency Int'l						83 / 159	66 / 178	49/183

Table 1 (continued)

Measure	Source	1980	1985	1990	1995	2000	2005	2010	2011/2012
World Governance Indicators (Scored -2.5 to 2.5; higher numbers represent better quality governance)									
Voice and Accountability—Score	World Bank				-1.52	-1.56	-1.35	-1.33	
Voice and Accountability--Percentile Rank	World Bank				6.25	7.21	10.58	10.90	
Political Stability—Score	World Bank				-2.07	-1.80	-0.88	-0.11	
Political Stability--Percentile Rank	World Bank				3.37	5.77	21.15	41.51	
Government Effectiveness—Score	World Bank				-1.20	-0.65	-0.89	-0.05	
Government Effectiveness--Percentile Rank	World Bank				11.22	27.80	20.49	54.07	
Regulatory Quality—Score	World Bank				-1.47	-1.06	-0.94	-0.18	
Regulatory Quality--Percentile Rank	World Bank				7.35	13.73	18.63	47.85	
Rule of Law—Score	World Bank				-1.52	-1.31	-0.92	-0.31	
Rule of Law--Percentile Rank	World Bank				4.78	7.66	20.10	45.97	
Policy and Institutional Assessment (Scored 1 to 6; 6 represents higher capacity)									
Environmental Sustainability	World Bank					3.0	3.5	3.5	
Gender Equality	World Bank					3.5	3.5	4.0	
Public Administration	World Bank					3.5	3.5	4.0	
Public Resource Use	World Bank					4.0	4.5	4.5	
Property rights/ rule-based governance	World Bank					3.0	3.0	3.5	
Social Protection	World Bank					3.5	3.5	3.5	
Social inclusion / equity	World Bank					3.6	3.9	4.0	
Transparency and accountability	World Bank					3.0	3.5	3.5	
Population									
Total Population	World Bank	5,178,927	6,080,907	7,109,538	5,570,206	8,098,344	9,201,727	10,624,005	
Rural population	World Bank	95%	95%	95%	92%	86%	83%	81%	
Population growth (annual %)	World Bank	3.3%	3.7%	-0.2%	-1.4%	6.6%	2.1%	3.0%	

Sources: (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2010, 2011; Freedom House, 2002, 2005, 2010, 2012; Kekic, 2007; OECD Development Center, 2012; Reporters without Borders, 2005, 2010; Transparency International, 2005, 2010, 2011; United Nations Development Program, 2012; World Bank, 2012)

brings together female survivors of the genocide with women whose husbands have been

imprisoned for crimes of genocide. Together, they learn about forgiveness,

reconciliation, nonviolence, and conflict resolution. They listen to each other's stories,

and they learn how much they have in common. Clémentine told me that some of her

best friends are now women whose husbands participated in the genocide, and she has

accompanied some of them to prison to visit their husbands. She has reconciled with

many Hutu. I did not ask her if she had forgiven, reconciled with, or had any contact

with the men who had raped her—how can you ask such thing?—but Clémentine has

made remarkable strides toward personal healing through religiously-influenced

reconciliation.

Research Question

Religion is a central theme of both the genocide and Rwanda's post-conflict

recovery. Early Christian missionaries to the country reinforced the ethnic divisions of

Rwandan society, which was then governed by a Tutsi monarchy. After independence,

churches allied themselves with the Hutu-led government, rarely criticizing the

government for the many abuses it committed. During the genocide, most religious

institutions remained silent, failing to condemn the violence and sometimes even

supporting the government's genocidal actions. Clémentine's experience in the church is

not unique. Massacres occurred in dozens of religious buildings and facilities across the

country. Most of the people who killed called themselves Christians and attended

services. More disturbingly, priests and pastors occasionally directly participated in the

massacres or provided material and moral support to the people who were.

After the genocide, churches and mosques began working to help their members and the country to recover. They have organized relief shipments to be brought from abroad, developed peace theologies and curricula for pastors and lay leaders, encouraged the preaching of forgiveness, and provided trauma healing services for victims. Clémentine's story also illustrates how religious beliefs and participation have been important resources for people's individual journeys of reconciliation. This dissertation seeks to systematically explore these dynamics. How has religion influenced Rwanda's recovery from violence? What resources and obstacles does religion provide for both individuals and groups as they cope with the legacies of genocide and seek reconciliation? The subsequent chapters explore these and other questions.

Outline

This dissertation is divided up into eight chapters, including this introduction. Chapter II explores the history of Rwanda with a particular focus on the role of religion. Chapter III outlines the methods for data collection and the analyses that form the basis for the subsequent three chapters. Chapter IV explores how religion has affected individual coping and recovery. Chapter V examines organizational responses to the genocide. Chapter VI analyses religious change after the genocide. These three empirical chapters each begin with a review of the relevant theoretical and empirical literature around the chapter's specific focus. Chapter VII weaves this analysis together from the perspective of power and scale. Chapter VIII contains the conclusion.

Key Definitions

Before the dynamics of religion and reconciliation can be explored, it is necessary to define some key terms. This section defines the basic parameters around the dissertation's central concepts of religion and peacebuilding and sets the groundwork for a subsequent discussion about how religion and peacebuilding intersect at individual and societal levels.

Religion

At the risk of stating the obvious, religion means different things to different people and in different contexts. When Pargament, Sullivan, Balzer, Van Haitsma, & Raymark (1995) asked people to define religion for them, they got a wide variety of responses. The most common response was that attendance at some form of worship service defined religion, but other prominent themes included altruism, doctrinal orthodoxy, feelings of closeness to God, and degree of involvement in personal religious activities like prayer. When Clark (1958) asked social scientists the same questions, he got highly variable answers, including some oriented towards the supernatural, some related to religion as a response to problems in life. Regardless, religion frequently evokes emotions or experiences linked with perceptions of the divine, beliefs and practices related to the supernatural, and/or institutions that structure and support people's experience, beliefs, and practices.

Conceptualizations of religion within sociology can be broadly divided into three categories: substantive, functional, and the search for significance or meaning (Berger, 1974; Pargament, 1997). The substantive tradition focuses on people's beliefs, emotions,

and practices as well as the social relationships and institutions that surround individual action in relation to a supernatural being or power. Substantive studies of religion examine the content of a person's or community's beliefs and practices and their conceptions of the divine. Overall, I am not interested in the veracity of people's beliefs about the supernatural; rather I seek to understand how these beliefs and behaviors affect how they view themselves, their neighbors, their society, and the myriad of social challenges that face post-conflict societies. I am interested in how religious beliefs, practices, and institutions provide resources for and potentially place obstacles in front of processes of reconciliation. As such, I take a much more functional perspective on religion (Yinger, 1970) as compared to other scholars who might emphasize the substance and content of belief.

The functional tradition has its roots in Durkheim's definition of religion as a system of beliefs, behaviors, and rituals which sets apart elements of daily life from the profane or ordinary (Durkheim, 1912/1995). Durkheim believed this separation served to maintain the social order, itself based on communities of common moral beliefs and practices. Religion is the means by which individuals internalize the organizing principles of the social order; therefore conceptions of God are constructed as a projection of society's guiding principles and values. Durkheim thought that religion disciplines individuals to keep them in line with social values. Religion forges strong bonds between people in the same community, makes life more vigorous or lively, and creates feelings of euphoria to promote perceptions of well-being and confidence.

Marx's understanding of religion was also functionalist. His oft-quoted phrase "religion is the opiate of the people" reflects a belief that religion serves to keep the lower

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classes content with their place in the social order by promising them justice and a better life to come in the afterlife (Marx, 1843/1972). Similarly, proponents of secularization theory, who also have a functionalist view of religion, believe that modern societies no longer need neither religious institutions for educational, health care, and other services nor religious ideas and values to shape culture in productive directions. Functional understandings of religion are concerned less with the content of people's ideas, beliefs, and behaviors about and around the divine but are more interested in the consequences those ideas, beliefs, and behaviors have for how individuals live their lives and societies structure themselves. Weber's analyses on how religious beliefs and religious institutions shaped social changes in economic and other spheres—how, for example, Protestant asceticism laid the foundations for the development of capitalism (Weber, 1930/1992), or how the development of a priestly class of people that mediated the relationship between ordinary people and the supernatural had long term consequences for societies (Weber, 1922/1933)—are classic examples of the functionalist understanding of religion.

As Berger (1974) points out, a purely functional perspective on religion that ignores the sacred or divine misses something of religion's essence. Such an omission conceals differences in religious belief and practice between individuals in the same congregation, between congregations in the same denomination, and between sects in the same religion, and between the world religions themselves. Differences at all of these levels may have significant effects on the behaviors and structures that are influenced by religion. It is the content of people's belief and practice and their affiliations to church and community (among many other possibilities) which determine many of the specific choices they make in regards to the understandings of and means of coping with death,

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justice, and suffering. As such, I cannot completely ignore the content of people's beliefs; rather, I seek to understand how variations in substance lead to variations in function in regards to post-conflict recovery.

This perspective that seeks to combine both the content and the functional elements of much of the work on sociology of religion is the perspective that religion represents a search for significance or meaning (Pargament, 1997; Park, 2010). Systems of meaning which define religion are culturally and socially conditioned. Individuals do not randomly invent religious beliefs to suit their whims; rather, religious systems of meaning are inherited systems, passed down from generation to generation as a series of conceptions about the way the world works expressed in symbolic form (Geertz, 1973). These forms not only interpret and shape the world but are actively shaped by it. Religion's function is to formulate a system of meanings which explains humankind's experience in the world, particularly the experience of pain and suffering. As Geertz puts it,

> The strange opacity of certain events, the dumb senselessness of intense or inexorable pain, and the enigmatic unaccountability of gross iniquity all raise the uncomfortable suspicion that perhaps the world, and hence [our] life in the world, has no genuine order at all—no empirical regularity, no emotional form, no moral coherence. And the religious response to this suspicion is in each case the same: the formulation, by means of symbols, of an image of such a genuine order of the world which will account for, and even celebrate, the perceived ambiguities, puzzles, and paradoxes in human experience. The effort is not to deny the undeniable—that they are

unexplained events, that life hurts, or that rains falls upon the just—but to

deny that there are inexplicable events, that life is unendurable, and that

justice is a mirage. (Geertz, 1973, p. 108)

It is in this tradition of religion as systems of meaning that I orient my own work. People

who experience suffering may already be religious, having been born into or otherwise

acquired a socially and culturally shaped system of meaning that helps them understand

their suffering. Similarly, people who were not religious prior to experiencing suffering

can search for a system of meaning to make sense of that suffering, sometimes finding it

in religion. Religious beliefs and practices shape responses to life events, as they provide

various mechanisms to cope with that event. At the same time, events in the experienced

world can overwhelm systems of meaning, and we need to be able to trace how religion

changes as a result.

Even with these outlines of some traditions of sociological thought about religion,

there is a fundamental lack of clarity of what religion actually is. I conceptualize religion

in a multi-level framework, in which individuals feel, act, and think in regards to the

divine privately. Groups of people gather together to do the same, with individual

members influencing each other and some groups influencing other groups. Religious

organizations and institutions exist to guide, nurture, and control individuals and groups.

The lines of influence pass in all directions. Individuals influence each other as well as

groups and institutions. Groups influence individuals and institutions. Institutions

influence individuals and groups. Beliefs about the nature of the divine or supernatural

are formed and held in the individual, discussed with groups, and codified and refined

into dogma and passed down through education and tradition via institutions and

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symbolic practices (Geertz, 1973; see also Durkheim, 1912/1995; Weber 1922/1933).

Likewise, religious practices are carried out by individuals, often working in groups, frequently though not always based on traditions and teachings passed down through institutions. Individual, group, institutional, and other influences beyond the religious (economic, political, and the like) also influence religion.

Institutions and organizations. Several concepts related to religion deserve further definition. One pair is organization and institution. In common parlance, the words are often used interchangeably to refer to the same concept. In sociological theory, however, they have distinct meanings. Durkheim thought that systems—the rituals, ceremonies, and the like—that maintain the collective ideas and values of society become crystallized over time. While they were originally developed by individuals, as these systems are passed down over time they become depersonalized and resistant to change. These rituals and ceremonies, and especially the values and beliefs they uphold, are social institutions. Individual actors who work together in structured groups form organizations, but they themselves enact and perpetuate and can have little impact on the institutions in which they are embedded (Durkheim, 1912/1995). Similarly, Weber's descriptions of how traditional and charismatic sources of authority—originally defined in religious terms but eventually separating into secular and spiritual specializations— become rationalized and transformed into bureaucratic legal systems follow a slightly different narrative path to arrive at a highly similar distinction (Weber, 1922/1933). Selznick described a process by which organizations transform into institutions, as the organizational form and activities become infused with value and inertia. The form and activities then persist over time and through changes in the human composition of the

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organization because their perpetuation becomes the underlying goal of institution (Selznick, 1948, 1996). Parsons focused less on an evolutionary description of the development of institutions but on showing how the values and norms of institutions legitimate the form and actions of specific organizations within specific sectors of society (Parsons, 1934/1990, 1960). The conclusions of both conceptions of organization and institution are clear: organizations are structures of human actors, whereas institutions are patterns of belief and action. Organizations are more-or-less malleable to human action and leadership, whereas leaders must often conform to the expectations of institutions, forces against which individuals have relatively little power. Organizations can, but do not always, change quickly. Institutions tend to change slowly, though there can be rapid change as well (Douglas, 1986; W. R. Scott, 2008). Given their long-held rituals, roles, practices, and belief systems, Christianity and Islam are institutions, but churches, mosques, and denominations are organizations that are embedded in those religious institutions.

Such conceptions of institutions tend to deny or minimize the role of human agency and innovation in institutional change. The earliest sociologists depicted the normative components of institutions well, showing how their quasi-moral expectations created social obligations that people feel obliged to respect. They also showed how these collective norms, symbols, and meanings affect and govern individual thought processes and appraisals of what is and is not possible in the world (Douglas, 1986). Our thought processes are institutionally disciplined, in a form of institutionality, to extend Foucault's concept of governmentality (Burchell, Gordon, & Miller, 1991; Foucault, 1991; Foucault & Gordon, 1980). These theorists described less well how these norms

are maintained over time. Institutions are in part defined by sets of rules. If a person violates the rules of social institutions, there are consequences. There can be self-punishment through feelings of guilt, or more social punishment from people who shun the violator because of his violation, or coercive force or punishment from some authority. It is in seeing how institutions regulate behavior to guarantee their perpetuation that the role of human agency and the potential for innovation becomes clear. People—specific, identifiable individuals—have to both define someone as a transgressor and then perform acts of discipline. People have to actively debate whether codified rules and norms are worth maintaining and changing. A critical task in the study of institutions is to discover the motivations and interests of the people who do the work of enacting institutions in everyday life. Some of them are powerful people looking out for their own interests. Some are less powerful, acting under the influence of the institution's own norms and values because it is the right thing to do and they are rewarded handsomely for doing so. It is here, as we recognize the importance of human actors which actively ensure the survival and power of institutions, that we identify the opportunity for change, revolutionary or incremental, which is inherent in what may otherwise seem like institutional inertia.

Religion versus spirituality. There are an increasing numbers of people who define themselves as spiritual but not religious. They maintain certain beliefs and practices related to the divine but generally eschew participation in organized religious activities (Marler & Hadaway, 2002). Several writers connect this general trend with an increasing privatization and de-institutionalization of religious belief and practice (Berger, 1967; Fuller, 2001; Saucier & Skrzypinska, 2006). In popular interpretations of

the terms, spirituality refers to individual processes of discernment, searches for

significance, and communing with the mystical or divine. Such activities are usually

conducted in private. Religion, on the other hand, refers to institutionally bound, public

manifestations of rituals and dogma. Where spirituality is individual, religion is

connected with groups and organizations (Zinnbauer, et al., 1997). Religiosity is a term

describing individuals' participation in organizational and institutional forms of religion.

Generally, I find the distinction between religion and spirituality to be unsatisfactory,

given the significant interconnectedness between individual religious belief and practice

and group and institutional manifestations of religion. Individuals are spiritual in

societies permeated by religion, and religion cannot function without spiritual people.

This shift towards spiritual-but-not-religious orientations to faith is in some ways

reactionary, for people who define their religious identity in such terms do so because of

opposition to or dissatisfaction with the religious world around them. Whatever private

spiritual beliefs and practices a person might turn toward, such choices are influenced by

organized and institutionalized religion. Religion and spirituality are inseparably bound,

and the discussion of one cannot proceed without the inclusion of the other. Researchers

absolutely must make clear distinctions between individual, group, and organizational

manifestations of religion, but we must also observe their deep interconnectedness.

Therefore, when speaking about religion in the forthcoming pages, unless I qualify it as

uniquely personal/individual, group, or institutional, I am referring to this view of

religion and spirituality as integrated phenomenon.

Orientations to religion. Religion must also be conceptualized as both a means

and an end. In important ways, religion structures the process of living. For example,

while not all religions demand asceticism from their adherents, many ask their members to abide by certain codes of conduct or belief. The exact content of these requirements is highly variable across religious groups (and even between individuals in the same groups) in regards to their specific history, precise expectations, understanding of the divine, and the extent to which they affect practitioners' lives. These religious requirements are means which then lead to certain religious ends: promises of reward or threats of punishment. Religion promises a worldview that helps make sense of life, to understand of suffering, and to provide comfort in times of trouble. Religion also serves to restrain undesirable or "sinful" behavior and improve well-being and quality of life. Religious groups also provide meaning to people's existence and help guide personal development and growth. Membership in a group can provide important identity markers for individuals and help orient members in time and pace (Bellah, Madsen, Sullivan, Swidler, & Tipton, 1985), embedding and unifying people in a group that provides advantages for individual and collective flourishing (Durkheim, 1912/1995). Religion can also promise certain corporeal advantages, such as blessings for physical health, economic well-being, and the like.

Individuals and religious organizations tend to prioritize either the means or the ends of religion. Some people have a more intrinsic religious orientation, where religious means take priority, and the ends of religion tend to be focused on spiritual and altruistic levels (Allport, 1966; Allport & Ross, 1967). Other people have a more extrinsic religious orientation. To them, religious means are not particularly important. They focus more on the worldly rewards of religion, on the safety, comfort, social connections, and status one gains from being religious (Allport, 1966; Allport & Ross, 1967). A third

religious orientation, religion as quest, emphasizes religion as a constant search for and negotiation of meaning, where religious means are constantly explored and questioned and religious ends are oriented towards developing meaning and truth (Batson & Schoenrade, 1991a, 1991b; Batson, Schoenrade, & Ventis, 1993).

Religious change. The final element in this brief description of religion is the recognition that religion is constantly changing. Various theorists have attempted to define, theoretically and empirically, stages of religious and moral development across the human life span (J. W. Fowler, 1995; Kohlberg, 1981; Piaget, 1932/1997), often focusing on how religious and moral thought and understanding changes from childhood into adulthood to become increasing abstract, complex, and moving from reasoning which seeks to avoid punishment to obeying rules to developing individual moral codes. While these understandings of religious development can be critiqued for relying too much on a view of religion as a rational cognitive construct by individuals, one underlying principle is clear: individual religion changes as people mature and change over their lifetimes.

Religious institutions also change. Weber thought that religious institutions become increasingly rational over time, as their core beliefs and practices become institutionalized and the magical and ritual elements of their origin become de-emphasized (Weber, 1922/1933, 1930/1992). H. Richard Niebuhr thought that religious institutions become increasingly complex and systematized overtime, moving from cults focused on individual beliefs and practices to sects to churches focused on the organization manifestations of religion (Niebuhr, 1954). Secularization theory explores

how religious institutions decline in the face of a changing society that may need them less than it once did (Berger, 1967; P. Norris & Inglehart, 2011).

Asking people in a research context about religion then may involve, depending on the researcher's specific interests, questions across many dimensions. An individual's beliefs about the nature of the divine, of the afterlife, of the way in which the divine interacts with the world, and what may be considered moral or immoral have all been the basis of investigation previously. Likewise, people's private religious behaviors, (including private prayer, worship, use of religious texts, and the like) and participation in organized religious events (worship services, prayer services, text studies, ceremonies and rituals marking important events like births or deaths) have all been studied. The structure of religious institutions, the means in which beliefs or practices become rationalized into dogma and ritual, the means by which religious thought is passed down through education, and the like have also been the subject of scholarly investigation. This dissertation uses multiple measures and conceptions of religion to develop a holistic perspective of its role in Rwanda's recovery from genocide.

Peacebuilding

Like religion, peacebuilding can be a complex idea to define. This particular project focuses on post-conflict peacebuilding, the processes by which societies that have experienced violent conflict recover from the destruction of war. I conceptualize post-conflict peacebuilding as having four essential dimensions. First, peacebuilding is concerned with helping the victims of violence recover from their injuries and losses. People in post-conflict zones have a variety of needs ranging from psychological trauma

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to physical injuries to immediate needs for housing and food. Peacebuilding activities at this level may involve medical and financial assistance, reuniting families who have become separated over the course of the conflict, and helping victims cope with the psychological effects of the trauma they have experienced. Second, peacebuilding involves rebuilding the institutions and infrastructure on which government, education, health care, economic activity, and other services are based. This rebuilding happens on two levels. The first is the physical reconstruction of infrastructure and (re-)training the people who use and operate it. The second comprises efforts to help institutions regain their legitimacy in the eyes of the population they serve, particularly when those institutions may have been implicated in violence.

Reconciliation, the restoration of relationships between people who have been alienated by a history of conflict, is the third dimension of post-conflict peacebuilding. Reconciliation, the restoration of relationships between individuals and groups who have been alienated by a history of conflict, is a particularly important dimension of post-conflict peacebuilding. A peaceful future requires that neighbors be able to work together, that political parties can cooperate in the governance of the country, that groups who were former enemies be able to engage in dialogue for their mutual benefit. These demands require that trust be re-established, that the wounds of history be closed and healed, that former enemies try to forge a shared identity and common—or at least not mutually exclusive—vision of the future (Galtung, 2001; Schreiter, 2008). As multiple scholars note, there are various degrees of reconciliation. Reconciliation could be superficial, where people in former enemy groups merely tolerate each other because they must live in proximity or they agree to democratically share power because they see

that they have few other tolerable options (Brounéus, 2008a; Crocker, 1999; Mukashema & Mullet, 2010). Reconciliation can also be deeper, involving deep socio-emotional transformation taken at risk to the participants in which the lives of the parties formerly in conflict become much more intertwined and interdependent after expressions of apology and forgiveness (Crocker, 1999; Longman, Pham, & Weinstein, 2004; Mukashema & Mullet, 2010; Nadler & Shnabel, 2008; Shnabel & Nadler, 2008; Shnabel, Nadler, Canetti-Nisim, & Ullrich, 2008; Shnabel, Nadler, Ullrich, Dovidio, & Carmi, 2009).

Reconciliation is also a multi-scalar phenomenon (Kohen, Zanchelli, & Drake, 2011; Oliner & Zylicz, 2008; Skaar, Gloppen, & Suhrke, 2005; Verdeja, 2009; Zachar, 2006), happening at an interpersonal level between individuals formerly in conflict (Murphy, 2006), at an intergroup level not only between ethnic and racial groups and but also between groups built around affiliations to religion or to an economic and social class (Kelman, 2008), and at a political level, between the competing interests, politicians, and political parties that vie for power in a democratic society (Brounéus, 2008a; W. J. Long & Brecke, 2003; Wüstenberg, 2008). Conceptions about the interactions between these levels are complex: some theorists make the assumption that if a critical mass of individuals reconcile with their neighbors, that will spark a bottom-up tide of reconciliation to affect intergroup and societal level relationships (Mukashema & Mullet, 2010). Other theorists believe that reconciliation happens first at the national level, with national leaders from all sides in a conflict coming together for symbolic interactions where past wrongs are acknowledged and confessed, apologies are offered and accepted, and frameworks to work cooperatively in the future are offered (Brounéus,

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2008a; W. J. Long & Brecke, 2003). These manifestations of top-level efforts at reconciliation may spark the imaginations of individuals, motivating them and making them feel safe to reach out to their neighbors to begin a process of interpersonal reconciliation. There are also mid-level theories that emphasize the work of low- and mid-level political, religious, economic, social, and cultural leaders to create peace between themselves, inspiring both the general population and top governmental leaders to do the same. Bottom-up theories of conflict transformation and reconciliation look at ways in which individuals create the conditions for peace within their own communities and pressure their governments and leaders to do the same on a larger scale. Impediments at one level can have profound effects at them all.

The final task of post-conflict peacebuilding is taking steps to prevent the recurrence of violence. Countries that have recently experienced a war are far more likely to experience another outbreak of violence than those who have not (Collier, 2003). The success of any peacebuilding process in preventing a renewed outbreak of violence is dependent in many ways on its success in the other three domains, in rehabilitating victims and ensuring that their needs are met (unmet needs can lead to renewed violence as people strike out in anger and frustration), in rebuilding institutions and infrastructure, and in promoting reconciliation.

Like reconciliation, peacebuilding is a concept involving multiple scales of change, actors, and time. John Paul Lederach (1997) has conceptualized peacebuilding and reconciliation work as occurring with three levels of actors. High-level negotiations and mediation to establish ceasefires and outline treaties involve high-level leaders, national politicians, military leaders, and religious leaders who have national or

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international influence. Peace commissions, problem-solving workshops, and training in conflict resolution happen with mid-level leaders, ethnic and religious leaders, academics, and the leaders of non-government organizations. Grassroots training and efforts to reduce prejudice and promote psychosocial healing happen with local leaders, teachers, medical professionals, and the local population (Lederach, 1997). Peacebuilding also occurs over several different time scales, ranging from immediate crisis intervention to short term stabilization of the situation to longer-ranging planning of social change in search of a vision of a desired future (Lederach, 1997, 2005).

Theories of change are not well articulated in the literature on peacebuilding. Ilena Shapiro has developed two typologies, one focused on individual change and the other focused on social change (Shapiro, 2005, 2006). At the individual level, she suggests peace progresses through cognitive changes. Individuals can develop new knowledge about a situation or find new ways of framing and thinking about a situation, through emotional change. They might also gain emotional control over their previous trauma or develop better understandings of their emotions after having experienced a traumatic event. They could focus on changing behavior, to learn and rehearse new ways of solving problems and new ways of doing things. They might also prioritize changing relationships, as learning about their former enemies and re-humanize them (Fisher, 2001; Galtung, 2001; Shapiro, 2005, 2006). On the social level, peaceful change can happen through appeals to rationality, convincing leaders and their followers that it is in their best interests to pursue peace. Peacebuilders can try to change the norms of society through education and other measures, trying to reduce the acceptability of violence and increasing the desire for peace in the society and culture. Somewhat paradoxically, peace

can also occur through power-coercive approaches, where people with various forms of

power can incentivize or force change by punishing people who do not comply with the

new social order and rewarding those who do. It is also possible to work structurally,

attempting to solve both the active conflicts and the underlying conditions in society that

provoke and legitimate violence (Shapiro, 2005). Unfortunately, beyond Shapiro's brief

description, no one has systematically applied these theories of change to analyze peace

processes.

Different theories of change lead to different kinds of peacebuilding interventions

and activities. At an individual level, the main types of programs are trauma healing,

conflict resolution, and relationship building.[2] Trauma healing programs are predicated

on the assumption that continuing trauma and post-traumatic stress disorders are an

obstacle to peace and reconciliation. People who are traumatized are too angry or afraid

(or any other of a range of possible emotional barriers) to enter into meaningful

relationships with the people who may have hurt them. As such, if reconciliation is to be

promoted, people living with trauma will have to undergo a process of trauma healing

before they are able to reconcile (Bar-Tal, 2003, 2007; Hamber, 2007, 2009; Hamber &

Wilson, 2002; Staub, Pearlman, Gubin, & Hagengimana, 2005). This conception of

trauma as an obstacle to peace and reconciliation has some support in the empirical

literature: Pham, Weinstein, and Longman (2004) found that high scores on post

traumatic stress disorder measures are associated with lower scores on several

reconciliation measures even when controlling for ethnicity and exposure to trauma.

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[2] Shapiro, in analyzing peacebuilding programs in the United States, defined a typology of six different program types, including prejudice reduction, healing and reconciliation, anti-racism, diversity/multiculturalism, democracy building, and conflict management. My typology of individually-oriented programming collapses prejudice reduction, anti-racism, and diversity/multicultural programs into the category of relation building (Shapiro, 2002).

Similarly, Bayer, Klasen, and Adam (2007) find a negative correlation between measures of post traumatic stress and openness to reconciliation among former child soldiers in Uganda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Contrarily, Petrovic (2005) finds no statistically significant relationship between trauma and non-readiness for reconciliation and Miklos and Petar (2005) find no relationship between trauma and readiness for reconciliation in a separate projects in the former Yugoslavia.

Conflict resolution programs are predicated on a theory that people need to know how to resolve conflict in order to be able to reconcile. They contend that unless people know how to handle conflict constructively, the tensions created by the conflicts inherent in everyday life will overwhelm any attempts at reconciliation (Bar-Tal, 2000). If there can be no peace in the present, then there is little possibility of dealing with the wounds of the past. If people are taught how to transform conflicts using nonviolent techniques so that the best possible outcome is pursued for everyone involved, then, this theory says, not only will a nonviolent and nonthreatening space be opened for the work of reconciliation to happen but also the contacts afforded by conflict resolution will allow for people to get to know each other better, promoting long-term contact and eventual reconciliation. While there are no extant studies that examine this hypothesis in any depth, Stover and Weinstein (2004) found that three items which they labeled community—measuring people's perceptions of the amount of conflict and trust in their community—were positively correlated to responses to their Openness to Reconciliation Scale.

Finally, there are programs aimed at improving relationships between individuals and groups formerly in conflict. Many of these programs use some variant of the contact

hypothesis explanation as the basis for their programming, believing that increased contact between former enemies leads to mutual understanding and dialogue that, over time, decreases prejudice and increases goodwill. The contact hypothesis itself is empirically validated in the literature on race relations in the United States, for example, finding that people who have more contact with people from the other race generally have many fewer prejudices about individuals from that other race than those people who have minimal or no contact. A recent meta-analysis based on an analysis of 713 separate samples from 515 studies finds clear evidence that intergroup contact reduces intergroup prejudice (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2000, 2006); the studies included in this meta-analysis measure reductions in prejudice not only between racial and ethnic groups but also for religions and other social cleavages.

At the social level, change toward peace is promoted through a number of strategies, including truth-telling, justice promotion, economic development, democratic development, and institutional capacity building. The logic behind truth-telling strategy is roughly analogous to that of the trauma healing programs for the individual: the nation cannot deal with the crimes of the past and move forward to create a better future unless those crimes are named and identified. There can be no trust between warring parties unless the history between the parties is brought into the open (Minow, 1999; Minow & Rosenblum, 2002; Rotberg & Thompson, 2000; Senehi, 2000). Truth telling also has the possibility of creating cognitive dissonance, as people's assumptions and perceptions about their enemies are revealed to be untrue, thereby provoking reassessments of the basis of their relationships (Gibson, 2004a). While truth-telling can happen between individuals in programs based on the contact hypothesis, truth commissions are a widely

used mechanism to help countries deal with crimes of the past; the United States Institute of Peace has documents relating to over fifty truth commissions of various sorts in its admittedly incomplete library (United States Institute of Peace, 2010). There is some evidence to support the importance of truth telling in peace processes: in post-apartheid South Africa, people of all racial groups who accepted the truth as established by that country's Truth and Reconciliation Commission were more likely to report better attitudes towards other racial groups (Gibson, 2004a), though subsequent analyses have revealed that there may be no relationship between truth and reconciliation among black South Africans, in part because many people in that group believe there has been insufficient attention paid to promoting justice in the country (Gibson, 2004b, 2006a, 2006b).

Closely related to truth telling is the promotion of justice and accountability for the crimes of the past. Justice is important to help individuals and the society deal with the psychological wounds, to restore trust in the institutions of government and the rule of law, and to delegitimize the use of violence. Truth commissions, as in South Africa's case, are sometimes paired with judicial proceedings to hold people accountable for their actions, though amnesties or reductions in sentences are available for people who voluntarily testify. Justice can be oriented towards punishing people, creating accountability, or restoring right relationships through confession and restitution (Fletcher & Weinstein, 2002; Hayner, 2002; Minow, 1999; Minow & Rosenblum, 2002; Rigby, 2001; Rotberg & Thompson, 2000). In a study of wrong-doing in business settings, respondents who perceived that there was fair judicial process in place were far more likely to endorse attitudes of forgiveness and reconciliation than those who did not

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have faith in the fairness of the judicial process (Aquino, Tripp, & Bies, 2006). The lack

of justice in South Africa—the decision to grant amnesty to perpetrators who participated

in the TRC, the failure to adequately help victims of the apartheid regime, and continuing

structural economic inequalities between blacks and whites—have been suggested as

reasons for the limited scope of the reconciliation in that country (Gibson, 2002).

Economic development can be an important component of peacebuilding, for

conflicts are frequently driven by economic inequalities or poverty. Eliminating these

structural promoters of violence takes away justifications for war based on grievances

and provides incentives for peace through the promise of higher wealth and income.

Higher rates of post-conflict economic growth have been associated with substantial

reductions in the risk of a post-conflict society relapsing into war in the long term

(Collier, 2003; Collier, Hoeffler, & Soderbom, 2004; Quinn, Mason, & Gurses, 2007).

Poverty, though not economic inequality, has also been associated with the onset of civil

conflict (Collier & Hoeffler, 2002).   A growing body of post conflict scholars have

begun examining the importance of this domain of peace for transitional justice and

reconciliation (de Greiff & Duthie, 2009; Duthie, 2008; Harwell & Le Billon, 2009;

Huggins, 2009; Laplante, 2008; Z. Miller, 2008; Roht-Arriaza & Orlovsky, 2009; Selim

& Murithi, 2011). A study in post-genocide Rwanda found that people who thought that

the economic situation had deteriorated since the genocide were less likely to support

both the judicial proceedings aimed at holding people who committed crimes of genocide

accountable for their actions and were less open to reconciliation with members of other

ethnic groups (Pham, et al., 2004; Stover & Weinstein, 2004).

Institutional capacity building and democratic development are the two final component strategies of social change. Insomuch as sustainable peace and reconciliation are dependent on well-functioning government and civil society to help promote economic development, deal with the inevitable disputes that will arise as groups compete for power and influence, and lead the recovery process generally, this domain is of critical importance. Previous research has found that authoritarian post-conflict states are more likely to be unable to maintain peace than their democratic counterparts, though this effect is dependent on the quality of the democratic process, as the mere fact of holding elections had no protective effect (Collier, et al., 2004; Collier, Hoeffler, & Soderbom, 2008).

One of the major challenges around peacebuilding interventions is that these goals are frequently in tension with one another. Lederach (1997) conceptualizes reconciliation as a social space that opens when peace, justice, mercy, and truth come together in post-conflict situations. These four pillars are not a recipe for reconciliation—take a little peace, mixed in some justice and mercy, and top off with some truth, bake, and you have reconciliation—but rather a guide constructing a framework in which reconciliation, if people desire and work for it, can happen. In later writing, Lederach recognizes that the four pillars can conflict with each other. In particular, too strong an emphasis on post-conflict justice conflicts with the principle of mercy. Moreover, there can be a conflict between justice and truth. As they found in post-apartheid South Africa, there was no way of convincing the former apartheid government officials to tell the truth about what had happened without offering them amnesty, upholding the principles of truth and

mercy while violating important tenants of justice (Lederach, 1999, 2005; see also Minow, 1999; Rotberg & Thompson, 2000).

While Lederach has provided a valuable framework with which to understand post-conflict peace processes, I believe that there is a need to be more explicit about the framing and complexity of each of the four pillars. Lederach conceptualizes peace, for example, as the absence of violence and a lack of threats that could knock a peace process off track. While this type of peace is important, people in Rwanda and elsewhere have told me repeatedly that it is difficult to focus on rebuilding relationships and the institutions of society when so many people do not have any financial security and are one poor harvest or one sickness away from destitution or death. In such a perspective, Johan Galtung's conception of peace as direct, structural, and cultural peace is quite useful. Never forgetting that peace is the absence of acts of violence committed by people against other people, which he calls direct violence, Galtung introduced the concepts of structural peace (Galtung, 1969) and cultural peace (Galtung, 1996) into peace studies. Structural peace is the absence of structural violence, characterized as the absence of structural forms of violence, or the death, pain, and suffering caused not by the direct actions of individuals on individuals but rather by the structures and institutions of society. Structural violence occurs, for example, when a person dies of malaria even though there are readily available and effective drugs to treat the disease. Finally, cultural violence is those societal structures, ideologies, and narratives that legitimize and justify the existence of the other two forms of violence.

Similarly nuanced thinking is valuable for the other three pillars as well. For example, I differentiate between narrative truth and forensic truth when talking about

how truth promotes reconciliation.[3] Somewhat similar to the ideas of micro and macro

justice—micro justice being an individual's perception that he or she has been treated

justly, and macro justice the idea that a perceptions in society that a group or

subpopulation has been treated justly (Brickman, Folger, Goode, & Schul, 1981; Lillie &

Janoff-Bulman, 2007)—I characterize forensic truth as an official and public accounting

of "what really happened" during the conflict, the kind of truth that is written down in

history books and remembered in official ceremonies on significant anniversaries and in

memorials. This accounting does not always do justice to all the experiences of violence

and suffering a country has experienced, for the process of memory-making and history-

recording is always a political process in which various powers compete for what will

and will not be remembered and recorded (Trouillot, 1995). Space must be created for

individuals who lack the power to have their stories recorded in the history books to be

able to tell their own narratives of suffering and pain, particularly if that suffering and

pain is not recognized in the official version.

Justice can also be understood from two perspectives as well. The victims and

survivors of a violent event must feel that they are being fairly treated by the judicial

system, that their suffering has been acknowledged and, to the best of the state's or

perpetrator's ability, compensated. Survivors want to be treated with dignity and respect

by a judicial process. If justice is to occur, they want their continued suffering to end,

meaning that the process will provide them with the resources necessary to heal.

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[3] Ernesto Verdeja creates a third category, phenomenological truth, to cover the category of emotions and
reactions which accompany the sort of events which are catalogued in accountings of forensic truth,
recognizing that people's individual experiences of factual events are unique and determined by a variety of
factors (Verdeja, 2009). Forensic accounts of the truth, which he calls factual truth, miss this component of
history. While the concept of phenomenological truth highlights the importance of emotion in story- and
truth-telling, I am not persuaded that its existence as a separate category is justified. Emotions are part of
narrative and experiential truth, not separate from them.

Survivors and victims also want to know that the people responsible for their victimization are being held accountable and appropriately sanctioned for their actions. While some people want vengeance or compensation, others simply want a confession, but all victims generally want justice to deal with the people who hurt them. On the other side, perpetrators also need to feel like they are being fairly dealt with by a judicial process. They need to have a chance to defend themselves before their accusers. If punishment is to be imposed, perpetrators need to feel that sanctions applied to them are fair. While many perpetrators would argue that any punishment is unfair, they at least need to feel that the quantification of the sentence is proportional to their role in the violence, that it was arrived at through an official process and binding guidelines, not arbitrarily, and that, in the case of financial sanctions, they have a chance to pay the fine or compensation while still being able to provide for themselves (Govier, 2006; Hayner, 2002; Rigby, 2001; Rotberg & Thompson, 2000; Verdeja, 2009).

Finally, there is tension between the ideas of amnesty and forgiveness in regards to Lederach's fourth pillar, mercy. Amnesty, the promise that crimes will not be prosecuted, has been used as a tool in peace processes to get people to tell the truth, or as a means of promoting political stability in situations where there are multiple competing legitimate claims to power in a post-conflict situation. Amnesty operates differently from forgiveness, which is focused on an expression, frequently religious in nature, of pardon by the victim towards the perpetrator. Forgiveness may be required for interpersonal reconciliation, but amnesty is a frequent part of national and community level reconciliatory processes. This is the tension between micro justice, justice for the

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individual, and macro justice, the justice necessary for society to promote rebuilding and reconciliation (Brickman, et al., 1981; Lillie & Janoff-Bulman, 2007).

Conclusion

Both religion and peacebuilding are complex phenomena. For the purposes of this dissertation, religion has several key dimensions. First, it is practiced by individuals, groups, and organizations, all of which influence each other. Religion provides a meaning-making framework that allows individuals and groups to both interpret their experiences in the world and provide justifications for action or inaction. Religion is also an institution insomuch as it has become a value system embedded in the very fabric of life that serves to regulate and influence social, political, and other relationships. While manifestations of religion are often focused on beliefs, behaviors, and organizations that have endured for many centuries, religion also changes as individual and organizations adapt themselves to new social and material realities. Religion as an individual and organizational structure, as a system of meaning making, as an institution, and as a changing phenomenon are all important concepts for the development of this dissertation.

Similarly, peacebuilding has multiple dimensions of interest. It too is practiced at different levels of social organization, ranging from top-level leaders to the grassroots. This dissertation examines the work of religious groups, probably best thought of as mid-level actors, and the connection between faith, coping, and post-conflict growth among "ordinary" people. Post-conflict peacebuilding happens across multiple dimensions: helping victims recover from violence, rebuilding physical and civic infrastructure, preventing the recurrence of violence, and re-establishing relationships (reconciliation).

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My work here focuses on reconciliation, but elements of the other three dimensions also make emerge. Finally, peacebuilding work happens through multiple efforts, including trauma healing, conflict resolution, dialogue, economic development, truth telling, and justice promotion. The sections of the dissertation that are oriented at individual coping and change after the genocide focus on trauma healing and dialogue, but those sections on the role of religious organizations and the government examine truth telling and justice promotion as well.

Chapter II

THE CONTEXT: RELIGION IN RWANDA

In order to understand how religion and spirituality affect both the present and the future in Rwanda, we must also understand Rwanda's past and particularly how religion has played a role in that history. I start with a brief description of pre-colonial history, including the nature of the ethnic divides that led to Rwanda's genocide, and the religious and political landscape of the time. The significant changes in Rwandan society precipitated by the arrival of both European colonial powers and Christian missionaries are an essential element in understanding the eventual genocide, so I will present that period in more detail. Institutional religion and politics were highly intertwined in post-independence, but the relationship remained largely unchanged for nearly thirty years. Invasion and the outbreak of war in 1990 created political tensions within religious institutions, but the historical record is not particularly rich in this regard, so the bulk of my examination of the religious history of Rwanda will rest on religious involvement in the genocide. Rather than simply describing how religious institutions and their members took part in killing, which has been well documented in numerous sources, I will instead analyze how people retrospectively understand and explain the involvement of religiously motivated organizations and individuals in genocide. Finally, I will outline many of the different efforts used to promote reconciliation after the genocide.

A Short (Religious) History of Rwanda

Pre-Colonial Rwanda

Pre-colonial Rwanda was characterized by iron-age technology, a subsistence economy based on livestock, agriculture, and the manufacture of simple tools and pottery (Chrétien, 2003; Vansina, 2004). When the Europeans arrived, the area had a significantly developed political and social system despite limited technology. A central kingdom had expanded to cover much of present-day Rwanda and was still actively conquering or otherwise absorbing chiefdoms and rival kingdoms on its borders (Chrétien, 2003; C. Newbury, 1993, 1998; D. Newbury, 2009; M. C. Newbury, 1978; Vansina, 2004). The monarchy was bound up in indigenous Rwandan religion, which considered the king of divine origin. The king's power and authority were spiritual in origin (Chrétien, 2003; Vansina, 2004). In addition to the religion associated with the royal court, Rwandans worshiped or revered a wide assortment of ancestor spirits and minor deities, offering sacrifices to influence the spirit world in their favor.

The genocide in Rwanda was ethnically based, in which elements of the majority Hutu population slaughtered a large portion of the minority Tutsi population. In pre-colonial kingdom, the monarchy and most of the bureaucrats that served as the administrative apparatus of the country was comprised of the Tutsi. Tutsis were generally seen as pastoralists, whereas the Hutu was agriculturalists. There is another very small ethnic group called the Twa that does not figure either as victims or perpetrators in the genocide. The Twa have historically been identified as forest-dwelling potters. While there are no reliable population counts of the various ethnic groups prior to the genocide—people who should have been classified as Tutsi following

the rules of patrilineal heritage actively tried to change their identity cards and other documents to categorize themselves Hutu in order to gain access to educational and employment opportunities—estimates appearing in numerous sources state that 80 to 90% of the Rwandan population was Hutu, 9 to 19% were Tutsi, and about 1% were Twa.

The nature of the Hutu-Tutsi-Twa identities in pre-colonial Rwanda is hotly debated within the country after the genocide. The official version of history approved by the current government states that these ethnic categories did not exist prior to the arrival of Europeans, that Rwandan identity was unified on a national level, though cleavages of clan and region did exist (Bromley, 2009; Buckley-Zistel, 2006; Freedman, Weinstein, Murphy, & Longman, 2008; Jefremovas, 1997; D. Newbury, 2009; Pottier, 2002). Proponents argue that the existence of a common language used by all three groups proves this theory. The best anthropological evidence challenges this account, however. While the extant archaeological evidence is ambiguous about the nature of the social divisions, the historical accounts, documented foundational myths, and ethnographies produced by the Rwandan elite themselves are clear that Hutu-Tutsi-Twa were identities with significant social weight behind them prior to the arrival of Europeans (Chrétien, 2003; Jefremovas, 1997; Vansina, 2004).

In further proof of the pre-colonial existence of socially and politically meaningful ethnic groups, Nigel Eltringham identifies six meanings to the term Tutsi that were applicable in different times and contexts in pre-colonial Rwanda. It could describe a) possession of wealth in cattle; b) membership in certain elite lineages; c) having the favor of the king; d) a title marking an elite status to confer social recognition on certain

people; e) the status of anyone who owned cattle regardless of quantity; or f) a label for anyone who was not Hutu (Eltringham, 2004, p. 14). Vansina argues that Hutu signified any lower class, rural person who acted in ways seen as uncivilized by the royal court (Vansina, 2004). There was some flexibility in identity: Hutu could become Tutsis if they had enough cows or were granted status by the king, and Tutsi could be demoted to Hutu status. Claudine Vidal has called the Tutsi elite that governed Rwanda a fourth ethnic group, functionally separate in their social role and class from ordinary Tutsi (Chrétien, 2003; Vidal, 1991). There is reliable research that phenotype and genotype distinctions exist between all three groups (Mamdani, 2001), though there are suggestions that phenotypic distinctions are due to lifestyle and nutritional differences between the groups rather than genotype (Rodney, 1981). Regardless of biological or cultural roots, Hutu and Tutsi were "political identities formed first and foremost through the state" (Katongole, Payne, Dagne, Stockman, & Murigande, 2005, p. 71; see also Mamdani, 2001). An understanding of these identities as primarily political serves to highlight how political changes in the pre-colonial kingdom led to shifts in ethnic identities. Multiple writers have attempted to trace shifts in the significance of the Hutu and Tutsi identities in pre-colonial Rwanda. There is an emerging consensus that social and economic stratification aligned with ethnic identity was becoming more firmly entrenched in the latter half of the nineteenth century (Carney, 2012; Des Forges, 2011; Mamdani, 2001; C. Newbury, 1993; Pottier, 2002; Rudakemwa, 2007; Vansina, 2004).

Colonial Rwanda

The ambiguity and flexibility in ethnic and social identity, already in flux in the country, came to an abrupt end when Europeans colonized Rwanda. Representatives of the German government first arrived in 1897, seven years after a conference in Brussels allocated that portion of east Africa to them. After World War I, Germany was stripped of its overseas possessions and Rwanda was given to the Belgians under a League of Nations mandate. Belgian anthropologists began studying the social structure of Rwanda and its morphological correlates.[4] They interpreted the phenotypic differences they discovered in the light of the Hamitic hypothesis, suggesting that the Tutsis were racially superior to the Hutu and Twa because they more resembled Europeans. They believed the Tutsis had migrated from northern Africa and were likely descendants of the Biblical figure of Ham (Gatwa, 2000).

Given the supposed similarity and common ancestry of the Tutsi to Europeans, the Belgians considered the Tutsis the natural ruling class of Rwanda and began to favor them with better access to education and positions in the civil service. In 1935, the Belgians also instituted a formal identity card system, recording every person's ethnic identity and declaring that ethnic identity was to be passed down patrilineally, eliminating the flexibility that had previously "promoted" or "demoted" people according to complex social and economic considerations (Chrétien, 2003; Des Forges, 2011; C. Newbury, 1993, 1998; M. C. Newbury, 1978).

Catholic missionaries accompanied the first colonial administrators into Rwanda and immediately began efforts to establish mission stations and convert people to

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[4] Using calipers and other anthropometric measurement devices, on a population basis, the Tutsis were found to be taller, have thinner noses and smaller lips than the Hutus .

Christianity. Protestant missionaries from Anglican, Adventist, Presbyterian, and Methodist denominations followed in the early part of the twentieth century (Guillebaud, 2002; Linden, 1977; Longman, 2009b; Ngabo, 2008). Muslims also entered the country as traders, but they remained a minor social force eschewing major proselytization, comprising at most 1% of the population prior to 1994. All the Christian missions worked closely with the colonial authorities, monitoring the local population and providing intelligence to the authorities about potential rebellion or violence (Linden, 1977). Initially the missions struggled to win converts, finding the most success with people who were poor and of low social standing. The influential Tutsi monarchy remained suspicious of and hostile to the new churches, frustrating the mission's efforts to win visible and influential converts among the high leadership (Carney, 2012; Linden, 1977; Sibomana, 1999). Over time the missions began to take on greater economic significance as they employed local people, and the missionaries acquired social status as they mediated disputes and began to govern the areas around their stations. A school for government officials supported by both the Belgians and the Catholic Church meant that increasing numbers of European-trained and -influenced Rwandans were becoming prominent in the country, challenging the traditional authority of the monarchy (Linden, 1977). Seeing the increasing power of the missions, King (*Mwami* in Kinyarwanda) Musinga began accommodating them, strategically granting them certain hills for new mission stations. He did this in part so as to extend his own influence and control that was then marginal in some areas of the country (Linden, 1977). By the 1920s, it was clear that the King was no longer at the top of the political hierarchy in Rwanda, having been displaced by the Belgian administrators and the mission leaders (Linden, 1977).

The church continued attract mostly Hutu converts until the late 1920s, when the Tutsis

began converting en masse to seek the social and economic benefits Christianity

provided. The Belgians deposed Mwami Musinga in 1931 and replaced him with his son

Mutara, who had recently converted to Christianity and had received catechism

instruction from the church. After a Catholic king gained the throne, the pace of

conversions accelerated, and soon Catholicism was the dominant religion in Rwanda

(Linden, 1977). Where early Catholic attempts at proselytization garnered converts

among the lowest classes of Rwandan society, after 1930 Catholicism became almost

universal among the political elite of the country(Carney, 2012).

The church had considerable influence in the latter days of the Belgian

administration. It ran the school system with a subsidy from the state. In addition, the

first newspapers in the country were run by the Catholic Church (Linden, 1977). The

dominant discourse around the role of European religion in colonial Rwanda states that

church leaders actively supported the Hamitic theory of Rwandan origins (Chrétien,

2003; Gatwa, 2000), which was certainly true under the first leaders of the Rwandan

mission (Carney, 2012). Both church and government favored the Tutsi aristocracy,

educating the sons of the nobles and reserving access to professional positions for them

(Linden, 1977). Church favoritism was influenced not only racist theories of Tutsi origin

but also pragmatic attempts to convert and influence the existing elite of Rwandan

society (Carney, 2012).

By the 1940s and 1950s, structural preferences for the Tutsi were starting to

unravel. The United Nations made it clear that Belgium had to give Rwanda

independence and was obliged to help the country move toward democratic rule. In

addition, many of the new priests and nuns from Europe were uncomfortable with the

Church's preference for the Tutsi, a discomfort exacerbated by their own class

consciousness as the sons and daughters of working class people, though the mission

leadership was largely drawn from the upper classes of European society (Linden, 1977;

Sibomana, 1999). Various moves towards democracy were made, ending the clientelistic

relationship (corvée labor) known as *ubuhake* which forced the lower classes (both Hutu

and Tutsi) to provide free labor to the ruling Tutsi elite. The reforms also began to

redistribute limited amounts of land (Linden, 1977). As Rwanda approached

independence in the decolonizing surge of the 1950s and 1960s, the church and colonial

government were at once torn between supporting the minority Tutsi who had historically

governed the country and the majority Hutu who, by rights, should have a significant role

to play in a democratic government. The Belgians abruptly switched their preferential

treatment from the Tutsis to the Hutus in 1959, sparking an outbreak of violence against

the Tutsi which led tens of thousands of them to flee to neighboring countries as refugees.

Post-Independence Rwanda

Upon independence in 1962, the new Hutu leaders sought to consolidate their

control over various institutions by excluding the Tutsis from important governmental

and administrative posts. A quota system was established, limiting the Tutsis to only 9%

of the available slots in schools and universities. Juvenal Habyarimana mounted a

military coup in 1973, claiming he was attempting to stabilize the country and end a

corrupt government. His government began enforcing the ethnic quotas more strictly,

forcing Tutsi teachers, doctors, and professors to resign amidst some small-scale

violence. Habyarimana remained in power until 1994 as a one-party dictator, initially

leading the country through rapid development but then through economic stagnation and

increasing social tensions (Des Forges, 1999; Prunier, 1997).

The churches in Rwanda during this period were also changing. Rwandan clergy,

trained since the very beginning to take up leadership of the evangelistic enterprise and

administration of the church, began taking more senior positions in the church

hierarchies. All the major churches had significant social programs as well, providing a

substantial portion of the country's educational and health services. Church-based

programs were major employers, particularly away from the larger cities (Longman,

2009b). What did not change, however, was the close alliance between church and state,

even though the leadership of both had transferred to native Rwandans (Longman, 2001).

Leaders of the churches had to be at least tacitly approved by the government, and the

preferential treatment for Hutus was accepted by the churches in regards to their

leadership appointments (Bizimana, 2001; Linden, 1977; Longman, 2001, 2009b). In

return, the government included religious leaders on councils and committees at all levels

of administration; the Catholic Archbishop even served on the ruling party's central

committee.

The Genocide

The causes of Rwanda's genocide are multiple and complex. However, before

examining the role of religious individuals and groups in the events of 1994, it is

somewhat important to put their actions in context. While large-scale, politically

motivated violence did not break out in post-independence Rwanda until 1990, the

country was experiencing significant social pressures for at least a decade prior to then. Tutsi families that fled from the country in response to the outbreaks of violence in 1959, 1962, and 1972 were advocating for their right to return, in part because their reception in their host countries was quite hostile (Des Forges, 1999; Prunier, 1997). The Rwandan government refused these entreaties, replying that the country was "full" as there was insufficient land to support the large number of returning refugees. Rwanda's population density is very high, and the large majority of the population depends on subsistence agriculture. These population pressures, combined with ecological degradation and the collapse of the prices of the commodities upon which Rwandan exports were based, led to significant economic problems (Boudreaux, 2009; Des Forges, 1999; Jefremovas, 2002; Pottier, 2002; Prunier, 1997). With the end of the Cold War and the termination of unconditional aid from friendly allies such as France and the United States, Rwanda was forced to turn to the World Bank and multilateral donors for economic assistance. The international community offered a financial assistance package that forced to the government to make structural adjustments to its budget and economy, including reductions in government spending, a move towards a more free market-based economy, and transitions to democracy (Andersen, 2000; Ballet, Mahieu, & Radja, 2007; Chossudovsky, 1996; Des Forges, 1999; Jefremovas, 2002; Langford, 2005; Prunier, 1997; Storey, 2001; Uvin, 2001).

The move towards multi-party democracy took place in a political context dominated by cronyism, corruption, and one-party dictatorship. The clientelistic relationships that defined the Rwandan polity prior to colonization continued in some form, as those people who occupied positions of power in post-independence Rwanda

rewarded their family and friends. The move towards multi-party democracy was a direct

threat to the privileged positions of the small group of people who benefited enormously

from their control over the political and economic apparatuses of Rwanda (Des Forges,

1999; Langford, 2005; Longman, 2009b; Pottier, 2002; Prunier, 1997).

The planned transition to democracy was further complicated by the armed

invasion of the country in October 1990 by the Rwandan Patriot Front (RPF), a group of

Tutsi exiles based in neighboring Uganda. While the initial invasion was quickly

rebuffed, the RPF was able to gain control of a large swath of the northern part of the

country in successive attacks. The sudden emergence of the RPF as a *de facto* power

necessitated their participation in the process of democratization. Negotiations for

democratic government were subsumed into larger peace negotiations that took place

with the assistance of regional mediators in Arusha, Tanzania. The Arusha Accords

eventually outlined a power-sharing agreement granting executive and ministerial posts

as well as parliamentary seats to certain current incumbents, the RPF, and a range of

other new political parties. Certain groups of people within Rwanda whose privileged

positions were threatened by the proposed changes were extremely unhappy with the

agreement, and they began to work to undermine it. They chose to emphasize the ethnic

divisions in Rwandan society and begin casting the Tutsi—both in the RPF and those

who remained in Rwanda—as a threat to the well-being and prosperity of the country

(Des Forges, 1999; Jefremovas, 2002; Langford, 2005; Longman, 2009b; Prunier, 1997).

After 1990, these groups began to refine a political ideology and produce propaganda that

marginalized and dehumanized the Tutsi population. They also began to surreptitiously

import weapons, train militias, and plan for an eventual violent takeover of the

government, all the while under observation by the relatively impotent UN peacekeeping force UNAMIR (Gourevitch, 1999; Melvern, 2000, 2006; Prunier, 1997). On April 6, 1994, the President of Rwanda's plane was shot down on approach to Kigali airport, and these groups began assassinating their political opponents and unleashing the preplanned genocide of the Tutsi population and anyone else who opposed them. The RPF immediately resumed their armed offensive but were unable to conquer the country and put an end to the genocide until July 1994. While the exact death toll of these one hundred days of genocide is unknowable,[5] current estimates indicate that nearly one million people died, over 15% of the population.

It would be a mistake to consider the genocide only an action perpetrated by an extremist element of the Rwandan political class. Certainly they organized, prepared for, and financed the genocide, but the majority of the killing was carried out by members of the general population (Fujii, 2009). In the post-genocide *gacaca* courts, a participatory, community-based judicial system set up to try perpetrators of genocide, over 800,000 people have been charged with organizing the massacres, killing or injuring people, or looting property during the genocide (National Service of *Gacaca* Jurisdictions, 2008). How this group of people was motivated to commit these crimes is an important part of understanding the origins of genocide. There are multiple reasons. First, the political

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[5] There is some controversy over the number of people said to have died in the genocide. Soon after the genocide, Prunier made a very rough estimation of approximately 800,000 people dead, 750,000 of whom were Tutsi (Prunier, 1997), a number which was quickly accepted as authoritative in much of the literature. Using a similar methodology, Reyntjens estimated about 1.1 million dead (Reyntjens, 1997). Others have claimed that only 500,000 Tutsis died with another 100,000 Hutu fatalities (Kuperman, 2001; Mamdani, 2001). A Ministry of Local Government and Social Affairs report said that 1,074,017 Rwandans had died during the genocide, a number which excludes those killed in other violence during the same period (Ministère de l'Administration locale, 2002). Reyntjens says this number lacks credibility, both for its precision and because even the largest estimates of the number of Tutsis in the pre-genocide Rwandan population was well under one million individuals (Reyntjens, 2004). A later government report put the number of dead at 937,000 (Ministry of Youth Culture and Sports, 2004).

class was exceptionally talented at the process of dehumanizing the Tutsis. Using radio, other forms of media, and community meetings, the organizers of the genocide characterized the Tutsi as cockroaches or snakes that must be exterminated (Africa Rights, 1995; Des Forges, 1999; Fujii, 2009; Gourevitch, 1999; Prunier, 1997). Second, the clientelism and hierarchy in Rwandan culture also meant that people were predisposed to obey the commands of the government, that was pervasive in Rwandan life. The country was divided into provinces, communes, sectors, cells, and groups of one hundred and ten houses, each division overseen by a governmental representative, so the ability to escape surveillance was minimal. All citizens were expected to participate monthly in communal work to build roads, repair soil terraces, or plant trees. In this context, participation in the genocide was seen as obeying, as people had done for years, government orders and the fulfillment of people's obligations of communal work (Des Forges, 1999; Fujii, 2009; Gourevitch, 1999; Prunier, 1997). Finally, the killing was also driven by material and economic motivations (Pottier, 2002). A significant portion of people charged with crimes of genocide have been accused of Category Three crimes, or crimes against property (National Service of *Gacaca* Jurisdictions, 2008). Testimony of many perpetrators and their families also reveal that they participated in the killing in order to profit from their neighbors' flocks and fields and to loot their homes (Fujii, 2009; Hatzfeld, 2005b).

Religious Involvement in the Genocide

It is perhaps tempting to understand the genocide solely as an event perpetrated by people who were acting in their own political and material interest. We must,

however, also seek to understand the religious elements of the genocide for three reasons. First, the genocide took place in what has been called the most Christian country in Africa, one in which over 90% of the population professed membership in a variety of Christian denominations. For a religion that professes peace and love of both enemies and neighbors, the crimes of its Rwandan adherents are a significant challenge (though perhaps not a surprise, given the behavior of other Christians in the Crusades, Inquisition, and even in justifying recent wars such as the invasion of Iraq. In this light, I am all too cognizant that there is an injustice in attempting to hold the Rwandan church and Christians to a standard that churches and Christians in the global North themselves have not met). Second, some of the leaders of the genocide were also religious leaders, priests and pastors and nuns. Moreover, many of the killings were conducted in churches, as these locations had served sanctuaries during periods of past violence. Finally, religious institutions and leaders did relatively little to use their power to either save people or condemn the genocide.

Christians as killers. Many of the more than 800,000 people who have been accused of crimes of genocide are Christian. Though statistics are not collected on the religious affiliations of people who have been accused, the religious demographics of Rwanda at the time mean that the vast majority of those people implicated in the genocide were Christian. What is striking in the literature about this group is that few of them seem to have used their religious identities or drew upon the teachings of their religious traditions to justify their participation in the violence. While there are mentions in a variety of sources on how some of the killers would attend regular religious services or participate in religious exercises like prayer over the course of the genocide (Hatzfeld,

2005a, 2005b), I can find few mentions in the literature that they believed God would somehow guide them through or bless them in their task or that they felt like their actions had been ordained by God, religious tradition, or Scripture. Allison Des Forges notes that leaders on the radio would from time to time assert that the Virgin Mary had assured victory, or that God had abandoned the Tutsis (Des Forges, 1999, p. 246). However, doctrines used to justify violence in other contexts, such as just war theory, are absent in the few religious overtones of the genocide. This absence is in stark contrast to the religious justifications that are cited by those relatively few people who risked their lives to hide and shelter people who were targeted by the genocide (Rutayisire, 1995).

Some of the most high-profile participants in the genocide were religious leaders, both ordained clergy and lay leaders. In a report published soon after the genocide which was compiled using data collected in a non-systematic way, Africa Rights identifies an extensive list of clergy members who participated in some form in the genocide (Africa Rights, 1995). Similarly, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), set up by the United Nations to try organizers of the genocide who had fled the country after their military defeat, has charged six clergy out of 88 defendants, including an Anglican bishop. Particularly grievous examples of religious leaders' involvement include the rector at the oldest Catholic Church in Kigali where several thousand people had taken shelter. He compiled lists of the people present and coordinated with the killers who had surrounded the church to find particular sought individuals who were handed over and killed. At his trial, he justified his actions by saying that cooperating with the killers to identify select individuals was the only way to save the remaining people in the church, most of whom did survive (Africa Rights, 1995; Gourevitch, 1999). The parish priest at

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Kaduha, the site of famous Marian apparitions in southern Rwanda, led groups of killers to seek out people in hiding throughout parish buildings and in the grounds (Africa Rights, 1995; Gourevitch, 1999). The priest at Nyange paid a roadwork crew to bulldoze his church in order to kill the thousands of people who had taken refuge there (Africa Rights, 1995; Gourevitch, 1999). Leaders of the Seventh Day Adventist church and hospital at Mugonero in the west of the country had been principal organizers and leaders of the genocide in that location (Africa Rights, 1995; Gourevitch, 1999; Locke, 2004). These egregious examples are notorious throughout Rwanda, but they are joined by a litany of lesser-known examples where priests, pastors, and nuns refused to open their facilities to people who were looking for hiding places or betrayed the people who had, authorized or not, gone into hiding in their buildings. Of the hundreds, perhaps thousands, of foreign missionaries in the country, all but a handful were evacuated by western governments at the outbreak of the genocide, meaning they could not protect anyone. To be fair, these leaders were not necessarily acting in cold blood but rather were seeking to protect their schools, hospitals, monasteries, and church buildings from damage and seeking to protect themselves and the members of their families and religious congregations or orders from seeming to be siding with the Tutsi and the invading RPF, suspicion of which could have led to their own deaths. Nonetheless, their refusal to help cost thousands of lives.

Religious leaders were also targets of the killings, and some risked a great deal to shelter all the people they could. A small number of people sacrificed their own lives in an attempt to protect people who were targeted for death (Africa Rights, 1995; Des Forges, 1999; Gourevitch, 1999). One of the first massacres to occur after the president's

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death was at a Jesuit center in Kigali which had become the headquarters of a small but effective church-based human rights organization, the Association of Volunteers for Peace (Africa Rights, 1995). Tutsi pastors, priests, and nuns were killed throughout the country. Religious leaders at the Catholic schools at Ndera near Kigali and in Gisenyi who otherwise would have been spared were killed because of their attempts to save people (Africa Rights, 1995). Sometimes this resistance was somewhat more effective, as the priest in charge of the Pastoral Center at Saint Paul managed to save many people's lives who had taken shelter in his facility (Gourevitch, 1999). People associated with Islam in Rwanda, both leaders and ordinary members, have generally been portrayed in a positive light after the genocide, given that mosques and Muslim homes became much more of a safe shelter for people than were churches, though some Muslims did participate in the killing (Africa Rights, 1995; Kubai, 2007b; Tiemessen, 2005).

Churches as sites of genocide. I have already described how priests and pastors at Kigali (St Famille), Kaduha, Ngorero, and Nyanza directly participated in or abetted the killing of people who attempted to take shelter in their church-run facilities. Many thousands of other people were killed in religious buildings across Rwanda, though religious leaders were not implicated in many of these killings. When violence broke out in Rwanda in 1994, many people who remembered the violence of 1972 and the sporadic killing that occurred after 1990 recalled that churches had served as effective places of refuge, and they flocked to their local church with many of their belongings to wait out the violence (Des Forges, 1999; McCullum, 1995). Unfortunately, the killers did not respect the sanctuary offered by churches on this occasion, though no one has adequately explained how the events of 1994 were substantially different than previous outbreaks of

violence in this regard. At two sites south of Kigali, Ntarama and Nyamata, the killers

surrounded the church buildings while people barricaded themselves inside. They broke

holes the walls and tossed in grenades, whereupon the people inside were hacked to death

using machetes (Africa Rights, 1995; Des Forges, 1999; Gourevitch, 1999). These

scenes repeated themselves at multiple other sites in Rwanda. Africa Rights has made

the claim that more people were killed in churches in Rwanda in 1994 than in any other

location (Africa Rights, 1995), though the manner by which they calculated these

numbers, and how these numbers compare with the number of people killed in their own

homes, in the fields, or at roadblocks is unclear.

Churches failing to prevent genocide. Beyond criticism that the majority of

killers were Christians, that unconscionable numbers of clergy and other religious leaders

participated in the killing, and that religious facilities were used as killing grounds and

concentration camps, the major accusation leveled at religious leaders and institutions is

that they either failed to use their considerable power to condemn the genocide or that

they deliberately minimized the nature of the violence in Rwanda to the benefit of the

genocide regime. Several high ranking clergy served as effective mouthpieces for the

genocidal regime, telling the international community that a civil war was occurring and

that it should not take sides and intervene. They justified the violence by saying that the

government had been attacked first, and they completely denied that civilians were being

deliberately targeted. Given the privileged and pervasive position of religious institutions

in Rwandan society, condemnations from religious leaders may have gone a long way

either in convincing the international community to intervene in the conflict or in

reducing the intensity and scope of the genocide even if they could not have stopped it all

together. (Africa Rights, 1995; Bizimana, 2001; Des Forges, 1999; Gourevitch, 1999; Longman, 2001, 2009b).

Theodicic Understandings of the Genocide

Beyond simply describing how religious people and institutions participated or were otherwise involved in the genocide, we must also analyze the ways in which people understand how the nature of religion in Rwanda made this involvement possible. To do so, I make use of numerous religiously themed books and memoirs about the genocide, identifying explicit and implicit understandings of the causes of genocide. I do not claim that there can be a definitive explanation of the evil of the genocide, but commentators on the genocide have, explicitly or implicitly, put forth religiously-oriented theories on how the genocide could have taken place in Rwanda. I group the explanations into three categories. First, some people focus on the faith of individuals to explain the genocide. Second, some explanations focus on the failings of religious leaders and organizations. Third, other explanations focus on the influence of supernatural entities, are presented below. These explanations are not mutually exclusive.

The people were not really Christian, or were insufficiently Christian. This explanation examines the actions of the people who were nominally Christian, finds them morally deficient, and declares that the people who committed the genocide could not possibly have been Christian if they acted in a manner clearly antithetical to Christian teaching. True Christians with a mature faith would not have committed genocide (again, there is a certain hypocrisy in this view, especially when espoused by people from the global North). This understanding of the root cause of genocide suggests that if people

had somehow been more Christian or better Christians, the genocide would not have taken place (Guillebaud, 2002; Katongole, et al., 2005).

People's ethnic identities were more important than their religious identities. A closely related explanation for genocide to the view that people were not sufficiently Christian is that their religion—while truly and honestly believed—was less important in Rwandan society than ethnic identities. When crisis emerged, people were more loyal to their ethnic identities than they were to their faith (Locke, 2004). Conflicts within churches prior to the genocide often had ethnic overtones, and religious leader would often try to promote their ethnic group at the expense the other (Linden, 1977; Longman, 2009b; McCullum, 1995).

Christian missionaries introduced destructive ideologies into Rwanda. The next explanation transfers responsibility from individual Rwandan Christians to individual Christian missionaries. Looking back at the history described previously, current commentators in Rwanda believe that the introduction by European missionaries of Hamitic ideologies in Rwanda, coupled with the clear favoritism of one or the other ethnic groups and the artificial hardening of ethnic identities, made violent ethnically-based conflict far more likely than it otherwise would have been (Bjornlund, Markusen, Steenberg, & Ubaldo, 2004; Des Forges, 1999; Freedman, et al., 2008; Gatwa, 2000; Longman, 2004, 2009b; Ugirashebuja, 2004). Certain commentators have placed the blame for genocide on the early missionaries' interest in and preferential treatment of the ruling classes of Rwandan society and the subsequent switch of allegiances by the next "generation" of missionaries. This switch reflected a change in the missionaries' own class and ethnic heritages. The early mission leadership was drawn from the aristocratic

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classes of French, Belgian, and British society, but the leadership of the 1940s and 1950s

came from the working classes of urban Belgium (Lindman, 1977). Moreover, Timothy

Longman suggests that the early missionaries went to great lengths to portray themselves

as morally and spiritually superior to their Rwandan converts. In his analysis of the

Gahini revival,[6] the missionaries actively sought to discredit the movement because it

appeared to demonstrate that the Rwandan converts, newly introduced to Christianity,

were more pious and connected with the divine than were the far more educated and

experienced missionaries (Longman, 2009).

      Religious institutions were too close to the government. One of the strongest

critiques of the Rwandan church in the years leading up to the genocide was that it was

entirely too enmeshed with the workings of government (Bowen, 2004; Katongole &

Wilson-Hartgrove, 2009; Longman, 2001, 2009b; McCullum, 1995). I have already

described how religious leaders occupied important posts in the government machinery

and how the government in turn had a role in choosing candidates for episcopal

appointments. Critics, viewing the churches' tacit (in the absence of widespread, church-

based dissent) and oftentimes overt support for government actions and policy in the run

up to the genocide and during its conduct, argue that the religious establishment was

unable to speak in a prophetic voice to criticize the government because in some real way

church and government had merged (Longman, 2001, 2009b). While isolated voices of

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[6] The Gahini revival was a mass conversion event in 1936 at the Anglican mission at Gahini in eastern
Rwanda, where events interpreted as dramatic manifestations of the Holy Spirit incited many Rwandans to
convert to Christianity. A part of a wider "movement of the Spirit" throughout the region, the East African
Revival would reverberate among Evangelical Christians around the world. The missionaries, while among
the most Evangelical of Anglicans, were initially very suspicious of these events, which they thought might
be the work of the devil. As the revival spread at Gahini, the converts questioned the spiritual credentials
of the missionaries and began to challenge their authority . A similar supernatural manifestation occurred
in the 1980s at Kibeho, in southern Rwanda, where several Catholic schoolgirls saw disturbing visions of
the Virgin Mary, again challenging the ability of the institutional church to guide and control its members.

dissent certainly existed, and the Vatican itself was sufficiently concerned about the closeness of church and state that it directed its Rwandan archbishop to resign from the central committee of the ruling party, the closeness of church and government in post-independence Rwanda mirrored the relationship between missionaries and the colonial administration pre-independence.

Religious institutions failed to confront an unjust social order. For many decades prior to the genocide, Rwanda had experienced various forms of injustice. While the Hutu majority initially faced discrimination, eventually the roles reversed and the Tutsi minority was discriminated against. Irrespective of ethnicity, there was a significant divide between rich and poor in the country. Rwandan churches did little to confront this problem (Bowen, 2004; Guillebaud, 2002; Katongole & Wilson-Hartgrove, 2009; Linden, 1977; Longman, 2009b). During the two decades prior to the genocide, church leaders were largely Hutu, and it was their ethnic group that was benefitting from discrimination (Linden, 1977; Longman, 2009b). Moreover, the churches, given their long history of alignment with the government, had little capacity to mount a prophetic voice in the interests of justice. To be sure, the theological, ethical, and intellectual resources to help the churches find this voice existed in the religious world outside of Rwanda, including liberation theology in Latin America and the principled opposition of some churches to apartheid in South Africa, but these movements had little impact in Rwanda (Longman, 2009b). Finally, particularly in the Protestant churches, the focus had always been on an evangelistic piety to the exclusion of much socially oriented work beyond basic service provision (Guillebaud, 2002; Linden, 1977).

Religious institutions failed to adequately evangelize people. This cause largely accepts the charge that Rwandans were insufficiently Christian, and that their lack of understanding of the faith contributed to the genocide, but it transfers ultimate responsibility for the shallowness of their faith to the institutions and leaders who were charged with shepherding the flocks, churches and priests, for insufficiently fulfilling this important task (Bowen, 2004; Guillebaud, 2002; Rutayisire, 1995). The churches were more interested in producing nominal converts and increasing the number of baptisms or confirmations rather than ensuring the quality of those who sought to become members, a tension that was discussed by missionary leaders in the earliest days of Rwandan evangelization (Lindman, 1977). Churches failed to ensure that their members truly understood the tenets of Christianity. In some ways, the success of the *Abarokore* and Charismatic Catholic movements in Rwanda during the 1980s underscore this critique. They were efforts by lay Christians, oftentimes in direct conflict with official church authorities, to deepen people's faith and move towards a strict individual piety that they felt was lacking in teaching and programmatic efforts of the mainstream churches (Longman, 2009b).

Supernatural explanations. There are three other religious explanations of the genocide, all focused on supernatural action. The first is that God abandoned Rwanda, and it was the departure of the deity that allowed the genocide to occur (Hatzfeld, 2009; Sibomana, 1999). A pre-colonial religious belief in Rwanda stated that Imana, the god at the top of the supernatural hierarchy, roamed the earth during the day but always returned to Rwanda to sleep at night. Some people explain the genocide as Imana (now also the name for the Christian God) having left Rwanda even during the night. Evangelical

Christians have individualized this view by claiming that the Holy Spirit left the hearts of

the people who became genocidal killers in Rwanda, and the absence of the Spirit

allowed them to commit crimes of genocide (Guillebaud, 2002).

An alternate explanation for the genocide is that God was somehow punishing

Rwanda.   People have identified a variety of "sins" for which Rwanda would need to be

punished, ranging from the persistence of syncretic pre-colonial religious beliefs ("devil

worship") and practices in the country to the standard range of sins that human beings

commit against God and each other, lying, stealing, cheating, sexual sins, and the like

(Hatzfeld, 2009; Rucyahana, 2008). A related explanation is that God was testing

Rwanda in some way, or had handed Rwanda over to Satan to be tested like Job had

been, but similar challenges to this explanation also persist.

Finally, given the widespread belief in Rwanda that spirits and demons interact

with the everyday world, many people believe that demons were somehow responsible

for the genocide (Guillebaud, 2002; Hatzfeld, 2009; Rucyahana, 2008). These

supernatural explanations point in two directions. First, they reveal a belief in an inherent

flaw or weakness in individuals in Rwanda who were unable to resist the temptations that

befell them due to the work of demons or the absence of God or which caused God to

abandon or punish them or leave them vulnerable to the predations of demons. Second,

they represent an attempt to transfer responsibility for the genocide away from personal,

institutional, and structural problems in Rwanda to supernatural causes, thus absolving

people of responsibility for the violence.

Post-Genocide Rwanda

Compared to the vast literature describing the genocide and analyzing its causes, there is relatively little dealing with Rwanda's post genocide recovery. Much of the existing literature on the topic is descriptive commentary. In this next section, I shall attempt to briefly describe the dynamics of post-genocide Rwanda, covering economic, political, and religious changes as well as efforts at promoting justice, peace, and reconciliation by both the government and non-governmental organizations, including religious organizations.

Political and Economic Changes

Upon their victory, the Rwandan Patriotic Front committed to implementing the power sharing principles of the Arusha Accords, though without the participation of people who had committed crimes of genocide. In 1994, they established a Government of National Unity. There were many challenges, including a refugee crisis, a decimated economic and institutional infrastructure, and continuing insurgency by elements of the old government who attacked the country from bases in Zaire/the Democratic Republic of the Congo. By 2003, however, they had established a new constitution and held the first democratic elections for the legislature and presidency in the history of the country. Additional rounds of elections have been held in 2008 and 2010. During this time, significant strides have been made to formally recognize women's rights (Burnet, 2008a), reform the educational system, expand the health system, minimize corruption in government services, and create a policy framework to encourage development. Despite these positive changes, there is a significant democratic deficit in Rwanda. Most of the

senior positions in government have been occupied by Tutsi refugees from Uganda who have been accused of using Rwanda's continuing influence in the conflicts in the Democratic Republic of the Congo to enrich themselves. The rights of Rwandans to political dissent are limited, as the government vigorously enforces narratives of national origin which emphasize everyone's Rwandan heritage and eliminates the ethnic identities which were the focus of the genocide and may now be foci of continuing economic, political, and social disparities (Beswick, 2010; Brandstetter, 2010; Buckley-Zistel, 2006, 2009; Burnet, 2008b; Eramian, 2009; Freedman, et al., 2008; Ingelaere, 2010; Andrea Purdeková, 2011; Reyntjens, 2004, 2011; Silva-Leander, 2008; Stansell, 2007; Zorbas, 2004).

Promoting Justice and Reconciliation

One of the major challenges in post-genocide Rwanda has been to hold the people who planned, organized, and implemented the genocide accountable for their actions. After the genocide, tens of thousands of people were imprisoned on suspicion of having committed crimes of genocide. The government, faced with a decimated judicial infrastructure, began by trying the people they considered most responsible for what had happened. At the rate the trials were proceeding in the late 1990s, however, it would have taken over a hundred years to try all the people currently in prison, let alone the thousands of people who had not yet been apprehended. The government began looking for other solutions. Their solution was the *gacaca* process, a revival of a traditional participatory justice framework which had been previously used in Rwandan villages (Burnet, 2008b, 2010; Daly, 2001-2002; Honeyman, et al., 2004; Karbo & Mutisi, 2008;

Lahiri, 2009; Longman, 2009b). Guided by a panel of elected *inyangamugayo* (literally translated as people of great esteem), each community in Rwanda would gather together weekly to create lists of the people who had been killed or injured during the genocide as well as the property that had been looted or destroyed. Perpetrators were then charged with committing these crimes. Hearings for crimes against property and low-level injuries or killings were tried at the village-based tribunal with the full community present. People who were charged with sexual crimes or of planning or inciting the genocide had their cases transferred to the regular judicial system (Honeyman, et al., 2004; Rettig, 2008). At the beginning of the process, people were given significant reductions in sentencing (a combination of jail time and community service, scaled to the nature of the offense) if they confessed prior to the sentencing phase. It had been hoped that the process would resemble a sort of restorative justice, enabling victims and offenders each to testify what had happened to them, to re-establish accountability, and to promote reconciliation (Daly, 2001-2002; Staub, 2004; Uvin & Mironko, 2003). Unfortunately, the luster of those hopes has faded, as victims have noted that the process does little to meet their material or psychological needs. There have been allegations that the process can be easily corrupted with lies and silence. Many Rwandans have resented the requirement of frequent participation in *gacaca*, feeling the process is not relevant to them or offers them nothing (Apuuli, 2009; Brandstetter, 2010; Brounéus, 2008b, 2010; Burnet, 2008b, 2010; Eramian, 2008, 2009; Hilker, 2009; Honeyman, et al., 2004; Ingelaere, 2009, 2010; Kohen, et al., 2011; Megwalu & Loizides, 2010b; Nessel, 2007; Olwine, 2011; Andrea Purdeková, 2011; Rettig, 2008; Rimé, Kanyangara, Yzerbyt, & Paez, 2011; Sosnov, 2007; Stansell, 2007; Thomson, 2011a; Waldorf, 2011; Zorbas,

2009). In addition to the 800,000 people charge domestically, approximately 80

defendants have been tried by the international community at the International Criminal

Tribunal for Rwanda, an international court set up to prosecute people arrested outside of

Rwanda.

During the last eighteen years many books (Guillebaud, 2002, 2005; Hatzfeld,

2005a, 2005b, 2009; Kaggwa, 2003; Katongole & Wilson-Hartgrove, 2009; Larson,

2009; Rucyahana, 2008) and films (Bromley, 2009) have been written and created to

document the astonishing moves Rwandans have made towards reconciliation. They all

have remarkable stories to tell about the progress the country has made toward

forgiveness and reconciliation amidst unspeakable horror. At the same time, this

literature, which is based on select interviews and often analyzed and presented for its

emotional power rather than their rigorous portrayal of events, must be called into

question. Beyond the methodological problems, Rwandans are expected by the

government and many of their peers to accept and participate in a rhetorical construction

of the present which denies that there was ever ethnic tension in Rwanda prior to the

arrival of Europeans, that no one else suffered in the genocide besides the Tutsis,[7] that

people want reconciliation, that the constructed ethnic differences of the past have been

erased, and that the government is guiding the country towards a just and peaceful future

(Buckley-Zistel, 2006; Pottier, 2002; Zorbas, 2004). Attempts to point out continuing

injustice in Rwanda, particularly as many people consider the government to be

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[7] I am in no way trying to deny that a genocide against the Tutsi population took place, nor am I trying to relativize its brutality or to justify it. That said, many Hutus were also killed in the civil war and subsequent refugee crisis in Rwanda, some at the hands of the Rwandan Patriotic Front, the rebel group which forms the core of the current government. It is not acceptable to say that Hutus also suffered, and that some of them may have legitimate grievances against the government, nor it is acceptable to question the government's presentation of history. The government runs Ingando solidarity camps to promote or indoctrinate their view of history and the present among soldiers, released prisoners, government works, and students (see Chapter VII).

dominated by Tutsis and see an expanding gap in income and wealth in favor of the

Tutsis (Koster, 2008), are subject to a range of disciplinary tactics ranging from social

censure to criminal prosecution (Brounéus, 2008b; Buckley-Zistel, 2006; Burnet, 2008b,

2010; Eramian, 2009; Ingelaere, 2009, 2010; Andrea Purdeková, 2011; Reyntjens, 2011).

That said, an experienced researcher with knowledge of the context is able to understand

when someone is trying to talk about these subjects indirectly. Only Guillebaud (2002,

2005) and Hatfield (2005a, 2005b, 2009) even mention these tensions in their books. It is

not clear if the other authors are deliberately blind to them, or if they did not have enough

experience locally to detect these problems.

Religious Themes in Post-Genocide Memoirs

Religious themes also appear in the few memoires thst have emerged exploring

people's recovery from genocide. Many of the survivors have thanked God for helping

them survive (Hatzfeld, 2005a, 2005b, 2009; Ilibagiza & Erwin, 2008; Irivuzumugabe &

Lawrence, 2009; Larson, 2009; Sebarenzi & Mullane, 2009), though usually without

asking hard questions about why they survived when many of their family and neighbors

did not. The religious call to forgiveness is another popular theme, highlighted in both

Christian (Hatzfeld, 2009; Irivuzumugabe & Lawrence, 2009; Larson, 2009; Rucyahana,

2008; Sebarenzi & Mullane, 2009), and Muslim (Sebarenzi & Mullane, 2009) contexts.

There are also beliefs that God will bless people in the midst of their suffering, that that

the genocide somehow represents a transformative moment in which Rwanda can be

reimagined and reworked (Ilibagiza & Erwin, 2006, 2008; Irivuzumugabe & Lawrence,

2009). Some survivors report having found solace in participating in religious activities

(Ilibagiza & Erwin, 2006, 2008) and engaging with fellow worshippers in a variety of religious and social events (Hatzfeld, 2009).

Conclusion

Religious people and organizations have been thoroughly implicated in Rwanda's genocide. Religious people killed their neighbors, pastors and priests participated in massacres, and religious organizations failed to use their moral authority to call for an end to genocide. Racial and ethnic ideologies introduced or reinforced by Christian missionaries contributed to the ethnic tensions which led to genocide. My task here is not to re-analyze this history but to lay the groundwork for my contribution to Rwanda's written history: how has religion contributed to Rwanda's recovery?

Chapter III

METHODS

I make use of multiple sources of data in exploring the role of religion in post-genocide Rwanda. In 2008, I traveled to Rwanda and conducted a small number of interviews and fielded a large survey. In 2010, I returned and interviewed religious leaders and conducted oral histories with "ordinary" people. I also employ data from the Pew Forum's survey entitled *Tolerance and Tension: Islam and Christianity in Sub-Saharan Africa* (2010). I describe each of these three sources of data in turn.

I must preface any discussion of my research method by acknowledging that I lived and worked in Rwanda for 42 months prior to beginning graduate school. I worked for the Mennonite Central Committee (MCC), the relief, development, and peace agency of a coalition of Mennonite and Brethren in Christ denominations in Canada and the United States. MCC is an explicitly faith-based organization that prefers to work with and through local churches and other faith groups, though aid is available to everyone regardless of religious affiliation.

While MCC has been active in international development since the 1920s, it did not become involved in Rwanda until after the genocide, when it mobilized significant material and financial resources to support the many refugees who fled the country in 1994. The refugee program largely came to an end by 1997, though the agency continued supporting peacebuilding efforts through small grants to local organizations. In 2000, the MCC presence grew in the region again when a Canadian volunteer helped

to found the Friends Peace House (FPH).   FPH was established to formalize and professionalize many of the peace programs of the Evangelical Friends Church of Rwanda (EEAR). She also worked with the Evangelical Alliance of Rwanda's (AER) efforts to create a peace team of pastors and lay church leaders, which became the Peacemaker's Commission of Rwanda (CAPR). The volunteer left after one year, though she continued to provide administrative support through a new regional position with working with a European Quaker organization.

I came to Rwanda in early 2003 to continue the previous volunteer's work in supporting the development of the Peace House, the Peacemaker's Commission, as well as other programs that caught my interest. While my initial remit was oriented towards helping these agencies and groups refine their programming, my focus soon turned to organizational development, particularly helping FPH and CAPR to develop the capacity needed to support their growing programs and apply for the many grants then available to support peacebuilding work in Rwanda. In addition, I offered workshops in conflict resolution, peace theology, program design, grant writing, and other topics both to my primary partners as well as to any interested organization. Through my work, I became acquainted with many different peacebuilding initiatives across the country. Much of my knowledge was focused on the work of Protestant Christian churches and organizations, including the EEAR and FPH, CAPR and the AER, the Protestant Council of Rwanda (CPR), African Evangelical Enterprise (AEE), the Gikongoro and Byumba dioceses of the Episcopal (Anglican) Church in Rwanda (EER), and the national Presbyterian Church (EPR). Besides MCC, I had contact with several international organizations working in peacebuilding, including Oxfam Great Britain, Christian Aid, Norwegian People's Aid,

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and Norwegian Church Aid. In addition, I gained limited knowledge of the work of the Catholic Bishops Council, Catholic Relief Services, and the work of Muslim associations and individual mosques. I also had opportunity to observe the work of the government to promote peace, particularly in the *gacaca* tribunals, ingando solidarity camps, community mediators, mobilization and reintegration work with former combatants, and the National Unity and Reconciliation Commission.

I left Rwanda in mid-2006 to begin graduate school. In my three-and-a-half years in the country, I had amassed a series of anecdotes about peace and reconciliation, had firsthand knowledge of many programs, saw the strengths and weaknesses of different approaches to promote reconciliation, and had developed an understanding of the contexts of reconciliation in the country, including both constraints and opportunities. Nonetheless, my knowledge and expertise was necessarily limited and partial, particularly towards the Protestant experience. In order to gain a better understanding of the whole field of religious peacebuilding in Rwanda, I felt I needed to do systematic research among all religious sectors in Rwanda. To achieve that end, I returned to the country twice. Nonetheless, this research is inevitably rooted in my first experiences as a peace practitioner. I could not have explored the nuance of religion and peacebuilding there had I not had this extensive baseline of knowledge and experience from which to draw.

Wave One: Program Evaluation

In 2008, I conducted three months of field research in Rwanda, using primarily survey methods supplemented by a limited number of interviews. I hired three assistants to help during this process. A translator provided simultaneous (whispering in ear) translations of interviews and written translations of documents. Two logistics assistants visited field sites, arranged transport and accommodation, and identified potential research participants prior to my arrival.

Sampling and Data Collection

To select survey respondents, I asked for lists of participants living in ten randomly selected districts from the programs I was evaluating (see Figure 1 for a map). My research assistants then contacted a random selection of those participants to see if they would be interested in participating. If they were, we arranged a meeting where I explained the research project, obtained consent, and distributed the survey questionnaire. On average, participants took approximately 45 minutes to complete the survey; all participants received a small cash payment of 500 Rwandan francs (about a third of a day's wage for unskilled work in urban areas) to thank them for their time.

Survey Items and Constructs

Prior to the trip, I had designed a survey to evaluate the outcomes of a variety of programs designed to promote reconciliation. Because I knew many of the programs had religious components, I decided to include questions about respondents' current and former religious affiliation, private religious behavior, participation in organized religious

activities, religious change, and certain beliefs regarding the nature of conflict. In addition, the survey contained questions about demographics, whether or not the respondent identified as a survivor of the genocide, whether or not they had ever been charged with crimes of genocide, the frequency of their participation in local *gacaca* tribunals, as well as detailed information about the peacebuilding programs they had participated in. The questionnaire incorporated the PTSD Civilian Checklist to measure respondents' trauma levels (Blanchard, Jones-Alexander, Buckley, & Forneris, 1996; Ruggiero, Del Ben, Scotti, & Rabalais, 2005; Weathers, Huska, & Keane, 1991), a forgiveness scale which included subscales of the presence of positive feelings and the absence of negative feelings (Rye, et al., 2001), and the Satisfaction with Life scale on general well-being (Diener, Eammons, Larson, & Griffin, 1985). I also heavily modified two existing scales (Pham, et al., 2004) to measure reconciliatory attitudes and signs of behavior that one would expect after reconciliation may have taken place. Because of political sensitivities in Rwanda, I could not ask about people's ethnic identity before the genocide, nor could I ask them to evaluate or otherwise make judgments on the *gacaca* process. Likewise, to avoid potentially causing emotional distress for respondents, I refrained from inquiring about their specific experiences during the genocide. The questionnaire was translated into Kinyarwanda and then back translated into English; discrepancies were resolved through extensive consultations with experts. The final translation was then field tested with a small sample of fifteen people, changes were made to correct for problems identified, and then the survey was distributed to participants in Kinyarwanda. A full accounting of the constructs in the survey can be found in Appendix A.

Preliminary Results

My survey dataset contains the responses of 312 individuals. Most (57%) were female, with an average age of 34 and almost eight years of education. Slightly over a quarter (27%) identified themselves as genocide survivors, and 8% said they had been charged with crimes of genocide. Seventy percent had children. Ninety-one percent said they belonged to some Christian religious group, 7% were Muslim, and less than 1% reported having no religion. Further details are contained in Table 2.

The dataset contains a moderate number of missing responses, ranging from people who did not complete the questionnaire, accidentally skipped questions or pages, or gave unclear responses. I used multiple imputation techniques (Allison, 2010; Rubin, 2004; Schafer, 1999; Sinharay, Stern, & Russell, 2001) through R's Multiple Imputation through Chained Equations module (Van Buuren & Groothuis-Oudshoorn, 2010) to fill these gaps. However, the resulting full dataset did not materially change any of the outcomes of my analyses. As such, I display the results from analysis of the incomplete dataset here. Were the full dataset available, I would have adequate statistical power (1 – β = .80) to detect a small effect size (f^2 = .07) for a regression equation with eighteen variables, the most of any model I include here, a small effect for bivariate correlations (d = .16), and medium-small effects for an ANOVA with five categories (f = .20) or a severely unbalanced t-test (d = .29). As it stands, even with a reduced sample (the lowest effective sample size for any analysis I present here is n = 216), I am still able to detect a small-medium effects for regression (f^2 = .11) and bivariate correlations (d = .19), and

medium sized effects for ANOVA ($f = .23$) and t-tests ($d = .37$).[8] There is more than

adequate statistical power to detect all but the smallest patterns and trends in this dataset

without the use of imputed data.

Table 2 2008 Survey Descriptive Statistics

Variable	Frequency	Mean (SD)	Range
Gender (coded 1 = Female, 0 = Male)		.57 (.50)	0 - 1
Age (years)		34.22 (11.97)	18 - 69
Marital Status			
Married (legal or common law)	53.3%		
Widowed	5.9%		
Divorced/Separated	2.4%		
Single, never married	36.2%		
Education (years)		7.80 (4.14)	0 - 16
Waged job (coded 1 = Yes, 0 = No)		.28 (.45)	0 - 1
Self employed (coded 1 = Yes, 0 = No)		.46 (.49)	0 - 1
Survivor (coded 1 = Yes, 0 = No)		.27 (.45)	0 - 1
Perpetrator (coded 1 = Yes, 0 = No)		.08 (.28)	0 - 1
Gacaca judge (coded 1 = Yes, 0 = No)		.28 (.53)	0 - 1
Community mediator(coded 1 = Yes, 0 = No)		.17 (.43)	0 - 1
Organized religious activity participation		4.84 (.99)	1 - 6
Private religious activity participation		4.39 (1.15)	1 - 6
Change in spirituality		4.53 (.84)	1 - 5
Religious salience		5.72 (.62)	1 - 6
Current Religious Affiliation			
Catholic	25.7%		
Mainline Protestant	12.1%		
Evangelical Protestant	53.1%		
Muslim	6.9%		
Other Religion	1.7%		
None	0.9%		
Childhood Religious Affiliation			
Catholic	59.9%		
Mainline Protestant	8.8%		
Evangelical Protestant	18.6%		
Adventist	3.5%		
Muslim	7.7%		
Other Religion	2.8%		
None	1.8%		
Gacaca Participation		3.68 (1.27)	1 - 5
Reconciliation Behaviors		4.57 (1.28)	1 - 6
Reconciliation Attitudes		5.06 (1.19)	1 - 6
Positive Forgiveness		4.20 (.84)	1 - 5
Satisfaction with Life		5.73 (1.23)	1 - 7
Post Traumatic Stress		2.92 (.97)	1 - 5
Genocide Intensity		1.50 (.94)	0 - 3
Reconciliation program participation		2.38 (2.35)	0 - 13

[8] All power calculations were completed using G-power (Faul, Erdfelder, Buchner, & Lang, 2009).

Table 3 displays the inter-item correlations for this dataset. Women are less educated ($r = -.32$), reflecting the legacy of past patterns of unequal access to education for women. They are more likely to be survivors ($r = .14$) and less likely to be perpetrators ($r = -.16$) then are men. Not surprisingly then, women also have higher levels of post traumatic stress disorder symptoms ($r = .23$). Older people engage in more private religious activities ($r = .19$) and have higher religious salience ($r = .14$). Age is also associated with higher levels of PTSD ($r = .13$), reconciliation behaviors ($r = .15$), reconciliation attitudes ($r = .19$) as well as forgiveness ($r = .20$). More highly educated people tend to be more religious across multiple domains; they also have less PTSD ($r = -.19$) and lower levels of reconciliation attitudes ($r = -.16$) and forgiveness ($r = -.26$). Genocide survivors participate less often in organized religious activities ($r = -.14$), but there is no association with private religious activities. As one might expect, survivors also have lower scores on the reconciliation attitudes scale ($r = -.23$). Perpetrators are less satisfied with their lives ($r = -.16$) but score higher on the reconciliation attitudes scale ($r = .12$). The religiosity measures tend to be moderately correlated with each other. Participation in organized religious activities is associated with higher satisfaction with life ($r = .20$), as well as reconciliation behaviors ($r = .25$), attitudes ($r = .28$), and forgiveness ($r = .37$). Participation in private religious activities is also positively associated with reconciliation and forgiveness. People who score higher on the satisfaction with life scale also score highly on the reconciliation behaviors ($r = .28$) and reconciliation attitudes ($r = .34$) measures. The reconciliation and forgiveness measures are all moderately correlated with each other except for reconciliation attitudes and positive forgiveness, which are very highly correlated ($r = .67$).

Table 4 examines differences between religious traditions in Rwanda in the variables I measured; I omitted the 'none' and 'other' religious categories from this analysis because there are very few cases in each category. There are relatively few differences between religious groups. Muslims report higher levels of self-employment than do other categories. Mainline Protestants and Catholics identified as perpetrators more often than did Evangelical Protestants or Muslims, consistent with the general knowledge about the genocide. Catholic tend to be older than the other religious groups; it is then not surprising that they are more often in community leadership positions as *gacaca* judges and mediators, though these effects are not sufficiently large to be significant. Protestants of both sorts report higher levels of spiritual well-being. Muslims report much lower levels of religious attitudes and positive forgiveness, though the positive forgiveness measure is barely non-significant ($p = .06$). Evangelicals have participated in more programs, unsurprising since so many such programs are organized by Evangelical organizations.

Wave Two: Oral Histories

In 2010, I returned to Rwanda to conduct additional interviews. I completed 61 oral histories with people about their experiences of the connections between religion and reconciliation. I also completed 10 interviews with the staff of faith-based organizations about how they perceive the connection between faith and post-conflict recovery.

Table 3 2008 Survey Inter-Item Correlations

	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18
1. Female	-.02	-.32**	-.03	.14*	-.16**	.04	.01	.02	-.04	-.16**	.15**	.23**	-.04	.07	-.05	.06	-.12
2. Age		-.11	-.22**	-.13*	.06	.07	.19**	.13*	.14*	.08	.11	-.13*	.05	.15*	.19**	.20**	.15*
3. Education			.00	.01	-.22**	-.14*	-.05	.02	-.01	.23**	-.17**	-.19**	.02	-.05	-.16**	-.26**	.10
4. Genocide Intensity				.20**	0.15**	-.15*	-.07	-.17**	-.18**	-.14*	-.11	.06	-.04	.02	-.15*	-.09	-.08
5. Survivor					-.11	-.25**	-.07	-.14*	-.08	-.04	-.04	.08	.03	-.04	-.23**	-.12	-.06
6. Perpetrator						-.06	.04	.00	.08	-.08	-.15*	.02	-.16*	.08	.12*	.11	.06
7. Organized rel. participation							.48**	.40**	.26**	.26**	.20**	.11	.09	.25**	.28**	.37**	.01
8. Private religious activity								.19**	.17**	.19**	.09	.09	.03	.21**	.20**	.23**	-.02
9. Change in spirituality									.37**	.25**	.07	-.07	.06	.09	.11	.26**	.01
10. Religious salience										.27**	.07	.05	.01	.12	.27**	.28**	.06
11. Spiritual well-being											-.05	-.20**	.20**	.08	.10	.14*	.29**
12. Satisfaction with life												.04	.30**	.08	.28**	.34**	.08
13. PTSD symptoms													-.25**	.08	-.04	-.03	-.47**
14. PSOC														.26**	.26**	.26**	.26**
15. Reconciliation behaviors															.37**	.36**	.14*
16. Reconciliation attitudes																.67**	.21**
17. Positive forgiveness																	.31**
18. Negative forgiveness																	

* Indicated statistical significance at *p* < .05

** Indicates statistical significance at *p* < .01

Table 4 Religious Differences in the Bazuin Sample

Variable	Catholic	Mainline Protestant	Evangelical Protestant	Muslim	ANOVA Results
Female	.65 (.47)	.62 (.49)	.52 (.50)	.50 (.51)	$F(3, 285) = 1.38$
Age	39.38 (14.04)	33.28 (1.76)	32.96 (1.41)	25.15 (9.30)	$F(3, 280) = 9.97**$
Education	8.02 (4.08)	7.57 (4.97)	7.79 (4.04)	7.00 (3.62)	$F(3, 276) = .34$
Waged Job	.25 (.43)	.31 (.47)	.26 (.44)	.47 (.51)	$F(3, 245) = 1.22$
Self Employed	.25 (.44)	.31 (.47)	.27 (.44)	.47 (.51)	$F(3, 245) = 3.16*$
Survivor	.32 (.46)	.19 (.40)	.25 (.43)	.42 (.50)	$F(3, 278) = 1.43$
Perpetrator	.11 (.31)	.16 (.37)	.04 (.20)	.05 (.22)	$F(3, 284) = 2.56*$
Gacaca Judge	.40 (.73)	.27 (.45)	.23 (.42)	.21 (.41)	$F(3, 281) = 1.96$
Community Mediator	.26 (.60)	.11 (.31)	.13 (.34)	.21 (.41)	$F(3, 278) = 1.81$
Gacaca Participation	3.68 (1.28)	4.00 (1.12)	3.67 (1.28)	3.37 (1.46)	$F(3, 278) = 1.17$
Org. Religious Part.	4.41 (1.02)	5.16 (.81)	5.07 (.84)	4.49 (1.22)	$F(3, 264) = 1.10$
Private Religious Part.	4.17 (1.21)	4.48 (1.02)	4.53 (1.06)	4.04 (1.15)	$F(3, 263) = 2.39$
Change in Spirituality	4.54 (.79)	4.45 (1.02)	4.61 (.73)	4.17 (.98)	$F(3, 274) = 1.81$
Religion Salience	5.76 (.51)	5.65 (.91)	5.76 (.46)	5.72 (.58)	$F(3, 268) = .38$
Spiritual Well being	5.18 (.61)	5.40 (.85)	5.40 (.65)	5.04 (.78)	$F(3, 281) = 2.85*$
Social Justice	3.74 (1.04)	3.70 (1.11)	3.43 (1.07)	3.40 (.84)	$F(3, 280) = 1.85$
Satisfaction with Life	5.39 (1.36)	5.46 (1.23)	5.48 (1.11)	5.61 (.77)	$F(3, 274) = .20$
PTSD Symptoms	2.94 (.95)	2.82 (.93)	2.88 (1.01)	3.08 (.82)	$F(3, 259) = .34$
Sense of Community	4.63 (.88)	4.86 (.68)	4.60 (.78)	4.63 (.52)	$F(3, 255) = .96$
Reconciliation Behaviors	4.67 (1.19)	4.69 (1.20)	4.56 (1.32)	4.05 (1.47)	$F(3, 263) = 1.35$
Reconciliation Attitudes	5.02 (1.27)	4.99 (1.51)	5.22 (.93)	4.14 (1.46)	$F(3, 280) = 5.29**$
Positive Forgiveness	4.13 (.86)	4.18 (.94)	4.32 (.71)	3.83 (.88)	$F(3, 275) = 2.44$
Negative Forgiveness	3.14 (1.01)	3.02 (.97)	3.24 (1.09)	3.54 (.95)	$F(3, 271) = 1.07$
Program participation (all)	1.94 (1.88)	1.94 (1.80)	2.84 (2.65)	1.05 (.88)	$F(3, 291) = 5.82**$
Contact program	.68 (.74)	.60 (.60)	1.04 (1.01)	.15 (.36)	$F(3, 291) = 8.54**$
Conflict resolution program	.58 (.85)	.54 (.89)	.85 (1.02)	.30 (.47)	$F(3, 292) = 3.34*$
Trauma healing program	.31 (.57)	.40 (.60)	.61 (.72)	.05 (.22)	$F(3, 292) = 7.20**$
Genocide intensity	1.44 (.88)	1.24 (.97)	1.51 (.97)	2.00 (.35)	$F(3, 279) = 2.61*$

* indicates statistical significance at $p < .05$

** indicates statistical significance at $p < .01$

Sampling and Data Collection

I knew from previous experience in Rwanda that several demographic dimensions would likely be important in how people experience reconciliation. Women's experiences during war time are different than that of men, for they are less likely to engage in combat but still experience high levels of victimization through attacks on civilians and sexual violence. They are more likely to suffer the consequences of war-induced deprivations and displacement (Ashford, 2007; Brittain, 2003; Helweg-Larsen & Kastrup, 2007; Jansen, 2006; Plümper & Neumayer, 2006; Salvage, 2007). There were also gender differences in my 2008 survey, so it was important to me that the oral history sample had an approximately equal number of both genders. In addition, my experience with programs like Women and Dialogue also made me suspect that women had different experiences of reconciliation. Survivors and non-survivors, a category including both people who perpetrated the genocide and people who neither participated nor were in any danger, was another dimension which needed to be included in my sampling plan. Place of residence during the genocide was also important, for there are locations in Rwanda which were quickly conquered by the Rwandan Patriotic Front and where the genocide was therefore very minimal in scope. Other places remained behind government lines for months and experienced very intense levels of genocide. I therefore categorized each of the former 12 provinces in the country into low, medium, and high intensity genocide zones; while my categorization flowed from my reading of the history of the genocide from multiple texts, a recent analysis of data derived from the *gacaca* fact-finding process largely confirms my categorization (Verpoorten, 2011).

Finally, religious affiliation was another critical dimension, for it follows that people who belong to different religious groups may have different reactions to the genocide and the necessity for reconciliation. While there were multiple ways to potentially stratify Rwandan religious affiliation, I chose five categories: Catholics, Mainline Protestants, Evangelical Protestants, Muslims, and a catch-all category for other religions, which includes atheists, Baha'i, Jehovah's Witnesses, and other minor groups. While it may seem inappropriate to import the Mainline-Evangelical distinction of Protestantism into Rwanda when it comes from a largely American body of religious research, Rwandan Protestants divide themselves into these two categories and have ecumenical groups which reflect these categories. While I could select a sample proportional to the percentage of the Rwandan population which are members of a church or other group in each category, I thought it necessary to have a sufficient number of interviews in each category that I could develop a full description of the patterns associated with membership in that category. A proportional approach means I would interview only two Muslims for example, which would be insufficient to learn anything systematically about Muslims' experiences of reconciliation. As such, I decided to complete an equal number of interviews in each category.

With these four dimensions in mind, I established a sampling frame such that I would interview one male and one female survivor and one male and one female non-survivor from each of the five categories of religious affiliation. I would repeat each set of twenty interviews three times: once each in locations with low intensity genocide, medium intensity, and high intensity. With that stratification frame in mind, my research assistant and I purposefully chose six locations across Rwanda to conduct interviews.

Because this was a politically sensitive time as presidential elections approached,[9] we needed to go to locations where we were known by the authorities and had local contacts among the religious community. I sent my assistant to each location before I went to explain to the authorities the nature of my work and to gather from a variety of local religious and civic leaders lists of people who might be willing to speak with us. On my arrival, we chose a random subset of these names and contacted them to see if they were willing to participate. If they were, we invited them to meet us at a private place and proceeded with the interview. Participants were served refreshments and paid 3000Frw for an interview.

Table 5 shows how the actual sample fits into the planned sampling frame. If all had gone to plan, there would be one man and one woman in each cell of the table. However, we did encounter some difficulties. At several locations, it proved rather difficult to find people who fit in the "other/no religious affiliation" category. In addition, when we arranged with a person of a specific gender or religious affiliation to be interviewed, they sometimes sent someone else in their place, a person who did not fit in the same stratum as the original invitee. Sometimes people made claims to survivor status during the interview when we were almost certain that, given their family history and other things that were known about them, they could not be; nonetheless, I accepted people's word about their status. In the end, I interviewed 13 Catholics, 10 Mainline Protestants, 17 Evangelical Protestants, 10 Muslims, and nine people belonging to the 'other' category. Interviews were evenly distributed among the three intensity zones. There are slightly more survivors (n = 32) than non-survivors (n = 28), but exactly half of

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[9] At one site, even after explaining our project and receiving permission to proceed, we were shadowed and harassed by government agents. We suspended interviewing until we could sort out the situation. After some phone calls and getting references from people in Kigali, we were left to our own devices.

the interviews are with women and half with men. A complete list of interviews and the demographics of each person who was interviewed is included in Appendix B.

Table 5 Oral History Sampling Frame and Interview Numbers

	Low Intensity Area		Medium Intensity Area		High Intensity Area	
	Survivor	Non-Survivor	Survivor	Non-Survivor	Survivor	Non-Survivor
Catholic	F: BYU-05 F: BYU-07 M: BYU-08	F: BYU-01 M: BYU-06 F: RUH-07	F: KIG-16 F: KIG-13 M: KIG-12	F: KIG-10	F: GIK-01	F: KIB-06 M: KIB-10
Mainline Protestant	F: BYU-09 M: RUH-08	M: RUH-04 M: RUH-01	F: KIG-07 M: KIG-01	M: KIG-17 F: KIG-19	F: GIK-09 M: GIK-10	
Evangelical Protest.	F: BYU-04 M: BYU-10 F: RUH-03	F: RUH-10 F: RUH-09 M: RUH-02 M: RUH-06	M: KIG-20 F: KIG-18	M: KIG-21 F: KIG-05	F: GIK-06 F: GIK-08 M: KIB-08	M: KIB-01 M: KIB-05 F: KIB-07
Muslim		F: BYU-02 M: BYU-03	F: KIG-03 M: KIG-11	M: KIG-14 F: KIG-15	M: KIB-09	M: GIK-02 F: GIK-05 F: KIB-03
Other (No) Religion			M: KIG-04 M: KIG-23	M: KIG-09 F: KIG-06	M: GIK-07 F: KIB-02 F: GIK-04	F: GIK-03 M: KIB-04

Interviews lasted from 30 to 90 minutes. After an informed consent process, I asked them about a variety of topics, including their past and current religious affiliation, the reason for any changes, how they understand and have experienced both religion and reconciliation, and how religion may have either supported or inhibited their personal recovery from the genocide; a complete interview guide with prompts is contained in Appendix C. If the participant was comfortable speaking English or French, I conducted the interview in that language. If not, I used a translator who provided simultaneous translation of the interview. All interviews were audio recorded.

The sampling for the interviews with religious leaders was less formally structured than for the oral histories. While I prioritized getting a cross section of interviews which somewhat represented the diversity of religious organizations in Rwanda, because of my specific interest in the organizations' peace efforts, it was necessary to convince the single person or two within each organization who was the local point person to sit down with me. They are busy people, and it was not possible to convince all of the people I had wanted to interview. Nonetheless, I did complete 10 interviews with this population, including one with an Anglican bishop, two with Mainline Protestant denomination department heads, two with Evangelical denomination department heads, one with a Catholic department head, and three with leaders from non-denominational (though usually Protestant affiliated) Christian organizations. These interviews lasted from 30 to 60 minutes and were conducted in English or French following the interview guide in Appendix D. Participants were not paid for their time, but I did purchase meals or refreshments if we met in a public place.

Coding and Analysis

Most interviews were transcribed from the audio recordings. I transcribed interviews which I judged from my field notes to be of particularly high quality in their entirety. Less high quality interviews, where the participant seemed reluctant to answer questions or provided little detail, were selectively transcribed. I then used the qualitative analysis program AtlasTI to code the transcripts. The first round of coding was based directly on themes emerging from the texts (Charmaz, 2006; Holton, 2007; Saldana, 2009). I then completed several memos about ideas I had developed from this round of

coding and started to connect those ideas with the theories I had employed when I had examined the literature in preparation for this study. I then recoded the interviews with a more structured coding scheme, using AtlasTI's capabilities to group codes and trace patterns and connections between them (Charmaz, 2006; Friese, 2012; Kvale & Brinkmann, 2008; Lempert, 2007).

Wave Three: Secondary Data

Between December 2008 and April 2009, researchers in 19 countries in sub-Saharan Africa, including Rwanda, interviewed more than 25,000 people on the topic of faith and public life, with a particular focus on Muslim-Christian relations (Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life, 2010). Because the data purports to be nationally representative in each country in which interviews were conducted, this Pew dataset offers an important secondary source of data about religion in Rwanda to complement my own non-representative survey data.

Survey Items and Constructs

Pew's particular interest for their research was in understanding the connections between religion, interfaith relationships, attitudes towards politics, and attitudes towards social issues. As such, the dataset contains many items about interfaith relationships, attitudes, and perceptions not relevant to this dissertation. Nonetheless, the demographic questions combined with items about past and present religious affiliation, religious participation, and religious beliefs, provide a useful means by which to examine the religious lives of a more representative sample of the population than I obtained in 2008.

Individual survey items which I employ in my analyses are listed in Appendix E. I was able to create several scales and indices from individual items in the dataset; details on these constructs are also available in the Appendix.

Sampling and Data Collection

The Pew researchers interviewed 1,000 adults in Rwanda in late January 2009. Interviews were offered in Kinyarwanda, English, or French, depending on the respondents' preferences. They constructed a stratified sampling frame in 12 of Rwanda's 30 districts[10] and randomly selected participants to reflect the urban-rural character of the districts. Pew claims that the sample is nationally representative of the adult population.[11] The dataset also includes the means to statistically weight individual cases in order to more accurately reflect the demographics of the country.

Pew's sample of one thousand people yields high statistical power, with the ability to detect very small effects across a range of statistical tests. At a standard power of 0.80, I have the ability to detect very small correlations ($d = .09$), small mean differences using t-tests ($d = .16$) or ANOVA ($f = .11$), and small effects in multiple regression ($f^2 = .02$). There is some missing data which reduces the effective sample to as low as 772 cases for certain analyses. Even at this level, there is more than adequate

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[10] The dataset's codebook says that a "stratified random sample of *all* 12 districts proportional to population size and urban/rural population" (emphasis added). This inconsistency in the number of districts is unexplained. If only twelve districts were selected, no information is given about which twelve they might be or how they were chosen. The codebook contains no descriptions of how the Pew team recruited individual respondents, nor is there any information about how the researchers ensured that remote, very rural places were included in the sample.

[11] There is evidence both confirming and challenging the representativeness of the sample. For example, 34.7% of the Pew sample reports owning a cell phone, nearly identical to World Bank statistics which put cell phone penetration at 33.4%. Similarly, Pew reports 22.1% of respondents living in an urban area, compared with 18.9% based on the World Bank, though it is unclear how either group defined urban or rural. However, the World Bank says that 13.0% of the population uses the internet, but Pew reports 29.9% usage (World Bank, 2012).

power to detect small effect sizes for all statistical tests I will employ (correlation: $d =$ .10; t-test: $d = .18$; ANOVA: $f = .13$; regression: $f^2 = .02$).

Initial Analyses

Of the 1,000 Rwandans that Pew interviewed, 48.0% are male, 22.1% live in an urban area, 60.4% have children, 93.0% are Christians from a variety of different denominations, 5.4% are Muslim, 0.6% practice some other religion, and 0.9% have no religion. The average respondent has completed some secondary school, is in his or her mid 30s, and rates his or her income as fairly low. Some 30.1% of respondents had the maximum score on the poverty and deprivation index. Additional details can be found in Table 6.

The results of my own survey and Pew's survey are similar in regard to demographics. Both have a small majority of women, have average ages in the early to mid thirties, and have average educational attainments relating to early secondary school. They are not similar in terms of current religious affiliation, with over 53% of my sample belonging to Evangelical Christian churches versus only 21% in the Pew sample. The discrepancy can be explained by the dominance of Protestant Christian peace programming that I evaluated; as regards religious affiliation, my sample makes no claims to be representative. That said, there are several other similarities between my sample and that from Pew's efforts: both report high levels of religious salience, high levels of group religious activity and religious service participation, high frequency of prayer and other private religious activity,

Table 6 Pew Survey Descriptive Statistics

Variable	Frequency	Mean (SD)	Range
Age		3.57 (2.63)	1 – 9
18-24 (coded 1)	31.8%		
25-29	17.1%		
30-34	8.5%		
35-39	10.0%		
40-44	6.6%		
45-49	8.6%		
50-54	5.7%		
55-59	4.3%		
60 or older (coded 9)	7.4%		
Marital Status			
Married (legal or common law)	49.8%		
Widowed	7.6%		
Divorced/Separated	2.9%		
Single, never married	39.8%		
Education		1.77 (.82)	1 – 3
Completed primary or less (coded 1)	46.1%		
Some secondary/Completed Secondary	27.0%		
Post-Secondary and up (coded 3)	23.7%		
Don't know / refused / other	3.3%		
Income[12]		2.18 (1.13)	1 – 4
Very Low (coded 1)	30.1%		
Low	15.3%		
Medium	17.3%		
High (coded 4)	13.1%		
Refused / Don't know	24.3%		
Poverty Index		.42 (.44)	0 – 1
Lives in urban area	22.1%		
Current Religion			
Catholic	54.0%		
Mainline Protestant	8.6%		
Evangelical Protestant	20.5%		
Adventist	8.0%		
Other Christian	2.0%		
Muslim	5.4%		
Other Religion	0.6%		
None	0.9%		
Childhood Religion			
Catholic	66.0%		
Mainline Protestant	7.1%		
Evangelical Protestant	10.4%		
Adventist	6.8%		
Other Christian	2.7%		
Muslim	4.7%		
Other Religion	2.3%		
None	0.0%		
Group Religious Activity participation		2.25 (1.09)	0 – 4
Prayer Frequency		5.51 (1.64)	1 – 7
Religious Media Use frequency		.82 (.30)	0 – 1

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[12] Pew attached locally specific response options for this question. In reporting cross-national results, they recoded those responses into four ordinal categories.

Table 6 (continued)

Variable	Frequency	Mean (SD)	Range
Religious Service Participation frequency		4.96 (1.25)	1 – 6
Strength of Belief		3.90 (.35)	1 – 4
Religious Salience (Importance)		3.87 (.42)	1 – 4
Religious Devotion		.74 (.24)	0 – 1
Spiritual Intensity		.38 (.33)	0 – 1
Overall satisfaction with country's direction		.88 (.33)	0 – 1
Satisfaction with country's economic situation		3.22 (.73)	1 – 4
Satisfaction with person economic situation		2.77 (.85)	1 – 4
Current life satisfaction		5.14 (1.49)	0 – 10
Optimism for future		7.21 (1.71)	0 – 10
Improvement over past		.49 (1.63)	-10 – 10
Trust		.28 (.44)	0 – 1
Ethnic Conflict (1 = High, 4 = Low)		1.58 (1.00)	1 – 4

Table 7 contains the inter-item correlations for this dataset. As one would expect, respondents who are more highly educated have more money ($r = .42$), experience less poverty ($r = .27$), are more likely to live in an urban area ($r = .19$), are more satisfied with their general situation ($r = .19$), and are more optimistic for the future ($r = .17$). People with more income are also more satisfied, but in addition they attend religious services more frequently ($r = .08$), are more religiously devoted ($r = .12$), and have more intense experiences of their spirituality ($r = .26$). They also see less improvement over the past five years of their lives ($r = -.12$). Men generally score lower on measures of religiosity and spirituality then do women. All religiosity and spirituality items are moderately to highly correlated with each other, but there are few relationships between those measures and measures of satisfaction with the respondents' personal situation or with the country's situation. There are few, rather weak relationships between religiosity or spirituality and certain proxies for reconciliation: people who attend more religious services tend to perceive less ethnic conflict ($r = -.13$), and people who engage in more religious activities tend to be more trustful of their neighbors ($r = .07$). Trust is lower in urban areas ($r = -.09$) and among the poor ($r = -.10$). People who

are more satisfied with the country's direction and economy also have more trust ($r = .12$ and $r = .14$ respectively). Perceptions of ethnic conflict are higher in urban areas ($r = -.10$) and among people who are more satisfied with life ($r = -.14$) and optimistic about the future ($r = -.16$).   As trust increases, perceptions of ethnic conflict go down, but the relationship is weak ($r = -.09$).

Table 8 contains an analysis of the differences between members of different faith groups. Demographically, Catholics are nearly a full category older than adherents of other religious groups. Adventists are more educated than average, and Catholics are less educated. As one might then expect, Catholics also have less income, though people from all faiths score similarly on the poverty index. Protestants are more likely to be female; Muslim respondents tended to be male. Catholics participated in religious activities at a much lower rate than did members of other groups, including group religious activity, prayer frequency, and service attendance. Muslims prayed more and went to services more frequently than any other groups, a pattern which reflects the liturgical requirements of their faith. Muslims also report higher levels of devotion. However, both Mainline and Evangelical Protestants respondents said that they experience their faith much more intensely than did respondents from other groups. General satisfaction with Rwanda's current direction was similar across the five groups, but Mainline Protestants tended to be less satisfied with the country's economic situation. Muslims were least happy with the current life situation. There were similar—though low—levels of trust across religious groups, but Evangelical Christians perceived less ethnic conflict than did Catholics, Mainline Protestants, Adventists, or Muslims.

Table 7 Pew Data Inter-item Correlations

	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18
1. Education	.42**	-.27**	.07*	.19**	.05	.02	.02	.03	.05	.19**	.17**	-.02	.05	.20**	.00	-.07	-.02
2. Income		-.36**	.09*	.13**	.04	.05	.08*	.12**	.26**	.16**	.13**	.03	.08*	.25**	-.10*	-.03	-.12**
3. Poverty			-.04	-.08*	-.01	-.10**	-.15**	-.02	-.12**	-.13**	-.02	-.02	-.09*	-.20**	.02	.06	.05
4. Male				-.03	-.10	-.09**	-.10**	-.07*	-.06	-.03	.05	-.01	.02	.08*	-.05	-.01	.04
5. Urban					-.01	-.05	-.07*	-.04	-.03	.13**	.07*	.02	-.03	.07*	-.09**	-.10**	.04
6. Group religious activities						.38**	.33**	.41**	.29**	-.05	.04	.05	-.09**	-.03	.07*	-.03	-.03
7. Prayer frequency							.48**	.55**	.28**	-.07*	-.04	-.02	-.07	.01	-.03	.01	.07
8. Relig. service participation								.55**	.21**	-.01	.01	-.03	-.03	.08*	.00	-.13**	.05
9. Religious devotion									.33**	-.02	.06	.01	-.07*	-.01	-.02	.00	.05
10. Spiritual Intensity										-.01	.09**	.05	.02	.04	-.09**	.00	-.02
11. Satisfaction with life											.53**	.14**	.05	.27**	-.02	-.14**	.44**
12. Optimism for future												.09**	-.02	.28**	-.02	-.16**	.10**
13. Satis w/ country's direction													.28**	.23**	.12**	.00	.03
14. Satis w/ country's economy														.48**	.14**	-.05	-.06
15. Satis w/ pers.econ situation															.10**	-.08**	-.05
16. Trust																.09**	-.04
17. Ethnic Conflict																	-.05
18. Improvement over past																	

* indicates statistical significance at $p < .05$

** indicates statistical significance at $p < .01$

Table 8 Pew Sample Religious Differences

Variable	Catholic	Mainline	Evangelical	Adventist	Muslim	ANOVA results
Age	3.92 (2.76)	3.22 (2.85)	3.04 (2.30)	2.84 (2.14)	3.29 (2.17)	$F(4, 958) = 6.67**$
Education	1.68 (.80)	1.87 (.85)	1.85 (.83)	2.03 (.88)	1.71 (.75)	$F(4, 927) = 4.45**$
Income	1.96 (1.10)	2.57 (1.16)	2.42 (1.16)	2.36 (1.11)	2.53 (1.00)	$F(4, 726) = 9.25**$
Poverty Index	.43 (.44)	.41 (.44)	.39 (.44)	.35 (.43)	.35 (.42)	$F(4, 915) = .94$
Male	.51 (.50)	.40 (.49)	.42 (.50)	.39 (.49)	.57 (.50)	$F(5, 958) = 2.69*$
Urban	.21 (.41)	.17 (.38)	.25 (.44)	.23 (.43)	.25 (.44)	$F(4, 958) = .87$
Group activity	2.05 (1.11)	2.39 (1.00)	2.63 (1.00)	2.52 (1.02)	2.24 (.83)	$F(4, 954) = 13.24**$
Prayer frequency	5.24 (1.68)	5.74 (1.33)	5.81 (1.47)	5.90 (1.26)	6.75 (.84)	$F(4, 953) = 16.23**$
Religious media	.79 (.31)	.83 (.32)	.87 (.26)	.91 (.21)	.75 (.36)	$F(4, 961) = 5.31**$
Religious service	4.77 (1.29)	5.11 (1.04)	5.18 (1.19)	5.22 (1.04)	5.71 (.71)	$F(4, 918) = 11.39**$
Strength of belief	3.86 (.41)	3.95 (.21)	3.95 (.22)	3.96 (.19)	3.86 (.39)	$F(4, 952) = 4.22**$
Religious salience	3.87 (.37)	3.88 (.39)	3.90 (.40)	3.94 (.23)	3.94 (.22)	$F(4, 956) = 1.09$
Relig. devotion	.68 (.24)	.76 (.23)	.81 (.21)	.79 (.20)	.85 (.20)	$F(4, 951) = 17.53**$
Spiritual intensity	.32 (.30)	.50 (.34)	.51 (.34)	.33 (.33)	.26 (.31)	$F(4, 946) = 17.91**$
Satis country dir	.87 (.32)	.90 (.29)	.88 (.32)	.89 (.30)	.82 (.38)	$F(4, 943) = .55$
Satis country econ	3.28 (.74)	3.04 (.74)	3.22 (.68)	3.12 (.67)	3.25 (.77)	$F(4, 938) = 2.49*$
Satis person econ	2.74 (.91)	2.79 (.78)	2.80 (.79)	2.80 (.64)	2.98 (.78)	$F(4, 949) = 1.08$
Life satisfaction	5.11 (1.50)	5.11 (1.32)	5.23 (1.50)	5.48 (1.33)	4.70 (1.45)	$F(4, 949) = 2.54*$
Optimism/ future	4.59 (1.71)	4.75 (1.62)	4.62 (1.62)	4.88 (1.24)	4.42 (1.88)	$F(4, 949) = .86$
Improve/past	7.09 (1.79)	7.27 (1.87)	7.37 (1.63)	7.32 (1.31)	7.17 (1.51)	$F(4, 900) = 1.08$
Trust	.28 (.45)	.20 (.40)	.24 (.43)	.35 (.48)	.21 (.41)	$F(4, 912) = 1.57$
Ethnic Conflict	1.52 (.95)	1.58 (.99)	1.76 (1.13)	1.48 (.97)	1.48 (.94)	$F(4, 944) = 2.39*$

* indicates statistical significance at $p < .05$

** indicates statistical significance at $p < .01$

I use these three sources of data to answer a variety of specific research questions in the upcoming three chapters. Chapter IV examines individual patterns and outcomes related to the use of religious coping styles. Chapter V is comprised of an investigation into how religious organizations have both reacted to the genocide and have been changed by it. Chapter VI contains analyses related to how individual people's religious lives have changed after the genocide.

Chapter IV

RELIGION AND RECONCILIATION: INDIVIDUAL OUTCOMES

There are many people in Rwanda who, like Clémentine, have turned to religion

to help them cope after the genocide. Their stories provide tantalizing hints but no

conclusive evidence of the efficacy of religion in promoting individual and social well-

being, but theirs are only the stories of a small number of individuals. This chapter

examines the role of religion in Rwanda's recovery in a more systematic way, whether

and how religion functions to enhance individual coping and support reconciliation.

Coping Theory

Coping is the process by which people who experience problems in life make

choices and engage cognitive, emotional, religious, material, social, and other resources

to manage that problem. Successful coping involves minimizing negative consequences

of stressors and maximizing potential positive outcomes. Coping involves a wide range

of human functioning. The psychological literature examines coping from the

perspective of the individual as an active agent in his or her own coping processes while

recognizing that forces and resources external to the person affect the choices they make.

Those choices are highly diverse, for people will respond to stress in unique ways,

governed by both the environment in which they are embedded and their own habits and

preferences. Resilience, a related concept, is the ability of individuals to cope and adapt

in the face of adversity. Vulnerability is the opposite of resilience, defined as the structures and traits that make it difficult for people to and adapt to life problems.

Two of the most influential theorists of coping and resiliency in the field community psychology are Rudolf Moos and Barbara Dohrenwend. Moos developed an integrated framework of individual coping in the face of various stressors which combined both the individual as well as his or her social and environmental context (Billings & Moos, 1981; Holahan, 2002; Moos, 1984, 2002; Moos & Schaefer, 1993). In Moos' framework, individuals' perceptions of and responses to life stressors are governed by personal and environmental characteristics. Personal characteristics include health, self-concept, other personality traits, and habits influenced by gender, race, class, and culture. These characteristics both define not only how a person perceives a problem but also how they marshal resources to deal with it. Environmental characteristics include the physical, social, interpersonal, and societal structures in which the person functions. They also help shape perceptions of the problem and responses to it. Personal and environmental characteristics combine to shape the various resources that people can call upon when coping with a life problem. Those resources then help to determine the effectiveness of the coping action, leading to variations in well-being. Moos' model makes clear that the techniques and outcomes of coping strategies also change both the individual and the environment, creating a transactional, dynamic system.

Dohrenwend's model of psychosocial coping is somewhat more elaborate than that of Moos. Like Moos, Dohrenwend emphasizes that individuals who experience stressful life events are embedded in contexts that affect both the experience of that stress and the reactions and coping mechanisms deployed to deal with it (Dohrenwend, 1978).

Individual personality characteristics that shape perceptions of stress are in turn affected by a person's education and socialization, which are in part determined by the environment in which they live; that environment also shapes perceptions. The environment is shaped by structural and political forces far beyond the individual. An individual's reaction to stress is mediated by several different factors. Personal aspirations and values serve to increase or decrease their coping abilities. Situational mediators provide material and social supports and/or impediments. Characteristics of personal resilience can be strengthened through skill training, and advantageous environmental conditions can be increased through community and organizational development. These mediators help to determine the consequences of the stressful event. Mediators also affect both the choices people make to dealing with it and their outcomes of those choices. These consequences can range from psychological growth to little change to negative change or psychopathology. Dohrenwend emphasizes that even highly successful coping processes may involve temporary reductions in well-being. While Dohrenwend's framework is more descriptive than Moos', she does not make clear that coping is an iterative process, such that the outcomes of an individual's coping then feed back into both personal and environmental characteristics which may affect people's perceptions of and coping skills regarding the next stressful life event.

Both the Moos and Dohrenwend models situate individual coping in the social context in which the person is embedded. This ecological perspective is important, for it recognizes that a person's choices in regards to how they cope are shaped— simultaneously expanded and constrained, depending on the specific context— by the availability of resources beyond their person. Resources are highly significant in coping.

These resources are personal and social characteristics and traits upon which people or communities experiencing stress may call to deal with that stress (Thoits, 1995). Rather than representing coping actions or strategies in and of themselves, coping resources are latent parts of the coping process; their presence or absence determines the possibility for action and the deployment of certain strategies (Thoits, 1995). The centrality of resources in coping has significant implications for coping in post-conflict situations. The people and institutions around the individual experiencing a stressful life event will often simultaneously be experiencing their own stress and have fewer resources to support each other through difficult times.

Two of the major environmental or external coping resources are social support and economic means. Social support is the existence of a network of friends, family, colleagues, and acquaintances who can provide emotional, spiritual, financial, material, and other forms of support to an individual experiencing stress. Social support has been an important component of successful individual coping processes across a range of traumatic events (Andrews, Brewin, & Rose, 2003; Bonanno, Galea, Bucciarelli, & Vlahov, 2007; Brewin, Andrews, & Valentine, 2000; Glass, Flory, Hankin, Kloos, & Turecki, 2009; Kaynak, Lepore, & Kliewer, 2011; Moskowitz, Hult, Bussolari, & Acree, 2009; Ozer, Best, Lipsey, & Weiss, 2008; Prati & Pietrantoni, 2009). Structural factors have been found to affect the extent of a person's social network and the potential resources it might contain: people who live in poverty not only tend to have fewer economic resources with which to cope, but they also tend to have fewer social connections on which to rely (McLeod & Kessler, 1990; Mickelson & Kubzansky, 2003; Myers, 2009).

Economic resource availability can also affect the capacity of individuals to cope with stress. People who are poor are already experiencing a great deal of stress and have limited capacity to cope with more. Crisis stressors like war or natural disaster often negatively affect people's access to shelter, food, and medicine. People who are better off financially can afford to replace losses, at least to some degree. However, people with few financial resources will have less capacity to recover (Bonanno, et al., 2007; Gallo, 2009; Gallo, Bogart, Vranceanu, & Matthews, 2005; Gallo & Matthews, 2003; Goodman, Smyth, Borges, & Singer, 2009; Matthews, Räikkönen, Gallo, & Kuller, 2008; McLeod & Kessler, 1990; Myers, 2009; Schuster, Park, & Frisman, 2011; Trickey, Siddaway, Meiser-Stedman, Serpell, & Field, 2012; Yuan, et al., 2012).

One of the major weaknesses of both Moos' and Dohrenwend's conceptualizations of stress and coping is their near exclusive focus on the individual, even if they recognize that the context in which that individual exists is highly important. Norris, Stevens, Pfefferbaum, Wyche, & Pfefferbaum (2008) extend the concept of resilience beyond the individual to the group and community, particularly communities which have experienced disaster. Recognizing that communities are more than just the aggregate of the people who belong to them, Norris and colleagues state that a community's constituent individuals may not recover and cope in the same way or at the same rate. Community resilience refers to both the social, economic, political, and cultural resources of communities which help prevent the development of psychopathologies among their members and the resilience of the organizations and relationships which constitute community. In some ways, groups and communities that experience stressful events can be analyzed in much the same way as individuals: the

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community's pre-existing capacities and resources as affected by the context in which it exists helps define extent of the crisis provoked by a stressor event, and those resources or lack thereof affects the ability of the community to cope. The outcome of successful coping is a community which has recovered from the injury inflicted by the disaster, ensuring health and well-being for its members as well as recovery of infrastructure, social capital, and community competence which makes life in community possible. Outcomes are in part dependent on the resources that a community can mobilize to rebuild and recover, resources which were depleted by the disaster in the first place (F. H. Norris, Stevens, Pfefferbaum, Wyche, & Pfefferbaum, 2008).

Theories of Religion and Coping

Religion fits into both the Moss and Dowhenrend models of coping quite easily, particularly because the work of Kenneth Pargament, the field's leading theorist and researcher, shares their transactional, ecological orientation (Gall, et al., 2005; Pargament, 1997). Recalling my conceptualization of religion occurring at multiple scales (personal, group, and organizational/institutional) and involving beliefs and ways of thinking, behaviors, affiliations, and relationships, religion enters into concepts of coping in two primary ways: meaning-making and support.

Religion defines part of a person's worldview. It may also affect how a traumatic event is understood and perceived (P. A. Gordon, et al., 2002; Pargament, 1997; Park, 2005, 2010; Park & Ai, 2006; Park, Edmondson, Fenster, & Blank, 2008; Park, Edmondson, & Mills, 2010). Religion creates certain incentives to accept specific frames of meaning around the event; it also provides negative incentives to avoid certain

meaning-making frames which are inconsistent with its teachings and worldviews.

Pargament calls the way in which religion shapes personal meaning and perception the religion-appraisal connection (Pargament, 1997; Pargament, et al., 1990). Religious beliefs can help people frame their suffering in a redemptive light, believing that a better life is promised to them in the future. Religious people who experience suffering can believe that God is on their side, will protect them, will bless them soon, and/or will punish their adversaries. At the same time, religious beliefs can influence people to have maladaptive understandings of suffering, believing that they are being punished for sin of unfaithfulness, believing that God has abandoned them or that the forces of evil are stronger than the forces of good, or encouraging inaction with a misguided belief that there will be a supernatural intervention.

Religion's social elements can also affect coping. Friends and peers who are co-participants in the individuals' religious life may remind the person of the teaching and worldviews offered by their religious tradition that may frame the problem in a positive or negative light. Peers might also place pressure on an individual to endorse a particular understanding of their suffering or reframe their perceptions of the problem in a more orthodox manner. Religious organizations, through the work of clergy, religious teaching, and the use of ritual, may serve the same function.

Pargament and colleagues (1988) have described three distinct styles of religious coping that relate the people's perceptions of their individual power as well as the influence of the divine to solving problems: self-directing, deferential, and collaborative. The self-directing coping style attempts to rely on the power of the individual to solve problems, excluding the divine from the equation. The deferential style abandons most

personal agency in favor of waiting for the supernatural divine do the work of coping

with and solving problems. Collaborative-style coping understands the coping process as

a partnership between the individual and the divine, where both agents work together to

cope and identify solutions. Wong-McDonald & Gorsuch (2001) have proposed the

addition of an additional style, that of surrender, in which the individual actively

acknowledges that there are certain things which he or she cannot change and turns those

problems over to God. These styles are systems of meaning about human nature and

human power in the face of a divine being, and they all are associated with a certain way

of understanding the universe and a person's place in it. Beliefs about human agency,

then, are important aspects of religious coping.

Beyond meaning-making and shaping how individuals perceive of their suffering,

religion is capable of providing various supports which may help an individual more

effectively engage in various coping activities (Maton & Wells, 1995; Pargament, et al.,

1990). Both religious peers and organizations can provide resources, such as material aid,

emotional support, and the opportunity to engage in supportive services and rituals,

which can help a person cope with a problem. Not all religiously oriented coping is

positive, however, and an individual's religious peers and the religious organizations of

which they are a part may convince them that they deserve the suffering they are

experiencing, may withdraw their support, or may even ostracize them from community.

Pargament and colleagues have used grounded-theory practices to develop a list

of specific types of religious coping (Pargament, et al., 1990). Their list contains

spirituality-based, good deed, avoidant, pleading, and discontent coping types.

Spirituality-based types of coping lead people to focus on the spiritual meaning of their

struggles. Good deed types describe occasions when a person tries to become more righteous and lead an upstanding life. Avoidant types are strategies which ignore or avoid the problems of "this world" by focusing on the promise of the afterlife or "world to come." Pleading involves bargaining with or begging God to provide a solution, and religious support involves seeking support from clergy or church members. The discontent type includes becoming angry at God or at religious institutions or abandoning one's faith (Pargament, et al., 1990). In a later publication, religiously-motivated forgiving and reconciling was added to this list (Pargament, Koenig, & Perez, 2000; Pargament, Smith, Koenig, & Perez, 1998). These activities make it clear that religion has the potential to provide both positive and negative resources to help a person cope with stressful life events. Pargament has labeled various activities as positive or negative: "benevolent religious appraisals, collaborative religious coping, seeking spiritual support, spiritual connection, religious purification, seeking help from clergy or members, religious helping, and religious forgiveness" are positive forms of coping, while "punitive religious reappraisals, reappraisals of God's power, spiritual discontentment, self-directing religious coping, and interpersonal religious discontentment" are negative forms (Pargament et al., 1998, p. 712; see also Pargament et al., 2000). However, this normative categorization of forms of coping as positive or negative is rooted in a perspective which sees religion and all religious belief and practice as positive. An atheist may find it a good thing that someone became discontented with God, or a pastor might be quite satisfied that one of his or her members, as a result of suffering, altered a conception of God that was not rooted in their religious text. Similarly, clergy and members can help a person cope in negative ways. For example,

pressure to forgive may not be productive for a relationship of continuing harm. Nonetheless, the recognition that religiously-influenced coping strategies are not always positive is important.

How and why people turn to religion as part of their coping strategies has been an important consideration the theoretical and empirical explorations of the connections between religion and coping. Pargament's description of coping activities may evoke thoughts of people rationally turning to religion to help them through difficult times. Some people in some circumstances do engage in rational calculations when faced with stress. However, for a substantial portion of the population, the use of religiously-influenced coping is not based on rational decision making. Rather, religion is part of individual and social patterns about how coping is conducted—people turn to religion because that is what they and people like them have traditionally done. According to Spilka, Shaver, and Kirkpatrick (1985), the turn to religion is determined in part by the nature and background of the individual in question, in part by the circumstance that individuals finds him or herself, and in part by the context surrounding the individual and the circumstance. It is not as if religion becomes universally relevant when anyone experiences stress in their life. Rather, people who were not religious before the stress event tend not to turn to religion in times of coping. Individuals' religiosity, even if only weakly observed or practiced, will usually exist before the crisis they experience. If religion is one of multiple coping tools an individual brings to any stressful event, they may or may not use it. The more important religion is in a person's everyday life, the more likely that they will turn to religion in times of crisis (Spilka, et al., 1985). For people who are deeply religious, coping using the tools provided by religion is the normal

and obvious thing to do. People who have little place in their lives for religion are less likely to use it. Religious coping may also in some sense required by religious beliefs or affiliations, understood as a religious and social obligation.

Religion is involved in people's appraisals of the nature of a problem as well as their search for solutions to or mechanisms to cope with that problem. However, the consequences of stressful events also change religion (Pargament, 1997; Pargament, et al., 1990). A person's religion—beliefs, worldviews, behaviors, memberships, and relationships—can also be changed by the experience of suffering and coping with it. Sometimes the suffering experienced during a stressful event, particularly a very significant event like war or rape, confronts the individual with a reality so completely divorced from the blessings promised by their religion that their belief in and affiliation with that religion are no longer sustainable. As a result, there are frequent changes in either religious belief or affiliation as a result of personal suffering as people search for a religious tradition that can provide either more support for coping and recovery or a more convincing explanation for their suffering. Even if a person who suffers greatly does not completely lose their religion, events which are overwhelming psychologically and physically can also overwhelm a person's religious beliefs and practice, preventing them from turning to those resources in times of crisis. Alternately, if a religious worldview tells a person that they are suffering because of their sinfulness or other faults, that person might redouble their commitment to religion in an effort to become more righteous. Non-religious people may turn to religion in times of crisis, or when they are faced with stressful events over time, because religion provides resources not available through other means to cope with that stress.

There is always unease among researchers about how well theoretical concepts derived from the study of social patterns and structures in one part of the world can translate to realities in other parts. Much of both the theory around religion and coping has used western religions, and particularly Christianity, as its frame of reference. It has neglected to develop meaningful understandings of the ways in which religions from other world regions understand and deploy resources to manage the universal problem of human suffering. Part of this neglect is based on the ethnocentricity of western researchers who find that their own culture is most accessible to them. In addition, while there may be excellent research investigating religion and coping in other parts of the world by local researchers, it is not being published in journals commonly read in the western world. Furthermore, there are significant technical challenges in attempts by western-based researchers to do research in other contexts: they lack the contextual expertise to do valid cross-cultural research, and many of the standard tools and measures that have been developed for western Christianity would not translate well to other contexts, but that problem is being remedied (see, for example, Raiya, Pargament, Mahoney, & Stein, 2008). There are some indications, however, that Pargament's general orientation to religion and coping may be valid beyond Christianity. For example, Gall and colleagues presented a framework for understanding religion and coping which was heavily influenced by the work of Pargament to a set of mental health practitioners from diverse religious backgrounds. These practitioners widely affirmed the validity of the orientation across multiple religious traditions (Gall, et al., 2005), though this is a question which requires further research and reflection.

Empirical Studies of Religion and Coping

Individual Outcomes

The empirical literature on religion and coping is wide and diverse. In Pargament's authoritative book on the subject, he identifies 31 separate studies which examine what portion of their sample use religion in some way to cope with a wide variety of stressful events, 54 studies which examine which personal, situational, and contextual factors predict the use of religion in coping, 74 studies which examine the relationship between religious orientation and outcomes after experiences of stressful life events, and 30 studies which examine how religion affects the relationship between a stressful event and post-event adjustment and recovery (Pargament, 1997). Both the research designs and conclusions of the studies are highly variable within the same general category. Rather than replicate his work and conduct a fine-grained analysis of the state of the literature in 1997, I will outline in broad strokes a summary and critique of the literature at that time before examining in more detail recent developments in the field. The citations and examples I include here do not serve as a comprehensive summary of the field at the time Pargament wrote his book, but rather as an example of the range of constructs, outcomes, and results that he found.

Of the 31 studies which examine what proportion of the population engages in religious coping strategies, there are a wide variety of responses depending on the sample. For example, 58% of residents of Toledo, Ohio indicated that they used religion to some degree while coping with stressful events (Wicks, 1990), while 73% of married, non-black residents in Detroit reporting engaging religious coping strategies (Mattlin,

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Wethington, & Kessler, 1990). Eighty percent of African-American adults reported using prayer to cope (Ellison & Taylor, 1996), 44% of adults in New Haven, CT, coped using prayer (Lindenthal, Myers, Pepper, & Stern, 1970), and 16% of Americans in 1960 reported turning to prayer first when dealing with difficult events (Gurin, Veroff, & Feld, 1960). The studies are a roughly even mix of quantitative, survey-based studies and interview-based qualitative studies, though none of the studies examine change over time with the participants. Given the highly divergent definitions of religious coping, different populations under study, and different situations in which coping techniques are called upon, it is difficult to get a clear picture of the extent of people's reliance on religious approaches to coping.

Of the 54 studies predicting the use of religious coping techniques, 26 examine the connection between personal characteristics including gender, race, denominational affiliation, religious activity, personality characteristics, and educational attainment. Almost universally women turned to religious coping more often than men (Bjorck & Cohen, 1993; Ellison & Taylor, 1996; Ferraro & Koch, 1994; Gurin, et al., 1960; Koenig, George, & Siegler, 1988; Pargament, et al., 1992; Sattler, Hamby, WInkler, & Kaiser, 1994). People with lower educational attainment turned to religion more than more highly educated people in some studies (Bearon & Koenig, 1990; Gurin, et al., 1960). Similarly, lower socioeconomic status was a predictor of the use of religious coping in some studies (Bearon & Koenig, 1990; Gurin, et al., 1960) but not in others (Ellison & Taylor, 1996; Ferraro & Koch, 1994; Koenig, et al., 1992; Pargament, et al., 1992; Sattler, et al., 1994).

Eighteen of the 54 studies examined the types of situations that provoked religious coping, yielding a wide variety of results. These studies found that health problems and catastrophic events provoked use of religious coping more than did family, marriage, financial, and other sources of stress (Ellison & Taylor, 1996; Lindenthal, et al., 1970; Mattlin, et al., 1990; Pargament, et al., 1992; Spilka & Schmidt, 1983). People who attended church or participated in private religious activities like prayer often, who had higher degrees of religious salience, or who lived in regions where a large portion of the population was religious all used religious forms of coping more readily than did people who were less involved in religion or lived in areas where religion was less prevalent (Ellison & Taylor, 1996; Ferraro & Koch, 1994; Jenkins, 1995; Pargament, et al., 1992). The seeming contradictory results of these analyses have more to do with different study populations, different definitions of religious coping techniques, and examinations of the use of coping in a wide variety of circumstances rather than a fundamental difference in results.

Of the 74 studies in his analysis of religion and the outcomes of coping processes, Pargament documents 380 analyses of connections between different forms of religiosity (personal and organizational forms of religiosity, mixed forms, and religious orientation) and different forms of adjustment after a negative event. Thirty-two percent of the analyses revealed a positive relationship between various forms of religiosity and coping (increased levels of coping associated with increased personal religious expressions), only 3% showed a negative relationship (increased religious expressions leaded to decreased coping), and 65% showed no relationship. While the number of analyses that detected no relationship may seem high, these analyses represent highly diverse ways of

measuring both religion and coping, and one could not realistically hope for a clear relationship. People who had had religious faith tended to have less fear of death (Bivens, Neimeyer, Kirchberg, & Moore, 1995; Gibbs & Achterberg-Lawlis, 1978) and better psychological outcomes (Gray, 1987; C. R. Harris, et al., 1995; Kass, Friedman, Leserman, Zuttermeister, & Benson, 1991), but the frequency of prayer had mixed results (Pargament, et al., 1999; Pargament, et al., 1990). Participation in organizational forms of religious life was associated with improved psychological outcomes (C. R. Harris, et al., 1995; Koenig, 1995; McGloshen & O'Bryant, 1988; Pargament, et al., 1999), but had mixed effects on fear of death (Bivens, et al., 1995; Franks, Templer, Cappelletty, & Kauffman). The results around religious orientation are decidedly mixed, with intrinsic, extrinsic, and quest orientations all associated with a range of both positive and negative outcomes.

Similarly, Pargament documents 79 separate studies analyzing the connection between 463 combinations of religious forms of coping and coping outcomes. Of the 463 analyses, 30% showed positive associations, 20% revealed a negative relationship, and the remainder showed no relationship. These results paint a decidedly ambiguous picture of the relationship between religious forms of coping and coping outcomes, though they are consistent with the theory of religious coping which acknowledges that there are both positive and negative forms of religious coping which lead to both positive and negative outcomes. Many of the negative coping outcomes contained within this set of studies are associated with a deferential religious orientation which denies human agency. Such orientations limit the capacity of people to take action to cope, though these studies do

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document some results where deferential orientations are associated with positive outcomes.

Reviews of the literature and meta-analyses subsequent to Pargament's analysis have largely confirmed his findings. Shaw, Joseph, and Linley (2005), examining 11 studies, found that the majority of analyses reveal a positive relationship between religion and post-traumatic growth. Schaefer, Blazer, and Koenig (2008), reviewing 23 studies, found that intrinsic religious orientations are among the best predictors of positive religious coping and post-traumatic growth. In a review of 11 studies, Chen and Koenig (2006) found that there was a significant relationship between religion and PTSD in nine of them, though that relationship was positive—increased measures of religion being associated with decreased PTSD symptoms—in only six. In a meta-analysis of 49 studies containing 105 effect sizes, Ano & Vasconcelles (2005) found a moderate positive relationship between positive religious coping and positive psychological adjustment, a small inverse relationship between positive religious coping and negative psychological adjustment, no relationship between negative religious coping and positive psychological adjustment, and a moderate positive relationship between negative religious coping and negative psychological adjustment. Unfortunately over two thirds of the studies on religion and coping they identified had to be excluded from their meta-analysis because important data was missing from the publications, meaning that the results may have limited validity (Ano & Vasconcelles, 2005).

Even when focusing only the post-Pargament literature on religion and coping, there is still far too much literature to productively analyze and critique all the individual articles. To focus the remainder of this section, I focus on religion and coping in the

aftermath of violence and crime and other trauma events such as terrorism. Much of the literature on religion and coping is connected with medical problems, and filtering out these articles greatly reduces the relevant pool of studies.

Experiences of crime and violence. Various studies studied the effects of religious coping on people who have been victimized by crime.   The results are contradictory. Among African American women, religiosity and spirituality have been associated with lower levels of PTSD symptoms and depression after experiencing domestic abuse (Ahrens, Abeling, Ahmad, & Hinman, 2009; Bradley, Schwartz, & Kaslow, 2005; Paranjape & Kaslow, 2010; Watlington & Murphy, 2006), though other studies find no effect (Bryant-Davis, Ullman, Tsong, & Gobin, 2011; D. N. Fowler & Hill, 2004). Similar patterns hold true for violence or abuse experienced by American Muslims (Abu-Raiya, Pargament, & Mahoney, 2011). Certain negative religious coping styles, which included feelings that God had abandoned or was punishing the victim, are associated with poorer outcomes including higher levels of PTSD and lower levels of social support (Abu-Raiya, et al., 2011; Ahrens, et al., 2009; Bradley, et al., 2005). Several studies highlight the importance of social support in promoting positive outcomes, but the contributions of religion are somewhat contradictory across studies. Watlington and Murphy (2006) and Paranjape and Kaslow (2010) find that people who are more involved in religious activities have higher levels of social support, while Bryant-Davis and colleagues find no connection (Bryant-Davis, et al., 2011).   A potential explanation comes from understanding the nature of religious community: some survivors of domestic abuse find that religious expectations around gender roles, especially the relationship between husband and wife, is an obstacle when trying to find

support (Levitt & Ware, 2006; Wang, Horne, Levitt, & Klesges, 2010; Yick, 2008).

These patterns suggest that religiously influenced social support is dependent on victims

still managing to abide by the expectations and norms of their community, norms which

may be challenged by their victimization. Ahrens and colleagues warn that not all

populations and groups use religion after crime in the same way, finding that while

African Americans turn to religion for coping after experience domestic abuse at higher

rates than other racial groups, Caucasian survivors have a stronger relationship between

positive coping and positive outcomes (Ahrens, et al., 2009).

> **Violence-related bereavement**. Wortmann and Park (2009) conducted a review

of 73 empirical studies on the connection between religion and coping among people who

have lost a family member or friend due to violence. One of the excellent features of

their review is that it separates religion into multiple dimensions and analyzes each one

separately. They found that a majority of studies observed no relationship between

membership in specific religious traditions and coping, further confirming the results of

Pargament's review (Pargament, 1997). Frequency of religious participation, general

religiosity (respondents' self-rating of the strength or importance of their faith or of their

interest in religion), strength of religious beliefs (particularly belief in the afterlife),

extrinsic and intrinsic religious orientations, and "spiritual" experiences of interacting

with the divine were all found to be positive predictors of post-bereavement recovery in a

majority of studies they reviewed. The authors were surprised that the frequency and

intensity of religious coping techniques as well as the amount of support received from

religious peers and institutions were studied in the available literature only 15 and three

times respectively, though they found both dimensions to be positively related to

successful recovery in a majority of studies showing any effect. Wortmann and Park also found that the mechanism which connected the measured dimensions together was meaning making, as religion helped people who had suffered bereavement understand, make sense of, and construct meaning around the loss they had experienced (Jennifer H. Wortmann & Park, 2009).

The results from Wortmann and Park's work emphasize the necessity of understanding precisely how religious coping takes place. Negative religious coping styles, including belief in a punishing God, pleading with God, and post-traumatic religious discontent have been associated with negative outcomes after bereavement multiple times (Anderson, Marwit, Vandenberg, & Chibnall, 2005; Burke, Neimeyer, McDevitt-Murphy, Ippolito, & Roberts, 2011; Exline, Park, Smyth, & Carey, 2011; Gerber, Boals, & Schuettler, 2011; Lee, Roberts, & Gibbons, 2012; Neimeyer & Burke, 2011; Thompson & Vardaman, 1997; J. H. Wortmann, Park, & Edmondson, 2011). On the other hand, positive religious coping styles, such as a secure belief in a loving God and belief in an afterlife, such that parents who have lost children believe they will be reunited in the afterlife, are associated with much more positive outcomes (Currier, Mallot, Martinez, Sandy, & Neimeyer, 2012; Gerber, et al., 2011; Kelley & Chan, 2012; Parappully, Rosenbaum, van den Daele, & Nzewi, 2002; Suhail, Jamil, Oyebode, & Ajmal, 2011). However, some studies, similar to those discussed in the previous section, are ambivalent about the link between positive religious coping and bereavement outcomes (Burke, et al., 2011; Neimeyer & Burke, 2011).

Terrorism. There is also a small set of articles within the literature on religion and coping which seek to understand how people may use religion to cope with exposure

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to violence and suffering as a result of terrorist actions which occur in their city or country. Generally, members of this group and their friends and family members have not been direct victims of this violence. Among Jewish youth (Laufer & Solomon, 2009a; Schiff, 2006), American adolescents (Milam, Ritt-Olson, Tan, Unger, & Nezami, 2005), American college students (Ai, Cascio, Santangelo, & Evans-Campbell, 2005), Americans generally (Park, Riley, & Snyder, 2012), and among students in Pakistan (Ahmed, et al., 2011), religion and religiosity are generally associated with positive coping and better outcomes. However, there is at least one example of the converse being true, where religion and faith are associated with higher levels of worry, negative coping, and worse well-being (Plante & Canchola, 2004).

Several studies in this category emphasize the importance of examining cultural differences in religion and coping. Constantine (2012) found that while African-Americans and Latinos attended church more frequently, Asians were more likely to reflect on their relationships with a higher power and interpret the events of September 11, 2001 as the will of God. Dickstein and colleagues found that it is Israelis' ability to accept and make meaning of the threat of terrorism that allows them to cope effectively with the threat (Dickstein, et al., 2012), a finding reflected by Park and colleagues' research in the United States (Fischer, Ai, Aydin, Frey, & Haslam, 2010; Park, et al., 2012). Similarly, some American Muslims' ability to religiously interpret the September 11 terrorist attacks as a desecration made them more likely to positively cope with the aftermath of those attacks and the social stigma they faced (Abu-Raiya, et al., 2011). American Muslims tend to turn to more social means of coping, often based on social connection within their home mosque, whereas American Christians tended to use more

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individualistic means of coping divorced from their religious affiliations (Fischer, et al., 2010). Israelis who directly or indirectly experienced rocket attacks also have differential coping abilities linked to religion: those Jews who practice more moderate variations of their religion are more likely to experience negative effects of such violence than are Orthodox Jews (Chipman, Palmieri, Canetti, Johnson, & Hobfoll, 2010) (Kalayjian, Shahinian, Gergerian, & Saraydarian, 1996), though the cause of these differences is not explored. Among Israeli youth, an intrinsic religious orientation has positive coping effects after exposure to terrorism, but and extrinsic orientation has negative effects (Laufer & Solomon, 2009b).

Religion and coping in the aftermath of genocide and war. There are several studies examining the role of religion in helping people recover from genocide. Survivors of the Armenian genocide who had subsequently emigrated to the United States cited some form of religion and spirituality as their most frequent coping strategy (Kalayjian, et al., 1996).   Among Israelis, Holocaust survivors and their children had greater rates of belief and God and hope in the future than did non-survivors (Carmil & Breznitz, 1991). In Bosnia, a full or partial loss in faith in God was associated with increased likelihood that survivors would experience major depression controlling for several other factors including family history of mental illness (Basoglu, et al., 2005). Among Kosovar Albanian refugees in the United States, higher positive religious coping is associated with higher levels of hope, whereas higher levels of negative religious coping is associated with lower levels of hope (Ai, Peterson, & Huang, 2003). Higher levels of religiosity—particularly strength of belief—helped displaced Tibetans adjust to their new lives (D. Hussain & Bhushan, 2011). In Afghanistan, women living amidst the

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violence there often cited mosque attendance and prayer as coping strategies (Welsh & Brodsky, 2010).

Studying specific aspects of context is of critical importance in this literature as patterns which are true in one context may be different for another. Khamis, for example, finds that religiosity and PTSD and other psychological markers of well-being are positively related in Gaza but negatively related in Lebanon (Khamis, 2012). In Israel, women in range of enemy attacks during the 2006 Lebanon War recited psalms as a means of coping, in part because they had few if any other ways of dealing with the danger. However, women not directly in the war zone did not use scripture as a means of coping (Sosis & Handwerker, 2011).

Coping and Interpersonal Relationships after Traumatic Events

There is very little direct research which links religion, religious forms of coping, and various interpersonal outcomes after a person has experienced a stressful event. In the context of externally-imposed trauma, particularly when there are perpetrator and victim, these interpersonal outcomes such as forgiveness, reconciliation, desire to punish, and the like are particularly important.

Religious coping and the desire for relationships. There is only indirect evidence to link religious coping with a person's willingness to strengthen or weaken their relationships with others. Since social isolation is frequently associated with depression, it is reasonable to expect that people who have experienced traumatic events may be tempted to isolate themselves from their friends and family. That said, a wide variety of studies have found that people who have experienced or witnessed traumatic

events actively sought relationships, either as an active coping device or as a general attitude to want to be closer to their loved ones in the face of danger or tragedy (Ai & Park, 2005; Bryant-Davis, 2005; Meisenhelder & Marcum, 2004). Unfortunately, none of the studies actively linked religion in any form with post-traumatic relationship seeking, nor did they seek to analyze variations in the prevalence of sociability across different demographic groups or different coping techniques.

Religion and the desire to punish. Religion affects how people desire to punish or forgive wrongdoers, particularly in criminal cases. Multiple studies have established that differences in the way in which people attribute responsibility for criminal acts affects their attitudes towards punishment. People who think that criminals have actively chosen a life of crime, are inherently evil, or have a range of other personal faults are more likely to support strict punishments, even the death penalty, than people who believe that criminal acts are at least in part attributable to the environment in which a person exists (Cochran, Boots, & Heide, 2003; Grasmick, Cochran, Bursik, & Kimpel, 1993). Religious affiliation has been found to affect attributions of responsibility in the United States, where more fundamentalist Christians, whose more literal interpretation of the Bible emphasizes the personal character and responsibility in the pursuit of salvation are much more likely to want to punish a criminal than are more liberal or moderate Christians (Grasmick, Bursik Jr, & Blackwell, 1993; Grasmick, Davenport, Chamlin, & Bursik Jr, 1992; Grasmick & McGill, 1994)..

Similarly, images of God affect willingness to punish: people who perceive that they have a close relationship with a loving God are less likely to support capital punishment (Unnever, Cullen, & Bartkowski, 2006). On the other hand, people with

images of God as a powerful, dispassionate figure and who view religion in legalistic and moralistic ways are more likely to support punitive orientations to criminal justice (Unnever & Cullen, 2006; Unnever, Cullen, & Applegate, 2005). Unfortunately, none of these studies look directly at victims' desire to punish the people who perpetrated crimes against them, examining instead the general acceptability of punishment in society.

Religion and forgiveness. Empirical research into the connection between religion and forgiveness is a relatively recent addition to the literature on religion and various personal and social outcomes. Until 15 or so years ago, the field lacked comprehensive theoretical understanding and reliable measures of forgiveness, so quantitative survey-based research to determine the causes of and efficacy of forgiveness in dealing with traumatic situations is relatively new (Edwards, et al., 2002). The research which has emerged shows that many world religions highly esteem forgiveness, but empirical research has documented an ambivalent relationship between religiosity and forgiveness (McCullough & Worthington Jr, 1999). One study paints an unambiguously positive connection between religion and tendencies toward forgiveness (Edwards, et al., 2002). However, another suggests that there is only a marginal relationship between religiosity and actual acts forgiveness, though religious people do consistently predict that they would forgive when asked about hypothetical transgressions (Berry, Worthington Jr, Parrott Iii, O'Connor, & Wade, 2001). Still another find no empirical link whatsoever between religion and forgiveness (Wade, Meyer, Goldman, & Post, 2008).

These discrepancies may be attributable to various theoretical and psychometric shortcomings in the literature (Tsang, McCullough, & Hoyt, 2005). On one hand, a focus

on religion's contributions towards forgiveness correctly identifies a preoccupation in many religious traditions with sinfulness, repentance, and forgiveness. On the other, such a focus is not sufficient, for it neglects the very real justifications within such traditions to resist the urge to forgive, to limit forgiveness, or to justify retribution. Omissions of these aspects of the relationships between religion and forgiveness may contribute to the empirically ambiguous relationship between them (Tsang, et al., 2005). For example, Cohen and colleagues link beliefs that certain crimes are unforgiveable to less generalized willingness to forgive among Jewish populations (Cohen, Malka, Rozin, & Cherfas, 2005).

Simplistic measurements of religion also contribute to the misunderstanding of its relationship with forgiveness. For example, merely asking if someone is religious fails to detect variations in the frequency of their participation, the intensity of their beliefs, or the support they receive from co-religionists or religious institutions. Variation in these constructs has been proven to affect the performance of forgiveness (Barnes & Brown, 2010; A. Fox & Thomas, 2008). For example, Mullet and colleagues found that it is not religious beliefs but rather the social component of religion—people's visible attendance at church—which predicted willingness to forgive (Mullet, Barros, Usaï, Neto, & Shafighi, 2003). The specific aspects related to church attendance which might have led to willingness to forgive are not discussed.

One possibility why embeddedness and active participation in a religious community might be related to forgiveness is because of social pressures within that community to forgive. One study found that respondents with intrinsic religious orientations were more likely to report having forgiven people who had hurt them,

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whereas people with an extrinsic orientation were more likely to want vengeance. The study also examined the role of social pressure to forgive, finding that extrinsically oriented respondents were much more likely to forgive when they were under pressure to do so; there were no effects detected between intrinsically oriented people and social pressure (K. C. Gordon, et al., 2008).

The nature of people's beliefs about God also affects their willingness to forgive. People who have an impersonal or inconsistent relationship are less likely to forgive someone who had previously hurt them (Davis, Hook, & Worthington Jr, 2008). People with more fundamentalist beliefs about God and Christianity had more positive attitudes about forgiveness but actually forgive people less when compared with people of more moderate religious beliefs (Brown, Barnes, & Campbell, 2007). Similarly, Walker and Doverspike (2001) found that Christian men who valued a strict masculine gender role were less open to forgiveness.

Even when forgiveness is clearly associated with a specific religious tradition, mere membership with that religion may not be enough to promote forgiveness. In one study, increased religiosity (participation and rated importance of religion) were better predictors of forgiveness rather than dichotomous measures of affiliation to specific religious groups (A. Fox & Thomas, 2008). Embracing certain faith-prescribed rituals around religion, such as confession, repentance, and apology was found to be more important than spirituality in predicting forgiveness in another (Luzombe & Dean, 2009). This study suggests that it is not merely enough to expect that religion or spirituality alone will encourage a person to forgive; rather, the offender may need to embrace rituals and values consistent with the victim's religious understanding of forgiveness in order to

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make forgiveness itself more likely. On the other hand, Wade and colleagues found that perceived offender contrition had no effect on various measures of forgiveness among religious people (Wade, et al., 2008).

  Religion and reconciliation. Despite the extensive literature linking religion with its supposed normative messages of forgiveness and reconciliation (Lederach, 1999; Oliner & Zylicz, 2008; Petersen, 2001; Volf, 1996, 2001), I can locate only one empirical study which links religion, forgiveness, and reconciliation. Williamson and Gonzales (2007) found that respondents reconciled with the people who harmed them more often the less severe the offense was and the closer the relationship they had prior to the incident. Respondents for whom religion was important in their daily lives were more likely to reconcile, as were respondents who had already forgiven the offender when compared with respondents who had not yet forgiven (Williamson & Gonzales, 2007).

General Critique

  There are hundreds of articles about religion and coping. Even when this literature is narrowed to include only those events connected with violence and war, the corpus is still large. Nonetheless, the extant body of research has several shortcomings.

  A failure to understand religion and coping as processes. Much of this literature has been based on quantitative research as opposed to qualitative research—for example, 15 quantitatively oriented articles dealing with religion and coping appeared in the Journal of Traumatic Stress during the 1990s, compared with only one qualitatively oriented article (Weaver, Flannelly, Garbarino, Figley, & Flannelly, 2003). When combined with a preponderance of cross-sectional as opposed to longitudinal designs

(Chen & Koenig, 2006; Schaefer, et al., 2008), it is difficult to use this literature then to understand coping as a process, for we cannot understand specifically how individuals and their environments cope and change over time. Given the evidence that both religion and various measures of well-being affected by coping change after experiencing a stressful event, a longitudinal rather than cross-sectional approach is a much better way to understand this dynamic relationship, for many cross-sectional studies position religion as an independent, and therefore unchanging, variable in their analyses. Moreover, it is nearly impossible to truly understand the mechanisms by which people draw upon religious resources to cope through simplistic measurements of religion, such as the frequency with which a respondent attends church or prays, without the detailed descriptions of coping processes which comes best from qualitative research (Kwilecki, 2004). We need other forms of research, especially longitudinal quantitative analyses and qualitative research, to develop nuanced knowledge about the link between religion and coping.

Inadequate conceptualizations of religion. An unsophisticated approach to measuring or even conceptualizing religion permeates much of this research (P. C. Hill & Pargament, 2003). Too frequently religion is measured simplistically, using single items or constructs rather than attempting to ascertain an understanding of religion in its ecological and multi-scalar complexity. The ambiguous results presented in this review are in part attributable to the label religion being applied to a wide diversity of beliefs, behaviors, orientations, affiliations, and relationships. The situation is further complicated by religious coping being applied in a wide variety of stressful situations and an extremely varied set of post-traumatic outcomes. There needs to be more precision

about what religion entails in these contexts. Researchers must also be better attuned to how specific aspects of religion are associated with specific coping outcomes. One area which is sorely lacking is the role of religious people, professionals, and clergy in direct interventions in post-traumatic situations (S. Smith, 2004).

Failure to integrate religion with other coping processes. Too much of the literature also sees religion as a phenomenon separate from other critical coping resources, like social support, economic resources, and non-spiritual emotional and cognitive processes. Religious people get social support at church, may receive financial assistance from religious institutions or religious friends, and may receive counseling service from religious mental health professionals. It is somewhat misleading to isolate these aspects of the coping process from religion. Moreover, we must seek to better understand how religious people, organizations, and relationships are part of the coping process.

The dominance of clinical, psychological, and mental-health disciplinary boundaries in the literature on religion and coping further limits how religion, coping, and outcomes after trauma are conceptualized. The literature is almost exclusively focused on the individual as a cognitive processor with a bundle of personal characteristics rather than as a person embedded in a complex web of relationships and affiliations. In this review, I have not come across a study which seeks to understand how relationships (beyond simplistic understandings of social support) and embeddedness in a variety of contexts, religious and non-religious, may affect coping. Furthermore, the outcome of a coping process is too often viewed in terms of mental health. While personal well-being is very important, people live their lives in the context

of community, and religion and coping must be conceptualized as affecting relational

well-being, the ability and willingness of people to engage in healthy relationships with

their family, friends, and neighbors.[13] Moreover, viewing religion as a personal

characteristic, a set of beliefs and behaviors, tends to omit certain manifestations of

religion, such as the use of magic rituals to ward off evil or suffering and the power of

mystical religious experiences (being visited by God, or a near-death experience) to

transform people's ability to cope with trauma (Kwilecki, 2004).

Trauma, Religion, and Coping in Rwanda

It will be no surprise that Rwandans experienced high levels of trauma,

depression, and other negative effects after the genocide. For example, female rape

survivors said that they had lost their dignity, respect, and identity; and that rape had

created social stigma from the society at large such that they had to hide their status.

Many survivors said that it was difficult for them to think positively of the future

(Mukamana & Brysiewicz, 2008). Large studies of children immediately after the

genocide found extremely high levels of trauma: over 90% of them believed they would

die over the course of the genocide, 78% lost at least one member of their family, 80%

had to hide to protect themselves, 15% hid under dead bodies, and 96% had directly

witnessed some sort of violence, including 70% who had seen someone being killed; 79%

of the children had high enough scores on a test to be diagnosed with PTSD (Dyregrov,

Gupta, Gjestad, & Mukanoheli, 2000; Neugebauer, et al., 2009; Schaal & Elbert, 2006).

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[13] There is a literature which links experiences of stressful events, coping, and a variety of marital and familial outcomes, but I have not found a single article which links religion, coping, and those outcomes.

Ten years after the genocide, 44% of respondents still met the diagnostic criteria for PTSD (Schaal & Elbert, 2006).

The effects of the genocide are not restricted to children. Five years after the genocide, 16% of adults—and especially women—had symptoms of major depression. These symptoms were associated with functional impairment of a range of individual, family, and social roles including maintaining personal hygiene, engaging in family and community life, and working on a regular basis (Bolton, 2001; Bolton, Neugebauer, & Ndogoni, 2002). In a study conducted some eight years after the genocide, 73% of adult respondents reported having a family member killed, and 25% met the diagnostic criteria for PTSD (Pham, et al., 2004). People with high levels of trauma were less likely to have positive attitudes about *gacaca* or other judicial processes, to trust their neighbors, or to maintain interdependent ties with people of the other ethnicity. Women were found to have higher incidents of PTSD symptoms then men, Tutsi had more symptoms than Hutus, and people living in regions which experienced more intense genocide also had more symptoms. People with higher levels of education were less likely to be open to reconciliation as measured on four dimensions, as were people who experienced higher numbers of traumatic events, as were those who thought that their economic and security situations had deteriorated since 1994 (Pham, et al., 2004). There was no mention of religion in any of these three studies which examined trauma among Rwandan adults, and two of them neglect economic status as well.

Several studies have examined attempts to help Rwandans cope after the genocide. Orphan headed households, a common occurrence after the genocide, were marginalized from their surrounding communities because they were seen as

troublemakers with little discipline (Boris, et al., 2008; Thurman, et al., 2008). Their marginalization from the community was also related to higher levels of depression (Boris, et al., 2008). Radio-based interventions which attempt to decrease Rwandan's willingness to uncritically obey authorities and to reduce intergroup prejudice and conflict have seen to be at least partially effective (Paluck, 2009; Paluck & Green, 2009). Higher levels of people's expressed willingness to reconcile has been linked to participation in various workshops and trauma healing programs (Bazuin, 2009; Chico, 2006; Chico & Uwimana, 2005; Mahler, Ntakarutimana, & Niyongabo, 2007; Richters, Dekker, & Scholte, 2008; Sezibera, Van Broeck, & Philippot, 2009; Staub, et al., 2005). While the radio interventions were conducted by a religious radio station and at least one of the workshops had some religious content, these evaluations studies do not examine any differential outcomes for religion affiliation, religiosity, or spirituality.

There is also a great deal of literature on the impact of *gacaca* in Rwanda. At the individual level, witnesses report feeling more insecure, sad, fearful, and socially isolated as a result of their testimony and have higher levels of depression and PTSD than did non-witnesses even when controlling for genocide experience and demographic factors, an effect which is particularly pronounced for survivors (Brounéus, 2008b, 2010). Another survey likewise identified high levels of sadness, fear, and anxiety among both victims and perpetrators after taking part in *gacaca* (Brounéus, 2010). A subsequent study found more nuanced results: survivors had higher levels of anger, disgust, and PTSD and lower levels of shame compared to perpetrators. Both groups identified more strongly with their pan-Rwandan identities than their pre-genocide ethnic identities and had more positive stereotypes of the other after participating in *gacaca*. Perpetrators

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perceived social cohesion at very low levels prior to *gacaca*, and reported significant improvement after; victims, on the other hand, had medium levels of cohesion pre-*gacaca* and slightly lower results afterward (Rimé, et al., 2011).

At the social level, results are somewhat more mixed. Several ethnographers have concluded that, at least in the short term, the tribunals destabilized the country and deepened interpersonal and interethnic conflict (Burnet, 2010; Thomson, 2011a). Multiple surveys reveal generally high levels of satisfaction with *gacaca* (Megwalu & Loizides, 2010a; Rettig, 2008), with people who participate more, more poorly educated people, rural residents, and people who were not in Rwanda during the genocide having higher levels of satisfaction (Koster, 2008; Kubai, 2007a; Megwalu & Loizides, 2010a). In another manuscript based on analysis of my survey data, I found that there is a positive link between *gacaca* participation and reconciliation (Bazuin, 2012).

One study describes in detail processes of coping among Rwandans, specifically among women who had survived rape. Zraly and Nyirazinyoye (2010) found that these women frequently made reference to three culturally specific modes of coping. *Kwihangana*, which literally means to be patient, calls the suffering person to find inner strength to persevere in the face of continuing suffering. *Kwongera kubaho* means to desire to keep living in the way one did before, of relocating one's humanity which had been stripped away over the course of the genocide. *Gukomeza ubuzima* is a sense of having agency and power in one's own life, that one will not let circumstances and potential enemies lead to discouragement and acquiescence but will strive to create the best life possible (Zraly & Nyirazinyoye, 2010). Unfortunately, the authors do not explore how these coping concepts are operative, if they are located in the individual, if

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they are social constructs pressed upon these survivors by well-meaning group leaders or outside professionals, if they are deployed in everyday life in social situations by the group members. Moreover, no mention is made of religion, nor is coping analyzed from the perspective of survivors' economic status,.

Specific Research Questions

Much of the existing literature on religion and coping is focused on American and European contexts. While psychological theories of coping highlight the importance of economic and social resources and context, both aspects are largely missing from the religion and coping literature. In addition, the research on post-genocide Rwanda largely neglects the religious and economic factors of coping. As such, I have developed the following questions with which to interrogate my data:

1. What does the connection between religion and post-conflict coping look like in Rwanda? How might it be different from or similar to the connection between religion and coping in other social, political, economic, and geographic contexts?

2. How does affiliation with different religious traditions (Catholic, Mainline Protestant, Evangelical Protestant, Muslim, and Other) affect individuals' ability to cope with trauma? To reconcile after genocide? What aspects of religion in these traditions, in regards to belief, behavior, affiliation, and relationships, contribute to differential levels of coping and reconciliation effectiveness?

3. How does religion shape Rwandans' relationships with each other? How do interpersonal relationships, religiously-based or not, affect willingness to engage

in reconciliatory initiatives or activities? How are both religion and coping social

phenomena in Rwanda?

4. How are people's understandings and enactment of post-traumatic recovery,

peace, and reconciliation affected by their social status, especially in regards to

gender, genocide experience (victim versus perpetrator), and income/wealth?

Results

Quantitative Results: 2008 Data

Table 9 displays the results from six separate regression analysis linking various

demographic, religiosity, and religious affiliation variables with a range of post-conflict

outcomes. In addition to these results, I conducted an additional regression with negative

forgiveness[14] as an outcome. However, the adjusted r-squared is zero for the model, so

the current suite of variables is unable to predict variations in this construct, and I do not

display the results here. Similarly, while older people report lower levels of PTSD

symptoms, there are no relationships between PTSD and religion, and the data fit the

model rather poorly ($R^2 = .07$). There is, however, a strong relationship between religion

and positive forgiveness: as a person's participation in organized religious behaviors and

perceptions about salience of religion increases, they tend to report higher levels of

positive forgiveness. Neither private religious behaviors nor religious affiliation are

associated with positive forgiveness. Educated people are less likely to forgive, however.

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[14] Negative forgiveness is the absence of certain behaviors or attitudes which would indicate non-forgiveness, for example, "I can't stop thinking about how I was wronged by this person." Positive forgiveness is the presence of attitudes which would indicate forgiveness, such as wishing good things for a person who had done you harm. See Appendix A for a complete list of items.

These results suggest that several possibilities require further investigation. First, the exhortations to forgive that people hear at church and mosque might be effective in persuading people to actually forgive. The effectiveness of religious-based messaging might also be reflected in the positive relationship between organized religion and *gacaca* participation, where people who go to church more participate in *gacaca* more frequently. The link between religious salience and forgiveness may indicate that people who value religion more and find it more important in their lives, are more likely to obey the preaching of their sacred texts and religious leaders. Second, as people participate more in organized religious activities—which are inherently social—they may be increasingly embedded in networks of incentives, both positive and negative, that promote forgiveness. More highly educated people may be able to better resist this pressure, seeing alternatives and understanding forgiveness in a more nuanced way. Regardless, the mechanisms by which religious participation are linked to forgiveness will be further explored in the qualitative analysis which comes later in this chapter.

For the three remaining constructs, I conducted stepwise regression analyses. The first step included the standard set of demographic and religious variables included in the previous analyses. The second step incorporates two of the previous outcomes, PTSD symptoms and positive forgiveness. Multiple writers suggest that reconciliation, as a social phenomenon, may require certain psychological changes in individuals which could be understood as forgiveness (Hamber, 2007, 2009; Hamber & van der Merwe, 1998; Kelman, 2008; Kriesberg, 1997; Longman, et al., 2004; Oliner & Zylicz, 2008; Petersen, 2001; Schaap, 2005; Schreiter, 2008; Shnabel & Nadler, 2008; Shnabel, et al., 2009; Verdeja, 2009; Volf, 1996, 2001; Zorbas, 2009), so including forgiveness as a

predictor of reconciliation makes some theoretical sense. That said, positive forgiveness is highly correlated with reconciliation attitudes ($r = .67$) and reconciliation behavior ($r = .36$), so the stepwise method also allows for the initial examination of links between religion and reconciliation absent the effects of multicollinearity which might be introduced by the inclusion of forgiveness.

Absent the inclusion of PTSD and forgiveness, perpetrators of the genocide report higher levels of both reconciliation attitudes and reconciliation behaviors than do non-perpetrators. Accused perpetrators (the question asked about being tried), unless they have a great deal of shame for their actions or were unjustly accused of participating in the genocide and experienced anger afterward, would clearly have fewer emotional obstacles to reconciliation than would survivors. Likewise, they are under significant social pressure to at least rhetorically embrace reconciliation, being trained in *ingando* solidarity camps prior to and extensively monitored by the authorities after their release. Their acceptance back into the community may be dependent on them talking positively about and engaging in behaviors which show that they are atoning for their previous actions and seeking relationships with the people they may have hurt. In the second regression step, controlling for forgiveness, the effect for perpetrators disappears in reconciliation attitudes, but genocide survivors have much lower scores on the same construct. Again, survivors tend to have lingering emotional distress after the genocide, and their lower scores are to be expected.

There are surprisingly few connections between religion and reconciliation or life satisfaction. Muslims tend to score much lower on reconciliation attitudes than do people affiliated to any other religious group. Respondents in the "other" and "no religious

affiliation" category score much higher on reconciliation behaviors, but this may be a

statistical artifact connected to the relatively small number of people found in that

category. Affiliation has no other effects.[15] Private religious participation and religious

salience are not predictors of reconciliation or life satisfaction. Organized religious

participation was a significant positive predictor of both reconciliation behaviors and

satisfaction with life in the first step of the regression, but the effects disappear in the

second step. As such, forgiveness completely mediates the relationship of organized

religious participation with reconciliation and satisfaction with life, for forgiveness is

itself a very powerful predictor of reconciliation attitudes, reconciliation behaviors, and

satisfaction with life. This result suggests that religion's impact is more directly on

forgiveness rather than reconciliation.

Table 9 Religion and Post-Conflict Outcomes (Bazuin sample)

| | PTSD Symptoms | | | Positive Forgiveness | | | *Gacaca* Participation | | |
	B	SE	β	B	SE	β	B	SE	β
Constant	1.71*	.83		.76	.61		a		
Gender (1 = Female)	.26	.17	.13	.09	.12	.05	-.76*	.32	5.77
Age	-.01*	.01	-.17	.01	.00	.09	.03*	.01	4.90
Education	-.03	.02	-.12	-.04*	.01	-.20	-.05	.04	1.93
Survivor (1 = Yes)	.15	.18	.07	.04	.14	.02	.18	.35	.27
Perpetrator (1 = Yes)	.02	.32	.00	.17	.22	.05	.33	.59	.31
Org. rel. participation	.04	.09	.03	.20*	.07	.22	.45*	.18	6.06
Priv. rel activities	.14	.08	.15	.07	.06	.09	.26	.15	3.13
Religious salience	.15	.12	.10	.38*	.09	.29	-.32	.23	1.94
Affiliation: Catholic	.21	.20	.09	.00	.14	.00	.43	.37	1.38
Affiliation: Mainline Prot	-.09	.24	-.03	.12	.18	.04	.18	.45	.16
Affiliation: Muslim	.62	.37	.13	.06	.29	.01	-.11	.70	.03
Affiliation: Other/None	.63	.43	.12	-.43	.31	-.09	-.24	.79	.09
Genocide intensity	.02	.10	.01	-.03	.07	-.03	-.11	.17	.40
Reconciliation prog. part.	-.02	.03	-.05	.04	.02	.11	.00	.06	.00
R²	.07			.30			.19		
Regression type	OLS			OLS			Ordered logistic		

[15] In a separate analysis not included here, I constructed interaction terms between each religious affiliation category and participation in organized religious activities, private religious activities, and religion salience and included them in the model. None of the model fits improved, and none of the main effects changed, and none of interaction terms were significant predictors.

Table 9 (continued)

	Reconciliation Attitudes			Reconciliation Behaviors			Satisfaction with Life		
Step One	B	SE	β	B	SE	β	B	SE	β
Constant	11.03	7.82		3.48	8.39		4.21*	.99	
Gender (1 = Female)	1.53	1.61	.08	2.09	1.74	.10	.20	.20	.09
Age	.05	.06	.06	.01	.07	.01	.01	.01	.12
Education	-.22	.19	-.10	-.24	.21	-.10	-.05	.02	-.16
Survivor (1 = Yes)	-2.70	1.71	-.12	1.10	1.85	.05	-.01	.22	.00
Perpetrator (1 = Yes)	6.90*	3.00	.19	7.51*	3.20	.19	-.59	.38	-.13
Org. rel. participation	1.24	.91	.12	2.57*	.97	.24	.23*	.11	.19
Priv. rel activities	.89	.72	.11	.31	.77	.03	.04	.09	.04
Religious salience	1.22	1.12	.09	.14	1.19	.01	.00	.14	.00
Affiliation: Catholic	-.48	1.86	-.02	3.30	2.02	.14	.00	.24	.00
Affiliation: Mainline Prot	-.71	2.24	-.02	3.71	2.38	.12	.38	.29	.10
Affiliation: Muslim	-8.49*	3.63	-.18	-2.35	3.86	-.05	.78	.46	.13
Affiliation: Other/None	-1.62	4.02	-.03	10.04*	4.26	.18	.30	.51	.05
Genocide intensity	-.90	.91	-.08	-.79	1.01	-.06	-.18	.12	-.13
Reconciliation prog. part.	.36	.32	.09	1.63*	.36	.35	.02	.04	.04
R²	.15*			.19*			.09*		
Step 2									
Constant	3.40	6.58		-7.06	8.04		3.28*	.97	
Gender (1 = Female)	.74	1.36	.04	2.10	1.67	.10	.28	.20	.12
Age	.01	.05	.01	.02	.07	.03	.01	.01	.08
Education	.04	.16	.02	-.01	.20	-.01	-.02	.02	-.08
Survivor (1 = Yes)	-3.59	1.42	-.16	.33	1.74	.01	-.16	.21	-.06
Perpetrator (1 = Yes)	4.73*	2.43	.12	5.52	2.94	.15	-.81*	.36	-.18
Org. rel. participation	-.49	.77	-.05	1.26	.93	.12	.07	.11	.06
Priv. rel activities	.40	.61	.05	-.16	.75	-.02	-.04	.09	-.04
Religious salience	-1.12	.95	-.08	-1.50	1.16	-.10	-.12	.14	-.07
Affiliation: Catholic	-1.08	1.53	-.05	1.87	1.87	.08	-.09	.23	-.04
Affiliation: Mainline Prot	-1.81	1.82	-.06	2.88	2.19	.10	.31	.28	.09
Affiliation: Muslim	-9.16*	2.96	-.19	-2.98	3.57	-.06	.82	.44	.14
Affiliation: Other/Non	-.82	3.27	-.02	8.97*	3.93	.17	.28	.49	.04
Genocide intensity	-.32	.75	-.03	.12	.95	.01	-.11	.11	-.08
Reconciliation prog. part.	.01	.26	.00	1.39	.34	.31	.00	.04	.00
PTSD symptoms	7.47*	.83	.65	4.46*	1.06	.36	.47*	.12	.33
Positive forgiveness	-.03	.61	.00	.90	.75	.09	.00	.09	.00
Gacaca participation	.21	.50	.03	1.30*	.62	.16	.21*	.07	.22
R²	.47*			.32*			.21*		
Regression Type	OLS			OLS			OLS		

* Indicates statistical significance at *p* < .05

[a] This ordinal logistic regression has five response categories and therefore four thresholds, which are similar to intercepts. None of the threshold values are statistically significant, so I omit them to preserve the general formatting of the table.

There are, however, several unexpected outcomes in these analyses. That survivor status is not a more frequent predictor in these six outcomes is something of a

surprise, given the importance of the survivor category in a previous analysis linking

program participation to these outcomes, an analysis which omitted the religious

independent variables (Bazuin, 2012). Similarly, given the different experiences of men

and women during and after the genocide, it is surprising to see no gender differences in

outcomes except for on *gacaca* participation, where women participate less frequently,[16]

but the lack of gender differences across both the religious variables and the post-conflict

outcome variables (see Table 3) hinted at this possibility. It may be that survivor and

perpetrator are more salient categories in post-conflict Rwanda, and gender maps

(imperfectly) onto those categories.

Quantitative Results: Pew Data

Table 10 contains results of analyses where a range of demographic and religion-

related variables are regressed on five outcome variables: perceptions of ethnic conflict,

perceptions of trust, current life satisfaction, optimism for future, and improvement over

the past.   There were some constraints when performing this analysis. Two of the

religious variables which the literature suggested would be influential, specifically

salience and strength of belief, have little variance with well over 90% of respondents

having the maximum score in these categories. As such, they could not be included in

the analysis.

Nonetheless, there are some notable results. Controlling for income, education,

gender, and age, Rwandans who live in urban areas tend to perceive more ethnic conflict

and less trust; they are, however, more satisfied with their current life circumstances than

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[16] I conducted a similar interaction analysis with gender, looking for links between gender, religiosity, and religious affiliation. The analysis yielded no additional results.

rural Rwandans. Religious variables are mixed in their relationships. Evangelical

Protestants perceive less ethnic conflict than do Catholics (Catholic is the reference

category for all religious affiliation comparison in this set of analyses), but there are no

relationships between affiliation and trust. People who participate in more organized

religious activities such as prayer groups, proselytization efforts, or choirs perceive there

to be more trust in the country, lending some support to the contact hypothesis. The

model fit of both regressions are rather poor, however, with pseudo r-squared of .03 and

.06 for ethnic conflict and trust respectively. The ethnic conflict model has no better fit

than a completely unspecified model (log likelihood for the intercept alone = 1344.70, for

the model = 1325.24, significance of difference: χ^2 = 19.46, p = .11). The trust analysis,

using a binomial logistic regression model, only correctly predicts 1.8% of the people

who say there is trust in the country. As such, these results must be interpreted with

caution.

As one might expect, people with more education are more satisfied with their

current positions and optimistic for the future. People with higher incomes and people

living in urban areas are also more satisfied with their current life circumstances, though

there is no relationship with optimism for the future with either variable. Not a single

religious variable predicts life satisfaction or optimism for the future. Likewise, there is

no relationship between religion and trust. There is, however, a positive relationship for

both outcomes with ethnic conflict, with people who perceive more ethnic conflict being

less satisfied and less optimistic. This counterintuitive relationship maybe a statistical

artifact, for nearly 70% of respondents said that ethnic conflict was a serious problem, the

minimum category, in Rwanda.

There are some relationships between the religious variables and people's perceptions that their current life circumstances are better than they were in the past. People with higher incomes perceive less improvement, but that connection may be because poorer people see more marginal improvements as having a disproportionate impact on their quality of life than do richer people. Evangelical Christians tend to perceive greater improvement than Catholics. Controlling for religious affiliation, people with higher levels of religious devotion have significantly higher levels of improvement, though higher levels of participation in organized religious activities is associated with lower levels of improvement. While the model fit is rather poor, with only 3% of variance explained, the model still has a better overall fit than a null model ($F(15, 670) = 2.60, p < .01$)

The Pew data reveal rather little about the relationship between religion and various post-conflict outcomes. The poor model fits and unexpected, sometimes counterintuitive results give little insight. In some sense, analyses of the Pew dataset contradict the analyses from my own survey, where aspects of religiosity were predictors of a variety of outcomes. Some of these disappointing outcomes are likely related to the way Pew measured these constructs, relying on a single question for each of the outcome variables which were used in these analysis, whereas I used multiple item scales with excellent reliability. On the other hand, analysis of the Pew dataset does reveal that affiliation with a variety of Evangelical Christian denominations may lead to more positive post-conflict outcomes. The abundance of Evangelical Christians in my non-representative sample may somehow skew the results, though I do control for affiliation. In order to investigate potential connections between religious affiliation, measures of

religiosity, and post-conflict outcomes, I created interaction terms between affiliation and religiosity for this dataset as well, but there were no significant findings from that effort.

Table 10 Religion and Post-Conflict Outcomes (Pew sample)

	Ethnic Conflict		Trust		
	B	SE	B	SE	e^B
Threshold = 1 /Constant	.30	.39	-.65	.43	.52
Threshold = 2	.82*	.40			
Threshold = 3	1.65*	.40			
Gender (1 = Male)	.04	.17	-.31	.18	.73
Age	-.01	.03	.00	.04	1.00
Urban	-.57*	.23	-.74*	.26	.48
Education	-.12	.12	.11	.13	1.11
Income	.00	.08	-.13	.09	.88
Prayer frequency	-.12	.47	-.17	.49	.84
Religious devotion	-.12	.40	-.31	.43	.73
Org. religious participation	-.06	.09	.21*	.09	1.24
Affiliation: Muslim	-.32	.39	-.19	.41	.83
Affiliation: Mainline Protestant	.18	.30	-.63	.36	.53
Affiliation: Evangelical Protestant	.55*	.21	-.40	.25	.67
Affiliation: Adventist	-.47	.40	.33	.34	1.39
Affiliation: Any other/none	.41	.58	-.45	.68	.64
Nagelkerke R^2	.03*		.06*		
Regression Type	Ordinal Probit		Binary Logistic		

	Life Satisfaction			Optimism for Future			Improvement over Past		
	B	SE	β	B	SE	β	B	SE	β
Constant	5.22*	.30		7.52*	.36		.35	.32	
Gender (1 = Male)	.03	.11	.01	.15	.14	.04	.12	.12	.04
Age	.00	.02	.00	-.07*	.03	-.11	.04	.02	.07
Urban	.32*	.15	.08	.02	.18	.01	.29	.16	.07
Education	.17*	.08	.09	.19*	.09	.09	.06	.09	.03
Income	.13*	.06	.10	.12	.07	.08	-.19*	.06	-.13
Prayer frequency	-.36	.31	-.05	-.62	.37	-.08	.14	.33	.02
Religious devotion	.09	.29	.02	.37	.33	.05	.67*	.30	.11
Org religious participation	-.07	.06	-.05	.01	.07	.01	-.13*	.06	-.09
Affiliation: Muslim	-.44	.25	-.07	-.07	.29	-.01	-.50	.27	-.08
Affiliation: Mainline Protestant	-.05	.22	-.01	-.07	.25	-.01	-.08	.23	-.01
Affiliation: Evangelical Protestant	.16	.15	.04	.14	.18	.03	.36*	.17	.09
Affiliation: Adventist	.31	.24	.05	.13	.28	.02	.11	.26	.02
Affiliation: Any other/none	.12	.42	01	.91	.48	.07	-.66	.45	-.06
Trust	-.14	.13	-.04	-.09	.15	-.02	-.14	.14	-.04
Ethnic Conflict	-.24*	.06	-.16	-.35*	.07	-.20	-.08	.06	-.05
R^2	.07*			.07*			.03*		
Regression Type	OLS			OLS			OLS		

* indicates statistical significance at $p < .05$

Quantitative Discussion

Both quantitative datasets provide some limited understanding of the nature of religion and coping in Rwanda. My own dataset suggests that forgiveness may be a critical construct in understanding how religion may contribute to reconciliation there. Rwandans—or at least some Rwandans— may actually want to forgive people after the genocide. Religion can encourage them to do that. Religion may also give them a language to understand forgiveness and tools to make forgiveness possible. Alternately, religion, as it has in other contexts, might provide theological and social pressure to forgive. Some Rwandans may benefit from that pressure to take a hesitant step toward forgiveness and reconciliation; others may be effectively coerced into forgiveness for which they are not ready. Unfortunately, merely identifying a statistical relationship between religion, forgiveness, and reconciliation provides little direct understanding about how that relationship functions.

These data offer a few tantalizing clues about how religious affiliation may affect post-conflict outcomes. My data suggest that Islam may be less effective at promoting reconciliation. The Pew data suggest that Evangelical denominations may be more effective at promoting positive outcomes. There seem to be no links between religiosity—measured as organized and private participation and salience—denominational affiliation, and the examined outcomes. However, based on my experiences with these groups in Rwanda, it would be unreasonable to assume that there are not significant variations in belief and behavior between these religious categories which affect peace and reconciliation. It may be that insights into these differences

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cannot be obtained quantitatively, or both Pew and I may have measured the wrong constructs.

The Pew data suggest that income is related to post-genocide satisfaction in Rwanda, at least inasmuch as people with higher levels of satisfaction tend to have higher incomes. Indeed, such a link is somewhat self-evident, for people who struggle for food, shelter, and clothing frequently have less time and energy (and money) to expend on leisure and other activities which provide joy and relaxation, and the struggle against poverty wears at the body and psyche (Morgan & Carnes, 2005). My own dataset contains only a two measures of income or poverty, whether or not the respondent has a job with a salary and whether or not she is self employed. I had judged that asking people for their income would be very difficult, for many people are subsistence farmers who eat what they grow and have little cash income. Jobs with a salary tend to provide the highest security in a place like Rwanda, where the vagaries of nature make life difficult for farmers. However, while the results are not included here, there was no link between employment type and any outcome, a result which may be linked to imprecise measurement. Nonetheless, the link between economic resources and coping is one which deserves further examination.

Finally, these data suggest that there may be a significant link between social interactions and reconciliation. That it is organized (group) rather than private (individual) religious participation which consistently has positive associations with a range of post-conflict outcomes suggests that there may be something particularly important about the social nature of group religious interactions. There are many possibilities here, none of which can adequately be explored by these data. Absent some

sort of social network analysis approach to quantitative data, which would expand the scope of any survey questionnaire prohibitively, it is difficult to develop detailed understandings of social dynamics.

Exploring People's Stories: Qualitative Analyses

The two quantitative datasets analyzed here provide valuable though incomplete insights into the dynamics of religion and coping in Rwanda. How specific types of religious affiliation, belief, and practice affect coping, how religious relationships actually contribute to reconciliation, the importance of forgiveness, and how the link between economics and coping may be influenced by religion are all topics which can be more fully investigated using the interviews which I completed in Rwanda.

The oral histories reveal a wide range of ways that people have benefitted from religion as they struggle towards forgiveness and reconciliation in Rwanda. One of the striking aspects of the link between religion and reconciliation is the many paths it takes. Consistent with patterns in the quantitative dataset, nearly all the people I interviewed reported some form—and usually multiple forms—of religious coping. Religious beliefs help people make meaning of their suffering. Religious activities make them feel less lonely. Religious teaching persuades them of the necessity of forgiveness. Religious friends and provide comfort and solace. Religious organizations teach, provide resources, and provide contexts for important interpersonal encounters to occur. I explore each of these manifestations of religion in turn, showing how Rwandans connect religion to their personal and social journeys after the genocide.

Religious Beliefs, Values, and Meaning-Making.

Understanding the genocide. Religion also helps people make sense of their experiences in the genocide. Many people initially struggled to understand the genocide using religious ideas, for the suffering and violence was initially incompatible with their meaning systems, a theme to which I return in Chapter VI. Others, however, found comfort in the idea that God had protected them during the genocide:

> R[17]: Actually, my faith did not change after the genocide. Instead, I felt closer to God than my faith did previously.
>
> I: So how did it come about that your faith became stronger as a result of the events of 1994?
>
> R: It's the real time that I saw that God is there.
>
> I: And how did you experience God being there for you?
>
> R: I used to pray as usual. Actually, God protected me in a wonderful way. The people who were good at praying were protected even more than. I remember that the people who looked for and bypassed me, and I can't think how I survived because it was through God's own hands that made me survive. Because they would hunt for me and fail to get me, and I was there. (BYU-07)

Because the *génocidaires* failed to find her when she was hidden, even when they were very close, she sees God at work in her life. She links her survival to her ability to pray and be a good Christian. The genocide becomes meaningful and intelligible to her because of her religious framing of her experiences, and this religious framing makes possible certain actions to thank God for surviving. This woman, for example, responds

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[17] When I present a conversational exchange as an excerpt from the oral histories, respondents statements are preceded by R and my questions and statements are preceded by I. When no R or I is present, the quotation represents the words of the respondent only.

to this perceived blessing and divine protection by creating a support group, which I discuss more below.

Other Rwandans have found religious significance not in their individual experiences but in the experiences of the country as a whole. When they ask themselves why Rwanda experienced genocide, they often use religious explanations. Two common explanations are that God was punishing Rwanda or that demonic forces were responsible for the genocide. For people who say that God was punishing Rwanda, the appropriate response to the genocide is to somehow live less sinfully. However, when I probed for what that might look like, what kinds of sins Rwanda needed to atone for, people often did not have an answer or they referred to vague perceptions about continued use of Rwandan traditional religion as idolatry. Moreover, as I have discussed previously, such orientations serve to prevent people from making changes in the social and political order which may have contributed to the genocide. If the genocide was the work of the devil, the only option is to make people more resistant to demonic attack, a spiritual but not political task.

Belief in an afterlife has also brought some measure of comfort to religious people who lost loved ones during the genocide.

> R: Last week I was talking to a Christian man. He had lost—most of his family had died. He said, because I'm a Christian and I know I'll go to heaven and rejoin them, it's okay for me, I have peace in my heart, because I know I'll see my people again.

> I: So are there beliefs like that in Islam?

R: Actually we have such beliefs in Islam because we know that it's the body that gets buried but the soul goes straight to heaven.

I: So for people who have had members of family die, do you think it helps them to know that one day they'll see each other in heaven?

R: We also believe that. (BYU-02)

This is something of a classic coping strategy among certain Christians, Muslims, and other religious people who believe in an afterlife: the loss of a loved one is not so devastating because the religion believes that people will be reunited in heaven. Here, the afterlife serves as a means of not being trapped in the past, allowing people to manage their emotions and move forward with lives.

Understanding suffering generally. Similarly, religion's explanations for suffering have been a comfort to many people. Repeatedly, people told me about Biblical stories and characters which inspired them to find strength in the face of suffering and adversity. For example, this person found meaning in Jesus' healing of a leper:

I: How has being religious helped you after the genocide?

R: The church in general, or being a member in a certain religious group, can help in encouraging people to know that God is there because almost all churches believe in God.

I: Why is it important to know that God is there? How does that help?

R: If you believe in the word of God, because of the teachings you get from the church, at least it is always a change whereby one can feel that God is there and God is able to change and make some things happen. There are some other Bible verses which encourage people in bad situations.

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I: What sorts of Bible verses? Can you remember any specific ones?

R: I don't remember the chapter and the verse, but I can remember the words. The verses concern the sick people where one may who had leprosy contacted Jesus and told him, Savior, if you're willing, you can heal me. Then Jesus cured him. (KIG-07)

For this person, going to church includes hearing these types of stories, reinforcing beliefs that God will provide for needs. People told me that they were similarly inspired about the stories of Ruth and Naomi, Jonah, Joseph (son of Jacob in the Old Testament, who was thrown into a pit by his brothers and sold into slavery before becoming a member of the ruling class in Egypt), all stories of people who faced adversity but found that God protected them through their trials and eventually blessed them. These Rwandans find meaning in their own suffering (and, for some, the suffering of their country) in similar principles: God saw them through the genocide, even if they did not emerge unscathed, and they hope for future blessings.

Many other people cited the suffering of Job as their archetypal model for perseverance. Consider the response of this man, who says that the story of Job shows him how God makes everything right in the end:

R: The story of Job helps me. Job had so many problems, but God eventually made everything right. Job is my example.

I: It's an example that you believe that God will make everything right?

R: Yes.

I: What happens when a person is sick and they pray for healing, but they don't get better? How do you understand this example of Job where God

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made everything right, even though there are times when people prayer and

not everything becomes right?

R: The Bible says wait for the result and be patient. Maybe when the result

you want doesn't come, you just need to be patient and wait for the answer

of the Lord. (GIK-01)

Because I had heard similar sentiments from many people, during this and several other

interviews I decided to push back a little against this person's explanation, using a classic

dilemma from theodicy: if you believe that God makes everything all right, why does it

seem that God make things all right for some people but not for others? It is a difficult

question, one which the people I interviewed did not have a ready answer. This person

said to the message was to be patient and wait for God's response. While it may not be

the most satisfying answer, such orientations do help to structure action and attitude.

Rather giving up or living fatalistically, these religious beliefs help people remain

hopeful for a better future.

     Understanding the new social order. One of the religious values which has

become importance in post-genocide Rwanda is the idea that there are no fundamental

differences between people who have different family, ethnic, racial, or cultural

identities. Many people told me that "our church teaches that all people are equal, no

matter which group they come from" (GIK-03), reflecting the government's commitment

to erasing the ethnic identities which led to conflict and genocide. Religious groups have

found various theological bases by which to support this change. A Catholic woman

understood people as reflecting the image of God: "I describe God according to the

people I see. When I look at person, I understand the image of God. I cannot say God is

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like this or God is so and so except that I just get the image of God from other people"

(BYU-05). Believing that all people reflect godliness emphasizes their equality.

Similarly, another Catholic woman, through sharing her experiences and listening to that

of others as part of a post-genocide dialogue group, saw that God had played a role in the

life of all the people in the group:

> I: Do you think your religious faith changed at all as a result of the events of
>
> 1994?
>
> R: I had this inferiority complex. I felt like I couldn't sit nearby some people
>
> [before]. But now I understand we are all created by God.
>
> I: What helped you make that understanding that we're all equal before, created
>
> by God?
>
> R: Actually, before the genocide we couldn't sit together and share things in
>
> common, but after the genocide we would sit as women, share experiences,
>
> and get to know each other. (BYU-01)

Finding out that her neighbors have had similar experiences—similar hopes and joys,

similar disappointments and tragedies—has meant that this woman has been able to see

that all people are created in the image of God and that she should not fear them.

Similarly, teaching in mosques has emphasized that all human beings are descended from

Adam and Eve[18] and therefore should be treated the same:

> I: And does the mosque you're a part of, what kind of activities do they have to
>
> help people after the genocide?
>
> R: They are trying to make people reconcile.
>
> I: And how do they do that, trying to make people reconcile?

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[18] Judaism, Christianity, and Islam share the Adam and Eve myth of the origin of humankind.

R: They are helping people to reconcile through the teachings of Islam. They do

teach that all human beings are from Adam and Eve. There is no reason to call

you a Hutu and call you a Tutsi. We are all from Adam. (BYU-02)

This man sees the idea of equality between Rwandans as critical for reconciliation, and

he finds support for equality in the teaching he receives in his mosque.

Religious behavior.

Prayer. People also reported that focusing their mind through prayer prevented

them from thinking about and reliving the events of the genocide. For example, this

person linked praying with temporarily forgetting one's troubles:

Let me talk about a person who likes praying very much. If he or she is going to

pray, in most cases she or he forgets about her troubles and throw herself into

prayers which helps her to forget about her problems….We should not forget

about your conditions completely. But if you're going to pray, maybe you like to

pray every time and every day, it helps you to forget about bad things you

experienced and instead helps you to go ahead and have a vision ahead of you that

God is going to change things and that you have a spiritual not keeping on

remembering your experienced.

Continuing prayer to and dialogue with God not only help people temporarily forget their

problems, but it also gives them hope and vision for the future where God will bless

them. This person said that even a feeling that God is responding to prayer is important

to help people cope: "if I give an example about myself, there was a time when you feel

like you are in a difficult situation and you decide to go to pray. When you pray and talk

about that problem in your prayers, you may get a strong feeling that God has heard your prayers and will do anything for you to help you get out of that problem" (KIB-01).

Other people felt like God became a replacement companion for them after the genocide, filling some of the roles left by friends and family members after the genocide:

I'm not shy to tell you because I take you to be my brothers and sisters. Whenever I talk about the problems I experienced, I feel like I'm discharging myself. I had lost my family first of all in 1994. I felt as if there was no one that was there for me like my parents. And I felt like there was no one else I could tell my problems, except God who can even see the secrets. And by that time I felt like asking God to be my father and actually my parent….I didn't say anything [ask for help] to people outside except to God as I said before. Actually, whenever I prayed, God answered my prayer. He used to send many different people to me with different helps. (KIG-08)

This woman goes further than most people who say they rely on God for help after the genocide. For them, they find comfort in talking to God, in communicating problems, and having specific prayer requests. They often interpret the good things that happen to them as God's intervention in their lives, and they patiently await that intervention even in the midst of suffering. However, understanding God as a surrogate for human providers and human relationships, as this woman does, is relatively rare. From what I could gather during my interview with her, she was doing recently well, so her social isolation may not have been a bad thing.

Religious activities. Multiple people reported that that their participation in religious activities helped them cope with the aftermath of the genocide. For example,

such activities provided structure for establishing the relationships which lead to reconciliation. In a Catholic church, a member of a parish group thought that meeting together in prayer across ethnic lines was a symbol of reconciliation: "my own group…is called Joseph the Guide of Workers. When we meet we pray, and it's a sign of our unity and reconciliation" (BYU-05).   Many other respondents mentioned the importance they placed on praying, singing, and doing forms of church and community service across ethnic divides. For some people, such activities were a sign of their eagerness to move forward and create a new, reconciled Rwanda. For others, these activities were the actual context in which reconciliation took place. This person, a young woman, found that an invitation to a religious seminar paved the path to her reconciliation:

> I had my friend who we used to walk together, to talk to each other, and there was a group called the Bible Society. In Kinyarwanda we used to say it meant like cure [care for?] me and I cure you. That girl said they wanted volunteers to join that group, and I accepted to go with her. We went together and we were trained, so they took us and we were in training for two months, and the workshop was held at EPR. And that project was in EER, but the workshop took place at EPR. So the lessons we were taught were like unity and reconciliation. In fact I knew the person that killed my mom there. One pastor from that church from EPR was the one who gave us that lesson, and I felt touched. I said in whatever case I can help my life if I continue to be in this group or in this place, maybe the church. (KIG-11)

Her story has several key parts: a friend spoke to her about a religious organization which was starting a volunteer group about peace and reconciliation. Due to some religious teaching at the subsequent training event, she felt touched and

Activities also serve as something of a distraction from the pain and trauma of the genocide and its lingering effects:

> When you are a member of a religious group and getting engaging in different activities in that religious group. Let's say like singing or you are joining in different groups in the church, like joining prayers, you don't get enough time to think about your troubles and problems, instead you just think about what you're going to do and what you are participating in and that helps to occupy your mind.

Similar to the way prayer focuses the mind elsewhere, engaging in an organized and social religious activity like a choir or prayer group serves as a diversion away from rumination about the past. Religious activities are a way to ensure that people remain busy and engaged with their lives, a visible demonstration in some ways that they refuse to give up.

Religious social ties.

Friendship. Many respondents reported having religious friends as means of not being alone and therefore being distracted from the consequences of the genocide. While others have said that they engage in religious activities for the same reason, here the act of just being with people who are caring is enough to distract some survivors from their trauma. Consider the statements of this woman:

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Being together with others helps a person in this way in that you don't get enough time to think about your problems and troubles when you are with others. If you are sitting alone, it's as if you're giving room to the thoughts and deep thinking, but if you join others, you think to be listening to them, to be doing different things with them, that helps to make you forget your troubles…. If you have friends, they can help you when you are in times of troubles by telling you about good things, not reminding you of bad memories.

In addition to social ties being a welcome distraction, this woman said that religious people tended to be good friends, listening to and providing support when it is needed:

I: How has having friends who are religious helped you?

R: If they are really good friends, or if you have a good relationship with others, they can actually help you in different conditions. Let's say I have a problem, and the best way to help that person is to when I listen to his or her problem and make it my own problem and help her or help him to carry this heavy luggage of the problem or feelings. If I listen to that person, if we try to share experiences, we can seek to help any way to help that person throughout that problem.

Material support. Such support through religious relationships was an important component of many of my interviews. Not only did such relationships provide welcome distractions, listening ears, and comforting words, they also frequently included material and economic support: "when I didn't have enough money, people could give me clothes, people could buy me a kilo of sugar, people could give me food because I do not have enough to eat…. There is time I got sick and my pastor visited me and gave me

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5000 francs. Because I have the HIV virus, they always help me with different, simple things" (BYU-04). Sometimes this support extended far beyond small offerings of food, clothing, or money. This woman was inspired by her religion to actively adopt the child of a man who had been imprisoned for killing members of her family:

> I had headache, every minute, every hour, every day. By twelve sharp and by nine o'clock I would say the rosary. Then one time I decided to pray myself when I was alone. When I was praying I heard a voice telling me that if I don't have love then I'm wasting my time. So what I did after listening to that voice I went to the house of the person who killed my relatives and brought his kid to my house and took care of her. That child is a girl, so I went I asked for her. I took her to my house. And because they know I'm a survivor, FARG took care of this child for payment of school fees. She studies, and she completed her senior six, and blessed and got the government scholarship to join the university. (KIG-05)

There are several other examples in these interviews of people taking in orphans, of taking financial responsibility for multiple people as a result of their friendships and the needs they say in the wider community. This particular woman's story is certainly extraordinary in that she actively sought out people who had been implicated in her family's death in order to help them.[19]

Moral support. Religious people in Rwanda have often felt it was their duty to help people after the genocide. This woman, who had felt that God had protected her

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[19] In retrospect, I am sorry that I did not probe a little more on the adoption aspect of this particular anecdote. I did probe about the religious motivations she described here. At the time, her action seemed quite selfless. However, upon rereading the transcript, there is an undertone that she might have asked for the child as some form of compensation for what had happened to her during the genocide. It is very common in Rwanda for poor families to send their children to live with richer relatives or even strangers. In many cases, these children are treated as domestic servants. In other cases, however, the adopting family pays for the child's education, as this woman did here.

during the genocide, felt called to provide support for other victims, so she created a support group of women:

> According to what I experienced and according to the great hand of God that I saw during the genocide, I didn't have difficulties after the genocide because I started gathering together bringing together all women, either widows of genocide or women whose husbands in prison, and the more we shared experiences, the more I felt like they're my sisters and the we share everything in common. So I feel like I did not find any difficulties or any problems. (BYU-07)

While this group was not specifically religious in that it was not attached to a church or faith-based ministry, this woman founded the group to reach out to people because of her faith and her experiences during the genocide. Here, support does not flow from a pre-existing friendship but is rather offered as part of a religious response to the genocide. These relationships offer the same opportunities for distraction, moral support, and material support as do preexisting supportive relationships. Indeed, there may even be some advantages to these kinds of structured programs, given that it is normal and expected to speak of one's genocide experiences and suffering in this context, whereas in "natural" friendships such talk may be difficult and awkward. Moreover, while this sort of relationship may seem forced and artificial in comparison to preexisting supportive friendships, they seem to be equally meaningful for people who benefit from them.

Religious membership and participation.

Structured encounters through sacraments. Sacraments are another means by which religion has contributed toward reconciliation. While I had started asking people

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about Eucharist participation and its connection to reconciliation, people were confused about its connection to reconciliation, no matter how I rephrased the question. In our general conversations, however, confession as a sacrament emerged as an important theme in how people have dealt with the pain of the past and forged ties of reconciliation in the present.

> I: How has being religious made reconciliation easier for you?
>
> R: In Catholic church there is this sacrament of going to the priests or Catholic father and acquired to bless, and you confess your sins to the father or priest and then he counsels you and then you go out feeling forgiven.
>
> I: When you leave there, you feel like you've forgiven the person who hurt you, or you feel that God has forgiven you for the bad things you might have done?
>
> R: Actually, that creates a feeling that God has forgiven you because the one who wronged does not even understand that you went into a secret place with the priest or the father (BYU-01)

This interviewee felt like the sacrament creates peace with God, and that peace makes it easier to be with others. This next respondent, who had left the Catholic Church for an Anglican congregation, linked confession as a sacrament with mutual forgiveness. When they have this shared experience of the sacraments and other church activities, the salience of pre-genocide identities fades:

> I: So how has being Christian or going to church made reconciliation easier?
>
> R: The importance of going to church and its contribution to reconciliation is that people who go to church they get time to confess their faults, and in that case they forgive one another, so the importance is that.

I: Are there any ways in which being Christian or going to church have made reconciliation more difficult?

R: [No]. Going to church is always a good solution to unity and reconciliation. Why? Because when people go to church they get time to share, the church puts together people of different views, of different backgrounds. When they get together, it's an opportunity for them to get rid of those differences. (GIK-10)

For some people, then, religious ritual takes on increased salience in post-genocide Rwanda. These rituals, particularly confession and asking forgiveness, are focused primarily on human relationships with God, but people report that they spill over into their relationships with each other. While Catholic, Anglican, and Lutheran churches in Rwanda all have formalized confession and asking for forgiveness as part of their standard liturgies, they are fundamentally private: the member might privately confess to a priest or privately ask forgiveness from God. On the other hand, Evangelical Protestants do not have formal liturgies in the same way as Catholic and Mainline denominations, also incorporate more informal opportunities for members to confess their sins, ask forgiveness, and share stories about

Common religious membership makes it easier to reconcile. There is also a common perception among religious people in Rwanda that it is easier to reconcile with someone who comes from the same religious tradition. This Muslim man said because Muslims share a common faith which emphasizes the rapid resolution of conflicts and reconciliation between two people in conflicts, such acts would be easier among two

Muslims than it would be between a Muslim and someone else who did not share the same faith:

> R: With Muslims it's easier to reconcile and to forgive each other because of sharing the same faith and having the same lessons about forgiveness and reconciliation. We are taught that it's not good and it's prohibited to get a problem and get annoyed between two of you maybe from today until the next day. We are told we have to reconcile before 24 hours. If it's between a Muslim and a non-Muslim, it might take a long time than between two Muslims.
>
> I: And why might it take a long time? Because the Muslim person might not want to get involved? Or is it because the other person doesn't have the same rules so he or she might not be willing to reconcile?
>
> R: A Muslim to a non-Muslim, it might be difficult because a non-Muslim doesn't know how it's important for Muslims to ask for forgiveness or reconcile right away because he doesn't know about the teachings of Islam. But for a Muslim to a Muslim, it's easy because they are both concerned. (BYU-02)

Similar sentiments were shared by a Catholic woman: "let's say if reconciliation takes maybe six steps to have the conclusion, maybe for a Catholic it may take three steps, and that means it's easier. To a Catholic and a Muslim, it might take the whole of the steps, as we said there are six, but at the end they come to the conclusion" (KIB-08). Common membership undergirds common sets of values as well as shared norms and expectations about reconciliation. Moreover to the degree to which the conflict may be public, there

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may be considerable pressure from other people in the congregation to resolve the conflict and reconcile.

Material resources. One of the most common ways in which religious organizations have helped individuals cope with the aftermath of the genocide has been through the provision of material and economic assistance. Nearly all respondents told me that their church or mosque had some sort of program to help widows and orphans after the genocide, often helping them with medical bills, school fees, and food. Many local congregations also built simple homes for people affected by the genocide. For the most part, this assistance is limited to survivors of the genocide, particularly in the program run by national church or diocesan authorities. However, a small number of congregations have opened up their assistance programs to families who have been affected by HIV/AIDS as well as people whose primary breadwinner has been imprisoned for crimes of genocide. For the most part, this work is done informally under the initiative of local congregations. Though there are exceptions, these programs which embrace a wider definition of people in need of material and economic aid are dependent on the contributions of money and labor from members of the congregation, receiving little support from national denominational offices or international organizations.

Religious teaching. The teaching of religious organizations, especially around forgiveness, was widely cited by respondents from all religious traditions and backgrounds as being particularly important for their own personal reconciliatory journeys as well as that of the country. The statements of this young survivor demonstrate the importance of religious teaching around love and forgiveness:

R: Being a member of ADEPR helped me in order to listen to some voices that used to come to me.

I: What do you mean, voices?

R: Things like being forced to revenge or to kill others. We are taught about love in the church. They teach us love. I find being a Pentecostal church member very important because I wouldn't listen to other words except engaging myself into God's word.

I: When you say you heard these voices telling you to seek revenge? Was it your neighbors or people close to you saying you should seek revenge and telling you that, or was it a voice in your heard saying that revenge was something you should do?

R: I felt it in my mind that I should revenge because of the death of my parents. Had it been that I didn't call myself a Christian, I would have tried my best to seek revenge. (KIG-17)

She says that had it not been for the teaching of her Pentecostal church, she would certainly have sought revenge on the people who had killed her parents. She says she felt strong urges for revenge but the teaching about love at her church helped her to realize the importance of suppressing them. While there were no other stories quite as dramatic as this one, similar sentiments were expressed by a substantial portion of the people I interviewed. Even if people had not personally been affected by such teachings, they still saw their utility: "if you are a member of a certain religious group, of course there must be teachings. Those teachings say how you direct your life, how you obey human rights, how you understand human beings. So all those you learn from churches helps you to be

a person who can forgive and then get to reconcile" (KIB-05). The importance of teaching also extends to Muslim respondents, who emphasized the importance of forgiveness and conflict resolution as contained in the Koran and taught in mosques. Religious teaching is an important component of Rwandan's religious explanations for reconciliation.

Given how important religious teaching was to people in enabling them to see the importance of reconciliation, about mid way through these interviews I started asking people why they thought religious teaching was so effective. I tried to contrast teaching about forgiveness and reconciliation with teaching about certain lifestyle issues like alcohol consumption, which many Rwandans engage in even though most Evangelical churches in strongly condemn it. Many people struggled to answer this difficult question. Those who did seemed to focus on the need for religious action to change people's hearts rather than just their words, but they offered no concrete suggestions for how that could happen.

Negative and maladaptive religious coping. Not all religiously-influenced coping is positive, either in form or in outcome. Rwandans are not immune to maladaptive forms of coping. This final section highlights some of these negative forms of religious coping, including experiences of pressure to forgive and perceptions that religious people should not engage in political activities. While more a negative appraisal of religion rather than negative coping, there are also some people who believe that religion has contributed little to Rwanda's post-genocide recovery; I include their perspectives here as well.

Pressure to forgive. One man, after starting to talk about the importance of religious teaching, walked back his previous statements and appeared to say that teaching (words) can have little effect on human nature:

> Actually it's not the church that teaches people to forgive in words. That depends on someone's nature. Let's say we have a problem between us, but we have got neighbors. But if you forgive me by words but not from your heart, the rest of our neighbors cannot start. And in most cases they are the ones who reports that to the concerned, and it seems that this man did not forgive this man. Through the help of the neighbors you can take other steps. (KIG-11)

He thinks that religious teaching causes people to say the words of forgiveness and reconciliation, but it has relatively little impact on their hearts. The religious rhetoric around forgiveness and reconciliation creates an expectation that a good Christian or a good Muslim will forgive even if they have not or cannot forgive in their hearts. His perspective on the matter raises the prospect of religion—either through explicit pressure from leaders or other members, or through norms—pressuring people to forgive even when they did not.

When I asked people about this possibility, many were aghast at the idea. This man, who had become a lay leader in several religious peacebuilding programs, said that he thought there was no possibility of churches directly putting pressure on people to forgive:

> I don't think there is pressure--there is no pressure but on people to forgive. What churches do is just to teach about the goodness in forgiving, and I'm actually among the people that helps some groups and some peoples. Under Urugo

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rw'Amahoro I help to coordinate four churches in teaching or talking about

conflict resolution. So we don't know any church who has ever forced people to

forgive. We don't ever force people to forgive. Instead, we just talk about it. It

just depends on someone to forgive or not, or not saying that people do force

others to forgive. (RUH-06)

He strongly denies the existence of pressure, just teaching about forgiveness. However,

he seems to focus on the idea of religious groups forcing or coercing people to forgive,

perhaps through threatening them with ecclesiastical discipline or other form of sanction

if they do not. While I cannot deny the possibility that such sanction might exist, neither

I nor any of the people I have spoken to in Rwanda can cite an example.

However, the absence of official sanctions does not mean that people do not

perceive significant normative pressure to forgive in religious settings. Frequent teaching

about forgiveness and opportunities in many Evangelical churches to share testimonies—

some of which contain stories of forgiveness and reconciliation—create a culture in

which forgiveness is a social norm. Other people did see some of this normative

pressure, characterizing it as a certain shyness and fear or what others might think if they

don't forgive:

Yeah, it might happen that you might be forced to forgive each other in a church

like you say, but that forgiveness does not come from the bottom of your heart.

You might accept that you've forgiven him or her when in actual sense you've not

forgiven. At times a person feels shy in front of the church leaders and feels like

if I don't say that I've forgiven this person, then the church elders will think of me

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as a bad person, and then through that you might say I've forgiven when in actual

sense you've not forgiven. (RUH-09)

It is difficult to gauge the effects of pressure to forgive or less than sincere declarations of

forgiveness. Insincere avowals of forgiveness might give the impression that Rwandans

are recovering from the genocide more quickly than they really are. However, real

progress is being made, even in the area of healing individual psychological wounds after

the genocide and repairing interpersonal relationships; forgiveness is very real for many

people in Rwanda. Pressure to forgive might re-traumatize people, victimizing them an

additional time at the hands of religious people or organizations as they feel coerced into

facing and speaking with the person who killed their family or tried to kill them.

However, there is a third possibility: talking as if one has already forgiven may make it

somewhat easier, over time, to actually forgive, as a person starts thinking about the act

and why they have not yet chosen to do it. Unfortunately, none of the people interviewed

for this project felt (or would admit) that they had directly experienced this pressure, and

so it is difficult to discern its consequences.

Beliefs about religion and politics. One person thought that one of the lessons of

the genocide was that religious people could not be involved in politics. A member of an

Evangelical denomination, she thought that her church taught that Christians were to stay

out of political questions:

I: How has being a religious person make reconciliation easier for you?

R: Ah, we try to avoid political issues and instead we pray that God might bring

together all people, and we pray that God might change the hearts of different

people and stop them from doing evil. And again, because of being a Christian,

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if a person come to you and says please forgive me, I killed your family

member, it's easy to forgive that person because you have a sense of forgiving

from the word of God.

I: Why does being religious mean that you avoid political issues when talking

about reconciliation?

R: No one can deceive a good Christian. A good Christian cannot be a part

Christian and a part politician. If a person tries to seduce you into political

issues, it's good to try and contact the church leader and ask for advice.

(BYU-04)

This woman's worry over the compatibility of religion and politics reflects a general

understanding in Rwanda that the genocide was planned by political leaders as part of

their resistance to the country's transition towards democracy; for some, this history

means that politics, and potentially democracy, are forever suspect. Politicians are

always dishonest. Her solution to this dilemma was then that Christians should not be

political, for fear that political engagement might again draw them into violence. She

also relies on her pastor to guide her when faced by a political question, making clear that

her primary allegiance as a religious woman first and a political woman second. While

this is certainly a minority view in Rwanda, it is a withdrawal type of religious coping

which deserves some mention.

Religion has done nothing to change the country. Two of my interviewees

thought that religion has had very little if anything to do with the changes in their own

lives after the genocide or the changes the country has experienced. Instead, they

attributed the changes they say to the work of the government. In a conversation about

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unity, this respondent, a Muslim man, stated that religious organizations have mirrored the work of the government in promoting unity, but it is the government's intervention which has been most influential:

> R: No one else helped to create hope and life for people except for the leadership of the government that came over and replaced the government that had planned to kill people.
>
> I: So it's the work of the government that has helped you recover. Your faith has had little to do with helping overcome what's happened?
>
> R: An individual's faith could help him in guiding him to say a short play like Lord, help me, guide me today, save my life, or something like that. But when this government took over, it created hope again to people that they can live again, because they were teaching, through the government, religions adopted the same teachings. They also started teaching their members too to be one again.
>
> I: It's the leadership of the government and the churches that follow the example of the government that is promoting reconciliation. Is that right?
>
> R: Yes. (BYU-03)

Without the critical decision of the government to promote unity and reconciliation, this man is unsure that Rwanda's churches and mosques would have taken the initiative on their own to do this work. The government made the decision and expected civil society to work towards the same goal. Another Muslim, this time a woman, likewise echoed that change since the genocide has focused on political matters:

I: OK. One of the things I'm interested in is how people's lives have changed for better or for worse since 1994. I wonder, what has gone well for you since that time?

R: Actually, we had no security before the genocide. We were suspicious of each other. We could not understand things the same way.

I: So now things are different, there is security and you're not so suspicious of each other anymore? Is that what I should understand?

R: Though I was still young, I understood and I saw each and everything thing that happened during the genocide. Actually, what you thought I wanted to mean is true, because where I stayed before the genocide we had different political parties. People in this political party would think that it's not good to talk with these ones in another political party. The Hutus couldn't talk to the Tutsis or the Tutsis could not talk to the Hutus. Now it is not the same. We are in different political parties but that doesn't make us feel that we don't need each other. We are still the Hutus and the Tutsis but we can still talk.

I: Do you think religion has made these changes easier or better?

R: It's not actually because of religion but this understanding of the concept of different ethnic groups and political parties was eliminated by the government, because the government wanted to encourage people to be one again. So from the government it came to all different types of people through their churches, because the churches helped to teach about oneness and reconciliation. (BYU-02)

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This woman traces change since the genocide to two things: security and the de-ethnicization of politics and social life. Security is the domain of the government, and it has been quite successful in reducing crime and violence (though see Chapter VII for a further discussion of the role of government). Likewise, it has been government policy to declare that the old ethnic identities no longer exist and were based on the ideologies of the colonizers. Religious organizations in the country have largely supported this policy by teaching about and finding theological justification for ideas of unity.

That both respondents who thought that religion has played little role in promoting reconciliation were Muslim is of some note. Based on an overall analysis of the qualitative data, Muslims report fewer activities which aim to promote forgiveness and reconciliation. While they tell me that the messages they receive at the mosques emphasize conflict resolution and forgiveness, there seem to be fewer structured opportunities or people to interact across the victim-perpetrator divide in Muslim communities. While there are efforts to mobilize economic and material resources for people in need, they are haphazard and small in scale and impact. By comparison, the programs available in Christian groups are far more numerous.

Discussion

The connections between religion and individual coping in post-genocide Rwanda are multiple and complex. As it does in many parts of the world, religion in Rwanda helps people make meaning of what happened to them during particularly important or traumatic times in their lives, in this case genocide. Some of this meaning-making takes the form of finding God's hand in the positive things that have happened to people after

the genocide. Others have tried to explain the genocide in spiritual terms. Others have used religious values—some of which are have newly emerged in Rwandan religious discourse—to understand the changes to the social order which have occurred after the genocide. In this way, Rwanda looks much like other contexts in which individuals use religion to cope with stressful or traumatic events.

One element of religious meaning-making deserves somewhat more interrogation. Many people reported that they thanked God for surviving and were patiently waiting for God's blessing to help them through the aftermath of the genocide. In some ways, this pattern reflects Pargament's deferential coping style (Pargament et al., 1988) and his avoidant coping type (Pargament et al., 1990).[20] The situation is somewhat more nuanced than either of those labels would suggest however. Certainly there are some people who, on face value, seem to be taking relatively few concrete steps to help themselves cope with the genocide, relying instead on God to intervene in their lives. There is a certain connection to themes from prosperity gospel in this discourse—if people are good enough Christians, then God will bless them and make them rich. While few people in Rwanda seemed to think God would make them rich economically, there was definitely a sense that the harder one prayed, the better Christian one was, the more likely they were to experience healing and other blessings. This belief seemed to be more common in my respondents who had few economic resources of their own. Given their meager resources and the limited opportunities that exist for people in Rwanda to become prosperous, particularly subsistence farmers with low levels of education, these people's hope in forces beyond themselves is perhaps understandable. Beyond people who seem to have relatively little power of their own, deference and reliance to God is perhaps

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[20] See page 100 for definitions of both the deferential coping style and the avoidant coping type.

understood best as a mindset rather than a coping strategy. Other people who said that they were waiting patiently for God to respond to their prayers seemed to have some idea of their own agency and were looking for actively opportunities to improve their circumstances. When they found a way, or when something good happened to them, they interpreted such events as God at work in their lives. In this sense, while their rhetoric may be deferential and avoidant, it is really their interpretation of the world rather than their activity in it which falls into those categories.

Beyond meaning-making, this examination of religion and coping in Rwanda confirms many patterns identified in other contexts but challenges several others. There seem to be few links between specific religious affiliation and coping, largely confirming previous research which has identified that specific patterns of belief and behavior, not labels of membership, are determinative of the success of coping. While some people have changed affiliation because they thought their original congregation did not provide enough resources for coping or because that congregation was too closely affiliated with the genocide (a theme further developed in Chapter VI), there was only one consistent result in either the qualitative or quantitative data: Muslim Rwandans report less reconciliation and fewer activities for reconciliation than do Christian Rwandans. There are at least two reasons for this disparity. First, Muslims are seen with some suspicion in the wider Rwandan society, and they may experience obstacles to creating relationships with people across religious divides. Second, because Islam was far less implicated in the genocide than Christianity, it is possible that Muslim leaders have felt less of a need to emphasize efforts for post-genocide recovery and reconciliation. In comparison,

Christian groups may have higher levels of activity precisely because they feel the need to atone for the degree to which they enabled the genocide.

There was no link between private religious participation (private prayer, sacred text study, and the like) with forgiveness, trauma, or reconciliation. While the oral histories revealed that some people found their interior spiritual lives a significant resource to them while coping, this pattern is not borne out in the quantitative analysis; the number of people for whom interior spirituality and private religious activities is important may not be large enough to be detected quantitatively. Instead, it is participation in organized religious activities which predicts forgiveness, and forgiveness directly mediates the relationship between such participation and reconciliation. Unlike the previous relationship, this pattern is borne out in the qualitative data. People report hearing about forgiveness on a regular basis when they attend church or pray at the mosque, and they say that this teaching has been important in helping them actually forgive. It is a frequent topic of pastoral teaching, and people routinely share stories of forgiveness as part of their testimonies. Quantitatively, the more often one participates in such an environment, the more likely one is to forgive, and the more forgiveness someone has, the more likely they are to be in a relationship with someone who wronged them. However, there is a risk that such environments, which have developed significant internal norms around forgiveness, put unfair pressure on people to forgive.

For a significant number of Rwandans, religion serves as something of a distraction from emotional pain and trauma. Some respondents—certainly not all— engage in religious activities and seek out relationships with people to forget. For people who engage in this kind of coping, religion is not a means by which to make sense of

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what happened in the past. Rather, it enables people to set aside their pain, to temporarily

forget about the genocide and its aftermath, and find joy and happiness. In some ways, it

is also an act of defiance, a declaration that the survivors of the genocide are still alive,

that they can carry out the tasks of a normal life, that the *génocidaires* have not won. The

prevalence of the use of religion in this way may be due to the relative lack of other

acceptable means of distraction in Rwanda, particularly in rural areas. Unlike the global

North where people might have many opportunities to distract themselves, in Rwanda

there is little access to television or movies and few places to hang out with friends.

Churches and mosques, on the other hand, are ubiquitous. The requirement for daily

prayer is common across the world for Muslims, but many churches in Rwanda have

daily services and meetings, providing many opportunities for people to be involved.

Even when there is nothing happening at church, a person can still sing or pray or read

the Bible if they feel themselves beginning to ruminate on the past. Certainly a limited

number of people seek distraction and numbing of pain through alcohol, but such habits

are both expensive and generally unacceptable among many religious communities.

Religion serves as the most accessible means of mental distraction in Rwanda, and

therefore people rely on it a great deal to fill their time.

Both social support and economic resources are important components of

religious coping. In Rwanda, religious ties help people form friendships and other sorts

of supportive relationships which are important for people's coping. These relationships

form the basis of many activities of distraction. However, they are much more than that.

Religious relationships provide encouragement, positive words, and emotional support.

They also provide material resources when needed. Some of these relationships predate

the genocide, but many of them emerge from religion. Some friendships grow naturally as part of proximity and shared activities at church, but others come from people in the church feeling called as part of their religious identity to reach out to survivors and other people in need. Clearly, the social aspects of religion are influential in religious coping.

Likewise, economic resources are an important part of religiously-influenced coping. Churches have historically been and still are significant economic actors in Rwandan society. After the genocide, they have mobilized large amounts material and economic resources to build houses and pay school fees for survivors and, to a lesser extent, families who have had their main breadwinner imprisoned. Respondents look to the churches in times of need, perhaps because there are few other options beyond the inefficient government Survivor's Fund (FARG). In a country like Rwanda were unmet material needs are widespread, it is perhaps unsurprising that such resources are important. However, even beyond the resources churches and mosques have contributed to post-genocide recovery, religious people have rallied resources for the people in their community, often when they themselves had lived within severely limited means.

Despite my predictions that men and women would have different coping processes and outcomes, gender was not a significant category in either the quantitative or qualitative datasets. Gender did not predict forgiveness, PTSD symptoms, reconciliation, or satisfaction with life, either as a direct predictor or in interaction with other variables. Similarly, I was unable to detect an unambiguous relationship between gender and the types of stories and responses people gave me during the oral histories. There are some indications that women may participate in religious activity, particularly organized religious activity, more often than do men. However, their general patterns of

engagement, despite being more frequent, are largely similar to those of men: women and men make meaning, are taught about forgiveness, and rely on social and economic resources in much the same way. Quantitatively, women's higher level of participation, combined with the emphasis many churches and even some mosques have placed on working with women in the aftermath of the genocide, over time may have served to overcome the higher levels of victimization women experienced during the war, essentially equalizing the level of men's and women's forgiveness and reconciliation some fourteen years later.

Conclusion

The Rwandan case both confirms and supplements some of the established understandings of religion's role in coping. Religion has clearly been an important component of how people have understood and acted in response to the genocide, its aftermath, and the emerging social order. However, rather than private aspects of religion being a dominant driver of that understanding and the resultant changes, it is organized religion that seems to have had the most significant impact on forgiveness and reconciliation. Moreover, Rwanda has highlighted the importance of considering the social and resource side of religion in understanding coping processes and outcomes.

Chapter V

RWANDA'S CHURCHES AND MOSQUES IN THE PURSUIT OF

RECONCILIATION

Religion has played an important role in post-genocide Rwanda. People who participate in religious programming more frequently demonstrate higher levels of forgiveness and reconciliation than people who participate less frequently. People use religion to make meaning of what happened to them and the changes they see in Rwanda after the genocide. Religion has helped to normalize a national rhetoric of forgiveness and reconciliation. This chapter examines the specific roles of religious organizations—denominations, neighborhood churches and mosques, religious programs, national offices, and the like—in enabling and facilitating these changes. In addition, the chapter considers how religious organizations have changed after the genocide, in particular reference to their relationship with government.

Religious Organizations after War and Trauma

Religious organizations occupy complex positions and play multiple roles in post-conflict situations, and the dimensions of their participation in peacebuilding and the effect of social changes on them are dependent on multiple factors. Unfortunately, there is very little literature that examines the role of religious organizations in peacebuilding, so I am forced to come at the question somewhat tangentially. I start by examining the ambiguous place of religious organizations (and religion generally) in promoting peace

before moving on to see how religious organizations and institutions interface with both

individuals and the state in working towards peace and post-conflict recovery. The

review ends with a discussion of how religious institutions themselves may change in

post-conflict situations, examining both forces internal to the organization as well as

external forces.

Ambiguity in Religion, War, and Peace

The ambiguities in the contributions of religious institutions towards

peacebuilding are obvious. While some religious groups have a long history of pacifism

and nonviolence, others are engaged in promoting war and violence in diverse settings.

There is nothing about religious organizations of any sort, be they Christian, Muslim,

Jewish, Hindu, or any other group, which makes them inherently or uniquely good at

promoting peaceful change. Rather, religious groups represent a range of possibilities,

some which may promote peace and some which may promote violence, resulting in

what Scott Appleby calls the "ambivalence of the sacred" in peacebuilding (Appleby,

2000; Gopin, 2000; Philpott, 2007; Silberman, Higgins, & Dweck, 2005).

There are several tendencies among religious institutions which create this

ambiguity. Many religious traditions tend to see the world in more or less black and

white terms, unable to find distinctions of grey in a dichotomous conception of good and

evil. The inability of some religious institutions to accommodate pluralistic perspectives

of the world may be one reason they contribute to violence. In such contexts, violence

can be understood as a sacred duty, where the actions which take place during a conflict,

the worldview which sustains them, and the people or nation such actions are designed to

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benefit are understood to be ordained or commanded by God. Conversely, peace, peaceful actions, and an acceptance and tolerance of diversity can be understood as a sacred duty depending on the particular orientation of the group in question (Appleby, 2000; Gopin, 2000). European Christians supported the Crusades long after they suffered crushing defeats because religion distorted their perceptions of the costs and benefits associated with armed struggle (Horowitz, 2009). An analysis of modern civil wars demonstrates that where one or more belligerents make religious claims as part of their stated goals for engaging in violence, the conflict is much less likely to be ended through negotiation. On the other hand, in cases where the parties in conflict identify with specific religious traditions but where the religious identities do not figure in the war, religion does not positively or negatively affect probability of a negotiated settlement (Svensson, 2007). Simple religious affiliation does not necessarily change behavior around conflict, but when religion motivates violence, conflicts become hard to resolve.

Religious affiliation often closely tracks other social cleavages in divided, conflict-prone societies. For example, the historically marginalized groups in Northern Ireland tend to be Catholic, while the powerful are typically Protestant. The alignment of religion with inequalities of power and privilege means that religion is unable to provide a cross-cutting tie across ethnic, class, political, or other potential foci of conflict. In such situations, everyday conflict is more likely to erupt into violence as a simple threat magnifies across multiple overlapping dimensions of individual and group identity (Basedau, Strüver, Vüllers, & Wegenast, 2011). Moreover, the "rightness" and divine ordination of religious identity means that such identities are resistant to change and compromise, so when they become enmeshed in conflict, such conflicts are very difficult

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to solve (Akenson, 1992; Seul, 1999; A. D. Smith, 1999). Where religion can cut across these divisions, it has the possibility of aligning people in conflict around other identities tied to religion which may be more powerful than ethnic, political, or class identities (Appleby, 2000).

Silberman, Higgins, and Dweck (2005) systematically consider the reasons why religion occupies this ambiguous role in promoting peaceful social change. They note that the relationship between religion and change is complicated, in part because religion represents a "complex and malleable meaning system" (Silberman, et al., 2005, p. 769). Religious institutions can be conservative in orientation, preserving the social order as it is (following the thought of both Durkheim and Marx), but they can also promote change, calling adherents to work to promote justice and equality or even to bring about a theocratic form of government. Both impulses are present in Jewish, Christian, and Muslim texts. As Silberman and colleagues suggest, these competing impulses create a situation in which "traditionally religious individuals are *both* less likely to accept changes in the tradition *and* yet more likely to believe in and encourage radical world change" (Silberman, et al., 2005, p. 765).

Building on a rich analysis of religious institutions in the sociology of religion, Silberman and colleagues propose that one of the reasons religious institutions differ in their attitudes towards change is that there exists a set of fundamentally different orientations to the world between them (Silberman, et al., 2005). Some religious traditions tend to embrace the world as it is, encouraging members to accept the world, others seek to withdraw from the world, and yet others seek actively to change it; variations in engagement orientation may depend on the extent to which the religious

institution's position in society, wealth, and power are bound up in the state (Johnson, 1963, 1971; Lincoln, 1985; Philpott, 2007; Stark & Bainbridge, 1979; Troeltsch, 1992; Weber, 1969; Yinger, 1965). Of course, all of these general possibilities play out in specific places and times, with social orders, governments, and religious institutions each with certain histories, worldviews, and goal sets, but the Silberman framework suggests that by understanding both an institution's core worldly orientation as well as their specific place in the environment in which they exist, we may be able to predict some of their choices and strategies in engaging (or not) in peacebuilding activities.

Silberman and colleagues suggest that there are several other reasons that religions and religious institutions have ambiguous potentialities in regards to peace (Silberman, et al., 2005). First, religion tends to promote perceptions of self-efficacy among its adherents, believing that their actions will be effective by virtue of having God on their side. Such beliefs facilitate taking risks, either for peace or for violence. Religious institutions also tend to emphasize certain values, including selflessness and self-sacrifice, particularly when coupled with promises of reward for following the divine will. These values may also inspire people to take risks to promote war or peace as the activities associated with those risks are seen as holy and sanctified (J. Fox, 1999). Finally, religion, through various social and institutional supports, creates conditions where healthier, happier people are more able to take risks and either have assistance to absorb the consequences if they fail or reap significant material and social rewards if they succeed (Silberman, et al., 2005). These justifications for violence and peace as related to religious institutions have been documented among the narratives of religiously-motivated terrorists and martyrs (J. Stern, 2003).

Religious Peacebuilding and Individuals

One of the ways in which religious institutions may engage to support individuals in post-conflict contexts is through the provision of resources—in some literature, religion is said to tap market spaces for such resources (Brewer, Higgins, & Teeney, 2010). Within the extensive literature on religion and coping, few studies document the role of the clergy in providing support to traumatized individuals (Meisenhelder & Marcum, 2004; Meredith III, 2009), but they are largely descriptive rather than evaluative or analytical, unable to reveal which circumstances and characteristics might lead to more effective support processes and better outcomes. Likewise, there is a great deal of anecdotal evidence about the ability of religious institutions to assemble and distribute material aid for people in distress (Meredith III, 2009), but the effectiveness of that aid when compared to non-religious sources has not been explored; moreover, the link between material and economic resources and coping outcomes has not been well documented in the literature generally, so the effectiveness of faith-based aid has little with which to compare.

Religious institutions may also try to persuade their adherents through various means of the importance of seeking and promoting peace in post-conflict situations. Sermons, workshops, and religious education classes may all try to persuade adherents to act in certain ways, to have certain attitudes towards peace and the former enemy, and to support people in need (Appleby, 2000; Brewer, et al., 2010; Gopin, 2000; van der Merwe, 2003). The institutions may also impose sanctions or disciplinary action on members who do not comply with these teachings. Institutions may also provide or facilitate opportunities for members and non-affiliated people to engage in a variety of

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reconciliation promoting programs, including trauma counseling, truth-telling sessions, conflict resolution workshops, and space for intergroup dialogue and community-building (van der Merwe, 2003). To my knowledge, no one has yet evaluated the efficacy or impact of these teachings and policies in promoting change among members of religious organizations in post-conflict situations.

Religious Peacebuilding and the State

Religious institutions are one of many members of civil society, which Carroll and Carroll (2002) suggest form a civic network which engages, in many (democratic) societies, with government around a range of social issues, questions, and problems. Religious institutions have a long history of engaging government in general policy-making and in post-conflict situations, including role as advocates, intermediaries, observers, and educators (Sampson, 1997). Unfortunately, the impact of religious interventions compared with the interventions of non-religious civic network actors is unevaluated.

One of the ways in which religious institutions may affect peace processes at societal levels is through their participation in truth commissions. In South Africa, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) was famously led by an archbishop of the Anglican Church and counted several other religious leaders among its commissioners (Chapman & Spong, 2003; Krog, 2000; Shore, 2008, 2009; Tutu, 1999). Some South African churches actively encouraged their members to participate in the process and even sent leaders to give testimony, whereas others only reluctantly participated and provided no institutional incentives for people to participate (Chapman & Spong, 2003;

Krog, 2000). Religion's role in the TRC has been controversial. Some people have blamed it for too heavy a focus on forgiveness and mercy and insufficient focus on retributive justice and economic redistribution (Mamdani, 1996; Wilson, 2001), though others wonder if the TRC could have been at all effective or legitimate in South Africa were it not for the moral force of Archbishop Tutu and religion (Shore, 2008, 2009).

While some of South Africa's religious leaders actively supported the government-initiated Truth and Reconciliation Commission, some religious institutions have undertaken post-conflict processes of truth seeking on their own initiative, sometimes in the face of considerable opposition from the state. It can be inherently dangerous for religious groups to oppose the state, inviting censure or retaliation, and participation may depend on how cooperative or adversarial the religious group's orientation to the state is (Philpott, 2007). In Brazil, the Catholic archdiocese of Sao Paulo documented human rights violations during that country's military dictatorship during the 1970s and compiled a lengthy report on the human rights situation (Pope, 1985).   On a smaller scale, the South African Council of Churches (SACC), individual denominations, parishes, and clergy in South Africa were all active in naming human rights violations and bringing them to public consciousness during the apartheid era, so much so that the SACC building was bombed by agents of the state (Cobban, 2005). In El Salvador, church leaders and workers were assassinated for attempting the name the truth about the human rights situation in that country (Hayes & Tombs, 2001; Peterson, 1997).

Churches and other religious organizations can also serve as mediating institutions which create protected space and provide resources for individuals to do

counter-hegemonic work in opposition to the state. During dictatorships in both Chile

and Brazil, the Catholic Church sponsored hundreds of base communities, some of which

engaged in political action against the government (Drogus & Stewart-Gambino, 2007;

Hewitt, 1990). Furthermore, the church, as one of the few remaining functional

institutions in civil society, provided material support to people who had been victimized

by the dictatorship, and its actions inspired some Chileans who had previously been

ambivalent and politically inactive to work against the government (S. J. Stern, 2004).

They were able to do so in part because the church's moral authority protected them from

the wrath of the government. Religious institutions are not necessarily always on the side

of human rights, peace, and justice. Just as they can use their authority to shield

members or affiliates (or even people who are not affiliates) from the wrath of other

powerful actors, religious groups can often be agents of hegemony in and of themselves,

either in their own interests, in the interests of another actor with whom they are aligned

or perhaps even against their own interests in fear of the consequences which might befall

them if they did not appear to support very powerful actors.

Religious groups have also been extensively involved in mediating conflicts and

using their good offices to help belligerents negotiate. In Mozambique, the Catholic

Church began a process of meeting with military and political leaders on both sides of

that country's civil war in the late 1970s. Local and international bishops eventually

convinced both sides to meet for direct negotiations which were hosted by various

Catholic institutions in Rome, especially the Sant'Egidio community. These efforts

culminated in an agreement to end the violence in 1992 (Bartoli, Bui-Wrzosinska, &

Nowak, 2010; Serapião, 2004). Since then, Sant'Egidio and many other religious groups

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have been involved in mediating conflicts around the world, including in Algeria, the former Yugoslavia, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (Bercovitch & Kadayifci-Orellana, 2009; Giro, 1998; Haynes, 2009; Smock, 2004). However, while there is anecdotal evidence of the successful use of religious pressure and religious good offices on mediation to end a conflict, an analysis of the work of networks of religious actors in countries experiencing conflict revealed that they had little impact on peace or conflict processes (Basedau & Vüllers, 2010).

The ability of religious actors to engage the state in peacebuilding activities is highly variable. Brewer and colleagues, among others, note that the nature of religious organizations, people, and institutions with the state prior to their peacebuilding engagement can depend in large part on the status of the religious actor vis-à-vis the state prior that engagement. If the religious actor has minority status, defined either as being a small denomination or world religion in the state, a non-mainstream group within a larger body of religious actors, or an "unestablished" group, they may simultaneously have limited access to the state but greater latitude to take unconventional approaches to peace and lobbying generally. Majority groups may have better access to the state, more resources to draw upon, but they are also constrained in the scope and nature of the actions they can undertake by their need to preserve such access and resources (Brewer, et al., 2010; Hertog, 2010; Johnston, 2003; Johnston & Sampson, 1995; Philpott, 2007). Likewise, official interventions differ from unofficial ones (Brewer, et al., 2010). Official peacebuilding carries with it the full moral force of the religious actor, but the actor is again constrained to be consistent with its history and public positions. Unofficial interventions may carry less weight but allow for more flexibility.

Religious Leaders and Peacebuilding

Religious leaders—pastors, bishops, imams, and others—can have important roles to play in peacebuilding. There are several reasons for their prominent roles. First, like religious organizations, they claim significant legitimacy. Among the communities which they lead, and potentially among the wider society, religious leaders tend to be well respected. This respect is particularly true as regards moral issues and normative talk. Insomuch as war and peace are moral issues, their influence can be great. Similarly, while it may be anathema for a political leader to speak of compromise, religious leaders can legitimately talk about and urge dialogue, love for enemies, forgiveness, and reconciliation (Illman, 2007). Believers are often deferential when leaders make normative pronouncements concerning the application of their religious beliefs to concrete events (Appleby, 2000).

Beyond the moral and normative, religious leaders often act in the pursuit of their own, their community's, or their country's interests. They carefully assess the advantages and disadvantages of intervention and make a decision according to an analysis of the potential risks and rewards of participation (De Juan & Vüllers, 2010). If engaging in a peacebuilding activity could unacceptably damage their relationship with the state, their believers, or other groups in society, they may choose not to take part (Philpott, 2007). On the other hand, a potential for significant reward—prestige for themselves or their religious community, avoiding punishment from the eventual winners, peace for their society—could motivate quite risky participation. Indeed, religious groups in Africa have been carefully balancing the demands of the powerful political elite and the weak grassroots for many years (Longman, 1998).

Institutional Peacebuilding, Society, and Culture

One of the strengths of religious institutions is the significant legitimacy they have in society, legitimacy which they can bring to both analyses of and potential solutions to problems. In societies where religious institutions are respected, their willingness to engage with social problems may confer instantaneous legitimacy on the problem (Hadden, 1980). In addition, religious organizations with significant resources at their disposal may be able to bring those resources to bear on the problem, facilitating great social change, and their example may incite other people to similarly provide resources to the cause. Regardless, religious institutions have significant power to focus a society's attention on an issue and to provoke action around it.

This privileged position of religious institutions may make it possible for them to define new norms for a society, even beyond their members. I have already showed how religious organizations may attempt to persuade individuals to adopt certain values or worldviews or provide programmatic opportunities to get people to alter beliefs, attitudes, and behaviors. The importance of centrally planned and disseminated collective action frames, "schemes of interpretation that explain reality in a simplified way" (De Juan & Vüllers, 2010, p. 7), in inciting people to participate in a variety of social movements has been widely established (Barker, Johnson, & Lavalette, 2001; Fearon & Laitin, 2003; Polletta & Ho, 2006; Snow, Rochford Jr, Worden, & Benford, 1986). Peacebuilding must also use collective action frames which delegitimize violence. Religious institutions, with their central and powerful role in many societies, can be among the actors which define new norms which make peace an acceptable goal and a worthwhile risk to take.

One potential challenge in the inclusion of religious institutions in peacebuilding

activities is that their influence may isolate non-religious people. An additional concern

is the ability of religious groups to so successfully promote religious norms and

worldviews that they hurt the ability of important secular ideas to influence the peace

process. In South Africa, a religious understanding of reconciliation as an interpersonal

process involving confession, repentance, forgiveness, and mercy eclipsed more secular

understandings of reconciliation as a political process to redress the history of violence

between racial groups, perhaps leading some people in that country to disengage with the

peace process, ignoring it as irrelevant to their lives or upset that the orientation towards

forgiveness and mercy prevented them from receiving justice (Chapman, 2003).   That

said, other people in South Africa praised the religious orientation of the TRC for

transcending politics and providing legitimacy to a contentious process (Krog, 2000;

Chapman, 2003).

Religious Change after War and Disaster

Like any other organization, religious organizations change and evolve. This

change is driven by a complex interplay of factors both internal to the organization and

the external conditions in the environment. The following section examines some of the

explanations for religious change in post-conflict contexts.

Internal causes. There are several reasons why religious organizations and

institutions would change after war and disaster. First, should they truly have an

orientation to serve others, the significant needs in their country after a disaster would

naturally prompt them to attempt to change their activities to respond to those needs.

Second, the event may have sparked a reappraisal of their understanding of their role in society, of their divine purpose or calling, or of their theology, leading to a change in perceptions of their purpose and mission. Third, the significant changes in their society may leave them with little choice to adapt to new circumstances, as their historic modes of operation may no longer be viable in the social order, necessitating a strategic changes to ensure their continued relevance to and survival in an evolving society (De Juan & Vüllers, 2010).

The source of change in religious organizations after conflict can also vary. In a domain like war and peace in which religion has historically had an ambivalent record, there is tremendous opportunity for strong religious leaders to guide their institutions towards a more peaceful orientation, though it must also be recognized that they could equally steer such institutions to a more war-like, aggressive stance (Appleby, 2000). At the same time, leadership of religious organizations might be hostile to or unable to change, meaning that change must come from lay members or be encouraged or imposed from the outside.

External causes. Both neo-institutional and organizational ecology theories provide additional means for understanding change among religious organizations in post-conflict contexts, particular means of escaping the rational actor models which pervade the discussion of internal causes of change (DiMaggio, 1998). Neo-institutional theory highlights the importance of organizational legitimacy, which is "a generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions" (W. R. Scott, 2008; Suchman, 1995, p. 547). Organizations and institutions have power

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because they are legitimate, that they are accepted and supported by prevailing social norms (W. R. Scott, 2008; Weber, 1924/1968). Legitimacy functions across three dimensions, including regulatory, where legitimate organizations have legal status and are operating within the confines of the law, the normative, where legitimate organizations are seen to reflect the morals and values of the communities in which they are embedded, and the cultural-cognitive dimension, where the organization reflects the dominant worldviews (W. R. Scott, 2008). Legitimacy is usually generalized (W. R. Scott, 2008), applying to organizations and institutions over large swaths of time, but the legitimacy of organizations in crisis situations may be sharply focused on its actions during and immediately after that crisis. Walton (2008) found that national NGOs in Sri Lanka were subject to rapid changes in legitimacy as that country's war and attendant peace process evolved quickly.

The analysis of organizational legitimacy has largely focused on businesses and corporations, but there is an increasing body of literature theorizing about its importance for non-profits as well (Lister, 2003; Slim, 2002), though the specific application of institutional theory to religious organizations is quite sparse (Demerath III, Hall, Schmitt, & Williams, 1998; DiMaggio, 1998), particularly in regards to empirical studies. The complexity and wide reach of faith-based organizations may set them apart in analyses of legitimacy, particularly when legitimacy is understood as a generalized concept, for the work of faith-based organizations to engage in spiritual work may be seen as entirely legitimate whereas attempts by such organizations to provide social services, particularly with government money in the United States with its separation of church and state, are viewed as illegitimate (Scherr, 2005). In another context, Sri Lankan religious NGOs

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attempting to intervene in the conflict in that country were automatically accorded legitimacy because they were separate from the political parties and ethnic groups which were seen as perpetuating the conflict (Goodhand, Klem, & Korf, 2009).

Organizations which lose legitimacy face a number of challenges. They have a harder time getting people to volunteer and donate resources to them, thereby disrupting resource flows, they have a harder time forging ties with other organizations and individuals, their reputations are damaged, and the organization finds itself with little room to maneuver or change. Through these conduits, the loss of organizational legitimacy can lead to organizational death (Hamilton, 2006). Not all organizations with reduced legitimacy do ultimately die, for the abuse scandals in the Catholic Church have hurt that institution but it continues to survive, albeit with a harmed reputation, fewer members and resources, and greater scrutiny. Hamilton suggests that the survival of the Church may in part be due to perceptions of inherent legitimacy attached to religious organizations, whose roots are perceived by many people not to be in human constructions but in divine ordination (Hamilton, 2006). Moreover, given its age and prominent place in society, people may credit the Catholic Church with perceived wisdom and grant it benefit of the doubt that it would react, at least in future cases, with the best intentions (Hamilton, 2006).

Isomorphism, another concept from institutional theory, is yet another explanation of religious organizational change after crisis. Isomorphism is the tendency of individual organizations which inhabit the same organizational field to become more similar over time (W. R. Scott, 2008). This decreased diversity over time can come from two pressures: either organizations are mimicking their most efficient and effective

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counterparts in the field in order to become more successful (Hannan & Freeman, 1989), or organizations become more similar because there is a single dominant organizational form which is seen by regulating authorities and by society as legitimate, and all organizations are therefore compelled on some level to adopt that form (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). To purposely deviate from the established norms is inherently risky, and conformity with hegemonic norms may be necessary for organizations to remain legitimate and therefore viable. In contexts where religious organizations have damaged legitimacy due to their action or inaction in times of crisis, such as during the Rwandan genocide, the room for innovation may be limited due to increased scrutiny by both government and the larger society, increasing the tendency towards isomorphism and acquiescence to powerful forces.

Competition between organizations, where a large number of largely similar organizations dominate the "religious marketplace," can also spark change (Berger, 1963, 1967; K. D. Miller, 2002; Stark, 1987; Stark & Finke, 2000; Stark & Iannaccone, 1994). However, in this case there are two possibilities for the nature of that change. Churches, mosques, and temples which seek to more effectively compete may try to imitate their most successful rivals, thereby changing to become more like other organizations, another form of isomorphism. On the other hand, religious organizations might try to distinguish themselves from the pack, to gain visibility and create a competitive advantage, or try to create a niche for themselves by specializing in serving an underrepresented group or issue. In a crowded religious marketplace, being unique may be a way to get a one's organization noticed and to become more successful.

Regardless of the exact mechanism of change, be it internally or externally oriented, there are many reasons why religious organizations and institutions might find themselves changing in the post-conflict contexts. There exist no theoretically informed analyses of change in religious organizations in post-conflict contexts, so it is not possible to see which of these possibilities are most salient in such situations.

Religious Organizations in Rwanda

The religious organization landscape in post-genocide Rwanda has not been extensively described or analyzed in the literature. Guillebaud has analyzed the work of four Christian agencies providing trauma healing work and reconciliation promotion activities (Guillebaud, 2005). While all four agencies are religious, none are specifically linked to a single church group. They use a variety of techniques, including workshops, radio programs, structured encounters between genocide survivors and family. While they all incorporate a variety of religious influences, most have a quasi-Evangelical flavor as they focus on narratives on Christ-oriented personal and community transformation. Despite this focus, they target beneficiaries from all religious groups in Rwanda, and people from diverse religious backgrounds find these programs valuable, though there has not been a comprehensive evaluation of any of them.

In addition, Philip Cantrell (Philip A. Cantrell, 2007; Phillip A. Cantrell, 2009) has described the work of the Episcopal (Anglican) Church (EER) in Rwanda during the genocide. He writes that the EER is closely aligned with the RPF government, for the memberships of the top leadership of both were Tutsi exiles in Uganda prior to 1994. Additionally, the Province of the Episcopal Church of Rwanda has provided episcopal

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oversight to congregations in the United States and Canada who have severed their affiliations with their local dioceses and national churches, often over the emerging acceptance of gay marriage among North American Anglicans. Rwandan Anglican church leaders have brought to North America a narrative of genocide and reconciliation which closely mirrors that of the Rwandan government. In doing so, they also mobilize considerable economic support from American congregations to support the Rwandan church, especially for training programs, facility construction, and social programs. At home, the EER has endeavored to create theological justification for the government's efforts at nation-building and used its international connections to muster additional support for this project. Besides Guillebaud's and Cantrell's relatively comprehensive descriptions of the four non-denominational agencies and the EER, there are no other written analyses of religious organizational changes after the genocide.

Research Questions

I conducted interviews with ten religious leaders in Rwanda, including top staff people in Baptist, Adventist, and Presbyterian churches, a Muslim imam, an Anglican bishop, and two staff people with Catholic peace and justice ministries. I was largely interested in two themes when I interviewed them:

1. How have Rwandan religious organizations responded to the needs of their country after the genocide? How are they contributing to post-genocide recovery?

2. How have Rwandan religious organizations changed after the genocide? Specifically, how have their relations with government changed? Would

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churches be able to contribute to peace in Rwanda if the government supported another conflict?

Results

My interviews indicate that there is disjuncture between individual congregations and national churches in Rwanda, as national churches have engaged in activities that do not seem to have "trickled down" to the local level. Unfortunately, despite considerable effort, I was unable to interview the Mufti in Rwanda in regards to his religion's efforts to promote peace in Rwanda. In addition to difficulty finding free time during Ramadan, which overlapped with my 2010 trip, he eventually told my research assistant over the phone that he was uncomfortable talking to a stranger about questions with political import, especially because he felt he was under increased surveillance as Rwanda prepared for presidential elections in August 2010. As such, I cannot say if a similar divide exists between Rwanda's individual mosques and their national association.

The Responses of Local Congregations

The analyses of the oral histories presented in Chapter IV show that there has been a consistent pattern in how local congregations and mosques have responded to the genocide. Both religious groupings have undertaken a wide variety of activities. Pastors and imams frequently teach about forgiveness and peace. Most congregations provide material or economic support to survivors of the genocide and other people in need among their members and in the wider community. Many religious individuals reach out to survivors to provide social support either informally or as a part of organized efforts by

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their congregations. There are official and informal support groups, prayer groups, and study groups. Table 11 shows the results of several quantitative analyses from the 2008 dataset regarding how often people reported hearing about certain themes, including the genocide, reconciliation, and *gacaca*, in church or at the mosque. Reconciliation was by far the theme which was most often taught in religious organizations. Women reported hearing more frequently about *gacaca* and the genocide generally than did men, though there were no differences for reconciliation. This effect is likely attributable to women's more frequent participation in organized religious activities than men's, for such participation is slightly correlated with each of the four themes ($r = .21, .25, .32,$ and $.24$ for the genocide, violence, reconciliation, and *gacaca* respectively). There were no statistically significant differences in frequency between any of the five denominational or religious groupings. On the reconciliation item specifically, Muslims tend to score much lower than do Christians from all three categories, but because of large variances within each of the categories, the effect is not statistically significant.

Table 11 Selected Themes Heard in Religious Contexts

	Mean[a] (SD)	Gender Differences			Denominational Differences					
		Female	Male	t-test	Catholic	MP	EP	Muslim	Other	ANOVA
Genocide	3.16 (1.44)	3.30 (1.49)	2.90 (1.34)	$t(278.57) = 2.37$*	3.32 (1.42)	3.40 (1.59)	3.01 (1.41)	3.27 (1.40)	3.46 (1.61)	$F(4, 286) = 1.03$
Other violence	3.20 (1.46)	3.26 (1.53)	3.03 (1.37)	$t(271.22) = 1.32$	3.44 (1.46)	3.18 (1.44)	3.15 (1.46)	2.94 (1.39)	3.00 (1.68)	$F(4, 280) = 0.73$
Reconciliation	4.12 (1.18)	4.17 (1.19)	4.02 (1.21)	$t(285) = 1.04$	4.22 (1.15)	4.28 (1.15)	4.09 (1.17)	3.58 (1.32)	4.07 (1.43)	$F(4, 285) = 1.15$
Gacaca	3.44 (1.53)	3.60 (1.52)	3.15 (1.53)	$t(284) = 2.48$*	3.85 (1.38)	3.53 (1.52)	3.28 (1.54)	3.12 (1.62)	3.21 (1.71)	$F(4, 283) = 2.09$

* indicates statistical significance at $p < .05$

[a] range for all items was 1 (Never) to 5 (Very Often)

While congregations with more money would seem to have more resources to devote to these efforts, it has been my experience that congregational resources do not much matter, at least not to a large degree. When in Kigali, I often attended an English worship service at the Anglican cathedral. The congregation was made up of highly affluent members from the highest levels of Rwandan government and business. However, the congregation struggled to meet its modest operational budget through member offerings and had almost no social outreach program to speak of. Poor rural congregations whose church buildings are made of mud will oftentimes mobilize far more resources for social action than affluent urban congregations. A lot of these resources are donations of material and time rather than money, but their effect in providing struggling community members with important means of survival is nonetheless significant.

One of the notable absences from both the oral history and the leader interviews is an emphasis on pastoral care. There were very few stories of effective pastoral care in my interviews. They were almost non-existent among those denominations—primarily Evangelical, but also some Mainline—where pastors are bi-vocational and minimally trained.[21] Only those pastors which had undergone extensive training as part of their preparation for ministry—largely restricted to the Catholic, Episcopal and Presbyterian denominations—seemed to provide effective pastoral counseling. This story, for

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[21] I offered a course on conflict resolution at a seminary in Burundi during my original term in Rwanda, and several colleagues were involved in other forms of pastor training. Based on these experiences, pastoral training among most protestant denominations is focused on theology rather than the practice of being a pastor. Candidates for a training program are chosen based on their spiritual rather than their academic qualifications, and considerable time is spent on remedial training to get their reading and English or French language abilities high enough to proceed with regular classes. While courses in practical theology, counseling, and other applied domains are occasionally offered if qualified instructors are available, they remain mostly academic discussions. There are no supervised community placements or practica offered as part of Rwandan pastoral training, and most of these pastors would not have time for such opportunities even if they were available.

example, shows the extent to which a Catholic priest walked with a woman I interviewed, doing so even across the ethnic divides which created so much tension in the immediate aftermath of the genocide:

> That Father [priest] who came to talk to me was from another or another tribe from me. Among the tribes we have in Rwanda, we did not share the same race. He helped me to know where the bodies of my relatives were. When I buried them, when I honored them during their burial ceremony like others, I felt like I've forgiven everyone from that tribe. And that led me to trust him. (KIB-05)

In some ways, this is an exemplary case of pastoral care, where a Hutu pastor—potentially at considerable risk—helped a Tutsi survivor find the remains of her family provided them with an honorable burial, and continued in relationship with his parishioner. This type of story is rare, however, as most pastors have neither the training nor the time to engage in such intensive work.

Despite the relative lack of pastoral care of any sort, a few people did see the power that the pastor role could have in Rwandan communities:

> Almost all people are Christians. In religious, there is other power, we cannot even know where they get that power from. They are powerful in a certain way. Yeah, actually a pastor a Catholic priest or an Islam leader if for example he's preaching, what he says to the Christians, they take it to be true. If a priest can say reconciliation is impossible, then of course they might take it that way that reconciliation is impossible. They trust their leaders to a high extent, so if they told them that reconciliation is difficult, then of course that would be their truth. (BYU-06)

Clearly, given the authority that pastors and imams have in their congregations and their communities, they have significant potential to influence the population towards peace or violence. As such, they seem to occupy a position of unrealized potential in promoting reconciliation in Rwanda.

The Responses of National Churches

While there seems to be a consistent baseline of activity aimed at promoting well-being, forgiveness, and reconciliation after the genocide in most congregations, there are some congregations which offer additional opportunities and programs. A few congregations have had conflict resolution and mediation services or trauma healing and counseling rooms. Likewise, there are a small number of congregations that offered large development projects to members, providing vocational skills training as well as microcredit services and supports for mutual aid associations. Here resources make all the difference: programs with professional staff and a wide reach cost a great deal of money. Small congregations cannot afford such initiatives. Indeed, with the exception of some Catholic parishes—which may have up to 30,000 members, according to one of my respondents, whereas the vast majority of Protestant congregations have fewer than 200 members—practically no individual congregation in Rwanda can afford the sustained, intensive levels of activity that such programs require. They are only able to do so because their national churches heavily subsidize and otherwise support peacebuilding and development programs. As Cantrell described in reference to the EER, many Rwandan churches are able to pay for these program through international donations, though income generation activities such as guest houses also play a role. Many of the

smallest Evangelical Protestant churches, particularly those with comparably weak central offices, have limited international connections, and their programmatic offerings are correspondingly meager.

Interviews with national church leaders reveal that they engage in a wide variety of other activities beyond supporting the work of local congregations to respond to diverse needs in Rwandan communities. Every leader with whom I spoke talked about how the genocide made their churches realize that they had considerable work to do. Many of them decided that they needed to study the Bible and other key texts to see how to respond to the genocide to promote peace. Some spent several years in study to best determine how to respond to the genocide, consulting with foreign experts and holding study sessions and workshops. From this effort came official statements supporting Christian work for peace and reconciliation, booklets outlining the newly developed peace theology, and training programs for pastors and lay leaders. Several staff members who saw the importance of this work began working to develop the capacities to provide services to genocide survivors and other people in need; their efforts eventually led to now independent (religious, but not attached to a specific denomination) organizations efforts to promote reconciliation. The Catholic Church developed a radio station which uses radio drama to teach principles of peace, and other churches developed video series, individual radio programs, or Bible study guides to promote reconciliation. Like support for individual congregations' efforts, some of this work requires substantial resources, and only the largest and best connected religious organizations are able to undertake it.

Among the Evangelical churches in Rwanda,[22] there is something of a tendency to view the genocide and its aftermath not in structural terms but in spiritual terms. The genocide was not the result of bad governance, ideological dehumanization, or economic pressures but because religious people failed in their duty. Their response to the genocide has therefore been somewhat different from that of other groups. Rather than focusing on provision of services and direct teaching bout forgiveness and reconciliation, they put much of their focus on making people better Christians, an idea often associated with the term discipleship training. One religious leader, who headed an Evangelical association for university students, described the situation in this way:

> Before the genocide, we thought that more than 95% of Rwandans were
> Christians. So I asked myself as a leader, if that's really true, that more than 95%
> were Christian, how did so many people commit such unimaginable acts? So I
> ask myself, what percentage of Christians would we need in this country such that
> such violence would never happen again in Rwanda or in the world? What
> percentage. Our first objective is to evangelize. If we were so successful, how
> could so many of people have participated in the genocide? It's a difficult
> question. We tried to contact some experts, we talked about it together. If I jump
> to the end, to the conclusion…we came to the conclusion that while people called
> themselves Christian, the churches in Rwanda put their effort in teaching things
> which were not essential in the Bible. For example, they didn't teach the love of

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[22] Here I use the term evangelical more loosely than I have previously. While a set of churches—Baptist, Pentecostal, and many small non-denominational congregations—are members of the Evangelical Alliance of Rwanda, the rise of global evangelicalism has touched all denominations. In the Pew dataset, fully 44% of Catholics, 67% of Mainline Protestants, 76% of Adventists, and 75% of members of "evangelical" denominations defined themselves as born-again Christians. Similar patterns exist for Charismatic and Pentecostal descriptors.

God. Today we try to teach love, but a lot of times we fail. They used to teach

other doctrines which were not important, like respecting the Sabbath. You know

what that led to among the Seventh Day Adventists during the genocide? From

Sunday to Friday they killed, but on Saturday they took the day off to respect the

Sabbath. I think they missed the point. Churches like the ADEPR and the

Catholics put a lot of effort on giving money as offerings. Pastors say things like,

"if you don't tithe, you won't go to heaven." Churches didn't teach love. Even

today it's not great. (LEA-03)

He suggests two interrelated solutions: a deeper, more transformative sort of evangelism,

focused on really changing people's hearts, and a renewed focus on teaching people how

to love rather than legalistic rules or the rituals of religion. However, even among those

congregations he thinks are moving in the right direction, he worries the situation has not

improved a great deal.

Given the considerable effort national churches have put into responding to the

genocide, it is somewhat surprising that there are few local signs of this effort beyond the

support given to local congregations.   In a substantial minority of the oral histories,

people told me theologically dubious ideas about peace and justice, for example that

people were not responsible for the genocide because it was the work of the devil, or that

people who pray hard enough will be completely healed of their emotional trauma.

When I asked leaders about this, they all said they had developed specific ideas in their

theologies of peace and reconciliation around these questions. However, the messages

which they had developed in their national offices were not getting through to the

grassroots. I asked them why they thought they faced this problem, and many of them

attributed it to poorly trained and marginally effective local pastors. Like this

respondent, many of the leaders said their organizations had to put more effort into

training: "We also have to train more with pastors. Most pastors haven't been students.

There's a Kinyarwanda proverb that says, 'you can't give that which you don't have.'

Their capacity is very low, and they serve according to their capacity. So churches have

to put more effort into training effective pastors" (LEA-05). Unfortunately, there seem to

be few ideas on how to accomplish this training within the resource constraints pastors

and national churches face.

Religious leaders also questioned the depth of the reconciliatory effort in Rwanda.

When I asked them about my perceptions that the love they so strongly preached was

understood on the ground as visiting people who are sick and feeding the hungry,[23] they

largely agreed:

> I: I've noticed during these interviews that I'm doing right now that people tell
>
> me that we have to love each other. And I ask, "what is love?" They tell me
>
> that it means going to visit the sick or, if a person is very poor, you should help
>
> them by bringing them food. And I ask myself, is that sufficient? So how do
>
> you understand this Biblical love?
>
> R: These things of going to visit someone or to help them, that's important. But
>
> in Rwanda, I think those sorts of things are of secondary importance. The
>
> more important question is how can we live together? I think we have to talk
>
> about what happened. Sit down together, talk together as Christians with a

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[23] I recognize that this is a complex question. On one hand, feeding the hungry and visiting the sick are relatively easy ways of loving your neighbors. Such actions are largely ritualistic, require comparably little sacrifice, and are limited commitments. On the other, in a place like Rwanda where it is difficult to trust your neighbors, and where the weight of recent history can poison many social interactions, such actions may be much more significant than they first seem.

heart to truly listen. Communication. Then we'll really know how to help

each other. In Rwanda, love starts with communication. (LEA-08)

This leader described how it is hard to listen in Rwanda, given the depth of people's pain

and guilt. He went on to describe at length a program that provided structural encounters

between genocide survivors and perpetrators and how that program made it safe for

people to really sit down and listen to each other. He said the forgiveness and

reconciliation which emerges from these encounters is real and honest. However, this is

not the kind of program that can be effectively delivered by a single pastor preaching to

several hundred people; it requires small groups with several facilitators to create a space

in which this kind of communication and forgiveness can happen. Even when trying to

scale up this program by training more facilitators, they could only reach a small fraction

of the population.

Church goers also seemed to perceive a gap between their needs and the programs

of national church bureaucracies. Several people who participated in the oral history

interviews stated unequivocally that they thought national churches should spend more of

their time and resources promoting economic development and humanitarian assistance

in local communities. For example, a woman in Gikongoro said, "poverty will never end

I think. Above all, as we see, [churches] should be trying to help poor people. So they

should actually continue in helping poor people. Though we say they are helping, they

have not reached to all people so far, so if they can try to enlarge their activities so they

can reach to all the poor" (GIK-04). They saw less of a need for pastoral training,

theological development, and peace oriented programming. Rather, for them, material

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needs remained at the forefront, and churches needed to be doing more to respond to those needs.

Changes in Religious Organizations after the Genocide

Clearly churches and mosques have made significant changes in their operations after the genocide. Many have discovered vastly expanded a social role for religion where previously they had restricted themselves to education, health care, and economic development. They have also developed new theologies of peace, forgiveness, and reconciliation, and they have tried to innovate new means of educating their members about these new theologies. Many churches are putting an effort not just on converting people to membership but on transforming people into "real" or "true" Christians. Every religious organization with which I had contact in Rwanda is making serious and fervent contributions towards peace and reconciliation.

Despite this considerable progress, there is another dimension of religious change that needs to be examined. Chapter II extensively described how religious organizations became so entangled in the workings of the Rwandan government that they could not speak against the genocide and even contributed to it. Has this situation changed? If a similar situation presented itself today, could religious organizations oppose government-sponsored violence or genocide? Have they learned crucial lessons of the past?

Empirically, the answer to this question is clear: religious organizations in Rwanda are still intimately bound up with government, and their ability to question and challenge government is severely limited. As far as I can tell, there is no religious opposition to Rwanda's continued support for warlords in the Democratic Republic of the

Congo, who are responsible for the deaths of hundreds of thousands of people and the rapes of tens of thousands of women. When opposition leaders are harassed in Rwanda and when the government commits other sorts of human rights violations, no religious voices inside the country speak against these acts. It is extremely rare for any religious organization or religious leader to speak out in opposition to the government on issues of political import in the country.

When I raised these concerns with religious leaders, however, they were somewhat more generous in their assessments of their relationships with government. Many said that if they saw a need to oppose the government, of course they would do so. Said one leader, "you are right that churches were implicated too much in the genocide. Have we changed though? I think we have. If we saw the need to respond to a situation in the country, even if our position was opposed to the government, I think we would. If something like a genocide ever happened again, I think we would try to stop it. I think we learned a lot from the genocide" (LEA-07). At the end of the day, nearly all leaders said that they maintained good relationships with the current government because it is a good government. They saw no need to oppose it.

The reality is somewhat different. Government sanctions often preclude people from being able to be critical of its positions or actions. This is particularly true for questions relating to the genocide or its nation building agenda after the genocide. However, even around issues of second concern the government brooks little opposition. For example, during the summer of 2008 rumors swirled in the religious communities of Kigali that Emmanuel Kolini, the then Anglican Archbishop of Kigali and chairperson of the National Commission in the Fight against HIV-AIDS, had lost the government's

favor when he opposed acceptance of an international grant which would have provided

education and other HIV preventive services to Rwanda's small homosexual

population.[24] It is unclear if his resignation from the archbishopric, announced a little

more than a year later, was at all related to this public falling out with the government.

While I find Kolini's perspectives on this particular policy matter regrettable, HIV and

homosexuality are far down the list of pressing concerns in Rwanda. Nonetheless, that

the government accepted no open criticism on a relatively minor issue from a person who

had been very supportive of it on other questions of public policy demonstrates the

degree to which such opposition will be quelled. Kolini's position or reputation did not

protect him, though he suffered only a minor direct sanction from the government, the

loss of his chairmanship.

Discussion

As the largest sector in Rwandan civil society, religious organizations have a

significant opportunity to work for reconciliation in the country. In many ways, they

have succeeded, developing and maintaining a wide range of new programs to respond to

the aftermath of the genocide. While their successes may be somewhat more limited than

they had hoped, they have contributed significantly to the country's story of

reconciliation. There are two dominant reasons for the limited scope of religiously-

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[24] Kolini opposed the grant because of his principled stance against homosexuality, which he terms "moral genocide." In contrast to several neighboring countries, Rwanda's official stance towards homosexuality is relatively liberal for Africa. Same-sex physical contact is not illegal, though the constitution only recognizes marriage between a man and a woman. The government has resisted significant pressure to criminalize homosexuality since 2009, when both Burundi and Uganda began tightening laws; Uganda is considering imposing the death penalty for certain acts. However, Rwandan culture and society remain hostile to homosexuality. While LGBTQ people may not experience legal discrimination, they frequently live in fear from social discrimination and abuse.

influenced change: a lack of resources and poorly trained pastors. A lack of money and, to a lesser degree, capacity does limit how much religious organizations can accomplish, particularly in regard to more professionalized services. The focus on poorly trained pastors as an explanation for limited success has some merit, for pastors are the link between national church resources and ordinary church members. However, it is also something of a straw man argument. Churches and mosques cannot possibly create total change in any society. The social phenomena in play in Rwanda—peace, reconciliation, forgiveness, economic development, democracy, and more—are simply too complex and diverse for religion or any other single sector of society to change them by themselves. Certainly it would be prudent and productive to work towards increasing pastors' capacities, but rather than blaming these pastors for limited impacts, religion should recognize its own ambiguities and limitations. Such recognition may be difficult for religious organizations. Many deal in moral absolutes and normative visions of the future which they conceive as perfect. With such elevated pictures of what could be, getting them to accept the improved but still imperfect may be difficult.

The lack of substantial change in religious organizations' orientation to government in Rwanda is disappointing but not surprising. The degree to which the Christian leaders were implicated in the genocide has thoroughly discredited them and reduced the legitimacy of religious organizations generally. While most of the population tends to trust religious organizations, there are some who are still on guard for "genocide ideologies" and other signs that they have not substantially changed. While Islam was not implicated in the genocide, many Rwandans are suspicious of the minority religion and its perceived links to terrorism. As such, legitimacy is very low for all

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religious organizations among government officials: in some real sense, religious organizations have proven that they cannot be trusted. As such, they must be continually monitored and disciplined—a theme which is further developed in Chapter VII—to keep them in line. Religious organizations must toe the line of the government and support its initiatives if they want to operate at all.

The emphasis among many Evangelically-oriented Rwandan Christians on personal transformation and not structural or political change as means of responding to the genocide can be profitably analyzed from the standpoint of religious orientations to engagement with the wider world. Silberman and colleagues described three general orientations: acceptance, withdrawal, and active engagement (Silberman, et al., 2005). Given the limitations the government places on all groups of Rwandan civil society, religious organizations see little possibility of active engagement on their own terms with many political and social questions. Instead, they are left with two options: they can withdrawal from the world, or they can accept it as it is. The turn towards personal responsibility and spiritual transformation reflects both choices. The government's approach to post-genocide justice through *gacaca* has focused on the personal responsibility of those who participated in the genocide. In this light, religious organizations' focus on personal transformation accepts the government's framing of the question and works within it. However, this transformative approach also represents something of a withdrawal away from the political realm towards ground which has traditionally been the realm of religion, namely the spiritual and interior world.

Organizations that lose legitimacy should be able to regain it, given enough effort and time. In view of the significant effort of Rwandan churches and mosques to respond

to the genocide, one might expect that they have regained the trust of the government and

society.   However, I think it unlikely that religious organizations will experience

significant new freedoms under Rwanda's current political system. Even if the religious

organizations had legitimacy in Rwanda after the genocide, it is unlikely that they could

have significantly more impact on or be more independent from the government. The

government accepts no religious criticism even beyond questions of legitimacy because it

operates in a hegemonic way. It carefully creates a discourse of good and responsible

government, of slow and careful steps toward fuller democratization, and of lingering

tensions which could, if allowed to rise to the surface, undermine all the progress Rwanda

has made in the past 18 years. This narrative creates a powerful framework which

legitimizes almost anything the government does. That moral authority, combined with

the government's continued ability to point to the genocide-era disgrace of the churches,

means that options for religious independence from government and religious

organizations' ability to influence government will be very limited for the foreseeable

future. Certainly there is room for change, if the government creates space—

incrementally perhaps—for religious organizations to do their work. The only question is

how Rwanda might get to the point where those in power feel confident enough in both

religion and their population generally to let such a transformation take place.

Chapter VI

RELIGIOUS CHANGE IN RWANDA AFTER THE GENOCIDE

The religious landscape of Rwanda has been in considerable flux since the genocide. The 1991 Rwandan census found that 62% of the population defined themselves as Catholic, 18% as Protestants, 8% as Adventists, 1% as Muslim, and 8% adherents of traditional religions, other religions, or no religion. In 2006, the census found that 56.5% of the population was Catholic, 26% Protestant, 11.1% Adventist, 4.6% Muslim, and 1.7% no or other religious affiliation (Bureau of Democracy Human Rights and Labor, 2007), figures which are largely confirmed by the Pew dataset as described in Chapter III. While these numbers show shifts away from Catholicism, they also mask changes in the structure of Rwandan Protestantism as membership in Mainline denominations has remained relatively stagnant while the number of Evangelical denominations, congregations, and adherents has increased since the genocide (Koster, 2008; Kubai, 2007a).

Commentators on religion in Rwanda find a number of causes for this shift. First, there has been a significant influx of Evangelical Protestant missionaries into Rwanda since the genocide (Bureau of Democracy Human Rights and Labor, 2003, 2007; Philip A. Cantrell, 2007; Kubai, 2007a), including a significant effort by Rick Warren's Saddleback Church[25] (Morgan & Carnes, 2005). Second, some portion of the population

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[25] Rick Warren, a noted pastor and author, has written numerous books for Christian audiences. His work includes the bestseller *The Purpose Driven Life* which has been translated into Kinyarwanda and widely distributed in Rwanda. Saddleback Church is the evangelical megachurch he leads near Los Angeles, California. Saddleback is noted for providing short-term mission opportunities for its members to all

is unhappy with the traditional established Catholic and Mainline Protestant churches, particularly for their role in the genocide, and has sought alternatives in the Evangelical churches. The change is so significant that the Pentecostal church is widely said to have overtaken the Episcopal Church as the largest Protestant denomination in Rwanda (Kubai, 2007a). As a result, many Mainline and Catholic congregations have sought lessons in the efforts of the *abarokore* and Charismatic movements of the 1980s and transformed their worship, religious education, and other programming to reflect the exuberant worship, high levels of participation, and emphasis on personal piety of the Evangelical tradition.

Discontent with the established churches has also led to an increasing number of Muslim converts in Rwanda (Kubai, 2007b), though Islam still accounts for less than 5% of the population. There have been many reports that hundreds of thousands of people have been moving towards Islam such that it counts for over 10% of the population (Lacey, 2004; Tiemessen, 2005; Wax, 2002), but the census results do not reflect such elevated estimates. Nonetheless, the conversion narrative in those sources which have examined this trend emphasize that the growth is due to people abandoning Christianity for Islam because of Muslim Rwandans' relatively good conduct during the genocide (Kubai, 2007b; Lacey, 2004; Tiemessen, 2005; Wax, 2002).

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countries on the planet. Rwanda was an early focus of Saddleback's efforts. Paul Kagame, Rwanda's President, is close to Warren. Publicity around Saddleback's ministry in Rwanda has used the term "purpose driven country."

<center>**Religious Change**</center>

This chapter examines the nature of post-genocide religious shifts in Rwanda society. In it, I ask what kinds of people are changing their religious affiliation and consider explanations for such shifts. The chapter also considers several explanations of religious change, including structural-functional explanations, including secularization theory, a rational choice and religious marketplace model, and changes linked to meaning-making.

Structural-Functional Theories

Structural-functional approaches focus on the roles that religions serve in producing and reproducing the social order. Durkheim saw religion as a fundamental way to give societies collective purpose and modes of understanding (Durkheim, 1912/1995). Marx thought that religion served to stifle movements for economic (distributive) justice by promising the poor rewards in the afterlife to compensate for their current deprivations (Marx, 1843/1972). Weber, building off the work of Durkheim and Marx, described how certain religious beliefs and behaviors made the accumulation of wealth and the capitalist system possible; he also described how bureaucratic rationalization has its source in religious rationalization and the rise of the professional religious institution which preserves the institution in ways that dependence on traditional or charismatic authority cannot (Weber, 1922/1933, 1930/1992). All three thinkers foresaw that as societies grow increasingly intertwined with technology, science, and professionalized (rationalized) governance, these changes undermine the very religious foundations of those societies. Religious change, therefore, can be traced to

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attempts to keep religions relevant to the societies in which they are embedded. Such change can either be intentional, as religious and political leaders try to design a religious system which meets certain social and political needs, or it may be more unintentional and evolutionary, responding to subtle pressures introduced by changes in society.

Ideas of organizational legitimacy, as described in Chapter V, are closely related to the structural-functional explanations of religious change. Structural-functional orientations to the study of religion and the concept of legitimacy apply to Rwanda in several ways. First, it is indisputable that religion made significant contributions to the social structure which made the genocide possible (see Chapter II). After the genocide, Rwandan society changed, both as a reaction to people's experiences during the genocide and because of new leadership, such that ethnic ideologies and violence have become increasingly unacceptable. Religious change in Rwanda can then be interpreted as religion's attempt to keep up with the changes in society. In addition, because not all churches were equally involved in making the genocide possible—the Catholic Church and Mainline Protestant denominations are far more implicated—it is precisely those denominations which have lost legitimacy in the eyes of many Rwandans. Many of their former members have left, to the benefit of Evangelical Christian denominations and the Muslims.

Secularization theory. Secularization theory, a specific manifestation of a structural-functional orientation to religion, states that as societies develop and modernize, they will become less religious. Religion serves as a means to guarantee existential security (P. Norris & Inglehart, 2011). As societies develop more capacities to meet such needs through means other than religion, religion loses its relevance, and

religious affiliation and religiosity decline. There is broad evidence to support this

hypothesis, at least in the traditionally Christian parts of the world, for religiosity has

declined as societies have become more prosperous and more developed in Europe, North

America (with the possible exception of the United States), and Australia. Worldwide,

however, the proportion of people who define themselves as religious is growing, as

population growth rates in the west slow but continue to be strong in the less affluent

global South (P. Norris & Inglehart, 2011).

As there is a great deal of economic insecurity in Rwanda, and many people still

see a threat of violence-related insecurity, secularization theory says that Rwandan

society should remain strongly religious. Rwanda also challenges secularization theory,

based as it is on a trajectory of secular modernization. While health care and education

and economic development are all improving in the country, religious groups continue to

play a significant role in providing the services which make such progress possible.

Whether increasing levels of existential security which are underpinned by religiously-

provided services still lead to increased secularization will be an interesting question for

Rwanda's future.

The Religious Marketplace Explanation

A competing but closely related theory of the causes of religious change focuses

on the model of a religious marketplace, itself based on theories of rational choice

(Berger, 1963, 1967; K. D. Miller, 2002; Stark, 1987; Stark & Finke, 2000; Stark &

Iannaccone, 1994). The paradigm assumes that individuals have a great deal of freedom

in the religious choices they make. As such, they continuously survey the totality of the

religious marketplace, assessing the advantages and disadvantages of changing their current affiliation or patterns of participation, and make a cost-benefit calculation about switching or other change which will maximize their reward and minimize negative consequences (Barro, Hwang, & McCleary, 2010; Sherkat & Wilson, 1995; C. Smith & Sikkink, 2003; Stark & Bainbridge, 1996). In a post-conflict context the potential rewards for switching may be high, including new economic, social, or religious resources for coping as well as the avoidance of emotional associations connecting victims' prior religious affiliation with their experiences of suffering. They then balance the projected rewards against potential losses, which involve the costs associated with rejecting the social norms of the community in which the person has been previously embedded as well as the social ties and other resources such embeddedness brings. If the costs outweigh the benefits, they change.

Another marketplace explanation focuses on religious competition. Proponents argue that as societies become more religiously diverse and as the number of religious organizations increases, those organizations compete against each other for adherents. In doing so, they innovate and become more dynamic (Berger, 1963, 1967). This dynamism attracts new adherents, as people are drawn in by new patterns of worship or new supports for members. Advocates of this model say that the countries of Europe have experienced declines in religiosity precisely because their religious groups lack such dynamism, for many are dominated by a single large, often state sanctioned, denomination (Diotallevi, 2002; Hamberg & Pettersson, 1994; Introvigne & Stark, 2005). However, market-place focused secularization theory has proven to be controversial, with many studies purporting both to support and contradict it (Chaves & Gorski, 2001; J. P.

Hill & Olson, 2009; Olson, 1999, 2002; Stark & Iannaccone, 1996; Voas, Crockett, &

Olson, 2002). Understanding Rwanda's religious transformation using this theory

suggests that as missionaries (both European/American and African) have brought new

Evangelical Protestant denominations into the country, they invented a series of religious

innovations in religious content and practice which caught the attention of people,

causing increased numbers of people to switch denominations.

Meaning Making

Religion helps people make sense of the world. Most of the theoretical and

empirical literature on religion as a process for making meaning in response to traumatic

events conceptualizes religion as a part of an individual's system of global meaning

through which they interpret and make sense of the situational life event which they are

experiencing (Park, 2005, 2010; Park & Ai, 2006). The literature does not sufficiently

explore the possibility that situational experiences may so radically challenge a person's

global meaning system that it fundamentally changes it. The religious meaning-making

literature which does focus specifically on coping after trauma almost completely

neglects the possibility of religious change following trauma (see Fontana & Rosenheck,

2005; and Park, et al., 2010 for exceptions), in part because such change is seen as quite

rare (Overcash, Calhoun, Cann, & Tedeschi, 1996).   The loss or change in meaning can

cause additional significant distress for victims beyond the problems caused by the event

itself (Fontana & Rosenheck, 2005). The relevance of the meaning-making theory of

religious change is clear in a post-conflict context like Rwanda: people's belief systems

can be overwhelmed by the sheer enormity of their suffering, and they make adjustments

to that belief system in part by seeking new religious affiliations that may provide alternate schema through which to understand the meaning of their experience. Meaning making is less a competing cause with structural-functional and rational choice theories of religious change than a further explanation about why such change occurs. Meaning making can lead to a rupture in the structural utility of religion, or meaning making can be relevant as a person weighs the various costs and benefits to religious change.

Factors Influencing Religious Change

At the individual level, there are multiple studies about deconversion and religious switching. Deconversion describes people abandoning their religious faith. Switching occurs when individuals develop new beliefs and/or seek new religious affiliations. Life events are key drivers of religious switching in many contexts. Marriage between people of different religious backgrounds often involves one of the spouses to join the other's religion (Hoge, Johnson, & Luidens, 1995; Musick & Wilson, 1995; Roof, 1989). There is a often a preference to retain the woman's religious affiliation in traditional heterosexual marriages (Newport, 1979). Moving to a place where one's current religious affiliation is no longer viable, either because there are no such groups of which to become a member, or because that group is socially stigmatized locally, also is a common cause of religious switching. However, one must be cautious about interpreting religious switches related to changes in life events, for marriage and destination choices may be affected by religious preferences (Musick & Wilson, 1995).

There are certain characteristics of individuals who switch. People who are more educated are more likely to change religious affiliation (Loveland, 2003; Need & de

Graaf, 1996; Newport, 1979; Roof & Hadaway, 1979; Scheitle & Smith, 2012; Schwadel, 2011). Likewise, people with higher incomes are more likely to switch (Newport, 1979; Roof & Hadaway, 1979). Education and income may drive religious switching at the individual level for the same reasons that development and modernization drive secularization at the social level: highly educated, more affluent people need religion less than those with lower education and therefore less income. Alternately, educated individuals may be more likely to both assess the extent to which their personal beliefs and practices align with those of their current religious affiliation and be aware of other possibilities in the religious landscape. If such a person perceives too many differences with their existing affiliation and sees a viable option for change, they might seize that opportunity. Education can also introduce new ideas which are similarly disruptive (Schwadel, 2010, 2011). However, new data suggest that these demographic patterns of switching and deconversion are changing over time, perhaps in relation to different social norms operative in different generational cohorts and different religious groups (Scheitle & Smith, 2012; Schwadel, 2010, 2011; Sherkat, 2002). For example, new analyses based on American data suggest that education actually increases people's likelihood to become or stay religious and to increase their religious participation (Schwadel, 2011; Uecker, Regnerus, & Vaaler, 2007). Lower economic class can also prevent participation in religion, as poor individuals and families can find no place for themselves in a largely middle class (or upper class) denomination (Schwadel, McCarthy, & Nelsen, 2009). The theoretical implications of these new data have not been thoroughly analyzed.

When people do change their religious affiliation, there are some predictable patterns. They tend to choose a faith group that is already similar to their original group,

in terms of denominational family as well as doctrine, praxis, and racial, ethnic, and socioeconomic composition (Doughty & Rodgers, 1998; Hadaway & Marler, 1993; Phillips & Kelner, 2006). This has led to the development of the concept of the R-order, or a hierarchy of similarity between religious traditions. A general principle of the R-order and related concepts is that people tend to minimize their movement on the hierarchy when switching (Babchuk & Whitt, 1990; Newport, 1979; Roof & Hadaway, 1979). Several studies give additional insight into such patterns. Hoge and colleagues, for example, find that when life events lead to a change, people tend to chose new affiliations which are similar to their original; when it is dissatisfaction with the original faith, the change tends to be more dramatic (Hoge, et al., 1995). Observers of the American religious landscape have argued that denomination boundaries have become more porous and the role of social status in determining membership have become less important over time, diminishing the utility of the R-order concept (Sherkat, 2001).

Religious marketplace and rational choice proponents often argue that, in general, the costs of religious switching are lowest when the switching individual follows someone he or she knows down the path of religious change (Stark & Finke, 2000). Relationships with friends and family who are already affiliated with the destination congregation are a particularly important driver of religious switching (Loveland, 2003; Newport, 1979; Regnerus & Uecker, 2006; Sandomirsky & Wilson, 1990). Social ties with the people they followed to the destination group often get stronger as that small group is isolated from other portions of their historic social network because of their choice.

Structural functional models of religion and religious change challenge this assumption of rational choices behind religious switching. Because many people are well embedded in a society which is in part cohered together by religion, it is difficult if not impossible to fully comprehend and assess the costs and benefits of switching or deconversion. Rather, it is people who are not well integrated into society and its norms who see possibilities for change (Hak, 2007; Roof & Hadaway, 1979). As such, only a minority of people tend to change religious affiliation in their lifetimes, a point well supported by the empirical literature internationally (Barro, et al., 2010). In the post-conflict context however, particularly after such a catastrophic event like the Rwandan genocide, that religious glue comes unstuck as the norms of society are comprehensively violated. This lack of sticky ties means that more people may be likely to convert.

The largest portion of the empirical literature on religious switching studies American populations, though there are a smaller number of studies on European societies. There is a single cross-national comparative study of religious switching which examines religious mobility in forty countries, almost all of which have medium and high levels of development (Barro, et al., 2010; Loveland, 2003). It gives some insight into how various societal patterns and structures shape religious mobility, though it does embrace a religious marketplace orientation. Societies that are more religiously plural (have more religious choices, in a marketplace orientation) and have higher levels of educational attainment also have increased levels of switching. Logically, countries with restrictions on conversion because of a state-regulated religion or state-mandated policy of atheism have lower levels of switching. Income levels, an established state religion, and religious participation rates all have no effect on switching. If the pattern holds to

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other countries not included in the sample, we might expect there to be a naturally high

level of religious mobility in Rwanda regardless of changes wrought by the genocide,

given Rwanda's assurances of personal freedom of religions, relatively high pluralism

rates (at least between different strains of Christianity), and the degree to which the state

embraces religious organizations as a means of social action.

Crisis, Tragedy, and Religious Change

There is a limited literature examining religious change in the aftermath of crisis,

tragedy, and trauma. The literature that does exist is highly contradictory. It is clear that

traumatic events are sometimes the cause of a religious switch or even a loss of faith.

American Jewish soldiers who participated in the liberation of German concentration

camps during WWII sometimes lost their faith (Levinson, 2011). Similarly, people more

severely affected by the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks or who experienced major

mental health problems after the event reported that their pre-attack religious beliefs

became less important to them (Seirmarco, et al., 2012).   Rape and sexual assault victims

also report becoming less religious after their victimization (Ben-Ezra, et al., 2010).

Americans experiencing financial problems are more likely to both seriously consider

leaving their religion and to actually leave (Vargas, 2011). Other studies, however, find

contradictory results, with people who have experienced violence or violence-related loss

to have higher levels of religiosity (Currier, et al., 2012). One found that a minority of

people who experienced sudden death of a family member in the UK became cynical

about their faith; the majority used faith as a means of coping (Chapple, Swift, &

Ziebland, 2011). A meta-analysis finds religious growth after trauma to be the norm rather than the exception (Shaw, et al., 2005).

People who experience crises sometimes see the importance of their religious faith change. Those who experience the same event have diverse religious reactions: some see increases in the intensity of their faith, some see a decrease, and some see no change across diverse settings, including American mental health service seekers (Falsetti, Resick, & Davis, 2003), female African American sexual assault survivors (Kennedy, Davis, & Taylor, 1998), and Norwegian tourists directly exposed to the Indian Ocean tsunami of 2004 (A. Hussain, Weisaeth, & Heir, 2011). American soldiers who killed someone or failed to prevent a death experienced weaker religious faith (Fontana & Rosenheck, 2004). Presbyterians reported feeling closer to God and to their church after experiencing the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks (Meisenhelder & Marcum, 2004). Increases in spirituality are associated with increases in post-event well-being, and no change or decreases in spirituality correspond with decreases in well-being (Butler, et al., 2005; Kennedy, et al., 1998; Meraviglia, 2004).

There is limited evidence about how the magnitude of changes in spirituality after trauma varies across populations. As the severity of the event increases, changes in faith tend to become correspondingly large (Butler, et al., 2005; Falsetti, et al., 2003; A. Hussain, et al., 2011). There is also evidence that such changes are only temporary, at least for a subset of the affected population (Falsetti, et al., 2003; A. Hussain, et al., 2011). People who engage in positive religious coping styles tend to have more positive religious changes after disaster (Meisenhelder & Marcum, 2009). The Jewish concentration camp liberators who lost their faith, for example, were unable to reconcile

God's promises that the Jewish nation would number like the stars in the sky or the sands of the sea with the realities they encountered in the camps, or see how a loving God could allow the amount of suffering they experienced. Christian soldiers were not similarly affected, in part because their faith was not directly implicated (Levinson, 2011).

The vast majority of the existing literature on links between traumatic experiences and religious change deal with disasters, accidents, and sickness. The religious components of these events are somewhat tenuous, depending largely on how the sufferer understands the power and will of God and/or evil forces vis-à-vis such events. Indeed, individuals' interpretations of the traumatic event in a religious light maybe one of the more important predictors of religious change as a result of that event. Shand (2000) finds that personal tragedy can lead to increases in religiosity and spirituality, particularly when sufferers initially find that religion is an effective means of coping with their pain and then the effect cascades. People who struggle more with their faith after a traumatic event often have poorer outcomes than those who do struggle to a lesser degree (J. I. Harris, et al., 2008).

Research Questions

The anecdotal evidence of significant religious shifts in Rwanda, combined with this theoretical and empirical background, lead me to ask two sets research questions:

1. What religious changes have occurred in Rwandan society after the genocide? Who might be switching their affiliation? What groups may see changes in the content and importance of their faith?

2. What are the causes of these changes? Have religious institutions and

   organizations lost legitimacy? Are they struggling to keep up with changes in

   society, as structural functional orientations would suggest? Are people making

   rational choices to switch affiliation, as a marketplace model would imply? Or

   are people having difficulty making meaning of their experiences with their old

   religious meaning frameworks, leading to a change?

Results

Changes in Spirituality and Affiliation

Table 12 shows how the religious configuration of Rwanda is changing according

to the Pew dataset. Nearly 20% of respondents reported being in a different religious

tradition from that in which they grew up. Catholicism has seen the greatest changes,

with 21.2% of people who were Catholic as children switching out of that denomination.

The majority of those became Evangelical Protestants, but some also become Mainline

Protestants, Adventists, Muslims, some other religion, or a-religious. Both Mainline and

Evangelical Protestants have lost substantial numbers of people who grew up in the

church, though the Evangelical loss is probably inflated as Pew has collapsed any

response category which received fewer than ten responses into the "Other" category.

There are many small Evangelical churches in Rwanda, and it is likely that people who

are members there have been categorized as Other. Regardless, over half the people who

currently affiliate with an Evangelical denomination did not grow up in that

denomination, as did 30% of people who are currently Mainline Protestants. My data,

though influenced by the disproportionate number of Evangelical Protestants, also show a similar pattern.

Consequences of Change

It is inappropriate to try to predict why a person might have switched using the results from a cross-sectional survey. Without knowing when a person made the switch, linking measures of current religiosity with switching is deeply problematic: people may have switched because their religious behavior and beliefs no longer matched those of their original church affiliation, or their behavior and beliefs have changed because they switched. Likewise, it is impossible to link switching to the genocide using this dataset because it did not ask precisely when people changed their affiliation; many may have done so prior to the genocide. Nonetheless, it is possible to explore differences in religiosity and demographics among people who have switched, being cautious not to attribute causation. Table 13 analyzes such differences for both datasets.[26]

In the Pew sample, switchers tend to be more educated, have higher incomes, and experience less poverty than non-switchers. These patterns largely reflect classic American patterns around switching. There are few differences in terms of religious practice between the groups. In the Pew sample, switchers have higher levels of spiritual intensity and religious devotion, but actual participation measures are about the same. Religious salience and trust in neighbors are lower among switchers. In my sample, men are much more likely to have switched than women. People who are married or have

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[26] I did also complete logistic regressions for both datasets with switching as the outcome. To avoid the problem of implying causation, I only included demographic variables such as gender, age, education, income, marital status, and past religious affiliation (as a series of dummy variables). The models are both very poor fits, and the results show nothing different than do those presented in Table 13.

Table 12 Changes in Religious Affiliation, Pew and Bazuin samples

Pew Data		Childhood Affiliation						Totals—Current Members		
		Catholic	MP	EP	Adventist	Muslim	Other	Switched In	Stayed In	% of sample
Current Affiliation	Catholic	78.8%	2.9%	6.8%	4.4%	2.1%	21.7%	3.7%	96.3%	54.0%
	MP	3.3%	85.7%	0.8%	2.9%	2.1%	0.0%	30.2%	69.8%	8.6%
	EP	12.7%	4.3%	84.8%	1.5%	0.0%	21.7%	50.2%	49.8%	20.5%
	Adventist	2.4%	2.9%	0.8%	89.7%	0.0%	0.0%	23.8%	76.3%	8.0%
	Muslim	1.2%	1.4%	0.0%	0.0%	95.7%	0.0%	16.7%	83.3%	5.4%
	Other	1.5%	2.9%	6.8%	1.5%	0.0%	56.5%	62.9%	37.1%	3.5%
Totals--Childhood	Switched Out	21.2%	14.3%	22.7%	10.3%	4.3%	43.5%	19.9%		
	Stayed In	78.8%	85.7%	77.3%	89.7%	95.7%	56.5%		80.1%	
	% of sample	66.0%	7.0%	13.2%	6.8%	4.7%	2.3%			
	Net Change	-12.0%	1.6%	7.3%	8.0%	0.7%	1.2%			

Bazuin Data		Childhood Affiliation						Totals—Current Members		
		Catholic	MP	EP	Muslim	Other		Switched In	Stayed In	% of sample
Current Affiliation	Catholic	42.4%	4.0%	1.9%	0.0%	10.5%		5.3%	94.7%	26.4%
	MP	4.7%	40.0%	13.5%	0.0%	0.0%		60.0%	40.0%	8.7%
	EP	47.6%	56.0%	84.6%	18.2%	57.9%		78.6%	21.4%	53.5%
	Muslim	0.6%	0.0%	0.0%	81.8%	0.0%		5.3%	94.7%	6.6%
	Other	4.7%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	31.6%		57.1%	42.9%	4.9%
Totals--Childhood	Switched Out	57.6%	60.0%	36.5%	18.2%	68.4%		47.9%		
	Stayed In	42.4%	40.0%	63.5%	81.8%	31.6%			52.1%	
	% of sample	59.0%	8.7%	18.1%	7.6%	6.6%				
	Net Change	-32.6%	0.0%	35.4%	-1.0%	-1.7%				

been married in the past are less likely to have switched, a result which seems to

contradict the life events hypothesis in the religious switching literature. On the other

hand, a single person has more flexibility in his or her decision making, for they do not

have to take into account immediate family's preferences and social connections.

Switchers also have fewer PTSD symptoms. Again, causality is difficult to determine

here. If people switch because they are looking for a religious home which best meets

their needs, it could be that existing trauma motivates them to find a church or mosque

that can address their mental health needs; over time, membership here can reduce PTSD

symptoms. Likewise, if their original religious affiliation was part of the cause of their

trauma, leaving it could reduce their symptoms. On the other hand, extreme trauma may

preclude the type of decision making necessary to leave a congregation. In addition,

people who have very high levels of trauma and the associated mental health challenges it

brings with it can often isolate themselves socially. If this were true, one could expect

high levels of trauma to be associated with abandoning religion.   However, it is

impossible to say which of these particular pathways may be accurate with this particular

dataset.

The How and Why of Religious Change

The oral histories conducted for this project provide excellent insight in how and

why people's beliefs and religious affiliations have changed after the genocide. The

interview format allows for detailed exploration of life events such as religious switching

and change, the motivations behind them, and their consequences. Of my 60 oral history

participants, 38 people had changed religions or denominations. I cannot explain why

Table 13 Religious Switcher and Non-Switcher Differences

Pew Data	Mean (SD)		t-test results	Bazuin Data	Mean (SD)		t-test results
	Switchers	Non-Switchers			Switchers	Non-Switchers	
Gender (1 = Female)	.53 (.50)	.52 (.49)	$t(996) = -0.15$	Gender (1 = Female)	.49 (.50)	.63 (.48)	$t(286) = -2.54**$
Age	3.44 (2.56)	3.60 (2.64)	$t(996) = -0.77$	Age	34.40 (1.24)	33.60 (13.47)	$t(253) = .59$
Education	1.90 (.81)	1.73 (.81)	$t(963) = 2.74**$	Education	8.28 (4.32)	7.54 (3.93)	$t(278) = 1.50$
Income	2.35 (1.15)	2.13 (1.12)	$t(754) = 2.15*$	Paid work	.23 (.42)	.24 (.43)	$t(295) = -.15$
Ever married (1 = Yes)	.56 (.49)	.61 (.48)	$t(312) = -1.32$	Ever married (1 = Yes)	.30 (.46)	.44 (.49)	$t(269) = -2.55*$
Urban	.20 (.40)	.22 (.41)	$t(996) = -0.53$	Genocide Intensity	1.51 (.97)	1.52 (.88)	$t(282) = -.13$
Poverty index	.36 (.44)	.44 (.44)	$t(948) = -2.17*$	Survivor (1 = Yes)	.22 (.42)	.30 (.46)	$t(273) = -1.46$
Religious devotion	.78 (.21)	.72 (.24)	$t(323) = 3.16**$	Perpetrator (1 = Yes)	.07 (.26)	.08 (.28)	$t(284) = -.32$
Spiritual intensity	.43 (.36)	.36 (.32)	$t(286) = 2.54**$	*Gacaca* participation	3.72 (1.21)	3.61 (1.32)	$t(274) = .752$
Org. rel. activity part.	2.37 (1.10)	2.21 (1.08)	$t(992) = 1.91$	Reconciliation prgrm part.	2.86 (2.55)	1.91 (2.04)	$t(285) = 3.51**$
Prayer frequency	.81 (.23)	.78 (.23)	$t(991) = 1.75$	Org. rel. activity part.	4.96 (.98)	4.73 (.98)	$t(268) = 1.92$
Rel. service participation	5.03 (1.36)	4.94 (1.21)	$t(954) = 0.90$	Private rel. act. part.	4.46 (1.06)	4.27 (1.20)	$t(266) = 1.32$
Strength of belief	3.92 (.28)	3.88 (.36)	$t(384) = 1.68$	Change in spirituality	4.53 (.89)	4.49 (.83)	$t(276) = .40$
Religious Salience	3.80 (.62)	3.89 (.35)	$t(235) = -1.95*$	Religious salience	5.70 (.63)	5.75 (.58)	$t(270) = -.65$
Life satisfaction	5.15 (1.54)	5.13 (1.47)	$t(988) = 0.21$	Spiritual well-being	5.43 (.59)	5.19 (.74)	$t(284) = 3.03**$
Optimism for future	7.33 (1.75)	7.18 (1.70)	$t(939) = 1.09$	Satisfaction with life	5.38 (1.17)	5.54 (1.16)	$t(275) = -1.12$
Improvement from past	.34 (1.66)	.53 (1.62)	$t(987) = -1.48$	PTSD symptoms	2.78 (.98)	3.02 (.96)	$t(260) = -2.01*$
Country satisfaction	.86 (.34)	.88 (.32)	$t(976) = -.61$	Reconciliation behaviors	4.60 (1.24)	4.57 (1.30)	$t(265) = .20$
Country economic satis	3.08 (.75)	3.26 (.72)	$t(973) = -2.98**$	Reconciliation attitudes	5.13 (1.14)	4.98 (1.25)	$t(281) = 1.08$
Personal economic satis	2.69 (.79)	2.79 (.86)	$t(987) = -1.45$	Positive forgiveness	4.23 (.82)	4.14 (.88)	$t(278) = .87$
Trust	.22 (.41)	.28 (.45)	$t(312) = -1.93*$	Negative forgiveness	3.16 (.88)	2.94 (.97)	$t(275) = 1.95*$
Ethnic Conflict	1.67 (1.07)	1.55 (.99)	$t(294) = 1.44$				

this group contains a disproportionate number of switchers, except to recognize that oversampling for some of the smaller religious groups in Rwanda may have captured larger numbers of in-switchers. Nonetheless, several themes emerged from my analysis of these data. First, religious switching frequently had nothing at all to do with the genocide. Nearly a quarter of people who switched had done so prior to the genocide. Approximately half of people who switched after the genocide cited ordinary life events as the cause. Second, for a relatively small group, switching was directly caused by the genocide and religion's role in it. Third, for an even smaller group, religious change is not linked to the violence or perpetration of the genocide but rather to religion's reaction to it and the needs in Rwandan society after.

Life events. For a substantial number of my respondents, their religious shift happened prior to the genocide. Two women, one Catholic and one Evangelical, married Muslim men (GIK-05; KIB-03). Upon marriage, both converted to Islam. Unlike patterns seen in the US, it is traditional in Rwanda that a newly married woman would follow her husband's religion, a pattern followed in several other interviews (RUH-05; KIB-07). However, my informal conversations with key informants suggest this practice is becoming less common with rise of women's rights in Rwanda. Indeed, one interviewee had followed his wife to the Pentecostal Church (KIB-10). Moving house was cited several times as the reason people had to change churches, for it would have been impossible to commute back and forth between their new house and their old church (RUH-08; GIK-08; RUH-06; KIG-15; KIG-19). Said one young man who had converted to Islam: "My brothers were Muslims, and they taught me and helped me change to Islam. There was a mosque near our house, and my brothers were still young and they

went there. They were taught by other Muslims. When they heard the teachings, they switched" (KIG-14). I had long suspected that people chose churches in Rwanda, particularly in the countryside, by going to the one closest to their houses. Subsistence farmers especially do not have the money to use a bus or bicycle taxi to commute regularly to church, and they do not have the time to walk long distances. These interviews confirmed that transportation is a significant consideration for religious participation among at least a part of the population (KIG-15; BYU-04), though many others do consider theological and liturgical fit when faced with several options close to their home.

    Mundane conflicts. Conflicts and disagreements that have nothing to do with the war or genocide were other frequently cited reasons that people changed their religious affiliation. Perceived hypocrisy among church leadership, or a systemic lack of commitment among members that was tolerated by leadership, were reasons that several people cited as a reason for their disillusionment with their original religion and their search for a new one (KIG-04; KIG-20). One man had become a Muslim because his family was unhappy with the leadership of their Anglican church, where they felt that pastors were being hypocritical when they preached about lifestyle rules that they themselves did not follow (KIB-09). Disagreements over the nature of baptism was a theological dispute I heard about several times. In these cases, church members always wanted to practice immersion whereas their church's leaders promoted sprinkling (RUH-10; KIB-05). Likewise, one respondent began to disagree with Catholic practice around certain sacraments, particularly the mediation of the priest between sinner and God in confessions, so she became a Mainline Protestant (BYU-09). One man thought that the

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Pentecostal Church had too many rules and too high expectations about daily participation; he was planning to return to the Catholic Church in order to reduce his church involvement (KIB-10). Another man thought that a Catholic priest was being unreasonable when demanding that he attend a three year training in order to get his child christened, so he left for a Mainline denomination (GIK-10). A Tutsi refugee who lived in the Democratic Republic of the Congo for many years wanted to get away from the long-time theological and historical conflicts which plagued her denomination. When she moved back to Rwanda, she purposefully chose another denomination (RUH-06). These conflicts, about beliefs and practices which have nothing to do with the genocide, were a common reason that people cited for seeking a new religious orientation.

Evangelization. Many switches occurred because of evangelism or proselytization, either formal or informal. One former Catholic who became a Muslim did so after attending a workshop about Islam (GIK-02). He found that he preferred Islam's images of God over that of the Catholics. Similarly, given the importance of religiously-run schools in Rwanda's education system, it is unsurprising that people who go to such schools sometimes report switching to the faith of their schools (KIG-04). Other people reported switching when church members came knocking on their door sharing the gospel or offering to pray. They then visited the missionaries' church and found that they prefer what they experienced there to the worship and practice of their home congregation (GIK-07; KIG-04).

Other examples of switching are linked to indirect forms of proselytization through social networks and friends. One man said he got to know some Islamic classmates at secondary school and decided to join that religion (BYU-03); others

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followed family members to Islam (KIG-14) or Mainline Protestantism (KIG-17). In addition, a teenage Presbyterian was invited by her friends to go to the local Catholic Church with them. When she saw the quality of their youth programming, she decided to become a formal member (GIK-01). Stories of following friends to a new denomination were quite common among people who had switched (GIK-07; GIK-10; KIG-18)

Close analysis of the demographics of people who had switched in response to proselytic contacts reveal that such conversions usually occur in two circumstances. First, such people tended to be young, either teenagers or in their early 20s. Theories of religious development frequently cite these years as times when people are exploring their faith and finding meaning in the world, questioning the belief systems and religious practices they have inherited from their families. It is therefore no surprise that many of the conversions and switches described by my interviewees also occurred during this period of psychological, social, and moral development. Second, people who switch under these circumstances are frequently already dissatisfied by some aspect of their current affiliation. They may not be actively searching for another group to attend, but this formal or informal contact, often with an invitation to participate as a guest in a different service, allows them to formally articulate their discontent and see alternatives. Consider this interview with a young woman who left the Catholic Church when she was 15 years old:

I: Why did you leave the Catholics?

R: In the Catholic Church, there is no change.

I: Help me understand what that means….

R: It's something they memorized when they are praying. They keep saying the same thing, today, tomorrow, next year. They never change words.

I: And why is that a problem?

R: Except going into the church to sing and pray in the usual way, I felt that nothing would change my heart if I kept going there.

I: And why were you looking for something to change your heart?

R: I felt I wanted to be a person who would pray more and increase the way I loved God. I couldn't do that staying where I was.

I: So why did you chose New Jerusalem over any of the churches you could have chosen?

R: When I entered there, I felt I liked New Jerusalem more than any other church

I: So had you visited lots of other churches before going to New Jerusalem?

R: Actually other churches are very good like New Jerusalem. The exception is that New Jerusalem is in my neighborhood. (KIG-18)

This interview encapsulates many features of conversion patterns in Rwanda. A teenage girl had become disillusioned with the religious tradition in which she had grown up and began thinking she wanted to grow more in her faith. Friends introduced her to other possibilities, and she finally chose a new church based on its proximity to her house and perceptions of other benefits.

The genocide. Although many the changes that have occurred in the Rwandan religious landscape have little to do with the genocide, the genocide has fundamentally altered some people's conceptions of the church and God. For people who have seen changes in the nature of their faith, disillusionment with Christianity, the church, or

Christians have motivated changes in religious affiliation. This man, a survivor, left the Catholic Church after the genocide:

> After the events of the genocide here in Rwanda, that hit me hard. I saw active church members, youth, choir members, those who called themselves brothers, faithful, Christians, who I shared the same church with [involved in the killing]. I thought about abandoning religion all together, because I saw my Christian brothers and sisters who should have protected me. Instead, they watched as I struggled, manned barriers to catch me, turned their backs to me. I thought I should quit church, because it didn't do anything to have faith or belong to a church. Eventually, I accepted Jesus as Savior, and I thought I had to go back to church and start praying again, so that I could rejoin Christ. The time that I didn't go to any church was only about six months. During that time, I didn't want to live. I took beer and drugs to numb myself. I cried to Jesus, and he answered that he was with me, and I found Restoration Church. There was no particular reason that I chose Restoration Church. I knew I didn't want to go back to the Catholics, because there were massacres of innocents. It was the same at the Methodists, the Presbyterians, the Pentecostals. (GIK-04)

Because he had been hunted down by fellow Catholics, and because other Catholics had turned their backs on him rather than help, this man lost his faith in the social bonds of religion. Membership in the church meant nothing in desperate times, and the church lost its legitimacy. Disillusioned with the church as a social group and as an institution, he turned away from many of its moral conventions, using alcohol and drugs to dull the

feelings of pain he experienced after the genocide. However, in midst of his anguish, he

got to a point where he reached out to God, and he felt that God responded to his plea.

His testimony shows that he underwent a switch in his motivation for belonging to a

religious group. Prior to the genocide, he was motivated at least in part by the perceived

benefits of membership in a religious organization. When they proved ephemeral, his

religious focus became more spiritual and focused on meaning, focusing on a personal

relationship with God. When he returned to a Church, the return was focused less on

rejoining a social community for its own sake than on fulfilling God's will that worship

take place in such a community. This man listed four denominations which he refused to

join because they were deeply involved in the killing. Restoration Church is relatively

new in Rwanda, and its lack of involvement in the genocide meant that was a safe space

for him.

Several other interviewees have similar stories. A man who had become a

Muslim shortly before genocide was impressed by other Muslims' responses to the

violence: "I switched to Islam before the genocide. But I saw how Muslims acted during

the genocide, how they saved people, and I was glad of my choice" (KIB-03).

Unfortunately, stories of people staying in their current religious membership or joining

another because of the group's positive actions during the genocide are rare. The reverse

is more often the case. Consider the story of this man, the only person in my sample who

labeled himself an atheist, though that term may not adequately define the nature of his

religious life. He was 19 years old during the genocide. He had been a Catholic who was

heavily involved in his church, serving as an altar boy and in the choir. His dedication

had not protected him:

R: I was a Christian before the genocide, but after the genocide I did not go back because of what I saw during the genocide. I had a Catholic Father who was a great friend of mine. That priest, during the genocide, we ran to his house to take refuge. When we arrived, we met that father at the gate. He chose some of the children who used to serve with him in the church [as altar boys], took them aside, and took them to a different place. That father did nothing to save us or to help us but instead they shot the place where we were gathered. Some died. I and two others survived….

R: After the genocide, I felt like I didn't want to pray again. That's why I call myself an atheist….

I: Who or what did you understand God to be at that time?

R: I still take God to be powerful and the doer of everything. Stopping going to church and praying doesn't mean that I don't know God. God's not the one that caused all that happened. What I don't want to do is sit with the people that caused all these problems.

I: OK, so you're not exactly an atheist, because you still believe in God….

R: Before you ask me anything, I want to tell you this. There was a time when I felt like should change religion, but it's still the same. If I find a religion that can help me forget about all that happened to me, I can join that. Up until now, when I think about all churches in 1994, different images come to me, and I don't take them to be real Christians because of what I saw…

I: …Did you immediately stop going to church, or did it take a little bit of time for you to make that decision?

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R: I stopped right away. It felt like someone had come with an eraser and erased

everything concerning religion from my mind. Even [a well known local

pastor] has tried to convince me to change my mind. I can't. (KIG-23)

This interview is in some ways similar to the last. The actions of people affiliated with

the church, in this case a priest, undermined this man's confidence in the church, and he

turned away from it. His genocide experiences deeply challenged his religious meaning

system, particularly its social aspects. His response to that challenge was to "erase

everything concerning religion from [his] mind." There are aspects of his meaning

system which remain intact, particularly his belief in a good God; his discomfort or anger

at religion is focused much more on the institutional and social than the spiritual.

However, his continuing search for religious meaning is centered on finding a religious

group that was innocent during the genocide and that can help him forget about what

happened. In the absence of a group which can offer that, he refuses to re-affiliate and

remains "unchurched."

The response to genocide. Other people were challenged not by what religious

organizations and individuals did during the genocide but rather by what they did after it

was over. Some respondents saw continued "divisionism," or the existence of ethnic

ideologies, within their churches. One woman, who had switched from the Catholics to

the Jehovah's Witnesses, traced her move to the way the priests treated her because of the

political activism of her father.

R: My father was in prison. After prison, he became a refugee. After, he got

teachings from Jehovah's Witnesses. As a Catholic, you should be baptized as

a child, but the Catholic Church refused to baptize me because of my father's

disagreement with the church.

I: What was the source of your father's disagreement or conflict with the

Monsignor?

R: The three groups in Rwanda, if you come from one group, you don't

necessarily have fellowship with the others very well. My father was

imprisoned because he was a Tutsi activist, and that's why he left. There is

also divisionism in the Catholic Church today according to ethnic group. I

didn't see that in the Jehovah's Witnesses."

I: Can you give me an example of how you knew there was divisionism in the

Catholic church in 2003 [the year she moved]?

R: At that time, when you are in Catholic Church, but if you were in a different

[ethnic] group from your neighbor, they would not hide you during difficulties.

But the JWs can hide you not considering your ethnic group. In Congo, I saw

that the JWs saw people as individuals, not as their ethnic group. (GIK-03)

Although she had seen differences between Jehovah's Witnesses and other groups while

she was a refugee with her father in Congo, and she had experienced some discrimination

from Catholics because of her father's ethnic identity, she did not formally leave the

Catholic Church until 2003. At that point, she decided she could not handle the ethnic

tensions she saw in the church. She believed that the same patterns that led to the

genocide still existed ten year later. However, she was not clear, despite my questioning,

about what specific events or experiences may have led to those beliefs.

A church with continued ethnic tensions was cited by another interviewee, who left a Presbyterian congregation in the north of Rwanda because the regional pastor for that province seemed to favor Hutu people: "Something that made us go to another church is segregation between races. [The regional pastor] liked the Hutus the most, then the Tutsis. He could listen more to a Hutu leader in the church than to a Tutsi. They would announce activities for all children in the church, but our children would be sent away, and we would not be informed of what they did [to be excluded from the activity]" (RUH-06). Unlike the previous example, this woman was able to provide specific examples of the discrimination she experienced. These discriminatory activities drove her from the church. She explained that she left despite the fact that the national denomination took such accusations seriously, for they demoted and relocated the pastor shortly afterwards. Regardless, this person's trust in the Presbyterian Church had been eroded, and she had found a new religious home by the time the EPR took corrective action, so she did not switch back.

Other people highlighted the importance of unity in their new religious homes. This man saw that his local Catholic parish's unwillingness to help people who were not members of the parish as a significant problem which led him to join the Episcopal (Anglican) Church.

> I: What are some of the differences you see between the Catholic Church and the Episcopal Church?
>
> R: There is no big difference, but what is better for Protestants is that they try to put together their strength, they are united, contrary to the Catholic Church.

I: What do you mean the Catholic Church isn't united? Help me understand that
     more.

R: For example, there is a problem of job opportunities. Catholics only give jobs
     to each other.

I: Are there any other examples you can give besides this problem of the jobs?

R: When Catholics give help or aid to poor people, they only help Catholic
     Christians.

I: OK. And the Episcopal Church will help anyone?

R: Yes. (GIK-10)

In our discussion of the interview after we were finished speaking with this man, both my

translator and I suspected that the man was potentially hinting that there were continuing

ethnic divisions in his Catholic parish (as had been reported in another interview in the

same area, see GIK-03), but we had no absolute proof. Nevertheless, the man pointed to

the willingness of the Episcopal Church to open itself to all people as a significant reason

that he joined. These sentiments are echoed by another interviewee, this time a young

woman who became a Pentecostal two years after the genocide:

I: Have you always been a member of the Pentecostal Church, or did you move
     from a different church to the Pentecostal Church?...

R: I grew up in the Anglican Church…

I: So what led you to choose the Pentecostal church as opposed to any of the
     other churches that were close by?

R: I chose to become a Pentecostal church member because they had love, they
     talked to everyone, I felt like I liked everything they were doing.

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I : What do you mean, they had love?

R: Whenever a person would be converted to ADEPR, the church members would visit him or her, showing him or her that they are interested in getting new members in their church.

I: And you've also said that they talked to everyone. Is that the same thing? Who is everyone I guess?

R: I just wanted to mean that they showed love to all people. They didn't discriminate. Even during the time of genocide they would hide any person who would come running to them. I don't know if it depended on someone's heart, I think religion has something to do with that, they were different from other religions.

I: Give me an example of how these other religions would work that was different than how the Pentecostals would work.

R: Anyway, I cannot talk very much about other churches or other groups of religious, but I know about the Pentecostal Church because it's where I know. But the example I can give you is during the genocide. In Catholic churches people died very much, but I've never heard of a church which is Pentecostal in which they say many people died in this church. I've ever heard in the Catholic churches in which people died in large number.

I: So are there no people in the Pentecostal church in your experience who have had to go before *gacaca*?

R: Maybe it's possible, but I've never seen a Pentecostal in a *gacaca* court in this area where I live. (BYU-10)

She was more concrete about the ways in which her Pentecostal congregation earned her respect than was the previous interviewee. Their behavior during the genocide was a significant reason. While she was wrong in saying that no Pentecostal church members had committed crimes of genocide, certainly the Pentecostal Church has a better reputation than does the Catholic Church after the genocide. It is also possible that the woman is intentionally blind when it comes to crimes of genocide committed by Pentecostal members, for such admissions would undermine the narrative she has constructed about having found a safe church home after the genocide. The Pentecostals were willing to reach out to everyone in their community, something that would have been a significant risk in the immediate post-genocide era when trust levels were low. The spirit of love and the lack of discrimination after the genocide were important reasons that caused this woman to change denominations.

The importance of finding a religious home which provides support and services for survivors of the genocide was also as an important factor in individual decisions to switch religious affiliation. One man, who had been in a mixed marriage (he was Hutu and she was Tutsi), summarized his story in this way:

> After completing my studies, I worked at customs at the border. I and my wife had seven children. I was in the Catholic Church. Our relatives killed my wife. What made me change was seeing that those who killed my wife, my family members, the Church didn't give any help. I used to drink alcohol and smoke to cope. I thought that if the church gives me no help, where can I go to find help? I changed from Catholic to Pentecostal. I asked the pastor to pray for me, for me to stop abusing alcohol, and to take care of my children….The

people who killed my wife also prayed in the Catholic Church, but I couldn't

face them. (KIB-01)

There are two reasons he describes for leaving the Catholic Church. First, he, like the other people described above, could not face the people who had killed his wife who were also members of his local Catholic parish. The second is that he could not find support for adequate coping mechanisms from his priest or other sources at church. As an educated man with a job, he did not suffer the poverty that many survivors who had lost the main salary earner in their families did. Rather, he identifies his post-genocide need as positive methods for coping with his loss. He felt that the Catholic Church was providing no prayer support or guidelines on effective coping. On befriending a pastor from an Evangelical church, that pastor began praying for him, an act which provided some comfort to the man. More importantly, as he started going to the pastor's church, it encouraged him to adhere to their lifestyle expectations which he saw as encouraging positive coping strategies. He was told not to drink or smoke and to take good care of his surviving children. It was these expectations which differentiated his experience between Catholicism and Evangelical Protestantism and which persuaded him that switching was important.

Discussion

There is no doubt that a large number of people—at least 20% of the population, but Pew likely underestimates these figures slightly—have switched religious affiliation in the aftermath of the Rwandan genocide. The Catholic Church has seen its share of the population decline significantly as Evangelical Protestant denominations and Islam

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increased their share. While total membership levels for Mainline Protestant churches have remained relatively steady, they too have seen substantial numbers of adherents leave; it is only because the number of people moving into MP denominations has compensated for these losses that their portion of the population has not decreased.

A number of these switches have nothing to do with the genocide. Some happened prior to it, and a substantial number of those that happened after the genocide were driven by marriage, moving, non-genocide-related preferences, and other reasons. However, people have switched and are still switching for genocide-related causes. They have become disillusioned with Christianity in general, with specific church organizations, or with Christians, and they have left their denominations to find churches (or, occasionally, a mosque) that retain legitimacy in their eyes. Others believe that religious faith, either specifically attached to their denomination or more generalized, cannot adequately explain and compensate for the pain they experienced, and they either seek a new denomination or leave their faith. Others are looking for churches that provide specific types of coping resources. Others switch in response to perceptions of divisionist ideologies in their original churches, ideologies which have become socially unacceptable after the war. Some do not mention specific ideologies, but they appreciate the emphasis placed on unity in their new religious homes.

These narratives of religious switching among Rwandans after the genocide support all three broad theoretical descriptions of religious change. No one in Rwanda told me that they felt they did not need religion or that religion is not relevant to their lives. This pattern confirms the general tenets of secularization theory. Because Rwanda remains poor and there is a great deal of suffering and trauma which remains after the

genocide, levels of existential security in the country are low. As such, religion generally and religious organizations specifically have not lost their relevance to society, and the vast majority of Rwandans remain affiliated with some religious group.

Whether supply-side (the religious marketplace model) or demand side (structural functionalist) explanations for religious switching account for the patterns seen in post-genocide Rwanda is a difficult question. The answer is both, as unsatisfying as that might be for advocates of one theory over the other. On the supply side, people are making decisions to change denomination because they see features of their destination denomination that they like or feel a need for. They see a minimal cost in leaving their old affiliation and, on balance, greater benefits for joining a new one. These benefits include social, theological, and economic support for people who are struggling with their genocide experiences. Benefits also include new feelings of unity and belonging as well as a new global meaning system which better explains and interprets the experiences of the genocide. Often, they see these benefits not because they were looking for them but because a friend or acquaintance invited them to church or to the mosque and they saw a range of differences when compared with the place of their current membership. In addition, people who are switching have such a range of choices because the number of denominations in Rwanda has increased greatly, both as a means of expressing dissatisfaction with the options which were available pre-genocide and because the new denominations see particular niches to fill within the larger Rwandan religious landscape.

There is evidence for demand side explanations as well. Some individuals actively reject their original affiliation because it lost legitimacy in their eyes. Due to the actions of leaders or members, some switchers felt that they could no longer continue to

be members at a specific church. Others struggled to use the meaning systems embedded in their religious membership to make sense of what happened to them. Because their experiences were so devastating, their ability to make sense of events overwhelmed their meaning system. As a result, they rejected it as untrue or unworkable. Still other Rwandans have switched churches because they perceived that ethnic ideologies played a role in how their original churches functioned; they switched because the church has been unable to completely adapt itself to be relevant in the new Rwandan social order.   There is a clear narrative sequence in these oral histories: people reject their former religious affiliation and stop going to church all together for a period of time. Usually this period is short, a few months to a year longer. With one exception, all my respondents then all found a new religious group with whom to affiliate.

Rejection of religion as an organization or as a meaning system clearly supports demand-side interpretations of switching. However, Rwandans who reject one form of religion almost always chose another form. For some, they feel called back to religion, either because of a spiritual call or because they want to reestablish the patterns of their former life. Their priority when rejoining a community of faith is often not to go back to where they were before, for the reasons that caused them to flee that community in the first place still exist. This is largely not a rational decision making process but an emotional one: the norms and habits that bound people to a religious affiliation have been catastrophically disrupted, and they cannot face going back. Other people who have rejected one religious affiliation are actively searching for a faith community that is a good fit for their needs; here, supply-side, rational-choice explanations are again relevant.

Discussion about which theory of religious change, functionalist or rational choice models, better explains patterns of switching is somewhat misguided, at least in Rwanda. Change in the religious affiliation of individuals can profitably understood as a multistep process where people actively reject their former affiliation and then pursue a new affiliation. Rejection can be best understood in structural-functionalist terms, for a disruption of the norms, habits, and systems of meaning associated with religious membership signify that continued membership is no longer relevant in the face of considerable changes both in their individual circumstances and in the social context in which they and the religious group they belong to are both situated. The choice of a new affiliation can be emotionally driven by a need to continue to distance oneself from the rejected affiliation, or it may be rationally driven by an assessment of how the particular options best suit their perceived needs. Certainly there are religious marketplace dynamics at work when Rwandans chose a new group with which to affiliate. Of course, the bounds of rationality and choice are determined by both their past individual patterns of belief and behavior and by cultural norms and values. Despite the disruptions to Rwandan society caused by the genocide, not all of these norms disappeared, and it would be false to claim that Rwandans have complete freedom of choice. Within the boundaries of culturally acceptable and culturally determined options, Rwandans seeking new religious affiliations after the genocide do have choices, and the differences between groups serve as markers within which they evaluate those choices and make decisions. Not everyone rejects their current membership, simply finding that they prefer a new option that they have encountered through social networks or other means. Similarly, not everyone who rejects a religion chooses another. Structural-functionalism explains the

rejection; depending on the circumstances, the switch into a new affiliation can be explained in both structural-functional and rational choice/religious marketplace terms.

Conclusion

In post-genocide Rwanda, religious switching is a multi-step process. Many people who switch first reject their original religious affiliation for a variety of reasons. This rejection corresponds well to structural-functionalist explanations of religious change. Others find better fits for their needs and interests in the more diversified religious landscape that has developed in Rwanda after the genocide. This change corresponds well to a marketplace understanding of how religious change occurs. The rejection of existing religious membership and the quest for new membership are often related to religion's role as a system of meaning making in people lives. This is particularly important as Rwandans struggle to make sense of what happened to them and find meaning in their lives and in society going forward.

Chapter VII

FROM NEIGHBORHOOD TO NATION, DIOCESE TO PRAYER GROUP:

SCALE, RELIGION, RECONCILIATION, AND POLITICS

This last major chapter considers some lingering questions in this dissertation by engaging in a meta- reflection using the lenses of two interrelated concepts: scale and power. Given the complexity of religion, Rwanda, and post-conflict peacebuilding, it is inevitable that any discussion which brings the three together will be partial and incomplete. Nonetheless, concepts of scale and power illuminate some of the contradictions of religion and reconciliation in Rwanda after the genocide.

Scale and Power

For many years, a key concept in geographical, social, and political thought has been the idea of scale. In its most common and potentially most basic form, scale can be understood as the hierarchical, nested ordering of things. I am purposefully vague here, for the concept of scale can be applied to many different sorts of things. Scale can refer to the ordering and governance of territorial units of various sizes: households within neighborhoods within cities within provinces within a country, for example (Brenner, 1997, 2004). Scale can apply to the arrangement of people, materials, and processes into subunits of various sizes within large organizations. Scale can describe social relationships, as people interact with their neighbors face-to-face but also communicate with acquaintances scattered across multiple continents who they have never actually

met. Scale also describes economic transactions: buying and selling happens interpersonally at a market stall, yet negotiations for value and price are determined by local, national, and international markets, and the sale is finalized using currency which underpins national and international economies (Brenner, 1998; Herod, 1997).

There has been a great deal of controversy over the nature of scale (Collinge, 2006; Cox, 1998a, 1998b; Escobar, 2007; Hoefle, 2006; Jonas, 2006; Leitner & Miller, 2007; MacKinnon, 2010; Marston, Jones, & Woodward, 2005). Much of the human geographic thought on the idea has largely settled on the idea that scale is constructed, that is, the boundaries between and limits of differently sized units and the relationships between them are not permanent but are frequently transformed by a variety of human action (Delaney & Leitner, 1997; Ferguson & Gupta, 2002; Kaiser & Nikiforova, 2008; Marston, 2000; Moore, 2008). Brenner has argued forcefully that one of the foci of efforts to understand scale must be on examining how and why scales change over time (Brenner, 1998). If we are to successfully study how scale changes, we must study how boundaries between levels and categorization of people and places into scalar units are constructed (Brenner, 2001; MacKinnon, 2010). As such, any discussion of scale is intimately bound up in power (Leitner & Miller, 2007). Leitner and Miller wrote of the importance of placing agency within any discussion of scale and power, for failing to do so characterizes scales as deterministic structures outside of human control or intervention. Scale is socially produced, and scholarship which uses scale must find how, why, and by whom: "the task is not to ignore or reject hierarchies, but to trace them to the sites of their production and the actors producing them" (Holifield, 2006, p. 15, as quoted

in Leitner & Miller, 2007, p. 212; Moore, 2008 #840, see also Kaiser & Nikiforova, 2008).

While there is widespread agreement that scale is socially produced, there is less consensus whether its usefulness lies in understanding it as ontological reality or as an epistemic or heuristic idea deployed to analyze, understand, and act upon complex human systems is another area of serious debate (Delaney & Leitner, 1997; Jones, 1998; Moore, 2008; N. Smith, 1992b). The distinction is perhaps less useful than it may first seem. While it is difficult to label any object or phenomenon as a scale, we can label things or processes as having a scalar nature. As such, because scale is a means of categorization or a descriptive or representational label, it is an epistemologic tool, a way of knowing (Cox, 1998a; Jones, 1998). However, while scale is certainly useful as an academic category of analysis, it is also a category of practice (Moore, 2008). Scale as a way of describing and knowing the world is useful not just for academics for politicians, bureaucrats, businesspeople, and many other actors. Scale—specific descriptions and understandings of how things, people, and resources are structured and categorized—is produced and deployed precisely to make some political, economic, social, or even religious project possible (Kaiser & Nikiforova, 2008; MacKinnon, 2010; Moore, 2008). Certain categories of scale—local, regional, national, international—are often inherited as the basis of analysis and action (Moore, 2008). While these scalar categories are rarely adequate to describe complex social processes, they are also made relevant because they structure action in recognizable forms.

Much of the initial academic reflection of the hierarchical nature of society and social processes essentially assumed that power flowed down from the highest level of

the scale to the lowest. Powerful actors resided at the top of the hierarchy, and they wielded power against/on/for the relatively powerless actors at the bottom. Much of the effort on studying the power of scalar hierarchies focused on the people, organizations, and processes who occupied the top of the scale (Brenner, 1997; Swyngedouw, 2000). Such assumptions have been challenged, however, by careful examinations of the function of scale and power in social processes. These descriptions have highlighted the ability of people further down the scale to resist domination: the oppressed themselves have power, though it may not be equal in magnitude or effectiveness to that of the oppressor (Jessop, Brenner, & Jones, 2008; Sharp, Routledge, Philo, & Paddison, 2000). Scholarship on scalar hierarchies no longer assumes that concentrations of power at the "top" of hierarchical structures lead to domination. Studies of domination show that resistance occurs routinely in the exercise of power (Hollander & Einwohner, 2004; J. C. Scott, 1987, 1992). Integration of the idea of resistance shows that people at the bottom of scalar hierarchies have power, and they frequently use it to challenge the domination of those at the top (Paddison, 2000; M. Rose, 2002; J. C. Scott, 1987, 1992).

Newer concepts of scale and power have focused on the relational aspects of both (Brenner, 1997; Howitt, 1998; Jessop, et al., 2008; Kaiser & Nikiforova, 2008; MacKinnon, 2010; Massey, 2004). The focus on hierarchy implied that relationships were vertical across the hierarchy, and that power and influence operate downwards as people at the top exercise their power on and over those towards the bottom. Increasingly, however, there is an effort to recognize that relationships exist laterally between horizontal units in scalar relationships (Swyngedouw, 2000). As Neil Brenner said,

The meaning, function, history and dynamics of any one geographical scale can

only be grasped relationally, in terms of upwards, downwards and sidewards links

to other geographical scales situated within tangled scalar hierarchies and

dispersed interscalar networks . . . Each geographical scale is constituted through

its historically evolving positionality within a larger relations grid of vertically

'stretched' and horizontally 'dispersed' sociospatial processes, relations and

interdependencies. (Brenner, 2001, pp. 605-606)

As geographical and social thought has focused on both vertical and horizontal

relationships imbued with power as essential components of any description of scale, it

has moved away from an idea of scale as hierarchical structures which have ontological

permanence. Scale and power are relationally and contextually specific. As a given set

of actors come together to interact about a certain problem or issue, they create a space of

exchange. Each actor brings with them a web of relationships which extend beyond the

immediate space of interaction (Amin, 2002; Cox, 1998a, 1998b; S. Fox, 2002; Kaiser &

Nikiforova, 2008; Marston, et al., 2005). These relationships encode sets of resources—

social, economic, technical, natural—some of which are relevant to the situation, some of

which are not. To the extent to which an actor can mobilize resources to influence that

exchange space, he has power. Because the exchange space and the relevance of the web

of linkages which embed resources are contextually specific, power is also contextually

specific (Cox, 1998a, 1998b). Historical narratives and patterns as well as social norms

and ideas influence and govern these exchange spaces. Networked resources, then, are

not the only sources of power in these exchanges, for the actor finds herself advocating

repetition of past social patterns and the continuance of current social norms has the force

of history and society behind her. Of course, neither history nor society are singular

structures which are universally experienced, so such advantages may be unevenly

distributed across the exchange interaction.

This idea of networked power is heavily influenced by the writing of Foucault,

who famously said that

> power must be analysed as something which circulates, or rather as something
>
> which only functions in the form of a chain. It is never localised here or there,
>
> never in anybody's hands, never appropriated as a commodity or piece of wealth.
>
> Power is employed and exercised through a net-like organisation…And not only
>
> do individuals circulate between its threads; they are always in a position of
>
> simultaneously undergoing and exercising this power. (Foucault, 1980, p. 98)

Foucault's oeuvre on power is influenced by his examination of the development of the

disciplinary, carceral state (Foucault, 1995). He introduces the idea of governmentality

by extending Bentham's panopticon prison to larger society. Governmentality refers to

the methods and techniques by which the state exercises power over the population so

that the population disciplines and governs itself according to priorities set by the state.

In contrast to more coercive, hierarchical approaches to power which use brute force and

public punishment to enforce compliance, Foucault's analysis of governmentality

suggests that power in liberal societies is based on the shaping of knowledge and

discourse towards certain political ends. Such discursive practices are coupled with

generalized surveillance of the population such that people internalize and accept the

rightness of behavior which conforms to the state's expectations (Foucault, 1991, 1995;

Foucault & Gordon, 1980). Governmentality, referring to the technology or technique of

governance, convinces the people who are governed that the goals of powerful decision-makers are really their own, that they must work to uphold a vision of society which the powerful says already exists but is really entirely dependent on their cooperation.   By creating a discourse which shapes and limits how people understand their own agency and their aspirations, the state is able to get people to self-govern. For Foucault and the other theorists who have developed the idea of governmentality, their focus has been on describing how modern liberal societies use the language of freedom, personal responsibility, and entrepreneurialism to shape cooperation with and acceptance of a reality which may limit real freedom (Dean, 1999; N. Rose, 1999). The application of governmentality to the analysis of non-western political contexts has been rather infrequent, though examinations of governmentality in China and Indonesia suggest that while the language of personal freedom might be less relevant, the power of the state has also moved towards rationalized governance through self-regulation there (Hoffman, 2006; Sigley, 2006).

Scale, Power, and Reconciliation

Reconciliation has often been conceptualized as a multiscalar process, often contrasting political and national reconciliation with interpersonal reconciliation (Gloppen, 2005; Kohen, et al., 2011; Oliner & Zylicz, 2008; Skaar, et al., 2005; Verdeja, 2009; Zachar, 2006). Ernesto Verdeja described reconciliation as having four levels:

> Reconciliation is best understood as a multilevel process, one characterized by specific logics and strategies operating at four levels: the political, institutional, civil society, and interpersonal levels….That efforts at reconciliation exist at

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different levels, from the political and institutional to the social and interpersonal,

is not mere coincidence. Rather it points to something more fundamental:

reconciliation develops through the contextually specific actions and strategies of

actors, and thus any theory must maintain sensitivity to these different

contexts….Reconciliation does not unfold harmoniously along different levels.

Rather it is best theorized as disjunctured and uneven….These four levels are only

conceptually distinct; reconciliation through the smooth and even integration of

these levels is rarely, if ever, achieved empirically. Nevertheless, by theorizing an

ideal model, we can identify how actions and developments can affect the larger

effort of reconciliation. In this sense, the model serves as a heuristic and

analytical device to interrogate the strengths and shortcomings of actual

reconciliatory efforts. (Verdeja, 2009, p. 20-21)

In this passage, Verdeja captures many of the ideas emergent in the evolution of the

concept of scale toward a flatter ontology. He recognizes that reconciliation is uneven

and differentially experienced by people at different positions in the assemblage of actors

that make up the reconciliatory context. He also recognizes that the idea of hierarchical

levels has more value as a heuristic analytic tool than it does as a descriptor of empirical

reality. That said, Verdeja's description of reconciliation's levels of action fails to

consider how power permeates processes of reconciliation. This chapter explores how

power, domination, and resistance as rooted in scalar forms of government and religion

affect reconciliation in Rwanda.

Power, Hierarchy, and Rwandan Civic Life

Rwandan government is extremely hierarchical (see Figure 1 for a schematic diagram). Constitutionally, the country has a strong executive branch, where power is highly concentrated in the office of the president. He is assisted by a large cabinet whose members lead government departments and agencies, but the ministers have little independent power and can be dismissed at will by the President. The popularly elected Chamber of Deputies and Senate debate and approve legislation and investigate social issues. While the legislative branch has some nominal powers to balance that of the executive, in practice it effectively legitimizes and rubber stamps the will of the president. The Rwandan judiciary similarly lacks independence from political interference, and the rule of law is not well established.

The country is divided up into five provinces, 30 districts, 416 sectors, 2,146 cells, and 14,876 zones or villages. The provincial authorities are appointed by the Minister for Local Affairs (MINALOC) in the name of the President, and their primary task is to monitor the work of the lower levels of government. Much of the work of administration happens at the district and sector levels.

Executive Branch
(President and Cabinet)

5 Provinces
(2.34 million people per province)

30 Districts
(390,000 people per district)

416 Sectors
(28,000 people per sector)

2,146 Cells
(5,500 people per cell)

14,876 Villages
(800 people per *umudugudu)*

Groups of 10 homes
(100 people per group)

Individual Citizen / Subject
(11.7 million)

Figure 1 Structure of the Rwandan State

Some municipal officials are popularly elected, at least in theory. However, municipal elections in Rwanda are highly corrupt.[27] District mayors make agreements with the President, in the name of their population, to achieve certain development goals over the course of the year. These projects are often centrally determined and imposed on the population. Districts often impose fines and other punishments on residents who do not make adequate contributions to the development goals of the district (Ingelaere, 2011). The President routinely fires district leaders if they do not reach their goals or if they somehow otherwise incur his disfavor. Much of the work of service delivery happens at the sector and cell offices, where residents go to register births and deaths, get agricultural extension services, get married, and other functions. The smallest official unit of Rwandan administration is the zone or village (*umudugudu* in Kinyarwanda), which is in charge of mobilizing the population. The zone leadership gathers its inhabitants regularly to educate them about issues or new district initiatives, to do communal work, and for other reasons. Unofficially, an additional layer of government exists, for each zone is divided up into groups of approximately ten homes; a coordinator from each cell reports to the zone chief and helps him or her surveill and manage the population. From the district down, the local structures of the Rwandan government are charged with implementing national policy, providing services, and monitoring the population for compliance with laws and government standards.

---

[27] In addition to my research role, I have been an official election monitor in Rwanda, and I have personally witnessed several incidents of election fraud. District and sector elections are held by physically assembling the population behind the candidate for whom they wish to vote. If the tally shows that another candidate besides that preferred by the local elites won, the population is either told to vote again or the tally is simply swapped between candidates until the preferred candidate is declared victorious. While there are secret paper ballot for elections for President, there was ballot stuffing in multiple precincts in both the 2003 and 2010 Presidential elections. For the 2010 election at least, the fraudulent ballots were used to inflate the turnout; they did not change the outcome of the election, in which the incumbent President was re-elected by a large margin. More seriously, the strongest opposition politicians are often barred from participating in elections.

This extremely hierarchical orientation to governance is not a new innovation in Rwanda. The monarchy governed the country through a similar system, where the king appointed several leaders for each hill in the country, and hills themselves were subdivided into smaller units. These relationships were clientelistic in nature: hill chiefs owed tribute to the king for the favor he bestowed on them by elevating them to leadership positions and by granting them cattle, and they in turn elevated people to leadership positions in the expectation of tribute, in labor, crops, and livestock, from the people under them (Lemarchand, 1972; Lemarchand & Legg, 1972; C. Newbury, 1993; Reyntjens, 1987). While the Germans and the Belgians maintained the hierarchical territorial divisions, they did seek to end the tribute system. To some degree, they succeeded, for the formal *ubuhake* system was effectively transformed—primarily monetized in the form of taxes—during the colonial administration (C. Newbury, 1993; M. C. Newbury, 1978; Reyntjens, 1987). Nonetheless, to this day, many Rwandan social relationships have a certain client-patron nature to them. People search for patrons with wealth and power to grant them favors. Government bureaucrats, who control the distribution of land and other resources in a country where there are few property rights, are also treated as potential patrons (Desrosiers & Thomson, 2011; Reyntjens, 1987). In return, they are loyal to the patron and will return a favor when asked. A patron's clients also tend to be in competition with each other. While some of it is friendly, some of it is ruthless: clients use rumor, indirect violence or other attacks, and types of spiritual warfare to gain advantage on their neighbors. A favored tactic is to watch neighbors to find some incriminating evidence, or to manufacture evidence which is difficult to refute, and inform on them to the government. In this climate, many Rwandans remain

suspicious of at least some of their neighbors. The genocide built on some of these

cultural patterns to turn neighbors against each other; people killed their neighbors in part

to benefit from the occasion to steal property and status.

The post-independence but pre-colonial government's system of local government

was even more sprawling than that of the current government.   It was they who

formalized a government bureaucracy which subdivided the country into increasingly

smaller units.   The effectiveness of this system was one of the reasons the genocide

could be so cruelly efficient: the government knew almost to the house where Tutsi and

other targets were, or at least where they should have been. The current government

largely maintained the system they inherited until 2006, when international lenders

effectively forced Rwanda to scale back, decentralize, and professionalize its

bureaucracy—many elected positions now require candidates to hold a university degree,

for example—cutting by up to two thirds the number of provinces, districts, and sectors

in the country. Despite these changes, Rwandan government remains intensely

hierarchical.

Power, Hierarchy, and Rwandan Religious Life

Rwandan religion is similarly hierarchical (see Figure 2). The structure of nearly

every Christian denomination or Muslim association which has more than a handful of

parishes, congregations, or mosques mirrors that of the government. A central office,

headed by a powerful Legal Representative, oversees the denomination as a whole. In

the larger denominations, such offices often have considerable numbers of staff

overseeing various programs including theological training, specialty programs for

Figure 2 Rwandan Religious Hierarchies

women and youth, support and administrative office for schools, hospitals, economic development initiatives, and other social programs run by the denomination. The central denominational office also hires, appoints, or ordains pastors for individual congregations. The denomination sometimes pays for the training and education of the pastors, but many Rwandan pastors have no formal theological training. Congregations are often grouped into regional bodies headed by a regional pastor. Each congregation is further subdivided: there are usually multiple choirs, Bible study groups, prayer groups and other affinity or activity groups for diverse constituencies. Each has a group of officers who report to the congregation's pastor or, if it is particularly large, to an elder or other leader. Districts and sectors liaise with and monitor religious groups in their communities.

The Rwandan government does impose this organizational form on religious groups, at least to some degree. The Ministry of Local Government, which oversees churches and other civil society organizations, wants a single person, the Legal Representative, with whom they can liaise. The Legal Representative is responsible for knowing what is occurring in his denomination or association, reporting regularly to MINALOC, and ensuring that the activities of the church or mosque are legal; if they are not, he (and, so far, I am unaware of any women legal representatives of religious

organizations, except for those associated with Catholic orders of nuns, though they too

are answerable to their bishops) could face penalty. As a result, denominations which are

based on congregational polities in much of the world look much more like their

episcopally-governed cousins in Rwanda.

While Rwandan religious organizations are structured into recognizably

hierarchical forms, power is much less entangled in the threads of religious life than it is

in civic life. Government holds religious leadership accountable for what happens in

their organizations, and leaders at the top hold their direct employees responsible for

what they do. There is, however, a disjuncture in that power relationship between official

employees of a religious organization and the people who voluntarily adhere to it as

members. If the member does something which violates group rules or norms, a religious

denomination has limited options. The group can try to persuade the member to reaffirm

his commitment to the rules. If such moral persuasion does not work, the only truly

regulative power the group has is to exclude the member through excommunication or

other means. The entanglements of power in their top down hierarchy extend only so far,

and the ability of such organizations to influence their members rests on moral authority

and the threat of excommunication.

Power and Hierarchy in Post-Genocide Reconciliation

Given the intensely hierarchical nature of both Rwandan government and religion

as well as the centrality of both in the country's post-conflict recovery, we must also

consider how reconciliation might also be a scalar phenomenon entangled with networks

of power. Figure 3 outlines where a variety of formal reconciliation-oriented programs

and initiatives fall within the hierarchies of both state and religion. The most important

state initiatives are all national in scope. The *gacaca* tribunals, for example, try genocide

suspects at the sector and cell level following procedures set down by national laws. The

local tribunals are monitored by a specialized unit within the Ministry of Justice. The

Genocide Survivor Assistance Fund (FARG) is also nationally administered.

Figure 3 Situated Reconciliation Activities

The National Unity and Reconciliation Commission (NURC) is a national office charged with coordinating and implementing government reconciliation policy except for *gacaca*, which falls under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Justice. It has few activities besides conducting research, writing reports, developing curricula, and holding conferences which reflect the government's perspective on the genocide and post-conflict transition (NURC, 2008). One of its tasks has been to define "genocide ideology" and "divisionist ideologies," terms which are meant to describe attempts to revive ethnic identities in Rwanda and return to a politics and culture which are based on such identities, but in reality people who criticize the government on legitimate policy grounds can be labeled as divisionist in an attempt to silence them (Beswick, 2010, 2011; Buckley-Zistel, 2006, 2009; Hintjens, 2008; Pall, 2010; Reyntjens, 2004, 2011). In addition, NURC coordinates the *ingando* "solidarity camps" which government leaders and employees, active and demobilizing soldiers, returning refugees, released prisoners, entering university students, and other groups are required to attend. While the camps teach Rwandan history and values and are meant as opportunities to "reflect on and find solutions to national challenges" (NURC, 2010), they are largely seen as an opportunity for the government to indoctrinate potential opinion leaders with the ideologies of the ruling party (Buckley-Zistel, 2006; Mgbako, 2005). They include a requirement that participants pledge their allegiance to the state and praise the current government; participants fear consequences if they do not comply (Mgbako, 2005; A. Purdeková, 2008). There is also a paramilitary component of the training, as civil servants and students are trained in the use of firearms (Longman & Rutagengwa, 2006). Curiously, the policy framework under which the NURC categorizes *ingando* is "itorero

ry'igihugu," a phrase which could be translated as *national church* or *temple of society*.

NURC has few truly community-based or local initiatives, besides supporting

reconciliation clubs in schools and advocating for foreign financial support for a select

number of community groups (NURC, n.d.). Several prominent religious leaders have

served as NURC Commissioners and Presidents, including Antoine Rutayisire, a well-

known genocide survivor and head of African Evangelistic Enterprise, and John

Rucyahana, former Anglican Bishop of Shyira (Ruhengeri).[28]

     Beyond these formal programs, NURC and the government more generally

construct strict discourses of reconciliation which leave little room for doubt about how

they want the genocide and reconciliation to be understood by the wider population.

When the Kinyarwanda word for reconciliation, *ubwiyunge*, is talked about, it is

invariable accompanied in the same phrase by *ubumwe*, or unity. In fact, the two words

are almost treated as a singular concept: *ubumwe n'ubwiyunge*, or unity and

reconciliation. Unity is part and parcel of reconciliation. In part, this discourse

emphasizes that all Rwandans are the same, that Hutu and Tutsi no longer have divisive

meanings. However, unity also emphasizes that the entire population must line up behind

the government to speak with one voice, especially on matters of reconciliation.

Prominent people who deviate from the accepted discourse, for example by saying that

people other than Tutsis were killed during the genocide, are punished for this discursive

violation. For example, an opposition leader who tried to run for President in 2010 was

arrested for advocating more nuanced understandings of history. She was found guilty of

treason in 2012. The rhetorical pairing of unity and reconciliation extends beyond

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[28] My description of the National Unity and Reconciliation Commission is scathing. That said, I must
recognize that many on the staff of NURC and in the government really do want a stable, peaceful
government for Rwanda and reconciliation between its people.

political discourse, as I caught both my translator and my respondents automatically translating my questions about reconciliation into questions about unity and reconciliation.

The discursive discipline of the government is not limited to this rhetorical joining. The government defines which acts of violence can be condemned and which covered up, makings its stance clear in the wordings imprinted on physical memorials to the genocide. Prior to 2010, genocide memorials around the country had had lengthy inscriptions describing the victims of genocide as well as other forms of violence and massacres which were buried nearby, leaving open the possibility of remembering Hutu and Tutsi victims of violence. Between my visits in 2008 and 2010, these memorials were repainted to include much shorter inscriptions recognizing only the victims of the "genocide of 1994." The *gacaca* tribunals have a similarly narrow mandate, only allowed to consider crimes of genocide committed between October 1990, the date of the RPF invasion and when pogroms against Tutsis started, to July 1994, when the RPF took control of the entire country. Massacres committed by the RPF as an insurgent force and later as the government are specifically excluded (Buckley-Zistel, 2006, 2009; Burnet, 2010; Ingelaere, 2009; Longman, 2009a; Megwalu & Loizides, 2010b; Olwine, 2011; Thomson, 2011a; Thomson & Nagy, 2011). As the *gacaca* process has come to an end and the genocide has begun to lose some of its political salience, the government has discursively appealed to people's patriotism and their pride in the country's recent accomplishments and its future vision as justifications for deference to and validation of its overall agenda.[29] Governmental programs and rhetoric to promote a vision and

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[29] In 2008, friends of mine were actively planning to have no more children after their first because "that's what the President asked us to do." In a very densely populated country, the government is actively trying

practice of reconciliation in Rwanda flow from the top of the civic hierarchy, enacted by powerful actors.

On the religious side of the hierarchy, every religious organization I spoke to in Rwanda has programs to respond to the genocide (see Chapter V for more details). Several churches require or encourage pastors to receive practical training in conflict resolution and mediation. Seminaries and theological schools offer courses and workshops in peace theology. Multiple religious NGOs have trauma healing services, some of which are very religiously oriented. Some denominations and NGOs offer training programs to develop lay capacity around conflict resolution and reconciliation. In addition, denominations often mobilize material resources, often donated by people overseas and shipped to Rwanda, for their members. All of these efforts flow down from central church and mosque offices to local congregations, where pastors and lay leaders take charge of distributing it to members.

In addition to these centrally sourced efforts, there are both congregational based and more informal religiously-based efforts to support reconciliation, as I described in Chapter IV. I have already discussed how participation in religious activities—any activity—provides important distractions for genocide survivors who would otherwise ruminate about their experiences. In addition, religious people create both formal and informal visitation ministries which seek to support people how are still experiencing grief in their communities. Such support may be limited to a distracting visit, or the group can provide important material assistance as well as evangelistic or theological persuasion which they believe will allow people to heal more quickly. Congregations

to get people to limit the size of their families. Rather than institute punitive policies like China's one child law, the president has appealed to Rwandans' sense of duty and patriotism as motivation for family planning.

often have formalized efforts to collect and distribute aid such as school fees, housing assistance, and the like to people in need in their communities. Survivors sometimes band together to form support groups within their congregations, or they might be a survivor-perpetrator group formed under the auspices of a specific reconciliation ministry.

Scale, Power, and Unanswered Questions

This theoretical orientation of scalar entanglements of power and this hierarchical context of state, religion, and reconciliation help to answer some of the lingering questions which have accumulated during my research and analysis.

Why is religious teaching seemingly so effective in promoting forgiveness?

One of my frustrations when I was conducting my field research is that I could never understand why so many people told me that one of the most effective influences on them recognizing the importance of forgiveness and reconciliation was preaching and other forms of teaching in church. When I started asking people directly why they said religious teaching was so important, even though people seem to routinely flout teaching around other behaviors, no one ever gave me an entirely satisfactory explanation. However, upon reflection, there seem to be two likely answers. First, the importance of reconciliation to individual Rwandans and Rwandan society as a whole is very high, much higher than the consequences if someone breaks lifestyle rules. If the reconciliatory process should fail, the risk of another violent conflict is high. The genocide was brutal enough, but people have told me that they believe a future conflict in

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Rwanda will be a total and apocalyptic war, as ethnic identities re-emerge—they certainly have not been forgotten—and both Hutu and Tutsi try to annihilate each other to ensure the survival of their own group. People then are receptive to the necessity of forgiveness and reconciliation, and the religious message to reconcile therefore finds receptive ears and hearts which see the need to accept the message.

The other explanation is less optimistic. People probably also told me religious teaching about reconciliation is important because that teaching aligns almost perfectly with government expectations around reconciliation. Both because ordinary Rwandans are accustomed to do what authority figures tell them to do and because they fear reprisal if they do not obey, they see the churches' teachings as *de facto* instructions from the state.

The caveat in this explanation is that some Rwandan churches seem to encourage a form of forgiveness which is far more radical than that the government seems to want for perpetrators. *Gacaca* encourages accused perpetrators to confess and ask for forgiveness: if they do confess, they garner a reduced sentence for their crime. Certain church members, however, have told me that if someone asks for forgiveness for the crime they have committed, then there should be no consequences for their actions. At a workshop I once attended at an Evangelical Protestant church in the Northern Province, a woman stood up to tell her story. She had survived the genocide, but many of her family members had not. Like many survivors, she was extremely angry in the years after the genocide, especially because the people responsible for her family members' deaths could not be located. In her anger, she falsely accused a man of being involved. He was imprisoned. As her anger later receded, she began to feel guilt for the man; she recanted

her testimony, and he was released. It was his turn to be angry, and in his anger he killed one of the woman's children. He was imprisoned again. As part of the woman's participation in a church-based survivor group, she made a visit to prison, and the man asked for forgiveness. Following the teachings of the church, she granted it. But she went a step further: she petitioned the authorities to release him, believing that he should face no further consequences because she had forgiven him.

This view of forgiveness, that there people who are forgiven should face no consequences for their actions, is relatively common among Rwandans. I included a question about this principle as a miscellaneous item on my 2008 survey.[30] Only one third of respondents disagreed in any way; another third strongly agreed. While there are no differences in responses to the question across demographic and religious groups, based on my experience of the country, I believe that agreement with radical forgiveness is more common among people who are less educated and who attend churches where the pastors may have little theological training. Certainly none of the religious leaders I spoke with said this was an official position of their organization or a theologically rigorous principle. They traced the phenomenon to the Kinyarwanda word *imbabazi*, commonly used to describe the forgiveness God grants sinful Christians in the New Testament, but more accurately describing ideas of amnesty or mercy. Historically, asking for *imbabazi* after a conflict meant asking for complete forgiveness with no continuing consequences; there are other Kinyarwanda words which more faithfully communicate the idea of forgiveness with justice (Guillebaud, 2005). While this practice does complicate to some degree the conclusion that Rwandans listen to churches to

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[30] The specific wording was "People who confess their crimes and ask for forgiveness should not be punished." Respondents had six options by which to express the strength of their agreement or disagreement.

forgive because the religious message closely mirror the government message, I think the pattern holds, for people who practice such total forgiveness are in the minority and they are following historic concepts which have their roots in pre-Christian Rwanda.

Why so much focus on forgiveness at all?

Results presented in Chapter IV showed the importance of forgiveness in the relationship between religion and reconciliation both quantitatively[31] and qualitatively. The dominance of forgiveness rhetoric when talking about reconciliation in Rwanda probably comes from two sources.[32] First, as a theological principle, reconciliation is a rather unfamiliar concept. There are many descriptive examples of and vocabulary surrounding forgiveness in the Christian Bible. However, there are many fewer examples of reconciliation.[33] The teaching in which it is embedded is conceptually difficult and refers primarily to the relationship between God and humankind. As a normative and religious concept, forgiveness tends to be much more accessible to people with relatively little theological training than does reconciliation.

The second reason for the dominance of forgiveness talk in Rwanda is that reconciliation as practiced in the country, and especially among religious groups, focuses

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[31] Recall that forgiveness completely mediated the relationship between organized religious participation and reconciliation.

[32] While this is not the place to discuss the theological differences between forgiveness and reconciliation, in more practice-oriented terms, forgiveness refers to the letting go of the baggage of past wrongs. Reconciliation refers to a commitment to share future life together. Forgiveness can happen in the context of interpersonal relationships, especially after an apology, but it is fundamentally an individual, unilateral act; a relationship between the victim and the transgressor is not required for forgiveness. However, reconciliation requires an ongoing relationship. Forgiveness does not always lead to reconciliation, but deep and honest reconciliation that goes beyond sharing superficial aspects of life does (almost always) depends on forgiveness.

[33] Romans 5 and 2 Corinthians 5 are the only times reconciliation or a derivative word is used in the Christian Bible. Both refer to reconciliation of God and humankind, though 2 Corinthians makes reference to a "ministry of reconciliation" given to humankind by God.

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on repairing interpersonal relationships as opposed to political or ethnic relations. A

Tutsi reconciles with the neighbors that threatened her during the genocide, a survivor

with the men who killed the other members of his family. Here, forgiveness is deeply

bound up in reconciliation, for the offense is deeply interpersonal. There is no dialogue

about other forms (or levels, to recall Verdeja's terminology) of reconciliation, especially

ethnic or political. Because it is politically dangerous to speak in terms of Hutu and

Tutsi, certain rhetorical avenues are closed to discussion. One cannot speak of a wider

reconciliation between whole ethnic groups, in part because such talk might open up

questions about the current government's own human rights abuses. In addition, the

government's choice to focus *gacaca* on holding individuals accountable for the genocide

rather than confronting structural causes means that the dominant focus of change in

Rwanda is on the individual. In this framework, where the permissible dialogue about

and actual conduct of reconciliation are fundamentally interpersonal, the near-universal

linkage between forgiveness and reconciliation exists because the Rwandan government

allows few alternatives.

Why are there not more differences between religious groups?

The quantitative results presented in Chapter IV demonstrated no systematic

differences between members of different religious traditions and reconciliation.

However, given the empirical importance of organized religious participation in

promoting reconciliation, this result is somewhat unexpected. There are substantial

differences in form and function of religious beliefs and practices between different

religious traditions in Rwanda, not to mention substantial differences in the resources

available to different congregations and denominations. It is reasonable to inquire why these differences have not led to measurable variations in reconciliation. Aggregating different denominations into groups like Mainline and Evangelical Protestant may have concealed some empirical differences. Beyond problems with method, however, the significance of religious teaching about forgiveness may be a more substantive explanation. Teaching about forgiveness requires relatively few resources. Despite concerns about insufficiently trained pastors and theologically suspect understandings of forgiveness, it may be that any teaching of forgiveness is far more important than none. This becomes particularly true when the nature of forgiveness and reconciliation is discursively conditioned by a powerful state. While there are differences between the state-centric vision of reconciliation and that offered by many religious traditions, they perhaps have more in common than they have in difference. Certainly the Rwandan government could have chosen a far more punitive orientation after the genocide, even more of a victor's justice, but their choice of the rhetoric of unity and reconciliation at least superficially aligns with religious principles.

Why is there not more religious resistance to the government?

The obvious answer is that the top-down nature of Rwandan government, its proven willingness to prosecute and persecute people and organizations who flout the official versions of history and reconciliation, and the totality of its surveillant gaze make religious leaders extremely reluctant to risk punishment. Unlike other contexts where religious leaders and organizations are seen as set apart from general society and somewhat protected from the full force of government (see Borer, 1996; Peterson, 1997;

Pope, 1985; and S. J. Stern, 2004 for details on the role of religious organizations in struggles for justice in South Africa, El Salvador, Brazil, and Chile respectively), the degree to which power is concentrated in government hands in Rwanda makes the country somewhat unique in this regard. The government of Rwanda has shut down religious organizations, imprisoned leaders, and detained members who overtly challenge its, even for something seemingly so mundane as Catholic criticism of its family planning policy (see Bureau of Democracy Human Rights and Labor, 2005; 2011 for details).

Given some of these egregious abuses, it is perhaps surprising that there are religious leaders who actively support government efforts, including serving as commissioners on the NURC. A perfectly valid form of resistance is to simply disengage from the oppressor (J. C. Scott, 1987). There are a number of potential explanations as to why Rwandan religious leaders continue to engage their government. Some may actively support the government and its strategies, accepting the injustices which accompany such strategies with ease. Others—and this was a view I heard when I had a conversation with one of the religious leaders who was a NURC member— may be deeply uncomfortable with the abuses, but they see few other options than to work with the government. The country desperately needs reconciliation. They know they have can little impact on the government and society if they oppose the government efforts, and they know that while there may be some corruption, one of the government's goals is reconciliation. As such, they see few other choices to work towards peace than to at least selectively engage with the government, and to try to improve the process from within.

Is there any resistance at all?

There is something of an academic fascination with and perhaps even reification of resistance. We have come to see resistance everywhere that we see power. In some ways, this is a positive development, for it allows us to detect and understand some of the subtler ways in which people may resist tyranny or oppression, even resistance which is largely symbolic. On the other hand, our preoccupation with resistance has led to an understanding of domination and resistance which mirrors Newton's third law; "for every action there is an equal and opposite reaction" becomes something like "everywhere there is domination there is a proportional amount of resistance." Simplified understandings of domination and resistance risk underestimating the costly nature of resistance. Domination is effective precisely because it is backed up powerful, coercive force: it compels people to obey by threatening and imposing great consequence if they do not. Resistance in Rwanda can be quite costly. People are harassed, scrutinized, and intimidated by their neighbors and agents of the government if they have unpopular opinions about the country. Dissenters are put in prison, often after a show trial based on phony charges. Organizations which resist can be shut down, their operating permits revoked, and their assets seized. The political adversaries of the current regime are often forced into exile, and the occasional opposition politician is assassinated or disappeared in mysterious circumstances.

Nonetheless, resistance to the government's domination and discipline of civil society does exist. Given the range of punitive responses used by the government, such domination must necessarily be quiet, subtle, and indirect. For example, participation in *gacaca* was mandatory in many jurisdictions, but that did not stop many people from at

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least occasional absenteeism. People obey begrudgingly, seeking small ways to express

their dissatisfaction (Thomson, 2011b). There are mutterings between friends who reveal

their true political feelings to one another, cautiously at first, but eventually opening up as

trust is built. The existence of programs like Women in Dialogue is a subtle, non-

confrontational form of resistance. While they recognize the tremendous suffering of

genocide survivors, they also honor the suffering of different groups: women whose

husbands who have been imprisoned for committing crimes of genocide, widows who

lost their families in the refugee crisis, people whose children were killed by government

forces in the counterinsurgency operations which followed the genocide. Non-survivors

in Rwanda are making claims that their suffering should be recognized (Burnet, 2009;

Ibreck, 2010). There is yet no clear role for religious work in this process. The

possibility exists that religious groups could develop theologies which justify certain

forms of resistance. If it were sufficiently widespread and accepted, such teaching could

create a safe space for more resistance work to continue.

I witnessed several tentative attempts at resistance over the course of this

research. Several of my respondents cautiously told me stories that directly challenged

the official government discourse around the genocide and its aftermath. When doing so,

they often asked that I turn off the tape recorder or took me around the corner of a

building when my translator was taking a break to tell me these things, but they still

shared that they were unhappy with the recovery process, with *gacaca*, or with other

aspects of post-genocide life. They often emphasized that the official telling of the

history of the genocide did not correspond with their own experiences or the experiences

of their community. Their turn to a foreigner is a classic element of many analyses of the

scalar politics of domination, in which resistance sometimes attempts to "jump scale" (Brenner, 1999; Jessop, et al., 2008; Jones, 1998; N. Smith, 1992a, 1992b; Swyngedouw, 2000) to align themselves with actors who have power outside of the networks of domination of their local situation. By appealing to actors who are not already enmeshed in the local, they hope to bring new resources to the situation to challenge the hegemony of those at the top of the local hierarchy and thereby circumvent the hegemony of the national (Brenner, 1999; Cox, 1998b; Ferguson & Gupta, 2002). In Rwanda, this strategy is problematic, for the government effectively forces all actors to subjugate themselves to its disciplinary gaze. Foreigners, even tourists under recent laws, are not allowed to enter the country unless they have a letter of invitation from a local organization which will be responsible for their conduct while in the country. International organizations are subject to surveillance and permitting processes which effectively provide them with only marginally more independence than local organizations. The government has regularly investigated and denounced foreign organizations for divisionist ideologies and other supposed crimes against the state.

It is not only foreign individuals and international organizations who are disciplined by the Rwandan state. The government will even directly challenge far more powerful donor governments who attempt to criticize its records on human rights or democratization. These challenges take the form of reminding the international community of its guilt in allowing the genocide to happen[34] and saying that Rwanda

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[34] Under the 1948 Convention Against Genocide, signatory governments are required to intervene to stop genocide whenever and wherever it occurs. Rather than recognize their responsibility to stop the genocide, the United States and United Nations both went to significant pains to label the events of 1994 as something other than genocide. Romeo Dallaire, head of UNAMIR in 1994, estimated that if he had only 5,000 well armed troops and the political backing to act, he could have stopped the genocide (Dallaire, 2004; Gourevitch, 1999; Melvern, 2000, 2006; Prunier, 1997). Many Rwandans and the Rwandan government resent the decision not to intervene.

needs space to recover from the genocide at a speed which respects the condition in the country. These assertions, combined with Rwanda's relatively good track record at promoting investment, tackling corruption, and making a show of democracy compared to the rest of Africa, often serve to quell or even entirely prevent criticisms from donor governments. When they are insufficient, however, Rwanda has demonstrated its willingness to go further. In 2007, when a French judge was investigating the RPF for a potential role in shooting down President Habyarimana's plane in 1994, the event which sparked the genocide, Rwanda became so incensed that it severed diplomatic relations with France, closed all French government institutions in the country, expelled French government employees, and began to reduce the recognition of the French language, then an official language in the country. Jumping scale and appeals to international actors as techniques to resist the power of the state are clearly limited in effectiveness in Rwanda.

Perhaps the only absolutely safe way to express dissatisfaction with the government's quasi-reconciliatory program is to do so from the safety of a hard line survivors' rights perspective. There are a number of prominent Rwandan academics and organizations who strongly criticize any notion about the necessity of forgiveness or reconciliation because they feel it undermines a survivor's dignity, robs them of their rightful anger, minimizes the need for justice, and somehow reward perpetrators simply because their crime is so enormous as to be difficult to them accountable within the normal bounds of procedural or societal justice (Brudholm & Rosoux, 2009; Hatzfeld, 2005a, 2009; Mujaweyo & Belhaddad, 2004; Mujaweyo & Belhaddad, 2006). The government tolerates this opposition in part because it would be unseemly to crack down on survivors and in part because many in the government deeply understand this

perspective. As it would be for people around the world, forgiveness and reconciliation are not necessarily the most natural reactions for Rwandans whose families have been hunted down and butchered. This view is not mainstream among religious actors in Rwanda, but it is not unheard of either. In my experience, religious leaders who encounter it tend to view people who think this way as still traumatized; they want to support such people and encourage them to heal, often by praying or studying scripture together, but they tend to take a gentle approach.

Why are there so few gender differences?

There are few differences, either in my quantitative or my qualitative data, between men and women in Rwanda. I expected more, given the extent to which women are disproportionately survivors of the genocide or have effectively become widows as their husbands have been imprisoned. There are several potential explanations. First, I could simply have asked the wrong questions or otherwise not recognized important differences in gender. Second, there is evidence that women are more religious than men in Rwanda, at least from the Pew data. Given the link between religious participation and positive post-conflict outcomes, women's high levels of religious participation may mean better coping, leading to outcomes which are comparable to those of men who were less traumatized to begin with. Third, Rwandan society has been transformed in the last eighteen years in regards to gender equality. It has the largest number of women legislators in the world. Women's rights have been enshrined in the constitution, and women are learning to assert their rights. Churches are not immune to these changes, and they have been changing to be more gender inclusive as well. There are specific

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women's departments or programs at the congregational level and women's groups at the congregational level. Women are increasingly allowed into leadership. Church-based lifestyle rules which applied more heavily to women than to men, such as restrictions on trousers, jewelry, and hairstyles in conservative Evangelical denominations, have been relaxed considerably even in the last five years. Reconciliation efforts have also recognized the importance of working with women, and there are programs specifically for them. It is possible that all this effort towards establishing gender equality in Rwanda has led to more equal outcomes for women and men than would otherwise be the case. One consequence of women becoming more equally integrated into the mainstream of Rwandan civic and religious life is that they are more completely entangled in the networks of power which characterize it. As such, there is perhaps less space and less flexibility for them to seek alternate means of reconciliation and to express dissatisfaction with the dominant modes of peacebuilding in the country.

Are any of the stories of reconciliation real? Or is this all governmentality at work?

Given the sanction and surveillance power of the Rwandan government and the society's powerful emerging norms around forgiveness and reconciliation, it is not unreasonable to ask if all the patterns I have identified are not some chimera caused by fear and social desirability. When I discussed these questions with Rwandan colleagues, we were forced to recognize that these forces have certainly affected my data. Patterns may have been obscured as people put more positive spins on their answers than they really believed. However, there are several reasons to believe that the data quality has not been completely compromised. First, there are patterns in the data which are

consistent with both theory and previous empirical research. Survivors have higher

levels of PTSD symptoms. People who are more religious have better post-conflict

outcomes. People are able to articulate how and why religion has helped them and how

and why it has not. Second, on multiple occasions people felt comfortable enough with

me to tell me something that could get them in serious trouble if the government had

found out. Third, the stories people have shared with me are accompanied by honest, real

emotions. I saw people's pain when talking about the past as well as the passion for

peace and joy when they find reconciliation. Most ordinary Rwandans are not

sufficiently good actors that they can fabricate these feelings at will. Fourth, I have seen

how hard people work for peace and reconciliation in Rwanda, particularly in the years I

lived and worked there. If reconciliation were not real, people would not work for it.

Certainly not all Rwandans believe in reconciliation or in the possibility of a peaceful

future, but there are many who sacrifice a great deal, both in terms of effort and in

making themselves vulnerable to sanction by a powerful government.

Are there any advantages to such a hierarchical, sometimes oppressive system?

While the lack of freedom and robust democracy in Rwanda has many costs, there

are certain benefits. A powerful government may impose particular form of peace,

largely synonymous with stability, which allows current leaders to maintain all the

privileges and powers they have. However, the people who are in some way subjugated

by this system also benefit from its stability to go beyond the peace envisioned by the

government, building deeper and more honest forms of reconciliation. If Rwanda were

still experiencing widespread active violence—and no one can deny that it is the RPF,

which forms the core of the current government, who ended the violence and created stability in the country—one of Lederach's four pillars of reconciliation would be missing, and reconciliation would be that much harder to achieve. The government sees its role in part as disciplining an unruly society which could easily revert to armed conflict (Silva-Leander, 2008). It may have something of a point. Recognizing this fact does not excuse the many human rights abuses which the government has committed in the pursuit of stability. Moreover, even if the *Pax RPF* has created the conditions which have allowed Rwanda to start healing from the genocide, the government shows no signs of relaxing its grip on the population. As peace and reconciliation become more firmly established in the country, any argument that the government must continue its oppressive reign is undermined. The only justification for a strong-armed approach to create stability is that it will be temporary; unfortunately, Rwanda's government shows few signs that it is willing to relinquish power any time soon.

What does the Rwandan case add to our theoretical or empirical understanding of power, scale, and governmentality?

Contrary to some claims (Marston, et al., 2005), scale is still a useful tool by which to analyze a complex situation involving the interactions of multiple actors with differential sources of and subjection to power. Without doubt, the situation in Rwanda does not call for a return to a strict understanding of scale and power which views grassroots people as permanently dominated by the powerful at the top of a social, economic, and political hierarchy. Rwanda's political and social configuration is far more fluid than that, as different actors—governmental, civil society, and religious—

navigate a process of reconciliation in which they have uneven and changing amounts of power. Moreover, because reconciliation is itself differentially experienced across Rwandan society, it is impossible to speak of reconciliation as a singular process. Different religious groups shape reconciliation in different ways, and different individuals and neighborhoods experience different tensions and outcomes around reconciliation. Religion contends with a variety of forces, including political, economic, countervailing social pressures, and people's own emotional baggage, and its impact on reconciliation or any other social and/or political project is therefore limited.

That said, a hierarchical ordering of Rwandan society has existed for many years, and the sociopolitical structures which make up the assemblage of the Rwandan polity are at least partially calcified. There is perhaps less resistance in Rwanda to the hegemony of an oppressive government because scalar hierarchy has become hardened and patterns of oppression and domination have become familiar. While these scalar politics are not permanent, its configuration is perhaps less situationally specific than the conceptions of flatter networks of power which have come to preeminence in the recent literature on scale and power. It does take active work by the government to maintain this structure by actively stifling dissent, but there is also relatively little resistance from the population. There are few conceptions in Rwanda, at least among the ordinary people who are not part of a specialized human rights discourse, that governance could look substantially different. The mentality of governance has seized the imaginations of most Rwandans, and they see few possibilities for change. Just as the change from the government of Habyarimana to that of the RPF was more a change in leadership than a change in form and content of government, oppositional politics in Rwanda today are a

struggle over who wields the machinery of government rather than what that machinery actually looks like or how it functions. While the Rwandan state has never used discourses of individual freedom to convince people to self-regulate, governmentality is alive and well. Its rhetorical basis is centered around ideas of unity, reconciliation, and national development. In addition, it uses a hierarchical system of surveillance, punishment, and a discourse that there is no other viable system to promote peace and stability in the country to convince people to accept the status quo. The core message in this analysis is, however, that this system is actively perpetuated by the government. The appearance of scalar permanence is only that, an appearance, a veneer enacted through discourse and surveillance.

Unfortunately, religious groups in Rwanda have few choices to influence such a totalitarian state. Until religious organizations and the other dimensions of civil society do have some influence, either by a loosening of government oversight or by explorations to find subaltern means to express alternate understandings of reconciliation, peace, democracy, and development, Rwanda's progress in these areas will continue to be limited.

Chapter VIII

CONCLUSION

Long known as the land of a thousand hills, Rwanda also remains—some 18 years after the genocide of 1994—a land of valleys filled with the shadow of death. And yet from a country which experienced horror come stories of hope, resilience, forgiveness, and reconciliation. Rwanda—its government, its organizations, its people—is actively working to remake itself. Holding people responsible through the *gacaca* mechanism is an important part of changing the culture of impunity which characterized the country during 1994. Tentative moves towards democracy, incomplete and insufficient as they are, are another important indicator of recovery. Economic development is moving some people out of poverty, though progress is uneven and inequality is increasing. People are increasingly optimistic about the future.

Religion has played a significant role in Rwanda's reinvention. Religious beliefs have helped people interpret the genocide in ways which make it possible for them to have hope. Religious values have emphasized that all Rwandans are created in God's image, creating important moral groundwork for reconciliation. Religious teaching has moved people towards forgiveness, and the data indicate that forgiveness is the crucial link between religion and reconciliation in Rwanda. There is a small minority of people for whom religion has encouraged or led to somewhat negative outcomes. Religious organizations have been active in creating and sustaining theologies of peace and various programs to support healing and reconciliation. In many ways, these patterns reflect

some of the classic patterns in the theoretical and empirical literature on religion and coping.

This case study on Rwanda leads to some new insights into religion in coping as well. It highlights, for example, the importance of social ties in religious coping. Religion has motivated people to support neighbors and friends who are struggling, offering them companionship, prayer support, and more. Survivors and non-survivors alike have flourished as members of religiously-affiliated groups and programs which have helped them overcome barriers to social interaction and meaningful relationships. Many Rwandans have reported how important these relationships (in addition to religious activity participation generally) are in helping them temporarily set aside the lingering pain of the genocide, offering them reprieve from suffering and the and opportunity to focus on something else for a while as they struggle to rebuild their lives. While some of these interactions would surely have occurred without religious intervention, they are enhanced and expanded by religion's values and efforts.

The case also calls potential to the potential intersection between religion and the provision of economic resources. In a poor country like Rwanda, provision for the material expenses of day-to-day life is difficult enough when the family is intact and everyone is in good physical and mental health. It becomes much harder when there are ongoing injuries or trauma, or when the family's main source of income has been killed. Religion has played a key role in meeting this need in Rwanda. Individuals provide labor and gifts of food, clothing, and more to neighbors in need, inspired in part by the moral guidance they receive from religion. Congregations organize to build homes and collect money for vulnerable people in their communities. Denominations and national church

offices provide such material support when they can, often mobilizing donations from overseas. This aspect of religious coping rises to prominence in Rwanda because of the country's poverty, but there are likely economic aspects to religious coping in more affluent societies which have not yet been adequately explored.

This research into Rwandan religious action after the genocide also draws attention to the role of religious capacities and resources. In some sense, capacity development and resource mobilization among leaders and organizations have not much mattered, for teaching about forgiveness and creating a culture which makes peace possible do not require highly skilled pastors or well financed religious programming, particularly when the religious message is somewhat closely aligned with the rhetoric about reconciliation coming from other sectors of society, particularly the state. However, there also seems to be a great deal of unfulfilled potential in Rwandan religious contributions to peace. There is little pastoral care, effective programs are limited in scope for a lack of resources, and messages which are confused and potentially damaging because of a lack of training. In this sense, resources and capacity matter a great deal.

Rwanda also highlights the limits of religion, particularly in regards to its role in creating political and structural change in the face of a powerful government. While there is significant overlap between the goals of the government and the goals of religious people and organizations in the country—all sides, at least nominally, want peace and reconciliation—there are significant differences in the manner in which the state and religion pursue those goals. There are many injustices in *gacaca*, in how history is constructed, and in the political process generally, and religion in Rwanda can do little to work towards justice in this situation. The government is too powerful and the cost of

resistance too high. There is the possibility for change, however, though it is difficult to see how and in what circumstances that might occur.

As I began this dissertation with the story of Clémentine, I will end with the story of Dieudonné. Dieudonné killed several people during the genocide, and he spent time in prison. While in prison, a Christian ministry visited and preached about sin and forgiveness. While he had been hostile to his jailers and refused to respect the validity of the new government, he began to change. As part of *gacaca*, he confessed what he had done. He was eventually released from prison. On his release, he found people in his community hostile towards him. A young man when he was imprisoned, he had no wife, no family, no animals, no friends, and none of the other things an upstanding man of his age would normally have. He told me that he didn't even have a chair for someone to sit on if they wanted to come visit, but no one did. Eventually, he started attending a local Evangelical church. While the hostilities never completely went away, he found a home and friends there. They listened to his story, they accepted his confession and repentance, and they welcomed him. If people like Dieudonné and Clémentine can find community again through religion, then religion can indeed be a powerful force for change in places like Rwanda and beyond.

2008 SURVEY CONSTRUCTS

Construct	Questions	Response Options/ Coding	Reliability
Gender	SQ1: Please indicate your gender:	Male / Female	n/a
Age	SQ2: How old are you in years?	Free response blank	n/a
Marital Status	SQ3: Please indicate your marital status:	• Single, never married • Divorced or separated from previous spouse • Widowed from previous spouse • Currently married	n/a
Children	SQ4: How many, if any, children do you have?	Free response blank	n/a
Education	SQ5: What is the last level of formal schooling you completed?	No schooling P1-P6 S1-S6 B1-B2 L1-L2 Grad School	n/a
Job	SQ6a) What is your profession? SQ6b) Do you currently work for a salary or wage?	7a) free response 7b) Yes / No	n/a
Current Residence	SQ7a) Where do you currently live? Province? District?	Free response blank	n/a
Residence during genocide	SQ7b) Where did you live during the genocide of 1994? Prefecture? Commune? Outside of Rwanda?	Free response blank Check box for outside of Rwanda	n/a
Current Religious during Childhood	SQ8: What type of religious service do you usually attend? Choose only one.	Options: • Christian (specify denomination) • Muslim • Other group (specify) • Do not currently attend	n/a
Religious Attendance during Childhood	SQ9: What type(s) of religious service(s) did you attend as a child? Check all that apply.	Options: • Christian (specify denomination) • Muslim • Other group (specify) • Do not currently attend • Do not remember	n/a
Born Again	SQ10: Do you consider yourself a born again Christian?	Yes / No	n/a

Construct	Questions	Response Options/ Coding	Reliability
Organized Religious Activities SQ11a)-c): (Evans, Cullen, Dunaway, & Burton Jr, 1995)	SQ11: How often you engage in the following religious activities? Circle the appropriate answer. a) In the last twelve months, how often did you attend religious services? b) In the last twelve months, how often did you attend social events at church? c) In the last twelve months, how often did you participate in choir or other musical activities at church? d) In the last twelve months, how often did you attend Sunday school or other Bible study events? e) In the last twelve months, how often did you participate in a prayer group or prayer service? g) In the last twelve months, how often did you share your faith with someone else to try to convert them? h) In the last twelve months, how often did you participate in youth group, women's group, or other unique constituency activities?	1 = Never 2 = 1-2 times per year 3 = Once per month 4 = 2-3 times per month 5 = Once per week 6 = Several times per week	alpha = 0.79 (for a, b, & SQ12c)
Private Religious Activity SQ12a & b: (Koenig, George, & Titus, 2004) SQ12c: (Evans, et al., 1995)	SQ12: How often do you engage in the following spiritual activities? Circle the appropriate response. a) In the past month, how often have you prayed? b) In the past month, how often have you read the Bible or other religious material? c) In the past month, how often have you listened to religious programs on the radio or television?	1 = Never 2 = 1-2 times per month 3 = Once per week 4 = 2-3 times per week 5 = Everyday 6 = Several times per day	Alpha was not reported
Changes in Spirituality (Kennedy, et al., 1998)	SQ13: Since your experiences in the genocide, how has your spirituality changed? For each item, indicate if your spirituality has decreased a lot, decreased a little, stayed the same, increased a little, or increased a lot. a) My belief that there is a divine plan for the world has… b) My search for spiritual meaning has… c) My desire to understand events in spiritual terms has… d) My belief that it is important to follow a spiritual path has… e) My tendency to base my actions on guidance from a higher power has…	1 = Decreased a lot 2 = Decreased a little 3 = Stayed the same 4 = Increased a little 5 = Increased a lot	Cited alpha = 0.85 My alpha = .90, single factor
Religious Salience (Evans, et al., 1995)	SQ14: Please circle the answer that best describes how much you agree or disagree with each statement. Circle only one answer for each statement. There is no right or wrong answer. a) Religion is a very important part of my life b) Following God's commandments is important to me. c) In times of personal trouble, I turn to religion for guidance.	1 = Strongly disagree 2 = Moderately disagree 3 = Slightly disagree 4 = Slightly agree 5 = Moderately agree 6 = Strongly agree	Alpha = 0.85

Construct	Questions	Response Options/ Coding	Reliability
God and the genocide	SQ14: Please circle the answer that best describes how much you agree or disagree with each statement. Circle only one answer for each statement. There is no right or wrong answer. d) The Church in Rwanda has no complicity in the genocide. e) The Church is obligated to help reconstruct and promote reconciliation in Rwanda. f) I was angry at God after the genocide. g) Religious people should never participate in killing. h) The genocide would not have happened if God was all-powerful. i) The genocide was a result of demonic activity. j) God abandoned Rwanda during the genocide.	1 = Strongly disagree 2 = Moderately disagree 3 = Slightly disagree 4 = Slightly agree 5 = Moderately agree 6 = Strongly agree	Not yet calculated
JAREL Spiritual Well-being Scale	SQ14: Please circle the answer that best describes how much you agree or disagree with each statement. Circle only one answer for each statement. There is no right or wrong answer. k) Prayer is an important part of my life. l) I believe in an afterlife. m) I feel there is a close relationship between my spiritual beliefs and what I do. n) God has little meaning in my life. o) I find meaning and purpose in my life. p) I believe I have spiritual well-being. q) Prayer does not help me in making decisions	1 = Strongly disagree 2 = Moderately disagree 3 = Slightly disagree 4 = Slightly agree 5 = Moderately agree 6 = Strongly agree	Not reported in source article; My alpha = 0.49
Social Justice at Church (Hungelmann, Kenkel-Rossi, Klassen, & Stollenwerk, 1996)	SQ15: How often do you hear preaching on or otherwise discuss the following issues in church? (Please circle the appropriate answer). a) The 1994 genocide b) Other violence c) HIV-AIDS d) Economic development e) Education f) Reconciliation g) *Gacaca*	1 = Never 2 = Seldomly 3 = Occasionally 4 = Frequently 5 = Very often	Not yet calculated
Survivors of the Genocide	SQ18: Are you a survivor of the genocide?	Yes / No	n/a
Family member held responsible	SQ19a) Have members of your family been charged with crimes of genocide?	Yes / No	n/a
Gacaca **attendance frequency**	SQ21: How often do you attend *gacaca* tribunals in your community? Choose only one answer.	• Never • I attended only a few times. • I attend once per month. • I attend most sessions • I attend all sessions	n/a
Peace process	SQ22: Are you an inyangamugayo (*gacaca*	Yes / No	n/a

Construct	Questions	Response Options/ Coding	Reliability
leadership	judge)? SQ23: Are you an umwunzi (community mediator)?		

Listening to reconciliation radio programs	SQ24: How often do you listen to the following radio programs?
	   a) Musekweya, Radio La Benevolencija
	   b) Other (please specify)
	   c) Other (please specify)
		1 = Never
		2 = A few times per year
		3 = Once per month
		4 = 2-3 times per month
		5 = Every week
			n/a

Reconciliation promotion program participation	SQ25: In which of the following reconciliation promotion programs have you participated? Check all that apply. If you remember when you participated, please write the year in the space.
	  a) Friends Peace House: Soutien de Gaca
	  b) FPH: Parlons de la Paix
	  c) FPH: Paix Durable
	  d) FPH: Trauma Healing (HROC)
	  e) FPH: AVP
	  f) FPH: Femmes et Résolution des Conflits
	  g) FPH: Femmes en Dialogue
	  h) African Evangelistic Enterprise
	  i) PHARP
	  j) MOUCECOR
	  k) Other: _____ (specify)
	  l) Other: _____ (specify)
	  m) Other: _____ (specify)
		□ No □ Yes
		→ when? _____
		(year)	

Satisfaction with RPP participation	SQ26: The following statements represent potential reactions to the reconciliation promotion program(s) in which you have participated. Please indicate your agreement or disagreement with the statements. a) I was glad to have attended these programs. b) These programs helped me heal from my trauma. c) These programs helped me know how to resolve conflicts effectively. d) These programs helped me know how to promote reconciliation in my community. e) I would not participate in these programs again. f) I made lasting friendships as a result of my participation in these programs. g) I would recommend that my friends and families participate in these programs. h) These programs helped me empathize and know how to support other people.	1 = Strongly disagree 2 = Moderately disagree 3 = Slightly disagree 4 = Slightly agree 5 = Moderately agree 6 = Strongly agree	Not yet calculated
Most effective program	SQ27a) Which of these programs do you think was most effective? b) Why?	Free response	
Least effective program	SQ28a) Which of these programs do you think was least effective? b) Why?	Free response	

Construct	Questions	Response Options/ Coding	Reliability
Forgiveness (Rye, et al., 2001)	SQ29: Think about a person who may have hurt you in the past. Please circle the answer that best describes how much you agree or disagree with each statement about your attitude towards that person. Circle only one answer for each statement. There is no right or wrong answer. a) I can't stop thinking about how I was wronged by this person. b) I wish for good things to happen to the person who wronged me. c) I spend time thinking about ways to get back at the person who wronged me. d) I feel resentful toward the person who wronged me. e) I avoid certain people and/or places because they remind me of the person who wronged me. f) I pray for the person who wronged me. g) If I encountered the person who wronged me I would feel at peace. h) This person's wrongful actions have kept me from enjoying life. i) I have been able to let go of my anger toward the person who wronged me. j) I become depressed when I think of how I was mistreated by this person. k) I think that many of the emotional wounds related to this person's wrongful actions have healed. l) I feel hatred whenever I think about the person who wronged me. m) I have compassion for the person who wronged me. n) I think my life is ruined because of this person's wrongful actions. o) I hope the person who wronged me is treated fairly by others in the future.	1 = Strongly disagree 2 = Disagree 3 = Neutral 4 = Agree 5 = Strongly agree **Reverse coded items**: 1,3,4,5,8,10,12,14 **Absence of Negative subscale items**: 1,3,4,5,8,9,10,11,12,14 **Presence of Positive subscale items**: 2,6,7,13,15	Whole scale Alpha = 0.87 Negative subscale alpha = 0.85 Positive subscale alpha = 0.86

Construct	Questions	Response Options/ Coding	Reliability
Reconciliation antecedents	SQ30: Please circle the answer that best describes how much you agree or disagree with each statement. Circle only one answer for each statement. There is no right or wrong answer. a) The génocidaires should spend more time in prison. b) The génocidaires have been fairly treated by the justice system. c) Survivors of the genocide receive adequate support. d) Survivors of the genocide have been justly treated. e) The génocidaires should be required to compensate with money survivors of the genocide. f) Survivors of the genocide feel safe in Rwanda. g) Rwanda is a safe place to live. h) If I had more money, it would be easier for me to forgive those who hurt me. i) People who are poor have a hard time reconciling. j) The culture of impunity has ended in Rwanda. k) People who commit crimes should be held responsible for their actions. l) There needs to be more forgiveness in Rwanda. m) If more people confessed their crimes as a result, it would be OK to reduce punishments for those crimes. n) People who confess their crimes should not be punished. o) The truth of what occurred in Rwanda during the genocide is known by most of the population p) It is better to forget about the painful memories of the past q) It is important that Rwanda tell the story of the genocide to the world r) The experiences of people like me during the genocide have been acknowledged s) People listen to my story about what happened during the genocide when I want to tell it	1 = Strongly disagree 2 = Moderately disagree 3 = Slightly disagree 4 = Slightly agree 5 = Moderately agree 6 = Strongly agree	Not yet calculated

Construct	Questions	Response Options/ Coding	Reliability
Reconciliation attitudes (Pham, et al., 2004; Stover & Weinstein, 2004) (Tobias, 2008, personal communication)	SQ31: Please imagine a person you know who belongs to a group that has done harm to a person from your group in the past. Would you do the following things with or for this person? Circle only one answer for each statement. There is no right or wrong answer. a) If this person was in trouble, I would try to help him or her. b) If I was in trouble, I would go to this person to get help. c) I would allow my child to marry someone from this person's family. d) I would buy things from a store owned by this person. e) If I owned a shop, I would hire this person to work for me. f) I would let my children play with the children of this person. g) I would let this person borrow tools and other household objects from me. h) If this person did something bad to me again, I would forgive him or her.	1 = Strongly disagree 2 = Moderately disagree 3 = Slightly disagree 4 = Slightly agree 5 = Moderately agree 6 = Strongly agree	Not yet calculated Pham et al.'s social justice scale, which is the inspiration for this scale, had a alpha of 0.75
Relationships behaviors and relationships (Gibson, 2006b; Pham, et al., 2004; Stover & Weinstein, 2004) (Jutta, 2008, personal communication)	SQ32: Please imagine a person who belongs to a group that has done harm to a person from your group in the past. Have you done the following activities with that person? Circle yes or no. a) Have you shared a drink or a meal with this person or someone like him or her during the past month? b) Have you visited a person this person or someone like him or her in his or her home during the past month? c) Have you helped this person or someone like him or her in their field, in their business, or at their home during the past month? d) Have you prayed with a this person or someone like him or her during the past month? e) During the past year, have you attended a funeral for someone from this group? f) During the past year, have you attended a wedding for someone from this group? g) During the past month, have you greeted this person or someone like him or her on the street? h) Are there members of your family who are part of this group? i) Do you have friends who are part of this group? j) Do you have coworkers who are part of this group?	Yes / No for each item	Not yet calculated Pham et al.'s interdependence scale had an alpha of 0.46

Construct	Questions	Response Options/ Coding	Reliability
Satisfaction with Life (Diener, et al., 1985)	SQ33: Please circle the answer that best describes how much you agree or disagree with each statement. Circle only one answer for each statement. There is no right or wrong answer. a) In most ways my life is close to my ideal. b) The conditions of my life are excellent c) I am satisfied with my life. d) So far I have gotten the important things I want in life. e) If I could live my life over, I would change almost nothing.	Scoring 1 = Strongly disagree 2 = Disagree 3 = Slightly disagree 4 = Neither agree nor disagree 5 = Slightly agree 6 = Agree 7 = Strongly agree	Alpha = 0.87
PTSD Checklist— Civilian Version (Weathers, et al., 1991)	SQ34: Below is a list of problems and complaints that people sometimes have in response to stressful experiences. Please read each one carefully, put an X in the box to indicate how much you have been bothered by that problem <u>in the past month</u>. a) Repeated, disturbing *memories, thoughts,* or *images* of a stressful experience? b) Repeated, disturbing *dreams* of a stressful experience? c) Suddenly *acting* or *feeling* as if a stressful experience *were happening again* (as if you were reliving it)? d) Feeling *very upset* when *something reminded you* of a stressful experience? e) Having *physical reactions* (e.g., heart pounding, trouble breathing, sweating) when *something reminded you* of a stressful experience? f) Avoiding *thinking about* or *talking about* a stressful experience or avoiding *having feelings* related to it? g) Avoiding *activities* or *situations* because *they reminded you* of a stressful experience? h) Trouble *remembering important parts* of a stressful experience? i) *Loss of interest* in activities that you used to enjoy? j) Feeling *distant* or *cut off* from other people? k) Feeling *emotionally numb* or being unable to have loving feelings for those close to you? l) Feeling as if your *future* will somehow be *cut short*? m) Trouble *falling* or *staying asleep*? n) Feeling *irritable* or having *angry outbursts*? o) Having *difficulty concentrating*? p) Being *"super-alert"* or watchful or on guard?	1. Not at all 2. A little bit 3. Moderately 4. Quite a bit 5. Extremely	Alpha = 0.94 (Blanchard et al, 1996; Ruggiero et al., 2005)

Construct	Questions	Response Options/ Coding	Reliability
	q) 17. Feeling *jumpy* or easily startled?		
Psychological Sense of Community (D. A. Long & Perkins, 2003)	SQ35: Please circle the answer that best describes how much you agree or disagree with each statement. Circle only one answer for each statement. There is no right or wrong answer. a) I can recognize most of the people who live in my village or neighborhood b) Very few of my neighbors know me c) My neighbors and I want the same thing from our village or neighborhood. d) I have almost no influence over what this village or neighborhood is like. e) If there is a problem in this village or neighborhood, the people who live here can get it solved. SQ36: In general, would you say that people in your village or neighborhood watch after each other and help out when they can, or do they pretty much go their own way? Please circle one answer. SQ37: Would you say that it is very important, somewhat important or not important to you to feel a sense of community with the people on your village or neighborhood? Please circle one answer. SQ38: Would you say that you feel a strong sense of community with others in your village or neighborhood, very little sense of community or something in between? Please circle one answer.	SQ35a) through e) 1 = Strongly disagree 2 = Moderately disagree 3 = Slightly disagree 4 = Slightly agree 5 = Moderately agree 6 = Strongly agree SQ36: Go their own way, a little of both, watch after each other SQ37: Very important, somewhat important, Not at all important SQ38: Very little sense of community, something in between, strong sense of community Subscales Mutual Concerns: SQ35a), b), c), d) Social Connections: SQ35e), SQ36 Community Values: SQ37, SQ38	Time 1 Alpha = 0.65 Time 2 Alpha = 0.73 Mutual Concerns subscale alpha = 0.50 / 0.65 Social Connections 0.55/0.50 Community Values 0.51/0.61
Nonviolent choices scale (Coggins, 2005)	SQ39: Please circle the answer that best describes how much you agree or disagree with each statement. Circle only one answer for each statement. There is no right or wrong answer. a) If someone is trying to make me angry it is best just to ignore them. b) When my friends or neighbors fight, I try to get them to stop. c) There are better ways to solve problems than using violence. d) I try to talk out a problem instead of using violence. e) If I see violence about to start between people I go get the authorities to stop it.	1 = Strongly agree 2 = Slightly agree 3 = Slightly disagree 4 = Strongly disagree	0.61, 0.79
Comments	If you want to tell us anything more, or if you have questions, write them in the space below, or talk to a member of the research team.		

Appendix B

LIST OF ORAL HISTORY INTERVIEWS

Interview	Gender	Age	Education	Survivor	Employment	Current Religion	Childhood Religion	Marital Status	Children
Low Intensity Genocide Areas									
BYU-01	Female	45	P-6	No	Farmer	Catholic	Catholic	Married	6
BYU-02	Female	28	S-5	No	Unemployed	Muslim	Muslim	Married	2
BYU-03	Male	38	S-5	Yes	Odd jobs	Muslim	Catholic	Married	2
BYU-04	Female	29	none	Yes	Farmer	EP: Pentecostal	EP: Pentecostal	Married	2
BYU-05	Female	37		Yes	Small business	Catholic	Catholic	Widowed	1
BYU-06	Male			No		Catholic	Catholic		
BYU-07	Female	60	S-3	Yes		Catholic	Catholic	Married	6
BYU-08	Male	45		No	Teacher	Catholic	Catholic	Married	4
BYU-09	Female	27				MP: Presbyterian	Catholic		
BYU-10	Female	28	P-6		Farmer	EP: Pentecostal	MP: Anglican	Widowed	3
RUH-01	Male	50	S-3	Yes	Trader	MP: Presbyterian	EP: Pentecostal	Married	6
RUH-02	Male	55	P-6	No	Farmer	EP: Pentecostal	MP: Anglican	Married	9
RUH-03	Female	27	S-6	Yes	Teacher	EP: Bethany	AP: Quaker	Married	2
RUH-04	Male	48	S-3	No	Farmer	AP: Anglican	AP: Anglican	Married	6
RUH-05	Female	39	P-6		Shopkeeper	EP: Brotherhood	EP: Pentecostal	Married	7
RUH-06	Male					EP:	EP:		
RUH-07	Female	53	P-6	Yes	Farmer	Catholic	Catholic	Married	9
RUH-08	Male	49				AP: Presbyterian	EP: Pentecostal		
RUH-09	Female	35		Yes		AP: Quaker	EP: Pentecostal		
RUH-10	Female	35	P-5			EP: Bethany	AP: Anglican		6

Interview	Gender	Age	Education	Survivor	Employment	Current Religion	Childhood Religion	Marital Status	Children
Medium Intensity Genocide Areas									
KIG-01	Male	24	S-6	Yes	Unemployed	EP: Evangelique	EP: Evangelique	Single	3 siblings
KIG-03	Female		S-6	Yes	Unemployed	Muslim	Muslim	single	none
KIG-04	Male			Yes		O: Jehovah Witness	Catholic		
KIG-05	Female	27	P-6	No	Unemployed	EP: Zion Temple	Catholic	Single	2
KIG-06	Female	23	S-3	No	Unemployed	O: Adventist	Adventist	Single	1
KIG-07	Female	22	S-6	Yes	Misc. business	MP: Presbyterian	Presbyterian	Single	0
KIG-10	Female	21	S-6	No	Unemployed	Catholic	Catholic	Single	0
KIG-11	Male	39	S-2		Driver	Muslim	Muslim	Single	0
KIG-12	Male	28	S-3	Yes	Electrician/ Plumber	Catholic	Catholic	Single	5 siblings
KIG-13	Female	23	B-2	Yes	Student	Catholic	Catholic	Married	0
KIG-14	Male	28	S-2	No	Trader	Muslim	Catholic	Married	2
KIG-15	Female	30	P-6	No	Unemployed	Muslim	MP: Presbyterian	Divorced	2
KIG-16	Female	26	L-1	Yes	Student	Catholic	Catholic	Single	3 orphans
KIG-17	Male	30	S-6	No	Student	MP: Quaker	O: Adventist	Single	0
KIG-18	Female	23	S-6	Yes	Unemployed	EP: New Jerusalem	Catholic	Single	0
KIG-19	Female	40	L-2	No	Unemployed	MP: Quaker	Catholic	Married	4
KIG-20	Male	32	P-6	Yes	Phone card sales	EP: Pentecostal	Catholic	Married	1
KIG-21	Male	40	L-2	Yes	Hotel server	EP: Bethsaida	Catholic	Married	5
KIG-23	Male	35	S-3	Yes	Driver	O: None	Catholic	Single	0
High Intensity Genocide Areas									
KIB-01	Male	59		No	Customs	EP	Catholic	Widowed	7
KIB-02	Female	~32	S-2	Yes	Farmer	Other: Adventist	Catholic	Married	3
KIB-03	Female	~25	S-4	No	Market sales	Muslim	EP: Pentecostal	Married	4
KIB-04	Male	25	S-6	No	Construction	Other: Adventist	Other: Adventist	Single	0
KIB-05	Male	48			Pastor (unpaid);	EP: "My church"	MP: Anglican	Single	0
KIB-06	Female	36			Cleaner	Catholic	Catholic	Widowed/ Remarried	10
KIB-07	Female	29	S-6	No	Odd jobs	EP: Restoration	Catholic	Married	1
KIB-08	Male	28	P-6	Yes	unemployed	EP: Restoration	EP: Pentecostal	Single	0
KIB-09	Male	41	S-2	Yes	Welder	Muslim	MP: Anglican	Married	5

Interview	Gender	Age	Education	Survivor	Employment	Current Religion	Childhood Religion	Marital Status	Children
KIB-10	Male	46	P-6	No	unemployed	EP: ADEPR	Catholic	Married	3
GIK-01	Female	28				Catholic	MP: Anglican		
GIK-02	Male	39	S-2			Muslim	Catholic	Married	4
GIK-03	Woman	49	S-3	No		O: Jehovah's Witness	Catholic		4
GIK-04	Male	45	L-2	Yes	Teacher	EP: Restoration	EP: Pentecostal	Married	5
GIK-05	Female	53	P-6		Farmer	Muslim	Catholic	Widowed	5
GIK-06	Female	23	P-6	Yes	Unemployed	EP: Pentecostal	EP: Pentecostal	Married	
GIK-07	Male	~30	B-2			O: Adventist	Catholic		
GIK-08	Female	36	S-2		Small business	EP: Restoration	EP: Pentecostal	Married	5
GIK-09	Female	52	P-1	Yes	Farmer	MP: Anglican	MP: Anglican	Widow	2
GIK-10	Male	42	S-2	No	Unemployed	MP: Anglican	Catholic	Married	5

Appendix C

ORAL HISTORY INTERVIEW GUIDE

Not all questions were asked. The interviews covered each of the major areas enumerated with an Arabic numeral, but not every probe (listed with letters) was explicitly asked. Sectarian specific language (references to specific texts or practices) were adjusted as necessary according to the religious adherence and practice of the interviewee.

1. Tell me about your memories of religion when you were younger.
    a. What, if any, kind of religious organization did you attend?
    b. How often did you attend?
    c. What kind of organized religious activities did you participate in? [Probe for music, text study, religious education classes, prayer meetings, development programs spearheaded by RO]
    d. What kind of private religious practices did you engage in? [Probe for prayer, sacred text study, fasting, etc]
    e. How did your religious beliefs or participation affect your life outside of church or the mosque?
    f. How did you understand God?
    g. How did you understand sin or evil?
    h. What about your parents? How did they practice their religion? How do you understand their beliefs?
2. What did you understand the role of religious organizations (churches and mosques) to be in Rwandan society prior to the genocide?
    a. What kind of teaching occurred in these settings?
    b. What kind of programs did these organizations offer?
    c. How did these organization act in relationship to government?
3. Did you ever have a conversion experience or a time when religion became more or less real for you? Describe it for me.
    a. Was there anything happening in your life at the time which might have influenced the experience?
    b. Were you responding to a particular event or teaching?
    c. How did your participation in organized religious activities change? Private religious practice?
    d. How did you understanding of God, of sin, of evil change?
    e. How did the change affect your life outside of religious settings?
    f. How did your friends and family react to this change?
4. Have you ever stopped attending one congregation or denomination? Or have you switched congregations, denominations, or religions? Describe for me what motivated you to do that.

a. Same probes as for item three
5. Tell me about how you practice your religion today
   a. Same probes as for item one
6. What has gone well for you since the genocide of 1994? [Probe specifically for social supports or stigma, economic situation]
   a. What has made it easier to forgive?
   b. What has made it easier to reconcile?
   c. How has religion made things easier or better for you? (Beliefs, friends, institutions)
7. What has been a challenge for you since the genocide of 1994? [Probe specifically for social supports or stigma, economic situation]
   a. What has made it more difficult to forgive?
   b. What has made it more difficult to reconcile?
   c. How has religion made things more difficult for you? (Beliefs, friends, institutions)
8. How has your religious faith changed, if at all, as a result of Rwanda's genocide?
   a. Did you or do you blame God for what happened?
   b. What effect did these changes have in your religious practice, in terms of prayer, worship, attending church, participation in church activities, reading the Bible, and the like?
   c. Churches and pastors have been blamed by some people for the genocide. Some churches and pastors actively helped perpetrate the genocide, while others are criticized for not doing enough. What do you think of these criticisms?
   d. Some people have blamed the devil or demonic activity or other spiritual forms of evil for what happened during the genocide. How do you respond to that?
9. How has the church, mosque, or other organization you attend changed as a result of the genocide? What about national religious organizations?
   a. What kinds of programs do these organizations have to respond to Rwanda's violent history? Have you participated in one or more of these programs? If so, what did you think of them?
   b. In your opinion, what should the role of religious groups be in promoting reconciliation and reconstruction? Are these groups currently meeting your expectations?
10. What do you understand reconciliation to be? Has your understanding of reconciliation changed at all in the fifteen years since the genocide?
    a. What actions would be signs of reconciliation??
    b. What attitudes would be a sign of reconciliation?
    c. What does your religious faith contribute to your definition of reconciliation?
    d. How does your religious faith help you determine which actions and attitudes would be signs of genocide?
    e. What does the (Bible, Koran, or other sacred scriptures) say about reconciliation and peace making? How do you think these scriptures apply to Rwanda?

11. What do you understand the role of religion has been in promoting reconciliation and trauma healing in Rwanda?
    a. Based on your experience, how might personal religious beliefs provide strength for people in times of trouble?
    b. How might having religious friends provide strength for people in times of trouble?
    c. How might being part of a religious organization provide strength?
    d. How might religious beliefs, religious friends, or religious organizations be an obstacle to healing or reconciliation?
    e. Have you ever felt pressure to forgive someone? To reconcile with someone?
12. Is there anything else you want to tell me about religion and reconciliation?
13. To finish, I have a few more questions:
    a. Where did you live in 1994?
    b. Would you consider yourself a genocide survivor?
    c. Have you or someone in your family been charged with crimes of genocide?
    d. What do you do for a living?
    e. Are you married? Single? Divorced? Widowed?
    f. Do you have children?
    g. What is the highest level of education you have completed?
14. Do you know someone, particularly a religious leader, you think I should speak with about this topic? What is his/her name? How might I contact them?

Appendix D

RELIGIOUS LEADER INTERVIEW GUIDE

1. Did your organization exist before the genocide? What were your priorities then? How have your priorities shifted after the genocide? What caused those shifts?
   a. If your organization is new, what caused you to start it? How has it been shaped by the history of violence in this country?
2. How has Rwanda changed in the years after genocide? What has been the role of religious institutions in those changes?
3. What do you understand the needs of Rwandan people to be after the genocide? What steps has your organization taken to respond to those needs? In your opinion, what should be the place of religious groups in promoting peace and reconciliation in Rwanda?
4. What do you think religion generally has to offer people who are struggling emotionally after the genocide? Financially struggling? Physically struggling with injuries and the like? What does your [denomination, organization] offer to such people that other traditions might not? What positive outcomes have come of religion in post-genocide Rwanda?
5. How might religion be ill-suited to helping Rwanda reconcile and heal after the genocide? Could you give me some examples where you think religion may have been harmful? Or that people have understood religion in certain ways that led to negative outcomes?
6. Are there particular verses of scripture or stories or other pieces of your religious traditions that speak to you about the current situation in Rwanda? What are they? What about them do you find significant? Why did you choose them? Are there other perspectives in your religious tradition which could have led you down other paths? If so, what made you choose the paths you did versus others which may have been available to you?
7. Christian churches in Rwanda have been criticized for their role in the genocide. How do you understand the role of churches and other religious groups in the genocide? Do you think the criticism is fair? How do you think churches and other organizations have changed after the genocide?
8. From time to time people here tell me that they think God allowed the genocide to happen to punish Rwanda. What do you think of that point of view? How would your organization respond if someone told you that?
9. Can you summarize for me the goals of your program? How has faith shaped those goals? How have those goals shaped the faith of people who participate?
10. Who are the beneficiaries of your program? Do you target your program at distinct groups of people? How did you come to choose those people or that group?
11. What are the religious or faith-based components of your program?
    a. Do you pray before, during, and/or after activities?

     b. Which religious teachings are included in your activities? Which sacred texts are used in your activities? How do participants talk about their faith during your activities?
         i. Are most participants Christian? Muslim?
        ii. Do you invite participants based on their religious affiliation?
      iii. How do you accommodate having people from different faith traditions?

12. Is your organization attached to any specific faith tradition?
     a. Do you have an affiliation with any congregation or denomination?
     b. How is religion expressed in your activities?
         i. Mission statement and vision
        ii. Theological content to service delivery
      iii. Targeting specific congregations, pastors, or other groups of people defined by faith
      iv. Use of programs for evangelistic purposes
     c. How does your organization relate to other programs or organizations which work in similar areas?

13. Can you tell me one story—please don't reveal the name of anyone involved—to illustrate a success of your program? How did religion or spirituality play a role in this outcome?

14. Do you anyone else with whom you think I should talk to better inform my research? Could you provide me with their contact information?

15. Do you have any questions for me before we end?

PEW SURVEY CONSTRUCTS

Construct Name	Questions/Items	Response Options/ Coding	Reliability
Religious Participation Frequency	For Christians: Aside from weddings and funerals how often do you attend religious services? For Muslims: On average, how often do you attend the mosque or Islamic Center for salah and Jum'ah Prayer?	1 = Never 2 = Seldom 3 = A few times a year 4 = Once or twice a month 5 = Once a week 6 = More than once a week	n/a
Prayer Frequency	People practice their religion in different ways. Outside of attending religious services, how often do you pray?	1 = Never 2 = Seldom 3 = A few times a month 4 = Once a week 5 = A few times a week 6 = Once a day 7 = Several times a day	n/a
Religious Media Use Frequency	And do you ever read religious materials other than scripture, such as religious pamphlets, magazines, newspapers or books? And do you ever listen to religious radio or watch religious television programs?	0 = No 1 = Yes Took mean of the two items	n/a
Group Religious Activity Participation	How often do you read scripture outside of religious services? How often do you participate in prayer groups, scripture study groups, or religious education programs? How often do you share your faith or views on God with people from other religions? How often do you participate in religious chanting or singing gatherings and ceremonies?	1= Never 2 = Seldom 3 = Several times a year 4 = Once or twice a month 5 = At least once a week (responses were averaged together)	.74 Despite the first item not necessarily being a group activity, all items loaded onto a single factor and had good internal reliability
Traditional Religious Practice Participation	Do you have traditional African sacred objects in your home, such as shrines to ancestors, feathers, skins, skulls, skeletons, powder, carved figures or branches, spears, cutlasses or animal horns?	0 = No 1 = Yes (responses were averaged together)	.66 The traditional healers question was omitted from the final construct to increase

Construct Name	Questions/Items	Response Options/ Coding	Reliability
	Do you ever participate in traditional African ceremonies or perform special acts to honor or celebrate your ancestors? Do you ever participate in traditional African puberty rituals or manhood/womanhood initiation rituals for friends, relatives or neighbors in your area, such as endurance or challenge tests, or initiation to a traditional dance? Do you or your family ever use traditional religious healers when someone is sick		reliability. In Rwanda, the use of traditional religious objects and ceremonies is seen as qualitatively different than seeing a traditional healer, so the items can be separated conceptually even though they load on to a single factor.
Strength of Belief	How certain are you about your belief in God?	1 = Not at all certain 2 = Not too certain 3 = Fairly certain 4 = Absolutely certain	n/a
Religious Salience	How important is religion in your life?	1 = Not at all important 2 = Not too important 3 = Somewhat important 4 = Very important	n/a
Religious Devotion	*Muslims* Do you give zakat, that is give a set percentage of your wealth to charity or the mosque? Do you fast, that is avoid eating during the daytime, during the holy month of Ramadan? *Christians* Do you tithe, that is give a set percentage of your income to charity or the church? Do you fast, that is avoid eating for certain periods during holy times like Lent? Prayer frequency Religious participation frequency	0 = No 1 = Yes Muslim and Christian responses on offerings (zakat and tithing) were combined, as were responses related to fasting. Responses were appropriately scaled and averaged	.56 Factor analysis (PCA with oblimin rotation) with these four items, the strength of belief item, and religious salience item revealed that neither strength of belief nor religious salience loaded on to the same factor as the other four items
Spiritual Intensity	Have you ever experienced or witnessed a divine healing of an illness or injury? Have you ever given or interpreted prophecy? Have you ever received a direct	0 = No 1 = Yes Responses were averaged together	.68 Factor analysis (PCA with oblimin rotation) revealed that the prayer request item loaded onto a different factor. It

Construct Name	Questions/Items	Response Options/ Coding	Reliability
	revelation from God? Have you ever experienced or witnessed the devil or evil spirits being driven out of a person? Do you ever receive definite answers to specific prayer requests?		was dropped in the reliability calculations and for the final construct.
Religious social programming	Does the mosque, church, or house of worship where you most often attend religious services provide food or clothing for people in need? Does the mosque, church, or house of worship where you most often attend religious services help people with finding a job? Does the mosque, church, or house of worship where you most often attend religious services help people find housing? Does the mosque, church, or house of worship where you most often attend religious services provide language or literacy training?	0 = No 1 = Yes Responses were averaged together	.70 Single factor structure
Present Situation	Here is a ladder representing the 'ladder of life.' The top of the ladder represents the best possible life for you; the bottom, the worst possible life for you. On which step of the ladder do you feel you personally stand at the present time?	0 - 10	n/a
Optimism for Future	Just your best guess, on which step do you think you will stand in the future, say five years from now?	0 – 10	n/a
Improvement from Past	On which step would you say you stood five years ago?	0 – 10 Calculated by subtracting Present Situation Score from this question	n/a
Satisfaction with country	Overall, are you satisfied or dissatisfied with the way things are going in our country today?	0 = Dissatisfied 1 = Satisfied	n/a
Country economic situation	How would you describe the current economic situation in our country?	1 = Very bad 2 = Somewhat bad 3 = Somewhat good 4 = Very good	n/a
Personal economic situation	What about your personal economic situation, how would you describe it?	1 = Very bad 2 = Somewhat bad 3 = Somewhat good 4 = Very good	n/a
Trust	Generally speaking, would you say	0 = Can't be to careful	n/a

Construct Name	Questions/Items	Response Options/ Coding	Reliability
	that most people can be trusted or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people?	1 = Most people can be trusted	
Ethnic Conflict	Ethnic conflict might be a problem in our country. Tell me how big a problem you think it is?	1 = Very big problem 2 = Moderately big problem 3 = Small problem 4 = Not a problem at all	n/a
Deprivation Index	Have there been times during the last year when you did not have enough money to buy clothing your family needed? Have there been times during the last year when you did not have enough money to pay for medical and health care your family needed? Have there been times during the last year when you did not have enough money to buy food your family needed?	0 = No 1 = Yes	.86
Education	Specific question wording is not available; respondents were given locally appropriate response options which were then recoded	1 = Completed primary or less 2 = Some secondary/ completed secondary 3 = Post-secondary and up	n/a
Income	Specific question wording is not available; respondents were given locally appropriate response options which were then recoded	1 = Low 2 3 4 = High	n/a

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